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Examining the Success and Failure of Multiethnic Coalition Governments in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Cases of Kenya and Senegal

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EXAMINING THE SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF MULTIETHNIC COALITION GOVERNMENTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: THE CASES OF KENYA AND SENEGAL

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Abstract:
This thesis is focused on multiethnic coalitions in Africa. Specifically, it seeks to identify the causal mechanisms at play in the formation of multiethnic coalitions and whether or not they succeed or fall apart. It also seeks to identify whether multiethnic coalition success or failure is related to the emergence or lack thereof, of violence. Case studies and process tracing are the primary methods of analysis, using Kenya and Senegal as cases under the most similar systems design. There is an examination of the actors involved in the formation of multiethnic coalitions in both nations, why the opposition coalitions fell apart in both Kenya and Senegal as well as the relationship between coalition failure and violence. Through this examination, causal hypotheses have been developed that can be tested by other scholars, thus hopefully leading to more advancements in the field of research on multiethnic coalition formation and success.

Key words: Multiethnic coalitions, Kenya, Senegal, ethnic violence, most similar systems design
I. Introduction

In African politics, ethnicity is a salient cleavage within the political spheres of nations. In Kenyan politics, where ethnic parties dominate, this is the case. However, Senegal serves as a unique example of a multiethnic society where ethnicity is not a salient cleavage. Despite the differences in the salience of ethnicity, both countries have had multiethnic coalitions following their first free and fair elections of the new millennium. Both countries have had different levels of success with the multiethnic coalitions they have experienced, but despite these differences the two countries have many similarities. Both the president of Kenya and the president of Senegal were democratically elected as part of multiethnic opposition coalitions, once elected, they each became more personalistic in their leadership and centralized power within the executive branch of their countries. This effectively decreased the political institutionalization of both countries. This thesis examines the differences and similarities of what happened in both countries to try and better understand what causal mechanisms were at play in the different success rates of the multiethnic coalitions. The research identifies politicized ethnicity and institutionalized violence as two causal factors of the violence in Kenya and the lack of these factors as causal factors of peace in Senegal. Through the compilation of research and analysis of other scholarly work, this work provides a basis upon which other scholars can further the study of ethnicity, violence and the success of multiethnic coalition governments in African nations.

a. Research Statement

The purpose of this research is to examine multiethnic coalitions. Specifically it seeks to identify what causal mechanisms are at play in the formation and success of multiethnic
coalitions. Kenya and Senegal are used as case studies which are examined under the most similar systems design. The most similar systems design is defined as follows:

Such studies are based on the belief that systems as similar as possible with respect to as many features as possible constitute the optimal samples for comparative inquiry. . . therefore, the number of “experimental” variables, although known and still large, is minimized . . . It is anticipated that if some important differences are found among these otherwise similar countries, then the number of factors attributable to these differences will be sufficiently small to warrant explanation in terms of those differences alone” (Przeworski & Teune, 170, p. 33).

The most similar systems design can be used because both Kenya and Senegal have many similarities. Both nations underwent political and economic liberalization preceding their alternations of executive power in the early 2000s, and both nations have seen similar rule under the new executives that were elected. Centralized executive power and weak institutions are also characteristics of both nations. These characteristics have been theorized as the reason for the violence in Kenya in 2007, however, no violence erupted in Senegal despite the existence of these same variables. Through the study of multiethnic coalitions in Kenya and Senegal, this research proposes causal hypotheses that can be tested by other scholars. Much study has been conducted on multiethnic coalitions, and on ethnic violence, but there is a dearth in the comparative literature about what causal mechanisms relate multiethnic coalition success or failure to the emergence or lack thereof, of violence. Providing causal mechanisms that can be tested will allow others to advance the understanding of the relationship between multiethnic coalitions and ethnic violence, which
could help multiethnic communities and policy makers in their management of multiethnic issues.

II. Theory

To begin the discussion of multiethnic coalition governments in Kenya and Senegal, one must understand the definitions of “ethnicity” and “coalitions” as understood in the scholarly literature. As Horowitz states, “ethnicity easily embraces groups differentiated by color, language and religion; it covers ‘tribes’, ‘races,’ ‘nationalities,’ and ‘castes’ (Horowitz, 1985, p. 53). Beyond ethnicity, one must understand what the definition of ethnic salience is that will be used throughout this research. Ethnic salience is defined as “the importance that individuals attach to ethnicity, [as] one among several components of an identity repertoire” (Bhavnani & Miodownik, 2009 p. 30). This means that in Kenya ethnicity is salient because it is important to individuals as part of their identity, whereas in Senegal ethnicity is not salient, because it does not hold a large significance as part of an individuals’ identity. The Blackwell Dictionary of Political Science defines a coalition government as “a government formed from ministers drawn from more than one party” (Coalition Government). This means that multiethnic coalitions are governments made up of people from numerous political parties and ethnicities. There are problems that arise in multiethnic states. The classic literature on the topic states that the presence of ethnicity in the political sphere will result in an unstable democracy (Lijphart, 1969). Ethnicity is a factor that has to be confronted when it is an active cleavage in society. When this is the case, the consensus among scholars is that coalition governments can mediate ethnic tensions by creating more centrist governments that can better represent multiple ethnic groups (Lijphart, 1991).
Ethnicity is seen as a factor that is subject to change and manipulation, although across time, it often remains constant (Basedau, Ermann, Lay & Strohl, 2011). The effect of ethnic diversity on society is largely determined by whether or not ethnicity becomes politicized (Basedau et al., 2011; Eifert, Miguel & Posner, 2010; Chandra, 2005). Therefore, the relevance of ethnicity varies from country to country. Basedau et al. find little evidence that ‘ethnicized’ party systems are harmful to democracy (462). As they state, there is often a dearth in the literature explaining why ethnicity becomes politicized. Basedau et al. state that there are three overall explanations in the literature that exist: structural explanations, institutional explanations and historical explanations. Structural explanations look to the makeup of the ethnic demography in a country, stating that high levels of ethnic fractionalization hinder the politicization of ethnicity because there are too many groups to effectively represent, while high levels of ethnic polarization help to mobilize ethnicity because there are generally fewer groups, but with distinct views that are salient. The institutional explanations discuss how political institutions impact the mobilization of ethnicity, for example, party bans are created for the purpose of preventing ethnicity from entering the political system. Lastly, historical explanations focus on if ethnicity had been previously mobilized within a country. This explanation states that in some cases where ethnicity becomes politicized and experiences positive results, it creates a cycle of mobilizing along ethnic lines (Basedau et al., 2011, p. 468-469).

Other theories regarding ethnicity in the political realm focus on the role ethnicity plays, rather than how ethnicity is mobilized. One theory is that ethnic identities in Africa are strengthened in the presence of competitive elections, lending support to the idea that ethnicity is salient when it is instrumental, in this case for the purpose of gaining political
power (Eifert et al., 2010). Similarly, the link between ethnicity and political parties has been found to play a significant role in the management of conflict in societies because political parties often “channel, aggregate, and express political demands,” thus, when political parties are ethnic parties, ethnicity is an active determinant of state policy (Reilly, 2006 p. 811). Ethnicity is often an easier cleavage to appeal to when campaigning, incentivizing politicians to use it (Reilly, 2006; Chandra, 2005).

Politicized ethnicity is often seen as a factor that needs to be confronted, no matter how ethnicity was mobilized. Theories of ethnic outbidding state that the politicization of ethnic divisions gives rise to more ethnic parties (Chandra, 2005; Arriola, 2012). When ethnic parties exist, the political elite find it advantageous to mobilize people along ethnic lines, and citizens believe that political spoils will be channeled disproportionately to coethnics of the politician in power (Eifert et al., 2010). This creates a zero-sum game where gains by one politician are seen as losses for all others (Arriola, 2012). As a result, ethnic parties are forced to outbid each other for resources and competitive politics are destroyed (Chandra, 2005; Arriola, 2012). However, the ban of parties does not always prevent this ethnic outbidding. Party bans in Nigeria have not prevented the high levels of ethno religious violence the country has seen since 1999 (Kuenzi & Lambright, 2013). Chandra takes it a step further stating that “institutions that artificially restrict ethnic politics to a single dimension destabilize democracy, whereas institutions that foster multiple dimensions of ethnic identity can sustain it” (Chandra, 2005 p. 235).

Political coordination among multiethnic populations is an important factor in the electoral process. Leonardo Arriola’s research on multiethnic populations in African states finds that it is necessary for opposition parties to coordinate across ethnic cleavages in order
for electoral competition to be meaningful (2012, p. 26). However, he finds that political parties have struggled to coordinate across ethnic lines since independence efforts first materialized in Africa. He posits that two reasons for the difficulty in the political coordination are the imperfect democratization of Africa and strong ethnic divisions that fragment the opposition. Multiethnic opposition coordination should be more likely to occur in executive elections held under the plurality system, and opposition forces should be more likely to fragment in presidential elections held under the runoff system (Arriola, 2012, p. 46).

Arriola also looked at multiethnic coalitions in Africa. His research findings indicate that economic and business interests have an impact on multiethnic coalitions. Where economic liberalization occurs and business allegiances can no longer be controlled by incumbents, multiethnic coalitions are most likely to occur. Arriola finds that coalition building is resource intensive and clientelistic in nature, because politicians must purchase support from other politicians to gain a large enough voter base. However, politicians generally have a high incentive to run independently rather than in a coordinated opposition effort because they cannot guarantee the pre-election share of spoils that are promised once they are in office (Arriola, 2012, p. 46).

