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An Examination of the Varying Role of the United Nations in the Civil Wars of Rwanda and El Salvador

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Vanessa Jaramillo-Cano

Special thanks to Dr. John Tuman, Dr. Peter Starkweather, and Dr. Tiffiany Howard

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Chapter 1:

Introduction

The purpose of this work is to examine the efforts of the United Nations in the Post-Cold War era with special emphasis on peacekeeping missions. A comparative study of recent United Nations peacekeeping operations will be completed to identify the variables that encourage or discourage international (UN) involvement in cases of civil conflict. For the purpose of this work, civil conflict will be narrowly defined as a domestic conflict with two major armed groups (ie: civil wars). Two countries will be studied to explore the nature of the respective conflicts, the transitional methods used by the peacekeeping mission to return to and/or institute democratic rule, and the mandates of each mission. Both cases will then be analyzed for similar factors, differing factors, and the effect of these on the peacekeeping mission. A variety of factors can affect United Nations involvement, including but not limited to the interests of influential figures, the economic costs of missions, and the power of advanced first world countries in the United Nations Security Council.

To understand the effects of these factors on the international relations system, the theories of structural realism, idealism, constructivism and pluralism will be examined to contextualize the field of international relations. Structural realists view international arena as an anarchical system. Actors maximize their power through economic and military means for basic self-preservation and survival in the international system (Mearshimer 72). At the other end of the spectrum from realism lies the theory of idealism. Idealists seek to remove a system of “anarchy” and replace it with a system of community where independent states seeking to overcome mutual problems (Weber 41). International organizations such as the UN and EU are viewed favorably as forums inspiring changes in international law. The theory of constructivism

addresses the identity of a state and its interests as constantly changing. For their part, pluralists choose to focus on issue areas rather than state motivations because problems are becoming more transnational as society progresses. Pluralists thus seek to reach the end goals that are common to humanity: human rights, economic well-being, environmental balance and social justice (Fetherston 90). The question is, which of these theories help to explain the variation in UN involvement? This work will further delineate the tenants of each theory and apply them to each case study.

International organizations choose to become embedded in civil conflicts for a variety of reasons that are often multi-tiered. Trade relations, allies, media attention, diaspora communities and the need for international actors to appear to be good willed, are common motivations that pressure international organizations to intervene. The UN Security Council is the most important unit of the UN given its budgetary role in funding UN peacekeeping missions. Passed by the Security Council in 1991, Resolution 688 creates the foundational principle of initiating interventions because it specifies that: “human suffering could constitute a threat to international peace and security and hence warrant a collective armed intervention by the society of states” (Bellamy 325). If acted upon, Resolution 688 can, and has, initiated tangible actions including armed intervention. However, the utilization of Resolution 688 is dependent upon a myriad of factors. It is therefore not as realists, idealists, constructivists or pluralists would analyze the world order or the characterization of interests, but rather a combination of factors inherent in each theory that explain changes.

To fully understand the United Nations and its peacekeeping missions, the UN structure will be dissected. The seven main organs of the United Nations will be described with particular attention given to the organs and agencies that affect peacekeeping missions. The UN Charter

will be analyzed to explain the legality of peacekeeping missions in the global community as well as the principles of peacekeeping. To provide historical context, a brief review of the earliest peacekeeping missions will be summarized. The economic aspect of funding these missions will address a breakdown of the peacekeeping costs by identifying which state(s) share the larger burdens among the member states. This work will utilize two case studies to examine United Nations interventions—Rwanda and El Salvador. The central determinant in the choice of these countries is the nature of their antecedent histories—civil conflicts. Each nation-state had state-sponsored violence, financial support from a major power and approximately 750,000 deaths. However, the United Nations peacekeeping mission of each nation had different mandates with different impacts. Furthermore, although the Rwandan case went beyond a civil war into genocide, this does not significantly affect the similarities in case choice¹. The genocide fell within the confines of the civil war and occurred after international peace agreements. Therefore, the existence of genocide does not create a situation where both of these cases could not be compared and contrasted. The Rwandan genocide (*sensu* UN General Assembly Resolution 260 III A) was based on state-sponsored murders of the Tutsi minority by the Hutu dominated government (par. 6 Harsch). Following the genocide, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda was created and the Rwandan genocide trials were initiated with substantial oversight by international organizations including the UN (par. 1 Global Policy Forum). By contrast, El Salvador, which also experienced civil conflict, has not had international trials.

¹ Barbara Harff and T. R. Gurr broadly define genocide: “Cultural explanations focus on the circumstances under which persisting communal inequalities are intensified to the point that one group seeks to eliminate its opponents, often using or seizing state power to accomplish its ends (see for example Fein, 1979; Kuper, 1981; Harff, 1987b). Some scholars consider the role of ideologies an important factor, in particular those exclusionary belief systems which deny a people the right to exist in dignity (see for example Kelman, 1973; Kuper, 1981; Charny, 1982; Harff, 1987b). Still others note the significance of economic conflict and international factors in amplifying or inhibiting genocidal processes. (Barbara Harff and T.R. Gurr “Toward Empirical Theory of Genocides and Politicides: Identification and Measurement of Cases Since 1945,” *International Studies Quarterly* 32 (1988) 63.)

Peace in El Salvador was gained through peace accords facilitated by the UN. The United Nations Mission in El Salvador (MINUSAL) encompassed nation building initiatives and reforms in human rights processes (par. 4 El Salvador UN).

Variation in the mandates of these peacekeeping missions provides the central question: Why were there such differences in UN involvement in these cases? In an attempt to answer this question, and illustrate the differences between the cases of intervention, both cases will be discussed from the inception of the civil war to the end of the UN peacekeeping mission. Both will also be compared and contrasted to identify factors. The relative success or failure of both missions will be analyzed in reference to distinguish factors that may have been present in one mission but not in the other. These factors include: international interest at the time of conflict, international interest in creating a peacekeeping mission, the behavior of the Security Council, the funding of the missions and the behaviors of the principal actors in the civil war.

Chapter 2:

Theory Summary

To illuminate the decisions of political actors, political scientists utilize theories to establish frameworks. Taken in concert, these theories offer explanations as to the motives and decision making processes of foreign policy actors. To understand the motivations behind United Nations peacekeeping operations, it is necessary to understand the various frameworks that explain those motivations. Theories in the realm of international relations can be divided into two groups: systemic and state-centered. Systemic theories, such as structural realism and idealism, offer frameworks that help to understand the international relations arena as a system. By contrast society-centered theories, such as constructivism and pluralism, explain the decisions of political actors with attention to domestic pressures. For the purposes of this work, the discussion of international relations theories will be limited to the aforementioned four. Furthermore, two of the primary theories of the nature of peacekeeping will be discussed thereafter.

Structural Realism

Structural realism is rooted in the principles of realism but differs in the view that the negative aspects of human nature are the foundation of motive. Structural realists explain state behavior based on the structure of the international system and not the inherent qualities of man as realism does. In this perspective, the international states system is characterized as an anarchical system. This anarchy assumption is that “international politics is composed of sovereign nation-states and that these sovereign nation states are beholden to no power” (Weber 14) As such, power guarantees succeeding in conflict and leads actors to maximize their power in the most basic form of self-preservation and survival in this system (Mearshimer 72). Put

bluntly, Hobbes explained this state best when he stated “war of all against all” (as qtd in Jackson & Sørensen 168) The two main forms of power are derived through economic and military means. The best indicator of a state’s economic power is its GDP, which by extension, denotes a certain amount of political muscle. A stronger military, armored divisions and nuclear power, assure that a state will succeed in deterring attacks and fending off any state who dares to wage a war (Mearshimer 72). Economic power is thus a form of latent power because it allows military strength to increase (Mearshimer 72). In this reasoning, in order to maximize power, states must have resources to draw from, personnel to build up the military, and supreme technological intelligence.

In the theory of structural realism, there exists a further division regarding the allocation of power and the answer to the question: “How much power is enough?”(Meirshimer 75). Offensive realists argue that the main goal of states is to reach the highest form of power, namely, hegemony (Meirshimer 775). Hegemony is defined as “(especially of countries) the position of being the strongest and most powerful and therefore able to control others” (Hegemony). Hegemonic power is viewed as the ultimate goal by offensive realists because it provides assurances that no other state will threaten the hegemon and has a better chance at survival. In the unlikely event that another state does not threaten the hegemon, it is assumed that buck-passing will occur. Buck-passing is a maneuver where the hegemon, or strongest state(s), passes the burden to the smaller states that support it (Meirshimer 76). The smaller states check the state that is threatening the hegemon. An example of this hegemony is the United States after the end of the Cold War, as well as the hegemony of Imperial Germany. In reference to UN peacekeeping, the idea of hegemony and the pressures exerted by powerful states will be revisited in each case study.

In reference to international organizations such as the UN, the majority of structural realists regard such institutions as irrelevant because they aspire to an ideal in which states can reach a sense of global governance –which realists view as utterly implausible. Structural realists view membership to such organizations as a threat to sovereignty because of the power given up to this organization through membership. These threats to sovereignty are viewed by some structural realists as an issue that may in fact produce more problems creating more friction and should be avoided (Carlanes, Risse, and Simmons 521).

The aforementioned tenants of structural realism with reference to international organizations would lead scholars to believe that structural realists would view peacekeeping missions as unnecessary. Organizations such as the UN are founded on principles championing respect for human rights as well as political and social freedoms in member states. Because humanitarian crises such as famines, epidemics, natural disasters or civil wars are frequently used as motivations to create peacekeeping missions, it is important to draw the conclusion that structural realists view peacekeeping missions as useless—unless they are vital to that state’s interest.

There exists a minority of structural realists that view international norms relative to peacekeeping and human rights as vital to state interests. However, these norms only gain acceptance when they are supported by a hegemon or a group of powerful states...because norms are epiphenomenal to the distribution of material and military capabilities in the international system (Carlanaes, Risse, and Simmons 522). Moreover, even if a nation-state joins an international organization, this does not challenge state sovereignty because membership in an organization such as the UN or EU is voluntary (Weber 14). When looked at through a historical lens: “The content of human rights issues that were at the forefront in various historical periods

reflected the concerns of those states which possessed a preponderance of economic and military power” (as qtd in Carlnaes, Risse, and Simmons 522). Combined with globalization, the establishment of international human rights institutions can be viewed as a tool of great powers, based in rational self-interest, to delegate sovereignty to a supra-national authority.

Idealism

At the other end of the spectrum from realism lies the theory of idealism. Former President Wilson summarized the goal of idealist theory when he sought to “make the world safe for democracy” through the adherence to idealist principles post-World War (Weber 38). In his mission to make the world safe for democracy, Wilson’s 14 point-plan created the League of Nations which was the precursor to the United Nations. The foundation of idealist principles is the belief that human nature is basically good and not destructive as realists believe (Weber 41). By extension, bad human behavior is explained as the result of evil institutions that motivate individuals to act selfishly and harm others (Weber 41).

At the level of international relations, idealists seek to remove a system of “anarchy” and replace it with a system of community. The goal is to create an international system based on a community of interdependent states that seek to overcome mutual problems (Weber 41). By extension, international organizations such as the UN and EU are viewed as a forum to bridge discussions across countries, cultures, and characters. International law and morality are paramount in this approach because they provide legislative initiatives that curb negative behavior. The League of Nations, post World War I, is one way in which the principles of idealism were codified. The reciprocity principle is also enforced through the belief in the idea that states could develop organizations to facilitate cooperation and form a world federation—one which has many similarities to the United Nations. Regarding domestic policies, the

legislative branch is necessary in every nation to hold a monarch, or other authoritarian figure, in check. Trade is viewed as a vehicle to promote peace and not an issue that increases tension. Just as the Cold War was quintessential of realist principles, the Post-Cold War was characteristic of an infusion of idealist principles. The infamous “East-West” struggle was no longer an issue and what emerged was a culture of community (Weber 39). The proliferation of arms control agreements spread rapidly along with democracy taking hold of many nations (Weber 39). Human rights culture spread globally and interventions increased exponentially (Weber 39).

However, although there were very obvious changes after the Cold War, it does not suffice to say that the world was dominated by realism during the Cold War and converted to a world dominated by idealism post-Cold War. Cynthia Weber explains this transition in summarizing of the pivotal points of Charles Kegley’s academic work. According to Kegley, one cannot quickly summarize the status of international relations during the Cold War as anarchical and post-Cold War as one of world governance. Essentially, he argues that one theory does not begin where the other ends. Rather, it is more of a continuum. First and foremost, there is no ‘world government’ even if the majority of nation-states have membership to international organizations. Kegley chooses instead to characterize the attitudes at the global level. There was a change; the change was from conflictual behavior to cooperative behavior. Essentially, the world was characterized by a system of bipolarity—similar to a hegemon except that in a bipolar system two nations are the strongest in the international arena instead of just one. The system of bipolarity that characterized the Cold War was a lesson to world leaders that the structure of bipolarity is negative and an inefficient organization of nation-states. From this lesson, idealist and neo-idealist principles of cooperation began to be cemented in international relations for the benefit of all nation-states. But this was not immediate and began slowly. However, cooperation

is based in notions that benefit every nation ie: justice, security, and higher living standards. The desire to cooperate with other nations in search of these notions is driven by self-interest.

Therefore, is post-Cold War ‘idealism’ better explained as ‘realism’ masquerading as idealism?

Given that idealists paved the way for the creation of the United Nations, it is obvious that idealists would view UN peacekeeping missions in a positive light. The main goals of the UN, and of idealists, are the creation of world where the foundation is the establishment of norms that advocate social, political and human rights. To create this world, it is necessary to rid the world of evils and foster a culture of benevolent principles. Peacekeeping missions would clearly be viewed as an extension of the UN and a tool to reach those goals.

Constructivism

Constructivism, although more of an approach than a theory, is a society-centered model that has been applied to international relations. In the 1980s, constructivism began to be applied to political science in an attempt to “describe the dynamic, contingent and culturally based condition of the social world” (Carlsnaes, Risse, and Simmons 96). True to its name, constructivism views the world as a “project under construction, as becoming rather than being” (Carlsnaes, Risse, and Simmons 96). Constructivists see the “potential to transform the understanding of social reality in the social science” (Carlsnaes, Risse, and Simmons 96). Furthermore, all types of constructivists converge on an ontology that depicts the social world as one of social facts—that are facts inasmuch as they are reached by human agreement (Carlsnaes, Risse, and Simmons 100). Constructivists focus on the creation of realities:

When drawn upon by individuals, the rules, norms and cause-effect understandings that make material objects meaningful become the source of

people's reasons, interests and international acts; when institutionalized, they become the source of international practices. (Carlnaes, Risse, and Simmons 102)

While structural realism focuses more on material power, such as the aforementioned economic and military powers constructivists focus more on social realities, such as how human awareness and consciousness can change political realities (Jackson & Sørensen 162). Therefore, when adapted to the international arena, constructivists argue that interests are ideas and as such cannot be deduced from international anarchy and the distribution of resources.

Instead of explaining the world system in the confines of a strident theory, constructivists attempt to understand how actors define their states' interests. States and social actors are the primary determinants of state interests and identities because the international system is not "out there" like the solar system but is a system created by ideas—and these can change (Jackson & Sørensen 162). It is the belief that "the social world is an intersubjective domain: it is meaningful to people who made it and living in it, and who understand it precisely because they made it and they are home to it" (Jackson & Sørensen 165) Therefore, the international arena may be anarchical, but it is not cooperative or conflictual by design (Weber 60). Rather, if states choose to interact together, the international system is one that is cooperative. If nations choose to be in constant conflict, the international system is conflictual. There is no "nature" in international society. The essential posit is summarized by Wendt: "anarchy is what states make of it" (as qtd in Jackson & Sørensen 162). States are decision-makers and act in their own self-interest, yet how they act is not predestined, yet, the routes that a decision-maker can take are as a result of a collective knowledge: "Rational actors live and act in a socially constructed world and instrumental action takes place as a backdrop, not only to the knowledge that individuals share

qua individuals, but also to all institutionalized knowledge—such as norms (Carlnaes, Risse, and Simmons 103).

However, because the interests and identities of states change, so do their behaviors. For example, constructivists would use the United States and Britain as an example of the evolution of state interest and identity. Both nations share a common history, alliances and generally the same political norms. As such, neither nation views the other as a threat. These ‘international norms’ conform into a “logic of appropriateness” and a “logic of consequences”(Goldstein and Pevehouse FIND). These two nations are indicative of how interests change over time and political relations adjust accordingly. Another example would be the newfound European identity of Western European states, they now exhibit relationship of cooperation and friendship between them—codified through organizations such as the EU (Jackson & Sørensen 168)

In reference to human rights and international organizations, constructivists argue that norms in reference to human rights gain strength due to their universalistic nature and their applicability to all human beings (Carlnaes, Risse, and Simmons 522). Moreover, because constructivism is based in social communication, the media and by extension the international media, play a decisive role in what is deemed important and what becomes a part of the social reality of the world (Carlnaes, Risse, and Simmons 102). In “Peacekeeping and the Constraints of Global Culture” Roland Paris uses the theory of constructivism and the concept of an “international normative environment” to explain changes in peacekeeping missions (Paris 441). He argues that this environment, or global culture, shapes the designs of peacekeeping missions because a global culture is comprised of formal and informal rules of international social life (Paris 442). Agencies such as the UN, “seem predisposed to adopt strategies that conform with global culture, and to reject strategies that they view as normatively inappropriate, even if the

rejected strategies are potentially more likely to accomplish goals” (Paris 441). Through careful study of the beliefs of constructivism, it can be gathered that constructivists would support peacekeeping missions if the community of individuals that create the international arena have so decided. Because constructivists stress the importance of communication, the more the international community becomes aware of issues through media attention and the international arena is cooperative—the more likely the support of peacekeeping missions would be.

Pluralism

Pluralism is the final international relations theory to be discussed in this thesis. Another society-centered approach, pluralism began as a reaction to the shortcomings of realism. In the 1970s and 1980s, political scholars were finding that realism did not accurately predict international interactions due to the utilization of the nation-state as the primary unit of study (Fetherston 90). Through the critique of the myopic views of realist perspectives, pluralists choose to move beyond the nation-state as the basic unit of analysis and include a wide array of interactions at all levels of social and political spaces (Fetherston 90).

Pluralists choose to focus on issue areas rather than state motivations. Issue areas focus on the mutual dependence of problems—security, trade and finance are examples (Brown 39). Because problems are becoming more transnational as society progresses, crises such as dramatic changes in international trade, and environmental degradation are beyond the control of one state (Fetherston 90). Therefore, pluralists seek to better understand and explain major world events beyond the effects of one state (Neufeld 48). The end goal of pluralism is to reach the end goals that are common to humanity: human rights, economic well-being, environmental balance and social justice (Fetherston 90). By extension, boundaries are not limited to the physical area of a state but rather extended to include multi-national corporations, markets and ethnic groups.

The aim is to foster a normative approach to build world systems that properly address the problems of the global population (Fetherson 90). Consequently, there is no agenda that is set in stone; rather, any issue could feasibly be at the top of the international agenda of a state depending on the need (Brown 40). At the domestic level, pluralists view the state as an arena where actors compete for their respective interests. When adapted at the international level, pluralists seek a world system that is responsive to global needs; pluralists study peace, conflict, security, development, democracy, participations, peace movements, and identity (Fetherston 90). Given that pluralists view interaction on multiple levels, actors are not relegated to simply national actors. Pluralism is based in the notion that groups are competing for influence to affect changes in policy—whether that policy be state or international. These groups include multi-national corporations and grass-roots peace movements as well as individuals. Each of these actors has the ability to cause a substantive amount of change and each is viewed in such a manner. The idea of power is akin to realism, yet pluralists view the power of one actor at the international level in terms of interdependence and not in terms of absolutes as do realists (Brown 40).

Through careful study of the pillars of pluralism, it could be argued that peacekeeping missions would be supported in the international arena if those pillars are met. If and when domestic groups succeed in effectively lobbying their respective governments, there would be an increase in acceptance of peacekeeping mission and movements to create more. However, this would depend on a variety of groups in a variety of nations lobbying and succeeding their respective nations to support peacekeeping missions.

Westphalian Order

The previously discussed theories are the dominant theories in international relations. However, peacekeeping mission can also be discussed in the context of Westphalian and Post-Westphalian conceptions of the international arena. The Westphalian order is a conception born out of the Peace of Westphalia following the end of Europe's Thirty Years' War (Bellamy 30). In this order, there were certain rules that gradually developed and were applied to the international arena. For example, following the treaty of Westphalia, it was accepted that "the king was emperor of his own realm.... and was not subject to any higher political authority" (Bellamy 30) Moreover, "outsiders had no right to intervene in a foreign jurisdiction on the grounds of religion" and also that the balance of power in Europe guaranteed the "prevent[ion] of one state from making a successful bid for hegemony that would, in effect, re-establish empire on the continent" (Bellamy 30). This Westphalian conception of international society views the world as divided into states that recognize no superior power. Issues that are strictly domestic in nature are to be under the discretion of the sovereign and not susceptible to outside intervention.

These principles have been applied to the practice of peacekeeping: "Peace operations were initially conceived as a tool for maintaining order between states in an international society based on rules arising from state sovereignty, especially non-aggression and non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states" (Bellamy 29). This approach is tied to the conception of the world during the Cold War and the limitations of the UN during this time period of bipolarity. Peacekeeping missions, such as UNEF I (discussed in chapter 3), were created to solve inter-state issues and not *intrastate* issues. Due to globalization, and the increasing interconnectedness of states, along with the end of the Cold War, this theory is no longer applicable to peacekeeping missions although it maintains a strong following in the General Assembly and among many international lawyers (Bellamy 29).

Post-Westphalian

An increase in interstate relations, the power of multinational corporations and the lessening political significance of state boundaries has ushered in a new era of “Post-Westphalian” society in the post-Cold War world (Bellamy 29). Under this theory, states only enjoy full sovereignty *if* they maintain certain responsibilities towards their citizenry (Bellamy 29). Thus, sovereignty has been “reconceptualized” due to the fact that “globalization is changing the world in ways that make the traditional Westphalian approach anachronistic” (Bellamy 37). Instances such as government-sponsored genocide and mass atrocities invalidate the legitimacy of a state and results in a loss of sovereignty (Bellamy 30). To compensate for the loss of sovereignty, the UN is given a broader conception of power and control to provide for a nation in crisis. Therefore, when the host state “proves itself unable or unwilling to” control domestic affairs, the UN and by extension the peacekeeping mission, can assume that authority (Bellamy 30). To further explicate this change from Westphalian to Post-Westphalian orders, the data on peacekeeping missions during the cold War and Post-Cold War is very telling: “Between 1987-1993, Security Council Resolutions increased from 15 to 78, peacekeeping missions from 5 to 17, peacekeepers from 12,000 to 78,000” (Pevehouse 239).

Conclusion

Through a concise understanding of the relevant international relations theories, the desires of states and their priorities can be better understood. These predispositions shed light on the actions that states take in the UN and can offer insight into the amount of support a state gives to a peacekeeping mission. Furthermore, the final two theories in this chapter explain one of the largest theoretical considerations in peacekeeping—sovereignty. The aforementioned theories will be applied to each of the case study nations in later chapters. Initially, a sense of

cognitive dissonance between theory and reality is apparent. This is due to the fact that the factors of some case study nations may not align themselves well with the tenets of one particular theory.

Chapter 3:

UN Structure and Peacekeeping Summary

UN Structure

The United Nations (UN) is an international organization born out Woodrow Wilson's fourteen-point plan which was a call to unite a League of Nations (History of the UN). The initial call for such an organization was the devastation of the Second World War and the rampant human rights violations that shocked the international community (Bellamy 76). Founded in 1945 with only 51 member nations, the UN has grown to include a total of 192 member states and a myriad of offices throughout the world (History of the UN). The goals of the organization are broad, yet far reaching. In sum, the UN has four principal goals:

- a) to keep peace throughout the world; b) to develop friendly relations among nations; c) to help nations work together to improve the lives of poor people, to conquer hunger, disease and illiteracy, and to encourage respect for each other's rights and freedoms; d) to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations to achieve these goals. (UN at a glance)

To accomplish these goals, the UN is divided into seven main organs: Secretariat, Security Council, General Assembly, Trusteeship Council, Economic and Social Council, International Court of Justice and the Repertory of Practice of the United Nations Organs (UN at a Glance). For the purposes of this work, and in relation to peacekeeping missions, the most pertinent organs are the Secretariat, Security Council, General Assembly and the International Court of Justice. To better understand the work of each organ and its effect on peacekeeping, a detailed description of each follows.

At the apex of the United Nations is the Secretariat. This organ is exclusively international in scope and functions at the highest levels of the international arena (Secretariat). It carries out daily activities of the Organization in addition to servicing other organs in the administration of programs and policies (Secretariat). In itself, the Secretariat is structured to include a myriad of sub-unit offices and departments responsible for issues ranging from economic affairs to public information (Secretariat). The focus in this endeavor will be placed on the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the effects of peacekeeping operations in nations experiencing transitional justice. Leading the Secretariat, and responsible for all departments and staff, is the Secretary-General (UN Charter Chapter XV Article 97). This individual is nominated by the Security Council and approved by the General Assembly to serve for a five-year term (UN Charter Chapter XV Article 98).

The Security Council is the organ of the United Nations responsible for maintaining international peace and security as well as restoring peace when it breaks down (UN Charter Chapter 5 Article 24 Section 1). The Security Council is composed of 5 permanent member states (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) and six non-permanent members (UN Charter Chapter V Article 23 Section 1). Similar to the General Assembly, each member of the Security Council has one vote; yet, each member of the Security Council also has the power to veto which effectively kills any resolution (Pevehouse and Goldstein 240). This Council functions on multiple levels to prevent and alleviate conflicts. The Council can encourage peaceful negotiations of conflicting parties, investigate and mediate conflicts and issue cease-fire directives (UN Charter Chapter VI Article 33 Section 1). Most important, the Security Council assesses threats to peace and decide what measures will be taken—including measures of force (UN Charter Chapter VII Article 39). As mentioned previously, the Secretariat

aids in the administration of programs and policies. Therefore, the Security Council routinely works in concert with the office of the Secretariat for efficiency and can be viewed collectively as the Executive Branch of the United Nations. Decisions made by the Security Council are binding on all UN member states. To date, over 1,700 resolutions have been amassed.

