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American Hypocrisy in Foreign Policy:
Operation FUBELT and The Overthrow of Salvador Allende

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On 11 September 2001, terrorists, in hijacked commercial aircraft, smashed into the World Trade Center complex in New York City. Nearly three thousand people died as a result of this action. The President of the United States, along with his National Security Advisor, Director of Central Intelligence, and Attorney General were quick to go before the American people and condemn this act of treachery. Calls for justice were quick and many, and the American people came together in a chorus of condemnation of those responsible. On 11 September 1973, the President of the United States, along with his National Security Advisor, Director of Central Intelligence, and Attorney General, helped facilitate the rise to power of General Augusto Pinochet as the new President of Chile. It is estimated that 2,800-5,000 people died as a result of this action. There was no condemnation for this act of treachery. In fact the American public was unaware of the actions of the United States Government so there was never a cry for justice. The actions of the United States government would become public knowledge twenty-six years later.

In February 1999, President William J. Clinton declassified the documents associated with the operation that put Pinochet into power, and the public slowly started to become aware of what our government had done. This CIA operation, code named FUBELT, was put into action despite the fact that President Salvador Allende posed no threat to the United States. These documents, many of which are cited herein, show a blatant disregard of the United States government's own ideology and policies regarding democracy, as well as its disregard of the United Nations (U.N.) documents that it signed to guarantee a right of self determination. The disregard of these rights that the United States has agreed to under the U.N. charter and the rights to a free and democratic society as guaranteed by our own Constitution are the heart of the hypocrisy of United States foreign policy. There are many examples of this hypocrisy in foreign

policy, in numerous countries in virtually every region of the world. This paper will look at just one of those examples, the United States involvement in the overthrow of President Salvador Allende of Chile.¹

On the 26th of June, 1945 the United States signed the United Nations charter. Chapter 1, Article 1, paragraph 2 states clearly the following rationale for the organizations existence, and commits the signatories: "To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace."² The right to self-determination was one of the founding principles of the United States' War of Independence as well as the nation's Constitution. Why would the United States undertake an operation that goes against these very principles? What had Allende done that made him a target of the United States?

The actions that President Richard Nixon and his administration took against Salvador Allende and Chile were directly related to, or derived from, policies and actions of his predecessors. To understand the how and why of the United States involvement in Chile, we must look at those actions and policies undertaken by the Presidents of the containment generation. The Cold War, and the policies that arose from it, shaped United States foreign policy immediately following World War II, and for decades thereafter. As the war came to a close, two powers stood at polar ends of the political spectrum: the United States and the Soviet Union. Having seen the Soviet Union take control of Eastern Europe, the fear of future Communist expansion became the impetus for "containment" of communism, and the domino theory as the basis of United States foreign policy for the next quarter century. President Truman became the first of the containment generation Presidents. His containment policies included

The Truman Doctrine, The Marshall Plan, and the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.³

In October of 1949 the Chinese Revolution put Mao Zedong into power and created a Communist China. This was seen as a serious setback to the United States foreign policy of containment and left Truman with the label of the President who "lost" China.

In 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower succeeded Truman as President. Stopping the spread of communism, and containing the Communist desire for world supremacy remained the top priority for American foreign policy.⁴ Under Eisenhower's New Look policy, the United States would take any actions it deemed necessary in order to keep the current balance of power in its favor. It was during the Eisenhower administration that the CIA became a major player in United States foreign policy. This administration and those that followed initiated covert operations into foreign territories through the CIA. In 1959, at the end of Eisenhower's presidency, the Cuban Revolution took place and had a profound effect on the entire Latin American region.

The effects of the recent Cuban Revolution swept through virtually all Latin American countries, and was something that the new administration under John F. Kennedy had to deal with.⁵ Because of its impact, the Cuban Revolution played a key role in determining future American foreign policy responses in Latin America. Cuba and Latin America became the impetus for many of the programs and policies under Kennedy, policies that allowed the containment and the domino theories to obtain new heights. Kennedy did not want to be seen as weak on communism, or to become the next President to lose a country to the perceived threat of Communist expansion. Under President Kennedy, the policy of "flexible response" replaced Eisenhower's New Look policy. Flexible response expanded the conventional military forces

greatly, and placed special emphasis on the establishment of special forces units such as the Green Berets.⁶ According to Fraser and Murray the last policy in the containment of Communist expansion, especially in Latin America, was "United States support for anti-Communist forces plotting to overthrow actual pro- or suspected Communist governments in Central and South America."⁷ This policy became the key to President Richard Nixon's response to the election of Salvador Allende in Chile.

Who was Salvador Allende and how did he become the target of the Nixon administration? Salvador Allende Gossens was born in Valparaíso, Chile on 26 June 1908. His family was considered upper class and had a history of being involved in politics. In 1932 Allende graduated from the University of Chile with a degree in medicine. It was during his college years, while working part time with the ambulance service, that Allende would witness the effects of deep impoverishment and illiteracy in Chile. His desire to help the poor and his social conscience pushed him into politics and made him the Marxist he became.⁸ In 1956 Allende's coalition became the Frente de Acción Popular (FRAP), and in 1958 he served as the party's candidate for the presidency. Allende did much better in the 1958 election than he had in the previous Presidential election, receiving 29 percent of the popular vote versus 6 percent in 1952. Because of his narrow defeat and his Marxist ideology, Allende attracted a lot of attention amongst officials in Washington D.C.. In 1964 Allende ran once more for President. Unlike the previous elections in which three or more candidates had run, the 1964 election saw only Allende and Eduardo Frei running against each other. Allende represented the left and was again the candidate of FRAP. Frei represented the center and right and was the candidate of the Christian Democrats. Conservatives and liberals that were allied with the radical elements of the right had no desire to see a Marxist candidate in power. To eliminate this possibility they broke away

from their alliance and allowed their supporters to vote for Frei. With a Marxist candidate on one hand and a democratic candidate on the other, the United States could not let Allende win. The Johnson administration tasked the CIA with helping the Frei campaign. To accomplish the mission, the CIA covertly contributed millions in financial support to Frei's campaign. Frei went on to win the election. This marked the first time—certainly not the last—that the United States involved itself in an Allende related election. In 1970, Salvador Allende ran for President again, this time for his own Unidad Popular (People's Unity) coalition. The 1970 election was a return to a three candidate election and Allende won this election but not with a clear majority. Allende received 36.5 percent of the vote, Jorge Alessandri got 35.2 percent and the third candidate Radomiro Tomic received 28.0 percent. Under the Chilean Constitution, if no candidate receives a majority, congress would choose the winner of the election. This set in motion the events that led to the overthrow of Allende and demonstrated, once again, the hypocrisy of American foreign policy.