Building off of the work of Leonardo Arriola, Kenya and Senegal are two sub-Saharan African countries that have had multiethnic coalitions (Arriola, 2012). While Arriola discusses when multiethnic coalitions are likely to occur and the coordination efforts of the opposition, there is room to expand on why multiethnic coalitions experience such stark differences in their success rates. In Kenya, extreme violence erupted after the election following a multiethnic coalition failure, while in Senegal, peace was maintained even though the multiethnic coalition fell apart.
Kenya and Senegal can be used under the most similar systems design because of their similarities. Both countries underwent political and economic liberalization before the shift from de-facto one party rule to multipartyism, and eventually the alternation of power\(^\text{11}\) (regarding Kenya: Mueller, 2001; Orvis, 2001; Thioub, Dioup, & Boone, 1998; regarding Senegal: Hartmann, 2010; Galvan, 2009). In the 1980s there were 240 State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in Kenya, and by 2005 this number had dwindled to 108 SOEs, decreasing by 45%. In Senegal in the same time frame, there was a decline from 87 SOEs in the 1980s to 50 SOEs in 2005, resulting in a 57% decrease in total SOEs (Pitcher, 2012).

The eventual move toward greater democracy through the alternance of executive power occurred within the same general time frame for both countries. For Kenya this occurred in the presidential election of 2002 (Githongo, 2010; Barkan, 2004; Steeves, 2006) and for Senegal, this shift in regime type occurred in the presidential election of 2000 (Vengroff & Magala, 2001; Wittman, 2008; Galvan, 2009; Kuenzi, 2011).

III. Cases

a. Kenya

Ethnicity is a highly salient cleavage in Kenyan politics. Political leadership is based on ethnic identity, and those who become political leaders are expected to serve their ethnic communities, which results in a zero sum game for those involved (Steeves, 2007, Mueller, 2011). The Kikuyu are approximately 22 per cent of the total population, the Luhya are 14 per cent, Luo are 13 per cent, Kalenjin are 12 per cent and the Kamba are 11 per cent of the

There are 42 ethnic groups in Kenya, but Posner (2004) developed a method of counting politically relevant ethnic groups (PREG), in which ethnic groups that affect the economic policies and the rate of economic growth are the only groups to be counted. By the (PREG) measurement, Kenya has a political fractionalization score of 0.57 using the Kikuyu, Luo and Kalenjin ethnic groups. However, under the more traditional BAH measurement calculated from Morrison et al. (1989), Kenya has an ethnic fractionalization score of 0.73 (Posner, 2004).

When Kenya gained independence from British colonial rule in 1963, the first elections occurred. The first presidential election was between Jomo Kenyatta of the Kenyan African National Union (KANU), and Daniel arap Moi of the Kenyan African Democratic Union (KADU). KANU was predominantly representative of the Luo and Kikuyu people, the latter of which had been favored under colonialism. KADU thus formed as a coalition of smaller ethnic groups in opposition to continued Kikuyu rule. However, when KANU won the elections, KADU integrated into KANU to share in the spoils of power. Under this integration, Moi took the Vice Presidential position under President Kenyatta (Orvis, 2001). The country prospered under Kenyatta’s rule, however, he continued to concentrate prosperity among his ethnic group, the Kikuyu, as had been done under British rule. Kenyatta ruled until his death in 1978, when Moi succeeded him, bringing a different method of rule to the country (Barkan, 2004).

President Moi, previously of the KADU, sought to finally redress the favoring of the Kikuyu people. His aim was to shift the political favor from the Kikuyu to his Kalenjin people of the Rift Valley (Barkan, 2004). Moi did not follow the ‘gentle’ authoritarianism of Kenyatta. Following a failed coup attempt in 1982, Moi’s leadership became more repressive
Despite his repressive tactics, Moi was forced to liberalize the political system, at least on paper, which he did by removing the 2(a) clause of the Constitution in 1992, which had made Kenya a de facto one party state (Mueller, 2011; Orvis, 2001; Steeves, 2006). Multipartyism resulted in the creation of more political parties because it allowed ethnic groups the chance to compete for the political power they had always been denied. However, while Moi allowed multipartyism, he did all in his power to prevent the end of one-party rule by using repression. Part of this repressive ruling style was utilizing political and economic statism to guarantee that opposition to KANU rule was put-down (Mueller, 2011; Barkan, 2004). Moi did follow one trend of leadership from Kenyatta, which was weakening government institutions outside of the executive. This method gave the executive more power, making it easier to combat any opposition forces (Mueller, 2011).

In the presidential election of 1992, the first legal opposition forces to Moi and KANU rule emerged. The initial opposition party was the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD) which initially united Kikuyu, Luo and Luhya leaders (Orvis, 2001; Kagwanja, 2005). A second opposition party was formed by a former Vice President under Moi, Mwai Kibaki. Kibaki, of the Kikuyu people, formed the Democratic Party (DP) (Orvis, 2001; Barkan, 2004; Steeves, 2006). FORD fragmented into two parties because of a disagreement between Oginga Odinga and Kenneth Matiba over who would be the party candidate for president. This lead to the formation of FORD-Kenya under Odinga, which represented primarily the Luo community and a section of the Luhya people. Under Matiba, FORD-Asili was formed to represent Kikuyu (Orvis, 2001; Steeves, 2006; Kagwanja, 2005). The regime initiated violence against the opposition during the time leading up to the 1992 election. Such violence was used to detract the focus from uniting under Anti-Moi and Anti-Kikuyu banners.
(Steeves, 2006). The opposition separated the vote between the DP, FORD-Kenya and FORD-Asili. This failure to unite under a single slate of candidates resulted in Moi winning a plurality of the vote. The fragmentation of the parties was seen in the vote tallies, which were split along the ethnic lines that the parties represented (Orvis, 2001; Steeves, 2006).

Moi won the 1997 election in a similar manner as he had won the 1992 elections. Slight improvements occurred between the 1992 and 1997 elections, such as the Electoral Commission of Kenya allowing an equal number of opposition appointees to preside over elections. Additionally, the requirement that parties apply for and receive approval to hold rallies and public meetings was abolished, allowing for a more liberalized political scene—at least on paper. The same opposition parties were around for the 1997 election, however, FORD-Asili perished without the leadership of Matiba, who was unhappy that no substantial constitutional reforms had taken place. FORD-Kenya further fragmented when Oginga Odinga died. Michael Wamalwa, of the Abaluhya ethnic group, replaced Odinga as leader of FORD-Kenya. However, Raila Odinga, the son of Oginga Odinga, left the party to chair the National Development Party (NDP). Kibaki continued to run under the DP. The Social Democratic Party (SDP) was a new party to join the opposition, led by Charity Ngilu of the Kamba people (Steeves, 2006). The continued inability of the opposition to unite under a single slate of candidates resulted in Moi winning the 1997 election (Barkan, 2004).

Moi continued his reign through the 1992 and 1997 presidential elections by suppressing opposition forces. KANU senior officials assisted Moi in doing everything they could to “divide, harass, and intimidate opposition forces” within civil society and in politics (Steeves 2007, p. 213). The opposition forces rallied along ethnic lines, competing for public resources for the ethnic groups they represented (Orvis, 2001; Steeves, 2007). Due to the
ethnic focus of Moi’s regime and the opposition, Moi intentionally created violent ethnic clashes within the Rift Valley before and during the presidential elections. One method of suppressing the opposition was the intentional creation of ethnic clashes, using ‘Kalenjin warriors’ to kill opposition voters and members of other ethnic groups in the Rift Valley before and during both presidential elections of the 1990s (Mueller, 2011; Steeves, 2006). However, Moi was forced to seek the support of opposition forces after the 1997 elections because KANU did not have enough power to be effective in government, due to the shrinking presence of his party in government. Odinga of the NDP party and Luo people, formally merged with KANU in 2002 to create the New-KANU. Moi created four new chair positions all held by different ethnic leaders, of the Abaluhya, Kamba, Mijikenda and Kikuyu ethnic groups (Steeves, 2006).

The formation of a multiethnic coalition before the 2002 elections did not result in a win for the New KANU party, as Moi had planned. Mwai Kibaki of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) was elected as the third president of Kenya (Barkan, 2004). NARC was a coalition of coalitions, the National Alliance of Kenya (NAK) and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The NAK formed five months prior to the 2002 election. It joined Kibaki’s DP with a dozen other ethno-regional parties, including the Meru and Embu (close relation to the Kikuyu), the Abaluhya who supported Wamalwa and the Kamba people who supported Ngilu (Steeves, 2006; Barkan, 2004). Moi handpicked his successor, Uhuru Kenyatta without consulting the New KANU party, which fragmented the party. Odinga and other upset New KANU members formed the Rainbow Alliance, requesting that there be an open and fair convention to choose the presidential candidate. Moi could not reign in the Rainbow Alliance because he would not remove Kenyatta as his candidate, resulting in the Rainbow Alliance
joining the LDP (Steeves, 2006). The LDP formed ten weeks prior to the elections, with Odinga’s support (Barkan, 2004). The NAK and LDP came together on October 22, 2002 after signing a Memorandum of Understanding that power would be equally distributed between the two parties in government, and agreeing that Kibaki would serve as the presidential candidate (Steeves, 2006, Barkan, 2004). In this election, the opposition rallied around a single slate of candidates, resulting in its success in electing Kibaki as president (Barkan, 2004).

