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Latino locales: Does context matter?

Matthew C. Dempsey

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LATINO LOCALES: DOES CONTEXT MATTER?

by

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Bachelor of Arts
Stephen F. Austin State University
2004

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the

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ABSTRACT

Latino Locales: Does Context Matter?

by

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This thesis examines the influence that contextual factors have on the political behavior of Latinos in the United States. I argue that, due to the unique immigration and socialization experiences of Latinos, context will play a role in the political behavior of Latinos. The hypotheses are tested against data collected from a national survey of Latinos conducted in 2006 and the National Election Studies from 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2008. The results of the analysis indicate that context does influence the partisanship of Latinos; however, the effect of descriptive representation for Latinos at the Congressional level does not mirror the experience of African Americans.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would first like to acknowledge Margaret W. Dempsey, my grandmother, who, while she did not live to see the completion of my thesis, has remained a constant inspiration and guide. I miss you deeply.

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To Congresswoman Dina Titus: thank you for your encouragement and interest in my educational career, even the smallest of comments were always greatly appreciated.

I would be remiss if I neglected to mention the impact Renee Aschoff has had, not only on my professional political career but my educational path, as well. Renee, you have been a consistent and welcome source of support and understanding. It is not hyperbole to state that without you, this research project would never have been completed. I am in your debt.

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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Contemporary American politics has featured an ever-increasing amount of attention to Latinos and, more specifically, Latino political behavior. The 1980s were labeled the “Decade of the Hispanic” (de la Garza 1987, 1) and every two to four years since then journalists and pundits have referred to Latinos as the “sleeping giant” and pondered whether this was the election year in which Latinos would “awaken” (Campbell 2007, 199). However, “each election is followed by a somewhat disappointing review in which the Latino promise is not met and in which ongoing problems (most notably low turnout) are advanced as easy explanations”, in addition to lower levels of political knowledge, and a lack of representation in elected office (Suarez-Orozco 2002, 398). Even with often disappointing voter turnout rates, some scholars have claimed, “…the most important demographic trend in America today is the significant increase in the size and share of the Latino population” (Campbell 2007, 200).

Latinos surpassed African-Americans to become the largest minority group in the United States in 2002 (Miller 2003, 1). Currently, Latinos accounted for half of the United States’ population growth since 2000 (Economist, 1/7/10) and make up 40.5 million, or 14.2 percent, of the U.S. household population while African-Americans consist of 36.6 million, or 12.8 percent of the U.S. household population. It is projected that by 2050 the Latino population will triple to 132.8 million. This growth doubles the Latino share of the overall population from 15 percent to 30 percent (Bernstein 2008, 1). It is expected that by 2042 the growth of the Latino population will cause whites to become a minority in the general population (The Economist 1/7/10).

In light of these statistics, it seems critical for those who study American elections to
begin to understand what shapes, molds, and ultimately drives Latino political participation. Perhaps the two most important aspects of political life are partisan choice and turning out to vote. It has been said that understanding partisanship is “crucial for understanding the political behavior of individuals” (Flanigan and Zingale 2006, 81). Additionally, “the central focus of research on American political behavior is vote choice…No other single form of mass political activity has the popular interest or analytic significance…” than does voter turnout (Flanigan and Zingale 2006, 197). In addition, when looking at the Latino population and politics two important events have occurred: 1) The Latino population is growing and Latinos are moving out of their traditional central cities and the Southwest; and 2) Latinos are increasingly winning electoral office. Since partisan choice and turning out to vote are part of the “pathway to political incorporation”, it is therefore important, and the goal of this thesis, to understand how these two contexts/conditions have influenced Latino political behavior.

Specifically, the purpose of this study is to examine how environmental, or contextual, factors influence the political behavior of Latinos in the United States. A three-pronged approach will be used to study the impact of contextual factors. First, a review of recent literature on assimilation theory will be presented in order to better understand how the environment and assimilation may impact Latinos. Second, how context effects the acquisition of partisanship by Latinos will be examined. Finally, the influence of descriptive representation on Latino political knowledge and political participation will be explored.

The Latino Community

Before one can examine the political behavior of U.S. Latinos, it is useful to discuss
one of the most debated subjects in the Latino political behavior literature: whether or not a Latino community actually exists. Concepts like ‘Latino’ and ‘Hispanic’ are mainly American social constructions and research has been conducted on whether Latinos actually think of themselves in pan-ethnic terms (Campbell 2007, 203). In fact, during the 1970s, the Census Bureau began to discuss how best to label those who, up until that time, had been labeled Spanish speaking or Spanish surnamed. What the Bureau decided upon “came right out of the dictionary”: Spanish/Hispanic origin (Jones-Correa 1996, 216).

De la Garza and DeSipio argue that viewing Latinos as a monolithic group “…confuses rather than clarifies our understanding because of the characteristics that distinguish the national-origin groups…” (De la Garza & DeSipio 1994, 3). In 1989-1990, the Latino National Political Survey (LNPS) was conducted and it, for the first time, allowed researchers to compare the opinions of Cuban-, Mexican-, and Puerto Rican-Americans. The authors concluded by stating “there may be a Hispanic political community, but its parameters do no fit any existing presuppositions” (De la Garza, et al 1994, 13).

Since the results of the LNPS were made public, scholars have become increasingly sensitive in their use of pan-ethnic terminology (i.e. ‘Latino’ or ‘Hispanic’). In fact, most scholars always include a footnote explaining that ‘Latino’ is used for ease of explanation and does not represent a homogenous group of individuals. Additionally, the research and literature post-LNPS seems to pay much more attention to the national-origin of the respondents. In a re-examination of the Latino National Political Study, Jones-Correa and Leal delve further into the concept of pan-ethnicity and its meaning. They discovered that
Latinos predominately self-identify through national labels, such as Mexican-American (Jones-Correa and Leal, 1996, 215). Their conclusions further reinforce the notion that Latino pan-ethnicity is simply an American construction. They state that if there were substantial levels of pan-ethnicity one could expect to find some sense of political similarities among the Latino subgroups in matters such as ideology, partisanship, and party identification; however, they argue this is not the case (Jones-Correa and Leal, 1996, 239). Those that do self-identify with a pan-ethnic label tend to have a weaker sense of common pan-ethnic agendas than do other Latinos. In other words, it is not a sense of solidarity with fellow Latinos that is at the root of a Latino’s choosing to identify pan-ethnically. In fact, those who choose to identify in such a fashion may do so because they lack any strong ethnic attachment at all. Factors such as “distance from the immigration experience, youth, and education…” all correlate with increased usage of a pan-ethnic label (Jones-Correa and Leal 1996, 240).

In the 1989-90 Latino National Political Survey, respondents were asked their preferred ethnic identification. Only 18% of respondents choose the pan-ethnic (Latino/Hispanic) identification. A small minority, 7%, chose “American” as their preferred ethnic label. The remaining 75% preferred to be identified by their ethnic background (Mexican-American, Cuban-American, or Puerto Rican-American). Respondents were also asked if they had a belief in a common Latino culture. Regardless of national origin, nearly 26% believed Latinos were not very similar. Additionally, almost 56% of Latinos reported that Latinos had somewhat similar cultural beliefs. On the other hand, only 19% reported that Latinos were very similar culturally. This data clearly shows that a pan-ethnic identity among Latinos living in the United States was
relatively low and the vast majority, 82%, believes Latinos have little to nothing in common culturally.

The most recent national survey of Latinos, the Latino National Survey of 2006, found much different attitudes towards pan-ethnicity. While the LNS did not ask the same questions as the original survey, there are several measures that can be used to measure pan-ethnic feelings. One of the survey questions was attempting to understand which pan-ethnic label U.S. Latinos preferred. Hispanic was preferred by 35.1%, Latino by 12.9%, 32.6% stated either label was appropriate, while only 18.1% stated they didn’t care for either label. This is a stark reversal from the Latino National Political Survey in which only 18% preferred the pan-ethnic label. Along the same vein, 51.5% of respondents believe Latinos to be a distinct racial group while 38.5% believe Latinos are not. The LNS also gauged several measures that could be considered akin to whether Latinos have a shared cultural identity. When asked to think about job opportunities, education, and money, respondents were asked how much they had in common with other Latinos. Only 23.3% said they have little or nothing in common while 71.3% believed they have some to a lot in common with other Latinos. Additionally, respondents were asked to think about government services, political power, and representation and how much they had in common with other Latinos. The results were similar to the previous question: only 36.8% believed they have little or nothing in common with fellow Latinos while 56.1% believed they have some or a lot in common.

While a direct comparison of the two time periods is impossible due to the different wording of the survey questions, one can nevertheless draw several conclusions from the varied responses. First, it is abundantly clear that the Latinos surveyed in the earlier study
did not have strong attachments to either a pan-ethnic label or to a shared Latino experience. This radically changed in the sixteen years between surveys. The Latinos surveyed in 2006 had much stronger opinions that Latinos are a distinct race, a clear majority preferred the Hispanic/Latino label than those who did not, and sizeable majorities believed they have something in common with fellow Latinos when it comes to jobs, education, and the government. The reasons for increased findings of pan-ethnicity, however, are unclear and are outside the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, the increased anti-immigrant rhetoric that began in the early 1990s (specifically with the ballot measures in California) culminating with the 2006 immigration debate at the federal level which sparked massive protests from the Latino community surely contributed to a sense of common purpose among Latinos of different backgrounds. Ultimately, and at the very least, the increased sense of commonality among Latinos solidifies the notion that Latinos should be studied as a group. In other words, if Latinos continued to exhibit low levels of pan-ethnicity, as in the LNPS, or perhaps even lower levels, there would be little impetus to study Latinos as a monolithic group.

Partisanship

One of the most important choices in the U.S. political system is that of party affiliation. It is true that political parties in the United States have become organizationally weak, relative to their European counterparts; however, party identification remains an important influence in the average American’s political attitudes and behavior. Partisanship, or “the sense of attachment…that an individual feels for a political party” is still one of the most important factors in determining the political behavior of individuals, including political opinions and voting behavior (Flanigan and
Shortly after the 2004 election, Republican pundits were quick to claim that President Bush won forty-four percent of the Latino vote in his re-election campaign, which would be a record high for any Republican presidential candidate. Republican strategists generally have attributed this unusually high vote share, and hope for greater continued support for Republican candidates by Latinos, on rising Latino incomes and conservative family values. The literature, however, has contested the forty-four percent figure. Depending on which exit polls one considers, President Bush received between 31.4% to 45.0% of the Latino vote (de la Garza 2007, 214). Additionally, some scholars place Bush’s actual Latino vote share closer to forty percent mark (Suro 2005, ii). Regardless of the actual final percentage, Bush’s share of the Latino vote is the highest a Republican presidential candidate had garnered in at least twenty years. Are Latinos undergoing a partisan shift? Which party best reflects the values of the Latino community?

It is difficult to place Latinos within one particular party, though if one must do so, they align most with the Democrats (De la Garza, et al, 1992, 16). Since Latinos fit best under the Democratic umbrella and since Latinos tend to support policies and programs advocated for by the Democratic Party, how do they become Democrats? How strong is their attachment to any particular party and what is the basis of their gaining partisanship?

Bruce Cain, D. Roderick Kiewiet, and Carole Uhlaner attempt to answer these questions in their study of immigrant and second or later generation Latinos. The basis of their research rests on three hypotheses: 1) factors that influence the attractiveness of parties to immigrants; 2) how continued exposure to U.S. politics effects partisanship; 3)
how immigrant’s partisanship is affected by the political climate in the U.S. when they arrive. The authors draw upon data from a statewide survey of Californians conducted in 1984 because the impact of Latino immigrants had been felt most in California (Cain, et al 1991, 391). Their results are not surprising. The longer a Latino immigrant has been in the United States, the more likely they are to identify as Democratic. Second and subsequent generation Latinos have shown similar age-related gains in Democratic identification. Additionally, the lower the income a Latino earns, the more likely they are to identify as a Democrat. Latino partisanship intensifies the longer they are in the U.S., when Latinos are committed to remaining in this country, and when they have obtained more education (Cain et al, 1991, 416). The authors are candid, however, as to what their study cannot address. For example, it may be possible that “younger Latinos are more Republican than their elders because their political experience disproportionately reflects the relatively popular presidencies of Ronald Reagan and George Bush” or perhaps “older Latinos are relatively more Democratic because of events that occurred during a formative period of their lives” (Cain et al 1991, 417).

In a more recent study, R. Michael Alvarez and Lisa Garcia-Bedolla examine the same issue using evidence from the 2000 election. Their findings are similar in most regards. Latino partisanship evolves over time spent in the United States, however, newer and younger voters lean toward independence, not being Republican (Alvarez and Garcia-Bedolla 2003, 44). Older Latinos, on the other hand, have firmly established partisanship and as Latinos become more socialized in American politics, they move toward the dominant party for their group, being Democrats for Puerto Ricans and Mexicans and Republicans for Cubans. The authors claim that because partisanship is derived from
policy issue preferences, these attachments are unlikely to change unless the two major American political parties undergo a vast transformation. The authors conclude by stating, what so many others have: that Latinos are a heterogeneous group, both across the different national origins and across generations \((\text{Alvarez and Garcia-Bedolla 2003, 46}).\)

**You Can Lead a Horse to Water But You Can’t Make It Drink: Latino Voting Turnout**

As of September 2007, Census data shows that an estimated 18.2 million Latinos were eligible to vote. Latino participation, however, has lagged far behind all races in respect to voter registration and the act of voting. As a segment of the overall voting population, Latinos have grown faster than any other group, approximately 13% growth from November 2004 to September 2007. However, Latinos also make up 15.3% of the overall population in the United States but only account for 8.9% of eligible voters. Comparatively, African Americans, now the second largest minority group in the U.S., made up 12% of eligible voters as of September 2007 \((\text{Taylor and Fry 2007, 13}).\)

As is evident by the chart below, the Latino voting population had steadily grown since 1984 but voter registration has not kept pace. In fact, it has actually decreased from the 1984 levels while the overall population’s voter registration figures have remained relatively constant.

The reason Latinos lag behind when it comes to voter registration and participation is due to several factors. The number of naturalized Latinos of voting age has increased by approximately 708,000 since 2004. However, 16.6 million, or 55%, of the Latino adults who were born in a foreign country, only 4.7 million, or 28%, of those are naturalized
U.S. citizens. This means that, of the entire Latino electorate (both native born and naturalized citizens), just 26% were foreign born. However, Latinos born in another country comprise more than 50% of the entire Latino adult population (Taylor and Fry 2007, 14).

The second reason Latinos fall behind in voting power is because of the relative youthfulness of the Latino population. More than 33% of the U.S. Latino population is under the age of 18, and therefore are unable to vote. As a result of the large number of Latino youths and those ineligible to vote due to citizenship status, a mere 40% of the total Latino population was eligible to vote as of September 2007 (Taylor and Fry 2007, 14).

