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Democracy behind barbed wire: Examining the political culture of Japanese American Evacuees

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DEMOCRACY BEHIND BARBED WIRE:
EXAMINING THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF JAPANESE AMERICAN EVACUEES

By

ALLEN ATKINSON

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ABSTRACT

This paper explores the relationship between culture and political behavior through an investigation of those Japanese Americans who were denied due process and imprisoned during World War Two simply for being of Japanese descent. Military necessity was the reason cited for the government's action, although racism, war hysteria and economic competition also played a major role.

At the time there was a general belief among Caucasian Americans that the Japanese in America had avoided Americanization and could not be trusted to participate in democratic processes. It was suggested that their political and civic culture was an obstacle to the achievement of democratic aspirations.

Using an approach similar to that pioneered by Almond and Verba in their 1963 study of five nations, this research explores the political and civic culture of the Japanese American Evacuees and argues that the skills required for meaningful participation in political and civic networks were present in the Japanese Americans, but went unrecognized.

The study concludes by finding no substantiation of the claim that the Japanese in America were then, or are now either un-Americanized or politically incompetent in a democracy.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This research effort would not have occurred without the motivation and guidance provided by my research advisor, Professor William Thompson.

Of special note is the assistance given so freely by Lillian Morizano, former evacuee interned at the Gila River Relocation Center, who was there for me whenever I needed her help.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## REFERENCES

## APPENDICES

A. Japanese American Concentration Camp Installation

B. Selected Bibliography for Background and Further Research

C. Timeline of Selected Events Related to the Japanese American Evacuation and Internment

D. War Relocation Authority Publication on Relocation of Japanese Americans

E. Interview Questionnaire

F. List of Interviews
Chapter 1

Introduction

Because the American notion of democracy makes possible, preserves and promotes a variety of desires, all kinds of people have come to admire it and consider it a good way of life. A great number migrate to the United States from different nations, and residents and immigrants meet, mix, and intermarry. The result is the greatest possible variation in character, upbringing and styles of life.

But, democracy is not an unqualified good. In an illiberal democracy, there is the possibility of tyranny of the majority, of the many over the few. The melting pot does not treat everyone equally. Contradictions between ideology and reality sometimes surface in our history. Leighton (1945, p. 345) refers to Americans as "authoritarian democrats" who create an impossible situation for those we govern by teaching them to be like us and thereby achieve what we have achieved, but at the same time build barriers intended to make any such achievement impossible.

Sometimes conflict between a majority and minority group is "solved" by population transfer. This occurred in the case of both the Native American tribes and, in 1942, Japanese Americans living on the West Coast of the United States. The political and civic behaviors of those 120,000 Japanese Americans interned in American concentration camps are the focus of this research.

The Problem

At the beginning of World War Two, Japanese Americans who sought to demonstrate their Americanism by participating in war related
community affairs were turned away (Spicer, 1969). Japanese in the United States had found that they, like the Chinese before them, were accused of being unable to adopt an American way of life (Hayashi, 1983). Among several rationales used to justify the evacuation and internment was an underlying belief that the Japanese in America, even though two thirds of them were U.S. citizens by birth, had somehow avoided Americanization. They were under the influence of an alien culture, and did not possess values, skills, or an underlying belief system consistent with American philosophy and, therefore, could not be trusted in a democracy.

Grodzins (1949) reports that the claim that cultural factors inhibiting Americanization of Japanese in America was the least frequently used argument, though it was specifically used by the California State Personnel Board when they released all persons of Japanese descent from state employment. The belief that culturally based antidemocratic tradition is an obstacle to political participation continues to be an issue for discussion even today (Kitano, 1969, Lien, 1997). According to Chung (1992) many ethnic Asians do not participate in politics or civic activities because their parents taught them to shun expression of public opinions.

Generally speaking, what these reservations imply is not only that Japanese and Japanese Americans did not possess the proper political knowledge, but also and more importantly, neither did they possess the political judgement to be actively involved in the deliberation of complex policy issues.
The debate arose, of course, because of the real or alleged differences as to the actual and potential capacity of Japanese Americans for a full and responsible civic life. This, in turn, involves varying views about leadership, the relationship between the people and their political leaders, the real meaning of equality, and methods of assuring political discourse while preserving social stability.

**Purpose of the Study**

Although the forced evacuation and internment of 120,000 persons for close to four years is an extraordinary and well documented event, it is most often treated merely as history or a case study in civil rights. This paper treats the evacuation in a different manner from the standard methods of cataloguing events, or highlighting racial victimization and intends to explore civic orientations, and democratic performance of the Evacuees themselves.

This study hypothesizes that the contemporary view of Japanese Americans as unassimilated and incompatible with American political and civic culture was incorrect. Evacuees displayed their civic and political competence, during and after internment in the relocation centers. Using evidence obtained from both literature and personal interviews, the research will confirm that their competence was dynamic and public spirited, demonstrating a level of participation in voluntary associations and partisan politics comparable to other Americans.

**Significance of the Research**

While Almond and Verba (1963) investigated the political culture of five countries, more recently, Verba, Nie and Kim (1978) examined seven.
Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) made an extensive study of political culture throughout the United States. Other research has been done on minority political participation (Verba & Nie, 1972; De la Garza, et al., 1992; Dawson, 1994), Asian American participation (Lien, 1997) and even Japanese American participation (Fugita & O’Brien, 1991). Data related to political and civic behaviors of the evacuees themselves seems to be absent.

The events of the Japanese American Evacuation also provide an excellent case study in political-social studies, and lessons learned could be applied to studies in political efficacy in general.

**Terminology**

The lexicon of the Japanese American evacuation and internment is often confusing. For example, various government entities and personnel referred to the Japanese and Japanese Americans in the camps as evacuees, colonists, residents, or non-appointed personnel. The camps were officially called relocation centers, but also referred to as colonies, and often communities. The word “interned” is frequently used, but technically appropriate only for those who were Japanese citizens, not for the two thirds who were US citizens. Strictly speaking, an “evacuee” is a person who is evacuated; the word does not imply incarceration.

Caucasian personnel who worked in the camps were referred to variously as staff, administrators, or appointed personnel. The senior administrator of each camp was called the project director.
The words “concentration camp” are technically appropriate, since they refer to a temporary location where civilians who may give aid and comfort to an enemy are detained. President Roosevelt, himself, referred to the relocation centers as concentration camps, however, later discovery of the Nazi camps in Europe imparted a new definition to the words, making them synonymous with “death camp” (Kitano, 1969, p. 61-62). Broom & Kitsuse (1956) see this confusion as evidence of a government cover-up (21). The Commission on Wartime Relocation of Civilians simply calls the words “euphemisms” (CWRIC, 1982, p.VII).

In this paper the word “evacuee” refers to those resident Japanese citizens and Japanese Americans who were removed from their homes by executive and military orders, transported by the government to one of ten camps and confined. There were generally three categories represented: the Issei who were born in Japan and were Japanese citizens, the Nisei, who were born in the United States and were US citizens, and the Kibei, who were Nisei who had lived in Japan and received a Japanese education. Redress refers to compensation from the United States government for losses sustained during the forced evacuation.

The former evacuees who were interviewed for this research tended to use the phrase “in camp”, when referring to the relocation centers, such as “were you in camp?”, or “when I was in camp.” In this paper the official government term “relocation center” is used to identify any of the ten camps described in Appendix A.
Such discussion is necessary, but somewhat esoteric. During one interview with a former Nisei evacuee I asked, "What word did you use to describe yourself? Were you an "internee" or an "evacuee?" She responded emphatically, "I was a prisoner!"
Chapter 2

Literature Review

Many works on the evacuation and relocation are available to the researcher. Some were written by Caucasian researchers and others by former Japanese American evacuees. Some of the earliest came from studies made by sociologists and cultural anthropologists assigned to each camp as social analysts (Leighton, 1945). The U. S. Government War Relocation Authority (WRA) kept good records and many are available. (WRA, 1947; Sugihara, 1943; Daniels, 1989). A number of magazine articles were written for popular publication during the event. Several appeared in magazines with a religious orientation, such as Christian Century. Various thesis and dissertations related to this subject are on record (Hopkinson, 1951; Jackman, 1955). Much of the remainder consists of accounts of evacuation events (Nelson, 1976; Oda, 1980). A final category consists of personal anecdotes including diaries, art or poetry related to the evacuation and internment (Gorfinkel, 1995; Eaton, 1952).

Krammer (1997) reported finding over one thousand published works on the subject in the Library of Congress. The bibliography to this paper (Appendix B) lists over 100 selected references related to Japanese American immigration, culture, evacuation, and internment available for background study or further research.
Rationale for Evacuation

In February 1942, Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 which provided a legal basis for eventually placing 120,000 men, women and children of Japanese descent in American concentration camps (Hatamiya, 1993). At the time it was alleged to be of military necessity, however, modern historians dispute this opinion. A 1982 assessment provided by the Presidential Commission on the Wartime Internment and Relocation of Civilians (CWIRC) stated:

Military necessity, and the decisions that followed from it - detention, ending detention and ending exclusion - were not driven by analysis of military conditions did not justify the promulgation of Executive Order 9066. The broad historical causes that shaped these decisions were race prejudice, hysteria and a failure of political leadership. Widespread ignorance of Japanese Americans contributed to a policy conceived in haste and executed in an atmosphere of fear and anger at Japan. A grave injustice was done to American citizens and resident aliens of Japanese ancestry who, without individual review or any probative evidence against them, were excluded, removed and detained by the United States during World War II (p. 18).

Grodzins (1949) analyzed hundreds of pro-evacuation statements and uncovered eleven specific arguments used for the evacuation.

1. Sabotage, espionage, fifth column: The Japanese were actual or potential saboteurs, fifth-columnists, or espionage agents.
2. Public morale: Widespread distrust of the Japanese population lowered public morale on the West Coast; correspondingly, evacuation would lift public morale.

3. Humanitarianism: The Japanese (a) were themselves in danger from actual or potential vigilantes, and the evacuation (b) would be carried out with decency and without hardship.

4. Approval of Japanese militarism: The Japanese in America had earlier favored Japanese aggression in Asia; had been informed of Pearl Harbor in advance but had not revealed the secret; and in no single instance gave adverse information about dangerous members of their own race to the intelligence agencies.


6. Migration and distribution: The Japanese had invaded America by fraudulent immigration, and they had located themselves in strategic areas.

7. Race: Because of racial peculiarities, Japanese Americans were un-assimilable, their thought-processes were inscrutable, and the loyal could not be distinguished from the disloyal. Their high birth rate was a mark of special danger.

8. Culture: Cultural practices (language schools, vernacular press, sending children to Japan for education) enhanced the racial barrier to assimilation.
9. Economics: Economic practices made Japanese undesirable competitors, and their productive contribution to the nation's economy was negligible. In any case, evacuees could be employed in productive work at points of concentration.

10. Appeal to patriotism: Loyalty of the Japanese would be demonstrated by acceptance of evacuation; if they refused to co-operate, they thereby showed disloyalty.

11. Necessity for drastic measures: Constitutional rights had to give way, in total war, to drastic measures (p. 400 – 401).

Argument number eight, "Cultural practices (language schools, vernacular press, sending children to Japan for education) enhanced the racial barrier to assimilation" indicates that there was widespread ignorance of the culture of the Japanese in America leading to a belief that they were unassimilated, and under the influence of a belligerent foreign culture.

A 1942 Army analysis concluded with the statement that "The Japanese race is an enemy race and while many second and third generation Japanese born in the United States soil, possessed of United States Citizenship, have become 'Americanized,' the racial strains are undiluted." The memorandum goes on to say, "It therefore follows that along the vital Pacific Coast over 112,000 potential enemies of Japanese extraction, are at large today" (Smith, 1995, p. 124). In the United States Senate, Tom Stewart of Tennessee declared that the Japanese were "cowardly and immoral. They are different from Americans in every
conceivable way, and no Japanese should ever have the right to claim American citizenship" (Smith, 1995, p. 120).

General DeWitt, Commander of the newly formed Western Defense Command and architect of the Japanese American Evacuation, described them as a "large, unassimilated, tightly-knit racial group bound to an enemy nation by strong ties of race, culture, custom, and religion " (Arrington, 1962, p. 5). A delegate from the California Joint Immigration Committee, speaking before the Tolan Committee said "Many American citizens of Japanese ancestry were sent to Japan for an education which "for all intents and purposes" made them Japanese. Language schools in America tended to accomplish the same purpose. The religion of emperor worship similarly led people away from Americanism " (Grodzins, 1949, p. 408).

The Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (CWRIC, 1982) reported that four cultural patterns: dual citizenship, language schools, and education in Japan, foreign religion, and ethnic organizations which were seen as evidence that the Japanese in America "would not or could not assimilate to American life and represented an alien threat" (p. 41). That same commission also revealed that "The government's efforts to Americanize the children in the camps were often bitterly ironic:

An oft-repeated ritual in relocation camp schools ... was the salute to the flag followed by the singing of "My Country, 'tis of thee, sweet land of liberty" – a ceremony Caucasian teachers found embarrassingly awkward
if not cruelly poignant in the austere prison — camp setting" (CWRIC, 1982, p. 11).

Supporters of the Japanese Americans were few. Los Angeles Baptist minister C.C. Pierce presented one opposing view when he testified before a House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization that, “There is no Japanese problem in California. ... It is not true at all that they ... hold a divided allegiance, that they do not understand or appreciate our institutions ... that they are an unassimilable race” (Foner & Rosenberg, 1963, p. 63). Such voices were rare. Even the American Civil Liberties Union refused to defend them (McDaid, 1969).

Many liberal Caucasian Americans held no particular animosity for the Japanese in America. But, even for these people, the evacuation was seen as a way of making some good come out of a bad situation. The camps where the evacuees were interned were intended to be not only places of confinement, but also “Americanization units” (Gridner and Loftis, 1969, p. 310), places where the evacuees could be exposed to American ideas and practice American style democracy on a small scale, and be better prepared to assume full citizenship responsibilities after the war. This was not a new idea. Planned Americanization efforts had been conducted by the US government in the Philippines (Stanley, 1974; Pomeroy, 1974), and on Native American Reservations (Harmon, 1949; Kelly, 1983) prior to World War Two, and would later be devised for Vietnamese and other ethnic South-East Asians (Savale, 1979; Henkin &
The War Relocation Authority, which ran most of the camps, continued this theme of un-assimilation when it declared that one purpose for internment was to teach citizenship (WRA, 1947). When describing the required organizational structure for a typical camp “community” they wrote: “A community government shall have as its objectives the training of residents of the community in the democratic principles of civic participation and responsibility....” (Broom and Kitsuse, 1956, p. 21). Evacuees in the relocation centers were urged to create a “democratic model community” (Yatsushiro, 1953, p. 490).

Referring to the Issei, who had been born in Japan, Dr. T. G. Ishimaru, a former chairman of the Poston Relocation Center Community Council wrote:

Let us make the Issei government conscious, that there is a responsibility on their shoulders to make them better citizens, to make them understand American Institutions, which are theirs as long as they live in this country. In one respect, this is an Americanization program (1943, p.8).

Appendix C provides a list of events related to the evacuation and internment. Appendix D describes the evacuation program from the government’s point of view.

Relevant Research Theory

Although participation in government is an integral part of both the ideal and the practice of democracy, such participation is sometimes difficult to define. There is, of course, voter and political party participation, but there is also committee membership, and organized private associations. Verba, Nie and Kim...
consider only "legal acts" such as voting, campaign activities, particularized contacts, and communal activities. However, Verba, Scholzaman and Brady (1995) expand the definition to include additional means such as protests, demonstrations, strikes and riots.

Armed with extensive survey data, Almond and Verba (1963) investigated the relationship between culture and viable democracy and determined that effective democracy depends on citizen competence, trust, and cooperation. They argue that:

If in most social situations the individual finds himself subservient to some authority figure, it is likely that he will expect such an authority relationship in the political sphere. On the other hand, if outside the political sphere he has the opportunity to participate in a wide range of social decisions, he will probably expect to be able to participate in political decisions as well. Furthermore, participation in nonpolitical decision making may give one skills needed to engage in political participation (pp. 271-272).

In effect, those persons who do not learn how to participate in decisions at home, school, or in the workplace may not develop the motivation and skills of participation, and subsequently become excluded from public participation in government and the civic arena. In this approach, political culture consists of normative values, attitudes and beliefs within the specified population.

Putnam (1993), reached much the same conclusion in his investigation of the culture and government of Italy. Exploring the link between civic attitudes of different regions of Italy and efficiency of government, he found that the cultural
legacy of the regions had a notable effect on the responsiveness of
governments.

