Adoption of External Voting in Latin America and the Caribbean

Hafthor Brynjar Erlingsson

University of Nevada, Las Vegas, erlingss@unlv.nevada.edu
ADOPTION OF EXTERNAL VOTING IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

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Hafthor Brynjar Erlingsson

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Hafthor Brynjar Erlingsson

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John Tuman, Ph.D., Committee Chair
David F. Damore, Ph.D., Committee Member
Ted G. Jelen, Ph.D., Committee Member
Miriam Melton-Villanueva, Ph.D., Graduate College Representative
Kathryn Hausbeck Korgan, Ph.D., Interim Dean of the Graduate College

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Abstract

The number of countries worldwide that have allowed citizens abroad the opportunity to vote in elections taking place in their country-of-origin has risen sharply in the last thirty years. Many countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have followed this global trend of granting voting rights to their migrant communities. However, the source of this trend in Latin America and the Caribbean has not been well addressed in the political science literature. This study seeks to minimize that gap by analyzing the determinants of external voting rights for 27 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, using data from 1980-2012. The study applies the Cox Proportional Hazard Model to determine which variables increase the likelihood of external voting legislation. Furthermore, case studies of Chile and Mexico are presented. The thesis concludes by emphasizing the impact of remittances, political leaning of the government, and the political calculations that politicians must take when deciding whether or not to adopt external voting laws.
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Chapter 1:

Introduction

In the span of a few decades, the number of countries in the world granting their citizens abroad the right to vote has significantly increased. Despite the fact that a majority of the world’s countries and territories now allow external voting in some form, and that external voting has been implemented in every region of the world (Navarro, Morales and Gratschew, 2007) the political science literature has not paid much attention to this important topic.

The goal of this thesis is to find out why external voting legislation has been adopted in Latin America and the Caribbean. Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have followed a global trend, as the number of countries allowing those abroad the chance to vote has sharply risen in the last thirty years. However, the source of this trend in Latin America and the Caribbean remains a puzzle. First of all, extending the voting base has the potential to challenge those in positions of authority and weaken their power. As Jack and Lagunoff have stated, “expansion of political rights by ruling elite is at first glance paradoxical. The elite, after all, dilutes its power when it extends these rights to others” (2006, 552). Secondly, allowing those abroad to vote also reduces the power of the electorate as a whole, as it can be argued that each vote that is cast abroad decreases the power of votes in the homeland. Therefore, one would expect that those in power would be hesitant to adopt laws that enfranchise those living abroad.

In the subsequent chapters, I will examine in detail some of the potential factors that might help explain why external voting has been adopted and implemented in Latin America and the Caribbean. Several prominent explanations are often mentioned in the
scholarly literature for why external voting legislations have been implemented, including: that sending states are willing to grant political right to migrants in order to receive economic and political benefits in return; states have started to view the notions of citizenship and the nation-state in a different way; and that the globalization of the world’s population has pressured states to adopt external voting.

Numerous countries in Latin America and the Caribbean are highly dependent on financial assistance from those that have emigrated. As of the mid-2000s, in some countries in the region, remittances sent by migrants surpassed foreign aid budgets and remittances matched the foreign currency states received from exports (Portes, Escobar and Radford, 2007, 243-244). This has led countries to implement a wide range of policies in order to attract and channel remittances (Levitt and De la Dehesa, 2003). The financial power of emigrants of the Dominican Republic has been viewed as a major reason why Dominicans were allotted the right to vote in elections while abroad, and why they were granted the right to hold dual citizenship (Barry, 2006). Another important reason why external voting has become so prevalent is the changing attitudes towards emigrants.

Historically, once individuals left their country-of-origin they were no longer considered to be a part of society, and those that emigrated were frequently portrayed negatively by their home government. Emigrants were often cast as deserters that no longer had an interest in their homeland, or even traitors (Gamlen, 2013). Countries were subsequently deeply opposed to granting migrants political rights such as the opportunity to vote from abroad and the opportunity to acquire dual citizenships. However, in the last few decades, the relationship between migrants and their state of origin has been
transformed significantly. Heads of states in many countries are now determined to make a point by embracing their émigré population that had previously been forgotten by the state (Ragazzi, 2009). Migrants are now more frequently viewed as being successful by those in the homeland, and they are also viewed as being an important asset to export values and practices that they have adopted in their host country (Fargues, 2011). This change in the perception of migrants has in part led to the proliferation of states granting political and social rights to those abroad. In fact, it might be considered that external voting is becoming a democratic norm, which might explain the increase in countries allowing for voting abroad, and why western democracies have started to encourage emerging democracies to adopt external voting.

The international community has favored letting migrants vote in contentious elections to give those elections more legitimacy. Migrants were given the chance to vote in East Timor, Kosovo, and Bosnia and Herzegovina because external voting was seen as a step towards national reconciliation and being helpful to start the process of building democratic institutions (Grace, 2007). Afghans living in Iran and Pakistan were ten percent of the electorate in the first elections after the fall of the Taliban regime (Navarro, Morales and Gratschew, 2007), and Egyptians abroad were allowed to vote for the first time in the parliamentary elections subsequent to the January 25, 2011 revolution (El Baradei, Wafa and Ghoneim, 2012). After the fall of Saddam Hussein, the Danish government encouraged citizens of Iraq in Denmark to vote by subsidizing their travel cost to get to a polling place (Thompson, 2007). These examples illustrate the rise of external voting around the world. A few decades ago, it had only been implemented by a
modest number of states, but now it is being recommended to the most volatile “democracies” in the world, many of which are holding their first democratic elections.

It seems clear that the increase in international migration coinciding with democratization has largely sparked the increase in migrants’ rights around the world (Fierro, 2007). From 1910 to 2000, the estimated number of people not living in their country of origin increased six times, while at the same time the earth’s population increased by threefold (Benhabib, 2005, 673). This increase in international migration, especially in certain areas such as Latin America and the Caribbean, is fundamentally changing how states view citizenship, as it is becoming less based on territorial bounds (Joppke, 2003; Escobar, 2007). It is understandable that states are being forced to rethink their relationship with citizens living abroad due to the sheer numbers of citizens that have emigrated.

In terms of population, New York City has the second largest number of Dominicans in the world, second only to Santo Domingo, the capital of the Dominican Republic (Portes, Escobar and Radford, 2007). The global trend of migration has also affected highly developed migration receiving states. It has been estimated that 5.5 million British citizens live permanently abroad, which is more than 9 percent of the population, with another 500,000 people spending part of the year abroad (Sriskandarajah and Drew, 2006, viii). In 2000, there were 70 countries where migrants accounted for 10 percent of the population, and there were six countries where migrants were more than 60 percent of the population (Braun and Gratschew, 2007, 2). Therefore, it is becoming harder for states to ignore their emigrant population because of the number of emigrants. Political parties have also become active in courting those living abroad.
In February 2014, Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan campaigned in Germany, where it is estimated that more than 1.6 million Turkish citizens live, as Turkey is set to implement external voting for the first time in 2014 (Wall Street Journal, 2014). Transnational political campaigns have been taking place in major cities of migration destination countries for several decades. Mexican politicians have been campaigning for the support of Mexicans living in the United States as early as 1929, when José Vasconcelos, a leader of the Mexican Revolution, appealed for their support while he was running for the presidency (Lafleur, 2011). In fact, before external voting was adopted in Mexico,¹ all the three main Mexican political parties frequently campaigned in the United States, with some candidates handing out phone cards to Mexican migrants living in the United States, asking them to call their friends and families in Mexico and suggest that they vote for their party (Bada, 2003, 24). Politicians from Haiti and the Dominican Republic have also frequently campaigned in the United States, as leaders have started to view their emigrant community as a part of the nation-state (Sherman, 1999). Political candidates and parties do not only campaign abroad to court votes and ask emigrants to try to persuade their relatives and friends in the homeland to vote for them; they also request financial support.

It is when politicians are abroad that emigrants have the best opportunity to request increased rights. During their trips abroad, politicians often make promises to push for further rights but whether they follow up on their promise is often questionable. African politicians frequently make trips abroad to ask for financial support. During these trips, they often pledge that they will work on emigrant rights issues, but once they

¹ The 2005 law that allowed for external voting in Mexico prohibited Mexican candidates and parties to conduct any transnational campaigning.
are back in the home country these promises frequently go to the wayside (Whitaker, 2011, 779). When Dominican politicians toured the United States asking for political and financial support, they tended to be criticized by the migrants as they had not implemented external voting (Itzigsohn and Villacrés, 2008, 671). Political parties of the Dominican Republic have been campaigning in the United States for decades, but since the 1990s Dominicans living in the United States have become a key feature of the political process (Itzigsohn et al, 1999), with financial contributions from the United States having been estimated to be around fifteen percent of the parties annual fundraising (Guarnizo, Portes and Haller, 2003). Although political parties see numerous benefits in granting external voting and other political rights, there are several obstacles that make it difficult to implement voting from abroad.

Whenever political candidates and parties participate in campaigning abroad, they are breaching a long held international norm of not meddling in the politics of other countries, by interfering with a population that is living in a different state (Gamlen, 2008b). Although the acceptance of external voting has significantly increased in the last few decades, some countries are wary of having transnational electoral activity within their borders. Switzerland used to prohibit foreigners to vote in foreign elections (Lacy, 2007). Canada does not want its territory to be considered as a part of another country’s constituency (Lafleur, 2013b), and the Australian government has been against Australian citizens running for a seat in the legislature of another country while they live in Australia (Mascitelli and Battiston, 2009). Sometimes host governments also worry that foreign electoral campaigns may introduce political and ethnic conflicts within a migrant group (Sheffer, 2003; Bauböck, 2007), and that foreign political campaigns diminish the
likelihood that immigrants will successfully assimilate in the host country (Bauböck, 2007, 2442).

Not allowing the emigrant population to vote in emerging democracies may delegitimize the elections, especially if many migrated away from the country because of political or religious reasons. But there are also several political and logistical problems that are associated with implementing external voting (Grace, 2007), especially for countries that do not have a long history of holding elections. In 2006, Ghana experienced civil unrest after the country allowed external voting (Collyer and Vathi, 2007). There is also the problem of potential electoral fraud, as it can be difficult for states to apply the same measures to prevent fraud abroad than it is within their borders. When external voting was being debated in Mexico, the Mexican Federal Election Institute, which is responsible for holding elections, warned that it might have problems upholding the same standards abroad as it does in Mexico to ensure fair elections (Suro and Escobar, 2006; Lafleur, 2013a).

Another problem with implementing external voting is the cost, as the cost per voter tends to be higher for elections held abroad. The Mexican government ended up spending over 27 million dollars but less than 33,000 Mexicans living abroad ended up voting; therefore, the Mexican government spent around 850 dollars per vote abroad (Lafleur, 2013a, 43). After the first implementation of external voting in Honduras, there were also complaints due to the high cost of implementation. This led to critics advocating for a repeal of voting abroad (Thompson, 2007). Colombia, which has a long history of external voting, has been able to keep the costs lower. For the Colombian Senate elections of 2002, the government set up 365 polling stations in 66 countries and
kept cost at approximately two dollars per registered voter (de Acosta, 2007, 81). There are also some that criticize the implementation of external voting regardless political consequences.

In 2006, Italy and Mexico, two countries with a long history of emigration, both implemented external voting for the first time, with very different political consequences. Voters from abroad in Italy elected a senator that tipped the balance such that Silvio Berlusconi’s coalition lost power (Lafleur, 2013a). Berlusconi ended up challenging his defeat by questioning the legitimacy of those voting abroad. In Mexico, the legitimacy of external voting was also questioned but because of the low turnout. Accordingly, external voting can be contested both on the grounds that those abroad should not have the chance to decide who governs, and that low turnout does not justify the high costs associated with the implementation of external voting. In 2007, external voting was abolished in Armenia, a country that has a population of approximately three million, but with twice that number of Armenians living abroad (Rhodes and Harutyunyan, 2010, 483). The right of Armenians was rescinded because of sentiments that only those in Armenia should have the power to choose who governs their country (Fierro, Morales and Gratschew, 2007). Another country that has abolished voting from abroad is South Africa. This was done for political reasons at the end of apartheid in 1998, as it was alleged that the government viewed its citizens abroad as being sympathetic to the old apartheid regimes (Collyer and Vathi, 2007).

This thesis will attempt to do what King, Keohane and Verba see as important for a good research project in political science (1994, 15). First of all, the research topic under review has real world implication. There is a debate in many countries whether to
adopt external voting, and in some places whether to abolish it. There are numerous countries that are scheduled to implement voting from abroad for the first time in 2014, including Costa Rica and El Salvador (Bravo, 2013). Secondly, I will make a contribution to the scholarly literature on external voting by attempting to answer why states adopt external voting in Latin America and the Caribbean. This study looks for variables that increase or decrease the likelihood that a country will adopt external voting, currently the reasons why external voting is adopted and implemented remain mostly unclear (Lafleur, 2013a). Even though I am only studying countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, there is a reason to believe some of the variables tested are also relevant for the study of external voting in other regions.

The remainder of the study will be organized as follows. Chapter 2 will review both the empirical and the normative scholarly literature on external voting. I will also evaluate some of the most hypothesized variables that explain why states have started to expand rights to their emigrants. Chapter 3 focuses on theory and the methodology that will be used in the paper. Chapter 4 consists of a case study of Mexico which has adopted and implemented external voting. Chapter 5 looks at Chile which has not passed and external voting legislation. Chapter 6 examines the results from both the quantitative sections and the two case studies. Chapter 7 will review the previous chapters and present the conclusion of the study.
Chapter 2:

The Expansion of Migrants Rights

In a 2007 study, Collyer and Vathi found that out of the 144 countries in their sample, 115 nations had allowed their citizens abroad to vote in some manner (15). Likewise, Navarro, Morales, and Gratschew (2007) established that a majority of states in all the regions in the world now allow for voting abroad. However, despite the large number of countries allowing for external voting, the scholarly literature on the topic has been limited (Lafleur, 2011), and external voting remains a marginal topic in political science. One possible explanation for the lack of scholarly attention on external voting is that previous studies have tended to greatly underestimate how widespread voting abroad is (Collyer and Vathi, 2007). Furthermore, the political science literature has tended to focus on how migration affects migration receiving countries, while most governments around the world tend to be more apprehensive about those that leave (Ragazzi, 2009).

When groups of emigrants leave in large numbers, they are often referred to in the scholarly literature as a “diaspora”. For many decades the term diaspora was almost exclusively associated with Jews dispersed around the world (Safran, 2005). Recently, diaspora is turning more into a catch-all term (Faist, 2010). It can refer to Latinos around the world that live outside of their homeland, Asian-Americans, Arab-Americans, and members of transnational religions, or even to transnational groups that share the same political ideology (Sheffer, 2003, 10). It is important to understand that many states do view their emigrants as being the country’s diaspora because they have been forced to leave their homeland in order to search for economic opportunities, or because of mistreatment. When states reach out to their diaspora, it can be seen as a unifying
measure, which shows that those who live abroad are still valued, and that the state would welcome an eventual return to the homeland. Appealing to the diaspora can also be used by emerging political forces that use the imagery of the diaspora, a group of people who felt that they needed to leave their homeland to point out failures of previous governments. The emergent “new left” in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador all challenged old held notions of the nationhood (Elner, 2012), and, under Rafael Correa, the Ecuadorian state has started using the slogan “Todos somos migrantes” (we are all migrants) (Margheritis, 2011, 198). In this paper, I will stay away from the term diaspora and also “expatriates” which refers to a citizen who leaves for a long time or permanently from their homeland (Bauböck, 2007). Instead, I use the terms “migrants” and “emigrants” as it refers to individuals that leave their country of citizenship without specifying whether they intend to return or not.

Expanding Migrant Rights

It has been claimed that external voting goes as far back as the Roman Emperor Augustus, when the members of the local senate in 28 newly established colonies had the opportunity to vote for candidates for the city offices of Rome (Ellis, 2007, 41). But historically, external voting is a fairly recent development and several countries that are viewed as being strongly consolidated democracies did not adopt external voting until fairly recently, such as Belgium (1999) and Japan (2002) (Ellis et al, 2007). External voting started as a way to enfranchise those serving the state’s interest abroad. Wisconsin allowed Union soldiers to vote in other U.S states during the American Civil War\(^2\) (Ellis, 2007), and some small nations like Iceland allowed sailors and fisherman, its

\(^2\) Wisconsin is technically not an example of voting abroad since soldiers voted in other states within the United States
key economic constituency, the right to vote in the middle of the 20th Century (Braun and Gratschew, 2007).