Table 1.1  Latino Voting-Age Population, Registration, and Voting, 1984-2004*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Voting-Age Population</th>
<th>Registration</th>
<th>Voting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>9.5 (170.0)</td>
<td>40.1% (68.3%)</td>
<td>32.6% (59.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>12.9 (178.1)</td>
<td>35.5% (66.6%)</td>
<td>28.8% (57.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>14.7 (185.7)</td>
<td>35.0% (68.2%)</td>
<td>28.9% (61.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>18.4 (193.7)</td>
<td>35.7% (65.9%)</td>
<td>26.7% (54.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>21.6 (202.6)</td>
<td>57.3% (63.9%)</td>
<td>45.1% (54.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>27.1 (215.7)</td>
<td>34.3% (65.9%)</td>
<td>28.0% (58.3%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Units: Voting-age population in millions of persons; percent reporting registration and percent reporting voting out of the voting-age population. All races in parentheses. * Table adapted from information found in Hispanic Americans: A Statistical Sourcebook
Table 1.2   Latino Eligible Voters by Nativity, 2000 to 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>18,165,000</td>
<td>17,315,000</td>
<td>16,088,000</td>
<td>13,940,000</td>
<td>2,077,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naturalized citizen</td>
<td>4,734,000</td>
<td>4,392,000</td>
<td>4,026,000</td>
<td>13,940,000</td>
<td>708,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native born</td>
<td>13,431,000</td>
<td>12,923,000</td>
<td>12,062,000</td>
<td>3,358,000</td>
<td>1,369,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second generation</td>
<td>4,949,000</td>
<td>4,704,000</td>
<td>4,163,000</td>
<td>10,581,000</td>
<td>785,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third generation or higher</td>
<td>8,482,000</td>
<td>8,219,000</td>
<td>7,898,000</td>
<td>6,860,000</td>
<td>583,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Pew Hispanic Center analysis of the Current Population Survey (CPS)

The Chicken or the Egg: Latino Elected Officials

Related to Latino voting turnout is the ability of Latinos to get elected. Latino turnout is likely to be stimulated if Latinos are on the ballot, but if turnout is low then it is unlikely that Latinos will win, thus high quality Latino candidates are unlikely to run. As a result of this minority representation paradox, coupled with comparatively low levels of voter registration and turnout, Latinos, unlike African Americans, have not met their total potential. In the current House of Representatives, for example, there are only 26 Latinos, about 6 percent of the total. There are 41 African Americans, on the other hand, which is much close to their actual percentage in the population at large. Additionally, Latino senators and governors have been a rarity in American politics (The Economist 1/7/10).

The minority empowerment thesis states that minorities could become “empowered” after they achieved influence and representation in government (Segura and Bowler 2005,
This empowerment would lead to increased levels of participation and it should also change levels of trust and efficacy, which should lead to change in the relations among the majority (white) – minority differences. Banducci, Donovan, and Karp (2004) studied the effects of the minority empowerment thesis in regards to African-Americans who had an African-American or non-African-American representative in the U.S. Congress. Their results largely mirrored the thesis. African-Americans with an African-American Representative were more likely to feel that government was responsive to their needs and more likely to vote, although they were still just as cynical towards government as those African-Americans with descriptive representation. The effects of the minority empowerment thesis were strongest for the least-educated citizens and there was little evidence of substantial white reaction to non-descriptive representation. (Segura and Bowler 2005, 209).

As of June 2007, there were 5,129 Latinos serving in elected office nationwide (NALEO 2007, 1). This represents a 37% increase in the total number of Latino elected officials since 1996, when the National Directory of Latino Elected Officials first began publishing their list. Even more striking is that Latinos serving in the federal and state government has grown over 50% and that 43 states now have Latinos elected in some capacity (NALEO 2007, 1). Also, 2008 marked a political milestone for Latinos with Governor Bill Richardson running as the first viable Latino candidate for President from a major political party. In spite of this explosive growth, Latinos still lag behind African-Americans in political representation. The 1990 Statistical Abstract reported that Latinos had 4,000 elected officials throughout the country and by 2000, that figure had grown to 5,200. African-Americans, on the other hand, had 8,000 and 9,000 elected officials
respectively (Segura and Bowler 2005, 3).

Since Latinos have had explosive growth in their elected representatives, especially at the federal level, an updated view (and one that is Latino-centric) of the minority empowerment theory is needed.

**Participation in the Political System**

Successful democracies rest on the consent of the governed. As such, democracies offer the opportunity for its citizens the ability to speak their minds, select their leaders, and offer its citizens the opportunity to organize. With that, the health of a democracy is often gauged by widespread public support and participation. As Flanigan and Zingale (2006) note “most Americans understand the basic obligations of citizens in a democracy” (23). The authors report that about 90 percent of all adults believe it is an American’s duty to vote; Americans also believe that being informed about political and governmental affairs is important. Nevertheless, “many of them do not act on that commitment at every election” (23).

Still, the most common form of political participation is the act of casting a ballot. However, maintaining the health of a democracy requires more than simply voting. Victorious politicians often claim a sweeping mandate but what exactly that mandate means is often unclear. Therefore “organizing with like-minded individuals increases the chances that one’s interests will be heard” (Flanigan and Zingale 2006, 23). In a 1995 study of political participation, Verba, Scholzman, and Brady (1995) find sizeable increases in the number of Americans making political contributions and contacting public officials (509).

This thesis will focus on several aspects of Latino political behavior and participation.
Since successful democracies rest upon the consent and faith of the governed, the effects of descriptive representation on feelings of trust towards the government will be explored. Also, because voting is the main metric of a healthy democracy (not to mention a necessary component), the partisanship of Latinos will be examined as well as how descriptive representation may affect voter turnout. Other forms of political participation will also be tested, such as the rate at which descriptively represented Latinos contact their elected officials to express their thoughts on policy issues.

**Research Questions**

While the overarching goal of this thesis is to explore the influence context has on Latino political behavior and participation, there are several specific research questions the thesis will attempt to answer. First, what does Latino partisanship look like? How has it changed over time? Is Latino partisanship susceptible to changes in context? Specifically, does the county a Latino resides in have any influence on their partisanship? Finally, what does Latino voting turnout look like? What factors are associated with Latino turnout? Does having descriptive representation influence Latino voting and attitudes towards the government?

**Methodology**

Three major surveys will be analyzed to help understand whether context matters. By using two surveys of U.S. Latinos taken over a seventeen-year time span (1989 through 2006), in addition to national election studies and county-level data, my analysis will be unique in that it will not be isolated to a single data set from a given time period, specific election, state, region, or county.

The first survey is the 1989-90 Latino National Political Survey (LNPS). One of the
first surveys of its kind, this data collection measures the political attitudes and behaviors of three specific Latino groups in the United States: Mexican-, Puerto Rican-, and Cuban-Americans. Information collected ranges from political participation to policy issues to demographic information. The survey population, randomly selected from forty Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas across the United States, was representative of 91% of the nation’s Latinos. This survey will be used to create a baseline from which to compare attitudes and opinions of Latinos to the more recent 2006 Latino National Survey.

The second survey used is the 2006 Latino National Survey (LNS). The LNS, the most recent survey of Latino behaviors and beliefs, contains 8,634 completed interviews of self-identified Latino/Hispanic residents of the United States. Interviewing was conducted from November 2005 through August 2006. The survey contained approximately 165 distinct items ranging from demographic descriptions to political attitudes and policy preferences, as well as a variety of social indicators and experiences and is representative of 87.5% of the U.S. Latino population. This survey, in conjunction with county-level segregation data, county-level party registration statistics, and county-level presidential voting patterns will be used to examine the influence on county-level contextual factors on Latino partisanship.

Lastly, the American National Election Survey (ANES) for several election years is merged into a single data set. By pooling the ANES data, a practical number of Latinos, and Latinos represented by a Latino member of Congress, can be obtained. This data is merged with data regarding the percentage of the Latino population per Congressional district and data on the race of Members of Congress to examine the effect of descriptive representation on various forms of Latino political behavior and political attitudes.
Organization of the Study

The remainder of this study is divided into four chapters, with each individually discussing the influence context may have on Latino political behavior. Specifically, Chapter Two will explore both the classical and contemporary theories of assimilation and acculturation. Next, the influence of contextual factors on Latino partisanship will be examined in Chapter Three, while Chapter Four tests the effects of descriptive representation on Latino voting behaviors and attitudes towards government. Finally, in Chapter Five, whether context matters in regards to Latino political behavior will be discussed, along with suggested further areas of study.

Conclusion

As is typical in every recent election year, Latinos were hailed as the swing constituency for the 2008 elections and the expectations were large, both on the part of the media and the campaigns themselves. Additionally, we can expect to find that Latino outreach reached unprecedented levels (Page 2007, 1). Furthermore, we can expect Latinos to continually be in the spotlight of U.S. elections as their percentage of the overall population continues to increase. In light of this, and with the 2010 mid-term and 2012 presidential race looming, there is no doubt that Latinos will continue to be a large focus of professional campaigns for both political parties. Additionally, with whites projected to be a plurality of the U.S. population in as little as three decades, the future of American politics truly lies in the votes of Latinos. As a result of their current status as the largest American minority group and their increasing political influence, an updated view on U.S. Latinos political behavior is very much in order, which this research will attempt to provide.
CHAPTER TWO
THEORIES OF ASSIMILATION AND ACCULTURATION

Why Might Assimilation Matter?

Many scholars have suggested, and recent data seems to confirm, that a Latino identity is simply an American construct, rather than a shared commonality brought to the United States from Latin American immigrants (Jones-Correa and Leal 1996, 239). Given the lack of a common Latino purpose in those who migrate to the United States, how is it that feelings of pan-ethnicity have increased (see Chapter 1) in recent years? How do Latinos become politically socialized? Latino assimilation, and the context in which this assimilation occurs, might just hold the key.

“Most social groups,” according to Flanigan and Zingale (2006), “…make some effort to teach appropriate attitudes and expected behaviors to their new members” (24). The authors state that, in a democracy, this would largely include teaching the beliefs and values that would propagate such a system, such as majority rule and an understanding of the proper role of citizens as participants. This socialization is largely focused on children, the largest pool of new members in a democracy. Through this practice of the political socialization of children, “the political culture of a society is transmitted from one generation to the next” (Flanigan and Zingale 2006, 25).

As noted in Chapter One, 55% of all Latino adults residing in the United States were born in a foreign country. In addition, approximately 708,000 naturalized citizens of voting age have been gained in the U.S. since 2000. While it is true that only 28% of the foreign born Latinos residing in the United States are naturalized, nevertheless, an enormous segment of the Latino adult population was not politically socialized in the
United States and, therefore, one could expect their children might not be socialized in
the annals of American democracy. It would seem then, that it is reasonable to assume
that assimilation, and again the context of that assimilation, becomes even more
important for a large segment of potential Latino voters.

Theories of Assimilation

One of the major, and still undecided, topics of debate in the assimilation literature is
whether Latinos are assimilating similarly to previous immigrant groups, such as the
European immigrants of the 19th and early 20th century. If not, are Latinos, much like
African Americans, becoming a racialized group that views their role in society, and
therefore politics, through a lens of being a member of a minority group? The answer to
this question is critical as one would suspect that the political behavior of Latinos would
vary based on the model of incorporation that best describes their assimilation. Both the
classical assimilation theory and ethnic competition theory, and some opposing
viewpoints, will be the focus of this chapter in order to determine what exactly these
theories are and which might best help scholars and political scientists understand how
the context of incorporation into the United States may influence Latino political
behavior.

Classical Assimilation Theory

Classic assimilation theory is best presented in Milton M. Gordon’s 1964
“Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion, and National Origin”.
Gordon brings together references from a wide variety of sources on race, religious, and
ethnic groups in the United States to provide a historical examination of assimilation. He
argues that as cultural and structural barriers are overcome, namely by adopting the
language, social habits, and manners of the dominant culture, the minority group gradually loses their original cultural identity and becomes more like the majority. The rate at which assimilation occurs is dependent on the immigrant’s race, language, and religion. The rate of assimilation may be increased if the immigrant starts out being closer to the dominant English-speaking Protestants.

The core concept of the work is what Gordon describes as the “nature of assimilation.” He divides the assimilation process into seven steps, which are sequential and related to one another. First comes cultural or behavioral assimilation, which is defined as a “change of cultural patterns to those of [the] host society.” Structural assimilation, or a “large-scale entrance into cliques, clubs…on [a] primary group level,” follows. Next is marital assimilation, which encompasses “large-scale intermarriage” and then identificational assimilation in which there is the “development of sense of peoplehood based exclusively on [the] host society”. The “absence of prejudice” or attitude receptional assimilation is the next stage in assimilation followed by the “absence of discrimination” or behavior receptional assimilation. Finally, there is civic assimilation, or the “absence of value and power conflict” (Gordon 1964, 71).

Gordon believes that acculturation, while the first step and virtually inevitable, is not the key to assimilation. Broadly defined, Gordon sums up acculturation as the minority group’s adoption of the “cultural patterns” of the dominant society but goes beyond, in the American case, speaking English and other obvious external cues. Acculturation could happen regardless of progress in the other six stages and could in fact be terminal. Therefore, he viewed structural assimilation as the key. This is where minorities become involved in clubs and activities that the “core” subsociety engages in. He states “Once
structural assimilation has occurred,…all of the other types of assimilation will naturally follow” (Gordon, 1964 80-81). Ultimately, this would mean that prejudice and discrimination would no longer exist (or at least be lessened), intermarriage rates would rise, and that a sense of separate identity would weaken. He finds that America has undergone widespread ethnic acculturation but the other six stages have advanced much less (Gordon 1964, 81). What results, then, is a society that is structurally pluralistic. This leads to the creation of “ethclasses”, based on social class, each containing its own primary group relationships. These ethclasses do not interact with each other outside of the impersonal, secondary world of economic and political affairs (Gordon 1964, 161).

In defining assimilation, Gordon wrote “if there is anything in American life which can be described as an overall American cultures which serves as a reference point for immigrants and their children, it can best be described, it seems to us, as the middle-class cultural patterns of, largely, white Protestant, Anglo-Saxon origins” (Gordon 1964, 72). He argued for this viewpoint simply because it was the first one established by the European colonists and was associated with the ethnic core of the United States. He also recognized that simply obtaining this cultural prototype did not assure acceptance by the dominant culture and thus assimilation. Gordon also questioned whether the minority subculture could influence the majority, core society. He asks: “Was the core culture entirely unaffected by the presence of the immigrants and the colored minorities?” (Gordon 1964, 110). Gordon did make an effort to show that, yes, the dominate group is influenced by the minority but his answer for the most part was yes, the dominant culture remains largely unaffected by these “minor modifications” (Gordon 1964, 110).
A Response to the Classical Assimilation Theory: Segmented Assimilation

The literature suggests that there are several reasons why classic assimilation might not be the appropriate lens through which to view Latinos. Park (1950) believes that the ability of the United States to assimilate minority groups is limited in scope by factors outside the control of governmental policies, such as skin color. Park believes that differences such as these are too great to be overcome simply by adopting English or the dominant Protestant religion or other social customs of the majority. Additionally, the classical assimilation model may fall short in its explanation of Latino acculturation because a central tenant of the theory is that there will be extensive primary-level interaction among members of the minority and majority groups. Redfield, Linton, and Herslovits (1936) state that there must be “continuous first-hand contact” between the two cultures. This, however, is often not that case. Many Latinos live in segregated barrios, which, in turn, severely limits the crucial minority-majority interaction required by the classical assimilation model. Additionally, “…Latino population and growth [is] predominately concentrated in the Southwest [and] different measures of segregation shows that the level of segregation between Hispanic and whites is higher outside of the Southwest.” Fry and Farely (1996, 37) found the areas with the highest levels of segregation between Latinos and non-Latinos were in the Northeast and Midwest.