Despite the success of forming a coalition government for the first time in Kenya, in the first free and fair elections in the country’s history, the success of the multiethnic coalition was short-lived (Githongo, 2010; Steeves, 2006). Kibaki abandoned the Memorandum of Understanding between the NAK and LDP, eliminating the power of the LDP (Khadiagala, 2010). Kibaki began to promote ethnic hysteria and allowed his lieutenants to issue warnings of the dangers of a Luo-led country. This weakened public trust in the government. What followed was the formation of Odinga’s Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), which was a union of those opposed to the president and his allies (Khadiagala, 2010; Githongo, 2010). The ODM further inflamed ethnic passions, to which the president retaliated. The language between minority ethnic groups against the president and his Kikuyu people was similar to that before the Rwandan genocide, describing outsiders as ‘spots’ needing to be cleaned (Githongo, 2010, p. 3). This preceded the 2007 presidential elections and resulted in intense ethnic violence (Mueller, 2011 elections).

After the failure of the 2002 coalition, no successful coalition was formed in 2007. Kibaki defeated Odinga’s ODM in the 2007 presidential elections, resulting in an eruption of violence. The results of the election were not seen as legitimate by ODM supporters because
the numbers were very close and came after pressure was placed on the Electoral Commission of Kenya to provide a winner (Cheeseman, 2008). Gang violence erupted, and politicians called on their own ethnic youth to fight (Githongo, 2010; Kagwanja 2005). One theory is that gang violence became institutionalized during Moi’s regime, when he practiced ethnic violence, leaving the gangs waiting to be tapped (Mueller, 2011). Despite the fact that politicians from both sides were implicated in the violence, they have remained in power, suggesting that ethnic violence has become an accepted part of the political process (Githongo, 2010; Mueller, 2011). There are multiple theories on why violence erupted after the 2007 election, but most focus on the centralized power of the presidency, the weakening of institutions, political parties driven by ethnicity and the decline of the state’s monopoly over resources (Mueller, 2011; Githongo, 2010; Cheeseman 2008).

Kenya had once been known as the bulwark of stability within Africa, as an “island of peace” and “one of the foremost maturing democracies on the continent,” all of which immediately came to an end with the violence of 2008 (Juma 2009, p. 411). Due to the violent nature of the conflict, and the fact that Kenya had once been an example of African success in maintaining peace and democratizing, the 2008 post-election violence received much international attention. President Kibaki and his administration did not look kindly upon western interests getting involved in efforts to end the violence, but would accept African intervention. The African Union (AU) intervention that occurred “‘protected’ Kenya from being ‘hijacked’ by international agendas, shrinking a fear across the country and most specifically within the Kibaki administration of Western powers (viewed as spoilers) that were intent on bringing his administration down.” (Juma, 2009, p. 415). The intervention occurred swiftly, which is remarkable considering there were not specific guidelines in place
for how the AU should manage internal conflicts within countries, and the entire process was determined on an ad-hoc basis. The intervention of individual peace-keepers from other African states was also timely. Notably, Archbishop Desmond Tutu of South Africa arrived in Kenya three days after the violence began. While he came for the All-African Conference of Churches, he urged church and political leaders to work together to end the violence, and while he was unwelcome, he set the stage for other influential leaders from Africa and the west to enter the country for peace talks (Juma, 2009, p. 412).

The AU was ultimately the main body that mediated and ended the post-election violence in Kenya. As chair of the AU, former president of Ghana, John Kufuor selected Kofi Annan to lead the mediation in Kenya (Juma, 2009; Lindenmayber & Kaye, 2009). Annan had extensive experience in politics and negotiation, making him an “inspired choice” as described by Margaret Vogt, Deputy Director of Africa I Division within the UN Department of Political Affairs (Lindenmayber & Kaye, 2009). Civil society was vital to the efforts to end the violence in Kenya; women’s groups, religious leaders and concerned citizens all joined together to try and stop the bloodshed on local levels (Juma 2009; Lindenmayber & Kaye, 2009). Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga both met with Annan as part of the mediation process.

The final solution was a grand coalition between Kibaki and Odinga, where Kibaki maintained his position as president and Odinga sat as Prime Minister. Annan unveiled this idea in front of the Kenyan legislature on February 11, 2008 and it was put into place shortly thereafter on February 28, 2008 when both parties signed an agreement to coalesce. Before signing the agreement, a meeting between Annan and the leaders took place. In order to ensure that the position of Prime Minister would maintain its authority, there was a need to
revise the constitution. Kibaki wanted to maintain the current structure of the constitution, but this was impossible. Eventually, there was an agreement made on how to amend the constitution, and “when they emerged from this meeting, they were ready to sign an ‘agreement on the Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government’ (Baldur 2008b). This paved the way for the promulgation of the National Accord and Reconciliation Act (Government of Kenya 2008; Annan, signing event, Nairobi, 28 February 2008)” (Juma, 2009). This Act would be the final step in solidifying the coalition between the two politicians, and ending the ethnic violence.

However, the agreement was problematic because it was forced by peacekeepers. Outside international actors from the AU had created the coalition between Kibaki and Odinga, the two had not agreed to be peaceful on their own. As such, the Kenyan people did not trust the government coalition, and policy making was difficult to attain (Githongo, 2010). Despite the “success” of the government, the people of Kenya did not approve of the coalition (Bratton & Kimenyi, 2008). A general lack of trust and legitimacy in the government resulted in a lack of an effective opposition coalition formation in 2013, when Uhuru Kenyatta won the presidential election. Odinga contested the results of the election because he said rigging and technical problems had occurred. As such, he took the case to the Kenyan Supreme Court, where they upheld Kibaki’s win. After the ruling, Odinga conceded defeat and asked the people to accept the results (“Kenya court upholds Uhuru Kenyatta's poll win”).

b. Senegal

Senegal is a multiethnic society. The Wolof comprise 43 per cent of the population, the Serer 15 per cent, the Fulbe 14 per cent, the Halpulaar 9 per cent, Jola 5 per cent and others comprise 14 per cent of the total population (Kuenzi, 2011). The Wolof group is the largest
and dominates in economic and political life, however, ethnicity is not a salient issue (Bossuroy, 2011; Kuenzi, 2011). By Posner’s politically relevant ethnic group (PREG) measurement, which measures ethnic groups that affect the economic policies and the rate of economic growth, Senegal has a score of 0.14 (Posner, 2004). However, most literature considers the five major ethnic communities. Following this more classic approach, the BAH measurement calculated for Morrison et al. (1989) has an ethnic fractionalization score of 0.71. This is extremely close to Kenya’s score using the same measurement, of 0.73. Since independence in 1960, ethnic relationships have been peaceful between these five communities (Hartmann, 2010; Galvan, 2001). Despite the relative ethnic peace, there has been a secessionist movement in the southern Casamance region, comprised of the Jola ethnic group. This is most likely due to the fact that the geographic makeup of the country separates the southern region from the bulk of the country, resulting in the Jola ethnic group being excluded from the networks that peacefully connect the other ethnic groups (Kuenzi, 2011).

Senegal has a vibrant civil society, which has existed since colonial times (Resnick, 2013; Gellar, 2005). There is a prevalence of cross-cutting cleavages and a political culture of blurred roles between political and religious actors (Wittmann, 2008; Hartmann, 2010; Kuenzi, 2011). One argument for why ethnicity has not been a salient issue in Senegal is that the parties are culturally embedded and the existing social capital prevents the tendency of elites to play the ethnic card (Galvan, 2001). Yet another theory for why ethnicity is not a salient cleavage is that party bans have been effective in limiting the politicization of ethnicity. However, it seems more likely that the party ban provisions were indicative of the overall political culture, showing that ethnicity was never an issue (Hartmann, 2010).
Following independence, Leopold Sedar Seghor of the Union Progressiste Senegalais (UPS) was elected president, and ruled from 1960 to 1980. A democratic constitution was adopted, however Senghor did not implement the constitution properly and instead focused on clientelistic relationships between the government and other prominent actors in society (Wittmann, 2008). Senghor did not allow any opposition to his rule, which he ensured with the new constitution of 1963 which created a de-facto one party state and essentially a presidential plurality system (Hartmann, 2010; Resnick, 2013). In 1976, external pressures from the world economic crisis resulted in the reestablishment of multiparty rule. Senghor created a three party system, and the UPS became the Parti Socialiste (SP) (Hartmann, 2010; Wittmann, 2008; Kuenzi, 2011). Abdou Diouf succeeded Seghor and continued the path of liberalization.