The United States followed the same path as many countries, by first expanding external voting rights to those in the military during World War II, with the passing of the Soldier Voting Act of 1942. Then in 1975, emigrants were granted the right to vote while abroad when the Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act was adopted (Rhodes and Harutyunyan, 2010). Furthermore, in 1986 voting legislation was consolidated and American citizens abroad were guaranteed the right to vote in all federal elections after the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act was passed. Some U.S states also allow overseas voters also to participate in both state and local elections (Green, 2007, 101). The United States government was less eager to expand the right of dual citizenship to emigrants and immigrants. In 1967, the U.S Supreme Court forced the U.S government to change its policies toward dual citizens, when it ruled that Beys Afroyim, a naturalized citizen, had not given away his citizenship by participating in the 1951 Israeli elections as had been argued by the U.S State Department. The State Department did not fully acknowledge the Court’s decision until 1990 when it directed its embassies and consulates around the world to ease the process for dual citizens to retain their American citizenship (Wucker, 2004).

Colombia was the first country in Latin America to pass an external voting legislation in 1961 and implementing it in 1962 (de Acosta, 2007). Most countries in the region that have adopted external voting have done so in the last thirty years. This increase in external voting has been spurred on by democratization and the consolidation of democracy in the region. Several countries have adopted external voting since the end
of rule of Alfredo Stroessner in Paraguay in 1989, and General Augusto Pinochet in Chile in 1990, which marked the end of a long era of authoritarian rule in South America (Munck, 2007). Furthermore, countries such as the Dominican Republic have adopted and implemented external voting to illustrate that they are becoming consolidated democracies (Itzigsohn and Villacrés, 2008). Costa Rica and El Salvador will become the most recent countries to implement external voting as they are scheduled to implement it for the first time in 2014.

Migrants are able to achieve their goals of increasing their rights by participating in political transnationalism which describes a wide number of activities that migrants perform in two different countries. These practices include running across borders, and lobbying their homeland governments for rights (Lafleur, 2008, 43). Itzigsohn et al categorized transnational practices into four categories: political, economic, civil societal and cultural practices (1999, 324). As should be expected the number of migrants who are active in transnational border activism is small (Guarnizo, Portes and Haller, 2003; Hickerson, 2012), as Robert Dahl explained “Even for someone to whom politics is important, it is easier to be merely interested than to be active” (2005, 280). The opportunity cost for those abroad is higher compared to those that live in their homeland. Nonetheless, many emigrants are involved in transnational practices. For example, a 2006 survey of Peruvians living in Spain showed that 60 percent of those surveyed had exchanged information and opinions on the 2006 elections in Peru with their friends and family “back home” (Escrivá, Cruz and Bermúdez, 2010, 114).

The emergence of transnational practices are often explained because of improvements in technology (Vertovec, 2003; Bauböck, 2005; Barry, 2006; Collyer and
Vathi, 2007; Castro and Gonzalez, 2008; Fargues, 2011; Addis, 2012; Poganyi, 2013). The invention of new communication technologies and cheaper international phone rates have made it much easier for migrants to be in contact with those in their country of origin. Furthermore, migrants can now much more easily be informed on the news that is taking place in their country of origin, as they can read news on the internet, or in some cases watch the same news as their countrymen through satellite television. Therefore, technology has made it easier for migrants to stay in touch with those still living in their country-of-origin and to lobby governments for the expansion of rights.

In his book, Politics and the State. The External Voting Rights of Diasporas (2013a) Jean-Michel Lafleur, a prominent author on external voting, points out three different perspectives that studies on external voting have tended to follow. First, scholars have looked at the expansion of external voting from a legal perspective which sees changing norms and changing perceptions as the main explanatory reason why external voting has occurred. Secondly, a portion of the scholarly literature has looked at external voting through normative lenses. Finally, there is the socio-political approach which has looked at what incentivizes states to implement external voting (2013a, 32).

Legal Perspective

Many scholars have seen the proliferation of external voting and other measures that give rights to emigrants as a correlation to changing international norms. Rhodes and Harutyunyan refer to this claim as the “global-norm hypothesis” (2010, 472). These changes in norms are challenging the traditional Westphalain notion of citizenship and sovereignty. Traditionally, states viewed it as a taboo to grant their citizens any rights that could imply dual loyalties in any way. However, these long standing norms have
started to change, as more countries have allowed their citizens to adopt dual citizenship and external voting.

It is important to also look at the expansion of dual citizenship when studying external voting. As states are faced with similar normative quandaries when deciding whether to allow dual citizenship as when deciding whether to allow external voting. As Szabolcs Pogonyi (2013, 4) has stated, “The growing toleration of dual citizenship is a very important factor in the proliferation of external voting”. In the traditional view individuals cannot have loyalty to more than one state, which is why states have been opposed to dual citizenship (Bloemraad, 2004; Rubio-Marín, 2006; Lafleur, 2008; Spiro, 2010). There is also the question of how a person can fulfill some of their civic responsibilities such as military service to more than one state (Sejersen, 2008). However, in the last few decades, countries around the world have changed their attitudes toward dual citizenship, and states have started to sanction it (Faist, Gerdes, and Rieple, 2004). In a 2008 study of 115 countries, Tanja Sejersen found that in the 1980s less than 20 percent of the countries in her sample had allowed for dual citizenship, but in the last two decades the number had significantly increased and a majority of countries now allow for dual citizenship (2008, 542). Similarly, Cristina Escobar (2007) found that Latin American countries have followed a similar trend in her study. Before 1991, only 4 countries in Latin America permitted dual citizenship but since 1991, 12 more Latin American countries permitted dual citizenship (2007, 542). Furthermore, in 2000, at least 10 Caribbean basin countries allowed for dual citizenship (Levitt and De la Dehesa, 2003).
Rhodes and Harutyunyan (2010) make the argument that emigrant rights have emerged in part due to changing international norms, and that the enfranchisement of those abroad should be studied in the same context as how other excluded members of society gained suffrage. Since World War II, democratic states started a slow-moving transformation of expanding political citizenship\(^3\) to unrepresented groups such as women and minorities. The inclusion of emigrants into the electorate has taken place without international agreements legitimizing this new notion of citizenship. Only the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers specifically states that migrant workers should be permitted to vote in their state of origin (Nohlen and Grotz, 2000, 1117). The Council of Europe has advised that emigrants should have the right to vote abroad (Collyer and Vathi, 2007). Nevertheless, no shared policy has emerged among European states on external voting, and the European Court of Human Rights has ruled that the inability of Greeks abroad to vote in parliamentary elections did not infringe upon their human rights (European Court of Human Rights, 2012). It is also possible to argue that external voting breaches the sovereignty of the migrant receiving state (Gamlen, 2008b), since the sending state is extending rights to a person living in another country.

States have often depicted their migrant population in a negative way. Robert Muldoon, the Prime Minister of New Zealand, from 1975-1984, stated that “New Zealanders migrating to Australia raise the average IQ of both countries” (Gamlen, 2013, 238). The Mexican state portrayed its migrants in a negative manner during most of the

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\(^3\) Political citizenship refers to the right to partake in the political process
20th century, even using the derogatory term of “pochos”\(^4\) when referring to those that had left (Lafleur, 2008). However, in the last few decades states worldwide have started to portray their emigrants in a much more positive manner (Larner, 2007; Gamlen, 2013). Since 2000, the Mexican state abandoned its long standing policy of limited engagement with their migrant population living in the United States. Since then the Mexican state has developed policies to improve its relationship with those that have left (Déлано, 2009). The Mexican state has also started to portray their migrants as being a part of the “Mexican global nation” (Smith, 2003), instead of being a group that the state has forgotten about. New Zealand has also moved from portraying its migrant population in a negative to a positive manner (Gamlen, 2013). Furthermore, the Philippines has started to depict their emigrants as heroes (Rodríguez, 2002), and since 2003, India has started to celebrate Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (Day of Indians Abroad) which celebrates those living abroad (Mani and Varadarajan, 2005).

The mass movement of people across borders can also be seen as defying the traditional view of the nation state (Margheritis, 2011), and migration has forced states to rethink their position on political citizenship. More people are now living transnational lives, having families in more than one country. These developments have posed problems to the old idea of the nation state (Sejersen, 2008). States must also determine if citizenship should be rewarded on the basis of jus sanguinis, jus soli, or a mixture of both.\(^5\) The creation of the European Union (EU) also helped transform the long held belief of the nation state by removing barriers of movement within most of Europe. At

\(^4\) The term pocho can refer to “pathetic figures who do not fit in either the United States or Mexico” (Smith, 2003, 306), or for “Mexican American citizens considered as having forgotten their Mexican roots” (Lafleur, 2008, 330).

\(^5\) Jus sanguinis refers to a policy where citizenship is awarded through a blood lineage (i.e. having a parent(s) who are of a certain nationality). Jus soli bases citizenship on where a person is born.
the beginning of 2009, it was estimated that 31.9 million foreign citizens lived in the 27 EU member states (Eurostat, 2010). Some estimate that in 2005 there were up to 190 million migrants in the world, and that the number of migrants has doubled since the 1970s (Braun and Gratschew, 2007, 2). Migration has certainly existed since the beginning of human history; but, in the last few decades international migration has increased in every region of the world (Hollifield, 2000). The number of people leaving is creating an unprecedented challenge for states in Latin America and the Caribbean and around the world (Thompson, 2007). Subsequently, several scholars have seen external voting partly as a response to migration (Barry, 2006; Tager, 2006; Bauböck, 2007; Fierro, 2007; Nohlen and Grotz, 2007).

Latin America has a history of being a region of destination countries, receiving immigrants mostly from Europe. However, in the last few decades the region has developed into a region of sending countries with large numbers of Latinos moving to the United States (Pellegrino, 2000; Escobar, 2007; Durand, 2009). The number of Latin Americans living in the United States went from 1 million in 1960 to approximately 8.5 million in 1990 (Pellegrino, 2000, 398). Many small cities have been hit hard by emigration as a large percentage of the working age population has left (Margheritis, 2011). From 1997 to 2006, approximately 900,000 Ecuadorians or about 20 percent of the economically active population left Ecuador (Antón, 2010, 269-270). The Caribbean has followed a similar trend as Latin America, as emigration became common after a period of population growth (Pellegrino, 2000). Although it is safe to assume that emigration was mostly sparked because of lack of economic growth, there are also examples in Latin America and the Caribbean where migration was caused because of the
political regime in a country (Itzigsohn and Villacrés, 2008). Latin America and
Caribbean countries have started to change their policies towards its migrants because of
perceived threats to their migrant population in host countries, especially in the United
States.

States need to tread carefully when they want to build a relationship with their
emigrant community especially in countries where their presence is contested by some
(Cano and Délano, 2007). Several nations in Latin America and the Caribbean have had
a history of pursuing a policy of non-intervention with its emigrant population as they did
not want to be seen meddling with a population living in another country. But many
states started to change their policy of non-intervention in the 1990s, because they felt
that the interests of their citizens were being threatened in the United States.

The anti-immigration laws that were passed in the United States during the 1990s
acted as an exogenous shock that forced Latin America and the Caribbean countries to
engage their migrants and adopt policies to protect them. One such exogenous shock was
Proposition 187 in California, which goal was to save money by cutting any rights
undocumented migrants had (Garcia, 1995). These laws pushed countries in the region to
swiftly change their policies (Escobar, 2007), and it also led states to become more
willing to expand political rights to their emigrant population. The Brazilian government
historically did not interact much with their emigrants, but this changed when claims
started in the local media that Brazilians living in Europe were being mistreated (Levitt
2001).

Policy makers as well and scholars have seen the influx of migrants as being a
challenge to the identity of destination states. As Samuel Huntington (2004, 2) stated,
“In this new era, the single most immediate and most serious challenge to America’s traditional identity comes from the immense and continuing immigration from Latin America, especially from Mexico”. Additionally, former Republican Congressman Tom Tancredo suggested that the amount a country receives from remittances from emigrants in the United States should be subtracted from its foreign aid that it gets from the United States (Wucker, 2004). Latin America and the Caribbean countries, especially those with a large migrant population have had to be careful when they grant certain rights to emigrants. For example, some feared that having long lines of Mexicans voting in the United States might help anti-immigration forces spark xenophobic sentiments (Tager, 2006). Nevertheless, states have changed their long held policy of non-interventionism to respond to perceived threats to their migrants.

**Normative Perspective**

A significant proportion of the external voting literature has looked at the subject from a normative standpoint. With the proliferation of voting rights for emigrants around the world, the debate over external voting has moved from a theoretical issue to something that has real world political implications. Policy makers and scholars alike must come up with answers to current normative question such as should Scottish citizens living abroad have the opportunity to vote in the referendum whether Scotland secedes from the United Kingdom?

A prominent argument made by migrants is that all adult citizens should have the right to vote (Barry, 2006; Bauböck, 2007; Song, 2009; Honohan, 2011). It can also be argued that a full universal suffrage must also include those that live abroad. Especially since many have emigrated because they felt that they needed to leave, either in order to
support themselves and their family, or because political or religious reasons. Letting refugees vote can be seen as a central step in building democratic institutions and norms in countries after a conflict. Denying those that have been forced to leave the right can not only delegitimize the electoral process, but also provide an electoral advantage to those that who favored the displacement policy (Grace, 2007). There is also the idea that emigrants can help influence a peaceful regime change. Following Croatia’s independence in 1991, 10 percent of the parliamentary seats were allotted to Croats who had recently returned from living abroad (Wucker, 2004, 44). Furthermore, some make the argument that emigrants should be rewarded with voting due to the financial contributions they make to their home country. While there remains doubt about the exact money sent home and that it varies between countries there is no question that sending countries have started to rely on remittances being sent home. However, the counter argument could be made that if financial contributions should count towards voting rights then foreign investors might also ask for enfranchisement (Pogonyi, 2013).

The most prominent explanation why external voting might be opposed from a normative standpoint is that emigrants do not live in the territory of the government they are voting for, and therefore, they are not affected by certain laws and policies (Blais, Massicotte and Yoshinaka, 2001; Bauböck, 2005; Rubio-Marín, 2006; Lafleur, 2008; Song, 2009; Honohan, 2011). There is also the argument that emigrants are not interested in the politics of their home state and therefore they should not have the chance to vote. In 2006, a survey found that more 55 percent of Mexicans living in the United Stated did not know that there was a Mexican presidential election scheduled for the same year (Suro and Escobar, 2006, 1). An argument can also be made against external
voting stating that the emigrant community is no longer in touch with the political and societal issues in their home country (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). The 2012 elections in Venezuela is a good example of this political gap that can emerge between those living in their country of origin and abroad. Hugo Chavez ended up winning the 2012 elections by receiving 55 percent of the total vote, but he received less than 10 percent from electors abroad, and only a little over two percent from Venezuelans living in the United States.6 Some have also pointed out that external voting might be bad in a normative sense because there is a possibility that a person can cast more than one vote, one in their country of origin and one in their host country (Tager, 2006; Bauböck, 2007; Addis, 2012).

Some scholars have made recommendations of who should have the right to vote or how voting abroad should be implemented. Rainer Bauböck (2003), who is a well-known scholar on migration issues, suggested that citizenship should not be automatically transferred beyond the first generations of those born in a foreign country, and that suffrage should not be extended to all those that are entitled to citizenship. Claudio López-Guerra (2005) recommended that countries implement electoral rules similar to that of Canada and Australia, which rescind the right of emigrants to vote after they have lived abroad certain number of years. López-Guerra views this system as being superior compared to the external voting rules used in the United States and France, where there are no time restriction on how long emigrants can be away and still be eligible to vote.

It is debated what consequences migration has on sending and host countries, and whether migration involves winners and losers, or if both set of countries gain from

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6 http://www.cne.gob.ve/resultado_presidencial_2012/r/1/reg_000000.html Accessed February 15th, 2014. Interestingly, in New Orleans Chavez only received 0.60% of the votes (51 votes) while his main opponent Henrique Radonski received 99.18% (8,375 votes)
migration (Gamlen, 2008a). The traditional belief among scholars is that most people emigrate from developing countries to developed countries because of lack of opportunities in their homeland (Massey, 1998). The impact of migration will depend on who leaves, as migrants are a diverse group of people consisting of both skilled and unskilled workers and those that intend to stay temporarily and permanently (Bach, 2011). Migrants also leave their homeland for a various set of reasons whether it be simply to find a better life or because of other, more somber circumstances (Addis, 2012). The relationship between those that migrate and their home country is likely to be heavily dependent on who is leaving and their skill level and under what circumstances they left.

