Paradigmatic recrudescence: Classical realism in the age of globalization

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PARADIGMATIC RECRUDESCENCE: CLASSICAL REALISM IN THE AGE OF
GLOBALIZATION

by

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ABSTRACT

Paradigmatic Recrudescence: Classical Realism in the Age of Globalization

by

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The paradigm of classical realism has been the subject of extensive debate in the study of international relations. Its axiomatic suppositions, conceptual structures, theoretical framework, and analytical scope have made realism the subject of both genuine veneration and intense scrutiny at the hands of international relations scholars. This has had a three-fold effect on the evolvement of the paradigm: realism has been methodically revised by neorealists; realism has become a tool of analysis for revisionist non-realists; and realism has been marginalized and erroneously critiqued. The objective of this thesis is to demonstrate and prove the following four points. First, to address the problem of revisionism and the marginalization of classical realism, arguing for the revival of the paradigm. Second, to introduce an original method of inquiry, via the dialectical, to the study of the realist paradigm, providing for a new analytical approach. Third, to demonstrate, contrary to much held criticism, that the realist paradigm is both adequate and progressive within the standards of philosophy of science. And fourth, to address the concerns of whether the explanatory powers of the paradigm are sufficient in addressing the anomalies of the modern international political system. In its entirety, this thesis demonstrates that classical realism is a complete paradigm, providing the discipline with the most comprehensive tools in addressing the age of globalization.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

At the most fundamental level, the objective of scholarship is the advancement of knowledge, and through this advancement, some form of contribution to humanity. The intellectual is the most important member of society, for evolution favors him. To this end, the advancement of knowledge is the advancement of man, and as Aristotle teaches us, the attainment of man’s highest level of development: his nature. The intellectual, by nature, is elite. In this sense, I would like to thank the specific set of intellectuals whose dedication and contribution to this project have been enormous and constructive. Words cannot properly express my gratitude to Dr. Jonathan Strand, whose tireless devotion, sage advice, and endless patience made this project possible. His chairmanship of this project speaks volumes for his consummate professionalism. Deference must be endowed upon Dr. John Tuman, whose impressive intellect has been a model for me throughout the years that I have known him. I offer him many thanks for being part of this thesis. Intellectual growth is nourished and nurtured through patience and respect. Much of my growth in the academia is contributed to Dr. David Fott, whose devotion and friendship throughout the years have instilled in me the duties of being a scholar. I am indebted to him more than he can know. I would also like to thank Dr. Andrew Bell for being a contributing member of my thesis committee.

Loyalty, honor, and a stoic sense of duty are what define Armenian men. This is best projected through one’s family. I am defined by my love for my family.

This project is dedicated to my Armenian homeland, where my heart will always belong. “The strong did what they could, and the weak suffered what they must.” The truth spoken by Thucydides always pierces my soul.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 2 MORGENTHAU’S CLASSICAL REALISM: GODFATHER OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Literature Review</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realism’s Epistemology: The Underlying Theoretical-Philosophic Structure</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classical Realism as a Theory of International Relations: Its Principles, Concepts, and Analytical Framework</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Concept of Power and the Theory of Balance of Power: Realism’s Homage to Reality</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morality and International Peace: The “Softer” Side of Classical Realism</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 3 THE NEOREALIST AND NEOLIBERAL CHALLENGE TO REALISM: AN ATTEMPT AT PARADIGM BUILDING</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Passion for Structure: Waltz’s Neorealism</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Passion for Institutions: Keohane’s Neoliberalism</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Neoparadigms Exposed: Revisionism as Contradiction</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 4 CONTRARIA CONTRARIIS CURANTUR: POWER AND THE DIALECTICAL</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction to the Dialectical</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Development of Interest: A Dialectical Model</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Logic of Power: Power as Dialectical Evolution</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Defined in Terms of Power: Final Synthesis</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 5 THE POWER OF POWER POLITICS: A DEFENSE</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Anatomy of a Paradigm: Realism and the Philosophy of Science</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Inadequate Epistemological Structure: Vasquez’s Problem of Defining Realism</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluating the Adequacy of the Realist Paradigm: Disputing Vasquez’s Criteria</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 6 THE REALIST PARADIGM IN MODERNITY: A CONCLUSION</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addressing Anomalies in the Modern International Political System: Realism’s Staying Power</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VITA</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The paradigm of classical realism,¹ as a research program that seeks to understand and explain the nature of international politics, has been the subject of extensive debate in the study of international relations (IR). The composition of realism, with its axiomatic suppositions, conceptual structures, and analytical depth, has made this theory the subject of both genuine veneration and intense scrutiny at the hands of international relations scholars. The principles of the discipline often make realist assumptions about the nature of international politics appear to be truisms. Because of this, realism has been the subject of extensive usage by various schools of thought within IR. This appeal to realism, however, has had a three-fold effect with respect to the evolvement of realism. First, realism has been the subject of methodical revisionism² at the hands of neorealists. Second, realism has become a tool of analysis for revisionist non-realists who have sought to use the richness of realism to bolster their own theories. And third, neorealism and other minimalist realist approaches have been incorrectly classified as extensions of the realist paradigm, where all forms of criticism leveled against the neo-paradigms have been erroneously deemed critiques of realism itself. Whatever the case might be,

¹ “Classical realism” will be used interchangeably with the term “realism” to refer to Hans J. Morgenthau’s political theory. While E.H. Carr is also deemed as one of the founders of classical realism, this paper will primarily concentrate on the theoretical structure of Morgenthau, since much of international relations scholarship has placed far more emphasis on Morgenthau than any other realist thinker. While we closely associate Morgenthau with classical realism, we refrain from extending this method of analysis to any other scholar (with the exception of Kenneth Waltz with neorealism and Robert O.Keohane with neoliberalism), thus bypassing the very complex and controversial process of identifying certain scholars with certain paradigms, where such certainty is both unclear and debatable.

² The term revisionism is used in this thesis within the context of defining and exposing the methodical alteration, modification and restructuring of a given paradigm’s theoretical structure, conceptual models, and fundamental assumptions. A scholar or a school of thought is deemed revisionist when it engages in an act of revisionism, as specified above, and where which such revisionism contradicts the theoretical framework and fundamental assumptions of the given paradigm. Epistemologically, therefore, revisionism as contradiction is a form of paradigm-building that is structurally unjustifiable.
contemporary scholars have remolded and restructured the paradigm for the sake of formulating their own theories. The dire need of such scholars to resort to revisionism in their approaches to realism suggests that they presuppose an underlying deficiency within realism itself.

While it is not the intent of this thesis to rescue realism from revisionism, it is, however, to expose how revisionism has taken place, the rationale that claims to justifies revisionism, and the inherent inconsistencies that are prevalent between the revisionist justifications and the overall theoretical framework of classical realism. Thus, the first part of this thesis seeks to expose the misuse of realism at the hands of contemporary revisionist scholars, address in a comparative fashion the theoretical foundations of the revisionist schools of thought, and provide a counter-argument in defense of the presumed insufficiencies that are inherent in classical realism.

Since realism has been the subject of extensive use by the various theoretical schools of thought within IR, this thesis can not address the revisionism undertaken by all. It will, however, address the two main schools of thought that have revised realism more extensively than any of the other schools of thought within the discipline: neorealism and neoliberalism. Neorealism, as the self-proclaimed savior of the paradigm, has adapted structuralism in its attempt to contribute to the advancement of classical realism. In its attempt to account for the “deficiencies” of realism, neorealism has negated the atomistic nature of realism in favor of a positional analysis, has rejected the emphasis on optimization of power in favor of distributive assessments, and has disregarded the important components of diplomacy and rational stratagem as reductionist in favor of systemic determinism. In essence, the presuppositions of realism have been revised and
altered to make realism compatible with systemic structuralism. Therefore, this thesis shall demonstrate the incompatibility of realism with structuralism by demonstrating the fundamental principles of classical realism, its negation of revisionism, and how it accounts for the so-called insufficiencies and deficiencies that the discipline presumably suffers from.

Neoliberalism, on the other hand, has approached classical realism in a purely instrumental sense: to use the important components of realism to augment liberal institutionalism, and then completely disregard realism in favor of institutionalism. Thus, while neorealism derives in part from realism, albeit perhaps inconsistently, neoliberalism only views realism as a theoretical framework that should be used for the benefit of its own theory and then to be cast aside. While neorealism commits more acts of revisionism, neoliberalism, however, provides far more instances of analytical and theoretical inconsistencies. Shifts from state-centrism to limitation of the state by institutions, from rational and egoist assumptions to bounded-rationality and empathy contentions, and from marginalization of security concerns to concentration on institutionalized economic cooperation are but a few examples that demonstrate the incompatibility of neoliberal revisionism. In sum, the initial argument of this project holds that the revisionism committed by neorealism and neoliberalism is incompatible with realism, does not provide for the so-called deficiencies within realism, and establishes neorealism and neoliberalism on theoretically inconsistent and contradictory foundations. Consequently, two important approaches are taken: 1) a solution is provided to these exposed problems, while accounting for the so-called deficiencies that neorealism and neoliberalism have claimed to satisfy; and 2) this thesis will compare and
contrast the two paradigms that have sought to revise realism, while providing an original theoretical argument that is consistent with realism, accounts for institutionalism, and negates the concerns of neorealism. Note, the ongoing neoliberal-neorealist debate is not crucial to the underlying argument of this paper, but merely serves as a mechanism by which the reintroduction of classical realism, as a more useful paradigm, is introduced in relation to the two revisionist paradigms. Neoliberalism and neorealism, in and of themselves, are not crucial to the analytical and structural model of this project’s assessment of classical realism. The revisionist paradigms, however, are incorporated into the discourse for three primary reasons: 1) to demonstrate to the reader how classical realism has been treated in modern scholarship; 2) to engage and counter criticisms of classical realism, while demonstrating the superiority of the paradigm; and 3) to justify the necessity of reviving classical realism.

This initial introductory chapter provides a general introduction to the overarching structure of this thesis, with a tour of the extant discourse of classical realism, the neorealist-neoliberal debate with respect to each paradigm’s claim of ascendancy, and the nature of the revisionism that classical realism has been subjected to. Chapter 2 is introduced with a literature review that explores the current discourse pertaining to the very issues discussed in the introduction. The structuration of the paradigm’s epistemological framework is also introduced in this chapter, along with an assessment of the fundamental assumptions that define the paradigm. Paradigm-building, as a theory oriented approach, is explored in this chapter, providing for a penetrating look at the guidelines of theory articulation within the paradigm. Chapter 2 then proceeds to explore
the conceptual, structural, and analytical framework of classical realism, providing an assessment of all the important components of the paradigm’s theoretical model.

In chapter 3, an analysis of the fundamental principles of classical realism is presented in conjunction and in comparison to the revisionism undertaken by both neoliberalism and neorealism, demonstrating that the presumed deficiencies within classical realism (as claimed by the two neo-paradigms) are in fact distortions or misinterpretations of realism. The problem of revisionism becomes a critical issue of discussion because it illuminates the rationale for the negation or marginalization of the paradigm. Thus, by exposing and countering the claims of the revisionist scholars, it becomes possible to provide the theoretical and epistemological justifications for the revival of classical realism as a progressive paradigm.

Chapter four addresses the most important theoretical concept within classical realism, and the one that is perhaps the most controversial: realism’s fundamental assumption that interest defined in terms of power is the underlying force in international politics. That is, does power, as defined within the interests and actions of the rational state-actor, explain the nature of modern international relations? While in chapter two the concept of power is addressed normatively and historically, it is not addressed within the context of modernity. Modernity requires its own separate structure of justification vis-à-vis the vast difference between the international political system of the past and the present. The theoretical-analytical model that provides an answer to the concerns of modernity is the dialectical model presented in this chapter. Hegelian in structure and Clausewitzian in context, this proposed model addresses accountability, consistency, and the explanatory powers of classical realism as it takes on the challenges of modernity.
More specifically, it provides an original and in-depth assessment of the paradigm’s underlying structuration, in which the formulation of several of the paradigm’s fundamental assumptions are demonstrated, along with the intrinsic and intricate nature of how these fundamental assumptions are intertwined and developed within the dialectical process.

Chapter five addresses one of the most devastating critiques leveled against the realist paradigm, that realism is a degenerative paradigm by virtue of its regressive scientific approach. Using Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy of science, John A. Vasquez offers a powerful argument that the realist paradigm has failed to lead scientific inquiry and knowledge accumulation within the field of international relations. Vasquez seeks to demonstrate that the fundamental assumptions of the paradigm lack explanatory and predictive power and are thus falsified, leading to his conclusion that realism, as the most dominant paradigm in the post-WWII era, is degenerative. Concomitantly, this thesis takes issue with Vasquez’s eloquent critique, demonstrating the theoretical and analytical flaws in Vasquez’s assessment of realism, and arguing that Vasquez’s misreading of the paradigm’s fundamental principles is the underlying reason for his conclusions. As such, Vasquez’s entire approach is deconstructed and scrutinized to demonstrate that the realist paradigm, contrary to Vasquez’s evaluation, meets the criteria of a progressive paradigm.

In conclusion, the sixth chapter will address the fundamental question of whether classical realism is in fact compatible with modernity. More specifically, is realism a progressive paradigm? It does so by asking whether the fundamental assumptions and the theoretical framework of the paradigm, as demonstrated and interpreted in this thesis, are outdated assessments that still clinch to the power politics of the past; or are they
dynamic paradigm-guided assumptions whose explanatory capacity in dealing with the reality of international politics make realism an important tool in studying the international system of the modern age?
CHAPTER 2

MORGENTHAU’S CLASSICAL REALISM: THE GODFATHER OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Revisionism is analytically problematic and theoretically subjective. The negations of being accused of revisionism are embedded in its complexity, its exposure concealed in the pluralistic nature of analysis, and its subjective justification. Classical realism’s rudimentary elements have been synthesized, altered, manipulated, and distorted all under the banner of making classical realism escape its status as an inadequate and insufficient theory. As a result of such revisionism, and the complex features of revisionism itself, very few scholars have undertaken the burden of addressing this phenomenon and exposing revisionism for what it is: instrumentalism that has distorted and manipulated classical realism’s analytical-theoretical structure to formulate new research programs. This section will provide a close reading of Morgenthau’s classical realism, assessing its fundamental assumptions, theoretical presuppositions, and discussing such imperative concepts as power, balance-of-power, morality, and international peace. This will demonstrate that such concepts have been disregarded or altered by revisionist scholars in their misunderstandings of classical realism, leading to a falsification of the claims proposed by such critics that classical realism is either inadequate or insufficient as a paradigm to deal with the complexities of contemporary international politics. But first, a schematic literature review.
A Literature Review

Since its introduction into the study of international relations in the early 1950’s, realism has become perhaps the most dominant paradigm in the discipline, displaying a “staying power” that has been appreciated by both academicians and practitioners of politics alike.\(^3\) Steven Forde confirms this widely held argument by maintaining that “[r]ealism of one variety or another has dominated the study of international relations for the past fifty years.”\(^4\) Keith L. Shimko demonstrates that the dominance of realism became embedded in the academia of post-WWII society after “liberal idealism and its attendant utopianism were discredited” in mainstream scholarship.\(^5\) Since the American intellectual heritage lacked a genuine conservative tradition, the failure of its liberal idealism paved the way for realism, as a European intellectual movement, to find a prominent niche in the study of international relations in America. Robert Cox holds that it was “European-formed thinkers like…Hans Morgenthau who introduced a more pessimistic and power-oriented view of mankind into the American milieu conditioned by eighteenth-century optimism and nineteenth century belief in progress.”\(^6\) While political realism is generally traced all the way to ancient Greece, especially in the works of Thucydides, its introduction as a scientifically oriented discipline was facilitated by Hans Morgenthau and E.H. Carr. However, while Carr placed extensive emphasis on the “scientific character of the enterprise,” Morgenthau sought more of a middle ground.

approach, seeking to find a balance between leading the scientific revolution headed by realism and preserving its normative essence.\(^7\)

While extensive attention has been given to Morgenthau’s realism as regarding power and irredentism, more contemporary scholars have emphasized and sought to demonstrate the vital role that elements of morality and ethics play in the principles of realism. A.J.H. Murray insists that in contrast to “traditional interpretations,” classical realism is primarily hinged on the normative tradition, and “in contrast to revisionist accounts,” Morgenthau’s moral theory “is rooted in the Judeo-Christian tradition of moral thought.”\(^8\) Other scholars, concentrating on realism’s power politics, have rejected this premise, holding that the underlying assumptions of realism make its appeal to morality ultimately inadequate and problematic.\(^9\) Bahman Fozouni provides special attention to such inadequacies, maintaining that the shortcomings of classical realism are embedded in its epistemological underpinnings. This, however, is the byproduct of the “exceptional parsimony of realism’s theoretical structure and the nomothetic nature of its claim.”\(^10\)

Criticisms of inadequacy, amorality, theoretical insufficiency, limited scientific methodology, and accusation of realism as a “degenerative” paradigm gave birth to the rise of neorealism as the self-proclaimed heir of classical realism, while also paving the way for the introduction of neoliberalism as a paradigm that fuses classical realism with

\(^7\) For a discussion of E.H. Carr and his perspective on the scientific role of Realism, see The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939, (London: MacMillan, 1940), pg. 8-10. For Morgenthau’s skepticism toward the over usage of science in the study of international politics, see Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946).


classical idealism/liberalism. Yet regardless of one’s position on classical realism, “[f]ew would dispute the claim that the theory of political realism, especially as articulated by Hans J. Morgenthau nearly half a century ago, has been the nearest approximation to a reigning paradigm or, at least, a dominant orthodoxy in the field of international politics.” This same position is also held by Mansbach and Vasquez, where they maintain that the sustainable dominance of classical realism in the study of international relations is unquestionable. In a similar fashion, Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff have also conceded that classical realism, as articulated by Morgenthau, has displayed an unmatched staying power in the study of international relations.

The introduction of structuralism and the subsequent renaissance of institutionalism in international relations scholarship—as tacit reactions to classical realism—made neorealism and neoliberalism “two of the most influential contemporary approaches to international relations theory.” Much of the neorealist-neoliberal debate can be seen as a reaction to the publication of Kenneth Waltz’s *Theory of International Politics*. This reaction came in the form of Robert Keohane’s neoliberalism, which sought to

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12 Fozouni, “Confutation of Political Realism,” pg. 479.
16 For a discussion of the overall theoretical structure of neorealism, see Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, (Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1979). For a look at Waltz’ initial works, especially his assessment of classical realism and an introduction of some of neorealism’s most important principles, see *Man, The State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001). For a general discussion by Waltz of these two books and their vital importance to the neorealist-
synthesize elements of classical realism with liberal institutionalism, with extensive emphasis on the world political economy.\textsuperscript{17} While both paradigms concede that the foundations of their philosophical, theoretical, and conceptual structures are greatly hinged on classical realism, both claim to have surpassed classical realism in depth, progressiveness, and more importantly, in explanatory capacity. The neorealist-neoliberal debate has sidelined the relevance of classical realism in contemporary discourse, with much of the debate revolving around one paradigm seeking to falsify the other, while downplaying the extensive level of revisionism undertaken by both.

Neorealists such as John J. Mearsheimer agree that “institutionalist theory is largely a response to [neo]realism” and it “challenges [neo]realism’s underlying logic.”\textsuperscript{18} Neorealists fault neoliberals for their extensive attention to institutionalism at the expense of security, for neorealism argues “that international institutions are unable to mitigate anarchy’s constraining effects on inter-state cooperation.”\textsuperscript{19} This is complemented by neorealism’s innate pessimism toward the prospects of international cooperation and the capacity of international institutions to facilitate such.\textsuperscript{20} John G. Ruggie, among many other scholars, rejects the anti-institutionalism argument presented by the neorealist camp, demonstrating that international institutions and institutional restraint have facilitated continued international cooperation within contemporary international

\textsuperscript{20} For a discussion of classical realism’s pessimism toward cooperation, see Morgenthau, \textit{Scientific Man vs. Power Politics}, pp. 187-199. For a neorealist interpretation of realism’s pessimistic analysis, see Robert
politics. The debate between these two approaches has dominated international relations scholarship for the last two decades, contributing to the development and intellectual heritage of the discipline. Regardless of the suggested differences between the approaches, however, it is not that difficult for observers to detect how the two theories overlap in many ways, suggesting some common roots in classical realism, and their common revisionism of Morgenthau’s political theory. To this end, the next section introduces the political theory of classical realism.

Realism’s Epistemology: The Underlying Theoretical-Philosophic Structure

Realism, at its most basic level, involves commitment to a set of propositions concerning the nature of international politics that are essentially extrapolated from the diplomatic history of Europe following the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. These propositions are articulated in the form of a theory, and the formulation of such a theory that defines classical realism is the one provided by Hans J. Morgenthau. For Morgenthau, a theory of international relations is in essence a theory of international politics, for as a totality of complex social phenomena, international relations, similar to domestic relations, necessitates the capacity of international politics to take precedence over other perspectives and become the focus of any theoretical approach to international politics.


relations: “[t]he primacy of politics over all other interests, in fact as well as in thought, is so far as the relations among nations and areas are concerned, needs only to be mentioned to be recognized.”23 Since the nature of politics is embedded in the struggle for power, this premise of uniformity holds true for both international and domestic politics, leading to Morgenthau’s conclusion that a general political theory inevitably confronts a theory of international politics.24 Yet Morgenthau does not suggest that domestic and international politics are intertwined to such an extent that the distinction is blurred, but rather he argues that the environment within which international politics takes place is quite different from the environment of domestic politics, “[w]hat sets international society apart from other societies is the fact that its strength—political, moral, social—is concentrated in its members, its own weakness being the reflection of that strength.”25

Morgenthau contends that theory must serve as a tool of understanding, a mechanism that facilitates the objective of bringing order and meaning into a “mass of unconnected material.”26 Its primary purpose is to reduce the facts of experience to specific instances of general propositions, yet it should not be forgotten that this reduction automatically transcends the specific facts of experience into an intellectually abstract realm. Thus, the general propositions formulated by theory should not be employed as “blueprint for political action.”27 Theory, because of its abstract nature, is limited by the very nature of

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24 Ibid., pg. 77.
26 Morgenthau, The Decline of Democratic Politics, pg. 72.
politics itself, where contingent and unpredictable elements obviate the possibility of definitive theoretical understanding. It is precisely at this point where Morgenthau’s realism defines itself as a realism of both theory and politics, where the abstract is negated in favor of the practical. In short, pragmatic assessments of the empirical world are more important than the systematized abstractions of that empirical world.

Morgenthau’s appeal to the traditional continental conservatism of Edmund Burke, which rejects theory in favor of practical politics, defines the philosophical-theoretical structure of classical realism.\textsuperscript{28} It is for this reason that Morgenthau attacks theoretical endeavors that seek “to reduce international relations to a system of abstract propositions with a predictive function.”\textsuperscript{29} It is classical realism’s negation of this specific premise (which lies at the very heart of its theoretical-philosophical structure) that has been ignored and manipulated by revisionist paradigms that appeal to classical realism as a source of self-legitimization. Thus, the very insertion of structuralism, for example, is a mechanism of systematization that seeks to serve an explanatory and predictive purpose. While elements of realism can comfortably be remolded into a structural framework, this very process of synthesis is antithetical to the philosophical-theoretical principles of classical realism. Furthermore, Morgenthau’s appeal to a practical, and pragmatic assessment of international politics makes classical realism compatible with the constant changing nature of international politics, for the essence of realism is to observe and practically deal with such flux, not to enmesh itself into its own theoretical abstractions as a methodological approach to understanding the phenomena of international politics,

\textsuperscript{28} Morgenthau opens \textit{Scientific Man versus Power Politics} by quoting Edmund Burke, “politics ought to be adjusted, not to human reason, but to human nature; of which reason is but a part, and by no means the greatest part.” See Morgenthau, \textit{Scientific Man versus Power Politics}, pg. ii.