Ruling from 1981-2000, Diouf made many adjustments to the regime. He eliminated the three-party restriction of 1976, which resulted in a competitive multiparty system (Galvan, 2009; Hartmann, 2010; Resnick, 2013). Economic liberalization also prospered under Diouf in a way that was unseen under Senghor. There was a move away from business groups implementing government policy through the private sector, and thus, away from clientelist-style relations between businesses and the state. However, this was not all positive. The result was the fragmentation of the political and economic elite, creating a situation where both state and business actors had to fight for access to state resources to protect their interests (Thioub et al., 1998). Rather than having opposition parties based on ideological grassroots support, many actors in Senegal’s opposition parties use these parties as vehicles for power, resulting in the voluntary forming and breaking of alliances when convenient (Resnick, 2013; Galvan, 2001).
Since Senghor’s rule, the relationship among political and religious elite has been a notable part of political culture. When Senghor was in power, the dominance of the UPS which would become the SP in 1976, was due to efforts to build coalitions with the country’s Sufi Muslim brotherhoods. These Sufi Muslim brotherhoods were the most legitimate and popular social organizations in the country (Resnick, 2013; Galvan, 2001). Beyond this, the political elite were forced to arrange electoral contracts with the marabouts (religious leaders) of the Muslim brotherhoods. These contracts were called ndigels and resulted in the marabouts telling their followers which political candidates to vote for (Wittman, 2008; Hartmann, 2010). So, while ethnicity was never salient in Senegal, civil society in the form of religion has played an important role in the political process, while still keeping the country secular.

In 2000, Senegal achieved its first legitimate alternation of power, with the election of Abdoulaye Wade of the Senegalese Democratic Party (SDP) (Wittmann, 2008; Galvan, 2009; Kuenzi, 2011). In 1998, opposition parties began to break off from the SP, with the formation of the Union poir le Renouveau (URD), led by Djibo Ka, who had previously been a prominent actor in the SP. The former prime minister of the SP, Moustapha Niasse formed the Alliance des Forces de Progres (AFP), in 1999 (Hartmann, 2010). Ka and Niasse shifted their support to back Wade in the 2000 election under the understanding that Niasse would be prime minister and Ka would be given a ministerial position, however Ka backed the SP party in the second round. These two—before Ka defected to the SP—were part of a larger coalition of nearly 40 parties, which ran on the slogan of SOPI (meaning ‘change’ in Wolof). Before the first round of the presidential election, nearly all candidates had reached an agreement stating that they would back whomever moved on to the second round of the
In the first round, Diouf gained 41 per cent of the vote, and Wade gained 31 per cent of the vote, moving both of them to the second round (Vengroff and Magala, 2011). Part of what united the opposition was that the SP had evolved into a patronage machine despite the liberalization efforts under Diouf (Galvan, 2009). One theory is that Diouf created the necessary elements to allow the opposition to win with his liberalization efforts. Specifically, Diouf’s acceptance of the liberalization of media was to his downfall because it allowed for investigative journalism. Investigative journalism showed the flaws of the Diouf regime and forced the transparency of the ballot (Wittmann, 2008).

In 2007, Wade won the presidential election again, however, he was not backed by a coalition this time around. Wade moved away from his promise to further liberalize the nation and instead focused his efforts on personalized rule. Such acts as centralizing the power of the executive, bullying the press and briefly supporting an anti-Catholic movement, were seen by the citizenry as traits which they looked to remove from the executive office. President Wade was very paranoid about opposition to his rule, as such, he went through five prime ministers, and he arrested one man who was his presumed successor (Galvan, 2009; Resnick, 2013). Despite the perceived problems with his rule, Wade won the election with 55 per cent of the vote, defeating fourteen rivals (Galan, 2009; Hartmann, 2010).

The 2012 presidential election saw the reformulation of an opposition coalition, through which Macky Sall beat Wade to become president (“Senegal's President-elect Macky Sall hails 'new era'”; “Senegal's president concedes defeat in runoff election”). There was civil unrest before the elections due to Wade’s decision to run for a third term despite the new constitutional amendment which limited the presidential term to two successive terms. Wade said that because the amendment was created while he was in power in his first term, the first
term did not fall under this limitation (Resnick, 2013). Surprisingly, after his loss, Wade requested that the people of Senegal respect the election results, and conceded defeat (“Senegal's President-elect Macky Sall hails 'new era’”; “Senegal's president concedes defeat in runoff election”). The coalition opposition included twelve individual candidates. Sall ran under the party he founded in 2008, the Alliance for the Republic (APR). Wade ran on the PDS ticket as part of a coalition known as the Allied Forces (FAL) 2012. When Sall received enough votes to move to the second round of voting, all of the main opposition parties rallied behind him and formed the Benno Bok Yakaar (BBY) coalition, which translates to ‘Together We Share the Same Hope.’ The ability of the BBY to form a coalition shows the high volatility of electoral voting, which some see as a problem for the political institutionalization of Senegal (Resnick, 2013).

IV. Research Questions

The following research questions are investigated in order to identify the causal mechanisms at play in the success and failure of multiethnic coalition formation. Additionally, the last question looks to identify the causal mechanisms involved in the emergence of ethnic violence or the continuation of peace.

1. Why were the opposition coalitions able to unify in the presidential elections of both Senegal in 2000 and Kenya in 2002?

2. Why did the multiethnic coalitions fall apart in both countries?

3. Why did the election of 2007 result in violence in Kenya and not Senegal?

V. Methods
Using Kenya and Senegal as case studies, an analysis of each country’s presidential elections was conducted. The analysis of Kenya focuses on the presidential elections of 2002, 2007 and 2013, while the analysis of Senegal focuses on the presidential elections of 2000, 2007 and 2012. Case studies are used because they “are essential for description, and are therefore, fundamental to social science. It is pointless to seek to explain what we have not described with a reasonable degree of precision” (King, Keohane & Verba, 2004). Additionally, case studies are the preferred method when examining contemporary events in which the relevant behaviors cannot be manipulated (Yin, 2003). By examining in-depth case studies causal hypotheses can be created (King et al, 2004). While case studies are good for creating causal hypotheses, process tracing is used as a complimentary method in order to gain insight into causal mechanisms at work (Collier, 2012). Process tracing is defined as “an analytic tool for drawing descriptive and causal inferences from diagnostic pieces of evidence” (Collier, 2012). Using this method allows for the opportunity to closely examine the presidential elections in Kenya and Senegal and look for and examine causal mechanisms in the formation of multiethnic coalitions, the success of multiethnic coalitions and the inability to form opposition multiethnic coalitions.

Data collection used for analysis consisted of secondary and primary sources from scholarly articles, books, newspapers and surveys. Although these sources included pertinent quantitative data, such as charts on party polarization and the effective number of parties, the focus is primarily qualitative in nature. Primary and secondary sources were acquired through the use of scholarly journals and databases such as JSTOR, Academic Search Premier, Sage, the New York Times and Afrobarometer.

VI. Research Findings
a) Why were the opposition coalitions able to unify in both Senegal and Kenya in the 2000 and 2002 presidential elections?

_Multiethnic Coalition in Kenya_

The political climate of Kenya leading up to the 2002 presidential election created an optimal climate for a unified opposition coalition. The combined effects of the declining power of the ruling party, liberalization and fluid politics where politicians lack strong ideological identities and easily switch parties in order to gain power, led to the formation of the multiethnic coalition government in Kenya in 2002.

Before liberalization, President Daniel arap Moi had been in complete control of state resources, allowing him to partake in clientelism at his will (Murunga & Nasong’o, 2006). However, as Kenya liberalized economically, President Moi lost his control over state finances, which was one of the reasons that he did not want to participate in liberalization efforts. While the need for IFI loans forced Moi to liberalize, the process of liberalization still occurred with great hesitation (Pitcher, 2012). Economic liberalization paved the way for business interests to become politically active as the state was pushed out of the economic sphere. Business leaders had an increasing propensity for funding coalition parties, as they knew that there was an actual chance for success. These business leaders took particular interest in opposition parties that they knew could influence policies important to their economic interests if the opposition won. Arriola argues that opposition politicians are more likely to form multiethnic coalitions for executive office where incumbents have been forced to relinquish the state’s historic control over capital (2013; 242). The effects of economic liberalization changed the political climate of Kenya (Arriola, 2012).
As economic liberalization changed the political climate in favor of opposition parties, KANU was facing these realities in terms of political strength. Following the 1997 elections, Moi and the KANU party started losing power due to parliamentary losses, which forced Moi to re-examine his political strategy (Elischer, 2008). President Moi realized that in order to be competitive in the 2002 elections, his party would require a larger multiethnic voter base. In order to create such a voter base, Moi’s KANU party formally merged with Odinga’s NDP party with a base of Luo support, to create the New-KANU. Moi created four new chair positions all held by different ethnic leaders, of the Abaluhya, Kamba, Mijikenda and Kikuyu ethnic groups. Moi’s new party with a broader ethnic base alerted opposition leaders that they would also have to join together to create a larger voter base in order to be competitive against New-KANU (Steeves, 2006; Khadiagala, 2010).

