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The Regime Legitimacy of One-China: How the Vatican Can Make China Whole Again

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THE REGIME LEGITIMACY OF ONE-CHINA: HOW THE VATICAN CAN MAKE CHINA WHOLE AGAIN

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The Regime Legitimacy of One-China: How the Vatican Can Make China Whole Again

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Abstract

Currently, the sovereign state of Vatican City does not formally recognize the People’s Republic of China. Nor does the Vatican recognize the Chinese Communist Party as the legitimate regime over China. Instead the Vatican recognizes the Republic of China on the island of Taiwan. There are 23 countries in the world who share the Vatican’s legitimization of the Republic of Taiwan. The largest concentration of those countries is in heavily Catholic Central America. This thesis looks at the dynamics of the Sino-Vatican relationship in three areas: political tension management of the Chinese people by the CCP, improved relations between the countries of Central America and the People’s Republic of China in the area of formal recognition, and how improved Sino-Vatican relations would aid the reunification of the Republic of China with the Mainland. This thesis finds that improved Sino-Vatican relations would improve the likely-hood of reunification, but there is a limited time frame for improved Sino-Vatican relations to be of benefit to the ruling regime of the Chinese Communist Party.
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Introduction:
The Sino-Vatican Dynamic

The role of the People’s Republic of China in world politics has greatly increased over the last 30 years, and empirical studies of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are just beginning to receive the attention they deserve. One important area of concern in the study of the PRC is the delicate interplay of religion and politics. A good deal of the research in this area, over time, has focused on human rights issues associated with religious freedom. Over the last twenty years however, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has made impressive positive moves in religious tolerance and freedom. These moves have not come close to the religious liberalization of the western world, but they are a far cry from the oppressive conditions that existed during the Cultural Revolution. Because of the tightly controlled and ever-changing state policy concerning religions in the PRC, any study of change in religious activity in China is also a study of CCP politics. Understanding the CCP’s attitudes towards its internal religions and the external influence on them offers a window into CCP thinking and policy.

In order to better understand CCP thinking in the area of its policies on religion, this thesis will examine the dynamics of the relationship between the CCP and the Vatican over the last several years. The overarching theme of this thesis is improved Sino-Vatican relationship should aid the PRC in three particular areas: domestic tension management, improvement of relations with Central America, and isolating Taiwan from the international community. The first proposition to be explored is examining how the CCP has and could use a better relationship with the Vatican in managing internal
political tensions. Theorists such as Inglehart and Welzel (2005), postulate that as the Chinese people become more affluent they will desire more freedoms associated with liberal democracies. This thesis contends that the CCP is unwilling to switch to a completely democratic system, but the CCP may be willing to trade personal freedoms, namely more religious freedom, in order to stave off a liberal western style democracy. The CCP can be a forward-looking political machine and is well aware of the proposed theoretical outcome that lies at the end of the road to modernization. It is the intention of this thesis to show clear evidence that there is a focused effort by the CCP to make allowances for more self-expression by the people of the PRC without ceding political power.

The second proposition that will be examined is how the PRC’s relationship with Central America has changed over the years in regards to official diplomatic recognition. The PRC has been very active in trying to lure the countries of Central America from their diplomatic friendships with the Republic of China on the island of Taiwan. The purpose of the PRC’s efforts is to further isolate the Republic of China so that reunification between the PRC and the Taiwan is inevitable. The PRC has used several strategies to further its goals to include soft power, trade, foreign direct investment, and economic aid. The Vatican is also heavily influential in Central America owing to the large Catholic majority in the region. This thesis contends that if Sino-Vatican relations were to be formalized with diplomatic recognition it would aid the PRC’s efforts in Central America. To clarify, this thesis does not contend that if the Vatican switches its official diplomatic recognition to the PRC the countries of Latin America will do so as well, but rather, if the Vatican switches it will be aspect of soft power that the PRC, and
maybe the Vatican, can use in Central America to weaken the Republic of China’s position there.

The third proposition examined is how improved Sino-Vatican ties, most especially official diplomatic recognition of the PRC by the Vatican, will work to further isolate the Republic of China from the rest of the world. This thesis contends that if the Vatican and the PRC where able to settle their differences and officially recognize each other, it would further isolate the Republic of China and thus lead to a unified singular China. Again, this thesis does not dare to contend that Vatican recognition is the lynchpin which still allows the Republic of China to exist as an autonomous breakaway republic. However, the Vatican may be the most influential state that still officially recognizes the Republic of China. Loosing that recognition would be a crippling blow to further autonomy from the PRC. This, unfortunately, is a difficult measure to make. In country studies, it may be possible to examine data by controlling for the influence of an extra state actor. Here, however, the control would have to be for the extra state actor, a large religious majority, and an influential centralized religious authority. Additionally, Catholicism has always been a policy factor in Central America since the 1700s. There is simply no modern record of any relations with Central America where Catholicism has not had at least some mitigating influence.

The first chapter of this thesis explains China’s path to modernization. Following the presentation of the history of modernization in China it is also necessary to explain the history of Catholicism in China and the current state of Sino-Vatican relations. In the second chapter, this thesis presents an examination of the PRC’s effort at political tension management of its own people through its relations with the Vatican and the Catholic
population of the PRC. The PRC is a large and somewhat unwieldy nation. As the PRC completes its modernization, it is no longer going to be able to control its own people with the authoritarian force that it has in the past. For the first half of its existence, the PRC managed tensions with the people of China through force. If the CCP wishes to remain in power and guide the PRC into the future, it is going to have to develop a new relationship with the Chinese people. As has been stated before, one of the theories underlying this thesis is the idea that the CCP is willing to trade certain religious freedoms in order to maintain its control of China. By improving relations with the Vatican, and thus with its own Catholic minority, the CCP will be able to give increased liberty to the people of China. Additionally, Catholicism in the PRC is most predominant in rural areas where the CCP has less control. By fostering better relations with the Vatican, the CCP could use the Catholic Church as another locus of control in those rural areas of China. Right now the CCP uses the strength of its economy to legitimate its rule over the PRC. In colloquial terms, the force once used by the CCP was the “stick.” Now the booming economy and new wealth is the “carrot.” When, instead of if, the economy begins to slow, this thesis argues that instead of returning to the stick of military backed authoritarianism, the CCP is trying to create a normative system of legitimacy where the CCP legitimates itself by meeting the expectations of the people.

The third chapter examines the relationship between the PRC and the predominantly Catholic countries of Central America where the Vatican has influence. The PRC is a resource-hungry nation, but its needs go beyond food and land. One of the things the PRC desires most are markets for its goods. Central America is a ripe market for PRC trade. The countries of Central America are reasonably accessible to the PRC as
they are just an ocean voyage away. These countries also have experienced improved conditions and economic stability over the last two decades. The countries of Central America are at various stages of modernization themselves, but most have not yet reached the industrialization level of the PRC. Whereas the PRC once reached out to the world for help on its path to modernization, it is now in a position to help others in the same situation. To be sure, this help is not all altruistic. Central America’s proximity to the United States (US) market, as well as Central America’s food production capabilities and cheap labor, make it a very attractive location for Chinese foreign direct investment. However, in Central America only Costa Rica officially recognizes the PRC as the one China (Lum et. al, 2009). Official diplomatic recognition is important to the PRC, and it also matters to the rest of the world. There are several mitigating factors in the policy decision of those Central America countries that still recognize Taiwan over the PRC, but this work shows that establishing formal ties between the Vatican and the PRC will aid the PRC in gaining official diplomatic recognition of all the countries of the Central America.

The fourth chapter will examine how the PRC’s relationship with Central America, the Vatican, and political tension management all come together as part of the reunification of China. In the CCP’s 11th five year plan of 2000 clearly stated the “One-China” goal to reunify Mainland China with Taiwan (CCP White Paper, 2000). The issue of reunification is not a matter of “if” but rather “when.” The democratically elected government of Taiwan has progressively moved closer to agreement with the “One-China” goal (China Post, 09/10/2008). One of the few remaining items of sovereignty that Taiwan can still cling to in maintaining its independence is that of international
recognition. The most powerful country that still recognizes the sovereignty of Taiwan, at least powerful in the soft-power sense, is the Vatican. The Catholic population of Taiwan is not very large. Of the 23 million people in Taiwan, only about 300,000 (1.3%) of them are Catholics. However, out of those 300,000 Catholics, 100,000 are migrant workers from the Philippines (L’Osservatore Roman, 12/2008). Even though the Vatican has supported Taiwan and maintains good relations with it, the Vatican’s recognition of the PRC has more to do with the state of the Catholic Church in the PRC than it has to with the Vatican’s support of Taiwan. The main point of contention between the PRC and the Vatican concerns which power has the authority to appoint bishops in the Chinese Catholic Church. If reconciliation over this matter could be achieved in an equitable fashion to both sides this work predicts, based on the evidence, the Vatican would officially recognize the PRC as the one China.

In the last chapter there is a discussion as to why it would be beneficial for both the Vatican and the PRC to establish formal ties now rather than later. Both countries have much to gain from establishing formal diplomatic relations, but the Vatican has more to lose by waiting. Because of the PRC’s economic power, growing influence on world trade and politics, desire for resources, and almost complete recognition by the world as the “One-China,” the Vatican’s bargaining position on recognition is slowly slipping away. More prominent scholars in the field such as Richard Madsen (2003) and Laura M. Luehrmann (2009) have theorized that the Vatican has the position of dominance in the formalization of relations. It seems that the Vatican did once have the superior position, but that is no longer the case. This is especially true when it comes to gaining the official recognition of the countries of Central America. In the conclusions
section of this thesis there is also a brief discussion as to why it might actually be too late for the Vatican to attempt an equitable reconciliation with the PRC.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has only existed since 1949, but China itself is one of the oldest continuing cultures/states in the world with a cultural and national history stretching back 5,000 years (Taiwan Affairs Office of the PRC, 2000). The PRC is just the latest incarnation of historical China. The confusion of proper names becomes even more problematic when the Republic of China (Taiwan) is added into the discussion. When the Guómíndǎng Nationalist fled Mainland China (yet another name for the PRC) to the Island of Taiwan, it in essence created two Chinas. The issue of two Chinas is a major focus of this thesis as the majority of the nations of the world since 1949 have recognized the People’s Republic of China, also known as Mainland China, also known as Communist China as the one true China instead of the Republic of China on the island of Taiwan. There are, however, twenty-three countries which still recognize Taiwan as the true China. The Vatican is perhaps the most powerful of these countries. The largest concentration of countries, both geographically and population wise, are located in Central America. There are an equal number of countries in the Caribbean and Oceania that also recognize Taiwan, but Central America is by far Taiwan’s largest power block of diplomatically friendly nations left in the world. In order to stave off the confusion that can arise from trying to conceptualize three Chinas a clear definition is needed. For the purposes of this thesis, The People’s Republic of China (PRC) will be used when discussing the territorial nation of mainland, communist China which has existed since 1949. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will be used to describe the decision making and legislative body of the PRC. China itself will be used to describe the
historical, cultural nation of China, and the Republic of China will be referred to as Taiwan.

One of the key points of political statecraft dealt with in this thesis is formal diplomatic recognition of one state by another. Since the Chinese Communist came to power in 1949, there have technically been two Chinese nations, the People’s Republic of China on the Mainland and the Republic of China on the island of Taiwan. Both have their own separate governments, and those governments have both claimed over the last 60 years to be the only legitimate regime of China. How a government is legitimated on the world stage is through official diplomatic recognition by the governments of other nation/states. It is recognition of sovereignty as set out in the Montevideo Convention of 1933. When a state is legitimated by recognition it can participate in international conventions and agreements. Without legitimacy, a state runs the risk of becoming an international pariah unable to trade or deal equitably with other nation/states. After the revolution, the communist took over Mainland China and Guómíndâng Nationalist were forced off the mainland and had to continue their Nationalist government on the island of Taiwan. Since that time both have been officially recognized by the other nations of the world. However, because both claimed to be the one true legitimate government of China, foreign states had to diplomatically recognize either one of the other, but never both at the same time. At present, 169 nation/states recognize the People’s Republic of China and the one Chine, while only 23 nation/states still recognize the regime on Taiwan as the legitimate ruler of China. Out of those 23 nations, one is the Vatican and six are in Central America (Rich, 2009).
Studying China requires an application of Weber’s term Wertfrei (value free). American researcher have to pay particular attention to removing westernized cultural biases and observe China coldly and rationally in its own context (Grasso, 2009.ix). The PRC seems to be completely devoted to western modern capitalism that has little association with classical socialism. The CCP would disagree. There is a famous Chinese axiom used by many CCP officials which explains how socialist China can embrace capitalism so easily. “It doesn’t matter if the cat is black or white as long as it catches the mouse” (Vogel, 2011:391). This saying is perhaps best in explaining the pragmatism of the CCP in its adopting of capitalist market practices, and for that reason it will be used continually throughout this thesis in regards to what is apparently an unabashed embracing of capitalism. The CCP is utilizing market capitalism in order to create the modernization and capital required to fund a socialist state.

This thesis also deals with a conundrum in researching the Vatican. In the study of International Relations, should the Vatican be studied as a sovereign state, or as an international religion? Vatican City State was created in 1929 as a recognized independent state under international law. The Holy See is the title given to the state functioning government of the Vatican and it is the supreme governing body of Vatican City State. The Holy See is made up of the Pope, who is the supreme leader, and his advisors. The Vatican maintains official diplomatic relations with 176 members of the United Nations, and has over a hundred permanent diplomatic missions in other nations (U.S. Department of State, 2011). The PRC negotiates with the Holy See as a sovereign state and not as a borderless religion. The Holy See acts as a sovereign state on the
international stage when it deals with other nations. However, the Vatican’s religious imperatives cannot be discounted.

Even though the Holy See is the governing body of the Vatican City state and the Vatican is the governing body of the Catholic religion, they are the same institution. As Richard Madsen points out (2003) the Vatican is genuinely concerned for the religious wellbeing of people’s souls. This cannot be discounted, and must be factored into the international actions of the Holy See. When the Holy See negotiates with the PRC, it is negotiating the ability to save souls in China. The CCP is an atheist institution. There is evidence to suggest that many members of the CCP do hold religious beliefs even though party members must affirm their atheist beliefs (Associated Press, 12/19/2011), but those religious beliefs are eastern beliefs and far from the narrative and doctrine espoused in Judeo-Christianity. Additionally, Roman Catholicism is an alien religion in China, and one that has been associated with western imperialism (Bays, 2004:29). Even though Catholicism has had a toehold in China since the time of Matteo Ricci (1552-1610), it is most often associated with the subjugation of China after the Opium Wars of the mid-1800s (Kaey, 2009:412; Rozman, 1981:33-46). As will be explained later, the points of contention that still remain in Sino-Vatican relations concern religious traditions that the Vatican holds sacrosanct, but the CCP sees as intrusion on state sovereignty.

For these reasons the Holy See will be researched and discussed as the Vatican. This might seem like a matter of semantics, but it does hold a significant meaning. When policies and negotiations are issued from Rome, they serve the purposes of the Holy Roman Church and the Catholic religion. Even though the Holy See is a viable state, it acts like no other state in the world. The Holy See is not concerned with beneficial trade
deals or internal border security. Instead it is concerned with saving souls. The Vatican is not a state using religion to further its Realist goals. Instead it is a religion using its status as a nation/state to spread and protect Catholicism. However, as has been mentioned, the CCP does not afford the Vatican any special status for its religious beliefs. To the CCP the Vatican is just another state (Sisci, 2009). And that attitude must be accounted for when conducting research on CCP policy decision concerning Sino-Vatican relations.
Chapter 1

Where is China today: Chinese Modernization and Catholicism

Much modern academic scholarship on China views the rise of the PRC as a traditional case of modernization, but Chinese modernization is different than the modernization path which dominated in the West. Western modernization theory links socioeconomic development with coherent and somewhat predictable cultural and political changes (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005:19). Modernization requires industrialization as the jumping off point in the creation a modern state. Inglehart and Welzel claim that industrialization can come about in any modern governmental system like authoritarianism, communism or capitalism. A liberal democracy is not required for industrialization. However, where modernization becomes western is in the post-industrialist phase. In this phase the goal of modernization is to become like the West in all aspects (Cao, 2009). After industrialization, self-expression becomes a dominate factor in personal values. As people become more affluent and their day to day needs are being met, they begin to desire more personal freedoms. The citizens’ desire for self-expression presses the state towards democracy (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005:21).

Psychologist Abraham Maslow pointed out in *Hierarchy of Needs* that desires for self-expression are universal, and attaining them brings a sense of self-fulfillment. His research has been continually proven by empirical psychological research (2005:139). According to Maslow’s theory, the people of China possess the same desires for self-expression that the rest of the world does. Western modernization theory claims that the reward at the end of the path of becoming an industrialized modern state is a liberal
western style democracy which provides avenues for self-expression. “The Western world is widely perceived to be the highest development stage of human social evolution. And it was believed that the non-Western world would use the Western as an example to pursue” (Peng, 2009). Inglehart & Welzel exemplify this by going so far as to predict China will democratize if it maintains its high level of industrialization (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005:42).

