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One year after Katrina: Tragedy of the Crescent City

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SIAM members know well the myriad ways state and local governments seek solutions to problems national and even global in scope. Addressing environmental problems is a good example. One need to not have waited to see Al Gore’s movie, *An Inconvenient Truth*, or the Hollywood disaster flick, *The Day After Tomorrow*, to know that global warming is making its way onto the public agenda, and beyond the boundaries of the national government’s scope of concern into state and local policy discussions.

For example, in their recent essay in *Publius*, “The State of American Federalism, 2005, Federalism Resurfaces in the Political Debate,” John Dinan and Dale Krane discuss state and local actions to address global warming while the national government continues to debate appropriate action. They discuss briefly the “Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative,” which is designed to reduce power plant emissions, adopted by seven states in the Northeast. They mention Oregon and Washington adopting California’s automobile tailpipe emissions standards. They also mention the U.S. Conference of Mayors resolution calling for the state and national governments to follow the Kyoto treaty.

This past Spring Semester at Villanova we arranged to host a roundtable discussion open to the public on actions local governments can take to address global warming. Representatives from the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) discussed their “Cities for Climate Protection Campaign,” that began in 1993. Now over 160 municipalities in the United States and over 650 around the world are part of the campaign.

Member municipalities promise to reduce emissions that contribute to global warming and use planning tools and practices provided by ICLEI. Examples include Toledo, OH retrofitting 20 city facilities to make them energy efficient and therefore reducing 5250 tons of global warming pollution; Austin, TX requiring the city to purchase at least 5% of its energy from renewable sources; Boulder, CO operating a shuttle bus to

**From the Chair . . .**

Katrina: One Year Later

This newsletter has a number of articles focusing on Katrina one year later. There are great lessons to be learned from Katrina regarding intergovernmental management at all levels, as you will see in these articles. Thank you to everyone who took time to make a contribution. If you would like to comment or make suggestions for future newsletter themes, please contact Kendra Stewart at kendra.stewart@eku.edu.

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**What can Hurricane Katrina and emergency management teach us about intergovernmental administration and management? More than can fit in this one article....**

John Vocino, Senior Analyst, U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)

Recently, I spent the 1-year anniversary of Hurricane Katrina’s landfall in New Orleans and the Mississippi coast in the final production process to get a GAO report that encapsulates our work to-date on Hurricane Katrina, specifically, and catastrophic disasters in general.¹ This particular report was released on September 6, following the release of over 30 other GAO products, and reports by the House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina,² the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee,³ the White House Homeland Security Council,⁴ the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Inspector General,⁵ and DHS and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).⁶ In addition to these reports, those interested in the subject can also find analyses by organizations such as the American Bar Association, the Urban Institute, private sector firms specializing in risk management, and after-action reports by many of the federal agencies who were either the primary or support agencies under the National Response Plan.

All these reports are helping to identify the variety of strengths and failures in the nation’s preparations for, response to, and initial recovery from Hurricane Katrina. These reports,
One year after Katrina, New Orleans and the surrounding area are slowly showing signs of growth and a return to normalcy. Two recent studies provide excellent overviews of the economic impacts the hurricane had on the area as well as the efforts New Orleans has made to recover from the storm’s devastation. The first study which was published in August of 2006 was done by the Brookings Institution. A “Special Edition of the Katrina Index: A One-Year Review of Key Indicators of Recovery in Post-Storm New Orleans” by Amy Liu, Matt Fellowes and Mia Mabanta, provides an overview of key social and economic indicators on New Orleans’ progress since the storm. The other study, published in June 2006, “Advancing in the Aftermath II: Tracking the Recovery from Katrina and Rita,” by Dr. Loren C. Scott, provides an extremely detailed account on the progress of recovery in the four MSAs along the Gulf Coast.

In this brief article, we summarize key economic indicators and look at how the city and region’s economy has been impacted by the storm and its progress since. We rely heavily on these two studies and recommend them as outstanding sources for the economic impact the hurricane had on New Orleans.

**Housing Market**

Recent reports on the recovery efforts in the New Orleans metropolitan area have emphasized the importance of the housing market toward a full economic recovery for the area. Key housing indicators included in economic analyses of the recovery have included housing rehabilitation and demolition, home sales, and rent and home prices. A review of these indicators demonstrates some positive momentum since the hurricane, but housing affordability remains an issue.

Housing development and demolition remain priorities for the New Orleans MSA, especially for much needed workers for area businesses. Without essential renovations, businesses will find it difficult to remain operating and further hamper the sustainability of the area’s economy. Recent demolition activity and issuance of permits (up 117 percent) in the New Orleans MSA since February of this year are positive signs that the once stagnant recovery effort is now gaining some ground.

In spite of this, an assessment of homes for sale and sold appear to be more sluggish indicators. Homes for sale in the parishes most effected by Hurricane Katrina are exceeding homes purchased, with the number of homes on the market 53 percent more than the number six months ago. Home and rent prices are also troubling for the region as a whole due in large part to availability issues. According to a recent Brookings Institute report, even as home prices have continuously decreased in Orleans and Saint Bernard Parishes, prices have risen in the more favorable suburban areas of west Jefferson and east St. Tammany Parishes.

While much needed federal assistance is on the way, a further complication will be the new guidelines for the base flood plain level. In order to be eligible for certain federal funding, residents will have to comply with the new elevation levels. This will, according to Scott’s report, add to the estimated 50 percent increase of the pre-flood value of homes to rebuild and renovate. However, large construction efforts scheduled for the area as a result of billions in federal funding and insurance dollars will aid the rebuilding efforts and the promising recovery of the New Orleans MSA.