\textsuperscript{29} Morgenthau, \textit{The Decline of Democratic Politics}, pg. 65.
for realism “appeals to historic precedent rather than to abstract principles.”\(^{30}\) For this reason, only by observing Morgenthau’s conception of what theory is, and how his conception of theory shapes the theory of realism itself, can we better understand the nature of the revisionism that has taken place against realism.

### Classical Realism as a Theory of International Relations: Its Principles, Concepts, and Analytical Framework

Having developed a conceptual understanding of classical realism’s philosophical-theoretical structure, we now turn our attention to an assessment of what classical realism is as a theory of international relations. Realism is the political philosophy of Morgenthau, yet Morgenthau is quite aware of the fact that as a term, realism is both ambiguous and not self-explanatory. Thus, Morgenthau places emphasis on the concept of actuality, an assessment of that which exists, rather than that which could, or which is presumed to exist, that is, the phenomena in question are actual phenomena, not hypothetical, or theoretically abstract. Hence Morgenthau’s definition of the theory of realism: “[t]he theoretical concern with human nature as it actually is, and with the historic process as they actually take place, has earned for the theory presented here the name of realism.”\(^{31}\) Realism is concerned not with a theory’s conception of what the world is or should be, but rather what the empirical world actually is. Therefore, reality, for realism, takes precedence over theory, and theory only serves reality as its servant, for it is reality that shapes the theory of realism, not the theoretical concepts that are born out of the theory itself. For this reason, realism is a broad and dynamic paradigm within IR,

for its explanatory powers and auxiliary assumptions account for the realities of the world, rather than seeking to shift or manipulate such realities to fit into its own theory.

As a result of such scope and depth, the accusations of inadequacy or insufficiency leveled against realism are themselves inadequate and insufficient, for realism is not a static theory—it deals with historic processes, that is, the constant change and evolvement of the world—and is thus capable of providing adequate and sufficient assessments of the ever-changing realities of the world. In essence, contentions of inadequacy or insufficiency suggest a theory’s inability to account for or deal with novel phenomena within the realities of world politics. However, the very essence of realism is precisely to account for and address actual phenomena. Therefore, realism cannot be deficient as its very purpose is to decide and understand the actual historic processes taking place. In this sense, any contemporary phenomenon that come into existence are phenomena that realism can address, for its is not restricted by any theoretical assumptions, since its main theoretical assumption is just that, to deal with the actualities of the world, regardless of how dynamic, unique, or unusual it may be. Thus, realism, for example, can explain globalization, institutionalism, integration, and other phenomena that are taking place in the world. More deductive paradigms may be prone to refuse to accept the actual realities of the world because of the narrowness of their research programs. That is, realism would not and cannot reject any actual phenomena regardless of its theoretical presuppositions, for the very purpose of its theoretical presuppositions is precisely to do that, to account for phenomena that reality presents. In sum, while certain theories approach the realities of the world through the myopic lenses

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31 Ibid., pg. 4.
of their paradigms, classical realism does just the opposite, it approaches the world as it is, not what a paradigm’s theoretical presuppositions assume it to be.

To provide a more thorough understanding of realism, Morgenthau provides an outline of the six principles—which form a large part of the paradigm’s fundamental assumptions—that are the core and essence of realism’s political philosophy. The first principle maintains that politics is “governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature.”33 The capacity to improve society is embedded in understanding these laws, and realism aspires to formulate a rational theory that “reflects” these objective laws. These laws, in essence, are what define the known world to us, for their existence is an extension of human nature, and both are fixed and innate.34 The static nature of these objective laws of politics (static in this sense refers to longevity, that they have existed as such throughout history, but their static nature is not absolute) suggests a capacity to transcend time, and such longevity and endurance suggests a unique capacity within a theory that articulates such laws. Morgenthau specifically concentrates on this point, “the fact that a theory of politics was developed hundreds or even thousands of years ago—as was the theory of the balance of power—does not create a presumption that it must be outmoded and obsolete.”35 The wealth of history, Morgenthau suggests, provides legitimacy to a theory that has endured and observed the persistent complexities of human interactions, for a theory of politics “must be subjected to the dual test of reason and experience.” This incrementally developing conception of a theory’s legitimacy vis-à-vis its historical endurance provides a strong rebuttal against contemporary revisionists

33 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, pg. 4.
34 Ibid., pg. 4.
and critics who have accused realism of the very same contentions that Morgenthau himself foresaw fifty years before:

To dismiss such a theory because it had its flowering in centuries past is to present not a rational argument but a modernistic prejudice that takes for granted the superiority of the present over the past. To dispose of the revival of such a theory as a “fashion” or “fad” is tantamount to assuming that in matters political we can have opinions but no truths.\(^{36}\)

In this first principle, Morgenthau provides an argument against potential claims of static ahistoricism, for he clearly separates the static nature of objective laws from the historical processes such laws transcend. Any claims by critics or revisionists that fail to observe this underlying premise of separation are mere “opinions but no truths.” In sum, the first principle accomplishes two objectives: it lends authoritative legitimacy to a theory that has endured throughout history and it separates the static nature of this endurance from its historic process, refuting accusations of ahistoricism.

The second principle introduces one of the most vital concepts in the political philosophy of realism: the concept of interest defined in terms of power.\(^{37}\) Thus, realism assumes that political actors behave and think in terms of interest defined as power. This concern with interest and power leads realism to eschew any preoccupation with the ideological preferences of political actors. Political actors engage in the process of expanding the rational interests of the state, and since such interest is defined in terms of power, political actors are in essence seeking to expand the power of the state. This mechanism of expansion is the state’s foreign policy, and only a rational foreign policy is a good policy, “for only a rational foreign policy minimizes risks and maximizes benefits

\(^{35}\) Ibid., pg. 4.  
\(^{36}\) Ibid., pg. 4.  
\(^{37}\) Ibid., pg. 5.
and, hence, complies both with the moral precept of prudence and the political requirement of success.\textsuperscript{38} By defining what rational foreign policy should be, realism becomes capable of countering critics and revisionists who have offered a potentially devastating attack against realism: realism’s notion of national interest is extremely broad and ambiguous, and any activity undertaken by the state is deemed rational and in its self-interest regardless of outcome, leading to the conclusion that the state cannot be irrational or act against its self-interest. This widely held claim is directly falsified by Morgenthau’s definition, for if a state’s actions do not “maximize benefits” and “minimize risks” through prudent decision-making, its lack of political success would cause the state’s actions to be both irrational and not in its self-interests. To this end, claims of ambiguity, with respect to national interest, and relativity, with respect to rationality, are not legitimate grounds of criticism of classical realism.

It is the concept of power, Morgenthau maintains, that distinguishes the study of political facts from the study of nonpolitical facts, that is, “[w]ithout such a concept a theory of politics, international or domestic, would altogether be impossible.”\textsuperscript{39} Realism’s specification that interest defined as power applies primarily to the political realm is complemented by Morgenthau’s claim that it also separates politics from “economics, ethics, aesthetics, or religion.” Therefore, propositions, for example, that claim the realist conception of power to be inadequate or inapplicable in dealing with economic factors become propositions that are inherently flawed, for the concept of interest defined as power is only applied to the political domain. Thus, when the economic realm becomes the subject of study, realism does not and cannot insist that the concept of power should

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., pg. 10.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., pg. 5.
be the dominant or the primary tool of analysis, but rather “interest defined as wealth” becomes the conceptual tool of analysis. Such a confusion of the functional role of a concept within a theory is a problematic presupposition presented by the observer, not the theory itself. To this end, the second principle solidifies the legitimacy of realism by providing two levels of defense against critics and revisionists: 1) the national interest and rationality problem as it pertains to the state is alleviated; and 2) the confusion or misunderstanding over the concept of interest defined as power is remedied by demonstrating its specific functional role within the paradigm.

The third principle addresses one of the most important and misunderstood premises pertaining to the realist conception of interest defined as power: realism does not claim an absolute and permanent meaning for its concept of power, but rather assumes the concept as “an objective category which is universally valid, but it does not endow that concept with a meaning that is fixed once and for all.”\(^\text{40}\) While the idea of interests is indeed the essence of politics and is “unaffected by the circumstances of time and place,” it, however, is dependent upon the “political and cultural context.” that is, environment plays a vital role in shaping the interests that determine and provide justification for political action.\(^\text{41}\) This same fundamental premise also applies to the concept of power, for its “content and the manner of its use are determined by the political and cultural environment.”\(^\text{42}\) More specifically, Morgenthau is not asserting that the concept of power is used in an ad hoc fashion, but rather that power is not absolute, in that it is not “fixed once and for all.” Thus, Morgenthau formulates an extremely important distinction between interest and power, establishing a framework through which the capacity of

\(^{40}\) Ibid., pg 10.

\(^{41}\) Ibid., pp. 10-11.
power as the most dominant interest is inherently limited, for power is contingent upon the environment and conditions that define and determine the state’s interests.

This distinction questions the widely held myth that realism is obsessed with power, and that its political philosophy hinges all forms of analysis upon a power-based framework. Realism does not approach historical and contemporary phenomena through a power-based framework because of its theoretical presuppositions, but rather because the historic process and the nature of contemporary international politics are assumed to be defined by power. Thus, it is the nature and the role of power in international politics that lead realism to place extensive emphasis upon it, not its innate philosophical-theoretical structure. It is power, as an undeniable reality within international politics, which accounts for realism’s subscription to the concept, and to this end, if power ceases to serve as the dominant force in the reality of international politics, realism will, without any reservations, limit its subscription to power. For this reason, the claims that realism is a power obsessed paradigm are “mere opinions” that hold no analytic truth, for realism is not power-centric, but rather interest-centric, and Morgenthau demonstrates this by limiting the role of power as it relates to the realities of international relations:

When the times tend to depreciate the element of power, it [political science] must stress its importance. When the times incline toward a monistic conception of power in the general scheme of things, it must show its limitations. When the times conceive of power primarily in military terms, it must call attention to the variety of factors which go into the power question.¹⁴³

The conceptual framework established by the third principle is problematic for critics and revisionists for two primary reasons: 1) by demonstrating the non-static/dynamic

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¹⁴² Ibid., pg. 11.
¹⁴³ Morgenthau, *The Decline of Democratic Politics*, pg. 47.
nature of the concept of interest defined as power (that is, interest is defined as power only to the extent that realities of the world continue to exist as such), and by separating power and interest as two distinct elements, with the latter being the defining element of realism, the third principle falsifies the claim that realism is a power-centric paradigm; and 2) by demonstrating its awareness of the fact that power, as the defining interest, is ephemeral in relation to the changing nature of the historic processes, realism reveals the pragmatic, practical, and realistic nature of its paradigm, proving that it is not defined by its theoretical presuppositions, but rather by an objective assessment of the empirical world and the realities of international politics.

Principles four and five address realism’s approach to morality, and the role morality plays, or should play, in international politics.⁴⁴ Political realism, the fourth principle holds, is not indifferent to morality, and is “aware of the moral significance of political action.”⁴⁵ However, realism is also aware of the “ineluctable tension” between morality and successful politics, and this tension is born out of the dichotomous complexity between individual/universal morality and state/political morality. That is, action necessitated for the attainment of a certain moral goal is differentiated with respect to the nature of the moral goal and the extent of the action that is necessitated. Thus, individual/universal morality engulfs itself in some realm of abstract idealism, while state/political morality is defined by its capacity to serve the interests of the state. Therefore, the moral goal of the state might necessitate action that could be deemed morally problematic on the individual/universal level. However, since the nature of the state’s moral goal is different from that of the individual, the extent of the necessitated

⁴⁴ For a more thorough discussion of morality, see the section on morality and international law, Chapter 2 of this thesis.
action is defined by its adherence to the ultimate moral goal of the state, the preservation of its interests.\textsuperscript{46} Morgenthau further articulates this premise, “[r]ealism maintains that universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract universal formulation, but that they must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and space.”\textsuperscript{47} For this reason, political morality is defined by prudence: the necessity for extensive “consideration of the political consequences of seemingly moral action.” To this end, the morality of state action is defined by its political consequences.

After having distinguished and established a dichotomous relationship between individual/universal morality and political/state morality, Morgenthau writes of the fifth principle, “[p]olitical realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe.”\textsuperscript{48} In essence, while the existence of universal morality is an undeniable truism, this truism ultimately fails to serve as the guiding force behind the objectives of a given state, for the moral aspirations of a state, as discussed, are quite different from universal morality. Political realism’s refusal to identify state/political morality with universal morality is not merely based on philosophical-theoretical grounds, but also, and perhaps primarily, on pragmatic grounds: “[a]ll nations are tempted…to clothe their own particular aspirations and actions in the moral purposes of the universe.”\textsuperscript{49} That is, the realities of the political world necessitate states to define their interests in terms of power; however, to conceal and legitimize their objectives, states tend to appeal to a universal morality.\textsuperscript{50} In more basic terms, principal

\textsuperscript{45} Morgenthau, \textit{Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace}, pg. 12.
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., pg. 12.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., pg. 12.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., pg. 13.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., pg. 13.
\textsuperscript{50} Morgenthau articulates this specific premise when he asserts that “to pacify the resentment and opposition that arise when the drive for power is recognized for what it is, those who seek power employ,
five refuses to allow realism to become naïve, for naïvety is antithetical to realism, since it would blind the paradigm from the realities of international politics.

The fourth and fifth principles produce two distinct assumptions on morality that are directly problematic for both neorealism and neoliberalism as revisionist paradigms. First, principles four and five are directly tied with principle two, fusing the concept of morality with the concept of rationality with respect to the concept of interest. Specifically, since rational policy is good policy (second principle), that is, policy that serves the interests of the state, and since serving the interest of the state is the moral goal of state action (principles four and five), then any action that serves the interest of the state is both rational and moral. This synthesis of the two concepts proves to be extremely problematic for neorealism’s deterministic structuralism, for neorealism’s revisionist premise negates the capacity of the agent to be responsible for consequences, since consequences are determined by the structure. However, since the morality of the state is defined by the consequences of the state’s actions, this negation of consequences automatically negates the capacity for morality within neorealism, for it deems the concept irrelevant. This hurls neorealism into the ethically problematic trap of being amoral, while preserving classical realism’s claim as a paradigm that values morality. Second, the distinction between universal and political morality is a proposition that neoliberalism blatantly fails to observe, concentrating only on the former, while attaching the concept of rational self-interest to the latter. Thus, neoliberalism falsely links rationality with universal morality, instead of political/state morality, throwing itself into the trap of naïvety, that is, an inability to observe the state’s concealment of its true

as we have seen, ideologies for the concealment of their aims. What is actually aspiration for power, then, appears to be something different, something that is in harmony with the demands of reason, morality, and
objectives. At the same time, if the actual, realistic state of the international political system demonstrates international cooperation through which political/state morality is being aligned with universal morality, then realism will be able to accept this, for it accepts and holds universal morality in high regard. On the other hand, however, this becomes extremely problematic for neorealism, undermining the very foundations of the paradigm. In any instance, the flexible consistency of realism’s conception of morality proves to be far more adequate and sufficient than that of its revisionist counterparts.

The sixth principle establishes the uniqueness of realism, in that realism is different from “other schools of thought,” and this difference is both “real” and “profound,” for realism constitutes a distinct intellectual approach. This approach is in sharp contrast with other approaches to IR, for realism advocates the autonomy of politics vis-à-vis other spheres of thought, that is, it “cannot but subordinate these other standards to those of politics.”\(^{51}\) Morgenthau presents a distinct and powerful argument for purism as a method of study for politics, that is, he rejects the infringement of other disciplines into the realm of IR. This introduces realism’s negation of revisionism, that is, the interjection of external schools of thought and the alteration of the existing conceptual framework of the paradigm for the sake of accommodating such interjections. Morgenthau maintains that realism “parts company with other schools when they impose standards of thought appropriate to other spheres upon the political sphere.”\(^{52}\) This premise demonstrates realism’s complete rejection of the revisionism undertaken by neorealism as the self-proclaimed savior of realism and neoliberalism as a subscriber to classical realism’s fundamental presuppositions. By interjecting microeconomic principles and establishing

\(^{51}\) Ibid., pg. 13.

\(^{52}\) See Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, pg. 219.
sociological structuralism as the defining theoretical-conceptual framework of its paradigm, neorealism commits a flagrant violation of this sixth principle, for it “imposes standards of thought appropriate to other spheres,” such as economics and sociology, “upon the political sphere.”\(^{53}\) This act of revisionism is antithetical to the entire philosophic-theoretic structure of classical realism, completely negating and falsifying neorealism’s claim as the heir to realism.

Neoliberalism also suffers a similar quandary; however, since it does not claim to be an offshoot of classical realism, its revisionism is less problematic than that of neorealism. Nonetheless, neoliberalism’s institutionalism, with its inherent roots in classical idealism, proves to be both problematic and contradictory with its subscription to the basic conceptions of classical realism. “The realist defense of the autonomy of the political sphere against its subversion by other modes of thought does not imply disregard for the existence and importance of these other modes of thought,” Morgenthau writes. “It rather,” he continues, “implies that each should be assigned its proper sphere of function.”\(^{54}\) The necessity to defend the “autonomy” of the original sphere becomes a litmus test that neorealism completely fails through its acts of “subversion,” while neoliberalism manages to preserve some degree of consistency, yet not to the extent of remedying its own acts of revisionism. In sum, the sixth principle offers a decisive blow against revisionism and becomes the fulcrum on which the theoretical justification of this thesis hinges.

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\(^{52}\) Ibid., pg. 13.  
\(^{53}\) Ibid., pg. 15.
The Concept of Power and the Theory of Balance of Power: Realism’s Homage to Reality

Having assessed the theoretical, structural, and fundamental principles of classical realism, this thesis now seeks to address the concept of power as a conceptual framework that provides explanatory power to realism’s capacity to account for international political phenomena. The social world, Morgenthau observes, is “but a projection of human nature onto the collective plane,”55 a world of “unceasing struggle between good and evil, reason and passion, life and death—peace and war—a struggle which so often ends with the victory of the forces hostile to man.”56 It is a world of opposing interests, driven by conflict and evil, with its roots in human nature, particularly two human traits: selfishness and the lust for power. The former, however, has rational limits, for it has an “objective relation to the vital needs of the individual” and “offers the best chances for survival under the particular natural and social conditions under which the individual lives.”57 Selfishness, in other words, serves an important purpose and can be satisfied, and for this reason, it alone cannot explain the unending nature of conflict between man. Thus, it is the latter that is the root of conflict and evil, for man’s desire for power is an “all-permeating fact which is of the very essence of human existence,” one which has no limits, and unlike selfishness, it cannot be appeased by concessions.58 The desire for power, Morgenthau holds, “besides and beyond any particular selfishness or other evilness of purpose, constitutes the ubiquity of evil in human action.”59

54 Ibid., pg. 15.
55 Morgenthau, The Decline of Democratic Politics, pg. 7.
56 Morgenthau, Scientific Man versus Power Politics, pg. 206.
57 Ibid., pg. 193.
58 Morgenthau, The Decline of Democratic Politics, pg. 312.
59 Morgenthau, Scientific Man versus Power Politics, pg. 194.
In politics, the lust for power “is not merely blended with dominant aims of a different kind but is the very essence of the intention, the very life-blood of the action,” for “politics is a struggle for power over men, and whatever its ultimate aim may be, power is its ultimate goal.”\(^{60}\) From this premise, Morgenthau defines power as “man’s control over the minds and actions of other man,” one which “covers all social relationships,” and systematically gives control to the dominant group over the dominated group.\(^{61}\) In sum, political power is about control, not simple brute force, but rather the ability of men to influence and have dominion over other men.\(^{62}\) This encompasses all concepts of hegemony: ideological, cultural, social, economic, religious, etc. More specifically, power in classical realism is to be understood as control over other actor(s), control over the resources of these actor(s), and control over the events and outcomes that are the byproduct of this continued control over the relationship by one actor over the other(s). This plays an instrumental role in defending classical realism against much criticism that views realism’s appeal to power only through a military, violence-oriented lens. That is, while military capability is of extreme importance, realism does not view dominance primarily through a military lens, and for this reason, such phenomena as economic or ideological/cultural hegemony that could account for certain international phenomena are not negated by classical realism, for classical realism transcends the limited scope of military power and accounts for all forms of power. Thus, the essence of realism’s appeal to political power is hinged upon the following premise: it is not the nature or the form of power that is of essence, but rather the capacity of such power to

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\(^{60}\) Ibid., pg. 195.


\(^{62}\) Morgenthau draws a specific distinction between political power and the actual exercise of violence, see ibid., pp. 31-33.
establish control. Thus, realism, for example, would have no compunctions with the idea of altering its power capabilities from a military-based conception of power to an economic-based conception of power if the latter is more compatible with the actual realities of international politics and could provide for more control than the former.

The classical realist conception of power presents two conceptual frameworks that are extremely problematic for critics and revisionists. First, since the issue of power is embedded in human nature, and not within the state itself, and since the state, or the collection of humans, is the “projection of human nature,” realism perceives the state, as an actor in power politics, to be the unit of analysis not because it presupposes the givenness of the state, but rather the basic givenness of the human and the existence of the state as an extension of human nature. Thus, realism escapes the problem of statism and of the givenness of the state by presupposing the givenness of the obvious: man. Second, by defining power in terms of hegemony or control, and not mere military force, realism escapes the problem of having to define the form of power in question, consuming itself with only accounting for power that establishes control, regardless of the form. This provides realism the theoretical elasticity necessary to account for any international phenomena—ranging from economic to ideation factors—that deals with control. To this end, this second framework allows realism to escape the much held criticism that power is its Achilles heel, demonstrating that its primary task vis-à-vis power is to account for control, regardless of the nature or the form of power that leads to

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63 Morgenthau specifies that a “nation as such is obviously not an empirical thing,” and is thus an “abstraction from a number of individuals who have certain characteristics in common, and it is these characteristics that make them members of the same nation.” Therefore, “when we speak in empirical terms of the power or the foreign policy of a certain nation, we can only mean the power or foreign policy of certain individuals who belong to the same nation.” By establishing the existence of the state as an extension of the individual(s), realism demonstrates that it does not presuppose the givenness of the state. See ibid., pp. 115-118.
the establishment of control. In retrospect, realism maintains that interest is the essence of all politics. Therefore, it is only natural that on the international scene each state should define and follow its national interest. Defined in terms of power, regardless of form, interest defined in terms of gaining control becomes a truism that any state aspires to. By bypassing the problem of having to define the form of power, realism escapes the accusation that power is its Achilles heel and demonstrates that it possesses the adequate tools to account for diverse and dynamic activities that dominate international politics.

Power, in realism, is counter-balanced by power, and while power is limited within the domestic realm by a centralized authority, this, obviously, is not the case on the international scene. Thus, the drive for power is potentially limitless. Realism accounts for this problem at the structural level with its balance of power theory, which primarily observes the state’s capacity for survival to be based on its ability to counter-balance the power of another state. More specifically, to limit or prevent the control of another state over one’s own sphere of influence, one must possess the capabilities of power that may counter-balance the opposing state’s capacity for control. At the international level, this creates a balancing game between the most powerful states, where a status quo provides equilibrium to the international power structure, establishing the grounds for ephemeral peace based on distribution of power. Thus, by carefully studying the distribution of power, the capabilities of others, and optimizing one’s own powers, states engage in a balancing act. The debate over the balance of power theory is quite vast, and space will obviously not allow us to either tackle the concerns many critics have with the theory, nor to assess the specific components of the theory. It will be noted, however, that this thesis uses the concept of optimization of power to bypass the debate between
maximization/absolute gain and relative gain that has dominated the discourse. A frequent misconception of realism is to depict the struggle for power in terms of maximization, with maximization being a product of the system, and power is maximized without regard to environmental constraint. This assumption suggests a complete misunderstanding of realism, for maximization inevitably promotes imperialism and overextension, negating the most important concept to the balance of power theory: the preservation of the status quo. Thus, imperialistic policy would account for all international behavior, and the status quo policy would make no sense. Furthermore, power is a relative concept, as Morgenthau has famously held, and maximization, without observing environmental constraints, could lead to loss in relative position, rejecting the existing balancing structure. Optimization, on the other hand, accounts for the relative nature of power, optimizes power in relation to its environment, bypasses much of the criticism falsely leveled against realism with respect to maximization, and provides a more consistent approach to the relative gain premise: that relative gain, in itself, is not sufficient, for a state must engage in relative optimization.