PRC academics have embraced modernization theory, especially the technological and industrialization aspects of the theory. Where they differ from the western model is on the ideas of what happens to a society in the post-industrial phase. Chinese scholarship generally does not deny the western model of modernization, but instead claims that modernization is “one directional with multiple paths” (Luo, 2009). Inglehart and Welzel say as much when they claim that industrialization can come out of any system, but the Chinese scholars theorize that the final outcome of modernization is not liberal democracy (Luo, 2009; Peng, 2009; Cao, 2009). These scholars see the PRC’s path as modernization with Chinese characters. This new theory of modernization holds that modern systems are as diversified as the traditional systems from which they evolved. There is no single track to modernization and there is no single track from modernization (Cao, 2009). The culture that has been part of China through its extensive history is completely different and has little in common with the West. Yet still, western scholars continue to view PRC’s modernization through a western prism (Jacques, 2009:13).

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1 Chinese tradition is to place the family name first and the given name last. However, many Chinese scholars have reversed their traditional Chinese names for western publication. For historical and political Asian figures I will use the first name listed as the surname, for scholars I will reference the last name listed.
This new view of modernization borrows much from traditional modernization. Modernization is a process countries use to catch up with the modern world. It relies heavily on industrialization and the use of technologies, either borrowed or created. Modernization changes the way the people of a given country live. It changes educational levels, social values, and psychological attitudes (Peng, 2009). These characteristics are universal in modernization. The nations of the Global North were the first to modernize. As the nations of the Global South industrialize, it appears those nations are following the same path to modernization as the Global North, and thus should eventually produce liberal democracies. This is the assumption made by Inglehart and Welzel. Scholar Fangjun Cao disagrees. Cao (2009) believes that China must follow its own path, its own guidelines to modernization. Although this path may appear to be western, it is guided by Marxism and has a strong foundation in Chinese Socialism.

To be sure, the modernization of China came from outside influences as much, if not more, from internal motivation. Western influences had slowly pressured China from without until the West was able to fully dominate China militarily, economically and even culturally. Before the Opium Wars of the mid-19th century, China had maintained its culture for thousands of years. Empires came and went, but they were all governed by Confucian ideals. Confucian thought allowed for a transfer of power between regimes while maintaining the state and the nation. Each successive new regime in China was able to legitimize its rule by the Mandate of Heaven. Under the Mandate, regimes had to provide for the peoples safety and needs. Ancient Chinese regimes lost the Mandate when it was perceived by the people that the regime could no longer provide these things. Unlike the Devine Right of Kings, which gave carte blanche to western sovereigns to rule
over the common people, sovereigns in China did not have the same luxury. Rulers in pre-revolutionary China did not rule with infallibility or the grace of God. When Chinese rulers lost the Mandate invading armies or internal usurpers could supplant the sovereign with little disruption to the national identity. Under the Confucian system and the Mandate of Heaven, the common people were obliged to follow the new regime as long as the new regime adhered to the Mandate and provided for the good of the people (Keay, 2009:53-54). One of the more interesting aspects of the survival of Chinese culture happened when foreigners\(^2\) took control of China and received the Mandate of Heaven. The new regime would adapt to Chinese culture, and any cultural aspects they imported from their home lands were incorporated into the already dominant Chinese Culture. Thus, there was never a loss of Chinese culture or what it was to be Chinese (Jacques, 2009:75). There was no humiliation in defeat because only the regimes were defeated, not China or the Chinese people. However, with the Opium Wars the West defeated China and extolled the western occupation. The invasion of China by the West was unique to China because it was not one regime replacing another, nor did the West seek to claim the land. Instead it was an invasion by modern capitalism where profits were more important than territory (Luo, 1997:130).

This failure to adapt to an increasingly changing and modernizing world came to a head with the two Opium Wars of 1839-1843 and 1856-1860, and more importantly, the “Unequal Treaties” that were forced on China (Grasso et.al, 2010:37-45). The Opium Wars play a great significance to modern China for several reasons. First, the Unequal Treaties (the Treaty of Nanjing, the Supplemental Treaty of Bogue, as well as additional

\(^2\) “Foreigner” is used here to reference other Asian peoples separate from the Han or larger cultural Chinese identity.
treaties that were created in the wake of the Opium Wars) humiliated China and placed its empire and its people under severe strain, both in terms of sovereignty and economics (2004:52-56). The Unequal Treaties that China was forced to adhere to after the Opium Wars had detrimental effects on all aspects of foreign and internal affairs of the successive governments of China. The treaties reduced China to a semi-colony of the combined powers of Great Brittan, France, Germany, Russia, the United States and eventually Japan (Luo, 1997:136). To be sure, the sheer corruption of the Qing Dynasty and later the Guómìndâng were major stumbling blocks to modernization for China, but the unequal treaties of the Opium Wars created situation in which China could not govern important parts of its economy without the permission of foreign powers. Revenues from important revenue generators like customs duties and taxes on salt went directly to the foreign countries that had negotiated the unequal treaties. What income the government was able to generate was lost through corruption or in reparations to foreign capitals. Foreign troops were stationed along the coast of China and could be dispersed rapidly throughout the population centers to protect foreign interests, thus eliminating China’s own ability to administer law and security within its own territorial boundaries (Xi, 1997:9-10; Rozman 1981:32-33). The Unequal Treaties produced a scar on the cultural identity of China that is evident today. Another example is how methodically and carefully the PRC was industrialized under Deng Xiaoping (Vogel, 2011:399-411).

China was quickly and resoundingly defeated by the western military powers, most particularly Great Brittan, which was literally from the other side of the world. The rapid defeat of China by the western powers showed the cultural and economic elites of China just exactly how far behind the rest of the world China had fallen (Grasso et. al,
Whereas Europe and American had advanced through expansionism and industrialization, China remained isolated and fell far behind the technological and cultural advances of the rest of the world (Keay 2009:378-382). China was so far behind the modernizing West it was difficult to see any way to catch up without massive changes to the identity of the nation. This was the driving force behind the Nationalist Revolution of 1911 and the Communist Revolution of 1949 (Grasso et. al, 2009:65-68,132-136). The CCP still uses the humiliation of the Opium Wars and the Unequal Treaties as a cautionary tale in their dealings with the West (Grasso et. al, 2009:303-306; Moody, 2012).

Capitalism is viewed as a key part of the drive to modernization. It is difficult to judge whether western style capitalism would have developed in imperial China because of the Confucian political system, the tendency of China to seal itself off from the rest of the world in times of economic and social decline, and the complexities of imperial law (Luo, 1997:140). Because of the situation forced on China through the unequal treaties there was little free exchange of ideas and products through the concession ports awarded by the treaties to the industrialized powers. It would have even been difficult for capitalism to develop from the influence of the western nations because they so tightly controlled the one-way trade into China. Even when the last imperial dynasty, the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911), did attempt to undertake a modernization effort it was not for economic reasons, but military. This attempt to modernize their military was tightly controlled by the government. However, the attempt to modernize the military did not have much influence on the national economy of China, nor did it even greatly aid China on the path to modernization (1997:142).
When the last dynasty did attempt to modernize at the end of the 19th century, it was too little too late. As part of its modernization attempt the imperial Qing government sent many bright young students abroad to study in the West. What the Qing Dynasty really achieved in sending these students abroad was to create a class of young and motivated Chinese literati which quickly realized the best way to start modernizing China was by replacing the Qing Dynasty with a republic system (Luo, 1997:146; Grasso, 2009:64). In effect, the Qing Dynasty sealed its own fate. The most famous of the reformers to arise from the newly educated youth of China was Dr. Sun Yet-sen (1866-1925) who is called the “Father of the Revolution” in China. Sun quickly became the leader of the Guómíndång Nationalist cause in seeking to reform China and remove the Qing Dynasty (Grasso et al, 2009:74). Sun has been revered throughout modern Chinese history and is still celebrated by the CCP today, even though he believed in the power of the elites and favored strong western style capitalism.\(^3\) However, he and his Nationalist cause successfully overthrew the Qing Dynasty in October of 1911.

Even with the 1911 Revolution and the institution of western ideas in place of the Confucian system, the western powers were not willing to part with their dominance and concessions in China. This became very evident to the Guómíndång Chinese after WWI when their demands for control of their own lands and self-determination were rebuffed by European powers. These demands extended to China’s desire to come out from under the dominance of Japan, which, because of its ability to contribute more to the Allied war effort, had been allowed to dominate the East Asian economic sphere (Grasso et al,

\(^3\) I base this on my recent trip to Beijing, China where Dr. Sun Yet-sen is still revered by the CCP as evidence by having the Sun Yet-sen Memorial Hall on the grounds of the Forbidden City and also several other state sponsored sites for Dr. Sun throughout China. Additionally he is positively depicted in the state sponsored films such as 1911 (2011) and Bodyguards and Assassins (2009). And colloquially, he was mentioned with reverence on several tours throughout Beijing.
To many of the Chinese elites it was obvious that westerners believed freedom and democracy were meant only for westerners.

Chiang Kai-shek (1887-1975), who became leader of the Guómíndâng after Dr. Sun’s death in 1925, wanted to modernize China. However, Chiang ruled through the strength of the military which used up much of the funding that was needed for industrialization (Grasso et al, 2009:102). There were very few reforms under Chiang to create any kind of economic or normative legitimacy for the Guómíndâng regime.

Chiang, like his mentor Sun Yet-sen, wanted to adopt western styles of government, but instead of the democracies or republics of the West, Chaing incorporated Fascism into his Guómíndâng (2009: 103). Under Chaing, China’s economy produced wealth, but it was almost entirely directed to profit the elites. What wealth the government could generate was used to strengthen the military and prop up the regime. There was not capital investment by either the government or by the elites to produce any real progress in modernization (2009:105).

When the CCP finally did come to power in 1949 it was not prepared to make the industrial and economic strides needed to modernize China. The CCP was a rural party of the peasants that had had to worry about feeding and arming itself throughout the 1930s and World War II. It had very little experience in national economic matters of transferring a society from agrarian to industry. Initially, the CCP worked under the Soviet model for industrializing by sacrificing agriculture expenditures to increase industry. Although industrial output increased by fivefold, it was mostly light industry. However the sacrifices made to agriculture, as well as the population increase in the PRC
following the war, caused food shortages that became outright famines throughout the first decades of PRC rule (Grasso et al, 2009: 162, 173-175).

Chairman Mao Zedong desperately wanted to modernize the PRC, but on his own terms. At first he enlisted help form the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.), but quickly realized that the U.S.S.R. sought to turn newly communist China into a vassal state. For Mao, and the other old guard communist in China, Soviet clientelism was just another form of western imperialism. Additionally, Soviet style communist thought stressed the importance of the proletariat in continuing the revolution. Because China lacked a true industrial base, there was not a large enough proletariat population to support Soviet style communism. What small proletariat base there was in China at the time of the Chinese Communist Revolution was in the eastern part of the nation where the Guómíndâng had had its power base before fleeing to Taiwan. The Chinese Communist power base was deep in the rural interior of China. For these reasons Mao eschewed Soviet style communism and created a Marxist ideology unique for China and the Chinese Communist Revolution. Mao’s new style Chinese Marxism became known as Mao Zedong Thought, and in this new approach to Marxism it was the peasant class that was the driving force in Chinese communism (Grasso 2009:127-134, 156-162). The refuting of Soviet style communism, plus the decision to staunchly resist any attempt by the U.S.S.R. to co-opt the PRC, drove a deep wedge between the U.S.S.R. and the PRC that started in the mid-1950s and did not begin to thaw until the late 1980s (Vogel, 2011:37-41).

The breakdown of relations between the U.S.S.R. and the PRC ended Soviet assistance for industrialization in the PRC. The West was not an option for assistance in
the PRC’s industrializing desires because of the West’s nearly dogmatic anti-communism. The PRC became and international pariah throughout the 1950s and 1960s (Grasso et.al, 2009:149). Mao did little to deter this. In fact, Mao’s action contributed to the isolation of the PRC by completely disregarded history and following the Chinese tradition of withdrawing from the world. Other than necessary international relations with bordering states, and supporting the communist of Vietnam, the PRC had little to no impact on the world stage till 1971 when negotiation began for US President Richard Nixon (1913-1994) 1972 visit to the PRC (Vogel, 2011:66).

During Mao’s nearly all powerful reign as Chairman of the CCP, he stifled industrialization and modernization more than he ever helped it. A major stumbling block to modernization was Mao’s Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976. To be sure, the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) did quite a bit to stifle PRC modernization, but it had nowhere near the detrimental effect on the PRC as the Cultural Revolution did (Vogel, 2011; Grasso et.al, 2009). The Cultural Revolution had several drastic effects on the PRC beyond just modernization. The Cultural Revolution further isolated the PRC from the rest of the world thus preventing outside technology and ideas from being adapted by the PRC. Even though the thawing of relations with the U.S. happened in the middle of the Cultural Revolution, the PRC did not capitalize on the new relationship till Deng formalized ties with the U.S. in 1979 (Vogel, 2011:66). During the Cultural Revolution, trade dropped significantly. With the reduction in trade, the PRC lost important capital needed to function. Mao used the Cultural Revolution to rally his base by once again championing the rural peasantry. Mao attacked and nearly ended higher education throughout the PRC creating an entire generation of Chinese who lacked the education
needed to bring about the technological advances required to industrialize and modernize a nation (Grasso et al, 2009: 208-234).

The tragedy of the Cultural Revolution continues to trouble the PRC even today. Through the Cultural Revolution, Mao attempted to create a new version of Chinese identity by eradicating 3,000 years of Chinese culture history. Mao seemingly was attempting to replace the identity of China with Mao Zedong Thought. In essence, he was trying to destroy what it was to be Chinese. Through his purges of the party elites and intellectuals he stymied the CCP’s ability to make China competitive in an increasingly globalized world. But perhaps the most debilitating and long lasting damage Mao did was in the area of education. Mao’s Cultural Revolution decried what he considered to be the elite bourgeois education of university learning. His “reforms” crippled the intellectual capacity of a generation of Chinese (Grasso et al, 2009:239, Keay 2009:526-527).

True modernization started with Deng Xiaoping. Deng was very practical and believed in using what worked, instead of trying to force his theories to work. Through his leadership and deft statecraft he created the modern PRC. Deng modernized China through education, industrialization, and controlled capitalism. When criticized by hardliners in the CCP for using capitalism to spur growth, reshaping education by sending students to learn abroad, and importing western ideas for modernization, Deng response was the aforementioned “It doesn’t matter if the cat is black or white as long as it catches the mouse” (Vogel, 2011:319). Deng utilized the CCP’s “Four Modernizations” as a guide for industrializing the PRC. These four modernizations are 1) modernizing agriculture, 2) modernizing industry, 3) modernizing science and technology, and 4) modernizing the military (Vogel, 2011:94). Deng used to the “Four Modernizations” to
seek education advances in science and technology instead of ideological reeducation. In order to achieve the “Four Modernizations” Deng opened up China to foreign investment and education. And whereas Mao had stressed continual class struggle, Deng sought for the unity of the classes to create a unified and powerful China (Grasso et al., 2009: 220).

Initially, it was important for Deng to associate all of his modernization efforts with Mao Zedong Thought to satisfy the hard liners of the Party. Deng was very crafty about his path to modernization for China. Firstly he did not make blanket changes nationwide, but instead created test areas to flesh out modernization ideas. His most successful of these test areas were the Special Economic Zones that he created in four of China’s coastal cities where foreign companies could build factories and businesses. In order to attract foreign business, the Special Economic Zones had special tax incentives and cheap labor. Through these zones China was able to gain access to foreign capital, investment, technology and expertise (Grasso, 2009:226). Jiang Zemin (b. 1926), President of the People's Republic of China from 1993 to 2003, increased the number of Special Economic Zones during his tenure which was one of the main reasons for the PRCs economic boom of the 1990s. The Special Economic Zones championed by Deng and Jiang, which became Economic and Technological Development Zones under current President Hu Jintao (b. 1942), have provided an impressive amount of foreign direct investment to the PRC. It is foreign direct investment more than anything that created the Chinese economic boom of the early 21st century. Between 2001 to 2005 foreign direct investments contributed more than $60 billion (US) to the PRC’s economy (Grasso et al. 2009:283).
Although the PRC has modernized rapidly over the last three decades, it still faces many problems that will have to be addressed before it can move into the post-industrial phase of its modernization. One of the problems that the PRC faces with its rapid industrialization is industry in China is hugely inefficient and highly polluting. Industry in the PRC is 7 times more inefficient than industry in the US. And although the PRC has made moves to create more renewable sources of power, the PRC's main source of power is coal fired plants which are poorly regulated. The PRC has yet to make the leap into high-skilled or heavy industry. Most of the industrial base in the PRC is still what is considered light industry. The lack of a highly-skilled, educated work force could prove to be a hindrance to moving up the industrial ladder (Grasso et al. 2009:294).

Throughout 1988 and 1989, China experienced a wave of prodemocracy movements that culminated with the Tiananmen Square protest. Even though these protests were brutally suppressed, thus ending a nationwide call for “democratic” reforms, it does not necessarily mean that China’s path to modernization was sidetracked. Traditional western views of modernization see it as a process for the rest of the world to adopt western ideas, freedoms and democracy (Peng, 2009). Since Tiananmen, there has been a systematic effort by the CCP to either educate the desire for democracy out of the youth of the PRC (Grasso, 2009:305), or change the concept of democracy. Recent survey data of the Mainland Chinese people suggest that they might believe they already have democracy. More than 75% of Chinese polled say that China is a democracy. However, the Chinese concept of democracy is a “Government for the people, by the people,” and not the more normalized traditions of democracy such as voting, civil rights, and rule of law (Chu et. al., 2008:219). It seems that the CCP may be redefining what “democracy” means as a
way of fulfilling the end game of modernization theory without actually becoming a liberal democracy. To be sure, the CCP is trying to create modernization without losing its authoritarian control over the PRC.