**Income Levels**

An analysis of personal income for MSAs in the U.S. is another indicator of the economic impact Hurricane Katrina had on the New Orleans area. Utilizing preliminary data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BSA) over the period of 2003 – 2005 for 361 MSAs provides a snapshot of the extent to which the natural disasters of 2005 depressed personal wealth in two key economic MSAs in Louisiana. Six of the MSAs experienced negative percent changes during this period, among them two Louisiana MSAs (New Orleans and Lake Charles) that were in the direct paths of Hurricane Katrina and Rita respectively (table 1).
Table 1. Personal Income and Per Capita Personal Income by Metropolitan Area, 2003-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area name</th>
<th>Personal income</th>
<th>Per capita personal income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Millions of dollars</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metropolitan portion of the United States</td>
<td>7,978,326</td>
<td>8,458,879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metropolitan Statistical Areas 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lake Charles, LA</td>
<td>4,906</td>
<td>5,134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flint, MI</td>
<td>12,509</td>
<td>12,475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Champaign-Urbana, IL</td>
<td>6,786</td>
<td>6,204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kokomo, IN</td>
<td>3,190</td>
<td>3,159</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the country experienced a growth in personal income (5 percent), the New Orleans and Lake Charles MSAs incurred a reduction of 33 and 8.5 percents respectively. The consequences of such declines in personal wealth have reverberating affects on the economies of the two MSAs, further hampering progress in the area.

**Labor Force**

One year later, the New Orleans labor force is 30 percent smaller than it was before the hurricane. There are an estimated 191,000 fewer workers in the metro New Orleans’ workforce a year after Katrina, according to the Brookings Institution. That is a 31% drop in employment from April 2005 and April 2006. Over the last six months, there have been signs that the New Orleans economy is slowly growing. During this time, the labor force has grown about 14,700 workers or just about 3.4 percent (this figure, of course, includes temporary workers).

Meanwhile, the unemployment rate in New Orleans remains higher than it was before Katrina. According to the Brookings Institution, approximately 7.2 percent of New Orleans workers do not have jobs and this figure exceeds pre-Katrina conditions and is higher than the state’s 4.6 unemployment rate. This large job loss has been felt across the major industries in New Orleans and the region. The education and health services industries were most affected by hurricane Katrina. According to the Brookings Institution, during the past year, these industries have experienced a 41.2 percent job loss which translates into 32,600 lost jobs. The business and professional services industries have experienced a 36 percent loss of jobs.

However, there has been some positive news in terms of jobs for New Orleans. The rise in gas prices and the increase in construction and infrastructure rebuilding in the area seem to have had a moderately positive impact on metro area jobs. Employment in natural resources, mining and construction were cut by a somewhat modest 22.3 percent since August 2005.

Also, there have been some new jobs created in the leisure and hospitality industry. In fact, this has clearly been one of the bright spots for New Orleans and the region. After the hurricane, the city lost about half of its convention business. But today, hotel business and visitor travel to the region are estimated to be 80 percent back to pre-Katrina levels, according to the Brookings’ report. At the Louis Armstrong airport, passenger levels are just 20 percent shy of pre-storm levels. In the past six

Continued on page 5
Death by A Thousand Cuts: Administrative Failure in the Wake of the Katrina Disaster (to be published December 2007)

By all accounts the single most devastating natural disaster in the history of the U.S., the impact of Hurricane Katrina continues to be felt acutely in Southern Louisiana and Mississippi, and in profound ways its reverberations persist in the U.S. and the globe. It will be many years if not decades before the site of the storm’s impact achieves any sense of normalcy. The ultimate question is why, how could an event for which the area had adequate warning (unlike the recent devastating earthquakes or tsunamis), would have ameliorated the extent and impact of the disaster? What was successful and what wasn’t, what should have been done and by whom, and why weren’t actions taken that would have ameliorated the extent and impact of the disaster? What is the scope of the governors’ responsibility in such situations, both defined and expected, in comparison to the mayors of the cities affected, and the federal government? What can and should be done now by these governors to restore homeostasis in the region? How does the level of professionalism in Louisiana public administration demonstrated in the wake of Katrina compare to that of New York in responding to the 9/11 disaster? If differences exist, to what extent should the federal government accommodate for those differences in providing assistance and support?

We invite manuscripts for a special issue of Public Administration Review: Death by A Thousand Cuts: Administrative Failure in the Wake of the Katrina Disaster. Specifically, we seek manuscripts focused on Louisiana and Southern Mississippi in the following areas:

**The Federal Responders: The Responsiveness of Key External Actors**

**White House**

Aalysis of the executive branches’ response to the disaster, who did what, what was successful and what wasn’t, what should have been done and by whom, and why weren’t actions taken that would have ameliorated the extent and impact of the disaster. Why is the scope of the executive branches’ responsibility in such situations, both defined and expected? Compare and contrast this administration’s response to the Katrina crisis as compared to 9/11. What is recommended to better prepare the executive branch to deal with such crises in the future?

**FEMA/Homeland Security**

What elements in the structure, policy, leadership, and oversight of these affiliated agencies contributed to their successes and failures in responding to the disaster? What caused the failures that occurred? How could they have been prevented? What steps can be taken now to ensure they are better prepared to respond to a similarly devastating event? How and why did the coordination between this agency and other responders fail, and what steps can be taken to improve the system?

**Army Corps of Engineers**

What elements in the structure, policy, politics, and oversight of this agency contributed to its successes and failures in responding to the disaster? What caused the failures that occurred? Should they have foreseen the problems that emerged and could they have been prevented? What steps can this agency take now to ensure it is better prepared to respond to a similarly devastating event? How can the coordination between this agency and other responders be improved to avoid the pitfalls experienced in this situation?

**U.S. Military/Coast Guard**

What elements in the structure, policy, and oversight of these units contributed to its successes and failures in responding to the disaster? What is the key to their effectiveness in responding when they did? What setbacks occurred and could they have been prevented? What steps can they now take to ensure greater preparedness in responding to similarly devastating events? How and why did the coordination between these units and other responders contribute to their success or failure, and what steps can be taken to improve the system?