The primary concern in this section is to demonstrate that the principle of balance of power is applicable to all international phenomena, for having specified in the previous section realism’s conception of power, we bypass the much held misconception that balance of power primarily pertains to balance of military power. While such has been the case historically, this does not suggest that the theory is not flexible enough to

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64 Realism rejects both expansionism and imperialism as detrimental to the balance of power structure. In cases where the status quo is one of imperialism, the distribution of power is both ephemeral and unstable. This is the case because imperialism is by nature defined through irredentism and expansion, which leads to a continued strive for power. While balance can be temporarily attained in an imperialist status quo, the result is a swift return to war and instability by virtue of the imperialist state’s natural need to expand. The result is renewed conflict, instability, and the destruction and restructuring of the balance of power system.
account for international phenomena that are outside of the military realm. That is, since power is defined in terms of control, and not necessarily military prowess, this allows the balance of power theory to apply to all acts of balancing that pertain to control and influence. Thus, the capacity of actor A to balance and limit actor B’s capacity for control determines the status of actor A’s autonomy from actor B, and also actor A’s capacity to control other actors. To presuppose that an actor willingly accepts being controlled is defeatist and inherently problematic. When applied to any other realm within IR, for example, this theory still holds: balance of power in economics (EU/US/Japan/China relations), or balance of power in ideology/culture (Western democracies/Islamic extremism relations). Each actor seeks to preserve its capacity for control by balancing that of the other actor’s. Such is the balance of power theory, and it can account for international behavior, regardless of the form of power or the nature of the phenomena.

Morality and International Peace: The “Softer” Side of Classical Realism

The claim that moral virtue is subordinate, or even antithetical, to the basic instincts of human nature is an axiomatic presupposition that classical realism has had to deal with in its attempt to address the realities of international politics, while at the same time accounting for the necessary role of morality that international politics has historically sidelined. In dealing with Morgenthau’s conception of morality, one encounters a two-tier framework that has caused much misunderstanding and revision. The first framework revolves around the practical or pragmatic-realistic approach to morality, that is, morality is instrumental to classical realism in the tradition of the Hobbesian-Machiavellian framework. As discussed previously, Morgenthau seeks to confront the “tension”
between morality and politics, seeking a middle ground where the latter does not negate the former, while at the same time the former is not made an instrument of the latter.\textsuperscript{65} It is here we observe Morgenthau’s rejection of morality being used as an instrument of the state, when he specifically cautions against the instrumental usage of morality, that is, the “drive for power” being concealed under the banner of morality.\textsuperscript{66} In the first framework, therefore, Morgenthau addresses the realistic and tense nature of morality in the political realm, while negating the instrumental usage of morality through his demonstration of the dichotomous relationship between universal and state morality.

Since realism refrains from rejecting universal morality in favor of state morality, but rather concedes that the reality of international politics simply demands such a categorization, realism introduces its second framework: the ontological relevance of morality, within an Augustinian-Burkean framework, to the theoretical-philosophical structure of realism.\textsuperscript{67} Morgenthau’s appeal to moral restraint within the international realm—which discusses such factors as morality restraining states from engaging in

\textsuperscript{65} As discussed in this chapter, the moral actions of the state are defined by its consequences, that is, prudent, rational actions result in consequences that are moral, while consequences that are antithetical to the interests of the state are irrational and morally problematic. This demonstrates a separation of state morality from universal/individual morality, since the reality of international politics demands such, not, as the Hobbesian-Machiavellian framework advocates, the state uses morality as an instrument for its ends.

\textsuperscript{66} Morgenthau, \textit{Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace}, pp. 219-223.

\textsuperscript{67} One of the most widely held misconceptions is the identification of classical realism’s conception of morality with a Machiavellian-Hobbesian framework, as opposed to an Augustinian-Burkean framework. As discussed earlier, the Machiavellian-Hobbesian framework approaches morality primarily through an instrumental lens, while the Augustinian-Burkean framework accounts for the realities of the political realm through the lens of political action having some moral guidance and responsibility, that is, political action is not completely free of moral consequences. Thus, the former conceives of morality as a means to an end, while the latter deems morality as an end in and of itself. Aside from the conceptual consistency by which realism aligns its conception of morality with the Augustinian-Burkean framework, we find Morgenthau directly rejecting the attempt to tie his classical realism with either Hobbes or Machiavelli. “It is a dangerous thing,” Morgenthau writes, “to be a Machiavelli,” while “It is a disastrous thing to be a Machiavelli without virtu.” See Hans J. Morgenthau, “The Political Science of E.H. Carr,” \textit{World Politics}, Vol. 1, (1948), pg. 134. Rejecting Hobbesianism, Morgenthau insists, “I have always maintained that the actions of states are subject to universal moral principles, and I have always been careful to differentiate my position in this respect from that of Hobbes.” See Morgenthau, \textit{The Decline of Democratic Politics}, pg. 106. For our discussion of Morgenthau’s appeal to Edmund Burke, see pg. 7.
assassinations, mass extermination and conquest, enslavement, etc.—is empirical testimony to the Augustinian-Burkean claim that morality should guide political action to the extent that the realities of the political conditions allow. This reintroduces the much discussed paradoxical situation between morality and political conditions, leading to Morgenthau’s declaration, “the lust for power as ubiquitous empirical fact and its denial as universal ethical norm are the poles between which this antinomy is suspended.”

This dialectical process between the two poles of an antinomy forms the foundations of realism’s attempt to accommodate the dilemma: the direct application of moral imperatives to the political realm will yield disaster, while to altogether abandon the moral imperatives will negate the very concept of morality. Morgenthau’s solution is an appeal to the Augustinian-Burkean framework, “Both individual and state must judge political action by universal moral principles,” that is, the “dialectic of ethics and politics…prevents the latter, in spite of itself, from escaping the former’s judgment and normative directions.” Building upon this dialectical proposition, Morgenthau further demonstrates realism’s complete rejection of instrumental morality and levels a devastating blow against revisionism when he maintains that the “very juxtaposition of ‘power politics’ and ‘moral politics’ is fundamentally mistaken,” for “morality is not just another branch of human activity,” but rather it “is superimposed upon them, limiting the choice of ends and means and delineating the legitimate sphere of a particular branch of action altogether. This latter action is particularly vital for the political sphere.” This claim is further legitimized by Morgenthau’s direct homage to the Augustinian-Burkean

71 Morgenthau, *Scientific Man versus Power Politics*, pg. 177.
framework: “political action can be defined as an attempt to realize moral values through the medium of politics, that is, power.”

The ontological relevance of morality to the power politics of classical realism is indispensable. On the international scene, these ontologically inescapable moral values have gone unrealized because the nature of the international system is antithetical to the attainment of such an order. “In the absence of an integrated international society,” Morgenthau writes, “the attainment of a modicum of order and the realization of a minimum of moral values are predicated upon the existence of national communities capable of preserving order and realizing moral values within the limits of their power.”

The absence of such an integrated international society is, in essence, the determinant that accounts for the limited role of morality in the international realm. Concomitantly, the fact that classical realism contemplates a world composed of an integrated society most clearly suggests that if such a society were attained, realism could quite easily account for the state of equilibrium between international morality and politics. This allows classical realism to account for two important phenomena that have engulfed the contemporary world: globalization and the formulation of supranational entities by way of integration. Since realism does not negate the formulation of an integrated international society, but rather views it extremely beneficial if it may be attained, the theoretical structure of classical realism becomes both adequate and sufficient in accounting for international phenomena that create a more integrated, cooperative world. This important realization, however, brings up an even more important question: while an integrated international society

72 Morgenthau, The Decline of Democratic Politics, pg. 325.
73 Ibid., pg. 110.
could relatively account for more cooperation and harmony in the world, is international peace a real possibility?

Classical realism maintains that peace may be preserved by two primary devices: 1) balance of power; and 2) the normative limitation of “international law, international morality, and world public opinion.”\(^7^5\) Balance of power, however, is not an adequate device to preserve peace, for its uncertainty, aggravated by the absence of a restraining moral consensus, leaves balance of power vulnerable as a peace-maintaining device. International morality, on the other hand, can exert substantial pressure and promote peace preservation if it could be counter-balanced against the phenomenon of nationalism. Classical realism suggests a causal relationship between the decline of international morality and the rise of nationalism, and thus, if nationalism witnesses a similar decline in the face of the changing circumstances of international politics, then the world may perhaps observe the rejuvenation of international morality.\(^7^6\) In applying this premise to the current international scene, it becomes quite feasible to argue that the nature of regionalization, integration, and globalization are directly tied to the decline of nationalism and the rise of international morality. In this respect, realism demonstrates a capacity to account for the state of international cooperation that is taking place in response to the narrow, myopic interests of nationalism.\(^7^7\)

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76. Morgenthau’s reference to international morality is a reference to individual/universal morality, hence its opposition to state morality (presented somewhat in the form of nationalism). As it will be demonstrated in Chapter 4, the dialectical synthesis of universal morality with political morality provides for a more concise understanding of morality in the international domain. For Morgenthau’s discussion of the detrimental effects that the rise of nationalism has had upon “supranational forces,…and all other personal ties, institutions, and organizations,” especially international morality, see ibid., pp. 271-272.
77. Nationalism is quite distinct from the national interest, for the former is consumed with certain ideological underpinnings that take precedence over the national interest and even seek to redefine the national interest to fit into its own myopic goals, while the latter subordinates ideology for the sake of the national interest.
Similarly, world public opinion—a phenomenon that transcends national boundaries and asserts itself in uniting much of the world’s reaction to certain political forces—is a mechanism of enforcing peace if it may be realized on the international scene. While Morgenthau demonstrates skepticism as to the realization of this phenomenon, since no historical accounts could be presented, he nonetheless suggests the possibility of world public opinion, if realized, as being a powerful force on the side of international peace. The extent to which world public opinion exists in our contemporary world is a subject of much debate, but the fact that realism is capable of accounting for its potential effect upon international peace demonstrates the paradigm’s unique capacity to deal with international cooperation. In contrast, realism finds international law to be extremely limited and quite ineffective with respect to its effect upon international peace, for unlike international morality and world public opinion—two phenomena that are based upon non-legal factors and do not necessitate the existence of external enforcement—international law is completely contingent upon the presence of a central authority, and since the nature of the international system has not made such an authority a reality, international law finds itself dependent upon alliances, diplomacy, and on the previous two normative limitations: international morality and world public opinion. To this end, while realism does not undermine the importance of international law, it is aware of its limits, and for this reason, it understands why powerful states that have invested so much in international cooperation regularly violate international law.

While attaining peace is one phenomenon, preserving the peace is a distinct phenomenon itself, and while the two concepts are intertwined, they are in essence two different categories, with the former being heavily hinged upon the latter. With the three
normative limitations serving as both peace-creating and peace-preserving factors, Morgenthau addresses three different categories of peace preservation: peace through limitation, peace through transformation, and peace through accommodation. Demonstrating realism’s rejection of political idealism, he negates peace through limitation and peace through transformation on several grounds, while grounding his assessment of international peace on the category of peace through accommodation, that is, diplomacy.78 Diplomacy holds a very unique and prestigious place in the theory of classical realism, for diplomacy is the practice of advancing and limiting power, securing and endangering peace, and most importantly, diplomacy is the art of practicing politics. Used in conjunction with international morality and world public opinion, guided by moral wisdom, and practiced by statesmen, diplomacy is the greatest and most powerful weapon for the preservation of peace in the international political system.79

Diplomacy is a strategic tool utilized by the state to implement the objectives of its national interests, while displaying its prestige and national character. Because of its vital role, there could be no peace between states without diplomacy, for diplomacy defines the nature of the relationship between states. Morgenthau establishes nine rules of diplomacy, with five prerequisites for compromise: 1) diplomacy should be divested of

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78 The first category, peace through limitation, revolves around disarmament, collective security, judicial settlement, peaceful change, and international government. Morgenthau demonstrates realism’s rejection of the peace through limitation premise on several grounds: while disarmament may be important, it is insufficient in providing peace; collective security is problematic, unattainable, historically discredited, and unrealistic; judicial settlement, like international law, is deficient in the face of the international system; peaceful change fails to account for the nature of change in the international system, and proposes a resolution that fails to understand the role of conflict in change; and international government does in no way provide an answer to the problem of peace, for it necessitates and presupposes a harmonious relationship between nations in order to realize its own formulation. Peace through transformation, the second category, involves the creation of a world state and the formulation of a world community, where peace may be realized in the same fashion as peace exists within any other state. Morgenthau completely rejects this proposition as impractical, idealistic, and incompatible with the nature of the international political system. See chapters 18-23 in Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, pp. 277-358.
the crusading spirit; 2) foreign policy objectives must be defined in terms of national interest and must be defended with adequate power; 3) diplomacy should look at the political scene from the point of view of other nations; 4) nations should be willing to compromise on all issues that are not vital to them; 5) a nation should give up the shadow of worthless rights in favor of the substance of real advantage; 6) a nation should never put itself in a position from which it cannot retreat without losing face and cannot advance without great risks; 7) a nation should not allow a weak ally to make decisions for it; 8) the armed forces must be the instruments of foreign policy and not its master; and 9) the government should be the leader of public opinion and not its servant.  

These nine rules, implemented by qualified statesman, are the instrument that could help establish international peace in the face of the conflicting nature of international politics. By accommodation, the diplomat advances the interests of the state, while at the same time complementing the interests of the opposing states. Since the essence of diplomacy is mutual understanding, its natural objective is a beneficial alliance. With the diverse interests of the various states being accommodated by mutual concessions and understandings, alliances provide a framework through which the diplomat attains peace. Assessed in the context of contemporary international politics, we observe diplomatic initiatives and unique alliances being the roots of international cooperation, integration, mutual trust, and more importantly, resurgence in international morality. For as states develop closer relations born out of diplomatic initiatives, these initiatives provide mutual trust and obligations, which become strengthened by moral principles that serve as extensions of such trust and reciprocity. This contention is most evident, for example, in

79 Ibid., pg. 361.
80 For a more in-depth discussion of the nine rules of diplomacy, see ibid., pp. 381-387.
the case of the European Union, where diplomacy lies at the heart of the interactions between the various states, where mutual concessions, agreements, and trust give way to unique alliances, creating deeper integration and peace. In the case of globalization, diplomacy is considered to be at the forefront of the development of a worldwide community, where extensive alliances give way to the formulation of international institutions, which are further strengthened by excellent diplomatic initiatives. In sum, regardless of the nature of international cooperation, integration, or peace, one finds diplomacy at the forefront of the process, structuring itself in the form of alliances, with the alliances serving as extensions and building blocks of what diplomacy has created. To this end, realism’s appeal to diplomacy is an adequate and sufficient prescription for accounting and safeguarding the possibility of international peace.

The introduction in this chapter of realism’s epistemological framework, along with its fundamental assumptions, explored the structure of the paradigm and the guidelines through which theory articulation develops. This underlying structure was complemented by the conceptual, structural, and analytical frameworks of the paradigm, displaying the core concepts that define realism. These important elements of the paradigm become effective tools of analysis in the next chapter, where the paradigm-building efforts of the neo-approaches are addressed.
CHAPTER 3
THE NEOREALIST AND NEOLIBERAL CHALLENGE TO REALISM: AN ATTEMPT AT PARADIGM-BUILDING

The defense of classical realism presented here necessitates an assessment of the revisionist paradigms against which realism is being defended. Having provided broad considerations of the principles and conceptual frameworks of realism, this thesis now conducts an overview of the fundamental presuppositions of both neorealism and neoliberalism, providing the grounds for a close scrutiny of the level of revisionism undertaken by both of these paradigms. The theoretical assumptions of both paradigms are considerable, but even a simple overview would clearly demonstrate that these theoretical considerations are established upon a two-fold framework: 1) adapting the essential components of classical realism; and 2) modifying and restructuring these components in a fashion that becomes compatible with either the microeconomic principles and sociological structuralism of the neorealist framework, or the institutionalist, quasi-classical idealist economics of neoliberalism. In any instance, the foundational considerations of both paradigms, which in essence are the justifiable and legitimating aspects of any theory—its hard core of premises—are based upon the very dependable philosophical-theoretical structure of classical realism. The formulation and the development of these two theories, however, methodically undermines these very philosophical-theoretical structures upon which the foundations of their paradigms legitimate themselves through. Thus, classical realism is used to justify and legitimate the
foundations of these research programs, while concomitantly being redefined and restructured to meet their revisionist ends.\textsuperscript{81}

**The Passion for Structure: Waltz’s Neorealism**

Kenneth Waltz’s neorealism orchestrates a methodological framework that seeks to construct a coherent and consistent understanding of theory formulation as the foundation of structuring a research program.\textsuperscript{82} Waltz holds that the objective of theory is founded upon its explanatory powers, for theory is not the mere collection of laws but rather statements that explain them. The explanatory premise also pertains to predictions, Waltz argues, for although predictions are based on empirical facts and casual connections, these factors nonetheless need to be explained, for an unexplained prediction minimizes its capacity to serve its purpose. Theories cannot be formed inductively, induction only pertains to hypothesizing, leading Waltz to conclude that knowledge must precede theory, and yet knowledge can proceed only from theory. Thus, theory evolves with knowledge, but holds no truths, only explaining truths inherent to laws. This is why better theories replace old ones, for they provide better explanations of phenomena related to laws.\textsuperscript{83} Herein lies the first theoretical justification for neorealism’s revision of classical

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\textsuperscript{81} This thesis will primarily address the philosophical-theoretical structure of the two paradigms, assessing its conceptual and analytical framework. It will not be able to address specific components and elements, but rather presuppose such specifics to be embedded in the general framework of their research program.

\textsuperscript{82} In the same fashion that Morgenthau is deemed the father of contemporary classical realism, with most of the fundamental assumptions of the paradigm being associated with him, so is Kenneth Waltz with respect to neorealism, and to this end, while the range of neorealist scholars is extensive, all of them, to a very strong extent, define their neorealism in conjunction with Waltz’s propositions. For this reason, our discussion of neorealism will primarily concentrate on Kenneth Waltz.

realism: the lack of explanatory powers of classical realism necessitated its replacement with a paradigm with better explanatory theories: neorealism.

In its second framework of revisionism, neorealism introduces its negation of reductionism, that is, theories are reductionist or systemic not in accordance to what they deal with, but how they arrange their materials. Reductionism is the methodological reduction of analysis from the structural level to the unitary/sub-unitary level. The reductionist approach explains international outcomes through elements and combination of elements located at the national or sub-national levels. It is a theory about the behavior of parts, and the internal forces of the unit/actor/agent serving as determinants in international outcomes. Waltz rejects this reductionist approach as being a trap, for it negates the systemic structural level of analysis in favor of the national/sub-national level. Reductionists fail to observe the nature of the international system that accounts for change, and neorealism holds that it is not possible to understand world politics by simply looking inside states.84 This premise relates to the initial claim of the inadequacy of classical realism in its capacity to provide explanatory powers, especially when it comes to change, for reductionism, which defines its approach, is inherently flawed, making realism insufficient as a theory.

The static ahistoricism of neorealism maintains that the pattern of continuity throughout history, which is found in the Westphalia system, provides legitimacy to the need for a shift from the reductionist approach to a systemic structural approach. The structure of a system acts as a constraining and disposing force, and because this is the nature of the systemic structure, systems theories explain and predict continuity within a system. Thus, systems theory explains change only across systems, not within them. It
explains how a state will act under certain conditions, how its interactions will be shaped by the system, and how different units behave similarly despite their variations, producing outcomes that fall within expected range. These effects of the structure are observed indirectly, and are produced in two ways: through socialization and through competition. Through interaction between actors, socialization gives birth to conditions that are beyond the control of the actors but inherent in the system. This decreases variety, because all actors engage in similar behavior that is consistent with the structure of the system. Competition generates order, leading to similarity, since those who survive adopt similar characteristics that have contributed to their survival. Thus, the structure of the system affects agents and agencies through providing conditions that promote socialization and competition.\textsuperscript{85} This introduces the systemic determinism of structuralism, disqualifying components of second level analysis as reductionist and irrelevant, hence revising the very fundamentals of classical realism and supplanting it with systemic structuralism.

The most dominant concept that defines neorealism is its systemic structuralism, which holds that a system is composed of a structure and of interacting units. The structure is the system-wide component that makes it possible to think of the system as a whole. Structures, by their definition, are free of units and attributes. Complementing this framework, and perhaps being the most important presupposition that gives neorealism’s appeal to structuralism its logical justification, is the contention that the international structure is shaped by its anarchic system. From this premise, neorealism defines structure by three elements: 1) in accordance to the principle by which a system is

\textsuperscript{84} Ibid., Waltz, “Reductionist and Systemic Theories,” pp. 47-59.
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., pp. 60-68.
ordered, that is, the arrangement of its units; 2) by the specification of function of differentiated units; and 3) by the distribution of capabilities across units, system wide. In sum, neorealism utilizes the theoretical and conceptual tools of classical realism as a mechanism of justifying its incorporation of systemic structuralism as the hard core of its research program, while disregarding important elements and components of classical realism that could be potentially problematic for structuralism as reductionist and irrelevant. Three important components of realism are revised by neorealism’s introduction of structuralism and its application to anarchy at the systemic level. First, freeing the structure from its units and attributes restricts the capacity of these attributes to serve as relevant frameworks in the assessment of international phenomena, further undermining all of the important theoretical and conceptual components of classical realism, for they are separated from the structural and deemed irrelevant. The second element that defines neorealism’s conception of structure is applicable only when applied to a hierarchical system; namely the functions of differentiated units are negated by the international system, for its structure is that of an anarchic system. Finally, taking the realist conception of anarchy as a one of the most important foundations of its philosophic-theoretical structure and abstractly revising it into a systemic structural model, neorealism uses a revised classical realist concept to deem classical realism itself as deficient. This chapter will later assess the revisionist nature of structuralism, and the extent to which its repudiation of reductionism makes neorealism apolitical, posing a severe problem to its legitimacy as a paradigm.

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86 This only applies to the hierarchical system, not the anarchic, for the structure of the anarchic system omits the relevance of the functions of its units.
The Passion for Institutions: Keohane’s Neoliberalism

Neoliberalism, on the other hand, as embodied in the ideas of Robert Keohane, utilizes a similar tactic implemented by Waltz; yet Keohane does not hinge the theoretical justifications of his paradigm’s hard core on realism, but rather uses the valuable conceptual and theoretical tools of realism to strengthen the framework of his paradigm.\(^{88}\) Thus, while Waltz’s revisionism defines his implementation of structuralism, Keohane’s revisionism is defined by his instrumental usage of classical realist assumptions. In adapting realist premises to build an institutionalist framework, neoliberalism proposes the following premise as the central theme of its paradigm: the existence of a hegemonic power is neither necessary nor a sufficient condition for international cooperation, for international institutions facilitate international cooperation; therefore, international regimes make international cooperation possible without the presence of a hegemon by alleviating many of the obstacles created by the anarchic international system.