The relationship between a citizen and the state drastically changes when a person becomes an emigrant. In most countries, emigrants are not expected to pay taxes, and those that leave, especially for a long time, are likely to lose benefits from the state (Collyer and Vathi, 2007). The relationship between emigrants and the government of the sending state can be amicable when both parties share similar values and interest; but that is often not the case, as the rapport between the two is often based on hostile feelings and suspicion (Addis, 2012). If a mass exodus takes place during times of political or religious persecution, then the state is likely correct in viewing those that have emigrated as being hostile to their rule. Also, if a country has a history of a one party rule during times of migration it can also be assumed that the migrants will be opposed to that party. Migrants are also sometimes viewed as having voted with their feet, by leaving the homeland and therefore, having given up their voice in matters relating to their home country (Fox and Bada, 2008).
It should be presumed that disinterest toward its migrant population is the default position of the state because of normative and practical reasons (Bauböck, 2003, 709). Nevertheless, the number of states creating government institutions to work with the emigrant community keeps on growing, and as has been stated before, more and more states are granting their emigrant population political citizenship. It should be considered that for most developing states it would more than likely not be in the best interest of the state if all the emigrants were to return. Although developing countries are concerned about the brain drain that occurs from mass migration, they are also aware of the financial benefits they receive in return, especially from remittances, but also from knowledge transfers (Ratha, 2005). Migration can also benefit developing states as it can decrease the number of the unemployed, and the social unrest that is often associated with having high unemployment. Since a massive return migration might not be good for many developing states, they might be more willing to extend certain rights to emigrants such as external voting that can make them feel like they are a part of the homeland.

States have also adopted other measures to retain formal ties with their emigrants. For example, the Mexican government trains teachers in the United States, and Mexicans living in certain cities in the U.S are able to get a Mexican high school degree. The Brazilian government has also implemented similar policies at a smaller scale towards its emigrant population in Japan (Levitt and De la Dehesa, 2003). When states communicate with their citizens’ abroad, they are also working with a group that is likely to push for other measures than the citizens living in the country of origin.

All immigrants are emigrants and for many emigrants it is more important to maintain a relationship with their homeland rather than their adopted home since they are
unlikely to have any voice in their country of destination (Collyer, 2013), very few countries in the world allow non-citizens to vote (Collyer and Vathi, 2007). As can be expected the political priorities of emigrants are often different than from those living in the homeland, emigrants are often not directly affected by many of the laws and policies that are adopted in their country of origin. Some key rights emigrants lobby for are to be able to keep social protection as well as economic rights, having the opportunity for dual citizenship, and political rights.

An important concern for emigrants having left their country is still keeping certain social and economic rights in their homeland. Those that leave seek to have the right to buy property whether it is to invest, for family members, or in case they were to return one day. It is not uncommon for migrants to invest in their homeland and some even keep paying social benefits while they are living abroad (Pogonyi, 2013). Therefore, emigrants often request that their states of origin allow them to have certain toll exemptions and favorable investment rates (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003).

States do not tend to disqualify the populace from citizenship just because they move to another country (Rhodes and Harutyunyan, 2010), but they often do not allow their citizen to acquire another citizenship. Having the right of dual citizenship is very important to emigrants. Because dual citizenship also allows emigrants the opportunity to engage in transnational practices, they can travel without restriction between their country of origin and country of destination (Bauböck, 2003). Furthermore, if an emigrant loses his or her citizenship they also lose the right of diplomatic protection from their country of origin (Rubio-Marín, 2006).
Emigrants also want to have fuller sense of citizenship by having the chance to vote. A 2006 survey conducted by the PEW Hispanic Center of Mexicans living in the United States found that 68 percent disagreed that elections in Mexico were not important to them (Suro and Escobar, 2006, 3). Migrants also want the right to vote for symbolic reasons. In his interview with Ecuadorians living in Italy, Paolo Boccagni (2011) found that most people did not vote because of strong support for a party or a candidate, but rather to carry out their duty as Ecuadorian citizens. Migrants also make the argument that although they leave and settle in a different country they do not lose their socio-political connection with the homeland (Escobar, 2004; Lafleur, 2008).

Socio-Political Perspective

A persistent assumption in the scholarly literature is that states grant emigrant political citizenship because of financial incentives, and that when countries grant emigrants rights they can expect something in return (Collyer and Vathi, 2007; Gamlen, 2008a). Countries have also come to rely financially on their citizens abroad (Levitt, 2001; Portes, Escobar and Radford, 2007; Goodman and Hiskey, 2008; Hickerson, 2012), which makes states more likely to grant emigrants political citizenship. Municipal and federal governments are often mindful to keep their emigrant population content. As the former governor of the Mexican state Zacatecas explained while talking about the emigrant population, “if we depend on them economically, it would be the last straw not to respect their rights!” (Levitt and De la Dehesa, 2003, 599). A Mexican hometown association leader even suggested that remittances from the United States are averting an outbreak of a civil war in Mexico (Tuman, 2009, 19). Local, municipal, and federal governments have started establish policies to manage and maximize remittances of those
abroad (Díaz-Briquets and Pérez-López, 1997; Goldbring, 2002; Guarnizo; 2003; Skeldon, 2008).

The Mexican state Zacatecas was the first to implement the 3X1 (Tres Por Uno) program. The goal of the 3X1 Program is to encourage investment in the public and social infrastructure in the migrant’s communities of origin. The program consists of the government matching the amount sent by migrant organization by three to one (Durand, 2007; Meseguer and Aparicio, 2012). Numerous other Mexican states have adopted the 3X1 program, and in 2000, El Salvador launched a similar program to leverage remittances for local development (Burgess, 2012). Many countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have also become reliant on remittances as a source of foreign of currency. Remittances are the second largest source of foreign income in Ecuador (Calero, Bedi, and Sparrow, 2009). Some states have started to offer migrants a premium exchange rates (Díaz-Briquets and Pérez-López, 1997). They do this partly to increase their foreign exchange reserve, which states can use to finance trade deficits and service foreign debt (Barry, 2006). Remittances are also becoming a more important part of the economy in many sending countries, such as Mexico, where the remittances being sent back have skyrocketed in the previous decades, and few industries generate as much revenue to the Mexican economy than those living abroad (Smith, 2003; Tager, 2006). However, the importance of remittances is often best seen at the regional level, for example, in the Mexican state of Michoacán remittances have been more than 15 percent of the state’s gross domestic product (Lafleur, 2008). Remittances also highly impact financial wellbeing in developing states at the micro level.
Remittances have been seen as very efficient as they require no bureaucratic action and they tend to go to those that need them the most (Airola, 2007). Many low and medium income families in Latin America and the Caribbean are very dependent on remittances sent by emigrants, as they are used for necessary expenses as well as to build up savings accounts (Itzigsohn, 1995; Barry, 2006; Rubio-Marín, 2006). In Honduras, remittances are sometimes referred to as the “economic mattress” (Thompson, 2007, 133), and remittances have been shown to increase schooling rates in Ecuador, especially among girls, the poor, and those living in rural areas (Calero, Bedi, and Sparrow, 2009, 1150).

Nonetheless, the impact of remittances have also been debated by scholars (Guarnizo, 2003). Ratha (2005) found that remittances are a stable source of foreign currency for developing countries and are less volatile than other types of foreign capital, while other scholars have questioned the reliability of remittances, and have argued that remittances are highly dependent on economic and political circumstances (Itzigsohn, 1995; Díaz-Briquets and Pérez-López, 1997). Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) found that receiving remittance appears to minimize the likelihood of business ownership in the Dominican Republic. Furthermore, remittances tend to be unequally distributed within countries (Fox and Bada, 2008; Lampert, 2009). The impact of remittances are clearly a potential motivator for states to adopt external voting. Furthermore, emigrants can use their financial support to pressure their family and friends to push for their enfranchisement.

The globalized economy is an additional explanation why states might grant their emigrant population political citizenship. States want to build a relationship with their
emigrant population in order to acclimate to the knowledge-based global economy (Larner, 2007), as well as to use the knowledge, skills, and connections of their emigrant population to achieve economic growth. This strategy has been called the “globalization adjustment” variable (Lafleur, 2013a). Gamlen (2013) saw the change in New Zealand’s government policy as a direct result of the government wanting to incorporate its accomplished emigrant population into the economy. Although on average the migrant population from Latin America and the Caribbean tend to have less education compared to some regions such as Asia (Kapur, 2001), migrants from Latin America and the Caribbean are an asset to their governments as they have acquired assets and skills while living abroad (Evans, 2000). States also see their emigrant population as ambassadors and potential lobbying force.

It has been well documented that countries often want to use their emigrant population to lobby for their home state’s interest while they are abroad (Escobar, 2007; Gamlen 2008a; Itzigsohn and Villacrés, 2008; Pogonyi, 2013). The Israeli lobbying groups in the United States are the envy of many sending states who wish to have a population that is able to influence the destination country in their favor. Mexico is widely believed to have become more willing to work with their migrant community abroad, and changed their attitudes towards dual citizenship because they wanted Mexicans living in the United States to lobby the U.S government to let Mexico join the North American Free Trade Agreement (Sherman; 1999; Fitzgerald, 2005; Barry, 2006; Tager; 2006; Cano and Délano, 2007; Lafleur, 2008; Délano, 2009).

There is also a prominent hypothesis that states are more likely to enfranchise those abroad if the migrant community is organized (Itzigsohn, 2000; Escobar; 2007;
The adoption of external voting tends to take place over a period of several years (Nohlen, and Grotz, 2007). During this time it is important that the emigrants speak with a unified voice in order to achieve their goal. Furthermore, whenever migrants organize they can also make more of an impact financially by consolidating their investments or public works projects. However, there are also examples of emigrant organizations developing a negative reputation. In Nigeria the divisive politics of Nigerian emigrant organizations has been seen as damaging to Nigerian unity (Lampert, 2009). Furthermore, migrant organizations in Mexico have been accused of picking pet public work projects, such as building basketball courts that are mostly used when they themselves come to visit instead of other more urgent projects (Fox and Bada, 2008, 456).

When studying external voting, it is also important to mention the institutional factors involved. There are great variations in how voting abroad has been implemented throughout the world. The way electoral rules are set up can greatly influence voter turnout of those abroad, and whether voters abroad are of political importance (Fox, 2005). It is most common that emigrants can only vote in national elections, although there are some countries including France and some states in the United States which allow those abroad to vote in local elections (Bauböck, 2007, 2429). Some political parties have also started to let emigrants participate in the process of selecting candidates. This includes the Democratic Party in the United States, which allows its members who are abroad to play a part in nominating their presidential candidate, as they are allowed to vote in primary elections (Lafluer, 2013b). Some countries have chosen to create special districts for their emigrant population in the legislature. Having a reserved seat in the
legislature for those abroad can help alleviate the concerns of political parties as it caps the political power of those abroad, and at the same time, it also encourages emigrants to vote as they know that they will be represented.

According to Fierro, Morales and Gratschew (2007), nine countries have set up seats in their legislature that are reserved for those abroad. In Italy, external voters can vote for 12 of the 630 seats in the House of Deputies and 6 of 315 members of the Senate (Tager, 2006). Colombians abroad are given one of the five seats that have been set up for minorities in the Colombian Chamber of Representatives (Nohlen and Grotz, 2007). There are also examples of regional governments reserving legislative seats for emigrants. The Mexican state of Zacatecas, where approximately half of the population lives abroad, has reserved two seats in the state legislature (Barry, 2006). But institutional constraints have also made it very difficult for emigrants to be relevant politically in many countries.

Some countries, such as Bolivia, have set up restrictions to limit the political importance of those abroad. In Bolivia, only citizens living in the four countries with the highest number of emigrants can participate. None of these four countries can register more than half of those voting abroad. And, the number of those abroad who register to vote cannot be more than 10 percent of the voting population in Bolivia (Lafleur, 2013b). In Peru, emigrants are placed into the same electoral districts as the capital Lima, where around one third of every elector lives. This reduces the power of the emigrant vote (Escrivá, Cruz and Bermúdez, 2010). Mexico is perhaps the most infamous example of strict institutional constraints. The 2005 law that allowed for external voting, greatly restricted who could vote and banned parties from campaigning abroad. These
institutional constraints portray the complicated relationship between migrants and their homeland.
Chapter 3:
Theory and Methods

External voting has only recently started to gain traction among academics (Lafleur, 2013b). Therefore, the literature on the topic is still developing, and the reasons why external voting is adopted and implemented remain mostly unclear (Lafleur, 2013a). Nonetheless, there have been many different explanations put forward to what reasons motivate states to adopt and implement external voting. Vanessa Bravo’s (2013) study on the future implementation of external voting in Costa Rica and El Salvador, in 2014, shows how countries adopt external voting laws through different paths. In Costa Rica, there was little resistance to granting those abroad voting rights, and the Costa Rican Electoral Supreme Court was a main reason why they adopted the law. However, in El Salvador it was the El Salvadorian emigrant community that pushed for the legislation with opposition from the political parties (Bravo, 2013, 12).

The introduction of voting abroad varies greatly from country to country. In some places it is has been easy to pass, but in other countries external voting is a very controversial topic, and the political process to decide whether these laws should be approved often take numerous years and sometimes decades (Nohlen and Grotz, 2000). Nevertheless, the goal of the subsequent chapters is to see if countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have features that increase or decrease their likelihood of adopting external voting.

Prior studies of external voting have tended to use only one methodological approach, this study is atypical in that it employs a quantitative analysis in addition to
case studies. Furthermore, previous studies have almost unanimously focused on the implementation, while this study looks at the adoption of external voting laws.

There are several reasons why a potential voter might be away from his or her home country during elections including: vacation, studies abroad, and so forth. However, most people who are not present during elections have emigrated, some with the intention never to return while others anticipate returning home one day. In this thesis, I will focus on emigrants and their relationship with the state and political parties back in their country of origin. I use a broad definition for the terms “external voting” and “voting abroad” stating that countries have external voting as long as all or some of a country’s electors who are temporarily or permanently abroad have the chance to vote outside of their national territory. This definition is almost identical to the one that is laid out by the International Democracy Electoral Assistance (IDEA) handbook on external voting (Braun and Gratschew, 2007, 8). This definition insists that voters must have the right to vote outside the territory of their respective states, excluding embassies or consulates. Therefore, the definition differs from those that view external voting as the right to vote for non-resident citizens, even if the voting itself takes place within the borders of the their country (Pogonyi, 2013, 3). Voting from abroad can also consist of postal voting, online, or even a proxy vote just as long as those who are not in their respective country have the chance to vote.

The time frame for this study is 1980 to 2012, and it includes countries in Latin America and the Caribbean in accordance to how the World Bank classifies “Latin America and the Caribbean”. However, 10 out of the 29 countries are dropped from the

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7  An extensive search of the literature has not turned up any works that combines both methods.  
study either because of lack of data\textsuperscript{9} or because they had adopted external voting laws before 1980.\textsuperscript{10} Twelve countries adopted external voting at some time during the study; none of the countries in this study have rescinded the rights of emigrants to vote abroad after having passed external voting laws.

The relationship between several independent variables and the dependent variable (adoption of external voting) will be tested using the Cox Proportional Hazard Model (Cox, 1972). This model is frequently used in the social sciences (Beck, Katz, and Tucker, 1998). The goal of the Cox Proportional Hazard Model is to measure failure, which in this study, is operationalized as the adoption of external voting. The Cox Proportional Model is especially useful to measure policy adoptions (Jones and Branton, 2005, 424), and various studies have used this model to do so (Langer and Brace, 2005; Murillo and Martínez-Gallardo, 2007; Romansky, Telang and Acquisti, 2011).

\textit{Dependent and Independent Variables}

The dependent variable \textit{Adoption of External Voting} refers to whether a country has passed legislation allowing for citizens who are abroad to vote outside of their respective country’s territory (excluding embassies and consulates), or in any other rare circumstances which allows for external voting. This includes for example, situations when external voting has been adopted because of decisions in the judiciary or through an executive decree. The information on whether a country has adopted external voting laws or not, and in what year it was passed, are taken mostly from the IDEA’s website section on voting abroad\textsuperscript{11} and other academic sources (Navarro, 2007; Thompson, 2007;

\textsuperscript{9}This includes: Antigua and Barbuda, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines
\textsuperscript{10}This includes: Brazil, Colombia, Guyana, and Peru
\textsuperscript{11}http://www.idea.int/elections/vfa_search.cfm#
Bravo, 2013). All countries are coded 0 until they adopt external voting, once they have adopted the law they are coded as 1 and dropped from the sample.