As a result of this inherent weakness of the classic theory what some consider a more appropriate theory, segmented assimilation, also known as ethnic competition, has emerged. The primary proponents of this theory are Glazer and Moynihan (1970) and Greeley (1971). This theory argues that as familiarity with the dominant culture rises and as greater socioeconomic success is achieved, immigrants will gain a realistic
understanding of the inequality and discrimination that exists in the United States as minorities compete with the dominant social group. “The better immigrants understand the host country language and the more they endorse its values,” writes Portes, Parker, and Cobas (1980), “the more skeptical they are of the realities of that society and their actual condition within it” (220).

Segmented assimilation theory stems from the idea that the conditions in which modern immigrants assimilate are different that those conditions previous immigrants faced. The first such difference is that immigrants in American’s past were predominately white and, therefore, “their skin color reduced a major barrier to entry into the American mainstream” (Portes and Zhou 1993, 76). As a result of this reduced barrier, assimilation dependent upon an immigrants’ decision to leave their culture behind and adopt American values and ideals. Second, Portes and Zhou believe that the “structure of economic opportunities has also changed” (1993, 76). When the United States was a industrial power in the world, it required a diverse work force and allowed second-generation immigrants an opportunity to move up in social and economic status. In recent years, however, the United States has seen a national deindustrialization of its’ industries and a much more global market economy. This has resulted in immigrants “confronting a widening gap between the minimally paid menial jobs…and the high-tech and professional occupations…” (Portes and Zhou 1993, 76).

Portes and Zhou believe that these changes lead to an “emerging paradox” for the second-generation and their assimilation. According to the authors, “adopting the outlooks and cultural ways of the native-born does not represent…the first step toward social and economic mobility but may lead to the exact opposite” (Portes and Zhoe 1993,
On the other hand, immigrant youths who do not assimilate may actually have an increased chance of upward mobility through the use of the resources their communities provide (Porter and Zhou 1993, 82).

This two-pronged reaction to the dominant culture does not “dictate a common path of integration” but rather, three district modes of adaptation (Portest and Zhou 1993, 82). First, there is the “time-honored portrayal of growing acculturation…into the white middle-class;” the second method “leads straight in the opposite direction to permanent poverty and assimilation into the underclass;” and the third and final mode is that of “rapid economic advancement with deliberate preservation of the immigrant community’s values” (Portes and Zhou 1993, 82).

Portes and Zhou (1993) conclude by stating that the contemporary context of segmented assimilation, the options are unclear. Children of non-white immigrants may never have the opportunity to gain access to the middle-class, regardless of their level of acculturation. On the other hand, remaining within their native circles may leave the child of immigrants in permanent poverty and disadvantage. As a result, remaining within the immigrant community may signal, not a withdrawal from society but rather, an immigrants best chance for “capitalizing on otherwise unavailable material and moral resources” (Portes and Zhou 1993, 96).

Echoing this sentiment, Garcia-Bedolla (1999) finds that third generation and later Mexican-Americans, whom one would assume are the most assimilated, are the most pessimistic about the American political system. Individuals therefore choose to resist acculturation and instead maintain a separate ethnic identity, which includes maintaining behaviors, beliefs, and practices of their original culture (Mendoza and Martinez, 1981).
This practice may be further reinforced by the “significant historical barriers (personal or otherwise) based on animosity and hatred toward the new culture” (Cuellar, Arnold, and Maldonado, 1995, 279). The end result is that in which an immigrants’ identity is transformed from that of one anxious for membership in the dominant social group into that of a member of a minority group that is denied the full benefits of such membership (Michelson, 2003, 922).

Ultimately, the segmented assimilation theory “recognizes the fact that immigrants are…being absorbed by different segments of American society,” from the middle-class to the inner-city ghettos and that becoming American may not be beneficial for their families (Zhou 1997, 999). These contextual differences, put simply, mean that the different assimilation paths may lead to either upward or downward outcomes. Additional external factors, such as segregation, economic opportunities, and racial stratification “affect the life chances of immigrant children not only additively but also interactively” (Zhou 1997, 999).

**Further Responses to the Classical Assimilation Theory**

Since Gordon’s work in 1964, immigration primarily from Asia and Latin America has presented a serious challenge to the assimilation theory. “Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration” by Richard D. Alba and Victor Nee examines whether assimilation is still a viable theory for understanding modern immigrants. Alba and Nee argue strongly for a continued comparison between modern patterns of acculturation with those of past immigrant waves. The contend that, on the surface, it may seem that past generations of immigrants have little in common with more contemporary waves, especially since immigrants since 1965 have been drawn
from different racial groups, that somehow the immigrant experience may be different. However, even with an increased American tolerance for a global economy, transnationalism, and the celebration of cultural diversity, the authors state “the distinctions between contemporary and past immigrations have been overplayed” (Alba and Nee 2003, 125). The authors provide detailed measures of assimilation and how they are occurring at rates comparable to previous generations of immigrants, intending to show that assimilation is not dead.

First, Alba and Nee examine the classic approaches to assimilation, such as that compiled by Gordon. They find four basic problems with the previous assimilation model: inevitability, full incorporation, ethnocentrism and one-sidedness without a positive contribution of ethnic cultures. Alba and Nee therefore create their own definition of assimilation that is viewed as a weakening role of ethnicity in an assimilated person’s life chances.

The patterns of assimilation rates similar to that of the early 20th century immigrants do not apply equally to all current immigrant groups. Alba and Nee make a distinction between “human capital” immigrants who move more readily into the middle class and “labor” immigrants who start out at the very bottom of the socioeconomic scale. In both cases, however, there is still movement towards assimilation, although in the latter group it is at a slower pace. The authors do find a troubling pattern for several groups, namely Mexicans, for whom assimilation seems to stall in the third generation. To explain this concept they quote Will Herberg: “What the son wishes to forget, the grandson wishes to remember” (Alba and Nee 2003, 27). Additionally, the children of darker skinned Latino immigrants show evidence of assimilating into “oppositional” subcultures that are
alienated from the dominant society (Alba and Nee 2003, 290). In fact, race remains significant in American society and darker skinned immigrants consistently score lower on many assimilation measures. The authors conclude that “assimilation…is unlikely to dissolve racial distinctions entirely in the United States and to end the inequalities rooted in them. Assimilation, then, provides no reason to end the struggle against the power of racism” (Alba and Nee 2003, 292).

Bean and Steven (2003) largely echo the arguments of Alba and Nee. Overall, the authors’ goal is to determine how many and what kinds of people migrate, the fate of immigrants, and the impact that newcomers have on the United States. Of most relevance to this thesis is perhaps Bean and Steven’s (2003) discussion of immigration’s social-cultural impact. The authors believe that the presence and actions of immigrants undermine the old black/white paradigm. They further argue that past literature of racialization, namely built upon the experience of African-Americans, cannot be transferred to recent immigrant groups. As evidence of this, the authors point to higher rates of intermarriage and multiracial identity for Asians and Latinos. Latinos, for example, largely engage in endogamy once in the United States, but have very high intermarriage rates in subsequent generations. As a result, the United States may be moving towards a new black/nonblack racial divide.

Is Assimilation Happening?

Samuel Huntington (2004), in his book Who Are We?, examines America’s changing national identity and the implications for the future. Huntington claims that “high levels of immigration from Mexico and elsewhere in Latin America could have quite different consequences for assimilation than previous waves of immigration” (14). As noted
above, modern immigrant waves do seem to be assimilating differently than previous
generations of immigrants, however, Huntington believes that the actual arrival of Latin
Americans, namely Mexicans, into America has vastly different consequences for the
future of the American way of life than have previous immigrant groups. One key
difference is that previous immigrant groups were not actually immigrants at all, but
rather, were settler (2004, 39). Settlers, as defined by Huntington, leave an existing
society, with a sense of purpose, in order to create a new community. On the other hand,
immigrants do no create a society but instead, they move from on to another (2004, 39).
This is an important distinction to Huntington because, as he states, “at least until the late
twentieth century, it was the Anglo-Protestant culture and the political liberties and
economic opportunities it produced that attracted [immigrants] to America” (2004, 41).
This distinction is even more critical to Huntington’s view because earlier in America’s
history, immigrants were “in various ways compelled, induced, and persuaded to adhere
to the central elements of the Anglo-Protestant culture” (2004, 61).

Huntington also believes that a “demographic reconquista” is occurring, in which
Mexican immigrants are immigrating to areas “Americans took from Mexico by force…”
which is ultimately leading to the “Hispanization” of America (2004, 221). Ultimately, he
feels that Mexican immigration is different from all others because of six factors: the
contiguity of Mexico and the United States, the number of Mexican immigrants, the
proportion of Mexicans that are illegal immigrants, their regional concentration, the
 Persistence of their immigration, and the Mexicans’ historical claim to the Southwest
United States. These differences, as such, pose problems for Mexican assimilation into
the American mainstream, and if Mexican immigration were to be reduced, many
problems, as he sees them, facing American society would ease (2004, 243).

A Response

Gary Segura (2005) wrote a fairly scathing review of Huntington’s *Who Are We?*. His first major issue with the work is that it is largely a literature review that asserts, rather than tests. Segura contents that current data is not analyzed and the book never considers arguments to the contrary (2005, 640). Segura believes that the current data available would counter, and perhaps even disprove much of the assertions that Huntington makes. Specifically, Segura critiques Huntington for not citing roughly 30 journal articles on relevant subjects since 1985 (2005, 641). Ultimately, Segura cites information that contradicts the “findings” in Huntington’s book as dismisses it as “polemic and not a work of scholarship” (2005, 642).

Why is Assimilation Important?: Assimilation and Political Behavior

Understanding how and why Latinos assimilate is important because the context of their assimilation can have effects on their political behavior. For example, the likelihood of increased group political participation occurs when groups find themselves treated differently. Being treated differently results in a given group needing to find methods of reacting to that treatment. Some groups seek accommodation with the dominant culture; others reject the dominant culture, while others still strive to drastically alter the dominant culture (LeMay 2004, 37).

Internal to the group, variation in social and economic assimilation will correlate with civic assimilation. As Latinos become integrated into the economy there may be reasons why this would also increase civic assimilation. While not unique to Latinos, the research shows that the longer a Latino has lived in the United States, the more education they
have received, and the higher the income, the more assimilated they are, the more likely it is they will participate in the political system. Furthermore, social assimilation, such as interracial marriage or friendships outside of their culture, may reduce group voting blocs (LeMay 2004).

External to the group, how the dominant culture treats the group will influence civic participation. Economic and social discrimination may hinder economic and social assimilation but stimulate political assimilation. A stark example of this is seen in the effect of several ballot propositions had on the Latino community in California during the 1990s. Prior to 1994, Latinos in California had turnout rates similar to Latinos in other parts of the United States; however, with Governor Pete Wilson’s re-election campaign in 1994 and the first of three propositions aimed specifically at the Latino community, Latinos became galvanized. Specifically, Latino voter registration figures increased, their turnout percentage increased, and Latinos were now identifying as solid Democrats in much larger numbers than they had during the 1980s. Conversely, states such as Texas and Florida, two states that also have large Latino populations, did not have contentious ballot initiatives like those in California and Latino electoral participation and partisanship did not see drastic changes in comparison to the previous decade (Segura and Bowler 2005, 150).

Michelson (2003) found that as Latinos assimilate and begin to participate in American politics, a strong sense of distrust is carried with them. She found that both major theories of acculturation, the classical and ethnic competition model, “predict that increased familiarity with the dominant culture will result in increased cynicism” (2001, 926). This stems from the very nature of assimilation and adopting the attitude of the
dominant culture. Michelson states that since the 1960s there has been ever-increasing levels of Anglo distrust of the government due to the Vietnam War and various presidential scandals. Therefore, assimilation theory would seem to suggest that as Latinos begin to adopt the attitudes and values of the dominant, Anglo culture, Latinos would begin to be more distrusting of the government. As for the ethnic competition model, she believes that Latinos, as they come to be more assimilated, would begin to realize that that are not considered equal members of American society and would then begin, due to racism and discrimination, think of themselves as members of a racialized minority group. Her research fails to “reveal which acculturation model is more appropriate for describing how Mexican-descent Latinos lose political trust, but it is abundantly clear that acculturation does corrode trust in government” (928).

Conclusion

While there is no consensus among scholars as to how immigrants, and Latinos specifically, assimilate, it is clear that whichever the method, there are implications for the future of American politics. Also, it seems worth being said that perhaps Latinos assimilate differently in different parts of the United States. One could reasonably assume that Latinos in California would assimilate differently than those in Oklahoma, South Dakota, or Maine.

That assumption aside, it seems that the classical model of assimilation offers the most encouragement for positive political participation. While Michelson’s research shows that regardless of the method of assimilation, acculturated Latinos become less trusting of government. This distrust would seem to be more benign under the classical model, which Latino attitudes largely reflecting those of the majority culture. On the other hand,
the results of the ethnic competition model seem to portend a more dangerous signal. Since this model is predicated on racism and discrimination culminating in a minority’s rejection of the dominant culture, this could lead towards individuals feeling the government is racist and that it mistreats minorities. These feelings, in turn, could manifest themselves in a multitude of ways. Resentment towards the government is one such possible response, as is simply withdrawing from political action, namely not voting, or voting for third parties. However, those who do develop values different from the dominant culture may also become actively disruptive of the system (Flanigan and Zingale 2006, 29). Whichever path is followed, there is an impact of the future of American politics.
CHAPTER THREE
THE INFLUENCE OF CONTEXTUAL FACTORS ON LATINO PARTISAN IDENTIFICATION

Latinos, Political Parties, and Democracy

It has been argued that political parties are essential to healthy and vibrant representative democracies because they generate political interests and opinions, not just simply reflect them. They do this by creating conflicting positions that facilitate citizens in "choosing sides" (Rosenblum 2008, 310). This partisan choice is considered essential in mobilizing interest and participation, as well as promoting deliberation. How citizens come to this partisan choice is an enduring question in political science, as partisanship has a profound and practical impact on politics (Neimi and Weisberg 2001).

As discussed in Chapter Two, Latinos often live in segregated barrios, much removed from the dominant culture. This segregation is a severe impediment to the assimilation process, as espoused by the classical assimilation theorists. Even as Latinos begin to move out of the Southwest and into the South and Midwest, Latinos find themselves in even more segregated situations, offering an even greater barrier to assimilation than those experiences in the Southwest. As a result, the environment that Latinos live in may influence their political socialization and, in particular, their partisan attachment.

This chapter will examine the influence of the social, economic and political environment on Latino partisan identification. Although Latinos only made up approximately nine percent of the electorate in the 2008 presidential election (a one percent increase from 2004), the rapid growth in the size of the Latino population has garnered enormous attention from scholars, journalists and political activists (DeSipio and de la Garza 2002). Since the “Decade of the Hispanic,” journalists and pundits have
referred to Latinos as the “sleeping giant” (Campbell 2007, 199). Indeed, some scholars have claimed, “…the most important demographic trend in America today is the significant increase in the size and share of the Latino population” (Campbell 2007, 200).