To say that the United States was the sole contributing element that led to the overthrow of Allende would be inaccurate. Salvador Allende's political ambitions, as well as his actions, or in some cases his inaction, were all contributing factors to his own downfall. Historian Thomas Wright points out several of Allende's contributory actions and non-action. First was the hyper mobilization of rural and working classes. This created significant problems for Allende as rural peasants had taken Allende's agrarian reform into their own hands to occupy large estates and urban workers had taken action as well by seizing factories. The problem for Allende was a question of what or what not to do about it. Allende waived on action against his own people as his government was a peoples government. On the other side of the fence Allende believed that he needed to enforce the laws of the land. Wright says, "On one hand Allende had

Constitutional responsibility as President to enforce the law, which of course guaranteed private ownership rights until valid expropriation order was given. On the other hand the workers were Allende's constituency, and for ideological as well as practical reasons he was understandably loathe to use force of a "people's" government against the people."⁹ Secondly there existed a power struggle between the President and congress as congressional impeachments of Allende appointed cabinet ministers took place. Chile's congress and judiciary branch had no sympathy for Allende's Marxist objectives and showed this by refusing to pass bills brought forth by his UP coalition. Thirdly there were mounting economic problems such as shortages of food and other consumer goods and inflation that reached 300 percent. These economic problems were exacerbated by Track II operations. Chile's radical left wing, the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), continued to radicalize and mobilize the lower classes. Furthermore the MIR wanted, and advocated in actions, Allende to take bigger and bolder steps. As Allende continued to nationalize the Chilean economy and the United States economic warfare took its toll, the support of the middle class was fading away. The *gremios*, Chile's economic and profession associations, launched the 1972 truckers strike to protest nationalization of the trucking sector that shutdown the provisioning to cities. In addition, a second strike on July 25, 1973, was designed to totally shut down the economy for as long as necessary to remove Allende. Both strikes were supported financially by the CIA as part of its covert destabilization plan. Joining the *gremios* were Chilean housewives in the "marches of the empty pots", demonstrations by students and general street agitation. Along with all the violence, economic warfare, and a political impasse, the MIR and Allende's last move brought the coup climate to critical mass and provide the impetus for the Chilean military to move against Allende.

Chilean Naval intelligence had uncovered a plot that sailors in two cities were planning to mutiny against their commanders. With this information they accused the MIR, Socialist Senator Carlos Altamirano and the Movement for Unitary Popular Action Deputy Oscar Garretón with plotting the mutiny. Allende's last move, unfortunately, coincided with the "discovery" of the mutiny plot. Allende decided to replace officers in various strategic positions within the Chilean military with officers that he was confident in. Prior to this action, Allende had taken a hands off approach with the military. This would be the first time that he would use his powers as the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces.

Scholarship written in the first few years after the coup are good sources on events within Chile. During this period the most influential scholars in the field included Paul Sigmund, Elizabeth Farnsworth, James Petras and Morley Morris. The documents released in 1999 changed the accuracy and scope of many of these secondary sources.¹⁰ For the purpose of this paper, I have primarily utilized secondary sources written after President Clinton's release of the Chilean documents. Influential authors from this period include Peter Kornbluh, Lubna Zakia Qureshi, and Thomas Wright.

Against the backdrop of the Cold War, superpower one-upmanship, domino theory, and Communist containment policies of the four preceding administrations, the Nixon administration had to deal with the election of an openly Marxist President and a Marxist-oriented government in Chile. President Richard Nixon was not going to let another Cuba happen in Latin America. Qureshi summed it up well when she stated that President Nixon was "shaped by cultural prejudice and influence by the legacy of his predecessors" and that he "looked on political developments in Chile with proprietary interest."¹¹ As mentioned earlier the actions that

President Richard Nixon and his administration took against Salvador Allende and Chile were directly related to, or derived from, policies and actions of his predecessors.

The democratically elected Chilean President, Marxist Salvador Allende, took office on 3 November 1970. Despite the fact that the United States Government intelligence and diplomatic assessments had determined that Allende posed no threat to the security of the United States, nothing would stop the Nixon administration from being the force behind the efforts to try to keep him from being seated as the new President, or his subsequent removal from office if inaugurated.

On 15 September 1970, President Nixon, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Richard Helms, and Attorney General John Mitchell met in the Oval Office, to discuss United States policy toward Allende and Chile. It was reported that President Nixon was very angry and was concerned that if Allende became the new Chilean President that communism would spread throughout Latin America. Qureshi theorizes that, "What probably intensified his paranoia about Allende's Unidad Popular and other Latin American nationalist movements was the most successful one of all, Castro's Cuban experiment."¹² During this meeting Nixon stressed that he wanted to prevent Allende from being inaugurated. Handwritten notes taken by DCI Helms showed the beginning of United States intervention into Chilean internal affairs. The handwritten notes from this meeting became the Presidential directive regarding actions to be undertaken in Chile. The notes provide insight to President Nixon and his disregard for Chilean sovereignty.

The notes state:

*One in 10 chance, perhaps,
but save Chile:
Worth Spending*

Not concerned risks involved
No involvement of Embassy
\$10,000,000 available, more
if necessary
full-time job-best men
we have
game plan
make the economy scream
*48 hours plan of action*¹³

The next day, 16 September 1970, DCI Helms met with high agency officials of covert operations to discuss options. Minutes of this first meeting note that the CIA must prepare an action plan for National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger within 48 hours.

“The Director told the group that President Nixon had decided that an Allende Regime in Chile was not acceptable to the United States. The President asked the Agency to prevent Allende from coming to power or to unseat him. The President authorized ten million dollars for this purpose, if needed. Further The Agency is to carry out this mission without coordination with the Departments Of State and Defense.”¹⁴

Here we see written documentation of President Nixon's disregard of our own government's ideology and policies regarding democracy, as well as the U.N. documents that it signed to guarantee a right of self determination. Proof that United States foreign policy is hypocritical and is meant as a tool for the United States to get its way through intervention. The CIA Plan that evolved out of this meeting was one that consisted of dual actions, known as Track I and Track II, both running concurrently. This plan was given the codename FUBELT. Kissinger and the CIA immediately implemented FUBELT in order to comply with the directive of the President. Oversight of the operation was handled through the 40 Committee. The 40

Committee supervised all intelligence operations that were undertaken on behalf of the White House.