**State, Local, and Nonprofit Responders: The Responsiveness of Key Grassroot Actors**

**Governor’s Office**

An analysis of Louisiana’s and Mississippi’s top administrative officer and his/her direct reports in responding to the threat of Katrina, its impact, and its consequences. Who did what, what was successful and what wasn’t, what should have been done and by whom, and why weren’t actions taken that would have ameliorated the extent and impact of the disaster? What is the scope of the governors’ responsibility in such situations, both defined and expected, in comparison to the mayors of the cities affected, and the federal government? What can and should be done now by these governors to restore homeostasis in the region? How does the level of professionalism in Louisiana public administration demonstrated in the wake of Katrina compare to that of New York in responding to the 9/11 disaster? If differences exist, to what extent should the federal government accommodate for those differences in providing assistance and support?

**New Orleans Mayor’s Office**

What actions were taken following the initial threat of hurricane Katrina through its impact, aftermath, and continuing today. What did Mayor Ray Nagin do to successfully address the situation at all points and what did he fail to do? What factors contributed to these outcomes? Address the efficacy of coordination and communication with other local departments and agencies, state administrators, the media, and federal government. What specifically should have been done differently and what shifts in organizational structure or policy are necessary to prevent such dire consequences in the future, both for New Orleans and more broadly across the entire U.S. What lessons can be learned from this experience regarding municipal preparedness, leadership, communication, coordination, and how well our discipline’s theories of disaster management apply to what transpired in New Orleans.

**Police, Military, and Law Enforcement**

An analysis of their disaster preparedness planning and how they responded to the impact and aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. What did they do well, and what contributed to the negative outcomes of the event. Include a discussion of the ethical and legal transgressions alleged against members of these units, how and why these occurred, and what oversight was in place that should have prevented such actions. What lessons can be learned for the future, not only for New Orleans but nationwide, in terms of emergency preparedness and responsiveness, accountability, and oversight.

**The Role of Nonprofit Organizations**

An examination of how nonprofit organizations at the federal, state, and local levels responded to the crisis, what they did and when, both in preparing for the disaster and responding to it. Compare the efficiency and effectiveness of well-established and well-funded nonprofits nationally with religion-based charities and with the nonprofit

*Continued on page 5*
months, the airport has seen a 46 percent increase in passenger travel. This increase in visitors to the city can be seen in the sizeable number of hotels that have reopened. In fact, it is estimated that 85 percent of the city’s hotels are back in business. This is good news for New Orleans and means that the city’s cultural and economic life is almost fully restored to pre-hurricane levels.

However, while hotels have returned to New Orleans, only about one-third of restaurants and other food establishments are back in service. According to the Louisiana Restaurant Association, over 50 percent of the city’s eateries are still closed one year after Katrina. If more of the restaurants do not come back, then this would not bode well for the positive tourist trends the city has recently encountered. Also, while many of the businesses catered to tourists others, including grocery and convenience stores, meet the needs of local residents.

The casino industry, which suffered some of the most significant losses and damage, is showing signs of significant recovery. Brisk business has been reported by two reopened casinos – the Boomtown and Treasure Chest. Harrah’s has also reopened its downtown New Orleans casino and the casino industry in the region has committed to rebuilding in the area.

**Signs of Progress**

While the data above projects a grim picture of the recovery of the New Orleans MSA, there are indications that the economy is starting to pick up steam. A promising sign is the recovery of the Port of New Orleans to pre-Katrina activity. As of mid-February of this year, the port has regained 100 percent of cargo ship calls, well above industry estimates (Port of New Orleans 2006). The Port of New Orleans is not only vital to the state’s recovery, but is also a crucial port of entry for the nation’s imports (Port of New Orleans 2006; Scott 2006). The Port of New Orleans’ cargo activity supported $37 billion in economic benefits to the country and generated $2.8 billion in federal tax revenue (AAPA 2005).

The importance of the Port of New Orleans to the state’s recovery efforts was stated quite clearly by the Port’s President and CEO, Gary Lagrange:

*One thing that we all learned from Hurricane Katrina is that everything is connected . . . This city’s future, the state’s future and this Port’s future are all intertwined (Port of New Orleans 2006).*

(Endnotes)

1 Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

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**Call for Manuscripts**

*From page 4*

organizations that spontaneous emerged across Louisiana in response to specific disaster-related needs. How did the nonprofit sector’s response to Katrina contribute to a new conceptualization of the role of nonprofits in service delivery, professionalism, funding, and as a sector in coordination with public and private entities. What does this shift forecast for the future of nonprofits in the U.S.

Please email an abstract of your proposed manuscript to Carole L. Jurkiewicz at cljrkwcz@lsu.edu by November 1, 2006.

From the abstracts, authors will be invited to submit full length articles of 25-30 pages including references, due by March 15, 2007. All articles will be blind peer reviewed by three referees. The peer review process will determine the final selection of articles for the special issue.

This special issue of PAR is sponsored by The Public Administration Institute at the E.J. Ourso College of Business Administration at Louisiana State University. Please direct any questions to Carole L. Jurkiewicz, Women’s Hospital Distinguished Professor of Healthcare Management at Louisiana State University: cljrkwcz@lsu.edu.
Lessons Noted or Lessons Learned?
U.S. Emergency Management Post-Katrina
A Guided Interview with the ASPA Katrina Task Force
DC ASPA Conference
Call for Questions to be Addressed

ASPA’s Katrina Task Force is currently soliciting questions for its agenda at the DC ASPA conference. The session is titled, “Lessons Noted or Lessons Learned? U.S. Emergency Management Post-Katrina.” The session will use the successful format introduced at the Denver ASPA conference. A moderator will ask a set of pre-determined questions and the 9 KTF members will engage in discussion among themselves and the broader set of session attendees. The questions will be distributed at the beginning of the session and developed by KTF members, ASPA’s Katrina Advisory Group (KAG), and any interested SIAM members.