Similar to realist assumptions, neoliberals hold that the greatest danger for the world political economy and world peace is rooted in political conflicts among states. While there is no certain way of alleviating this problem, international regimes and institutional restraint could, to a very strong degree, limit the possibility of conflict through cooperation.\(^{89}\) Neoliberals accept the state-centric/rational-egoist premise of realism, arguing that self-interest plays a fundamental role in the formulation of institutions, which provide the grounds for cooperation. The concept of cooperation, as a theoretical premise, lies at the heart of neoliberal theory, which is realized in the international

\(^{87}\) Ibid., Waltz, “Political Structures,” pp. 70-96.
\(^{88}\) In the same fashion that Morgenthau and Waltz are used as the sources of their respective paradigms, so is Keohane used with respect to neoliberalism.
\(^{89}\) See Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, pp. 5-12.
political realm through international institutions/regimes.\textsuperscript{90} Cooperation is the mutual adjustment of policies and behaviors by actors, and such adjustments are usually born out of discord or potential discord. The necessity of attaining cooperation leads neoliberals to place emphasis on the creation of international regimes. International regimes are initiated by the hegemon as a mechanism of providing stability to the international political economy, yet the maintenance of such regimes does not require the existence of a hegemon. That is, the institutionalization of cooperation among states by way of international regimes facilitates the capacity of international regimes to function without the presence of a hegemon. International regimes are issue-oriented institutions formed through the cooperation of collectives. They provide information, decrease transaction costs, monitor compliance, create issue linkages and prevent cheating, all factors in facilitating cooperation between rational-egoist actors.\textsuperscript{91} In sum, neoliberal institutionalism argues that by alleviating the distrust and uncertainty that exist between states—neoliberalism accepts such concepts as being inherent in the anarchic international system—international regimes could facilitate cooperation by way of economic integration and institutional restraint.

The overall theoretical structure of neoliberalism, along with its fundamental assumptions, are not inherently problematic for classical realism, since neoliberalism negates a lot of the idealistic assumptions associated with classical liberalism and adapts the pragmatic assumptions of realism. Neoliberalism’s revisionism, however, becomes prevalent when it does three of the following. First, it alters and restructures the conceptual tools that it adapts from realism, specifically the rational-egoist premise.

\textsuperscript{90} Ibid., pp. 49-53.  
\textsuperscript{91} Ibid., pp. 57-61.
Second, it modifies and eventually rejects realism’s conception of human nature. Three, it presents inherent contradictions for neoliberalism’s own theoretical structure when it revises and negates these fundamental assumptions. Thus, through the usage of realist concepts, neoliberalism is able to formulate an institutionalist framework that assesses cooperation and peace in the world political economy. However, by eventually altering and revising these fundamental concepts, neoliberalism ends up contradicting its own foundations. The next section will demonstrate how this revisionism proves to be extremely problematic for neoliberalism, since its limitation of the rational-egoist argument ends up resting on a negation of the realist conception of human nature, which naturally questions the consistency of neoliberalism’s appeal to the self-interest premise of realism that is essential to the theoretical justification of the formulation of international institutions, that is, the hard core of the paradigm.

The Neoparadigms Exposed: Revisionism as Contradiction

If Proteus was the god of academic scholarship, revisionism would be his child, the ever-changing vivacious force, concealing its circumlocution, prevaricating in articulation, desiccating the originality of the thinker’s ideas, and yet exhibiting itself as the advocate of the thinker’s unalloyed thought. The thinker is Morgenthau, the idea is classical realism, the children are the neo-paradigms, and the revisionism is the homage that these children pay to their father, that chameleon-like force that pierces the soul of every scholar and encourages creativity, a creativity that is at the expense of another. Such is the nature of the revisionism suffered by classical realism, where the creativities of neorealism and neoliberalism are formed at its expense, violating its principles,
altering its assumptions, and being told that such is being done for its own well-being, for it is deficient and inadequate, and thus needs the creativity of others to save itself. Yet realism has displayed, throughout this project, that it is in fact adequate, that it is sufficient to account for all the great occurrences of international politics, and that the revisionism that it has suffered at the hands of the neo-paradigms is unjustified.

Both neorealism and neoliberalism have been established on revisionist grounds and at the expense of classical realism, for both have utilized the fundamental premises of classical realism for their benefit, but do not adapt the internal consistency of classical realism’s theoretical structure. This revisionism rests upon a three-tier analytical framework: 1) the theoretical foundations of the neo-paradigms, that is, the premises that legitimize their paradigms, are established upon their adaptation of classical realist assumptions; 2) such revisionist adaptations are inherently antithetical to the theoretical principles of classical realism, hence disqualifying the legitimacy of such revisionist adaptations; and 3) the negation of such revisionism proves detrimental to the consistency of the theoretical structures of the neo-paradigms, for their foundations are justified by the very adaptations that have become negated as a result of its revisionist nature. Thus, the legitimacy of the neo-paradigms are disputed, for they are established upon revisionist grounds, grounds that are antithetical to the very justifying mechanisms that the neo-paradigms legitimate themselves upon.

This three-tier framework is more consistently demonstrated in the assessment of the two neo-paradigms: 1) neoliberalism’s revisionism of the rational-egoist argument structures itself on its negation of the realist conception of human nature, posing severe theoretical problems to the consistency of neoliberalism’s appeal to the self-interest.
premise, since this premise serves as the justification upon which the formulation of international institutions is made, that is, the grounds upon which the hard core of the paradigm is legitimized upon becomes negated; and 2) neorealism’s revisionist rejection of reductionism—that is, all that is political about classical realism—as grounds for the implementation of systemic structuralism inherently negates the political, for the structure becomes paramount to all the assumptions of classical realism, making neorealism apolitical and incompatible with political realism. To this end, revisionism makes the theoretical foundations of the neo-paradigms inconsistent, and thus places the paradigms in contradiction with their very foundations.

For neoliberalism, the relaxation, that is, the revision, of the rational-egoist premise is vital for emphasizing the importance of international regimes, for bounded rationality, as a revised alternative, fused with idealist notions of empathy or general reciprocity, provide grounds for further cooperation.\(^9\) By revising the strict assumptions of rationality, states become emphatically interdependent to each other. This will inevitably lead to shifts in state preferences, making states more likely to cooperate by means of international regimes. This revisionism of the rational-egoist premise permits neoliberalism to alter the concept of self-interest, making it more compatible with its conception of cooperation. The revisionism of the rational-egoist premise, as an

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\(^9\) Robert E. Keohane argues that maximizing rationality, as embodied in the rational-egoist framework of realism, is problematic, for such framework views rationality as having absolute capabilities in the form of maximization. For this reason, neoliberalism advocates bounded-rationality, which “satisfices” rather than maximizing the capabilities of the rational-egoist actor. This revisionist rationale for restructuring an important realist premise for its supposed insufficiency is inherently flawed, for it demonstrates an absolute misunderstanding of realism’s conception of the rational-egoist actor. As Morgenthau so thoroughly demonstrates, the rationality of the egoist actor is not absolute, but is guided and justified by the important concept of prudence. Thus, neoliberalism’s disregard for the concept of prudence as a mechanism of revising the rational-egoist premise to legitimate its institutionalist framework is extremely problematic, for such disregard is based on false and revisionist grounds. For Keohane’s justification of revising the rational-egoist premise and introducing bounded rationality, see ibid., pp. 111-116.
underlying attempt to revise the concept of self-interest, is intrinsically tied to
neoliberalism’s revision of realism’s conception of human nature. Specifically,
neoliberalism rejects that discord is inherent to the nature of actors, because this will
indicate that cooperation is temporary and eventually irrelevant. Thus, neoliberalism
revises the realist conception of human nature as problematic, selfish, and belligerent,
into a conception of the rational-egoist actor intrinsically rotating toward cooperation as
an extension of its self-interest.93 That is, it is often in the self-interest of the rational-
egoist actor to cooperate, and if cooperation fails, it is not the nature or the inherent
character of the actor that is at fault, but rather such factors as logistics, circumstances,
and structural failures. In sum, the modification of the realist concepts of the rational-
egoist premise and human nature methodically leads to neoliberalism’s revision of the
concept of self-interest, a revisionist premise that tries to legitimize the theoretically
justifiable grounds for the formulations of international institutions and cooperation.

The inherent contradiction and the sheer act of revisionism embedded in the
neoliberal endeavor are most evident, for by altering the realist notion of self-interest into
a revised neoliberal notion of self-interest, the concept may be applied to justify the hard
core of the paradigm: institutional restraint, by way of regimes, leads to cooperation. The
contradiction lies in one simple premise: the incorporation of an idealist notion of self-
interest is inherently antithetical to the realist notion of self-interest, and furthermore,
self-interest is defined by the actor’s selfishness, hence the self, not the alteration of this
notion of selfishness as selfishness being reciprocal in goodwill. By presupposing that
self-interest may be revised along idealist notions, neoliberalism both contradicts
classical realism and classical liberalism, and demonstrates that its attempt at a synthesis

93 Ibid., pg. 67.
is inherently contradictory and flawed. The nature of this revisionist conception of self-interest becomes even more problematic for the paradigm’s hard core, for a realist conception of self-interest obviously cannot account for institution building and cooperation to the extent that neoliberals demand, hence their revisionism. At the same time, an appeal to idealism suggests a rejection of self-interest. Since neoliberalism refrains from subscribing to the latter, but rather revising the former, this subscription to the former, because of its revisionism, becomes inherently contradictory. This contradiction hampers the capacity of neoliberalism to justify the formulation of international institutions on self-interest, for its notion of self-interest, as demonstrated, is de-legitimized. Thus, with the building block to its theoretical structure being falsified because of its revisionist nature, all that which have been built upon this premise themselves become falsified. To this end, the formulation of international institutions as mechanisms of providing international cooperation fails to have legitimacy, for the grounds that they are structured upon, the self-interests of the state, are grounds that are contradictory and false. 

Thus, revisionism as contradiction undermines the consistency and legitimacy of neoliberalism’s theoretical structure, that is, its hard core. Revisionism as contradiction proves to be even more problematic for neorealism, for the very structure of neorealism is developed on the complete reformulation of the basic principles of classical realism, leading to its negation of the theoretical-philosophical...

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94 This same premise of revisionism as contradiction also falsifies neoliberalism’s notion of collective security, for the concept is founded upon the very concept of self-interest which was just demonstrated as contradictory and false. Furthermore, with classical realism vehemently rejecting collective security as impractical, idealistic, and structurally problematic, the realist conception of self-interest could provide no grounds for legitimizing collective security. Thus, with the realist notion of self-interest negating collective security, and with the neoliberal conception of self-interest being shown to be contradictory and flawed, the same way that the formation of international institutions becomes problematic, so does the theoretical grounds of legitimizing the concept of collective security. For classical realism’s rejection of collective security, see Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pp. 290-298.
structure of the same paradigm which it claims to be saving. This negation, of course, is born out of the inherent contradictions between the theoretical structure of classical realism and neorealism’s antithetical stands toward this structure with its introduction of the sociological concept of structuralism. In applying structuralism at the systemic level to the study of international politics, neorealism commits three acts of revisionism that weaken its claims to be the heir of classical realism. First, the systematization of international politics through the abstract framework of systemic structuralism is a direct violation of the fundamental assumptions of the realist paradigm, which formulates its assessment of international phenomena by rejecting systematization and assessing phenomena as they exist in reality. Second, the rejection or indifference toward actual international phenomena for the sake of a theory’s narrow presuppositions is an approach to the study of international relations that is conceptually problematic for classical realism, for abstract theorizations and systematizations take precedent over reality, violating the very purpose of studying international relations. Finally, in its most important act of revisionism, neorealism deems its paradigm apolitical by introducing its concept of reductionism, disqualifying every component of political realism for the purpose of accommodating systemic structuralism, hence marginalizing the political.

As discussed earlier, classical realism rejects the interjection of other disciplines into the autonomy of politics, for such an attempt at a synthesis negates the political for the sake of the methodological, limiting the approach to the realities of the political realm for the purpose of accommodating this synthesis. Neorealism does precisely that through its implementation of sociological structuralism onto the international political domain, formulating a revisionist paradigm that legitimates its presuppositions upon classical
realist grounds, yet comes to undermine these very presuppositions through its adherence to the concept of structuralism. Thus, structuralism, for neorealism, takes precedent over its assessment of the political realm, for actual political phenomena, which lies at the heart of analysis for classical realism, become an issue of limited relevance, since reality is restructured to fit the structuralist framework. The problem with structuralism, as far as classical realism is concerned, lies in the fact that it is an abstract conceptual framework, that structure, in and of itself, does not exist, but is rather a methodological framework of assessing certain systemic factors. As such, the assessment of systemic factors through a structural framework is systematized to account for pattern and continuity, a new framework that proves detrimental to neorealism’s subscription to classical realism. By systematizing the assessment of patterns and continuities along structural lines, neorealism revises and supplants classical realism’s conception of historicism. The historical is exchanged in favor of static, atemporal structuralism that is inherently ahistorical, disregarding the classical realist appeal to such concepts as historic process, environmental conditions, and the nature of actual international phenomena. The insensitivity to historicity for the purpose of structuralism demonstrates neorealism’s revision of realism’s fundamental claim of preserving the autonomy of the political sphere. By violating this very important principle, neorealism demotes politics to the depth of irrelevancy, appealing to the negation of reductionism as grounds for the supremacy of structuralism, and establishing the foundations of its paradigm upon a questionable premise: revisionism as contradiction in the form of the apolitical.

For all its grand theoretical contentions and conceptual formulations, neorealism fails to observe one simple premise: it is not a theory of politics, but rather a theory of
systemic structuralism, one where the political is rejected, and structure lies at the heart of its theory. In the study of international politics, it is the political that matters, the interactions between states, the nature of the political structure of the specific states, the nature of the relationships and diplomatic endeavors between these states. What matters is the application of all these political components to change and continuity within the international political system. All such considerations are obviously and inherently political, where the very essence of international politics is defined by politics itself, with everything being subordinate to the political, even theoretical and conceptual frameworks. This, in essence, is the theory of classical realism, the study of politics in all its forms as it presents itself in the international realm. For neorealism, however, the political does not and cannot matter, for all that is political is by its nature reductionist, since politics is the outcome of human action, that is, it is the outcome of reductionist analysis. By removing the interactions of the state, the nature of these interactions, and the role of the actors in these interactions, the political, in essence, is being removed, for all that is political becomes rejected as mere reductionism—that is, it is not structural and it thus cannot provide for anything that pertains to the systemic level. To this end, structure defines all that is in the international realm, not the political, and for this reason, neorealism is apolitical, for the political, in the face of the structural, is simply a non-factor.

An example is neorealism’s revision of the balance of power theory, perhaps the most important conceptual framework in classical realism that accounts for systemic factors. Rejecting classical realism’s assessment of the concept as reductionist, neorealism argues that balance of power is something which the state strives for, yet it is something that the
system determines. The capacity and the resilience of the states to preserve the status quo do not matter, for the intent of the units within the structure is not important. It is the system that determines the outcome, and to this end, all the unique and important political endeavors that are undertaken by the powerful states to establish equilibrium are deemed irrelevant. Balance of power, in essence, is something that the structure of the system produces, and all the important concepts of national power, character, and capability that classical realism concentrates upon are flawed approaches to understanding international politics. In more simple terms, to understand the nature of politics and the balance of power theory, one must remove the political and the balancing game undertaken by the states out of the equation.

In sum, neorealism accounts for all international phenomena through its systemic structural framework, contending that the structure is independent of all units and attributes, in that it is independent of all that is political. Since it is the abstract concept of structuralism that defines the nature of international politics, domestic politics, in essence, ceases to serve a purpose, for the determinism of the structure is all that matters, and not what the political aspires. In this sense, it does not matter what the political actor does, for the political is subjected to the structural, and since it is the structure that determines all, the political has neither explanatory nor predictive powers, for it is merely a subordinate servant to structure. For this reason, the revisionism of the political for the sake of the structural, the revisionism of the realistic for the sake of the abstract, and the revisionism of the classical realist for the sake of the irrelevant reductionist, leads to the conclusion that neorealism is a form of realist structuralism and not a form of structural realism, for structure is not the adjective but the thing itself, the noun that defines the

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paradigm. To this end, by minimizing the political in favor of the structural, neorealism has inherently contradicted itself as a study of politics, since its apolitical approach has made neorealism antithetical to the very paradigm it claims to save.

It has not been the intent of this chapter to either discredit or falsify any of the neo-paradigms, but to rather demonstrate that their acts of revisionism have contradicted the very theoretical and conceptual foundations of their respective paradigms. One cannot deny that to a strong extent, both paradigms do display important explanatory purposes, and while disagreements may persist as to the extent of such importance, the fact of the matter remains that both of the neo-paradigms have become powerful forces in the study of international relations. Having said this, it is only consistent to argue that the method by which these paradigms are constructed and the process through which they justified and legitimated their paradigm-building are very problematic. It is for this purpose that the revisionism undertaken by both of the paradigms has been exposed, allowing this thesis to demonstrate that their claims of insufficiency and inadequacy leveled against realism are baseless. Thus, while neoliberalism situates itself in its myopic institutionalism, as does neorealism in its myopic structuralism, classical realism transcends any notions of myopism and demonstrates a paradigm that is far more outreaching, adequate, and sufficient than any of its neo-critics. The wealth of a paradigm is defined by its explanatory powers and the consistency of such power vis-à-vis the continuous and dynamic nature of the international political system. By addressing revisionism, this chapter has sought to elucidate this wealth that classical realism embodies, and to argue that a close and thorough study of the paradigm would provide sufficient and adequate answers to all the questions posed by the nature of international
politics. To this end, revisionism as contradiction allows realism to escape the injustice
done to it by the neo-paradigms, and to perhaps demonstrate to other scholars that paying
homage to Proteus is problematic and unnecessary.
CHAPTER 4

CONTRARIA CONTRARIIS CURANTUR: POWER AND THE DIALECTICAL

At the most fundamental level, the objective of this project has been to bring classical realism in line with modernity,\(^6\) that is, to address contemporary opponents of realism that claim the paradigm is incapable of accounting for the existing international political system. In the age of modernization, international economic integration, and the formulation of supranational entities, many scholars claim that the fundamental principles of classical realism lack the capacity and the explanatory powers to deal with the international politics of the modern age. In more simple terms, classical realism is outdated, a nostalgic paradigm that still clinches to the power politics of the past. As addressed in the second chapter, the revisionist paradigms sought to do just that: to account for modernity by altering or restructuring components of classical realism that are deemed incompatible with contemporary international politics. This attempt, albeit theoretically inconsistent and inherently problematic, brought to light the necessity of demonstrating whether realism as a progressive paradigm is capable of accounting for modernity. To this end, the task at hand appears to be a vital one: to demonstrate the explanatory powers of classical realism as being sufficient in dealing with modernity, with this sufficiency being justified through the implementation of an original analytical framework that demonstrates the depth and scope of the paradigm’s philosophical and theoretical structure.

\(^6\) The concept of modernity is used within the context of specifying the era in the international political system following the Cold War, where the bipolar structuration of the international system came to an abrupt end. The end of the bipolar system, the rise in international organizations and institutions, the continued integration of supranational entities, the evolving scope of regionalism, and the spread of globalization have become the international political realities of the modern age, that is, modernity. The
Introduction to the Dialectical

The fundamental conceptual framework of realism that necessitates theoretical and empirical justification is its appeal to power as the underlying force in international politics. The earlier discussion of Morgenthau elucidates the epistemological foundations of this claim, while the assessments of E.H. Carr, another founder of classical realism, demonstrate its historical justifications. At the same time, the conceptual structure of power within classical realism and its application to international politics has not been justified within the context of modernity. That is, while the paradigm’s core thesis is addressed normatively and historically, it has not been addressed within the context of modernity, for modernity demands its own separate structure of justification vis-à-vis the vast difference between the international politics of the past and the present. To this end, one fundamental question related to the realist conception of power must be addressed: does power, defined within the interests and actions of the rational state-actor, provide accountability for the nature of modern international relations?

The theoretical-analytical model that provides an answer to this question is the dialectical model developed here. Hegelian in structure, Clausewitzian in context, and original in its application to modernity, this model will provide accountability, consistency, and strength to the explanatory powers of classical realism as it takes on the term “modernity” will be used interchangeably with the term “modern age,” since both terms will be a reference to the post-bipolar international system as specified above.

97 Since this paper’s concentration is primarily on Hans J. Morgenthau as the leading source of classical realism, the discussion has been limited specifically to him. However, it is important to note E.H. Carr’s contribution to the paradigm by way of his historical assessment of realism. Carr’s study of history, especially in the works of Thucydides and Machiavelli, provide a historically developed assessment of realist theory and its consistent presence throughout history. In this sense, Carr’s contribution to realism is valued for its attention to the historical context. At the theoretical and epistemological level, Carr’s main emphasis has been his intense criticism of idealism when compared to the political thought of realism. See E.H. Carr, The Twenty Year’s Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations, (London: Macmillan Press, 1974).
challenges of modernity. While the proposed dialectical model is systemic, it does not suggest a systematization of realism, but rather a systematic justification of the concept of power defined in terms of interests of the state. Furthermore, since the very nature of a dialectical model suggests dynamic and constant change via historicism, the application of such a model is compatible with classical realism, for it demonstrates a capacity for flexibility and accountability in the face of modernity.

As specified in the previous chapter, realism’s reliance on power, as a conceptual framework that defines the state’s notion of interest, is not based on a specific or a set of theoretical presuppositions, but rather upon the observation that power defines the nature of international politics within the existing international system. More specifically, power is the vital center of attention in the assessment of international politics because such happens to be the reality of things. To this end, an emphasis on power via the dialectical model is not absolute, for it holds true only to the extent where which power maintains its status as the determining component of international relations. Namely, if the phenomenon of power, in its existing conceptual structure, is altered or limited by a change or an alteration within the international system itself, then realism’s conception of power would both accommodate and shift in accordance with the realities of the international system. Consequently, any other claims pertaining to realism’s conception of power vis-à-vis the international system—that is, any claim which neglects to deal with the flux in the international system—would be deemed static, ahistorical, and

98 Its practical implications remain unaltered, for any alterations would be in direct contradiction of this thesis’s discussion of Morgenthau’s rejection of abstractly systematizing practical-pragmatic assumptions about the real world. See Chapter 2 of this thesis.
99 Also see Chapter 2 of this thesis.
deterministic presuppositions that are structurally irreconcilable with the principles of classical realism.

The dialectical model presented here is Hegelian in structure, meaning that the dialectical process proceeds and develops in accordance with the dialectical structure presented in Hegelian philosophy. Hegelian dialectics maintains that all logic and world history follow a certain dialectical path, where internal contradictions are transcended and give rise to contradictions that themselves require resolution. Building upon this initial premise, dialectical thought argues that reality is not simply a state of affairs, but rather an ongoing historical process, where the key to understanding reality lies in the ability to understand the very nature of change. Thus, historical change is not simply a random process, but rather obeys a discoverable law. This discoverable law of change is the dialectic, which, itself, is comprised of a three-fold process: 1) the unity of opposites, in that the nature of everything involves internal opposition of contradiction; 2) quantity and quality, in that quantitative change always eventually leads to qualitative change; and 3) negation of the negated, in that change negates what is changed, and the result is in turn negated, but this second negation leads to a further development and not a return to that which it began. This process is also known as the repeated triadic movement of a thesis giving rise to its reaction, an antithesis which contradicts or negates the thesis, and the tension between the two being resolved by means of a synthesis. At the ontological level, Hegel further demonstrates the structural formation of the dialectical process when he describes a dialectic of existence: first, existence must be posited as pure Being; but pure Being, upon examination, is found to be indistinguishable from Nothing, and when
it is realized that what is coming into being is, at the same time, also returning to nothing, both Being and Nothing are united as Becoming.