The studies that discuss the importance of remittances on sending countries are numerous (Itzigsohn et al, 1999; Itzigsohn, 2000; Bauböck, 2003; Joppke, 2003; Wucker, 2004; Fitzgerald, 2005; Ratha, 2005; Barry, 2006; Tager, 2006; Cano and Délano, 2007; Escobar 2007; Itzigsohn and Villacrés, 2008; Sejersen, 2008; Margheritis 2011; Mata-Codesal, 2011; Hickerson, 2012 ). Many scholars point to remittances as a key incentive for states to increase the rights of those living abroad (Barry 2006; Cruz, 2007; Sejersent, 2008). The theory posits that states adopt external voting as they wish to please those abroad to keep the remittances coming. Furthermore, through their financial support emigrants also can pressure their family and friends to push for their enfranchisement. However, the impacts remittances have on external voting still remain questionable. In a 2007 study, Collyer and Vathi found that remittances and external voting were not correlated. However, Collyer and Vathi’s study compared some of the richest and poorest countries in the world. Many of the most developed countries in the world have also adopted external voting although remittances have little influence on their economy. In order to examine the importance of remittances in each country, I divide the dollar figure of the remittances by the growth domestic product (GDP) of each country and employ remittances as a percentage of GDP for each country during the time period of my study. The data on GDP and remittances is taken from the World Bank (n.d.). The impact of remittances have been found to be nonlinear, where the inflow has a weaker impact after it reaches a certain level (Chami, Hakura and Montiel, 2009). Therefore, remittances as a percent of GDP squared is also employed in the model in order to
capture a potential nonlinear relationship. It is likely that countries will try to restrict the power of its emigrant community if they deem them too have the potential to be too powerful. Using the squared form of remittances as a percentage of GDP is also important for the nonlinearity in the parameters of the Cox Proportional Hazard Model (Keele, 2005, 3).

The problem with the data from the World Bank on remittances is that it only accounts for money that is sent through official channels, and it is widely known that part of the money that emigrants send home go through unofficial channels (Levitt, 2001; Skeldon, 2008). It is my hope that this bias is distributed equally among all countries. Some have used the number of Western Union agencies per capita as a way to measure remittances (Calero, Bedi, and Sparrow, 2009; Antón, 2010), but this data is unfortunately not publicly available for all the countries in the study. Furthermore, looking at the number of Western Union agencies per capita also presents a bias, as Western Union might have a higher market share of the remittance sent in some countries than others, where other companies might have a stronger presence.

Hypothesis 1: Countries with a higher percentage of remittances measured as a percentage of GDP are more likely to adopt external voting.

Hypothesis 2: The impact of remittances as percent of GDP is nonlinear, after accounting for a topping point the effects dissipates

I will also test the relationship between the level of democracy and the likelihood a country will adopt external voting. There is obviously a link between democracy and voting. However, there is a chance that countries adopt external voting for symbolic reasons to portray themselves as being more democratic than they actually are. The King
of Morocco decided that Moroccan emigrants would have the chance to vote in the 2007 elections despite Morocco being in essence an absolute monarchy, where the King is the final decision maker (Collyer and Vathi, 2007, 5). Some have seen external voting as the next step towards reaching universal suffrage (Nohlen and Grotz, 2000), others view external voting as a step towards democratic consolidation (Pogonyi, 2013). Nonetheless, external voting has not been recognized as an essential part of democratic governance.

Freedomhouse gives an annual score for political rights and civil liberties for each country ranging from 1 (most free) to 6 (least free). The advantages of Freedomhouse compared to other indexes such as the Polity index is that Freedomhouse includes several smaller nations in Latin America and the Caribbean that the Polity index does not. To code the level of democracy, I use the mean for the political rights and civil liberties score.

**Hypothesis 3**: Countries with a lower combined Freedomhouse political and civil rights score are more likely to adopt external voting.

It is clear that both left and right leaning governments around the world have adopted and implemented external voting. In addition, there is no research that suggests clear ideological preference among emigrants. However, Latin America has a history of persecution of leftist political forces after there were numerous right wing coups in the region in the 1970s and 1980s (Arditi, 2008). Authoritarian regimes in countries such as Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Haiti, Paraguay and Uruguay were a major driver for many emigrating (Pellegrino, 2000). Many leftist were also forced to leave their countries as civil wars broke out. In El Salvador, the civil war led to over a million people leaving
their country (Wright and Moody, 2005), and in Guatemala a civil war led to a mass exile of political refugees to go to Mexico and the United States (Tuman and Gerhart, 2010). The left leaning parties in Latin America also have the history of being the ones that have pushed for expanding enfranchisement (Smith, 2011). The scholarly literature has also showed that leftist forces in numerous countries have started using the imagery of their “diaspora” in their political message of inclusion (Margheritis, 2011; Ellner, 2012; Bravo, 2013).

Additionally, since emigrants tend to leave because of lack of economic opportunities I hypothesize that left leaning parties will be more likely to see political gains from adopting and implementing external voting. The data for the orientation of the executive comes from the Latin America and the Caribbean Political Dataset, 1945-2008 (Huber, Stephen and Mustillo, 2012). The dataset codes the leaning of the executive in 14 different ways. I code leftist orientation as a binary variable, with secular left, secular center left, Christian left, and Christian center left being coded as having a left leaning executive.

**Hypothesis 4: Countries with a left leaning executive are more likely to adopt external voting**

External voting legislation tends to arise from the negotiation among the main political parties (Lafleur and Chelius, 2011). I find it most likely that the adoption of external voting will take place whenever the major parties have a relatively similar share of seats in the legislature. As Barbara Geddes states” (1) reforms are more likely to pass the legislative hurdle when patronage is evenly distributed among the strongest parties, and (2) initial reforms are more likely to be followed by further extensions of reform
where the electoral weight of the top parties remains relatively even and stable” (Geddes, 1991, 371). In order to test for power among the strongest parties I use data from the Latin America and the Caribbean Political Dataset, 1945-2008 (Huber, Stephen and Mustillo, 2012). Hypothetically, this data can range from zero (the party of the executive has no seats in the lower house) to 100 (the party of the executive has all the seats in the lower house).

_Hypothesis 5: Countries that have equilibrium of seat share in the lower house of the party of the executive are more likely to adopt external voting._

Another potential reason why countries in Latin America and the Caribbean adopt external voting is because of diffusion from neighboring states. Local politics are often influenced by what occurs in their neighboring countries (Gleditsch and Ward, 2006; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 2007). As Kurt Weyland has stated “A bold reform adopted in one nation soon attracts attention from other countries, which come to adopt the novel policy approach. As such a wave gets under way, innovations often spread quickly to other countries following the trendsetter” (2005, 262). In order to code diffusion, I take the percentage of each country neighbors that have adopted external voting laws per year. Therefore, the higher percentage of neighbors that have adopted external voting the more likely nations are to adopt external voting. The data whether or not a country has adopted external voting is taken from the same sources as the dependent variable, the IDEA’s website^{12} and from Navarro (2007) Thompson (2007), and Bravo (2013).

_Hypothesis 6: Countries are more likely to adopt external voting if they border a high percentage of countries that have adopted external voting._

^{12}http://www.idea.int/elections/vfa_search.cfm#
Adoption of external voting does not necessarily mean that a government intends to implement them. A state can adopt the legislation but not have any intentions to setting in place the mechanism needed to allowing those abroad to vote. Belize was one of the first countries in Latin America and the Caribbean to pass external voting legislation in 1978, and added the provision needed to implement external voting in 1998\textsuperscript{13}, but Belize has still not yet implemented the law (IDEA, 2014). After a country adopts external voting there are still numerous obstacles before implementing voting in a foreign territory. First of all, external voting tends to be expensive. Secondly, countries must have the structural and technical capabilities to implement external voting while safeguarding its electoral process. I expect countries that have a high GDP are more likely to adopt external voting as they are more likely to have the capabilities to actually implement them. The data for GDP in constant dollars comes from the World Bank. The GDP is logged in order to control for a large difference in GDP size among countries in the sample.

*Hypothesis 7: Countries with a high GDP are more likely to adopt external voting.*

It has also been suggested that norms are the key reason why countries try to keep relationship with its emigrant community (Gamlen, 2008a). Because of the globalization of international norms, “new international norms have also taken hold which make this shared policy repertoire something that is expected by emigrants and states alike” (Lewitt and de la Dehesa, 2003, 599). In the last thirty years the number of countries allowing for external voting has increased exponentially. Political globalization is something that is truly difficult to quantify, but the KOF political globalization is supposed to do just

\textsuperscript{13} Belize was coded as having adopted external voting in 1998
that. The index gives a score from zero (lowest level of political globalization) to hundred (highest level of political globalization) yearly from 1980 to 2010. The index does so by looking at the number of embassies a country has, the number of international organizations the country is a member of, number of United Nations peace mission the country has taken part in to name a few and few other criterions.

**Hypothesis 8:** Countries with a high level of political globalization are more likely to adopt external voting.

**Case Studies**

In addition to the quantitative chapter explaining why states adopt external voting this project will also include case studies of Mexico and Chile. The potential political cloud of Mexican emigrants has the possibility to have a tremendous impact on Mexican politics. The possible impact of Mexicans abroad was one of the main reasons that kept the Mexican political parties from coming to an agreement on an external voting legislation, and led to an external voting bill being passed that made it very difficult for Mexicans abroad to vote. The second case study is Chile, which has not yet passed a voting from abroad legislation. External voting is an important topic in the political agenda of Chile. However, institutional factors dating back to the rule of Augusto Pinochet have made it difficult to get any external voting bill passed. Despite the importance of external voting in the political landscape there has been very little scholarly literature that has focused on the struggle of Chileans abroad to have the right to vote, and virtually no scholarship exist on the topic in the English language.

When analyzing the case studies, I will focus on the interplay of actors that other scholars have viewed as important when it comes to adopting external voting laws. José
Itzigsohn has come up with the three key actors: “the state apparatus of the country of origin; the political parties of the country of origin; and migrant organizations in the country of reception” (2000, 1126). Christina Escobar has come up with the same political factors influencing the outcome: “the state, the political parties, and the immigrant community—and their interplay in both the country of origin and the country of residence” (2007, 44).

Migrant organization play a very important role in trying to get external voting passed and implemented as they can help those living abroad speak in a more unified voice. They also can have a strong negotiating position with the state in and in some instances political parties by threatening to stop sending back remittances and other financial assistance (Itzigsohn, 2000). Furthermore, migrant organizations can influence politics by encouraging family and friends to vote in a certain manner. However, the power of migrant organizations to influence politics back home often varies greatly between countries, and sometimes within regions of countries (Tuman, 2009). Migrant organizations are often ignored by their homeland (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). The power of migrant organizations can also be dependent in which destination country they are located in, as involvement in migrant organizations is seen in some countries as not assimilating (Wucker, 2004). I expect that external voting is more likely to occur in countries that have strong and organized migrant organization living abroad.

Political parties are certainly most interested in doing what will benefit them mostly politically. If a political party views migrant as being favorable to their opinions they are likely to support external voting, “Individuals and parties who must compete in electoral contests may advocate the expansion of the electorate in order to advantage their
own political fortunes” (Rhodes and Harutyunyan, 2010, 473). In Colombia, for example, the political parties were the main drivers for allowing Colombians to have the opportunity to vote abroad, and there has been smooth transition of incorporating the emigrant community in the political process (Escobar, 2007). On the contrary, if a political party believes that they will not benefit from external voting then it is only rational for them to be opposed it. As Barbara Geddes has stated while discussing the adoption of administrative reforms in Latin America “To explain why reforms have occurred at some times and places but not others, then, one must answer the question, Under what circumstances will the benefits of reform outweigh the costs to the politicians who must at least acquiesce in passing them?” (Geddes, 1991, 373). External voting is likely to be adopted in countries where it is believed that external voting will not give any political movement a clear advantage, or when a new political force comes to power.

Since many countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have become heavily reliant on remittances it can be expected that states are likely to favor external voting in countries that receive much financial support from those that live abroad. However, the willingness of states to adopt external voting is likely to be minimized if those that left are seen as being likely to oppose the current government (Wucker, 2004). For example the Cuban state does accept remittances of its emigrants, however, it is clear that the Cuban government has no intention of letting those abroad to play any role in the politics of Cuba (Itzigsohn, 2000, since most emigrant would certainly oppose the Cuban government.
Chapter 4:
The Struggle for Suffrage for Mexican Abroad

The first large groups of Mexican immigrants in the United States were a result of two treaties signed in the middle of the 19th century, the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo and the Gadsden Purchase. These treaties led Mexico to lose about half of its territory to the United States, and around 75,000 Mexicans decided to stay put in what was now the United States (Cano and Délano, 2007, 698). Since then, the migration flow from Mexico to the United States has been consistent. However, since 1980, an unprecedented number of Mexicans left to the United States, as Mexico struggled through a long and difficult political and economic transformation (Goodman and Hiskey, 2008). In the beginning of the 21st century, emigration from Mexico to the United States was the largest bilateral migration flow between any two countries in the world (Pellegrino, 2000). Around ten percent of all those born in Mexico currently reside in the United States (Pérez-Armedáriz and Crow, 2010, 126). Therefore, the potential political impact of Mexicans living abroad is enormous, as the Mexican population living in the United States represents approximately 14 percent of the entire Mexican voting population, if citizenship would be the only requirement to be eligible to vote (Bada, 2003).

The Battle for Suffrage

Mexicans living in the United States have expressed their desire to vote in their home country’s elections since the late 1920s (Marcelli and Conelius, 2005). In addition, Mexican politicians have been campaigning for the support of Mexicans living in the

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14 Although in the past few years, in large part due to economic recession, the migration flow to the United States from Mexico has slowed considerably, and there may even be a reverse net return migration from the United States to Mexico (Passel et al. 2012).
United States as early as 1929, when José Vasconcelos, one of the leaders of the Mexican Revolution, appealed for their support while he was running for the presidency (Lafleur, 2011). After Vasconcelos’ campaign failed, the issue of external voting became dormant for decades, as the dominant Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) opposed reforms, fearing an anti-PRI response from voters abroad (Smith, 2008). It was not until 1988, when Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas split away from the PRI to start the Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD), that the issue of external voting once again came to the forefront. Cárdenas looked for support from Mexicans in the United States as he ran for the presidency and Cárdenas asserted that he would support the cause of migrants in the U.S (Waldinger, 2008). He ended up losing the 1988 elections, but there were widespread claims of electoral fraud. The uproar after the 1988 elections led the PRI to negotiate electoral reforms which led to the creation of the Mexican Federal Election Institute (IFE), an independent institution that monitors Mexican elections (Berruecos, 2003).

Signs of real reform started when the PRI’s power started weakening, and in 2000, when Vicente Fox from the center-right Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) was elected, one of Fox promises was to enact voting from abroad (Lafleur and Chelius, 2011). On the day after his inauguration, President Fox had more than a hundred representatives of Mexican emigrants living in the United States to celebrate his victory, and Fox pledged that he would be the President of all Mexicans both those living at home and abroad (Bada, 2003). President Fox enacted several measures to strengthen the ties between those living abroad and the homeland (Lafleur, 2011). However, Fox had trouble passing an external voting bill as the Mexican Congress dismissed or rejected several bills. Therefore, Fox asked his Undersecretary of Political Development to come up with
a compromise that would satisfy all the three major political parties (Lafleur and Chelius, 2011). This led to the electoral law legislation in 2005, which opened up the possibility for Mexicans to vote abroad in the 2006 presidential elections. However, the 2005 legislation turned out to be a watered down version of external voting that minimized political risks for all of the political parties involved. Political parties were forbidden to campaign outside of Mexico, Mexicans living abroad could not financially support candidates, and the cost of voting became very high. This chapter examines the political process that led to the legislation that was passed in 2005 with near unanimous support in the Mexican Congress. This legislation has been seen by many Mexican migrant leaders living in the United States as a great disappointment. I argue that the three major Mexican political parties took a rational choice to purposefully enact a weak external voting law in 2005 in order to preserve the status quo. The political parties felt that putting several million new voters on the voter registration was too risky.

