Kuwait Task Force: A Unique Solution to Kuwait's Reconstruction Problems

Patrick W. Carlton

University of Nevada, Las Vegas, carltonp@unlv.nevada.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/sea_fac_articles

Part of the International Relations Commons, Military and Veterans Studies Commons, Military History Commons, and the Near and Middle Eastern Studies Commons

Citation Information
http://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/sea_fac_articles/404

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Public Policy and Leadership at Digital Scholarship@UNLV. It has been accepted for inclusion in Public Policy and Leadership Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Digital Scholarship@UNLV. For more information, please contact digitalscholarship@unlv.edu.
"The role that was played by Civil Affairs ... needs to be explained and better understood by the American people. This includes the manner in which planning was accomplished for Kuwait reconstitution."\(^1\)

Civil Affairs forces have been part of the Army inventory since World War II, where they served well and faithfully, usually performing the doctrinal mission of civil administration in occupied Europe and in Japan. Since that time, however, utilization of the CA capability has languished, being relegated primarily to the U. S. Army Reserve and seldom allowed to participate in military pre- or post-conflict planning.

During the 1970's, under the auspices of the CAPSTONE program, relationships were established between Reserve Component (RC) CA units and a variety of Active Component (AC) organizations, but these relationships, intended to foster training, mutual understanding, and increased opportunity for CA utilization, were in some cases only incompletely implemented by the time Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM was initiated in August, 1990.

Most important to the Kuwait scenario was the status of the CAPSTONE relationship between the 352nd Civil Affairs Command, Riverdale, MD, and Headquarters, Central Command (USCENTCOM). Speaking plainly, the relationship was incompletely developed and less than totally satisfactory, both from the perspective of CENTCOM staff officers, who

---

had reservations about the capabilities of the 352nd, and from the point of view of the members of the 352nd, who felt that CENTCOM was not utilizing their resources and talent in an altogether appropriate manner.\(^2\) When DESERT SHIELD commenced, no plans had been developed for the restoration of Kuwait or for utilization of the 352nd in the effort.

The attack on Kuwait by Saddam Hussein's Iraqi forces stunned the world. Most analysts at the Department of State and within the international diplomatic community had rejected that idea that one Arab nation would attack another, despite the festering Kuwaiti-Iraqi dispute over Rumaila oil field production, and Saddam Hussein's claims that Kuwait was conspiring with the U. S. and Israel to "sabotage Iraq." At the May 1990 Arab League Summit in Baghdad, Saddam sought payment of $27 billion from Kuwait, claiming that the Kuwaitis had been stealing Iraqi oil. In June he demanded that Kuwait and other Arab states bordering the Persian Gulf cut production in an attempt to drive up the price per barrel of crude oil.\(^3\) Saddam's increasingly belligerent attitude toward Kuwait was emphasized by ever-larger troop movements of an unusual kind beginning on 17 July 1990. By the end of the month he had stationed 100,000 troops along the Kuwaiti border.

---

\(^2\) The 352nd, located near Washington, D.C., has long had the reputation of being highly "politicized" in personnel, attitude, and action. Drawn from the ranks of the government service and those industries dependent upon the government for their well-being, the personnel of the 352nd tend to be "well-connected" on Capitol Hill. Over the past two decades loyal unit members have not hesitated to use these connections on behalf of the Command. Furthermore, there exists a well-developed and intensely loyal group of "alumni" of the 352nd, composed of retired officers and enlisted personnel, who have on numerous occasions lobbied vigorously on behalf of the Command. This situation has not endeared the 352nd to members of the active military establishment, many of whom have felt the wrath of the CA "lobby" in matters viewed as detrimental to the Branch. As an example of the influence exercised by the alumni group, it is well-known within the community that a close connection exists between the senior Senator from South Carolina, and the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Civil Affairs Association.


Kuwait and Iraq had been in constant political conflict since the creation of the former in 1961. A few days after independence was granted by Great Britain, Iraqi General Qassim claimed Kuwait as Iraqi territory. The Iraqi threat to Kuwait persisted over the next several decades. Hazem Beblawi, The Arab Gulf Economy in a Turbulent Age (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1974), p.173.
On 1 August, the Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, briefed Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney on the likelihood of an Iraqi attack on Kuwait. Shortly after General Schwarzkopf returned to Tampa, he received word that the invasion had begun.4

On 8 August 1990, President George Bush stated in a speech to the nation that the U. S. sought "...immediate, unconditional, and complete withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait...[and that]...Kuwait's legitimate government must be restored to replace the puppet regime...."5 This speech triggered immediate Civil Affairs planning efforts on the part of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (OASD SO/LIC), OSD's CA proponent.6 By 14 August 1990, the Hon. Jim Locher III, the ASD, had been presented an information paper dealing with various CA issues. Among these were: DoD's potential role in the reconstitution of the government of Kuwait (GOK) and the need to explore with Department of State plans for support of the GOK; the need to provide cultural orientation for U. S. forces being inserted into that region and to minimize contacts between Americans and the local populace of Saudi Arabia, an exceptionally conservative society; and the requirement that U. S. forces be prepared to help multi-national force commanders lacking CA capabilities in meeting

4 H. Norman Schwarzkopf, It Doesn't Take a Hero (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), pp. 293-5. General Schwarzkopf indicated that the CENTCOM intelligence organization was functioning flawlessly, and that his information regularly exceeded in quality that being provided by Defense Intelligence Agency, in Washington, D.C. Cited hereafter as "Hero".


6 In point of fact, OASD SO/LIC has legal responsibility for CA initiatives only insofar as they relate to special operations. For conventional operations, no proponent at DoD level has been designated. Nevertheless, given the modest level of attention and support traditionally devoted to CA by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Department of the Army, it was logical that SO/LIC, as a concerned party, initiate action. As has so often been said, "Power abhors a vacuum".
their legal and moral obligations under international law. This paper recommended that
the ASD send a memo to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) recommending
activation of the Joint Civil Affairs Committee (JCAC). 7 The draft of this memorandum,
staffed informally with the Joint Staff, was ultimately responded to by the Director of the
Joint Staff. (DJS).

The JCAC, chartered to serve as an advisory committee to the Chairman, JCS, in the
formulation of CA policy, had never been activated. Activation appeared clearly to be in
the best interests of DoD, since the absence of such an instrumentality left the Joint Staff
with inadequate CA policy-development capability. After several days, the DJS indicated
in a handwritten note to the ASD that he did not consider activation of the JCAC
appropriate at that time. 8 This left the ASD SO/LIC to his own devices in surfacing CA
policy issues within DoD. Fortunately, both he, individually, and his staff members were
highly proactive and dedicated to appropriate CA utilization in this emergency. They
continued to "percolate up" issues and suggestions relating to CA policy through the Office
of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, (DUSD-P), Mr. Paul Wolfowitz, during
the next several months, attempting to influence CA involvement to the greatest extent

---

7 LTC Paul Mikesh, "Read Ahead Paper for the Civil Affairs Symposium" (Draft), dated 30 September 1991, pp.1-2. A revised version of this paper was printed in the Proceedings. Cited hereafter as "Draft Read Ahead Paper."

8 The Director, Joint Staff, LTG Michael Carns, appears to have been reacting negatively to "civilian" (DoD) attempts to influence military (JCS) affairs. Such a response was not unusual. The author became aware of such sensitivities during his period of service with the Joint Staff. LTG Carns also suggested in his response a lack of understanding of CA capabilities and possible missions as they related to the Kuwait situation. This response served to deprive the Chairman of high-quality CA advice on a regular basis. His senior CA person was a Lieutenant Colonel, Dennis C. Barlow, an action officer in the Operations Directorate. Barlow was unable to gain regular access to the Chairman or Director, Joint Staff throughout the war. This was most unfortunate since he is a competent and well-informed individual, and could have been of immense help. As it was, Barlow spent extensive periods of time trying to "percolate up" ideas concerning CA operations and capabilities as they influenced the war. Such organizational shortcomings significantly degraded the Joint Staff's understanding of, and ability to respond to, CA-related issues.
possible. An outside observer watching the ebb and flow of these events would have, undoubtedly, been perplexed at the spectacle of the home service, the U. S. Army, as well as the Joint Staff, exhibiting little apparent interest in the enormously complex CA missions associated with this crisis. As it turned out external forces generated sufficient pressure to insure appropriate action.