Track I is said to have originated on June 18, 1970 when Ambassador Edward Korry proposed to the 40 Committee that a contingency fund of \$250,000 be established in order to bribe Chilean congressmen and senators, in the event that neither candidate received a majority. Under the Chilean Constitution, if no candidate receives a majority of the popular vote, then congress must select the winner of the election. This was the case, as Allende received 36.5% of the vote, Jorge Alessandri 35.2% and Radomiro Tomic 28%.¹⁵ Allende's party did not have the congressional votes to put him in power, without a minimum of 19 votes from the Christian Democratic Party. To insure that Allende would not win, bribery of the Christian Democrat members of congress would be a way to keep Allende out of power. The ultimate goal of this covert political maneuver was for the Chilean congress to ratify the runner-up candidate, Jorge Alessandri. After Alessandri's ratification, the plan called for him to then renounce the presidency and create the need for a new election. The outgoing Christian Democratic President Eduardo Frei could run again, and with United States assistance like the 1964 elections, defeat Allende. This was the initial plan that the CIA called Track I or the parliamentary solution. Track I was considered and generally accepted to be a legal and Constitutional approach to keeping Allende from assuming the presidency. On September 14, the 40 committee authorized expenditure of this fund. It quickly became apparent that bribery was too risky due to the number of officials needing to be bribed. With such large numbers the chances of exposure were high. If the plan were exposed, the anti-American sentiment that it would create within Chile could cause the collapse of the entire effort.¹⁶

The plan to bribe members of the Chilean congress was abandoned but covert efforts to pressure the military and the Christian Democrats to accept and enact the “Frei re-election gambit” continued. When it was realized that there was no way to get enough of the Christian Democrats votes to ratify Alessandri this plan was also abandoned. Nixon knew that direct military intervention would lead to world condemnation and serious repercussions in the U.N. so he continued to push the CIA to come up with a covert plan to keep Allende from being ratified as the winner of the election. The new plan called for current President Eduardo Frei to institute a self coup. Under the plan Frei would order his cabinet to resign and replace them with a cabinet composed entirely of military officers. After this, Frei would appoint an acting President and then leave Chile. This would leave the country under the control of the military, and a Presidential figurehead. The problem with the Frei self coup plan was that it depended on Frei’s total commitment to execute the plan to completion. Frei's objection to betraying both the Constitution and Chile's historical tradition of non military intervention in civil rule led to the failure of Track I.¹⁷

Efforts to get Frei to set the coup plan in motion continued. These efforts included false newspaper articles claiming the Communists were out to destroy Frei and his legacy as soon as Allende assumed power. Other efforts included telegrams to Frei's wife, from fake women's groups, asking her to save the region from communism. The work that went into trying to keep Allende from being elected, and then inaugurated was nothing when compared to the efforts of the CIA during the 1958 elections. Many historians feel that there is a distinction between Track I and Track II. The distinction that Track I was a Constitutional approach and that Track II was a military coup is erroneous. As seen by the CIA's plan involving Eduardo Frei, Track I changed its focus from one of a constitutional approach to one of a coup. Track II focused on the Chilean

military, in regards to identifying any current or retired officers willing to lead a coup against the Allende government. Furthermore, any assistance that the United States can provide, to include, money, equipment, and direction would be available. CIA efforts to keep Allende from assuming office did not succeed. This did not stop the Nixon administration from continuing to make plans for his eventual overthrow.

Allende was ratified as President on 24 October 1970. Per Nixon's orders, the CIA continued to develop covert plans aimed at the removal of Allende from office. Evidence of these orders is seen in a secret cable, sent on the 16th of October 1970. CIA deputy director of plans, Thomas Karamessines, conveys Kissinger's orders to CIA station chief in Santiago, Henry Hecksher:

"It is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup. It would be preferable to have this transpire prior to 24 October but efforts in this regard will continue vigorously beyond this date. We are to continue to generate maximum pressure toward this end utilizing every appropriate resource. It is imperative that these actions be implemented clandestinely and securely so that the USG (United States Government) and American hand be well hidden."¹⁸

This secret cable was in essence, the green light to begin planning and implementation of future Track II operations. The Republican party had given Truman the label of the President who lost China to the Communists. Nixon was dead set on not giving the Democratic party any opportunity to label him the next President to lose a country to communism. Because of this Track II operations would continue.

Running concurrently with Track I, Track II operations had begun on September 9 and were accelerated when Nixon's directive of September 15th was issued. The approach was three pronged. The first step was to identify, contact, and gather background information on any

military officers who would be willing to participate in and execute the coup plan. The second step was to inform them that the United States government was committed and they would receive its full support short of sending in military forces. The final step was to create a climate within Chile that provided an excuse for the Chilean military to overthrow Allende.¹⁹

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) military attaché in Chile was Colonel Paul Wimert. He was used in this effort because he had established close ties with the Chilean military including those who might support the coup. Wimert was advised to proceed with the knowledge of the Ambassador. He accomplished his mission through the use of “false flaggers” or the “illegal team,” an elite team of four special agents. These four operatives were chosen for the experience and ability to pose as non-United States nationals, a means that safeguarded the operation against exposure. False flag agents usually operated under deep cover, posing as Latin Americans and were used to make contacts with individuals for whom the CIA had little or no information, people who operated on the fringe, and whose reliability was unproven or unknown to the CIA.

The CIA identified five possible military candidates to lead a coup against Allende. These men were General Camilo Valenzuela, Commander of the garrison in Santiago de Chile, General Joaquín García, second in command of the air force, General Vicente Huerta, commander of the national police, Admiral Hugo Tirado, second in command of the navy, and retired General Roberto Viaux.²⁰ All of the officers were informed that the United States government would support them before and after the coup took place. After contacting these and a number of other active duty officers, Roberto Viaux was tabbed by the CIA to lead the coup. A CIA talking paper notes that the “only one military leader of national stature, General Roberto Viaux, appears committed to denying Allende the presidency.”²¹ Viaux was a disgruntled commander who had

been retired for attempting a military coup in 1969 against Frei. Being retired he commanded no troops, therefore the choice of Viaux was not without its own problems. Most active duty officers would not move against the Allende government due in large part to their Commander in Chief, General René Schneider. Following the tradition of the Chilean military, Schneider was completely committed to a position of supporting the Constitutional transfer of power. Furthermore, General Schneider publicly supported the transfer of power to whichever candidate the Chilean congress would chose, including Salvador Allende.