Please send questions that you think should be addressed to Bev Cigler, co-chair of the KTF at cigler@psu.edu or contact any other member. The KTF members are:

Bruce Baughman, KTF Co-Chair
Director of the Alabama Emergency Management Agency

Beverly A. Cigler, Ph.D., KTF Co-Chair
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Post-Katrina Changes in the U.S. Emergency Management System
Panel for the DC ASPA Conference
By: Beverly A. Cigler


This panel follows the Katrina Task Force staffed panel at the Denver conference titled “Redesigning Risk: Perspectives from Katrina,” which was moderated by Louise Comfort and had Jim Svara as the discussant. KTF co-chairs Bruce Baughman and Bev Cigler presented perspectives from practice and perspectives from theory, respectively. Lenneal Henderson offered perspectives from people and Frannie Edwards focused on perspectives from the community. Papers or powerpoints from the various presentations are available from the panel participants.
dealing with these types of issues. In order to fight declining subscriptions, SLGR is trying to identify new MPA grads and letting them know about SLGR.

Also at the meeting, Kurt Thurmaier and Jered Carr (who did not have any treats) proposed that SIAM become involved in the creation of a two day conference on inter-local arrangements and issues. They proposed that this type of meeting would occur every other year. At each year’s meeting, some type of working group of inter-local research and issues/collaboration would be created and the conference would use SIAM as the framework. These conferences would include working papers, data sets, etc. So, we would have a SIAM webpage and have a 2 day workshop (every 2 years). The SIAM board unanimously approved of this concept and everyone was excited to see it put into motion.

Tribal Governance - Luke Jones
Also visiting our meeting this year was Luke Jones from the EPA. He addressed the topic of Tribal Governments and Environmental Issues. He is asking SIAM to become involved with tribal IGR issues and conflicts. Several members asked why this should be done through SIAM and not through a newly created ASPA specialization. Luke argued that this makes the tribes a separate group. Luke wants this group to be solely dealing with IGR issues. SIAM unanimously voted to help Luke create a working group on IGR tribal issues.

State and Local Government Review – Mike Scicchitano
SLGR would like to move to 4 editions in the future. It is something they are exploring. As mentioned previously, SLGR needs to increase subscriptions. And, they are pushing the electronic version. So, encourage your university or college library to subscribe to the SLGR electronic version.

SIAM NEWSLETTER
As always, we need submissions and ideas for the upcoming Newsletters. So contact Kendra with any ideas you may have. Also, we are moving forward with an electronic SIAM newsletter. Kendra noted that it costs about $1200 a year to do the hard copy version, so moving to the electronic version will save SIAM money (see below).

Budget Situation
The board and the members, in true Ronald Reagan fashion, decided to cut the mailing of SIAM newsletter. This will save the organization quite a bit of money. Also, as previously discussed, we need to increase membership which will help SLGR and our expenses.
especially the investigations by the House and Senate committees, also detail the roles and responsibilities executed by various federal, state, and local agencies and other organizations, and the extent of their interactions and relationships. In addition, these reports have chronicled the strengths and weaknesses of federal, state, local, and nongovernmental efforts, and offered a number of specific recommendations for improving the nation’s ability to effectively prepare for and respond to catastrophic disasters.

Examining emergency management and homeland security issues may be one of the best ways to analyze federalism and U.S. intergovernmental behavior in real time. As my title above suggests, “What can Hurricane Katrina and emergency management teach us about intergovernmental administration and management?” In my opinion it is truly more than can fit in this one article. That’s why I will solicit the help of some colleagues here to provide SIAM newsletter readers a series of articles that will cover some of our observations as they relate to particular federalism and intergovernmental issues.

This article will start with the broad overview of GAO structure and describe how our different issue teams coordinated, and conclude with a summary of our overall finding from our September 2006 Catastrophic Disaster report – just so I don’t leave you hanging.

In future newsletter articles we will introduce issues such as the efforts under mutual aid agreements and state-to-state assistance compacts such as the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), the role of nongovernmental organizations in disaster response, and many other federal-state / federal-state-local issues in Gulf Coast preparedness, response, recovery and rebuilding issues.

**GAO unprecedented coordination across mission/issue teams a reflection of the intergovernmental coordination in response to Hurricane Katrina**

In looking back one year later as to Hurricane Katrina’s impact on GAO’s work, the storm resulted in the largest coordination of our efforts across almost all of GAO’s specialized issue-area and support teams. GAO’s work to date has produced over 38 products directly related to Hurricane Katrina (reports, testimonies, statements, and briefings), with another 15 products that will be coming out by the end of 2006 or in early 2007—an investment of over 300 staff years agency-wide during FY 2006. The full impact of this catastrophe generated a GAO-wide need to assess the many efforts to provide response and recovery services to individuals, families, businesses, communities and the Gulf Coast infrastructure. The table below may help in illustrating this point. The left hand column lists the 15 Emergency Support Functions (ESF) and 2 of the support annexes to the National Response Plan (NRP). These support function are the designed divisions of labor in response to “Incidents of National Significance” (the formal designation that activates some or all of the NRP). In the corresponding column is a listing of GAO’s mission teams that have responsibilities for either the programmatic activities or the responsible federal agency under an ESF.

### Comparison of GAO’s Issue Area Work across the NRP's Support Functions and Annexes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Response Plan:</th>
<th>GAO Mission Teams</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Support Functions - ESFs</td>
<td>Physical Infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESF 1. Transportation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESF 2. Communications</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ESF 8. Public Health and Medical Services</td>
<td>Health Care</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Continued on page 9
The responsibility for coordinating this wide range of work—especially GAO’s many interactions with DHS—rested in our issue team which is responsible for GAO’s homeland security work. Our Homeland Security & Justice (HS&J) issue team houses GAO’s expertise in emergency preparedness and the Robert T. Stafford Act, which is the nation’s legal framework for acting during times of disasters. We provided GAO-wide support to communications between GAO and DHS (especially FEMA), and the sharing of information between mission and engagement teams, in part, through the implementation of an intranet web portal we call “Hurricane Central.” This became the model for the similar site created for GAO’s pandemic flu work.