The dialectical model of this thesis strictly adheres to the ontological, epistemological, and structural formulation of Hegelian dialectics, and it is to this end that it is maintained that the proposed theoretical model is Hegelian in structure. In context, however, this thesis implements a Clausewitzian approach, that is, the Hegelian context is both vast and universalistic, applying to theoretical models that address vast concepts such as development of history and the historical process. This makes it difficult to address conceptual and theoretical models that are not vast in context, such as the concept of power, which is only one component of history and the historical process. Therefore, while the purity of the Hegelian structure is preserved, the context is used within a Clausewitzian approach. Carl von Clausewitz applied Hegelian dialectics to his study of the philosophy of war in human history, and as such, he used the dialectical to understand and trace the nature of war, the internal complexities of war, and its overall relation to history and politics. Clausewitz’s important claim, via the dialectical model, is his assessment that war should be used as an instrument of policy, and to this end, war must serve the interests of the state. The Clausewitzian approach, therefore, takes the universal context of Hegelian dialectics and applies it to a more concrete process, the conceptual development of war in history.\footnote{Clausewitz’s implementation of the dialectical logic in his assessment of war is both complex and fascinating, making Clausewitz’s philosophy and the relationship between war and politics an invaluable contribution to the politico-philosophic thought of realism. See Carl von Clausewitz, \textit{On War}, (London: Routledge, 1966).} It is in this respect that this thesis claims its context is Clausewitzian, in that it takes the universal Hegelian context and applies it to a
more concrete process, the development of the concept of power within the political philosophy of realism.

The nature of attaining the ultimate state objective in realist philosophy, power, is inherently defined by the logic of the process. That is, the logic of power. As defined in the Chapter 2, the realist conception of power refers to any specific conceptual premise by which one actor attains and practices control over another actor (this clearly entails control over the actor’s resources and the events and outcomes of the relationship). Thus, when dealing with the realist conception of power, one is confronted with a two-fold theoretical framework: 1) the objective of attaining power, that is, the rationale by which power serves the interests of the state; and 2) the mechanism of attaining power, that is, the process by which the concept of power comes to be defined within realist political philosophy. Each of these theoretical frameworks is further conceptualized and developed within the dialectical process. More specifically, the thesis-antithesis dialectics of the first model result in a synthesis, as does the dialectical model of the second theoretical framework. The synthesis of the first theoretical model (the dialectical development of the concept of interest) becomes contradicted in opposition, or the antithesis, of the synthesis of the second model (the dialectical development of the concept of power), leading to the formulation of the next step in the larger dialectical process. The outcome of the two dialectical models provides for the final synthesis: the logic of power, or to use Max Weber’s vocabulary, zweckrational, final rationality.

This proposed dialectical model does two things: 1) it demonstrates that the concept of power follows a certain logic in realist philosophy, in that the misleading contention that realist philosophy advocates the attainment of power for the sake of power is a claim
that is rejected and demonstrated to be an underdeveloped stage in the dialectical process; and 2) this logic, in turn, is governed by final rationality, that is, the interest of the state. In this sense, the final resolution/synthesis of the dialectical model is the harmonization of the interests of the state with the objectives of its power structure. By demonstrating that the interests of the state are a byproduct of the complex dialectical process, and are born out of its synthesis with the very process of developing the logic of power, it becomes clear that the concept of interest defined in terms of power is a final dialectical process governed by rationality. Therefore, the concept of national/state interest and the concept of power are not vague conceptual frameworks that are open for criticism because of such presupposed vagueness, but are rather the byproducts of a specific and concrete dialectical process, where interest and power are synthesized in a final, harmonious resolution.

The Development of Interest: A Dialectical Model

Policy formulation, or the rationale for attaining power, that is, interest itself, is developed and defined by the ends-means dialectic. The ends-means dialectic, like the process itself, proceeds through a hierarchical fashion, with each step up in the hierarchy resulting in a synthesis, and hence leading the way to the final resolution. More specifically, at the initial stage of the dialectical model, policy formulation begins with the prudent assessment of tactics, with tactics serving as the means, and by its internal contradictions dialectically synthesizing with strategy, or the ends. Thus, tactics, at the initial stage, are the means of attaining strategy, which is the ends, or the antithesis, within this starting level of the hierarchical dialectic process. The end of all tactics is a
strategy, in that all tactics are themselves the means. The tactics, therefore, are the various methods or means by which a policy may be formulated, that is, the development of strategy.

Following this line of thought, it appears that the superior ends that strategy aims at govern the dispositions taken by tactics. This dialectical relationship between the tactic-strategy antitheses synthesizes into policy formulation, completing this initial stage of the dialectical process and beginning the next level in the hierarchy. The constant dialectical struggle between tactic and strategy, with the former consistently serving the ends of the latter, results in a fusion of the two concepts, hence the synthesis and the resolution of this specific dialectical stage. Policy formulation refers specifically to the orchestration of the forms of policy that determine the objectives of the attainment of power. The range, both theoretically and practically, of the structuration of the area of policy formulation is clearly linked to the ends and means dialectic. This, once again, pertains to the conceptualization of one component of the dialectical model serving as the means to the ends of the other component, or the antithesis, of the model. Thus, if policy formulation is the synthesis of the initial stage in the hierarchy of the dialectical model, what, then, forms the next stage of the hierarchy by serving as the antithesis of policy formulation?

The antithesis to policy formulation is action: the method by which the implementation of policy formulation is operationalized. Action, in its opposition and contradiction to policy formulation, gives way for the development of this specific dialectical stage. The ends-means dialectic of the tactic-strategy antitheses resolved into the formulation of a synthesis: policy formulation. Policy formulation, as a byproduct of the dialectical process, becomes contradicted and opposed by the probability of action,
that is, the action necessary to make the abstract/theoretical (policy formulation) into the practical (concrete action).

Action, whether in the form of specific acts of violence, war, diplomacy, economic sanctions, or any other form of political action, functions with the view of imposing one side’s will on the other, that is, allowing for the practical realization and materialization of the state’s formulated policy. In this specific dialectical capacity, action serves as the means, with the implementation of the formulated policy being the ends of such means. Without a synthesis these two diametrically opposed thesis-antitheses remain opposed and unresolved, for a formulated policy without implementation simply remains an abstract or a theoretical assumption without any capacity for practical relevance. Action, on the other hand, absent of a formulated policy and contradicted in its practical emptiness to the theoretically abstract—that is, lacking a mechanism for the practical implementation of its very policies—remains a means without an end. The necessity for a resolution, therefore, allows the dialectical process to produce a synthesis and complete this specific stage within the hierarchy. The synthesis of this stage is extremely important for the dialectical process, for it leads to the development of the next and final stage within this specific theoretical model: the dialectically developed concept of interest. More specifically, the completion of this stage completes this specific hierarchical model itself, and this completion takes form in the resolution of policy formulation and action into a very important synthesis: the objective of attaining power is the interest of the state.

The synthesis of the formulated policies, as one component of the dialectical process, with the actions necessary for the implementation of such policies, as the other
component, results in the realization of what the interest of the state is, or, what to do with the powers attained by the state. Since the objective of the state is itself the interest of the state, the determination of the objectives of the state’s attained powers is the same thing as asserting what the interests of the state are. In more simple terms, the policies that determine the ends for which the attained power should be used for are, in essence, the policies that are born out of the dialectical process and hence provide for the developed conception of state interest. The interests of the state are undoubtedly the ultimate ends of the state, for the state’s very existence is defined by properly understanding what its interests are. However, this dialectical process that allows for such realization is vital to the very development of interest, for a state’s interest is not the byproduct of a simple decision by a specific leader or a group of leaders, but rather an extensive dialectical process that engulfs the entire state. From tactics and strategy, to policy formulation and action, to the realization of what the state’s interests are, the state and its institutions and functional mechanisms become overwhelmed and are dictated by the dialectical process. More precisely, the logic of defining the interests of a state is inherently a dialectical process, for the dialectical is the very process by which such logic is born.

INTEREST / INTEREST AT ITS DEVELOPED STAGE

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\begin{align*}
\text{INTEREST} & \rightarrow \text{INTEREST AT ITS DEVELOPED STAGE} \\
& \quad \downarrow \\
\text{POLICY FORMULATION} & \leftrightarrow \text{ACTION} \\
& \quad \downarrow \\
\text{TACTIC} & \leftrightarrow \text{STRATEGY} \\
& \quad \downarrow \\
\text{Dialectical model, the development of the concept of interest}
\end{align*}
\]
The Logic of Power: Power as Dialectical Evolution

Having dialectically traced the development of the concept of interest through the hierarchical, theoretical model presented above, this section presents the second theoretical model: the dialectical development of the concept of power. Only after the development and the realization of what the concept of power actually means in realist philosophy could one then proceed to the next stage in the dialectical model, the struggle between power and interest for the final resolution. Power, however, unlike interest, is itself formulated by two theoretical models: development of power and the development of morality. That is, while the development of interest is defined by a singular theoretical model, power is also defined by an overarching singular model, with the minor exception being the necessity of the introduction and fusion of morality, a separate model, into the larger theoretical model for the concept of power.

In realist philosophy, any assessment of power begins at the ontological level with a consideration of the paradigm’s conceptualization of human nature. It is at this initial stage that the hierarchical dialectical process initiates the theoretical model of accounting for the nature and development of power in realism. It begins with Morgenthau’s observation of the interaction between the existing world and human nature as being caught up in a dialectical melee of “unceasing struggle between good and evil, reason and passion, life and death…peace and war—a struggle which so often ends with the victory of the forces hostile to man.” It is a world, therefore, of opposing interests, driven by conflict, opposite of interests, and internal contradictions, with its roots in human nature, particularly two human traits: selfishness and lust for power. These two components of human nature formulate the first stage of the hierarchy of power in the dialectical model,
as one human trait engages in a dialectical clash with the other, its antithesis. This premise is further clarified by Morgenthau’s examination of the relationship between selfishness, lust for power, and conflict (the dialectical struggle). Selfishness, realism holds, has rational limits, for it has an “objective relation to the vital needs of the individual” and “offers the best chances for survival under the particular natural and social conditions under which the individual lives.”¹⁰³ This rational capacity of selfishness, along with its functional relevance vis-à-vis human survival, is not enough to explain the unending nature of conflict among men. Thus, it is its antithesis that is the root of conflict and evil, since man’s desire for power, Morgenthau holds, is an “all-permeating fact which is of the very essence of human existence,” one which has no limits, and unlike selfishness, it cannot be appeased by concessions.¹⁰⁴ The desire for power constitutes the ubiquity of evil in human action.

This dialectical struggle between rational selfishness as a mechanism of survival and the desire for power as the underlying cause of evil in human nature formulates a synthesis that completes the initial stage of this hierarchical model: brute force, that is, attaining power for the sake of power. This synthesis of brute force that is born out of the selfish-power lusting antithesis comes into being through the internal contradictions and the eventual resolution of the contradictions between the two components of human nature. Selfishness, as the rational mechanism of survival, synthesizes with the unending desire for power, with the resolution being a calculated and selfish desire for power: brute force. Brute force, at this dialectical stage, is not completely rational, for it is rational only to the extent of serving its selfish ends, namely, attaining power for the sake of

¹⁰³ Ibid., pg. 193.
attaining power. The ends-means dialectical in this process is quite convoluted, for they are one and the same, since the attainment of power is both the means and the ends of the brute force synthesis.

This stage of the dialectical model presents an inherent ethical horror, for brute force presents human action at its most vicious level, since this new lust for power “is not merely blended with dominant aims of a different kind but is the very essence of the intention, the very life-blood of the action,” for “politics is a struggle for power over men, and whatever its ultimate aim may be, power is its ultimate goal.”¹⁰⁵ The dialectic formulation of brute force, however, is not the conception of power that realism defines, since brute force is incomplete as a concept of power, for it becomes caught in a dialectical struggle with its antithesis, morality. This is one of the most misunderstood components of realism: that brute force is the concept of power realism speaks of when it discusses its notion of power. Such suggests a complete misunderstanding of both realism and the dialectical process, for the concept of power, at this stage of the dialectical process, is not yet developed, and therefore, brute force is power at its undeveloped level. Realism’s conception of power, however, is the notion of power at its highest developed level in the dialectical model, and this level of development is attained when brute force is synthesized with its antithesis, morality. For this reason, this thesis turns to a dialectical assessment of morality as it develops in the hierarchical model and becomes the antithesis to brute force.

Morality, at its most basic level, is addressed in realist philosophy upon ontological and metaphysical grounds, this being individual or universalistic morality. Morality, in

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¹⁰⁴ Morgenthau, The Decline of Democratic Politics, pg. 312.
¹⁰⁵ Ibid., pg. 195.
this sense, refers to the general issues of ethics, values, right, wrong, and other factors of the sort, both at the personal level, and more importantly, at the universal level. To this end, realism accepts a certain notion of morality that pertains to all of humanity: morality is not relative. This notion of individual/universal morality finds itself in an “ineluctable tension” with state or political morality. This tension between the two forms of morality within realist philosophy provide for the formulation of the initial stage of the dialectical process that assesses the theoretical model concerning morality.

The dichotomous complexity between individual/universal morality and state/political morality is defined by the dialectical struggle between the forces of the political realm and the virtues of the moral realm. As specified in Chapter 2, the inherent contradictions between the two forms of morality are born out of the state’s necessity to adhere to the ultimate goal of the state, that is, the preservation of its interests. This, at times, comes into contradiction with the principles of individual/universal morality, giving way to the dialectical struggle of the individual/universal-state/political antithesis. Furthermore, the thesis-antithesis conflict between the two moralities is further exacerbated by conceptual and structural factors, since individual/universal morality is idealistic and abstract, while state/political morality is pragmatic and concrete. This clearly makes the struggle between the two concepts natural for realism, for the moral aspirations of the state are quite different from universal morality, and to this end, until a synthesis is attained between the two dialectical components, the two principles of morality remain contradicted and at opposite ends.

\[106\] See Chapter 2 of this thesis for realism’s conceptualization of morality, both at the universal/individual and stat/political levels.
The synthesis of the two diverging notions of morality gives birth to the following resolution: interest defined in terms of morality, that is, that which is moral is in the interest of the state, and that which is in the interest of the state is moral.\(^{107}\) This dialectical fusion of universal/individual and state/political morality formulates a synthesized notion of morality that defines the concept of morality at its fullest developed stage within the dialectical model. More specifically, universal/individual morality and state/political morality are both underdeveloped notions of morality within the hierarchy of the dialectical process, and it is only when the two underdeveloped notions of morality become synthesized that the actual realist conception of morality is fully developed. To this end, morality within the lexicon of classical realism is defined as such only at its developed stage, which allows for the completion of this specific dialectical model and formulates the beginning of the next stage: the dialectical clash between the theoretical model of morality and its antithesis, brute force. It is with the synthesis of these antitheses that the entire dialectical model of power is resolved, for the resolution of the contradictions between morality and brute force by way of a synthesis allows for a final conceptual definition of what power is within the philosophy of classical realism. Therefore, the next stage of the dialectical process traces the dialectical clash between morality and brute force, and the eventual synthesis of these two concepts that gives birth to the realist conception of power.

Morality, at its developed stage within the hierarchical model, becomes contradicted by its antithesis, brute force, as the dialectical process of negations proceeds to formulate the realist conception of power at its developed stage. Morality, with its conceptual and dialectically developed tool of interest playing a role of reciprocity within the theoretical

\(^{107}\) See Chapter 2.
model of morality, is still incomplete as a conceptual framework within the larger theoretical model of power. As one of the dialectical components of power, morality is only capable of completing this dialectical stage by synthesizing itself with its antithesis. The antithesis, brute force, as discussed earlier, is also an underdeveloped dialectical component of power—that is, while morality is developed within its own conceptual framework, it only remains incomplete within the larger theoretical framework of power—brute force, however, is altogether incomplete, for brute force presents no conceptual model of its own, but rather falls within the larger theoretical framework of power. Accordingly, since brute force is far too deficient and underdeveloped as both a concept and a component within the hierarchical dialectical process, its synthesis with morality becomes a necessity, a natural outcome of the dialectical resolution that gives way to the formulation of the realist conception of power.

The dialectical dance between morality and brute force is a vital point of concentration in realist philosophy, for Morgenthau specifies his rejection of the instrumental usage of morality by the state, that is, the “drive for power” must not be concealed under the guise of morality.\(^\text{108}\) This direct negation of brute force by Morgenthau demonstrates the internal contradictions of the two antitheses, for realism refrains from rejecting morality in favor of the brute objectives of the state, that is, the attainment of power for the sake of power. At the same time, it does not allow morality, at the universal level, to interfere with the interests of the state. However, at its developed stage, morality takes precedence over brute force in the dialectical struggle, for in the

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final synthesis of the two concepts, morality is “superimposed” upon the justificatory mechanisms of force in the conceptual framework of power.\(^{109}\)

This premise is extremely important for the potential resolution of this specific dialectical stage, for Morgenthau consistently appeals to moral restraint in the face of brute force, maintaining that morality should serve as a guide to political action, yet this is acceptable to the extent that the realities of the political conditions allow it, that is, the preservation of the state’s interests. This dialectical struggle is a consistent problem for realist theory at this stage of the dialectical process, for morality, as a mechanism of state policy, is inherently problematic, since it limits or hampers the state’s capacity for the formulation or the full development of its interests. More specifically, morality cannot serve as the ends of a state’s objective, and to this end, neither could it serve as a means. Hence the necessity of power to serve as a mechanism of implementation. At this stage, however, the concept of power itself is not fully developed, for it is brute force, and as a mechanism of implementation, brute force is quite limited and underdeveloped, since it lacks the means to rationally calculate the ends or the objectives of the state. It is at this point that a synthesis begins to take form between the antitheses, for morality remains incapable of serving the interests of the state without a mechanism of implementation, while brute force, as a mechanism of implementation, is not developed enough within the dialectical process to undertake this task.

Morgenthau directly addresses this dialectical dilemma: “the lust for power as ubiquitous empirical fact and its denial as universal ethical norm are the poles between

\(^{109}\) Morgenthau, *The Decline of Democratic Politics*, pg. 325.
which this antinomy is suspended.”

This dialectical process between the two poles of an antinomy forms the foundations of realism’s attempt to accommodate this dialectical struggle and its potential synthesis: the direct application of moral imperatives to the political realm will yield disaster, while to altogether abandon the moral imperatives and resort to brute force will negate the very concept of morality. Morgenthau’s synthesis of this dialectical stage is an overall negation of brute force in relation and in comparison to morality. Morality, in and of itself, is the byproduct of an entire dialectical model, since morality is at its highest/fullest developed stage, while brute force, as discussed extensively, remains underdeveloped by way of the dialectical. Morgenthau elaborates on this point by maintaining that when the state engages in an assessment of a certain political action, it is both prudent and necessary that such action be judged by moral principles. This rationale, he suggests, is sanctioned by the dialectical process itself, for the “dialectic of ethics and politics” inhibits brute force, “in spite of itself, from escaping” morality’s “judgment and normative directions.”

This limitation of brute force during the synthesis process of this dialectical stage becomes an ontological necessity if a synthesis with morality is to take place. More specifically, Morgenthau attempts to suggest that brute force is not even the equal of morality within the dialectical process (as mentioned earlier, morality is developed, while brute force is not), for the “very juxtaposition of ‘power politics’ and ‘moral politics’ is fundamentally mistaken,” since “morality is not just another branch of human activity,” but rather it “is superimposed upon them, limiting the choice of ends and means and

112 Morgenthau, Scientific Man versus Power Politics, pg. 177.
delineating the legitimate sphere of a particular branch of action altogether.\textsuperscript{113} The synthesis of brute force and morality, therefore, is the dialectical formulation of the realist conception of power: force as a mechanism of action and implementation as guided and limited by the principles of morality. This synthesis is the completion of the dialectical model for power; since, power, as a concept within realist theory, comes into being and is hence developed by way of resolving the dialectical struggle between brute force and morality. The resolution to this dialectical struggle, power, is the negation of brute force as a form of action and the fusion of morality with political action, that is, prudent action. Morgenthau writes, “political action can be defined as an attempt to realize moral values through the medium of politics, that is, power.”\textsuperscript{114} Thus, it is power, in its complete, developed stage that allows for the realization of moral political action. To this end, power in realism is defined as “man’s control over the minds and actions of other man,” yet the extent and the mechanism by which such control is practiced are further defined by its moral principles. This dialectical resolution provides power its capacity for reason, that is, power in realism is not brute or blind force, but rather force that is born out of prudent action and moral guidance. This becomes fundamental as the completed dialectical model of power itself becomes entangled in a dialectical struggle with its antithesis, the completed dialectical model of interest. And it is the final synthesis of power and interest that completes the dialectical process, providing the final rationality for the most important concept in realism: power defined in terms of interest.

\textsuperscript{113} Morgenthau, \textit{The Decline of Democratic Politics}, pg. 325.
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid., pg. 110.
Dialectical model, the development of the concept of power, with a fusion of the concept of morality

Interest Defined in Terms of Power: Final Synthesis

The final hierarchical stage of the dialectical process is the resolution of the two main models discussed in this chapter: the dialectical model of the development of interest (the tactic-strategy antithesis, its synthesis: policy formulation; policy-action antithesis, its synthesis: interest, that is, interests of the state) and the dialectical model of the development of power (the selfishness-lust for power antithesis, its synthesis: brute force; brute force-morality antithesis: its synthesis: power, that is, prudent action). The dialectical struggle between the interest-power antitheses is further defined by the means-ends nature of this dialectical. This pertains to the specific nature of each of the components in this final dialectical stage: power, as one component, serving as the means to the end of the other component, interest. The following diagram provides a visual of the final model:
As discussed in Chapter 2, and dialectically developed in this chapter, the concept of interest within realism is the overarching set of policies that define what the objectives of the state are. Chapter 2 demonstrates the components of prudence, risk maximization-minimization factors, and rationality assumptions as frameworks defining the specific conceptual understanding of interest in realist philosophy. The dialectical model presented in this chapter demonstrated the process by which interest comes into being and the method through which it evolves and reaches its state of development. Similar to
interest, the same analytical process was presented for the concept of power, from its theoretical and definitional assessments in Chapter 2 to its dialectical development in this chapter. At its developed stage, both of these concepts seek a dialectical fusion, that is, a final synthesis that serves as the final rationality, the logic of power. More specifically, the dialectical struggle between interest and power is in essence a mean-ends struggle, for to properly understand the axiomatic thesis of realism (interest defined in terms of power) a synthesis is necessitated of this final dialectical stage to produce a final resolution.

The interest, or the objective, of a state is to attain power, that is, to establish control of all the specific components within the international system that will contribute to the preservation of the state’s interests. Thus, it is in the interest of the state to preserve its interest. Power is the mechanism of establishing control, and thus, power becomes an interest in and of itself. But power, as an interest, is incomplete, for it becomes meaningless tautology to claim that power is interest and it is in the power’s interest to preserve its interest, that is, power. In more simple terms, the attainment of power for the sake of attaining and preserving power is an incomplete interest of the state, for it only serves as a single interest, its own (power’s) preservation. The state, however, formulates interest not only for the sake of power, but for the sake of all that is in fact in the interest of the state. Therefore, when maintaining that it is in the interest of the state to preserve its interest, this thesis is specifically asserting that it is in the interest of the state to have power, for power is necessary in preserving the interests, or all the other objectives, of the state. Therefore, power is only one interest, and when realism asserts that it defines interest in terms of power, it is in fact formulating the final synthesis of the dialectical model: power, as an act of political action, becomes fused with its opposite, interest, and
thus becomes a form of interest. The synthesis, therefore, is the final rationality and logic of power: power as policy of the state, that is, power as an interest of the state serving all the interests of the state. Thus, the ends-means dialectical also completes itself, for although as an interest power is an end in and of itself, it is at the same time a means to other ends, the other interests of the state. Hence the final resolution to the dialectical model and the final rationality of power: interest defined in terms of power.

Collectively, this chapter has provided the theoretical, structural, and conceptual justifications for the all-important role of power in the philosophic and epistemological structure of realism. In doing so, it has also burdened itself with achieving five important tasks. First, defining the very nature of power in realist philosophy. Second, elucidating how the concept of power in realist thought has not been thoroughly understood and grasped by international relations scholars. Third, demonstrating that the concept of interest is not merely a vague conceptual premise, but rather a concrete and developed framework within the dialectical model. Fourth, demonstrating that the notion of power is not a relative or vague concept within realism, but rather a developed and structured framework within the dialectical model. And fifth, demonstrating that the realist concept of interest defined in terms of power is a complex, highly-developed, and theoretically rich conceptual model that is epistemologically legitimated and justified by synthesizing power and interest into a final rationality within the dialectical structure.