The General Assembly of the United Nations acts as an international forum of national leaders. Each of the 193 member nations has a representative who has one vote—regardless of country size, power, or economy (UN Charter Chapter 4 Article 18). Plenary sessions run from September to January and a variety of actions are taken (Pevehouse and Goldstein 249). Decisions are made when a two-thirds majority of the members are present and are voting (UN Charter Chapter 4 Article 18 section 2). The most important function of the General Assembly is its budgetary power. Although the Security Council dictates initiatives in peacekeeping and the Secretariat provides the means for such initiatives, the effects of those efforts are directly related to the budgetary allotment dictated by the General Assembly (UN Charter Chapter 4 Article 17 Section 2). The General Assembly can also make recommendations on general principles of global cooperation including peace and international security (UN Charter Chapter 4 Article 13 Section 1). In addition, studies on international political cooperation can be conducted relative to the codification of international law, human rights considerations, social, economic, and health fields (General Assembly).

The International Court of Justice serves as the judicial branch of the United Nations. Established in June of 1945, the Court is headquartered in The Hague, the Netherlands (UN Charter Chapter 1 Article 22). The Court is composed of a total of 15 judges serving for 9-year terms (UN Charter Chapter 1 Articles 3 and 13). For a judge to be considered elected to the Court, an absolute majority vote in the General Assembly and the Security Council are needed

(Chapter 1 Article 10). Not only does the Court settle matters of international law, it also serves as a legal advisory to other United Nations organs. Legal disputes between states are known as contentious cases while requests for advisory opinions are known as advisory proceedings (How the Court Works). Because only states can sue or be sued in the Court, the jurisdiction is relatively limited and the caseload tends to be light (Pevehouse and Goldstein 254). However, there is a disconnection between the original goals of the Court and the obedience of the states once cases have been settled. States have not “agreed in a comprehensive way to subject to its jurisdiction”, which limits the power and credibility of the Court and its decisions (Pevehouse and Goldstein 255).

Peacekeeping: An Overview

The following sections will focus on the history and development of UN peacekeeping operations. To begin, the UN charter and the relevant articles providing the legal basis for interventions will be discussed including the principles of peacekeeping. The earlier missions of the UN will be summarized to facilitate a foundation and offer a continuum of how operations began and evolved into peacekeeping missions. Particular attention will be placed on the dramatic shift in peacekeeping operations Post-Cold War. Moreover, the financing of missions will be discussed in addition to a listing of current missions and the recent changes to bring about reform.

Charter

In the realm of international relations, legality is a difficult concept to establish. States foster legality through constitutions and statutes. However, in the international arena, there is no true global government and as such no uniform legality. The UN Charter attempts to codify international law among its members. Yet, the charter offers no direct mention of the legality of

peacekeeping missions—neither mentioning peacekeeping by name nor authorizing any type of intervention other than *peacemaking*. Throughout the charter, the use of ambiguous statements creates divide between championing idealist notions of intervention and the realist assertion of state sovereignty in matters of domestic disputes.

The first chapter of the UN Charter states that the purpose of the UN is “To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace...” (UN Charter Chapter 1 Article 1). This article is frequently referenced as the legal basis for peacekeeping missions, yet, there are critics who do not feel that this statement allows for the far-reaching mandates of some peacekeeping missions. In the very next article, it is outlined that “The Organization is based on the principle of sovereign equality of all its Members” and further goes on to state that “Nothing in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter” (Chapter 1 Articles 2 and 7). To conceptualize the incompatibility of these beliefs requires further explanation. The preceding articles state that the UN will do all within its power to maintain international peace. Yet, it also states that it will not intervene in any situation that is domestic in nature. The subject of this work is to analyze UN peacekeeping missions in civil wars—civil wars are inherently domestic by nature. Therefore, it is difficult to find a sense of legality where both of these ideas can be taken in concert.

The sixth and seventh chapters of the UN charter have also been used as reference points that assert the legality of peacekeeping missions. Article 6—Pacific Settlement of Disputes, outlines the manner in which states in dispute shall execute their disagreements as well as the role of the Security Council. Article 33 very clearly states that “the parties to any dispute...shall,

first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice”. However, the following two articles, Articles 34 and 35, state that the Security Council may investigate any dispute among its members that threatens peace. It is also stated that any member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party for the purposes of fostering a pacific settlement. This allows for the Security Council to investigate issues but also allows for the parties in dispute to seek out help from the UN—whether through the Security Council or the General Assembly.

An extension of Article 6, Article 7—Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression, explains the role of the Security Council in deciding what measures can be taken and how those measures will be completed. Article 41 states:

“Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decision...may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.”

(Chapter 7 article 41)

When the Security Council deems a dispute important enough that it affects international peace and security, all the members of the United Nations must “make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security” (Chapter 7 Article 43). Member support is further emphasized

in Article 45 where it is stated that “Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action”.

Unmistakably, many of these articles seem to be opposed to each other. If Article 41 of Chapter 7 asserts that the Security Council may use all measures necessary that do not involve force, but the 43rd article of Chapter 7 states that members must comply with Security Council decisions and supply troops—there is a disconnect. Peacekeepers are lightly armed, primarily for personal safety. By being armed, peacekeepers have the ability to use force and they can be thought of as a “measure of force”. The divide between these articles, along with those in the first chapter present a muddled justification of peacekeeping missions. Former Security-General Dag Hammarskjold has joked that peacekeeping forces “were allowed under “Chapter Six and a Half”, between the nonviolent dispute resolution called for in Chapter 6 of the Charter and the authorization of force provided for in Chapter 7” (Pevehouse and Goldstein 244).

Furthermore, the articles referenced above fail to capture the growth of the UN in reference to treaties. If a member of the UN refuses to sign a treaty of the UN, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, then the Security Council and the UN as a whole cannot take aim at said nation because it has not agreed to the Treaty (Bellamy 47). Charter ambiguity and the application of treaties have made the legality of peacekeeping missions come under assault. Similar to the way that matter of US constitutionality are still debated today, so is the UN Charter in reference to peacekeeping missions. Definitions have changed over time and been elaborated, but the only assurance is that these matters are still contested and the same words can be reread through different perspectives.

Principles of Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping is established on a set of principles that must be met prior to intervention. Adherence to these principles lessens the possibility that the UN will inadvertently become a party to the conflict and have to use more force than necessary. The three principles of peacekeeping, per the UN peacekeeping website are: the consent of the parties, impartiality, and a policy of non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate. Each of these primary principles will be summarized in this section and applied to each of the case study countries through the utilization of the UN peacekeeping website (UN Peacekeeping).

The most important principle of peacekeeping is the consent of the parties involved in conflict. Quite obviously, if the UN does not have the consent of the parties involved, it could cause an escalation of violence and threaten the lives of its peacekeepers. Inherent in this principle is the commitment by the parties to a political process and their acceptance of the UN peacekeeping operations' mandate. Such consent allows the UN the necessary room to complete the various goals of the missions' mandates. Although consent is necessary, consent of the parties does not guarantee consent at all levels of society. Universality of consent is even more unlikely in volatile areas where the presences of armed groups are independent of the main parties.

The principle of impartiality also forms an integral part of UN peacekeeping missions—both for the safety of the peacekeepers on the ground and the negotiations for peace with the parties in question. Although neutrality is paramount, it does not apply to the mandate. Peacekeepers must follow the protocols of the mandate exactly how they are delineated. The best way to understand the role of the mission is with the example of a referee—remaining impartial but penalizing infractions from either side. Through impartiality, the UN assures cooperation from the conflicting parties. Impartiality also applies to activities that peacekeepers engage in;

they must be sure to remain as neutral as possible. Failure to remain impartial may result in the withdrawal of troops and the removal of consent, effectively ending the mission.

The main goal in the creation of the UN was to foster a better world for coming generations, as explained in the opening lines of the charter. Therefore, UN peacekeeping missions have a firm policy of non-use of force except in self defense and defense of the mandate as their third principle. Use of force is authorized by the Security Council and is used as a deterrent for attempts to curtail the political process, to protect civilians and/or assist authorities in maintaining calm. The use of force may be ostensibly strong; yet, it is necessary to add that the use of force demands authorization from not only the Security Council but also the consent of the host parties. Consent of the host parties is the pivotal difference between peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions. Force is relegated as a measure of last resort and is not to be taken lightly; use of force always has political repercussions which can manifest in a myriad of manners. A variety of factors are discussed and evaluated including: humanitarian concerns, safety of peacekeepers and all necessary personnel, as well as the effects the action will have at various levels of conflict. In the evaluation of these factors, the benefits must outweigh the costs before action is taken. This principle is meant to ground the mission and not use force unnecessarily but also to assure the country in question that force is relegated to a last resort and many factors will be considered to assure that force will only be used when there is a high probability that force will aid the conflict and not worsen it.

First Few Crises

Peacekeeping missions have seen dramatic changes in scope and mandate. To establish a foundation, the first few crises will be discussed in brief vis à vis the restrictions of the political climate during the Cold War. During the Cold War, the international arena was characterized as

a bipolar world of proxy wars and nuclear tensions. Due to this reality, peacekeeping missions were generated with careful consideration to aid countries but not further disrupt the international order:

It was widely understood that during the Cold War the UN should focus on interstate conflicts. If the consent of the belligerents was not present, or if the conflict was internal, there tended to be considerable opposition to any UN military activities. (Bellamy 48)

To illustrate this example, violence in the Congo did not cause an overwhelming response to aid the nation. Instead, the Soviet and French governments opposed UN enforcement activities and refused to contribute to the budget (Bellamy 48). Due to the limitations of the political atmosphere, the UN was essentially unable to do the job it was designed to do. Naturally, the UN had to conform to the limitations of the political realities. As Professor Durch explained in N.D. White's Keeping the Peace:

“Global collective security, the organizing precept of its Charter, was impossible in a world divided into hostile blocs.... As a neutral organization, it could sometimes help to bring smaller conflicts to an end, keep them from flaring anew, and keep them from leading to a direct and potentially catastrophic clash of US and Soviet arms” (as quoted in White 210)

The first peacekeeping mission was created through special session as a result of tensions between Egypt and Israel in 1956. The relations of both nations were strained due to border disputes and armed disputes that led to an arms race. Egypt, in control of the Suez Canal and the Strait of Tiran, sought to limit Israeli shipping at the entrance of the Gulf of Aqaba. Because the Suez Canal was being built through international funding, other nations began using this as

leverage to manipulate the relations between the parties in dispute. When the United States refused to continue funding the dam project, the Egyptian state nationalized the dam and charged dues to users. In October of that same year, Israeli forces launched an attack on Egypt, occupying Sinai and the Gaza Strip. British and French troops also landed in the area. The Security Council could make no decision due to vetoes by the French government prompting the matter to be settled by the General Assembly which called for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of foreign forces from occupied land. Through this decision, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) was established to “secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities”.

At this point in UN history, although it was a relatively new organization, a sponsored mission of this kind had not been envisaged by the charter or suggested as an alternative. Two other missions had been previously established (United Nations Truce Supervision Organization and the United Nations Military Observer Group in Indian and Pakistan), but they were strictly observer missions. By contrast, UNEF I employed armed troops (Fetherston 240). In using armed troops, the third mission of the UN, UNEFI, is viewed as the precursor to modern day peacekeeping missions. Because only Egypt consented to the mission, UN peacekeepers were situated strictly on Egyptian soil and were to use their weapons “only in self-defense and even then with the utmost respect” acting as a buffer between both nations while monitoring the ceasefire (UNEF I). The importance of this mission is that it established a precedent for future missions. Secretary General Hammarskjold and a Canadian diplomat, Lester Pearson, are given the credit for creating the unit and for publishing a document detailing the key principles for the establishment of a mission. Due to the involvement of the US involving funding and the French and British involvement regarding troops, there was uniform agreement in the mandate and

existence of the mission. By contrast, the following peacekeeping mission in the Congo became a cause for disagreement in the UN (Fetherston 13).

As previously mentioned, the mission in the Congo was a source of contention for the UN and for the members of the Security Council. At the core of these disagreements was the source of funding which “generated a crisis so serious that the continued existence of the UN itself was in some doubt” (Fetherston 13). To fully understand the issues it generated, it is necessary to understand the factors of the conflict and the issues with creating this mission in particular.

The history of the Congolese conflict and the creation of the mission were born out of Congolese independence from Belgian rule. In the days following the official independence, what resulted was a “miasma of Congolese tribal conflict and political wrangling compounded by poor infrastructure and a weak economy” (Fetherston 14). This political turmoil was maximized by the fact that Belgium had sent representatives “without the agreement of the Congolese Government, for the declared purpose of restoring law and order and protecting Belgian nationals” (ONUC). In response, the Congolese government requested that the UN provide military assistance to protect the nation from “external aggression” (ONUC). A.B. Fetherston explains the impetus for the peacekeeping missions: “The threat to international peace and security was not so much the internal dispute, which would have been dangerous enough, but the fact that the Congo, because of its rich resources, looked set to become the next superpower battleground.” (Fetherston 14). Although his analysis explains the reasons for creating the mission, what resulted was an utter failure. The primary issues with the mission were that “It was into this civil disorder that 20,000 UN military and civilian peacekeepers were cast, without adequate international support or planning, and with a mandate which was so

ambiguous as to be virtually useless” (Fetherston 14). Moreover, the Secretary-General at the time, Hammarskjold, died along with 200 other peacekeepers in the Congo.

The result of the turmoil at the UN, the mismanagement of the mission and the image of the UN caused severe issues for the UN. The Soviet Union and France, both members of the Security Council, refused to pay their dues in protest of Hammarskjold’s policies. After falling two years behind in their payments, the United States tried to put a motion forward to suspend the Soviet vote in the Security Council—as a result of Article 19 of the charter (Fetherston 15). Relations eventually were slightly equalized at the UN, with the United States withdrawing the motion and the Soviet Union received agreement to create the Special Committee on Peacekeeping. However, as a result of these conflicts:

Operations continued to be set up on an ad-hoc basis. The fact that peacekeeping was not written into the Charter meant that it was not supported constitutionally. But the flexibility of the ad hoc approach allowed peacekeeping to survive as a working tool of the Security Council. (Fetherston 16)

Post-Cold War

The Post-Cold War era initiated a revolution in peacekeeping operations that continues today. The change in world order caused a shift of ideologies that had far-reaching consequences on peacekeeping missions. Ideas of peace and security underwent dramatic changes, mandates expanded, and number of missions increased dramatically.

Following the end of the Cold War, the entire international states system began a transformation which was immediately felt in UN peacekeeping missions. The time following the end of the war has been characterized as a “march for democracy”(Weber 41). States began overcoming and rejecting authoritarian forms of rule in favor of more democratic institutions and

principles (Weber 41). Moreover liberal free trade agreements, such as NAFTA and ASEAN, international cooperation and collaboration agreements have increased seeking to create a balance—ie: NATO, EU, AU. (Weber 41) The first groundbreaking resolution that altered the definition of threats to peace was Security Council Resolution 688, passed immediately after the Gulf War (Weber 41). This resolution established that the Kurdish refugees crossing Iraqi borders constituted a threat to peace (Bellamy 49). From this resolution came a myriad of other resolutions modernizing the concept of dangers to peace and security. State collapses, overthrows of democratically elected governments, international terrorism, nuclear proliferation and humanitarian suffering began to be seen as threats to international peace demanding action by the UN (Bellamy 49).

As previously summarized, the first few peacekeeping missions were primarily observer-based, and the following missions (UNEF and ONUC), were convened as a result of the intentions of superpower nations protecting their interests. Moreover, relative to the mandates of later missions, the earlier mandates were very limited and the actions taken were minimal and/or incorrectly planned and executed. El Salvador, which will be discussed in a later chapter, is an excellent example of how mandates have changed dramatically. When the United Nations Mission in El Salvador was created, the mandate explicitly called for three divisions: police, human rights, and civilian. Collectively, these three branches effectively began an expansive nation-building campaign. Over 1000 peacekeepers from 36 countries “monitored everything from human rights to the army, police, elections, public demonstrations, land, and judicial reform”—a far cry from the early missions (Montgomery 140)

Financing

Financing is pivotal for the adequate functioning of a peacekeeping mission. Without

appropriate funding, a peacekeeping mission will meet certain failure if it is underfunded and the troops lack basic necessities. The UN peacekeeping budget is established by the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly which approves and oversees the peacekeeping budget. The missions are funded by all UN member states and the costs are shared among them. For the current fiscal year beginning July 1st 2011 through June 30th 2012, UN peacekeeping operations have a budget of approximately 7.60 billion US dollars. To bring this figure into scope, \$7.60 billion is less than half of one percent of the world military expenditures for the year of 2010. This budget is divided among the 15 peacekeeping operations that are currently underway.

As all UN Member States share the costs of peacekeeping, the Assembly apportions these expenses based on a special scale of assessments, taking into account the relative economic wealth of member states, with the permanent members of the Security Council required to pay a larger share because of their special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Consequently, the top five providers of the UN peacekeeping budget are as follows: United States (27.14%), Japan (12.53%), United Kingdom (8.15%), Germany (8.02%), and France (7.55%) (Financing Peacekeeping). Interestingly, although each nation must share the burdens of peacekeeping missions, there is currently a deficit of just around \$1.6 billion in back dues. Excluded from the peacekeeping budget per mission is the payment to soldiers who are in fact paid by their own governments according to the nation's respective pay scale and rank.

Current Missions:

Although this chapter has focused primarily on the history of peacekeeping missions, there are still a number of missions underway throughout the world. In Africa alone, the United Nations has a total of six missions in progress and one hybrid mission in cooperation with the African Union. The UN missions include: the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South

Sudan (UNMISS), the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) and the hybrid mission the African Union-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). In Asia and the Pacific, there are currently three operations: the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), and the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). Europe has two current missions in Cyprus and Kosovo—the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The final region of UN focus is the Middle East accounting for three missions the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). Due to the devastation in Haiti, the UN also has a UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). The addition of Haiti brings the total count to 13 peacekeeping missions underway. Given the number of peacekeeping missions, the UN has sought to offer reforms moving forward.

Conclusion:

The history of UN peacekeeping is rather difficult to fit into a clear model of explanation. The earlier missions, as a result of interstate issues and Western interests, exemplified the questions that needed to be answered prior to the creation of a mission—ie: funding, plan of action etc. The increasing tensions of the Cold War fostered an environment where the UN could have very little success in matters of international security due to the U.S.-Soviet conflict and the effect of this conflict on UN consensus (Goldstein and Pevehouse 238). Moreover, during the Cold War, the General Assembly was primarily composed of third world membership which

drove the interests of the UN do be concentrated on the economic and social problems of the global south (Goldstein and Pevehouse 238). Following end of the Cold War, peacekeeping missions increased exponentially—as well as the problems associated with such pervasive missions. The goal of this section was to provide a historical background of peacekeeping, as well as pertinent issues and changes that will be represented in the following chapters detailing each case study nation.

Chapter 4:

Rwanda

Introduction

To understand the factors that affected peacekeeping in Rwanda, principally why the UN intervened with a peacekeeping mission and an international tribunal, a broad approach will be taken. A relative history of colonialism and the practices that were engrained into the political environment will be summarized to provide a historical context for the violence. A short section will follow detailing the civil war and genocide as well as tools of the genocide such as radio and newspaper. To understand the various aspects of UN intervention, the mandate of the peacekeeping mission will be summarized followed by historical accounts of its results. Finally, an analysis of several factors will be conducted to explain the course of action by the UN.

Historical Overview

Rwanda first became a target of European influence in the late 1800s when a German count informed the king of Rwanda that Germany was now in control of East Africa (Olson and Shadle 529 and Barnett 50). When colonial rule descended onto Rwandan soil, the German forces united with the smaller of the two main tribal groups, the Tutsi, to quell any uprising. Seeking economic profit similar to nearby British and Belgian colonies, German leader Richard Kandt promoted coffee as a cash crop and introduced money into the Rwandan economy (Olson and Shadle 530). This decision further divided Rwandans because cattle, a Tutsi-dominated asset, was no longer thought of as wealth (Olson and Shadle 530).

After the collapse of the German state following World War I, a League of Nations mandate placed Rwanda under Belgian trusteeship (Olson and Shadle 530). The primary responsibility of the Belgian government was to “promote peace, order, good administration and

social progress” (Olson and Shadle 530). However, the Belgian government acted directly against this mandate and continued to favor the Tutsi (Olson and Shadle 530). Belgian leadership purported racist evolutionary theories and created hierarchical system of racism placing Caucasians at the apex (Barnett 51). Races were then ranked based on their similarities to the Caucasian people “in physical and morphological structure” (Barnett 51). To avoid confusion, a meticulous census was undertaken and every Rwandan was given an ethnic identity card cementing their existence as either Hutu or Tutsi (Barnett 51). Belgian ethnologists arrived:

[W]ielding measuring tapes and calipers in an effort to categorize Rwandans as Tutsi or Hutu, typically measuring noses and foreheads. A Tutsi nose, Belgian scientists claimed, was 55.8 millimeters long and 38.7 millimeters wide; a Hutu’s, 52.4 millimeters long and 43.2 millimeters wide. (Neuffer 89)

Through this system, the Tutsi were deemed ethnically superior and the Belgian government began replacing Hutu chiefs with Tutsis—effectively determining who would reign superior in a country of very scarce resources (Neuffer 88). Consistent with this political institutionalization of a racist hierarchy, educational policy in Rwanda asymmetrically favored the Hutus by barring Tutsis from receiving an education (Barnett 51). Hutu men were also limited in education—they could become either farmers or priests (Neuffer 88). These actions caused both groups to become self-motivated and their hatred spurred further conflict (Neuffer 88).

Ironically, there are very few differences between these groups. The population of Rwanda is composed of approximately 85% Hutu, 14% Tutsi and 1% Twa (Melvern 7). Both major groups share sociological, linguistic, and political characteristics and are identical in almost every way except for their origin (Melvern 7). “It was colonialism that institutionalized ethnicity and infused it with a perverse and distorted ‘scientific’ belief system that naturalized

the Tutsi destiny to rule over the majority Hutus” (Barnett 50). Through these divisions, Rwanda became known as an epicenter of ethnic violence and the battleground for one of the bloodiest genocides of the 20th century (Power 336).

Seeds of Civil War

Though Rwandans eventually achieved independence from Belgium in 1961 (UN Resolution 1746), this did not undo the maladies of the past—Rwanda was already decades deep into a violent ethnic strife that would lead to a devastating genocide (Power 336). Between 1959 and 1961 a Hutu Revolution took over Rwanda (Barnett 52). Ethnic cleansing and massacres throughout the nation were sporadic, yet palpable (Power 336).

U.N. sponsored elections were held after Rwanda gained independence and the Hutu-dominated parties won the majority of political power (Barnett 53). This inversion of power led to a new campaign of Hutu-dominated vengeance on the Tutsis (Barnett 53). The U.N. was well aware of the situation, and in a 1961 UN Trusteeship council report it was stated: “These last 18 months have brought about the racial dictatorship of one part.... It is quite possible that some day we will witness violent reactions against the Tutsi” (as quoted in Barnett 52). These actions drew cruel responses from the Rwandan government and approximately ten to twenty thousand Tutsis were murdered (Barnett 52).

The early 1970s ushered in the era of Major General Juvenal Habyarimana who very quickly organized a coup d'état leaving him in power of a “one party state” (Barnett 53). Habyarimana consolidated his power and began a series of improvements that resulted in Rwanda being seen as “a model of efficiency and referred to it as the Switzerland of Central Africa” yet to accomplish this he ruled with an “iron glove” (Barnett 53). An economic decline in the late 1980s signaled a shift in the political realities of the nation. As a result of the violence,

many Tutsi began to flee to Uganda and created the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) (Neuffer 95). The RPF hoped to appeal to both Hutu and Rwandans in a call for democracy. Yet, encouraged by Uganda, the RPF began a series of border raids attacking the Hutu population and the Rwandan government. Rwanda's civil war officially began on October 1st 1990 (Jones 15). The RPF invaded Rwanda in response to the "repeated government-sponsored massacres of ethnic Tutsis" (Howard 29). The violence from this war led to the eventual signing of the Arusha Accords as a mechanism to bring an end to the civil war through a cease-fire. Despite their initial intent, the accords did little to quell the rampant violence. Moreover, President Habyarimana, a French-speaking Hutu and army general, was further exacerbating the political environment by blaming the Tutsi for any negative issues in Rwanda—political, social, or economic (Barnett 56). Although he assisted the signing of the Arusha Accords, they were in useless and violence prevailed (Barnett 56).

Arusha Accords

The Arusha Accords were diplomatically created to end the civil war. Present in the discussions prior to the signing of the Accords included representatives from the United States, France, Belgium and Germany (Jones 75). The Organization of African Unity (OAU) also facilitated these accords. Negotiations took place in Paris, Arusha, and finally in Tanzania (Howard 29). President Habyarimana, the RPF and several other third parties signed the agreement (Jones 34). Although there was international attention on these accords, it was "an extraordinary story of a sophisticated conflict resolution process gone disastrously wrong" (Jones 69). The accords seemed like a success on paper but they failed to become a reality that "was comprehensive and wide-ranging, providing for political, military and constitutional reform" as intended (Melvern 60). The accords delineated the establishment of an interim government,

demilitarization, refugee repatriation, power sharing, and democratic elections (Barnett 157). Despite these goals, ethnic strife continued in Rwanda and “ferocious negotiations that grew in bitterness and violence” proved to be the “critical spur to radical polarization of politics in Kigali” (Jones 103). A year later, upon his return from a scheduled trip to Dar el Salam, Habyarimana’s plane was shot down and landed in the presidential gardens killing everyone on board (Melvern 135). Forty-eight minutes later, the genocide began (Barnett 97).

Genocide

Between April and July of 1994, in a very short 100 days, approximately 800,000 men, women, and children were murdered (Barnett 218). That amounts to “333 ½ deaths per hour, 6 deaths per minute, and 1 death per second” (Cohen 14). Estimates place this number as 75% of the Tutsi population and 10% of the Rwandan population (Berry and Berry 15). This genocide broke the most scandalous records; the rate of killing in Rwanda was five times faster than the Nazis and was done in broad daylight (Melvern 5). Planned to an unforeseen degree, hit lists were made ahead of time and posted at radio offices (Berry and Berry 15). *Radio-Television Libre des Mille Collines* would broadcast daily the “names, addresses, and license plate numbers” of victims (Power 333). In creating such detailed lists “the killers almost never made a mistake in finding who they were looking for” (Berry and Berry 15). The murderers were:

[M]embers of Habyarimana’s government who were unwilling to open up the political sphere to other parties and most certainly not to the Tutsi-dominated RPF; Interahamwe and Ipuzamugambi militias numbering 50,000 (who had originally been trained mainly by the French); the Gendarmerie or rural police (also trained by the French); the government’s Forces Armées Rwandaises who were less involved in the planning and execution but did not take part; and finally,

ordinary peasants who carried out most of the genocidal killing after ‘years of indoctrination in the ‘democratic majority’ ideology and of demonization of the ‘feudalists’’. (Howard 30)

Moreover, it was not only Tutsi that were murdered by these groups but also Tutsi sympathizers (Berry and Berry 184). Hutus who opposed the killing campaign or the forces conducting the killing were murdered alongside the Tutsi. But this would come a day or so into the killing spree:

First to be killed were the individuals most likely to resist the plan of genocide in positions of power. The opposition prime minister, the president of the constitutional court, priests, leaders of the Liberal Party and Social Democratic Party, the Information Minister, and tellingly, the negotiator of the Arusha Accords. (Berry and Berry 184)

This brutal enforcement of “Hutu Power” was driven by the slogan “Eliminate the Tutsis” and the “Inyenzi” which translates to ‘cockroach’ and was used as a derogative term to refer to the Tutsi (Gourevitch 23). To achieve this goal, the weapon of choice in the genocide was a masu—a club studded with nails (Gourevitch 23). The poverty in the country gave way to the use of “knives, machetes and spears....Later screwdrivers, hammers, and bicycle handlebars were added to the arsenal” (Power 334). What was truly shocking about the genocide was how deeply personal the killings were. Survivors have testified:

They sent people in among the bodies to verify who was dead....They would say ‘Here is Josue’s father, his wife and mother, but where is he?’ And then, in the days after, they tried to hunt you down if they thought you were alive. They would shout out, ‘Hey Josue, we see you now’ to make you jump and try to run so that they could see you move and get you more easily. (Power 333).