I have been a member of this issue team since April 2003, and had just completed a review of the extent first responders’ all-hazards capabilities were supported by DHS. Moreover, I became involved in GAO’s Hurricane Katrina work for another reason: 20 years ago I had come from the New Orleans area where I had lived for almost 5 years and worked as a local emergency management planner for St. Bernard Parish. During my time in St. Bernard Parish I had helped develop the parish’s first hurricane analysis tools to improve its warning and evacuation capabilities as part of a regional hurricane evacuation study. As a result, I was familiar with not only the physical surroundings of the New Orleans area, but also Louisiana’s unique structure of government and even some of its actors such as St. Bernard’s Parish President and Sheriff who were in those positions when I was there back in 1987. Similarly, a colleague in our HSJ division was assigned to assist the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs committee in part because he was from Long Beach, MS and had the same knowledge of Mississippi’s coastal governments and its actors.

As an organization, we generally dropped much of what we were doing and pulled agency-wide staff and resources to devote to getting GAO analysts to the scene to collect “perishable data.” This internal coordination even included the construction of an internal GAO website for knowledge management and information sharing across GAO teams. On this intranet cite—Hurricane Central—anyone could access basic documents such as the NRP, and post information on which FEMA officials they spoke with, when, and on what topics. In early October 2005, we initially sent 4 interdisciplinary teams to each of the affected states. This complemented our one defense-related GAO team that was sent out in September 2005 to assess the military’s roles and efforts in responding to this catastrophe.

To give you a sense of the coordination across our agency issue teams, for example, the 6-member party that traveled to Louisiana included an Assistant Director from Homeland Security and Justice, who would go on to manage analyses of FEMA’s flood insurance program and FEMA’s Individuals and Households Program for victim assistance; one member from GAO’s Health Care group who would go on to review New Orleans’ health care infrastructure damaged by the storm; a member from GAO’s strategic issues who would lead a review of the EMAC state-to-state assistance efforts; a member from GAO’s natural resources group who would go on to review and monitor the U.S. Army Corps of Engineer’s lead work on the New Orleans levee system; and finally a member from GAO’s defense capabilities group who would lead the review of the military efforts in the aftermath of the storm. My efforts resulted in the deployment of the Comptroller General’s formal statements to the House and Senate investigating committees (GAO-06-365R and GAO-06-442T, respectively), a congressional testimony on FEMA’s placement within DHS (GAO-06-746T), and the eventual capping report in September (GAO-06-618). While our HS&J issue team coordinated the production of the Comptroller General’s statement and testimony to the congressional committees investigating Hurricane Katrina and the Catastrophic Disaster report, the following teams made contributions to these products: ASM (contracting), DCM (national guard and active military support & international assistance), FMCI (temporary housing), FSI (IHP fraud issues), PI (evacuations), NRE (New Orleans levees), EWIS (role of charitable organizations; child services), HC (health care issues, including New Orleans charity hospital); and FMA (accounting for federal response/recovery appropriations).
At the same time GAO detailed numerous staff to help the Senate and House committees investigating the nation’s preparedness and response to this event, and the agency developed coordinated efforts with the “accountability community”—federal, state and local inspectors generals, legislative and executive audit offices—in order to share information, contacts, and coordinate the scope of our efforts. Generally, GAO analytical efforts were designed to focus on the systemic-level issues and practices, while the IGs and auditors focused on the specific internal control problems and specific contracts.

In addition to the above efforts, top GAO management also visited the region and interviewed the governors of each state, the Mayor of New Orleans and the federal official for Gulf Coast rebuilding. This collection of perishable data during the fall of 2005 was the foundation of briefings to top GAO management and congressional committees, as well as a February 2006 written statement to the House committee investigating Hurricane Katrina and a March 2006 testimony by the Comptroller General.

As a result, GAO has published over 35 products (reports, testimonies, statements, etc.) directly related to Hurricane Katrina, with another 15 products that will be coming out by the end of 2006 or in early 2007.

**GAO’s Hurricane Katrina Capping Report: Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation’s Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System**

Hurricane Katrina was the largest, most destructive natural disaster in our nation’s history. The storm was a catastrophic disaster whose scope and destruction severely tested all levels of governments in the affected areas and the nation as a whole. Hurricane Katrina almost immediately overwhelmed state and local first responders, and the response required outside action and support from many sources. The federal government and many states provided substantial personnel and resources to assist in the response—the heroic efforts by many saved thousands of lives—but these proved insufficient to meet the immediate challenges posed by Hurricane Katrina’s effects. This disaster was unique in U.S. history in that the massive evacuation and housing of millions of Gulf Coast evacuees resulted in emergency declarations in almost every state in the union. The problems experienced in responding to Katrina resulted in a number of investigations—by congressional committees, the White House Security Council, and others which I’ve mentioned at the beginning of this article.

GAO’s report identifies three basic elements in preparing for, responding to and recovering from any catastrophic disaster: (1) leadership; (2) capabilities; and (3) accountability. Leadership in the form of legal authorities, roles and responsibilities, and lines of authority at all levels of government must be clearly defined, effectively communicated, and clearly understood in order to facilitate rapid and effective decision making. DHS has made revisions to the National Response Plan designed to further clarify federal roles and responsibilities, but their effect has not yet been tested in an actual disaster.

Developing the capabilities needed for catastrophic disasters should be part of an overall national effort designed to integrate and define what needs to be done, by whom, and how well. Ensuring needed capabilities are ready requires effective planning and coordination, plus robust training and exercises in which the capabilities are realistically tested, problems identified, and subsequently addressed in partnership with federal, state, local, and nongovernmental stakeholders. In addition, integrating an all-hazards risk management framework into decision making is central to assessing catastrophic disaster risks and guiding the development of national capabilities to prevent or mitigate where possible and respond to such risks. DHS has announced a number of actions to improve readiness and response for catastrophic disasters, but there is little information available on the extent to which these changes are operational.

Accountability procedures ensure that resources are used appropriately for valid purposes. Following a catastrophic disaster, decision-makers face a tension between the demand for rapid response and recovery assistance—including assistance to victims—and implementing appropriate accountability procedures. Our work and that of others found, for example, the processes for confirming disaster victims’ eligibility for assistance were insufficient and resulted in millions of dollars in questionable payments to fraudulent claimants. Also, some contracts had insufficient provisions to ensure that prices were fair and reasonable. DHS has reported that it has taken steps to address some of the concerns, including working to complete more contracts for key services in advance of a disaster and improving its ability to verify individual claimant eligibility for disaster benefits and assistance.

