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The Footnote, in Theory

Anne H. Stevens and Jay Williams

The future of theory depends on the future of critical reading, and to the end of speculating on these two intertwined futures the staff of *Critical Inquiry* set out to determine what *Critical Inquiry* authors have read over the past thirty years. We set out to determine, first and most simply, who and what works are most often cited in our pages. Second, we wanted to track trends and fashions, as well as constants. Over the past thirty years, theory has seen any number of upheavals and innovations, so we wanted to see if certain writers remained touchstones for our authors. Third, we wanted to investigate a related question, the question of the status of the footnote in our pages. Elaborating upon Anthony Grafton's book *The Footnote: A Curious History*, we sought to investigate how theory is transmitted through notes, what sorts of conversations are held below the main text, and to thus discover in a different sort of way the identity of our journal, a journal that has been identified with theory for so long. If we have not been, nor will be any time soon, *Raritan*—that is, an academic journal without footnotes

This was truly a collaborative effort, and we want to thank Jeff Rufo and Sara Ritchey for their work on this project. A word on the professional roles of the present authors: we are (were, in the case of Stevens, who left *CI* in the fall of 2004) the two full-time staff members of the journal; as such we sit in the monthly editorial board meetings during which six to eight essays are discussed as possible candidates for publication. Also, we see all and sometimes write, from notes from the editorial board meetings, the rejection and acceptance letters. Our principal task, of course, is to copyedit manuscripts for publication. Because the character of a journal is partly determined by those who run it, we thought it important to note that, unlike many other journals, which rotate its editors every few years, *CI*'s personnel—its editor, coeditors, and staff—has seen little change.

This paper began as a talk that Jay Williams gave in 2004 at a conference, "Critical Inquiry: The End of Theory?" organized by Wang Ning at Tsinghua University in Beijing. Thanks to the audience at that talk for their comments and suggestions. Thanks also to Wang Ning, W. J. T. Mitchell and *CI*'s coeditors, John Tresch, Rafeeq Hasan, Alan Liu, Aeron Hunt, Denise Tillery, Robert Huddleston, Kate Gaudet, and Abigail Zitin.

and (or thus?) more literary than theoretical—then who are we? And, by extension, what is theory? Searching for definitions of theory and *Critical Inquiry* by defining the status and use of footnotes may seem like a risky venture—are the stakes really that high?—but we believe with Grafton, John Guillory, and others that the footnote illuminates larger concerns within the disciplines and thus helps us speculate on the future of theory.

A caveat: *Critical Inquiry*, in any number of ways, is a notoriously difficult journal to define. Calling it interdisciplinary or a journal of cultural critique are only ways of hiding or containing this difficulty. Perhaps its general nature can be summed up with words that Wayne Booth, Robert Streeter, and W. J. T. Mitchell used to help the journal both honor its founding editor and to work through a crisis of identity (who are we if we are no longer the journal edited by its founder?). Here they describe Sheldon Sacks in his *CI* obituary: “Along with his commitment to theoretical inquiry, he responded warmly to the personal, the offbeat, the idiosyncratic.”¹ We might add *the passionate* or *the polemic* to this list, for, in another moment of self-definition (generated again by a crisis of identity: are we the kind of journal that publishes polemics, specifically Edward Said’s statements against the state of Israel?), the journal’s coeditors endorsed the following declaration by Mitchell:

Critical Inquiry is a journal dedicated to debate, dialogue, and controversy. We may hope for the elevated, disinterested discourse of angels, but we have to settle for the passionate engaged voices of men and women in real historical situations. . . . Once a question of general urgency has been raised, we would not presume to dictate inflexible limits of propriety or to rely unquestioningly on appeals to the authority of experts. In this policy of critical tolerance of polemic, we find ourselves aligned with William Hazlitt: “passion . . . is the essence, the chief ingredient in moral truth.”²

1. Wayne Booth, Robert E. Streeter, and W. J. T. Mitchell, “Sheldon Sacks: 1930–1979,” *Critical Inquiry* 5 (Spring 1979): i. This mesh of inquiry and idiosyncrasy may also describe Mitchell, only the second editor of the journal.

2. [Mitchell], editorial letter, *Critical Inquiry* 16 (Autumn 1989): 203–4. See “An Exchange on Edward Said and Difference,” *Critical Inquiry* 15 (Spring 1989): 611–46, which includes essays by Robert J. Griffin, Daniel and Jonathan Boyarin, and Edward Said.

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The polemic, the passionate essay, the personal essay, the generally idiosyncratic essay require a generalist's knowledge built from wide reading, but not the bibliography of a theorist and certainly not the footnote structure of a professional academic. And so we note that 137 published pieces in thirty volumes of *CI* (averaging out to a little more than one per issue) do not contain a single footnote.³

The more polemical, the more passionate the essay, the more likely it will generate critical responses and rejoinders—a trademark feature of the journal—accompanied by footnotes. And, so, when Richard Stern published his private dialogue with himself about the physical appearance of certain writers at the 1986 International PEN conference, Joyce Carol Oates insisted on not only an angry rebuttal—punctuated by constant page referencing to Stern's "pig-souled sexism"—but photographic evidence—a kind of footnote in itself—dismissing his physical characterization of her.⁴ When Susan Gubar published "What Ails Feminist Criticism?" her essay provoked an immediate, critical, and heavily documented response from Robyn Weigman, several letters to the editor, and Gubar's own footnoted rejoinder. Jane Gallop's defense of a sexual act she engaged in with one of her students and Paul de Man's controversial writings in a Belgian newspaper in the thirties (which, incidentally, resulted in a marked decline in the number of times he was cited in our pages) generated similar feelings of anger, disgust, and betrayal, all accompanied by footnotes.⁵ This journal, in fact, argues that passion is not diminished when it is superscripted. It is a further mark of its complex nature that although submissions have been rejected for not being passionate enough, and they have been rejected because of a lack of necessary citation and documentation, not one essay in our memories has ever been rejected because it did contain footnotes.