Furthermore, this genocide pitted family members against each other. Although ethnic strife was an ever-present issue, Tutsis and Hutus intermarried and began families prior to the genocide. But after violence began it could not be stopped, “the outbreak of killing forced Hutu and Tutsi friends and relatives into life-altering decisions about whether or not to desert their loved one in order to save their own lives” (Power 334). Individuals faced very difficult decisions with no clear answers as to how to survive and where to run:

Because her husband was Tutsi, her children had been categorized as Tutsi and thus were technically forbidden to live. But the machete-wielding Hutu attackers had assured the woman that the children would be permitted to depart safely if she agreed to accompany them. When the woman stepped out of the church, however, she saw the assailants butcher eight of the eleven children. The youngest, a child of three years old, pleaded for his life after seeing his brothers and sisters slain. ‘Please don’t kill me,’ he said. ‘I’ll never be Tutsi again.’ But the killers, unblinking, struck him down. (Power 334)

Rwandans witnessing the deaths of their family members was, unfortunately, very commonplace and used as a war tactic. Mothers and fathers were forced to watch as “their small children who were only a few months old had their heads smashed against a wall” (Power 334). The militia members would also throw infants in the air to see “how many times they could hit them with a machete before it fell to the ground” (Berry and Berry 14).

The killing was widespread throughout Rwanda. In Nyarubuye, townspeople asked the mayor of the city where they should seek refuge (Gourevitch 18). The conflict however, put all of those in power against the Tutsi. As a result, the mayor “suggested that they seek sanctuary at the church” (Gourevitch 18). Days later the mayor came to kill them with other militants

(Gourevitch 18). Many killers knew the victims and exploited those relations to kill more efficiently. Yet, the relations did nothing to lessen the violent way in which they killed: “the killers killed all day....At night they cut the Achilles tendons of survivors and went off to feast behind the church, roasting cattle looted from their victims in big fires and drinking beer”

(Gourevitch 18). Those who managed to reach official buildings were not safe. Hutus were “driving Tutsi out of their homes to government offices, churches, schools or other public sites, where they would subsequently be massacred in large-scale operations (Des Forges: Recruiting for Genocide). In one city, the hospital was packed with as many as two thousand refugees (Gourevitch 27). But the hospital was not a sacred place and the killers and the Presidential Guard cordoned off the complex, cut the water lines and would allow no one to leave the premises (Gourevitch 27).

Radio and Newspaper: Weapons of War

The Hutu used modern technology to further their ability to commit mass atrocities. *Radio-Television Libre des Mille Collines* (RTLM) was used by the Hutu elite, and sanctioned by the Rwandan government, to amplify wide spread violence. In those days prior to the plane crash, there were ominous mentions of a “final attack” calling Hutus to “stand up” in support of the army (Berry and Berry 115). After the death of Habyarimana: “News, opinions, and unsubstantiated rumors were interspersed within the same broadcast, creating international confusion among listeners, who often relied on RTLM as their sole source of information about the outside world” (Berry and Berry 115). Mobilization of massacres was a daily occurrence calling on the Hutu listeners to “fill up” the half-empty graves with Tutsis (Berry and Berry 116). Given the prevalence of poverty, radio was an inexpensive way for the rural poor to remain

informed—a primarily illiterate urban poor who understood all news as the truth (Berry and Berry 116).

Hutu leaders were also aware of the power of newspapers on the population. A local publication titled *Kangura* published daily articles inciting violence and advocating a “pure Hutu race”—which was very reminiscent of Nazi lexicon (Melvern 49). *Kangura* published the ten commandments of the Hutu which further propelled notions of a superior ethnic group. According to these Ten Commandments, “strategic political, administrative, economical [*sic*], military and security positions” must be reserved for the Hutu and no Hutu should never “sympathize” with the Tutsis (The Path to Genocide). To fully understand the response of the UN to the situation in Rwanda, the most pertinent Security Council resolutions follow.

Security Council Resolutions:

The Security Council resolutions will be discussed in chronological order with added emphasis on the earlier resolutions to establish the commitments of the Security Council. In March of 1993 the Security Council passed its first resolution referencing the civil conflict in Rwanda. Resolution 812 was created in response to the calls for a deployment for United Nations observers along the border of Uganda and Rwanda by representatives of both respective governments. The UN called for the RPF to pull back and respect the buffer zone between both nations creating a neutral and demilitarized zone. The Security Council urged both sides to respect international humanitarian law and to resume negotiations for a peace agreement that should begin no later than April 1993 (U.N. Security Council, 3183rd Meeting)..

Although negotiations for a peace agreement were underway, the Security Council decided to pass Resolution 846 which created the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR). The observer mission was to be stationed on the Ugandan side of the

border under a six-month mandate with the option to renew—an option which was upheld in Resolution 891 of the same year. The goal of UNOMUR was to monitor the border and assure that no military assistance was reaching Rwanda by road or tracks (U.N. Security Council, 3244th Meeting).

Following the official signing of the Arusha Peace Accords in August of 1993, a report by the Secretary General on September 24, 1993 prompted the Security Council to pass Resolution 872 establishing a UN peacekeeping mission in Rwanda. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) was established for a period of six months with the possibility to continue providing an extension of its mandate at the appropriate intervals (U.N. Security Council, 3288th Meeting).

Resolution 912 was passed just 17 days after the death of President Habyamirana. The Security Council was “appalled at the large-scale violence in Rwanda, which has resulted in the death of thousands of innocent civilians, including women and children” as well as being “deeply concerned by continuing fighting, looting, banditry and the breakdown of law and order, particularly in Kigali”. The resolution extended the mandate and added 45 civilian monitors (U.N. Security Council, 3368th Meeting).

Resolution 918 of the same year paints a more vivid picture of the violence in Rwanda. The Security Council expressed:

[A]larm at continuing reports of systematic, widespread and flagrant violations of international humanitarian law.... the killing of members of an ethnic group with the intention of destroying such a group, in whole or in part, constitutes a crime punishable under international law.... the magnitude of the human suffering caused by the conflict and concerned that the continuation of the situation in

Rwanda constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region. (U.N. Security Council, 3377th Meeting)

Resolutions 912 and 918 clearly demonstrate that the Security Council had knowledge of the human rights violations occurring and of the reluctance of the conflicting parties to fully accept the provisions of the Arusha Accords. An embargo was put in place intended to “prevent the sale or supply to Rwanda... of arms and related matériel of all types”. Moreover, the Council also decided to increase troop size by 5,500 and made further requests to the Secretary General for information relative to member states in violation of the embargo.

On June 8, 1994, the Security Council passed Resolution 925 condemning acts of genocide in Rwanda: “[A]cts of genocide have occurred in Rwanda and recalling in this context that genocide constitutes a crime punishable under international law” as well as “expressing its outrage that the perpetrators of these killings have been able to operate and continue operating within Rwanda with impunity”. In response, the Council demanded the immediate deployment of two additional battalions. Furthermore, the Council highlighted the lack of safety pervasive in the nation and those effects on peacekeepers “UNAMIR may be required to take action in self-defense against persons or groups who threaten protected sites and populations, United Nations and other humanitarian personnel or the means of delivery and distribution of humanitarian relief”. But this did not include protecting civilians from mass killings (U.N. Security Council, 3388th Meeting).

Of the remaining resolutions of the year 1994, Resolutions 929 and 965 were perhaps the explicitly called on member states to fulfill their requirements of their memberships—to offer support of the mission. The international response to the UNAMIR mission will be addressed later in this chapter; therefore, it is important to keep these two resolutions in mind (U.N.

Security Council, 3392nd Meeting and U.N. Security Council, 3473rd Meeting). However, it was Resolution 955 that officially established the foundation for the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (U.N. Security Council, 3453rd Meeting).

Resolution 1013 of 1995 requested that the Secretary-General establish an International Commission of Inquiry. This resolution was particularly important because it further demonstrated the knowledge of the Security Council as to the situation on the ground in Rwanda. They requested that the Commission:

[C]ollect information and investigate reports relating to the sale or supply of arms and related matériel to former Rwandan government forces in the Great Lakes region in violation of Council resolutions 918 (1994), 997 (1995) and 1011 (1995)... To identify parties aiding and abetting the illegal acquisition of arms by former Rwandan government forces, contrary to the Council resolutions referred to above..." (U.N. Security Council. "Resolution 1013")

This resolution also called on member states, nongovernmental organizations and international humanitarian organizations to collect relative information and make it available.

Although many of these resolutions give the appearance of awareness and of commitment, the mission was an utter failure. To fully understand the activity of the UN, the UNOMUR and UNAMIR missions will be summarized followed by an analysis of the completion of the mandates and their success or failure.

United Nations Missions: UNOMUR and UNAMIR

UNOMUR:

In June of 1993, the Security Council decided to establish the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR). The goal of this mission was to place military personnel

on the Ugandan side of the Uganda-Rwanda border to assure that “no military assistance -- lethal weapons, ammunition and other material of possible military use --was being provided across it.” (UNOMUR). Leading the mission was Brigadier-General Romeo Dallaire who was in charge of a total of 81 military observers (Melvern 95). The observers were posted along the 180km border and were supported by both international and local staff members (Melvern 95). Although the amount of violence in Rwanda kept the mission from completing its mandate, it was the precursor to a more peacekeeping mission which contained a more developed mandate.

UNAMIR (United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda) Mandate

In September of 1993, the Security Council decided to implement the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) as a tool to ensure full compliance of the Arusha Accords. Active from October of 1993 through March of 1996, the mission was deemed a necessity due to the continuance of non-compliance from both sides of the conflict and the ever-present civil war in the nation. This section will detail the mandate of the mission and will later be analyzed through the use of first-hand accounts.

The main goal of UNAMIR was to help implement the Arusha Accords which were formally signed and completed in August of 1993. The mandate specifically called for peacekeepers to:

Assist in ensuring the security of the capital city of Kigali; monitor the ceasefire agreement, including establishment of an expanded demilitarized zone and demobilization procedures; monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional Government's mandate leading up to elections; assist with mine-clearance; and assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities in conjunction with relief operations. (UNAMIR Mandate)

On the surface, the mandate was very far-reaching. To fully accomplish this mandate, Dallaire asked for a minimum of 4,500 troops (Melvern 85). Unfortunately, the mandate was not sufficiently funded or supplied and the mission is widely regarded as a failure in international peacekeeping. The primary reasons that the mission failed helped to demonstrate UN variation in this peacekeeping mission. These reasons include: an uncompromising UN and a lack of funds and supplies resulting from an unwilling international community.

Mission Outcome: Failure

Uncompromising UN

Although the Security Council resolutions have already been summarized, their full impact can only be understood by their impact on Rwanda. The mandate seemed very far-reaching but it was actually very short-sided and did not establish sufficient provisions to guarantee full compliance of the Arusha Agreement (Des Forges 100). The mission also failed to contain a human rights component and the soldiers were told to maintain their distance from protecting civilians (Barnett 157). Moreover, the mandate was never changed from a chapter 6 to a chapter 7 prohibiting peacekeepers from protecting Rwandan citizens (Berry and Berry 143).

The UN created UNAMIR on August 15, of 1993 prior to the genocide. From the outset, the UN was conscious of the failure in the UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia and decided that it wanted a mission of a smaller size and force (Des Forges 100). This is demonstrated by virtue of the fact that Dallaire asked for a minimum of 4,500 troops but was only given 2,548 troops and 60 civilian police (Howard 31). Instead of choosing to guarantee overall security in the small country, the mandate was established to only “contribute to security, and not throughout the country but only in the city of Kigali” (Des Forges 100). On January 11, 1994, Dallaire sent a fax to Kofi Annan, the head of the DPKO, and told him that he had received ominous news of an

impending crisis. Dallaire warned that Hutu extremists were planning to massacre the Tutsi: “Example he gave was that in 20 minutes his personnel could kill up to 1,000 Tutsis” (Beardsley xi). But these pleas seem to have been ignored. Dallaire constantly asked for more well-equipped battalions to be sent to stop the slaughter but he was constantly ordered to maintain neutral in the situation and not protect civilians (Berry and Berry 143). By the time the genocide started, the mission was not functioning as a cohesive whole (Howard 31).

On April 21st, the Security Council decided to withdraw all troops except a small contingent of 270 troops (Howard 18). Unfortunately, “in the real hours and days of deepest crisis, consistent testimony points to a lack of political leadership, lack of military capacity, severe problems of command and control, and lack of coordination and discipline” in the mission, as directed by the UN and the international community (Howard 31). Many Rwandans had grown accustomed to seeing the UN in Rwanda since the time of UNOMUR and when the genocide broke, many fled to UN offices throughout Rwanda seeking refuge (Des Forges 23). But the Rwandans who managed to escape the genocide and reach UN offices were abandoned because the UN pulled out its peacekeepers when they were needed most:

Nearly one hundred Belgian peacekeepers abandoned some two thousand unarmed civilians, leaving them defenseless against attacks by militia and military. As the Belgians went out one gate, the assailants came in the other. More than a thousand Rwandans died there or in flight, trying to reach another U.N. post. (Des Forges 23)

The situation on the ground was further complicated by the fact that the UN refused to dismiss the Rwandan representative in the Security Council or publicly denounce the genocide. This allowed the Rwandan authorities to continue to reign and violate international human rights law

(Berry and Berry 144). Rwandan power manifested itself at every level of society: “Armed youths at roadblocks guarded neighborhoods and were on many occasions drunk by 1:00 in the afternoon” (Berry and Berry 145). This not only derailed Dallaire in receiving whatever scant materials were intended to reach his mission headquarters, but also inhibited him from moving very far outside of his compound. Roadblocks with different standards were on every street manned by heavily militarized soldiers (Barnett 83). The UN failed Dallaire in giving him the appropriate power to complete the mandate because it continued to allow the Rwandan government to be a legitimate voice for the Rwandan people, created a mandate that could not be completed and it continued to insist on a cease-fire between the warring groups when there was none to be had. But the UN was not the only one at fault for this, ultimately, the UN is a group of nations and the decisions of the UN fall on the shoulders of its’ member states.

Lack of Resources

First and foremost, there was little interest from major world powers in supplying troops or resources for a peacekeeping mission in Rwanda. The lack of resources is an unfortunate occurrence that no one understands better than Dallaire. Upon arriving in Rwanda he was quickly confronted with the inability to pursue his goals due to the constant need for materials from which “the UN had absolutely no pool of resources to draw from” (Dallaire 90). One makes a request for everything needed and then must wait while that request is analyzed. In a push system, food and water for the number of soldiers deployed is automatically supplied. In a pull system, you have to ask for those rations, and no common sense seems ever to apply. (Dallaire 100)

Given the gravity of the mission and the necessity to act quickly, this was an unwelcome variable for Dallaire. As a result of an unwilling international community, Dallaire’s request for

troops: “8,000 and at a minimum of 4500-5000, the higher number was not given to the Security Council and advance messages from the US were clear that ‘there would be no support for a large mission in Rwanda’” (Barnett 105). Frequently bothered by this, he claimed that: “It maddened me that I was forced to fight a petty internal war over vehicles and office supplies. The lack of supplies and the delays damn near hijacked the mission” (Dallaire 107). Unfortunately it was not only office supplies, Dallaire’s mission was failed on virtually all accounts with a wide range of services unmet. He was reduced to a state of:

Borrowing petty cash from a UN agency. He lacked everything from ammunition to sandbags, fuel and barbed wire. The mission did not have essential personnel; there was no public affairs officer, no legal adviser, and no humanitarian or human rights experts. (Melvern 99)

Unfortunately, it was up to the member states to provide for the mission and they overwhelmingly refused. The countries with the resources “organization, and acumen to possibly make a difference were the ones that were performing miserably in Bosnia and were hardly keen to act in an unfamiliar part of the world where the circumstances were even less hospitable” (Barnett 131). It would seem that much like the United States was involved in other conflicts, so too were other nations and all essentially ignored Rwanda.

Of the aid given to Dallaire, much of it was useless. For example, he was promised twenty-two armored personnel carriers (APC’s) but only eight were provided and only five could actually be used (Melvern 99). Troops that were donated were just as useless and demanded more time being made to function properly than they could actually be used. A half-battalion of infantry from Bangladesh is the perfect example in showing the inefficiency of the international

community and aid that hindered the situation rather than helped it (Melvern 109). The half battalion:

[H]ad little operational experience; they were poorly trained and not a cohesive unit. They had no logistics, no engineering equipment. They had arrived in Rwanda without bottled water or food in spite of instructions from New York that all contingents should be self-supporting for three months. (Melvern 109)

Instead of aiding Dallaire, he was left with soldiers who could not sustain themselves and were not adequately trained. As a result of these difficulties, when the genocide began in April, “UNAMIR lacked reserves of such basic commodities as food and medicine as well as military supplies” (Des forges 100). Moreover, foreign nationals were evacuated by troops of their respective governments leaving the Rwandans and Dallaire to their luck: “the evacuation force left him and the peacekeepers ‘on the tarmac, with the bullets flying and the bodies piling up’ around them” (Des Forges 22).

Although some nations offered troops, they came with many conditions. For example, some African countries offered to donate peacekeepers to the cause, yet there was a catch. In exchange for African soldiers, they demanded to be “outfitted with the latest Western military equipment, which they would be allowed to keep as peacekeeping booty” (Barnett 137). Outfitting troops in such a manner required Western military equipment and, by extension, Western funding. However, there were also doubts as to the capability of these troops to enter such a violent civil war. The other predicament would be the idea of “first-rate equipment being handed to third-rate forces” (Barnett 137).

UNAMIR II

Following the genocide, there was resurgence in the international community to rejuvenate the mission and it was renamed UNAMIR II. A frustrated Boutros Boutros-Ghali knew that this mission would be nothing more than “a paper force” and he was right. UNAMIR II suffered many of the setbacks of UNAMIR I and did little to quell the remaining suffering after the genocide (Barnett 147). The intent was purely aimed at refugees and at providing security and support for those still suffering (White 277). With a provision for 5,500 troops, the deployment of the mission was contingent upon a cease-fire on all sides. But the troops were late by arriving in August, and the equipment was useless because the RPF had already gained control of the country (Barnett 143).

Dallaire counts the “fundamental indifference of the world community ...in a tiny country that had no strategic resource value to any world power” as the primary factor that determined UNAMIR’s failure (Dallaire 6). Regrettably, Dallaire could only stand back while: “Rwandan men, women and children were brutally murdered while the developed world, impassive and apparently unperturbed, sat back and watched the unfolding apocalypse or simply changed channels” (Dallaire xvii). The reasons for inaction can be summarized by simply stating that the UN and the international community “could not find the political will nor the resources to stop it” (Dallaire xviii). Dallaire was left with “the inflexible UN Security Council mandate, the penny-pinching financial management of the mission, the UN red tape, the political manipulations and my own personal limitations” (Dallaire 6).

The difficulty of this poorly constructed mandate and the ensuing lack of funds led Major MacNeil, a liaison officer for UNAMIR, to welcome the RPF. He stated: “Finally, I must admit that on 4 July, when Kigali city finally fell to the RPF, I felt a great sense of relief. It was amazing to watch how Kigali, after only 72 hours under RPF rule, returned so quickly to a sort of

normalcy. There was an immediate change” (Berry and Berry 146). Unfortunately, one side of the conflict was the most successful in ending the conflict and restoring some semblance of peace in the small African nation.

American Response

The American response to the situation in Rwanda heavily influenced the UN. The United States government provides the largest portion of peacekeeping funds to the DPKO and is the most powerful military force in the world (Financing Peacekeeping). As a member of the Security Council, the U.S. has veto power over all decisions made just as other members, but its large military makes a veto more forceful. The U.S.’ reluctance to support a peacekeeping mission can best understood through the analysis of three major factors: the recent failure of the mission in Somalia, a lack of qualified government officials who understood the country and the civil war, and an unwillingness to provide foreign aid where it had no national interests.

Somalia

The United States was still reeling from the failure of the conflict in Somalia and aware of the backlash by American citizens. The deaths of eighteen American soldiers in Somalia, and the subsequent withdrawal of American troops, created an unwillingness to intervene in areas that had no direct US interest (Melvern 92). President Clinton and his advisers “knew that the military and political risks of involving the United States in a bloody conflict in Africa were great, yet there were no costs of avoiding Rwanda altogether” (Power 335). On April 7th, news that Belgian troops had been brutally murdered and dismembered in Rwanda was reported and it was taken as a sign that Rwanda would become another Somalia (Power 335). Officials at the Pentagon believed that “Rwanda had gone from being a ‘Somalia waiting to happen’ to a Somalia that was happening” (Power 332). At this time, the United States was aggressively

opposing any UN peacekeeping mission altogether and the validity of such missions had soured (Jones 109). This news, a lack of faith in the ability of the UN and the realization that there were no interests vital to the United States in Rwanda led the Clinton administration to do very little to help the conflict. In effect, the fate of Rwanda was decided through the failure of Somalia.

Uneducated Government

The United States government at this time had limited information on Central African countries—possibly due to the Cold War. The region was low priority for the United States and the government had only one intelligence asset in the region (Kuperman 23). When the conflict in Rwanda began to draw international attention, the US was severely unqualified to understand its true magnitude. Lieutenant General Wesley Clark, the director of strategic plans and policy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon asked was quoted asking: “Is it Hutu and Tutsi or Tutu and Hutsi?” (Power 347). Moreover, a Hutu opposition campaign was claiming the RPF rebels had massacred 20,000 people and a U.S. officials “didn’t know who was shooting at whom” (Kuperman 25). Given the lack of information, it was very easy to label the Rwandan conflict another round of ethnic tension, and this is exactly what the United States decided to do.

The US government also refused to seek out information from prominent individuals intimately aware of the conflict in Rwanda. For example, Joyce Leader was the second in Command at the US embassy in Rwanda and had witnessed the Hutu massacres (Power 332). Leader lived next door to Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana and attempted to hide her in her home when Hutu soldiers came after her (Power 332). Escaping with her husband and children, Leader heard as “the militiamen hunted them down in the yard, where the couple surrendered. There were more shots. We heard her screaming and then, suddenly, after the gunfire, the screaming stopped and we heard people cheering” (Power 332). Leader managed to escape with her life and

upon returning to the United States was relegated to a desk job at the State Department where she was restricted from communicating with her sources in Kigali (Power 365). She was told to prepare daily summaries on Rwanda and instructed to use only press and U.S. intelligence reports.

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was the only agency in the United States that obtained intelligence on Rwanda during this time (DIA About DIA). During the Rwandan conflict, the goal of the DIA was to gain information to facilitate a plan to remove American nationals (Kuperman 32). Following the death of Habyarimana's, the DIA requested that satellites take photos of Kigali and areas that they suspected of violence (Kuperman 32). They found evidence of several massacre sites and began to intercept communications when they heard of plans for future massacres (Kuperman 32). With this information, the DIA prepared maps detailing the locations of massacres and the positions of militia groups (Kuperman 33). Although the DIA shared this information with the executive branch and other US agencies, the reports were dismissed as too extreme (Kuperman 33). Although a study in December of 1993 found that 4 million tons of small arms had arrived in Rwanda from Poland through Belgium, there were no efforts to try to understand the conflict (Power 338).

National Interests

The memories of Somalia, as well as an uneducated and uninterested government were not the only issues that cemented the response to the Rwandan genocide. Having no national interests, the US decided to defer responding. First and foremost, the US was already involved in a multitude of conflicts and the addition of another one, which seemed to be another 'Somalia', was an idea too inconvenient for most to entertain (Power 364). National Security Adviser Anthony Lake justified his position when he stated: "I was obsessed with Haiti and Bosnia

during that period, so Rwanda was, in journalist William Shaw Cross's words, a 'side show,' but not even a sideshow—a no show” (Power 364). Madeline Albright, US Ambassador to the UN echoed this sentiment when she stated: “The global 9-1-1 was always either busy or nobody was there” (Power 341). To effectively propel the United States into the conflict and go against the objections of the Pentagon, a strong proponent was needed. Lake and Albright had already justified their positions, Clinton could not fathom entering the US into another conflict that seemed doomed to fail just as Somalia had, and no one else came forward (Power 373).

Diplomatically, the US represented these lethargic dispositions. At multiple diplomatic levels, the US government refused to take many simple steps that would have at least given the appearance of action. Madeline Albright was instructed in a briefing memo as to her appropriate behavior prior to meetings relative to the situation in Rwanda. She was instructed very clearly: “You should be mostly in a listening mode during this meeting. You can voice general sympathy for the horrific situation in Rwanda, but should not commit the US to anything” (Power 357). However, many officials did not need any instruction as to their appropriate behavior. Secretary of State Warren Christopher made his beliefs very clear when he stated: “I have other responsibilities” (Power 352). At the same time that the US was avoiding Rwanda, it was “actively contemplating a military operation in Haiti” which offers more insight into the priorities of the time (Barnett 140). Yet it was not only diplomats that were expressing such disinterest, it was also Congress that was making its motives very clear. Bob Dole was quoted as saying “I don't think we have any national interests there” (Power 352). This statement seemed to sum up the opinion of Congress as a collective unit and was further delineated in its legislation during this time.