Based upon this trend, it is not surprising that Latinos have been described as the most highly courted constituency in American politics (Coffin 2003). Pundits, journalists, and academics have all made note of the Republican Party's recent attempts to recruit Latino voters (Baik, et al. 2009). Many have considered these attempts to be somewhat successful (McDaniel and Ellison 2008; Alvarez and Garcia Bedolla 2003; Cain, Kiewiet, and Uhlaner 1991; Dutwin 2005). For example, in 2004 national exit poll data suggested George W. Bush received 44 percent of the Latino vote, the highest proportion of Latino voters ever garnered by a Republican presidential candidate. The reporting of these results began an avalanche of newspaper articles and academic scholarship assessing the accuracy of the results and the substantive meaning of such Republican gains. The 2008 election results, with estimates of 31 percent of Latinos supporting the Republican candidate, John McCain, have again called into question the Republican Party's ability to recruit Latino voters to their party and whether partisan attachments are highly stable or influenced by external conditions.

Latino partisan identification will be examined using the 2006 Latino National Survey. The primary research question is: how do contextual factors influence Latino partisanship? Political scientists and others scholars have traditionally focused on individual characteristics to explain political attitudes and behavior. By the 1980s, however, increasing numbers of studies incorporated environmental (often referred to as “contextual”) factors in their analysis. Huckfeldt (1986, 1) argued “political opinions and
behavior of individuals cannot be understood separately from the environment within which they occur.” Similarly, Jelen (1992) noted that contextual effects were often stronger than individual-level effects. This chapter examines how individual-level partisanship of Latinos is associated with different political, social and economic contexts.

Latino Party Identification

Partisanship has been defined as “the sense of attachment or belonging that an individual feels for a political party” (Flanigan and Zingale 2006). Although political parties in the United States are organizationally weak, relative to their European counterparts, party identification still plays an important role in the average American's political attitudes and behavior. This attachment is one of the most important factors in determining the political behavior of individuals, including political opinions and voting behavior. Because partisan choice is such an important component in American politics, Rosenblum (2008) argues that those who identify with a party are "on the side of angels."

Given that partisanship is a crucial component of establishing political behavior how do individuals, and Latinos in particular, form partisan attachments? Compared to African-Americans, where 76 to 90 percent of those surveyed have some attachment to the Democratic Party (Bositis 2000, 2008; Benjamin 2005; Dawson 2001), it is more difficult to place Latinos within one particular party (De la Garza, et al. 1992, 16). Scholars have noted how the term Latino may simply be an American social construction rather than an accurate label for a monolithic or homogeneous group (Campbell 2007; De la Garza and DeSipio 1994). Jones-Corra and Leal (1996) argues if Latinos were a
homogeneous group, one would expect to observe some political similarities in ideology and party identification; however, he suggests that this is not the case.

Although Latinos are not a homogeneous group, they do align more frequently with the Democrats (De la Garza, et al, 1992; Hero, et al. 2000). The 2006 LNS found that approximately 36 percent of Latino respondents considered themselves Democrats compared to 11 percent Republican and 17 percent independent (see Tables 1 and 2). Yet this large margin over the Republican Party has not discouraged Republican strategists who see this large socially conservative voting bloc as a potential pool of new supporters (Baik, et al. 2009; Bowler and Segura 2005). How successful the Republican Party has been in recruiting Latinos’ support for Republican candidates is debatable. Nicholson and Segura (2005) are doubtful of the Republicans’ ability to attract Latinos, where as McDaniel and Ellison (2008) see some Republican gains, at least with Evangelical Latinos. According to Coffin, the disagreement over Latino partisanship may partially be due to the difficulty in applying traditional voting behavior theories to Latinos since a sizeable population of Latinos are relative newcomers to the political system (Coffin 2003).

**Contextual Effects on Partisanship**

Page and Wolfinger (1970, 290) refer to a political party as a type of "reference group," defined as a collective "which many people identify and which helps its members define themselves." The authors go on to say individuals may belong to any number of reference groups "each of which is relevant in different contexts." This research builds on this idea of partisanship and its "relevant context" by asserting that partisan choice is
likely to be influenced by various spatial or geographic conditions. The general argument for environmental effects on political behavior and attitudes is based on the belief that “where and with whom individuals live combine with their personal characteristics to influence their vote choices” (Campbell, Wong, and Citrin 2006).

The argument that contextual conditions influence partisanship breaks with the earlier research that considered partisanship to be generally inert (Key 1966). The American Voter (Campbell, et al.1960) suggested that party identification was remarkably stable and immune to political events except under special or unusual circumstances. This early literature considered American voter to have a long standing, psychological commitment or attachment to a party similar to religious convictions (Key and Munger 1959) and therefore contextual factors were unlikely to have any direct influence on party identification (Durand and Eckart 1976).

Many scholars have challenged the depiction of partisanship as a stable condition, resistant to change or external influence. Although partisan identification in the aggregate has been observed to be relatively stable, some scholars have argued that such aggregate stability masks a substantial amount of individual level change (Niemi and Weisberg 2001). Fiorina (1981) finds that partisanship is influenced by retrospective evaluations by voters. Voters keep a kind of "running tally" of events and conditions that they use to update their assessment of the political parties. Many scholars have found partisanship shifts to be associated with temporal changes in a variety of political and economic conditions. Weisberg and Smith (1991) found party identification to vary

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1 It is also believed that temporal conditions are likely to influence partisan choice, but this research currently only examines the 2006 LNS dataset, which does not allow for an exploration of temporal conditions. For an example of an examination of partisan change and state context using panel data see MacDonald and Franko (2008).
monthly in relationship to various objective economic indicators. Similarly, scholars have found current political issues and the performance of elected officials to influence party identification and loyalty (Niemi and Jennings 1991; Stewart and Clarke 1998).

As a growing body of literature began to argue that partisanship was not as stable as once believed, other studies began to confirm earlier findings that partisanship was resistant to exogenous factors such as political campaigns or issues (Johnston 1992; Whiteley 1988). This is due, in part, to the fact that campaign messages, information and new political issues are filtered through a person's partisanship, and therefore may simply reinforce existing beliefs and attachments rather than producing change. Gerber and Huber (2009) find that partisanship helps shape perceptions of economic conditions and even influences real economic behavior. Democrats are more likely to believe the economy will improve when there is a Democratic president and Republicans believe the economy will improve when there is a Republican in the White House. Gerber and Huber (2009) find that these differences are not just an artifact of a survey instrument but reflect true beliefs that are associated with measureable economic behavior (i.e. consumer spending).

This seems to reinforce early studies that argued individuals are not “slender reeds in the winds of dominant community sentiment” (Durand and Eckart 1976, 301) and individuals are likely to interpret their environments in ways that fit their current belief system. Miller (1992) suggested partisanship is likely to remain very stable over time and observed aggregate change may be due to generational replacement. Weisberg (1983) and Schickler and Green (1997) showed that observed aggregate change in partisanship was due to random error and that party identification was highly stable once
that error is controlled for. More recent studies suggest that not only is partisanship stability due to early socialization, but also heredity (Alford, Funk, and Hibbing 2005; Settle, Dawes, and Fowler 2009).

**Contextual Effects and Latino Partisanship**

Assuming that contextual factors influence partisan choices (and the above material suggests that this assumption is not without its skeptics), it is likely that contextual factors do not work uniformly for all groups, since different groups often live in very different contexts (Marschall and Stolle 2004). Economic downturns, scandals, wars, rally events, and elections are likely to influence observers and participants (Clarke and Suzuki 1993), but these events may impact different groups (i.e. age, gender, race, and class) in different ways and/or degrees. In addition, states, regions and localities may experience or be exposed to these events in different ways (Kosmin and Keysar 1992).

This regional difference in context may be best seen in California during the 1990s where immigration became a highly contentious issue. Although the immigration debate reached a peak in salience nationally during the early 1990s (Hopkins 2007), the issue had profound policy ramifications in California where a variety of anti-immigrant ballot initiatives, executive orders, speeches and campaign ads created a politically charged environment that had a measurable effect on Latino residents. Pantoja, Ramirez and Segura (2001, 747) find that this political environment prompted many Latino residents to become naturalized citizens and to participate “in politics at rates substantially higher that those naturalized in other environments.”

This research posits that there are varieties of conditions that would influence how context or environments influence Latino partisanship and to what degree. First, as
MacDonald and Franko (2008) note, the United States has a highly mobile population with approximately 2.5% of its residents moving state to state annually. This is especially true for Latinos who are moving away from their traditional urban centers and are also moving away from the Southwest region. Frey (2006) found that the Chicago-Naperville-Joliet (IL-IN-WI), the Washington-Arlington-Alexandria (DC-VA-MD-WV), and the Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta (GA) areas had some of the largest Latino population gains in the nation from 2000 to 2004.

This migration away from urban centers and to the Midwest and South may have an important influence on political socialization of Latinos, both young and old. Although Campbell et al. (1960) in The American Voter presented arguments supporting the stability of partisanship, they also noted that a change in environment may expose an individual to neighbors with different partisan views and such exposures may "foster change in identification (150)." This may be especially true for Latino partisanship since there is a sizeable population of Latinos that are foreign born. These immigrants and their children will have far less political socialization regarding party identification (Coffin 2003) and therefore contextual factors may have a substantially larger impact on partisan choice. This line of thinking is consistent with the spatial-assimilation model, which sees the geographical distribution of minority groups as a product of their level of assimilation. This model suggests that increases in assimilation and acculturation leads to an increase in minority residential mobility, which in turn, helps lead (or is necessary for) "a more complete… structural-assimilation" (Alba and Logan 1993, 1390).

Second, there is evidence that the United States is becoming more geographically polarized and that different parts of the country are drifting apart from one another
(Stonecash, et al. 2003; Bishop 2008; Kim et al. 2003). This is important because if states and counties have drifted apart politically, then the migration of Latinos to areas outside urban centers and the Southwest region may bring Latinos into contact with very different political climates. The combination of increased rates of migration of Latinos to different parts of the country and the geographic polarization of the United States may increase the likelihood of contextual conditions influencing Latino party identification.

Which Contexts Matter?

Therborn (2008) notes that all democracies exhibit a spatial pattern of voting, with people from different classes, ethnic groups, and religions voting differently depending on where they live, but the reason for these spatial differences are not well known. The effect of political, economic, and social contexts may stem from how environmental conditions influence 1) how information and political issues are conveyed and understood and 2) who is in a person’s social network. For example, the partisan make up of an area may influence the issues residents are exposed to, either through the social network surrounding the individual or the partisan influence on the local media.

Besides examining the influence of partisan context on individual level partisanship, several other county characteristics are included to explore and control for other contexts. For example, level of segregation between whites and Latinos as a measure of intra-unit exposure is included in several statistical models. Similarly, Latinos living in areas with a high proportion of Latinos may have experiences that influence partisan choice. Economic conditions such as the level of unemployment may influence how an individual perceives political parties and government performance. These contexts are likely to have an influence on the composition of a respondent’s social network, which in
Partisan Contextual Effects and the Criteria for Causation

In their critique on studies claiming the importance of contextual effects, Durand and Eckart (1976) suggest that many studies examining the influence of partisan context assume any observed relationship is due to environment and ignore individual self-selection. Durand and Eckart present an alternate explanation that an association between individual partisanship and partisan environment may simply be caused by prior conditions that cause “individuals with certain views to selectively in-migrate or out-migrate to particular areas.”² Durand and Eckart acknowledge that individuals are unlikely to move because they do not conform to the partisanship of their neighbors but they remind us that prior empirical research shows that “party identifications are related to other characteristics which do influence neighborhood turnover.” By including a variety of county characteristics (i.e., unemployment levels, levels of segregation, urban vs. rural, racial composition) the issue of self-selection can be addressed.³

A larger concern for this study is the temporal order criteria of causality. Without panel data that track respondents over time to help illuminate the causal connection between individual partisan choice and county-level partisanship, any correlation between individual partisanship and partisan context could simply be due to sampling homogeneous clusters. Durand and Eckart’s proposed solution for controlling for self-selection is to multiply their partisan contextual variable (percent Democrat) by the

³ See Brown (1988) for arguments “debunking” the self-selection critique.
likelihood of intra-unit exchange (a survey item asking respondents how often they visit their neighbors) presents an approach that might be used to solve the temporal ordering problem. For this research an interaction term was created by multiplying the partisan contextual variables with a survey item that asks respondents how long they have lived at their current residence. Such product terms help determine if the effect of one variable on the dependent variable is dependent on the value of a third variable. With this interaction term, I predict that the effect of the partisan context measure increases as the length of residency increases.\textsuperscript{4} If the partisan environment influences a person’s partisan identification one would expect that the strength of the influence would be contingent on how long a resident was exposed to that environment. An interaction term that is positive and statistically significant would provide evidence that partisan context influence partisan identification and is not just a product of self-selection or a sampling artifact.

Data & Methodology

The study combines several data sources together: The 2006 Latino National Survey, 2005 county characteristics, data on the level of segregation in county areas, and county-level party registration data. This data will be merged and analyzed using interactive logit models and multi-level models. The LNS, the most recent survey of Latino behaviors and beliefs, contains 8,634 respondents living in the U.S. who identified themselves as Latino. The survey was implemented between November 17, 2005 and August 4, 2006 (ICPSR 2009). The LNS is conducted in both Spanish and English and covers 15 states and the District of Columbia. The areas covered by the survey contain the largest

\textsuperscript{4} Interaction terms are more frequently created using dummy variables but can be created using two interval-level variables (Aiken and West 1991).
proportions of Latinos and are representative of 87.5% of the U.S. Latino population.\(^5\)
The survey contains respondents from 629 different counties and the District of Columbia, allowing us to examine the influence of different environmental conditions on respondent partisanship.

**Dependent Variable**

Although the LNS contains several partisanship survey items, this analysis focuses on the item that asks respondents: “Generally speaking, do you usually consider yourself a Democrat, a Republican, an Independent, some other party, or what?” Miller (1991, 558) argues that this phrasing of the question is perhaps the best measure to examine partisan self-identification and is preferable to questions that differentiate additional degrees of partisanship. Table 3.1 and 3.2 provides the breakdown of how respondents answered this question in the 2006 Latino National Survey and the 1989-90 Latino National Political Survey. The analysis that follows focuses on the dichotomous dependent variable that differentiates Democrats from all other respondents.\(^6\)

**Contextual Variables**

The main explanatory (independent) variables of interest measure the contextual conditions of the Latino respondents in the 2006 LNS. The LNS contains the Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) code which identifies the county (or county equivalent) for each respondent and therefore this is used as the geographic level of analysis.\(^7\) Branton and Jones (2005) argue the county is the appropriate level to examine contextual effects because a respondent's exposure to a particular group is not confined to

\(^6\) Republican, Don't Know; Don't Care; and Other Party were coded 0.
\(^7\) The FIPS codes are not currently listed on the publicly available dataset at ICPSR. It must be requested separately from ICPSR officials.
their neighborhood or census block. Estimates of the proportion of the electorate voting for Kerry in 2004, the unemployment rate, population density in 2005 for 629 county FIPS contained in the LNS were obtained from the County Characteristics, 2000-2007 dataset. These data are used as the contextual variables in the regression analysis that follows.