Although they often go unnoticed and unread, occasionally footnotes

3. The first number of volume four, for example, contains six essays, totaling a little over 100 pages, of unfootnoted text. To further confuse matters, for reasons yet to be determined (whether originating with the authors or with the journal's editors or staff) two essays in volume 4, number 4, and a few others as well, contain imbedded footnotes, that is, reference material in the text, and no footnotes. The first issue that was completely, thoroughly, unabashedly footnoted was volume 5, number 2, winter 1978. Sheldon Sacks died in early 1979; as far as we can tell, the date of the first issue without an unfootnoted essay is entirely arbitrary.

4. Joyce Carol Oates, "Response to Richard Stern," *Critical Inquiry* 15 (Autumn 1988): 195.

5. See Susan Gubar, "What Ails Feminist Criticism?" *Critical Inquiry* 24 (Summer 1998): 878–902; the critical responses to and rejoinder by Gubar in *Critical Inquiry* 25 (Winter 1999): 362–401; Jane Gallop, "Resisting Reasonableness," *Critical Inquiry* 25 (Spring 1999): 599–609; the critical responses to Gallop, who declined with pique to write a rejoinder, by Tania Modeleski, Lisa Ruddick, Terry Caesar, James R. Kincaid, and Ann Pellegrini in *Critical Inquiry* 26 (Spring 2000): 591–626; Jacques Derrida, "Like the Sound of the Sea Deep within a Shell: Paul de Man's War," *Critical Inquiry* 14 (Spring 1988): 590–652; and the responses and rejoinder from Derrida, *Critical Inquiry* 15 (Summer 1989): 704–873.

themselves become objects of controversy. Recently a well-known theorist (who will remain anonymous) submitted an essay to *Critical Inquiry* that included this footnote: "6. See Jacques Derrida." It was obviously to be filled in later (or was it?), but one reader, vetting the manuscript for publication, took serious offense. He could not understand how he was to evaluate the merits of the claim in a sentence thus footnoted. Doesn't the breeziness of the citation, its offhand and seemingly arrogant nature signal that the essay as a whole commits one of the sins of the well-established author, that is, the need to skip serious, rigorous, time-consuming research in order to reach for grand and majestic statements? And, if so, why include a footnote at all?

Whether or not this reader's reaction was warranted, he was relying on a fundamental function of the humanities footnote: it allows us a means of evaluating the level of scholarship of an essay. As Grafton points out, before the academic footnote came into existence, the authority of the author, his or her moral and intellectual stature, were inherent in what he or she said, not in his or her sources.⁶ Thucydides and Joinville did not footnote; they didn't need to. It seems our anonymous, theory-driven author who incited one reader's anger was writing for a different century. Today, footnotes in a scholarly essay are not uniformly marginal, minor, or digressive. They can be, but much more often they are a humanist's lab report, our empirical data. In a general sense, footnotes are the mark of the author's status as a professional. Because, as Grafton notes, footnotes persuade, we look to them for proof that the author has sufficiently covered the field, that enough evidence has been marshalled, that the status of the evidence has been sufficiently questioned. The profession requires not only the traditional recognition of the work of like-minded scholars but also a consciousness of their place in the field, one's own place in the field, and the field's status as a field of study. The footnote is written by an individual whose own voice has been rendered into a collective voice of similarly educated authors. That is, in the footnote the individual author purposefully loses his or her writerly voice to become part of this professional collective.

Of course the author retains his or her own voice when he or she uses the footnote as a record of conversations with other scholars. The reader goes to footnotes to find out who is talking to whom, who is being listened to, and who is being ignored. They are the place for polemics (if the body of the essay is judged inappropriate for such matters); thus, a footnote may be marginal without being minor. Footnoting can also be a way for the author to reveal more of his or her personality, to step out of the bounds of the self created by formal academic discourse; or, if the essay is personal in

6. See Anthony Grafton, *The Footnote: A Curious History* (Cambridge, Mass., 1997).

nature, the footnote may be the place to reassure the reader that he or she may be getting intimate but is still a professional. The footnote, then, can be distinguished not only spatially but aurally as well.

Table one summarizes the data we collected by eavesdropping on these scholarly discussions, while table two presents the ten most frequently cited authors per five-volume period, and table three ranks the frequency of citation overall (tables 1–3). To begin our investigation, the staff of *Critical Inquiry* devised a list of theorists whose work we knew had been frequently cited. (To have tabulated every author cited in every article would have required more resources than we had at hand.) We included theorists we knew were more popular in the early years of the journal, such as Northrop Frye and Wayne Booth, and those who only came to prominence in the last few years, such as Slavoj Žižek and Giorgio Agamben. We selected seminal figures from the major fields we publish, particularly literary criticism, art history, philosophy, psychoanalysis, and social theory.⁷ We then took this list of 147 names and went through each issue of the journal, noting each time these writers had been cited. Within a given essay, we counted the first reference to a work as a citation. We did not count subsequent citations of the same work, but we did count as separate citations the mention of a different work by the same author. Thus Geoffrey Harpham's critique of the reception of Žižek's work in America⁸ generated ten citations for Žižek, while an essay that engages closely with a single theoretical text would generate only one citation.

Another methodological issue we confronted while compiling our data was the problem of self-citation. If Stanley Fish cites *Is There a Text in This Class?* in a *CI* article, does it count as a citation? The danger there is that an author who cites his or her own work would receive more citations than one who does not—a singular variant of log-rolling. But self-citation is still citation and isn't necessarily self-promotion. Often scholars cite their previous work critically, historically, or as a shorthand to gesture towards fuller elaborations of their larger theoretical claims. Many scholars would cite Said's *Orientalism* as a foundational methodological text, so why shouldn't Said? Looking at table three, it appears that the issue of self-citation is irrelevant for many of the most frequently cited theorists, such as Freud, Lacan, and Kant. For the rest, readers should be aware that *CI* has published many of the authors on our list, and a few of the citations we counted, for authors like Derrida, Jameson, or Cavell, could be self-citations.