In September, 1990, the exiled GOK dispatched a team of twenty specialists to Washington to establish a reconstruction planning structure. The GOK planned to utilize funds on deposit in foreign banks to restore the rightful government as soon as the Iraqis could be ejected from their country. Mr. Fawzi Al Sultan, assigned to lead the team, planned to involve the United States heavily in the restoration and reconstruction effort. Mr. Al Sultan and his colleagues were soon apprised of the presence of the USAR Civil Affairs capability.

---

9 Doctrinally, the Joint Staff was supposed to request broad policy guidance on CA from the SECDEF. No such request was ever made. By October, 1990, ASD SO/LIC had developed draft policy guidance to be offered to CICS. It was never transmitted, however.

10 CA proponenty on the Army Staff rests in DAMO-OD, the Civil Affairs Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Headquarters, Department of the Army. This tiny organization was not known for its proactive stance in matters pertaining to the mobilization of CA units and personnel for Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM. Indeed, those associated with the Division were viewed by some within the CA community as obstructionist in posture, a peculiar stance for the entity charged with promotion of the CA cause within the Army. The writer was told of an instance in which one Joint Staff officer, perplexed by the negative attitudes being displayed by a CA Branch representative, commented that this person was 'like a used car salesman who didn't want to sell his cars.' (Interview by the writer with Colonel Thomas A. Timmes, Chief, PSYOP and Civil Affairs Branch, The Joint Staff, 10 June 1991.)

11 Fawzi Al Sultan was an official with the World Bank, who reported directly to the Crown Prince and the Emir of Kuwait. He was not directly accountable to the Kuwaiti Ambassador to the United States, Saud Nasir Al-Sabah. As weeks passed, tensions arose between these two strong personalities with the result that, in mid-December, 1990, Mr. Al Sultan was called home for consultation and replaced by Ibrahim Shaheen, who carried on the work of the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Program (KERP).

Elliott states: "A man of considerable intellect and absolute character, Shaheen brought his formidable integrity, knowledge of current Kuwaiti politics and understanding of Americans ... to the table. When Shaheen took over, there was immediate integration of the US-Kuwait effort ..." (Randall T. Elliott, "The Kuwaiti (sic) Task Force". Read ahead paper for CA Symposium, 3 October 1991, p. 5.) Cited hereafter as "KTF."
As it happened, Colonel Randall Elliott, a Reserve officer assigned to the 352nd CA Command, also held a middle management position within the Department of State. Furthermore, he was acquainted with Ambassador-designate Edward (Skip) Gnehm, who was then in Washington awaiting confirmation and deployment to Kuwait. Elliott foresaw the appropriateness of Civil Affairs involvement in Kuwaiti reconstruction and, apparently not trusting normal bureaucratic processes within the military establishment, called the matter to the attention of various State Department officials, including Ambassador Gnehm. Gnehm saw the potential for such an arrangement and discussed the matter with Ambassador Al-Sabah and the Kuwaiti delegation, who were immediately receptive to the idea of involving CA personnel. State passed the request to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, the Hon. Henry S. Rowan, who made arrangements through the Director of the Joint Staff for a briefing on Civil Affairs capabilities.

OASD SO/LIC had not been idle during this period. Staff officers had been awaiting the results of a preliminary on-ground CA assessment being conducted by an early-deploying
team from the the 96th CA Bn, the only active component CA unit. The message, received on 3 September, convinced SO/LIC that the battalion was "... operating beyond its capability and was not able to conduct an adequate assessment of this magnitude. The message also ... confirmed our suspicions that CENTCOM was ill-prepared to conduct CA operations." It was feared that ARCENT (the Army component of CENTCOM) was heading toward the creation of "... another 'ad hoc' CA organization ..." similar to the one that had been deployed in Operation JUST CAUSE with less than optimal results.16

This development generated a flurry of activity between SO/LIC and the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs on the topic of potential Civil Affairs missions in the CENTCOM AO. Shortly thereafter, a briefing was set up for the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Program (KERP) representatives in Washington. The stage was being set for the temporary removal of Command and Control of the CA assistance program from regular military channels.

The briefing was given on 4 October 1990 by the senior CA officer on the Joint Staff, Lieutenant Colonel Dennis Barlow, from the Psychological Operations/Civil Affairs Branch of the Directorate for Current Operations (J-33). LTC Barlow addressed an audience which

---

15 There were 37 Civil Affairs units within the Army structure at the time DESERT SHIELD began. Thirty-six of these were assigned to the U.S. Army Reserve and one to the Active Component. These units include a total of 4822 personnel of all grades. Civil Affairs is a branch of the Army, comparable in many respects to Military Intelligence or Military Police, but restricted to the U.S. Army Reserve. USAR officers and enlisted personnel assigned to CA wear a distinctive branch insignia. Active component officers assigned to CA are not assigned to the Branch but are eligible for a CA specialty designator and skill code.

16 Mikesh, Draft Read Ahead Paper, Sept. 30, 1991, p. 3. The assessment, received in message dtd 031957Z Sep 90, suggested three critical CA missions: Identification and acquisition of host nation support (HNS); development of CA guidance; and planning for follow-on operations. The message indicated that the addition of 20 personnel would enable the 96th Bn "... to meet immediate needs." The message did indicate that, as the theater matured, there would be a need for the addition of RC units. Nevertheless, it was SO/LIC's assessment that the 96th team did not fully grasp the CA mission potential. Part of the problem lay in the fact that the 96th Bn is configured as a Direct Support unit, often characterized as "the fire brigade" among CA units. The personnel assigned to that organization often have a limited understanding of the organization and operational capabilities of an RC Civil Affairs unit, having never been assigned to such organizations.
included Ambassador Gnehm; Lieutenant General Tom Kelly, (the J-3); Mr. Fawzi Al Sultan, Coordinator of the Kuwaiti Team; Mr. Sulayman Abd al-Razaq Mutawa, the Kuwaiti Minister of Planning; and Shaykh ‘Ali Khalifa al-Sabah, the Kuwaiti Minister of Finance. LTC Barlow’s briefing was well received by the Kuwaiti representatives, who inquired as to how a request for Civil Affairs assistance could be initiated. The response by U. S. representatives suggested the appropriateness of having the Kuwaiti Ambassador address a letter to President Bush requesting such aid. This letter was forthcoming on 9 October 1990.  

It stated, in part:

In violation of international law and norms of conduct between sovereign nations, you are aware of the aggression carried out by Iraq against ... Kuwait. ... We call upon the friendship and assistance of ... the United States ... in putting together an emergency and recovery program. More specifically, we have ... need for certain specialties and expertise resident, among other U. S. agencies, in the United States Department of Defense."  

On 19 October, 1990, Mr. Locher, the ASD SO/LIC attended the Deputies Committee meeting, during which the decision was made to provide advice and assistance to Kuwait in their restoration planning efforts. In the interests of time and efficiency, the National Security Council (NSC) recommended that DOS, OSD and JCS establish a steering committee to make the necessary arrangements, with ISA taking the lead for DoD. Mr.

---

17 The respondent was Mr. Sam Routson, Director of Mission Activities for ASD/SOLIC, who volunteered to assist in the drafting of the letter. His request being accepted, Routson prepared the initial draft of the letter eventually sent. Since the meeting was under the sponsorship of the Asst. Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Mr. Routson’s actions elicited some astonishment on the part of others present, who felt his offer to be inappropriate under the circumstances. Nevertheless, Routson’s action energized the process, with great success.

18 Saud Nasir Al-Sabah, KEA/270/90, Letter dated October 9, 1990, pp. 1-2. As mentioned above, Mr. Sam Routson, Director of Mission Activities at SO/LIC, "coached" the Kuwaitis in the preparation of the letter.