All three elements, leadership, capabilities, and accountability, apply to and across each level of government. That is, improving leadership, capabilities and accountability apply to the federal government—specifically to the Department of Homeland Security—but also to all other federal agencies that are designated to play roles under the NRP. However, these elements also apply across levels of government—federal to state, state to localities. Moreover, the response to Hurricane Katrina reminds us of the critical roles played by other sectors—the nonprofit sector and the private sector—who were key to providing life-saving, life-sustaining, victim relief, community and business recovery, and rebuilding efforts.

From our body of work we found many intergovernmental issues worth noting and further exploring by practitioners and academics in the SIAM community. For example

- **Response Capabilities**—The nation’s experience with Hurricane Katrina reinforces some of the questions surrounding the adequacy of capabilities in the context of a catastrophic disaster—particularly in the areas of (1) situational
ASPA’s Katrina Task Force (KTF) conducted a “guided discussion” with Task Force members and the attending ASPA conference participants at ASPA’s Denver conference. The major questions addressed were compiled by the Task Force, with input from a Katrina Advisory Group (KAG) formed by then ASPA president, Don Menzel. The topics discussed included those listed below. Not all subjects received the same amount of attention as some others due to time limitations. A few of the key points addressed are included after each question/topic.

To what extent was the slow and inadequate response to Katrina a result of the scale of the disaster? Task Force members argued that the scale of the disaster has been neglected in discussions of the response to Katrina.

What were the causes of the response failure in New Orleans, compared to a more effective effort in Alabama and Mississippi? Was it due to flooding, politics, and/or other problem(s)? Again, the discussion suggested that the New Orleans disaster was extraordinary in many respects, including the long term presence of flood waters that engulfed the city.

What were the major failures in the FEMA disaster response, in addition to the leadership failure? Were our assumptions about the federal role flawed? The litany of problems in any major disaster response was discussed, but special attention was paid to what FEMA is and is not. FEMA is primarily a coordinative agency and is not the “first responder” on the ground.

What is the future of FEMA and the nation’s capability to deal both with natural disasters and with large-scale terrorist attacks? At the time of ASPA’s Denver conference, the fate of any Department of Homeland Security (DHS) reorganization was uncertain and views about whether FEMA should remain in DHS were varied. There was a consensus that the head of FEMA should have a direct relationship with the President and that the agency should restore or rebuild its “institutional memory” with those competent in professional emergency management.

To what extent was the disaster complicated by social and economic problems such as poverty and racism in New Orleans and along the Gulf Coast? KTF members stressed the enormity of social and economic problems along the Gulf Coast and especially in New Orleans. The discussion ranged from evacuation plans that overlooked those without cars or resources for short or long term recovery. While the expectation by many in society was that Katrina would place poverty and racism back on key agendas, the general view was that this response was short-lived.

What role did pre-existing crime conditions, fear of crime, and actual post-disaster crime play in the public perception of the New Orleans flooding disaster? How did it affect willingness to assist victims, ability to perform rescue and community image? What lessons are learned from this? The role of the media in helping to shape public perceptions and opinions, whether informed or not, was demonstrated by the coverage of Katrina.

What lessons were learned about large-scale evacuation of urban populations? What role do psychological predispositions play? What role should the media play? What role should elected officials play? What can be reasonably expected of “first responders” when they and their families are victims? Many relevant points were made during the discussion. The need to include first responders’ needs (e.g., early evacuation of families) in evacuation planning was especially stressed during the guided discussion.

What lessons were learned about disaster sheltering, temporary housing, family reunification and resettlement? What happens when a community disappears? What happens to communities receiving evacuees? How do evacuees respond to communities outside of their region? It was noted that the destination areas during an evacuation have too often been neglected in studying disaster response and recovery. Similarly, a host of issues related to “special needs populations” (the sick, elderly, poor, etc.) were discussed, ranging from evacuating pets to developing communication networks for the displaced.

What role should the private business community play in preparedness, response to, and recovery from catastrophic disasters? What about the role of the military? Nonprofits? Discussion included a range of issues that highlight the need for greater collaboration and coordination among and between the various sectors before, during, and after a disaster response.

What changes should medical facilities make to their overall disaster planning in light of lessons learned from Katrina? Time didn’t permit examination of this area, which was deemed to be very important in drafting the questions used for the guided interview.

What will the Gulf Coast look like ten or twenty years from now? Why? The KTF primarily posed this as a question for consideration over the next year as long term recovery efforts are refined. This will be a topic for the D.C. ASPA conference, which will include another guided interview with the ASPA Katrina Task Force.
Recommended Resources on Katrina and IGR

The following is a list of recommended research, reports, websites, and other resources on Katrina and Intergovernmental Relations submitted by SIAM members. Thanks to all of you who took the time to submit a suggestion!

Hurricane Katrina was much more than a natural disaster, it also left New Orleans and the Gulf Coast of the United States financially devastated. The rebuilding effort will take place on the ground, coordinated largely by the state and federal governments and financed in capital markets. Hildreth examines the financial relationship and programs of the federal governments in the US and Canada with the sub-national governments at the state/provincial and municipal levels, and concludes each country could learn from the other.

A review of dozens of key social and economic indicators on the progress of recovery in the New Orleans region since the impact of Hurricane Katrina.

Greater New Orleans Community Data Center website http://www.gnocdc.org/
Since 2001 this has been the most widely used source for information about New Orleans’ neighborhoods and parishes. The site contains a wealth of information related to Katrina such as Post-Katrina population and housing statistics, demographic estimates, community resources and a variety of other links. There is also the opportunity to request information from the organization’s data expert.

One of the first collections of scholarly articles to address the natural disasters of 2005 has just been published in a journal co-sponsored by the Conference of Minority Public Administrators (COMPA), a section of ASPA. In February, the Journal of Public Management and Social Policy released its special symposium issue on “Natural Disasters: How do they impact the environment, economy, and people?” Articles address the history of natural disaster policy and strategies for strengthening local emergency management in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.