7. We also cross-checked our selections against the theorists anthologized in *The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism*, ed. Vincent B. Leitch et al. (New York, 2001).

8. See Geoffrey Galt Harpham, "Doing the Impossible: Slavoj Žižek and the End of Knowledge," *Critical Inquiry* 29 (Spring 2003): 453–85.

TABLE 1. Citations of Theorists in *Critical Inquiry*, per five-volume period

Last	First	Total	vols.	vols.	vols.	vols.	vols.	vols.
			1–5 (1974– 79)	6–10 (1979– 84)	11–15 (1984– 89)	16–20 (1989– 94)	21–25 (1994– 99)	26–30 (1999– 2004)
Adorno and Horkheimer		65	7	4	4	5	17	28
Agamben	Giorgio	10	0	0	1	0	0	9
Althusser	Louis	23	1	2	6	4	5	5
Appiah	K. Anthony	11	0	0	0	6	2	3
Arendt	Hannah	35	2	3	1	5	7	17
Aristotle		38	8	7	4	7	7	5
Arnheim	Rudolf	8	3	2	0	0	2	1
Arnold	Matthew	14	1	5	0	3	3	2
Auerbach	Erich	19	4	1	3	1	6	4
Augustine		11	1	1	2	0	3	4
Austin	J. L.	23	4	4	5	0	5	5
Bakhtin	Mikhail	25	0	13	5	3	2	2
Balibar	Étienne	12	0	1	0	1	5	5
Barthes	Roland	92	14	19	11	16	16	16
Bataille	Georges	27	0	0	2	3	13	9
Baudrillard	Jean	15	0	1	3	4	4	3
Beardsley	Monroe	19	7	7	3	0	1	1
Bell	Quentin	4	2	1	1	0	0	0
Benjamin	Walter	147	3	7	3	8	91	35
Bergson	Henri	8	1	0	1	0	2	4
Bhabha	Homi	38	0	0	4	8	20	6
Blanchot	Maurice	19	1	1	3	4	5	5
Bloom	Harold	34	8	13	7	4	2	0
Booth	Wayne	32	13	10	8	1	0	0
Bourdieu	Pierre	26	0	1	5	3	9	8
Brooks	Peter	16	0	2	2	5	4	3
Brooks	Cleanth	9	1	3	3	0	1	1
Burke	Kenneth	15	8	4	2	0	1	0
Butler	Judith	40	0	0	0	8	21	11
Canguilhem	Georges	3	0	0	0	2	0	1
Cavell	Stanley	57	4	8	12	17	11	5
Chomsky	Noam	17	1	2	2	1	1	10
Cixous	Hélène	7	1	2	2	0	2	0
Clark	T. J.	20	0	4	3	6	3	4
Clifford	James	19	0	0	1	11	3	4
Copjec	Joan	5	0	0	0	0	2	3
Cornell	Drucilla	3	0	0	0	0	2	1
Crane	R. S.	8	5	2	1	0	0	0
Crews	Frederick	6	2	0	1	2	1	0
Culler	Jonathan	48	7	16	12	9	2	2
Danto	Arthur	9	0	2	2	1	3	1
Davie	Donald	15	1	11	2	0	1	0
de Beauvoir	Simone	5	0	1	2	0	1	1
de Certeau	Michel	21	0	0	3	7	7	4
de Man	Paul	52	2	16	17	6	3	8
Debord	Guy	3	0	0	1	0	2	0
Deleuze and Guattari		44	0	0	2	5	8	29

TABLE 1. Citations of Theorists in *Critical Inquiry*, per five-volume period (*continued*)

Derrida	Jacques	177	16	32	31	24	38	36
Eagleton	Terry	27	1	7	8	4	5	2
Eco	Umberto	9	1	3	1	1	3	0
Eliot	T. S.	37	5	10	6	4	3	9
Empson	William	9	5	1	1	1	0	1
Fanon	Frantz	32	0	0	9	9	11	3
Felman	Shoshana	14	0	1	4	1	4	4
Fish	Stanley	54	16	13	10	5	3	7
Foucault	Michel	160	8	16	24	37	43	32
Freud	Sigmund	174	4	15	30	38	44	43
Fried	Michael	35	1	4	5	11	5	9
Frye	Northrop	34	12	13	2	4	0	3
Gadamer	Hans-Georg	23	2	4	7	5	1	4
Gates	Henry Louis	24	0	0	1	13	6	4
Geertz	Clifford	14	1	1	4	5	1	2
Gilbert and Gubar		21	0	9	10	2	0	0
Ginzburg	Carlo	8	0	0	1	1	2	4
Girard	René	13	0	4	2	1	2	4
Goldmann	Lucien	2	1	0	0	0	0	1
Gombrich	Ernst	44	17	7	12	3	3	2
Gramsci	Antonio	13	0	4	0	3	3	3
Greenberg	Clement	25	1	3	6	2	3	10
Greenblatt	Stephen	17	0	1	2	7	2	5
Habermas	Jürgen	58	1	2	6	16	16	17
Hacking	Ian	21	0	0	1	5	5	10
Hall	Stuart	14	0	1	2	3	4	4
Haraway	Donna	12	0	0	0	2	7	3
Hardt and Negri		11	0	0	0	0	2	9
Hegel	G. W. F.	55	4	9	12	5	8	17
Heidegger	Martin	52	0	6	12	5	9	20
Hirsch	E. D.	26	4	12	8	2	0	0
Irigaray	Luce	20	0	5	4	5	5	1
Jakobson	Roman	28	11	8	0	2	4	3
Jameson	Fredric	79	5	7	15	18	15	19
Johnson	Barbara	12	0	3	3	2	3	1
Kant	Immanuel	59	3	8	11	8	10	19
Kermode	Frank	25	8	6	5	4	0	2
Kittler	Friedrich	24	0	0	0	0	5	19
Kracauer	Siegfried	15	0	1	0	2	6	6
Kristeva	Julia	36	0	10	2	11	5	8
Kuhn	Thomas	18	4	2	5	1	2	4
Lacan	Jacques	80	0	11	11	22	19	17
LaCapra	Dominick	10	0	0	1	3	0	6
Laplanche and Pontalis		28	0	2	7	3	9	7
Latour	Bruno	18	0	0	0	6	2	10
Leavis	F. R.	9	3	4	0	0	0	2
Lefebvre	Henri	9	0	0	0	2	5	2
Lévinas	Emmanuel	30	0	0	3	9	11	7
Lévi-Strauss	Claude	26	4	4	5	6	4	3
Lukács	Georg	27	4	4	4	2	8	5
Lytard	J.-F.	27	0	1	4	8	8	6
MacKinnon	Catharine	12	0	0	0	3	6	3