19 The Deputies Committee is in the National Security Council Chain of Command. The rank progression from more to less senior is as follows: National Security Council, composed of the President, Vice-President, SECSTATE and SECDEF; the Principals’ Committee, composed of SECSTATE, SECDEF, Director of Central Intelligence, Chairman and Vice-Chairman of JCS, the National Security Advisor and the White House Chief of Staff; the Deputies Committee, composed of representatives from NSC, DoD, DOS, CIA, and JCS.
Rowan quickly issued a set of draft terms of reference (TOR) and circulated them for comment to JCS. In addition, Rowan asked that a military service be designated executive agent for the project and that appropriately qualified personnel be assigned to the various working committees specified in the TOR.²⁰

The TOR specified that the U. S. would have, as its objective, the provision of assistance to the legitimate Government of Kuwait in the planning of governmental restoration efforts to be implemented upon the withdrawal of Iraqi forces. DOS and OSD were to have joint primary responsibility for development of a civic restoration program, with other departments and agencies being called upon when appropriate. A U. S. Steering Group Committee, chaired by DOS, with representatives from State and DoD, was to oversee the planning effort. A U. S.-Kuwait Committee on Emergency and Recovery Programs was to be formed, consisting of the U. S. Steering Group Committee and representatives of the Kuwaiti Government in exile. Planning was to be undertaken in the twenty Civil Affairs functional areas, with working committees for each area established as appropriate. The GOK was to execute all contracts for services and equipment with civilian firms. The U. S. government was to be allowed to request reimbursement for the cost of various services rendered. Twice-monthly reports were to be submitted to representatives of DOS, OSD, JCS, the NSC, and CENTCOM.²¹ The terms of reference were approved

²⁰ Mikesh, "Draft Read Ahead", p.4. Mikesh points out that, initially, OASD (SO/LIC) was not invited to participate in the work of the Steering Group Committee as it oversaw DoD's role in providing assistance to the GOK. BG Charles E. Wilhelm, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Missions and Applications, sent a letter to Art Hughes, DASD NESA/ISA on 5 November, calling to his attention the role of OASD (SO/LIC) as functional proponent for CA within DoD, following which representatives from SO/LIC participated in Steering Committee meetings. Thus, regional and functional proponents worked together in harmony during the operation.

²¹ "Terms of Reference--United States Emergency and Reconstruction Assistance to the State of Kuwait," (Draft), November 13, 1990, pp. 1-2. The TOR was prepared by NESA/ISA, and was largely the work of Mr. Fred Smith, of that office.
on 5 November 1990 and working level groups to oversee implementation of the project were established.

During the period 5-15 November 1990, intense debate occurred within the Army and the Joint Staff over: appropriateness of DoD's providing such advice and assistance to the GOK and whether the Army was the right organization to lead the effort. "The Army did not want to get involved in a long-term non-military project which would divert resources from military operations and thought that the reconstruction of Kuwait was a job for the Department of State." In the event that OSD were to get involved, both the Army and the Emergency Planning office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy felt that the mission should be performed by an "ad hoc" group created for that purpose. The Army favored creation of a composite task force composed of representatives from various elements of the force structure (Medical, Military Police, Communications, Engineers, Quartermaster) with augmentation from Civil Affairs, the overall structure to be commanded by an active component general officer. The generally negative tone in Army communications issued throughout the process suggests a lack of confidence in the

---

22 John R. Brinkerhoff, "Waging the War and Winning the Peace: Civil Affairs in the War with Iraq," Washington: Office, Chief of the Army Reserve, August 1991, p. 53. Brinkerhoff indicates that the Army felt it had been "railroaded," not allowed to participate in the decision-making process concerning whether or not assistance should be provided to the Kuwaitis. Their behavior during organizational meetings suggested displeasure with the way in which the whole matter had been handled. Cited hereafter as Waging the War.


capability of the Reserve Component CA units to provide the needed services. Emergency Planning submitted a matrix involving the distribution of responsibilities among twenty-seven departments within the U.S. government. Their paper also suggested the assignment of an officer from the Corps of Engineers to Ambassador Gnehm's staff.

Department of the Army was supported in its concerns by operatives within the Joint Staff, who felt that the Department of State was the proper agency to lead the effort, it being primarily civilian in nature. A good deal of residual sensitivity existed within these organizations, the legacy of the Panama Operation, JUST CAUSE. During that activity DoD had found itself serving as "lead" agency long after the shooting had stopped, inadequately supported by DOS and other agencies of the U.S. government which, it was felt, should have taken political and fiscal responsibility for the restoration of services in that troubled nation. "The Director of the Joint Staff wanted to make certain that this time the Department of State and other U.S. government agencies would participate."

---

24 Having been overruled in the matter of RC CA employment in support of the GOK, staff members within DAMO-ODP, the office charged with CA planning proponency on the Army staff, continued to suggest the inappropriateness of CA utilization. In one memorandum, they stated: "The Army is not structured or resourced, and does not have the ... primary mission to accomplish the full range of the mission contemplated in the Kuwaiti request . . . . Civil Affairs units do not possess material resources or equipment to directly provide physical support to the civil sector." At another point, the memo states: "The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) has extensive expertise and experience in both public works management and disaster recovery operations." (Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, "Military Support in the Civil Restoration of Kuwait," Memorandum dated 24 October 1990, pp. 2-3.) Clearly, the writers felt it more appropriate to pass this action to the Corps, rather than involving the RC CA community. This apparent attempt to "damn with faint praise" drew a sharp response from the Office, Chief Army Reserve, which "nonconcurred with the negative tone of the letter . . . ." (Memorandum from Office, Chief Army Reserve dated 26 October 1990). OCAR went on to strongly defend the utilization of RC CA personnel for the mission.

25 Mikesh, "Draft Read Ahead Paper," pp.4-5. Mikesh indicates that SO/LIC, profiting from the lessons of Operation JUST CAUSE, supported a strong role for CA in pre-hostilities planning, to ensure that the CINC and DoD could function effectively as both a liberating and occupying force in Kuwait and Iraq, if required.

26 Brinkerhoff, "Waging the War," p.53. Fishel states: "...resistance came, initially from the Joint Staff which felt that DoD, and particularly the Army, had been left holding the financial bag for CMO operations in Panama when other government agencies reneged on promises to contribute. (Fishel, "War, Peace, and Civil Military Operations, p.9.)

Elliott states: "The Panama experience had soured some in high places on the costs—who would pay for Civil Affairs efforts—and this issue, as well as involvement of the U.S. Government as a whole, had to be settled."
Because of the Army's hesitance to commit to CA utilization, it was decided within OSD that the Army should not be designated as executive agent for the operation, as would have normally been the case. It was felt that the operation would not be vigorously prosecuted if matters were left to the Army. As can be imagined, this caused considerable embarrassment within Army circles. On 19 November, three assistant secretaries--ISA, SO/LIC, and Reserve Affairs, made a concerted effort to get things moving and on 21 November, after another exasperating last-minute holdup, this one generated by the Director of the Joint Staff, JCS reluctantly approved the formation of the Kuwait Task Force utilizing Civil Affairs soldiers. On 22 November, CJCS sent a message to the Chief of Staff of the Army and CINCSOC requesting activation of elements of the 352nd CA Command. The Kuwait Task Force (KTF) had been created.

It should be noted that during the period 7 August 1990, when Operation DESERT SHIELD commenced, (designated C day in military parlance) until 2 October 1990, General

27 The following excerpts from an Army-generated Memorandum for the Record give a sense of the frustration felt within the organization. "Mr. Fred Smith ... called a meeting of the so-called working group. ... I attended to look out for Army's interests ... The Army and OSD legal experts raised some substantive issues concerning TOR, but were 'blown off'. My perception is that ISA cannot be bothered with anything that threatens progress as they perceive it, that is USARCA soldiers on active duty working with the Kuwaitis, ASAP ... There was much discussion ... over executive agency. However, it appears that the JCS position will be that there is no need for one." (Memorandum entitled "US-Kuwait DoD CA Working Group, dated 7 November 1990.)