Blau (1974, 1977) argued that society is structured so as to cluster
individuals in groups based on nominal parameters such as race, sex, religion
and residence. Others (Sherif & Sherif, 1953; Tajfel, 1982) propose that those
groups may be altered by human interaction to form new groups based on
demonstrated that while social ties are strongest among persons with similar
backgrounds, they commonly cross boundaries and build bridges between
groups. Although primary socialization is a powerful force, human behavior is
also influenced by human interaction. This suggests that while our similarities
bind us within groups, our social, and possibly our political culture is defined by
linkages between groups.

Inside the Relocation Centers

The War Relocation Authority had the responsibility for providing all
support necessary to sustain the evacuees. This was accomplished under
difficult conditions, with wartime shortages. Ten permanent camps to house the
evacuees were built in remote areas in the Western United States. Figure 1 lists
each relocation center. More detailed information is available in Appendix A.

While the physical standards and comfort level of the relocation centers were generally low, these camps should not be confused with the death camps run by Nazis in Germany. The Japanese American relocation centers were concentration camps used to gather up and confine civilians who may engage in acts of war against the interning power and, as Kitano (1969) notes there was a systematic “process of checking, clearing, and then releasing Japanese to areas of the United States away from the prescribed Western Defense Area.” This included students going to college and adults looking for work (p. 35).
The relocation centers were controlled by the War Relocation Authority Staff in Washington DC. One relocation center, Poston, on the Colorado River Indian Reservation, was originally placed under the Office of Indian Affairs and was transferred to the War Relocation Authority on December 31, 1943. (Leighton, 1945).

The Director of the War Relocation Authority was appointed by the President and maintained an office and a staff in Washington D.C. The senior administrator for each camp was called the Project Director. Each Project Director was responsible directly to the Director of the War Relocation Authority.

The War Relocation Authority assumed responsibility for management of the relocation Centers and maintenance of the evacuees after their delivery to the relocation Centers by the Army. Initially, 110,000 persons were transferred from Army control to be interned by the new civilian agency (Arrington, 1962), but eventually 120,000 people would be incarcerated in the camps (Weglyn, 1976).


Laws of the United States, the individual state of internment, and local regulations were enforced using both an internal security staff consisting of evacuees and an external security staff provided by the Army who did not
hesitate to use their weapons (Bosworth, 1967, Taylor, 1993). Boundaries of the camps were marked by barbed wire and guard towers. The FBI was used on occasion to investigate crimes and alleged subversive activity inside the relocation centers (Jackman, 1955).

Despite formal organizational designs imposed by the War Relocation Authority, over time several barracks grouped together into a block became the fundamental unit of government for evacuees. Block residents exercised varying degrees of influence over their own lives through the use of informal or formally elected councils. In some relocation centers, each barracks had its own council. Informal councils often were formed to meet a specific need, such as make a decision to plan for land usage. Nissei, who were U.S. citizens, usually staffed the formal councils, while the Issei generally dominated the informal councils. Women rarely participated as members. (Spicer, 1969).
Chapter 3

Research Methodology

Before an analysis of civic and political attributes of Japanese Americans can be accomplished, it is necessary to specifically describe democratic attitudes and behaviors and operationalize them for testing. The research plan identified two major tasks. Essential to the first task was a historical reconstruction of events related to Japanese American activities inside the relocation centers, while the second task required fieldwork in the contemporary Japanese American community.

Research Strategy 1: Political Participation Inside The Relocation Centers

Democracy is often associated with voting. But, political participation in a democracy refers to any activity by private persons "that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the decisions they make" (Verba, Nie, Kim, 1978). Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995, p.48) point out that in a democracy there are a wide variety of activities intended to influence public policy. They break political participation into nine sub-categories as shown in Figure 2.
This figure identifies several ways by which people can communicate their needs and preferences to government authorities and induce those authorities to be responsive. However, such methods require resources, some more than others. The kinds of activities listed in the left hand column were used in this research to identify and categorize evacuee political and civic behavior in the relocation centers.

**Research Strategy 2: Comparative Survey**

The second part of the research involves a survey approach. The research tool is the sample survey. The unit of observation is the individual and
conclusions are based on aggregate data. While this study fits within the tradition of the Civic Culture in that it uses a survey study to deal with a political issue, one important deviation from the objectives of the Civic Culture is that in this study there is no attempt to associate any particular political behaviors with the stability of a larger political system. Rather, it simply tries to discover and identify among a selected population those political behaviors generally associated with the democratic political system as practiced in the United States. Inherent in this view is the belief that political efficacy is associated with a general sense of being personally effective and confident in dealing with authority, and that this same sense of personal effectiveness and confidence is a learned behavior.

The focus is on three dimensions of political culture: Political socialization, the obligation to participate, and voluntary organizational membership.

Research Limitations.
(a) Over fifty years has passed since the respondents lived in the relocation centers.
(b) Small population; only 10 persons were interviewed.
(c) Non-random population; all contacts were achieved through personal introduction. The persons who were interviewed had personal experiences in only four of the ten relocation centers.
(d) The interviewees were all Nisei or Kibei. No Issei were available.
(e) Most data related to the categorical activities in Figure 1 were obtained through a review of existing literature and are subject to the bias of the original authors.
Most of the living former evacuees were relatively young during this time in history and their span of personal experience was limited.

Shortcomings of the method are.

(a) The writer assumes for this paper that generalizations made from the sample are valid.

(b) There is also an assumption that interest and activity in political affairs produces stable (good) government.

(c) There is an assumption that a certain political culture is supportive of stable democracy and necessary to sustain it.

(g) This study focuses upon structures and processes of political activity. It makes no attempt to measure either volume of activity or output effect on the political processes.

(h) Conclusions reached using this methodology are highly interpretive and tentative.

Data Collection Techniques

Since the events related to evacuation and internment took place over fifty years ago, there are only two practical methods for gathering data on the subject. One method is to do literature and archival research and the other is to interview living former evacuees.

Research Strategy 1.

Literature and archival research involved a review of both primary and secondary sources of data. Most data came from a variety of books related to the
evacuation and internment, but some were also uncovered in original document collections held at the Arizona Historical Society at Tempe.

When an event or behavior was discovered that fit within the operational limits of democratic behavior as defined in Figure 2 on page 17, it was assigned to that category. Some events fit into more than one category, but were only used once in this research. Those events described in the Findings section of this paper represent a sample of the events collected. For some events an extensive narrative was required to place the event in context.

Each categorical event then becomes an argument that either the Japanese in America were successfully "Americanized" by the relocation center experience, or that their prior culture was fundamentally similar enough to the larger American political culture that their behaviors were already compatible.

**Research Strategy 2.**

The process of data collection was primarily accomplished through administration of a verbal questionnaire with some ancillary interviewing.

The subjects selected for inclusion in this study were not chosen on a random basis. All participants were obtained through the personal assistance of members of the Las Vegas Japanese American Citizen's League and are members of that organization. Each interview was conducted in the respondent's residence. The beginning of each interview consisted of an introduction and explanation of the purpose of the interview. Only one interviewer was used and each question was read verbatim from the written survey. When a respondent asked for clarification on a question, that question was read again verbatim. The
interviewer recorded all responses on an answer sheet. Respondents were cooperative and each interview lasted not more than 45 minutes. The process of verbally administering the questionnaire not only guaranteed a one hundred percent completion rate, but also provided the researcher with an opportunity to become familiar, through personal interaction, with the subjects. A list of respondents is provided in Appendix E.

Sample size was 10. Total number in the Las Vegas area was unavailable. Estimates from former evacuees ranged from 10 to 2,800. Nine interviewees live in the Las Vegas area; one interviewee lives in California and was visiting the Las Vegas area.

The assistance the directors of the Las Vegas Chapter of the Japanese American Citizens League was requested to help locate former evacuees. They refused to directly contact former evacuees, citing privacy concerns and “respect for our elders.” At their suggestion, an advertisement was placed in the local JACL newsletter explaining the research project and asking for former evacuees to call a listed phone number to be included in the interview process. There were no responses and no interviews were obtained by this method.

Several interviews were eventually obtained through personal introductions initiated by Lillian Morizano, a former evacuee who is publicly known and politically active. Even this method proved uncertain. Two former evacuees refused to be interviewed, saying “We’ve been interviewed so much. Can’t you find some one else?” Two other initial
refusals were later persuaded by Lillian to participate.

Most likely, the reluctance came from a dislike of dredging up old memories, and concerns about possible invasive questions. After one interview, the former evacuee made a comment about how easy the interview had been and expressed surprise that I had not asked any “intimate questions.” She then picked up the phone and arranged interviews with four of her friends.

The questionnaire was developed by adopting selected questions from the original 1963 Almond and Verba survey. The final result contained 23 dichotomous and multiple response questions. Responses from the questionnaire are compared to data from the general United States population. The two sources are then examined, and similarities and differences noted. The original question format used in the interviews is reproduced in Appendix F.
Chapter 4

Findings

Research Strategy 1: Archival Data

Despite the inherently undemocratic environment of a concentration camp, evidence of Verba, Schlozman and Brady's democratic methods of political participation listed in figure 1, page 17 can be found among residents of the relocation centers. All methods of political participation considered are voluntary. None was obligatory or received compensation. Volume, frequency or outcomes of these activities were not considerations, only that they were intended to communicate information to public officials and influence public decision-making.

Some activities listed, such as those associated with informal community work, may seem out of place as political acts. While some may have occurred simply for social satisfaction, others were created in response to needs that were unfulfilled by formal political structures.

Campaigns and Elections.

Campaigns and elections are considered of primary importance. Voting has long been considered the single greatest determinant of citizen participation. In line with their policy of providing training for evacuees in the American way of life, the privilege to vote for candidates for community councils was extended to all US citizens 18 years and older, while office holding was restricted to US citizens at least 21 years of age. Issei could only hold appointive positions until 1943, when the policy was changed (Arrington, 1962). Elections, which often
seemed contrived and purposeless, were difficult to manage in the authoritarian atmosphere of a relocation center.

At Manzanar there was continuing controversy over the nature of self-government. At one point the Project Director allowed for popular election of a committee to create the camp charter. Some groups were opposed to self-rule, wanting to keep the administration appointed Block Manager system. Jackman (1955) reports that in some blocks no one voted at all and in most others those elected were opposed to self-government. This represented no non-democratic ideals, but simply a resignation to the power of the administration, which held veto over the evacuees' will.

In January 1945 the Poston Council voted to accept an invitation to send delegates to an All Center Conference at Salt Lake City. Local Councils and Block Managers held meetings to devise methods for selecting the delegates and writing a platform. Poston Unit 1 chose to use a general election. Nishimoto (1995) called this the "most successful election in the Poston history" (p. 174). The popularly elected Unit 1 delegate joined the Unit II and Unit III delegates who had been selected by different methods.

Jackman (1955) describes how a plan to cooperate with the Office of Wartime Information (OWI) was handled democratically. First, a special council meeting was called to meet with the OWI representatives September 28, 1942. Then:

The council voted to confer with block residents and report back the following day. Block meetings were held all of that day and were attended
by all the residents in some blocks and by block advisory committees in other blocks. Nearly all of the blocks had one or the other type of meeting. The blocks then voted individually on the plan with the following results: 22 blocks voted against the plan, 21 voted for the plan with certain conditions, and 7 voted for the plan without conditions. ... A meeting of the council, block representatives, the OWI, the administration and about 250 interested evacuees was held. (pp. 190-192)

An additional meeting was held and the proposal lost support. (Jackman, 1955). Even though this incident eventually caused a separation between the council and other evacuees, it does seem to indicate a persistent belief in democracy and competence in democratic processes.

Contacting a Public Official.

The second democratic method involves contacting a public official. Living in such a restricted area, evacuees frequently came into contact with the appointed administrative staff. However, they did not limit their contacts with public officials to only those who worked nearby. On some occasions they communicated with high level government policy-makers.

A loyalty test had been devised to identify those evacuees who could be trusted and released to the outside, or inducted into the armed forces. Each evacuee was interviewed for this purpose. Two questions generated a heated controversy:

27. (for male Nisei) “Are you willing to serve in the armed forces of the United States on combat duty, wherever ordered?”
27. (for female Nisei and Issei) "... would you be willing to volunteer for the Army Nurse Corps or the WAAC?" This badly worded question was intended to ask if they would serve in a noncombatant capacity.

28. (for everybody) "Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America and forego any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese emperor, and any other foreign government, power or organization?"

The Issei were very concerned that renouncing any loyalty to Japan, while not having legal recourse for United States citizenship, would leave them a stateless people, without any power to look out for their interests. Contacts with War Relocation Authority officials prompted a revision that read:

28. "Will you swear to abide by the laws of the United States and to take no action which would in any way interfere with the war effort of the United States. (Weglyn, 1976, pp. 136)

The Nisei at Topaz sent a resolution to the Secretary of War explaining they would be willing to enter military service if their civil rights were restored. Without firm assurance from the government, military recruitment was slow (Arrington, 1962). Similarly, the Nisei in Poston "adopted a resolution expressing their willingness to 'give up our lives if necessary in the cause of our nation and democracy' "and asking for return of civil rights based on their new draft status and telegraphed a copy to President Roosevelt (Jackman, 1955). A Manzanar Issei group proclaimed that question 28 was not legal and threatened to call the Spanish Counsel, who as a neutral power was representing the Issei Japanese
citizens. The question was withdrawn by the Project Director and eventually rewritten (Weglyn, 1976).

On October 26, 1943 an organized group of evacuees confronted camp administrators with a list of complaints. The problems unresolved, on November 1, while visiting The Tule Lake Relocation Center, National Director Dillon Myer and several administrative heads were trapped inside the administration building by a large group of evacuees, who demanded redress for their unresolved complaints (Weglyn, 1976).

Another incident of contacting a public official occurred at Tule Lake where the Spanish Consul was contacted to arbitrate a dispute between evacuees and the army (Jackman, 1955). Also, in July of 1943 the administration at Minidoka ordered a reduction of the evacuee paid labor force ostensibly for budget reasons, but possibly to encourage forced relocation. The evacuees staged a variety of responses including a strike of maintenance workers who managed fires in the camp laundry and latrines. A group of women gathered at the office of the Acting Project Director demanding that he insure the camp had hot water. They also sent a telegram to the National Director of the War Relocation Authority demanding he assure them hot water. The National Director refused to get involved, sending a reply which stated that the dispute needed to be settled locally (Jackman, 1955).

Protest.

The next democratic method considered is protest. While democratic processes are often aimed at promoting commonality and accommodation,
democracy sometimes arises from conflict. Occasionally, in the relocation centers it must have seemed as though protest was the only way to accomplish goals.

Jackman (1955) provides a comprehensive analysis of protests in the relocation centers. He identifies four types of issues that sparked protests: labor issues, the loyalty oath, the military draft, and disputes over self-government (p. 35). He divides the category of “protest” into “negotiation of differences” and “passive resistance and insubordination”, and “overt rebellion.” He found at least twenty-six incidents of negotiation of differences and passive resistance in Topaz, Gila River, Heart Mountain and Granada (p. 85). There were twenty-nine incidents in the same categories in Poston, Minidoka and Jerome (p. 158). At Manzanar and Tule Lake he found seven incidents of passive resistance and insubordination, nine incidents of negotiation of differences, and two of overt rebellion (pp. 217-218).

Although there were some violent protests, they were rare. Most protest was non-violent. Two examples will help understand evacuee methods of protest. The first occurred at Poston where, due to wartime shortages, evacuees were told they must build their own schools and were not provided sufficient building materials. The administration was unable to enforce the order. Evacuees withheld their labor, and for a year and no schools were built (Yatsushiro, 1953). The second example occurred at Manzanar, where there was labor trouble. On August 11, 1942, camouflage net factory workers went on strike over wages (Jackman, 1955).
Informal Community Work.

The fourth democratic method considered is informal community work. The camps had been intentionally positioned in out of the way places and the evacuees were faced with the task of literally building communities from the ground up. Structured government programs would satisfy only part of the needs of the people. Much work was accomplished through the use of informal community work, either by individuals or collectively in groups.