TABLE 1. Citations of Theorists in *Critical Inquiry*, per five-volume period (*continued*)

Marcuse	Herbert	14	3	0	1	3	4	3
Marx and Engels		54	1	10	5	6	14	18
Mauss	Marcel	11	1	0	0	3	2	5
McGann	Jerome	16	1	3	4	3	2	3
McKeon	Richard	2	2	0	0	0	0	0
Merleau-Ponty	Maurice	18	2	0	1	1	5	9
Miller	J. Hillis	41	7	22	4	6	1	1
Mitchell	W. J. T.	39	1	1	4	9	10	14
Mulvey	Laura	10	0	0	4	1	2	3
Nancy	Jean-Luc	9	0	1	1	2	3	2
Nietzsche	Friedrich	57	6	10	6	11	8	16
Olson	Elder	3	3	0	0	0	0	0
Panofsky	Erwin	32	2	7	9	5	3	6
Perloff	Marjorie	8	0	0	4	1	1	2
Piaget	Jean	5	3	1	1	0	0	0
Plato		25	1	0	5	6	6	7
Poovey	Mary	7	0	0	1	2	1	3
Popper	Karl	12	7	1	4	0	0	0
Ransom	John Crowe	8	0	6	0	0	1	1
Rawls	John	11	0	0	0	0	3	8
Richards	I. A.	16	3	8	2	2	0	1
Ricoeur	Paul	22	6	6	3	4	0	3
Rogin	Michael	7	0	0	0	2	4	1
Rorty	Richard	49	1	3	10	16	7	12
Rose	Jacqueline	8	0	0	0	3	2	3
Russell	Bertrand	5	1	0	2	2	0	0
Sahlins	Marshall	5	1	1	0	3	0	0
Said	Edward	77	2	12	15	18	19	11
Sartre	J.-P.	36	6	3	5	7	9	6
Saussure	Ferdinand	14	5	4	3	1	0	1
Scarry	Elaine	11	0	0	0	2	8	1
Sedgwick	Eve	21	0	0	2	7	6	6
Herrnstein Smith	Barbara	23	3	6	7	6	0	1
Spitzer	Leo	11	3	0	0	2	2	4
Spivak	Gayatri	34	0	3	0	11	16	4
Starobinski	Jean	5	1	3	1	0	0	0
Taussig	Michael	8	0	0	0	0	5	3
Thompson	E. P.	9	0	0	1	3	4	1
Todorov	Tzvetan	20	5	6	3	3	3	0
Turner	Victor	7	0	3	2	1	1	0
Weber	Max	18	0	3	2	5	1	7
Wellek	René	16	7	6	1	0	1	1
White	Hayden	32	2	3	7	11	6	3
Williams	Raymond	37	1	10	8	4	7	7
Wimsatt	William	20	4	7	4	1	2	2
Winnicott	D. W.	6	0	0	1	0	1	4
Wittgenstein	Ludwig	52	9	7	5	11	14	6
Žižek	Slavoj	35	0	0	0	2	9	24
Totals		3970	354	586	587	688	859	896
Percent of total			8.92%	14.76%	14.79%	17.33%	21.64%	22.57%
			23.68%		32.12%		44.21%	

Data compiled by Jay Williams, Anne Stevens, Jeff Rufo, and Sara Ritchey, 2004.

TABLE 2. The Most Frequently Cited Theorists in *Critical Inquiry*, per five-volume period

	Overall	vols. 1–5 (1974–1979)	vols. 6–10 (1979–1984)	vols. 11–15 (1984–1989)	vols. 16–20 (1989–1994)	vols. 21–25 (1994–1999)	vols. 26–30 (1999–2004)
1	Jacques Derrida	Ernst Gombrich	Jacques Derrida	Jacques Derrida	Sigmund Freud	Walter Benjamin	Sigmund Freud
2	Sigmund Freud	Jacques Derrida	J. Hillis Miller	Sigmund Freud	Michel Foucault	Sigmund Freud	Jacques Derrida
3	Michel Foucault	Stanley Fish	Roland Barthes	Michel Foucault	Jacques Derrida	Michel Foucault	Walter Benjamin
4	Walter Benjamin	Roland Barthes	Michel Foucault	Paul de Man	Jacques Lacan	Jacques Derrida	Michel Foucault
5	Roland Barthes	Wayne Booth	Jonathan Culler	Edward Said	Edward Said	Judith Butler	Gilles Deleuze
6	Jacques Lacan	Northrop Frye	Paul de Man	Fredric Jameson	Fredric Jameson	Homi Bhabha	Theodor Adorno
7	Fredric Jameson	Roman Jakobson	Sigmund Freud	Jonathan Culler	Stanley Cavell	Jacques Lacan	Slavoj Žižek
8	Edward Said	Ludwig Wittgenstein	Stanley Fish	G. W. F. Hegel	Roland Barthes	Edward Said	Martin Heidegger
9	Theodor Adorno	Michel Foucault	Northrop Frye	Stanley Cavell	Richard Rorty	Theodor Adorno	Fredric Jameson
10	Immanuel Kant	Harold Bloom	Harold Bloom	Ernst Gombrich	Jürgen Habermas	Roland Barthes	Immanuel Kant

TABLE 3. The Ninety-Five Most Frequently Cited Theorists in *Critical Inquiry*, vols. 1–30