28 *When the matter came before the DJS he stated again that the assistance ... was more properly a role for DOS and ... directed that the alert of the 352nd be cancelled. When BGen (Charles) Wilhelm learned of this development he provided Mr. Locher with some background information in preparation for a meeting that evening with the DJS, LTG (M.P.C.) Carns and Mr. Rowen. Both BGen Wilhelm and Mr. Locher believed that this was a doctrinally correct CA mission. Mr. Locher saw CA as the medium for bringing all the resources of the government to bear on the problem ... The meeting concluded with the agreement that the call-up of the 352nd would be restored ... The unit officially reported on December 3rd. (Mikesh, "Draft Read Ahead Paper," p.5.)

29 Message, CJCS, Subject: Restoration of Kuwait, 22 November 1990. Things were moving so rapidly that the KTF had been hard at work for several weeks before President Bush approved the concept of providing assistance to the Kuwaitis, according to Mr. Fred Smith, of ISA.
Schwartzkopf and his planners had been operating on the assumption that their mission was to prevent the invasion of Saudi Arabia, protecting those allies from further incursions by the Iraqis. During that time the world political situation evolved rapidly, as did President Bush's views on appropriate military options. Further, the mood of the American people underwent a steady shift toward a more aggressive posture vis-a-vis Iraq. American and coalition forces in Saudi Arabia had been augmented to such an extent that great confidence existed in the Coalition's ability to repel any attempt at invasion by Saddam Hussein. By the 2nd of October 1990, General Colin Powell, the CJCS, was able to indicate that "... Washington was impatiently awaiting an 'offensive option' from Central Command." On 6 October, General Schwartzkopf directed his planners to assume the availability of an additional armored corps and to begin planning for a massive flanking attack to the West.\(^{30}\)

General Schwartzkopf and his planners have come under heavy criticism in Civil Affairs circles and in some offices within OSD for failing to plan "early and adequately" for proper employment of CA assets in the reestablishment of vital services in Kuwait. While it is true that Commanders are expected to plan for all contingencies, CINCCENT was laboring under serious informational and directional constraints as well as carrying a massive decisional and operational burden. He presents himself in his writings as struggling to understand the rapidly changing political environment and to respond appropriately in a reactive, as opposed to a proactive mode, at least during the early months of DESERT SHIELD. As part of his response CINCCENT worked himself hard. He is reported to have kept a strenuous schedule and to have been exceptionally demanding with his staff.

\(^{30}\) Schwartzkopf, "Hero", p. 354. The General had imported a team of six planning wizards from Fort Leavenworth, KS, to assist the CENTCOM staff. Informally dubbed variously "the Gang of Four" and "the Jeddah Knights," these talented officers had already begun to examine possible offensive options, submitting one plan as early as 6 October 1990.
Because of his extensive exposure to the Middle East, the General viewed himself as something of an expert on the topic. Indeed, he was quite effective in his dealings with his Saudi counterparts. One is struck, however, by his testimony to the effect that he was routinely drawn into the making of decisions that were clearly within the purview of Civil Affairs. General Schwartzkopf speaks, for example, of multiple direct dealings with the Saudis in the areas of religion, sensitivity to local customs and traditions, commercial relations, and other areas of CA concern. Had adequate CA assets been available to him during the early months of DESERT SHIELD, better plans could have been made for operations in Kuwait and better CA-related execution orchestrated for activities in Saudi Arabia. Arguably, such foresight would have reduced the burden on the General himself. Unfortunately, there is no indication that he was aware of or concerned about the employment of CA assets, perhaps because of his lack of knowledge of their capabilities, perhaps because of earlier experiences of a negative nature involving Civil Affairs forces in particular and the Reserve Components in general.31

A former member of the CENTCOM J-5 (Plans and Policy) staff states that the decision not to activate the RC Theater Army Area Command supporting Third Army (ARCENT), "... has been attributed to the Active Component leadership’s evaluation of Reserve Component units’ ability ... combined with the experience of AC leaders in

31 One can speculate that General Schwartzkopf and his senior staff members held the traditional view that CA units are equipped only to engage in civil administration functions of the type exercised during and after WWII. Whatever the reasons behind his behavior, CA was inadequately represented in the area of operations until December, 1990 when advance parties from sixteen RC CA units were called to active duty and deployed to the Gulf, augmenting the 96th CA Bn (AC) and elements of the 3rd and 4th CA Groups, USMC. Schwartzkopf’s comments concerning restoration of services in Kuwait following cessation of hostilities include the following: "We had to bring Kuwait City back to life, which meant repairing and turning on the water supply, electrical power grid, and telephones, helping the police maintain order, ... and a thousand other tasks. And until the UN approved a cease-fire agreement that would permit us to end our occupation, we had to serve as the government of southern Iraq--maintaining order, providing basic services, and caring for the thousands of refugees fleeing from upheavals in the North." (Schwartzkopf, "Hero", pp. 490-91.) In this catalogue of services and functions he discusses many basic CA missions without ever indicating an awareness of the existence of the Civil Affairs Branch, or of the KTF.
training and evaluating . . . the (RC) leadership . . . ." He later references "the apparent
distrust of the Reserve Component leadership and command and control organizations
. . . by the Active Component leadership."³² One can readily imagine the effect of such
widely-held views upon those decisions affecting the activation and deployment of RC Civil
Affairs units during early months of DESERT SHIELD.

CENTCOM’s lack of attention to CA-related issues put the Kuwait Task Force
(KTF) in a peculiar position. Having been placed under the Command and Control of the
Interagency Steering Group Committee, composed of OSD, DOS, and JCS, with nominal
support being supplied by the Department of the Army, the KTF had no formal relationship
with CENTCOM.³³ Consequently, they received almost no information concerning
CENTCOM plans. CENTCOM, in turn, knew relatively little about the KTF’s activities and
intentions.³⁴ This peculiar situation can explained, at least in part, by the fact that the
KTF, working closely with the Kuwaitis, was not authorized access to mission-related

³² Douglas W. Craft, An Operational Analysis of the Persian Gulf War (Carlisle, Pa.: US Army War College
Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), p.54. Craft further comments: "Through its lack of confidence in the Reserve
Component leadership, the Army further demonstrated a lack of confidence in the individuals that form a
powerful segment of the Total Army. Unfortunately, the rifts created by fallout from that decision threaten
to color . . . the development of the future force structure of the Total Army." (p.55). The major struggle taking
place between the AC, USAR and National Guard at the time of this writing (February, 1993) over issues of
force structure and mission suggest the correctness of Craft’s comments.

³³ Brinkerhoff reports that KTF members felt DA, more specifically the Operations Directorate of DCSOPs,
failed to support them adequately. (Brinkerhoff, “Waging the War”, pp.55-56.)

Regarding relationships between the KTF and CENTCOM, it should be noted that a CENTCOM staff
officer, COL Randy Conklin, was appointed to the US-Kuwait Civil Affairs Working Group, a subordinate entity
of the US Steering Group Committee assigned oversight of the KTF. There is no evidence to indicate that
Conklin was active in the working group. (Roster entitled ‘US-Kuwait Civil Affairs Working Group’, no date.)
"Conklin didn’t attend a single meeting after the initial meeting." (Marginal note By LTC Paul Mikesh in
response to draft of this paper.)

Colonel Elliott is of the opinion that COL Conklin placed a low priority on the activities of the KTF. He seemed
disinterested. Elliott provided him a copy of Annex G (Civil Affairs) to the OPORD, but he failed
to forward it to CENTCOM in a timely fashion, with the result that the KTF received a "hot" phone call for
failing to provide the requested document. (Conversation with Colonel Randall Elliott on 2 February 1993.)