While New-KANU had created a more ethnically diverse party, problems arose within the party itself that threatened its success in the 2002 presidential election. Moi could not continue his reign as president due to the two-term presidential limit, so it was clear there would be a need for a different presidential candidate. Odinga announced that he would like to nominate himself as the party candidate (Steeves, 2006). However, shortly following this, Moi personally hand-picked Uhuru Kenyatta as the presidential candidate to continue his reign (Steeves, 2007; Steeves, 2006). Uhuru Kenyatta was Kikuyu, and at the latest moment constitutionally allowed, Moi picked Musalia Mudavadi who was Luhya as the vice-presidential candidate. It was clear that Moi was attempting to create a multi-ethnic party simply to gain votes and maintain the power of KANU (Elischer, 2008). Despite Moi’s political maneuvering to maintain power, other members disagreed with his methods, which created a faction within the party.
Moi’s choice of Kenyatta as the presidential candidate was ultimately the end of the New-KANU. Raila Odinga, of the previous NDP party that had joined with KANU to form New-KANU, was named as Secretary General of the new party. He led the faction group within New-KANU after Kenyatta was chosen by Moi (Elishcer, 2008). The opposition group within the party was called the Rainbow Alliance, and toured Kenya telling of how they were upset over the lack of an open convention for determining the presidential candidate. There were chants of “All is possible without Moi” (Steeves, 2006: 201). The Rainbow Alliance could not be reined in by Moi, and broke from New-KANU to form the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) under Raila Odinga’s leadership (Elischer, 2008; Steeves, 2006). This splinter party from New-KANU severely weakened KANU and as well as the opposition. The opposition, which had already seen the need to create a multiethnic coalition because of New-KANU joining the NDP, now saw a great opportunity to join together. The opposition created the National Alliance of Kenya (NAK) which joined Kibaki’s DP with Michael Wamalwa of FORD-Kenya and Charity Ngilu of the National Party of Kenya (NPK) (Elischer, 2008; Steeves, 2006). Kibaki brought Kikuyu support, along with Meru and Embu community support, Wamalwa shared split support of the Abaluhya people and Ngilu also shared some support of the Kamba people (Steeves, 2006).

Ultimately, Odinga’s splinter party joined with the opposition coalition, creating a coalition of the LDP and NAK. The two came together as the National Rainbow Coalition on October 22, 2002 after signing a Memorandum of Understanding that power would be equally distributed between the two parties in government, and agreeing that Kibaki would serve as the presidential candidate (Steeves, 2006, Barkan, 2004). Following the Rainbow Coalition’s defection from KANU, senior political members seemed content to surrender
power. In the presidential elections of the 1990s, President Moi and the KANU party had taken part in political actions to ensure victory, including bribing, intimidating voters and using state finances to fund anything necessary to win the elections. While some bribing and voter intimidation did take place, it was on a miniscule scale compared to previous efforts, and the party did not spend a large amount to finance Kenyatta’s election. Moi was expected to fund Kenyatta out of his own pocket, but this did not happen, and the Kenyatta family funded most of the campaign (Barkan, 2011). It seemed as though President Moi and KANU politicians were conceding defeat considering the demise of their multiethnic coalition which would clearly mean a lack of votes.

In addition to the economic liberalization that allowed for the formation of the National Rainbow Alliance, there was another central characteristic of Kenyan politics that encouraged the creation of a multiethnic opposition coalition. In 2002, the ‘unbounded politics’ of Kenya allowed for the coming together of multiple ethnic groups and politicians. Unbounded politics is defined as the process under which “the big men of politics shift allegiances, parties and coalitions quickly when to do so is in their and their community’s advantage” (Steeves, 2006: 197). Each of the major political leaders before the 2002 presidential election took part in unbounded politics. Even President Moi took part in unbounded politics by trying to form a multiethnic party simply with the goal of maintaining his own power.

However, the opposition took unbounded politics to the extreme. The major opposition leaders each maintained their own parties in 1992 and 1997, and thus lost by fragmenting the vote share. Leading up to the 2002 presidential election the opposition leaders saw that it would be in everyone’s best interest to combine and gain all of the votes for the opposition
under one party title. The lack of strong ideological or policy preferences by the party leaders resulted in their ability to participate in unbounded politics and continue the trend of forming new opposition parties that had begun with the emergence of multipartyism (Resnick, 2013).

The simple desire for power that drives unbounded politics could be seen in the case of Wamalwa who did not think that Kibaki should be the presidential candidate because it would put another Kikuyu in power, he believed that it was time for another ethnic group, preferably his own ethnic group under his own leadership to take the glory. However, Kibaki had an inner circle of twenty prominent businessmen financing his efforts to win, meaning Kibaki had money to spare in his efforts to convince Wamalwa that he should be the presidential candidate. Once given an upfront payment, Wamalwa agreed to support Kibaki as the presidential candidate of the opposition, with the agreement that he would take the position of Vice President (Arriola, 2013). This example shows that power is the main goal of Kenyan politicians. Because of how unbounded politics works, however, anything that helps advance a politician’s self-interest will be supported. Wamalwa was set on the idea of himself being the presidential candidate and ending the long-trend of Kikuyu executive power, but due to his flexible politics he easily joined his competitor for a financial gain in addition to a share of power.

In the end, the National Rainbow Coalition was able to come together and Kibaki was able to win the presidential election with 15 parties in total supporting the opposition (Ndewga 2003). The NARC was successful enough to win the necessary 25% of the vote in all eight provincial regions to win the executive race. Notably, KANU did not even win in regions in which it was expected to thrive, such as the rural coastal region. In this region there had been a formation of opposition politicians on the parliamentary ticket in 1997 in
order to please supporters of a violent anti-KANU outbreak (Barkan, 2011). As part of the NARC, Charity Ngilu, Michael Wamalwa, Mwai Kabaki and Raila Odinga collectively represented the Kamba, Abaluhya, Kikuyu and Luo ethnic groups (Steeves, 2006). By combining these major ethnic groups as well as the ethnic groups of the smaller supporting parties, the coalition formed a constituent base that was truly multiethnic in nature (Elischer, 2008). The combined influence of economic liberalization which caused KANU’s power decline, along with the unbounded politics of the Kenyan system, allowed the multiethnic coalition to coalesce.

Multiethnic Coalition in Senegal

Senegal has a unique situation because while it is deemed a multiethnic society, ethnicity is not a salient political cleavage. Due to the societal makeup of Senegal the opposition coalition that formed in 2000 was multiethnic in nature, however it lacked ethnic parties. The opposition coalition was able to form due to the same factors as those that took place in Kenya leading up to the 2002 Kenyan election. Fluid politics, economic liberalization, and the decline of the ruling party all worked together to create the perfect environment for the Sopi coalition to succeed.

The election of 2000 was the first democratic transition of power, and the end of Abdou Diouf’s 19 year reign as executive (Wittman, 2008; Galvan, 2009; Kuenzi, 2011; Arriola, 2012). The importance of the opposition coalition had much more to do with the fact that the opposition came together to defeat the long-standing ruling PS (Parti Socialiste) than the fact that it was multiethnic, because parties are multiethnic by nature (Kuenzi, 2011). However, Arriola still identifies Senegal as having a multiethnic opposition coalition that was able to
unify because of economic liberalization (2012). A unique element of the liberalization process that led to democratization in Senegal is that President Diouf openly supported both economic and political liberalization efforts (Vengroff & Magala, 2008; Kuenzi, 2011). Monetary freedom by business leaders was a crucial part of the economic liberalization efforts that led to the opposition coalition winning in Senegal. Arriola discusses the importance of opposition politicians having enough money to show the people that they are successful and can financially back up their promises. Abdoulaye Wade was given as an example of an opposition politician who successfully and openly flaunted his wealth (Arriola, 2012; 40). Arriola mentions that with the money opposition candidates have, they are able to satisfy the resource requirements of coalition bargaining, such as providing other politicians payments for their support (2013; 316). The money that these opposition leaders, such as Abdoulaye Wade have, comes from the liberalization of the financial sector which removes the state from controlling the economy and businessmen. When this happens and the states do not control the banking sector, businessmen have freedom to prosper and use their monetary gains to fund opposition leaders who support economic interests, or become the opposition leaders, as was the case with Wade (Arriola, 2012; Arriola, 2013).

Other elements of liberalization efforts may have also been responsible for the successful formation of the opposition coalition in Senegal. One theory is that President Diouf’s liberalization efforts created the necessary elements to allow the opposition to win. Specifically, Diouf’s acceptance of the liberalization of media was to his downfall because it allowed for investigative journalism. Investigative journalism showed the flaws of the Diouf regime and forced the transparency of the ballot. By allowing the media to be liberalized, Diouf “contributed to the development of civic responsibility and played a crucial role in the
transparency of the ballot. . . [and it was through these efforts] that the opposition led by the SDP candidate, Wade, won the elections” (Wittman, 2008: 481).

The processes that allowed for democratization to occur in Senegal also allowed for the opposition to win as a multiethnic coalition government. Beyond media liberalization, institutional reform was a necessary element that allowed for the opposition to thrive. Under the reform, participation of opposition parties was encouraged to further the democratic competition (Vengroff & Magala, 2001). Democratic competition was high amongst the opposition, the Coalition pour l’Alternance 2000 (CA) was made up of eight parties before the election. Abdoulaye Wade was the clear choice as presidential candidate because of his high share of votes and his previous opposition tactics against President Diouf (Kuenzi, 2011). President Diouf attempted to have Wade join the government as the vice president, a position which he hoped to create, following the violent election of 1988. Diouf hoped that coopting with the opposition would ease the tension and bolster his position, but senior members of the PS vetoed the plan. According to Arriola, one of the main reasons that the opposition should form a coalition is to gain entrance into the government when exclusion has taken place (2012). After the first round of elections, the Front pour l’Alternance (FAL) comprising 21 parties was formed (Kuenzi, 2011). Ultimately, the opposition candidates came together to support Wade and put an end to the ‘massive patronage machine’ that Diouf’s party, the Parti Socialiste (PS), had become (Galvan, 2001).