Accordingly, this thesis once again poses the previously stated question: does power, as defined within the interests and actions of the rational state-actor, explain the nature of modern international relations? Realism provides the following answer: since the interest of the state is its very own preservation, and since this preservation is reliant upon power
(that is, the capacity to control all such variables which secure the preservation of the state’s interests), then the interests and actions of the rational state-actor are and must be defined in terms of power!

In conclusion, this chapter provided an original and in-depth assessment of realism’s underlying structuration, through which the formulation of several of the paradigm’s fundamental assumptions are demonstrated along with the intrinsic and intricate nature of how these fundamental assumptions are intertwined and developed in the dialectical process. Chapter 4 also demonstrated that the epistemological framework of the realist paradigm is formed in an iron-clad structure, where each developing assumption or conceptual framework is justified as it evolves to its final developed stage. This method of inquiry introduces international relations scholarship to an understanding of realism that has not been explored before. As such, this original approach provides realism with much more strength as a paradigm, for it demonstrates that the paradigm is not preserved upon ad hoc auxiliaries or added conceptual frameworks, but rather upon its internal and original theoretical-philosophical model.
CHAPTER 5

THE POWER OF POWER POLITICS: A DEFENSE

An adequate attempt to defend classical realism, or for that matter to extol the paradigm, cannot be simply established on a defense against the revisionist neo-paradigms, nor on an original and thorough exploration of the paradigm's philosophical and theoretical structure. Thus, while it has been demonstrated that classical realism is in fact a powerful enough paradigm to satisfy and negate the claims of insufficiency by the revisionists, it must also be demonstrated as to whether realism is adequate and progressive enough to rebuff the claim that it is a degenerative paradigm. In essence, it must be demonstrated that realism is a scientifically adequate approach for explaining behavior in international relations. The most difficult component of defending classical realism against its contemporary critics is the fact that almost all scholars consider classical realism, neorealism, and all other forms of minimal-realist approaches to be part of the same paradigm. As such, when confronting such critical scholarship, one is faced with a two-fold problem: 1) it becomes necessary to demonstrate that classical realism is completely separate from the revisionist "realist" paradigms (as it has been done in this project); and 2) one finds that most of the criticism is against the revisionist approaches, but since the revisionists are deemed to be an extension of the classical realists, scholars accept all forms of criticism leveled against all forms of realists to be a falsification of the paradigm itself. By separating classical realism from the revisionists, and by demonstrating the limits of the claim that the neo-paradigms are the next evolution in the paradigm, this thesis has shown that not only is its criticism of the neo-paradigms consistent with the criticism provided by other scholars, but that such criticism should not
and cannot be applied to classical realism. To this end, only critiques that are specifically directed at classical realism can be deemed criticisms of the paradigm itself, and as such, an attempt must be made to address such scholarship. The most notable critique in IR scholarship that has been leveled against Morgenthau's realism has been the one provided by John Vasquez, in his work, *The Power of Power Politics: A Critique*. To that end, employing the dialectically developed theoretical frameworks of the previous chapter, this chapter addresses Vasquez's attempt at falsifying realism as a progressive paradigm.

**The Anatomy of a Paradigm: Realism and the Philosophy of Science**

Using philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn's framework of evaluating what constitutes scientific inquiry, John Vasquez attempts to determine "whether the realist paradigm has adequately guided inquiry in international relations." However, before proceeding to a discussion of classical realism as the leading research program in IR scholarship, and the extent to which Kuhn's philosophy of science deems realism progressive or degenerative, Vasquez concedes that Kuhn's philosophy of science has itself been the subject of much criticism. As such, Vasquez opens up with a defense of Kuhn, for a defense of Kuhn is in essence a defense of Vasquez's overall attempt at falsifying realism as a paradigm, since the structure and criteria presented by Vasquez relies on the set of propositions presented in the writings of Thomas Kuhn. Vasquez seeks to do three things: 1) he attempts to clarify and define what Kuhn means by his concept of a paradigm; 2) whether Kuhn's description of scientific change is correct; and 3) establish the framework and structure through which a paradigm is evaluated.

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Vasquez concedes that Kuhn's usage of the paradigm concept is both vague and hard to define, since in his text, Kuhn has nearly 21 different uses for the concept.\(^{116}\) An attempt by Kuhn to reformulate the concept has not been satisfactory, with extensive criticism being leveled at two main points: 1) Kuhn's concept of a paradigm is ambiguous in that it refers to so many aspects of the scientific process that his thesis is almost nonfalsifiable; and 2) the concept is so vague that it is difficult to identify, in operational terms, the specific paradigm of a discipline. Thus, Kuhn fails to specifically define what constitutes a paradigm, and this is a point that Vasquez admits, as he specifies, "Kuhn has not adequately resolved these problems," and for that reason, Vasquez aspires to provide his own definition, as he asserts, "this analysis must provide its own stipulative definition."\(^{117}\) In essence, Vasquez, observing the inadequacy of Kuhn's presentation of the concept of paradigm, provides his own interpretation of what constitutes a definition of a paradigm within a Kuhnian framework. Concomitantly, he "stipulatively" defines the concept of paradigm as "the fundamental assumptions scholars make about the world they are studying."\(^{118}\)

At this stage, it is quite clear that Vasquez's approach here is inherently problematic. For one, the framework that he introduces is deemed problematic from the very beginning, and he must resort to his own stipulative definitions so that he can operationalize Kuhn's propositions. The extent to which Kuhn would agree with the revision of his concept of paradigm is quite problematic and an issue that Vasquez does not address. That is, the way Vasquez defines the concept of paradigm is not the same way that Kuhn defines it. Vasquez's justification for this reformulation is the contention

\(^{116}\) Ibid., pg. 1.
\(^{117}\) Ibid., pg. 4.
that in its existing definitional form, the concept cannot be properly applied and operationalized in assessing international relations research programs. This, of course, brings to light another serious problem: with these set of deficiencies, is the Kuhnian model an acceptable framework for evaluating scientific inquiry within IR? More specifically, if one rejects Kuhn's propositions, then Vasquez's underlying structure for his critique self-destructs, since he has no foundations to base his argument on. It is for this reason that Vasquez goes through the painstaking task of trying to convince the reader that, regardless of its flaws and shortcomings, Kuhn's framework should still be used. While this, clearly, is not convincing, we shall nonetheless accept Vasquez's plea for the sake of argument and allow him to proceed.

Vasquez provides the following explanation for his stipulative definition:

The preceding definition has been stipulated to distinguish a Paradigm from a conceptual framework or theory...A paradigm consists of a set of fundamental assumptions of the world. These assumptions focus the attention of the scholar on certain phenomena and interpret those phenomena via concepts. Propositions, in turn, are developed by specifying relationships between concepts. Finally, theories are developed by specifying relationships between propositions.119

Based on this epistemological structure, Vasquez concludes that a paradigm could give rise to more than one theory, for new concepts, propositions, or theories that do not change the fundamental assumptions of the paradigm do not constitute a new paradigm. Vasquez's proposed epistemology of a paradigm is problematic for several reasons. First, clarifying what the fundamental assumptions of a given paradigm are within IR is both debatable and unclear. Second, there is no set criteria as to what constitutes a fundamental assumption and what constitutes a conceptual or theoretical framework. The

118 Ibid., pg. 5.
givenness of a certain phenomena, for example, could be deemed a fundamental assumption, but within the structuration and context of a research program, that same presumed fundamental assumption may be deemed a theoretical framework. And third, it leads to an oversimplification of a given research program, for it reduces general and complex elements of a school of thought to a narrow set of fundamental assumptions for the sake of operationalization. Furthermore, Vasquez does not adequately explain how a given theoretical framework cannot be deemed a fundamental assumption, since the given assumption must be developed within a theoretical or conceptual structure. This epistemological flaw in Vasquez's proposition will create further problems for him as he attempts to classify and label what the fundamental assumptions of classical realism are.

Vasquez next shows Kuhn's description of how paradigms dominate a field and how they are replaced. First, a single work, so unprecedented in its achievement, becomes a paradigm because it becomes an exemplar of scientific analysis within its particular field. Second, once a paradigm dominates, it is referred to as normal science, where theory construction, fact gathering and research are guided by the fundamental assumption of the paradigm. And third, normal science begins to come to an end when an anomaly, or the recognition that nature has somehow violated the fundamental assumptions of the paradigm, cannot be removed by paradigm articulation, leading to the rise of new paradigms that could better account for the anomalies and the eventual supplanting of the old paradigm by the new.\(^\text{120}\)

While such scientific revolutions, or paradigm shifts, are not controversial, the capacity of Kuhn to provide criteria for the evaluation of a given paradigm is. This is

\(^{119}\) Ibid., pg. 5.
made more evident by Vasquez’s own assertion that "Kuhn provides little aid" with respect to a set of criteria for evaluating paradigms.\textsuperscript{121} Vasquez offers two sets of criteria for evaluating a paradigm which he claims, although there is much debate in the philosophy of science over it, have a consensus. First, since a paradigm produces theories, it is possible to evaluate the adequacy of a paradigm in terms of the corroborated hypotheses it produces. Second, a paradigm, as science, must produce knowledge. And herein lies another problem that Vasquez admits, and one that Lakatos points out: such questions as to how many corroborated hypotheses, or how much paradigm-directed research must be there in order for the set criteria to be deemed acceptable, "are unanswerable questions in the field of international relations."\textsuperscript{122}

Vasquez, once again, admits to the shortcomings of a given proposition (the criteria through which a paradigm is to be evaluated), but then proceeds with it. In short, his proposed criteria itself need a set of criteria, and it is one which he admits he is unable to provide. And so if the criterion for evaluating a paradigm is the corroboration of hypotheses, the criteria for selecting the quantity and quality of the paradigm-produced hypotheses is unattainable, as Vasquez himself admits. With such being the case, one could argue the very criteria that Vasquez proposes disqualifies itself, since his entire proposition of this given criteria becomes a subject of intense contention. With respect to the second criteria of science producing knowledge, Vasquez once again fails to do two things. First, he does not clarify what constitutes produced knowledge. Second, he fails to establish what is the criteria that determines whether a set of produced conclusions are

\textsuperscript{121} Vasquez, \textit{The Power of Power Politics, A Critique}, pg. 9.
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid., pg. 12.
deemed new knowledge or the regurgitation of existing knowledge. The lack of satisfactory answers to these complications suggests a severe problem in Vasquez’s research design.

To proceed with his attempt at characterizing realism as a degenerative paradigm within the Kuhnian model, Vasquez first seeks to establish that realism has in fact been the most dominant paradigm in the study of IR until the 1970’s. Vasquez’s approach here is quite obvious, in that by proving that realism has been the dominant paradigm in the discipline, he can lay the foundations for a potential scientific revolution. Moreover, an attempt at a paradigm shift could be undertaken if he can demonstrate that the dominant paradigm is degenerative. In order for Vasquez to be able to do this, he must prove the following three propositions to be true. First, he must show that the realist paradigm has guided theory construction in the field of international relations in the decades following its inception. Second, he needs to demonstrate that the realist paradigm has guided data making during the same time period. Lastly, Vasquez has to establish that the realist paradigm has guided research in the field of international relations also during that same time period. As Vasquez explains:

These three propositions specify much more clearly the spatial-temporal domain of the major proposition and what is meant by the realist paradigm ‘dominating’ international relations inquiry. Since the essential activities of any science are theory construction, data making, and research, it can be concluded that if the realist paradigm guides these three activities, then it is dominating international relations inquiry.123

As initially specified, Vasquez defines a paradigm within the Kuhnian model, where paradigm is understood as the given school of thought’s fundamental assumptions about the world. Furthermore, Vasquez asserts that a “fundamental assumption is one that
forms the foundation upon which the entire edifice of a discipline is built.” Based on this underlying logical structure, Vasquez defines the paradigm of realism to be founded upon three fundamental assumptions. The first assumption is that nation-states are the most important actors for understanding international relations. Second, according to realism there is a sharp distinction between domestic politics and international politics. And third, realism asserts “that international relations is the struggle for power and peace.” This oversimplification, and even misreading of classical realism, plays an important role in Vasquez’s research design, since his research design is based on proving the above three propositions to be true (that realism led the field in theory construction, data gathering, and research guidance). In this sense, Vasquez simply deems any scholar, regardless of the extent to which he or she somehow appeals to these three fundamental assumptions, to be a realist. Vasquez considers those scholars as realists who have been “providing alternative concepts and explanations that, while at times very different from those employed by Morgenthau, are still with few exceptions consistent with the three fundamental assumptions.”

Not only is Vasquez’ classification of what constitutes a realist unacceptable and problematic, it is also potentially devastating to his final critique. This is, since he is including a plethora of scholars into the realist camp who are not classical realists. Therefore, as it will be seen, when he aspires to critique realist scholarship and the paradigm itself, this criticism becomes inherently questionable, since the criteria through which he defines the paradigm is fundamentally flawed and oversimplified. More simply,

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123 Ibid., pg. 25.
124 Ibid., pg. 26.
125 Ibid., pp. 27-28.
126 Ibid., pg. 22.
Vasquez appears to argue that anyone and anything could be deemed part of the realist paradigm as long as they are somehow connected to what he defines as the three fundamental assumptions of realism, regardless of the fact that such perspectives could be completely antithetical to or “very different” from the fundamental assumptions articulated by Morgenthau. It then becomes a question of whether Vasquez is justifying revisionist scholarship as an extension of realism itself, only later to use it as a method of falsifying the paradigm, or is Vasquez accepting the ammunition provided by the revisionist/non-realists, in which case he only has to pull the trigger and deem the paradigm degenerative?

Whatever Vasquez’s approach, there are three structural problems with his critique. First, Vasquez’s categorization of the three fundamental assumptions that define the paradigm of classical realism is oversimplified, misleading, and underdeveloped. Owing to this initial problem, Vasquez’s attempt at critiquing the scholarship undertaken by realists becomes baseless, since his foundation of defining what constitutes a realist is flawed. Put differently, he deems criticism of scholarship, which this thesis does not recognize as realist, to be a critique of the paradigm itself. Lastly, Vasquez’s definition of the realist paradigm does not meet the philosophical-theoretical framework of classical realism presented in this thesis.

An Inadequate Epistemological Structure: Vasquez’s Problem of Defining Realism

The method through which this section will demonstrate the problem of Vasquez’s definition of the realist paradigm will be two-fold. First, the structural flaw in Vasquez’s epistemological framework of formulating the three fundamental assumptions that define
the realist paradigm will be explored. Then, five additional fundamental assumptions of classical realism will be discussed, through which the oversimplification, misreading, and underdevelopment present in Vasquez’s framework will be shown.\footnote{The three fundamental assumptions presented by Vasquez are not being challenged as fundamental assumptions of the paradigm. What is being contended is the fact that Vasquez disregards the rest of the fundamental assumptions that define the paradigm as specified by Morgenthau. Furthermore, this thesis questions Vasquez’s concept of what a fundamental assumption is, what a “prior assumption” is, and what a concept is with respect to their usage within Vasquez’s epistemological framework.}

The fundamental problem in Vasquez’s epistemological framework is his formulation of what constitutes a fundamental assumption. Vasquez asserts that not all “assumptions are fundamental assumptions,” and he argues that Morgenthau’s assumption, for example, “that the balance of power can sometimes be a useful mechanism for maintaining peace is not a fundamental assumption, because it rests on a certain prior assumption,” that only “nations can balance power.”\footnote{Ibid., pg. 26.} Vasquez’s introduction and implementation of the concept of prior assumption provides a potential problem in both his framework and logical structure. His usage of the concept of prior assumption in explaining and justifying why the balance of power concept cannot be deemed a fundamental assumption is very unconvincing, since it poses a similar problem to his proposed first fundamental assumption: that nation-states are the most important actors in understanding international relations.

Since prior assumption serves as a necessary epistemic criterion with respect to accepting or negating what constitutes a fundamental assumption, Vasquez undercuts his own proposition by presuming the givenness of the nation-state, since the nation-state itself rests on a “prior assumption.” If nation-states act in accordance to their interests, is not the concept of the interest of the state a prior assumption on which its actions rest? As
the most important actors, are nation-states not defined by their interests, and as such, is not the “fundamental assumption” of the nation-state as the most important actor hinged on the “prior assumption” of its very interests that define its importance? In Chapter 4, it was demonstrated that the interests of the state are undoubtedly the ultimate ends of the state, for the state’s very existence is defined by properly understanding what are its interests. Accordingly, the dialectical process that allows for such realization is vital to the very development of interest, for a state’s interest is not the byproduct of a simple decision by a specific leader or a group of leaders, but rather an extensive dialectical process that engulfs the entire state. From tactics and strategy, to policy formulation and action, to the realization of what the state’s interests are, the state and its institutions and functional mechanisms become overwhelmed and are dictated by the dialectical process. To this end, the importance of nation-states as international actors is defined as, and rested on, the prior assumption of the interests of the given state. For this reason, the method through which Vasquez disqualifies balance of power as a fundamental assumption, his own conception of the nation-state as the most important actor could also be disqualified as a fundamental assumption.

Vasquez faces a similar problem with respect to his epistemological framework’s formulation of what constitutes a fundamental assumption when presenting what he maintains to be the second fundamental assumption of the realist paradigm: the distinction between domestic and international politics. In order for a fundamental assumption to be deemed as such, it must rest upon its very own fundaments, and must thus be free of prior assumptions, for the very presence of prior assumptions negates the capacity of an assumption to be a fundamental assumption. This being the criteria
through which Vasquez qualifies what a fundamental assumption is, he must then be able to account for the claim that the assumption that domestic politics are distinct from international politics is not rested on a prior assumption. This, however, becomes problematic for Vasquez, when he explores Morgenthau’s underlying assumption as to why domestic politics is distinct from international politics: “Morgenthau points out…that it is specifically the decentralized or anarchic system of international society that makes domestic politics different from international politics.” Similar to Vasquez’s rejection of balance of power being a fundamental assumption, his own proposition also becomes a subject of contention, since the assumption that domestic politics is distinct from international politics rests on the prior assumption that the international political system is anarchic. Could it then not be claimed that the assumption the international political system is anarchic is a fundamental assumption? Since Vasquez’s proposition of a fundamental assumption rests on a prior assumption, this brings into question his own epistemological framework. In essence, Vasquez is presented with a question that is quite devastating to the overarching structure of his argument: what is a fundamental assumption, the international system is anarchic, or the distinction between domestic and international politics? Which assumption is a fundamental assumption, which assumption is a prior assumption, and which assumption is merely just an assumption, a conceptual framework that “forms the foundation upon which the entire edifice of a discipline is build?” Vasquez leaves such questions unanswered, which raises questions about the theoretical structuration of Vasquez’s argument.

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129 Ibid., pg. 27.
Vasquez’s presentation of the third assumption, that international politics is a struggle for power and peace, is the only fundamental assumption within his epistemological framework that is not completely problematic. Since the struggle for power is a fundamental assumption of the paradigm that does not rest on a prior assumption, there are no structural problems with this proposition. Vasquez, however, does not attempt to specify or define the concept of power within the realist paradigm. As such, he presumes any reference to war, conflict, or the use of arms to be an extension of the realist power framework. However, Chapter 4 demonstrated that the realist concept of power is not only a conceptual framework that is developed dialectically, but it includes vital components ranging from human nature, to brute force, to state and universal morality. For this reason, a scholar’s appeal to a power framework does not necessarily qualify such a scholar to be classified as a realist, since the criteria of what constitutes a realist framework vastly differs from what many perceive to be a fundamental assumption of the paradigm. The complex structure of the power framework and the process through which it comes into being, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, provide for a more specific understanding of what the concept of power means within the paradigm. Furthermore, this makes the implementation and the potential operationalization of the concept within a research design more parsimonious, since the concept can no longer be deemed vague and thus open to interpretations. As such, the dialectical development of power within the philosophical and theoretical structure of the paradigm presents serious problems for Vasquez, for it necessitates a more stringent and parsimonious criteria through which the power framework is defined.
As specified previously, this thesis does not contend that the three above-mentioned fundamental assumptions are contradictory to the fundamental assumptions that the paradigm makes about the world. The problem lies in Vasquez’s justification of what constitutes a fundamental assumption. Furthermore, Vasquez’s implementation of a conceptually flawed criteria (the concept of prior assumptions) is intended to exclude or disqualify other realist assumptions from being deemed fundamental assumptions. While the result of the criteria produces the opposite effect, it becomes a subject of contention as to why Vasquez excludes five other fundamental assumptions that the realist paradigm makes about the world. As such, while Vasquez uses, inconsistently, three fundamental assumptions to define what constitutes a realist, the exclusion of the other five fundamental assumptions of the paradigm undermines Vasquez’s argument. More specifically, Vasquez contends that if a scholar appeals to the three fundamental assumptions of the paradigm, that scholar is considered a realist.\textsuperscript{130} This thesis, however, rejects this criteria of what constitutes a realist, and contends that if a scholar is to be deemed a realist, then all eight fundamental assumptions of the paradigm, as laid out by Morgenthau, must be accepted. Not only does this enrich the understanding of what constitutes a realist, but it also makes the research design more parsimonious. That is, the three fundamental assumptions presented by Vasquez are such oversimplifications of the paradigm that almost any scholar who has had some affinity with power politics could be deemed a realist. To thoroughly reject and demonstrate the misleading nature of such criteria, five additional fundamental assumptions of the realist paradigm are presented below. In short, this will show that Vasquez’s argument is at times contradictory and

\textsuperscript{130} Ibid., pp. 33-35.
exhibits a misunderstanding of the theoretical and philosophical structure of the realist school of thought.

The first fundamental assumption that Morgenthau makes, which is in essence an epistemological presupposition, is that realism rejects systematized abstraction in favor of practical, pragmatic assessments of the empirical world, for “to reduce international relations to a system of abstract propositions with a predictive function” is not acceptable.\(^{131}\) The second fundamental assumption is specified by Morgenthau’s definition of what is the theory of realism: that “[t]he theoretical concern with human nature as it actually is, and with the historic processes as they actually take place, has earned for the theory presented here the name of realism.”\(^{132}\) The third fundamental assumption is that realism assumes that political actors act and think in terms of interest defined as power.\(^{133}\) The fourth fundamental assumption is that there is a relationship between morality and political action.\(^{134}\) The fifth fundamental assumption is that realism is different from “other schools of thought,” and this difference is both “real” and “profound,” for realism constitutes a distinct intellectual approach and “parts company with other schools when they impose standards of thought appropriate to other spheres upon the political sphere.”\(^{135}\)

Along with the three assumptions presented by Vasquez, the five additional assumptions presented in this section provide for the eight fundamental assumptions that define the realist paradigm. For Vasquez to include only three of the fundamental

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\(^{131}\) Morgenthau, *The Decline of Democratic Politics*, pg. 65. For a further discussion of this fundamental assumption, see Chapter 2 of this thesis.

\(^{132}\) Ibid., pg. 4.

\(^{133}\) See Chapter 2 of this thesis for a more detailed discussion of this fundamental assumption. Also see Chapter 4, where this fundamental assumption is developed dialectically.

\(^{134}\) See Chapter 2 of this thesis.

assumptions, while providing no convincing justification for having done so, presents a problem for his research design. In sum, the accusation of oversimplification presented by this thesis becomes even more evident when the following questions are brought to light. Why does Vasquez refrain from addressing two of the fundamental assumptions that deal with the epistemological framework of the paradigm (rejection of both systematized abstraction and the interjection of external standards of thought upon the realist framework)? How are the third and fourth assumptions presented above any different from the three presented by Vasquez with respect to being deemed as a fundamental assumption? How is the assumption that realism assumes that political actors act and think in terms of interest defined as power not a fundamental assumption, but the assumption international politics is distinct from domestic politics is a fundamental assumption? Why is the assumption that a deep-seated relationship exists between morality and political action disqualified as a fundamental assumption? Is this not a fundamental assumption that realist “scholars make about the world they are studying”? How is any of the five additional fundamental assumptions not a fundamental assumption that scholars of the realist paradigm make about the world that they are studying? Could it then not be concluded that Vasquez’s rejection of the five realist fundamental assumptions oversimplifies his assessment of the paradigm, and as such, raises doubt about his criteria of what constitutes a realist scholar?