³⁴ General Schwartzkopf’s book makes no mention of the KTF, a fact which suggests that he was either
unaware of its existence or that he felt its activities were insufficiently important to discuss in his memoir.
classified information, so far as CENTCOM was concerned. Indeed, CENTCOM worked hard to exclude the coalition members from access to the OPLANs being developed, for fear that the Arabs would compromise the operation prior to execution. Whether justified or not, there was a healthy degree of cynicism concerning the trustworthiness of these allies in classified matters. In addition, at the time the KTF was created, Colonel Elliott had been informed that the KTF would serve as a stateside planning group only—that there were no plans to deploy the group to the AO. Consequently, the KTF was initially structured as a planning cell only. Upon receiving the deployment request from Mr. Robert Kimmitt, of DOS, and the Crown Prince of Kuwait, it was necessary that the KTF reconfigure itself sufficiently to be able to conduct operational missions.

Following a series of "on-again, off-again" alert orders, the KTF was called to active duty on 1 December 1990. The group initially mustered 57 Civil Affairs functional specialists, and eventually reached a strength of 63 officers and enlisted personnel covering a majority of the twenty CA specialties. Most of these personnel had been identified

---

35 As late as January 9, CENTCOM had not informed the coalition partners of the date and time of attack on the Iraqis. Schwartzkopf states: "We were particularly concerned about King Fahd, who made it a practice to discuss everything, including state secrets, openly with his princes." (Schwartzkopf, "Hero", p.408.)

36 This change in mission evolved during COL Elliott's visit to Taif, Saudi Arabia, to brief the Emir and Crown Prince on KTF activities. Upon his return to Washington on 18 January, 1991, Elliott directed the KTF to prepare to deploy within ten days. The team arrived in Dharhan, Saudi Arabia, on 31 January 1991.

37 15 November 1990--USACAPOC calls saying that portions of unit will be activated; 17 November--USASOC calls stating that unit is alerted for mobilization; 18 November--USACAPOC calls to cancel the activation; 20 November--BG Mooney receives a call informing him that a portion of the unit will be activated, details to follow; later that day (20 Nov 1990) mission was canceled and personnel ordered to stand down; 21 November--USACAPOC notifies 352nd that 50-60 personnel would be activated on 1 December 1990. The official notification of mobilization was received on 29 November, 1990. The confusion engendered within the 352nd CA Cmd was considerable.
through use of a newly established and computerized CA Skills Data Base and were drawn from throughout the 352nd CA Command's CAPSTONE trace.\(^{38}\)

When the KTF was called to active duty, Brigadier General Howard T. Mooney was listed as Commander. New to CA, he was an experienced logistian and transportation officer, skills that were ultimately to stand him in good stead in the Persian Gulf. Activated on 1 December 1990, he was released from active duty on 3 December, having been informed that the Department of the Army would not validate his call up. He had no further official connection with the KTF until his arrival in Saudi Arabia in January, 1991. His Task Force deputy, Colonel Randall Elliott, became director of the KTF and served in that capacity for the duration.\(^{39}\)

Reporting to Washington, D.C. after a brief period of administrative in-processing at Ft. Meade, Md., the KTF sought to locate its own office space and to procure furniture, both tasks being quickly accomplished with the assistance of the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers and the General Services Administration. Office

\(^{38}\) The final 7 personnel assigned to the KTF were designated by USACAPOC and included a number of specialties not found within the CA Community. These included: Explosive Ordnance Disposal specialist and Military Police Officer, among others.

Elliott states: "The CA Skills DB . . . was ready to use in the summer of 1990. This invaluable tool let those who organized the KTF view the entire 352d and the units it commanded to search for specific civilian skills to complement the military skills of civil affairs personnel." (Elliott, "Brief History", p.4.)

\(^{39}\) BG Joseph Hurteau was given the sensitive task of informing BG Mooney about the reversal of his call-up, which was a source of great embarrassment to BG Mooney. One of the explanations given was that Mooney's activation would have resulted in exceeding the authorized ceiling for general officers serving on active duty at any time, a matter of ongoing concern throughout the war. It should be pointed out that exceptions to policy were made, however, as in the case of BG Donald Campbell, called up in April, 1991 and placed on TTAD (Temporary Tour of Active Duty) by exception to policy, along with two other GO's, in June, 1991. Brinkerhoff attributes the reversal in Mooney's call-up to " . . . the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General Gordon Sullivan." All requests for Reserve general officers were to be referred to the Chief of Staff for decision. Apparently, the Army was angered that General Mooney was called up without having first obtained CSA approval. ("Brinkerhoff, "Waging the War", p. 56.) Other sources indicate that BG Mooney was not well received by DA representatives, who took exception to the process by which the KTF had been created and that this fact may have figured in his release from duty.
equipment was furnished by Department of the Army. The KTF moved into leased space three blocks from the offices of the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Program (KERP), a convenient arrangement, and commenced assisting the Kuwaiti team with the business of planning for the eventual restoration of that unfortunate nation.

Elliott structured the work to be completed into four phases: 1--Task organizing; 2--Initial estimate and scope of work; 3--First draft of plans; 4--OPLAN (Annex G) completion; preparation for deployment. Organizational planning presented the KTF with special challenges, since no one could predict with certainty what conditions would exist within Kuwait after the Iraqis withdrew. Consequently, the KTF initially attempted to develop restoration matrices predicated upon varying degrees of destruction. This proving to be an unworkable approach, they soon shifted to a "worst case" scenario, operating on the assumption that lesser degrees of destruction could be readily managed under such a planning approach. The Kuwaitis, having been in the U. S. for several months, had already initiated the contracting process on a limited basis. The KTF immediately joined the process, providing advice and assistance, doing research on potential contractors and

---

40 Elliott reports: "The Army Operations Center had been initially tasked as the support agency for the KTF. However, the AOC was not in position to offer any support and indeed turned out to be critical of the support that the KTF acquired on its own. The Corps of Engineers (COE), however, offered to assist and a building . . . was located." (Elliott, "KTF", p. 3.

Another member of the KTF reports that the Task Force received assistance from the Office of the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army, Mr. Milt Hamilton, indicating that this was a normal and appropriate mission for that office. Apparently, it is reported, the leadership of the KTF was initially unaware of the availability of this administrative support and, consequently, proceeded to make their own arrangements to obtain what they needed to get started. This lack of understanding of standard operating procedures probably contributed to the confusion surrounding the initiation of operations. (From a conversation with LTC Dave Mitchell, former member of the KTF, on January 19, 1993.)

There appear to have been some feelings of ill-will between members of the Army Staff and the KTF. Brinkerhoff states that "Some DA officials thought the KTF officers had a superior and arrogant attitude, 'were forgetting that they wore green suits', and were getting big heads from consorting with ministers and high-level officials." (Brinkerhoff, "Waging the War", p. 56.)

41 Elliott, "KTF", p. 3.
providing lists of such organizations to the Kuwaiti team, and serving as a support structure for the KERP. It was made clear from the outset that the Kuwaitis would negotiate and sign all contracts—not the KTF—the members of which served as "honest brokers" throughout the process. Ultimately, the Kuwaitis concluded 271 contracts worth approximately $685 million during the life of the KTF.42 Most of these were for such things as food, water, medicine, power generation, emergency communications, uniforms, and vehicles. In line with U. S. desires that the Kuwaitis "buy American" wherever feasible, over 80% of the total dollar value of all contracts concluded was with U. S. firms.43 It was during this stage of operations that the KTF, sensing that the Kuwaitis had almost no experience in planning a recovery of this magnitude, arranged for representatives of the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers (COE) and of other federal agencies to brief the Kuwaiti governmental representatives. From these briefings sprang the ultimate agreement that the COE should play a major role in the restoration process.44

In addition to contractual services, the KTF became involved in the question of protection of the human rights of Palestinians and other third-party nationals. In the case of the Palestinians, stories of collusion with the Iraqis were filtering out of Kuwait, along with horrifying stories of atrocities against Kuwaiti citizens.45 In keeping with time-

42 Elliott, "KTF", p. 3. In "Brief History", p. 7, Elliott places the figure at $785 million.

43 Elliott, "KTF", pp. 3-4. "All CA personnel had been informed of the necessity to avoid conflicts of interest in contractual matters. According to one high official, the CA personnel were trusted by the Kuwaitis to give objective advice .... the Kuwaitis did not trust many of the other Americans beating at their doors for lucrative contracts. The GOK is most appreciative of the honest and objective work done by the KTF .... " (Brinkerhoff, "Waging the War", p. 58.)