Gila River Relocation Center provides an excellent example of informal community work among evacuees. Copies of the camp newspaper, the “Gila News-Courier”, reveal many examples of voluntary community work. Articles and announcements about YMCA meetings, volunteer adult education classes (“Organizer,” 1943; Adult Education,” 1943), Americanization (“Canal Camp,” 1942), social dancing (“Social Tonight,” 1943) music (“Classical Music,” 1943) and theatrical performances (“Butte Theater, 1943) demonstrate that evacuees involved themselves in voluntary associations designed to meet community needs. Boy scouts attended meetings and USO dances were held. YMCA, YWCA, Scouting and religious groups were available. Parents formed PTAs. (Myer,1971). Young people helped also. When the War Relocation Authority reduced funding for mess hall staffing, at Gila River the Young People’s Organization of Block 48 volunteered to wash dishes without pay. (“Block 48,” 1943).
Boards and Committees.

The fifth democratic method is boards and committees. Both formal and informal committees and boards were often used as forums for discussion and decision making in the camps. There are many examples available for examination.

In Poston I, administrators worked to encourage evacuee leadership to organize their community through officially sanctioned boards and committees. The Evacuee Civic Planning Board worked over four weeks to write a constitution. Sadly, this board was forced into dissolution when they discovered the War Relocation Authority had mandated a different sort of organization excluding the Issei. The project attorney took charge to implement the official War Relocation Authority structure and organized an election to form a Temporary Community Council. The Council then formed a Food committee to investigate the mess-hall and a Health Committee to investigate the hospital. Administrators began to react negatively to this unexpected activism and sought to block this expression of community power (Spicer, 1969).

Unofficial committees and boards also had influence. An unofficial Issei Advisory Board which operated separately from the Nisei Council was formed at Poston to advise and give the excluded Issei a voice, but being closer to the feelings of the majority, they came to express greater influence and eventually led a general strike to protest the arrest of two evacuees by the FBI (Spicer, 1969; Leighton, 1945)
Richard Nishimoto (1995), an evacuee at Poston gives an excellent description of how boards and committees could function effectively when allowed to do so. He is particularly interesting when he gives a detailed description of the widespread gambling problem created by former professional gamblers. The evacuees' first response was ineffective, unsure and lacking consensus. As the problem of crime associated with gambling grew unbearable, they organized and faced the issues. Calling a meeting of various evacuee boards, committees, councils and representatives they began a grassroots campaign of public awareness and community opposition. The evacuee police, bolstered by community support became more effective and the professional gamblers wary of grassroots opposition backed down. Soon, gambling was restricted to small friendly games with community approval. The community had succeeded without administration help. After it was all over, the Project Director issued a notice condemning gambling. But, the problem had already been solved by grassroots citizen action and effective utilization of existing political structures (pp. 144-146, 148-159).

A War Relocation Authority imposed job pay classification system allotted only 12-16 dollars per month for evacuee workers, far below the union scale wages they had been promised at the beginning of the evacuation. A serious manpower shortage at Poston promoted the formation of a combined group of staff, Issei and Nisei to form a Manpower Commission to study the problem. One notable outcome was a reclassification of all jobs from the civil service scheme of managerial, professional, and unskilled to a more relevant system based on
rewarding those who contributed to the community's life, health and security (Yatsushiro, 1953).

Other examples of special community organizations were the Library commission, and the rest home board to establish a home for the elderly (Hass, 1943).

**Political Organizations.**

The next democratic method considered is the formation of political organizations. No evidence was available to indicate the evacuees organized themselves in any way reminiscent of traditional American political parties. Much of the organized activity seemed to center around the different views and conflicts between evacuees and administrators, and between factions of evacuees.

Ad hoc organizations, intended to respond to specific issues were abundant. At Manzanar various grassroots political organizations were formed. Supporters of the war effort joined the Manzanar Citizens Federation to encourage military service and generally down play the evacuee situation as less important than the war itself (Weglyn, 1976). A Kitchen Workers Union was formed to oppose the administration Fair Practice Committee whose job was to hear complaints, regulate work and increase production. This Union was to become noted for their demands for an investigation into perceived administration poor accounting of the sugar ration (Jackman, 1955). The Heart Mountain Fair Play committee campaigned against the military draft of the Nisei and attracted large crowds in defiance of a ban on assembly (Okihiro, 1996).
Contributions to a Political Cause.

The final category of democratic methods relates to contributions to a political cause. Political discourse within the camps was carried out in an austere environment. No evidence of monetary contributions for political purposes was uncovered during this research.

Research Strategy 2: Interview Data and Comparative Analysis

This section focuses on interview data in which former evacuees revealed information describing their own political and civic behavior. The interview questions were divided in two four groups clustering related questions into modes of related activities. These modes are: political socialization, political cognition, obligation to participate, and membership in voluntary associations.

This study asks specific questions of a narrowly defined population. Other similar questions have been asked elsewhere in other studies. For comparative purposes, data from original Almond and Verba (1963) study were used. The time differences present no real barrier to comparison so long as they are taken into account during the analysis so, more current data from the Citizen Participation Study (Verba, Schlozman & Brady, 1995) and 1996 voting data (Brunner, 1998, p. 65) were used to supplement the original 1963 survey data. Through this method, I am comparing the Evacuee responses to the United States data from 1963, 1995 and 1996. In all cases, there are instances in which question wording was not identical to wording used in this study, however, wording in all cases was close enough to be considered equivalent. The combined United States data provides a model for a democratic society.
Political Socialization.

Political socialization addresses the nonpolitical knowledge and skills acquired by individuals from their family and associations such as school and workplace. Those who grow up learning associations in which participation and influence of the individual is normative are likely to take this same view as adults and participate with the expectation of having influence. The argument is that sense of political competence in adults originates in their early experiences at home, in school and in the workplace. These early non-political primary experiences are the foundations upon which political behaviors are based.

Almond and Verba (1963) point out that this is "a complex set of relationships" (p. 266) and that a view of the "political system as family writ large" is simplistic (p. 268). Tables 1 and 2 depict former Evacuee responses to questions on remembered family participation.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage who remember they had *</th>
<th>Evacuees (N = 10)</th>
<th>U S (1963) (N = 970)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Some influence</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No influence</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know or don't remember</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Actual text of the question: "As you were growing up, let's say when you were around sixteen, how much influence do you remember having in family decision affecting yourself? Did you have much influence, some, or none at all?
The former Evacuees seem to remember less opportunity to participate in family decision making than the general US population.

Much of the available literature on Japanese American family life in this era concentrates on conflict between the elderly Issei and their Nisei children. Issei are often portrayed as stern, strict and unforgiving. While most interviewee's comments seemed to support this notion, they generally felt that their parents were caring and had their children's best interest at heart. Only one respondent felt bitterly about his father's relationship to the son. The family structures they described were not obviously participatory. A most frequent comment was that the parents listened to what the children had to say and then did what they thought was best, and it was very difficult to change the parents' minds. Although some were adamantly negative. "A Nisei male responded "zero!" Another said, "I didn't have practically any."

Table 2
Perceived freedom to dissent within the family (pre-evacuation).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage who felt *</th>
<th>Evacuees (N = 10)</th>
<th>U S (1963) (N = 970)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Free to complain</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uneasy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not free to complain</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Remember</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Actual text of the question: "At around the same time, if a decision were made that you didn't like, did you feel free to complain, did you feel a little uneasy about complaining, or was it better not to complain?"
This question addresses the issue of adult political competence. Those people who feel subjectively that they can influence people and events are more likely to be politically active. Persons in political office then must pay attention to such people because ignoring them might adversely affect their support. So, officials are compelled to act in their behalf. The act of successful influence then adds to the individual's sense of competence.

Former Evacuees usually felt free to complain at a rate higher than the general US population, but most stated that while they did not fear complaining, their family's primary decision-maker was not likely to be influenced by the complaint.

Half of the respondents had no reluctance to complain, half did. Of those who felt complaining was acceptable, they still felt it did no good. Most still believe today that individual complaining is usually futile. Issues should be addressed by groups not individuals. One respondent stated that while he was free to complain, it never did any good. Another said “My father would get mad at me when I expressed my opinion.” Three of the respondents stated that they felt this was common among all relationships between parents and teens.

Almond and Verba divide competence into two types, political competence and administrative competence. Political competence reflects the individual's perception of his ability to influence public policy. Administrative competence reflects the individual's perception of his ability to affect policy in a situation which is immediate and personally relevant. Administrative competence is measured by questions related to the individual's feelings about his relationship
to hypothetical situations in which potentially harmful rules or regulations are being considered and the individual's relationship to the bureaucracy is under consideration. This is not a measure of actual efficacy; the government's response to the people is not measured in this method, only individual's perceptions and feelings. So, there may be a difference between the perceptions and reality. Table 3 depicts the former Evacuees’ expectations of fair and equal treatment now.

Table 3

Expectations of fairness (1998)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage who say *</th>
<th>Evacuees (N = 10)</th>
<th>U S (1963) (N = 970)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>They expect equal treatment</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They don’t expect equal treatment</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depends</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Actual Text of the question: “Suppose there were some question that you had to take to a government office - for example, a tax question or housing regulation. Do you think you would be given equal treatment - I mean, would you be treated as well as anyone else?”

Expectations of treatment by government bureaucracy measures expectations of fairness. This question assumes that everyone wants to be treated equally. Bureaucracy has a reputation for being impersonal and unresponsive. The question does not ask if the respondents expected to achieve a desired outcome, only if they would be treated fairly.
As Table 3 shows, the former Evacuees have an expectation of fair and equal treatment comparable to the general US population. Several respondents asked for clarification to verify that the question referred to a government office, implying that if the scenario had referred to a non-government situation the answer may be different. One respondent simply said, “I don’t think so.” Another said “I think I would get equal treatment in this day and age.” Another commented “I feel I get treated the same. I’ve never had any problems like that.”

**Patterns of Political Communication.**

People must be willing to discuss political issues. They must see some measure of value in such discussion and believe political discussion is safe, without untoward effects. Such discussion must take place in an atmosphere of relative freedom and with confidence. Table 4 depicts interest, confidence and willingness to discuss political issues.

**Table 4**

**Frequency of talking politics with other people (1998)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage who report they*</th>
<th>Evacuees (N = 10)</th>
<th>US (1963) (N = 970)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never talk politics</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes talk politics</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other and don’t know</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Actual text of the question: “What about talking about talking about public affairs to other people? Do you do that nearly every day, once a week, from time to time, or never?”*
Former Evacuees do sometimes talk about politics, but they do it differently than the general US population. They talk politics at about half the rate of the general US population.

A Nisei female replied, "We don't care about public affairs." A Nisei male responded, "Sometimes when we have spare time, if we're not talking about something else."

**Patterns of political cognition.**

Questions asked in this category address awareness and knowledge of the political system. We assume that awareness and knowledge of political affairs is a necessary precursor to active participation and that to some extent, awareness and knowledge influences type and degree of both participation and effectiveness. Tables 5 and 6 tell us something about political cognition among former Japanese American Evacuees.

Table 5

**Following the accounts of political affairs (1998)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>follow accounts*</th>
<th>Evacuees (N = 10)</th>
<th>US (1963) (N = 970)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regularly</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From time to time</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other and don't know</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Do you follow the accounts of political and governmental affairs? Would you say you follow them regularly, from time to time, or never?

The number of former Evacuees who regularly follow accounts of political affairs are comparable to the general US population, but the “from time to time” and “never” categories are inverted. The former Evacuee “never” responses occur more than twice as often as that of the general US population.

Table 6

Following reports of public affairs in the media (1998)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage who follow accounts of</th>
<th>Evacuees (N = 10)</th>
<th>US (1963) (N = 970)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newspapers at least weekly</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio or television at least weekly</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In magazines (ever)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Former Evacuees are paying attention to public affairs at a rate twice that of the general US population, though it may not translate into public
performance. A Nisei male answered, "I read the paper every day and I have my
own ideas as to what it's all about, but what the hell can you do?" A Nisei
female responded, I always have it on my mind." Another Nisei male answered,"No, except for Clinton and I'm not even sure if that's politics."

The obligation to participate.

Voting and participation in political campaigns are perhaps the most
commonly accepted vision of American democracy. Both involve a degree of
interest, confidence and trust in the electoral process. Disinterested or alienated
persons disengage. An orientation toward electoral campaigns indicates a belief
that they are necessary and have value. Absence of electoral activity shows
either apathy or a rejection of the process. Voting exerts influence over public
leaders. Voting is not a collective act; it is an individual act regulated by specific
infrequent opportunities to act. Elections are competitive activities, so voting
involves the voter in conflict. Table 7 depicts evacuee voting activity in a national
election.

Table 7


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage who voted in last presidential election *</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evacuees (N = 10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States (Brunner, 1996)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Actual text of the question: "Did you vote in the last Presidential election?"

This number is significant. Japanese Americans tend to register to vote at
a lower rate than the population in general. Lien (1997) reports that 37% of
eligible Japanese Americans registered to vote in San Francisco in 1984, while 60% of the general electorate registered at the same time. In this case, the evacuee registration rate is greater than that of the general electorate.

One Nisei female smiled and answered, “The first one was Truman. After that I didn’t bother anymore.” Another became excited when she heard the question and answered proudly, “Every one!”

Campaigning is a more complicated and potentially more powerful act than simple voting. Campaign activity is also part of the electoral process and is closely related to voting. Participation in a political campaign can be a more powerful influence than simply voting, because the participant has the opportunity to influence many others. Campaigns depend heavily on the dissemination of information and that information allows people to make choices and join groups of similar thinking persons. Table 8 shows former Evacuee responses regarding their campaign participation.

Table 8

Participation in a Political Campaign (1998)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of respondents who*</th>
<th>Evacuees</th>
<th>US (1995)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N = 10)</td>
<td>(N = 2,517)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worked for a candidate or party</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributed money</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Actual text of the question: “Have you ever been active in a political campaign? That is, have you ever worked for a candidate or party, contributed money, or done any other active work?”
Although one-half of the respondents had never participated in a political campaign, their rates of participation are still higher than the general population. Those who had never participated seemed strongly ambivalent toward political campaigns. A Nisei male answered “Zero – no.” Another stated “No, only during redress.”

**Sense of political competence.**

Tables 9 and 10 were designed to get some notion of the respondents’ views of their political competence (perceived ability to influence government) and of possible strategies they might employ to influence a government decision. Strategy is just as important as the willingness to participate. In a democracy, numbers count. Acting alone such as voting, is a very different approach than grassroots organizing, and with likely different outcomes.

Table 9 depicts the percentage of respondents who feel they can do something to change an unjust law they consider harmful.

**Table 9**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage who said they were*</th>
<th>Evacuees (N = 10)</th>
<th>U S (1963) (N = 970)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Likely to succeed</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Likely to succeed</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is obvious from the answers to this question than former Evacuees feel their likelihood of success to be much lower than the general US population. Half of the respondents (50%) indicated they believed it depended on the situation.

Strategies respondents would employ are listed in Table 10.
Table 10

Type of action they would take to influence government (1998)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of respondents who would*</th>
<th>Evacuees (N = 10)</th>
<th>US (1963) (N = 970)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Directly contact political leaders</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Try to enlist aid of others</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nothing</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Actual text of the questions: “Suppose a law were being considered by your local government that you considered very unjust or harmful. What do you think you could do? Anything else? If you made an effort to change this law, how likely is it that you would succeed?”

At first glance, this data seem to contradict data in Table 12. At only 10 percent, those who would try to enlist the aid of others seems odd when compared to their high rate of membership in voluntary associations. However, the question in Table 10 places the burden for action on the individual and goes far beyond mere membership in an association. This may also be associated with the perceived low likelihood of success as shown in Table 9. There is a rather high response rate for engaging in protest to influence government. Throughout the interviews the word “protest” was used frequently. Those who would do nothing (30%) contrasts with the general population who did not seem to even consider the possibility.
A Nisei female answered, "Usually in these things the JACL is on top of it."

A Nisei male responded, "Nothing, I'd just let it go down the drain." Another Nisei female simply said, "Don't rock the boat."

Table 11

Percentage who say they have tried to influence a government decision (1998)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage who said*</th>
<th>Evacuees (N = 100)</th>
<th>US (1963) (N = 745)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes, they had</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, they had not</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Actual text of the question: "Have you ever done anything to try to influence a government decision?"

Although at 50% the Evacuees responded "yes" at a noticeably higher rate than the general population, I had expected that all respondents would answer "yes", since all were members of the JACL and had supported redress. Possibly, some had provided only "checkbook" support for redress and the "yes" answers referred to other issues. One Nisei male related a personal story. "We all stuck together and voted against (a politician who did not support redress). I feel our Japanese community did some good (helped defeat the politician's bid for reelection).

Voluntary Organizational Membership.