The primary interest is in how the political context influences Latino partisan identification. The proportion of a county who voted for Kerry in the 2004 election is used to capture the different partisan dynamics within the different counties. It is predicted that Latinos who live in counties with higher proportions of the electorate that voted for Kerry are more likely to self-identify as a Democrat. McGhee and Krimm (2009, 345) state the presidential vote is not an accurate measure of partisanship because one cannot assume that a person who voted for a presidential candidate is a member of that party since the voter has “no viable alternative to the major-party candidates.” Instead, the authors use party registration statistics at the county-level to measure party support. They argue it is a more valid measure of the partisan make up of a county because voters can register as Independents or with a third party and still vote for a candidate from the two major parties in the general election. Only 26 states collect party registration information by county. McGhee and Krimm (2009) were able to collect data from 21 of these states. Of those 21 states 11 coincide with the 15 states in the LNS

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8 Brown (1988, 19) suggests, “crossing a county boundary is…sufficient to bring about a qualitative change in local political environments.”

9 Available from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) study # 20660 (http://dx.doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR20660). This dataset did not have information on one county in the dataset, Broomfield County, CO, which contained two respondents.

10 Measures assessing the average vote for Democratic Presidential candidates from 2000 and 2004 (and 2008) were also created with no substantive change in the findings.

11 This county-level registration data was made available by the authors Eric McGhee and Daniel Krimm (2009) and is currently not publicly available.
dataset (Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Maryland, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, and North Carolina).\textsuperscript{12}

In addition to partisan context, the level of segregation in a county was also used as a contextual explanatory variable. Data on segregation was obtained from the Racial Residential Segregation Measurement Project at the Population Studies Center.\textsuperscript{13} The level of segregation is measured by the Index of Dissimilarity, which measures whether two or more groups tend to live in different blocks within a county. This Index of Dissimilarity ranges from 0 to 100 where a value of 0 means that Latinos and whites are evenly dispersed in a county and 100 would mean that the two groups are completely isolated from one another. This index score in the 629 counties in the LNS dataset ranges from 9.1 (Humbolt County, NV) to 92.1 (Davis County, IA), with a mean of 54.87 and a standard deviation of 12.38. The level of segregation may influence Latino partisanship in that Latinos living in a segregated area may be more exposed to people of similar partisan identity and, at the same time, less exposure to out-groups that may have different partisan attitudes.\textsuperscript{14}

**Individual-Level Control Variables**

There is no consensus on how different individual-level characteristics influence Latino partisanship. Coffin (2003, 217) finds that “conventional socio-economic measures do not explain Latino partisanship,” while Kosmin and Keysar (1992) found

\textsuperscript{12} This means that when the party registration measure is used in the model, only 352 counties are included in the analysis.

\textsuperscript{13} http://www.psc.isr.umich.edu. See Appendix B for an explanation of how this index is calculated.

\textsuperscript{14} This is based on the assumption (or ecological fallacy) that a Latino living in a heavily segregated county is exposed to less partisan/political diversity. This assumption may not hold in that a respondent selected from a county with a high segregation score may still live in a part of the county that is racially diverse. In addition, even if the respondent does live in a racially segregated area, this area may have a diverse partisan environment.
that social class and demographic factors influenced the political party preferences of Latinos. A variety of control variables identified by previous studies as associated with political attitudes are included. For example, several scholars found that length of residency to be significantly related to the partisan identification (Alvarez and Bedolla 2003; Cain, Kiewiet and Uhlaner 1991; Wong 2000). Legal status and whether a respondent is a first generation born in the U.S. were found to influence partisan attachments and political behavior (Barreto 2005; Cain, Kiewiet and Uhlaner 1991; Wong 2000). Kelly and Kelley (2005) and McDaniel and Ellison (2008) found religion to be important factors in partisanship and political participation. National identity (i.e. being Cuban) was also found to be associated with partisan choice (Alvarez and Bedolla 2003). The LNS contains survey items that allow us to control for these individual-level characteristics and other traditional individual-level characteristics, such as age, education, perception of economic conditions (national economy, family financial situation, employment status, & government assistance),\textsuperscript{15} Latino identity/culture (keep distinct culture and keep ability to speak Spanish), union membership, interest in politics (newspaper readership, contact public official, & interest in politics), and whether a respondent is registered to vote. Appendix A contains descriptive statistics for all the variables used in the various regression models in the analysis section.

**Analysis & Results**

The exploratory analysis of context and Latino partisanship begins by examining how respondents in the LNS vary across state and county. Table 3.3 displays the distribution of responses to the survey question, “Generally speaking, do you usually consider

\textsuperscript{15} This index measure instead of household income is used because the survey item that asks respondents about their income has a large amount of missing data.
youself a Democrat, a Republican, an Independent, some other party, or what?,” across the 15 states. New York has the largest proportion of respondents that self-identify as Democrats (52%) and North Carolina with the least (20%). Table 3.4 shows how various county level demographics are associated with the proportion of respondents who are Democrat.

The proportion of respondents in a county self-identifying as Democrats is correlated with the several county level measures in expected ways. The proportion of Democratic respondents in a county was generally higher in counties with higher proportions of Latinos, counties voting for the presidential candidate John Kerry in the 2004 election at higher rates, and counties with less segregation between whites and Latinos. Not surprisingly, the proportion of respondents identifying as Democrats in a county was correlated with the actual proportion of the county registered as Democrats.

Measuring the Influence of Partisan Context with Cross-Sectional Data

The next step in the analysis is to look at how county-level measures are associated with variation in individual-level partisanship choice. The self-identification measure is recoded into a dichotomous variable where one represents a respondent who self-identifies as a Democrat and zero represents all other responses. Table 3.5 shows the results from two interactive logistic models used to analyze the 2006 LNS dataset.\textsuperscript{16} The first model (Model 1) uses county turnout in support for John Kerry in the 2004 presidential election as a surrogate measure of a county’s partisan context. Because survey data that represents a snapshot of Latino partisanship is being used, one cannot be

\textsuperscript{16} A robust between-cluster variance estimator for cluster-correlated data was used for the logit models using the STATA option cluster (see Williams 2000 for elaboration on the estimator).
sure that an association between partisan context and individual partisanship is not just a product of the level of variation between clusters not being homogeneous. If panel data that followed individuals across time and across geographic boundaries were available, one could better isolate the causal mechanism between context and partisanship. This is possible with panel series available from the American National Election Studies (i.e. Brown 1988; McDonald and Franko 2008), but is difficult when examining Latino partisanship because of the lack of available panel data with a sizable Latino sample.

The attempted solution to this problem is to include an interaction term between partisan context measure (% vote for Kerry or % registered Democrat) and the survey item asking respondents how long they have lived in the community. As discussed earlier, it is posited that if the partisan context measure has an influence on a respondent’s partisanship, then that influence would likely depend on how long a resident has lived in the specific geographic context. An interaction term to attempt to capture that dynamic is used.\(^\text{17}\) The first model in Table 3.5 shows that the both proportion of a county that voted for Kerry and the length of residency were positively related to the odds that a respondent self-identified as a Democrat, but the interactive term was not statistically significant. This means it is not certain if the association between the county political context and a respondent’s partisanship is a product of self-selection or a result of an uneven dispersion of Democrats across the areas sampled.

No other contextual variable was found to have a statistically significant relationship to the dichotomous dependent variable. Because of the correlations between some of the county-level measures, several models that contained the same individual-level variables,

\(^{17}\text{Both variables are centered before creating the product term as recommended by Jaccard (2001).}\)
the county vote for Kerry, and only one other contextual variable were reran. Then, the contextual variable was replaced one by one with another county measure to avoid any multicollinearity (results not shown for space considerations). Regardless of the combination of contextual variables, only the county vote measure was associated with the dependent variable.

Model 2 uses party registration data to measure the partisan context of a county. As noted above, McGhee and Krimm (2009, 345) argue that the use of the presidential vote as an indicator of an area’s partisan leaning may produce misleading results because a person who voted for a presidential candidate may not necessarily be a member of that party since the voter has “no viable alternative to the major-party candidates.” Because some states do not track voter registration by party, there is only registration data for 11 of the 15 states and some respondents were excluded because of missing data; therefore, only 337 counties are included in the analysis in Model 2.

The results showed that both the partisan context variable and the interaction term had a positive and statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable. A simple interpretation of the these coefficients suggests that not only does a Latino living in a highly Democratic county have a higher chance of being a Democrat but when the individual has lived in that county for a long time there is also an additional multiplicative effect on the dependent variable above and beyond that provided by each variable on its own. A more complicated interpretation is provided by Jaccard (2001, 44): the exponent of the product term between two quantitative/continuous predictors, X [in this case Dem. Registration] and Z [Length of Residency], represents the amount the multiplying factor of the political context changes given a 1-unit increase in length of
residency. For example, the odds of a Latino being a Democrat is 1.13 time higher for a Latino living in a county with 57 percent registered Democrats (approximately one SD above the mean) for 16 years (approximately one SD above the mean) than a Latino living in a county with 45 percent Democrats (the mean) for 7.86 years (the mean). This increase in odds is in addition to the 1.11 [exp(0.008*SD of 13.2)] times higher odds of being a Democrat for just living in a county with a higher proportion of Democrats (1 SD above the mean). This positive and statistically significant coefficient provides some evidence that a conditional relationship exists and that the measured association is not simply a product of self-selection or a reflection of county polarization.

Only one other contextual variable was found to have a significant relationship with Latino partisanship, the dichotomous variable indicating whether a county was urban or not (populations with 1000 or more residents per square mile were categorized as urban, which has been a density criteria of the U.S. Census since the 1960s). Latinos living in urban counties had higher odds of being a Democrat, even when taking into account the actual proportion of Democrats registered in the county, the size of the Latino population and the unemployment rate. Besides having often-higher concentrations of poverty, minorities, and Democrats, there might be reasons that urban environments are associated with Democratic partisanship. Population density may help translate these socio-economic conditions into more partisan environments because of higher rates of social exchange.

Multi-level Model

The data is reanalyzed using hierarchical generalized linear models (HGLM) to further

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18 http://www.census.gov/geo/www/GARM/Ch12GARM.pdf
explore the connection between partisan context and Latino partisanship. The purpose of a multi-level model is to predict the values of a dependent variable with a set of explanatory variables from more than one level (Luke 2004). The multi-level model provides another way of examining interactions, specifically interactions between variables from different levels. A multi-level or hierarchical model may be a better way of examining cross-level interactions than simply adding a product term. First, analyzing two levels of data (individual survey responses and county level data) with a traditional logit model may be inappropriate because the hierarchical structure of the data may violate the assumption of independence of errors (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). Although estimating robust standard errors may help take into account the influence of the clustering of observations, it is not necessarily an appropriate solution to the problem of estimating hierarchical data. Second, scholars who have experience using interactive terms have noticed that the “coefficients often change dramatically when compared with the corresponding coefficients from a main-effects model” (Jaccard and Turrisi 2003, 23).

The multi-level model has the benefit of examining interactions by observing how the relationship between a dependent variable and independent variable varies across clusters. It is argued here that this may be a way at getting at how partisan context influences Latino partisanship when one does not have panel data. If context matters, one should observe that the relationship between some individual-level variables and Latino partisanship will vary across counties and that this variation can be explained by a county’s partisan context (or other contextual factors).

19 Clusted data with correlated errors can underestimate the standard errors and thus increasing the chance of committing a Type I error (Luke 2004).
The multi-level model estimated here does not directly estimate individual level parameters (\(\beta_0, \beta_1, \beta_2, \beta_3, \ldots, \beta_k\)), but rather estimates them indirectly using county level parameters (gammas \(\gamma\)). The model treats the intercept and slopes (\(\beta_0, \beta_1, \beta_2, \beta_3, \ldots, \beta_k\)) as “outcomes” that vary across counties with some of this variation being a function of level-two (county) predictors. Estimators for these outcomes are based on the data from each cluster or unit and on data from other similar clusters, increasing precision. This is a major strength of multi-level models and allows for estimation even when sample sizes (n) in each unit (j) is relatively small, as long as the number of units that have more than 2 cases is large (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2005). Although the accuracy of these estimators are less dependent on sample size than traditional methods, those 162 counties that have 10 or more respondents residing in each county will still be examined. Including only those counties containing 10 or more respondents reduces the overall sample size of the LNS dataset from 8634 to 7270. When using the party registration data for the 11 states data was available for, only 108 counties remain in the dataset, reducing the sample size to 4994 respondents. Although this is a substantial loss of data, a healthy number of clusters is retained, containing anywhere from 10 to 461 respondents, with an average of 45 per county.

A variety of model specifications were explored. Table 3.6 shows the results from two of the more interesting examinations. It is not predicted that all of the relationships between Latino partisanship and the explanatory variables will vary across clusters. As in Model 1 and 2, it is predicted that length of residency in a community will have cross-

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20 See Appendix C for more information on the estimation of the HGLM model using HLM 6.02.
21 The average number of respondents per county is 45 with the largest numbers of respondents, 461, residing in Los Angeles County.
level interactions with partisan context. Similarly, the relationship between union membership and partisanship may be stronger in heavily Democratic counties.\textsuperscript{22} It is also predicted that those respondents that believed that it is important for Latinos to maintain a distinct culture and to maintain the ability to speak Spanish would more likely self-identify as Democrats because the Democratic Party is often seen as more tolerant towards immigrants and different cultures (Hero, Garcia, Garcia, and Pachon 2000, 531). Finally, it is also predicted that this relationship may vary depending on whether a Latino respondent is living in a county with a large proportion of Latinos. Latino identity may be activated by the presence of a sizeable Latino population.

Model 3 presents the results from the HGLM using the proportion of the vote in a county that went to the Democratic presidential candidate in 2004. The intercepts did not vary in a way that could be explained by partisan context but the model did provide evidence that the relationship between length of residency and partisan context was positive and statistically significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test). This means that respondents living in a county longer are more likely to be a Democrat if the county had a large proportion of voters supporting Kerry (above the median level of the sample counties - 49 percent). A cross-level interaction for the Latino identity measure (keep distinct culture + maintain Spanish language) was also found. The relationship between Latino identity and Democratic partisanship is larger in counties with a sizable Democratic population.

The results from Model 4 did not uncover a cross-level interaction between partisan context (using registration data) and length of residency, but it did find an interaction

\textsuperscript{22} In Model 3 and 4, a dichotomous measure of partisan context is used that simply measures if a county is above the median score on the Kerry vote measure or the Democratic registration measure.
between union membership and partisan context. The results suggest the relationship between union membership and partisanship is stronger in a county with a large proportion of registered Democrats (above the median – 39 percent). The HGLM in Model 4 also found that the intercepts vary across clusters and that part of this variation can be attributed to whether a county was an urban county. This means that in general, Latinos in urban counties had a high base-line level of odds of being a Democrat.

Conclusion & Discussion

The debate over whether partisanship is influenced by exogenous factors is well cited in the political science literature and as Niemi and Weisberg (2001) suggest, the debate is likely to continue for some time. This debate is less well documented in the literature on Latino partisanship. There are a variety of reasons why one may believe external conditions will have more or less of an influence on Latinos. Because a large proportion of Latinos are new to the political system (Coffin 2003), contextual factors may have more of an impact. In addition, increased migration from traditional areas is exposing Latinos to new political conditions and experiences. Alternatively, levels of segregation in areas and occupations may insulate some individuals from variation in political environments (Queneau 2009; South, et al. 2008).