44 Elliott, "KTF", p. 5. The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and the Federal Emergency Management Administration both conducted useful briefings for the GOK team during this period.

45 Message traffic examined by the author during his assignment with the Joint Staff was full of heart-rending stories of murder, torture, and rape aimed at men, women and children. They were disturbing, to say the least, and offered extreme provocation to members of the Kuwaiti government in exile.
honored cultural traditions, the Kuwaitis planned to exact retribution from these malefactors. The KTF, upon becoming aware of these intentions, began an organized campaign of written and oral communication designed to dissuade the Kuwaitis from their intent, arguing that such behavior was unacceptable to the U. S. government and would be embarrassing in the extreme. U. S. human rights policies were included in all agreements concluded with the Kuwaitis. Ambassador Gnehm joined the discussion, repeatedly making these same arguments with the GOK. The impact of this persuasion upon the situation that developed in Kuwait City after the Coalition forces reoccupied it was positive. Elliott states that "... the KTF made a difference... The physical presence of KTF personnel in Hawally (the major Palestinian neighborhood) and physical intervention by KTF personnel had a calming effect. We remain convinced that there were no officially sponsored or sanctioned acts of violence."  

Another function performed by the KTF was the preparation of a Civil Affairs Annex to Third U. S. Army's (ARCENT's) OPLAN. Work was undertaken beginning on 25 December 1990, and a draft was completed by early January, 1991. Unfortunately, aforementioned OPSEC considerations, coupled with the fact that the KTF was not at that

---

46 "... as early as mid-December 1990 (we) realized the potential for massive human rights abuses... following liberation. Members of the Kuwaiti government... began making threatening comments about Kuwaiti-Palestinians who they perceived collectively as Iraqi collaborators. One... official in providing us with a population estimate... to compute food requirements deleted the half million Palestinians in Kuwait. When asked why... he replied, 'Let them eat sand.' In another... conversation another senior official disclosed Kuwaiti plans... to deport immediately 50% of the remaining Palestinians..." (Andrew Natsios, "Preventing Human Rights Abuse in Kuwait", Read ahead paper for "Proceedings", dated October 23, 1991, p. 1.)

47 Elliott, "KTF," p.4. Brinkerhoff states: "Colonel Ronald M. Smith, Chief of the Public Security and Safety Division insisted on strict adherence to due process and maintenance of law and order... While in Kuwait as advisor to the police, he continued to advocate that stance... he personally rescued a Palestinian being mistreated by... the Kuwaiti resistance... (There were several other instances in which US personnel intervened to prevent miscarriages of justice)... There was no blood bath, and most agree that excesses... were much less than might otherwise have occurred if... Smith had not been involved. (Brinkerhoff, "Waging the War", p. 60.)
time subordinate to CENTCOM or ARCENT, prevented the degree of interorganizational coordination necessary for the preparation of high-quality strategic plans for CA employment. CCJS, the planning cell for CENTCOM, apparently made no effort to keep the KTF abreast of plans for CMO that were being developed in theater. These focussed on five areas: 1. minimizing interference by and hazard to the civilian population in Saudi Arabia; 2. development of contingency plans for temporary civil authority in occupied areas of southern Iraq; 3. contingency plans for handling dislocated civilians in Kuwait in support of the GOK; 4. emergency and restoration services in Kuwait City and Kuwait; and 5. repatriation of Enemy Prisoners of War.49

At the same time, the KTF was preparing its own Annex G to the ARCENT OPLAN on a parallel and often non-intersecting course. The KTF’s focus was upon long-term restoration of the nation’s infrastructure in cooperation with the Government of Kuwait and the U. S. Country Team, while the ARCENT/CENTCOM plans focussed upon short-term emergency services. These plans would not be compared until the KTF arrived in Kuwait, with the unsurprising result that ARCENT and CENTCOM found the KTF’s early planning efforts to be inappropriate and less than optimally useful.50

---

48 Fishel states that, "...while the KTF did attempt to keep CENTCOM and ARCENT informed about its planning, its efforts in this regard were hardly the central focus of its activity. In short, the relationship between the KTF and the two in-theater headquarters simply was not conducive to achieving unity of effort in strategic, or even operational, planning for CMO. (Fishel, "War, Peace, and Civil Military Operations", p. 13.)


50 Elliott states that "The OPLANS of both senior headquarters had already been completed (by the time the KTF deployed to the AO), so some of the KTF effort was not as useful as it could have been..." "Elliott, "KTF," p. 4.

Fishel states: "Because the KTF was not a CENTCOM asset it was not included in the distribution of the war plans. As a result it did its CMO annex in the dark with respect to what other U.S. plans were articulating. Thus, the annex produced by the KTF had major discontinuities with the CA plans and annexes produced by CENTCOM and ARCENT." (Fishel,"Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue", p. 28.)
In January, 1991, the KTF ceased operations in Washington, D.C., and deployed to Saudi Arabia, arriving on 31 January. The move had been requested by the Emir of Kuwait, with concurrence by the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, Robert Kimmitt, and the Steering Group Committee. Upon arrival in Saudi Arabia, the KTF was reunited with its parent unit, the 352nd CA Command and took up its duties in support of the Kuwaiti ministerial representatives with whom they had been working. There were some initial problems concerning the future role of the KTF, which was operating on the assumption that it would continue to support the Government of Kuwait in its long-term restoration and reconstruction mission. CENTCOM, ARCENT, and the 352nd CA Command, on the other hand, planned to reintegrate the KTF into the regular chain of command and to employ its members in emergency restoration missions. The crux of the matter was whether the KTF as then constituted would continue to exist and, if so, to whom that structure would report.\textsuperscript{51} It should be pointed out that message traffic received prior to its deployment had suggested new organizational arrangements which would have, in effect, dismantled the

\textsuperscript{51} Fishel describes the initial meeting between elements of the KTF and CCJ5 as follows: "Its initial encounter . . . was rocky, to say the least. The KTF leadership was concerned that the organization would be broken up as soon as CENTCOM gained control over it, while CENTCOM . . . (planned to) do everything necessary to establish that the KTF no longer was an independent planning entity . . . but rather now was a CENTCOM asset to be used as the CINC saw fit." (Fishel, "Liberation, Occupation and Rescue", p. 23.)

Colonel Ron Smith, traveling with the KTF Advance party, offended Colonel Bob Ward, the Chief of the Pol-Mil Division of CCJ5, who had greeted him at the airport, by demanding aggressively to know what intentions CENTCOM had concerning the break-up of the KTF. This introduction set a negative tone for early interactions between the two organizations. (From an interview with Colonel Ward conducted by the author on 19 November, 1991.)

Brinkerhoff states that "Observers at OSD thought that CENTCOM and ARCENT did not understand what the KTF had been doing and did not want to get involved . . . . The KTF was considered a bunch of Reservists who were trying to get into the act, an extension of OSD and "prima donnas" who were not "military guys." CENTCOM and ARCENT wanted to break up the KTF and use the individuals to augment their own staffs." (Brinkerhoff, "Waging the War", p. 64.)
KTF. The situation was rectified by Ambassador Gnehm, who spoke directly with General Schwartzkopf, seeking continued use of the KTF for the recovery and reconstruction mission. The result was a compromise arrangement, in which a handful of KTF officers were assigned to the performance of liaison duties at ARCENT and CENTCOM, while the main body continued to plan with the Kuwaitis. Their emphasis shifted at this point from long-term reconstruction to the emergency restoration of services, in line with CENTCOM's immediate requirements. They focussed their attention on the provision of food, water, medical care, sanitation, transportation, telecommunications, and electric power.