The intent here is to demonstrate that Vasquez’s oversimplification of the paradigm is based on his misunderstanding of the philosophical and theoretical structuration of classical realism. More specifically, Vasquez fails to grasp the underlying

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136 As specified earlier in this chapter, Vasquez defines the concept of paradigm “as the fundamental assumptions scholars make about the world they are studying.” See Vasquez, *Power of Power Politics: A*
epistemological framework of the paradigm, which not only demonstrates the dialectical
development of the paradigm’s core concepts, but also the fact that the set of fundamental
assumptions that define the paradigm are structurally tied to one another. The concept of
interest defined in terms of power, as a fundamental assumption, for example, is
intricately tied to the fundamental assumption that international relations is the struggle
for power and peace. By disqualifying the former, one is, by the very structuration of the
paradigm’s epistemological framework, questioning the legitimacy of the latter as a
fundamental assumption. In assessing the concept of interest defined in terms of power, it
was demonstrated in the previous chapter that this fundamental assumption incorporates a
multitude of realist assumptions into its framework, through which they dialectically
evolve into a final synthesis: interest defined in terms of power. As such, when
addressing the fundamental assumption that international relations is the struggle for
power and peace, then by the very standards of the paradigm, one is also addressing the
fundamental assumption of interest defined in terms of power, since it is in the interests
of the state to struggle for power and peace, for this interest is defined in terms of the
very power for which the state struggles. Furthermore, one is confronted with the
fundamental assumption that a deep-seethed relationship exists between morality and
political action. This relationship is intrinsically tied to the struggle for power and peace,
since power, at its highest developed stage, is synthesized with morality, while political
action, defined by the developed interests of the state, is shaped by its moral
consequences. It clearly is no coincidence that the set fundamental assumptions of the
paradigm established by Morgenthau are directly related to the dialectical model
provided in this thesis. Vasquez’s inability to observe and detect such conceptual

_Critique_, pp. 4-6.
structures within the paradigm’s philosophical and theoretical framework is the primary reason why his assessment of the paradigm is underdeveloped and oversimplified. In light of such assessments, Vasquez’s assertion that the qualification for being deemed a realist is defined by only subscribing to the three fundamental assumptions provided in his research design misrepresents the paradigm’s standard of what constitutes a realist.

Not only does Vasquez’s misunderstanding of realism lead to an oversimplification of the paradigm, but it also provides, perhaps inadvertently, an acceptance of revisionism. In addressing the process of theory construction, or paradigm articulation, Vasquez maintains, “New conceptual frameworks, even if brought in from sister disciplines, may not necessarily contradict the assumptions of the dominant paradigm and are adapted if they do. Thus, while new frameworks like decision making, systems analysis, game theory, and cybernetics constitute breaks with the power politics framework, they don not necessarily reject the three fundamental assumptions of the realist paradigm.”

A new conceptual framework, in its very structuration, must be based upon the philosophical-theoretical framework and the fundamental assumptions of the given paradigm. As such, the very suggestion that a new framework may be “brought in from sister disciplines” is not only a clear violation of one of realism’s fundamental assumptions, but also a complete misunderstanding of theory formulation within the paradigm. The fifth fundamental assumption discussed above—which holds that realism is different from other schools of thought in its distinct intellectual approach and that it decisively parts company with other schools when such schools impose standards of thought from external spheres upon the political sphere—demonstrates the misunderstanding that Vasquez has of the realist paradigm. Realism’s rejection of interjecting conceptual
frameworks from external disciplines is extensively discussed by Morgenthau. “The realist defense of the autonomy of the political sphere against its subversion by other modes of thought does not imply disregard for the existence and importance of these other modes of thought,” but “rather implies that each should be assigned its proper sphere of function.”

Vasquez fails to understand that “sister disciplines,” while not disregarded by realism, are deemed subversive and excluded from the paradigm’s theory construction process.

Vasquez is presented with another problem when he argues that if the new conceptual frameworks “contradict the assumptions of the dominant paradigm,” they could be “adapted” as a mechanism of either concealing or reconciling the contradiction. The mere insinuation of adaptation clearly advocates a revisionist framework, for the very act of adapting a conceptual framework from a sister discipline that contradicts the fundamental assumptions of realism into the paradigm necessitates the alteration, reconstruction, and revision of the contradictory conceptual framework. In more simple terms, Vasquez is suggesting that if a conceptual framework does not fit into the realist model, it is acceptable to engage in revisionism as a mechanism of alleviating such a problem. This is why Vasquez has no problems accepting all of the neo-paradigms that are at the periphery as being realist, even though all the acts of interjecting external conceptual frameworks into the paradigm are categorically rejected by the paradigm’s fundamental assumptions.

While Vasquez’s consistent violation of realism’s fundamental assumptions is contributed to his misunderstanding of realism, his following statement suggests a
disregard for what realism stands for: “Thus, while new frameworks…constitute breaks with the power politics framework, they do not necessarily reject the three fundamental assumptions of the realist paradigm.” Power politics defines the very structuration of the various fundamental assumptions of the paradigm, and as discussed above, the fundamental assumptions of the paradigm are intricately and intrinsically tied to one another. As such, a break with the power politics framework is a break with several of the paradigm’s fundamental assumptions, including the limited three assumptions that Vasquez presents. For Vasquez to assert that “they do not necessarily reject the…fundamental assumptions of the realist paradigm” is quite mind-boggling. At this stage the internal contradiction within Vasquez’s assessment undermines the foundation of his entire argument.

Evaluating the Adequacy of the Realist Paradigm: Disputing Vasquez’s Criteria

After demonstrating that the realist paradigm has dominated the field of international relations in the decades following its inception, and further attempting to demonstrate what the fundamental assumptions of the paradigm are, Vasquez concludes his argument by attempting to demonstrate that realism has failed to satisfy the most important criteria that evaluates a paradigm’s status as being progressive or degenerative: the ability to produce knowledge. Vasquez asserts that three specific criteria may be used to evaluate whether a “paradigm has produced any knowledge.” First is the “criterion of

139 Decision making, systems analysis, game theory, and cybernetics are transdisciplinary, interdisciplinary, and multiperspectival approaches that primarily suggest the introduction of methodological approaches, and as such, they are not a subject of contention with respect to this critique of Vasquez. The problem lies in Vasquez’s claim that a violation of the power politics framework, which is itself a fundamental assumption within the paradigm, is both conceivable and acceptable.

140 Ibid., pg. 173.

141 Ibid., pg. 174.
accuracy,” which maintains that the evaluation of a paradigm’s produced knowledge could be determined by “examining the empirical content of its theories, that is, the number of hypotheses that have failed to be falsified.”\footnote{Ibid., pg. 174.} Since a given paradigm’s hypotheses attempt to provide the most accurate prediction of behavior, a falsification of such hypotheses suggests disqualification of a paradigm’s predictive and explanatory powers. The second is the “criterion of centrality,” which holds that “a paradigm’s central propositions must fail to be falsified when tested.”\footnote{Ibid., pg. 174.} The logic for this criterion is based on the assumption that “the central propositions form the heart of the theory,” and if falsified, then the hard core of the paradigm collapses. The third and final criteria, the “criterion of scientific importance,” holds that the knowledge produced by a given paradigm must be of “some value.” This, however, is the most controversial criterion, for Vasquez concedes that “a number of secondary criteria could be provided to assess the value of the produced knowledge, but there is not much consensus in the field over what those criteria might be.” Such being the case, Vasquez presents his own criteria, “that the knowledge should be nonobvious to a large segment of scholars in the field.”\footnote{Ibid., pg. 174.}

In order to determine the extent to which the realist paradigm has satisfied the three criteria of paradigm adequacy, Vasquez attempts to test the following three propositions. First, the realist paradigm should tend to produce hypotheses that fail to be falsified (criterion of accuracy). Second, the central propositions of the realist paradigm should tend to produce hypotheses that fail to be falsified (criterion of centrality). And third, realist hypotheses that fail to be falsified should be of scientific importance (criterion of scientific importance). If these propositions “fail to be falsified, then it can be concluded
that the realist paradigm has been an adequate guide to scientific international relations inquiry.” If, however, these propositions are falsified, “then the claim that the realist paradigm was not very effective in explaining behavior will be given credence.”¹⁴⁵ The logic of Vasquez’s design is based on the assumption that if the three provided criteria, in conjunction with the testing of the three above-mentioned propositions, could demonstrate that realism has failed to produce knowledge in the field of international relations, then realism as a paradigm could be deemed degenerative. The ability of Vasquez to prove his claim is based on the applicability and the structural consistency of each of the criteria. This being the case, if it could be demonstrated that the proposed criteria are structurally inconsistent and unreliable, then their capacity to serve as agents of evaluating a paradigm’s adequacy is disqualified. Once this is established, the evaluation method which defines Vasquez’s research design and justifies his final conclusion becomes negated, since the criteria by which realism is evaluated become dubious, ad hoc, and unreliable.

In dealing with the first proposition (criterion of accuracy), Vasquez is immediately faced with a complication, and one which he concedes: “no decision-rule has been provided for determining how many hypotheses must be falsified before a paradigm can be declared to have inadequately satisfied the criterion of accuracy.”¹⁴⁶ This being the case, Vasquez resorts to an ad hoc decision-rule: the Lakatosian requirement that a theory’s adequacy can be evaluated by comparing the empirical content of one theory with the empirical content of a rival theory. Even after resorting to this ad hoc decision rule, Vasquez is once again presented with another problem; namely, there is not a single

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., pg. 174.
¹⁴⁵ Ibid., pg. 175.
theory in the field that realism can be tested against. Vasquez’s solution is a further revision of the ad hoc decision rule: every “nonrealist” hypothesis in the field of international relations will be tested against realism. These “nonrealist” hypotheses are defined as sharing “a common characteristic of ‘not being realist,’ but they do not share a well-defined rival paradigm.”

The structural design of the criterion of accuracy suffers from a vagueness that completely limits its capacity for proper operationalization. This being the case, Vasquez’s approach at operationalizing the first proposition not only makes the structural design of this criteria even more problematic, but also contradicts its very structure. Since an accepted decision-rule does not exist by which the implementation of this criterion could be legitimated, what allows Vasquez to conclude that an ad hoc decision-rule is justifiable? The absence of a decision-rule suggests that the criterion could not be applied without controversy, since a multitude of variables could be used to reject the outcome of the tested proposition. Realizing that this problem cannot be escaped, Vasquez interjects the Lakatosian assumption. While the Lakatosian assumption, by itself, is not problematic, its ad hoc implementation is. Vasquez does not provide a justification as to how Lakatos’ requirement is adequate in assessing the criterion of accuracy. Even if Lakatos’ standard is implemented, which “empirical contents” of a theory are to be compared? How many hypotheses from each theory are to be compared and falsified to satisfy the capacity of the criterion of accuracy to evaluate the adequacy of a paradigm? Vasquez fails to answer such questions.

146 Ibid., pg. 175.
147 Ibid., pg. 176.
The most problematic aspect of Vasquez’s approach is the revision of the ad hoc decision-rule, which is quite puzzling. Not only does Vasquez resort to an ad hoc approach, which immediately questions the consistency of his proposition, but he also revises the very ad hoc decision-rule that he initially implemented to revise the structure of testing the number of hypotheses. It appears that whenever his proposed method within a criterion becomes inadequate, he simply alters it to favor his research design. Unable to meet Lakatos’ standard of comparing two research designs, Vasquez decides to compare a single paradigm against the entire field. Not only is such an approach questionable, but it is unfair and ad hoc. If realism cannot be compared with another paradigm, then Lakatos’ standard becomes inapplicable, since Lakatos does not provide for ad hoc modifications. Furthermore, what constitutes a “nonrealist?” How are scholars that are on the periphery categorized? Vasquez’s definition of what constitutes a realist vastly differs from that of this thesis, and as such, what one scholar defines as realist differs from another scholar. This being the case, what is to be done with theories that have some fusion of realist assumptions, but at the same time use “nonrealist” principles? Is not the criterion of accuracy so convoluted, vague, and contradictory that its application to the process of evaluating a paradigm’s adequacy be disqualified? The operationalization of a criterion that is ad hoc and structurally inconsistent provides for the nullification of the conclusion produced by the criteria. For this reason, the application of the criterion of

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148 For example, in the test design to test this proposition, Vasquez composes 7,827 hypotheses as the test sample and codes each hypothesis as either realist or nonrealist. The criteria though which such labeling is undertaken is never specified by Vasquez. Moreover, he does not address where there might be controversy over whether a hypothesis is to be labeled as one or the other. For scholars who reject Vasquez’s three assumptions as sufficient criteria for defining what constitutes a realist, his entire labeling system clearly comes under question. The very nature of the research design is inherently subjective. See ibid., pp. 181-183.
accuracy to evaluate the adequacy of the realist paradigm becomes inapplicable, for the produced results of the criterion are disqualified by virtue of internal complications.

Vasquez’s treatment of the criterion of centrality is less problematic with respect to its capacity for operationalization, but more problematic with respect to its understanding of realism. The objective of this second criterion is to test the falsifiability of the paradigm’s central propositions. The controversy in this instance revolves around the question of what constitutes the central propositions of the realist paradigm? As discussed earlier in this chapter, Vasquez’s inability to differentiate and properly define what constitutes an assumption, a fundamental assumption, a concept, or in this case, a central proposition, proves to be detrimental to the epistemological structuration of his argument. In addressing the criterion of accuracy, Vasquez holds that the balance of power, national power, and war are the central propositions of the realist paradigm. Central propositions are defined as being more important, or having more value, in relation to other propositions in the paradigm. Based on this supposition, it becomes difficult to assess how balance of power, for example, is more important, or has more value, than diplomacy? Or, how diplomacy is not considered a central proposition, since balance of power, to a strong extent, is preserved though diplomacy, while at the same time national power, another central proposition, is projected by the machinations of diplomacy? Furthermore, war, as a concept in realist theory, is not necessarily a proposition, but rather a natural byproduct of human nature. More specifically, war is an outcome, an event, a consequence, not a conceptual framework. Vasquez’s application of war as a central proposition is both murky and confusing.

149 Ibid., pg. 184.
More problematic, however, is Vasquez’s coding in the research design of what constitutes the central hypotheses in the realist paradigm: national power and international alliances. Specifically, “national power variables” and “alliance variables” are coded as the “central hypotheses in the realist paradigm.” To narrow the vast and complex theoretical presuppositions and core propositions of the paradigm to two frameworks is a complete oversimplification of what constitutes the central propositions of the paradigm. Basically, Vasquez tests the falsifiability of two concepts to evaluate whether or not the entire paradigm of realism is adequate. While the research design and its methodological structuration are not problematic, Vasquez’s conceptualization of which propositions to test is. For example, as expected, Vasquez concludes that the national power variable and alliance variables fail to predict and provide explanatory power for the behavior of international actors. This, however, cannot be deemed surprising, since so many variables and core concepts are left out, that the capacity of two limited propositions to explain international behavior is not sufficient. For Vasquez to consistently separate concepts and propositions from their contexts, that is, from their interrelations, for the sake of operationalizing and testing these propositions is quite misleading. A great many hypotheses, for example, that include other central propositions that happened to be left out of the research design because of Vasquez’s misguided criteria could not have been falsified. Fundamentally, the tested variables in Vasquez’s research design are not complete and acceptable representations of the realist paradigm.

The third and final criteria of evaluating the adequacy of realism is the criterion of scientific importance, which “maintains that knowledge produced by the paradigm should

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150 Ibid., pg. 185.
151 Ibid., pp. 186-194.
not be trivial; that is, the produced knowledge should not be considered obvious or trivial to most scholars in the field.”\textsuperscript{152} If a criterion is subjective, vague, or subject to various different interpretations, then it loses both its parsimoniousness and its value as a standard of evaluation. The criterion of scientific importance suffers from this exact problem, for three immediate questions arise from Vasquez’s conceptualization of the criterion. First, what method of inquiry is to be used to determine if a produced knowledge is obvious, specifically, what constitutes obviousness? Second, how is triviality defined and measured? And finally, how is a consensus formed whether a produced knowledge is obvious, somewhat obvious, completely trivial, or partially trivial? While Vasquez provides no satisfactory answers to these questions, he does admit awareness of this problem, because “triviality is more subject to personal interpretation than other matters,” since the “criterion of scientific importance is very difficult to operationalize and measure.”\textsuperscript{153}

Vasquez’s solution to this “very difficult” problem is not only ad hoc, but highly subjective, since it is not based on the scientific method of inquiry: “the author has simply coded major findings as either trivial or nontrivial according to his own assessment of ‘importance.’”\textsuperscript{154} To establish the evaluation of the major findings of the realist paradigm on a scholar’s personal notion of “importance,” and not on an acceptable scientific and methodological standard, is to produce results that are highly questionable. This being the case, Vasquez appears to be arguing that what constitutes scientifically important knowledge is his opinion. For this reason, the findings of Vasquez’s research design become quite irrelevant, since they are established on subjective and non-scientific

\textsuperscript{152} Ibid., pg. 194.
\textsuperscript{153} Ibid., pg. 194.
grounds. To reject the major findings of a dominant paradigm as trivial and inadequate based on personal assessments is tantamount to rejecting the method of scientific inquiry that guides knowledge accumulation in the field of international relations. Ironically, Vasquez ends up contradicting the very thing which he seeks to advocate: the objective and epistemic value of scientifically produced knowledge.

Conclusion

The breadth and scope of Vasquez’s research design are both extensive and impressive. His exploration of the vast literature over the decades following the inception of realism is valuable, as is his assessment of the extent to which realism dominated the field of international relations within the standards of philosophy of science. The underlying problem with Vasquez, however, is not specifically his research design or his assessment of the paradigm’s role in the field, but rather his understanding of realism as a political philosophy. As a result of such misunderstandings, Vasquez’s research design produced variables that misrepresented the subject of study, defined concepts through a misreading of these concepts, and hence produced epistemological and analytical frameworks that were structurally problematic and inapplicable.

Vasquez’s assessments of the fundamental assumptions of the paradigm, for example, are oversimplified and incomplete. These oversimplified and incomplete assessments provided for a definition of what constitutes a realist to be deemed questionable and controversial. At the same time, Vasquez suffered from a set of problems with respect to his epistemological framework, since his concepts of assumptions, fundamental assumptions, and previous assumptions were underdeveloped and damaging to the logical

154 Ibid., pg. 195.
structure of his argument. This inevitably resulted in a complete misunderstanding of the intrinsic and intricate nature of the set of fundamental principles and assumptions that defined the paradigm. Finally, Vasquez’s three criteria of evaluating the adequacy of realism proved to be unconvincing. As demonstrated, the proposed criteria were structurally inconsistent, subjective, vague, and unreliable, thereby disqualifying Vasquez’s claim that the realist paradigm is degenerative by virtue of its inability to produce scientifically important knowledge.

Chapter 5 demonstrated that realism qualifies as the dominant paradigm in the field of international relations. This dominance is attributed to three factors: that realism guided the field of international relations in theory construction, data making, and research. Namely, realism came to define the very study of international relations. Concomitantly, an attempt was made by Vasquez to negate the continuation of this dominance by demonstrating the paradigm to be degenerative. This attempt, however, proved to be unsuccessful, as this chapter displayed the complications in Vasquez’s endeavor.

Alternately, what are the consequences of the set of conclusions reached in this chapter? First, the attempt to falsify the underlying assumptions of the paradigm failed. Second, the attempt to prove that the knowledge produced by the paradigm is inadequate failed. And finally, the attempt to falsify the paradigm as degenerative failed by virtue of failing to demonstrate that realism has failed to produce knowledge of value. Therefore, and in conclusion, this thesis maintains that realism is a scientifically adequate approach for explaining behavior in international relations.
CHAPTER 6

THE REALIST PARADIGM IN MODERNITY: A CONCLUSION

The purpose of a paradigm is to provide guidance, structure, and parameters to the study of a given field. By unambiguously connecting specific claims to core concepts and fundamental assumptions, paradigms provide assistance in defining the scope and strength of particular claims, assessing the paradigm’s explanatory powers, understanding the relationship between theories and hypotheses, interpreting the implications of specific findings, developing coherent explanations, and structuring social scientific discourse.

Realism’s long history and dominant position in the field of international relations has guided the field in theory formulation, research guidance, data-collection, policy analysis, and scientific inquiry. Realism is not just a theory, it is a constellation of theories established on an epistemological structure that is guided by a philosophical framework. This overarching model is the paradigm, the intricate structure of core concepts, fundamental assumptions, conceptual frameworks, and analytical methodologies. By virtue of its scope, depth, and structuration, classical realism is a complete paradigm in the study of international relations.

The objective of this thesis has been five-fold. First, to introduce the reader to a thorough assessment of the political philosophy of realism, defining and interpreting key principles, concepts, and structures that define the paradigm. Second, to address the problem of revisionism and the marginalization of classical realism, arguing for the revival of the paradigm. Third, to introduce an original method of inquiry, via the dialectical, to the study of the realist paradigm, providing for a new analytical approach in exploring its scope and depth. Fourth, to demonstrate that the realist paradigm is both
adequate and progressive within the standards of philosophy of science, arguing that the
misreading and misrepresentation of the paradigm is the primary reason why classical
realism has been misunderstood and foully critiqued. And five, to address the concerns of
whether the explanatory powers of the paradigm are capable of addressing the anomalies
of the modern international political system.

Chapter 2 introduced realism as a political philosophy of international relations,
exploring the structuration of the paradigm’s epistemological framework, along with an
assessment of the fundamental assumptions that define the paradigm. Paradigm-building,
as a theory oriented approach, was also addressed, providing for a consideration of the
guidelines of theory articulation within the paradigm. Chapter 2 then proceeded to
explore the conceptual, structural, and analytical framework of classical realism,
presenting an assessment of all the important components of the paradigm’s theoretical
model. This chapter introduced the reader to a comprehensive reading of the realist
paradigm, providing the foundations upon which the arguments in the following chapters
are established on.

The third chapter introduced the method through which classical realism has been
marginalized in international relations scholarship via revisionism. Revisionism is
exposed to demonstrate two things. First, realism’s explanatory power is so immense that
other research programs establish their foundations upon its political philosophy. Second,
the marginalization of classical realism has led to a misconception in the discipline that
the paradigm has either been supplanted by the new realist approaches, or that the new
realist approaches are the extensions of classical realism. The philosophical core and the
theoretical structure of the realist approach have been undermined by its own revisionist
defenders, who have sought to address new anomalies by reformulating realism in forms that are less coherent, less determinate, and less distinctive. This chapter demonstrated that classical realism is a separate paradigm and quite distinct from the revisionist research programs. It is for this reason that this thesis attempts to revive classical realism as a scientifically oriented inquiry of international political behavior. In sum, Chapter 3 demonstrates to the reader how classical realism has been treated in modern scholarship, engages and counters criticisms of classical realism, while demonstrating the currency of the paradigm, and justifying the necessity for reviving classical realism.

Chapter 4 introduced an original method of inquiry that has never been used in the study of classical realism as a political philosophy of international relations. This analytical model allows for a more thorough assessment of the paradigm's fundamental assumptions and its epistemic development via the dialectical. It is important to note that the dialectical is an approach that Morgenthau appeals to several times in his formulation of the realist philosophy, yet international relations scholars have failed to apply any attention or scholarship to it. This chapter introduced this unique component of realism as this thesis’ original contribution to the study of international relations.