President Diouf’s liberalization efforts to help make Senegal democratize may have been good-natured, however, it seems as though they were an unsuccessful attempt to hold onto power. The SP had evolved into a patronage machine long before the liberalization efforts, and the liberalization did not end this pattern (Galvan, 2009). Over time the political climate
shifted from strong support for the PS to an increasing interest in backing the PDS. In 1983 the PS had overwhelming popular support with nearly 84 percent of the vote, while the PDS had only about 15 percent of the vote. By 2000, the situation had dramatically shifted. By then, the PS’s support had dwindled to a little over 41 percent of the vote, while the PDS was now approved by over 58 percent of the voters (Galvan, 2001). There was a trend in African politics following the end of the cold war to liberalize because of international pressures (Arriola, 2012). It appears from the trend of waning support for the PS over time that Diouf was simply trying to impress international actors and keep the economy of his country afloat with liberalization efforts. Senegal was known for having a classic clientelistic relationship between business and the state, something that Diouf continued to try to maintain even while liberalizing (Galvan, 2009; Arriola, 2012). The changing political climate of Senegal was not conducive to the continued power of the PS, rather it encouraged the shift of power to Wade’s Sopi opposition coalition.

The overall landscape of the political environment remained the same in regard to how parties behaved. Arriola identifies the desire of African politicians to share in power as one of the ways in which they are able to bridge cleavages (2012). Senegalese politicians are pragmatic and joined together to remove Diouf from power despite the fact that the politicians who formed the winning coalition had different political ideals and little agreement on policy matters. Rather than having opposition parties based on ideological grassroots support, many actors in Senegal’s opposition parties use these parties as vehicles for power, resulting in the voluntary forming and breaking of alliances when convenient (Resnick, 2013; Galvan, 2001). Eight candidates ran on the executive ticket in the first round of the presidential election (Kuenzi, 2011). However, the lack of one single opposition
candidate for president was not significant because a majority of voters supported opposition candidates, forcing the necessity of a runoff second round. This was the first time in Senegal’s history that a majority of voters supported opposition parties, and it was the only time in Senegal’s political history that a second round was required in the presidential election (Vengroff & Magala, 2001). In the first round, Diouf gained 41 per cent of the vote, and Wade gained 31 per cent of the vote, moving both of them to the second round (Vengroff and Magala, 2011). The 2000 election was also notable because “the degree of cooperation manifested by members of the opposition in this election was higher than in any other since the commencement of full multipartyism in 1981” (Kuenzi, 2011: 37). The political climate that allowed the opposition to be competitive in the presidential election of 2000, supported by the pragmatism of the opposition politicians who sought power and the removal of Diouf, resulted in the successful win of the opposition coalition.

b) Why did the multiethnic coalitions fall apart in both countries?

*Coalition failure in Kenya*

The National Rainbow Coalition was short-lived. The adornment of the Memorandum of Understanding which had joined the parties together, the weakness of the coalition based on unbounded politics and an increasing propensity toward centralized rule by President Kibaki resulted in the demise of the coalition.

The Memorandum of Understanding that had been signed between the LDP and the NPK forming the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) in 2002 was quickly abandoned by Kibaki once he assumed the role of president (Githongo, 2010; Lynch, 2011; Steeves, 2006; Barkan, 2004). When forming the Memorandum of Understanding, there was an
understanding that Raila Odinga would be appointed as Prime Minister—a position that would be created specifically for him. This was part of the agreement between Odinga and Kibaki to ensure that there would be benefits for Odinga supporting Kibaki. However, once the NARC won the election and Kibaki became acting president, Kibaki and his supporting politicians said that creating such a position would create political instability by creating two spheres of central power (Murunga & Nasong’o, 2006). This was one of the major ways that the Memorandum of Understanding was completely abandoned by Kibaki. Although Raila Odinga was not given the position of power that he had been promised, he remained a part of the coalition government until 2005 when the multiethnic coalition government dissolved (Githongo, 2010). Tensions between Odinga’s Luo supporters and Kibaki’s Kikuyu supporters that resulted from the abandonment of the Memorandum of Understanding would remain a constant issue during the lifetime of the coalition, and even after its end.

Beyond simply abandoning the Memorandum of Understanding upon which the multiethnic opposition coalition was based, there were structural issues with the coalition. The foundation of the coalition was not strong enough to maintain the pressures that it would face when put into practice. Politics of convenience guided the formation of the coalition prior to the 2002 election. The NAK and LDP joined together with the purpose of opposing and removing KANU from power (Lynch, 2011). Unbounded politics as noted earlier, was helpful in forming the coalition (2006: 197). However, unbounded politics became more problematic when the coalition was active in government. Due to the fluidity of unbounded politics and politics of convenience, the multiethnic coalition government that was formed in Kenya was able to bridge ethnic cleavages, but not stabilize itself. The fact that these parties came together simply to share power and did not have strong ideological similarities, and in
fact shared more differences than similarities, made it no surprise that the multiethnic coalition did not stay united. Kibaki’s abandonment of the Memorandum of Understanding was evidence of the flaw of unbounded politics in forming coalitions of convenience. Once he was elected as president, there was nothing holding him accountable. Even the Memorandum of Understanding was simply an agreement between the two parties, there were no legal ramifications for deserting it once in power (Githongo, 2010; Barkan, 2004).

Once the Memorandum of Understanding was abandoned by Kibaki and his supporters, the whole façade of the multiethnic opposition coalition shattered. The ethnically inclusive image of the government dissolved for the public. What had been a coalition of all major ethnic groups, minus Moi’s Kalenjin group, became a Kikuyu dominated government. The Kikuyu gained benefits under Kibaki’s leadership and the administration was unfriendly to the poor. Due to the faction that resulted from the abandonment of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Luo and Kikuyu supporters of Odinga and Kibaki, leaders under the regime began to partake in further promoting this ethnic division. These leaders began to take part in ethnic hysteria, openly speaking out against the hazards of a country under Luo rule (Githongo, 2010). Ethnicity played a definite role in the dissolution of the 2002 coalition government. In the formation of the coalition, ethnicity had been an important factor in terms of strategizing to gain a broad enough constituency base to beat out the power of the KANU and their Kikuyu majority. However, it is notable that these ethnic groups only came together for the purpose of gaining votes and were ethnically based parties with little in common (Steeves, 2006). While ethnicity was the tool of choice utilized by politicians to remove Moi from power, it created a superficial combination of ethnic groups, which led to the demise of the coalition when bigger governing issues came to the surface.
Even with Kibaki’s dissolution of the Memorandum of Understanding and ethnic hysteria, Odinga remained part of the NARC government. The two publicly espoused their issues with one another. While Kibaki warned of a Luo led country, notable because of Odinga’s Luo identity, Odinga openly discussed the “Kikuyu arrogance, greed, and dishonesty [that] were on display everywhere” (Githongo, 2010, p. 4). However, despite the antagonism of one another, Odinga remained a crucial part of the political elite. The 2005 constitutional referendum was the ultimate demise of what could still very loosely be defined as a partnership between Kibaki and Odinga.

The NARC made many promises to the public when running for office, both for the executive and legislative positions. Mainly, Kibaki had promised to create a constitutional referendum to lessen the power of the executive. Moi had been known for personalized rule, and the reason that the opposition initially coalesced and the reason that this coalition had public support was for the purpose of ending such personalized rule. However, once Kibaki entered office he fell prey to the powers of the position, because at this time, the executive title still held an immense amount of power. At least under Moi there had been a successful, far-reaching neopatrimonial network of clientelism under which each ethnic group gained at least a small amount of benefit. Under Kibaki the focus was purely on the Kikuyu population and the ethnic groups of his strongest allies (Githongo, 2010). This did not bode well for the new administration in terms of public support, because comparatively it made Moi’s administration look ethnically inclusive. The deep-rooted problem of ethnicity being a zero-sum game became a huge issue for Kibaki’s administration.

Eventually a constitutional referendum was held in 2005, but with dire consequences for Kibaki and his allies, as well as the multiethnic coalition government of the NARC.
(Githongo, 2010; Lynch, 2011). The public was to vote on the constitutional referendum, called the Wako Draft. Symbols were used to illustrate support and rejection of the draft. A banana symbolized support of the draft, which Kibaki promoted, and an orange symbolized rejection of the draft, which Odinga promoted. Although the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) did not allow campaigning for either side until a little more than a month before the vote was to take place on November 21, 2005, both sides disregarded this rule. Kibaki and Odinga traveled the country eating and distributing bananas and oranges (Lynch, 2011: 233). Odinga not only campaigned against the constitution, he utilized the public’s distrust of Kibaki and their anger at the president unfairly favoring the Kikuyu to gain support. The referendum lost, 58 percent in dissent to 42 percent in support. Following the loss, Kibaki dissolved his entire cabinet of all previous multiethnic ministers, including Odinga, finally ending the multiethnic coalition government of the NARC (Githongo, 2010). The multiethnic opposition coalition that formed was successful at gaining power, but not stabilizing it, and ultimately did not result in a resolution of underlying issues with ethnic cleavages. The inability to resolve ethnic cleavages along with the weakness of the coalition itself and Kibaki’s authoritarian leanings, resulted in the dissolution of the NARC in 2005.