Upon deployment to Saudi Arabia, the activities of the KTF became intertwined with those of the larger structure established for the execution of the CA mission. BG Mooney, having arrived in theater on 1 February 1991, was named Commander of the newly created Combined CA Task Force (CCATF). This structure included the KTF, now redesignated

---

52 Message from USCINCCENT 161200Z Jan 91. "The Kuwait Task Force can best support the long-term goals by applying their unique expertise and knowledge of the Kuwaiti government's plans to assist USCENTCOM when directed in providing the initial emergency services to integrate the Kuwaiti government's restoration actions and to ease the transition of civil affairs operations to the government of Kuwait's control. USCENTCOM plans to use the members of the 352nd to create 4 teams to best utilize their skills. One team would remain in Washington, a second team would remain at HQ USCENTCOM. A third team would be deployed to USARCENT. The fourth team would remain with the Kuwaiti government."

53 Elliott, "KTF", p.6. Elliott states that "Col Sadek, the KTF deputy, had identified a key shortcoming in planning--the emergency phase, between combat and when CA forces would be able to start work. As a consequence, the KTF began concentrating on the emergency phase of reconstruction." Ibid.

Colonel Elliott also reported that, upon the KTF's arrival in Kuwait City, a hiatus occurred in the KTF's interface activities with the Kuwaiti ministers, who did not appear in the city for over two weeks following the cease fire. Elliott feels the Kuwaitis were appalled at the extent of the damage, exacerbated by the pall cast by hundreds of oil well fires set by the retreating Iraqis and, consequently, were reluctant to leave Saudi Arabia to commence the process of reconstituting the government. He reports that significant persuasion was required before the ministers appeared in Kuwait City. (From a conversation with Colonel Elliott on 2 Feb 1993.)

54 It had long been planned that BG Mooney would serve as ARCENT G5 upon deployment. Indeed, the Colonel occupying that position, Jim Kerr, recommended this assignment in late January, 1991. ARCENT CG LTG John Yosock decided to name BG Mooney Commander of the CCATF instead. Brinkerhoff says that "General Mooney got the feeling that ARCENT did not know what to do with a Civil Affairs general officer." (Brinkerhoff, "Waging the War", p. 65.)
the DCSREC (Deputy Chief of Staff for Reconstruction), although the name KTF continued to be used by those familiar with its operations. This move was probably designed, at least in part, to ameliorate some of the hard feelings and concerns within ARCENT and CENTCOM over the unusual circumstances surrounding the creation and operations of the KTF up to that time.\textsuperscript{55} The CCATF was, in turn, assigned on 13 February 1991 to Task Force Freedom (TFF), a composite service support unit composed of the CCATF and a Support Command Task Force commanded by the DCG of the 22nd Support Command, BG Kenneth Guest. BG(P) Robert Frix, the DCG of ARCENT, was named Commander of TFF. This arrangement worked very well. As Brinkerhoff stated: "General Frix provided the high level coordination and the clout needed to get resources. General Guest provided the logistical support. General Mooney provided the Civil Affairs know-how."\textsuperscript{56}

The ground war commenced on 24 February 1991 and the CCATF was ordered to Kuwait City. Two KTF assessment teams reached the city on 26 February, with the main body arriving on 1 March 1991. Assessment teams were sent out early that day, performing damage assessments and initiating humanitarian assistance. It was soon determined that the

\textsuperscript{55} The CCATF included, in addition to the KTF, the 431st and 432nd CA Companies, CA elements from the Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian armies, representatives of the US Corps of Engineers, designated the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office (KERO), British Engineers, Explosive Ordnance Detachments from several nations, liaison elements from the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Kuwaiti Red Crescent, and a composite team composed of personnel from USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and AID. Also present were consultants from Intertect, a private consulting firm specializing in disaster relief. The 96th CA Bn (AC) was also assigned to the CCATF, but remained OPCON to ARCENT. ("Combined Civil Affairs Task Force Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM After Action Report, April 1991, p. 5.) Cited hereafter as "CCATF".

\textsuperscript{56} Brinkerhoff, "Waging the War", p.67. It was widely believed that BG Mooney was not assigned a more senior role because he was newly arrived in theater, was a Reservist, and was unknown within the AC community. Furthermore, he had not yet established a strong track record within the CA community, which exhibits parochial attitudes toward outsiders. Mooney was a Transportation and Quartermaster officer who had not previously served in CA. His assignment as Commander, 352nd CA Cmd in 1989 had generated significant controversy within the Civil Affairs community. As it turned out, he performed well and was accorded great credit by CG ARCENT, including temporary Command of TFF and the award of the Legion of Merit. He was also designated to lead the RC marching unit in the DESERT STORM National Victory Parade, held on 8 June 1991, an additional honor.
city was in much better condition than U. S. forces had been led to believe. There was a good deal of water stored in rooftop tanks, food had been stockpiled by the inhabitants, and even the hospitals were operating at minimal levels. The major shortages were in electric power and an ongoing water supply. The Iraqis had destroyed the power generation facilities as part of their hasty withdrawal from the city. Without power, it was not possible to pump water for business or home use. The CCATF pitched in, coordinating with the engineers on restoration of these vital services, with good results. As discussed earlier, CA personnel also participated in the prevention of human rights abuses involving Palestinians and other third country nationals.

KTF personnel, along with other CA personnel in the area, assisted in a variety of others areas: provision of emergency care at a hospital for mentally and physically impaired children; assisting dislocated civilians; restoring the educational infrastructure; assisting in restoration of garbage services and sewage operations; restoring public archives and monuments; supporting the U. S. ambassador and the embassy staff in a variety of tasks; providing advice and assistance on financial and currency issues; clearing unexploded demolitions; assisting in fighting the 729 oil well fires set by the departing Iraqis; and working with the media to provide accurate and current information to all interested parties. The variety of tasks in which the CA community was engaged and the professionalism with which the soldiers performed are immensely impressive.

Over a period of several weeks, the seven functions deemed critical by the KTF and TFF changed in status from "red to green" with the restoration of essential services and availability of additional supplies. It soon became possible to release the tactical CA companies to ARCENT for redeployment to the U. S., beginning on 25 March and

---

57 Elliott, "Brief History", passim.
terminating with the release of the 432nd CA company on 6 April 1991. The KTF was able to revert to its earlier mission, assisting in long-term reconstruction efforts. Task Force Freedom's operations were terminated on 30 April 1991, at which time BG Mooney, who had been named Commander on 15 April, turned over the continued work of reconstruction to MG Patrick J. Kelly, head of the Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office (DRAO), an ad hoc body created from Army assets. Most of the KTF redeployed to CONUS, along with its parent organization, the 352nd CA Command, arriving in the U. S. on 10 May 1991.

The KTF, along with the 352nd CA Command, turned in an excellent performance during the Gulf War. Their prior planning and subsequent execution bore fruit in that Coalition forces were relieved of having to devote large amounts of their resources to the support of the civilian population. The Kuwaiti government contracted for most services, upon the advice of the KTF, and paid the bills promptly. Supplies delivered during the emergency included 2.8 million liters of diesel fuel; 1250 tons of medicine; 12.9 million liters of water; 12,500 metric tons of food; 250 electrical generators; and over 750 vehicles. Thirty-

---

58 The 432nd and 431st, along with the 418th CA Co. and the 354th CA Bde, were redeployed to Southern Turkey/Northern Iraq in April to assist in the Kurdish relief effort, designated Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. They performed magnificently in that role.

59 Brinkerhoff, "Waging the War", pp. 67-68. While the KTF had originally planned to remain in-country for an extended period, assisting with long-term reconstruction, the availability of the Corps of Engineers with its vast experience in such matters convinced all concerned that an early hand-off to DRAO was appropriate. DRAO reported to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and Logistics.

Elliott states that the KTF had expected to remain in-country until September or October, 1991. However, during the first week of June President Bush indicated that he would bring the troops home not later than July. Redeployment orders were cut almost at once. This was not seen as a problem by Elliott, since the Corps of Engineers had, by that time, assumed major responsibilities for the reconstruction effort. Elliott had been a strong proponent of COE involvement from the earliest days. "I knew we would fail if we didn't get the Corps involved", he stated. He indicated that it would not have been possible for a civilian agency to act as "lead agency" during the reconstruction effort, since they would not have been able to operate in a combat zone. (From a conversation with Colonel Elliott on 2 February 1993.)