Step three in Track II was an effort wherein the CIA, the United States embassy in Chile, and the White House set out to disrupt the tranquility of the nation and create turmoil so a “coup climate” would be created. This would create major challenges for the CIA and several problems. Among these problems and challenges was the fact that a large segment of the population was pleased and quite happy with the election of Salvador Allende. The second problem was the tradition of the Chilean military to remain out of politics and support the Constitution. The shining example of that was the CIA's third problem, General René Schneider. Therefore it was imperative that General Schneider be removed from the equation. Before any operation to remove General Schneider could be undertaken, the CIA needed to begin establishing a coup climate or crisis. The primary objective of this socioeconomic crisis was to force the military to take action against Allende, or for him to step down. To create a climate that provided a pretext for the military to take action, and assist in creating a flashpoint for action, the CIA used a three pronged attack: economic, political, and psychological warfare.

Economic warfare and pressure were always seen as key components of any coup strategy – In the infamous words of President Nixon, he wanted “to make the economy scream.”²² To make this happen the CIA was tasked to determine what economic tactics could be employed.

Actions considered included ideas such as starting rumors of food rationing to create hoarding and shortages; asking United States banks to halt renewal of credit to Chile; have Chile based United States companies halt or slow down critical items, such as spare machine parts for the mining industry; spreading false information about near bankruptcy of Chilean building and loan associations; pressuring United States companies to publically announce closure of their Chilean operations; and numerous other tactics. International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) and The PepsiCo companies were already involved in United States government plans to stop Allende. In addition, the CIA was pressuring European countries with economic ties to Chile to suspend or slow down activities.

Political warfare accelerated propaganda and mobilization of CIA-controlled organizations and assets. In an effort to isolate Allende's Popular Unity Coalition, negative reports by politicians and civic leaders, anti-Allende rallies, hostile media to include newspaper, radio, and television, were financially supported and directed by the CIA. Fictitious intelligence reports and false information about Allende's plans, were circulated throughout the press and the military, all with the intent of creating a climate and pretext for a coup.

A rumor campaign was started based on any possible bit of information that might help create the coup climate. It was suggested that false flag officers should frequent bars and plant a minimum of three rumors a day for ten days. The grist for the rumor mill would be provided by the CIA. The CIA was ordered to consider the use of terrorist activities against Allende's followers. The CIA documents declassified by the Clinton administration do not contain enough information to support the fact that terrorist activities were conducted in the effort to create the coup climate. Given the world situation today and the United States' "war on terror" the words "terrorist activities" have a rather profound impact. It shows another aspect of United States

government hypocrisy in the fact that it would possibly encourage terrorist actions, yet proclaimed displeasure with terrorist actions committed by others.

With the 24 October Chilean Congressional vote on the election winner looming, Kissinger pressured the CIA to instigate a coup. Under this extreme pressure the CIA decided that the solution for Track II would have to be a military action with retired General Viaux. Viaux was contacted through a foreign intermediary on 5 October 1970. Two false flag agents, Anthony Sforza and Bruce MacMasters, served as liaison with Viaux and his people and obtained details on strategy and support requirements. In order for the Viaux operation to be successful, General Schneider had to be neutralized. It was decided that Schneider would be kidnapped by the Viaux organization and isolated to keep him from making any statements that would keep other military officers from joining Viaux. It appeared to be a good plan since it removed a powerful Allende supporter and would have him replaced with a Viaux coup supporter. Additionally, the plan called for the kidnapping to be blamed on leftist extremists to undermine Allende's integrity. Sforza and MacMasters coordinated with members of Viaux's group to plan the kidnapping. As the planning continued, Thomas Karamessines lost confidence in the ability of Viaux to successfully lead a coup. In a meeting with Kissinger and Alexander Haig on 15 October 1970, Karamessines voiced his concern and when he stated that it was the CIA's conclusion that "Viaux did not have more than one chance in twenty-perhaps less-to launch a successful coup."²³ Furthermore, all members of this meeting agreed that Viaux had to be warned against launching a coup attempt at this time. To that end a message was sent to Viaux stating:

"We have reviewed your plans, and based on your information and ours, we come to the conclusion that your plans for a coup cannot succeed. Failing, they may reduce our capabilities for the future. Preserve your assets. We will stay in touch. The time will

come when you with all your other friends can do something. You will continue to have our support."²⁴

Despite the above quoted warning, the CIA continued to meet with and support Viaux. At 2:00 am on 22 October 1970, the CIA delivered three submachine guns to Viaux supporters. At 8:00am the next day, 23 October 1970, General Schneider's vehicle was struck and stopped by five members of Viaux's team. Two members of the group broke the rear window, General Schneider pulled his sidearm in an attempt to defend himself and several members of the kidnap team fired. The severely wounded Schneider succumbed to his wounds three days later.²⁵

The election of Allende to the Chilean presidency on 4 September 1970 was a moment that created a wave of actions in Chile, Latin America, and Washington D.C.. Frantic and frequent communications between Ambassador Korry and Washington became the norm. Despite the efforts of the United States and the coup supporters, Salvador Allende was ratified as the President of Chile on 24 October 1970. All seventy-four Christian Democrat Senators and Congressmen voted for Allende. The fact that there was no "coup climate" in Chile became painfully evident to the leadership of the United States government. The United States now had to scramble to cover up their role in the efforts to keep Allende out of office. Nixon, Kissinger, Helms, Korry, Mitchell, and the CIA had to keep the world from learning of their devious plans. Orders were given to destroy evidence that could produce a trail back to the United States government. The order included instructions to lie in response to any allegations of United States involvement and to stick with absolute denial of the facts. The CIA fostered an impression that all contact with General Viaux and his group were stopped before October 18. By scrambling to cover up its role, the Nixon administration admitted that what it was doing was wrong and in direct violation of the our own principles, values and rights.²⁶

After the Chilean congress approved Allende as their choice for President, President Nixon still wanted to bring down Allende. Qureshi's thesis sums up Nixon's reasoning, "Truman had lost China. Kennedy had lost Cuba. Nixon was not about to lose Chile."²⁷ On 3 November 1970, Salvador Allende was inaugurated as the new Chilean President. That same day the National Security Council presented Kissinger with a 21 page options paper for Chile. This paper described and presented the United States objectives, and interests as well as providing four options, Options A, B, C, and D, towards Chile.²⁸ On 9 November the National Security Council informed the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness and the Director of Central Intelligence that United States policy towards Chile would fall under Option C, cool but correct posture. These directives were issued under National Security Decision Memorandum 93 (NSDM 93).²⁹