1	Jacques Derrida (177 citations)
2	Sigmund Freud (174)
3	Michel Foucault (160)
4	Walter Benjamin (147)
5	Roland Barthes (92)
6	Jacques Lacan (80)
7	Fredric Jameson (79)
8	Edward Said (77)
9	Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer (65)
10	Immanuel Kant (59)
11	Jürgen Habermas (58)
12	Stanley Cavell, Friedrich Nietzsche (57 each)
14	G. W. F. Hegel (55)
15	Stanley Fish, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (54 each)
17	Paul de Man, Martin Heidegger, Ludwig Wittgenstein (52 each)
20	Richard Rorty (49)
21	Jonathan Culler (48)
22	Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Ernst Gombrich (44 each)
24	J. Hillis Miller (41)
25	Judith Butler (40)
26	W. J. T. Mitchell (39)
27	Aristotle, Homi Bhabha (38 each)
29	T. S. Eliot, Raymond Williams (37 each)
31	Julia Kristeva, Jean-Paul Sartre (36 each)
33	Hannah Arendt, Michael Fried, Slavoj Žižek (35 each)
36	Harold Bloom, Northrop Frye, Gayatri Spivak (34 each)
39	Wayne Booth, Frantz Fanon, Erwin Panofsky, Hayden White (32 each)
43	Emmanuel Lévinas (30)
44	Roman Jakobson, Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrande Pontalis (28 each)
46	Georges Bataille, Terry Eagleton, Georg Lukács, Jean-François Lyotard (27 each)
50	Pierre Bourdieu, E. D. Hirsch, Claude Lévi-Strauss (26 each)
53	Mikhail Bahktin, Clement Greenberg, Frank Kermode, Plato (25 each)
57	Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Friedrich Kittler (24 each)
59	Louis Althusser, J. L. Austin, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Barbara Herrnstein Smith (23 each)
63	Paul Ricoeur (22)
64	Michel de Certeau, Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar, Ian Hacking, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick (21 each)
68	T. J. Clark, Luce Irigaray, Tzvetan Todorov, William Wimsatt (20 each)
72	Erich Auerbach, Monroe Beardsley, Maurice Blanchot, James Clifford (19 each)
76	Thomas Kuhn, Bruno Latour, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Max Weber (18 each)
80	Noam Chomsky, Stephen Greenblatt (17 each)
82	Peter Brooks, Jerome McGann, I. A. Richards, René Wellek (16 each)
86	Jean Baudrillard, Kenneth Burke, Donald Davie, Siegfried Kracauer (15 each)
90	Matthew Arnold, Shoshana Felman, Clifford Geertz, Stuart Hall, Herbert Marcuse, Ferdinand de Saussure (14 each)

We decided to create our own index rather than use the Arts and Humanities Citation Index (AHCI). The latter yields with much more time and effort merely information similar to that we garnered by reading the print version of the journal, and, of course, it contains no data analysis. For example, it will tell you that there are fourteen essays in *Critical Inquiry* with the word *Derrida* in the title, that *Critical Inquiry* published thirteen essays by him, and, because it can search all journals in its database, that Derrida's essay "The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow)," which appeared in 2001, has now been cited five times in humanities journals indexed by the AHCI. It will also list the names and titles cited in each essay, and this information, of course, was required by us to begin our study. But because the AHCI doesn't automatically total the number of times a particular author has been cited throughout the history of a journal, and because retrieving the basic information of who cited whom is much easier using the hard copies of the journal, we found the AHCI redundant. We simply opened a copy of each issue of the journal, tallied the authors and the number of times they were cited, and proceeded through the entire run of the journal chronologically. Our methodological choices, however, do not signify a total victory of print over digitization, nor do we find the AHCI unhelpful. It simply did not provide us with the particular data we wanted.

We have compiled this data in the hopes of creating a history of literary theory over the last thirty years. Other scholars have attempted similar projects. Eugene Garfield's article "The 250 Most-Cited Authors in the *Arts & Humanities Citation Index, 1976–1983*" uses the AHCI to compile statistics on which scholars in the humanities are being cited most frequently.⁹ Garfield has compiled a separate table for twentieth-century authors. Particularly in that table, there is significant overlap with our data for the same time period. The microhistorical account we have constructed through an analysis of every footnote in *Critical Inquiry*, it turns out, isn't all that different from the larger picture. Also useful as a model was Allan Megill's article "The Reception of Foucault by Historians."¹⁰ As the title suggests, this is a study of the reception of Foucault's works specifically by historians. Megill uses data culled from the Social Sciences Citation Index and the Arts and Humanities Citation Index to talk about the history of criticism and the reception of French theory in America.¹¹

9. See Eugene Garfield, "The 250 Most-Cited Authors in the *Arts and Humanities Citation Index, 1976–1983*," *Current Contents* 48 (Dec. 1986): 3–10.

10. See Allan Megill, "The Reception of Foucault by Historians," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 48 (Jan.-March 1987): 117–41.

11. An example of a similar project being attempted for very different ideological purposes is Hilton Kramer and Roger Kimball's "Farewell to the MLA," *New Criterion* 13 (1 Feb. 1995), <http://www.mugu.com/cgi-bin/Upstream/People/Kimball/mla.html>. Here Kramer and Kimball compile anecdotal information on what is being cited at the Modern Language Association convention:

Like Garfield and Megill, we believe that numbers can be used as a means to assess intellectual trends. But instead of focusing on the entire body of humanities scholarship we have chosen to tell the story of a single journal. By restricting ourselves to the history of *Critical Inquiry*, we have sought to isolate trends in a particular strand of humanities scholarship: so-called high theory. *Critical Inquiry* is by no means the only journal we could have chosen to tell the story of theory's reception in the American academy. But because of our unique situation inside the journal, it felt like the right story for us to tell at this time.