60 20 members of the 352nd remained behind to assist DRAO until 5 May 1991. 5 persons remained with the 22nd Support Command assisting with Host Nation Support until September, 1991.
five major convoys were operated, involving 1700 vehicles. By the time the KTF and
Task Force Freedom departed, the Ministry of Health had become operational and the
Kuwaiti medical community was carrying 98% of its pre-war workload. The international
airport reopened and the Kuwaitis resumed operational control in April, 1991. Police forces
were operational within the first 30 days following liberation. A major Kuwaiti port was
opened during the first two weeks after liberation, and two others were being swept for
mines. All major roads had been restored to service, with most able to sustain convoy
traffic.

The work that the KTF did contributed to an unprecedented CA mission. The
initiative taken to remove the team from the Command and Control of the Army "plowed
new ground" in utilization of this branch for the purposes of national defense. That the
experiment had to be carried out with only grudging cooperation from Headquarters,
Department of the Army, added to the difficulty of reaching ultimate success, but in no way
detracts from the usefulness of the mission.

The work that the KTF and the 352nd CAC performed received high praise from Mr.
James Locher, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict,
and from Mr. Fred Smith, Director for Near East/South Asia, Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense of International Security Assistance, among others. The Secretary
of the Army, Michael P.W. Stone, wrote, "It is not an exaggeration to say that bringing
Kuwait back to life in the early days following the Iraqi departure would not have been

---

62 Ibid.
63 Interview by the author with Mr. Jim Locher, ASD SO/LIC, on 18 March 1991. Interview by the author
with Mr. Fred Smith, OASD/ISA, on 24 December 1991.
possible without the 352nd. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney wrote, "Your role in U. S. Government assistance to the Government of Kuwait in its reconstruction of that country was exceptional, both for its swiftness and the depth of expertise which you provided. The extraordinary skills resident only in the Reserve Component were absolutely essential to these successes."

Clearly, the KTF constituted a success story, one of which the CA community can be proud in the years to come. The work that it performed helped to establish a pattern for future utilization of military forces in disaster and humanitarian relief efforts. At the beginning of DESERT SHIELD, General Schwartzkopf indicated to Major General W. G. Pagonis that he didn't want "... to win the war and lose the peace." The KTF worked to insure that this did not happen. In great measure, as stated in the motto of the Civil Affairs Branch, they helped to "secure the victory."

---

64 Letter from the Secretary of the Army to MG W.F. Ward, Jr., Chief of the Army Reserve, dated 5 April 1991.


66 Since DESERT SHIELD/STORM and PROVIDE COMFORT (the Kurdish Relief Effort), CA personnel have been employed in the Bangladesh Typhoon Relief effort; the Haitian "boat people" episode; and the Florida hurricane relief effort. U.S. troops have also been employed in a Civil-Military Operations effort in the former Soviet Union and in Somalia. A clear trend toward more military involvement in missions of this type is evident.

67 William G. Pagonis, Moving Mountains (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1992), p. 11. General Pagonis mentions the employment of CA personnel at one point in his book, although he makes no mention of the KTF's activities or of the outstanding work performed in the area of Host Nation Support by the 304th CA Gp (RC), the 96th CA Bn (AC) and by the 3rd and 4th CA Gps, USMCR. This may be accounted for by the fact that the assets of these units were detailed in small cells to various elements of the 22nd SUPCOM, which provided overall logistics support to the theater. Consequently, the visibility of the CA units was much reduced. Pagonis does state that "At the height of the Gulf conflict, the 22nd Support Command drew a full 70-plus percent of its personnel from reserve units; and we're lucky that we were able to do so. . . . They were fully confident in their ability as leaders--and in fact many had been leaders in the private sector--and they accepted broad responsibilities eagerly." p. 101.
AFTERNOTE

An operation of this magnitude draws on the competence and dedication of many persons. As described in the preceding account, any number of senior to junior persons, starting with the President of the United States and ending with sergeants and privates in the various Civil Affairs units, contributed to the miracle that was the Kuwait Task Force. A number of talented civilians within DOD and OSD lent their talents to the success of the operation. Within the uniformed community, however, several key participants demonstrated unusual vision, political acumen, willingness to place themselves at risk, and tenacity. First among these is Colonel Randall T. Elliott, the Director of the KTF. Elliott was the man who, seeing the developing need for assistance of the type ultimately provided, and sensing that the Departments of Army and Defense were unlikely to call upon the Civil Affairs community to provide it, "took his career in his hands" and made the contacts with Ambassador-Designate "Skip" Gnehm necessary to initiate the process that created the KTF. As mentioned earlier, Elliott is a rare combination of intellect, assertiveness and drive, commitment and personal stubbornness. His salesmanship captured the attention of those who could "make things happen," and for this the Nation, DoD, and the CA community are in his debt.68

Within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, LTC Paul Mikesh, the Civil Affairs Action officer, served as a key player throughout the War. Mikesh, an experienced CA Reservist presently serving on an Active Guard and Reserve Tour, monitored the day-to-day activities in CA for his office,

68 Regrettably, Colonel Elliott's relations within the 352nd CA Command deteriorated to the point that he felt it appropriate to leave that unit shortly after the redeployment to CONUS. He presently serves as an Individual Mobilization Augmentee with OASD SO/LIC, in Washington, D.C. He did receive a Bronze Star for his service in the War.
acting as an intelligence-gatherer and "sleeve-tugger" for BG Charles Wilhelm, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Mission Activities. Mikesh sat through endless meetings, deciphered the voluminous message traffic, prepared dozens of memoranda and information papers for BG Wilhelm and Mr. Locher, and interacted constantly with personnel within the Pentagon. LTC Mikesh is largely responsible for making the policy-makers aware of the need for OSD and JCS to proactively assume their roles and for alerting these same decision-makers to the fact that CA assessments being conducted in Saudi Arabia during Fall, 1990, by the 96th CA Bn were insufficient and that planning for CA within ARCENT and CENTCOM was inadequate, at best. LTC Mikesh provided the ammunition used by Mr. Locher and BG Wilhelm in many of the successful battles they fought on behalf of CA and its appropriate utilization during the Gulf War. He is a gifted writer, a man of strong opinions and commitment, strong intellect, excellent political understanding and substantial drive. As in the case of Colonel Elliott, the Nation and the CA community are greatly in his debt.69

LTC Dennis Barlow, then the CA action officer with the PSYOP/Civil Affairs Branch of the Current Operations Directorate, The Joint Staff, was extraordinarily influential in the promotion of CA interests during the Gulf War. As the only trained CA person on the Joint Staff, he was the officer chosen to give the initial informational briefing to the Kuwaitis and, like LTC Mikesh, served on the U. S.-Kuwait Civil Affairs Working Group, a subset of the U. S. Steering Group Committee established to implement the assistance program to the GOK. A brilliant thinker and organizational strategist, Barlow is a powerful speaker and debater and a man of great conviction and integrity. His management of CA deployment orders within JCS, service on numerous committees responsible for CA-related decisions, and constant promotion of the interests of Civil Affairs as it supported national decisions.

69 LTC Mikesh's continues to serve in ASD SO/LIC, an unsung hero of the Persian Gulf War.
priorities was flawless, helping to insure the smooth flow of activities in this important area. 70

These three men, working closely with their superiors, were largely responsible for the success of the KTF mission. Many others, of course, contributed to the process but it was their dedication and hard work that provided the "chemistry" necessary to carry out this difficult and unprecedented mission. They demonstrated the "power of the lowerarchy," the influence that mid-level operatives can have in achieving organizational goals.

70 LTC Barlow was promoted to Colonel, was decorated, and assumed a position as strategic planner with OASD SO/LIC in late 1991.