**Political Actors Involved**

It is interesting to look at the political process that took place in Mexico through the behavior of the key actors at stake. As has been previously stated, this case study will focus on the role of the state, migrant organizations, and political parties. In the case of Mexico it can be argued that all three actors are strong. Many of the migrant’s organizations are active and well organized, and the emigrant community in the United States has the history of impacting domestic Mexican politics (Pfutze, 2007). In Mexico, there has been a special relationship between the state and the political parties, as there has been a certain level of a union between the state and the PRI, so much so that it can be difficult to see where the state begins and where the PRI ends. The PRI had a
monopoly of power for seventy-one years; for much of its time in power, elections were mere rituals that consisted of opposition parties in large part as a symbolic measure (Schedler, 2000). Many scholars and officials used to refer to the PRI as “el partido del gobierno” or the party of the government (Rodriguez and Ward, 1994). However, it has also been argued that this might not be truly the case; “the overlap between the PRI and the government in Mexico has often been overstated. In many respects the government (especially at the federal level) traditionally exercised a relative autonomy from the party, in part, of course, in order to sustain the overall hegemony of the PRI” (Rodriguez and Ward, 1994, 164). The opposition parties, the PRD and the PAN have not been able to get to the same level of organization and power throughout Mexico as the PRI (Harbers, 2012), although the PAN did win two consecutive presidential elections in 2000 and 2006.

Role of the Mexican State

The Mexican state did have legitimate concerns not to extend the right to those living abroad. However, there is also the suspicion that the Mexican state opposed certain measures to protect the PRI. IFE’s Committee of Experts had stated that it was feasible to conduct voting from abroad for the 2000 elections, but it was blocked as the PRI opposed the measure (Smith, 2008). For the 2000 elections the Mexican state did end up setting up polling stations along the border between Mexico and the United States, but officials knew that most Mexicans abroad would not be able to go home and vote. Furthermore, those who did cross the border found out that many polling stations had quickly run out of ballots (Lawson, 2003). Many Mexican officials were also worried about the practical consequences of adding millions of new potential voters to the registries, both because of
its high cost and the difficult logistical problems that are associated with external voting (Lafleur, 2011). There were those who were afraid of ballots coming from abroad might be susceptible to fraud, which could change election results due to the large number of Mexicans living in the United States (Marcelli and Cornelius, 2005). The ruling PRI continually made the argument that external voting might open up the possibility of electoral fraud, but in reality, the PRI was highly motivated by the potential negative political consequences of giving the Mexican emigrant community suffrage (Smith, 2003). Officials also feared that external voting might create a backlash from the United States (Smith, 2003). The loyalties of immigrants have long been questioned, and if the public saw Mexicans as primarily interested in the well being of their former home country, it might cause some anger among the American public (De la Garza, 1998).

Mexicans were allowed to become dual citizens in 1997 (Goldbring 2002), as the Mexican government hoped that allowing Mexicans to become U.S citizens would help Mexico in two ways. First, Mexicans could become a more influential force in American politics, as some would have the right to vote. The Mexican state realized that a politically active Mexican emigrant population in the United States might be able to push for legislations that are favorable to Mexico. Secondly, it would help make sure that remittances and capital coming from Mexican nationals abroad would not cease (Escobar, 2007, 54). Remittances are a major source of income for the Mexican economy, and in many rural areas remittances exceed the budget of state and local governments (Bada, 2003). It has been estimated that over one million families in Mexico receive money from remittance (Goldbring, 2002).
Although the PRI adamantly opposed external voting while it was in power, the Mexican state under its rule did enact several programs which Mexican migrants living in the United States wanted. In 1989, the Paisano program was started with the goal of reducing shame against Mexicans who choose to return back to Mexico. The PRI also created the Program for Mexican Communities Abroad (PCME) in order to improve its relationship with Mexicans living abroad (Lafleur, 2008). Furthermore, the Mexican state also started playing a role in organizing civic events for Mexicans in the United States by registering more than five hundred new community organizations and organizing sports leagues for emigrants in the United States (Smith, 2003).

Once the PAN’s Vicente Fox became the president of Mexico in 2000, the relationship between the state and the emigrant community improved. Fox was well aware of the consequences of migration as he was the former governor of the migrant sending state Guanajuato. Once Fox came into power, he tried to redefine the image of Mexicans living abroad in a more positive manner (Lafleur, 2008). Furthermore, shortly after being elected, Fox met with business leaders in the United States in order to negotiate lower rates on money transfers (Levitt and De la Dehesa, 2003).

Role of Mexican Migrant Organizations

Jean-Michel Lafleur has suggested that there are two important ways in which migrant organizations can push the state and political parties to enfranchise citizens abroad. The first is that migrants need to act in unity to push authorities to implement external voting. The second is that economic, political, and social influences from migrants on their home country can sway policy makers (2011, 483). The Mexican migrant organizations in the United States are a strong fit to both of the factors that
Lafleur sees as being important. There are several ways in which migrants living abroad can influence policies in their country of origin, such as, investing in their country of origin, sending remittances, calling their friends and relatives back home in order to influence their political behavior, and by organizing initiatives while abroad (Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow, 2010). The lobbying of Mexican migrant organizations has paid off as they have been able to at least achieve partial victories on several of their key issues including dual citizenship and external voting (Fierro and Carillo, 2007; Lafleur, 2008). There are Mexican hometown associations (HTA) spread out throughout the United States that are active in encouraging development in Mexico and improving the rights of Mexicans living abroad, as well as helping Mexicans to participate in Mexican elections (Tuman, 2009). The number of HTAs has grown rapidly in the past few decades, with a high concentration of migrants coming from the center-west area of Mexico (Burgess, 2012). However, it is not appropriate to lump all the HTAs together as they have both diverse goals and they have had different results in achieving their goals.

Not all the migrant organizations have the same objectives. Historically, the HTA from the state of Zacatecas have focused on receiving official recognition from the Mexican. Zacatecans have also focused on local politics by trying to influence the political process in Zacatecas and getting resources from their home state (Smith, 2003). On the other hand, HTAs from Oaxaca have tended to focus their attention on getting the United States and other international human rights regimes to help protect Oaxacans living in Mexico (Smith, 2003). Some states have been able to push their home states to accept or at least consider proposals that allow group members to vote in local elections and even run for office. Zacatecas and Michoacán are examples of states that have
considered legislation to allow Mexicans living abroad the chance to vote in statewide elections (Marcelli and Conelius, 2005). The governor of Zacatecas also used to make annual visits to the Mexican consulates in Los Angeles, where the governor brought his or her key cabinet ministers and discussed key issues that Zacatecans living abroad might have (Smith, 2003). There has also been variations on how politically active and successful the migrants groups have been to get their states to implement favorable policies, and there is also a large gap in where remittances are being sent back.

One possible explanation to why some HTAs have been more successful than others is to look how much the local and state economies are dependent on remittances and other forms of capital coming from abroad. Remittances from Mexicans abroad are highly concentrated in a relatively few states (Fox and Bada, 2008). There is no denying the enormous impact that migrants living abroad have on communities throughout Mexico. Donations from HTAs often equal the public works budget of local governments, especially in small towns (Orozco and Lapointe, 2004).

Both state and federal administrations have looked to Mexicans living abroad to help them improve the living conditions of communities in Mexico (Goldbring, 2002). Remittances sent back to Mexico are in the billions of dollars and Mexico receives by far the most amount of remittances of any Latin American and the Caribbean country. Migrant organizations have worked with several levels of governments to set up programs such as the 3X1 Program, in which the state and local government match 3 pesos in public work for every peso sent by migrants (Meseguer and Aparicio, 2012).

Mexicans living abroad have argued that they should be able to vote in Mexican elections due to the fact that they are helping development, and that the Mexican
economy is dependent on remittances (Waldinger, 2008). Migrant organizations started lobbying the Mexican government for the right to vote abroad in the 1980s, but the 2005 legislation did not meet what the HTAs wanted. The HTAs would have preferred less institutional restraints and many wanted there to be a special electoral district for those living abroad, like there is in Colombia and several other countries (Lafleur and Chelius, 2011).

*Role of the Mexican Political Parties*

Political parties tend to be the actors who have the strongest interest in opposing external voting reforms because of the uncertainty they bring to them; this was certainly true in the case of Mexico. The PRI was the party which opposed electoral reforms for those living abroad while the PRD and PAN at least stated publicly that they were in favor of external voting (Bada, 2003). However, the PRI was in power until 2000, so it was able to block any reforms that the minority parties might have wanted.

It is useful to look at the political process that took place in Mexico through the lens of rational choice theory. As Barbara Geddes has stated while explaining the process of administrative reforms in Latin America (1991, 371), “incentives facing the politicians who must initiate reforms if any are to occur, yields two predictions: (1) reforms are more likely to pass the legislative hurdle when patronage is evenly distributed among the strongest parties, and (2) initial reforms are more likely to be followed by further extensions of reform where the electoral weight of the top parties remains relatively even and stable”. The process described by Geddes does fit Mexico quite well. Reforms were not made until there was more of a balance of power between the PRI and the two other major parties. While the PRI was in control, it had no interest in extending voting rights
to those abroad. Once the PAN had won the presidency, the PRI was more willing to compromise.\textsuperscript{15} The PAN and the PRD publicly advocated for external voting, but at the same time both of the opposition parties had some doubts about what might happen if those electoral reforms were passed (Lafleur, 2011). What might explain the behavior of the PRD and PAN is that they were supportive of electoral reforms for electoral gains, but at the same time they were worried that in the long run they would not gain any benefits (Bada, 2003).

While in power the PRI played a twofold game: trying to actively court the migrant population, but at the same time preventing any reforms from being made. While it controlled both the presidency and the Mexican Congress, the long-ruling PRI adamantly opposed external voting, fearing that those who left for the United States had already voted with their feet (Marcelli and Conelius, 2005). Although there is no reason to think that most Mexicans emigrate for political motives, there is some reason to believe that migrants from Mexico harbor negative feelings toward the PRI (Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow, 2010), since most migrants had voted with their feet by emigrating under the rule of the PRI (de la Garza, 1998, 432). The PRI had serious trepidation that electoral reforms would mean growth for the opposition parties, especially the PRD, since the PRD was the only party that had successfully cultivated an important potential constituency abroad (Escobar, 2007). The opposition of the PRI

\textsuperscript{15} When the legislation passed in the Mexican lower house (Cámara de diputados) in June 2005, the PRI held 224 of the 500 seats. The PAN held 149 seats and the PRD 97. Information can be found by going to http://www.diputados.gob.mx/Votaciones.htm. Then click on the Primer periodo extraordinario Junio 2005 which is located under the information of the LIX Legislatura (2003-2006). Then click on votación for bill number1785-III, martes 28 de junio de 2005. Information accessed April 3, 2014.
against external voting continued throughout the 1990s until a compromise was reached after President Fox was elected (Lawson, 2003).

At the same time, the PRI was opposing extending suffrage to those living abroad. It was also actively courting the migrant community in the United States (Pfutze, 2007). The PRI had lobbied migrant organizations to support the party and it had also installed committees of sympathizers in several U.S states (Bada, 2003). The PRI used several tactics to get support from migrants in the United States, such as buying radio advertising slots and requesting that migrants ask their relatives in Mexico to support the PRI (Smith, 2003). The PRD and PAN persistently supported external voting publicly, but there is still some debate whether they actually wanted those living abroad to have the right to vote.

In the decades prior to the voting abroad legislation being passed in 2005, both the PAN and the PRD stated that they supported electoral reform for those living abroad, especially when it came close to election time (Bada, 2003). Eventually, both the PRD and PAN voted heavily in favor of a legislation that made sure that Mexicans living abroad would not have the opportunity to change the Mexican political landscape. The PRI emphasizes a different political strategy than the PRD and the PAN. The PRI has the ability to go on the offensive by sending resources to the states that have done poorly in the past, while the PRD and the PAN are very much focused on defending their territory by spending resources in areas where they have done well in past elections (Harbers, 2012). This might explain why the two parties who historically have been in the minority might favor a legislation that has little or no impact on election results. It is likely that the PRD and PAN were afraid that the PRI, with its superior resources and organization,
might make inroads with those living abroad in the future. Therefore, the PRI could further its dominance on Mexican politics.

The left leaning PRD was in many ways most supportive of external voting reforms being passed. It was Cuahtémoc Cárdenas who went to the United States in 1988 pledging support for Mexicans living abroad after the issue of migrants being allowed to vote had not been in the public discourse for quite some time (Waldinger, 2008). After Cárdenas lost, the PRD redoubled its efforts to expand migrant rights. It became the only party that actively campaigned and drew large numbers of Mexican emigrants to its events (Smith, 2008). In 2003, the PRD Governor of Michoacán, Lázaro Cárdenas Batel, sent a bill to the state legislature which would have allowed migrants to vote in state elections as well as to run for public offices. However, the bill was rejected by the PRI and PAN delegations in the state legislature (Marcelli and Cornelius, 2005). The PRD put in place commissions for promoting the vote abroad and it established thirty PRD committees in thirty U.S states (Bada, 2003, 24). It is perplexing to understand why the PRD would not advocate for legislation that would make it easy for migrants abroad to vote since it is quite possible that the PRD would be able to establish a large number of new voters abroad with some campaigning (Lawson, 2003).

Members of the PAN had been actively claiming that they are in favor of migrants abroad having the opportunity to vote. However, once the PAN was in power, there was not much action to get external voting legislations passed (Bada, 2003). The PAN’s leadership was even hesitant to back its own President’s legislative proposal to pass voting reforms for migrants (Marcelli and Conelius, 2005). External voting had been a key issue in the 2000 presidential elections. Some within the Fox campaign saw his
position on external voting as an important aspect to why he won; Vicente Fox had supported migrant voting rights in contradiction to the PRI’s candidate Francisco Labastida who opposed external voting (Smith, 2003). The PAN had lobbied those living abroad to support the PAN by installing promotion offices in several major American cities and by giving out three minutes phone cards to Mexican immigrants, asking them to call their friends and families to vote for the PAN candidates (Bada, 2003, 24). After being elected, Fox reiterated his support for allowing Mexicans abroad to vote, and Fox was able to partially fulfill his promise to the migrant community in 2005 when the electoral reforms were passed (Smith, 2003).

On June 28, 2005, Mexico’s Chamber of Deputies passed a long-awaited legislation on external voting. That legislation, however, resembled more a last-minute political compromise than a thorough measure to enfranchise the millions of citizens abroad. In the last full year of his presidential term, Fox came up with a bill that would not threaten any party, as the institutional factors included in the bill would surely limit voter turnout, since voting abroad was made difficult and costly. But at the same time, Fox was able to keep his promise of adopting external voting. In the end, the parties involved did not fear the migrant community living in the United States, as the parties took a rational choice of passing legislation that would not create uncertainty because the legislation was marred with institutional hurdles for any potential eligible Mexican voter living abroad. It seems likely that the PRI got the difficult institutional factors into the bill, which mitigated any potential political consequences coming from an anti-PRI sentiment from the voters abroad. Meanwhile, it looks like the PRD and PAN made sure
that no party could campaign abroad, preventing the PRI to make serious inroads with the emigrant community.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Voted For</th>
<th>Voted Against</th>
<th>Did not vote/absent/other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRI</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRD</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1 Voting of Mexican Representatives

Source: http://www.diputados.gob.mx/Votaciones.htm

After a debate lasting for over a decade, the final vote that allowed external voting was passed almost unanimously. The PRI, PRD, and PAN came together to support a bill which allowed them to say they had finally passed reforms, but at the same time they did not have to worry about any extensive political changes such as a new political movement that would focus on representing Mexicans living abroad. Additionally, none of the others parties that had representatives in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies voted against the legislation. The legislation to allow Mexicans living abroad to vote was popular in Mexico, as many saw it as another step for a more democratic Mexico, and no party wished to be on the wrong side of the issue before the 2006 elections (Smith, 2008).

The eventual legislation that was passed was a big disappointment to migrant leaders in the United States. The new law prohibited candidates and parties from campaigning abroad, which is something that all the three major parties had done in the past. It became illegal to support the parties financially, therefore, greatly minimizing the impact Mexicans could have on the domestic political process. Also, it mandated postal

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16 In order to find this information, one must go to http://www.diputados.gob.mx/Votaciones.htm. Then click on the Primer periodo extraordinario Junio 2005 which is located under the information of the LIX Legislatura (2003-2006). Then click on votación for bill number1785-III, martes 28 de junio de 2005. Information accessed March 5, 2014.

17 The Parties that are not included on the table include: Partido Verde Ecologista de México (14 voted yes, 3 were absent), Partido del Trabajo (6 voted yes), Movimiento Ciudadano (5 voted yes), Independents (1 voted yes, 1 was absent)
voting instead of letting migrants vote at Mexican embassies and consulates throughout the world, and it limited participation to only those that already had electoral credentials, which are only available in Mexico. Finally, a potential voter had to send a written request to be added to the list of those who were eligible to vote abroad (Waldinger, 2008). Any potential voter has to be on the Mexican National Voter Registry and has to have a valid electoral credential with a photo which can only be issued by the Mexican government (Smith, 2008). It is much more difficult for those who are undocumented to cross the border to Mexico as they face the prospect of being apprehended by the authorities in the United States when they come back. Furthermore, undocumented migrants often get rid of their identification cards, in case they are apprehended by the local authorities in the United States (Waldinger, 2008). Therefore, those who did want to vote had to jump through several institutional hurdles that made voting expensive both in terms of time spent and money.