This chapter attempted to explore how contextual factors influenced Latino partisanship by examining the 2006 Latino National Survey. Both political context measures (voting data and registration data) were found positively and significantly associated with increases in the odds of a Latino being a Democrat in three of the four regression models. Although this research did not have access to panel data that follow Latino political development over time, the LNS provides a variety of information that
can be used to explore the research question. By using interaction terms in traditional logit models and Hierarchical Generalized Linear Models, the relationships between individual-level characteristics and partisanship can be explored and are conditioned by these contextual conditions.

One of the interactive logistic models (Model 2) found evidence that the partisan context of a county interacts with how long a respondent has lived in that county to increase the odds that the respondent self-identifies as a Democrat. This interaction term gives a reason to believe that the relationship between partisan context and individual partisanship is not spurious. In addition, one of the multi-level models (model 3) also confirmed this interaction effect for length of residency and partisan context. Furthermore, several other contextual effects that produced results suggesting the promise of examining partisanship with multi-level models were examined. Not only do the multi-level models show that partisan context influences individual partisanship, but other socioeconomic contexts condition how other individual-level characteristics influence partisanship (i.e. size of the Latino population in a county).

Other permutations of cross-level interaction can be explored using multi-level models. For example, national identity has frequently been found to be associated with partisan identification. Many scholars have found Cubans less likely to identify as Democrats (e.g., Uhlaner and Garcia 2005), but this individual-level characteristic of being Cuban is taping into an historic and geographic contextual relationship rather than some intrinsic endogenous condition. Cubans living in counties with diverse partisan and racial contexts are likely to have different propensities for or against any specific party. A multi-level model is the appropriate method to explore this dynamic. The results from
this study suggest that interaction terms and multi-level models can provide useful tools to explore the contextual conditions of Latino partisanship.

Although these tools provided interesting and meaningful results, they cannot match the ability of panel data to examine how spatial and temporal changes are causally connected to changes in partisanship. Although this study could be expanded to incorporate the changes that occur in a county, it cannot incorporate the changes that have occurred in an individual and the multiple contexts that an individual has experienced. This will be the next obstacle for scholars interested in Latino political behavior to overcome.
Table 3.1: 2006 LNS - Generally speaking, do you usually consider yourself a Democrat, a Republican, an Independent, some other party, or what?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>3085</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>970</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>1435</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't care</td>
<td>1410</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know/other party</td>
<td>1734</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Sample Size</td>
<td>8634</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*unweighted frequencies

Table 3.2: 1989-1990 LNPS - Generally speaking, do you usually consider yourself a Democrat, a Republican, an Independent, some other party, or what?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>1181</td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>547</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Something else (specify)</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None of them (nothing)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refused</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inapplicable</td>
<td>1087</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Sample Size</td>
<td>3415</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*unweighted frequencies

Table 3.3: Partisan Self-Identification by State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>% Democrat</th>
<th>% Republican</th>
<th>% Independent</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>51.9%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>46.8%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>43.0%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>41.3%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>40.2%</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
<td>403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>39.1%</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td>811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>37.8%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
<td>1204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>33.9%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevada</td>
<td>32.3%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>19.1%</td>
<td>403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>31.8%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>30.3%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>26.4%</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>800</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
<td>401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
<td>401</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*calculated using state weights
Table 3.4: Correlations between Proportion Identifying with Democrats and County-Level Characteristics (N=630)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% Dem</th>
<th>% Registered Democratic (N=352)</th>
<th>% Voted for Kerry</th>
<th>% Latino</th>
<th>% White</th>
<th>Level of Segregation (N=629)</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Unemploy. Rate</th>
<th>Pop. Density</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Dem</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.111*</td>
<td>.147**</td>
<td>.253**</td>
<td>.078</td>
<td>-.135**</td>
<td>.065</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>.061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Reg. Democratic</td>
<td>.111*</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.458**</td>
<td>.367**</td>
<td>-.554**</td>
<td>-.275**</td>
<td>.063</td>
<td>.383**</td>
<td>.195**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Voted for Kerry</td>
<td>.147**</td>
<td>.458**</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.112**</td>
<td>-.353**</td>
<td>.134**</td>
<td>.375**</td>
<td>.196**</td>
<td>.310**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Latino</td>
<td>.253**</td>
<td>.367**</td>
<td>.112**</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.212**</td>
<td>-.299**</td>
<td>.043</td>
<td>.382**</td>
<td>.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% White</td>
<td>.078</td>
<td>-.554**</td>
<td>-.353**</td>
<td>.212**</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>-.062</td>
<td>-.335**</td>
<td>-.147**</td>
<td>-.225**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Segregation</td>
<td>-.135**</td>
<td>-.275**</td>
<td>.134**</td>
<td>-.299**</td>
<td>-.062</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.060</td>
<td>-.044</td>
<td>.075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>.065</td>
<td>.063</td>
<td>.375**</td>
<td>.043</td>
<td>-.335**</td>
<td>.060</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>-.142**</td>
<td>.442**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemploy. Rate</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>.383**</td>
<td>.196**</td>
<td>.382**</td>
<td>-.147**</td>
<td>-.044</td>
<td>-.142**</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>-.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pop. Density</td>
<td>.061</td>
<td>.195**</td>
<td>.310**</td>
<td>.045</td>
<td>-.225**</td>
<td>.075</td>
<td>.442**</td>
<td>-.019</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
TABLE 3.5: Interactive Logit Models: 1 = Democrat; 0 = Not Democratic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contextual Variables</th>
<th>MODEL 1</th>
<th>MODEL 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Logit Coefficient</td>
<td>Robust Standard Errors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat Registration</td>
<td>.008**</td>
<td>.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of County Vote for Kerry</td>
<td>.016***</td>
<td>.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Segregation</td>
<td>-.001</td>
<td>.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Latino</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Rate</td>
<td>-.025</td>
<td>.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban County</td>
<td>.050</td>
<td>.109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction Term: Dem. Reg. and Length of residence</td>
<td>.020</td>
<td>.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual-Level Variables</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of Residence</td>
<td>-.011***</td>
<td>.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.013***</td>
<td>.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.063***</td>
<td>.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Condition</td>
<td>.119***</td>
<td>.022</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### TABLE 3.6: Hierarchical Generalized Linear Models (Intercepts & Slopes as Outcomes Models)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIXED EFFECTS</th>
<th>MODEL 3</th>
<th>MODEL 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Logit: 1=Dem; 0=Not Dem</td>
<td>Logit: 1=Dem; 0=Not Dem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>Robust Standard Errors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model for Intercept</td>
<td>β0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-6.157***</td>
<td>0.467</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

***p < .01 for two-tailed test; ** p < .05 for two-tailed test; *p ≤ .1 for two-tailed test

*National weights were used
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>β</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Support for Kerry</th>
<th>Dem. Registration</th>
<th>Model for Length of Residence</th>
<th>Model for Union Member</th>
<th>Latino Identity</th>
<th>Age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>γ00</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>β1</td>
<td>γ10</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.009</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>γ11</td>
<td>0.027*</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>0.011</td>
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<tr>
<td>γ20</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.484**</td>
<td>0.184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>γ21</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>0.248</td>
<td>0.503**</td>
<td>0.222</td>
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<tr>
<td>γ30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>0.154</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>γ31</td>
<td>0.026*</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>0.016</td>
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<tr>
<td>γ4</td>
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<td>0.044***</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Parameter</td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>Standard Error</td>
<td>Estimate</td>
<td>p-value</td>
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<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Born in US</td>
<td>β5</td>
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<td>0.114</td>
<td>0.445***</td>
<td>0.090</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>β6</td>
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<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.073***</td>
<td>0.0226</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>β7</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.092</td>
<td>0.397***</td>
<td>0.082</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.143***</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemploy. Rate</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuban</td>
<td>β9</td>
<td>0.571***</td>
<td>0.169</td>
<td>-0.851***</td>
<td>0.176</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Interest</td>
<td>β10, γ100</td>
<td>0.231***</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.125***</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registered to Vote</td>
<td>β11, γ110</td>
<td>0.469***</td>
<td>0.129</td>
<td>0.544***</td>
<td>0.110</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Random Effects**

| Intercept u0               | Variance Component | 0.074*** | 0.109***  |
|                           | Standard Deviation | 0.272    | 0.329     |
|                           | Chi-Square         | 222.9    | 189.4     |
|                           | Reliability Estimate | 0.208   | 0.339     |
|                           | N (respondents)    | 7280     | 4994      |
|                           | J (Countries)      | 162      | 108       |

***p ≤ .01 for two-tailed test; ** p ≤ .05 for two-tailed test; *p ≤ .1 for two-tailed test

*National weights were used
CHAPTER FOUR
MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND PARTICIPATION

Introduction

The Voting Rights Act 1965, and its subsequent revisions and renewals, led to the creation of majority-minority congressional districts with the intent of increasing minority representation at the federal level. Over the past fifty years, the United States has seen an enormous increase in the number of minorities elected to public office. This increase in the influence of minorities in the public sector is likely to continue increase with each passing decade. Even so, minorities continue to lag far behind their actual numbers in terms of representation at the local, state, and federal level.

It has been argued “ethnicity places individuals in a particular cultural and social milieu that shapes their worldview and perceptions of their interests.” As a result of this shaped worldview, “ethnicity influences the manner in which individuals are brought into and engage the political system” (Graves and Lee 2000, 229). This chapter intends to explore that effect by examining how increased representation of Latinos at the federal level (U.S. House of Representatives) might influence Latino voters.

The 1989 Latino National Political Survey found that 66.4% of Latinos said that having a co-ethnic candidate on the ballot would not influence their vote choice. Conversely, 3.7% said a co-ethnic on the ballot would make them less likely to vote for that candidate and 29.93% said it would make them more likely. In the more recent 2006 Latino National Survey 26.8% stated it was not at all important to have a co-ethnic candidate on the ballot, 23.6% stated it was somewhat important while 49.6% believed it to be very important. While it is not within the scope of this chapter to address the
differences between the 1989 and 2006 responses, it seems that the perceived importance of having a co-ethnic candidate on the ballot has increased for Latinos. Given that, what effect does have a co-ethnic candidate on the ballot mean for Latino electoral behavior?

The amount of research dedicated to explaining American voting behavior is, to say the least, extensive. Two of the most prominent American voting behavior theories are those of Anthony Downs and Angus Campbell. The model espoused by Downs in his book *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (1957), put simply, is a spatial model that consists of voting for the candidate closest to the voter’s political preferences. Closeness can refer to many things, typically issue positions, but can also be in regards to a shared ethnicity. Campbell, on the other hand, purports a “funnel of causality” with a temporal chain of explanatory factors at the beginning of the mouth of a temporal funnel leading to the dependent variable, vote choice, at the stem of the funnel. A voter’s ultimate choice is influenced by partisanship, candidate positions, and evaluations of the candidate overall. These factors are themselves influenced by demographic factors such as socioeconomic factors, religion, and ethnicity (Campbell, et al 1960).

Given that shared race and ethnicity may be components that influence vote choice, this chapter will explore how descriptive representation may impact the political behavior of Latinos. Many scholars have researched descriptive representation’s effect on the political behavior and attitudes of constituents (Gay, 2001; Banducci, Donovan, and Karp, 2004; Gilliam, 1996; Bobo and Gilliam, 1990). This chapter builds on this research by exploring the effects descriptive representation in the U.S. House has on Latinos’ electoral behavior. The importance of descriptive representation is said to be “significant…for analyzing group status and power in the American political system”
What is Descriptive Representation?

The term “descriptive representation” was first coined by Griffiths and Wollheim (1960, 188) and refers to representatives who “are in their own persons and lives in some sense typical of the larger class of persons whom they represent” (Mansbridge, 1999, 629). In other words, women legislators represent women constituents, a union worker representing a union community, or Latino constituents being represented by a Latino representative. David Lublin puts it even more simply: “members of minority groups win descriptive representation in the political arena by electing members of their group to public office” (1997, 12).

The notion of descriptive representation is as old as the American republic itself. The United States Constitution, for example, requires that the president be born in the United States. Many local elections turn on the idea of “being one of us”. If a candidate has not lived in the district for an extended period of time, if at all, they are often perceived as an outsider, a carpetbagger, and not worthy of representing the citizens of that given locale. As Jane Mansbridge states: “‘being one of us’ is assumed to promote loyalty to ‘our’ interests” (1999, 629).

Mansbridge identifies one of the effects of descriptive representation as the “communicative advantage” (1999, 642). Some constituents may face barriers identifying or communicating with their representative. Descriptive representation, on the other hand, allows for a commonality from which the citizen can now relate to their representative, which in turn helps to break down otherwise potential barriers.

Mansbridge cites an example of descriptive representation from an exchange between a
black legislator and Richard Fenno: “every expression he gives or gives off conveys the idea, ‘I am one of you.’” Mansbridge notes that “his constituents in turn used not only the visible characteristic of skin color but also his body language, choice of words, accent, and other external signals to predict the likelihood of a large body of experience shared with them and other African-Americans” (1999, 645).

**Arguments Against the Relevance of Descriptive Representation**

Many scholars have summarily dismissed the notion of descriptive representation. Iris Marion Young writes: “having such a relation of identity or similarity with constituents says nothing about what the representative does” (1997, 354). According to Mansbridge, Carol Swain was the first political scientist to empirically study in depth the actions of Black members of Congress. Swain found that in the United States Congress “more black faces in political office will not necessarily lead to more representation of the tangible interests of blacks” (1999, 630). Hardy-Fanta, et al, acknowledge that descriptive representation “may not be sufficient for the achievement of political equality and policy responsiveness for marginalized groups…” but descriptive representation does have “symbolic or material importance as a necessary condition or positive factor towards group empowerment” (2005, 2).

One could argue that just because an elected official may share racial, sexual, or other cultural traits with their constituents, those ties might still not reflect upon what the representative actually does as a lawmaker. However, a representative’s race or ethnicity may provide some important information to voters regarding a candidate. One’s ability to identify racially with his member of Congress, or any other elected representative, may be of some importance because race can be viewed as a “signal that speaks louder than
words, or at least with more meaning” (Bianco 1994, 153). In fact, Lionel Sosa, a media consultant and presidential campaign adviser, conducted focus groups of Latino voters found that “positive ethnic identification with the candidate is an important factor” and that “issues also work, but only after Latino voters like and trust the candidate” (Baretto 2007, 67).