In 1977, Lawrence Lipking argued in *Critical Inquiry* that, because the division between text and footnote is never stable, even within the footnote itself—a position we agree with—footnotes should be dispensed with in favor of the marginal note. He wrote, “Fewer and fewer literary critics, these days, would accept the philosophical model of discourse on which the relation between text and note was founded: the clear division between certain knowledge, brought to light in the text, and conjectural or historical evidence, cited below.” Lipking, who wryly noted that “footnotes . . . stand for a scholarly community, assembled by the author specifically so that he can join it,” hoped to see a revolution in both essayistic form and professionalism. He hoped for a new kind of critic “who considers that community [of footnote-building scholars] an illusion, fabricated for self-serving ulterior purposes” and who will “choose another [professional] allegiance” and “scorn the footnote” in favor of “the marginal gloss.”¹²

Meanwhile, as one of us listened to these assaults on Conrad and Cather, the other chose to visit the session on “Feminist Perspectives on the Frankfurt School,” which drew a standing-room-only crowd and turned out to offer a little of everything—except, of course, literature. No sooner had we seated ourselves and unpacked the trusty tape recorder than we heard the familiar whine of the dentist's drill—no, sorry, our mistake: it was only the sound of the first speaker, who had come to “clarify the function of femininity in Frankfurt School thought, with an emphasis on re-reading the work of Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer in the context of gender.” Ah, yes, we knew it well: the “critique of patriarchy and logocentrism,” old friends such as the feminist icons Luce Irigaray and Julia Kristeva, not to mention Judith Butler, the young philosopher of queer theory who our rough tabulation identified as the second most frequently referred to person at the convention. The most frequently cited figure was undoubtedly Walter Benjamin, the hapless Marxist critic and protege of Adorno who committed suicide while fleeing from the Nazis in 1940.

Our data also indicates that Butler's and Benjamin's popularity surged around this time. But while Kramer and Kimball see this as a sign of the decline of the academy, we are not nearly so pessimistic.

12. Lawrence Lipking, “The Marginal Gloss,” *Critical Inquiry* 3 (Summer 1977): 639. We tend to think, as others have before us, that Gérard Genette's *Paratexts*, with its laying out of the concepts of text and paratext especially, will prove fruitful for further exploration into the theoretical nature of the footnote as long as those concepts are rethought in terms of new media, especially in terms of the internet. For example, we would want to critically examine the similarities between the footnote and the hyperlink. The latter certainly does not merely replace the

That future did not take place. Our study confirms the trend in academia in favor of more professionalized, footnoted writing and shows how *Critical Inquiry*, for all its idiosyncrasies, still reflects major changes in the academic profession. Footnotes in the early years of the journal tended to be short and to cite a single work in each note. In the last fifteen years or so the average length of the footnote has more than doubled. With increasing frequency, an author will cite a range of significant books and articles on a given topic, such as trauma or utopianism, even when these works have no direct bearing on the main argument of the paper. The proliferation of footnotes in the last fifteen years of the journal can be traced in part to the increasing professionalization of the humanities. The ongoing crisis in American higher education—the scarcity of jobs, increasing expectations for obtaining tenure, and rest of the old familiar laments—has put pressure on scholars to perform their scholarly credentials, even at the bottom of the page. By citing a list of ten or fifteen works on a subject tangentially related to their immediate topic, scholars demonstrate their knowledge, even mastery, of the larger context in which their argument can be placed. This type of footnote is especially common among younger or untenured scholars.¹³ Our study in fact shows that not only have footnotes grown in length but that nearly half of the footnotes we counted appeared in only the last ten years.

A major factor at work in this growth of footnotes is the proliferation of poststructuralist theoretical approaches. *Critical Inquiry* was founded in 1974 by a group of neo-Aristotelian literary critics, whose motto may have been the sentence that appeared on the journal's table of contents page for its first volume: "A voice of reasoned inquiry into significant creations of the human spirit." But it was founded in a contentious time when terms like *voice*, *reasoned*, *inquiry*, *significant*, and *human* were all up for debate. J. Hillis Miller first identified the Yale school in *The New Republic* in 1975, and, equally significantly, he defined an oppositional camp as well, citing Helen Vendler and James Kincaid as New Critics. In the *Georgia Review* (1976) he talked at greater length about the Yale school, prompting a response from Murray Krieger in the *New Republic*, who then critiqued Derrida's work in *New Literary History* in the same year. Thus, by its fourth volume, *CI* published an overview by Wallace Martin of the theory battles thus far, prompting a critical rejoinder from the Yale school critic Geoffrey Hartman.¹⁴ Very

former. See Georg Stanitzek, "Texts and Paratexts in Media," *Critical Inquiry* 32 (Autumn 2005): 27–42.

13. And here recall a young Leopold von Ranke's letter to his publisher, quoted in Grafton, *The Footnote*, p. 64: "I felt citation was indispensable in the work of a beginner who has to make his way and earn confidence."

14. Martin's essay is actually a critical response to Geoffrey Hartman, "Literary Criticism and Its Discontents," *Critical Inquiry* 3 (Winter 1976): 203–20. See Wallace Martin, "Literary Critics

early on, then, what the editors of the journal thought should be read, analyzed, and footnoted (“significant creations of the human spirit”) gave ground to what was happening in the larger intellectual arena.

It’s interesting to note that Aristotle is not cited much more frequently in the first years of the journal than he is in the most recent issues. Partly this is true because poststructuralism came to the journal so quickly. But partly it is because of how footnotes sometimes work; that is, generally speaking, we don’t footnote our most fundamental terms. The neo-Aristotelians did not need to cite Aristotle because Aristotle’s emphasis on genre and taxonomy went without saying. However, with the popularization of a number of competing critical approaches—deconstruction, psychoanalytic criticism, Marxism, postcolonialism, feminism, new historicism, and so on—critics have found it increasingly necessary to fly the flag of their team by citing key figures for a particular methodological school. Additionally, these varying brands of poststructuralism all share a tendency to question received wisdom and accept few absolutes or foundations. Thus a certain type of essay that mentioned authorship from the 1980s would have had to cite Foucault’s “What Is an Author?” and Roland Barthes’s “The Death of the Author” in order to demonstrate that the critic did not take authorship to be an unproblematic category and that he or she was aware of the important work on this topic. In the last few years, however, these poststructuralist tenets have become a new body of shared knowledge, and this type of footnote has become less frequent.¹⁵ Just as Booth did not need to cite Aristotle, so today’s scholars do not need to cite Foucault on biopower, or they risk looking like neophytes if they do.