Membership in a voluntary association implies interest beyond that of the individual. Although the organization can represent the individual's needs, and through larger numbers possibly be more effective, the act of association involves participation and interaction. Simple membership is not an absolute
indicator of true participation. Some members are "free riders" sharing in the benefits, but contributing little. This activity is not usually directly related to the electoral process, but though communication of information to individuals allows them to make informed choices and pressure leaders. Voluntary associations may act as mediators between individuals and political authority. Tables 12, 13 and 14 depict former Evacuee involvement in voluntary associations.

Table 12

Distribution of Voluntary Association Membership (1998)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Membership by percentage*</th>
<th>Evacuees (N = 10)</th>
<th>US (1995) (N = 2,517)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Actual text of the question: "Have you ever been a member of any organizations (labor unions, business organizations, social groups, professional or farm organizations, cooperatives, fraternal or veterans' groups, athletic clubs, political, charitable, civic, or religious organizations) or any other organized group?"

Organizational membership has dramatically changed since the 1963 survey. Fewer Americans are joining voluntary associations (Putnam, 1995), though former Evacuees appear to join at a high rate. Membership in the Japanese American Citizen League was common to all former Evacuees.
Table 13

Officership in a voluntary association (1998)

Officership by percentage (of those responding “yes” above)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Evacuees (N = 10)</th>
<th>US (1995) (N = 1,988)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Actual text of the question: “Were you ever an officer in this (one of these) organization(s)?”

Table 13 depicts a rather high incidence of officership in voluntary associations. Respondents did not seem to seek out officership, however. As one Nisei male who had been an officer several times described it “there was nobody else who would do the job.”

Table 14

Affiliation by type of organization. Percentage exceeds 100 due to multiple affiliations. (1998)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent membership by type*</th>
<th>Evacuees (N = 10)</th>
<th>US (1995) (N = 2,517)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unions</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veterans’</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional/Business</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Each person who responded positively to union membership indicated that joining a labor union was a merely a condition of employment and then expressed generally anti-union feelings. Membership in the Japanese American Citizen League was considered both a cultural and a political affiliation, which accounts for the one hundred percentile ratings in those categories. JACL membership was common to all respondents.

Effects of the Evacuation on Political Behavior

The Japanese American Evacuees have gone through a unique experience. On the one hand taught at an early age to be good citizens, while on the other specifically singled out for mass denial of the rights normally accorded to good citizens. The following questions as shown in Tables 15 through 22 were devised in an effort to determine what, if any, impact the evacuation and internment had on their perception of government.

Table 15

Reported interest and involvement (N = 10)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage who responded they*</th>
<th>Civic Affairs</th>
<th>Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Became more interested and involved</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Became less interested and involved</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Had no change in interest and involvement</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Actual text of the questions: "How did your experiences during the evacuation affect your interest and involvement in civic affairs? How did your
experiences during the evacuation affect your interest and involvement in local, state, or national government?”

The former Evacuees reported identical answers for interest in civic affairs and government. One respondent reported that he became disillusioned and angry when, in high school in the relocation center, he was taught the merits of democracy. A Nisei male answered “I was interested until the redress program was finished, then I could finally say we did our duty.” He continued “I learned the government meant business.” A previously apathetic Nisei female became strongly more interested. A Nisei male commented “When I studied civics in school (in a relocation center) I was always shaking my head, wondering what the hell was going on.” While a Nisei female stated “Just follow the crowd.” The young age of most respondents at time of evacuation is probably a factor in these answers.

Of those who reported increased interest in government, only one stated a preference for level of government, national. The others reported equal interest in local, state, and national government affairs.

Table 16

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage who reported*</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A difference</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No difference</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Before and after evacuation view of government (N = 10)
* Actual text of the question: “Think now of the life you led before evacuation and of the life you led after evacuation. Is there a difference in how you view government?”

Only twenty percent reported a difference between their pre-evacuation and post-evacuation view of government. One who reported no change stated “I still love it!” Another stated the evacuation experience created a much greater willingness to question the motives of government. Fifty percent stated that they were teenagers during evacuation, and at that age were not interested in either civic or government affairs. These same respondents reported little interest as post-evacuation adults. A Nisei male answered “I didn’t even think about government and nothing’s changed.” Another responded, “I had more confidence in it after the war. But, it would have changed regardless of whether I went to the evacuation or not.”

Table 17

Pre-evacuation Voting patterns (N = 10)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of those who reported*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voting at least once</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not voting</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Actual text of the question: “Did you ever vote in a presidential, state or local election before the evacuation?”

Only three respondents were old enough to vote before the evacuation and they could not remember voting in any election. All other respondents were under the required legal age for voting.
Table 18

Voting patterns During Evacuation (N = 10)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of those who reported*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not voting</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Actual text of the question: "Were there any elections held at (name of relocation center)? Did you vote? Did you run for any elective office?

Only three respondents remembered elections of any type being held at their relocation center. One mentioned mock elections in high school. Again, all but three were too young to have participated in voting activity. Four commented that they believed those who served on committees and councils were volunteers. A Nisei male answered "There were block elections, but I had no use for it. At the time who give a damn what the government was telling us to do. All we were interested in was sports." A Nisei female commented "I don't remember. They just do what they want."

Table 19

Committee membership (N = 10)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage who reported*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>committee membership in a relocation center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no committee membership in a relocation center</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Actual text of the question: "Were there any committees at (name of relocation center) to help organize and run things? (If yes) Were the members of these committees elected or appointed? Did you ever serve on a committee? Did this
(these) committee(s) have a positive influence on life at (name of relocation center)?"

Eighty percent reported knowledge of committees at their relocation centers, but none remembered how members were selected to serve. Two respondents actually served on informal committees, and all but one agreed the committees had a positive influence on camp community life. One Nisei male summed up the general feeling of all when he said that at the time, "I just wasn't interested."

Table 20

Work ethic in relocation centers (N = 10)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage who reported that*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Their work had a positive influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Their work did not have a positive influence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Actual text of the questions: "Did you have a job while at (name of relocation center)? If yes, what kind of job? Do you feel the kind of work you did made a positive contribution to the (name of relocation center) community?"

Several respondents had more than one job. Two reported that job skills learned inside the relocation center were useful after leaving camp. Four respondents held only part time jobs while attending high school. None reported that their jobs were useless or "make work". Most indicated that there was more than enough useful work in their communities to keep everyone busy. One Nisei male disagreed. He said "There was a lot of flunky jobs – they had to have them do something to stay busy."
Limited by the structure of relocation center life, protest sometimes became an outlet for expression of wants and preferences. Tables 21 and 22 address the issue of protest in relocation centers.

Table 21

Participation in a Protest (N = 10)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage who reported they had seen a protest*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 22

Feelings toward protest

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Of those who reported yes, percentage who reported*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protest had a positive influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest had a negative influence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Actual text of the question: “I have heard that sometimes evacuees would protest government in the relocation centers. Did you see any protests in (name of relocation center)? (If yes) Were you involved in any protests? Did the(se) protest(s) have a positive influence on life at (name of relocation center)?”

While the question asked if respondents had “seen” a protest, those who answered yes, clarified that they had actually “heard” or “heard about” a protest. No respondents admitted to participating in protest or personally observing one; they stated that they stayed physically far away so as to avoid possible injury.

One respondent did participate in a protest in an Army run assembly center, but that information was not included in this data. Four respondents
expressed their belief that the protests were engineered by the Kibei, who were described as "troubblemakers". A Nisei female commented "We had a classmate who died" and "Through curiosity they go to see." Another related "It was eerie cause they had this bell, the mess hall bell, and on and on they sounded that bell."
Chapter 5
Conclusions

In 1941 the Japanese in America were generally considered to be heirs to a non-democratic tradition. This was not simply an issue of people lacking the proper political and organizational skills, but by inference describes a people whose traditions of association and civic engagement would negatively affect their political behavior.

Kitano (as cited in Taylor, 1993) observed that for many evacuees, the limited experience in participatory democracy inside a relocation center was their first of that type. Political behaviors such as "block votes, community services community decisions, and the like, provided a taste of ‘ideal’ community democracy, the likes of which few Americans have ever seen" (p. 133).

Although it may have been their first attempt at participatory government, they seem to have proven themselves to be persistent and able democrats. Research strategy 1 revealed substantial anecdotal evidence to support the contention that the Japanese American evacuees displayed political and civic behaviors that were consistent with American style democracy. Eight of the nine categories of political participation were met. Absence of support for the ninth category may be more indicative of research limitations than actual absence of this category of behavior.

This conclusion is further supported by an informed observation made by the Project Attorney at Poston.
There were some who were inclined to think that the residents lacked the knowledge of self government. They were unaware that although few had held public offices, the Japanese communities had many organizations and had solved by themselves most of their internal problems such as crimes, delinquencies, and poverty, without resorting to courts or private or governmental relief agencies. No Robert’s Rules of Procedure, a few copies of which were sent to the projects, were needed for an orderly meeting (Haas, 1943, p. 63).

The participatory procedures in the relocation centers were designed by government administrators and reflected a bureaucratic approach rather than a true democratic approach to governance. Evacuee political behavior in these circumstances was a reflection of both their family structure and culture as permissible within physical and structural boundaries of camp life. Theoretical approaches for citizen education are meaningless unless the citizens actually require education. Perhaps by concentrating on similarities rather than differences, we will find answers we can all live with. A high school student at Topaz commented on the Caucasian school teachers", many of them, do not understand us, but I think that if they work with us, we might gradually be known to the American people as American." (Sugihara, 1943, p. 38)

Since the staff of the relocation centers was appointed by the War Relocation Authority and not elected, the structure more resembled a bureaucratic agency than a democracy in action. Policy-making was generally centralized at the national level, with individual Project Directors and staff allotted
administrative and technical tasks. The War Relocation Authority sponsored evacuee councils were most often literally employees of the administration, or as Daniels (in Taylor, 1993) described them, "trustees" (p. 133). In such cases ordinary evacuee influence was often indirect, with the members' participation restricted to stating opinions which the administration was free to ignore. Informal groups that arose, such as the Issei Council, were similar to modern citizen's advisory councils and reflected a genuine move toward citizen participation in democratic processes.

The events listed in research strategy 1 are not all encompassing. Certainly other, non-democratic behaviors also existed, however, the presence of committees, councils, elections and a tenacious attempt at participatory decision-making make a strong case for supporting the hypotheses.

Research strategy 2 served three purposes. The first was to supplement strategy 1 and confirm or dispute strategy 1 as to political behaviors inside the relocation centers. The second purpose was to explore political behaviors after evacuation. Finally, the third purpose was to explore the possibility of cultural and family influence on their political behaviors.

Evacuee political behaviors after release from the relocation centers appears wholly consistent with the American democratic model. They vote at a rate comparable with other Americans. They join and participate in various voluntary organizational activities. When motivated to do so, they participate in political campaigns. Two notable differences were discovered. Their strategies of influence tend to be strongly based on collective approaches and they seem to
have a somewhat lower expectation of success in influencing government. Only two respondents seemed to be independently politically active. Others generally traced much of their activity to involvement with the JACL. In these cases the JACL acts as a power broker in their behalf and the individual's sense of political efficacy is tied to the JACL as a mediating structure.

The attempt at finding a correlation between early cultural influences on political behavior was inconclusive and their influence on political culture remains uncertain. Respondents admitted that their parents, particularly the fathers, were strict, but strongly believed their parents had the children's best interest in mind. It is possible that values, attitudes and behavior acquired in childhood are pervasive, but not compelling. Interview responses seem to suggest the evacuees are aware of a tendency to be politically passive, but make conscious decisions to become politically engaged when necessary, at least on issues that are important to them. One Nisei male respondent made the following observation.

A lot of people will tell you a lot of things now because they know a little bit more now than they did before when they were in camp. Ninety-nine percent of them were people that were followers. Japanese people are followers; they're not leaders. And if they do get a leader watch out, he's a SOB, a smart SOB.

The various rationale behind the Japanese American Evacuation have not lost relevance. In 1982, a Chinese American named Vincent Chin was beaten to death by disgruntled Caucasian automotive workers who thought Chin was
Japanese. In 1990, a Vietnamese immigrant was beaten by African Americans because they mistook him for Korean (Min, 1995). During the gulf war, anti-Arab sentiment was aroused. Arab Americans found themselves facing a dramatic increase in the number of hate crimes directed against them, and President George Bush ordered the FBI to place Arab American leaders under surveillance (Abraham, 1994).

If the issue of assimilation into American democracy is to be resolved, the resolution must take place on the level of democracy and that resolution must be both rational and consistent with democratic principles. The pragmatics of American history have a habit of brushing aside legal niceties in the rush of events, and have proven time and again the elasticity of constitutions and laws. Democracy cannot survive without democratic inquiry. At this point, the issues of loyalty or political efficacy are no longer on trial, but rather the integrity of the American nation and its processes of public policy making. The lessons of this history are that fear makes people desperate for simple solutions, and that rights are relative to the perceived interests of the nation. Reason doesn't sleep in this scenario it sleepwalks, like in a nightmare.
References


Canal camp adult classes to start. (1942, October 10). Gila News-Courier, p. 3.


APPENDIX A

Japanese American Concentration Camp installation

by

MASUMI HAYASHI

The artist statement and text accompanying the series of photographs used in the exhibition Masumi Hayashi curated by Lisa Stamanis for the Reed Whipple Cultural Center in Las Vegas, Nevada, from April 9th, 1998, to June 10th, 1998. This installation includes panoramic photo collages of the internment camp sites 50 years later, audio interviews of internees, a website with this information and photographs, some photographs from Las Vegas residents who were interned in these camps.

Access the website at:

http://www.csuohio.edu/art_photos/
INDEX

1. Artist statement.
2. Executive order 9066.
3. Exclusion order no. 5.
4. Presidential apology.
5. Listing for ten relocation centers.
7. Granada relocation center.
8. Heart Mountain relocation center.
10. Manzanar relocation center.
11. Poston relocation center.
12. Topaz relocation center.
13. Tule Lake relocation center.
   Audio interviews.
MASUMI HAYASHI

December 1996.

The installation “American concentration camps” is about a collective memory of the camps that “interned” 120,000 Japanese Americans during World War II without trial. Its memories are about the reconstruction of that time and space fifty years later. It is about transition of the immigrant Japanese American people caught between two countries at war; people caught without a country would claim them as their own. It is about their collective voices and memories of that displacement. It is about a quiet silence that surrounds the land, those prison cities, and that time.

With the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the Japanese Americans in America were no longer seen by other Americans as industrious, immigrant neighbors but were transformed into enemy aliens overnight. There were no trials, no hearings, to prove innocence or guilt. They were assumed to be the enemy. They were prisoners, indefinitely incarcerated, a political decision based on race. They lost their homes and communities. Their families were separated. They felt shame and guilt. Their recent collective voices unfolding reach beneath this surface of the Japanese American image of passive acceptance, “gamman” (“endurance”), “shikata ga nai” (“it cannot be helped”), and survival. Their voices call out beyond anger and memory.

In 1946, over 120,000 Japanese Americans were removed from their homes in the “western defense zone” and incarcerated in ten camps in isolated areas of Utah, Montana, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Colorado, and Idaho. These ten camps functioned as prison cities, with populations of 10,000 to 18,000 people. Hundreds of barracks surrounded by barbed wire. Every 500 yards was a guard tower and a guard. Almost fifty years later,
Presidents Clinton and Reagan issued letters of apology to those still living who had been interned in the camps.

As the French theorist Michel Foucault has noted in nineteenth century prison architectural plan were often based on the panoptican, where one prison guard can see all of the prisoners in their separate cells. Such a space exudes hierarchy and control. These photographs of the concentration camps are also about a mapping of space. Where the viewer can instantly see a 360 degree panoramic view, which otherwise would circle around her. The viewer becomes both prisoner and guard within the photograph’s memory. The camera’s eye records a panoptic space that is also an impossible two-dimensional space, composed of overlapping cubist images. From over 100 snapshots, these many sequential fragments make-up one panoramic photo collage, extended and stretched like a multi-folded shoji screen. They represent the gestalt of looking at many fractured images and seeing a unified whole. These photographs contrast the beauty of the natural landscape with the memory that it was the omnipresent backdrop, the daily “image” for thousands of innocent but incarcerated Japanese Americans of the 1940’s.

This installation is about the construction of that time and space, that “memory“ of transition and displacement.
EXECUTIVE ORDER 9066

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, and Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, I hereby authorize and direct the Secretary of War, and the Military Commanders whom he may from time to time designate, whenever he or any designated Commander deems such action necessary or desirable, to prescribe military areas in such places and of such extent as he or the appropriate Military Commander may determine, from which any or all persons may be excluded, and with respect to which, the right of any to enter, remain in, or leave shall be subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary of War or the appropriate Military Commander may impose in his discretion....