The Holy Roman Empire in the Middle Kingdom

China has almost always had a system of state managed religion stretching back to the Qin Dynasty 200 BCE (Kuhn 2010:360). Starting with the Tang Dynasty (618-907) and continuing almost unbroken till today all religious groups in China have had to be registered and licensed. There has been almost no period in Chinese history when the state did not have authority over religion (Bays, 2004:26). The Chinese character for ruler symbolizes that the emperor connects heaven to Earth (王). For a religion to survive and thrive in China, it must be subservient to the needs of the state. This has always been a point of contention for Judeo-Christian-Islamic religions in China because those western religions stress the importance of the spiritual above the mundane. China does not have an “all or nothing” philosophy when it comes to religious beliefs. In China, one can easily be a Buddhist/Taoist without placing ones soul in jeopardy. The religions most commonly practiced in China (Buddhism, Taoism, and Folk Religions) easily coexist with one another, and are most often practiced simultaneously by individuals. There is a distinct difference between eastern and western religious philosophies on the supreme
authority of a religion. Another way to explain the difference is in the East a person can be a Christian Buddhist, meaning that a believer can incorporate all the ideas and moral structure of Christianity into Buddhism without going against Buddhist doctrine.

However, in the West, one can’t be a Buddhist Christian. Christian dogma and liturgy has no mechanism or tolerance to incorporate foreign ideologies. One is either a Christian or one is not. For Buddhism and Taoism, it’s not an issue because if someone is not a Buddhist or a Taoist in this life they will be eventually in another.

Both western modernization theory and Marxist ideology predicted that religious traditions would fall by the wayside as societies advanced through both paradigms (Tao, 2012). The PRC presents a unique case study for both theories as it is a socialist state which has experienced westernized modernization. According to predictions, the PRC should be experiencing a reduction in religious belief (Inglehart & Welzel 2005:18). This, however, is not the case as religion has proven to be very resilient in the PRC and is in fact growing (Fish, 2012, Yang, 2006). Buddhism, Taoism and the Folk Religions have all seen upswings since CCP religious policy has become more liberalized. Protestant Christening has also seen a large increase of worshipers (Fish, 2012). However, the growth of Chinese Catholicism has been static, staying steady with population growth since the takeover of the Communists (Madsen 2003). Catholics constitute approximately 1% of the entire population of the PRC (Luehrmann, 2009) whereas some estimates of Protestants reach as high as 10% of PRC population (Fish, 2012).

There are actually two forms of Catholicism operating in the PRC today. The first Church in the PRC is the underground Catholic Church that still swears allegiance to the pope. The underground Catholic Church exists and functions either outright illegally, or
more often than not, semi-illegally with the knowledge of local officials (Madsen, 2010). The other Church is the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association which was created August 2nd, 1957. The Catholic Patriotic Association is the state sanctioned and approved Church that is subservient to the PRC. Originally, it had no affiliation with the pope or the Vatican, but over time it has been allowed some doctrinal interaction with the Church in Rome on spiritual matters.

It is important to understand that these two Churches do not operate in clear opposition to each other. The dividing line between the Catholic Patriotic Association and the underground Catholic Church has become increasingly less clear over time. In many dioceses, official Catholic Patriotic Association priest and underground priest share church buildings or hold joint services. Some locations have no underground Church because there is no desire for one by local Catholics. In those areas the Catholic Patriotic Association adequately meets the spiritual needs of the people. Many of the Catholic Patriotic Association clergy and bishops have received official apostolic mandates from the Vatican. These ordinations are usually secret or at least semi-secret, but again, as CCP policy has become more liberal and tensions have eased in Sino-Vatican relations, official recognition of Catholic Patriotic Association clergy has become more public. In 2003 it was estimated that nearly 66% of Catholic Patriotic Association bishops had received papal approval (Madsen, 2003). By 2008 it was estimated by Cardinal Joseph Zen Ze-kiun (b. 1932), the Vatican ordained Cardinal of Hong Kong (2002-2009), that the number of Vatican approved bishops in the Catholic Patriotic Association had grown to nearly 85% (Luehrmann, 2009).
Apostolic mandate and Vatican approval of bishops is a very important aspect of Sino-Vatican negotiations which needs to be understood in order to comprehend why the two Churches in the PRC have not unified. Bishop appointment is the main area of tension that is preventing the Vatican switching its diplomatic recognition stance. When the pope issues an apostolic mandate to ordain a bishop, he is exercising the supreme authority invested in him by God. The Church maintains that this authority is spiritual and operates in a strictly religious sphere. It is not a matter of interfering with state or sovereign authority (Vatican, 3/14/2011). For the Vatican, and Catholics worldwide, bishops are literally apostles of Jesus in the same vein as the original twelve apostles of the Christian Bible.

The Roman Catholic Church believes it is the representation of God’s mandate on Earth, and the spiritual authority of bishops has been unbroken since the foundation of the Church. Unconsecrated bishops are automatically excommunicated (out of communion with God) by latae sententiae excommunication under Catholic Canon Law 1382. More importantly, any holy duties an unconsecrated bishop performs are also out of communion with God. Any priest an unconsecrated bishop ordains is also automatically excommunicated, and cannot properly perform their duties. According to Catholic liturgy, a person’s eternal soul is in jeopardy if it is out of communion with God. Certain religious rights (sacraments) have to be performed in Catholicism in order for a person’s soul to receive the grace of God and have everlasting life. In order for the sacraments to be valid, they have to be performed under the supervision of a consecrated Roman Catholic member of the clergy who is operating in accordance with the apostolic mandate. Without the mandate, every action becomes invalid and in violation of Church
law. This places the souls of the laity in jeopardy if they knowingly receive sacraments, or depending on the extent of the excommunication, have any religious communication with the unsanctified clergy (Catechism of the Catholic Church, 1321-1330).

The CCP, in accordance with Marxist doctrine, is atheist. The CCP does not accept the concept of an eternal soul or the necessity of a foreign government to maintain a connection with PRC citizens in order to save their eternal souls. In a 2011, the People’s Daily, the national state controlled newspaper of the PRC, commented that the Vatican’s assertion it has the right to appoint the bishops of the Catholic Patriotic Association, who are state officials, is unmerited. The People’s Daily contends that even if the Vatican asserts its role as merely a religious organization with no intention to interfere in the actions of foreign governments, the pope is still the official head of a recognized foreign state. The sovereign nation of Vatican City wants command whom the CCP appoints to official state position in the PRC. The People’s Daily asks if any sovereign state would be willing to allow a foreign government to appoint that sovereign state’s officials (Catholic Culture, 08/12/2011). The concept of a soul is not foreign to China, but the belief that the soul is condemned to eternal damnation because of a lack of communication with a foreign state actor is somewhat preposterous to the CCP. If the Vatican can appoint the leaders of the Church in China, the CCP fears that the Catholic Church can attempt to be a subversive force in the PRC by using the Catholics there to “westernize” China (Leung, 2000). This fear, however, is not without precedent. The Catholic Church was heavily influential in the fall of communism in Poland (Luehrmann, 2009). The CCP’s fearful attitude may be waning, though, as the PRC increasingly modernizes. Western influences have become far more prevalent through the
consumerism and wealth of the Chinese people. Religious traditions, even western ones, might actually be a way to facilitate stability and adherence to traditions which could provide relief from the negative psychological aspects of rapid modernization.

The uniqueness of the situation between the CCP and the Catholic Chinese has to do with the external aspects of the Vatican. The PRC has had struggles with protestant Christians to be sure, but Protestant Christianity does not have the external force of an actual sovereign state pressuring the CCP for religious autonomy. However, even with the contention between the PRC and the Vatican, Chinese Catholics are relatively ambivalent to CCP politics (Madsen, 2003). An increasing number of Catholics in China exist in the gray area described by Fenggang Yang (2006) in his seminal work on religious markets in China. In this gray market, as opposed to a legal red market and illegal black market, Chinese Catholics accept both the controls of the Catholic Patriotic Association, but also observe the tenants of the underground Church that still adheres to Vatican doctrine. The issue concerning recognition of Taiwan over the PRC as the one China is a distant concern in the day to day lives of the Catholic laity of the PRC (Wiest, 2003). There is very little conflict between internal Chinese Catholics and the CCP. For the most part, the Catholic Patriotic Association and its followers are ambivalent to politics. The majority of the conflict concerning Catholicism in the PRC arises between the Vatican and the CCP (Madsen, 2003).

The West continually calls for religious freedom and religious pluralism, but those aspects have traditionally been viewed by the CCP as mechanisms meant to weaken the socialist state. Even up until the turn of the 20th century there was a movement to eliminate foreign religions from the PRC (Leung, 2000). The CCP has a suspicion of
Western religions because they have been used in the past as a tool of imperialism (Kuhn, 2010: 364). The CCP has issues with autonomy and is leery of supranational organization like the Catholic Church. Deng Xiaoping feared the “Polish Disease,” in reference to the Vatican’s role in bringing down communism in Poland (Luehrmann, 2009). There is evidence that the Vatican and the US worked in collusion to weaken communism in Eastern Europe (Bernstein & Politi, 1996: 11). The distrust of western religion has historical roots in both Chinese and PRC history.

In the previous section on the modernization of China, it was explained how the Opium Wars, and the Unequal Treaties that followed, humiliated China. In addition to the economic hardships that were placed on China as a semi-vassal state, the Unequal Treaties greatly favored foreign Christian missionary efforts. In China, Christian missionaries where backed by the powers of the West, and both Protestant Christianity and Catholicism became associated with western imperialism (Bays, 2004:29). When the Communist came to power in 1949, Protestant Christian churches were able to easily separate themselves and become independent from other western Protestants faiths as was dictated by the communist. Separation from Rome was not so easy for Chinese Catholics. In order for the tenets of Catholicism to be observed, there has to be communication with Rome. This difficult situation was exasperated by Pope Pius the XII (1876-1958) who was anti-communist. In 1949 the Vatican ordered that no Catholic should join or sympathize with the communist party (Kuhn 2010:362). This was seen as a direct attack on the leadership in the newly formed PRC, and also as a continuation of western imperialism.
In the mid-1950s, the CCP started to form various state controlled religious organizations to control the internal religions of the PRC. Currently there are five separate state approve religions recognized by the PRC. For Buddhist the Buddhist Association of China was formed, for Taoists the Chinese Taoist Association, for Muslims the Chinese Muslim Association, for Protestants the Three-Self Patriotic Movement, and for Catholics it was the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association. Until the formation of Catholic Patriotic Association in 1957 the Catholic Church in China still sent the names of perspective bishops to the Vatican for approval, but the Vatican refused to have anything to do with the PRC controlled Chinese Catholic Church. In 1957, shortly after its formation, the Catholic Patriotic Association broke off ties with the Vatican (Kuhn 2010:362)

The creation of the Catholic Patriotic Association and its break with the Vatican was the culmination of years of tension between the communist in Beijing and the Vatican. The Vatican had strongly supported the Guómíndâng regime of Chiang Kai-shek in China and then on the island of Taiwan. After the split of the Catholic Patriotic Association from the Vatican, Pope Pius the XII issued a Papal Encyclical in 1958 that railed against communism in the PRC. This Encyclical, and its inflammatory language, has marred Sino-Vatican relations until today. Pope Pius commented that the changes in China under the communist were brought on “by deceit and cunning endeavor…” He also wrote that the Catholic Patriotic Association “…under and appearance of patriotism, which in reality is just a fraud…aims primarily at making Catholics gradually embrace the tenets of atheistic materialism…,” and lastly “…if Christians are bound in conscience to render to Caesar’s (that is, to human authority) what belongs to Caesar, then Caesar
likewise…cannot exact obedience when they would be usurping God’s rights or forcing Christians to…sever themselves from the Church and its lawful hierarchy. Under such circumstances, every Christian should cast aside all doubt and calmly and firmly repeat the words… ‘We must obey God rather than men” (Pope Pius XII, 1958). These harsh comments have been used by the communist regime as evidence the Vatican wants to use the Church in the PRC as a tool to resist the state. This idea was reinforced in 1989 with the fall of communism in Poland brought on partly by the efforts of the Catholic Church (Luehrmann, 2009).

Catholicism suffered under Mao and especially during the Cultural Revolution, but it survived and religion as a whole has had the opportunity to rebound since Mao’s death. Deng’s regime moved away from trying to eradicate religion and instead retreated to the traditional role of monitoring and control religion through mandate (Bays, 2004:34). Some significant events for Catholics in China started to happen in the 1980s. In 1981 the requirement for members of the Catholic Patriotic Association to swear independence from Rome was dropped and shortly thereafter the responsibility for doctrine and pastoral affairs was given over to the bishops and priest of the state approved Catholic Church. At this point, the Catholic Patriotic Association relinquished its role as overseer of the Catholic Church in China and instead concentrated on directing the external affairs of the Chinese Catholic Church such as church-state relations (Wiest, 2003; Luehrmann, 2009).

The new roles of the Catholic Patriotic Association and the bishops were formalized in Document 19 issued by the Communist Party Central Committee in 1982 which required all catholic religious activity to be under the supervision of the Catholic
Patriotic Association, but this document gave authority to the Chinese Catholic Bishops Conference on matters of doctrine. This is important because the Catholic Patriotic Association is a governmental agency under the direct authority of the state, whereas the Bishops Conference is spiritual in nature and can, in theory, operate with independence from the Chinese Communist Party. The Document also gave Catholics the right to express “Spiritual Allegiance” to the pope, but it does not allow the Vatican to interfere in Catholic Patriotic Association affairs (Madsen 2003; Wiest, 2003). The relationship between the Chinese Communist Party and the Vatican, and the Chinese Communist Party and Chinese Catholics continued to thaw throughout the 1980s as there was an easing of tension on both sides. The Vatican started to recognize bishops appointed by the Catholic Patriotic Association, which the Vatican had been stridently against before. The Chinese Communist Party, also, relaxed its requirement that all Catholics in China had to join the Catholic Patriotic Association (Luehrmann, 2009).

Starting in 2007, Sino-Vatican relations reached a new high and maybe showed a path to reconciliation for the future. In Pope Benedict the XVI’s June 2007 letter on the Church in China, he created a foundation for improved Sino-Vatican ties. One aspect of the letter which he stressed was that good Catholics adhered to the policies and laws of their nation. He called for Catholics to be good citizens (Benedict XVI, 2007). This part of Pope Benedict’s letter was intended to allay the fears of the CCP created by Pope Pius’ letter. Additionally, throughout the letter, Pope Benedict called for reconciliation between the Chinese Catholic Church and the Vatican (Benedict XVI, 2007; Luehrmann, 2009). Benedict revoked the long standing papal support for the underground Church in China.
Benedict also acknowledged the temporal authority of the CCP, but strongly maintained the Vatican’s spiritual authority (Reardon, 2011).

Yet another sign that the relationship was being repaired also happened around that time. High level meetings were held at the Vatican in 2007 to review Vatican policies in regards to the PRC. After these meetings Rome hinted at being willing to make the concessions the CCP wanted. One of these concessions would be official recognition of the PRC over Taiwan (Luehrmann, 2009). In February of 2008 more talks were held between Vatican and CCP officials about reconciliation. The meetings went so far as to discuss a papal visit to the PRC before the 2008 Olympics. The meetings were very cordial, even inspiring local PRC news agencies to release reports from the meetings devoid of the normally derogatory language used to describe the Vatican. Part of the discussion was the understanding that in order for reconciliation to happen the Vatican would have to move its official embassy from Taipei to Beijing (Catholic News Agency, 02/19/2008).

Since the 2007 Encyclical and meetings of 2007-2008, Sino-Vatican relations have been somewhat stagnant, neither greatly improving nor degrading. The two states have started to jointly appoint bishops without any formal structure in place to do so. The dual approved appointments have happened through general agreement rather than a formalized process. There have been occasional flair-ups between the two states about bishop appointment, but those events seem more like power posturing then outright hostilities. Most recently, in November of 2011, the Catholic Patriotic Association planned to appoint Father Peter Luo Xuegang to Bishop. Father Luo received joint approval from both the Vatican and the Communist Party. There was a problem in the
appointment though; two bishops from the CPA who had not received Vatican ordination were to take part the ceremony, which would have been in violation of Vatican Canon Law 1382. If the two excommunicated bishops did take part in the ordination their participation would render Father Luo in violation of law 1382 and thus cause his excommunication (Mackinnon, 11/29/2011). The ordination went on as planned. One of the excommunicated CPA bishops did attend and take part in the ceremony. However, all the other bishops that took part in the ceremony where in line with Catholic Church doctrine. As of this writing the Vatican has not issued any writ on the standing of now Bishop Peter Luo Xuegang (Sunday Examiner, 12/10-15/2011).
Chapter 2

Internal Tension Management: Freedoms Without Democracy

This chapter presents information on the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) mechanism for managing tensions with the non-Party people of the PRC. The CCP is working toward a “Harmonious World/Society” in which all nations of the world can coexist while maintaining their own unique differences and governmental systems. Internally, the CCP hopes to also create a harmonious China in the same vein where the Chinese people live together in stability and happiness. To accomplish this, the CCP plans to use the wealth created by the modernization of the PRC to create a society free of inequalities. That is not the case now, but it is the stated desire of the CCP (Blanchard, 2008). This chapter traces the history of political control and tension management by the CCP. Under Mao, China was ruled by force and ideology. Mao was able to validate the rule of the state by the power of the sword. Of late, the CCP has been able to maintain legitimacy via economic initiatives which have created a strong economy. The CCP is at the point where it needs to create in the people a sense of normative legitimacy by granting them the freedoms and protection of a liberal democracy, without actually allowing a classical western democratic model to form.