Congress

Congressional action was another arena where it was demonstrated that the US had no national interests in Rwanda and was not worth protecting. During UNAMIR II, Ghana had offered to supply peacekeepers but their deployment hinged on the ability to receive armed personal carriers (APC's), which are necessary for any military mission (Berry and Berry 151). The US refused to donate the APC's and "The Clinton administration was not about to donate the equipment only to find itself skewered by the likes of Bob Dole and Jesse Helms" (Barnett 143). When the APC's were finally shipped from Uganda and arrived in Rwanda, it was far after they were needed as the RPF had already taken control of the country and the genocide was over (Barnett 144). Moreover, Congress owed half a billion dollars in UN peacekeeping dues (Power 341). It was this fact that most likely encouraged Richard Clarke to introduce Bill PDD-25 listing sixteen different factors that needed to be considered prior to supporting peacekeeping missions (Power 342).

President Clinton

Furthermore, the vehement opposition of the United States was most through the Executive Branch. The US has a tradition of conducting diplomacy only through states and negotiations because: "most diplomatic contact occurs between representatives of states, U.S. officials are predisposed to trust the assurances of government officials" (Power 346). However, during the genocide it was the Rwandan government that was committing the murders and the Clinton administration seemed unable to fathom this reality (Barnett 146). Similar to the acts of Congress, Clinton was predisposed to take action only when national interests were at stake and he "had to fear a domestic backlash if he sanctioned another African operation that was not connected to American interests" (Barnett 140). The Clinton administration had the ever-present memory of Somali and Clinton "saw Somalia lurking around every corner" and "never even

debated the merits of intervention” (Barnett 140). President Clinton failed to convene even one meeting on the matter and many of his senior advisers did not condemn the slaughter (Power 332). Although it has been argued that Clinton and his advisers were unaware of the gravity and scope of the situation, there were no overt calls to understand the conflict either.

The point of interest is that Clinton refused to take any action—no matter how small. The US government has within its possession technical assets that have the ability to disrupt technical transmissions. These technical assets could have jammed the Rwandan radio station that was propagating hate and encouraging ethnic extermination, but the Clinton administration refused (Power 335). Moreover, US did not lobby to have the Rwanda ambassador to the UN expelled from the United Nations (Power 332). In sum:

Remembering Somalia and hearing no American demands for intervention, President Clinton and his advisers knew that the military and political risks of involving the United States in a bloody conflict in general Africa were great, yet there were no costs to avoiding Rwanda altogether. Thus, the United States again stood on the sidelines. (Power 335)

Unfortunately for the Rwandans, the United States chooses a course and stays on it. As David Rawson, the US Ambassador in Kigali commented “once the Washington side is busy into a process, it gets pursued, almost blindly” (Power 335).

Following the genocide, President Clinton both visited Rwanda and gave a speech where he apologized for his lack of involvement. In March of 1998 President Clinton arrived at the Kigali airport and explained that he had not comprehended the depth of the situation in Rwanda until it was far too late (Barnett 154). He also highlighted the inability of the international community to take action: “The international community, together with the nation in Africa,

must bear its share of responsibility for this tragedy. We did not act quickly enough after the killing began We did not immediately call these crimes by their rightful name: genocide” (Barnett 154).

Given these predispositions, the US used its power in the Security Council to pressure the UN to act just as tragically. As previously mentioned, the US is the most powerful member in the Security Council given its military and economic power and it is because of this that “the United States, more than any other country, would dictate the UN reply” (Power 350). When the international press began to argue for intervention, they understood that “there were few countries with the ability to execute an emergency operation, the United States being one of them” (Barnett 140). But “the United States ignored extensive early warnings about imminent mass violence... [and] denied Belgian requests to reinforce the peacekeeping mission” (Power 332). The United States did everything in its power to suggest that the UN had no cause in Rwanda and informed that they would not provide the funding (Power 332).

Results

The United States was aware of weapons movement in Rwanda and was aware that it had experts that could offer first-hand information of conflict. Yet, the government overwhelmingly refused at multiple times through multiple agencies. Congress refused to fund peacekeeping missions, Clinton refused to offer support to another conflict in Africa, and the State Department refused to show interest. The only agency that showed any modicum of attention was the Department of Intelligence Agency—whose documents were refuted as too extreme. Given that the US has a veto power, the strongest military in the world, and is one of the only countries in the world that could provide for an emergency mission, it is just to say that the response of the US government was accomplice to the deaths in Rwanda.

French Complicity and Response

Although the United States has been the most vilified for its inaction in Rwanda, France must also share the burden of the genocide. Rwandan ties to the French can be traced as early as the 1970s when an asymmetrical agreement with the Rwandan government was signed stipulating economic and military assistance (Melvern 24). For decades the French government has supported the Rwandan government and directly aided in the genocide through the use of military equipment and intelligence information. French interest culminated in a series of missions and the culpability of the French government in the Rwandan genocide is still being discussed in the international community.

Arming Genocide

When President Habyarimana became aware of the increasing force of the RPF, he immediately contacted his principal foreign backers, President Mitterrand and his son (McNulty 109). To assure cooperation, he immediately claimed that Rwanda was being attacked by English-speaking Ugandan President Museveni (McNulty 109). Following this exchange, France began providing “[a]n apparently inexhaustible supply of arms and aid” which was “open-ended and unconditional” (McNulty 121). Shipments of modern weaponry included “day-to-day military equipment, tents, clothing, parachutes, spare parts for helicopters and artillery” (Wallis 31). Deliveries exceeded need, given the size of the Rwandan army (Destexhe 11). Eventually filtering down through society, observers noted “grenades being sold openly on a market stall in Kigali, alongside bananas and mangoes...the grenades cost less than \$2” (Wallis 32). Even a UN a UN embargo placed on military equipment entering Rwanda in May of 1994 did not stop France—it simply found a loophole by basing its operation out of Goma, Zaire (McNulty 117). Human Rights Watch reported seeing airport staff and local businessman taking shipments on

cargo containing weapons and munitions from France explicitly for the FAR (McNulty 118).

Zaire was not the only country, the UK, South Africa, Albania Belgium, Bulgaria, China, Egypt France, South Africa and the Seychelles also acted in contravention of the UN arms embargo by sending equipment with the intention of arming the genocide (Wallis 115 and McNulty 118).

Operations Noroit and Amaryllis

Operation Noroit was an explicitly French military operation created under the guise of evacuating French citizens. However, when the troops descended into Kigali they remained for three years (McNulty 110). During this time, Habyarimana used French support to increase his armed forces from 5,000 to 28,000 (Melvern 48). Frenchman, Lieutenant Colonel Gilles Chollet was appointed special military advisor to the president and was the commander of operations to bring stability to Rwanda—a subsequent change in mandate (McNulty 110). Parallel to army growth, French arms transfers increased to: “assault rifles, anti-tank rocket launchers and hundreds of thousands of rounds of ammunition of all calibres ... to ensure that ‘the Rwandan Armed Forces were kept regularly supplied’” (As quoted in McNulty 111). To supplement the equipment, army training corps and the Military Assistance Mission took command of “surveillance, training and tactical support for Habyarimana (Wallis 33). Interviews with Hutus following the genocide confirm French support: “Most of the military aides came from France. It was the French who trained our soldiers” (Wallis 35). Moreover, Human Rights Watch reported that French soldiers were seen directly assisting Hutu extremists in checkpoints: “seen controlling check-points in Kigali, demanding to see identity cards, arresting Tutsi and passing them over to the Rwandan army”(Melvern 49). Ironically, during this time France was hosting several meetings in Paris between the leaders of both sides—“while continuing to arm, train and supply the Rwandan army” (Wallis 42).

Operation Amaryllis was launched just hours after Habyarimana's plane was shot down, with the sole objective to evacuate "foreign nationals, members of Habyarimana's family and former government ministers"—which included many of the architects of the genocide (Wallis 82). Dallaire was particularly outraged, but even more so when he learned "the French had been using UNAMIR vehicles to move Rwandans of known extremist background to the airport, where they were flown out of the country" (as quoted in Wallis 88). When questioned if the forces would aid other Rwandans, the Chief of Staff for the French Forces Admiral Lanxade responded that they would not because there was "no knowledge that a genocide was occurring at that time" (Wallis 83). Yet, there was certainly "warnings, including radio broadcasts, human rights groups, [and] intelligence reports from Dallaire... (Wallis 83). Moreover, interviews with French telecommunications experts have confirmed that a "secure telecommunications system to allow General Huchon and General Bizimungu of the FAR to communicate without being overheard" was installed (Wallis 113). The refusal to help Rwandans extended to the embassy a survivor recounts when he arrived:

All the high-ups from the former regime, and their families, the ministers from the President's [Habyarimana's] party, his in-laws. There was the director of Radio Mille Collines and his assistants, well known for their exhortations to commit massacres ... On the way to the embassy, at dozens of roadblocks, I saw people sitting on the ground, arms tied behind their backs, in the process of being killed. (As quoted in Wallis 89)

Many of these genocidaires were allowed to escape "armed and well-financed—to Zaire" (Newbury 82). During this time, General Huchon was urging for the creation of a zone explicitly under control of the FAR to ensure that deliveries could take place safely (Wallis 114).

Genocide Among Friends

Due to the Franco-Rwandan treaty, France had established relations with Rwanda and intended to continue those relations. When the approach of the English-speaking RPF posed a threat to French interests in the region, French leaders feared the overthrow of the French-leaning Rwandan government as an ally in the centuries old Anglo-Saxon and French rivalry. To effectively curtail the efforts of the RPF, Mitterrand and his staff favored intimate relations with Habyarimana to ensure he would stay in power and continue to serve French interests.

The Anglo-Saxon rivalry has been noted as the most prominent factor driving French-African policy. The rivalry is rooted in the Fashoda Crisis of 1898 when the British removed the French presence in the upper Nile (Barnett 56). As a result, “the French have been nearly paranoid about losing status and power to the vastly inferior Anglo-Saxons” (Barnett 56). Following the end of the Cold War, the rivalry continued. Rwanda’s geographic location proved to be very strategic for French interests as the “fault line of the Francophone and Anglophone countries in Africa” (Melvern 48). Fearing an “Anglophone encroachment in Africa”, France began pouring money into Rwanda (Melvern 24). Fortunately for Mitterrand, “there were no policy think-tanks or discussion groups” in France which allowed him and his close advisors to be the principles architects of African foreign policy (Wallis 23).

Ironically, Mitterrand began his presidential career as a proponent of human rights seeking to limit arm sales that could “further destabilize the third world” (Wallis 20). Yet, to maintain French influence in the region, Mitterrand was a very active supporter and close friend of French-educated Habyarimana (Melvern 48). For his part, Habyarimana was in favor of maintaining the Franco-Rwandan asymmetric agreement of 1975 because it guaranteed his authoritarian rule even through the civil war—funded by the French franc. Yet, after

Habyarimana's death, French support continued because: "Mitterrand's personal pride was at stake, for other francophone nation heads were anxious to see if his help to the Rwandan government was unconditional" (Wallis 43). Mitterrand's opinion of the genocide was widely circulated when a private comment made to an aid hit the international news: "dans ces pays-la, un genocide, ce n'est pas trop important", which roughly translates to 'in countries like that genocide isn't very important' (Wallis 106). In Rwanda, Mitterrand was referred to as: "Mitterahamwe"— a fusion of his name and 'Interwahame' (Melvern 49).

Also advising Mitterrand was the unelected African Cell and several powerful politicians. The African Cell was headed by Mitterrand's son Jean-Christophe who used his position to foster Habyarimana's regime with arms deals and military advice (Schmitt 593) The African Cell was essentially "a charmed circle of Franco-African leaders and businessmen"...where "decisions taken by this unit were often made on the basis of good-will towards favored clients or personal friends" (Melvern 48). There was also input from the French foreign ministry, the ministries of co-operation, of defense, of finance, and the French intelligence service (DGSE) (Melvern 48). Generals Huchon and Quesnot both served Operations Noroit and Amaryllis and constantly pushed their own anti-RPF agenda prior to the genocide and during (Wallis 112). Alain Juppe, former Foreign Minister was also complicit in these types of actions, during the genocide Juppe received many of the leaders on state visits and even quoted after the genocide:

'With regard to my services, I can tell you since the end of May [when the UN embargo was placed] there are certainly no deliveries of weapons to the Habyarimana regime'. While he was saying this he looked at the other side of the [river] Seine, towards the Elysee [Palace]. 'But what happens over there, I don't know anything about it' (Wallis 118).

Both Dallaire and Paul Kagame (RPF Major-General) have attested to the difficulty of the French presence. Dallaire was outraged when he met with French leaders: “While I was talking about stopping the genocide, his [Lafourcade’s] staff were raising points about the loyalty France owed its old friends”(Wallis 88). Paul Kagame publicized his difficulties with the French: “We were fighting to give negotiations a chance, and up against a power which refused any chance for democracy... the French army prolonged the conflict.” (Melvern 49).

Public Relations on Both Sides

The French and Rwandan governments both mounted public relations campaigns to justify French operations and the supposed plight of the Rwandan government. Efforts by the Rwandan government were two-pronged; the government wanted to maintain French interest and preserve any international support available. Recognizing the need to appear that he was indeed in favor of democratic reforms, Habyarimana added “an extra ‘D’ to the only political party in Rwanda, the MRN became the Revolutionary National Movement for Development (and Democracy)...pleasing his French backers and European aid donors” (Wallis 41). He was also very aware that negative press would affect his rule. He made sure that “internationally, Rwanda was portrayed as a democratic country with rule by the majority” (Melvern 25). The threat of an Anglo-Saxon presence in the region was also used in the media to keep French interest claiming “an Anglophone Tutsi plot to carve out a large new central African kingdom” (Wallis 25). Following the death of Habyarimana and the start of the genocide, these tactics continued. The Rwandan government hailed the French as saviors and decorated barricades with French flags and large posters of President Mitterand (Wallis 131). When international attention began to change, the Rwandan government feared: “if the French army betrays us the country will sink even further into catastrophe” (Wallis 133).

The French were very skilled in their plans to divert the attention away from the genocide and their involvement in funding it. The French representative to the Security Council was quoted: “We hope that the Rwandese [sic] parties will come to their senses and realize that the United Nations can neither take their place nor impose peace on them” (As quoted in Vaccaro 377). Similarly the French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe highlighted the need for democracy, “Since the international community cannot and is not willing to interfere physically in the country [Rwanda] ... the only remedy is democracy.... A return to the Arusha accords to stop the killing” which only resulted in further confusion (As quoted in Wallis 106). Yet, while both of these statements were being uttered, the French were funding the genocide and equipping the genocidaires. A Human Rights Watch report asserts that top French military leaders were “far more concerned with public opinion of the killing rather than the killing itself” and were told to “make it more presentable to the international press”(Wallis 113). However, when press crews arrived just before Operation Turquoise, the French decided to enter near a refugee camp to play the “humanitarian card so beloved the media to show a skeptical French public and international audience that France ‘cared” (Wallis 123). This camp “would make ideal fodder for Western TV crews anxious to see ‘humanitarianism’ in action” (Wallis 128). Images and footage such as this encouraged stereotypes of African nations and showed the situation as a “humanitarian crisis” and not as a safe haven for Hutu leaders who were living among Tutsi survivors (Destexhe 12). The confusion of the conflict and strategic planning made it impossible to distinguish between the “refugees” and the genocidaires dying of cholera and dysentery epidemics (Destexhe 12). The French government took advantage of the variety of obstacles plaguing the UN to establish its own operation. Operation Turquoise was a French-led initiative to ensure that the interim government remained in power to secure the interests of the French.

Operation Turquoise

When Mitterrand announced the creation of Operation Turquoise, the French continued with their public relations proclivities and made sure to stress the humanitarian goals of the mission. Mitterrand's advisor's convinced him to seek a UN mandate officially recognizing the mission—which he received. Operation Turquoise went on to become a Chapter VII peacekeeping mission allowing for the use of force, if necessary, “to protect civilians in the midst of civil war, by creating safe areas, if needed, and to provide security so that humanitarian activities could be conducted” (as quoted in Vaccaro 385). The desire for a French operation was not welcomed by all members, but “since there was little other recourse to stop the bloodshed, those with doubts—Brazil, China, New Zealand, Nigeria, and Pakistan—abstained from the vote to authorize the operation rather than oppose it” (Vaccaro 385). The ambassadors from New Zealand and Karel Kovanda were more vocal in their opinions arguing that UNAMIR II needed to be sent sooner instead of approving another mission that one of the parties involved, the RPF, did not approve of (Melvern 210). Other African nations leaned towards the theory of realism in their understanding of Operation Turquoise as more evidence of a world power manipulating the UN and using humanitarian interventions to demonstrate their own power in the region (Wallis 128).

Described as a “multinational operation, it was supported by troops from Senegal and Chad. However, this was only true after France pressured both governments and paid them to join (Wallis 129). Based in Zaire, the operation included a total of 2,924 French troops and 510 support staff as well as air and logistical cover (Wallis 129). As expected, military support increased and included “more than 100 armored vehicles, Gazelle helicopters, four Jaguar fighter-bombers, four Mirage F1CT ground attack planes and four Mirage FLC's for

reconnaissance purposes” (Wallis 131). Although launched for humanitarian purposes, the use of elite Special Forces and the fact that very few APC’s to move displaced people were used has raised considerable criticism (Wallis 131).

The French were stationed in the West in between the FAR and the RPF. As soon as the French entered Rwanda, they were welcomed as heroes “it was clear that these European soldiers were saving the killers from all the demons that their violence and murder against the Tutsis had stored within their psyches” (Wallis 131). Although officially they were told to ignore the Rwandan army and the Interahamwe, many French soldiers were well connected with the Hutu leaders (Wallis 130). Joint Interahamwe and French forces would enter refugee camps and transfer victims to the military zone where no civilians would witness (Wallis 138). Interviews with Interahamwe soldiers have described how the French would control the situations:

Who was the enemy? They too knew that the enemy were [sic] the Tutsis....The French had some fortified biscuits, canned food. Instead of giving it to those starving people, no, they gave it to the Hutus and the Interahamwe. When they left those places, they would fire into the air – this was the signal that the coast was clear and we could go in and kill them. (as quoted in Wallis 141)

Aloys, now in prison charged with genocide, testified to the collaboration between the Interahamwe and Operation Turquoise at Nyarushishi camp when he recounted instructions given by French commanders:

Given that there are many people gathered here, the satellite photos must have picked them up, the international community might have well detected their whereabouts, it’s no longer possible for you to kill them here. But you can flush out and liquidate all the ones that are hiding. (As quoted in Wallis 142)

A particularly harrowing incident in Bisesero seems to highlight the worst aspects of French intervention and their relative misunderstanding of the situation. After arriving in Bisesero with the Rwandan military, megaphones were used to lure Tutsis from their hiding places: “they were coming to rescue us, and intended to transport us to a place of shelter, in zones occupied by the RPF where there was no risk of us being killed” (Wallis 149). After revealing themselves, the French told the Tutsis they would be back in three days—effectively leaving the Tutsis to be slaughtered. When the French returned to their posts, they were denied permission to rescue those Tutsi. A “continued antipathy towards the RPF in the minds of some senior officers who had served in Rwandan during Operation Noroit” dominated decisionmaking despite the fact that there was “reconnaissance patrols having found no evidence of the RPF” (Wallis 157 and Wallis 152). Against their commanders, some soldiers returned and managed to save some of the remaining people—but this was also an issue. One survivor recounts: “For the first days they treated us very well, but later they reacted badly against us because we asked to be moved to the [RPF] area that was so close to us. They refused us food to eat and drink as well as the clothes they had promised us” (as quoted in Wallis 155).

Although the creation of the humanitarian protected zone (HPZ) was established as a safe haven for refugees, it also became “a secure retreat for the Rwandan government army and the perpetrators of the genocide – military, militia and civilian” (Melvern 214). The zone “possibly allowed many Hutu perpetrators to either escape into Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) or reestablish themselves in safe zones in Rwanda” (Schmitt 590). The operation did very little to improve the political situation by allowing the presence of militia members among the displaced Hutus gathered in the “security zone,” of propagandists from the ex-government, and of Radio des Mille Collines' spewing out its anti-RPF messages (Destexhe 11).

After the operation, many facts became evident. By the time French arrived, most of the genocide had ended because “all the Tutsi in the west had already been massacred” (Vaccaro 387). Dallaire has argued that the RPF was content with maintaining only half of the country but the French intervention spurred the RPF to continue because they believed the French intervention would reinforce the FAR (Vaccaro 387). Although it has been estimated that roughly 10,000 people from Western Rwanda were saved, this statistic seems misleading given the fact that almost no Tutsi were in the west and the fact that the French aided genocidaires (Jones 124). Critics contend that this type of situation occurs when an international community in the form of the UN procrastinates. Unfortunately “the gap is being filled more and more by countries...with geographic proximity and historical links to the crisis area. Russia was given the green light to mediate in Georgia, France in Rwanda...” (Destexhe 16).

Results

A variety of factors have been offered to attempt to explain French interests in Rwanda and how those interests were so contorted to fund a genocidal regime. A lingering Anglo-Saxon rivalry and the desire to maintain a sphere of influence in Africa only begin to explain French interest. Their interest in maintaining a brutal regime was advocated at all levels, national and internationally in the Security Council. It is very clear that Rwanda fell victim to French designs on the region and those who suffered the most were the Tutsis.

The UN Response

When fighting broke out in Rwanda, the United Nations found itself a time like no other. Peacekeeping missions had increased exponentially in the early 1990s and there were many missions running simultaneously. When it became clear that genocidal acts were being committed in Rwanda, the response of the UN was viewed as uncaring. The primary reasons that

negatively affected UNAMIR were: an uninvolved Secretariat that offered little leadership, an apathetic Security Council pressured by the US and France to remain apathetic, and a lack of mission support from the international community.

In recent history, the UN began displaying its weaknesses in peacekeeping missions. The cases of Somalia and Bosnia, also instances of civil war, demonstrated that the UN was not fit to intervene in the case of civil wars (Barnett Preface). At this time there was “a growing concern that the UN’s promise was being undermined by the weight of its own ambitions [and] by high-profile disasters in the field” (Barnett 13). Moreover, when it was confirmed that ten Belgian peacekeepers had been killed very early on in the Rwandan civil war, it was concluded that this could very well be another instance of failure. An unwillingness to overly commit was only one of the problems:

“The combination of the maelstrom on the ground and the UN’s weaknesses made it quite unlikely that the UN would meet only “failure” in Rwanda. Not only would the UN receive no thanks for trying, but also it would suffer fresh and increasingly harmful recriminations from Washington and elsewhere.” (Barnett x)

These issues weighed very heavily on the decisions of the Secretariat and the Security Council and it apparently motivated them to stay unmotivated.

Secretariat

Boutros Boutros Ghali

As the Secretary General of the Secretariat during this time, Boutros Boutros Ghali was responsible for the failure of the Secretariat to adequately respond to the genocide. The tenure of Boutros-Ghali has come under sharp criticism since the end of the war. Many believe that his ineffectual leadership during this time was the result of being a puppet of the French

government. Voting records and diplomatic pressure by the French and Boutros-Ghali tended to be very similar and the validity of these arguments will be analyzed below.

Prior to his tenure as Secretary General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros Ghali was a renowned French-educated Egyptian minister. He worked very closely with the French government and was a personal friend of President Mitterrand (Melvern 75). In 1990, it was Boutros-Ghali who personally approved of arms transfer from Egypt to Rwanda (Barnett 122). When he came up for election, France was the only country who supported Boutros-Ghali in his bid for Secretary-General (Wallis 103). French diplomats lobbied for his election arguing his “intellectual and diplomatic credentials” as testament of his capability to lead the United Nations. (Wallis 103-104). Boutros-Ghali even remarked after his election “President Mitterrand seemed to feel a personal victory in my election” (Melvern 75). Although he had originally pushed for UNAMIR, he also led the Security Council in reducing the operation by 90% leaving only 270 peacekeepers in Rwanda (Howard 28). This decision was also backed by France—even though they clearly had knowledge of genocidal acts (Wallis 105). This decision mirrored the initial interest by Boutros-Ghali and France to create UNAMIR. Many have argued that he was simply a puppet of the French, who acted on behalf of French interests in their desires to keep Habyarimana in power.

When the French decided to launch Operation Turquoise, Boutros-Ghali lobbied vigorously for the mission to be approved by the UN. Boutros-Ghali explained to ambassadors in the Security Council that the French mission for Rwanda would be similar to the one undertaken by the Americans in Somali (Melvern 210). Boutros-Ghali defended French behavior as a result of ‘bitter frustration with the US obstruction’ (Melvern 210). In a letter to the president of the Security Council, Boutros-Ghali addressed UNAMIR’s deterioration and the amount of time and

resources that would be needed to fund UNAMIR II (Wallis 128). Boutros-Ghali's decision to support of Operation Turquoise was unspeakable to many critics and his motives have been questioned. Boutros-Ghali said he had no choice but to support Operation Turquoise: "France was the only country that had offered anything for Rwanda and at no cost to the UN....The French would be providing troops and picking up the bill" (Melvern 210). Some argue that if he would have been more detailed in his memos, the Security Council would have been more aware of the true situation and Operation Turquoise would not have been necessary. For example, it has been argued that if Boutros-Ghali had indeed wanted a UN intervention:

[H]e could have portrayed the mounting deaths as due to ethnic killings and referred specifically to the Tutsis as the primary targets. Instead, he and his staff consistently portrayed the violence as "chaotic" and spontaneous, projecting an image of killing that was reciprocal and multisided. (Barnett 120)

Instead of portraying the mass killings as genocide he was cautionary and little attention was garnered. Boutros-Ghali addressed this allegation when he stated: "My role is to respect the decision and the resolutions of the Security Council. I can suggest different solutions, but the decisions are taken by the Security Council" (Melvern 196). Moreover, there is some evidence that French diplomats coached Boutros-Ghali prior to any speech he gave involving Rwanda "to elicit a verdict against intervention" (Barnett 121). Boutros-Ghali admitted years later "We were not even allowed to use the word 'genocide'" (Barker). It is not clear who he refers to as "we", whether the Secretariat as a whole, or he and his advisors. He also does not specify who prohibited him from using the term 'genocide'. Yet, this statement clearly attests to the tense political environment and competing interests at the time.

In an interview marking the 10th anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, Boutros-Ghali explained the principal problems of the UN response to the Rwandan genocide. Principally, he highlights the overload of multiple peacekeeping operations and the “financial problem” (Barker). He places the majority of the burden on the United States by stating: “The real problem was not the troops; the real problem was that only the United States had the infrastructure to do the transport of troops with big planes, and then who will pay?” (Barker). He also attributes the failed peacekeeping mission to the lack of leadership by the United States because by “not paying their contribution...[the U.S.] encouraged other countries not to pay their contribution” (Barker). Boutros-Ghali also explained stereotypes in the international community and their effect on the African continent: “

There's still a kind of discrimination concerning the African continent, concerning their own disputes, concerning the assistance given to Africa, concerning the perception of the international community concerning Africa -- that they are in a hopeless situation. It is the poorest continent, and [the perception is] they don't deserve the same attention like Latin America or like Asia or like European problems (Barker).