The historian Douglas Brinkley’s harrowing new book, “The Great Deluge,” captures the human toll of Katrina as graphically as the most vivid newspaper and television accounts did, and by pulling together a huge, choral portrait of what happened during that first week of havoc and distress (from Saturday, Aug. 27, through Saturday, Sept. 3), he gives the reader a richly detailed timeline of disaster — a timeline in which the sheer cumulative power of details impresses upon us, again, just how abysmally inept relief efforts were on every level, from FEMA to the Red Cross to the New Orleans Police Department, from the federal government to state and local authorities. (New York Times Review by Michiko Kakutani)

Association for the Study and Development of Community website http://capacitybuilding.net/Katrina/index.htm
The Communities Respond website presents a compilation of events, activities, and information that were organized by communities throughout the country to express their grief, empathy, and concern regarding Hurricane Katrina and its consequences. This information was sent to the Association for the Study and Development of Community (ASDC) from different sources across the country. The information is organized according to the major settings in which one might organize a response or offer any assistance.

The Urban Institute: After Katrina website http://www.urban.org/afterkatrina/
The Urban Institute has published a series of studies by a team headed by senior fellow Rudy Penner to analyze many of the issues raised by Katrina. After Katrina briefs include essays on education, healthcare, employment, arts and culture, the social safety net, the well-being of children, the status and needs of nonprofit organizations serving the city, the care provided by New Orleans’ hospitals after the storm, flood insurance coverage, the city’s information requirements as it rebuilds, and the most effective ways for nonprofits and government at all levels to respond to disaster. These studies can all be downloaded at this site.

Hurricane Katrina’s assault on New Orleans’ most vulnerable residents and neighborhoods has reinvigorated a dialogue on race and class in America. This paper argues that the conversation should focus special attention on alleviating concentrated urban poverty—the segregation of poor families into extremely distressed neighborhoods.
Federal Allocations in Response to Katrina, Rita, and Wilma: An Update by Matt Fellowes and Amy Liu. The Brookings Institution, August 21, 2006 [link]

Federal allocations in response to hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma now total $109 billion. Additionally, over $8 billion in tax relief is available. While these numbers appear quite large, widespread uncertainty exists over how much of this money has been spent and where. This brief with the accompanying tables illustrates the program categories behind the federal allocations to date for hurricane recovery activities and the chronology of legislative and executive decisions to respond to the needs of the Gulf Coast. These tables will be updated as new developments occur.

After Katrina: Rebuilding Opportunity and Equity Into the New New Orleans by Margery Austin Turner and Sheila R. Zedlewski. The Urban Institute, April 7, 2006. [link]

In After Katrina: Rebuilding Opportunity and Equity into the New New Orleans, urbanists, health and labor economists, education and housing experts, and other Urban Institute researchers chart paths out of the immediate emergency situation with proposals for rebuilding the social infrastructure of New Orleans. This collection is not a comprehensive blueprint for a comeback, and the authors don’t assume that the issues covered only in passing are less important than those analyzed in depth. They have stuck to what they know and do best and worked hard to make sure that the recommendations offered for discussion complement each other and strike a workable balance between road-tested ideas and much-needed innovation.

Hospitals in Hurricane Katrina: Challenges Facing Custodial Institutions in a Disaster by Bradford Gray and Kathy Hebert. The Urban Institute, July 14, 2006. [link]

This paper explores what happened in New Orleans–area hospitals during and after Hurricane Katrina and why hospitals had such varied experiences. It concludes with lessons based on the Katrina experience.


This paper examines four key programs that help individuals and families meet basic needs and cope with crises: housing assistance provided through the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); income replacement through Unemployment Insurance (UI) and Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA); health care through Medicaid; and cash assistance through Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).

Recommended Resources . . . From page 12

Donald C. and Alice M. Stone (Junior) Award

Best Paper on Federalism, IGR, or IGM by a Student

This year SIAM reinstituted the Donald C. and Alice M. Stone Award for Best Student Paper, also known as the Junior Stone Award. Congratulations to Simon Andrew for receiving the Award at this year’s SIAM meeting in Denver at the National ASPA convention. Simon is a doctoral student at Florida State University and his paper was entitled Interlocal Contractual Arrangements in the Provision of Public Safety. The process was so competitive this year that an honorable mention was awarded to Manoj Shrestha, also at Florida State University.

Past Winners of the Junior Stone Award include:

1984 Susan Golonka University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill)
1985 Scott Bollens University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill)
1986 Carol Swan University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill)
1987 Eleanor Blakely University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill)
1988 Roxy Mitchem-Horn University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill)
1990 Brendan Burke University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill)
1992 Devon Orland University of California (Davis)
1993 Maiya Young University of California (Davis)
1996 Dual awards:
   JoAnn Ewalt University of Kentucky
   Michael Sosato Lafayette College
2006 Simon Andrew Florida State University

Please be on the lookout for outstanding student papers for the 2007 Junior Stone Award. The call for papers will be forthcoming in the next newsletter.
assessment and awareness, (2) emergency communications, (3) evacuations, (4) search and rescue, (5) logistics, and (6) mass care and sheltering.

- **Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC)**—In addition to resources provided by the federal government, states affected by a catastrophic disaster can also turn to other states for assistance in obtaining needed surge capacity—the ability to draw on additional resources, such as personnel and equipment, needed to respond to and recover from the incident. Federal enabling legislation for EMAC was approved by Congress in 1996.

- **Long-term recovery and rebuilding**—State and local officials will have the lead on determining the future needs of the region’s recovery. We also have ongoing work examining other issues that will require federal attention, including (1) assessing the environmental hazards created by the storms; (2) rebuilding and strengthening the levees; (3) providing assistance to school districts that have enrolled large numbers of evacuee children; (4) continuing to provide assistance for temporary housing; and (5) assuring the financial soundness of the National Flood Insurance Program.