In order to maintain its control of the people and its position of power, the CCP needs to stave off the predicted democratization which happens when a nation modernizes. As the Chinese people become more affluent and globalized, they will begin to demand the freedoms and protections that are associated with a modern society.

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4 There are approximately 80 million Chinese Communist Party members as of 2010 (China Today, 4/17/2012).
(Inglehart & Welzel, 2005:21, 133). Issues such as government corruption, freedom of speech, property rights and education are already issues the CCP has had to make allowances for in order to maintain its legitimacy. Currently, the CCP is enjoying the benefits of a booming economy that is enriching the elites of the PRC as well as many of the common people. The new affluence in China has created a high level of good will between the people and the CCP. However, good economic times do not last forever. Additionally, the rapid economic growth in the PRC has created inequalities throughout the PRC that didn’t exist before. Although the PRC did not suffer the ill effects of the Great Recession of 2008 that the West did, it has its own problems on the horizon which could slow the PRC economy down, thus weakening the CCP tenuous legitimacy.

Originally, during the time of Mao, control of the people could be maintained by the military. However, the People’s Liberation Army is not what it once was. It is now a more technologically superior and better disciplined force, but it does not occupy the position of power it once did. Even if the People’s Liberation Army was the omnipresent institution it was throughout the first 30 years of the PRC, a modernized state with an educated society desiring liberalization is difficult to control with military force. And if the CCP was reduced to using military force to control the people, as it had to do in 1989 with the pro-democracy movements that happened across the entire nation, it would quickly delegitimize itself. The brutal crackdown that happened in Tiananmen Square reduced the PRC’s standing in the world, but it also weakened the CCP legitimacy with the Chinese people (Vogel, 2011:610-614). The CCP has since regained the esteem of the Chinese people, but the CCP also has not employed massive military operations against the people since Tiananmen.
Currently, the PRC is an orderly nation because everyone, in theory, has the opportunity to succeed financially. In modern societies based on the accumulation of wealth, people’s identities in the society are based on their abilities and achievements (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005:133). In a society where economic success is the pinnacle of achievement, the ability to excel is rewarded by other members of society with respect, prestige and power. As more people become involved in the economy, as is dictated by social norms, the necessity for an overbearing bureaucracy begins to recede as the norms of economic advancement create social controls of their own (Cao, 2009). These social controls become effective for controlling the economy, but they do not function as a sufficient mechanism for advancing the entire social structure. Additionally, as the society advances economically, it begins to demand more societal benefits associated with an advanced society. As the economic market advances it will create inequalities in the people that cannot be simply be corrected by a good economy.

As the society advances and the people demand the benefits of a modern society, the culture begins to separate itself from the controlling economic norms that have succeeded in modernizing the society. It is here at this point that a modern culture begins to become more formalized and normalized. Whereas before the people did what they were told under an authoritative regime, did what they needed to succeed under the economic model; the people now do what is expected of them by the society as a whole. The old divisions in the society that had dictated the actions of groups and their members fade away. In this post-industrial society, individuals have a strong desire to succeed. In the West that success is still judged economically by an individual’s financial success, but in the post-industrial PRC that success is not measured in monetary worth. Instead
success is measured in what the individual contributes back to the culture to which they belong (Cao, 2009). It is the CCP’s goal to create a society where the normative rules are for individuals to base their self-value on what they contribute to their society and also the success of that society. For westerners who have been indoctrinated with the ideal that individual success is the best success, basing self-value on the society as a whole is almost alien. In Asia though, it is the norm.

There are three periods of regime legitimacy that have been employed by the CCP in its relationship with the people. The first period was the authoritarian power of the state exercised through the military. The second period, which is currently providing legitimacy to the CCP, is the economic expansion and success of the PRC. The third period, which the CCP is actively trying to establish, is normative legitimacy. In this normative period the people will legitimate the CCP because of its actions and because each will meet mutual expectations. To be sure, each period is not completely devoid of the influence of other legitimizing functions. Even under authoritarian rule the people still acted with normative desires to do what it right and expected of them. The movement from authoritarian to economic to normative legitimacy should be viewed as an evolution in that gradual changes are made in the shifting to the next level through a continuum process. However, there are various amounts of all three present at each stage of development. A normative PRC will still have economic and authoritarian controls that further legitimate the state.
Old style: Legitimacy Via The Sword

Throughout the 20th century the people of China probably had more experience with living under military rule than any other time in their history. Even the famous Mongol invasion of Genghis Khan (Weatherford, 2005) did not subject China to such an extended military presence. Starting at the turn of the century, the Guómíndǎng Nationalist began to organize their revolt against the Qing Emperor that came to fruition with the Revolution of 1911. The Guómíndǎng never held full control of China though. Powerful warlords were able to operate throughout the nation creating their own little fiefdoms under the Guómíndǎng flag (Jacques, 2009:91). The power of the Nationalist was concentrated along the eastern coast of China. Starting in 1914, World War I reached the shores of China as many of the warring states of Europe had colonial possessions in and around China. The Second World War came early to China when the Japanese invaded in 1937. Fighting with the Japanese did not end until their official surrender to the Allied powers in 1945. Throughout this period the Guómíndǎng, the Japanese, the warlords, and the communist all used force and intimidation to control the people of China (Kaey, 2009:480-516).

In 1927 the communist split from the Guómíndǎng which started a 24 year long civil war for control of China. Under the Guómíndǎng regime of Chiang Kai-shek, military authority and strength was how Chiang controlled the state, mostly in the east where his power base was. Chiang launched several military expeditions into western and northern China to eradicate the communists. Sun Yet-sen’s hope of a republican system ruled by the elites gave way to an authoritarian system backed by a strong military. The
Guómíndǎng did not rule by the Mandate of Heaven, but instead ruled by the power of the gun (Grasso et al, 2009:102). Constant fighting between the two forces came and went across the entire breath of China until a fragile truce was established so that both forces could turn their attention against the invading Japanese. Even then though, fighting between the two did not come to a complete stop and renewed with vigor after the end of WWII. The communist existed in the rural communities of central and western China. Their rule was just as authoritarian as Chiang’s. However, most historical accounts of violence used against the Chinese people are attributed to the warlords and the Guómíndǎng.

After the communist came to power in 1949, Chairman Mao and the communist would employ the same rule by the sword method used by Chiang, except under Mao the military gained even more power. There is a common misconception in the west that the People’s Liberation Army has been an almost a co-ruler of the PRC. Although this may have been true throughout the early years of the PRC, it has not been the case since the 1970s. Throughout Mao’s chairmanship, the military was used to basically run the PRC’s entire infrastructure. Initially, Mao tried to create strong institutions to manage the PRC’s internal structure, but Mao laid those institutions to waste during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Both times Mao relied on the army to keep order in the state and “keep the trains running” (Grasso et. al, 2009: 190-202). From the end of the Great Leap Forward to the last days of the Cultural Revolution, the People’s Liberation Army’s power was second only to Mao’s. However, it was during the Cultural Revolution that the seeds for the eventual fall from power of the People’s Liberations Army were sown. It is important to understand that the controlling authority of the military was not naturally
given away, nor was it forcibly put down. Instead, the military was politically managed by Mao, Deng, and Zemin who all seized moments of opportunity to keep the military in check.

The military had always been very loyal to Mao, but because Mao was busy trying to maintain his position of authority and rule the PRC with near dictatorial power, he needed a trusted hand to control the very large and almost all powerful military. Mao entrusted Marshal Lin Biao (1907-1971) with the powerful position of Vice Chairman of the Communist Party (1964-1971) and head of the People’s Liberation Army. Lin had been a confident of Mao’s since the Revolution and had steadily risen through the CCP. Lin also controlled the Red Guard militia force which was the central actor in the Cultural Revolution. During the Cultural Revolution the people were not only kept in line by the military, they also had to survive the whims of the radically pro-Maoist vigilante forces of the Red Guard. As head of both of these PRC institutions, Lin became very powerful. Mao moved to put Lin’s power in check by issuing public and private critiques of Lin. Most scholars agree that by 1971, Lin was ready to attempt a coup d’état, but Lin panicked after he lost the tacit support of the Soviet Union and it became obvious that Mao was making moves to thwart the coup. Lin escaped by plane to Mongolia, but died when the plane was destroyed in a “landing accident” (Grasso et al, 2009: 230-234).

The importance of these events to this thesis is that after Lin Biao’s death Mao moved to limit the power of the military, but more importantly to eradicate Lin’s military power base. Lin’s power base in the military consisted of a large number of senior officer which basically meant the military was gutted of its power elites. When Mao died in 1976, Deng Xiaoping began to position himself as the eventual successor. The weakness
of the military hierarchy allowed Deng to put the modernization of the military, one of his and Mao’s “Four Modernizations,” on the back burner and instead focus on the economy. As far as control of the Chinese people, the military still existed and was ever-present throughout the PRC, but it did not have the infrastructure or elites anymore to pose a threat to Deng or the CCP. The after-effects of the Cultural Revolution kept the populace subjugated long enough for Deng’s economic reforms to take shape without having to use mass military mobilization. As soon as the economy started to improve, order was fairly easy to maintain (Vogel, 2011:173).

Deng’s concentration on the economy, which helped his regime achieve legitimacy through the power of the wallet instead of the sword, caused the military to become even less powerful. Throughout the late 1980s, the People’s Liberation Army had to invest in many for-profit businesses as a way to offset a continued decline in military funding, supplementing the People’s Liberation Army’s budget by as much as a third. The military proved to be very adept at business because by the time president Jiang assumed power in 1992, the People’s Liberation Army was poised to become a major player in the PRC economy. This situation presented another opportunity to reign in the military before it became too powerful (Vogel, 2011:647).

During the military’s foray into the business world of the PRC the senior officers of the military amassed small fortunes and power. As Deng readied to retire from public life, his goal was to turn control of the PRC over to Jiang Zemin. One problem standing in the way of a smooth transfer of power was the growing economic power of the military. Shortly after assuming the presidency of the PRC, Jiang instituted business reforms for People’s Liberation Army that shut down as many as 5,000 businesses
operated by the military and managed by junior officers. Jiang also instituted changes in
the military to restore discipline and morale, both of which had fallen off as the military
became more involved in business ventures. Jiang’s reforms put the military under tighter
CCP control (Vogel, 2011:623). Jiang’s reforms created a much more subservient
military (Grasso 2009:246-247). Jiang instituted even more successful economic reforms
that brought increased wealth to the PRC and its citizens which further strengthened the
economic legitimacy of the CCP regime. This further reduced the need for the
authoritative legitimacy over the people of China backed by a strong military.

Modern Style: Legitimacy Via The Wallet

Following the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989, conditions for people of the PRC
have improved greatly, especially in the metropolitan centers, mostly because of the
impressive economic growth that the PRC has experience over the last two decades.
Education levels and standards of living have progressively increased throughout the
PRC in the last 20 years. Additionally, the people of the PRC take a great pride in the
achievements of their nation. They feel they are more directly connected with their nation
then they did under Mao. The economic success of the PRC has been carried out through
tight government control, but it was accomplished by the people of the PRC (Vogel 2011:
638).

The grand economic success of the PRC has not been appreciated by all. The
appearance that the PRC is embracing capitalism is not appealing to the CCP hardliners.
The hardliners began their protest of the move to capitalism when Deng first started the
economic zones in the late 1970s. Deng responded with the commonly used refrain of “It doesn’t matter if the cat is white of black as long as it catches the mouse.” This of course portrays Deng’s pragmatic approach to communism. Deng also expressed that planning is not the same as socialism and markets are not the same as capitalism. Capitalist systems still plan for the future and markets exist in socialism. People can get rich in socialism, but they have a responsibility to pay more to the state for the good of all (Vogel, 2011:672). However, during the 1990s the CCP started worrying that there was a decline in socialist values spreading across the PRC as the nation rapidly embraced the market reforms started by Deng and followed in force by Jiang. The CCP is well aware that its current legitimacy is based on the steady economy, but the CCP fears losing control if the economy starts to decline. Also, the new wealth of the PRC has caused rampant corruption that the CCP is having difficulty controlling (Leung, 2000).

The strong economy of the PRC has allowed the CCP to move the country far down the path of modernization, but many in the CCP, both the hardliners and the new-leftist, feel it is time to start to use the rewards of modernization more for the people. This is opposite of the feelings of the mid-1990s when the CCP felt that economic advancement was more important than human rights or social justice (Qing, 1996).

During Deng and Jiang’s leadership, rapid economic advancement superseded domestic concerns and internal harmony. Now that the PRC has attained many of its economic goals, President Hu, and Vice-President Xi Jinping (b. 1953), who is presumed to be the next President of the PRC, have expressed their intent to create both an internal and external harmonious society where a truly socialist unified China lives peacefully with all the nations of the world and its own people (Zheng & Tok, 2007). Both Hu and Xi seem
to be implying that the “mouse” from Deng’s axiom, the financial success needed to create a successful socialist state that benefits the people and not just the elites, has been caught. Now it is time to eat it. The use of markets and controlled capitalism were only ever intended to raise the PRC up to a level where it could perform the functions of a true socialist state (Vogel, 2011:391). Many in the Party feel that the PRC has reached the point that it has to start focusing once again on socialism or the Party will lose its legitimacy.

The CCP has additional reasons to be leery of the embrace of capitalism that has swept the PRC. Capitalism is most clearly associated with West, and there still is a distinct sentiment of anti-westernism in the hardliners of the party. Even a hundred and fifty years after the Opium Wars and the Unequal Treaties, there is a fear of imperialism from the West. Speeches by high standing members of the Party are rife with anti-West and anti-imperialist sentiment. A simple perusing of the state managed media websites (http://english.gov.cn, www.peopledaily.com.cn, http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/) will easily show the anti-western and to some extent anti-capitalist bias that many in the Party harbor. The economic success of the West is appreciated by the Party, but the aspects of a liberal democracy, most especially the democracy part, are not desired by the Party for the Chinese people. When President Jiang began his reforms he refuted the idea that he was not copying western political systems. However he also spoke of a need to guarantee human rights and allow for limited democratic reforms on the village level (Grasso et al. 2009:282). Even these limited reforms were met with resistance from hardliners in the CCP.
The CCP now maintains its regime legitimacy on the economic happiness of the Chinese people (Bradsher, 2012). The Chinese people are happy with the good economic times and the PRC’s new place in the world, but again the legitimacy of the CCP from economic success is tenuous. The wealth of a modernizing nation correlates to happiness only up to a certain point. After a certain moderate level, an increase in a nation’s wealth adds little to its citizen’s quality of life (Davey, 2012). And not all of the citizens of the PRC are experiencing the same economic boom. Right now the PRC is one of the most unequal societies in distribution of wealth, income and opportunity (Davey, 2012). There also appears to be a generational shift in trust in the CCP regime. Those born after the time of Mao, during the time of modernization, are somewhat less trusting of the CCP (Wang, 2010).

Much like under the Guómíndâng, the coastal areas of the east have experienced the greatest growth and economic success. Economic success in the interior of the PRC is greatly concentrated in the cities. The western half of the nation is rather poor comparatively. Western China is very impoverished with limited opportunities and poor infrastructure. It is the western areas of the PRC, those most remote from the leadership in Beijing, which are most often seen in the news as problem spots in the PRC. The Autonomous Region of Tibet is currently experiencing large anti-government protest (United Press International, 2/01/2012) which has been labeled a religious revolt by the Tibetan Buddhists who still maintain allegiance to the Dalai Lama. Another religious minority on the periphery of the PRC which has not experienced the economic success that the rest of the PRC has, and also has been agitating for independence, are the Muslim Uyghers of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in far western China (Associate Press,
2/28/2012). Both struggles have been couched in religious terms by the CCP, but there are most likely multiple reasons for these uprisings by the religious minorities. Both areas are very impoverished with limited infrastructure or industrialization. The PRC modernization miracle hasn’t quite reached Tibet or Xinjiang yet. Unemployment is high in both regions as well as the levels of inequality. For these people, the economic miracle is not enough to legitimate the regime of the CCP (Kaplan, 2010).

There is a growing unease among the people with the PRC because of growing levels of corruption, the lack of an independent media, and an independent judiciary (Vogel 2011: 638). The PRC has been a “rule by law” nation, with the CCP making the laws and currently enforcing them through their control of the military, national police and political system. But with the accession of the nation into the WTO there is a need for the PRC to transition from a “rule by law” system to a “rule of law” system. This would mean a shift from current CCP controlled legal system where authority-is-the-law to a system where the authority and the people operate under the same legal system (Congress, 2006:6). With the growing inequality between the “haves” and the “have-nots,” the people of China are starting to view the issue of inequality as part of an inefficient legal system in the PRC. This translates from “haves” and “have-nots” to “cans” (those above the law, the CCP) and “can-nots” (everybody else).