Following his term as Secretary General he was elected General Secretary of the International Organization of the Francophonie—further fueling speculation of ulterior motives (Barnett 179). In effect, it would seem that Boutros-Ghali was influenced by the French. His close relationship with Mitterand, his history facilitating arms transfers to Rwanda during the civil war and his voting record provides a number of examples that suggest a strong connection between the desires of the French and the leadership of Boutros-Ghali.

Department of Peacekeeping Operations: Kofi Annan

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations seemed to follow a similar leadership style under Kofi Annan. As head of the DPKO, Annan had a responsibility to his department but instead followed the lead of Boutros-Ghali. UNAMIR cables were routinely overlooked and dismissed. Ironically, after the genocide he publicly apologized for his part in the genocide. He admitted that he “came to acknowledge that the world failed Rwanda at the time of evil. The international community and the United Nations could not muster the political will to confront it” (Barnett 154). Although he did mention his part in the lack of political will, he shared blame with the international community as well, in a sense “democratizing blame” to lessen his responsibility (Barnett 154). Officials in the department also attempted to shift their responsibility to other individuals and other organs of the UN claiming “they had done everything they could, given the sketchy information they were receiving from the field, insinuating that UNAMIR’s Force Commander Dallaire was not up to the job” (Barnett 6). However, this statement is not founded. Officials in the UNAMIR field office were sending cables of “mass ethnic killings and pleaded for permission to undertake military operations” to the DPKO (Barnett 3). The earlier cables, along with news reports, and the fact that Dallaire himself was asking for support should have been enough to compel the UN to, at the very least, inquire and send representative to ascertain the situation on the ground. But with the amount of peacekeeping operations at the time it was difficult to fathom another mission. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations was not the only organ within the UN that was seemingly uninterested. This was the most evident when looking at the decisions of the UN Security Council—the only branch that could call for a peacekeeping mission.

Security Council: Apathetic

A variety of factors established the position of the Security Council. Ultimately, its actions and inactions were deemed ineffectual. Although on paper the council seemed much vested in the matter and passed resolutions, very little amounted from those efforts. The Security Council was at best apathetic and at worst dismissive of the acts of genocide in Rwanda and utterly failed to protect Rwandan citizens. The costs, political and economic, were only one of the variables in play.

Through council resolutions, the council gave the illusion of interest when there was none by:

Passing resolutions that did not stand a chance of being implemented, and sending emissaries into the field to try to produce a cease-fire when it was clear that none would be had—these and other diplomatic undertakings can be reasonably and rightly justified on the grounds that attempts had to be made. (144 Barnett)

Furthermore, the never-ending meetings together with the stream of paperwork and formal statements created a façade behind which the council could hide (Barnett 145). These council meetings were not devoid of compassion for the Rwandan people, but rather devoid of real action to supplement real emotion. At times of lengthy and vigorous discussions “the council was noisy with passionate speeches on behalf of dying Rwandans but fell quickly silent when the Secretariat asked for volunteers” (Barnett 3).

When the Security Council began seriously considering the UNAMIR mission, it was plagued with a succession of problems and the mission was utterly unprepared, underfunded and understaffed. Ironically, the mandate was very involved, but the council was very inactive from its inception. Dallaire went to the UN headquarters himself and asked to see the official paperwork for Rwanda and his mission. He was surprised to find that:

“[T]here was no paperwork available in the Secretariat about the political and military situation in the country, and no reports on the Arusha Accords, even though UN officials had attended the negotiations. Much more interest was shown in crises in Liberia, Somalia, former Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Mozambique and Georgia. (Melvern 96)

This fact was further understood when Dallaire was responsible for a mission where it was “introduced to begging and borrowing to a degree” that he had never experienced before (Dallaire 102). Unfortunately, “UN officials also had distinguished themselves at the outbreak of the crisis by virtue of their disappearing act” and very little changed during the mission (Barnett 3). In addition, the DPKO maintained its position prior to the creation of the mission. One notable example is when Dallaire wanted to raid a weapons cache and was ordered not to enter the cache but instead to “notify Habyarimana of the information notify the Belgian, French, and US governments of the warning, and not to raid the weapons cache” (Howard 32)

Moreover, even when it was clear that genocide was occurring, there was significant apprehension in stating that fact publicly. Calling it genocide would “have forced the hand of the Security Council to take actions to stop the genocide and it would be bound to act as a result of the genocide convention of 1948 (Howard 33 and Power 60). Although the domestic governments of UN member states must have ratified the genocide convention before it would become international law, the UN still passed the convention and would at least be expected to call for troops to be sent. Furthermore, by calling it genocide before a cease-fire had been reached between the groups, there was a real possibility that calling it genocide would hinder the possibility of cease-fire. This fact was magnified by the reality that the mission on the ground was in awful conditions. Given the lack of leadership from the Secretariat, the underequipped

DPKO and the delicate political situation the Council continued to choose in action: “At the height of the genocide in late April 1994, the Council voted, counter intuitively, to reduce the size of the dysfunctional United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) from 2,500 to 270 (Howard 28). But the actions of the Security Council demand further explanation; ultimately, the Security Council is a forum for a group of nations, and the most powerful was undoubtedly the United States.

United States Lobbying and French Silence

Although the Security Council resolutions offer a glimpse into the actions taken by the council they do not define exactly why these actions were taken and what were the larger forces that were encouraging non-intervention. The United States and France are two very powerful members in the Security Council and had a shared interest in the Security Council remaining inactive. The US had no interest in involving itself in another African conflict where it had no national interest. By contrast, the French had a lot of interest in Rwanda but was better served by an indifferent Security Council that would allow the dictatorial regime to stay in power.

The US knew that if it voted to establish a mission, it would be called on to support the mission. As previously discussed, the US was not only unwilling due to the recent failure in Somalia but also stunted by an unwilling Congress and bureaucratic red tape. The US justified its motives by highlighting the failure of the Arusha Accords and the ongoing violence to suggest that the UN had no further business there (Barnett 138). The US knew that “in the Security Council: the United States has the greatest influence of all” and it used this influence to lobby for non-intervention (Barnett 11). Unfortunately, no one stood up to counter the claims of the US. When “None of the members of the Council was willing to challenge the United States on its new disinterest in funding and fielding multidimensional peacekeeping operations in civil wars”

that became the norm (Howard 29). However, after some time, many of the other members could no longer deny that genocide was occurring: “[M]ost on the council had tired of the United States; stonewalling, nay-saying, and cynical denial of the genocide. Still, the United States was relentlessly determined and consistently threatened to kill any resolutions that called for a complex and involved mission (141 Barnett)

As a permanent member of the Security Council, France also had a very large role in the UN intervention in Rwanda. Initially, when the situation in Rwanda was simply a civil war, France was very supportive of the Arusha Accords and eventually lobbied for UNOMUR—believing it necessary to end the civil war (Barnett 69). The rationale for French leaders was that the accords were “the cheapest and most effective way to maintain French power and access in Rwanda, given the options of either outright RPF victory or large-scale military invasion” (Jones 77). These arguments were supplemented by Jean-Damascene Bizimana, Rwandan ambassador to the UN, who constantly assured the Security Council that the situation in Rwanda was improving as a result of the stabilizing effect of the UN peacekeepers (Melvern 159). Moreover, France was adept at maintaining the situation in Rwanda at the bottom of agenda by delivering “confident reassurances that the parties were committed to see the accords through until the democratic end” (Barnett 70). Working in concert, a permanent member—France, and a rotating member—Rwanda, were instrumental in any interest on Rwanda.

However, when Habyarimana was pronounced dead, the Security Council recognized the need to evacuate foreign nationals in Rwanda (Barnett 100). Yet, there was little mention of the gravity of the civil war or any of the warnings of a rapidly approaching genocide (Barnett 100). Luckily for the French and their interests, the Security Council was suffering from fatigue and “the last thing the council needed at this moment was another operation in Africa designed to

quell ethnic conflict” (Barnett 68). The French government did nothing to alert the council of the truth or the warnings of the coming genocide and Bizimana affirmed to the council that the killings were simply part of the civil war and nothing else (Melvern 159).

When the reluctant Security Council eventually agreed to create UNAMIR, France feared the interim Rwandan government would be overthrown so French ‘client’ African states also rejected the proposal (Wallis 110). Oman and Djibouti as well as Rwanda, refused to support UNAMIR. Both French and Rwandan political elites enjoyed their strategic relations and “elites in both the French executive branch and the military had little desire to see their former clients lose control of power in post-conflict Rwanda” (Schmitt 595). When UNAMIR II was approved former foreign minister Jerome Bicomumpaka:

[D]etailed alleged RPF atrocities, including the allegation that they tore out and ate the hearts of their Hutu enemies. It was by all accounts and extraordinary performance, made worse by the grim silence with which it remained unchallenged by its listeners.” (Wallis 110)

Concurrent with the variables of other missions and an overwhelming fatigue, the council also relied on first-hand information from commanders sent directly to the Secretary-General and his/her subsequent advice. France took advantage of the fatigue of the Security Council, their misunderstandings of the true extent of the violence, and refused to be supportive of a peacekeeping mission that might upset the Rwandan government—all in an effort to secure French interests in the region. When France decided to launch Operation Turquoise, the Security Council was more than willing to outsource a very expensive peacekeeping mission as “France was the only power willing to enter, and they did so with their own motives” (Newbury 82).

However, the results of the Security Council “subcontract[ing] its responsibilities to individual member states” was hardly perfect (Destexhe 17).

As a result of US and French interest in the Security Council remaining uninterested, the Security Council looked weak, dismissive and unaware. The few actions that were taken included “hollow resolutions, shallow statements of concern, and false promises of action were born from a combination of cynicism, despair, self-deception, and wishful thinking (Barnett 132). Ultimately, the Council was subject to the whims of the uninterested members: “A malnourished and overused UN was highly dependent on the whims of the volatile Great Powers” (10 Barnett). By overstretching itself and having no resources from which to pull, the Rwandan genocide occurred at a time when the UN was unable to support the mandate itself and its most powerful military ally unwilling to help.

The Costs of a Mission-Politics and Economics

While the UN was overstretched in so many missions and severely lacking funds, it also had to consider the costs of another intervention. Political and economic costs were weighed and deemed more important than taking actions. The DPKO had to keep in mind “what traffic it would bear” if it suggested another mission (Barnett 105). This was another reality that was used to the advantage of the United States and France as well as other states who advocated a plan of non-intervention. The United States and other members of the Security Council also complained that they were under constant pressure to save money in face of a mounting billion dollar UN peacekeeping debt (Howard 33). At a time when the UN was obviously failing and on the heels of Somalia and Bosnia, many members felt that another failed mission might bring the end of the UN. Therefore, the UN “chose to remain concerned about the genocide, but not to do much, rather than potentially sacrifice the reputation of the whole UN” (Howard 34)

Post-Genocide UN Measures: HRFOR and the ICTR

Although the intent of this work is to focus on the variation in peacekeeping missions, it is necessary to highlight other instances of UN intervention and field knowledge in Rwanda. Following the failure of UNAMIR II, the United Nations Human Rights Field Operation in Rwandan (HRFOR) took over to aid with the refugee situation in mid-1994 (HRFOR). By April 1st of 1995, HRFOR was composed of 113 staff members in 11 field offices which included 67 fixed-term staff, 34 UN volunteers and 12 human rights officers (HRFOR). Human rights officers were stationed throughout the country to monitor projects that were created to rebuild the Rwandese administration of justice to human rights education (HRFOR). In conjunction with the UNHCR, human rights officers were put in place to assure that human rights were not being violated at any stage of return for incoming refugees. This field operation was a precursor the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)

The ICTR was created through Security Council Resolution 955. The tribunal was an effort “however slow, to end impunity. It will send a signal to all those alleged to have committed serious violations of international law, who, in feeling think that they have found a safe haven where their impunity will continue” (Berry and Berry 134). The court is composed of three trial chambers and the Appeals chamber composed of judges (UNICTR). As it is international in scope, the judges come from many countries (UNICTR). Currently, there is one person awaiting trial, 6 trials in progress, 17 cases on appeal, 41 individuals have completed their sentences, 10 individuals have been acquitted. Although the ICTR is a good tool, it is not all-encompassing as it only deals with the high-profile criminals. Moreover, concurrent with the following quote: “the international tribunal is not a panacea for the prosecution of the

perpetrators of genocide in Rwanda. Delivering justice to the Rwandan people can only be accomplished by the Rwandan courts, which will try the vast majority of the cases” the gacaca courts were established in Rwanda domestically (Berry and Berry 138).

Unfortunately, the Gacaca courts were not very successful. Claims have been made that “more than 10,000 Rwandans fled the country in anticipation of gacaca court inquiries, fearing false accusations and unfair trials” (Le Mon 16). Moreover, lacking a body of knowledgeable legal professionals, judges were given minimal training in criminal law and could sentence people up to 30 years imprisonment. By law, all individuals had to attend the gacaca courts and many witnesses were frequently harassed (Le Mon 17). Many leaders and government officials also “restricted access to troubled regions, interfered with efforts to gather testimony, destroyed evidence, and misrepresented events” (Des Forges 27).

Conclusion

According to the above-presented evidence, the UN categorically failed the Rwandan people and its intervention was a clear sign of failure. Many scholars describe the actions of the UN, particularly the Security Council, as influenced by major superpowers. The United States and France played definitive roles in the situation in Rwanda. France trained the militia and funded the genocide and the United States refused to adequately fund a peacekeeping mission or denounce the acts as genocide. The inadequacy of UNAMIR paralleled the predispositions of the international community and failed to complete its mandate. The most prevalent factors that affected UN intervention in this case were an overburdened UN and an uninterested international community. It is for those reasons that the UN chose to intervene when it did—late into the conflict and why it chose an ill formulated mandate—that it would not fund.

Chapter 5: El Salvador

Introduction:

The UN intervention in El Salvador's civil war was indicative of the international support for a peacekeeping mission. Both sides of the Salvadoran civil war had reached their point of exhaustion and leaders from both sides independently contacted the UN seeking a trusted arbiter to bring an end to the conflict. To fully understand the conflict and the UN actions, a historical overview will analyze Salvadoran political culture before and during the civil war. The multiple peace accords will be analyzed and both the UN observer mission and the peacekeeping mission will be explained through an analysis of their respective mandates. The response of several key nations will also be evaluated to explain the willingness of the global community to see a definitive peace reached in El Salvador.

Historical Overview

After gaining independence from Spain in 1821, and later from the Central American Federation in 1839, El Salvador began its legacy as a nation of political instability and bloody disputes for power (CIA). Between 1930 and 1990, El Salvador had a total of seven military coups and two major insurrections (as qtd in Hobden 107). A total of 5 different constitutions existed during these short six decades, and five elections took place during the 1980s alone (as qtd in Hobden 107). The earliest major incidence of civil dispute, and the most pivotal event in Salvadoran history, was the 1932 massacre "La Matanza". Due to the worldwide depression, coffee prices dropped leaving farmers dependent on costly imported goods (Murray 10). In response, Farabundo Marti organized the newly formed Communist Party under the name: Frente Farabundo Mari para la Liberacion Nacional (FMLN). The group was composed of urban laborers and migrant farm workers who would stage protests throughout El Salvador (Murray

10). Severely underarmed, the indigenous farmers, migrant workers and Farabundo Martí himself, were slaughtered by the Salvadoran army with estimates ranging from 10,000 to 50,000 during La Matanza (Darling 134). To quell future uprisings, anyone heard speaking the indigenous language of Nahuatl or wearing traditional clothing was killed, their property seized, and given to the political elite (Darling 134). Land seizures left approximately 85% of land concentrated in the hands of fourteen families (as quoted in Howard 89). Economic reforms were also instituted to strengthen the coffee oligarchy and cut wages of indigenous workers (Murray 10). The Armed Forces of El Salvador (FAES) were used to enforce the policies of the economic elite and maintain a firm control over El Salvador politically, economically and socially (Peterson and Peterson 521). The Matanza began an era in Salvadoran society of fear tactics and military domination that would eventually culminate in a bloody civil war.

Government-sponsored violence became definitive of Salvadoran society. When political instability in neighboring Nicaragua culminated in a government overthrow, it “fanned the flames of Salvadoran revolutionary movements” (Fishel and Corr 202-203). In 1979, a coup d’état removed Colonel Carlos Humberto Romero from power hoping to “chop the head off a violent Marxist revolution by initiating democratic revolution through evolutionary change” (Fishel and Corr 202). Ineffectual, the junta ended and left a power struggle among the army, security forces, and leftists attempting to control the government—leading to another ineffectual junta (Fishel and Corr 203). Finally, President Duarte was elected as “the final hope for a centrist coalition” to avoid the path taken by Nicaragua (Fishel and Corr 203). Yet, between 1979 and 1981, the FAES engaged in wide-scale repressions against perceived civilian supporters of the Left, leading to tens of thousands of deaths in El Salvador (Peceny and Stanley 69).

Two Sides of the War

Farabundo Marti established the FMLN in the early 1930s as a communist group opposing the authoritarian government. Continued violence in El Salvador led FMLN leaders on a campaign to reenergize and strengthen the group. On October 10, 1980, the FMLN united five guerrilla organizations, including the Popular Liberation front and the National Resistance, under the name FMLN (Perla 145 and Peceny and Stanley 71). Principally, the FMLN believed that the Salvadoran elite and army could never create an “equitable, modern society” and there was no hope of “economic reform, social justice, or free elections under the tyranny of the oligarchy allied with the armed forces” (Fishel and Corr 203). The FMLN considered itself the only savior of the Salvadoran people and sought to “destabilize and delegitimize the Salvadoran government” to create a fully functioning democracy (Howard 90). The FMLN tactics included:

[T]he kidnapping of the President’s daughter, machine-gun a restaurant full of civilians in order to kill four U.S. marines, murder the leading villagers in the town of Cacaopera and set off car bombs at a popular hamburger stand and in front of a civilian health clinic that happened to be beside an army base.

(LeMoyne 117)

Their intent was not to defeat the army, but rather to damage the economic and political structure that allowed the government to continue. By exhausting the army, the government could not effectively govern and the public opinion of the government began to decrease (LeMoyne 112). The FMLN was hoping the government would eventually surrender out of weakness.

The FMLN was heavily dependent on foreign aid. Given the political polarization of the cold War, a variety of nations were willing to offer support including: Cuba, the Soviet Union and Nicaragua’s Sandinista government (Howard 90). American officials estimated that approximately 60% of the M-16 rifles captured by the FMLN were US weapons that had been

sent to Vietnam (LeMoyne). The FMLN also benefitted from the international arms market using ransom money to purchase arms, as well as voluntary contributions from Germany and the theft of US-donated arms to the FAES (LeMoyne 118). The FMLN also enjoyed domestic support by voluntary supplies of food, water, information, transportation, and courier services (Peceny and Stanley 73). When compared to the FAES, the FMLN had “extensive political, diplomatic, social, financial and military resources” (LeMoyne 106).

Similar to the FMLN, the government forces composed several groups including the FAES, the National Police, Para-military death squads and extremist members of the ARENA political party (Howard 90). The economic elite continued to control the country and had no intention of allowing the FMLN to be fully legitimized as leaders of the Salvadoran people. To maintain power, the government utilized the military to oppress Salvadoran society and crush any attempts to overthrow the government. The government took advantage of the 50% unemployment and able-bodied men, by forcefully enlisting them in the army (LeMoyne 112). Army leaders would physically and ideologically abuse the young recruits and would train them to hate the Communist left and destroy them at all costs (Howard 90). A scorched earth policy was instituted to frighten citizens in the countryside “away from supporting the FMLN through brutal, public assassinations and sweeping military campaigns” (Howard 90).

To fund their campaign, the government received substantial support from the United States. More than one third of the \$6 billion in US aid to El Salvador went “directly for the equipment, training, and operational expenses of the El Salvadoran armed forces” (Juhn 6). It was only through massive U.S. assistance that the FAES managed to reach a stalemate with the FMLN by increasing their army 4-fold (LeMoyne 111). Although it benefitted from a very rich patron, the government forces were not highly efficient as many commanders redirected funding

for missions to their own bank accounts and neglected the needs of their soldiers (Peceny and Stanley 77). The highly disorganized system allowed for nearly independent units to operate as fiefdoms (Peceny and Stanley 77). At its peak in the late 1980's approximately 60,000 members were part of the government forces—many poor and uneducated (Peceny and Stanley 77).

Civil War

The civil war officially began in 1980 when Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero was assassinated while giving mass (Howard 89). Killed by a clandestine death squad and members of the ARENA party, his death began a total war in El Salvador that lasted over a decade and eventually became the longest running “formal, high-intensity civil war” of the twentieth century (Peterson and Peterson 511). Political murders defined the first two years with death tolls reaching 5000 and 10,000, respectively (Murray 13). Paramilitary units and armed death squads then began terrorizing civilians, especially men, who had any family member with political ties by killing, capturing or disappearing them (Peterson and Peterson 522). To assure that the civilian population would not support the FMLN, the names or initials of the various death squads were carved into dead bodies and the killers would often leave hand-written notes for those who discovered the bodies threatening that a similar fate would reach “subversives” (Stanley 1). In one particular incident, a lull in combat led the National Police to use a meat packing plant to behead their victims and later wash them down the drain (Stanley 2). Media outlets constantly produced images showing soldiers armed with machine guns firing on unarmed protestors and peasants being “hauled away by helmeted National Guardsman and mutilated cadavers in body dumps” (Peterson and Peterson 522). By 1981, a year of terror had reigned in El Salvador and most of the urban population was sufficiently frightened into submission and unwilling to take any action against the army (Stanley 4). The FMLN responded

with force, and between 1981 and 1984, the FMLN began a conventional war against the FAES (Peceny and Stanley 69). In 1983, the FMLN was successful in defeating FAES units and thwarting military victories. Although the FMLN response resulted in a decline in murders, imprisonment and violent forms of torture replaced murders (Stanley 3). The FMLN suffered in 1984 as a result of U.S. military and economic assistance to the government forces but they were not defeated (Peceny and Stanley 69).

The second half of the 1980s ushered in a different type of war. U.S. funding of the military led the FMLN to use classic guerilla insurgency tactics instead of directly provoking the army in conventional battle (Peceny and Stanley 70). The FMLN began a “concentration-deconcentration” method of attacking the FAES—the concentrated brigades would carry out medium and large scale military attacks while the deconcentrated armed forces would involve units of 5 to 12 carrying out irregular warfare (DSSSUES 435). Essentially, these types of divisions allowed the FMLN to “defeat the most with the least, quantity with quality, the strong with the weak” (DSSSUES 435). The FMLN would also sabotage the government forces economically by wearing down the army with mines, booby traps, and sniping (Peceny Stanley 80). This shift in tactics also signaled to the United States that the government forces were not prepared to fight a counterinsurgency war regardless of U.S. support (Peceny and Stanley 80).

Initiated by changes in the reality of a stalemate, ideological shifts became overtly obvious. By 1987, 63,000 people had been murdered throughout sectors of the nation—rural laborers, industrial workers, teachers, students, public employees and many others (DSSSUES 434). The FMLN was continuing to grow stronger and began expanding and maintaining control of a larger portion of land (Peceny and Stanley 76). However, by the end of 1987, a decline in death squads and rural massacres led to a decline in civilian deaths with as few as a dozen per

month as opposed to the deaths during 1980 which reached over a thousand a month (Peterson and Peterson 522). Polls taken in 1987 showed that 83% of the national population favored a negotiated settlement due to the fact that El Salvador was suffering from “extreme insecurity with its many civilian casualties, severe economic ruin and a large portion of its populace fleeing the country” (Wilkerson 36). Continuous talks by both sides in 1984, 1986, 1987 and 1989 amounted to little, and every step toward reform was met with another step back to violence (Wilkerson 35). In late 1989, peace talks ended when a bomb exploded and killed several people leading the FMLN to suspend peace talks (Fishel and Corr 208). The FMLN then launched an offensive military campaign and the government forces responded by murdering six Jesuit priests, their housekeeper and her daughter (Howard 92). Following the military offensive and the deaths of the Jesuit priests, both sides wanted an end to the war that claimed 80,000 lives, left 70,000 seriously incapacitated, created well over a million refugees and left the country in disarray (Howard 88 and Murray 14).

End of the Civil War

In 1989, both sides began independently working toward a solution to the conflict. Both sides could not continue to wage war against the wishes of their far more geopolitically powerful patrons (Juhn 125). The motivation behind the FMLN seeking to end the war was two-fold. The collapse of the USSR eliminated the “actual or potential source of financial and military support as well as reduced Cuba’s ability to provide aid to the FMLN” leaving the FMLN without a major benefactor in its mission (MacLeod 16). Nicaraguan assistance was also jeopardized after the Sandinistas were defeated in the 1990 elections (Burgerman 66). Devoid of financial support, the FMLN altered its goals from “socialist revolution to political reform” thereby creating a safety net in the capitalistic economic system (as qtd in MacLeod 16). The FMLN presented a

solution agreeing to disarm contingent upon two conditions: receiving legitimacy as a political party and the postponement of the elections so that the party could make preparations and register supporters (MacLeod 19).

The government also began taking its own steps to end the conflict. The newly elected president Alfredo Cristiani identified a negotiated peace as his top priority and agreed to speak with the FMLN leaders to reach it (Burgerman 66). He also promised to increase spending in the areas of healthcare, education, and the justice system as well as the government's land redistribution program (MacLeod 20). Moreover, he also articulated a notion that had not been stated publicly—to bring about a ceasefire, the armed forces would also have to decrease (Juhn 48). He acknowledged the root causes of the war and the social inequality issues that were most prevalent—yet, he also insisted upon the legitimacy of his government and the democratic system that created it (Juhn 49). In one interview he stated: “a military solution was possible but would not be enduring. The war was political, so the solution had to be” (as quoted in Juhn 49). His willingness to speak on such issues openly and seek to engage the FMLN in negotiations was very positive in ending the war (Juhn 49). International support was also definitive; Cristiani's speech writer noted the role of the United States: “The US government never imposed themselves on the negotiations. They protected Cristiani by sending very clear messages that if anything were to happen to him all hell would break loose...the weight of the United States would fall on the country” (Juhn 50). Furthermore, the military was also experiencing a fragmentation with one faction committed to a total war and the other faction willing to end the war through a negotiated settlement (as quoted in Burgerman 67). Both the government and the FMLN appealed to the UN to act as a mediator to secure the end of the war (Wilkerson 36).

Peace Accords

To successfully emerge from the civil war, a variety of factors needed to be accomplished. As Arnson underscored “Building a new society required building a new socio-political order. This required action in two pivotal areas: the establishment of democratic institutions and the construction of a more just society in socioeconomic terms” (Arnson 15). By the end of 1992, there was a general understanding that the country needed to be rebuilt—materially, economically, socially, structurally and culturally (Arnson 14). Domestically, the government and the FMLN failed in their attempts to negotiate peace accords and both sought the help of the United Nations to begin the process.