Economic pressures initiated under project FUBELT continued after Allende's inauguration. The first step in the economic effort to destabilize the Chilean government was to initiate what was referred to as an invisible blockade. The Chilean economy was deeply dependent on financial, industrial, and commercial relations with the United States. Two-thirds of the 1.6 billion dollar foreign investment in Chile was generated by United States businesses. Prior to Eduardo Frei's Chileanization of copper, United States businesses owned eighty percent of the Chilean copper industry. The United States government's invisible blockade, constituted total economic war against the Allende regime. Chilean accounts in the United States were frozen, new loans from banks were stopped or deferred, Chile's world credit rating was downgraded, and European countries were encouraged to adopt the same policies. The United States pressured European creditors to join them in refusing to reschedule Chile's debt. In terms of banking credit alone, the Chilean economy took a massive body blow. World bank loans dropped from 31

million to zero, Export-Import bank loans dropped from 280 million to zero, Inter-American Development Bank loans dropped from 46 million to 2 million, and loans thru the United States Agency for International development dropped from 110 million to 3 million. United States corporations with assets in Chile were encouraged to drag their feet and limit their operations as much as possible. A proposal was even considered to sell off the United States stockpile of copper in order to drive down the price. Economic pressure was considered for the Chilean military in the hopes that it would act against Allende. Postponement of a delivery of United States tanks was considered and new sales of military aircraft were processed slowly. But in light of the fact that the United States needed Chilean military cooperation for a coup, and in order to maintain contacts within the Chilean military, sales of military equipment, military assistance and training were actually doubled.³⁰

The United States attempted to isolate Chile diplomatically. Brazil and Argentina were consulted in efforts to try to remove Chile from the Organization of American States (OAS). The very same initiative that the United States took against Cuba after Castro declared his Marxist allegiance.

Economic and political destabilization were just two parts of a three part attack under NSDM 93. The United States budgeted seven million dollars for covert action programs for Chile. The first aim was to exacerbate existing economic, political, governmental, and military tensions. The second leg was to divide and weaken Allende. Activities undertaken to meet these objectives were directed against the Allende coalition, Allende himself, the Chilean military, any groups opposing Allende, the public and other Latin American countries. In a SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY summary for President Nixon, Kissinger listed the five principal elements of the CIA covert destabilization plan to accomplish these goals.³¹

Political action to divide and weaken the Allende coalition and support to non-Marxist political groups and parties were two of these five principals. Political operations included financial support of Chilean opposition parties for the April 1971 elections. This included covert financing of the Christian Democrat Party and the National Party and other smaller parties that could well be a part of a coalition government. The CIA was aware of that the business community was working to promote violent disorder to foment a coup.³² The business community had formed a group called the *gremios*. The *gremios* were comprised of small and large business owners, small farmers, transportation segments of the economy to include truck and taxi drivers, and artisans in what was truly a multiclass organization. Historian Thomas Wright argues that these groups banded together, "To counter the threat of reform," under the banner of "commonality of interests among all merchants, from the major import-export houses to the humble shopkeeper, all farmers, manufacturers, and professionals."³³ While political opponents were being financed and supported, the CIA looked towards maintaining and enlarging its contacts in the Chilean military.

The Chilean military was the third element of the CIA destabilization plan. The CIA Realized that the military was the key player in any effort to change Chile's future, therefore, the CIA put extreme emphasis on covert operations targeting the military. The emphasis was to rebuild the covert assets within the military after the arrests and purges that took place after the assassination of General Schneider. The deceptive operations were geared to convince the military generals that Allende was plotting with Fidel Castro to undermine the army's high command. This was done, in part, through the use of an anti-Allende newsletter that targeted the military. In turn, military officers who were strongly opposed to Allende made it known to the United States that they would support a coup. It was during a visit to a United States military installation in

Panama that one such officer, army commander General Augusto Pinochet, come to the forefront. In a secret CIA cable from 27 September 1972 noted that, "Pinochet, previously the strict Constitutionalist, reluctantly admitted he now harboring second thoughts: That Allende must be forced to step down or be eliminated."³⁴

The final elements of the CIA plan consisted of the assistance and use of selected media outlets to speak out against Allende constituted the remaining two elements noted in the Kissinger memorandum. The *El Mercurio* project was part of the CIA's plan to assist certain periodicals which could speak out against the Allende government. *The El Mercurio* newspaper was a key outlet for the massive propaganda campaign that was part of Track I and II. This was an unyielding campaign of inflammatory articles and editorials exhorting the opposition and calling for an overthrow of the Allende government. *El Mercurio*, in turn, received 1.95 million dollars.³⁵ As Peter Kornbluh notes, "In an admission that United States covert operations had directly contributed to the overthrow of Allende, the CIA asserted that the propaganda effort, in which *El Mercurio* was the dominant actor, played a significant role in setting the stage for the military coup of September 11, 1973."³⁶ A role that proved to be far more effective than the CIA's ability to influence elections via financial support of opposition groups.

In the spring of 1973 Congressional elections were held in Chile. Allende's UP coalition gained two seats in the Senate and six seats in Congress, despite six million dollars pumped into opposition group campaigns prior to the election. As a result of the elections the CIA refocused its attention on creating a coup climate. Adding fuel to the CIA's desire to create a climate for a coup was the fact that the Chilean military had indicated that they were ready to go with the coup in July 1973. Once again the only thing standing in the way was the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. Much like General Schneider, General Carlos Prats the new Commander in

Chief, was committed to upholding the Constitution and the traditional role of the Chilean military refraining from action in politics. Because of this Prats was viewed as the only officer impeding a coup attempt. Because of the assassination of General Schneider three years earlier, the CIA wished to avoid a replay with General Prats. The plan undertaken by the CIA, was a massive smear campaign through *El Mercurio*. The plan was very successful and led to the resignation of General Prats in late August.³⁷ Thus on 11 September 1973 the coup was launched and in the wake of this action Salvador Allende would be dead. Refusing to be captured by the military, Allende committed suicide. The Chilean people now faced sixteen years of extremely oppressive rule under the military leadership led by Augusto Pinochet.