The CCP is also well aware that the people are not happy with the levels of corruption that exist. The CCP is beginning to implement changes in order to maintain its power without having to rely on an ever expanding economy or turning back to rule by the sword. Currently Vice President Xi Jinping is slated to become the next President of the PRC in 2012. Xi built his reputation on cleaning up corruption (Demick & Pierson,
2/11/2012). Internal corruption can destroy governmental legitimacy and is notoriously rampant in authoritarian systems (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005:192-193). By reducing the levels of corruption in the government the CCP can possibly validate itself with the people by showing it is responsive to their concerns. These actions need to be more than just hollow words and show trials. The CCP needs to create a base of trust with the people of China. The people need to rely on the government being responsive to their needs, instead of having to push for changes. For the CCP to survive, it and the people need to create a relationship of mutual trust where each acts according to the norms of what is expected in a modern society.

**Normative: Legitimacy Via Meeting Mutual Expectations**

The CCP has begun to shift from focusing on the economy to focusing on the Chinese people and Chinese culture. The PRC has reached a point of industrialization where it can turn back to a people-centered focus at the heart of socialism. It is here that the CCP is planning to diverge from the traditional western path of modernization to complete the socialist state of the People’s Republic of China. The PRC has caught the mouse in Mao and Deng’s proverb. This is modernization with Chinese Characters (Cao, 2009). The CCP has transformed from a revolutionary party to a ruling party (Zhao, 2010). The CCP is hoping to create a normative legitimacy for itself in China. Normative legitimacy is about meeting expectations and doing what is right. There is a moral dimension to normative legitimacy. In a normative system people feel a moral desire to act in accordance with the rules of society. This is accomplished by creating a sense of
belonging to the society fostered by the state. The Chinese people have a distinct sense of belonging to Chinese culture, but to the PRC, that sense of belonging may not be strong enough to have created moral obligations (Etzioni, 1961:40-44). The CCP is looking to create a level of trust between itself and the people. In this new relationship, the CCP will meet the expectations of the people by providing for them what is established as norms. In return, the people will follow the directives of the government not because of fear of the military or the chance for economic success, but because the people will believe in the legitimacy of the state and the CCP. The people will follow the CCP because it is the “right” thing to do, and because the CCP does “right” by the people. Thus the society acts according to accepted norms. It remains to be seen if the CCP can pull it off.

In order to create a society based mainly on shared values where both the state and citizens do what it is expected for normative reasons, the CCP has to appear to be more responsive to the people. This is a tall order since the CCP has no intention of relinquishing power either through a liberal democracy or by the will of the people. As has been stated throughout this thesis, it is the intention of the CCP to establish a level of trust with the people of China so as to legitimize itself as the only necessary leadership. This does not discount the possibility of a limited democratic system in the PRC, but the candidates would almost certainly be Party members.

The CCP has been working diligently since the Tiananmen incident in 1989 to reshape the people’s concept of democracy. Recent survey data suggest that these redefining efforts are proving successful. More than 75% of Chinese polled say that the PRC is a democracy. However, the Chinese concept of democracy is a “Government for the people, by the people,” and not the more normalized traditions of democracy such as
voting, civil rights, and rule of law (Chu et. al., 2008:219). However, if the CCP can provide the freedoms, protections and the rule of law that are associated with a liberal democracy, and also allow for limited voting by the populace, they just might succeed at completing the modernization of the PRC without creating a western styled democracy. Democracy in the PRC would be a drastic change from the current system because the CCP now uses a top down system of management that incorporates institutionalism in an effort to make government more responsive to its citizens (Chen & Goodman, 2010).

If the PRC was to eventually develop democratic reforms it would be “Democracy with Chinese characters.” There have already been experiments with limited local democracy in rural areas, but they have been single party regional elections (Reardon, 2011). Democracy with Chinese characters would also have a more direct form of communication between the people and the government other than elections. It seems that the CCP would be leery of operating under a “throw the bums out” form of democracy, although they have made some concession to that ideology. Term limits have been put in place for office holders and there are mandatory retirement ages for CCP officials. These actions, though, are intended to strengthen the institution of the CCP and prevent the personality cults which dominated CCP policy during Mao and Deng’s leadership. Lines of communication between the citizens and the CCP elites would be meant to increase a sense of partnership in the rule over the state and not an ownership of government by the people.

The members of the Party, though, must also be accountable to the people of the PRC if there is any hope of creating a lasting trust between the two. Without elections to remove corrupt or ineffective party members, there has to be a mechanism to replace
party members who are not only in violation of party ideals, but who have lost the trust of the people. Several CCP committees have been formed within the Party to govern and review the actions of Party members. There has been a sustained movement to create strong courts with the authority to prosecute Party members who break the law or loose the trust of the people. As to the matter of the law, many in the CCP see the need to create the “rule of law” for all Chinese instead or the current system which is a “rule by law” for the party. The PRC does have a strong constitution, but it does not have a functioning court system yet that can act on behalf of the constitution (Zhao, 2010).

Other efforts and reforms have been made consistently by the CCP over the years to strengthen the bond between the government and the people. Throughout the 1990s, the CCP made reforms to the legal system of the PRC to establish a more regulated economy and also for civil rights. Most of these were done in order to satisfy criteria to join the World Trade Organization (Grasso et al 2009: 282), but they still benefited the Chinese people by providing more legal protection for them. When President Hu took over in 2002 he was presented with a PRC that was facing increasing regional disparities, widening income gaps, an ineffective social welfare system, and growing unemployment. Hu has adopted a pro-people approach allowing more social freedoms and even property rights for Chinese citizens (Zheng & Tok, 2009). Currently the Chinese people are socially mobile, educated, and wired in. Communication among the people of the PRC is at an all-time high. There might not yet be the ability to openly and freely share ideas among the people (Huang & Deng, 2007), but it is increasingly becoming harder for the government to control communication. Deng feared that tolerating divergent views from Party ideology could create public discontent and hostility to the CCP. However the CCP
may have to learn to tolerate them with the growing level of technology and communication in the PRC making the sharing of divergent ideas much easier (Vogel, 2011:711). The rights and civil liberties offered to the Chinese people are nowhere near what western societies have come to know and expect, but the Chinese people have more civil freedoms than they did thirty, twenty or even ten years ago. The liberalization of the PRC is a work in progress, but it is progressing.

To the benefit of the CCP, it has shown itself over the past few decades to be an institution willing to learn and adapt (Chen & Goodman, 2010). This is evident in their movement to modernization which the self-admittedly copied from Japan, the U.S. and Europe. Again, even though the PRC modernized with lessons learned from western countries (Japan not withstanding), it has no intention of following the western path of post-modernism. The CCP hopes to make the PRC an innovative society, both technologically and socially, so it can be free from the tyranny and control of theory, but more importantly, the control of other states (Blanchard, 2008). Education is a necessity for the Chinese people in order for them to be innovative. The PRC has made great strides in educating its people through the high-school level, but there needs to be a change in access to higher education if the CCP wants to jump from light industry to heavy industrial production. Also, the PRC is already experiencing movement of the work force into the service sector which will require a more highly educated populace (Chen et. al., 1997). Just as important as education is the freedom to create. Technological innovation will always be fostered by the PRC, but intellectual freedom is a grey area. Allowing intellectual freedom is a slippery slope for the CCP and may be one of the last freedoms they are willing to negotiate away in maintaining their power.
As the citizens of the PRC become wealthier they will want for more self-expression. The CCP, like many authoritarian regimes, can manage the material desires of the populace, but the demands for self-expression will also affect the elite. It is when the elites desire more freedoms that things start to change. The desires for individual freedom and self-expression will increase along with generation replacement in the PRC (Inglehart & Welzel 2005:219). Very soon leadership will come to the PRC which has only known a China on the rise. Vice President Xi Jinping was born in 1953 and has firsthand knowledge of the hard life before modernization. His family suffered greatly during Mao’s Cultural Revolution. He is part of the “Lost Generation,” of Chinese that came of age during the Cultural Revolution (Chen et. al., 1997; Lev, 2/23/2004). It remains to be seen who will replace him, but the next leader of the PRC after Xi may only have memories of a flourishing PRC. How will that leader approach personal freedoms and desires for self-expression without a memory of the times before modernization?

The Moral Dimension

One area of progress the CCP has made in normalizing the relationship between itself and the Chinese citizens is in religious tolerance and practice. The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China guarantees the right of religious belief. That is different than freedom of religion, in that the people of the PRC have the right to freely believe in and practice a recognized religion. There are only five recognized religions in the PRC and every Chinese citizen, except those who are party members are free to worship in a
manor approved by the governing state religious organizations (Constitution of the PRC, 1982). The CCP plans to incorporate the religious heritage of China, which the CCP refers to as cultural history (Madsen, 2010), into a stronger relation with the people. Starting with Deng, there was a push to reincorporate the traditional ideas of what it is to be Chinese back into the national identity. Both Presidents Hu and Jiang have stated that morality is the purest form of Chinese civilization, and they see the usefulness of allowing spirituality and religion to be another powerful contributor in asserting the morality of Chinese Civilization (Kuhn 2010:526). In Mao’s China, history and religion were consistently vilified as being parts of the bourgeoisie state that had subjugated the people. Religion was especially attacked by the Red Guard during the Cultural Revolution. During that period there was massive destruction to temples, churches and religious artifacts all across China (Starr, 2010:254). Deng, though, reversed the movement to destroy Chinese heritage and instead began the process of reembracing China’s history. No longer was the history of China painted with the broad brush of class elitism. Confucius, Taoism and Buddhism, once disparaged by the CCP, were reincorporated back into what it is to be Chinese (Vogel 2011: 661).

The CCP now feels Chinese culture can be used as a bulwark against the influx of western consumerism (Kuhn 2010:526). The PRC has worked diligently to reestablish its culture to the extent that it is now exporting it. Confucian Institutes are being opened up around the world as learning centers to show off Chinese culture, teach Mandarin and introduce the world to the modern PRC (Zheng & Tok, 2007). And maybe the most telling sign of how much the CCP is trying to reinstitute Chinese culture back into the mythic idea of China was during the breathtaking opening ceremonies of the 2008
Beijing Olympics. During the opening ceremonies not a mention or reference was made to socialism, communism or Mao Zedong Thought. Instead, the entire ceremony was a celebration of the culture and history of China, which included detailed references to Buddhism, Taoism and Confucius (Madsen, 2010).

The CCP estimates that there are one hundred million religious people in the PRC, but outside estimates place the actual number closer to 300 million who practice a formalized religion or traditional folk religions (Yang, 2006). Data on how many Chinese people accept or believe that there is an existence beyond the mundane is difficult to locate, but it can be assumed to be higher than actual practitioners of the various religions. More interestingly, religion is on the rise in the PRC (Madsen, 2011), and it might be in response to the rapid modernization of and the de-emphases of communism in the PRC. As the ideals of communism, which were once embraced by the Chinese as a source of popular inspiration, dissipate into consumerism and modernism, religion may now be supplanting communism as an attractive alternative for providing meaning and purpose. The rapid change of modernization can produce stress from the often traumatic social change that people are experiencing in the PRC (Chan, 2004: 61).

Whereas Mao pushed for a total eradication of religion, modern leaders see there could be a benefit to allowing people to have the right to believe (Kuhn 2010: 525). As was recently pointed out by one member of the State Administration for Religious Affairs on a trip to Nairobi, Kenya to investigate the growth of Christianity, “Religion is good for development” (Fish, 2/15/2012). Mao literally tried to destroy religion during the Cultural Revolution, but religion survived and has come back to thrive in modern PRC culture. However, religion in the PRC is managed by the state (Congress 2006:11), but it
has been that way in China for thousands of years (Kaey, 2009:20). The emperors of China understood the power of religion to pacify the people, something the liberal wing of the CCP is starting to understand (Fish, 2/15/2012). The management of religion currently might be more formalized and regulated than it was in the time before the communists, but religious tolerance has increased exponentially since the death of Mao. Spiritual beliefs are on the rise in the PRC and the CCP is seeking ways to manage the religions of the PRC so the believers can believe without fear of harm or imprisonment, while still placing loyalty to the state above loyalty to the ethereal (Luehrmann, 2009). President Jiang recognized the benefits of religion and stated as much to a conference on religious affairs. He stressed the importance to make socialism and religions fit together as he felt that both could coexist and support one another (Kuhn 2010:368).

For a religion to survive and thrive unmolested in the PRC, it must adapt to a socialist ideology in accord with the CCP (Chan, 2004:68). Leaders in the PRC are seeking more efficient ways to manage the spirituality of the populace through regulations and expectations. It appears that by allowing more freedom to religious practice, the CCP expects more compliance from religious adherents. The CCP seems to be willing to allow for more religious space as part of the cultural aspects of what it is to be Chinese, as long as the people do not use this new space for religious freedom to formulate descent against the state.

The CCP, as of yet, has not created a place for religious pluralism in the PRC, and, as with democracy, it is unlikely to do so. The CCP still suppresses those religions that exist in the grey and especially black markets of Chinese religious practice (Yang, 2006). If the CCP continues to suppress religion in the PRC it will just force them
underground as it has with the underground Catholic Church that maintains loyalty to a foreign power. Underground religions could prove to be a destabilizing force in the PRC, especially for those who are seeking an avenue to resist the state. The CCP is beginning to allow more religious freedom though. Religious organizations now have the sovereign authority to certify religious personnel, admit and train students in religious schools, design curricula, and recruit faculty in seminaries. The state supports the five recognized religions and funds the building of new religious spaces for worshipers. Religions are still not allowed to directly proselytize to the people, but the state does not deny the people the right to learn for people to seek out knowledge or guidance from any of the approved religions (Chan & Carlson, 2005:21-23).

The CCP is trying to create an institutional space for religion within the government by creating laws and organizations such as the Regulation of Religious Affairs and the State Administration for Religious Affairs. These new controlling mechanisms operate under a mandate of allowing believers to practice traditional religions, folk religion, and new religions denominations. Before, there was no mechanism in place governing new religious movements, or traditional religious practices outside of the five approved religions. These are the religious beliefs and practices which exist in Yang’s gray market (2006). They are not officially approved by the state, but they are also not specifically outlawed. The CCP created the Regulation on Religious Affairs and the State Administration for Religious Affairs specifically to allow for more, albeit limited, religious liberalization. These religious and practices outside of the five approved are allowed to exist as long as they register and are not a threat to the social harmony. The CCP allows new religious movements to apply for official religious
status. Most importantly, regulations have come out of the new institution affirming that the religions of the PRC do not have to swear allegiance to communism or the CCP (Tong, 2010).

Religion has been an institution for the people, but now it may also be an institution for the state. President Hu Jintao set out 4 basic guidelines for religions to flourish in and with the PRC: 1) Freedom of religious belief is a right, 2) religious affairs must be handled according to the law, 3) religions should be self-administered and not controlled by foreign agencies or governments, and 4) adapt religion to the society to promote a harmonious relationship (Kuhn 2010: 370). It is important to know that even though these agencies seem to be coordinating a more liberalized religious space in the PRC, the came into being because local agencies in the various parts of the PRC were not practicing sufficient enough control over local religious followers. The Regulation of Religious Affairs and the State Administration for Religious Affairs are intended to unify religious policy across all of the PRC and create a singular, over-arching and long lasting institution to govern religions in the PRC.

With entry into the World Trade Organization, the PRC had to create a new sphere for religious, not necessarily freedom, but rather tolerance. The liberal wing of the CCP wanted to use the opportunity of joining the World Trade Organization to broaden religious freedoms throughout the PRC, while the hard-liners of the CCP wanted to continue the process of suppressing religion in favor of the state atheist views. In the end a compromise of sorts was reached allowing more religious tolerance, but the state approved religions still had to operate under the CCP’s controlling regulations on religions (Chan, 2004:66). The added benefits of these actions, ones which the hard-liners
might not have anticipated, was the creation of clear regulations and guidelines like the Regulation of Religious Affairs which provided more protection for practitioners and the religions.

The growth of religion is reflective of the PRC in the 21st century. This is not the PRC of Mao or Deng, but instead a People’s Republic of China where the “People” are the emphases. Even though religious pluralism is not especially encouraged, in fact religious belief is prohibited for Party member, the CCP is learning to appreciate the benefits religion can add to the personal lives of the Chinese People (Kuhn, 2010:202; Associated Press, 12/19/2011). Allowing for more liberalization of religious practice could provide a source of stability for the Chinese people which would translate into a larger stabilizing agent in the PRC. Religion could be used to mollify the population that has had to adjust to the rapid modernization of the PRC (Chan, 2004:72).

When Sino-Vatican relations are examined, they are most often couched in either recognition of the PRC by the Vatican instead of Taiwan, or in the Vatican’s desire to control the Catholic Church in China. Beyond those concerns, a reconciled Catholic Church in China could benefit the CCP in establishing more normative controls over and with the Chinese people as part of a grander strategy to use religion as a mechanism of liberalization for the Chinese people. Altogether the two churches, the Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA) and the underground Chinese Catholic Church, represent only about 1% of the total Chinese population. By itself, the underground Church represents less than that (Luehrmann, 2009), but even that small percentage of people could be problematic if they decided, or were ordered, to resist the state. By bringing the underground Church into the fold, so to speak, the CCP would manage the tension
between itself and that small percentage of its population. Additionally, and maybe even more importantly, the CCP would show all the people of China its willingness to be more inclusive of religion and reconcile religious differences in an equitable manner.