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The White House

February 19, 1942

Civilian Exclusion Order No. 5
WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION
Presidio of San Francisco, California
April 1, 1942

INSTRUCTIONS
TO ALL PERSONS OF
JAPANESE
ANCESTRY
LIVING IN THE FOLLOWING AREA:

All that portion of the City and County of San Francisco, State of California, lying generally west of the north-south line established by Junipero Serra Boulevard, Worchester Avenue, and Nineteenth Avenue, and lying generally north of the east-west line established by California Street, to the intersection of Market Street, and thence on Market Street to San Francisco Bay.

All Japanese persons, both alien and non-alien, will be evacuated from the above designated area by 12:00 o'clock noon, Tuesday, April 7, 1942.

No Japanese person will be permitted to enter or leave the above described area after 8:00 a.m., Thursday, April 2, 1942, without obtaining special permission from the Provost Marshal at the Civil Control Station located at:

1701 Van Ness Avenue
San Francisco, California

The Civil Control Station is equipped to assist the Japanese population affected by this evacuation in the following ways:

1. Give advice and instructions on the evacuation.

2. Provide services with respect to the management, leasing, sale, storage or other disposition of most kinds of property including: real estate, business and professional equipment, buildings, household goods, boats, automobiles, livestock, etc.

3. Provide temporary residence elsewhere for all Japanese in family groups.

4. Transport persons and a limited amount of clothing and equipment to their new residence; as specified below.
THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS MUST BE OBSERVED:

1. A responsible member of each family, preferably the head of the family, or the person in whose name most of the property is held, and each individual living alone, will report to the Civil Control Station to receive further instructions. This must be done between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., Thursday, April 2, 1942, or between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., Friday, April 3, 1942.

2. Evacuees must carry with them on departure for the Reception Center, the following property:
   (a) Bedding and linens (no mattress) for each member of the family;
   (b) Toilet articles for each member of the family;
   (c) Extra clothing for each member of the family;
   (d) Sufficient knives, forks, spoons, plates, bowls and cups for each member of the family;
   (e) Essential personal effects for each member of the family.

   All items carried will be securely packaged, tied and plainly marked with the name of the owner and numbered in accordance with instructions received at the Civil Control Station.

   The size and number of packages is limited to that which can be carried by the individual or family group.

   No contraband items as described in paragraph 6, Public Proclamation No. 3, Headquarters Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, dated March 24, 1942, will be carried.

3. The United States Government through its agencies will provide for the storage at the sole risk of the owner of the more substantial household items, such as iceboxes, washing machines, pianos and other heavy furniture. Cooking utensils and other small items will be accepted if crated, packed and plainly marked with the name and address of the owner. Only one name and address will be used by a given family.

4. Each family, and individual living alone, will be furnished transportation to the Reception Center. Private means of transportation will not be utilized. All instructions pertaining to the movement will be obtained at the Civil Control Station.

Go to the Civil Control Station at 1701 Van Ness Avenue, San Francisco, California, between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., Thursday, April 2, 1942, or between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., Friday, April 3, 1942, to receive further instructions.

J. L. DeWITT
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Commanding

See Civilian Exclusion Order No. 5
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 1, 1993

Over fifty years ago, the United States Government unjustly interned, evacuated, or relocated you and many other Japanese Americans. Today, on behalf of your fellow Americans, I offer a sincere apology to you for the actions that unfairly denied Japanese Americans and their families fundamental liberties during World War II.

In passing the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, we acknowledged the wrongs of the past and offered redress to those who endured such grave injustice. In retrospect, we understand that the nation's actions were rooted deeply in racial prejudice, wartime hysteria, and a lack of political leadership. We must learn from the past and dedicate ourselves as a nation to renewing the spirit of equality and our love of freedom. Together, we can guarantee a future with liberty and justice for all. You and your family have my best wishes for the future.

Bill Clinton
GILA RIVER RELOCATION CENTER
Pinal County, Arizona

GRANADA RELOCATION CENTER
Prowers County, Colorado

HEART MOUNTAIN RELOCATION CENTER
Park County, Wyoming

JEROME RELOCATION CENTER
Chicot County, Arkansas

MANZANAR RELOCATION CENTER
Inyo County, California

MINIDOKA RELOCATION CENTER
Jerome County, Idaho

POSTON RELOCATION CENTER
Yuma County, Arizona

ROHWER RELOCATION CENTER
Desha County, Arkansas

TOPAZ RELOCATION CENTER
Millard County, Utah

TULE LAKE RELOCATION CENTER
Klamath Falls, California
Gila River

Gila River was the site of one of ten concentration camps which housed Japanese Americans forcibly removed from the west coast states during World War II.

Official name: Gila River Relocation Center.
Location: 45 miles southeast of Phoenix, in Pinal County, Arizona near Sacaton; the Superstition Mountains loomed in the distance.
Land: Leased from the Pima Indian Reservation.
Size: 17,000 acres; the center was divided into two camps: Canal (209.5 acres) and Butte (789.25 acres).
Climate: Desert; Summer temperatures reached 125 degrees. The average daily high temperatures for July, August, and September 1942 were 109.6, 104.0, and 99.7 degrees, respectively. Though not as bad as some other camps, duststorms were also a problem here.

Camp population came from: Mostly from Los Angeles (4,952), Fresno (1,972), Santa Barbara (1,797), San Joaquin (815), Solano (695), Contra Costa and Ventura Counties (583).
Via "assembly centers": Most came via Turlock (3,566), Tulare (4,951), and Santa Anita (1,294) "Assembly Centers"; nearly 3,000 came directly to Gila and another 2,000 came from Jerome upon its closing.
Rural/Urban: Roughly equal split.
Peak population: 13,348.
Date of peak: December 30, 1942.
Opening date: July 20, 1942.
Closing date: Canal Camp: September 28, 1945.
Butte Camp: November 10, 1945.

Project director(s): Lewis J. Korn, Eastburn Smith, Robert B. Cozzens, L. H. Bennett, and Douglas M. Todd.
Newspaper(s): Gila News Courier (September 12, 1942 September 5, 1945); Gila Bulletin (September 8 28, 1945).
% who answered question 28 of the loyalty questionnaire positively: 90.5.
Number and percentage of eligible citizen males inducted directly into armed forces: 487 (5.0%).
Industry: A camouflage net factory operated from Fall 1942 to May 1943; a model warship factory produced 800 models for the navy.

History: Gila River was on Indian Reservation land. The WRA director Milton Eisenhower refused to relinquish administrative control of the camp to the Office of Indian Affairs, probably because of the potential for profitable
agricultural enterprise here. Much of the administrative staff at Gila came from OIA personnel.

Gila had the most extensive agricultural program of all the camps. At its peak, Gila farmed approximately 7,000 acres, 3,000 in vegetable crops, some of which was shipped to other camps. Gila had 2,000 head of cattle, 2,500 3,000 head of hogs, 25,000 chickens, and 110 dairy cows. Fields of stocks and marigolds were also grown here for center consumption.

Gila saw four project directors in its first eight months; the fourth, L. H. Bennett, remained in that position from December 12, 1942 to July 31, 1945.

The camp was marred by inadequate housing initially as people poured into a center which was not yet complete. This necessitated housing people in every conceivable space in the midst of near constant 100 degree temperatures until construction could be completed. Schools opened in October 1942 despite the almost total lack of supplies and furniture.

On November 30, 1942, Takeo Tada was beaten by a group of men. He had been employed by both the Turlock "Assembly Center" and Gila administrations and was targeted as an "INU" (dog) by those angry over a delay in clothing allocations and at the administration in general. Hearings resulted in a 30 day jail sentence for the admitted perpetrator, amid a tense atmosphere where much of the camp population supported the attacker.

Inadequate sanitation and sewage facilities coupled with the wind, dust, and heat, led to outbreaks of diarrhea, tuberculosis, "Valley Fever," and other less serious disorders.

When Eleanor Roosevelt was to visit one of the camps in the Spring of 1943, Gila was the one chosen, undoubtedly because it had the best appearance.


Granada

Granada was the site of one of ten concentration camps which housed Japanese Americans forcibly removed from the West Coast states during World War II.

**Official name:** Granada Relocation Center.
**Location:** Prowers County, Colorado; located 14 miles east of Lamar and 20 miles west of the Kansas border in the Arkansas River Valley.
**Land:** Purchased from a private party.
**Size:** 10,500 acres.
**Climate:** Located on a hilltop at 3,500 foot elevation; arid and dusty, though not as severe as the Arizona camps.

**Camp population came from:** Mostly from Los Angeles (3,181), Sonoma (696), Yolo (666), Stanislaus (661), Sacramento (632), and Merced (449) Counties.
**Via "assembly centers":** Most came from Merced (4,500) and Santa Anita (3,063) "Assembly Centers".
**Rural/Urban:** Roughly equal split.
**Peak population:** 7,318; Granada was the least populous of the camps.
**Date of peak:** February 1, 1943.
**Opening date:** August 27, 1942.
**Closing date:** October 15, 1945.

**Project director(s):** James G. Lindley.
**Community analysts:** E. Adamson Hoebel, John Ralph McFarling, John A. Rademaker.
**Newspaper(s):** Granada Bulletin (October 14-24, 1942); Granada Pioneer (October 28, 1942-September 15, 1945).
**% who answered question 28 of the loyalty questionnaire positively:** 99.8; Granada had the highest "Yes" percentage of all camps.
**Number and percentage of eligible citizen males inducted directly into armed forces:** 494 (9.9%); Granada had the highest percentage of eligible males inducted into the armed forces.
**Industry:** Granada had a silk screen poster shop that produced a quarter of a million posters for naval training.

**History:** Though located in a farming area, the agricultural development of the camp was unimpressive. Granada was at one point plagued by a polio problem that caused the administration to cancel some activities and to stop issuing passes to the outside.


Heart Mountain

Heart Mountain was the site of one of ten concentration camps which housed Japanese Americans forcibly removed from the West Coast states during World War II.

Official name: Heart Mountain Relocation Center.
Location: Northwestern Wyoming, in Park County, 13 miles northeast of Cody.
Land: Federal reclamation project land.
Size: 46,000 acres.
Climate: Severe, even by WRA standards, with winter lows dipping to 30 degrees. Elevation: 4,600 feet.

Camp population came from: Mostly from Los Angeles (6,448), Santa Clara (2,572), San Francisco (678) and Yakima, Washington (843) Counties.
Via "assembly centers": Most came from Pomona (5,270) and Santa Anita (4,700) "Assembly Centers".
Rural/Urban: Mostly urban.
Peak population: 10,767.
Date of peak: January 1, 1943.
Opening date: August 12, 1942.
Closing date: November 10, 1945.

Project director(s): Christopher E. Rachford and Guy Robertson.
Community analysts: Asael T. Hansen and Forrest La Violette.
Newspaper: Heart Mountain Sentinel (October 24, 1942 July 28, 1945).
% who answered question 28 of the loyalty questionnaire positively: 95.9
Number and percentage of eligible male citizens inducted directly into armed forces: 385 (4.8%).
Industry: Heart Mountain had a garment factory, a cabinet shop and a sawmill that produced goods for internal consumption. A silk screen shop produced posters for the other camps and for the navy.

History: The weather, along with the shoddy construction of the barracks and a population mostly from Southern California unaccustomed to the cold, contributed to a great many illnesses that resulted in hospital overcrowding in the winter of 1942-43. In addition to the severe climate, Heart Mountain, like many other camps, was also plagued by duststorms and rattlesnakes.

Despite the inhospitability of the area, Heart Mountain was to become one of the most successful camps in terms of agriculture; many crops that had never been grown in the area before were introduced.

Heart Mountain residents were stung by a series of muckraking articles about the camp by Denver Post reporter Jack Carberry, alleging, among many other things, that the inmate population was being "coddled."
Heart Mountain was also the site of the only organized resistance to the military draft. Beginning in February 1944, the FPC organized in HEART MOUNTAIN around the issue of drafting NISEI from the concentration camps for military service. Citing the Constitution, the members of the FPC stated that they would not report to the draft board if called upon until their rights as citizens were restored.

See the entry for GILA RIVER.


Jerome

Jerome was the site of one of ten concentration camps which housed Japanese Americans forcibly removed from the West Coast states during World War II.

Official name: Jerome Relocation Center.
Location: Drew and Chicot Counties, southeastern Arkansas.
Land: Farm Security Administration land.
Size: 10,000 acres.
Climate: Swamp land; green and tropical; humid.

Camp population came from: Mostly from Los Angeles (3,147), Fresno (2,013), Sacramento (993), and Honolulu (445) Counties.
Via "assembly centers": Most came from Fresno (4,743) and Santa Anita (2,931) "assembly centers"; another 811 came from Hawaii.
Rural/Urban: Roughly equal split.
Peak population: 8,497.
Date of peak: February 11, 1943.
Opening date: October 6, 1942.
Closing date: June 30, 1944; Jerome was in operation only 634 days, the shortest of any camp.

Project director(s): Paul Taylor and W. O. "Doc" Melton.
Community analysts: Edgar C. McVoy and Rachel R. Sady.
Newspaper(s): Communique (October 23, 1942 February 26, 1943); Denson Tribune (March 2, 1943 June 6, 1944).
Percent who answered question 28 of the loyalty questionnaire positively: 75.0; Jerome had the highest percentage of persons answering negatively, giving a qualified answer or refusing to answer.
Number and percentage of eligible male citizens inducted directly into armed forces: 52 (0.9%); Jerome had the lowest percentage of eligible male citizens inducted into the armed forces besides Tule Lake.
Industry: Jerome had a sawmill that produced goods for internal consumption.

History: There were no guard towers at Jerome and the fences were low; this was because the camp was surrounded by swamps inhabited by four species of the most deadly snakes in America. Farming here was difficult, but the completion in November 1942 of a canal that drained off excess water resulted in some agricultural success.

See the entry for GILA RIVER.


Manzanar

Manzanar was the site of one of ten concentration camps which housed Japanese Americans forcibly removed from the west coast states during World War II.

Official name: Manzanar Relocation Center.
Location: Inyo County, California in the Owens Valley, 225 miles north of Los Angeles.
Land: Land controlled by the City of Los Angeles for its municipal water supply.
Size: 6,000 acres.
Climate: Desert, extreme Winters and Summers. Mt. Whitney and Mt. Williamson could be seen in the distance making it one of the most beautiful of camp sites.

Camp population came from: Mostly from Los Angeles County (8,828).
Via "assembly centers": Manzanar began as an "Assembly Center".
Rural/Urban: Overwhelmingly urban.
Peak population: 10,046.
Date of peak: September 22, 1942.
Opening date: June 1, 1942; Manzanar began as a Wartime Civil Control Administration administered "assembly center" and opened on March 22, 1942; it came under War Relocation Authority jurisdiction on June 1.
Closing date: November 21, 1945.

Project director(s): Roy Nash, Harvey N. Coverley, Solon T. Kimball, and Ralph P. Merritt.
Community analysts: John de Young and Morris E. Opler.
Newspaper: Manzanar Free Press (April 11, 1942 September 8, 1945); the paper started while Manzanar was an "assembly center" and continued to publish through its transfer to WRA jurisdiction.
% who answered question 28 of the loyalty questionnaire positively: 86.9.
Number and percentage of eligible citizen males inducted directly into armed forces: 174 (2.5%).
Industry: Manzanar had a camouflage net factory which operated from June to December 1942; also a garment factory, a cabinet shop, and a mattress factory which produced goods for internal consumption.

History: Manzanar was probably the most closely guarded of all the camps, due in part to its origin as a WCCA camp, to its location within the Western Defense Command's restricted zone, and the extreme hostility of the local population.

Counting its WCCA director (Clayton Triggs), Manzanar had five directors/managers in its first eight months. Merritt took over as director on November 19, 1942 and remained in this position until the camp's closing.
Manzanar was a relatively turbulent center; the *Manzanar Incident* of December 1942 exposed deep rifts in the population.


Minidoka

Minidoka was the site of one of ten concentration camps which housed Japanese Americans forcibly removed from the west coast states during World War II.