Geneva Accords: April 4, 1990

Prior to the Geneva accords, the Caracas Agreement produced an agenda for the forthcoming Geneva Accords on seven issues including a ceasefire and the reintegration of FMLN into civilian life (Doyle, Johnston and Orr 233). The accords were the result of intense international pressure—U.S. aid had to be reduced by 50% before the Salvadoran government would agree to significant military reforms or attend the peace accords (Wilkerson 36). The Geneva Accords created the opportunity for international human rights specialists, Salvadoran legal scholars and human rights advocates to negotiate peace (Burgerman 69). A speedy process, the accords were reached in less than two days and included a myriad of factors (Burgerman 69). Completed on April 4th, 1990, the agreement was designed to “bring about a definitive end to the armed conflict, reunify the country, promote democratization and guarantee full respect for human rights (Holiday and Stanley 418). These accords formed the cornerstone of all negotiations between the Salvadoran government and the FMLN with a fourfold objective to end the war and begin an aggressive peace-building program (Studemeister 34.)

The accords were personally spearheaded by Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar and his Personal Representative Alvaro de Soto (MacLeod 23). As de Soto remarked: “This was the first instance in which human rights was made the focus of a conflict resolution process, and the UN for the first time approached the idea of including institutional reforms aimed at long-term human rights protection in an accords package” (as quoted in Burgerman 69). The role of the Secretary General was unprecedented at the time. In the provisions, it was agreed that the Secretary General would maintain a “wide range of contacts permitted consultations with different actors within El Salvador and a range of countries, some of them, notably the United States, Cuba, and the Soviet Union, clearly aligned regarding the Salvadoran conflict and others not” (Studemeister 34). De Soto was a highly instrumental figure by personally communicating with both sides of the conflict and has been widely credited as the only individual who was capable of gaining the trust necessary to begin a peacekeeping mission among both groups (Wilkerson 36). Although the accords were quickly reached, the military saw peace as a significant impact to its position. In response, a meeting was convened without either party leading UN leaders to demand that another set of accords be implemented, resulting in the San Jose Agreement on Human Rights (Doyle, Johnston, and Orr 234).

San Jose Agreement on Human Rights

The San Jose Agreement was vital to the future of El Salvador because it was the first functional agreement of the accords. Initially, very little consensus could be reached as “the FMLN continued to insist on dismantling the army entirely; the government refused to discuss it”, but UN leadership succeeded in reaching some bargains (Juhn 71). The agreement established “standards for the protection of human rights, including an immediate end to night arrests, incommunicado detention and torture” to bring about a de facto end to the war (Holiday

and Stanley 419). From that point, both sides agreed to respect the treaties that they had previously signed including Salvadoran law, international treaties, the UN and the OAS declaration (Burgerman 69). Most importantly, the agreement called for a UN observer mission (The United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador also known as ONUSAL) with verification abilities to protect human rights (Fishel and Corr 206). ONUSAL would officially begin after a cease-fire was established (Montgomery 142). Through ONUSAL, the

“UN was charged with the powers to ‘verify the observance of human rights in El Salvador’ ‘receive communications’ from any individuals or groups, ‘visit any place or establishment,’ ‘hold meetings’ anywhere, ‘interview’ any individuals or groups, collect information by ‘any means it deems appropriate,’ ‘make recommendations to the Parties,’ support judicial authorities in order to improve human rights protection, ‘carry out an education and information campaign on human rights,’ and ‘use the media to the extent useful for the fulfillment of the mandate (as quoted in Howard 104).

Signed on July 26, 1990, the agreement demonstrated the ability for both sides to reach an agreement and the trust had in the UN as an institution to verify and implement the agreement (Doyle, Johnston and Orr 234).

New York Negotiations

The New York Negotiations called for a restructuring of the Caracas Agenda and were only agreed upon through substantial international pressure and assistance (Doyle, Johnston, and Orr 240). Signed on December 31, 1991 the accords were adjusted to meet the changing nature of the demands by both sides (Lopez-Reyes 34). For its part, the FMLN “gave up their long-standing demand to merge with or disband the army, and also agreed that no new issues would

be added to the ceasefire talks” and the government agreed “to protect the right of rebel families to hold on land they had occupied during the war” (Montgomery 144 and Doyle, Johnston, and Orr 240). Although the FMLN gave up its desire to become part of the army or see it disbanded, the FMLN agreed that it would instead be incorporated into the newly formed National Civilian Police (PNC) (Doyle, Johnson, and Orr 240). The PNC would replace the existing national police and have policing powers of the FAES and the State Intelligence Agency (Lopez-Reyes 33). To effectively placate both sides, all sides were represented: 20% FMLN, 20% old National Police, and 60% new recruits and was integrated with the support of the police section of ONUSAL (Fishel and Corr 209). Furthermore, an entrance exam became mandatory for all applicants and a new civilian-run police academy would train new recruits (Wilkerson 37).

The government was responsible for the majority of the reforms and the FMLN was responsible for demobilizing. The United Nations negotiated a schedule for the reforms by coordinating with both sides (Holiday and Stanley 420). Under this agreement, an ad hoc commission was established to purify the armed forces—the particulars of which were to be established in the forthcoming Chapultepec Accords (Johnstone 31) The National Committee for the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ) was also established under this agreement to negotiate the transfer of lands from former combatants in conflict zones, a reduction in the size and power of the armed forces, judicial and electoral reforms (Holiday and Stanley 420). The land transfer program delineated to “expropriate land in excess of the constitutional limit of 245 hectares to meet the needs of combatants and landless farmers” (Lopez-Reyes 33). The creation of this body was particularly useful in the negotiation of the accords as talks were more readily facilitated and if something were not covered in an accord it could be later discussed in a COPAZ meeting (Johnstone 56). COPAZ was composed of two members from the government forces and two

members of the FMLN making it a very important instrument for maintaining peace and cooperation—and it served as the only political institution in Salvadoran politics (Johnstone 56) COPAZ was to be supervised by the Catholic Church of El Salvador and the United Nations (Holday and Stanley 415).

The Chapultepec Accords

The Chapultepec Accords represented the final accords to officially end the civil war in El Salvador. Signed in the Chapultepec Castle of Mexico City on January 13, 1992, the accords contained a wide range of goals (Holiday and Stanley 415). The accords were the final diplomatic tool to

“[E]nsure the demilitarization of El Salvador and establish the political foundations for a new civil society. In return for a drastic reduction in the size of the armed forces, the dismantling of the allied repressive organizations allied to the military and the establishment of a Truth Commission to investigate human rights abuses committed during the war, the FMLN agreed to demobilize its forces and compete in the electoral process as a political party.” (Carr 2-3)

Both parties had the intention to diminish the power of the military and its view as a socially autonomous group—which was highly unheard of at this time (Juhn 4). Constitutional changes confined the armed forces solely to areas of national defense (Studmesiter 5). Although the political maneuvering was an arduous process that spanned seven different cities and twenty months of negotiations, the accords combined all previous agreements (Studemeister 5 and Holiday and Stanley 415). The final agreement was hailed as a “process in the articulation of norms appropriate to liberal democracy” (MacLeod 27).

Through the leadership of the Secretary General and the intimate connection to both sides of the conflict by Alvaro de Soto, both parties eventually “created a shared vision of political legitimacy rooted in internationally accepted democratic standards” (MacLeod 27). The amount of attention by the UN followed an unforeseen trajectory, beginning as a negotiator and then an observer, the UN became an active mediator and ultimately a verifier of the accords (Holiday and Stanley 416). By the end of 1992, as many as 60% of FMLN ex-combatants were demobilized and the FMLN was officially recognized as a legal political party on December 14, 1992 (Fishel and Corr 206). Some criticisms remained after the accords including the notion that the new social pact among Salvadorans was merely the result of a “superficial consensus imposed on them by external actors” and the distrust that still existed in the minds of the Salvadoran citizenry (Holiday and Stanley 416). The accords effectively terminated a bloody civil war and laid the foundation for El Salvador to transition into the modern international political economy (Juhn 4).

Security Council Resolutions

The resolutions passed by the Security Council were very heavily guided by the role of the Secretary General and international pressure. Resolutions 693, 729, 784, 791, 832, 888, 921, 961 and 991 will be summarized to understand their implications. Through their analysis, an understanding of the motivations of the Security Council during this time will be garnered.

In 1991, the Security Council responded to the Salvadoran civil crisis by passing Resolution 693. The Geneva Agreement was explicitly mentioned as well as the Caracas Agenda as reasons for issuing the resolution. The Security council stressed the full implementation of the human rights agreement and officially established the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador “to monitor all agreements concluded between the two parties, whose initial mandate in

its first phase as an integrated peace-keeping operation will be to verify the compliance by the parties with the Agreement on Human Rights signed at San Jose on 26 July 1990” (S/RES 693). ONUSAL was given an initial period of 12 months to carry out its mandate and both parties were urged to continue negotiations(S/RES 693). The Security Council asked that the Secretary-General continue to inform the council on the implementation of the resolution and the President of the Security Council wrote to the Secretary-General: “your letter dated 26 June 1991 concerning the composition of the military component of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They agree with the proposal contained in your letter”. This letter clearly indicates the intense amount of attention placed on El Salvador by the Secretary General and the pressure he placed on the council to pass resolutions.

Resolution 729 of 1992 acknowledges the positive effects of international actors on the peace process. The resolution officially thanks the “enormous contribution of the Secretary General and his personal Envoy for Central America, their collaborators, and all the Governments, especially those of Colombia, Mexico, Spain and Venezuela that have assisted the Secretary-General in his efforts” (S/RES 729). The council also officially stated that it stood ready to “deal expeditiously with any recommendations that the Secretary-General may make” further testifying to the leadership of the Secretary General during this time (S/RES 729). The council also references the report of the Secretary General to the Security Council and agrees to follow the report by including the verification and monitoring of the implementation of all signed agreements as well as “the establishment of a national civil police” (S/RES 729).

Resolutions 784 and 791 extended the ONUSAL mandate until November 30th of 1992 and then again until May 31st 1993. Resolution 791 also highlighted the intention of the

Secretary General “to adapt the future activities and strength of ONUSAL, taking into account progress made in implementing the peace process”, a directive unheard of in international peacekeeping (S/RES 784). Resolution 832 of 1993 provides official record that the government of El Salvador agreed that the UN verify the next general elections in March of 1994 (S/RES 823). ONUSAL’s mandate is enlarged to include the observation of the electoral process and the mandate is extended until November 30, 1993 (S/RES 823). The resolution also reemphasizes the need for the National Civil Police to be deployed as well as the phasing out of the National Police (S/RES 823).

Resolution 888 of 1993, passed as a result of an illegal weapons cache found, noted the possibility of an influx of violence by “illegal armed groups” that could disrupt the peace process (S/RES 888). The council called for the complete recovery of all weapons by private individuals and an end to the seemingly politically motivated murders by both parties (S/RES 888). The need to ensure that the police and the public security provisions of the Peace Accords be followed with full ONUSAL verification were also emphasized (S/RES 888). The council also called for a full and timely implementation of the recommendations made by the Commission on the Truth, and extended the ONUSAL mandate until May 31st 1994 (S/RES 888). Resolution 920 of 1994 notes the success of the first two rounds of elections under “appropriate conditions in terms of freedom, competitiveness and security” (S/RES 920). Yet, the Council expressed concern that the Peace Accords had only been partially implemented and extended the mandate until November 30th of 1994 (S/RES 920).

Resolution 961 of 1994 was passed in response to a report by the Joint Group for the Investigation of Politically Motivated Illegal Armed Groups of 28 July 1994 and a letter by the Secretary-General written in October of 1994 (S/RES 961). ONUSAL’s mandate was extended

for one final period April 30, 1995 so that elements of “the National Police, the transfer of lands, and the implementation of programs to facilitate the reintegration into civilian society of ex-combatants and war disabled, the problems of human settlements, the reform of the judicial and electoral systems, and several recommendations of the Commission on the Truth” could be established (S/RES 961). Resolution 991 reaffirmed the reports of the Secretary General and the Director of the Human Rights division of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (S/RES 991). It also recognizes that El Salvador “has evolved from a country riven by conflict into a democratic and peaceful nation” and that ONUSAL would indeed be terminated as of April 30th, 1995 (S/RES 991). Resolution 991 allowed for the creation of MINUSAL as a smaller mission to fully complete the goals of ONUSAL in an appropriate time frame (S/RES 991).

United Nations Missions: ONUSAL and MINUSAL

ONUSAL

Although ONUSAL was designed to be implemented following a national consolidation of peace, the mission was deployed prior to an official ceasefire. The Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council on 21 December 1990 stated that both sides of the conflict had independently contacted the Secretary General requesting that ONUSAL be deployed “as soon as possible without waiting for other agreements to concluded” (Montgomery 141 and MacLeod 25). Although there were some risks to the mission, a contingent of 100 observers, human rights officers, military and police advisers were sent in July 1991 (Johnstone 20). Ironically, the government continued to torture and execute political prisoners and the FMLN continued assassinations and recruitment of minors while signing the final peace accords—both were essentially regarded as spoilers of the peace accords at this point because they were continuing

the same activities they were negotiating to end (Howard 104). Yet, the mission was very successful from its inception. The UN was given permission to “visit any place freely and without prior notice” causing human rights violations to decrease dramatically (Johnstone 20). The ability to surprise violators imbued in the UN a power that neither the International Committee for the Red Cross nor the UNHCR had (Holiday and Stanley 422). Quickly building confidence in the negotiations process, the mission strengthened the commitment to a ceasefire and the promotion of human rights (Studemesiter 36). ONUSAL officials were also tasked to investigate any violations and keep the Secretary General abreast of any violations (ONUSAL Background).

United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador -Mandate

ONUSAL originated as a human rights mission with a limited mandate to verify the San Jose Human Rights Agreement (Burgerman 70). After the signing of the Chapultepec Accords, the mission evolved into a peacekeeping mission with military, and police divisions (Johnstone 25) The mission also had a variety of nation-building practices that were not previously encompassed in other UN endeavors.

The Human Rights Division was the most important division of the mission as it formed a foundational agreement between both groups and allowed for the mandate to be expanded into other fields. Human rights experts cooperated directly with Salvadoran institutions with the express interest of strengthening the domestic institutions (human rights groups, nongovernmental organizations etc) in promoting human rights and increasing leadership capacity (Katayanagi 78). Quite rightly, the division was tasked with verifying the implementation of the San Jose Human Rights Agreement with both human rights activists and legal advisers (Johnstone 24). The Active Verification established in the mandate allowed for

these representatives to enact a three-step procedure to deal with any human rights violations reported. The division could receive complaints and conduct investigations as well as make recommendations to the Salvadoran authorities on necessary changes (Macleod 25). The division also sought structural reform to curtail systematic human rights violations (as quoted in Macleod 24). The division was also relegated to recent or present abuses and not past abuses (Katayanagi 78). The San Jose Agreement also called for the appointment of new National Counsel for the Defense of Human Rights to observe the human rights situation and the behavior of state institutions (Studemeister 14). Rather ineffectual, the counsel took many years to become fruitful due to the human rights division of ONUSAL having more legitimacy.

The Military Division of ONUSAL was charged with verifying the cessation of the armed conflict and dealing with the logistical aspects of redeploying the FAES into positions that would maintain the fragile peace that had been formed. This division was also charged with monitoring the troops of both parties and verifying inventories of weapons and personnel. Any complaints could be investigated if there were any reports of violations. The Police Division of ONUSAL was responsible for supervising and providing instruction to the Auxiliary Transitory Police (PAT), which operated for just under a year between October of 1992 and July of 1993. The goal of PAT was “to monitor relations between the existing national police until the new national civil police was deployed” (Johnstone 25). It was through the police division that ONUSAL supported the police academy in training incoming police officers on human rights and aiding in norm creation at this level. This division also assisted in efforts to locate illegal arms caches and voluntary

ONUSAL was composed of well over 1,000 individuals including police, military and civilian personnel from over 36 countries (Montgomery 140). By monitoring everything from

human rights, army, police, elections, public demonstrations, land reform and judicial reform, ONUSAL frequently exceeded its mandate—yet it did so at the behest of the parties involved (Montgomery 140). Staff operated out of 4 regional and 2 sub-regional offices with 150 observers dispersed throughout the nation to report violations (Montgomery 148). Human rights education programs were initiated for members of the armed forces, security forces, FMLN and anyone with an influential role in norm articulation such as teachers etc (Montgomery 148)

MINUSAL

Following the completion of ONUSAL, a small contingent stayed behind to complete the work of ONUSAL. Led by Special Representative of Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Mr. Enrique ter Horst, MINUSAL was the result of a compromise reached by De Soto to downsize the mission and have it renamed to come under the General Assembly and allow the original goals to be completed (MINUSAL). The Programme of Work divided the remaining accords into six distinct areas encompassing: public security, land transfer, human settlements, reinsertion programmes, Fund for the Protection of the Wounded and Disabled and legislative reforms). Specific goals for each area were set and given a date of expected completion. The program for the land transfer became a “land for arms” program and acknowledged one of the root causes of the conflict (Studemeister 37)

Mission Outcome: Success

There is no doubt that ONUSAL, and its extension MINUSAL, was highly successful and it is constantly heralded as an example of “how to build democracy in a post-war environment” (Wilkerson 33). First and foremost, the domestic situation was very conducive to a true and lasting peace as both sides were seeking an end to the war. Cooperation at the international level was readily apparent among international organizations with the mutual

purpose of affecting change. The mission was imbued with the foresight to anticipate problems in the post-war environment and solve them effectively and legally through the adoption of specific accords. Above all, the mission was the first of its kind and international and national leaders benefited from the ability change the course of the mission and allow the mandate to evolve to more closely fit the needs of El Salvador as a nation emerging from a very violent civil war.

A Situation Conducive to Peace

The fact that the Secretary General and his Personal Representative were both Spanish speakers and from Latin America has been highlighted as a main source of UN support for a peaceful resolution (Howard 98). As both the Secretary General and the Personal Representative could communicate with members of both parties in El Salvador, there was the advantage of shared cultural understandings and goals (Howard 98). Geographically and logistically, it has also been argued that the Salvadoran peace process benefitted from the fact that UN headquarters and the nation in question were in the same time zone and only a plane ride from each other (Howard 98). The peak of UN interest was also reached at a fortuitous time. By the time the Security Council began passing resolutions on the conflict, both sides were exhausted from fighting a war that lasted longer than a decade. Foreign aid on both sides was decreasing and the sheer violence of the war was leaving many of the original benefactors of the war pushing for a solution (Howard 94). The stalemate that was reached led both sides to consider the reality that a political solution was more beneficial than a military victory (Burgerman 64). Because the UN became involved at the behest of both sides of the conflict, they were able to take a proactive role in the negotiations and address the most pertinent issues that needed resolving to ensure an opportunity at a lasting peace (Burgerman 63). Moreover, some scholars have argued that the

people of El Salvador did not require “the intensive training in democratic and electoral politics that was needed to bring about successful election in, for example, Namibia” (Howard 98).

The UN had an incredible amount of freedom when deciding a course of action in El Salvador. The global environment at the time was beginning to emerge from a decades long Cold War of proxy wars and the intent to correct such violence was welcomed (Weber 39). Because there was no precedent case for a UN intervention to resolve an intrastate conflict there was no simple solution (Burgerman 71). This led to ONUSAL being created and treated as a “pilot mission” to disarm and demobilize the military but also to reach a national reconciliation. (Montgomery 147). Furthermore, the UN also improvised in its tactics to assure full compliance of the accords. For example, when the secret arms cache of the FMLN was discovered, the UN utilized the international media to “publicly embarrass” the FMLN and gain clout in the negotiations—the possibility of “heavy international pressure” eventually led to acquiescence (Wilkerson 35). Yet, Cristiani also favored it himself independent of any international presence—“the preference of the United States to withdraw from El Salvador encouraged but did not at any point necessitate, Cristiani’s having to negotiate with the guerillas. Cristiani could have continued fighting, albeit with less external support (Juhn 10). Cristiani: allied with the ARENA party, had an oligarchic heritage, a US education made him accessible for US diplomats “No one to the left of Cristiani could have negotiated. No one to the right would have” Juhn 10

Cooperation

Cooperation at a variety of levels was paramount to the success of the mission. Throughout its mission, ONUSAL representatives worked with the UN Development Programme, the World Food Programme, UNESCO, and other donors to provide better living and sanitation conditions for the citizenry (MacLeod 29). The war was effectively ended through

the support of the Security Council, the Secretariat and his Personal Representative, regional actors, and the parties (Howard 98). For its part, the General Assembly formed a close liaison through the UN Development program and monitored the situation— a successful example of the merits of “staying the course” (Studemeister 39). By working across agencies, the end result was more easily reached. In fact, “the direct mediation of the negotiations in the Salvadoran peace process by a representative of the UN Secretary-General was, for the office of the Secretary-General, an unprecedented diplomatic intervention in internal conflict”(Bergerman 64).

A Future El Salvador

Among other things, ONUSAL and all those entities responsible for its conception, leaders had an incredible amount of foresight. One example of this foresight is the fact that many leaders had a cogent understanding of the rampant unemployment and what the reintegration of soldiers would mean to the economy (Wilkerson 39). To address the need for an alternate form of income, ex-combatants were the primary beneficiaries of the land program (MacLeod 30). By including ex-combatants in the political process, they assured that these ex-combatants would have a stake in the future peace of El Salvador and the establishment of a new political order and rule of law (Wilkerson 35). Moreover, the principal architects of ONUSAL understood the necessity to not only stop the civil war and the violence but also to create enduring institutions and make peace beneficial for everyone in society. To do so, representatives: “Conducted meetings with ‘the main political, judicial, and military authorities, making frequent visits to mayors’ offices, departmental governments, military and police units, law courts and other public entities” (As quoted in Howard 105). The mission also created many ways to ensure the permeation of human rights values throughout society “through the use of radio, television ads,

posters, and even a puzzle for children, the pieces of which comprised the articles of the Universal Declaration of Human rights” (Howard 106)

Shortcomings

Although a successful mission, there were many tensions throughout the accords that almost derailed the entire process. The FMLN difficulty in producing and destroying all of its weapons and the lack of political will to comply by the government prolonged the conflict (Montgomery 247). A critical juncture of the peace process was also the investigation of human rights violations because to accurately investigate any abuses, the violations had to identify perpetrators—and doing so goes directly against the impartiality on which all peacekeeping missions are founded (Howard 103). Currently, El Salvador remains highly polarized and fragmented even though two political parties have emerged and the party framework is pluralistic in nature (Arnon 3). Wide gaps between rich and poor are causing an increase in emigration among the lower class but also the middle class, with dentists and doctors leaving El Salvador (Arnon 5). Gang violence and social instability are still common and causing an increase in emigration.

Investigative Commissions

Ad Hoc Commission

The Ad Hoc Commission was created during the New York Agreement as a compromise to a major issue in the negotiations process. The FMLN wanted to purge the entire army and the government refused to discuss the issue leading to an ad hoc commission (Johnson 32). The commission was composed of three Salvadoran civilians appointed by the Secretary General after consulting with both sides of the conflict (Katayanagi 80). These three civilians were “of recognized independence of judgment and unimpeachable democratic credentials’ and ‘two

officers of the armed forces with impeccable professional records” (Holiday and Stanley 425). The purpose of the commission was to evaluate military officers based on three criteria and if a soldier were found deficient, he would be subject to discharge or transfer (Johnson 31). Criteria were specific to: records of observance of human rights, professional competence, capacity of function “in the new situation of peace, within the context of a democratic society” (Katayanagi 80). The commission had 2293 files to review in the short span of three months (Holiday and Stanley 425). Due to the limited time frame, the commission chose to evaluate only 232 of the most senior officers (Johnstone 32). Moreover, the commission was also tasked to make recommendations for purges from the government and military (Wilkerson 37).

The FMLN had originally wanted the “tandona” class of 1966 graduates to be removed because it was those graduates who dominated the army and the public security forces responsible for the violence during the war (Johnson 32). However, when the final report was given to the Secretary General and President Cristiani on September 22, 1992, the commission identified 102 officers to be purged and a vice minister of defense and most general and colonels (MacLeod 31). As a result, the commission essentially recommended the immediate discharge of the entire senior military establishment (Katayanagi 81). President Cristiani tried to bargain with the Secretary General to put the senior leaders on leave, but after some pressure he put all officers on leave to be retired by the end of that year (Johnstone 33).

Truth Commission

The Truth Commission ran parallel to the ad hoc commission and was composed of three foreign dignitaries chosen after consultations with the FMLN and the government (Katayanagi 78). The commission was tasked to “investigate serious acts of violence that [had] occurred since 1980 and whose impact on society urgently require[d] that the public should know the truth”

(Johnstone 34). The commission reached well over 22,000 complaints of serious acts of violence between January of 1980 and July of 1991—7000 from individuals and the rest from government and non-government institutions (Johnstone 35). To investigate, the commission and its staff could interview anyone on a confidential basis to ensure that accusers would not have the opportunity to confront their victims (Johnstone 35). No findings were based on a single source and information was received from the FAES, the FMLN, NGOs, and many foreign governments such as the United States (Holiday and Stanley 431). The commission found that of those murdered during the war, "60% were found to have been killed or abducted by army personnel, or had 'disappeared'; 25% by the security forces affiliated with the army; 10% by right wing-death squads with army participation; and only 5% by members of the FMLN" (Lopez-Reyes 32).

In addition to investigating serious acts of violence, the commission was also established to investigate "patterns of violence during the war and to present a public report of its findings and recommendations, including possible prosecutions" (Holiday and Stanley 431). Due to this broad mandate, the commission was allowed to "make far-reaching, binding recommendations designed to address its findings; strengthen state institutions; eradicate the structural causes of violence; overcome impunity; prevent the repetition of past violence; and promote reconciliation" (Studemeister 11). When the commission issued its report on March 15, 1993 it issued a plethora of recommendations (Studemeister 11). Recommendations included:

Dismissal from the armed forces or civil service of all people named in report.

Disqualification from holding public office for 10 years, resignation of all members of the supreme court, de-concentration of the power of the Supreme Court investigation of "private armed groups" ie: death squads, new legislation to guarantee due process in the criminal justice system, ratification of international

human rights agreements and acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, fund to compensate victims of human rights abuses (Johnstone 36).

Specific findings on 32 notorious cases were given as well as the implication of the FAES in the November 1989 murder of the six Jesuit priests, their cook, and her daughter (Studemeister 11). The report also accused the FMLN of serious violations—yet the violations were fewer in number (Studemeister 11).