The CCP may have a special interest in Catholicism particularly for its commitment to good citizenship. In reference back to the June 2007 letter of Pope Benedict the XVI’s to the Church in China, he stressed that good Catholics adhered to the policies and laws of the nations in which they lived. He called for Catholics to be good citizens (Benedict XVI, 2007). This assertion was reiterated again in 2011 when the director of the Vatican Press Office told the Global Times, a PRC daily newspaper, that a “happy Catholic is a productive citizen” in direct reference to Catholics in China (Global Times, 12/29/2011). Mostly, Chinese Catholics stay out of PRC politics. During the Tiananmen protest of 1989, Cardinal Zen of Hong Kong, the de facto head of the underground Catholic Church in the PRC, ordered priest and congregates to not participate in the demonstrations (Sisci, 2009). Zen, throughout his tenure as Cardinal, has harshly criticized the CCP for suppressing personal and religious freedoms, but when an actual pro-democratic movement was transpiring all across the PRC Zen did not seize the opportunity. There could be several reasons for Zen’s edict, but the one that seems to be most obvious is the Vatican’s stance that good Catholics are good citizens.

Normalized relations would impose a more autocratic control over the priest and bishops of the underground church, bringing them in line with the CPA. If the Vatican and the PRC could reach a mutual agreement assuring the CCP that the bishops and priests would not become politically active it would help achieve the social stability which is the CCP’s long term goal (Madsen 2003). Additionally, reconciliation would
allow the Vatican to exercise more discipline on the priest and bishops of both sides through improved direct communication. As long as the CCP could be assured this control would not encourage Catholics to resist the state, the PRC could receive the benefit of the social stability that comes from Church doctrine and authority (Madsen, 2003). This would create an additional control mechanism for the CCP with their people, especially in the rural areas where Catholicism is more prolific. The disadvantage of a “top-down” governmental system is that control literally comes from the central location of the government, Beijing. The PRC does have powerful government operations and centers in each of the various regions, but again, the farther away from Beijing they are the less “hands-on” control the CCP has on them.

Even though the Pope has stressed that the Vatican is not a political power (Speciale, 3/23/12), it remains to be seen if the Vatican would be willing to assist a communist country to control the populace. In March of 2012, Pope Benedict visited Cuba. Before the Pope’s visit he was quoted as saying to journalist travelling with him that it is “evident that Marxist ideology as it was conceived no longer responds to reality.” He added that the Cuban people needed to “find new models, with patience, and in a constructive way.” These words echo comments the Pope had previously made while visiting Brazil in 2007, “The Marxist system, where it found its way into government, not only left a sad heritage of economic and ecological destruction, but also a painful destruction of the human spirit” (Orsi, 3/23/2012). These words might seem inflammatory, but in the vein of international relations they might not be as harsh as they appear on first read. Reading the most recent quote from 2012, there is wiggle room for both the Vatican and the CCP. Mao Zedong himself changed Marxist ideology by relying
on uneducated rural laborers to support the Communist Revolution of China instead of the proletariat as dictated by Marx (Grasso et. al., 2009:181-184; Fish, 2/15/2012). The CCP itself constantly claims that it is creating a new type of modernization and harmonious multi-polar world. It may be the Pope’s words could be an opening for future improved Sino-Vatican ties in that “Marxist ideology as it was conceived,” needs to be reconceived by the CCP. To be fair though, the words may simply be meaningless to the PRC. Neither www.chinadaily.com.cn nor www.peopledaily.com.cn, two very popular web-based media sources for news in the PRC, filed any reports of Pope’s comments.
Chapter 3

Diplomacy Through Third Parties: The PRC’s Relationship With Central America.

The majority of research on Sino-Latin American cooperation centers on South America. This is easily explained by the fact that the PRC has had a much better relation with the countries of South America than with the countries of Central America (Mexico notwithstanding). In South America, only Paraguay still does not formally recognize the PRC as the one China. There are several reasons for why the PRC’s relationship developed with Latin America this way, none more important than the other. The opportunity for trade with the PRC presented a bigger market than with Taiwan. Improving relations with the PRC and turning their back on Taiwan was a way for countries to show defiance to the U.S. foreign policy. South America had more resources to offer to the PRC, so that is where the PRC first concentrated its efforts. The CCP’s use of soft power has become very impressive and the CCP consciously uses it throughout Latin America. It appears that the CCP is employing soft power as a mechanism to create normative relations with its international partners. In less analytical terms, it seems that the PRC is trying to develop a friendly partnership with Latin America, instead of a paternalistic relationship.

It appears the PRC has started investing in developing stronger ties to Central America in the past decade or so. The PRC has maintained a good relationship with Mexico since 1972, but the rest of Central America has been pro-Taiwan. After the Guómíndång were forced off the mainland in 1949, they began to develop close links with the countries of Latin America in order to legitimate their claim as the one China.
The PRC went into isolation mode until the 1970s when Mao allowed the PRC to once again enter the international stage. When the U.S. began to officially recognize the PRC in 1972 (full recognition was not formalized with the U.S. till 1979), other countries in the Western Hemisphere began to switch their recognition status as well (Ratliff, 2009). However, those relations were strained by the CCP supporting communist insurgencies in Latin American countries. This practice began to come to an end in 1970’s when the CCP started to draw back from spreading Maoism around the world. By 2001, the CCP had fully dropped its support for communist insurgencies in other nations (Kurlantzick, 2006). Additionally, with the end of the Cold War, U.S. financial support for anti-communist governments in Latin America began to drastically fall off. Over time, many of those formally pro-U.S./anti-communist governments have lost their positions of power, with more socially minded regimes replacing them. And now the PRC has become much more attractive as a state/friend to the countries of Central America.

**The Attractiveness of Chinese Soft Power**

Joseph Nye’s was the first to coalesce the idea of soft power in his *Bound to Lead* (1990). The concept had been discussed by others before Nye, but Nye’s still debated paradigm has become a very important tool for the CCP on the world stage. Nye differentiates hard power (military, economic, coercion, intimidation) from soft power (you making other states “want” to do what you “want” them to do). Soft power is the power of attraction (Huang & Deng, 2007). However, PRC soft power has taken on a
new dynamic. In this new dynamic, soft power is also about building friendships between states. These state-to-state friendships foster a mutually or multi-state beneficial relationship that moves beyond a realist parameter of states acting solely for their own benefit. The friendships between states created by soft power are not as intimate as friendships between people, but they do maintain some of the same traits. For the most part, US soft power was created amorphously over the years by the dominance of American culture and the image of America success. PRC soft power is actively being created and utilized by the CCP. In this regards, the PRC is not utilizing soft power to encourage other states to emulate the PRC, but instead wants to create an understanding and acceptance between states. The CCP’s interest in soft power probably resulted from the realization that the use of hard power would be insufficient and unproductive for the PRC to accomplish its goals of becoming a major player on the world stage (Withnow, 2008). This is especially true in light of the CCP having stated that it is employing soft power to ease the impression that the PRC is a militaristic nation (Li, 2008).

The PRC has distinct advantages in soft power that other countries may lack. China has the perhaps the oldest, continuing, intact cultural heritage of any nation in the world. Culture is very important. The stronger and longer lasting a culture is the more likely other cultures and people will be attracted to it (Huang and Ding, 2007). Chinese around the world proudly claim to be part of a 5,000 year old culture. The CCP, which has been concerned with complete recognition as a nation/state, has now started making some overtures that China is not so much a nation/state as a civilization/state (Jacques, 2009:13). Nations come and go, but civilizations endure. Those that cease to be become
romanticized in the annals of history. China has the rare benefit of both being a continuing civilization, and a much adored ancient civilization.

The 16th CCP congress in 2002 pointed out that in today’s world, a nation’s culture is intertwined with the economics and politics of a nation. Culture cannot be separated out. PRC President Hu Jintao reiterated this idea again at the 17th party conference in 2007. Additionally, he stressed the need for the PRC to continue building its soft power for both internal stability and international competitiveness (Li, 2008). For the future, soft power will be the operational framework that the PRC employs in its international relations. Soft power is also being readily used by the CCP in pursuit of a harmonious world and in creating good neighbors. Examples of the CCP’s incorporation of soft power can be seen in the exponential growth of the term being used in Chinese media (Bandurski, 2009).
The PRC has been actively exporting its culture around the world as part of its soft power initiative. It has built over 200 Confucius Institutes around the world as a way of introducing people to Chinese culture, other than the local Chinese restaurant (Luehrmann, 2009). The Confucius Institutes have a broader purpose than just exposing foreign peoples to the culture of China. They also present a kinder, less militarist PRC. Although these institutes are mostly on college campuses, the CCP controls the curriculum. This allows the CCP to shape the message of the Institutes and present the CCP’s own perspective on what it is to be Chinese (Gill & Huang, 2006). Additionally, some of China’s leaders see the traditional religions (Taoism, and Buddhism) as ways to promote Chinese culture to a global audience. These religions are part of the Institutes, but they are taught as part of Chinese culture and not as religions. Chinese religious history as soft power is taken seriously by Chinese leaders. (Kuhn, 2010:360). Eastern religions appeal to peoples of the West as philosophical alternative to Judeo-Christian-Islamic religions. Currently in Central America only Mexico has any Confucius Institutes. However, it does have five of them which are as many as Brazil (the PRC’s largest trading partner in Latin America), Argentina and Chili have combined (University of Nebraska, 2012).

One somewhat unusual and perversely humorous soft power benefit of the CCP’s authoritarian system in its negotiations with the countries of Central America over Taiwan is the lack of a free media in the PRC. This allows CCP officials to move money around in Central America, both legitimately and inappropriately, without fear of being exposed by an independent media. Taiwan, however, has a thriving independent media that is constantly on the lookout for government malfeasance. Several countries in Latin
America and Taiwan itself have had to deal with fallout from scandals caused by bribes and kickbacks by Taiwanese officials (Erikson & Chen, 2007).

One of the more powerful examples of the PRC’s soft power is one the CCP most likely never intended or expected to happen. Many countries in the Global South, including those in Latin America, are starting to be attracted to a modernization path known as the “Beijing Consensus” (Huang & Ding, 2007). The Beijing Consensus, also known as the China Model, stands in contrast to the western model known as the “Washington Consensus.” The Washington Consensus places heavy demands for democratic reforms and neoliberalism from countries seeking aid from the West. The Washington Consensus tends to measure success in economic terms (Chen & Goodman, 2012), whereas, instead of pure Gross Domestic Product, the Beijing Consensus model measures quality of life and equality as importantly as economic success. It also measures a nation’s level of self-determination in its actions on the world stage. The Beijing Consensus model takes into account the level of innovation a nation employs in its own development (Huang & Ding, 2007). The Beijing Consensus is about more than pure economics. It is also about quality of life, non-interference, politics, and the balance of power. The Beijing Consensus does not seek to create a single hegemony, but instead strives to create a multi-polar world (Ramo, 2004). To be fair, the Washington Consensus model also incorporates many of the same aspects of the Beijing Consensus model, but over time many countries have come to view the Washington Consensus negatively for what those nations fell are the models shortcomings and imperialistic conditions.

The Washington Consensus is generally applied to western forms of economic development for nations of the global south. It is aid and foreign direct investment made
by western nations to developing nations that is almost always laden with conditions for economic, democratic, and social reforms, and sometimes constraints that place limits on international trade. The Washington Consensus presents unilateral policies that are supposed to be for the benefit of the world community, but are often viewed by state actors and scholars as policies purely intended to protect U.S. interest (Ramo, 2004). Many countries with a desire to modernize that have become disenchanted with the Washington Consensus have shown interest in the PRC’s modernization experience (Huang & Ding, 2007).

The Beijing Consensus is not a planned or developed concept forwarded by think tanks in the PRC. Instead it is a concept that developed externally by other countries that have viewed the success of the PRC by following a different path then the Washington Consensus model that has been extolled around the world since the 1950s (Ramo, 2004). Many Latin American countries see the Washington Consensus as failing to assist them with modernization. The Beijing Consensus has become more attractive because it creates rapid economic growth while still allowing the ruling regime to maintain political control over the populace (Withnow, 2008). Many political regimes around the world do not want to adapt to the conditions which often accompany western aid. These regimes seek investment without judgment or conditions. The PRC is more concerned with national stability than regime change when it comes to economic aid or more often foreign direct investment.

Although it appears the CCP never intended for its path to modernization to become a blueprint for the rest of the world (well, maybe Mao did), it has now embraced the Beijing Consensus model as another soft power tool in its international tool chest.
The PRC uses its own success as example in its soft power negotiations with other countries. The PRC leads by example and not intimidation (Huang & Ding, 2007). Couple that with the PRC’s non-judgmental foreign direct investment, and it is easy to see why countries that have had to work under the yoke of US militarism and moralism are now cleaving to the PRC way (Chen & Goodman, 2011). The CCP genuinely appears to want other countries to succeed in economic and trade matters, even if those successes decrease the PRC’s own economic prowess. As part of its Harmonious World foreign relations platform, the CCP envisions a leveling off and balancing by the economically powerful countries of the world as other countries are given the opportunity to advance (Huang & Ding, 2007).

The Beijing Consensus lacks the drive for a global hegemon, and instead envisions regional hegemons who have a duty to assist other nations in the region to attain industrialization and modernization. The Beijing Consensus and the CCP’s plan for a harmonious world appear to comply with Deng’s socialist model that those that do well first have a moral responsibility to help (Vogel, 2011:672). Additionally, one wonders if China’s history of being soundly defeated and humiliated by stronger industrialized powers during the Opium Wars have shaped the CCP’s thinking. There does seem to be a trend in the international relations of the PRC to not use their new found wealth and power to bully weaker nations as China was once bullied by the West. It could be possible that there is a lasting cultural psychological effect on China. It may be that the PRC does not want to be just another modernized bully of weaker nations. There is a possibility that the countries which look unfavorably at the Washington Consensus see it as a form of international bullying and the Beijing Consensus as a model between equals.
Central America and the People’s Republic of China Currently

The PRC has replaced the European Union and Japan as the US’ chief trade rival in Latin America (Russell 2100:123). PRC exports to Latin America are almost all manufactured goods, while PRC imports from Latin America are almost all raw materials or food (Arnson & Davidow, 2011:3). As interested as the PRC is in the markets and materials of Central America, it’s main priority in the region is to further isolate Taiwan and prevent any chance of Taiwanese independence (Ding, 2008) The PRC has joined in mutual ventures with governments and corporation throughout Latin America to increase the level of trade (Mendoza, 2011:20). The PRC is currently the world’s top consumer of aluminum, copper, lead, nickel, tin, zinc and coal. It is not just oil that the PRC is thirsty for. These material needs are just one of the many factors which have encouraged the PRC to improve its trade relations with Latin America as a whole and with Central America specifically. The PRC’s growing influence, via trade, foreign direct investment and soft power, is appreciated by many countries in Latin America because it is mostly condition free. The PRC trades with countries regardless of their human rights histories, political regime or environmental standards (Blanchard, 2008). The US hegemony is declining in Central America partly because of the conditions associated with the Washington Consensus. The PRC’s progress in trade relations, use of soft power, and the attractiveness of the Beijing Consensus are part of the reasons Central America is starting to lean away from the US (Russell 2011:122).
Countries in Central America which officially recognize Taiwan (Belize, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Panama and Guatemala) still conduct trade with the PRC. These countries saw increases in their levels of trade from 1995 to 2005 with the PRC. Except for Costa Rica (which still recognized Taiwan in 1995-2005), the trade increases with the countries that still recognize Taiwan were less than 10%. Many other countries in Latin America that maintained official diplomatic relations with the PRC saw double digit percentage trade increases during the same period. Costa Rica’s increase in
trade from 1995 to 2005 was more than 20%. It was the only Central American country without official diplomatic relations with the PRC that saw a trade increase over 10% (Jenkins, Peters & Moreira, 2007). Costa Rica officially recognized the PRC in 2007 and started a mutual free trade agreement with the PRC in 2011 (Ministry of Commerce China, 4/7/2012). The significant increase in trade between the PRC and Costa Rica most likely contribute greatly to Costa Rica’s decision to switch recognition.

Trade balance of Latin American countries with China, 1995, 2000–05 ($ million)

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<tr>
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<th>1995</th>
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<td>1833.3</td>
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<td>1197.8</td>
<td>2828.8</td>
<td>2160.7</td>
<td>4076.8</td>
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<td>−126.8</td>
<td>−162.0</td>
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Source: IMF, Direction of trade statistics, and Jenkins, Peters & Moreira, 2007

The PRC can be viewed as an economic ally of Central America, but it can also be viewed as an economic threat to the countries of Central America. Much of South America has industrialized or is industrializing, whereas Central America is playing
catch-up. There is a fear that as much as the PRC can be a partner in modernization, it
can also be a competitor in the world’s market, especially for the U.S. market (Jenkins,
Peters & Moreira, 2007). However, Central America’s geographic closeness to the US
markets is one of the reasons it is attractive as a trading partner to the PRC. What Central
America loses to the PRC in trade with the US and Canada, it may offset with increases
in trade to the PRC. Also, because Central America is behind the rest of Latin America
on the path to industrialization, much of its exports are in raw materials and food stuff.
These are both resources for which the PRC is becoming increasingly hungry.
Unfortunately for Central America, increases in the trade of raw materials is not directly
beneficial to their industrialization desires.