**Official name:** Minidoka Relocation Center.

**Location:** Jerome County, south central Idaho, 6 miles north of Eden.

**Land:** Federal reclamation project land, part of the Gooding Reclamation District.

**Size:** 33,500 acres.

**Climate:** Severe; plagued by dust storms.

**Camp population came from:** King, WA (6,098), Multnomah, OR (1,927), Pierce, WA (1,051).

**Via "assembly centers":** Most came from Puyallup (7,150) and Portland (2,318) "Assembly Centers".

**Rural/Urban:** Mostly urban.

**Peak population:** 9,397.

**Date of peak:** March 1, 1943.

**Opening date:** August 10, 1942.

**Closing date:** October 28, 1945.

**Project director(s):** Harry Stafford.

**Community analysts:** Gordon Armbruster, John de Young, and Elmer R. Smith.

**Newspaper:** *Minidoka Irrigator* (September 10, 1942 - July 28, 1945).

**% who answered question 28 of the loyalty questionnaire positively:** 98.7.

**Number and percentage of eligible citizen males inducted directly into armed forces:** 594 (8.8%).

**Industry:** Minidoka had a garment factory which produced goods for internal consumption.

**History:** Minidoka was regarded by many as the "best" of the camps whose positive atmosphere stemmed from the relatively homogeneous population and the relatively benevolent administration. Because it was not in the Western Defense Command restricted area, its security was lighter than that of other camps.


Poston

Poston was the site of one of ten concentration camps which housed Japanese Americans forcibly removed from the West Coast states during World War II. One of two camps located in the Arizona desert, Poston was located on an Indian reservation and was the only camp to be administered by the Office of Indian Affairs (OIA) (until the end of 1943) rather than the WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY (WRA).

Official name: Colorado River Relocation Center.
Location: Yuma County, Arizona, 17 miles south of Parker.
Land: On the Colorado Indian Reservation.
Size: 71,000 acres; Poston was the largest of the camps.
Climate: Desert; perhaps the hottest of all camps.

Camp population came from: Mostly from Los Angeles (2,750), Tulare (1,952), San Diego (1,883), Orange (1,636), Fresno (1,590), Imperial (1,512), Monterey (1,506), and Santa Cruz (1,222) Counties.
Via "assembly centers": Most either came to Poston directly (11,738) or came from Salinas (3,459) or Santa Anita (1,573) "ASSEMBLY CENTERS"; Poston also received 469 transfers from Justice Department administered INTERNMENT CAMPS, the highest figure of any WRA camp.

Rural/Urban: Mostly rural.
Peak population: 17,814, the most populous besides TULE LAKE "SEGREGATION CENTER".
Date of peak: September 2, 1942.
Opening date: May 8, 1942.
Closing date: Unit I: November 28, 1945
              Unit II: September 29, 1945
              Unit III: September 29, 1945.

Project director(s): Wade Head and Duncan Mills.
Community analysts: Alexander Leighton, Edward H. Spicer, Elizabeth Colson and David H. French; Conrad Arensberg and Laura Thompson were consultants.
Newspaper: Poston Chronicle (May 13, 1942 October 23, 1945).
Percent who answered question 28 of the loyalty questionnaire positively: 93.7.
Number and percentage of eligible male citizens inducted directly into armed forces: 611 (4.8 percent).
Industry: A camouflage net factory operated from fall 1942 to May 1943.

History: The most notable incident at Poston was the POSTON STRIKE, described in detail in the following entry. There was another strike involving 57 adobe workers in August 1942 that was quickly settled. Poston was named after Charles Poston, the "Father of Arizona." One of the most intensively studied of all the camps, Poston housed a social science laboratory under the leadership of Alexander Leighton while under the OIA in addition to having WRA community
analysts and JAPANESE AMERICAN EVACUATION AND RESETTLEMENT STUDY fieldworkers.

Tensions between the OIA and the WRA led to the latter taking over administration of Poston at the beginning of 1944. The OIA had ideas of starting large scale farming ventures with the Japanese Americans on a semi permanent basis; this conflicted with the WRA's strategy of encouraging "loyal" residents to leave for RESETTLEMENT as soon as possible.

See the entry for GILA RIVER.

**POSTON STRIKE:** The strike was the manifestation of long standing tensions in the community exacerbated by the camp environment. By WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY decree, only NISEI were allowed to hold elective office, and the Community Council at Poston consisted entirely of young nisei. They quickly succeded in alienating the administration by being too inquisitive and in upsetting the residents who distrusted their JAPANESE AMERICAN CITIZENS LEAGUE orientation and their inexperience. They were seen by many as "administration stooges" or as a "child council." To try to bring ISSEI into the decision making process, the Issei Advisory Board was formed in August, but the utter lack of power granted this group only increased tensions. Competition between the Community Council and this advisory council ensued and people seen as "INU" were physically attacked.

On November 14, 1942, one such inmate was beaten severely with a piece of pipe. Quickly, 50 suspects were arrested and two were held for further questioning. Both were quite popular among camp residents. When it became known that these men were to be tried in an Arizona court on the outside (it was widely perceived that no Japanese could get a fair trial outside camp), protest erupted. An issei delegation visited the project director on November 17 to request the suspects' release. They were refused. After a second unsuccessful meeting the following day, a general strike ensued. The Community Council resigned as a body in support of the strike and in fear, and crowds began to gather around the jail holding the two suspects. In the meantime, the project director had left to attend a meeting, leaving the camp in charge of an assistant. With the beginning of the strike, some in the administration urged him to call in the army and to impose martial law; he chose the negotiation route. Meanwhile, over the next few days, all services except the police, fire department and hospital were closed down. Strike leaders stood around bonfires, played Japanese militaristic music and extolled the emperor. Eventually, the administration made concessions, agreeing on November 23 to release one prisoner outright and to try the other within the center. Meanwhile, after 10 days, the strike began to erode as many nisei tired of it. The issei leaders were recognized by the administration and agreed to try to help stop the beatings and
to establish better rapport between administration and internees.


Rohwer

Rohwer was the site of one of ten concentration camps which housed Japanese Americans forcibly removed from the West Coast states during World War II.

**Official name:** Rohwer Relocation Center.  
**Location:** Desha County, southeastern Arkansas.  
**Land:** Farm Security Administration land.  
**Size:** 10,161 acres.  
**Climate:** Wooded swamp land; high heat and humidity, with sudden rains.

**Camp population came from:** Mostly from Los Angeles (4,324) and San Joaquin (3,516) Counties.  
**Via "assembly centers":** Most came from Santa Anita (4,415) or Stockton (3,802) "ASSEMBLY CENTERS"; Rohwer also received the highest number of transfers from Jerome (2,734) upon that camp's closing.  
**Rural/Urban:** Mostly urban.  
**Peak population:** 8,475.  
**Date of peak:** March 11, 1943.  
**Opening date:** September 18, 1942.  
**Closing date:** November 30, 1945.  

**Project director(s):** Raymond Johnson.  
**Community analysts:** Margaret Lantis, Katherine Luomala and Charles Wisdom.  
**Newspaper:** Rohwer Outpost (October 24, 1942 July 21, 1945); Rohwer Relocator (August 1 November 9, 1945).  
**% who answered question 28 of the loyalty questionnaire positively:** 94.9.  
**Number and percentage of eligible male citizens inducted directly into armed forces:** 274 (4.7 percent).  

**History:** In an early episode, inmate volunteers clearing brush were marched off to jail at gunpoint by locals who thought they were Japanese paratroopers. Because of the irregular weather, farming was difficult here despite relatively fertile soil. The climate also led to problems with mosquitos and chiggers.

See the entry for GILA RIVER.


Topaz

Topaz was the site of one of ten concentration camps which housed Japanese Americans forcibly removed from the West Coast states during World War II.

Official name: Central Utah Relocation Center.
Location: Millard County, Utah, near Abraham, 140 miles south of Salt Lake City.
Land: Mix of public domain land, land which had reverted to the county for non-payment of taxes and land purchased from private parties.
Size: 19,800 acres.
Climate: Temperatures ranged from 106 degrees in summer to -30 degrees in winter; located at an elevation of 4,600 feet, the region was subject to a constant wind that resulted in frequent dust storms.

Camp population came from: Mostly from Alameda (3,679), San Francisco (3,370), and San Mateo (722) Counties.
Via "assembly centers": Nearly all (7,676) came from Tanforan "Assembly Center".
Rural/Urban: Overwhelmingly urban.
Peak population: 8,130.
Date of peak: March 17, 1943.
Opening date: September 11, 1942.
Closing date: October 31, 1945.

Project director(s): Charles F. Ernst (9/42 to 6/44) and Luther T. Hoffman (6/44 to 10/45).
Community analysts: Oscar F. Hoffman and Weston LaBarre.
Newspaper: Topaz Times (September 17, 1942 - August 31, 1945).
% who answered question 28 of the loyalty questionnaire positively: 89.4.
Number and percentage of eligible male citizens inducted directly into armed forces: 472 (7.3 percent).

History: Topaz featured an organized protest against the registration questionnaire, in which a petition was circulated demanding the restoration of rights as a prerequisite for registration. ISSEI chef JAMES HATSUKI WAKASA was shot to death by a guard on April 11, 1943. The literary and arts magazine Trek was produced here.

See the entry for GILA RIVER.


Tule Lake Relocation Center and Segregation Center

Tule Lake was the site of one of ten concentration camps which housed Japanese Americans forcibly removed from the west coast states during World War II. In 1943, Tule Lake was selected as the "Segregation Center" after the Loyalty Oath questionnaire identified dissidents, and a decision was made to isolate these internees.

**Official name:** Tule Lake Relocation Center.

**Location:** Klamath Falls Basin in Northern California, just south of the Oregon border. The closest town was Newell, Calif. Tule Lake is located just across the road from Lava Beds National Monument and the site of the Modoc war of 1872-73.

**Land:** Federal reclamation project land.

**Size:** 26,000 acres.

**Climate:** Relatively mild, for a WRA camp site; the land was a dry lake bed covered with sagebrush 4,000 feet above sea level.

**Camp population came from:** Mostly from Sacramento (4,984), King, WA (2,703), Placer (1,807), Pierce, WA (946), Yuba (476), and Hood River, OR (425) Counties.

**Via "assembly centers":** Most came via Sacramento (4,671), Pinedale (4,011), or Marysville (2,455) "Assembly Centers"; another 3,166 came directly to Tule Lake.

**Rural/Urban:** Roughly equal split.

**Peak population:** 18,789; peak population occurred after Tule Lake and become a "Segregation Center".

**Date of peak:** December 25, 1944.

**Opening date:** May 27, 1942.

**Closing date:** March 20, 1946; Tule Lake closed as a "Segregation Center".

**Project director(s):** Elmer Shirrell, Harvey Coverly, and Raymond Best.

**Community analysts:** Marvin K. Opler.

**Newspaper:** Tulean Dispatch (June 15, 1942 October 30, 1943).

**% who answered question 28 of the loyalty questionnaire positively:** 84.4.

**Number and percentage of eligible citizen males inducted directly into armed forces:** 57 (0.5%); Tule Lake had the lowest percentage of eligible citizen males inducted into the armed forces.

**Industry:** Tule Lake had a cabinet shop and a bakery which produced goods for internal consumption.

**History:**

Tule Lake Relocation Center, 1942-1943. Tule Lake was beset by much unrest. A farm laborers strike occurred on August 15, 1942 over the lack of promised goods and salaries. Packing shed workers struck in September, while a mess hall workers protest took place in October 1942. This culminated with large numbers of people refusing to register for the draft.
With the decision to segregate the "loyal" from the "disloyal" on the basis of the 1943 loyalty questionnaire, Tule Lake was chosen as the camp where the "disloyals" would be isolated. Tule Lake became "Tule Lake Segregation Center" in the fall of 1943.

**Tule Lake Segregation Center, 1943 - 1946.**

Tule Lake "Segregation Center" was created following disturbances associated with loyalty questionnaires administered by the War Department and WRA during February and March, 1943. The negative responses by many Japanese Americans to the loyalty questions were in reality protests against their removal and incarceration. The WRA was pressured from Congress, the Army, the Japanese American Citizens League, and its own project directors, to isolate the "disloyal" in a separate center.

On July 15, 1943, the WRA announced that the following would be sent to Tule Lake Segregation Center: aliens and American citizens of Japanese descent who had applied for repatriation or expatriation to Japan (7,222 persons); those who had answered the loyalty questions in the negative, or had refused to answer (4,785 persons); those who had been denied clearance to leave the centers; and paroled aliens from Department of Justice interment camps who were recommended for detention. The WRA also included all persons in their centers it believed to be anti administration or "troublemakers," as well as their family members. 6,000 original residents of Tule Lake Relocation Center chose to remain in the camp rather than undergo another forced move. The move to Tule Lake took place during September and October, 1943.

A newly erected heavy wire mesh "man proof" fence held them inside, while elevated block houses and watch towers with armed sentries prevented escape. Outside the fence, a battalion of military police with armored cars and tanks stood in full view of the residents. Permission to resettle was denied for all regardless of loyalty status. Self government, as established in other centers, was not allowed, although an advisory council to the administration was formed.

In October 1943, project director Raymond Best refused to negotiate with the internee community organization (the Daihyo Sha Kai) and its Negotiating Committee. A meeting followed in which national director Dillon Myer and other administrators were surrounded by thousands of peaceful residents/internees who came to support their representatives.

The U.S. Army entered Tule Lake segregation camp on November 4, 1943, and martial law was declared nine days later. The center was not returned to civilian control until January 15, 1944. A curfew kept people indoors, and ended recreational activities. The Army arrested anyone suspected of being anti administration without hearings or trials. A stockade was constructed.

Of the 18,422 persons isolated in the center, more than one fourth, including 4,517 citizens, were classified as loyal. Many of those classified as "disloyal"
Credits and acknowledgements for this show in Las Vegas:

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The Las Vegas Japanese American Citizens' League
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The Civil Liberties Public Education Fund, Research Grant
The Ohio Arts Council

Lisa Stamais, Senior Visual Arts Specialists
Dr. Y. Caryl Suzuki
Mits and Tuney Kodama
Hana Fukumoto
Mr. & Mrs. George Goto
The JACL Kaminari Taiko Drummers
The JACL Ondo Dancers
Dean Akira Keesey, website designer

There are many other individuals not mentioned here who have been helpful in the various aspects of creating the installation, photographs and the website that I also wish to thank.
Appendix B

Selected Bibliography on Japanese Immigration, Evacuation and Internment

For Background or Further Reading


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Appendix C

Timeline of Selected Events Related to the Japanese American Evacuation and Internment

1941

December 7  Naval air forces of the Empire of Japan attack United States installations on the U.S. territory of the Hawaiian Islands. FDR proclaims a state of war exists.

December 8  Congress votes for war. FDR issues orders classifying nationals of belligerent countries as enemy aliens. The Attorney General is given authority to establish prohibited zones, seize weapons or other articles, freeze enemy aliens' funds and to intern any who may be a threat to national security.

                False report of Japanese aircraft over San Francisco. Hundreds of similar reports follow.

December 7-9  The Justice Department arrests 857 Germans, 147 Italians and 1,291 Japanese. All arrests were based on information that had been compiled by the FBI and military intelligence services prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor.

December 11  Western Defense Command established, with Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt as Commander.

December 13  Japanese military forces capture Guam.

December 15  The governor of California declares a state of emergency. He also asks that tolerance be accorded American citizens of foreign decent and especially Japanese-Americans.

December 22  The Agriculture Committee of the L.A. Chamber of Commerce recommended that all Japanese nationals be put under "absolute Federal control."

December 24  Japanese military forces capture Wake Island

December 25  Japanese military forces capture Hong Kong
### 1941

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tr>
<td>December 27</td>
<td>Japanese military forces capture Manila. United States forces retreat to Bataan.</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 29</td>
<td>Enemy aliens in California, Oregon, Washington, Montana, Idaho, Utah, and Nevada ordered to surrender contraband.</td>
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### 1942

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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>January 1</td>
<td>First violence against Japanese - Americans. Kazuo Ouchida and Matsuo Matsumots wounded by gunfire in Gilroy, California.</td>
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<td>January 5</td>
<td>Japanese American selective service registrants classified as enemy aliens (IV-C). Many Japanese American soldiers discharged or assigned to menial labor.</td>
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<td>January 6</td>
<td>&quot;I do not believe that we could be any too strict in our consideration of the Japanese in the face of the treacherous way in which they do things,&quot; wrote Leland Ford, L.A. Congressman, in a telegram to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, asking that all Japanese Americans be removed from the West Coast.</td>
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<td>January 17</td>
<td>California State Senate passes a bill preventing the hiring of any additional persons of Japanese descent for civil service jobs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>January 27</td>
<td>City of Los Angeles and Los Angeles County fire all employees of Japanese descent.</td>
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<tr>
<td>January 28</td>
<td>The California State Personnel Board voted to bar all &quot;descendants of natives with whom the United States [is] at war&quot; from all civil service positions. This was only enforced against Japanese Americans.</td>
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<tr>
<td>January 29</td>
<td>The Attorney General issues an order designating &quot;prohibited areas,&quot; from which all enemy aliens, German, Italian and Japanese were to be evacuated by the 24th of February. About 10,000 people were affected, but most only moved a short distance away from certain factories,</td>
</tr>
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harbors or military installations. This order is implemented by the Justice Department, not the Army.