IFE is now in charge of monitoring that the parties do not campaign abroad. This has angered many migrant leaders, who see political campaigning by the political parties as the most effective measure to the get the migrant community to vote. There is also a great uncertainty about what campaigning actually means. Some have questioned whether wearing a t-shirt that states PRI on it while explaining the rules of the 2005 electoral reforms is breaking the law (Smith, 2008, 727). That is why many feel that Mexicans living abroad did not gain power with the 2005 external voting law. “Mexican politics abroad has moved from a system of ‘campaigns without votes’ to ‘votes without campaigns’” (Lafleur, 2011, 488).
IFE was also just given three months to implement all the rules before the deadline for registering to vote expired. After the Mexican government had spent over 25 million dollars (Fierro and Carillo, 2007, 192), only a little over thirty-three thousands Mexicans living abroad voted. This was significantly lower than what any previous scholarly research or government report had predicted (Enrico and Comelius, 2005; Smith, 2008). The Mexican authorities were satisfied with the results due to the reliability of the external electoral process and they stated that the low turnout was due to a lack of interest by those living abroad in the politics of Mexico more than any other factors (Lafleur and Chelius, 2011). Although the government suspected that the short time IFE had to implement the elections played a role as well, furthermore, around a quarter of the applications that IFE received were denied due to technical reasons (Lafleur and Chelius, 2011).

Beyond the institutional factor, one other explanation is that Mexican migrants are not interested in the Mexican political process, although some scholarship has questioned this assumption (Suro and Escobar, 2006). Although Mexicans in the United States account for well over ninety percent of migrants living abroad, their percent of votes cast was only about eighty-five percent. Countries that have smaller numbers of Mexican migrants such, as France and Switzerland, had much higher turnout rates (Lafleur and Chelius, 2011).

The PRI’s fear that the traditional oppositions parties (the PRD and PAN) would gain significantly if voting from abroad was to be adopted turned out to be substantiated. The PAN received over fifty-eight percent of the votes coming from abroad. But since

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18 The Mexican government spent an estimated overall cost of 305 million Mexican Pesos
there are so few that voted, it cannot be generalized that these percentages were to hold true if the number of voters would be drastically increased. It is likely that the PAN was highly overrepresented in the 2000 and 2006 elections. However, the support of the three major parties does support the hypothesis of most scholars that the PRI would not gain much support of Mexican migrants.

In the 2012 elections, the PRI received less than fourteen percent of the votes abroad

Chappell Lawson (2003) has come up with several hypotheses why the PRI does so much poorer abroad, including that the PRI tends to get a very favorable media coverage in Mexico, while the media in the United States tends to be more critical of the PRI. Furthermore, young men tend to be the most loyal supporters of the PAN, and there is an overrepresentation of young men who migrate compared to other demographic groups. Between the elections of 2006 to 2012, voter turnout increased by only seven thousand people.  

Table 4.2 – Results of 2012 Mexican Presidential Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Percentage of total votes</th>
<th>Percentage of votes outside of Mexico</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>26.05%</td>
<td>42.17%</td>
<td>+16.12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRI</td>
<td>39.19%</td>
<td>13.81%</td>
<td>-25.38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRD</td>
<td>32.42%</td>
<td>29.76%</td>
<td>-2.66%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Conclusion*

As noted, political parties in Mexico publicly stated that they were in favor letting migrants abroad vote. It seems clear that in the case of Mexico all the political parties came together to adopt reforms, so they could say that they had done something, but at

the same time it looks like they had no intention to change the political landscape.

“Mexican domestic actors achieved their objective of preventing emigrants from playing a crucial role in the 2006 presidential election, which later proved to be highly disputed” (Lafleur, 2011, 489). The future of political participation of Mexican emigrants is gloomy. Since the political parties are not allowed to campaign in the United States, it will have to be the hometown associations that do most of the work to get emigrants to vote. Almost 90 percent of all emigrants from Mexico are bound for the United States, and around 80 percent of all Mexican migrants living in the United States live in U.S states that used to be part of Mexico (Durand, 2007, 224). If Mexico allowed those abroad to vote at their consulates around the world, the voter turnout would surely increase significantly. However, that is unlikely to occur unless there is a real demand coming from Mexicans living abroad. It seems that the PRI fears that the PAN and PRD would receive the lion’s share of the votes coming from abroad, while the PRD and PAN fear that the PRI could make inroads with the Mexican community abroad.
Chapter 5:

Institutional Constraint and External Voting: The Case of Chile

The debate on whether to adopt external voting in Chile has been taking place for well over a decade, with numerous proposals having been brought up in the Chilean legislature. However, so far, no external voting bill has been passed despite several Chilean presidents endorsing external voting and evidence showing that a large majority of Chileans would be in favor of letting those abroad have the opportunity to vote (Escobar, 2007). The politics of external voting in Chile is still highly influenced by the rule of Augusto Pinochet, although it has been almost a quarter of a century since he exited from the presidency. The Pinochet regime used killings and forced exile as strategies to get rid of its political opponents. The brutality of Pinochet created tens of thousands of political refugees that never returned to Chile. After Pinochet left the presidency, he remained an influential figure in Chile that still had many supporters and admirers (Landau and Anderson, 1998). Pinochet’s power made it difficult for ensuing elected presidents of Chile to change his legacy. Those who wanted justice for the heinous crimes committed during the Pinochet era had to compete with the will of the military that adamantly opposed any investigations into what had occurred during their rule (Londregan, 2000). In order to understand why external voting has not been adopted in Chile, it is necessary to understand the reign of General Pinochet and the electoral rules he put in place before leaving his office. The 1989 Constitution that was adopted shortly before Pinochet left the presidency kept electoral rules which highly favored conservative political factions in Chile. These rules have made it very difficult for external voting legislation to be adopted despite there being political will to do so.
The Reign of Pinochet and Return to Democracy

From 1932 to the coup in 1973, Chile was seen as one of the most consolidated democracies in Latin America. It resembled a European party system with clear cleavages within society (Drake and Javsic, 1995). However, the events of September 11th, 1973 significantly changed the course of history in Chile, when the Chilean military, under the leadership of General Pinochet, bombed the presidential palace and conducted a coup d’état. The coup overthrew President Salvador Allande, who had been the first in the world to be democratically elected a socialist president in Latin America (Adams, 2013). The repression that ensued the military overthrow was immense. It has been estimated that up to 30,000 people were murdered by the Pinochet regime and up to 80,000 political prisoners were taken (Angell and Carstairs, 1987). The armed forces went on a mission to get rid of its political enemies regardless of whether they showed resistance or not (Ensalaco, 2000). The Pinochet regime also punished its enemies by forcing them into exile and denying them employment and income.

Many Chileans who had leftist ties both in the public and private sector were put on a government blacklist that denied them employment (Wright and Zúñiga, 2007). Military officers replaced university professors who had an association with the left, and leftist students were expelled (Oppenheim, 1999). The Pinochet government also punished its political enemies by sending them to isolated parts of Chile, where they had to sign in with the local authorities daily (Wright and Zúñiga, 2007). However, perhaps most important for the purpose of external voting, the political and economic persecution of the Pinochet regime led between 200,000 to 400,000 Chileans to leave their country (Stern, 2010, 36).
Pinochet was not the first leader in Chilean history to use exile in order to get rid of political opposition (Angell and Carstairs, 1987). However, nothing in Chile’s history compared to the mass exile that occurred under the Pinochet regime (Wright and Zúñiga, 2007). Many Chileans realized early what was about to occur and they managed to escape by taking refuge in foreign embassies and with the help of humanitarian agencies (Adams, 2013). Some foreign governments that were sympathetic to those being persecuted quickly filled their embassies with and allowed people to sleep on their embassy grounds. Some other dissidents thought that the regime would be short-lived and escaped to neighboring countries, expecting to return home soon (Wright and Zúñiga, 2007). However, the Pinochet regime was remarkably durable, surviving a wave of democratization in South America (Remmer, 1989). It has been estimated that at least two percent of Chile’s population in 1973 ended up seeking refuge in foreign countries (Hirsch, 2012).

It was in the early 1980s that real problems started arising for the Pinochet regime. The country had been hit hard by an economic slowdown, which emboldened political parties that had been outlawed to start to organize themselves (Silva, 1991). Protest further splintered the Pinochet regime and the leaders of several important security forces stated that they would welcome civilian rule instead of Pinochet’s rule (Angell and Pollack, 1990). Nonetheless, Pinochet was able to hold onto power until he called for a plebiscite in 1988. Pinochet and the military had expected that the 1988 plebiscite would consolidate their power by giving Pinochet eight more years to govern (Garretón, 1995). Registration started in 1986, with Pinochet himself the first person to register. The regime made registration easy for its political allies, but made it
complicated for perceived opponents to sign up. Furthermore, no parties were allowed to get any funding from foreign countries (Oppenheim, 1999). Despite Pinochet having systematic advantages, the center-left parties unified, and they were able to defeat Pinochet, as 55 percent voted against him remaining in power.

After losing the plebiscite, Pinochet focused his efforts on retaining power. Laws were adopted that kept Pinochet in charge of the armed forces and made the military a very autonomous institution apart from civilian control (Angell and Pollack, 1990). Furthermore, Pinochet named himself a senator-for-life. However, most importantly, Pinochet was able to change the electoral rules before leaving the presidency.

The battle for suffrage of Chilean emigrants has been largely impacted by the electoral rules that were implemented during the Pinochet regime. Before Pinochet left power, he was able to largely write the rules by which future democratically elected governments would have to abide by (Haggard and Kaufman, 1997). The Pinochet regime had initially favored a first-past-the-post in order to create a two party system, but once the regime realized that they would probably not win a majority of the seats, they decided to come up with a system that would favor them in the legislature (Angell and Pollack, 1990). Chile uses the d’Hondt allocation rule which almost assures that conservative faction get one representative in most districts (Haggard and Kaufman, 1997). Under the d’Hondt system, there are two representatives from each district, but in order for one party to gain both seats, it must get twice as many votes than the second biggest party. Otherwise, one seat is allocated to the party that receives the most votes and one seat goes to the party that comes in second (Rahat and Sznajder, 1998). The
d’Hondt electoral rules have helped to ensure overrepresentation of conservative parties who block external voting laws.

**Political Actors Involved**

The democratization of Chile after Pinochet has produced one of the most stable multiparty democracies in Latin America (Alemán and Saiegh, 2007). The election of Sebastián Piñera as president in 2010 helped illustrate the consolidation of democracy in Chile, as Piñera was the first center-right president since Chile democratized after the reign of Pinochet (Luna and Mardones, 2010). Piñera succeeded the left leaning Michelle Bachelet, who had been able to do away with some of the institutional rules that had been put in place during the Pinochet era such as guaranteed seats in the senate. However, Bachelet and her coalition had not been able to get rid of the main element of the binomial electoral system (Luna and Mardones, 2010). Chile has been admired for its stability since it democratized, but its main political actors are still constrained in their actions due to the rules set by the Pinochet regime.

The policies of the Chilean state towards its emigrant population have drastically changed since Pinochet left power. The Pinochet regime had portrayed those abroad as being hostile to the Chilean state, or even as being foreign agents (Wright and Zúñiga, 2007). Starting with the rule of President Aylwin, who was the first to be elected after Pinochet, government policies and institutions were set up to help with Chile’s past. However, since Pinochet still played a vital role within the Chilean state it was limited what the state apparatus could do (Wright and Zúñiga, 2007). Policies were set up to help Chileans emigrants return, but the success of these policies were limited, and many Chileans who did return back home no longer felt that they belonged there (Stern, 2010).
By expelling the leftist political elite, Pinochet managed to keep them out of domestic politics, but it also meant that there was a large group of politically active Chileans around the world working on delegitimizing his rule. Since democratization, it has been the conservative political factions which have been the main opposition group to external voting. They are afraid of including a new bloc of voters who might influence the balance of power in Chilean politics.

*Role of the Chilean State*

A key strategy of the Pinochet regime to consolidate its power was to murder, incarcerate, or force its enemies to move abroad (Wright and Zúñiga, 2007). In the first few months of military rule, the intelligence and secret police agency (DINA) was created. The DINA ruthlessly went after political enemies in Chile and abroad (Adams, 2013). In 1974, the DINA started tracking and killing political leaders that were in exile. This included car bombings in Argentina, Italy, and the United States (Stern, 2010). The DINA sent a clear message to Chilean leftists that they were not safe even while abroad. The Pinochet regime also had a stringent requirement for who could return to Chile up until the plebiscite in 1988. Once Pinochet was voted out of power, the new democratic government did make efforts to welcome those back that had been exiled and persecuted during the time of Pinochet.

As power shifted away from Pinochet to a democratically elected government in 1990, there were great limits to what the new government could do. When President Raúl Alfonsín had replaced the Bignone dictatorship in Argentina, he had sought retribution for the crimes that had been committed. However, President Aylwin had few other options than to deal with the crimes that were committed during the Pinochet
regime symbolically, by holding public rituals remembering those who had been violated (Robben, 2014). Aylwin did establish a truth commission to investigate the crimes that had been committed during the Pinochet regime, but the effectiveness of this commission was limited because of a 1978 law that had amnestied all of the regimes’ previous crimes and because of the constitution that had been adopted under Pinochet (Wright and Zúñiga, 2007; Robben, 2014).

Once the democratically elected government took control, the policies towards those living abroad did change. No longer were Chileans forced to stay abroad because of political reasons (Bolzman, 2011). President Aylwin did create the National Office of Return (Oficina Nacional de Retorno) in the ministry of justice, whose purpose it was to help those who returned from abroad to find employment and adjust to life in Chile (Loveman, 1995). However, the agency never got the funding that it needed and only lasted for three years (Stern, 2010), and most of those who had left during the Pinochet Regime ended up staying in their adopted country (Bolzman, 2011).

Michelle Bachelet, who was elected as president of Chile in 2006 and again in 2014, has been a key supporter of letting Chileans abroad having the right to vote. Bachelet is a poster child of the horrors that occurred during the Pinochet regime. Following the coup, she was put in jail and tortured, as were her parents. Her father died in prison; then, she went into exile with her mother. While in exile, she worked on influencing foreign governments to oppose the Pinochet regime (Lieberfeld, 2011). Her boyfriend and her mentor were killed by the Chilean secret police. Subsequently, she married a Chilean exile and ended up returning to Chile, where she had been blacklisted by the Pinochet (Lieberfeld, 2011). Therefore, from her life story, it should not come as a
big surprise that she has been more determined than her predecessors to build relationships with those that were violated during the military rule (Collins, 2009).

In 2006, Bachelet put together a commission to reform the electoral system, but this proposal was quickly defeated and it never made it to the floor for a vote (Luna and Mardones, 2010). In 2009, President Bachelet proposed legislation to the Senate that would grant those living abroad the right to vote in presidential elections. Her opponents in the Senate took the legislation to the Chilean Supreme Court to see if the constitution adopted in the time of Pinochet would allow for it (Bolzman, 2011). Starting her second term in 2014, Bachelet has vowed that her government will make the passing of external voting a matter of urgency (Latercera, 2014).

Since the democratization in Chile, the state has implemented numerous policies that are favorable for the migrant community, such as creating the National Office of Return and allowing Chileans to receive dual citizenship. Additionally, every President since Chile’s democratization in 1990 has favored external voting, including the center-right Sebastián Piñera (Escobar, 2007; Santiago Times, 2013a). Chile has also ratified the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, which encourages states to allow migrant workers to have the right to vote from abroad (Marshall, 2011, 144-145). But, the electoral rules and the Chilean constitution have made it difficult for any government to adopt and implement external voting.

*Role of Chilean Migrants*

The 1973 coup created a Chilean “diaspora” that dispersed around the world. Leaving Chile became a matter of life or death for thousands of Chileans who could
expect to be severely punished or killed if they got caught by the armed forces. Chileans went all throughout the world. It has been estimated that exiles went from 110 to 140 different countries on all continents (Wright and Zúñiga, 2007, 36). However, most common destinations for Chileans were the neighboring countries and, Venezuela, Mexico, and Cuba who openly welcomed a large number of political exiles (Wright and Zúñiga, 2007). The Pinochet regime still saw those that were exiled as important enemies, and the Chilean secret police tracked and killed some prominent leaders while they were abroad (Stern, 2010).