In Gerald Pomper’s Voters’ Choice: Varieties of American Electoral Behavior he describes two types of voters: the dependent and the responsive. The dependent voter seems to build upon that described in Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet’s The People’s Choice: “…a person thinks, politically, as he is, socially. Social characteristics determine political preference” (1968, 27). Pomper’s “…dependent voter does not rely primarily on his own resources and opinions in making political choices. Rather, he relies on cues of his social groups,” such as race. Furthermore, “the dependent voter does not make an autonomous choice on the basis of the issues…” (1975, 5-6).23

The idea of a “dependent” voter seems, at least to some degree, to be born out in research on race and its influence on voting. Raymond Wolfinger states “ethnic voting is strongest during an ethnic group’s earliest residence in this country [the United States] and subsequently declines from this peak as the group’s members make their way out of the working class.” Wolfinger goes on to qualify this as a sort of “assimilation theory” as there is a “direct relationship between the proportion of a nationality group in the working class and that group’s political homogeneity.” As more and more members of a given group enter the middle class, they become exposed, and adopt, different political

23 This is not to suggest that Latinos are unquestionably “dependent” voters whose electoral calculations are solely influenced by a shared ethnicity, but rather, to suggest that such a voter may exist and thus, descriptive representation may indeed be a valid variable in studying Latino political behavior.
interests and begin to identify more with the society’s majority (1965, 896). Wolfinger, however, finds that this theory may not actually be the case. Using Italians and Irish living in New Haven, Connecticut, he finds that ethnic voting “does not steadily diminish from an initial peak, but instead increases during at least the first two generations” (1965, 906). He concludes by suggesting, “even when ethnic salience has faded…its political effects will remain. One of the most remarkable tendencies in political behavior is the persistence of partisan affiliations for generations after the reasons for their formation have become irrelevant to contemporary society” (1965, 908).

While many scholars have referred to ethnic voting as a “transitional phenomenon” Graves and Lee, in their study of Latinos during the 1996 Texas Senate election, found that “the relationship between ethnic identity and voting persists in the United States” (2000, 226). The 1996 Texas senatorial contest was between the Republican Anglo incumbent and a Democratic Latino challenger. Graves and Lee’s study of whether ethnicity played a role in Latinos vote choice found that “ethnicity does have an indirect effect on candidate evaluation” because ethnicity does influence partisanship (2000, 232). Further, they find that “co-ethnic candidates are evaluated more positively than other candidates” (2000, 233).

Descriptive Representation and Minority Political Empowerment

Much of the early minority political empowerment literature comes from the 1970s and 1980s and mainly focuses on blacks. These early scholars agreed on two points: “that blacks tended to participate more than whites when differences in socioeconomic status were taken into account and that a strong sense of ‘ethnic community,’ or group consciousness, was the stimulus to heightened black participation” (Bobo and Gilliam,
Since the 1960s, the number of black elected officials has grown substantially and as a result, so has the literature exploring the effect of increased black representation on the political attitudes and behaviors of black citizens.

In short, the implication for the political empowerment model is that descriptive representation (for women, racial or ethnic minorities, etc.) ought to create increased positive feelings towards government and the representative, increased political participation such as voting and contacting members of government, and/or increased political knowledge.

**Empirical Findings Regarding the Effects of Descriptive Representation**

The literature that studies the effect descriptive representation has on minorities has been, at best, a mixed bag. Bobo and Gilliam (1990) studied the effects that black mayors had on the political behavior of black citizens in their respective communities. What the authors found is that “where blacks hold positions of political power, they are more active and participate at higher rates than whites of comparable socioeconomic status.”

Second, they found that black empowerment leads to increased feelings that participation has intrinsic value among urban blacks. Additionally, being empowered fosters an increased knowledge in blacks about political affairs (Bobo and Gilliam 1990, 388).

Banducci, Donovan, and Karp (2004, 549) studied the effects of descriptive representation for blacks on whether the constituent can recall their Congressional representative’s name, their approval for the representative, whether the citizen was more likely to contact their representative. The effects were found to be significant and in the expected direction: “even when controlling for party identification, blacks are more likely to recall the name of their representative, more likely to contact the representative, and
approve of his or her performance” than for those blacks who do not have a black representative. However, descriptive representation seemed to have no impact on political participation and efficacy.

Claudine Gay (2001) builds upon the work of Bobo and Gilliam and expands the black empowerment theory from the mayoral level to the congressional level. She finds that “in districts in which African-Americans enjoy political prominence…only occasionally is there greater political involvement among African-Americans.” “More often than not,” Gay writes, “African-Americans represented by a black member of Congress display the same patterns of behavior as their counterparts in other districts” (2001, 600). In further research, Gay also finds that both whites and blacks, to a lesser degree, are more likely to contact representatives with whom they identify racially (2002, 717).

In a very unique electoral circumstance in 1996, Hill, Moreno, and Cue study the Miami mayoral contest. The race featured a black Republican, Puerto Rican Democrat, Cuban-American Democrat, and a Cuban-American Independent. By the time of the run-off, the election was whittled down to the black Republican and the Cuban-American Democrat. What the authors found is that “ethnicity was an overwhelmingly more powerful predictor of vote choice than partisanship” (2001, 291). They concluded by stating: “Wolfinger’s thesis continues to hold…the influence of ethnicity on voting behavior remains a very powerful one, often to the exclusion of partisanship” (2001, 294).

Barreto, Segura, and Woods, in their study of majority-minority districts and Latino turnout, find that “Latinos vote more when in a majority-minority district, contrary to the
expectations of those who expected or feared minority demobilization” (2004, 74).

Baretto, furthering his work in the previous article, states “the most consistent findings across each election…is that Latino voters witness higher rates of voter turnout…for Latino candidates…” (2007, 425). This is due, in part, to the fact that American political parties play a shrinking role in voting behavior and as a result “voters constantly rely on information shortcuts when deciding whether and how to vote” (2007, 427).

Mobilization Efforts

As mentioned previously, Latinos have been referenced as “the sleeping giant” of American politics due to the gap between their voting turnout rates and their share of the population. As such, many have asked why Latinos “have no been incorporated into politics like previous waves of immigrants, which were mobilized by political machines” (Michelson 2003, 248). Some claim that this is a result of a weakening American political party system and a decline in mobilization efforts. In a time in which direct mail and television ads have replaced face-to-face mobilization efforts, it is no wonder that “during the last half-century, a dramatic transformation has occurred in the manner in which voters are mobilized” (Michelson 2003, 248). Because of the decline of the American political machine, scholars have tested whether or not face-to-face mobilization efforts boost Latino turnout and have largely found that yes, there is a positive impact (Michelson 2003, 248). Since the Chicano movement of the 1960s and 1970s, there has been “increased attention to and from political parties, especially the Democratic Party” (Hero, Garcia, Garcia, and Pachon 2000, 530). As a result, the Democratic Party has been viewed as more responsive to the needs of immigrant and minority groups and, perhaps not surprisingly, 65% of Latino elected officials are Democrats compared to only 5%
which are Republican (Hero, Garcia, Garcia, and Pachon 2000, 533). The fact that most Latino elected officials are Democrats, and that Latino mobilization efforts have been found to have “a particularly large effect on the turnout of Latino Democrats” (Michelson 2003, 247), one could assume that Latinos who are descriptively represented might exhibit increased, and positive, political behavior.

Expectations about the Effects of Minority Empowerment on Latinos

Based on the minority empowerment thesis, one could expect to find minorities who are descriptively represented will be more likely to experience higher levels of efficaciousness, feel increased levels of trust towards government, and exhibit elevated levels of political participation than minorities with non-descriptive representatives. In the context of this research, Latinos living in a congressional district represented by a Latino should be less cynical towards government, more likely to contact their government representatives, and vote at higher rates than Latinos that are not represented descriptively at the congressional level.

On the other hand, the opposing theory to minority empowerment is that descriptive representation may actually lead to unintended and negative consequences. Currently, only one of the twenty-four Latino members of Congress represents a district that is not majority-minority (John Salazar, CO-3). The fact that many Latinos are concentrated in districts that will, more likely than not, elect a Latino representative might actually create less of an incentive to participate in the political process since a Latino will be elected regardless of their individual behavior.

Age may also play a factor in explaining why descriptive representation may have little, or no (or negative) effect. Gilliam states “older blacks who came of political age in
a segregated society…are more likely to believe that black officeholding is an important and significant step.” On the other hand, “younger blacks socialized in a period where the shimmer had worn off of racial progress and where black officeholding was more common, should be more critical in their evaluation of black empowerment” (1996, 60). This too could have an effect on Latinos. Additionally, it could be the case that Latinos, who have migrated to the United States from Latin America or Spain, where Latino representatives are the norm, not the exception, might have a much different attitude towards being descriptively represented.

Finally, the minority empowerment theory seems to rest on one rather large assumption: that the individual actually knows the race of their member of Congress. Since the vast majority of descriptively represented blacks and Latinos reside in majority-minority districts, we know that, on average, those individuals will tend to live in urban cores, have less education, and lower incomes than individuals living in non-majority minority districts. All of these factors are correlated with (but not hard proof of) lower levels of political knowledge.

**Testing Hypotheses about Minority Empowerment: Data & Methods**

Very few studies of minority empowerment can be used to generalize about minorities in a national context. Primarily, previous studies have relied on data that only surveys a particular minority group, oversamples a minority group, or is limited in scope to one city, county, congressional district, state, or election year. This is understandable given that minorities, by definition, are a small subset of a population. A result of this reality is that minority groups, and Latinos specifically, do not constitute the bulk of any representative survey of American political opinion.
This research attempts to overcome the issue of data limitability by pooling data from the American National Election Survey (ANES) for several elections into a single data set. The years 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2008 will be used. By pooling the ANES data, a practical number of Latinos, and Latinos represented by a Latino member of Congress, can be obtained. These samples are merged with data on whether the respondent’s House member is Latino and the percentage of Latinos living in the respective congressional district at the time of the survey. The resulting sample includes 623 Latino respondents, with nearly 40% (n = 249) of the sample having a Latino representative in the United State House of Representatives.

Table 4.1 takes a simplistic view of the effect minority empowerment at the congressional level may have on Latinos in regards to their political behavior (voting and contacting government officials) and attitudes towards the federal government (is government run for the benefit of all?).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Empowered</th>
<th>Not Empowered</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government is run for the benefit of all</td>
<td>40.29%</td>
<td>41.18%</td>
<td>40.82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacted politician or gov’t representative</td>
<td>6.43%</td>
<td>11.23%</td>
<td>9.31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote</td>
<td>42.17%</td>
<td>47.86%</td>
<td>45.58%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


24 The 2002 sample consisted of respondents who provided an interview in 2000 and a new cross-section (the “fresh cross”). Only fresh cross respondents were included in the pooled data.
25 2006 is not included in the pooled data as it was a Pilot Study conducted for the purpose of testing new questions only.
26 All respondents this analysis are registered voters.
The bivariate results in Table 4.1 illustrate that a large portion of the Latino electorate holds a negative view towards the federal government. Nearly 41% of Latinos believe that government is run for the benefit of all while the remaining 60% believe that government is run to benefit a few big interests. Running counter to the minority empowerment theory, empowered Latinos are slightly less likely to believe government is run for the benefit of all.

The minority empowerment theory also falters in regards to the political participation of Latinos. Empowered Latinos are less likely to report voting in the previous election (42% versus 48%) and having contacted a politician or government representative (6% versus 11%) when compared to non-empowered Latinos. Next, multivariate models will be used to go beyond the bivariate analysis and examine whether empowerment affects some Latino voters differently.

The Effects of Minority Empowerment: Multivariate Models

In Table 4.2, the effect of Latino empowerment on the probability of voting is shown. The dependent variable, Vote, is a dichotomous variable (0,1) indicating whether the respondent voted in the previous election. The dummy variable Latino representative captures minority empowerment. This leaves the reference category as Latinos who have a non-Latino representative in Congress. Additionally, a variable has been added to control for whether a respondent is represented by a member who belongs to the same political party as the respondent (Identify w/party of rep). This variable is included because it is assumed that those who are represented by a member of the same party will likely have more positive attitudes towards government and increased political participation regardless of race. Additionally, whether the respondent was contacted
about registering or getting out to vote was included (Contact) to control for mobilization efforts. The model also controls for the standard factors expected to influence political behavior: education, age, income, evaluation of the economy, attending religious services, region of residence, gender, party attachments, and ideology. These are labeled, respectively, Education, Age, Income, Economy, Church, Region, Gender, Party, Liberal/Conservative (see Appendix D for details of coding). Dummy variables are also included for election years to control for election-specific effects, with 2008 being the reference category, and for Texas and California, as the bulk of respondents live in those two states, to control for state-specific effects. As should be expected, age and education are found to be statistically significant and in the expected (positive) direction. The year 2000 is also found to be statistically significant, in a positive direction, for Latinos turning out to vote.

As the bivariate analysis seemed to indicate, being empowered does not increase the likelihood of a Latino respondent turning out to vote. In fact, while it is statistically significant, it is significant in the negative direction meaning an empowered Latino voter is less likely to vote than a non-empowered Latino voter. This runs directly counter to the minority empowerment theory and much of the previous research on Latino empowerment and majority-minority districts.

In Table 4.3, the effect of Latino empowerment on cynicism towards government is shown. The dependent variable is the respondents’ answer to the question: “Is government run for the benefit of all or for a few big interests?” (with “all” being 1; “few” being 0). Latinos in the year 2000 are found to have less confidence that government is run for the benefit of all. In addition, a respondent’s views on the past
Table 4.2  Effect of empowerment on voting: Logistic regression estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coeff.</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latino representative</td>
<td>-1.356</td>
<td>0.534</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>0.356</td>
<td>0.395</td>
<td>0.368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church</td>
<td>-0.110</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>0.102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>-0.137</td>
<td>0.309</td>
<td>0.658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>0.204</td>
<td>0.151</td>
<td>0.178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.496</td>
<td>0.082</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-0.190</td>
<td>0.239</td>
<td>0.427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ident. w/party as rep.</td>
<td>0.291</td>
<td>0.330</td>
<td>0.378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>0.243</td>
<td>0.284</td>
<td>0.393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>-0.251</td>
<td>0.129</td>
<td>0.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Latino</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>-0.229</td>
<td>0.179</td>
<td>0.199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>-0.108</td>
<td>0.332</td>
<td>0.746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact</td>
<td>-0.043</td>
<td>0.050</td>
<td>0.391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1.381</td>
<td>.577</td>
<td>0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>-21.401</td>
<td>10434.540</td>
<td>0.998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-4.463</td>
<td>1.172</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2 log likelihood</td>
<td>459.344</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.320</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of cases</td>
<td>462</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Dependent variable is 1 if respondent voted, 0 otherwise; cell entries are logistic regression coefficients.

years’ economy and their educational level also lead to a statistically significant, and negative, relationship in regards to feelings of cynicism towards the government, meaning the more education and wealthy one is, the less likely they are to have positive
views towards government. The minority empowerment variable has a negative, but not significant, relationship with cynicism.

Finally, in Table 4.4, the effect of empowerment on another form of political participation, contacting government representatives or officials, is measured. Education is found to be statistically significant and in a positive direction. Also, aligning with the same party as one’s member of Congress also is a positively related to the likelihood of contacting a government representative (and statistically significant). Empowerment is again negative and not statistically significant.

Discussion

None of these results are consistent with the expectations of the minority empowerment theory. In regards to increased voting, Latinos represented by a Latino member of Congress are actually less likely to vote. Also, while not statistically significant, empowered Latinos are also less likely to contact their government officials and feel that government is run for the benefit of all.

But why is it that so much of the literature on minority empowerment seems to posit a positive relationship between political behavior and attitudes and descriptive representation? The answer may lie in the fact that Latinos may not view themselves as a cohesive group.27 As noted above, concepts such as ‘Latino’ and ‘Hispanic’ are mainly American social constructions and the research that has been conducted on whether Latinos actually think of themselves in pan-ethnic terms generally finds no such concept.