The PRC’s initial interest in Central America may have been specifically to
reduce Taiwan’s status as an independent nation. Now, as the PRC has become more
resource hungry, those relations have taken on a new parameter, but the One-China goal
is still of major importance to the CCP (Sepulveda, 2008). Throughout the 2000s, Taiwan
negotiated trade agreements with all the countries of Central America except Mexico,
Costa Rica and Belize (Erickson & Chen, 2007). Taiwan’s only remaining free trade
agreements are with the countries in Central America: El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama; and somewhat interestingly, the PRC (Ministry of
Economic Affairs R.O.C., 4/7/2012). The PRC’s soft power initiatives, coupled with their
economic trade, aimed at Central America have weakened Taiwan’s power in the region.
Some of the positive benefits of the PRC’s charm offensive in the area can be seen by
closer ties between the PRC and Panama and Nicaragua (Kurlantzick, 2007:142; Rogers,
1/14/2011).
As the PRC rapidly industrialized it quickly became flush with cash. Taiwan had modernized earlier than the PRC which brought wealth to the island. Taiwan was not above buying the affection and allegiance of countries in Central America, but starting in the late 1980s the PRC could simply outspend Taiwan towards buying friendship. The PRC has loaned more than $75 billion to Latin America since 2005. Some pundits feel these loans are simple “wallet diplomacy” by the CCP (Catholic Online, 2/16/2012), and they may well be, but Taiwan also used its wealth to influence the countries of Central America. Both Taiwan and the PRC condemn wallet diplomacy, but each still practices it and each has a long history of employing the practice to gain or maintain formal recognition (Rich, 2009). After Costa Rica switched its recognition to the PRC in 2007, Taiwan increased its aid package to Nicaragua to prevent it also switching its recognition status as well (Rich, 2009).

The PRC’s best relationship in Central America is with Mexico (Jacques, 2009:188). Mexico established diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1972. In the mid-1970s, when the PRC started to be more proactive in international relations, the CCP sent scholars and junior state officials to Mexico to learn about Latin America. Those specialists are now in charge of the PRC’s strategy toward the region (Arnson & Davidow, 2010). Mexico is the PRC’s largest trading partner in Central America (Central Government, 2/18/2012). This partnership and the level of trade are highly influenced to Mexico’s close proximity to the US. Initially, Mexico and the PRC had a good relationship, but that relationship began to wane in the 1980s as the PRC became a competitor against Mexico in manufacturing goods for the U.S. market. However, in 1994, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was ratified making it easier
for goods to flow across the Mexican-U.S. border. This rejuvenated Mexico’s relationship with the PRC as it became cheaper to ship goods into Mexico and then transport those goods into the U.S. and Canada by land than to ship them directly into the northern ports. The majority of trade, though, is one sided in the PRC’s favor. Mexico’s manufacturing sector is still suffering because of PRC manufacturing, but Mexico is reaping the benefits its close proximity to the North American markets and the low labor cost of its ports (Dumbaugh & Sullivan, 2005; Arnson & Davidow, 2011).

The PRC’s soft power initiatives with Mexico, as seen in the high number of Confucian Institutes in Mexico, seem to be having a positive effect. A BBC poll found that a plurality of Mexicans are in favor of the PRC’s growing influence in the world even though the PRC’s industrialization has slowed Mexico’s manufacturing sector (Huang & Deng, 2007). Some scholars have suggested that the PRC is using its strong relationship with Mexico to aid it in gaining acceptance by the other nations in Central America (Erikson and Chen, 2007).

After Mexico, the PRC next strongest relationship in Central America is with Costa Rica. Recently, Costa Rica and the PRC have signed a free trade agreement that is mutually beneficial to both countries (Ministry of Commerce China, 4/7/2012). Following Costa Rica, the PRC has strengthened relations with both Panama and Nicaragua. The PRC is the second largest user of the Panama Canal. Panama has been attempting to attract more PRC business to its nation and even has development offices for that purpose (People Daily, 4/13/2010). The PRC and Chinese construction companies are also aiding the government of Panama in the expansion of the Panama Canal. A major shipping company based in Hong Kong, Hutchinson-Whampoa, has a 50
year operational lease on some of the port facilities along the Canal. The business of shipping the PRC’s goods through the canal have brought Panama and the PRC closer together (Erikson & Chen, 2007). If Panama switches it’s recognition to the PRC it could have a mitigating effect on the other nations of Central America, because Panama is the most important nation in the region that still maintains official diplomatic relations with Taiwan (Kurlantzick, 2007).

President Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua, leader of the socialist Sandinista party, is seeking to formalize relations with the PRC, but still officially recognizes Taiwan. Nicaragua has been inviting PRC businesses to sell the wares in the country, while state trade agencies are trying to sell Nicaraguan agricultural products to the PRC. The Nica-China Friendship Association was founded by President Daniel Ortega’s top economic advisor to stimulate Sino-Nicaraguan trade (Rogers, 1/14/2011). In 1985, when Ortega first came to power, he broke diplomatic relations with Taiwan and officially recognized the PRC. When Ortega was voted out in 1990, Nicaragua resumed its recognition of Taiwan (Erikson & Chen, 2007). Both Panama and/or Nicaragua might be the next countries to switch their recognition to the PRC based on their levels of interaction with the PRC.
Chapter 4
Toward One-China

The CCP has always maintained that Taiwan is part of China. Much of the PRC’s foreign aid, as opposed to direct foreign investment, is aimed at helping the PRC accomplish two goals. The first goal is to secure the resources that the PRC needs more and more, and the second goal is to further isolate Taiwan (Lum et. al., 2009). In October 1992, President Jiang reported to the National Congress of the Communist Party that there was only one China, but that his government was prepared to talk with the government of Taiwan about reconciliation that was agreeable to both parties. Jiang’s comments lead to the first official meeting between Taiwanese and PRC officials. These meetings took place in April of 1993 and they succeeded in the bringing about the opening two semi-official joint organizations: The Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation and the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Straits (Grasso 2007:260, 263).

Since then the relationship between Taiwan and the PRC has grown much stronger. The PRC is the only country outside of Central America that maintains a free trade agreement with Taiwan (Ministry of Economic Affairs R.O.C., 4/7/2012). Nearly 40% of Taiwanese trade is with the PRC (Jacques, 2009:305). Even with the election of a pro-independence President Chen Shui-bian in 2000 as Taiwan’s first non- Guómíndǎng president, relations between Taiwan and the PRC have steadily improved. Elections in 2008 returned the Guómíndǎng party to power with the election of Ma Ying-jeou. The Guómíndǎng does not directly advocate for reunification, but is against independence from the mainland. As an example of how touchy a subject independence of Taiwan is, in 2005 the National
People’s Congress, the legislative body of the CCP, passed the Anti-Secession Law which approved military action in Taiwan if it was ever to claim independence from the mainland (Huang & Ding, 2007).

Still though, recognition is crucial to Taiwan to keep from being further isolated and eventually swallowed up by the PRC (Rich, 2009). The 23 countries that continue to recognize Taiwan give it some validity on the world stage. Taiwan also participates either directly or as an observer in many international organizations which also adds to its argument of sovereignty. It is the PRC’s hope that the international community will help it in achieving reunification by no longer recognizing Taiwan and refusing it to allow Taiwan to participate in international coalitions (Taiwan Affairs Office of the PRC, 2000). The CCP also seeks to prevent countries from entering into bilateral trade agreements with Taiwan, and encourages its allies to prevent Taiwanese officials from participating in nongovernmental regional forums (Kurlantzick, 2006).

The PRC understands the recognition game and plays it well. The PRC was quick to recognize the new states of Eastern Europe after the fall of communism in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The PRC immediately recognized the Baltic States that broke away from the Soviet Union. When the communist regime of the Soviet Union itself fell, China recognized the new Russian state rather quickly (Vogel 2011:658). It might be that after spending years in a state of formal recognition limbo, the PRC does not want to be seen using formal recognition as a weapon of state craft. The PRC maintains formal diplomatic relations with 169 other nations. In terms of regime legitimacy, all of those countries recognize the CCP in Beijing as the controlling regime of the PRC.
Additionally, by not recognizing Taiwan or the regime in Taipei, those 169 state actors are implying that Taiwan is part of greater China (Rich, 2009).

In the late 1970s Deng proposed a “one-country, two-systems” style for the return of Hong Kong to the Mainland. He later proposed that this system would work for Taiwan as well (Kuhn 2010:377). Hong Kong and Macau are both former territorial possessions of European nations, Great Britain and Portugal respectively. These former colonies were ceded to the PRC at the end of the 1990s. Both now operate as special administrative zone with a great deal of autonomy from the PRC. Hong Kong has an independent judiciary and multi-party elections (Hong Kong, 4/01/2012). Macau has its own separate government from the PRC which operates through a mix of liberal democracy and mercantilism (Macau, 4/01/2012). Both Hong Kong and Macau are examples of the willingness of the CCP to make impressive political and social exemptions in order to facilitate their One-China goal.

Starting in 1979, the CCP has pursued the “One-China, two systems” model for peaceful reunification of Taiwan with the Mainland which has become known as the “One-China” principle or goal (Taiwan Affairs Office of the PRC, 2000). The CCP seems willing to make extensive concessions to the Taiwanese people in order to reunify. It is even possible that the CCP would be satisfied with a simple changing of the flags, thus allowing Taiwan to continue for a number of years as is politically and socially. Both Hong Kong and Macau were guaranteed autonomy for a set number of years before they come fully under PRC control. It seems completely reasonable for a similar compromise to be made with Taiwan, maybe even one much more beneficial to Taiwan. Of course, the fear in all three cases is that the authoritative government of the PRC will
eventually reduce or remove the civil liberties and democratic liberalization of all three regions. This is an honest fear, and there is some evidence that it is happening in Hong Kong already (Economist, 2008). However, it is possible the liberalized aspects of Hong Kong and Macau will influence the PRC as a whole. If Taiwan was to reconcile with the PRC and reunify, it could have a positive effect towards liberalization (what the CCP might consider a negative effect) in a unified China.

The CCP is very adamant about the One-China policy. Even though tensions have eased over the last several years, the CCP most likely will never give up its goal of reunification. The military option might be slowly fading away as a rational choice, but the PRC could possibly use economic force to bring about reunification. The CCP will allow business to be conducted with a country that does not officially recognize PRC, but in order for any significant state business to transpire, like free trade agreements, countries have to officially recognize the PRC. Official recognition of the PRC does not mean a country has to fully suspend doing business with Taiwan either. It merely means that Taiwan can no longer complete treaties or trade negotiations as a state actor (Erikson & Chen, 2007). Reunification would also most likely mean that Taiwan would have to obey the treaties and trade agreements of the PRC, unless a compromise was negotiated for between Taiwan and the PRC where Taiwan could make separate trade agreements.

With the PRC’s economic might, it could easily start putting pressure on Taiwan’s trade partners to economically isolate the island. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Taiwan has proposed a “diplomatic truce” as a means for Taiwan to co-exist with the PRC. Under this truce, Taiwan would still be able to maintain diplomatic relations with foreign states, without being formally recognized by those states. Also, this
unofficial truce would end the unofficial “wallet war” being conducted between the PRC and Taiwan (China Post, 09/10/2008). Taiwan seems to be trying to establish some unofficial rules so it can continue unmolested. The CCP has the upper hand over Taiwan economically, and might even have it militarily through simple attrition. That is, unless of course, the US decides to honor its stated military protection of the island. The CCP could fear that if Taiwan is pushed into a corner economically or militarily, the Taiwanese might view declaring independence as their only option in maintaining their current freedom. Right now though, it appears the CCP is happy with the current level of détente over reunification. It is difficult to theorize how long that happiness can be maintained.

Even though the CCP appears to have reached an unofficial truce on militarily or economically forcing Taiwan to reconcile, it doesn’t mean it has given up on the soft power front. The PRC is reembracing its rich religious history, under the auspices of cultural heritage, in expressing itself both internally and internationally as part of its Harmonious Society initiative. The religions of the PRC are also the religions of Taiwan. There has been increased religious dialogue across the strait of Taiwan for a number of years now. Each side sees the creation of closer religious ties between Taiwan and the PRC as a form of soft power (Brown & Cheng, 2012). The State Agency for Religious Affairs sees the benefit in across strait religious relations and has encourages Buddhist organizations to build bridges with the Buddhist of Taiwan (Sun, 2011). Mainland China is resplendent with Buddhist and Taoist religious pilgrimage sites that lure Taiwanese across the strait. Tourism, even religious tourism, is a good form of soft power.
Continued cross-border movements by religious adherents will continue to bring the PRC and Taiwan closer together.

The Vatican’s power around the world could be viewed as almost entirely soft power. The quote “How many divisions [military] does the pope have?” in one form or another is attributed to Joseph Stalin about the insignificance of the pope. The answer is, of course, none. But the pope does command hundreds of millions of loyal believers. In today’s modernized world, it is difficult to imagine those followers taking up arms against the state at the pope or the Vatican’s request. However, it is not beyond credulity to imagine large portions of Catholics following Vatican dictates on voting. The soft power of religion is not as powerful as the sword or the wallet, but it does have power to influence and make change.

The current situation of recognition between the PRC and the Vatican is all soft power. The PRC cannot really threaten the Vatican with military or economic power. The Vatican has no real military or any real trade activity. The power the Vatican does have is a spiritual link to those few million Chinese who belong to the underground Catholic Church. It is the same spiritual link it has with the Catholics in Central America. The uniqueness of the Catholics in Central America is they are overwhelmingly the majority. Just over 75% of Central America is Catholic (CIA, 2012), and it can be argued, devoutly Catholic.

The Vatican has a heavy influence in Central America, maybe more so than any other region in the world. The Catholic Church heavily influences social policy throughout Central America. Even with the democracy movements and liberalization that has grown in the region, abortion and women’s reproductive issues are more restrictive in
Central American than anywhere else in the western hemisphere (Kulczycki, 2011). Central American attitudes on women’s reproductive issues are in line with Catholic Doctrine. The Catholic Church is staunchly anti-capital punishment. In Central America, only Belize allows for capital punishment in civil crimes, and additionally, El Salvador authorizes it for military crimes in a time of war (Amnesty International, 4/17/2012). The Vatican seemingly does possess soft power in Central America. A closer Sino-Vatican relationship could employ the soft power influence of the Vatican in Central America to aid the PRC in strengthening ties with the heavily Catholic countries of the region (Leurhman, 2009).

The Vatican is Taiwan’s longest enduring ally except Panama. It is the most influential of the 23 states that still recognize Taiwan. However, when the UN recognized the PRC in 1971, the Vatican replaced the head of the diplomatic mission to Taiwan with a charge d’affaires (below the status of ambassador). Since then, official relations between Taiwan and the Vatican have not been at the highest of international levels (Brown & Cheng, 2011). The CCP insist that diplomatic ties between the Vatican and the PRC can only be established if the Vatican recognizes the PRC’s “One-China” goal as legitimate, and suspends official diplomatic relations with Taiwan (Luehrmann, 2009). Attilio Massimo, ambassador to the PRC from Italy, stated in a PRC daily newspaper that relations with Taiwan were not the cause of the impasse in Sino-Vatican relations. It instead had to do with the appointment of bishops in the PRC. The ambassador also defined the negotiations as being between “two independent states” (Global Times, 11/29/2011). In 1999, Cardinal Angelo Sodano, the Vatican Secretary of State, said the
Vatican would be willing to drop its recognition of Taiwan if the PRC would appoint the bishops of the Chinese Catholic Church from a Vatican approved list (Reardon, 2011).

The PRC diplomatic strategy in Central America remains one of its main instruments in achieving its One-China goal and further isolating Taiwan (Dumbaugh & Sullivan, 2005; Sepulveda, 2008). Central America has other aspects that make it attractive to the PRC, but further isolation of Taiwan, thus forcing reconciliation, is seemingly far more important to the PRC than simple trade with Central America. According to the One-China goal, in order for a nation to maintain official diplomatic relations with the PRC that nation cannot recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state (Erikson & Chen, 2007). Taiwanese recognition is really the last sticking point preventing more trade between the PRC and Central America. And it is not really that big of a sticking point. Panama does not officially recognize the PRC, yet those two nations conduct a large amount of business together. Panama no longer supports Taiwan’s presence in the United Nations, despite official diplomatic relations between the two countries. China has already succeeded in weakening Taiwan’s presence in Central America recently as 2007 when Costa Rica changed its recognition status (Kurlantzick, 2006). The PRC’s use of wallet diplomacy was measurably effective in Costa Rica (Lum et al., 2009). As the PRC’s trade and Foreign Direct Investment have been rising in Central America, Taiwan has been steadily falling off (Cheng, 2006).

There is a feeling among some scholars that the CCP is interested in formalizing diplomatic relations with the Vatican specifically to aid the PRC in establishing diplomatic ties with Central America, thus further weakening Taiwan’s claim for autonomy (Cheng, 2006). It is impossible to say whether the Vatican could truly make
any Central American state change its official recognition status by itself, but having Vatican support would be influential for the PRC. This thesis is not supposing that a change in the Vatican’s position on the PRC would cause a domino effect of recognition switching by Catholic countries the world over, but just simply the idea that formal Sino-Vatican Relations would be beneficial to the PRC in the One-China goal. The Catholic Church does play a role in the governmental policies of countries where it has a large number of parishioners. The Catholic Church was influential in ending communism in Poland, and it has been influential in Central America social policies, namely reproductive rights. If the Vatican was to use its soft power to influence the countries of Central America to support the PRC it would most likely have an effect. Even if the Vatican simply removed its objection of the PRC it would still most likely have an effect on Central American recognition of the PRC by removing one more reason for denying recognition. It doesn’t appear there really needs to be that much more encouragement.

**Why formalized relations need to happen sooner than later.**

Richard Madsen, one of the more recognized scholars of modern religion in China, surmised in 2003 that the Vatican is winning the political battle with the CCP because Chinese Catholics have more allegiance to Rome than with the power structure in Beijing. However, it doesn’t seem to be to either parties benefit to continue this political tug of war. Both sides have histories they are not proud of in Sino-Vatican relations, but adhering to those histories only stands in the way of reconciliation.
Madsen’s conclusions might have been a correct assessment in 2003, but it is possible that his conclusions are no longer valid.