Thomas Karamessines words help to sum up the effect of the CIA operations when he said in 1975, "Track II never ended . What we were told to do was to continue our efforts. Stay alert, and to do what we could to contribute to the eventual achievements and of the objectives of Track II. I am sure that the seeds that were laid in that effort in 1970 had their impact in 1973. I do not have any question about that in my mind."³⁸ Karamessines' words also help to illustrate the United State's transition to covert influence versus overt military actions that was the hallmark of earlier foreign policy in the nineteenth and twentieth century.

During the nineteenth and early twentieth century, United States policy toward Latin America was such that overt military actions to remove governments that were not in concert with United States economic and political interests, were frequently authorized by United States Presidents. After signing the U.N. Charter in 1948 that stressed nonintervention and respect for a nation's sovereignty, the use of the CIA to assert United States influence in countries all around the globe, was used on a frequent basis. The opening salvo of American hypocrisy was United States support of the French in reclaiming their colonies in Indochina after World War II.

Hypocritical because of the words of the U.N. charter stating the rights of self determination, that were also the heart and soul of its predecessor the Atlantic Charter.

On the Jim Lehrer *PBS Online News Hour* of 20 February 2001, former Chilean Foreign Affairs Minister Juan Gabriel Valdes spoke for the Chilean government when he said, "It is always shocking to learn again that the United States sent machine guns in the pouch of the U.S. embassy in Chile to order the kidnap of the Commander in Chief of the Chilean armed forces. And of course this is very important for us to know; and I think that the reaction of my government at the time was, and still is, that we would like to see along with the papers a certain sense of remorse." Later in the News Hours, Henry Kissinger is quoted as saying " This assumes the policy was immoral or worse, and that I don't accept. It's easy to forget what the Cold War was like. We thought, wrongly or rightly, we were in a life and death struggle with the Soviet Union as a functioning global system."³⁹ The Chilean people do not agree and this is just one of the many reasons that the United States has such a terrible image among many of the nations in Latin America. It is an image that is tarnished as a direct result of our own political hypocrisy, the Cold War, and the desire of every President since Harry Truman to keep the United States in the spotlight of the world stage as a superpower. The actions taken by the government of the United States in its effort to "contain" the Soviet Union and the possible spread of communism completely violated the U.N. charter. Countries around the world were allowed the right of self-determination, as long as the government that was established was one that was friendly to the United States. Governments with even the least bit of a leftward lean were undermined either covertly or overtly in order to establish a more "friendly" government, never mind if the government that was in power was doing well for its people and the welfare of its own sovereignty.

As the history of past events begins to outlive its participants, more and more government documents are being declassified and released. For many events there remains a need to balance national security and the safety and reputations of those involved, against the desires of the public and historians to have access to what the government knows. Events like the assassination of President Kennedy, Roswell, and the Cuban Missile Crisis may never see their government sources and documents released. In the study and research of history, primary source evidence, like declassified government documents are playing a larger role in the evolution and truth of all studies of past subjects. In the case of my research, it played a valuable role in setting the record straight on U.S. involvement. It may also open the doors for possible legal actions against those involved, similar to Spain's attempt to prosecute Allende's replacement, General Augusto Pinochet, for crimes against humanity. Although declassification and release of government documents has provided a better understanding, by the public and scholars, of historical events, it appears to have done little to change government policy. United States interventions have led either directly or indirectly to the loss of life of thousands of people in Cuba, Chile, Argentina, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Panama, South Korea, Vietnam, and most recently in Afghanistan and Iraq. This paper has shown just one of those examples. Perhaps current attitudes towards the United States today are a direct result of political, economic and military interventions in the name of freedom and democracy. But that is something for another paper, some other time.

Notes

1. Early secondary sources dealing with the overthrow of Salvador Allende focus on limited or no involvement of the United States in the coup. These secondary sources include journal articles and monographs and are, Paul Sigmund, "The 'Invisible Blockade' and the Overthrow of Allende." *Foreign Affairs* 52, no.2 (1974): 322-40; Paul Sigmund "Chile: What was the U.S. Role? Less than Charged." *Foreign Policy* no.16(1974): 142-56; Elizabeth Farnsworth, "Chile: What was the U.S. Role? More Than Admitted." *Foreign Policy* no. 16 (1974): 127-141; James Petras and Morley Morris, *The United States and Chile: Imperialism and the Overthrow of the Allende Government.* (New York: The Monthly Review Press, 1975); Paul Sigmund, "The CIA in Chile." *Worldview* 19, no. 4 (April, 1976): 11-17; Paul, Sigmund, *The Overthrow of Allende and the Politics of Chile, 1964-1976.* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977); From the late 1970's to the mid 1990's more information began to leak out about United States involvement in the overthrow of Allende. Secondary sources from this period begin to show a trend of scholars moving away from the Nixon administration party line to one of showing the public that the United States was indeed involved in the coup. It is in this time period that we also see a change in the works of Paul Sigmund. Sigmund originally stood adamantly behind the Nixon administration, but as more information began to come to light his own works show a change in position. Some of these sources include, Edward Boorstein, *Allende's Chile: An Inside View.* (New York: International Publishers, 1977); Gregory Pannoni, "Overthrow of Allende: An Analysis of U.S. Involvement." *Towson State Journal of International Affairs* 13, no. 2 (Spring 1979): 97-116; Paul Sigmund, *The United States and Democracy in Chile.* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993). During the Presidency of William J. Clinton, the United States government released over 24,000 pages of documents relating to the United States involvement in the overthrow of Salvador Allende. Secondary sources after the release of these documents include, Peter Kornbluh, *The Pinochet File A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability.* (New York: The New Press, 2004); Jonathan Haslam, *The Nixon Administration and the Death of Allende's Chile: A Case of Assisted Suicide.* (New York: Verso Books, 2005); Lubna Zakia Qureshi, *Nixon, Kissinger, and Allende: A Study of U.S. Involvement in the 1973 Coup in Chile.* (University of California, Berkeley, 2007). Primary sources are documents released during the Clinton administration. These documents clearly show the extent of United States involvement and the fact that it was ordered by then President Nixon. These sources include, *CIA Notes on Meeting with President on Chile, (1970).* Available from: The National Security Archive at The George Washington University; *CIA Genesis of Project FUBELT, (1970).* Available from: The National Security Archive at The George Washington University; *CIA, Operating Guidance Cable on Coup Plotting, October 16 (1970).* Available from: The National Security Archive at The George Washington University; *CIA, Cable Transmissions on Coup Plotting, October 18 (1970).* Available from: The National Security Archive at The George Washington University; *CIA, Memorandum of Conversation of Meeting with Henry Kissinger, Thomas Karamessines, and Alexander Haig, October 15 (1970).* Available from: The National Security Archive at The George Washington University; *CIA, Briefing by Richard Helms for the National Security Council, Chile, November 6 (1970).* Available from: The National Security Archive at The George Washington University; *CIA, Report of CIA Chilean Task Force Activities, 15 September to 3 November 1970, November 18 (1970).* Available from: The