Coalition Failure in Senegal

The Sopi coalition in Senegal faced a similarly grim fate as the NARC coalition in Kenya. Interestingly, the factors resulting in the demise of the Sopi coalition closely parallel those in the demise of the NARC. First, the coalition was based on unbounded politics and weak, and second, President Wade centralized his rule and removed cabinet members. The end of the Sopi coalition eroded over time, rather than in an official removal of the entire cabinet at once.
The coalition government that enabled Senegal’s first alternance of power since independence was based on forty small opposition parties coming together for the purpose of removing Diouf from power (Kelly, 2012; Kuenzi, 2011). Notably, the parties that made up the coalition were not all based on a shared ideology, or platform, but rather united under the shared identity of the opposition (Kuenzi, 2011). The political tradition of using parties simply as vehicles of power allowed for the lack of ideological cohesion to be a non-issue when forming the coalition. Due to the fluidity of parties, it is commonplace in Senegal for parties to form and break alliances when convenient (Resnick, 2013; Galvan, 2001). However, while the coalition was able to form quickly because of rather weak institutionalization of the party system, this same factor would be problematic for the coalition. Wade had no problem removing cabinet members, because they were simply sharing power with him, there was no deeper connection than the agreement to form a coalition. The number of opposition parties was also too great for a true working coalition, 40 parties could not equally and effectively share power.

Abdoulaye Wade, the leader of the Sopi coalition was chosen as the leader of the opposition because he had won the most support in the first round of the presidential election (Kuenzi, 2011). The purpose of the opposition was to end the personalized rule that had been occurring under Diouf, however, once in power, Wade would fall into the very authoritarian ways he campaigned so vehemently against (Kelley, 2012; Galvan, 2001). While his newly gained presidential post was considered a democratic transition, it is often the case that “the expansion of democratic space is the stated objective of the new leaders, it often . . . [gives] way to a new series of efforts to manipulate the system in their favor and insure their own hegemony through manipulation of institutional structures” (Bingol & Vengroff, 2012, p. 38).
It did not take long after Wade began acting as sitting president for him to begin to participate in this pattern of behavior.

Wade’s authoritarian tendencies resulted in the demise of the opposition coalition that formed to bring him to power, but it would take until 2012 for the public to take enough issue with his actions to remove him from power. First, Wade manipulated small parties under him instead of strengthening his own PDS party. As a result of the fluidity of the party system, he encouraged further expansion of parties. These parties were clearly funded by the state for the purpose of supporting Wade (Resnick, 2013). Beyond this, he made few changes to what had become the status quo under Diouf. Wade continued to politicize institutions by giving patronage to his supporters, filling bureaucratic positions with people of his choosing. The Constitutional Court was a clear example of this authoritarian method of adjudicating government positions. Due to the fact that the president hand-picks the justices, the necessary checks on executive power that the court should provide became void (Kelly, 2012). Wade became notorious for bullying the press, in what was considered a ‘democratic’ nation, and supporting his Muslim Sufi Brotherhood, the Mourides in an anti-Catholic movement. If these actions were not symbolic of his transition from democratic messiah to authoritarian leader, the actions he took within his own government cabinet were without a doubt enough to illustrate Wade’s devolution into authoritarianism. President Wade became paranoid about opposition to his rule. He “went through four prime ministers, removing possible competitors, even arresting his presumed successor” (Galvan, 2009, p. 493). However, despite such tendencies toward centralized rule, the public remained hopeful that another term would allow President Wade to fulfill the promises he made while campaigning for the 2000 presidential election. Wade won the 2007 election, but all fourteen opposition
candidates contested the election, many of whom had been part of Wade’s government before it fell apart (Galvan, 2009).

While the coalition fell apart due to Wade’s paranoia and removal of cabinet members, public sentiment drastically changed between 2007 and 2012. Wade passed a constitutional referendum in 2001 that limited the presidential term from seven years to five years, however in 2008 he re-extended the term limit to seven years (Arieff, 2011). However, he argued that he had not fulfilled his two terms because he made the amendment while in office, so he ran again in 2012 (Resnick, 2013). With this argument, the public became increasingly aware that Wade was in office for the sole purpose of maintaining power. He tried to change the presidential electoral rule that requires 50% or more of the vote in the first round of the election to prevent a runoff, to 25% of the vote to prevent a runoff election. Such a change “would have de facto transformed the system from a two-round French style majoritarian system into a single-round plurality system virtually insuring the victory of the ruling party (Bingol & Vengroff, 2012, p. 111). Wade also wanted to create the position of vice president, which was taken to symbolize his hope that his son Karim would fill the position and be his successor (Galvan, 2009). There was backlash against such actions, with people accusing Wade of cronyism and corruption (Arieff, 2011). It took time, but the public finally saw Wade as power-hungry, something the elite had recognized prior to 2007, when they had been removed from their government positions by Wade.

The sheer number of parties involved in the coalition was problematic, but not as problematic as the weakness of the coalition based on unbounded politics. This weak coalition combined with the centralized rule of President Wade, resulted in a coalition that slowly fell apart as issues arose and Wade became paranoid.
c) Why did the election of 2007 result in violence in Kenya and not Senegal?

Kenya’s 2007 elections ensued in ethnic violence on a grand scale, whereas Senegal’s 2007 election did not. Both coalitions ended prior to the 2007 election, with similar causes as to their demise. But in Kenya, the election resulted in 1,500 people dead and hundreds of thousands displaced (Juma, 2009). Alternatively, Senegal remained peaceful and even kept President Wade in power, re-electing him as executive (Galvan, 2009). Why is this? Kenya and Senegal share many similarities, but why could one country have horrendous violence that required peacekeeping by the AU and one retain its dwindling democracy?

First, one must examine the similarities between Kenya and Senegal leading up to the 2007 executive elections. Both countries achieved independence in the early 1960s. Kenya became independent of British rule in 1963, when elections took place putting Jomo Kenyatta in power under the one-party rule of the KANU. (Barkan, 2004). Senegal attained independence from French colonial rule in 1960, when Leopold Senghor was elected president under the UPS party which later transitioned to the PS (Hartmann, 2010). Of course, as is the case in one-party states, both Kenyatta and Senghor oppressed opposition sentiments. In Kenya, Kenyatta ruled from 1963-1978 when he died and was succeeded by President Moi (Barkan 2004, Hartmann, 2010). In Senegal, Senghor stepped down after 20 years in 1980, when President Diouf succeeded him (Thioub et al., 1998). Kenya introduced multiparty elections in 1982 (Mueller, 2011), and Senegal introduced multiparty elections in 1976, although limiting it to three official parties (Hartmann, 2010). Liberalization efforts took place in both Kenya and Senegal in the 1990s (Arriola, 2012). Interestingly, while the KANU was losing electoral strength in Kenya before the 2002 election (Steeves, 2006;
Elischer, 2008), the PS was losing electoral strength in Senegal leading up to the election of the new millennium (Galvan, 2001).

The similarities between Kenya and Senegal continued past the democratic alternance of power in both nations. In Kenya, Moi participated in centralized rule, which was the basis for the unification of the opposition. This unified opposition resulted in a multiethnic coalition (Murunga & Nasong’o, 2006). The same was true of Diouf in Senegal, where the main goal of the opposition coalition was to end his centralized rule (Kuenzi, 2011; Galvan, 2011).

Once Mwai Kibaki was elected president as part of a multiethnic opposition coalition in Kenya, he began to act in an authoritarian fashion, causing issues within his own coalition government. Kibaki had run on democratic promises of change and prosperity, but this came to a halt once he entered office. He removed officials he deemed a threat to his power, and ultimately dissolved his multiethnic coalition over a disagreement on a constitutional referendum, under which he wanted to maintain the strength of the executive (Steeves, 2006).

In Senegal, Abdoulaye Wade was also elected president as part of a multiethnic opposition coalition, and began to partake in centralizing the power of the executive. He too, had campaigned on the premise of change, in fact Sopi means “change” in Wolof, which was the slogan of his campaign. Wade also, removed politicians he deemed as a threat to his power, and participated in patronage and corruption (Galvan, 2001). In short, the paths Kenya and Senegal took from independence to the 2007 are strikingly similar.

However, one important factor has not been considered in this examination of similarities between Kenya and Senegal, and that is the issue of ethnicity. Kenya has five major ethnic groups that make up approximately 72% of the population (Klopp & Kamungi, 2007). Senegal also has five main ethnic groups, but they comprise approximately 86% of the
population (Kuenzi, 2011). Referencing back to the literature discussed in the theories of ethnicity, Kenya and Senegal differ in regard to what influenced whether or not ethnicity was mobilized in each respective country. In Kenya, it appears as though the mobilization of ethnicity followed the historical explanation provided by Basedau et al. (2011). In this explanation of the mobilization of ethnicity, the authors postulate that when ethnicity has been previously mobilized and experienced positive results, it is likely that a trend will emerge where ethnicity continues to be mobilized (Basedau, 2011). Ethnicity was mobilized effectively by President Moi in the 1990s when he was able to turn ethnic groups against each other in order to fragment the opposition enough to secure the victory of his party (Barkan 2011).

