NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN 2013

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Lecture Outline

• How further nuclear arms reductions and arms control can enhance US security
• Arms control opportunities
• Arms control challenges
Reduced Enough Already?
New START Treaty

- Each side limited to no more than
  - 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles
  - 800 deployed and non-deployed launchers and heavy bombers
  - 1550 deployed strategic warheads
  - Limits to be implemented by 2018

- US-Russian strategic balance stable and numbers declining ... need to do more?
WHY PURSUE FURTHER NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL?
Reduce Strategic Threat to US

- Under New START, Russia can still have ~2000 deployed strategic warheads
- Most 7-55 times the power of “Little Boy” and “Fat Man”
Limit Nonstrategic (Tactical) Weapons

- Not constrained by any treaty
  - Concern to US allies
- Russian numerical advantage
- Strategic vs non-strategic
Transparency

• Data exchange and updates
• Notifications
• On-site inspections
• Result: US knows more about Russian strategic forces
## Data Exchanges and Updates

### New START Numbers, Sept 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>New START Limit</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>Russia</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deployed SDVs (700)</td>
<td>806</td>
<td>491</td>
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<td>Deployed and non-deployed</td>
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Source: U.S. Department of State
Potential US Cost Savings

- Robust strategic triad
- Need to recapitalize
  - Ballistic missile submarines
  - Heavy bombers
  - ICBMs
- Budget demands
Non-Proliferation Goals

• US nuclear reductions bolster diplomacy to block nuclear proliferation
  • US, Russia have to act
• Won’t solve North Korea or Iran
• Strengthens position to mobilize pressure against states seeking nuclear weapons
A Word on Deterrence

- Nuclear deterrence during the Cold War
- At several points, world was lucky
  - Cuban missile crisis
  - Test errors
  - US-Norwegian sounding rocket
Towards Lower Numbers ... and Zero?

- President Obama’s Prague speech
  - Reduce role and number
  - Zero attractive to US?
- But many challenges to resolve before could even get close to zero
- Still, properly designed reductions can enhance US security
NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL OPPORTUNITIES IN 2013
## US, Russian Nuclear Warhead Levels

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<td>Deployed strategic warheads</td>
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<td>Total warheads</td>
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* Estimated actual number, not New START accountable number

New US-Russia Negotiation

- Limit each side to no more than 2000-2500 total nuclear warheads
  - Sublimit of 1000 deployed strategic warheads
  - Limit of 500 deployed missiles, bombers
- Overall warhead limit forces trade
- Result = ~50% reduction
  - US still could maintain robust triad
Notional Reduction to 2000 Total

- **US Now**
  - Reserve: 4000
  - Non-Strat: 2000
  - Dep Strat: 2000

- **US After**
  - Reserve: 1000
  - Non-Strat: 1000
  - Dep Strat: 3000

- **Russia Now**
  - Reserve: 1000
  - Non-Strat: 1000
  - Dep Strat: 1000

- **Russia After**
  - Reserve: 5000
  - Non-Strat: 5000
  - Dep Strat: 5000
Missile Defense in Europe

• “European Phased Adaptive Approach”
  • (1) SM-3 IA, sea-based
  • (2) SM-3 IB, Romania
  • (3) SM-3 IIA, Poland
  • (4) SM-3 IIB
• Endorsed by NATO
NATO, Russia and MD

- Russian concern about EPAA
  - Offense-defense relationship
- NATO seeks cooperative missile defense
  - But Russians want “legal” guarantee
- Cooperative missile defense system
  - Political commitment
  - Jointly manned centers
  - Transparency
CTBT Ratification

- Testing moratorium
- Senate did not approve CTBT in 1999
- What has changed since then?
  - Stockpile stewardship program
  - Improved monitoring system
- CTBT locks in US advantage
  - Spur ratification by others
Multilateralizing Process

- Lay groundwork to broaden process
- UNSC P5 discussions

**Third Country Nuclear Forces**

- Britain
- France
- China
- Israel
- India
- Pakistan
- DPRK

*Weapons*
CHALLENGES TO ARMS CONTROL
Russian Position

• No enthusiasm for new negotiations now
  • Nuclear weapons = key to superpower status
  • Link to issues such as missile defense and conventional forces
• Waiting to see who will be US president
• US strategic advantages may give Russians motive for further reductions
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Allies and Assurance

• ~200 US nuclear bombs believed deployed in Europe
• Russians will insist weapons be based on national territory
  • Acceptable in right circumstances?

Source: “U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2012”
Verification

- Monitoring warheads in storage
  - New ground for both sides
- Lower monitoring confidence
Senate Republicans

- Skeptical about nuclear arms control
  - New START ratification proved more difficult than expected
- Seek commitment to US strategic force modernization
- Treaty or unilateral steps?
Prospects

• President Obama has indicated desire to negotiate further nuclear cuts
• Governor Romney skeptical of arms control
  • But tight defense budget, NATO considerations could affect his view
• Possible incentives for Moscow to negotiate

• Have opportunity in 2013 – will we use it?
Available October 16 from Brookings Institution Press
www.brookings.edu/about/press

THE OPPORTUNITY
NEXT STEPS IN REDUCING NUCLEAR ARMS

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