Despite the brutality of the Pinochet regime, it did receive complicit support from the Nixon administration for the coup (Calandra, 2013). However, the United States government was enraged when the Chilean secret police killed Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffit, who were murdered close to the White House; Letelier had been a diplomat in the Allande regime (Stern, 2010). Although forced exile ridded Pinochet of many of his most prominent political opponents, it also turned out to be a problem as his opponents were able to spread their anti-Pinochet message to governments throughout the world (Wright and Zúñiga, 2007).

Using exile, Pinochet was able to get the leftist political elite out of the country, which moved opposition out of the realm of domestic politics and out of Chile’s boundaries (Portales, 1995). Nevertheless, Chileans abroad became a problem to the Pinochet regime as once they arrived in their host countries they started organizing against the Pinochet regime and started working around the world to delegitimize his regime (Wright and Zúñiga, 2007). Although Chileans exiles were spread out throughout the world, they had enough numbers to form communities in many cities around the
world where they could organize against the Pinochet regime (Angell and Carstairs, 1987). Chileans abroad organized themselves in terms of the political parties they belonged to (Zarzosa, 1998), unlike migrant organizations of most countries that tend to organize themselves around their home town or region. Chileans abroad were able to gain some success in influencing foreign governments to pressure the Pinochet regime to soften up its policies (Portales, 1995). They also worked to get the Pinochet government condemned in international forums and campaigned governments to stop selling weapons to Chile (Wright and Zúñiga, 2007). The Chilean exile consisted of political elites, businessmen, and academics that were able to build up strong relationships abroad.

Those who left Chile during the 1973 coup were not the average migrants, who tend to have limited opportunities in their homeland and leave for jobs. These were former government officials, academics, and businessman that had connections abroad, and they were able to build relationships abroad. Although there was no clear leader in exile, as had been with Juan Perón in Argentina, there were many figures that were had the experiences to go into government positions once Chile democratized (Silva, 1991).

Chilean exiles played an important role in Chile’s democratization process. In 1984, key opposition leaders started challenging the no-return policy of the Pinochet regime, by entering Chile without authorization from the regime. The Pinochet government initially reacted badly to exiles challenging its policy and sent many of those back, action which was harshly criticized by the international community (Wright and Zúñiga, 2007). However, before the 1988 plebiscite, almost all exiles were invited to return back to Chile (Drake and Javsic, 1995). The exiles were able to help defeat Pinochet in the plebiscite and they helped bring about the Socialist-Christian Democrat
coalition that has been a prevalent political group since Chile democratized (Wright and Zúñiga, 2007, 47). However, many of those that did return to Chile found that the country had greatly changed during the Pinochet regime and they no longer felt as they belonged there.

Many returnees felt out of place once they returned back home to Chile. Furthermore, many Chileans saw those returning back from exile as representing bad memories that most Chileans were not necessarily willing to deal with (Stern, 2010). Most who returned from exile got a cold reception, and many businesses were hesitant to hire those that returned. This occurred in part because the Pinochet regime had been successful in painting those that left as not being victims, but instead having received Pinochet’s grace to leave (Wright and Zúñiga, 2007, 46). Most of those that had been forced out ended up staying in their host country, but the National Office of Return did assist over 50,000 people in their moves to come back (Stern, 2010). Since Chile democratized, emigrants have focused their attention on getting justice for the crimes that were committed during the Pinochet regime and increasing their rights as citizens.

Although the relationship between emigrants and the state has changed completely since Chile democratized, there are many that feel that it is still not at a sufficient level (Bolzman, 2011). Chileans abroad have in large part focused on the human rights crime committed during the rule of the military (Wright and Zúñiga, 2007), such as the Chilean migrant associations in Switzerland financing books on human rights (Bolzman, 2011). Furthermore, after Pinochet was arrested in London, Chileans abroad played an active role in sharing their views on the arrest in Chilean media (Tanner, 2001). Chileans abroad have also requested to have the right to vote in Chilean elections while
abroad. Migrant organizations have strongly advocated for this when Chilean national leaders have made trips abroad (Bolzman, 2011). For the 2013 presidential elections, Chileans abroad raised awareness of their requests by voting symbolically in pretend elections (CNNChile, 2014). They have also built up relationships with Chilean embassies, which they use as a gateway to lobby for their rights (Bolzman, 2011). However, the efforts of Chilean emigrants have not yet yielded results, as conservative political forces fear what the electoral consequences that external voting might bring about.

_Chilean Political Parties_

Allowing Chileans abroad the right to vote has been an important topic in Chilean politics for numerous years. It has been estimated that around 850,000 Chileans live abroad, although some argue that this number underestimates the true number of migrants (Toro and Walker, 2007, 134). Chilean presidents have unanimously favored external voting since democratization (Escobar, 2007), and numerous legislations allowing external voting have been brought up in the Chilean legislature. But so far, no legislation has passed the legislative hurdle, in large part because the conservative faction fears that it might benefit the left.

A major reason why external voting has not been adopted in Chile is because it is perceived that those abroad would favor the center left Concertación political coalition or other left leaning political factions (López and Figueroa, 2009). Therefore, the left in Chile has tended to be supported of external voting (Marshall, 2011), while the right has been more reluctant to endorse it. Legislation that has been introduced to allow for external voting have tended to come mostly from members of the Concertación (López
and Figueroa, 2009). However, there have been exceptions to this rule, especially when candidates from the right are running for the presidency (Santiago Times, 2013a). Given the history of emigration during the Pinochet regime, it is easy to understand the concerns of the political factions that supported Pinochet, that those abroad would be unlikely to support them.

The mass exodus that took place after the 1973 coup occurred because Pinochet strategically went after those who had been associated with the left leaning parties (Bolzman, 2011). The number of political elites that were forced to exile significantly changed how the left leaning parties were able to function. Furthermore, the main opposition political factions of the left were banned. Subsequently, it is logical for certain political parties to calculate that those living abroad would be likely to vote against their interest. Yet, there is some evidence which suggests that only a small proportion of Chileans currently live abroad because of political reasons, according to the Chilean census only 10 percent of Chileans abroad state political reasons for being the main motivation as to why they do not leave in Chile (López and Figueroa, 2009, 59). The institutional rules that were adopted during the Pinochet regime have prevented the Concertación from being able to adopt external voting.

Under the d’Hondt system, a party must receive 66.7 percent of the votes in order to guarantee that it will win both seats in a district. This system forces parties to form electoral coalitions in order to be competitive to win seats (Huneeus, 2005). Although the d’Hondt system has brought with it great stability, it has also disproportionately rewarded the conservative leaning Alliance with representatives that have been able to block external voting legislations. In 2006, President Bachelet of the Concertación set up
a commission to reform the electoral system, but it was immediately blocked, as the political right did not want to get away with this system that rewarded them for being the second biggest political faction in Chile (Luna and Mardones, 2010). Political parties have also debated how external voting should be implemented if it were to be adopted.

Another important concern for the political parties in Chile regards how external voting would be implemented. Chile has used a peculiar electoral system in which people are not forced to register to vote, but in which voting is compulsory (Huneeus, 2005). Subsequently, it must be decided how those abroad would register to vote and what would be needed in order for those abroad to register to vote. Furthermore, it is unclear in which district those living abroad would be counted in. There has been some discussion that votes from abroad would be counted in a major metropolitan area, similar to what Peru does, where the votes from abroad are included in the same constituency as the voters in Lima (Toro and Walker, 2007). There is also not a consensus on what voting method would be used, whether it would take place at Chilean diplomatic missions around the world or whether voters would mail in their votes (López and Figueroa, 2009).

It seems that there is a consensus from the various proposed legislations that voters from abroad should be allowed in presidential elections and referendums (Navarro, Morales and Gratschew, 2007; Santiago Times, 2013b).

**Conclusion**

Since Chile democratized, it has been one of the most stable democracies in Latin America, consisting of two dominant political factions. However, this stability has been brought about by electoral rules adopted during the Pinochet era which has largely prevented those that committed crimes during the coup to be punished, and it has also
made it very difficult to adopt external voting legislations. The 1973 coup created a large
group of politically active Chileans abroad. The mass exile removed Pinochet’s
opponents from being able to participate in Chilean politics, but at the same time, it gave
his adversaries the opportunity to work on delegitimizing his rule throughout the world
(Wright and Zúñiga, 2007). Pinochet was able to create the rules of Chilean politics
before leaving office, and governments that followed his rule have found it very difficult
to make changes to these rules (López and Figueroa, 2009). It has been my argument that
these rules have greatly limited the opportunity to adopt external voting although there
has been the political will to do so. Furthermore, the conservative political faction in
Chile has also generally been opposed to it as it expects that those abroad will favor its
political opponents.
Chapter 6: 

Adopting External Voting

This chapter examines the findings from the Cox Proportional Hazard Model and offers an analysis on the results. Two separate regressions were performed. The first regression (table 6.1) measures some of the main variables that have been mentioned in previous scholarship on the subject, and the second regression (table 6.4) includes electoral system variables that are intended to look at institutional factors. Additionally, this chapter compares and reviews the findings of the Mexican and Chilean case studies. The next section will review the results from the first regression.

Regression I

\[
\begin{align*}
[Adoption \\
\text{of} \\
\text{External} \\
\text{Voting}] &= \\
[Percent \\
\text{Remittance} \\
\text{of} \\
\text{GDP}] + \\
[Squared \\
\text{Percent} \\
\text{Remittance} \\
\text{of} \\
\text{GDP}] + \\
[Freedom \\
\text{House} \\
\text{Score}] + \\
[Left \\
\text{Leaning} \\
\text{Executive}] + \\
[Share \\
\text{of} \\
\text{the} \\
\text{Executive}] + \\
[Diffusion] + \\
[Log \\
\text{of} \\
\text{GDP}] + \\
[Political \\
\text{Globalization}]
\end{align*}
\]
As was discussed in chapter 3 (Theory and Methods) the relationship between external voting and remittances has been greatly discussed in the scholarly literature. However, the statistical relationship between the two has remained questionable. The most interesting result from the first regression is the role remittances have on the likelihood a country will adopt external voting. The coefficient for remittances as a percent of GDP is positive and significant when it is not squared, and when remittances as a percent of GDP are squared the coefficient becomes negative and still remains significant at the five percent level. This suggests that remittance to GDP has a positive effect on the likelihood on the adoption of external voting, up to a certain “tipping point”. Once the effect has been accounted for, the effect diminishes, as suggested by the negative and significant coefficient for remittance GDP squared. It is important to consider that governments and politicians must calculate their options of either keeping their emigrant population happy who are sending remittances by allowing them to vote, against the political uncertainty that might occur whenever a new group is given the right to vote (Tager, 2006). At high levels, remittances might be a political liability for those

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Remittance/ GDP</td>
<td>136.5736**</td>
<td>64.86359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remittance GDP/ squared</td>
<td>-1208.04**</td>
<td>602.123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedomhouse score</td>
<td>-.7784559</td>
<td>.9753588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left leaning executive</td>
<td>2.632665***</td>
<td>.9817958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of the executive</td>
<td>-4.547507</td>
<td>3.098586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diffusion</td>
<td>-.8204858</td>
<td>2.246075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDP</td>
<td>-.8278903</td>
<td>.8127563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political globalization</td>
<td>.1032548</td>
<td>.0708308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-Size 210</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi Square 17.05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**p < .001; ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < 0.10
who are considering adopting external voting. These results shown in table 6.1 indicate that political parties and politicians want to restrict the power of those abroad, which certainly could back up those who see the main goal of politicians to stay in power and be risk averse (Downs, 1957; Geddes, 1991; Mayhew, 2004). The case study of Mexico appears to support this finding. The number of Mexican emigrants and the money they send back certainly has the possibility of making them a noteworthy political force in Mexican politics. The Mexican political parties were fearful of the political impact those living abroad; therefore, they ended up adopting a law that makes it difficult and expensive for those abroad to vote despite the contribution they make to the Mexican economy.

Remittances also limit the power of politicians to hand out patronage. As Tobias Pfutze (2007) has stated “remittances are completely outside the government’s control they shift political power away from it towards the population, rendering clientilistic arrangements between the government and the electorate less sustainable” (2007, 2). Since politicians often use redistribution as a means to achieve their electoral goals (Cox and McCubbins, 1986), it is plausible that they see increased power of those outside as a threat to their own electoral viability.

The only other variable that is statistically significant at the five percent level is the binary variable for whether a country has a leftist government or not. One explanation for why leftist governments are more likely to adopt external voting in Latin America and the Caribbean is that leftist governments are more likely to want a build a symbolic relationship with those abroad. Leftist governments in the region also have the history of being more willing to enfranchise new groups (Smith, 2005). Furthermore, left
leaning government might also think that they are likely to gain an electoral advantage by allowing those abroad to vote.

Net migration was also tested by using data available from the United Nations.\textsuperscript{21} There was a statistically significant relationship between the coefficient for negative migration rate per 1,000 habitants (people emigrating) and adoption of external voting. However, the migration variable was too collinear with remittances as a percent of GDP, and therefore it was dropped.

Interestingly, countries that have a lower Freedomhouse score (lower scores meaning more democratic) are not more likely to adopt external voting. In fact, countries that have not adopted external voting tend to have slightly lower Freedomhouse mean scores (2.66) than those that have adopted it (2.83). These findings contradicts the results of Blais, Massicotte and Yoshinaka who found that there was a norm among “strong democracies” to allow citizens abroad have the right to vote (2001, 57). However, since the Freedomhouse variable is not significant no generalizations can be made about the relationship between democracy and the adoption of external voting.

Countries that have a higher log GDP are not more likely to adopt external voting. Subsequently, it does not appear that countries base their decision on whether to adopt external voting based on their financial capabilities of implementing the law. Neighborhood diffusion is also not significant, and neither is political globalization nor the share of the executive parties’ percentage of seats in the lower house.

The second regression is meant to measure institutional election rules. Due to multiple collinearity problems and since the electoral system variable would predict some of the party effects, this model was done separately. The dummy variable for single-

\textsuperscript{21} Dataset is available at http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Excel-Data/migration.htm
member district plurality voting (SMDP) was used as the reference variable; therefore, the coefficients for the other electoral systems are measured in relation to SMPD.

Regression II

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Adoption of External Voting} &= \\
&= \left[ \text{Proportional Representation} \right] + \left[ D'\text{hondt} \right] + \left[ \frac{\text{Percent Remittance Of GDP}}{\text{Remittance Of GDP}} \right]
\left[ \text{Squared Percent Remittance Of GDP} \right] + \left[ \text{Freedom House Score} \right]
+ \left[ \log \text{GDP} \right] + \left[ \text{Political Globalization} \right]
\end{align*}
\]

Table 6.2 – Regression II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proportional representation</td>
<td>.6535801</td>
<td>1.591549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modified proportional</td>
<td>.8989175</td>
<td>1.51293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>representation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D’hondt</td>
<td>-32.09856****</td>
<td>3.330643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remittance/ GDP</td>
<td>100.9307*</td>
<td>54.72792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remittance GDP /squared</td>
<td>-812.9531**</td>
<td>417.2212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedomhouse score</td>
<td>-.6287525</td>
<td>.5213937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDP</td>
<td>.3262299*</td>
<td>.1735521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political globalization</td>
<td>-.0093826</td>
<td>.0619138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-size 314</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi square <strong>1094.78</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**** p < .001; *** p < .01; ** p < .05 * p < .10

As can be seen from table 6.2, the coefficient for binomial d’hondt system is statistically significant and negatively correlated with the adoption of external voting.

The d’hondt system tends to exaggerate the electoral gains of the second largest political
parties. As was documented in chapter 5 (Institutional Constraint and External Voting: The Case of Chile) the d’hondt system has overrepresented rural interest in Chile which favored the conservatives parties that have been opposed to external voting. The coefficients for remittances as a percent to GDP and remittances squared as percentage to GDP remain consistent. After accounting for the effect of remittance at the tipping point, at high levels the likelihood that a country will adopt external voting diminishes. In this trial wealthier countries are more likely to adopt external voting, as the coefficient for log GDP variable is significant at the ten percent level. The next section will compare the results from the case studies.

*Case Studies*

External voting has been a salient political issue for numerous years with several legislations having been brought up to adopt external voting in both Chile and Mexico. After strong pressure from Mexico’s migrant community, Mexico’s three main political parties were able to come up with a compromise in 2005. Chile has not yet adopted external voting although every president since Chile democratized in 1990 has endorsed adopting it. The two case studies focused on the main political actors involved in deciding whether external voting is adopted: the state, migrants, and the political parties.