In 1974, in the second issue of *Critical Inquiry*, David Richter, then an assistant professor at Queens College and a student of Sheldon Sacks, predicted that the future of theory would be a battle among genre critics. He had already decided that the neo-Aristotelians, the Chicago school, had won out over neo-Kantians and the New Critics.¹⁶ Thus Tzvetan Todorov and Paul Hernadi, he predicted, would be read, not E. D. Hirsch and Murray Krieger. However, at the same time that he was making his predictions,

and Their Discontents: A Response to Geoffrey Hartman,” *Critical Inquiry* 4 (Winter 1977): 397–406, where he cites Miller and Krieger.

15. This move from citation to assumption parallels Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar’s taxonomy of scientific statements: “*type 5* statements represented the most fact-like entities and *type 1* the most speculative assertions.” When an assertion becomes a fact, it ceases to be footnoted: “a fact is nothing but a statement with no modality . . . and no trace of authorship . . . something so obvious that it does not even have to be said” (Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, *Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts* [1979; Princeton, N.J., 1986], pp. 79, 82).

16. See David Richter, “Pandora’s Box Revisited: A Review Article,” *Critical Inquiry* 1 (Dec. 1974): 453–78, whose first line is a quotation from Aristotle, unfootnoted. On the supplanting of the New Critics, see also Gerald Graff, *Professing Literature: An Institutional History* (Chicago, 1987).

Denis Donoghue and Frank Kermode were arguing, in footnotes, over the correct translation, meaning, and applicability of Jacques Derrida's "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences."

What then did happen in the pages of *CI*? Our citational index shows that though Richter had singled out some theorists who would figure prominently in *CI* for the next thirty years, the future in fact was happening under his nose, unseen. The ten authors most often cited, in descending order of frequency, are Jacques Derrida, Sigmund Freud, Michel Foucault, Walter Benjamin, Roland Barthes, Jacques Lacan, Fredric Jameson, Edward Said, Theodor Adorno, and Immanuel Kant (see table 2). Ranking the theorists we tracked by the number of times they'd been cited produced some interesting juxtapositions (see table 3). Karl Marx tied with Stanley Fish for fifteenth place. Some ties seem fortuitous (Kuhn, Latour, Merleau-Ponty, and Weber tied for seventy-sixth), others jarring (Aristotle and Homi Bhabha? Harold Bloom, Northrop Frye, and Gayatri Spivak?).

Many of the most frequently cited theorists have enjoyed a consistent reputation for the thirty years of *CI*. The statistics compiled in table one show a fairly steady rate of citation for eight of the top ten theorists: Derrida, Freud, Foucault, Barthes, Lacan, Jameson, Said, and Kant. Other theorists whose reputations did not change much over the years of the journal include pre-twentieth-century philosophers such as Aristotle, Marx and Engels, Hegel, and Nietzsche, certain early twentieth-century critics like Eliot, Wittgenstein, and Panofsky, and a few more recent theorists: Althusser, Habermas, Kristeva, Lévi-Strauss, Lukács, Lyotard, Sartre, Williams. In fact, this list of constants echoes John Guillory's positing, in *Cultural Capital*, of the emergence of a theoretical canon: "The fact that today we so easily recognize the names of the master theorists confirms the emergence of these names as a 'canon' supplementing the canon of literature in the graduate schools." This canon includes "the master theorists themselves, along with the historical writers—Nietzsche, Saussure, Freud, Heidegger, etc.—whose works are retroactively constructed as the *canon* of theory. This canon has emerged in the graduate schools alongside the literary canon, not only (or even most importantly) as a new area of specialization, but as the means by which to practice the criticism of literary texts in a new way."¹⁷

It might be argued that these constants, this theoretical canon, are evidence of a closed shop, so to speak, that the journal only reproduces itself, privileging articles that cite the "right" theorists. Just as a healthy journal depends on a stable of authors to give it a consistent identity, so too does a

17. John Guillory, *Cultural Capital: The Problem of Literary Canon Formation* (Chicago, 1993), pp. xii–xiii, 171.

journal, any journal, tend to replicate itself. However, we have seen enough evidence of *CI*'s eclecticism (and of the shifting nature of the boundaries of criticism) to be able to predict that just because, say, Cleanth Brooks has not been cited in fifteen years does not foreclose the possibility of an essay (or more) on Brooks or of an essay that uses Brooks's work. Thus, this list of constants comprises the authors *Critical Inquiry* authors read, and presumably these are the authors future *CI* authors will read if they want to continue, in our footnotes, the conversation. These numbers, of course, do not tell us *how* these authors have been read; it is our guess that perhaps only Benjamin's works are cited nonargumentatively.¹⁸ Even Foucault is no longer revered without reservation, and perhaps sometime soon someone will critique Benjamin, initiating a new direction in theoretical discussions. But to track that history of reception is an altogether different, though related, story.

Just as the literary canon changes over time, so too does the theoretical canon. If the above-mentioned theorists are the constants, the authors with whom our authors have engaged, and seemingly will continue to engage, what about those whose rise and/or disappearance may clue us into authors who are becoming more and more the focal point of research? *CI*, and theory more generally, has always been philosophically inclined; Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, and Cavell appear on a regular basis throughout our volumes. But because *Critical Inquiry* is often touted as one of the first multidisciplinary journals, how are other fields represented? Let us take the example of cultural anthropology. Victor Turner is cited six times from 1979 through 1989, but only once in the last fifteen years. This seems surprising, especially given the importance of Turner's concept of liminality to literary critics such as Sacvan Bercovitch. But perhaps Marcel Mauss has taken his place, having been cited once before 1992, and then ten times since. Other significant anthropologists include Clifford Geertz, ten times between 1982 and 1992, and only one or two times before and after; James Clifford, thirteen times between 1989 and 1995, and then only once every four issues thereafter; and Michael Taussig, who has been cited a total of eight times, but only since 1997. Of the anthropologists on our list, only Lévi-Strauss has had a con-

18. Pierre Bourdieu provides a rudimentary taxonomy of how footnotes indicate how an author is being read:

"Citatology" nearly always ignores this question, implicitly treating references to an author as an index of recognition (of indebtedness or legitimacy). In point of fact this apparent function may nearly always be associated with such diverse functions as the manifestation of relations of allegiance or dependence, of strategies of affiliation, of annexation or of defence (this is the role, for example, of guarantee references, ostentatious references or alibi-references).