There are a number of positions the Vatican still tenuously holds which would aid it in Sino-Vatican negotiations. Position number one is the level of commitment to Rome by the members of the unofficial Church in China. While religion is on the rise throughout the PRC, Catholicism is only growing at the same rate as the general population of the PRC (Madsen 2003). Because of the rules against proselytizing in the PRC it is unlikely that there would be a growth in Catholicism even with the Vatican’s influence. A papal visit might have some effect, but anything presented here would be speculative at best. Besides, the Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association (CPA) has been operating with the full support of the PRC for a number of years and it has not seen an exceptional population growth. It could be possible that a unified Catholic Church in the PRC might attract more parishioners, but there is very little evidence for this (Luehrmann, 2009). The underground Church faces several challenges which the CPA does not. The underground Church has limited financing whereas the CPA is state funded. The CPA has fully functioning seminaries to train new priest while the underground church must rely on priest with less or no formal training. Because the CPA operates with the official approval of the CCP there are much better lines of communication between the official Church in China and its parishioners. The illegality of the underground Church, however, causes communication between the different dieses in the PRC and even with Rome is difficult (Lai, 2006). Right now, Rome still has a good deal of influence with the underground Catholic Church. The underground Church has maintained its commitment to Rome even though it has been had to deal with all the
above mentioned constraints. It remains to be seen, though, how long the Vatican can walk the tight-rope between improved Sino-Vatican relations, and supporting the underground Church.

The second bargaining position is the apostolic mandate. Nearly 85% of the bishops in the PRC, both from the underground Church and the Catholic Patriotic Association, have received an apostolic mandate from the Vatican (Luehrmann, 2009). With the ever increasing number of bishops approved by both the Vatican and the CCP, the fear of placing ones soul in mortal peril by knowingly receiving sacraments from an excommunicated clergy is steadily being mitigated (Lai, 2006). The Vatican seems to be defeating itself, at least politically, by working with the PRC on mutually agreeing to the appointment of bishops. In this issue, the Vatican is failing to act like a realist state actor and is apparently more concerned for the souls of Catholics in China than what is best politically for the Holy See. If joint approval continues to happen the point of contention which is the apostolic mandate could simply disappear. It already seems that an unstated agreement is forming between the two powers on bishop appointment, but a formal agreement would serve both better.

The third position is growing competition in the PRC by other religions, or simple modernization, for the hearts and souls of the Chinese. Many urbanized Chinese are drifting away from Catholicism because it lacks relevance in a rapidly modernizing PRC. The strongest Catholic areas in the PRC are rural areas which have been Catholic since before the communist revolution (Madsen, 2003). As the PRC modernizes, the rural population will migrate to the urban centers. This is already happening. Whereas Mao’s Cultural Revolution brutally suppressed religion, the CCP now believe that scientific
education, and not political coercion, will bring an end to religious ideology (Madsen 2010). However, this has not been proven to be universally correct, and in fact in many nations the peoples’ desire for spiritual faith grows strong in spite of predicted modernization trends (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005:64). This is certainly the case in the US, but the US has a unique religious market place. But even in the rich religious landscape of the US, Catholicism is not experiencing a growth of conversion. Europe as well is seeing a decline of Catholicism (Luehrmann, 2009). Religion is on the rise in the PRC, but not Catholicism (Yang, 2006). Protestantism is growing exponentially, and the Chinese are reemerging their traditional religions (Madsen, 2010). At least for now, Catholicism is not losing ground. This may not be the case for very much longer as modernization moves into the rural spaces of China. The Vatican could negotiate for a more powerful presence in China, but those negotiations would have to be exceptionally nuanced.

Position number four is recognition of Taiwan. Pope Benedict the XVI implied in his 2007 letter the possibility of switching recognition. The Vatican is Taiwan’s longest enduring ally. The Church in Taiwan contends that a change in recognition would make little difference to its relations with the Vatican and also Catholics in Taiwan (Brown & Cheng, 2012). Vatican Secretary of state Angelo Sodano stated that the if Taiwan returned to the PRC the Vatican would be ready to close down the Taiwan Embassy in 24 hours (Galezzi, 12/22/2011). Relations between the PRC and Taiwan have been steadily improving over the last decade. The CCP is very pragmatic and forward looking. One of the benefits of being a 5,000 year old culture seems to be the ability to make very long term plans (Erikson & Chen, 2007). The CCP has a distinct desire to see Taiwan return to
the mainland. However, the CCP knows that these goals do not have to be accomplished today or tomorrow or even next year. There is no time frame and the CCP is more than willing to wait. Owing to its culture and history, the CCP doesn’t view its long term plans in years, but rather decades (Kay, 2012:114). The PRC could spend billions in wallet-diplomacy not to isolate Taiwan, or it can patiently wait to see if Taiwan rejoins of its own accord. It’s possible that the CCP believes that it has already won the recognition battle and is now just waiting for the rest of the world, and Taiwan especially, to realize it. Taiwan is much more important to the CCP than the Vatican or the 10 million or so Catholics in the PRC. If reconciliation of Sino-Vatican relations would cause any stress on PRC/Taiwan relations, the Vatican is going to lose. If the CCP has to choose between better relations with Taiwan or normalized relations with the Vatican, it will choose Taiwan (Brown & Cheng, 2011). The CCP still wants to isolate Taiwan. The Vatican’s recognition is a big “get,” and it would be a major piece in the CCP’s One-China policy.

The fifth position is the Vatican’s influence in Central America. The PRC is increasing its presence on the world stage and is also seeking to improve its relationship with Central America (Leuhrmann, 2009). The countries of Central America are already edging closer to the PRC. The Vatican’s soft power is influential in Central America. The soft power of the Vatican was evident to US President Reagan. His administration worked with the Vatican to weaken communism in Eastern Europe, particularly in Poland (Bernstein & Politi, 1996:13). This shows that the Vatican is willing to use its soft power to influence a region on behalf of another state actor as long as their goals are mutually beneficial. A combined effort of increased trade and foreign direct investment by the PRC, and the applications of the Vatican’s soft power aimed at Central America could
produce a domino effect and turn Central America pro-PRC in short order. Again though, the PRC is making its own headway in Central America irregardless of the Vatican. For the Vatican to use Central America as a bargaining position, it might need to imply more than just simple influence in the region.

And finally, the sixth position is the Vatican’s ability to have a stabilizing effect on the Catholic populace of the PRC. The CCP has a distinct desire to explore political tension management so it can continue to govern the PRC unchallenged. To do that it will need to make the Chinese people happy, or give them outlets for their unhappiness. Religion is an excellent conduit for the disenfranchised to release their displeasure. The Catholic Church has a long history of providing solace to the people without threatening the political regimes in power. Because of the centralized control of Rome and the tightly formalized structure of the Church, Catholicism does not lend itself to state instability. Catholicism’s ability to manage tensions and mollify the masses is could perhaps be the most appealing position to the CCP. It would not appear that this position is in danger of decreasing in value the near future like some of the other positions. However, any negotiations concerning the Vatican’s ability to provide another mechanism of political tension management for the CCP in this manner would have to be so tacitly nuanced that the author of this thesis cannot even begin to speculate.
Conclusions

The People’s Republic of China is now a financial world power, and the Vatican has been a dominating global force for the past 1,500 years. In the modernized world of today though, the Vatican’s power has diminished while the PRC’s has ascended. Still, the Vatican has influence in many nations of the world, including some without a Catholic majority. The Vatican’s influence is best characterized as soft power, but it is a well-entrenched and well-managed soft power. The Vatican has not had to deal with its own modernization, but it is possible that modernization has affected the Vatican City State as much as any other nation in the world. The Vatican has had to adapt to a modernizing world that is finding less and less space for a formalized religion still governed by 3rd century rules. Where once the Holy Roman Empire was the strongest force in the world, controlling people, royalty, governments, nations and continents, it now has to reshape itself to the rapidly changing world where knowledge is exchanged in the blink of an eye; where a new disease outbreak in the jungles of Borneo can be on the Vatican’s doorstep in less than twenty-four hours; where individual relationships and access to God can be completed regardless of the pope in Rome. Like China, the Vatican has known its own periods of retrenchment where it attempted to turn its back on the modernizing world. Eventually though, like China, the Vatican had to reenter the world and attempt to become part of it. The political gamesmanship of the world’s most religious state formally recognizing the world’s most atheist government is almost humorous, but it is also exemplary of modernity in a globalized world.
China did not just attempt to become part of the modern world, it capitalized on it. China’s story and the Vatican’s story have similarities which seem strange being that they are apparently such opposites. Both have seen massive upheavals which destroyed centuries of tradition. Both possess cultural heritages ruled by ancient systems that have had to reform themselves to survive into modernity. Both tried to withdraw from the world when it was clear it had passed them by. Both are using their cultural history as soft power to build bridges with other cultures around the world. It appears that both have a hope that their traditions and culture will be appealing to a world which is experiencing the benefits and determents from the maddening speed of modernity.

This thesis has postulated improved Sino-Vatican relationship should aid the PRC in three particular areas: domestic tension management, improvement in relations with Central America, and isolating Taiwan from the international community. The first proposition explored was a look at how the CCP has and can use a better relationship with the Vatican in managing internal political tensions. The actions of the government of the PRC, in regards to management of its people, point to a recognizable effort by the CCP in seeking to create a normative relationship between itself and the people of China. There are multiple benefits that can result from this normative relationship, not the least of which is regime legitimacy resulting from a happier population. Maslow theorizes that people have a desire for self-expression. In order for the CCP to maintain power and legitimacy in the PRC while still allowing for Chinese self-expression, the CCP has a need to create a space for individual freedom. Religion is outlet for those seeking control over their lives and a way to express personal freedom. A wide open religious market place, like the one in the US, most likely would not serve the CCP well in maintaining its
power. The highly structured and controlling Catholic religion can function well in authoritarian states. It is possible that the Catholic Church could work well with the authoritarian CCP. Catholicism advocates to its followers to render unto Caesar what is Caesar’s and render ones soul unto God (Matthew, 22:21). The Vatican contends that a good Catholic is a good citizen, and good citizens are what the CCP hopes to have.

Catholicism can serve a need for the people of modernizing China. It can provide structure and solace to the people of China whose lives are growing increasingly more hectic with the fast pace of modernization. Religion, and this is something Catholicism does exceptionally well, can provide a sense of community and belonging that may be slipping away from the Chinese. With modernization comes mobility, and the people of China are on the move more now than perhaps at any other time in their long history. The draw of wealth to be found in the cities of the PRC is pulling millions away from the traditional, ancestral homes. Religion can provide a connection to tradition and community which is often lost along the path of modernization. One aspect of Catholicism that possibly separates it from other religions is its formalized infrastructure which maintains a level of consistency throughout the Catholic world. This consistency and structure could prove to be beneficial to the people of China, but maybe even more beneficial to the authoritative regime of the CCP which can use every additional control mechanism it can find in managing the tensions of and with the Chinese people.

The second concept examined in this thesis has been how the PRC’s relationship with Central America has evolved over the last few decades concerning official recognition of the PRC instead Taiwan. The PRC has been very active in seeking to delegitimize Taiwan by luring away those few countries that still officially recognize it.
The PRC has had a great deal of success in these efforts as there are only 23 countries left in the world that still maintain official diplomatic ties with Taiwan. The greatest concentrations of countries that do still recognize Taiwan are the heavily Catholic countries of Central America. The PRC has used several strategies to further its goals which include soft power, trade and foreign direct investment. Costa Rica has already switched its allegiance, and Mexico did so long ago. Panama and Nicaragua may be the next to go. The Vatican does have influence in the region as can be seen by Central America’s policies concerning social issues. If the Vatican was to remove it objections and formally recognize the PRC, it would most likely provide more soft power for the PRC in its attempt to further isolate Taiwan by removing the support of the countries of Central America. This application of soft power would be even greater if the Vatican actually became an advocate for the PRC in the region.

The third proposition examined is how formal recognition of the PRC by the Vatican, a clear sign of improved Sino-Vatican ties, will help further isolate Taiwan as part of the One-China policy. The Vatican is arguable the strongest ally of Taiwan. Even though the Vatican does not command any armies or lucrative trade resources, it possesses almost incalculable soft power. The Vatican is an influential actor on the world stage, most especially the western world. Its allegiance to Taiwan helps to keep the issue of Taiwanese autonomy active. The Vatican is the only country in the Global North that still maintains official diplomatic relations with Taiwan. The soft power resources of the Vatican that have been able to support Taiwan could become the soft power resources of the PRC. This thesis does not contend that a change in the diplomatic recognition of Taiwan by the Vatican would immediately end Taiwanese autonomy, but instead has
presented evidence that loss of the Vatican’s recognition would be a crippling blow to Taiwanese autonomy.

The PRC has become a major force economically. It now wields power and influence that it has not possessed for hundreds of years. The PRC has a clear and motivated desire to reunify with Taiwan and is actively working to do so. The nation as a whole has an aching desire to be whole, to be One-China. Just one thing stands in its way, Taiwan. The PRC has already reached an economic level which allows it to dwarf any amount of trade, foreign investment, or aid Taiwan can use to maintain its autonomy. Because of the huge manufacturing base the PRC’s hunger for raw materials appears insatiable (Cheng 2007). With the inclusion of the PRC’s energy need for its population and ever expanding economic machine, there is simple no way Taiwan can compete in a trade war or simple wallet-diplomacy. As proof for this, the President of Taiwan, Ma Ying-jeou, has called for a diplomatic truce in the in the decades old trade war between Taiwan and the PRC (China Post 9/10/2008). For the most part, Taiwan is isolated enough politically from the rest of the world that the PRC can be patient about reunifying with Taiwan.

The CCP’s application of soft power throughout Central America has made the countries in the region which still support Taiwan pieces on an international chess board. In Central America, Taiwan still holds the majority of pieces. But when the scenario is expanded out to the entire world, Taiwan is severely outmatched. It is possible that those Central American countries which still recognize Taiwan only need a little more encouragement to make the switch. The PRC has been actively providing that encouragement through trade, infrastructure projects, and soft power. One additional
avenue of soft power that the PRC can play is employing the Vatican as a pro-PRC actor in the heavily Catholic countries of Central America. If the Vatican and the PRC were to settle their differences, come up with an equitable solution on the appointment of bishops, mutually agree on the jurisdiction of the Catholic Patriotic Association, and if the Vatican would recognize the PRC as the one China, then the two nations could formalize relations. What would certainly be part of that formal recognition would be for the Vatican to encourage the governments of the Catholic countries of Central America to follow suit. Neither the Vatican nor the CCP seem to be in any sort of hurry though. Patience in political matters seems to be a cultural trait of both the Chinese and the Holy See.

There has been a noticeable weakening in tensions between the PRC and Taiwan. It appears that there is willingness, at least for now, to accept things as they are. For the CCP, it’s possible they are no longer forcing the issue because the see reconciliation now as inevitable (Erikson & Chen, 2007). It is generally assumed that the PRC will allow Taiwan to continue to operate with its own government and policies as long as it does not seek to become independent. It might even be possible that the CCP would allow Taiwan an extensive amount of autonomy, to include its growing liberal democracy, even if it does accept PRC sovereignty (Jacques, 2009: 294). Taiwan might feel that it can continue indefinitely with the level of détente that now exist. The PRC has a number of other issues that require the concerted efforts of the CCP regime, which probably lends itself to the CCP’s acquiescence to the current static relation with Taiwan. At some point though, the CCP is going to return to the issue of reunification. Their return could be expedited by a new democratically elected regime in Taiwan that does not support the status quo. It
is possible that actions on either side could exasperate the current friendly relation into something much more dramatic.

The last chapter this thesis presented the idea that the Vatican needs to act now if it wishes to bargain from a position of strength, or even equality with the PRC. It is possible that it simply may be too late for the Vatican to hold either position. Cardinal Zen was asked in an interview by Zenit.org, a non-profit Catholic news site, when he thought the Vatican and the PRC would exchange ambassadors. Zen stated he did not see formalized relations happening between the PRC and the Vatican because it could offend the Taiwanese. Zen implies that the improved relationship between the PRC and Taiwan is much more important to the CCP then official recognition of the PRC by the Vatican (Koller, 09/08/2010). This shows that the negotiating power that the Vatican has with the PRC is waning even more. It may also be the case that, as with Taiwan, the PRC sees official diplomatic recognition by the Vatican as an eventuality. The two Churches in China are growing together and mutual bishop approval is becoming the norm. Allowing a natural progression to happen between the two churches could create a stronger organization, stronger perhaps than if they were forced together. Additionally, the CCP might realize that if the Vatican was to negotiate recognition now it would have a strong bargaining position. Whereas the longer the CCP waits the more strength the Vatican could lose.

Taiwan is the biggest card in the Vatican’s hand, but that card might be meaningless to the CCP. It is highly possible that the Vatican has lost most of its bargaining chips. There is a strong belief in both Taiwan and Beijing that reunification will happen. Central America is already seeing the advantage of being friends with the
PRC instead of Taiwan. The Catholic Church in China, both the state approved CPA and underground church are growing closer together. Additionally, Catholics in the PRC have never presented themselves as an outright threat to the regime of the CCP. It is very possible in the near future that the only thing the Vatican will have to offer the People’s Republic of China is just its friendship.
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