January 30
"Unless something is done it may bring about a repetition of Pearl Harbor," said Earl Warren, California Attorney General, calling Japanese Californians the "Achilles heel of the entire civilian defense effort."

February 2
Three hundred thirty-six aliens living on Terminal Island, near the San Pedro naval base, are arrested on Presidential warrants.

February 4
Attorney General of the United States Francis Biddle announces that the coast of California from the Oregon border to a point fifty miles north of Los Angeles and extending inland from thirty to one hundred fifty miles had been declared a "restricted area" for enemy aliens. Eleven other areas around Hydroelectric plants in the state were also restricted.

February 6
A Portland Oregon American Legion post urged the removal of "enemy aliens, especially from critical coast areas," including Japanese American citizens.

February 12
Attorney General Biddle sends a letter to Secretary of War Stimson with the following recommendation. No legal problem arises where Japanese citizens are evacuated; but American Citizens of Japanese origin could not, in my opinion, be singled out of an area and evacuated with the other Japanese. However, the result might be accomplished by evacuating all persons in the area and then licensing back those whom the military authorities thought were not objectionable from a military point of view. ... Let me add again that the Department of Justice, and particularly the Federal Bureau of investigation, is not staffed to undertake any evacuation on a large scale. ... the Army is the only organization which can arrange the evacuations.
February 13
A delegation of West Coast Congressmen (strongly influenced by special interest groups and newspapers) recommends to President Roosevelt that all persons of Japanese descent be removed from the Pacific Coast.

February 16
California Joint Immigration Committee urged that all Japanese Americans be removed from the Pacific Coast and any other vital areas. 2192 Japanese Americans are under arrest by the FBI.

February 17
California State Board of Equalization suspends 13 Japanese Americans from its roll of employees.

February 19
FDR signs Executive Order 9066, "Authorizing the Secretary of War to Prescribe Military Areas ... from which ... persons may be excluded."

February 20
Secretary of War Stimson delegates the powers given to him by the President and appoints General DeWitt as "the Military Commander to carry out the duties and responsibilities" under Executive Order 9066. Exact nature of his duties is unclear. There is no agreement as to how many or what kind of persons are to be evacuated. Stimson does specify that persons of Italian descent should not be removed. (The Mayor of San Francisco was Italian, so were baseball heroes Joe and Dom DiMaggio; Italians were favorably regarded by the American public.) In subsequent memos, Stimson indicates that German enemy aliens should be examined on a case by case basis. (The average age of German enemy aliens was determined to be about 70 years and those considered dangerous had been watched by the FBI and already arrested.)

February 21
Select House Committee on National Defense Migration (the Tolan Committee) holds its first public hearing in San Francisco. Other hearings will be held in Portland, Seattle and Los Angeles.

February 23
A Japanese submarine, I-17, fires thirteen cannon shells at oil storage tanks on a hillside north of Santa Barbara.
February 24  
The "Battle of Los Angeles." U.S. Army personnel detect (nonexistent) enemy airplanes over Los Angeles. A total of 1,400 anti-aircraft shells are fired over the city. Shell fragments fall onto city streets, damaging cars but causing no serious injuries.

February 26  
Tolan Committee sends a telegram to 15 Governors of Western States soliciting their response to the proposal to relocate all aliens, German, Italian, and Japanese (of whatever citizenship) east of the Pacific Coast State boundaries. The Governors responses were generally negative citing security problems and competition with local labor. Nebraska was willing to accept them if they were well guarded. Only the Governor of Colorado openly invited them into his state.

February 27  
The Cabinet meets in Washington to discuss evacuation of enemy aliens. The decision is made that the Army would only be responsible for rounding up enemy aliens. A new civilian agency called the War Relocation Authority would manage the actual resettlement.

February 28  
House Committee on Un-American Activities released its 300 page Yellow Book, containing multiple charges against Japanese Americans.

February 29  
Public Proclamation Number One begins voluntary relocation.

March 2  
Secretary of War increases the authority of the Commanding General, Western Defense Command. This action is intended to facilitate preparations for the defense of coastal areas against invasion.

Military Area Number One, as identified in Public Proclamation Number One, prescribes an area from 50 to 150 miles wide in California, Oregon, and Washington and Southern Arizona. All persons of Japanese descent were to be excluded from this area.
Military Area Number Two was established immediately East of Area Number One, but no directions for evacuation were given.

March 12
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco announces that it is contracted to take over duties in connection with evacuee property matters and would provide assistance. the Assistant to the US Secretary would take on the responsibility of conservation of evacuee property. Soon after, the Farm Security Administration was given the task of conservation of agricultural property.

March 15
General Order Number 34 creates the Civil Affairs Division of the Western Defense Command to carry out the evacuation.

March 16
DeWitt issued Public Proclamation No. 2, creating Military Areas 3 to 6 in Idaho, Montana, Nevada, and Utah, respectively.

March 18
President Roosevelt signs Executive Order 9102, which set up the War Relocation Authority within the Office of Emergency Management. Milton S. Eisenhower is appointed Director.

March 19
Colonel Karl Bendetsen, Assistant Chief of Staff for Western Defense Command and Director of the Wartime Civil Control Administration operations, announces that the Army would no longer be responsible for evacuees following their removal from the military areas.

March 20
Western Defense Command announces that it has taken over the Santa Anita Race Track for use as an "induction Center." Soon, the term "induction center" would change to "assembly center."

March 21
First Evacuation Order issued. One thousand Japanese Americans voluntarily moved from Los Angeles to a center at Manzanar in Owens Valley, California.

Congress passes legislation which would subject any civilian who disobeyed a military order to prison and a fine.
Republican conservative Senator Robert A. Taft was the only member of congress to challenge the bill, calling it "the sloppiest criminal law I have ever read or seen anywhere." Public Law 503 passes unanimously.

March 23

The Western Defense Command issues Civilian Exclusion Order No. 1 stating that all Japanese Americans living on Bainbridge Island (near Bremerton Navy Yard, Seattle) must evacuate by March 30.

March 26

Western Defense Command announces that eight new assembly centers would be opened at Marysville, Sacramento, Turlock, Merced, Fresno, Tulare, Stockton, and Pinedale.

March 27

Public Proclamation No. 4 forbids ethnic Japanese from changing their residence without Army permission and ends voluntary relocation after March 29 in Military Area Number One. Public Proclamation Number Six would stop voluntary relocation from Military Area Number Two on June 2, 1942.

March 28

The Portland, Oregon curfew violated by Minoru Yasui.

March 29

Exclusion Order No. One (Issued March 24, 1942) becomes effective. First controlled compulsory relocation executed.

April 7

WRA Director Milton Eisenhower meet with representatives from 10 western states. Most present oppose unsupervised migration.

May 6

Lt. General Wainwright surrenders U.S. forces on Corregidor.

May 8

First group of evacuees arrive at the Poston Relocation Center.

May 16

Seattle's curfew and exclusion restrictions violated by Gordon Hirabayashi.
May 30  Fred Korematsu arrested in San Leandro, California for exclusion violation.

June 7  General DeWitt announced completion of the removal of 100,000 Japanese Americans from Military Area No. 1.

June 12  Fred T. Korematsu was charged with violation of Exclusion Order No. 34 in U.S. District Court for Northern California.

June 17  Dillon S. Myer replaced Milton Eisenhower as WRA Director.

June 29  1600 evacuees sent to fill sugar beet labor shortage in Oregon, Utah, Idaho, and Montana.

July 13  Mitsuye Endo filed for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

August 7  Phase one of the evacuation completed. Forced removal of 110,000 Japanese Americans from their homes had been accomplished.

October 12  Roosevelt declared Italian aliens were no longer considered "enemy aliens."

October 19  Public Proclamation No. 13 ends curfew and travel restrictions for Italian citizens.

October 20  Trial of Gordon K. Hirabayashi started in Seattle with Judge Lloyd L. Black.

October 24  Over 8000 evacuees were working to save the beet and potato crop harvest in various western states.

November 3  Phase two of the evacuation completed. All evacuees previously confined in Army Assembly Centers had been transferred to War Relocation Authority Relocation Centers.

November 14  Evacuees at Gila River stage a demonstration and strike protesting the arrest of two residents accused of assault.

November 18  Poston 1 protest of arrest of two evacuees accused of assault begins.
(1942 Continued)

November 23  Agreement reached between internee representatives and camp administration at Poston.

December 6  At Manzanar, arrest of prisoners accused of informer-beating led to protest and violence. Military police fired into the crowd, killing two protesters and wounding at least 10 more.

December 24  Public Proclamation No. 15 ends curfew and travel restriction for German aliens.

1943

January 5  Hirabayashi's conviction for curfew violation reaffirmed by Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

January 28  Restrictions on Nisei military service are removed.

February 3  WRA began processing the loyalty questionnaire.

February 20  Seven months after it was filed, Mitsuye Endo's case was forwarded to the Supreme Court by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

June 9  California Governor Earl Warren signed bill prohibiting commercial fishing licenses for alien Japanese.

June 21  Hirabayashi's and Yasui's convictions reaffirmed by the Supreme Court, but it refused to address the question of constitutionality raised in the Hirabayashi case.

July 31  WRA designated Tule Lake as a "segregation camp."

October 15  A strike in Tule Lake followed the death of an inmate in a truck accident.

November 1  Mass demonstrations held in Tule Lake after it was placed under Army control.

1944

January 14  Tule Lake no longer under Army control.
(1944 Continued)

January 20  Secretary of War Stimson announced that Japanese Americans were eligible for the draft.

July 18  In Cheyenne, Wyoming, a federal district court convicted 63 men from Heart Mountain of draft resistance and sentenced them to three years in federal penitentiary.

July 29  Federal Judge Louis E. Goodman dismissed indictments against 26 Tule Lake draft resisters, declaring "It is shocking... that an American citizen be confined on the ground of disloyalty, and then... be compelled to serve in the armed forces, or be prosecuted for not."

December 17  Public Proclamation No. 21 issued by Major General Henry C. Pratt (effective January 2, 1945), allowing evacuees to return home and lifting contraband regulations.

December 18  Two years and five months after it was filed, the Endo case was ruled on in the Supreme Court -- the WRA cannot detain "loyal" citizens.

Executive Order 9066 and the evacuation was upheld by the Supreme Court in the Korematsu case. Justice Frank Murphy disagreed:

I dissent, therefore, from this legalization of racism. Racial discrimination in any form and in any degree has no justifiable part whatever in our democratic way of life. It is unattractive in any setting but it is utterly revolting among a free people who have embraced the principles set forth in the Constitution of the United States."

1945

June 23  Dillon Myer orders closing of Gila River and Poston by October.

August 14  Japan surrenders. World War II ends.

August 25  Manzanar ordered closed by December 1.
(1945 Continued)

September 4  Western Defense Command revokes all military restrictions against Japanese.

1946

March 20   Tule Lake Relocation Center Closed.

June 30   War Relocation Authority closed.

1948

January 19   In Oyama v. California, the Supreme Court struck down the Alien Land Laws as violations of the Fourteenth Amendment.

July 2   The Evacuation Claims Act authorized payment to Japanese Americans who suffered economic loss during imprisonment: with the necessary proof, 10 cents was returned for every $1.00 lost.

1988

August 10   President Ronald Regan signs the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, apologizing for the evacuation and awarding each former evacuee 20,000 dollars compensation.

RELOCATION OF JAPANESE-AMERICANS

Background

During the spring and summer of 1942, the United States Government carried out, in remarkably short time and without serious incident, one of the largest controlled migrations in history. This was the movement of 110,000 people of Japanese descent from their homes in an area bordering the Pacific coast into 10 wartime communities constructed in remote areas between the Sierra Nevada Mountains and the Mississippi River.

The evacuation of these people was started in the early spring of 1942. At that time, with invasion of the west coast looming as an imminent possibility, the Western Defense Command of the United States Army decided that the military situation required the removal of all persons of Japanese ancestry from a broad coastal strip. In the weeks that followed, both American-born and alien Japanese residents were moved from a prescribed zone comprising the entire State of California, the western half of Oregon and Washington, and the southern third of Arizona.

The Relocation Program

The United States Government, having called upon these people to move from their homes, also assumed a responsibility for helping them to become reestablished. To carry out this responsibility, the President on March 18, 1942, created a civilian agency known as the War Relocation Authority.

The job of this agency, briefly, is to assist in the relocation of any persons who may be required by the Army to move from their homes in the interest of military security. So far, the work of WRA has been concerned almost exclusively with people of Japanese descent who formerly lived close to the Pacific rim of the country.

At first, plans were made by the Western Defense Command and the WRA to build accommodations only for a portion of the 110,000 evacuated people. A considerable percentage of them, it was hoped, would move out of the restricted area and resettle inland on their own initiative. During March of 1942, some 8,000 actually did move, but the great majority were held back by limited resources, general uncertainty, and mounting signs of community hostility in the intermountain region. By the latter part of March, it had become apparent that such a large-scale exodus could be handled effectively only on a planned and systematic basis. Accordingly, all further voluntary evacuation was halted by the Western Defense Command on March 29 and plans were initiated by WRA for establishing relocation centers with sufficient capacity and facilities to handle the entire evacuated population for as long as might be necessary.

The relocation centers, however, are NOT and never were intended to be internment camps or places of confinement. They were established for two primary purposes: (1) To provide communities where evacuees might live and contribute, through work, to their own support pending their gradual reabsorption into private employment and normal American life, and (2) to serve as wartime homes for those evacuees who might be unable or unfit to relocate in ordinary American communities. Under regulations adopted in September of 1942, the War Relocation Authority is now working toward a
steady depopulation of the centers by encouraging all able-bodied residents with good records of behavior to reenter private employment in agriculture or industry.

The procedures are relatively simple. At a number of key cities throughout the interior of the country, the WRA has field employees known as relocation officers and relocation supervisors. These men, working in close collaboration with local volunteer committees of interested citizens and with the United States Employment Service, seek out employment opportunities for evacuees in their respective areas and channel such information to the relocation centers where an effort is made to match up the jobs with the most likely evacuee candidates. Direct negotiations are then started between the employer and the potential employee and final arrangements are made ordinarily by mail.

Before any evacuee is permitted to leave a relocation center for the purpose of taking a job or establishing normal residence, however, certain requirements must be met:

1. A careful check is made of the evacuee's behavior record at the relocation center and of other information in the hands of WRA. In all questionable cases, any information in the possession of the federal investigative agencies is requested and studied. If there is any evidence from any source that the evacuee might endanger the security of the Nation, permission for indefinite leave is denied.
2. There must be reasonable assurance from responsible officials or citizens regarding local sentiment in the community where the evacuee plans to settle. If community sentiment appears so hostile to all persons of Japanese descent that the presence of the evacuee seems likely to cause trouble, the evacuee is so advised and is discouraged from relocating in that particular area.
3. Indefinite leave is granted only to evacuees who have a definite place to go and some means of support.
4. Each evacuee going out on indefinite leave must agree to keep WRA informed of any change of job or change of address.

The primary purpose of this program is to restore as many of the evacuees as possible to productive life in normal American communities. The specific procedures being followed have been approved by the Department of Justice as sound from the standpoint of national security and have been endorsed by the War Manpower Commission as a contribution to national manpower needs. As the program moves forward, the costs for maintenance of the relocation centers will be steadily reduced.

Persons interested in employing evacuees from relocation centers for any sort of work should communicate with the nearest relocation supervisor of the WRA. The addresses and names of these supervisors are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Street address</th>
<th>Relocation Supervisor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chicago, Ill.</td>
<td>226 West Jackson Blvd.</td>
<td>Elmer L. Shirrell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleveland, Ohio</td>
<td>Union Commerce Bldg.</td>
<td>Harold Fistere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denver, Colo.</td>
<td>Midland Savings Bldg.</td>
<td>Harold Choate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt Lake City, Utah</td>
<td>318 Atlas Bldg.</td>
<td>El. Rex Lee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas City, Mo.</td>
<td>1509 Fidelity Bldg.</td>
<td>Vernon Kennedy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little Rock, Ark.</td>
<td>Pyramid Bldg.</td>
<td>E. B. Whitaker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York, N.Y.</td>
<td>Room 1410, 50 Broadway</td>
<td>Robert M. Cullum</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Evacuated People
In the interest of both accuracy and fairness, it is important to distinguish sharply between the residents of relocation centers and the militarists of Imperial Japan. Two-thirds of the people in the centers are American citizens, born in this country and educated, for the most part, in American public schools. At all centers, the residents have bought thousands of dollars worth of war bonds and have made significant contributions to the American Red Cross. Many of them have sons, husbands, and brothers in the United States Army. Even the aliens among them have nearly all lived in the United States for two decades or longer. And it is important to remember that these particular aliens have been denied the privilege of gaining American citizenship under our laws.