National Security Archive at The George Washington University; *Department of Defense, U.S. Milgroup, Situation Report #2, October 1 (1973)*. Available from: The National Security Archive at The George Washington University; *Department of State Memorandum, (1970)*. Available from: The National Security Archive at The George Washington University; *Department of State Cables, (1970)*. Available from: The National Security Archive at The George Washington University; *National Security Council, Options Paper on Chile (NSSM 97), November 3 (1970)*. Available from: The National Security Archive at The George Washington University; *National Security Council, National Security Decision Memorandum 93, Policy Towards Chile, November 9 (1970)*. Available from: The National Security Archive at The George Washington University; *Transcript of Telephone Conversation between H. Kissinger and Secretary Rogers (1970)*. Available from: The National Security Archive at The George Washington University; *Transcript of Telephone Conversation between H. Kissinger and President Nixon (1970)*. Available from: The National Security Archive at The George Washington University.

2. *Charter of the United Nations, (2010)*.

3. The theory of containment first came into being through the Long Telegram written by George Kennan, counselor at the Moscow embassy. In the telegram Kennan points out the ideological differences between the Soviet Union and the United States. Furthermore, Kennan argued that the Soviet Union would look out for itself and "that it would work to destroy our traditional way of life."³ Kennan's solution was that if the willingness to use force was made apparent, the Soviet Union would back down. Later in 1947 Kennan wrote an article under the pseudonym "X" in which he argued for "a policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world."³ Hand in hand with the containment policy was the domino theory. The domino theory is the belief that if a given country in any given region were to fall to communism, the other countries in that region would soon follow, one right after the other. In a speech before congress in 1947, responding to the end of British aid to Greece and Turkey in their fight against communism, Harry S. Truman formally announced what became known as the Truman Doctrine. The Truman Doctrine established "that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."³ The domino theory, along with the Truman Doctrine, was used to sway Congress in supporting United States aid to Greece and Turkey. Fearing the possible collapse of the European economy, which would conceivably allow the Soviet Union to move into Western Europe, the Truman administration devised the Marshall Plan. The Marshall Plan brought stability to Western European nations, by providing economic aid and assistance in rebuilding devastated infrastructure. It was also seen as another step in holding possible Soviet expansion into Western Europe at bay. The final piece of Soviet containment in Europe was the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1948. When combined, the domino theory, the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and NATO can be viewed as the first steps down the road of full-fledged policy of containment.

4. Eisenhower shared Truman's views in regards to United States foreign policy and was very suspicious of the Soviet Union and communism. In the mind of President Eisenhower the cold war was a battle between the two superpowers and their allies over ideology. Whereas Truman's

doctrine seemed to establish the fact that the United States would be more inclined to possible military intervention, Eisenhower was extremely cautious in the use of military forces for intervention in foreign nations. Eisenhower's New Look Policy was a way of compromising on his campaign promises to stop Communist expansion by way of 'liberation' and Truman's containment policy. Eisenhower's definition of liberation did not necessarily mean armed liberation.

5. One impact of the Cuban Revolution was that it dramatically increased the demands for change in Latin America. Historian Thomas Wright argues that "the intensity of political activity increased" throughout Latin America "after Castro's victory, as new actors, new social issues, and more aggressive challenges to the existing order came out in force."⁵ Guerilla and revolutionary movements sprang up throughout Central and South America. Perhaps the greatest impact for American foreign policy is that the Cuban Revolution challenged United States hegemony in the Western hemisphere. Secondly the Cuban Revolution had provided other revolutionaries a proven method for ending United States dominance in their countries.

6. The new Green Beret units and CIA teams played an integral role in the training of, and support for, many Latin American militaries, as well as specialized counterinsurgency forces throughout various Latin America countries. Financial and economic aid under the Alliance for Progress joined with this military buildup as an instrument of containment.

7. T.G. Fraser, and Donette Murray. *America and the World Since 1945*. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 90.

8. Allende was elected as a socialist deputy for Quillota and Valparaíso in 1937. In 1939 he was appointed minister for health and social security in the Popular Front administration. In 1941 he took charge of the national insurance for social security. In 1943 he became Secretary-General of the Socialist Party and in late 1944, Senator for Valdivia, Osorno, Llanquihue, Chiloé, Aisén and Magellanes. Allende ran for president in 1952 as the candidate of the Frente del Pueblo, and garnered only 6 percent of the vote. He became a senator again and in 1954 was the vice-president of the Chilean senate.

9. Thomas C. Wright, *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution*. (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2001), 141.

10. Early secondary sources dealing with the overthrow of Salvador Allende focus on limited or no involvement of the United States in the coup. These secondary sources include journal articles and monographs and are, Paul Sigmund, "The 'Invisible Blockade' and the Overthrow of Allende." *Foreign Affairs* 52, no.2 (1974): 322-40; Paul Sigmund "Chile: What was the U.S. Role? Less than Charged." *Foreign Policy* no.16(1974): 142-56; Elizabeth Farnsworth, "Chile: What was the U.S. Role? More Than Admitted." *Foreign Policy* no. 16 (1974): 127-141; James Petras and Morley Morris, *The United States and Chile: Imperialism and the Overthrow of the Allende Government*. (New York: The Monthly Review Press, 1975); Paul Sigmund, "The CIA in Chile." *Worldview* 19, no. 4 (April, 1976): 11-17; Paul, Sigmund, *The Overthrow of Allende and the Politics of Chile, 1964-1976*. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977).