We concluded our catastrophic disaster report by noting that the aftermath of events such as September 11, 2001, and the 2005 hurricane seasons which gave us Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma, have resulted in reassessments of the federal role in preparing for and responding to catastrophic events. Collectively, the analyses over the past year paint a complex mosaic of the challenges that the nation—federal, state, local, and tribal governments, nongovernmental entities, the private sector, and individual citizens—faces in preparing for, responding to, and recovering from catastrophic disasters. In addition to the reports issued to date, there are numerous ongoing analyses of various facets of the nation’s preparedness and response efforts before and after Hurricane Katrina.

Regardless of the level of government, improving the nation’s ability to prepare, respond, and recover from catastrophic disasters will take: (1) leaders and professionals with the right knowledge, skills, and experience; (2) plans and guidance that detail what needs to be done, by whom, how, and how well; and finally (3) clear criteria and expectations that are clearly communicated, well understood, and result in appropriate, coordinated actions from all levels of government, their emergency planners and responders, and the nonprofit and private-sector organizations that will be providing support. This requires the development of thoughtful strategic planning and assessment, along with developing and sustaining needed skills and assets. Effective training and exercises based on realistic scenarios is a key component of building and maintaining needed skills and capabilities.

However, as we noted in past GAO work, the federal government ultimately must determine how much it will cost to develop and maintain these needed disaster capabilities and what the federal government can afford to pay. Other levels of government face a similar challenge. DHS and its partners and stakeholders—governmental and nongovernmental, public and private—face the challenge of working together to coordinate preparedness activities and formulate realistic budgets and resource plans to share these costs and support and sustain implementation of an efficient and effective all-hazards national preparedness program.

1. GAO Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation’s Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System, GAO-06-618 (Washington, DC; September 6, 2006)


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In 1980 SIAM created the Donald Stone Awards to honor annually both a practitioner and an academic/researcher who have made significant contributions to the field of intergovernmental management over a substantial period of time. This year there was a competitive list of nominees and the two selected are outstanding in their fields. Recognizing our two recipients this year brought the added bonus of acknowledging two individuals who have long been active in ASPA as well.

The academic award was presented to Dr. Myrna Mandell for her prominent research on intergovernmental management. Myrna is a full professor in the Department of Management at California State University at Northridge where she teaches undergraduate and graduate courses in Management Theory, Practice and Processes; Organizational Behavior and Management; Organizational Theory; and Strategic Management in the Public Sector. She has numerous publications in a variety of journals including State and Local Government Review, American Review of Public Administration, International Journal of Organization Theory and Behavior, and Policy Studies Review. Her edited book, Getting Results Through Collaboration: Networks and Network Structures for Public Policy and Management, is an important contribution to the scholarship on networks and collaboration. Myrna has received numerous honors and awards for her research including the Humanities Research Fellowship from the University of New South Wales, Australia and the William Evans Fellowship from the University of Otago, New Zealand both to further her research and teachings of networks and collaboration. She has been a strong role model for younger faculty and has dedicated many years of service to various organizations including serving as a chair of SIAM and an ASPA board member.

The practitioner award was presented to Dr. Paul Posner. Paul is Director of the Master’s in Public Administration program at George Mason University. Previously, he served as Managing Director for Federal Budget and Intergovernmental Issues for the U.S. General Accounting Office where he led GAO’s work on federal budget policy and processes and provided support to the Congress through reports, testimonies and briefings. Paul has authored a number of journal articles on federalism, public budgeting and public administration, as well as a book, The Politics of Unfunded Mandates (Georgetown University Press, 1998). He currently serves as chair of the Federal Systems Panel for the National Academy of Public Administration, where he is a Fellow. He received his PhD from Columbia University.
Meet Your Newest Board Members…

At the SIAM Annual Meeting four new members were elected to the SIAM board. We welcome them and appreciate their service:

**Heidi Koenig** is an Associate Professor in the Department of Public Administration at Northern Illinois University. Heidi has a Ph.D. from the Maxwell School at Syracuse and a JD from the University of Nebraska – Lincoln. She is a regular contributor to *Public Administration Review* and has published in the *International Journal of Public Administration, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, and the *Journal of Public Affairs Education* to name a few. Heidi teaches graduate and undergraduate courses in public administration, research methods, public policy and law.

**Douglas Ihrke** is the Director of the MPA program at the University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee. He has co-authored articles in *Public Personnel Management, Public Performance and Management Review* and *Public Administration Quarterly*. He is Vice President of the Milwaukee Chapter of the American Society for Public Administration. Before his academic career, he worked as a public manager at the municipal level in Michigan. Doug teaches undergraduate courses in urban politics, public policy, public administration and American Government. He also teaches graduate courses in the Master of Public Administration (MPA) Program as well as in the Urban Studies Programs.

**Richard Feiock** is the Augustus B. Turnbull Professor of Public Administration and Policy in the Askew School and Affiliate Professor of Political Science at Florida State University. He directs the DeVoe Moore Center’s Program in Local Governance and served as the Ph.D. Program Director for the Askew School from 1999-2005. He has received National Science Foundation research grants as well as grant awards from Lincoln Institute for Land Policy, Aspen Institute, and the Fulbright Scholar Program. Rick has published seven books or symposia and over one-hundred refereed journal articles and book chapters. His recent books include *Institutional Constraints and Local Government: An Exploration of Local Governance, City-County Consolidation and Its Alternatives* and *Metropolitan Governance: Conflict, Competition and Cooperation*.

**Jack Meek**, SIAM’s new vice chair, is Professor of Public Administration at the College of Business and Public Management at the University of La Verne. Jack’s research focuses on metropolitan governance and regionalism and he has published articles in various books and academic journals. Jack has taught since 1980, holding faculty rank at Manchester College in Indiana and the University of La Verne in California. For the 2003-2004 academic year, Jack was Visiting Senior Research Scholar working with Professor Terry Cooper and the Neighborhood Participation Project at the University of Southern California. He holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the Claremont Graduate University, and a Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of La Verne.