The reactions from both the FMLN and the government were immediate dissatisfaction. The FMLN believed that the report was not complete but did accept responsibility for the events reported therein and agreed to fulfill the recommendations of the report contingent upon government compliance (Holiday and Stanley 425). The Salvadoran government argued that the commission had exceeded its mandate and called for “an immediate and sweeping amnesty “to prevent any prosecutions for human rights abuses committed during the armed conflict” (Studemeister 12). Top military leaders denounced the report as a “leftist plot to decapitate the military” (Holiday and Stanley 425). Although the commission actively investigated the killings and produced a very in-depth report, there have been “no prosecutions, no moral or material reparations, no official efforts to determine the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared, and no official acceptance of responsibility for abuses that occurred during the war” (Studemeister 12). After the report was passed, El Salvador’s Legislative Assembly passed legislation that granted total amnesty to individuals guilty of extra-judicial crimes during the war (Katayanagi 79). Oddly, the law was favored by both sides of the conflict and was largely accepted by the international community (Studemeister 5 and 13).

US Response

The United States was a very dominant factor at the height of the Salvadoran civil war. To concisely explicate US foreign policy with El Salvador and encapsulate changes in those policies, the US response will be broken down by administration. Although the civil war began during the Carter Administration, it was during the Reagan administration that US policy radically affected Salvadoran politics and during the Bush administration that there were calls to negotiate the end of the war. The United States Congress also passed relevant legislation and will be identified under the relative administrations.

Carter Administration:

When the Somoza regime in Nicaragua fell, the Carter administration made the decision to curtail any other regime changes by the political left (Peceny and Stanley 73). A lack of consensus on appropriate foreign policy decisions led to severe indecision and the possibility for the government of El Salvador to lobby the United States for aid to defeat the leftist communists (Peceny and Stanley 73). To avoid another Nicaragua, the Carter administration began what the U.S. Charge d'Affaires James Cheek referred to as "clean counterinsurgency" in El Salvador by using small amounts of force with economic and political reforms (Peceny and Stanley 74). This response can best be understood due to the Cold War mentality and the fear of another victory by Marxist rebels allied to US enemies Cuba, Vietnam, Nicaragua and the USSR (LeMoyné 106).

The response to the war was rather mixed. Although the administration identified human rights as the focal point of US aid, he also replaced Ambassador Ignacio Lozano with Frank Devine—a foreign service officer who hailed the strides taken by the government to end human rights abuses (*Resolution in El Salvador* 73). By supporting this regime, the U.S. military representatives essentially consented to the massive human rights violations that were committed by the forces (Peceny and Stanley 74). During this time, the U.S. Agency for International

development (USAID), was giving significant funds to villages for schools, clinics, roads, water and electricity (LeMoynes 121). Former U.S. Ambassador Robert White identified the U.S. response as prolonging the conflict when he stated “a good share of our problems in El Salvador arise directly out of the mixed signals we have been sending to the various political actors here, especially to the armed forces” (as quoted in Peceny and Stanley 74).

Reagan Administration

Prior to the Salvadoran conflict, the United States had exerted influence in the region constantly battling the British for control of rail and maritime transport, banking and many other industries that were strategic to the United States (Murray 15). When President Ronald Reagan came into office, one of his first official acts was to dramatically increase military and economic aid to El Salvador’s government (Perla 145). His decision to sponsor the government of El Salvador was inextricably linked to his fears that communism would spread in the region and upset US dominance in the Western hemisphere (Perla 145). When it became apparent that the FMLN was increasing in power, Reagan feared the fall of another government by an “unfriendly pro-Communist regime similar to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua” (Murray 15). El Salvador then became the place where Reagan hoped to “draw the line in the sand” in Central America. During the civil war, the US aid to this tiny country exceeded \$6 billion (Murray 15).

Cold War ideology was the most dominant factor in the foreign policy initiatives of the Reagan administration. Central America was viewed as a region of great importance to the U.S. during that time: “it is so close – San Salvador is closer to Houston, Texas, than Houston is to Washington, DC. Central America is America; it’s at our doorstep. And it has become the stage for a bold attempt by the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Nicaragua to install communism by force throughout the hemisphere” (As quoted in Howard 94). Reagan’s principal foreign policy

advisers constantly referred to the civil war as a “textbook case of indirect armed aggression by Communist powers acting through Cuba,” and the response of the Carter administration was inadequate because the policies of human rights merely undermined the anticommunist allies in the region (Peceney and Stanley 75). The U.S. was supported economically by many organizations at this time including “AID, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank, and by plans such as the Santa Fe Document, the Kissinger Plan, and the Caribbean Basin Initiative” (DSSUES 427). Politically and militarily, the U.S. position was justified by the U.S. doctrine of national security and the Monroe Doctrine (Doyle, Johnstone, and Orr 250).

The American concern with containing Soviet influence in the hemisphere dominated the minds of the administration “while Salvadorans were concerned with staying alive” (as quoted in Juhn 5). Washington’s new strategy of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) was initiated as an armed fight against the FMLN to contain communism and keep the government of El Salvador in power—all under the guise of support for democratic reforms (Howard 94). In doing so, the U.S. maintained its global geopolitical interests including “the continuation of capital accumulation at the international level, and the containment of those structural problems inherent to capitalism that are ideologically conceived by the United States to be part of the East-West conflict” (DSSUES 427). Ultimately, the US prolonged the civil war to maintain its own security objectives (DSSUES 427).

Concurrent with its policy objectives, teams of military strategists were created to assure a US desired outcome to the war. In the fall of 1981, Brigadier General Fred Warner and his team of advisers were called upon to identify the solutions most conducive to the foreign policy of the U.S. The Warner team identified three courses of action:

(1) [F]ollow the status quo and lose El Salvador to the FMLN, (2) provide enough assistance to regain the initiative and fight to a stalemate, or (3) provide even more assistance and defeat the FMLN. The report advocated option 3, and the United States eventually delivered more than the scope of support proposed for option 3 (Peceny and Stanley 77).

After the decision was made to fund the government and defeat the FMLN, Warner immediately left for El Salvador to assist the Salvadoran high command in preparation of a national strategy (MacLeod 15). To fund its LIC, the US began a massive increase in military assistance just after President Duarte was elected in El Salvador:

The United States delivered 105 mm howitzers, 90mm recoilless rifles, and 72 mm light antitank weapons and supported a build-up to forty-three battalions. Most importantly, the United States provided the Salvadorans with an enormous air force. A supplemental aid package that began to take effect in 1984 increased the number of helicopters available to the FAES and provided fixed-wing aircraft designed for attacking targets on the ground. The Salvadoran air force grew to 135 aircraft. (Peceny and Stanley 79).

During this time, the situation in El Salvador seemed to have ameliorated and the promotion of democracy and human rights became apparent to the U.S. Congress leading it to fund these measures at a very crucial moment (Peceny and Stanley 79)

Measures became increasingly larger in January of 1986 and the FAES began undertaking large-scale military operations under the direction of the Reagan administration (DSSUES 426). Following these measures, the new counterinsurgency plan was formally titled

“Unidos para Reconstruir” (United for Reconstruction) (DSSUES 426). These missions were directed in the “zones of control” of the FMLN to begin to defeat the guerilla forces. Had the U.S. not intervened, it is highly probable that the FMLN would have defeated the FAES and taken control of the country (Peceny and Stanley 79). Through its involvement, the US maintained secure ties with the Salvadoran administration. Direct involvement included official ties through the State Department, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Pentagon, and the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) which operates under the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (DSSUES 427-428). Indirect involvement included training and military instruction of the FAES by the US and other countries such as Chile and Israel (DSSUES 427-428). To maintain its image as a democratic government, the US counted on the support of other agencies and began calling on its” regional and extra continental allies to lend support to its bellicose and interventionist policies” (DSSUES 427-428). However, the administration did encounter some opposition by the Latin American bloc, the European Economic Community, the Organization of American States, and the United Nations internationally as well as opposition from the U.S. congress and some members with the CIA (DSSUES 450). Furthermore, there was a growing resentment among the US citizenry at university and religious and labor organizations (DSSUES 450). US citizens were sending “hundreds of letters a week, opposing the Reagan administration” to key members in the House and Senate Armed Services and Foreign policy committees (Perla 145). These measures proved futile and the Reagan administration continued with its aid and support for the Salvadoran government.

Regarding funding, the Reagan administration provided massive aid to the government and is indirectly responsible for the high amount of civilian casualties, including those non-

combatant citizens thought to support the FMLN (Wilkerson 35). During this time, US assistance totaled for \$6 billion in military and economic aid and extended the war by hardening the position of the Salvadoran government (Juhn 5-6). Of this \$6 billion, approximately 75% was for the military (Howard 93). In fact, the Reagan administration considered military victory the only solution that it funded and trained the FAES until it became the strongest and most equipped army in Central America in the twelve years of US support (Juhn 7). It is estimated that for most of the 1980s: "US taxpayers contributed more to the public of El Salvador than did Salvadorans" (Juhn 6). Although the Reagan administration swelled the military by delivering billions in aid, it failed to achieve many of its objectives. US interests were not met and eventually the FAES began to disintegrate. Counterinsurgency measures failed, and growing hostility toward a US-sponsored war became more palpable. Yet, it was not until the Reagan administration was replaced by the Bush administration that the US was able to adequately respond to the Salvadoran war and encourage the peace process.

Bush Administration

When the Bush administration came into power, there was a discernible shift in foreign policy. Following the years of the Reagan administration and the large amounts of funding to the government of El Salvador and the FAES, it became very apparent that peace would not be reached through war. The definitive shift occurred when the six Jesuit priests, their housekeeper and her daughter were murdered, prompting the Bush administration to threaten the government of El Salvador with reducing its funding (Studemeister 52). When it became known that the soldiers who murdered the Jesuit priests and the two women were trained by US personnel, international outrage ensued and the US refined its position (Murray 15). It became readily apparent that "the moral bankruptcy of the US government's claim that a professionalized

Salvadoran army had become a force of democratization” (Murray 15). Congressional efforts were also indicative of the Bush administration’s desires. The Dodd-Leahy legislation was passed in November of 1990 effectively limiting military assistance by 50% (Burgerman 67). If the Salvadoran government wanted to receive this aid, they would need to accept UN mediation, continue progress on the Jesuit case, and maintain control of the military to end violence against noncombatants (Brugerman 67). Following this decision, the Bush Administration knew it could no longer support the FAES and was essentially forced “to accept the United Nations-sponsored peace process that eventually ended the conflict without having achieved the policy’s original objective – military defeat of the FMLN.” (Perla 146). Moreover, the Bush administration began linking foreign aid to respect for human rights and the rule of law “making it clear that the decision could be reversed if the leadership of the FAES cooperated in the Jesuit case” (as qtd in MacLeod 16).

President Bush immediately began to dispatch diplomats, including Under-Secretary of State Bernard Aronson, to encourage flexibility among the warring groups (Murray 15). US Ambassador William Walker also visited El Salvador, including FMLN concentrated areas in his itinerary (Juhn 16). From that time on, the U.S. remained actively seized in the Salvadoran peace process and began a “long-term, controversial and highly problematic task that pretentiously used to be called “nation-building” to persuade the government to participate in the peace process (LeMoyne 107). Washington also maintained direct contact with leaders from both the government and the FMLN until the end of the talks (Juhn 16). By “using aid as a leverage instrument to ensure that the government would carry out its promises”, the U.S. succeeded in having government participation in the accords (Howard 94). The US government remained

active in their relations with the FMLN and “had offered to train a new civilian police force, retrain former combatants, and provide assistance in the national reconstruction plan” (Juhn 16).

Clinton Administration

When President Clinton came into office, he continued the propensities of the Bush administration and advocated an end to the war in El Salvador. Specifically, in February of 1993, concurrent with the US Congress, he froze \$11 million in military aid (MacLeod). With that decision, he would only release this aid when the Secretary General of the UN accepted the government’s compliance with all of the aspects of the Ad Hoc Commission’s recommendations (MacLeod 33). Secretary of State Warren Christopher reiterated this position when he travelled to El Salvador to assure that the peace accords would be executed and to foster hemispheric conditions “for development and free trade” (Fishel and Corr 209). After the agreement was made, the aid was released and Secretary of State Warren Christopher engaged in conversations with the government to provide an additional \$10 million to aid the land transfer program (MacLeod 33).

Domestic Politics

During the end of the administration, the Central American Peace and Solidarity Movement formed (CAPSM). Composed civil society organizations and of Salvadoran immigrants in the US—citizens, legal residents, undocumented immigrants, refugees, and temporary or transitory migrants played an essential role in creating a unified organization against the U.S. support of the Salvadoran government (Perla 143). The organization had four objectives: draw attention to the situation in El Salvador, influence public policy, generate and sustain a large social movement and build a support base for the revolutionary movement (Perla 148). The group was particularly powerful because many refugees who had been tortured and

traumatized would take the stand—risking deportation and certain death (Perla 155). It was CAPSM that was responsible for sending letters to both the Senate and the House committees during the end of the Reagan administration and to President Reagan. (Perla 157).

Conclusion:

Over time, the United States became increasingly unwilling to continue supporting the government of El Salvador. Although the end of the Carter administration and the entirety of the Reagan administration favored aid, the Bush and Clinton administrations were more inclined to succumb to international and domestic pressure to encourage a true and lasting peace. By limiting aid and pressuring the government to enter into talks with the FMLN, the U.S. was very integral to the peace process, even FMLN representatives “grew to appreciate the critical and ultimately positive role played by the United States in the peace process” (Howard 94). The U.S. eventually came to realize that although it was integral to the process, it should not involve itself and instead allow the United Nations and regional actors to complete the peace process (Howard 94).

International Response

The response of the UN was motivated by a variety of factors but the international pressure was very powerful. Preceding the initial interest of the UN, efforts to achieve peace in El Salvador were spearheaded first by the parties involved, and later by Central American community. The Contadora Group, later to be called the Friends of the Secretary General, the increased pressure by the OAS, and independent nations motivated the UN to intercede and

The Contadora Group

As early as 1983, Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela formalized their support for peace in El Salvador as the Contadora Group (Howard 90). The Contadora Group established its

mission to “launch a process of democratization in their countries, to promote a national dialogue, to decree a general amnesty, to bring about a genuine cease-fire and to promote the holding of free, pluralistic and fair elections” through the signing of Esquipulas I and II (Katayanagi 68). The group engaged in a series of negotiations with Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua to gain support and pressure the parties (Howard 90). Their “Document of Objectives” was a 21-point formal document calling for democracy and national reconciliation and “an end to support for armed groups engaged in cross-border attacks, reduction of foreign troops and advisors, and arms control” (as quoted in MacLeod 17). The nations officially signed Esquipulas II, which is regarded as the “official birth” of the Central American Peace process in 1987 (Doyle, Johnstone and Orr 12). Esquipulas II also highlighted the issue of El Salvador and the group began to focus its attention on the deteriorating situation the civil war as causing (Katayanagi 32). The agreement defined the issue of El Salvador as “detrimental to domestic and international security” (MacLeod 18). At the Summit of Central American presidents in December of 1989, the Contadora Group sent official documents to the Secretary General “welcom[ing] a more direct involvement of the UN, as opposed to the USA and OAS, in the region” (Doyle, Johnstone and Orr 228). The goal of the Contadora group then changed with the express concern to impact Salvadoran politics and increase pressure on both parties to end the war, as the refugee situation was affecting the stability of other nations (Howard 90). This group was supported by the Security Council and mentioned in many resolutions for its efforts to bring peace (Howard 90). In addition to the Contadora Group, a Support Group was also established composed of Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Uruguay (Katayangi 68)

The Friends of the Secretary General

The Friends of the Secretary General was an evolution from the Contadora Group composed of Colombia, Mexico, Spain and Venezuela (MacLeod 22). The group was tasked to mobilize support for the Salvadoran peace process and aid the Secretary General—an initiative never previously created (Studemeister 34). The group members were friendly to El Salvador and had an interest in seeing peace, they were flexible and effective as a mechanism that provided leverage in the region (Studemeister 34). The evolution of the group was the idea of the Secretary-General as a solution to in response to obstacles in the peace process. FMLN commanders Salvador Samayoa and Ana Guadalupe Martinez requested a meeting with UN representative Alvaro de Soto insisting that the UN act as a third-party broker (Burgerman 67). However, the FMLN was concerned that the Security Council was too much under U.S. control and the FMLN wanted an independent political base—leading to the creation of the Friends of the Secretary General (Burgerman 68). The group placed significant pressure on both sides, especially prior to the signing of the San Jose Agreement. (Juhn 96). The representative from Venezuela even told the FMLN leadership “enough with the hard-line on the FAES. Negotiate a cease-fire” resulting in the signing of the Chapultepec accords (Juhn 96).

Independent Nations

Individual nations also pledged their support to aid El Salvador transition to peace; the Soviet Union, Cuba and Spain were the most notable. Following the end of the Cold War, the USSR was willing to participate in some manner to the peace process—eventually signing eight joint statements with the United States at critical moments to support the implementation of the accords (Howard 94). Although both nations were engaged in a very long Cold War, “to all intents and purposes, the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union were unified in their desire for peace in El Salvador” (Juhn 64). It seems that “with the mutual withdrawal of

superpower interest from Central America went the ideological justification for protracted warfare” and nations were more willing to help end the conflict (MacLeod 26). Concurrent with the decisions of USSR, Cuba offered its participation in principle to the situation, and would actively encourage the FMLN to seek negotiations with the government (Juhn 53). Due in part to reduce its own isolation, Cuba “added its voice to the chorus urging the FMLN to cooperate in a ceasefire” (Burgerman 66). As a friend of the Secretary General, Spain also offered to support the peace process. Most likely due to its admission to the European community, Spain “sought to position itself more strongly as a bridge between Latin America and Europe (Howard 96). Spanish representatives were part of the small UN observer group sent prior to ONUSAL in 1989 (Howard 96). By the time ONUSAL was in its final stages of planning, the Spanish government offered the largest contributions of police and military personnel by sending almost two hundred Spanish troops and police (Howard 96). Spain also helped establish the Public Security Academy in El Salvador and provided over \$50 million in aid to El Salvador in 1992 alone (Howard 96). Along with diplomatic pressure by the USSR and Cuba, the help from Spain and many other countries were the “primary source for funding many of the programs mandated in the peace process”(MacLeod 28). It was only through these generous contributions that ONUSAL, and by extension the Salvadoran state, emerged from the civil war with institutions conducive to peace and democratic processes.

International involvement was crucial to the success of the Salvadoran peace process, not only in funding and supplying ONUSAL but also in generating support for the mission. Following the democratization that took hold of nearly every country in 1980s except El Salvador, the regional support was indicative of a change in the region and the willingness of countries to see a definitive end to the war in El Salvador. As the peace process was beginning to

unfold, it became clear that “the days of playing on superpower off the other were definitively over. The international consensus for peace in El Salvador was assured; only the Salvadoran were standing in the way” (Juhn 65). By creating groups such as Contadora and Friends, in addition to independent nations seeking change, the path to peace was supplemented by the various efforts of international support.

UN Response

The UN response to the Salvadoran civil war was driven by the amount of international attention the war was receiving. The involvement of the United States in the region and the various international bodies that formed to assure a peace in El Salvador created a highly charged situation at the international level. Following the end of the Cold War, the UN found itself at a truly unique time to involve itself in El Salvador which led UN leadership to position itself as a leader in creating democracies. Aiding the transition to peace was a knowledgeable and motivated Secretariat, a willfully led Security Council, and a general push toward a lasting peace by the international community.

Secretariat Response

The secretariat had an unprecedented response to the Salvadoran conflict. The Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar assured that his office was at the “center of the political decision-making” process and the peace process (Howard 102). Not only at the center of decision-making diplomatically, de Cuellar assisted both sides of the conflict by drafting the formal documents of the peace process—often the wording came directly from his agenda (Howard 102). His leadership was visionary at the time and many of the initiatives created during El Salvador have set precedents for other conflicts. A human rights component, peacekeepers used to nation build, and active verification were unheard of at the time but

managed to be very successful in El Salvador. By proposing the human rights component, he guaranteed his office would have “the tactical advantage of placing [power] squarely under the Security Council’s authority and oversight (as quoted in Burgerman 70-71). To assure success, de Cuellar “led direct talks at the highest level between the General Command of the police and the Government of El Salvador team” (Juhn 119). His commitment to the mission was evident until the very last minute of his tenure. On December 31st there was no agreement between either sides of the conflict (Juhn 121). As a central figure in the peace process, many argued that “if he left, the war would go on”, leading de Cuellar to negotiate with both sides until the last 30 minutes of his tenure (Juhn 121). Eventually, both sides agreed “on 15 and 62 points of concentration for the respective sides, with a nine-month ceasefire to begin on February 1...with final agreements to be made in Chapultepec”. (Juhn 121). Following this decision, the incoming Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali continued the leadership of de Cuellar and consulted experts from the IMF, World Bank, and Food and Agricultural Organization to personally find a solution to the land transfer program (MacLeod 31). However, although de Cuellar was personally invested in the conflict and led others to follow his example, it was his personal representative Alvaro de Soto who carried out the majority of the work. De Soto was present at every peace accord, maintained relations with both sides for years, and managed to have both sides compromise on a myriad of issues.

Alvaro de Soto

As a Personal Representative to the Secretary General, Alvaro de Soto acted as the Secretary General in many situations. Like de Cuellar, de Soto is Peruvian and very familiar with the region (Wilkerson 12). With the advantage of speaking the same language as the government and the FMLN, he was uniquely suited to create a sense of trust between both sides and the UN.

His role was so great, as the center of authority and legitimacy it was through his leadership that the Salvadoran parties granted the UN such an expansive authority (Howard 103).

When he began negotiations in 1990, he was able to reach mutual agreements with the parties even through unconventional methods. In times of extreme recalcitrance by both sides, he would write down a solution to a given problem and give it to the FMLN who would agree or disagree and then would go over to the government who would agree or disagree (Juhn 55). Eventually this diplomatic game led to the establishment of the Geneva Accords and formally began the peace process (Juhn 55). Unfortunately for de Soto, this was not specific to the Geneva Accords as he spent “months shuttling around to various parties, to work out the details of the negotiations framework” (Juhn 52). Through his ability to find agreement on smaller issues, he slowly built trust in the UN institution and the role was constantly expanded (Fishel and Corr 205). By acting as an assertive mediator, de Soto took advantage of the needs of the moment by putting pressure on both sides through “shame, cajoling, and persuasion” and he was able to secure a very robust mandate for the peacekeeping mission (as quoted in Howard 103). However, he had to maintain a strict mediator role, in an interview he highlighted the delicacy of the situation when he identified the need to build a constituency but not actually interfere with “running as tight a ship as possible in the negotiations” (Juhn 52). For example, the armed forces proved to be a very difficult point in the negotiation process because the FMLN wanted a complete abolition of the army and the government refused to consider the issue (Wilkerson 36). To find a solution, both parties turned to de Soto to “break the impasse” leading de Soto to ask for gestures of good faith and he managed to get the Geneva Accords signed (Wilkerson 36).

As a direct signatory to many of the peace accords, de Soto was instrumental in their creation and to the negotiations process (Howard 103). Due to his intimate proximity to both

parties he was careful to emphasize the extreme caution of de Cuellar. He stated in an interview that the negotiations were frequently tension-filled and he had to maintain a very close understanding of the consequences that could happen: “It was more than look before you leap. Before he dipped his little toe in the pool, he wanted to know how deep, for how long, what color the water was, everything” (De Soto interview 3 November 1995, Juhn 52). Moreover, he also served as an adviser to the Friends of the Secretary General as many nations deferred to him “to counsel both sides to stop fighting and negotiate” (Juhn 91). His leadership was so important that he was brought back to El Salvador in 1997 well after de Cuellar’s tenure to help with judicial reforms and constitutional amendments. Through his leadership, “a reduction of the period of judicial retention, indemnification of victims of judicial mistakes, a new procedure for selecting the National Council on the Judiciary, and new guarantees of habeas corpus” (Howard 110).

Security Council Response

Following the leadership of the Secretariat, the Security Council rarely took any measures to the contrary. The Secretariat constantly kept itself in contact with the Security Council, writing memos and directives as to the situation in El Salvador. In fact, “at no point in the operation did the Security Council come to a resolution that was not first formally requested by the Secretariat, the warring parties, or regional actors” (Howard 93). The Security Council exhibited a much more supportive role than responsive and depended on the Secretariat to provide sufficient leadership and guidance (Howard 93). During the Cold War the Security Council had no role other than passing ideological resolutions with minimal force due to the war between the United States and the USSR (Howard 96). When the Salvadoran conflict began, the “major sources of debate had evaporated and the Council expressed remarkable consensus around UN efforts to end the war in El Salvador through a negotiated settlement (Howard 96).

At the time of the conflict, the Security Council had complex missions in Yugoslavia and Cambodia and was initiating large-scale operations in Somalia and Mozambique in addition to those in Angola, Western Sahara and Iraq-Kuwait (Howard 97). Because of this, the Security Council mandates “often reflected the wishes of the Secretary-General and his advisors” (Howard 97). The resolutions often included the phrases: “approves the report of the Secretary-General”, “the enormous contribution of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy and noting “the continuing efforts of the Secretary-General to support the full implementation of the agreements” (Resolution 784, 729, 832). In deferring to the Secretariat, “all five permanent members expressed unanimity over the principles of the final peace negotiations and UN-led implementation” (Burgerman 66). With no major power opposing the process and a very generous international community, the Security Council passed resolutions to continue the mission until the conflict was sufficiently ended (Burgerman 66).

Conclusion:

The factors that most affected the variation in UN peacekeeping tactics were the interest of the Secretariat and the international attention on the conflict. The Salvadoran civil war was similar to other wars of the time as government oppression was stemming from past injustices. Yet, a variety of variables were unique to El Salvador. Principally, both sides of the conflict had reached their point of extreme exhaustion and the majority of the civilian population wanted an end to the war. For its part, the FMLN was highly organized when compared to other opposition movements and they managed to be recognized at the international level. Because both sides independently contacted the UN, the conflict was immediately regarded as an easier mission for the UN to undertake as they were welcome in the country as an intermediary. The fact that the Secretary General and his Special Representative were Spanish-speaking further propelled peace

because they had more interest in their home region and shared cultural similarities with the leaders of both sides. The end of the cold War provided a sense of global cooperation in which nations such as Spain volunteered not only troops but also police and aid. The eventual policy shift by the United States also gave the peace process a definitive amount of force as the US protected Christiani and any semblance of democracy that existed, while supporting the UN and providing funds for the land transfer program. Although the US foreign policy shift came very late in the peace process, it shifted as a result of the majority of nations being diametrically opposed to the US-funded Salvadoran government.