It is also important to distinguish between the residents of relocation centers and civilian internees. Under our laws, aliens of enemy nationality who are found guilty of acts or intentions against the security of the Nation are being confined in internment camps which are administered not by the War Relocation Authority but by the Department of Justice. American citizens suspected of subversive activities are being handled through the ordinary courts. The residents of the relocation centers, however, have never been found guilty—either individually or collectively—of any such acts or intentions. They are merely a group of American residents who happen to have Japanese ancestors and who happened to be living in a potential combat zone shortly after the outbreak of war. All evidence available to the War Relocation Authority indicates that the great majority of them are completely loyal to the United States.

The Relocation Centers

The physical standards of life in the relocation centers have never been much above the bare subsistence level. For some few of the evacuees, these standards perhaps represent a slight improvement over those enjoyed before evacuation. But for the great majority of the evacuated people, the environment of the centers—despite all efforts to make them livable—remains subnormal and probably always will. In spite of the leave privileges, the movement of evacuees while they reside at the centers is necessarily somewhat restricted and a certain feeling of isolation and confinement is almost inevitable.

Housing is provided for the evacuee residents of the centers in tarpaper-covered barracks of simple frame construction without plumbing or cooking facilities of any kind. Most of these barracks are partitioned off so that a family of five or six, for example, will normally occupy a single room 25 by 20 feet. Bachelors and other unattached evacuees live mainly in unpartitioned barracks which have been established as dormitories. The only furnishings provided by the Government in the residence barracks are standard Army cots and blankets and small heating stoves. One bath, laundry, and toilet building is available for each block of barracks and is shared by upwards of 250 people.

Food is furnished by the Government for all evacuee residents. The meals are planned at an average cost of not more than 45 cents per person per day (the actual cost, as this is written, has averaged about 40 cents), are prepared by evacuee cooks, and are served generally cafeteria style in mess halls that accommodate between 250 and 300 persons. At all centers, Government-owned or Government-leased farmlands are being operated by evacuee agricultural crews to produce a considerable share of the vegetables needed in the mess halls. At nearly all centers, the farm program also includes production of poultry, eggs, and pork; and at a few, the evacuees are raising beef and dairy products. Every evacuee is subject to the same food rationing restrictions as all other residents of the United States.
Medical care is available to all evacuee residents of relocation centers without charge. Hospitals have been built at all the centers and are manned in large part by doctors, nurses, nurses' aides, and technicians from the evacuee population. Simple dental and optical services are also provided and special care is given to infants and nursing mothers. Evacuees requesting special medical services not available at the centers are required to pay for the cost of such services. At all centers, in view of the crowded and abnormal living conditions, special sanitary precautions are necessary to safeguard the community health and prevent the outbreak of epidemics.

Work opportunities of many kinds are made available to able-bodied evacuee residents at the relocation centers. The policy of WRA is to make the fullest possible use of evacuee skills and manpower in all jobs that are essential to community operations. Evacuees are employed in the mess halls, on the farms, in the hospitals, on the internal police force, in construction and road maintenance work, in clerical and stenographic jobs, and in many other lines of activity. Most of those who work are paid at the rate of $16 a month for a 44-hour week. Apprentices and others requiring close supervision receive $12 while those with professional skills, supervisory responsibilities, or unusually difficult duties are paid $19. In addition, each evacuee working at a relocation center receives a small monthly allowance for the purchase of work clothing for himself and personal clothing for his dependents. Opportunities for economic gain in the ordinary sense are almost completely lacking to the residents of the centers.

Education through the high-school level is provided by WRA for all school-age residents of the relocation centers. High schools are being built at most of the centers, but grade-school classes will continue to be held in barrack buildings which have been converted for classroom use. Courses of study have been planned and teachers have been selected in close collaboration with State departments of education and in conformity with prevailing State standards. Roughly one-half of the teachers in the schools have been recruited from the evacuee population. Japanese language schools of the type common on the west coast prior to evacuation are expressly forbidden at all relocation centers.

Vocational training is provided at relocation centers as a part of the regular school program for youngsters and in connection with the employment program for adults. The purpose of this training is twofold: (1) To equip the evacuee residents so that they will be able to play a more productive role in agriculture or industry outside the centers and (2) to provide potential replacements at the centers for those who go out on indefinite leave.

Internal security at each relocation center is maintained by a special police force composed largely of able-bodied evacuee residents and headed by a nonevacuee chief plus a few nonevacuee assistants. Misdemeanors and other similar offenses are ordinarily handled within the center either by the Project Director or by a judicial commission made up of evacuee residents. The maximum penalty for such offenses is imprisonment or suspension of work and compensation privileges for a period of 3 months. Major criminal cases are turned over to the outside courts having appropriate jurisdiction. At each center, the exterior boundaries are guarded by a company of military police who may be called into the center in cases of emergency. The Federal Bureau of Investigation is also called in from time to time as the need arises.

Consumer enterprises, such as stores, canteens, barber shops, and shoe-repair establishments, are maintained at the relocation centers in order that the residents may purchase goods and services which are not provided as part of the regular subsistence. These enterprises are all self-supporting and are managed by the evacuee residents mainly on a consumer cooperative basis. Each resident is eligible for membership in the relocation center cooperative association and all members are entitled to patronage dividends which are derived from the profits and based on the individual volume of purchases. As rapidly as possible, the cooperative associations are being incorporated under appropriate laws.

Evacuee government is practiced in one form or another at every relocation center. In some of the
centers, formal charters have been drawn up and evacuee governments roughly paralleling those found in ordinary cities of similar size have been established. In others, evacuee participation in community government has been along more informal lines and has consisted largely of conferences held by small groups of key residents with the Project Director whenever important decisions affecting the population must be reached. The evacuee governmental set-up is not in any sense a substitute for the administration provided by the WRA Project Director and his staff, but residents are encouraged to assume responsibility for many phases of community management.

Religion is practiced at relocation centers with the same freedom that prevails throughout the United States. Nearly half of the evacuees are Christian church members. No church buildings have been provided by the Government but ordinary barracks are used for services by Protestants, Catholics, and Buddhists alike. Ministers and priests from the evacuee population are free to carry on their religious activities at the centers and may also hold other jobs in connection with the center administration. Such workers, however, are not paid by WRA for the performance of their religious duties.

Leisure-time activities at the centers are planned and organized largely by the evacuee residents. The WRA merely furnishes advice and guidance and makes certain areas and buildings available for recreational purposes. At each center, recreational activities of one sort or another have been organized for all groups of residents from the smallest children to the oldest men and women. Local branches of national organizations such as the Red Cross, the YMCA, the YWCA, and the Boy Scouts are definitely encouraged. At some of the centers, athletic contests are arranged periodically with teams from nearby towns.

**Student Relocation**

Although the War Relocation Authority is placing first emphasis on relocation of evacuees in private employment, student evacuees are also being permitted to leave the centers for the purpose of beginning or continuing a higher education. Applicants for student leave must meet the same requirements as all other applicants for indefinite leave and are permitted to enroll only at institutions where no objection to the attendance of evacuee students has been raised by either the War or Navy Department. The WRA provides no financial assistance to evacuees going out on student leave.

**Conservation of Evacuee Property**

When 110,000 people of Japanese descent were evacuated from the Pacific coast military area during the spring and summer of 1942, they left behind in their former locations an estimated total of approximately $200,000,000 worth of real, commercial, and personal property. These properties range from simple household appliances to extensive commercial and agricultural holdings.

At the time of evacuation, many of the evacuees disposed of their properties, especially their household goods, in quick sales that frequently involved heavy financial losses. The majority, however, placed their household furnishings in storage and retained their interest in other holdings even after they were personally transferred to relocation centers. Since these people are now in the position of absentee owners and since many of their properties are highly valuable in the war production effort, the War Relocation Authority is actively assisting them to keep their commercial and agricultural properties in productive use through lease or sale and is helping them in connection with a wide variety of other property problems.

To carry out this work, the Authority maintains an Evacuee Property Office in San Francisco with branches in Los Angeles and Seattle and employs an Evacuee Property Officer on the staff at each relocation center. Two principal types of service are rendered. In connection with personal properties, such as household furnishings, the Authority provides—at the option of the evacuee owners—either storage in a Government warehouse located within the evacuated area or transportation at Government expense.
expense to a point of residence outside. In connection with real estate, commercial holdings, farm machinery, and other similar properties, the Authority acts more in the role of intermediary or agent. At the request of evacuee property-holders, it attempts to find potential buyers or tenants, arranges for the rental or sale of both commercial and agricultural holdings, checks inventories of stored personal goods, audits accounts rendered to evacuees, and performs a variety of similar services. Any person who is interested in buying or leasing the property of evacuees should communicate with the nearest Evacuee Property Office in the West Coast evacuated area. The locations of these offices are:

Whitcomb Hotel Building, San Francisco, Calif.
Room 955, 1031 South Broadway, Los Angeles, Calif.
Room 6609, White Building, Seattle, Wash.

Wherever possible, these offices will try to put potential buyers or tenants in touch with potential sellers or lessors among the evacuee population. It should be emphasized, however, that the WRA has no authority to requisition the property of evacuees and cannot force any resident of a relocation center to sell or lease against his will. Final agreement on terms is solely a matter between the parties directly involved.
Appendix E

Interview With Former Japanese American Evacuees

Purpose is to determine attributes of former evacuees’ political and civic orientation.

INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERVIEW

My name is _______ I am doing a survey in order to find out how people who lived through the Japanese American evacuation feel about government and about civic affairs. We would like to know how they differ in their attitudes and in what ways they are similar.

TO BE FILLED OUT BY INTERVIEWER AT BEGINNING OF INTERVIEW
1. Sex
2. Age at time of evacuation
3. Background of interviewee:
   Issei, Nisei, or Kibei
4. In which relocation center (s) were you interned?

1a. Do you follow the accounts of political and governmental affairs? Would you say you follow them regularly, from time to time, or never? (IF NEVER OR DON’T KNOW, SKIP TO Q. 3)
   ASK 2b, 2c, 2d ONLY IF RESPONDENT FOLLOWS THE ACCOUNTS OF POLITICAL AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS:
   1b. What about newspapers - do you follow accounts of political and governmental affairs in the newspapers nearly every day, about once a week, from time to time, or never?
   1c. What about on the radio or television? Do you listen to accounts of public affairs nearly every day, about once a week, from time to time, or never?
   1d. What about magazines? Do you read about public affairs in magazines about once a week, from time to time, or never?

2. What about talking about public affairs to other people? Do you do that nearly every day, once a week, from time to time, or never.

3. Suppose there were some question that you had to take to a government office - for example, a tax question or housing regulation. Do you think you would be given equal treatment; would you be treated as well as anyone else?

4. Did you vote in the last presidential election?

5a. Suppose a law were being considered by your local government that you considered very unjust or harmful. What do you think you could do? (IF NEEDED) Anything else?
5b. If you made an effort to change this law, how likely is it that you would succeed?

6. Have you ever done anything to try to influence a government decision?

7. Now, I would like to ask you a about how decisions were made in your family when you were a child, let’s say when you were sixteen. In general, how were decisions made in your family?

   In general, father made the decisions
   In general, mother made the decisions
   Both parents acted together

8. When your parents made decisions affecting you, how well did you think they understood your needs? Did they understand them very well, fairly well, not so well, or not at all? (IF RESPONDENT ASKS: QUESTION REFERS TO RESPONDENT’S VIEW AT THE TIME, NOT LOOKING BACK NOW
9. As you were growing up, let's say when you were around sixteen, how much influence do you remember having in family decisions affecting yourself? Did you have much influence, some, or none at all?

10. At around the same time, if a decision were made that you didn't like, did you feel free to complain, did you feel a little uneasy about complaining, or was it better not to complain?

10a. If you complained, did it make any difference in your parents' decision? Did it make a lot of difference, some, or none?

11. Did your teachers in school treat everyone fairly, or were some treated better than others?

12. In general, how are decisions made in your family now?

- By and large, husband makes the decision
- By and large, wife makes the decision
- Both act together

13. Have you ever been a member of any organizations (labor unions, business organizations, social groups, professional or farm organizations, cooperatives, fraternal or veterans' groups, athletic clubs, political, charitable, civic, or religious organizations) or any other organized group?

14a. (IF NEEDED) Which ones?

14b. Was this before or after evacuation?

14c. (IF EVER A MEMBER) Were you ever an officer in this (one of these) organization(s)?

15. How did your experiences during the evacuation affect your interest and involvement in civic affairs?

- I became more interested and involved
- I became less interested and involved
- There was no change in my interest and involvement

15. How did your experiences during the evacuation affect your interest and involvement in local, state or national government?

- I became more interested and involved
- I became less interested and involved
- There was no change in my interest and involvement

16. (If more interested) Which are you most interested in?

- Local government
- State government
- National government

17. Have you ever been active in a political campaign? That is, have you ever worked for a candidate or party, contributed money, or done any other active work?
18. Think now of the life you led before evacuation and of the life you led after evacuation. Is there a difference in how you view government?

IF A DIFFERENCE, ASK 26a, b, c
18a. In what way was there a difference?
18b. What would you say is the cause of this difference?

IF NO DIFFERENCE, ASK 23c, 23d
18c. In what ways is your view of government the same?
18d. Why do you think there is no difference?

19. Did you ever vote in a presidential, state or local election before the evacuation? (IF NO) Why not? (If yes) Which one(s)

20. Did you have job while at (name of relocation center)? If yes, ask 26b
20a. What kind of job?
20b. Do you feel the kind of work you did made a positive contribution to the (name of relocation center) community?

21. Were any elections held at (name of relocation center)?
21a. Did you vote?
21b. Did you run for any elective office? What office? Did you win?

22. I have heard that sometimes evacuees would protest government policy in the relocation centers.
22a. Did you see any protests at (name of relocation center)?
22b. (If yes) Were you ever involved in any protests?
22c. Did the(se) protest(s) have a positive influence on life at (name of relocation center)?

24. Were there any committees at (name of relocation center) to help organize and run things?
24a. (If yes) Were the members of these committees elected or appointed?
24b. Did you ever serve on a committee?
24c. Did this (these) committee(s) have a positive influence on life at (name of relocation center)?
Appendix F

List of Interviews

NOTE: All interviews were conducted under conditions of anonymity.

Anonymous  Nisei
Female. Age at time of evacuation: 28. Interned at Gila River Relocation Center, Arizona.

Interviewer: Allen Atkinson.  Date: July 7, 1998

Anonymous  Nisei/Sansei
Male. Age at time of evacuation: 22. Interned at Manzanar Relocation Center, CA.


Anonymous  Kibei

Interviewer: Allen Atkinson.  Date: August 19, 1998

Anonymous  Nisei
Male. Age at time of evacuation: 19. Interned at Manzanar Relocation Center, CA and Topaz Relocation Center, UT.

Interviewer: Allen Atkinson.  Date: August 20, 1998

Anonymous  Nisei
Female. Age at time of evacuation: 19. Interned at Manzanar Relocation Center, CA.

Interviewer: Allen Atkinson.  Date: August 20, 1998

Anonymous  Nisei
Female. Age at time of evacuation: 16. Interned at Manzanar Relocation Center, CA.

Interviewer: Allen Atkinson.  Date: August 28, 1998
Anonymous  
Nisei  
Male. Age at time of evacuation: 16. Interned at Manzanar Relocation Center, CA.

Interviewer: Allen Atkinson.  Date: August 28, 1998

Anonymous  
Nisei  
Male. Age at time of evacuation: 16. Interned at Manzanar Relocation Center, CA and Tule Lake Relocation Center and Segregation Center, CA.

Interviewer: Allen Atkinson.  Date: August 28, 1998

Anonymous  
Nisei  
Female. Age at time of evacuation: 16. Interned at Manzanar Relocation Center, CA.

Interviewer: Allen Atkinson.  Date: August 28, 1998

Anonymous  
Nisei  
Female. Age at time of evacuation: 14. Interned at Manzanar Relocation Center, CA.

Interviewer: Allen Atkinson.  Date: August 28, 1998