27 Unlike the attitudes and perceptions of African-Americans who have a much stronger sense of racial cohesiveness and shared future (see Dawson, 2004).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coef.</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Sig</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latino representative</td>
<td>-0.593</td>
<td>0.440</td>
<td>0.178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>-0.088</td>
<td>0.333</td>
<td>0.791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church</td>
<td>-0.059</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>0.086</td>
<td>0.273</td>
<td>0.752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem</td>
<td>-0.335</td>
<td>0.306</td>
<td>0.273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>-0.496</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.119</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>0.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-0.178</td>
<td>0.205</td>
<td>0.386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ident. w/party as rep.</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.291</td>
<td>0.934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-0.042</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>0.327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>-0.154</td>
<td>0.252</td>
<td>0.540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Latino</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep</td>
<td>0.223</td>
<td>0.340</td>
<td>0.512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>-0.100</td>
<td>0.285</td>
<td>0.725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>-0.195</td>
<td>0.142</td>
<td>0.168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>-0.946</td>
<td>0.482</td>
<td>0.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>-0.218</td>
<td>0.634</td>
<td>0.731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>-0.164</td>
<td>0.371</td>
<td>0.659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.225</td>
<td>0.869</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2 log likelihood</td>
<td>600.487</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of cases</td>
<td>472</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Dependent variable is 1 if respondent believes government is run for the benefit of all, 0 respondent believes government is run by a few big interests; cell entries are logistic regression coefficients.
Table 4.4  Effect of empowerment on contacting gov’t: Logistic regression estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coef.</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Sig</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latino representative</td>
<td>-1.046</td>
<td>0.673</td>
<td>0.120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>0.125</td>
<td>0.451</td>
<td>0.781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>-0.410</td>
<td>0.415</td>
<td>0.323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>0.165</td>
<td>0.655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.341</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.507</td>
<td>0.314</td>
<td>0.106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ident. w/party as rep.</td>
<td>0.709</td>
<td>0.321</td>
<td>0.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>0.072</td>
<td>0.930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>-0.449</td>
<td>0.378</td>
<td>0.235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Latino</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>-0.486</td>
<td>0.451</td>
<td>0.281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>0.771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>0.204</td>
<td>0.969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>0.749</td>
<td>0.722</td>
<td>0.299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>0.435</td>
<td>0.848</td>
<td>0.608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>0.837</td>
<td>0.469</td>
<td>0.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-4.547</td>
<td>1.242</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2 log likelihood</td>
<td>311.302</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.082</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Cases</td>
<td>546</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Dependent variable is 1 if respondent has contacted a politician or government official, 0 otherwise; cell entries are logistic regression coefficients.
The fact that being Latino may not create a strong bond that ties a community together could explain why being represented by a Latino may not have the same effects that often appear when an African-American is represented by an African-American. According to the Latino National Survey, which is representative of 87.5% of the U.S. Latino population, only a bare majority, 51.5%, of Latinos think of Latinos as a separate racial group. It would seem then that the stimulus to minority empowerment, having a strong sense of ‘ethnic community,’ or group consciousness, may be lacking in the Latino “community” and therefore it is understandable why the minority empowerment theory may not manifest itself in the expected direction for Latinos.

This chapter adds to the current body of literature by using the most current, up-to-date national election surveys, and is not limited to a certain state or locale or unique time period, to study the potential effect of minority empowerment on Latinos political behavior. While the findings in this chapter call into question the minority empowerment theory in regards to the Latino community, and previous research on the topic, it is not alone in adding uncertainty to the topic. This research is limited, in part, by the lack of panel data on Latinos and with the data that is available containing few respondents and much missing data. Future research may wish to focus on whether descriptive representation influences behavior differently at the varying levels of government (city versus county versus state, etc). Perhaps national legislative figures are simply “too far removed” to have much impact on local behavior. Clearly, further expansive, and nationally representative, research will need to be conducted if this question is ever to be definitively answered.
CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

Partisan choice and voting are only two of the myriad of political behaviors available to study but they are arguably the two most important choices. Indeed, these two choices would seem to be the first made in an individual’s “pathway to political incorporation” from which making campaign contributions, electoral volunteering, running for office, and other political behaviors stem. With large growth in the native born Latino population and as naturalization rates among Latino immigrants continue to rise, the United States has also seen the size and strength of the Latino vote increase. The growth of the Latino population is not limited to the Southwest, however, as Latinos are moving outside of their traditional residences. It comes as no surprise then that politicians have taken note of this trend and that the Republicans and Democrats have invested heavily, though not consistently, in winning Latino electoral support. It was therefore the goal of this thesis to examine contextual, or environmental, factors that may influence Latino political behavior. Specifically, assimilation theories were examined, the influence of a county’s political make-up on the party registration habits of Latinos, and the effects of descriptive representation on Latinos were studied.

Assimilation, the internal and external group responses to an immigrant’s arrival to the United States, does indeed seem to influence Latino behavior. As shown by Michelson, Latinos who are further along the assimilation spectrum, whichever model is applied, tend to be more distrusting of American government than are recent immigrants (2003). Since the dominant group, Anglos, have been increasingly cynical towards government since the 1960s, Latinos are also becoming increasingly distrustful as they assimilate into American culture, leaving behind the hopes and aspirations they once had for the “Land
of Opportunity”. Increased cynicism towards government in turn leads towards higher levels of voter apathy and may even encourage more radical behavior. Surely then, the context in which Latinos become assimilated must have some influence on Latino political behavior.

Additionally, Latino partisanship was found to be influenced by exogenous factors. A county’s political environment, as measured by voting data at the presidential level and party registration data, were both found to be positively associated with increases in the odds of a Latino being a Democrat. In other words, the higher the percentage Senator John Kerry (D-MA) earned by county in the 2004 presidential contest and the higher the percentage of registered Democrats in a given county are correlated with higher levels of Latino Democratic registration. Additionally, the research in this thesis found that the longer a Latino has lived in county with increased Democratic partisan registration increases the likelihood that the Latino will register as a Democrat. Not only was the partisan context of a county shown to influence individual partisanship, but other socioeconomic contexts influenced partisanship, as well, such as the size of the Latino population within a county. This suggests that Latinos are acclimating politically to their surroundings. This is important since some scholars have found that areas of the U.S. are becoming polarized. As Latinos move from their traditional city centers and the Southwest, they are likely to come into contact with different political climates. The evidence here, along with the literature on assimilation, suggests that this will have a profound effect on their political attitudes and behavior. So why is it important that county conditions influence partisanship? For one, Latinos are likely to continually be highly recruited as potential voters, giving Latinos increased influence politically.
However, it also means that Latinos are less cohesive as a voting bloc, which in turn mutes their influence.

There are other contextual factors beyond the county of residence that affects the political behavior of Latinos. Another context explored in this thesis was that of representation. Minority politics research of the 1970s and 80s paid much attention to the descriptive representation of African-Americans. While there is no overall consensus as to the true effect, many scholars found positive signs stemming from the representation of African-Americans in government by African-Americans. The positives of descriptive representation have included increased voting habits, increased feelings of goodwill towards the government, and an increase in the frequency of contacting elected officials. However, much of the recent minority political literature, as it relates to Latinos, casts doubt of the effect of descriptive representation. While some of the literature does suggest there are positive benefits to a Latino being descriptively represented, this thesis found just the opposite. Latinos who are descriptively represented in the United States House of Representatives, when compared to those who are not, are less likely to vote. While not statistically significant, Latinos who are descriptively represented are less likely to contact their representatives in government and are more likely to believe that government works for a few special interests. This could, in part, be due to the fact that Latinos do not generally think of themselves as a cohesive group with shared political goals and interests. Ultimately, what does it mean that descriptive representation causes decreased Latino voter turnout for the larger issue of Latino influence? It means that Latino elected officials will have to play to a larger base, whites and other minorities for example, to compile a winning coalition. This may be a hindrance in Latinos continuing
to win large numbers of elected positions, at least outside of their traditional areas and majority-minority districts.

So does context matter? The answer seems to be: it depends on the context. The environments in which a Latino becomes assimilated and the context of the county in which they register to vote have clear effects on a Latino’s ultimate political behavior. On the other hand, unlike African-Americans, descriptive representation for Latinos seems to have the opposite effect. This anomaly lends credence to the scholars who suggest theories of African-American political behavior cannot be transferred to Latinos.

Ultimately, this research adds to our understanding of Latino political behavior by showing that yes, context matters but not in the same way as it has for other minority groups. Latinos may be assimilating differently than previous immigrant groups to the United States and descriptive representation, at least at the congressional level, seems to have the opposite effect than it does for African-Americans. In light of this, I echo the call of so many other researchers of Latino political behavior: more research is needed. By their very nature as a minority, little research exists for scholars of Latino politics to examine. With only two major Latino studies to analyze, the 1989-90 Latino National Political Survey and the 2006 Latino National Survey, consistent and current data is sorely needed, especially now that the new decennial census will be completed soon. Further research could explore whether other levels of descriptive representation, such as that on the city, county, or state level, has differing effects than what was found for the congressional level. Additionally, further forms of political behavior such as Latinos contributing to campaigns, using the Internet to connect to political information, and deciding to run for office could be explored.
It is not an overstatement to claim that to understand Latino political behavior is to understand the future of American politics. In 2008, Latino voters made large shifts away from the Republicans towards the Democrats. The number of Latinos that went to the polls in 2008 versus 2004 increased by 25 percent, the Latino turnout rate increased from 47% in 2004 to 50% in 2008, and Latino support for the Democratic nominee increased 14 percent over 2004 levels, which was the largest shift towards the Democrats by any voter group (Preston 2008). Nationwide, Latinos voted for President Obama by a margin of 67 percent to 21 percent, according to Edison/Mitofsky exit polls, with some estimates gauging that Latino support for President Obama surged even higher: 72% versus 25% for Senator McCain (NALEO 11/21/08). Given the estimates of the Anglo population falling below fifty percent by 2042, the fact that Latinos are the largest minority group in the United States, and several states are already majority-minority, it is crucial for students of American politics to pay close attention to the impact Latinos will have on the system and the impact the system will have on Latinos.

Even so, given the large gains in 2008, have Latinos truly reached their full potential? Several observers of Latino politics seem to think so. “They [Latinos] really delivered,” says Efarin Escobedo, director of civic engagement at the Latino officials’ association, a bipartisan group that runs voter registration drives. “This is an electorate that now understands the importance of voting, and they made a significant shift in the political landscape” (Preston 2008). Bill Richardson, the first viable Latino presidential candidate and former governor of New Mexico stated: “They [Latinos] turned out, erasing the fame of Latino voters as the sleeping giant and making them an actual giant” (Preston 2008).

Since Latinos are moving out of the Southwest and into the Midwest, South, and
Northeast and since there is evidence that they are assimilating to those areas, Latinos, much like the rest of the American electorate, are registering as non-partisans. This means that Latinos are going to continue to be highly courted by both political parties. Whether this means that Democrats and Republicans are going to present Latino candidates to recruit Latino voters is less clear. Nevertheless, with the 2010 midterm elections looming, whether Latinos will remain an actual giant remains to be seen. Regardless, the current political landscape shows Latinos holding several cabinet positions, the first Latino Supreme Court Justice in Sonia Sotomayor, and Latinos reaching their highest voter participation levels in 2008. Given that Latinos helped provide the margin of victory for the winner of the 2008 presidential candidate in several swing states, but not necessarily in the national popular vote overall, it goes to show that yes, Latino locales do matter.
APPENDIX A

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Descriptive Statistics of County-Level Variables

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<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
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<td>% Self-Identified Democrat</td>
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<td>% of County Latino</td>
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## Descriptive Statistics of Individual-Level Variables

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<td>(Readpapr + Polintere + Contoff)</td>
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<td>Interaction Terms</td>
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<td>Length of Residency * % vote for Kerry</td>
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<td>6241.87</td>
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APPENDIX B

INDEX OF DISSIMILARITY (LATINOS & WHITES)

The Index of Dissimilarity ranges from 0 to 100 where a value of 0 represents an even distribution of two groups (in this case Latinos and Whites) across a geographic area (i.e. county). It is calculated using 2000 U.S. Census data at the block level and the formula:

\[(1/2) \sum \left( \frac{i}{L} - \frac{w}{W} \right)\]

where,

\[i_i = \text{the Latino population of the } i^{th} \text{ census block in a county}\]

\[L = \text{the total Latino population in the county}\]

\[w_i = \text{the white population of the } i^{th} \text{ census block}\]

\[W = \text{the total white population in the county}\]
APPENDIX C

HIERARCHICAL GENERALIZED LINEAR MODELS

The two hierarchical generalized linear models (HGLM) were estimated using the software HLM 6.02. The logit link function was used as the necessary transformation of the dependent variable for a two-level model with a Bernoulli distribution:

Level 1: \( \eta_{ij} = \logit(Y_{ij}) \)

\[ \eta_{ij} = \beta_{0j}X_{1ij} + \beta_{1j}X_{1ij} + \beta_{2j}X_{2ij} + \ldots + \beta_{qj}X_{qij} \]

Where:

- \( \beta_{qj} \) are level-1 coefficients;
- \( X_{1ij} \) is a level-1 predictor;
- \( \gamma_{qs} \) (q = 0, 1, …, S_q) are level-2 coefficients;
- \( W_{qj} \) is a level-2 predictor; and
- \( u_{qj} \) is a level-2 random effect

HLM 6.0 does not estimate HGLM using maximum likelihood estimation (ML). Instead, HLM 6.0 uses a penalized quasi-likelihood (PQL) estimation procedure. PQL produces an asymptotic approximation to ML (Luke 2004), by constructing a linear approximation of the level-1 model, and assuming that the linearized dependent variable is approximately normal (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002)\(^{28}\)

\[ \beta_{qj} = \sum_{s=1}^{S_q} \gamma_{qs} W_{qj} + u_{qj} \]

---

\(^{28}\) The more computationally intensive Laplace method of estimation can also be used. Laplace was also used (results not shown here) with no difference in findings.
APPENDIX D

CODING

Cynicism: Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people? 1. Few big interests; 5. For the benefit of all.

Church: Do you attend religious services? 1. yes; 5. no.

Economy: How about the economy as a whole. Would you say that over the past year the nation’s economy has gotten better, stayed about the same, or gotten worse? 1. Much better; 2. Somewhat better; 3. About the same; 4. Somewhat worse; 5. Much worse.

Contact: During the campaign year, did anyone talk to you about registering to vote or getting out to vote? 1. Yes, someone did; 5. no, no one did.

Summary of Education: 1. 8 years or less; 2. 9-11 years; 3. High school diploma; 4. More than 12 years; 5. Community college degree; 6. Bachelors degree; 7. Advanced degree.

Income: 1. $0-$14,999; 2. $15,000-$34,999; 3. $35,000-$49,000; 4. $50,000-$64,999; 5. $65,000-$84,999; 6. $84,999+
WORKS CITED


Hardy-Fanta, Carol, Christine Marie Sierra, Pei-te Lien, Dianne M. Pinderhughes, and Wartyna L. Davis. “An Exploratory View of Multicultural Elected Leadership in


VITA

Graduate College
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Matthew C. Dempsey

Degrees:
Bachelor of Arts, Political Science, 2004
Stephen F. Austin State University

Thesis Title: Latino Locales: Does Context Matter?

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Committee Member, David Damore, Ph. D.
Graduate Faculty Representative, Christie Batson, Ph. D.