Chapter 6:

Analysis and Conclusion

UN Response

The UN response in both cases was remarkably different at multiple levels of the UN system. The Secretariat and Security Council took actions during one conflict that were diametrically opposed to the actions taken during the other conflict. However, both civil wars were similar in that the violence was government-sponsored and approximately the same number of people were murdered. The variations in behavior for both the Secretariat and the Security Council will be addressed to explain the impact of each on peacekeeping missions. Following the discussion of the behavior of the Secretariat and the Security Council, the factors that most contributed to the variation in the peacekeeping mission will be discussed. These factors will be limited to an analysis of international response, peace accords, funding, US response, legitimacy and initiatives for each conflict and will be explained using several theoretical models.

Secretariat

The Secretariat was far more involved in the case of El Salvador, while it was known for its absence in the case of Rwanda—particularly at the height of violence during the genocide. Although both conflicts had different Secretary Generals, Rwanda with Boutros Boutros Ghali and El Salvador with Javier Perez de Cuellar, the failure of Rwanda was preceded by the success of El Salvador providing an excellent example of leadership and UN strength.

Principally, differences between Boutros-Ghali and de Cuellar are most obvious in their leadership of the Security Council. Boutros Ghali argued that his role was to “respect the decision and the resolutions of the Security Council.... [because] the decisions are taken by the Security Council” (Melvern 196). Boutros Ghali claimed that it was not his responsibility to lead

the council in any direction; he could only serve as an advisor because it was ultimately up to the discretion of the members of the council to decide policy. On the contrary, de Cuellar was the center of the peace process throughout his tenure. By inserting himself between the warring parties he was able to assist both sides in drafting and implementing the accords as well as pressuring the Security Council to pass resolutions similar to his desires for peace (Howard 102). In one such memo, he delineated exactly what he wanted the Security Council to do in regards to the land redistribution, including exact measurements to be utilized and to whom the land shall be given (Lopez-Reyes 34). The leadership exemplified by de Cuellar set a precedent for the leadership style of a Secretary General in the post-Cold War.

Ironically, Boutros-Ghali's term came after de Cuellar's and he was a witness to the leadership initiatives that were available to him. Moreover, he also took over many of de Cuellar's initiatives in the case of El Salvador. For example, after de Cuellar's term was complete, it was Boutros Ghali who "consulted experts from the IMF, World Bank, Food and Agricultural Organization" to ameliorate issues with the land transfer program (MacLeod 31). He also established the policy that program beneficiaries would pay loans over 30 years (with a four year grace period), at an annual interests rate of 6 percent (MacLeod 31). Therefore, his contention that he was merely as an advisory counsel to the Security Council is severely unfounded, not only in theory but also in practice—his practice.

The existence of Alvaro de Soto in the case of El Salvador also proves another point of disconnect between the two cases. De Cuellar enlisted a very capable representative who was fully invested in a peace process, a representative who met with both sides of the conflict and put in a large amount of effort to see a solution to the violence. While Boutros Ghali witnessed de Cuellar's appointment of de Soto and his success, he chose to show very diminutive leadership

during Rwanda or appoint a representative. Moreover, instead of actively lobbying the Security Council on behalf of the Rwandese people as de Cuellar had, he made statements indicative of internal politics as the principal factor for his inaction: “We were not even allowed to use the word ‘genocide’. So this was a failure. It was my failure” (Barker). As Boutros Ghali himself admitted, it was a failure and even more so when it is acknowledged that the UN “had organized a round of calls to significant others, tasking them to put pressure on [Salvadoran President] Cristiani to come to New York and to conclude the agreement” including the Friends of the Secretary General, the European Community and the Catholic church, during the peacekeeping mission in El Salvador (Juhn 117). While de Cuellar’s leadership was defined by his willingness to lead the UN with innovative and far-reaching tactics, Boutros Ghali witnessed this political mobilization and yet, he decided to let Rwandans suffer because he felt that it was not his job to get too involved. The type of energy that characterized the UN under de Cuellar’s tenure seems to have dissipated almost as soon as Boutros Ghali came into office. Possible reasons for such different leadership styles can no doubt be attributed to personalities, but also the end of the Cold War, the international involvement and the failure in Somalia. However, the changes in leadership style clearly impacted both peacekeeping missions.

Security Council

The Security Council also reacted very differently in both cases. During the case of Rwanda, the council passed many resolutions and constantly highlighted its need to stay “seized in the matter”, yet it did very little to actually ameliorate the situation. In the case of El Salvador, the Security Council followed the specifications of the Secretary-General in passing very broad resolutions and creating and funding an expansive peacekeeping mission. The Security Council

resolutions are very indicative of the tone and the amount of importance the council placed on each mission.

In resolution 729 of El Salvador, international support was readily apparent and the Security Council offered their “thanks and appreciation for the enormous contributions of the Secretary General and his personal envoy...and all the Governments, especially those of Colombia, Mexico, Spain and Venezuela” for assisting in the peace process (S/RES 729). In addition to noting the international involvement, it also notes the predispositions of the Security Council in regards to the Salvadoran peace process: “[t]he members of the Council stand ready to deal expeditiously with any recommendations that the Secretary-General may make” in accordance with reports made by the Secretary General to the Security Council (S/RES 729). Nearly all of the resolutions passed in reference to El Salvador highlighted the international attention, the interest of the Secretary General and the willingness of the Security Council to follow in the leadership requests by the Secretary General (e.g. S/RES 784 and S/RES 791).

By contrast, the Rwandan resolutions were remarkably shorter, mentioned very little of the interests of the Secretary General and make no mention of international support for the peacekeeping mission. Although the Secretary General did write a report after the signing of the Arusha Accords, there is little mention of any other reports made by his office only the first resolution after the signing is there a mention of his report (S/RES 872). Moreover, Resolution 929 and 965 of Rwanda explicitly ask for the member states to fulfill their responsibilities and fund the mission—clearly different from the overwhelming praise given to countries during the Salvadoran case. Furthermore, Resolution 918 did not thank the Secretary General for his support but rather “further requests to the Secretary General for information relative to member states in violation of the embargo” (S/RES 918). The amount of interest by the international

community and the Secretary General can be seen throughout the comparison of these and other resolutions pertinent to both conflicts.

International Response and Involvement

International responses to conflicts can take on a variety of forms and types of involvements. Both cases will be analyzed in reference to international support for peace accords and relative funding given to each mission. Each variable will be presented to understand the amount of oversight and involvement in both cases and adapted to international relations theories.

Peace Accords

Although both conflicts were brought to an end through peace accords, El Salvador was much more successful. However, the success was due to the international attention that was placed on the peace process and the level of commitment by international actors. The peace process was reached by “sheer force of will” with a myriad of international actors, including the Secretary General and his assistant, independent groups formed by representatives of nations, such as the Friends of the Secretary General, and individual nations showing their support.

Therefore, what demonstrates the variation in UN involvement is subject to the amount and quality of international attention. On the contrary, the Rwandan state fell deeper into the throws of civil conflict and it was after the peace accords that the genocide occurred (Jones 75).

Although representatives from the United States, France, Belgium, Germany and the Organization of African Unity were present at the signing of the accords, the accords were only a success on paper. In fact, they have been reduced to “an extraordinary story of a sophisticated conflict resolution process gone disastrously wrong” (Jones 69). As Lieutenant Jean Marie Cameron, Liaison Officer for the Rwandan Patriotic Army argued: “When you engage yourself

to resolve a conflict, you are responsible for the results. Yet, while the negotiations were going on in Arusha, massacres were being prepared in Rwanda” (Berry and Berry 154). International actors were present at the accords but had no follow through.

Funding

The success of the United Nations peacekeeping missions does not depend on international presence but rather on the explicit and voluntary funding of troops and equipment. During both conflicts, the international funding was entirely different and heavily impacted the success of the mission and the ability to fund the expansive mandates. For example, El Salvador had a large network of international actors willing to donate funds. When calls were made to fund ONUSAL, many countries pledged funds and other nations such as Spain volunteered not only soldiers, but also police and civilian workers to thoughtfully rebuild Salvadoran society (MacLeod 28). By contrast, in Rwanda, UNAMIR was lacking even the most basic equipment “from ammunition to sandbags, fuel and barbed wire... essential personnel” in addition to lacking a “public affairs officer, legal adviser, humanitarian or human rights expert” (Melvern 85). Although the Security Council had many passionate speeches at the time of the Rwandan genocide to provide more funding for UNAMIR, the room fell “quickly silent when the Secretariat asked for volunteers” (Barnett 3). The countries with the resources and ability to fund UNAMIR and provide much needed assistance were unwilling to while they were “performing miserably in Bosnia and were hardly keen to act in an unfamiliar part of the world where the circumstances were even less hospitable” (Barnett 131).

Furthermore, the international architects of both peacekeeping missions displayed varying amounts of interest in educating the civilian populations of the UN mission. For example, the peacekeepers in El Salvador had the benefit of not only more funding but also the

infrastructure of a variety of mechanisms created to educate the Salvadoran citizenry. In their efforts, UN peacekeepers used radio and television ads as well as posters and programs to teach educators about the norms of human rights and create a different culture of political freedom in El Salvador (Howard 106). Their mission was thus inculcated with a sense of nation-building and creating a sustainable political future for El Salvador. Unfortunately, the majority of the people in Rwanda did not understand why the UN peacekeepers had arrived and their only sources of information were the two government controlled radio stations—and the government was committing the genocide (Melvern 85).

United States Response

The United States also played two very different roles in each conflict. During the Salvadoran conflict the US was funding the violence on the government side and during the Rwandan conflict the US was completely ignorant of the conflict and did not feel compelled to alleviate that defect. Geostrategic interest in each respective region was the primary determinant of US interests.

The US response to the Salvadoran conflict was defined by the power politics of the Cold War and the US and the USSR bipolarity. US leadership sent billions of dollars for over a decade to fund the conflict as a means of engaging in proxy war with the USSR. The economic and military support for the government forces of El Salvador augmented the ability of the army and the US government could effectively counter the USSR indirectly—as the USSR was funding the FMLN. Following the end of the Cold War, “the U.S. government ceased to impede initiatives to negotiate with Marxist insurgent movements in Central America” (Burgerman 64 and Fetherson 90). Toward the end of the peace process, the US was pivotal in providing support at a critical time and eventually helping to fund the land transfer program (MacLeod 33).

Although the change in US interest in El Salvador could be explained as a newfound desire to follow the principles of idealism, it is most probable that the US government was responding to the domestic pressures urging a peace in El Salvador and the image of the US at the international level, thus, a pluralist approach replaced a structural realist predisposition.

In the case of Rwanda, the US “didn’t have a dog in that fight” and Rwanda was fundamentally unimportant to US policy makers because it had no vital US interests in Rwanda (Kuperman 23). When the call came to fund UNAMIR, any modicum of aid that was promised, was curtailed by congressional action and the US failed in its efforts. Although US representatives were present at the signing of the Arusha Accords, which was the extent of their desire of interest and defined their approach throughout the civil war, peace accords and genocide.

Legitimacy

Legitimacy of both parties was another factor caused varying degrees of intervention. The resolution of both conflicts was entirely different and the end results were no doubt influenced by the amount of legitimacy given to all parties involved. In the case of El Salvador, the FMLN was given nearly the same amount of legitimacy as the Salvadoran government. The FMLN was heavily involved in negotiations, its leaders travelled to UN headquarters and it was dealt with as a political party and given the same treatment as government representatives. FMLN leaders were consulted in the peace process, drafted their own points and were highly centralized as a political group in its most high leadership (Junn 52). Radio Venceremos was clearly very useful in garnering international attention and would constantly be quoted in the international media. Because both sides of the conflict were so integrated into the peace process, El Salvador was more successful because it was more receptive to the needs of those in

conflict—and the initiatives that were created to bring about peace were established with both sides agreeing.

When the Rwandan conflict began garnering international attention, there were large amounts of misinformation flooding the international media. For example, the President of Rwanda was claiming that the Rwandan Patriotic Front was as a vicious army seeking to claim large amounts of territory because of their Anglophone alliance to the United States (Wallis 25). Foreign minister Jerome Bicomumpaka was also peddling misinformation at the international level in his attempt to discredit the RPF as savages when he alleged that one of the RPF tactics was to tear out the hearts of the Hutu enemies and consume them (Wallis 110). At this point in time, governments were given the highest amount of legitimacy and the public relations campaign propelled by the government of Rwanda effectively silenced any notions of viewing the RPF as a legitimate army with legitimate concerns. The RPF desire to rid the government of Rwanda because of its repeated and widespread massacres against the ethnic Tutsis was not mentioned in international circles and representatives of the RPF were not as integrated into the peace process or in its relations with the UN.

Initiatives

Each country had different initiatives established to return society to a sense of normalcy. The ad hoc and investigative commissions in El Salvador were created with different motives than the International Criminal Tribunal in Rwanda. The creation of truth commissions versus a criminal tribunal is very telling of the amount of international pressure and funding for each nation's future.

The Ad Hoc Commission in El Salvador was created during the New York Agreement as a compromise to a major issue that both sides were having (Johnstone 32). As the FMLN blamed

the military as the ultimate organization that perpetrated violence, they sought the entire military leadership to be purged (Johnstone 32). Yet, it was decided as a compromise that an ad hoc commission would be formed to investigate abuses and ‘recommend’ changes. With the support of the Secretary General, the most vital recommendation of the commission was initiated (Johnstone 33). A truth commission was also created through the signing of the Chapultepec Accords to investigate serious acts of violence committed by both sides to bring a definitive emotional end to the war—as many individuals had no idea where or how their relatives had been murdered (Johnstone 32). In sum, both the ad hoc and the truth commissions were created through UN negotiating with Salvadoran presence from both sides of the conflict.

The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was created independent of a large amount of Rwandan support or knowledge. When the Security Council decided through Resolution 955 to create a tribunal, they must have been aware that the tribunal would face the same problems as the mission had (S/RES 955). Although the resolution was passed in November of 1994, the tribunal was severely underfunded: “The general infrastructure in Arusha was quite rudimentary in 1995. There were few tarmac roads, very unstable electricity and water supplies, and austere living conditions. Telephone and fax lines were few and unreliable” leading the tribunal to spend more than a year creating an infrastructure because “as of September 1995, the Tribunal had no courtrooms, offices, prison, legal officers or secretaries” (Mose 922). The first case actually began in 1997, and although approximately 1,500 written decisions have been made, only 83 arrests have been made, and only 69 cases have been completed in the 17 years since the tribunal began (UNICTR). Moreover, one of the main problems of the tribunal is conveying information to the Rwandan citizenry as many of the activities of the tribunal are not even known to the Rwandan people! (Mose 938).

Political Theories

In addition, each of the four main theories will be discussed to explain the observed variation in the pattern of UN involvement in each case study. The theories of realism, constructivism and pluralism will be discussed. Idealism will be discussed in conjunction with constructivism based on similar notions and similar interests from political models.

Realism

During the Salvadoran conflict, the actions of the United States were driven entirely by realism. These actions were most obvious in US military and economic support for El Salvador. Similarly, the theory of realism is relevant to understanding the variation in the Rwandan genocide. Specifically, the actions of the Secretariat, Security Council, the US, and the support for initiatives were most visibly based in realism and will be discussed below.

El Salvador: United States

The US Response to the Salvadoran conflict was most obviously driven by realism given the constraints of the Cold War, which included the utilization of proxy wars as a means to display strength and counter-balance the other hegemonic power in the system (the USSR). By choosing to fund the Salvadoran government forces, the US sought to counter-balance the Soviet Union by denying the FMLN victory. It is important to recall that realists assume that the distribution of power in the international system determines state behavior. In a bipolar system, the US was using El Salvador as proxy war to counter-balance and ensure that the Soviet Union did not upset the polarity of the system.

El Salvador: Secretariat and Security Council

The theory of realism is not as relevant in the case of El Salvador where the actions of the Secretariat and the Security Council are concerned. The leadership of the Secretary General

decides the role of the Secretariat, as a unit. In the case of El Salvador, Javier Perez de Cuellar was tremendously supportive of peace in El Salvador—through a peacekeeping mission, UN representatives and funding. However, de Cuellar did not become extremely invested in the issue and had his personal representative at the forefront of any political maneuvering. Moreover, he did not take an active role in El Salvador until he was pressured by the Friends of the Secretary General and until the conflict was receiving international attention. Thus, one can say that de Cuellar also exhibited some realist preferences in his leadership style by waiting until a number of countries applied pressure. However, his appointment of de Soto and his leadership style in regard to the Security Council were more attune to constructivist tendencies and will be discussed below.

Furthermore, the Security Council preferred to focus on other issues—which is evident by the resolutions passed. The council preferred to defer to the Secretary General and pass resolutions that had been almost entirely written by the Secretary General's office. This lack of leadership on the part of the Security Council makes the institution seem rather habitual and ceremonial. The permanent members were rendered rather useless and acted only as figureheads, while other smaller nations such as Spain sent many police and judicial experts to propel a democratic Salvadoran system.

Rwanda: Secretariat

Although former Secretary General de Cuellar exhibited classic principles of idealism and constructivism in his approach to El Salvador, Boutros-Ghali favored a structural realist disposition. As an individual, Boutros-Ghali had no interest in seeing peace in Rwanda. He facilitated weapons agreements to arm the genocide, had many personal relationships with the French leaders funding the genocide, and he benefitted from an uninvolved Security Council—

which was evidenced by his appointment to a prominent French organization. Although realism tends to be relegated to nation states, it is clear that Boutros-Ghali was an international actor and his actions had very clear outcomes at the international level. Thus, his actions can be examined within the structural realist mindset because he acted in self-interest, economic gain, and a general disregard for human rights violations.

Rwanda: Security Council

The Security Council as an entity displayed similar dispositions. Because of the size of the Security Council and the veto power, it is fairly easy for a select few nations to determine the actions taken by the council and this was the case in Rwanda. While the US had no vital interests and refused to cooperate, French leaders were driven to support the genocide and maintain the violent regime. Both nations acted accordingly in the Security Council and both favored a tight-lipped approach to ensure their desires. By refusing to sway the council and preferring silence, the genocide continued and did not affect the US. In addition, the French benefitted from an uninterested and overwhelmed council to launch Operation Turquoise and continue to exert influence in Rwanda.

Rwanda: United States

The United States was heavily driven by realism. The United States government had no vital interests in the region, no grassroots political movements in favor of change, or any incentive to involve itself in the region. The fact that the U.S. did participate in the Arusha Accords can only be explained through a fleeting moment of constructivism or awareness of the change in international media. Given the end of the Cold War and the lack of interests in the region, U.S. leaders may have acted as the emerging hegemonic power in a constructivist manner

to support the UN—given the large amount of funding it was investing into the peacekeeping budget.

Rwanda: France

The role of the French in the Rwandan genocide can be analyzed as nothing more than self-interest on the part of the French government. French representatives funded the government, trained the soldiers, and were well aware of the mass slaughters that were taking place. Yet, they did nothing and continued to fund the genocidaires. Given the Franco-Anglo tensions that were blatantly obvious, the French were easily spurred to action after Rwandan leaders claimed the RPF were an English-speaking army intent on removing the French-speaking Rwandan leadership from power. With this lie came vast amounts of funding, conflict and murders. The French were acting entirely in their own self-interest by using a class example of realpolitik in their desires to maintain a sphere of influence in Africa, with little regard for human rights.

Rwanda: Initiatives

Following the end of the Cold War, the UN began engaging in and sponsoring initiatives such as the ICTR. These types of initiatives were almost entirely unheard of during the Cold War. The international attention and support for these initiatives can best be thought of as structural realism masquerading as constructivism. Although a variety of international judges compose the court, it has been historically underfunded and rather forgotten in popular discourse. Furthermore, the creation of the tribunal came after two failed missions and just as funding was lacking for the peacekeeping missions, there was a lack of funding for the criminal tribunal and the results have been fairly similar.

Constructivism

The vast array of initiatives taken during and after the Salvadoran conflict is consistent with idealist and constructivist explanations.. Idealism and constructivism will be discussed jointly because idealism now functions as a system in which constructivism is evidenced. The main goal of idealism is for international organizations, such as the UN, to resolve international conflicts and reduce world war; the main goal of constructivism is to view the world in terms of transnational issues that affect all nations and create norms to solve those transnational issues for the sake of humankind. The use of constructivist principles was most obvious in the leadership of the Secretariat, the peace accords and the initiatives taken after the conflict.

Secretariat

Although there is no explicit theory that ties the role of international actors such as de Cuellar to an international political theory, it is clear that de Cuellar was acting under the UN system, which is predisposed to follow the theory of idealism in its decision making processes—due to its desire to make a world safe for democracy. Moreover, as an international actor who was actively creating peace through decision making processes and actively propelling norm creation, the theory of constructivism is also relevant. By focusing less on material power and more on the social realities of the conflict, de Cuellar adopted a constructivist method of cooperation in the international system to ensure successful peace processes among both parties and the international community (Jackson & Sørensen 165). The theories of idealism and constructivism best explain these initiatives by the Security Council. The Secretariat successfully led the Security Council to correctly sponsor and aid in funding the mission and the leadership created new norms for peacekeeping missions and was representative of the global culture surrounding the conflict (Carlnaes, Risse, and Simmons 102).

Peace Accords

Although the peace accords were constructivist in nature, they were driven by realism. Because the Salvadoran civil war was creating refugee situations in neighboring countries, it was in the best interest of the Central American nations to gather and seek UN assistance to find a true and lasting peace based in democracy. The internal situation in El Salvador was escalating and with those escalations, refugees were increasing in countries throughout Central America. As such, these nations were driven by the realist contention that their nations were being affected by the civil conflict in a neighboring country—affecting their economies and domestic politics.

Initiatives

In contrast to the ICTR, the ad hoc and truth commission for El Salvador enjoyed international support—both economically and in judicial representation. Through the constructivist notions of norm creation, the Salvadoran conflict was brought to various ends including political, economic, social and cultural. These initiatives demonstrated the will of the UN and of other prominent nations to sponsor newfound directives to reach and maintain peace as an internal goal. The need to have a truth commission was an obvious demand of the people, and the ad hoc commission was a necessary compromise for the FMLN and government forces to agree to disarm and engage in peace talks. The UN support through treaties, Security Council resolutions and separate formal documents were strengthened by international funds and support to assure success. This type of support, norm creation, and burden sharing among states is highly definitive of constructivism and the desire to solve international problems through international means.

Pluralism

The theory of pluralism is also relevant to understanding the US response to the Salvadoran conflict after the civil war. Although the US had engaged in realist tendencies during the Salvadoran civil war, the US shifted strategies after the Cold War. The geostrategic interest that El Salvador presented during the Cold War was no longer necessary and the proxy war was irrelevant after the fall of the USSR. Moreover, the US began exhibiting an increase in domestic pressure through active grassroots movements (ie: CAPSM). Movements such as CAPSM were instrumental in pressuring US representatives to actively lobby for a peace process (Burgerman 64 and Juhn 60). This grassroots movement is indicative of pluralism because a primary principle of pluralism is the effects of domestic interests groups altering the national agenda to favor international outcomes. Essentially, CAPSM was so effective at pressuring congressional representatives to invest themselves in the Salvadoran conflict and seek to affect the decisions of the executive branch. Although the leaders of CAPSM may not have seen themselves as pluralists, they assured the goals of pluralists by altering the international agenda of a state. Thus, in the competition to influence the international agenda, CAPSM and smaller movements like it caused pluralist tendencies to dominate US motivations in the post-Cold War environment in regards to El Salvador.

Conclusion:

Ultimately, a variety of factors predisposed the variation in UN involvement—as well as the success in El Salvador and the utter failure in Rwanda. Domestically, the Salvadoran conflict had already reached a veritable stalemate and both sides had independently contacted the UN to assist in a peace process. Both sides were given legitimacy at the international level and ultimately the success of ONUSAL was due to local, regional and international commitments to peace (Aronson 14). Moreover, the end of the Cold War affected the importance of continuing to

fund a proxy war in El Salvador causing the US to radically change course and provide funding to end the conflict and stop supporting the government economically. The two theories that most explain the actions taken by various actors are structural realism and constructivism. Structural realism during the Cold War was most obvious through the bipolarity of the international system and the copious amounts of funding and international attention to alleviate the refugee situation in neighboring countries. Constructivism in the post-Cold War era was evident through the nation-building techniques, the appointment and power of de Soto and the initiatives that were UN sponsored and internationally supported. Through a constructivist approach, international actors from the UN and many other countries were able to create a different framework for a Salvadoran peace process. In this respect, constructivist notions could be implanted into the progressive nation-building plan that descended onto Salvadoran society.

In contrast, the situation on the ground in Rwanda seemed to be doomed before it began. The preceding failure in Somalia by UN and US forces, coupled with an international community unwilling to involve itself in another African conflict, led to an unfulfilled mandate and an ineffectual peacekeeping mission. Following with the ideas of realism, nations had no interest in the region leading them to be apathetic—with the exception of France. The government sponsored violence and its public relations maneuvers guaranteed that the opposition movement would be given little political legitimacy and ultimately allows the government to continue with its violence and ethnic cleansing until the RPF eventually won control of Rwanda. Although the UN attempted to create an expansive mandate based on idealist notions of international support of such conflicts as it had in El Salvador, there was simply no incentive for other countries to get involved and fund these plans. In the battle between idealist notions of aiding a failing state, realist doctrines prevailed and the lack of interest in the nation resulted in

the lackluster situation in Rwanda. Furthermore, the initiatives after both conflicts were indicative of the amount of faith placed on both countries to succeed in finding a lasting peace. The ICTR seemed to be instituted as a cover for failing so miserably in Rwanda yet it was also underfunded and deemed essentially unimportant by the Rwandan citizenry. However, the ad hoc and investigative commissions of El Salvador were thoughtfully executed and funded by international and UN support. Quite broadly it can be argued that because El Salvador was a more developed country and was geostrategically important to other nations, the peacekeeping mission could have the type of mandate that it did and be successful. Unfortunately for Rwanda, it had little geostrategic interests to other countries who could aid the peace process and there were no international donors willing to support UNAMIR leading to its demise and the types of initiatives that were created to deal effectively with the architects of the genocide. As a result, Rwanda is still healing in many ways from the civil war and genocide. The inability for murderers to be prosecuted judiciously has resulted in the unimaginable reality that some pivotal members of the government and the genocide, (such as Dr. Clement Kayieshema) are now working for international humanitarian organizations! (Berry and Berry 152).

Ultimately, imperfect individuals govern nations and the UN is similarly an imperfect institution with competing interests. Fortunately, changes have begun occurring to perfect the UN system. The Brahimi Report, the Capstone Doctrine, and discussions during the 2005 World Summit are the key forums advocating reform. A series of changes have begun taking place and they collectively offer the hope for more successful interventions like El Salvador, and the hope that a mission will never fail as UNAMIR did.

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