In Chile, when General Augusto Pinochet was in power, the Chilean state was outright hostile to its migrants, sometimes referring to those abroad as traitors. Once Pinochet exited the presidency attempts were made by the Chilean state to right the wrongs of the past, but these efforts were minimal in large part because Pinochet still played a significant role in the politics of Chile. In Mexico, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional was continually in power for over 70 years until the year 2000. During much
of this time the Mexican state pursued a policy of limited engagement with its migrant community showing little interest in adopting external voting. However, the Mexican state became more willing to implement favorable policies towards its emigrant population in the 1990s when the Mexican state saw its interest being threatened by anti-immigration sentiment in the United States, and also because they wanted to use their migrant community to lobby for their interests.

After democratizing, both countries have moved from being opposed to external voting to at least mildly supporting it. Both governments have set up programs to work with their emigrant population, and allowed their emigrants have the opportunity to acquire dual citizenship. Mexico and Chile struggled with the legitimate concerns of the logistical problems that are involved with enfranchising citizens abroad and how electoral integrity can be safeguarded.

When the military coup occurred in 1973 there was a mass exodus of Chilean leftist that spread throughout the world. A unique characteristic of the Chilean emigrant community was its education level and socio-economic status. Many of those that were forced out were political elites, academics, and businessmen. Chileans organizations abroad have often spoken with a unified voice as they regularly organized themselves in terms of political parties (Zarzosa, 1998), but unlike Mexico the Chilean economy does not rely heavily on those living abroad. This has led Chilean emigrants to lobby for the right to vote from abroad based on normative arguments; instead of their contribution as was the case in Mexico. Mexico has a very large migrant population with a vast majority of them living in the United States. Mexican emigrants play an important role in the Mexican economy through the remittances they send back. Mexican hometown
associations have actively lobbied for the expansion of rights of those living abroad, and they have achieved notable success as Mexico has created numerous programs to work with its migrant population.

Since Chile democratized after the rule of Pinochet every president of Chile has endorsed external voting. However, the conservative parties in Chile fear what the political consequences of external voting might be and they have been able to block attempts to adopt external voting. The conservatives fear that the center left Concertación political coalition or other left leaning parties would make electoral gains (López and Figueroa, 2009).

In Mexico the three main Mexican political parties tended to portray themselves as being in favor of letting those abroad have the opportunity to vote. However, all the major parties feared what might occur if a large new group would be enfranchised, which led them to coming up with a compromise, that was almost passed unanimously, that limited the political power of those living abroad.
### Table 6.3 – Review of Case Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Chile</th>
<th>Mexico</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>State</strong></td>
<td>Went from being openly hostile to its emigrant community to mild support of external voting.</td>
<td>Went from opposing external voting to mild support of external voting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Emigrants</strong></td>
<td>The emigrant community is spread throughout numerous countries. Tend to be politically motivated.</td>
<td>Large in numbers, highly concentrated in the United States. However, their cohesiveness is questionable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Parties</strong></td>
<td>Political parties of the left have endorsed external voting, but so far no compromise has been reached.</td>
<td>After push from the PAN and the PRD, the PRI was willing to compromise after it no longer controlled the presidency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome</strong></td>
<td>Chile has not adopted external voting, in large part due to their d’hondt electoral system.</td>
<td>Mexico adopted external voting in 2005, although the legislation has been criticized for severely limiting the political influence of those abroad.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As shown below in table 6.4, out of the eight proposed hypotheses in chapter 3 (Theory and Methods) 1, 2 and 4 are supported by the regression and 1, 2 and 6 are supported by the case studies. The Mexican emigrant community does have a much larger impact on the Mexican economy than the impact of remittances sent by Chileans abroad. Before external voting was adopted, Mexican emigrants often made the claim that they should be allowed to vote from abroad because of their financial contributions. However, due to the potential power of Mexicans abroad Mexican political parties decided to limit their impact.

Mexico’s economy is also significantly larger than Chile’s which would suggest that Mexico would be more capable of implementing external voting, especially since such a large percentage of Mexicans emigrants live in the United States. Mexico ended up spending over 25 million dollars on setting up voting from abroad (Fierro and Carillo, 2007, 192).
### Table 6.4 – Review of Hypothesis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Chile</th>
<th>Mexico</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hypothesis 1</strong>: Countries with a higher percentage of remittances measured as a percentage of GDP are more likely to adopt external voting.</td>
<td>The average percentage of remittances as a percentage of GDP in Chile between 1980 to 2012 was 0.006 percent</td>
<td>The average percentage of remittances in Mexico as a percentage of GDP between 1980 to 2012 was 1.54 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hypothesis 2</strong>: The impact of remittances as percent of GDP is nonlinear, after accounting for topping the effects dissipates</td>
<td>Since remittances are not a significant percentage of the Chilean economy, Chilean politicians have not opposed external voting legislation on the grounds that Chilean emigrants will be too influential</td>
<td>The potential power that Mexican emigrants could have on the political process was a key reason for why institutional arrangements were put in place to limit their influences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hypothesis 3</strong>: Countries with a lower combined Freedomhouse political and civil rights score are more likely to have adopted external voting.</td>
<td>The average combined Freedomhouse score in Chile between 1980 to 2012 was 2.60</td>
<td>The average combined Freedomhouse score in Mexico between 1980 to 2012 was 3.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hypothesis 4</strong>: Countries with a left leaning executive are more likely to adopt external voting</td>
<td>From 1990, when Chile democratized, to 2012, four out of five presidents of Chile have been left leaning.</td>
<td>External voting was adopted when the center-right Partido Acción Nacional controlled the presidency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hypothesis 5</strong>: Countries that have equilibrium of seat share in the lower house of the party of the executive are more likely to adopt external voting.</td>
<td>From 1980 to 2010 the average seat share of the executive party in the lower house was 31.36 percent.</td>
<td>From 1980 to 2010 the average seat share of the executive party in the lower house was 53.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hypothesis 6</strong>: Countries are more likely to adopt external voting if they border a high percentage of countries that have adopted external voting.</td>
<td>Between 1980 to 2012 all of Chile’s neighbors had adopted external voting</td>
<td>Between 1980 to 2012, two of three Mexico’s neighbors had adopted external voting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hypothesis 7</strong>: Countries with a high gross domestic product are more likely to adopt external voting.</td>
<td>The mean GDP of Chile between 1980 to 2012 was $87.1$ billion dollars.</td>
<td>The mean GDP of Mexico between 1980 to 2012 was $704.8$ billion dollars.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hypothesis 8</strong>: Countries with a high level of political globalization are more likely to adopt external voting.</td>
<td>The average political globalization score between 1980 to 2010 in Chile was 78.82</td>
<td>The average political globalization score between 1980 to 2010 in Mexico was 68.96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

22 The data on the share of the executive in the lower house only goes to 2010. Unfortunately, data is missing for the majority of years between 1980 to 2010

23 In 2005 constant U.S dollars
The results from this chapter show that remittances have a significant impact on the adoption of external voting in the Latin America and the Caribbean. The role of remittances is almost always discussed in the scholarly literature on external voting, but previous studies have not found a statistically significant relationship between the two. Perhaps this is because most studies tend to look at a combination of the world’s richest and poorest countries in the same model. It is very plausible that countries like the United States and Mexico do not have the same motivating factors to adopt external voting. The other significant variable, whether a country has a left leaning executive, might only be applicable to the Latin America and the Caribbean since the region has a history of a mass exodus of the political left because of right leaning authoritarian regimes (Pellegrino, 2000).
Chapter 7: Conclusion

In the last few decades, there have been developments that have made countries around the world more willing to allow its migrant population to have the opportunity to vote from abroad. External voting went from being almost exclusively practiced by a relatively few number of countries, which tended to be highly consolidated democracies, to now being implemented in countries that are not accustomed to holding elections. Despite the large number of countries having adopted and implemented external voting laws, the scholarly literature on the topic has remained somewhat limited.

The global spread of democracy and elections are important reasons to why this trend has occurred, but much is still unknown to why countries adopt and implement external voting. This thesis is an attempt to increase the knowledge to what factors influence countries to adopt external voting in Latin America and the Caribbean.

This study illustrated the political process that takes place when external voting legislations are being considered. Politicians and political parties must make a calculated choice between pleasing those who are abroad and often make significant financial contributions to the economy, and more importantly making sure that their own political futures will not be put into jeopardy. The case studies on Chile and Mexico demonstrated how political parties in both countries based their decision of whether to support external voting on how it might influence their electoral gains in the future.

Previous studies often tend to explain the rise in external voting because states want something in return or that states tend to enact external voting for symbolic reasons. I partly agree with these theories, however, this study found that the importance of the
political process that takes place in most countries when deciding whether external voting should be adopted is significant. It is important to consider that in most countries the political establishment will only allow external voting if the main actors do not see it as a threat to their political future. As Barbara Geddes (1991) has stated when explaining administrative reform in Latin America; “Reforms only occur in political circumstances that render the individual interests of the politicians who must initiate them consistent with the collective interest in reform” (Geddes, 1991, 371).

An interesting finding of this paper is the nonlinear relationship that remittances have on the likelihood that a country will adopt external voting. The impact of remittances as percent of GDP is nonlinear, after accounting for tipping point the effects dissipates. Politicians are willing to reward those abroad for contributing financially to their country-of-origin, just as long as those abroad are not seen to be too powerful to challenge their power. In some cases the main political actors do allow those abroad to vote, but they also make sure that their influences will be limited by creating strict electoral rules.

Although the number of countries in Latin America and the Caribbean adopting and implanting external voting has increased greatly in the last few years, these laws often seem to be more symbolic than anything else. It should be expected that turnout will be lower abroad than it is in the home country, but many countries including Bolivia and Mexico have put in institutional constraints that greatly limit the potential influences of those abroad.

It could be argued that Mexican migrants had more political power before the 2005 law adopting external voting was passed, because the Mexican political parties are
no longer allowed to campaign abroad, limiting the interaction with Mexican migrants and politicians. Furthermore, financial contributions from Mexicans abroad is also not permitted which largely constraints the power of emigrants to reward or punish the political parties.

The electoral impact that emigrants have had so far in most countries that allow external voting is limited. Nonetheless, external voting is an important topic. There have been examples around the world where those voting from abroad have played significant role in election outcomes. In 2006, emigrant voters played a key role in deciding election results in both Italy and Cape Verde (Bauböck, 2007). Furthermore, close elections in several countries in Latin America and the Caribbean also show the potential political power of migrants in future elections. Even a symbolic external voting legislation can be an important gesture that shows the migrant community that they are still part of the nation and that their voice is heard. External voting can also be a step to repair the relationship between states and the migrant community, especially in countries where forced exile or persecution has been used as a part of a strategy to silence opponents.

When Silvio Berlusconi’s coalition lost in 2006, he questioned the legitimacy of the emigrant vote (Collyer and Vathi, 2007). External voting has also been challenged due to low turnout rates. Subsequently, if the trend of more countries allowing external voting continues, a normative dialogue among policy makers and academics needs to continue to address the question what role migrants should have in the political process of their country-of-origin. Currently, the legitimacy of those aboard can be challenged on the grounds that they should not decide who governs and on the grounds that they do not
turn out in enough numbers to justify the relatively high cost that is associated with external voting.

It is likely that countries around the world will continue to enfranchise those living abroad, as migrant are expected to continue to request more rights from their state-of-origin (Bach, 2011). The changing perceptions of migrants will promote the increase in external voting because migrants are less often seen as no longer having a voice in their country-of-origin affairs because they left. Technological innovations have made it easier for emigrants to stay in contact with friends and family in their country-of-origin. Technology has also minimized the cost for emigrants to lobby political parties and governments in their home country to allow them to vote while abroad. States are also likely to be interested in continuing enfranchising those abroad in order to maintain a connection with its migrant community. The biggest challenge will come from the political parties who must decide whether it is in their best interest to include a new group of voters that potentially might challenge their power.

Future research on the topic could look at other regions to see if the findings are limited to only Latin America and the Caribbean. It would also be interesting to see more research on how emigrants impact their governments on a more regional level. Additional research on external voting could include further case studies to see whether the posited hypothesis that politicians make a calculated decision whether or not to adopt external voting based on their best interests. A limitation of this study is that numerous countries had to be dropped because of lack of data as the Latin America and the Caribbean Political Dataset, 1945-2008 (Huber, Stephen and Mustillo, 2012) omits
several countries in the region. Furthermore, this study only look at the adoption of external voting and not if countries had actually implemented the laws.
Appendix

Descriptive Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std Dev</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adopted External Voting</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>0.0179104</td>
<td>0.1327251</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remittance Inflow</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>589761922</td>
<td>1835635713</td>
<td>6038.03</td>
<td>22741840918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedomhouse Score</td>
<td>668</td>
<td>2.6564371</td>
<td>1.4019168</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Econglobal Score</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>57.7629082</td>
<td>20.7611743</td>
<td>9.66</td>
<td>94.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polglobal Score</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>50.1293313</td>
<td>19.4700772</td>
<td>11.33</td>
<td>89.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diffusion</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>0.3342537</td>
<td>0.3955488</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excelhshare</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>0.4629310</td>
<td>0.1980346</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left executive</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>0.2996516</td>
<td>0.4589055</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Countries Used in the Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries that adopted external voting laws</th>
<th>Year law was adopted</th>
<th>Countries that did not adopt external voting laws</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Antigua and Barbuda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Chile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Dominica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Grenada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Jamaica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>St. Lucia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>St. Vincent and the Grenadines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Suriname</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Hafthor Brynjar Erlingsson
Phone number: (702) 496-8442 E-mail hafthor.erlingsson@gmail.com
Curriculum Vitae

Education:

2012-Present: M.A. University of Nevada, Las Vegas: Las Vegas Nevada, Political Science: Comparative Politics; American Politics 3.85 GPA

2004-2008: B.A. Oklahoma State University: Stillwater Oklahoma International Relations with minor in History 3.60 GPA

Research Interest:

Transnational Political Activity External Voting Legislations
Migration Studies United States-Mexican Relation

Teaching Experience:

Teaching

Fall 2013: Guest lectures for PSC 101 Introduction to American Politics

Teaching Assistant

Fall 2013: PSC 403A: Natural Resource Policy (with Dr. Steven Parker)
PSC 305: The American Presidency (with Dr. Steven Parker)
PSC 302: Research Methods in Political Science (with Dr. Ted Jelen)
PSC 200: Survey of Political Theory (with Dr. David Fott)

Spring 2013: PSC 403A: Natural Recourse Policy (with Dr. Steven Parker)
PSC 373: Early Modern Political Theory (with Dr. Mark Lutz)
PSC 314: Religion and Political Process (with Dr. Ted Jelen)
PSC 305: The American Presidency (with Dr. Steven Parker)
PSC 200: Survey of Political Theory (with Dr. Mark Lutz)

Fall 2012: PSC 409H: Socrates (with Dr. Mark Lutz)
PSC 405P: Global Political Economy (with Dr. Jonathan Strand)
PSC 403A: Natural Resource Policy
PSC 305: The American Presidency
HON200H: Individual Society and Freedom (with Dr. Mark Lutz)
PSC 101: Introduction to American Politics (with Dr. Steven Parker)

Languages:
English: Fluent
Icelandic: Fluent
French: Professional Working Proficiency
Spanish: Professional Working Proficiency
Swedish: Elementary Proficiency

Related Experience:
Fall 2007 Intern for U.S House of Representatives John Sullivan (OK-01)- Washington D.C
Summer 2007 Research Experience for Undergraduates Sponsored by the National Science Foundation-Stillwater, Oklahoma

Relevant Graduate Level Coursework:
Research Methods in Political Science (with Dr. David Damore)
International Politics of Population, Technology and Resources (with Dr. Dennis Pirages)
Latin American Politics (with Dr. John Tuman)
Proseminar in Comparative Politics (with Dr. John Tuman)
Comparative Democratization (with Dr. Michele Kuenzi)

Honors, Awards, and Membership:
2008 President of Pi Sigma Alpha—Political Science Honor Society
2008 Deans Honor Roll
2008 Golden Key International Honor Society
2007 National Science Foundation Grant—Research Experience for Undergraduates
2006 President’s Honor Roll

Other Experiences:
Jan-June 2012 Private English Teacher. Guadalajara, Mexico
2010-2011 Barman and Manager at Molly Malones. Bordeaux, France