(Pierre Bourdieu, "The Market of Symbolic Goods," *The Field of Cultural Production: Essays on Art and Literature*, ed. Randal Johnson [New York, 1993], p. 138)

sistent level of citation: from three to six citations in each five-year period. From this we can extrapolate that cultural anthropology was most central to theory a decade or so ago, during the new historicist moment. It is a good guess that at least the immediate future of theory will be colored more by Taussig and Mauss than by Turner or Geertz.

Perhaps not so surprising is the fate of traditional literary critics like F. R. Leavis, Elder Olson, and Cleanth Brooks. Cited six or seven times for the first ten years of *CI*'s history, each has been cited one or two times in the last fifteen years. Other literary critics who have fallen out of vogue in the pages of *CI* include Monroe Beardsley, Harold Bloom, Wayne Booth, Kenneth Burke, Northrop Frye, I. A. Richards, and René Wellek. This shift is indicative both of the change in the discipline of literary studies and, perhaps more importantly, of the change in the identity of the journal from a journal of literary criticism to something more interdisciplinary. While the New Critics and their contemporaries have given way to newer models of analysis, a perhaps more unexpected decline can be found when we turn to the first generation of poststructuralist literary critics. The frequency of citation of the works of Jonathan Culler, Stanley Fish, and J. Hillis Miller drops dramatically over the course of the journal's history. But perhaps this decline is actually a plateau. When Culler's books on structuralism and deconstruction first appeared in the 1970s and 1980s, they had an immediate and dramatic impact on the discipline, being cited over and over again. With time, they have been assimilated into the theoretical body and will continue to be cited at a more moderate pace. Similar spikes can be seen in more recent years in the frequency of citation of Judith Butler, Homi Bhabha, James Clifford, and Gayatri Spivak. While the conservative critics at the *New Criterion* would see this as evidence of the trendiness of critical theory, equating the reputations of Butler and Bhabha to other late nineties phenomena such as the Backstreet Boys and Beanie Babies, we read this as a more organic intellectual evolution from assertion to fact. Initially, certain theorists and terms are cited frequently for five years or so, followed by the inevitable backlash and/or assimilation. Eventually, perhaps as much as fifteen or twenty years down the road, reputations stabilize. Some concepts become part of collective theoretical consciousness, while others fade away.

While our study has helped us to map the history of theory in the pages of *CI*, it can also be used to identify new trends, figures whose stock is rising. Among these are Giorgio Agamben, first translated into English in 1991, who has been cited eight times, all in the last four years. And Étienne Balibar and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, all of whom have been cited ten times, all since 1997. Although Žižek was first cited in 1993, his works have been cited with much more frequency just in the last few years. Will he reach his plateau soon? Other scholars whose works are being cited with greater fre-

quency include figures from newer areas like science studies (Bruno Latour, Ian Hacking) and media theory (Friedrich Kittler). Benjamin was cited thirteen times between 1974 and 1989, and then 134 times since, though this number is so high in part because of a special issue we devoted to his work in 1998. Still, the only other theorist on whom we have done a special issue—Mikhail Bakhtin—generated a total of twenty-five citations, and he has been cited only four times in the last ten years.¹⁹ Benjamin might be a case of a figure whose writings are so challenging that it takes time for their ideas to be put to use. Similar difficult theorists who have seen increases are Theodor Adorno (who died in 1969 but whose works become much more cited around the mid-1990s) and Gilles Deleuze (whose popularity surged several years after his death in 1995).

These are not the only trends we could have tracked using our study, and it is our hope that other scholars will be able to make use of our data. Though it confirmed many of our assumptions, say, about the importance of Freud and Lacan, and of continental philosophy, we were stunned by the fact that no woman theorist is in the top twenty. Judith Butler is the highest at twenty-five and is the only female to make it into the top ten in any five-year period. This, despite the fact that citations to women theorists had been on the rise since *CI*'s special issue *Writing and Sexual Difference* in 1981. We fervently hope that the long-range future of theory will incorporate many more women.

Our number one theorist, Jacques Derrida, we would argue, embodied what Mitchell called “a founding principle of *Critical Inquiry*'s editorial policy”: “The policy for acceptance of manuscripts rapidly shifted from ‘essays that are correct, or well reasoned, or which contain important discoveries’ . . . to ‘essays that the editors would like to argue with.’”²⁰ Because Mitchell doesn't name any other “founding principles” in perhaps his most complete attempt to define the journal, it's safe to say that this is *the* editorial principle; it certainly is the only principle named in editorial meetings, along with its collorary, essays that are passionate. Though Derrida did not single-handedly excite the debate around deconstruction, he generated passionate critical responses with his essays on racism and on de Man. It is likely that in some future generation Derrida will no longer be cited with the frequency he is now. But our prediction is that someone like him, someone who combines polemic with inquiry, passion with professionalism, will be. That is the future of reading, and that is the future of theory.

19. Since volume 30, *CI* has published one other issue devoted to a single literary critic, that is, to Said, and we anticipate another, devoted to Derrida. Said's issue, if it had been included, would at least temporarily have pushed him past Barthes in the top ten list.

20. Mitchell, “*Critical Inquiry* and the Ideology of Pluralism,” *Critical Inquiry* 8 (Summer 1982): 613.