11. Lubna Zakia Qureshi, *Nixon, Kissinger, and Allende: A Study of U.S. Involvement in the 1973 Coup in Chile*. (Berkeley: University of California, 2007), 19.
12. Qureshi, 19.
13. *CIA Notes on Meeting With President on Chile*, (1970). See Appendix A, Document 1.
14. *CIA Genesis of Project FUBELT*, (1970).
15. Wright, 134.
16. Peter Kornbluh, *The Pinochet File A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability*. (New York: The New Press, 2004), 12.
17. Kornbluh, 13.
18. *CIA Operating Guidance Cable on Coup Plotting, October 16 1970*.
19. Information regarding Track II operations is covered in depth by Kornbluh 14-20.
20. Edward Boorstein, *Allende's Chile: An Inside View*. (New York: International Publishers, 1977), 62.
21. *CIA Talking Paper 14 November* (1970).
22. *CIA Notes on Meeting With President on Chile*, (1970).
23. *CIA, Memorandum of Conversation of Meeting with Henry Kissinger, Thomas Karamessines, and Alexander Haig, October 15* (1970).
24. *CIA, Memorandum of Conversation of Meeting with Henry Kissinger, Thomas Karamessines, and Alexander Haig, October 15* (1970). See Appendix A, Document 2.
25. Kornbluh, 20-29.
26. Kornbluh, 29-35.
27. Helms, Richard. *A Look Over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency*. (New York: Random House, 2003), 404. Quoted in: Zakia Lubna Qureshi, *Nixon, Kissinger, and Allende: A Study of U.S. Involvement in the 1973 Coup in Chile*. (Berkeley: University of California, 2007), 78.
28. *National Security Council, Options Paper on Chile (NSSM 97), November 3* (1970).

29. *National Security Council, National Security Decision Memorandum 93, Policy Towards Chile, November 9 (1970)*. See Appendix A, Document 3.

30. Kornbluh, 83-87.

31. *National Security Council Memorandum, Covert Action Program-Chile, November 25, 1970*.

32. Kornbluh, 91.

33. Wright, 143.

34. *CIA Secret Cable, 27 September 1972*. Quoted in: Peter Kornbluh, *The Pinochet File, A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability*. (New York: The New Press, 2004), 142-143.

35. Kornbluh, 91-94.

36. Kornbluh, 94.

37. Kornbluh, 111.

38. Thomas Karamessines' testimony. *United States Congress, Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*. (Washington, D.C., 1975) 254. Quoted in: Peter Kornbluh, *The Pinochet File, A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability*. (New York: The New Press, 2004), 115.

39. Jim Lehrer, Pursuing the Past: "The Need For Greater Truth," *PBS Online News Hour* (20 February 2001).

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NLF MR Case No. 89-38
 Document No. #12

15 October 1970

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION:

Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Karamessines, Gen. Haig
at the White House - 15 October 1970



1.3(a)(4)

2. Then Mr. Karamessines provided a run-down on Viaux, the Canales meeting with Tirado, the latter's new position (after Porta was relieved of command "for health reasons") and, in some detail, the general situation in Chile from the coup possibility viewpoint.

3. A certain amount of information was available to us concerning Viaux's alleged support throughout the Chilean military. We had assessed Viaux's claims carefully, basing our analysis on good intelligence from a number of sources. Our conclusion was clear: Viaux did not have more than one chance in twenty - perhaps less - to launch a successful coup.

4. The unfortunate repercussions, in Chile and internationally, of an unsuccessful coup were discussed. Dr. Kissinger ticked off

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1.3(a)(4)

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his list of these negative possibilities. His items were remarkably similar to the ones Mr. Karamessines had prepared.

5. It was decided by those present that the Agency must get a message to Viaux warning him against any precipitate action. In essence our message was to state; "We have reviewed your plans, and based on your information and ours, we come to the conclusion that your plans for a coup at this time cannot succeed. Failing, they may reduce your capabilities for the future. Preserve your assets. We will stay in touch. The time will come when you with all your other friends can do something. You will continue to have our support".

6. After the decision to de-fuse the Viaux coup plot, at least temporarily, Dr. Kissinger instructed Mr. Karamessines to preserve Agency assets in Chile, working clandestinely and securely to maintain the capability for Agency operations against Allende in the future.

7. Dr. Kissinger discussed his desire that the word of our encouragement to the Chilean military in recent weeks be kept as secret as possible. Mr. Karamessines stated emphatically that we had been doing everything possible in this connection, including the use of false flag officers, car meetings and every conceivable precaution. But we and others had done a great deal of talking recently with a number of persons. For example, Ambassador Korry's wideranging discussions with numerous people urging a coup "cannot be put back into the bottle".

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (Dr. Kissinger requested that copy of the message be sent to him on 16 October.)

1.3(a)(4)

8. The meeting concluded on Dr. Kissinger's note that the Agency should continue keeping the pressure on every Allende weak spot in sight - now, after the 24th of October, after 5 November, and into the future until such time as new marching orders are given. Mr. Karamessines stated that the Agency would comply.



Document 3. National Security Council, National Security Decision Memorandum 93, Policy Towards Chile, November 9 (1970). Available from: The National Security Archive at The George Washington University. <<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/ch09-01.htm>> (accessed on 20 January 2010).

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~ UNCLASSIFIED November 9, 1970

National Security Decision Memorandum 93

TO: Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness
Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Policy Towards Chile

Following the discussion at the meeting of the National Security Council on November 6, 1970, the President has decided that the basis for our policy toward Chile will be the concept underlying Option C of the Inter-agency paper submitted November 3, 1970 by the Department of State for the consideration of the National Security Council as outlined in the guidelines set forth below.

The President has decided that (1) the public posture of the United States will be correct but cool, to avoid giving the Allende government a basis on which to rally domestic and international support for consolidation of the regime; but that (2) the United States will seek to maximize pressures on the Allende government to prevent its consolidation and limit its ability to implement policies contrary to U. S. and hemisphere interests.

Specifically, the President has directed that within the context of a publicly cool and correct posture toward Chile:

- vigorous efforts be undertaken to assure that other governments in Latin America understand fully that the U. S. opposes consolidation of a communist state in Chile hostile to the interests of the United States and other hemisphere nations, and to the extent possible encourage them to adopt a similar posture.
- close consultation be established with key governments in Latin America, particularly Brazil and Argentina, to coordinate efforts to oppose Chilean moves which may be contrary to our mutual interests; in pursuit of this objective, efforts should be increased to establish and maintain close relations with friendly military leaders in the hemisphere.

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by F. S. [unclear] National Security Council
B. [unclear] 894-100

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prepare options for specific courses of action and related action plans for the consideration of the Senior Review Group and to coordinate implementation of approved courses of action.



Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Secretary of the Treasury
Administrator, A.I.D.
Director, Office of Management and Budget
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

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