**Table 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey Questions</th>
<th>Kenya</th>
<th></th>
<th>Senegal</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnict group's economic conditions worse or much worse</td>
<td>% of respondents</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic group's political influence less or much less</td>
<td>% of respondents</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic group treated unfairly often or always</td>
<td>% of respondents</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Afrobarometer (http://www.afrobarometer.org/results/results-by-country-a-m/kenya) and (http://www.afrobarometer.org/results/results-by-country-n-z/senegal)
The history of the mobilization of ethnicity in Senegal follows a much different trajectory than in Kenya. Senegal appears to follow the institutional explanation provided by Basedau et al. (2011) under which it is theorized that institutional barriers to ethnicity prevent the emergence of politicized ethnicity. Senegal does indeed have party bans (Hartmann, 2010), and ethnicity is not a cleavage on which politicians mobilize voters, which seems to provide backing to this argument. However, Hartmann (2010) suggests that the party bans were put in place because they were indicative of the overall political culture, which never considered ethnicity an issue. Galvan (2001) argues that ethnicity has never been a salient issue in Senegal because of the vibrant civil society that acts to prevent political elites from mobilizing along ethnic lines. While both of these arguments are valid, the data in Table 1 derived from Afrobarometer suggests that ethnicity is more significant to Senegalese citizens’ personal feelings than the classic literature on Senegal would suggest. The percentages for Senegalese respondents in 2008 who feel that their ethnic group has less or much less political influence than other ethnic groups almost match up with the Kenyan responses from 2008, which is striking. However, also in 2008, the rates for feeling that one’s ethnic group was economically disadvantaged show that ethnicity is much less of an issue in Senegal than in Kenya. In Senegal, nearly 14% said their ethnic group was economically disadvantaged, while in Kenya over 45% of respondents stated the same thing. The disparity between these response rates illustrates that ethnicity is more salient and more of an issue in Kenya than in Senegal.

Despite the data on Senegal from Afrobarometer in Table 1 that shows that ethnicity may be slightly salient in Senegal, Kenya still undoubtedly has a greater connection to ethnic identities. Kenya has ethnic parties (Steeves, 06; Elischer, 2008) whereas Senegal does not.
The similarities between the behavior of the ethnic parties and theories on ethnicity are notable. Basedau et al. (2011) propose that ethnicity is used as an instrument for gaining power, proposing that ethnic identities are strengthened in the presence of competitive elections. This is undoubtedly true in Kenya, where all parties are ethnic parties (Barkan, 2011; Resnick, 2013). In the case of the 2007 election, the election was a Luo-Kikuyu battle for executive power (Juma, 2009). The violence that erupted follows the theory of ethnic outbidding which says that once ethnicity is politicized, people will mobilize along ethnic lines because they believe that whichever candidate wins the executive will unfairly allocate resources to their own ethnic group at the cost of other ethnic groups (Chandra, 2005; Arriola, 2012).

This zero-sum game mentality matches with the violence that erupted following the results of the 2007 presidential election in Kenya. Both sides erupted in ethnic violence against each other, but the term coined for the violence was “41 against 1” symbolizing that all ethnic groups were against the Kikuyu (Lindenmayber & Kaye, 2009, p. 5). The Kikuyu had historically been in power under Kenyatta, and there were conflicts before choosing Kibaki in 2000 because of the Kikuyu tradition of power (Resnick, 2013). The zero-sum game mentality was in full force during the 2008 violence. Kibaki blatantly favored the Kikuyu in his first term, resulting in great animosity from the other ethnic groups. As can be seen in Table 1, respondents from Kenya had large percentages of people feeling that their ethnic group was economically, politically and socially disadvantaged, both before and after the violence. Strikingly, the numbers did not increase in 2008 after ethnic violence, suggesting that ethnicity was not as salient of an issue following the elections (as theory would suggest) and peacekeeping efforts were an effective strategy to ending ethnic tensions.
### Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey Questions</th>
<th>Kenya</th>
<th>Senegal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of respondents</td>
<td>% of respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair political intimidation or violence a lot or somewhat</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of respondents</td>
<td>% of respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair political intimidation or violence a lot or somewhat</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Afrobarometer (http://www.afrobarometer.org/results/results-by-country-a-m/kenya) and (http://www.afrobarometer.org/results/results-by-country-n-z/senegal)

In 2008 Kenyan politicians called on their own ethnic youth to fight (Githongo, 2010; Kagwanja 2005). One theory is that gang violence became institutionalized during Moi’s regime, when he practiced ethnic violence, leaving the gangs waiting to be tapped (Mueller, 2011). In Table 2, nearly a quarter of respondents in Kenya in 2008 believed that violence was sometimes necessary in politics. This is a high number considering the ethnic political violence that erupted in 2008, although the number did drop in 2011, suggesting that perhaps people saw the negative consequences of political violence as too extreme. In both 2008 and 2011, large percentages of respondents were scared of political violence or intimidation. In 2000, 38% of respondents replied with fear of political violence and 56% in 2011. The fact that politicians from both sides were implicated in the violence but remained in power suggests that violence has become an accepted part of the political process in Kenya (Githongo, 2010; Mueller, 2011). The survey results from Afrobarometer provide support to this statement, while showing that violence is still an issue in Senegal, but to a lesser degree.
In 2003 and 2012/2013 respectively, the rates of respondents who believed violence should sometimes be used in politics was nearly the same in Senegal and Kenya. However, in 2005 the Kenyan responses were noticeably higher. This is interesting considering the political climate of Kenya in 2005 with the constitutional referendum movement, and the re-emergence of ethnic tensions.

The causal hypothesis formulated from this research is that the causal mechanisms at play in Kenya but absent in Senegal are zero-sum ethnic politics and institutionalized violence. These factors are the two predominant differences in the political environment of Kenya and Senegal, because as aforementioned, the two states share numerous similarities. Ethnicity is not entirely absent in Senegal, but the absence of politicized ethnic parties has prevented the ethnic outbidding that has occurred in Kenya. This ethnic outbidding seems to be largely responsible for the ethnic violence of 2008. It also appears that the lack of institutionalized violence relates to the absence of politicized ethnicity in Senegal. In Kenya, President Moi institutionalized violence along ethnic lines (Mueller, 2011), but in Senegal Diouf did not have this cleavage upon which to mobilize, so violence remained minor. While there is minor violence in Senegal, it is looked upon negatively, and is not instigated by the executive (Resnick, 2013). Ultimately, the lack of politicized ethnic salience in Senegal is what has kept the country peaceful despite having an extremely similar political track record to Kenya.

VII. Conclusion

There has been much study of multiethnic coalitions, and of ethnic violence, but there is a dearth of research in the comparative literature about what causal mechanisms relate multiethnic coalition success or failure to the emergence of violence, or lack thereof. This research analysis proposes that politicized ethnicity can be used to institutionalize violence,
as was the case in Kenya. Further research needs to be conducted into the relationship between politicized ethnicity and the institutionalization of violence, which could help multiethnic communities and policy makers in their management of multiethnic issues. Following the lead of this research, further research also needs to be conducted into the relationship between a lack of politicized ethnicity and a lack of institutionalized violence to determine if this is a pattern or if Senegal is unique. The results found by compiling Afrobarometer survey data in Senegal also warrant further investigation. Excluding the Casamance region in Senegal, scholarly literature as a whole follows the consensus that ethnicity is not salient because it is a non-issue, politically. The data from Afrobarometer surveys illustrates that ethnicity may be salient to one’s personal identity, but it is not salient in the public realm likely because it has not been politicized. It would be worth studying whether or not ethnicity does matter in one’s personal life in Senegal, and if it does, how people are able to keep it separate from political issues.

By examining Kenya and Senegal, this research postulates that politicized ethnicity and institutionalized violence are two causal factors of the post-election ethnic violence in Kenya, and their absence relates to the peace in Senegal. If further study could solidify these findings with empirical evidence on a wider scale than two countries, then the larger community could use these factors to examine how to prevent further violence in African states. Beyond that, it is clear from this research that African states need to further institutionalize their political systems to prevent the fluidity of parties that results in short-lived multiethnic opposition coalitions. Europe has stable parties with strong ideologies, and the coalitions that form are much stronger than the multiethnic coalitions that formed in Kenya and Senegal. For example, Switzerland is known for being a multiethnic state with peaceful executive
power-sharing in broad coalitions (Lijphart, 1999). Democratization success may also need to be revisited in Kenya and Senegal because both of these nations were deemed democratic, although once in power, the presidents partook in authoritarian actions. Other scholars should attempt to find a way to prevent centralized rule in Africa while simultaneously strengthening the party system, otherwise if countries follow the paths of Kenya and Senegal, the process of democratization will never be complete because of the executive.

The need for further research comes from the limitations of this research. By using the most similar systems design, the number of cases available was limited. Two cases is a very small sample and limits the scope of how far the causal hypotheses can be generalized to other countries. Also, identifying causal mechanisms only allows for the generation of causal hypotheses, not conclusions. So, this research is simply the start of the process of identifying the deeper relationships between ethnicity, multiethnic coalitions and violence. In order to further delve into the topic of this thesis, it would be necessary to do a larger study. Doing a larger study with multiple cases would allow one to perform quantitative analysis and examine the relationships between the variables of interest and rule out rival hypotheses through the inclusion of statistical controls. The first stage of a larger study would likely use African states because of their regional similarities, however, one would eventually want to use a research design that included cases from other regions to test these hypotheses and evaluate the external validity of any findings emanating from the study of just African cases. This thesis provides the groundwork for such further research.
References


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