Chapter five addresses one of the most devastating critiques leveled against the realist paradigm, that realism is a degenerative paradigm by virtue of its regressive scientific approach. Using Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy of science, John A. Vasquez offered a powerful argument that the realist paradigm has failed to lead scientific inquiry and knowledge accumulation within the field of international relations. Vasquez sought to demonstrate that the fundamental assumptions of the paradigm lack explanatory and predictive power and are thus falsified, leading to his conclusion that realism, as the most
dominant paradigm in the post-WWII era, is degenerative. Concomitantly, this chapter took issue with Vasquez’s critique, demonstrating the theoretical and analytical flaws in Vasquez’s assessment of realism, arguing that Vasquez’s misreading and misinterpretation of the paradigm’s fundamental principles are the underlying reason for the critique. As such, Vasquez’s entire approach was deconstructed and scrutinized to demonstrate that the realist paradigm, contrary to Vasquez’s evaluation, met the criteria of a progressive paradigm.

This final chapter will address the role of the realist paradigm within the context of modernity, providing a general outline of the paradigm’s explanatory powers and its capacity to account for new anomalies. It will be demonstrated that from a theoretical perspective, the core concepts, the fundamental assumptions, and the existing auxiliaries of the paradigm are sufficient in accounting for the modern international political system. From this theoretical assessment, further empirical research may be conducted in the future that could both explain and predict behavior. By establishing the conceptual arguments and theoretical guidelines of how classical realism addresses modernity, further scientifically oriented research may be conducted to provide empirical evidence for the paradigm’s claims and hypotheses.

Addressing Anomalies in the Modern International Political System: Realism’s Staying Power

Classical realism is the oldest and most prominent paradigm in the study of international relations. It is the primary, or at its minimal, the alternative theory in the majority of the scholarship conducted in the field. Furthermore, the tools of the paradigm
have led to the formulation of new research programs, midrange theories, and conceptual
frameworks for non-realist schools of thought. Realism retains a salient, and even,
dominant position in international relations theory because of its capacity to provide
plausible explanations for salient international phenomena. While many research
programs are born, or become degenerative, in response to accounting for new anomalies
in the international political system, realism only articulates or refines its existing core of
concepts and auxiliaries.

A paradigm’s capacity to deal with new anomalies is the underlying criteria by which
a paradigm is deemed either progressive or degenerative. If a paradigm is not able to
account for new anomalies and phenomena, then its explanatory powers become either
obsolete or inapplicable. More specifically, the assumptions that the paradigm makes
about the international system become inconsistent with the nature of that system,
hampering the tools of the paradigm from predicting or explaining behavior. In either
case, new paradigms with the capacity to account for new anomalies provide the grounds
for a scientific revolution: a paradigm shift. For example, idealism was supplanted as the
dominant paradigm by realism because of its incapacity to satisfactorily address a new
anomaly that questioned the fundamental assumptions of the paradigm, the Second World
War. When a paradigm’s fundamental assumptions, core concepts, and conceptual
models are not comprehensive enough to provide explanations for new anomalies, the
paradigm is faced with one other option: resorting to its auxiliaries. The use of
auxiliaries, however, makes the paradigm prone to both controversy and criticism if the
implementation of auxiliaries is not legitimated by two criteria: absence of ad hoc
explanations and connectedness.
As initially specified, a paradigm must be logically coherent, in that it must not contain internal logical contradictions that allow unambiguous derivations of contradictory conclusions. The use of auxiliary assumptions to account for new anomalies generally creates multiple and contradictory propositions if the auxiliaries are ad hoc. Specifically, ad hoc explanations are immunization stratagems that are designed to restrict the scope of theory exclusively for the purpose of saving it from confuting or falsifying evidence. For this reason, ad hoc auxiliaries do not provide either explanations or accountability for anomalies and therefore serve as multiple and differing assessments that tend to contradict one another. If an auxiliary assumption is ad hoc, it both damages the dependability of the paradigm and further contributes to its degeneration, since it becomes counterproductive. As such, not only must auxiliaries be absent of an ad hoc approach, but they also must meet the standard of connectedness. Theoretical explanations of empirical findings within a paradigm that rely on auxiliary assumptions must be connected to the paradigm’s core concepts and fundamental assumptions to provide new explanations, predictions, or to clear up anomalies. If the auxiliary assumptions are not connected to the fundamental principles of the given paradigm, then the auxiliary assumption is contradictory to the paradigm’s epistemological structure. To this end, when auxiliaries are used to account for anomalies, it is a necessary condition that such auxiliaries are connected to and are extensions of the paradigm’s philosophical framework. If the auxiliaries are ad hoc, or cannot be justified by the paradigm’s belief system, then their applications to addressing new anomalies are questionable and controversial. Therefore, auxiliaries that are not ad hoc, and are connected to the paradigm’s philosophical framework, are by definition extensions of the paradigm’s core
concepts and fundamental assumptions, for auxiliaries articulate and refine such concepts and assumptions to account for specific anomalies. More simply, auxiliaries update the paradigm with the changes brought forth by modernity.\(^{155}\)

As mentioned in Chapter 4, the international political system of the modern age differs from that of the previous ages, with new phenomena presenting anomalies for paradigms to clear up and explain. The dialectical model demonstrated realism’s dynamism as an evolving paradigm and its compatibility with the evolving and ever-changing nature of the international political system as an extension of historic change. Eras, or historic periods, are defined by changes in the structure of the international system, interactions amongst actors (e.g. war, diplomatic relations, etc), realignment in the balance of power, rise or fall of hemegen(s), and new developments that allow for the identification of the new era. It is not the intent of this thesis to specify what criteria constitute a change in a given historic period, or the birth of a new one. The intent, however, is to demonstrate that different historic periods produce different international phenomena as new anomalies that need new explanations and assessments. For example, the nature of the international political system was vastly different during the Roman Empire, the Renaissance, the post-Westphalia system, the World Wars, the Cold War, and the modern system. Each era introduced its own set of complexities and new phenomena.

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\(^{155}\) The following elaboration will be provided to allow for a better understanding of this process. The concepts of diplomacy, alliance formulation, and international peace, for example, are concepts that are part of the realist paradigm’s theoretical structure. As such, using these concepts to account for new anomalies is both acceptable and consistent. These concepts, however, have never been used to account for such phenomena as regionalism, integration, or the formation of supranational entities. This happens to be the case because such phenomena did not exist in the past international system. For this reason, these phenomena are considered to be new anomalies. Since diplomacy, alliances, and international peace, for example, can be used to address these new anomalies, the structure through which they address these new phenomena become auxiliary assumptions, for such assumptions have not existed in the past (since these anomalies did not exist in the past). To this end, the implementation of such auxiliary assumptions is
anomalies that did not exist in the previous era, and as such, a progressive paradigm must display a staying power through which it is able to address a given era, or the start of a new era. While certain axiomatic factors never change, as discussed in Chapter 2, new and complicated variables do come into play that must be satisfactorily explained.

The post-Cold War international scene, labeled in this thesis as the modern age, is a new historic period with its anomalies that the realist paradigm must demonstrate its capacity to explain. Generally speaking, the post-bipolar international political system has become dominated by the following new phenomena that did not exist in the previous eras: the rise in international organizations and institutions (IGOs), the continued integration of supranational entities, the evolving scope of regionalism, institutional restraint,\textsuperscript{156} ascendancy of international law, and the spread of globalization.\textsuperscript{157} From a theoretical perspective (which provides the justification for future empirical research), three core concepts of the realist paradigm, articulated and refined as connected and non-ad hoc auxiliary assumptions, explain and account for the new anomalies. All forms of integration, cooperation, regionalism, restraint, and adherence to standards of international law can be accounted for by three realist concepts: diplomacy, alliance, and international peace.\textsuperscript{158} All such phenomena within modernity have come into being, legitimate and acceptable because they are not ad hoc, and they are connected to and are extensions of the realist paradigm’s philosophical structure.

\textsuperscript{156} The concept of institutional restraint is used in this thesis within the context of self-restraint, that is, states choose to engage in self-restraint for the sake of preserving the given institutions, since such institutions advance the interests of the state. It is not used in the neoliberal context, which holds that institutions, as international regimes, limit the scope and actions of the state.

\textsuperscript{157} Compared to the past, the world has witnessed a decrease in inter-state conflict and an increase in cooperation. This development, however, is ephemeral, for the world is witnessing the beginning stages of the modern age, and one cannot presume the extent to which the conflict/cooperation variable will change in the future.

\textsuperscript{158} For further discussion of these concepts, see Chapter 2 of this thesis, pp. 33-38.
initially, through diplomacy, solidified through alliances, and maintained with international peace.

International institutions, specifically intergovernmental organizations, while having existed during and prior to the Cold War, have come to play a prominent role in modernity. The United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the World Health Organization (WHO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organization (WTO) are few examples of IGOs whose roles have created anomalies with respect to their relevance to the international political system. The ability for international organizations to exist suggests extensive cooperation amongst member states, a degree of institutional restraint, and an adherence to the attainment of some notion of international peace. The restructuration of the international system following the bipolar system has allowed for this phenomenon, supplemented by the fact that the single hegemonic system (U.S. dominance) does not feel threatened by the presence of such factors. Furthermore, the purpose of IGO’s is attainment of mutual goals, and since the objectives of membership are defined by a certain sense of mutual gain, its maintenance also serves a mutual interest.

Regional organizations, such as the European Union, the Asian Cooperation Dialogue (ACD), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the African Union, and the Organization of American States (OAS), are also examples of intergovernmental organizations that promote regional interests. Regional integration seeks to enhance economic and political cooperation through regional institutions and rules. The purpose of regionalism is to achieve broader socio-political, economic, and security objectives. The objectives
intergovernmental organizations are the attainment of mutual goals and the preservations of such designs. The European Union, however, has moved somewhat beyond an intergovernmental approach to a supra-national level of decision-making: supranationalism. It is the most regionally integrated area in the world, since its integration has not only been horizontal, but has also been vertical, allowing for deeper integration between the member states.

Since in the past the world has not seen such levels of integration, interaction, and cooperation that affect the international system, they become anomalies that necessitate explanations. These new anomalies, however, have not altered the axiomatic assumptions that define the existing nature of the international system. More specifically, the agent/actor structure has not been altered or supplanted, since the state remains the unit of analysis, and all other developments are the extensions of the behavior of the state. The anarchic nature of the international system remains intact, for neither intergovernmental organizations, nor their stipulation of institutional restraint, constitutes an absolute and independent form of hierarchic structuration of authority in the international system. Also, as it will be demonstrated, the formation of international institutions, intergovernmental organizations, and regional integration is best explained by one of the fundamental assumptions of realism: interest defined in terms of power.

As discussed in Chapter 2, classical realism contemplates a world composed of integrated societies if the structure of the international system allows it.\(^{159}\) Since realism does not negate the formulation of an integrated international society, but rather views it extremely beneficial if it may be attained, its theoretical structure becomes both adequate and sufficient in accounting for international phenomena that create a more integrated,
cooperative world. Tied to this underlying theoretical premise are the three core concepts—diplomacy, alliances, and international peace—that further explain and address the new anomalies of the international system. All international organizations and institutions initially come into being through diplomacy. Diplomatic relations between states provide the necessary conditions for states to engage in a discourse regarding the benefits or necessities of forming intergovernmental organizations. Realism defines diplomacy as a strategic tool utilized by the state to implement its national interests, while displaying its prestige and national character. At the same time, diplomacy defines the nature of the relationship between given states. It is the most important tool in the international system that a state possesses, since it allows for the attainment of given goals without the use of force or other forms of coercive action. Fundamentally, diplomatic relations between states define the nature and structure of their membership in a given international organization. Negotiations, cost-benefit assessments, rules, regulations, set goals, potential objectives, and the overall purpose of the international organization are all realized through diplomatic efforts.

In accounting for the new anomalies of modernity, the concept of diplomacy provides an initial explanation of how these anomalies can be addressed. It accounts for the formation of these new phenomena, the nature and structure of how they came into being,

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159 See pp. 33-34 of this thesis.
161 Realism conceptualizes diplomacy within a distinct framework. It understands that diplomacy should look at the political scene from the point of view of other nations, and that nations should be willing to compromise on all issues that are not vital to them. Furthermore, a nation should give up the shadow of worthless rights in favor of the substance of real advantage, but a nation should never put itself in a position from which it cannot retreat without losing face and cannot advance without great risks. At the same time, the armed forces of the state must be the instruments of foreign policy and not its master, and that government should be the leader of public opinion and not its servant. For further discussion of realism’s conceptualization of diplomacy, see Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, pp. 381-387.
and the underlying explanations for their continued existence. By studying the diplomatic relations between the member states of international organizations, the nature of their interactions as extensions of their given state’s interests and objectives, and the formulation of mutual goals, realism provides coherent explanations to the rise of IGOs in the international political system. At the same time, the study of diplomacy provides a window into better understanding the reasons why a state joins certain IGOs, or what it seeks to gain from membership. More concrete assumptions can be developed for understanding the conditions for cooperation, or the environment that encourages a state to be cooperative. Policies of member states can be more thoroughly understood through the study of diplomacy, allowing for a more systematic understanding of state behavior as a member of a given international organization.

Diplomatic relations are further solidified and made into law through treaties, that is, alliances. Alliances provide the fundamental structure that legitimizes international institutions and organizations. Alliances provide explanations to such factors as continued cooperation, restraint, obligations, and responsible behavior. If diplomacy accounts as to how international institutions and regional organizations come into being, the concept of alliance explains how such establishments are maintained. The formation of alliances are the conclusions to the diplomatic process, and as such, where the latter ends, the former begins. For this reason, a comprehensive assessment of the new anomalies of the modern age requires the study of alliance formation. All international organizations are formed and legitimized through treaties, creating alliances between member states. Obviously, the nature and structure of certain international institutions make certain alliances strong and obligatory, while others are quite loose. The European
Union is an example of the former, while the United Nations of the latter. However, to account for this very phenomenon, the study of alliances becomes a necessity. The reason why international institutions and regional intergovernmental organizations have become relevant in the international scene could be best understood by scrutinizing the scope and structure of the alliances that have legitimized such institutions.

The rise in international organizations and institutions, the continued integration of supranational entities, the evolving scope of regionalism, institutional restraint, ascendency of international law, extensive cooperation, and the spread of globalization have become actual phenomena in the state-based international system because states have nurtured the birth of these anomalies. The circumstance or environment that realism maintains allowed for such phenomena is the concept of international peace. As an auxiliary assumption, international peace does not pertain to the complete absence of conflict in the world, but rather the lack of conflict amongst the powerful states in the international system. The world has witnessed extensive levels of cooperation between the world powers in the modern era, specifically between actors that were adversaries during the Cold War. This extensive cooperation, via diplomacy and alliance formation, can be accounted for by observing the existence of international peace in the international system. The power constellations of the new world, however, are quite uncertain and it would be premature to prescribe predictions without first investigating what the world powers might expect from their international engagements. This uncertainty rests on the fact that the unipolar system is perhaps witnessing the decline of the single hegemonic power, with other potential powers (e.g. China, Russia, Japan, etc.) striving for a multi-polar world order. This assumption is further supported by the European component
(specifically Western Europe), since the American notion of unipolarity finds opposition against the European vision of pluralism. At the same time, rising powers have found it beneficial to develop strong relations, economic and political cooperation, and institutional collaboration with both the hegemon and other rising powers. This atmosphere classical realism conceptualizes as international peace.

International peace becomes a reality by two primary devices. The first is the balance of power, and the second is the normative limitations of “international law, international morality, and world public opinion.”

Balance of power, however, is not an adequate device to preserve peace, for its uncertainty, aggravated by the absence of a restraining moral consensus, leaves balance of power vulnerable as a peace-maintaining device. International morality, on the other hand, can exert substantial pressure and promote peace preservation if it could be counter-balanced against the phenomenon of nationalism. Classical realism suggests a causal relationship between the decline of international morality and the rise of nationalism; if nationalism witnesses a similar decline in the face of the changing circumstances of international politics, then the world may perhaps observe the rejuvenation of international peace.

In applying this premise to the current international scene, it becomes quite feasible to argue that the nature of regionalism, integration, cooperation, and globalization are directly tied to the decline of nationalism. International or regional cooperation requires a certain degree of openness, while at the same time restricting chauvinism and ideological irredentism. International

163 Morgenthau’s reference to international morality is a reference to the dialectically developed concept of morality, hence its opposition to the underdeveloped state morality (presented somewhat in the form of nationalism). For Morgenthau’s discussion of the detrimental effects that the rise of nationalism has had upon “supranational forces,…and all other personal ties, institutions, and organizations,” especially international morality, see ibid., pp. 271-272.
peace could not have been cultivated in the previous eras because nationalism and ideological irredentism superceded all notions of openness, cooperation, and restraint. In the modern age, however, the world has witnessed the exact opposite: in many areas the decline of nationalism and ideological irredentism has been replaced by an international sense of cooperation, integration, openness, and even a sense of comradery. This, in turn, has allowed for the rise of the new anomalies in the modern age. Consequently, realism’s concepts of diplomacy, alliance, and international peace not only account for these anomalies, but also explain the process through which they came into being and the mechanism through which they are maintained.

An extension of international peace is the concept of world public opinion, which is a phenomenon that transcends national boundaries and asserts itself in uniting much of the world’s reaction to certain political forces. Namely, it is a mechanism of enforcing peace on the international scene. This concept of a world public opinion allows for a better understanding of globalization. Globalization, as a phenomenon, is both controversial and problematic with respect to defining it or specifying its given qualities and criteria. Whatever the case may be, the fact of the matter is that globalization does exist and it has come to define the modern age. In this sense, the anomalies of integration, regionalism, intergovernmental institutions, and extensive cooperation are intertwined with globalization in a structure of reciprocity. Clearly, globalization became an international phenomenon because the new anomalies allowed for globalization to become a reality. If

\[164\] The exception being certain forces and states in the Middle East, or the Muslim world that advocate religious extremism as a form of nationalism and ideological irredentism. In such cases, openness, cooperation, or institutional restraint is either absent or minimal. However, since neither of these actors are world powers, their effect upon international peace is non-existent. Namely, world powers are either united against such forces, or display neutrality. But no circumstance can be observed where world powers have threatened international peace because of such actors.
international cooperation, integration, international peace, and the formation of international intergovernmental organizations did not exist, the international structure would not have allowed for globalization to take place. At the same time, globalization has strengthened and reinforced the rise of the specified anomalies, and to this end, all these phenomena are the byproducts of one another. World public opinion has provided the environment through which globalization has come to dominate the modern age. There appears to be a uniformity of opinion in the world that encourages continued economic, political, and social interaction, even integration and growth, which further promotes globalization. Globalization has provided for a network that ties humanity together, and world public opinion both encourages and promotes this process. Concomitantly, this entire process contributes to international peace, which in turn allows for the growth of cooperation, integration, and institutional restraint via diplomacy and alliances.

While the concepts of diplomacy, alliance formation, and international peace explain the new anomalies as outcomes of modernity, the realist fundamental assumption of interest defined in terms of power provides the most coherent explanation for state behavior. Realism’s ability to account for the anomalies of the modern international political system is further supplemented by the paradigm’s capacity to explain the actions of the given actors that have contributed to the formulation of the anomalies. The rise of international organizations and institutions, the continued integration of supranational entities, the evolving scope of regionalism, institutional restraint, extensive interaction, and cooperation are most concretely defined by the self-interest of the rational actor: the state. The capacity of given states to expand and preserve their interests has found the
highest benefit in integration and cooperation. International institutions and organizations have allowed for a shifting of responsibility, through which states, in comparison, use fewer resources in dealing with other states in the endeavor of furthering or preserving their interests. Cooperation and institutional restraint have replaced the much more difficult processes of brinkmanship, threat, mobilization, and the eventual use of force. More specifically, force has become a last resort, and one least preferable to the interests of the state. Policy formulation and implementation for the rational actor has become less dangerous, since calculating and assessing the positions of opposing actors are made more coherent by the given rules such actors follow as being members of certain international or regional intergovernmental institutions. Responsibility and obligation to preserving the international peace give way to self-restraint, since international peace allows for the proliferation of the interests of the state. In essence, the power of a given actor is optimized by precisely knowing the limitations of the opposing actor. In more simple terms, with minor exceptions, there are a set of rules that everyone plays by, and for this reason, the degree of security provided by integration, interaction, and cooperation enhances the powers of the state, that is, the ability to preserve its interests. These new alliances, therefore, have become forms of power for the given states, allowing for the coherent formulation and strengthening of their interests.

Fundamentally, however, in instances where the interests of the state have been limited or restricted by new supranational entities, intergovernmental organizations, or institutional agreements, such states have either disregarded or simply bypassed these restraining factors to further their interests. Therefore, states accept the importance of regional integration, obligations to international institutional, intergovernmental
cooperation, and adherence to international law only to the extent to which such factors benefit the given objectives of the state. The new institutional, regional, and cooperative arrangements of modernity only serve to enhance the powers of the state, for they serve as supplemental tools in advancing the interests of the state. In instances where such arrangements harm or minimize the objectives of the state, these arrangements are either disregarded, ignored, or the state unilaterally withdraws from the organization.

Essentially, the rational state actor engages in a cost-benefit analysis when confronted with the alliance or treaty obligations it has as a member of an intergovernmental institution. Accordingly, cooperation, integration, and openness are all limited, for the very notion of membership is based on the benefits that could be accrued by the given state.

In sum, the atmosphere of cooperation, interaction, and dialogue has promoted peace and well being in the international system. These new phenomena of the modern age have contributed to the advancement of the powers of the state, for they have allowed for the preservation or the extension of the state’s interests. Fundamentally, regionalism, integration, institutional membership, cooperation, and interaction benefit the interests of given states. When the opposite happens to be the case, states either disregard their commitments, or completely withdraw from such arrangements. Whatever the case may be, the interests of the state remain paramount.

Conclusion

A paradigm is only as powerful and useful as its ability to demonstrate its structural coherency and explanatory powers, while ruling out plausible competing assumptions
and explanations of the international political system. This thesis demonstrated the structural and philosophical coherency, theoretical and epistemological consistency, and the scientifically-oriented progressiveness of classical realism. Furthermore, the paradigm displayed its staying power by exhibiting powerful auxiliary assumptions, showing the paradigm’s scope and depth in accounting for new anomalies in the modern international system. Realism’s staying power, as a potent tool in the study of international relations, is one reason why it remains a dominant paradigm.

The case has been made as to why classical realism must be revived. Whereas most paradigms are ephemeral—in that they come into being either as reactions to an existing school of thought or an in an attempt to address new anomalies—realism has displayed a staying power in addressing phenomena and anomalies throughout the course of human history. In its contemporary form, the field of international relations presents several alternative paradigms or methodological approaches to the realist approach. The fact that none have supplanted realism as the dominant paradigm speaks volumes for its salience. The neorealist paradigm, and its minimalist offspring, present one alternative; neoliberal institutionalism represents another; the critical theory approach (Marxist, Neo-Gramscian, etc.) yet another; world-systems theory presents the fourth alternative; the liberal paradigm provides the fifth alternative; while the epistemic, or the postpositivist approach, represents the sixth alternative.

Chapter 3 demonstrated the failure of the neorealist approach through its revisionism and internal contradictions. Its structural approach was deemed to be an insufficient and deterministic account of international phenomena, while its anti-reductionist approach made neorealism myopic and limited. The limits of neorealism have been further
recognized by a new generation of “realist” scholars, where the paradigm has been fragmented into an endless number of approaches.\textsuperscript{165} Neorealism’s structural approach was applicable, in a limited capacity, to the bipolar system of the Cold War, but has been insufficient in addressing the post-Cold War structure. This is the reason why various offshoots of the paradigms have been born to account for the anomalies that structuralism cannot. For this reason, neorealism can be deemed as an ephemeral paradigm.

The institutionalist approach was also addressed in Chapter 3, assessing the role of international institutions, norms, revisionist realist propositions, and hegemonic assumptions that the paradigm holds. While the fundamental assumptions that institutionalism makes about the world are underdeveloped, its assessment of institutions has been valuable to international relations scholarship. But a paradigm based on the study of institutionalism is by definition both a limited paradigm, and an ephemeral one. Namely, if through the restructuration of the international system institutions become marginal or irrelevant, paradigmatic institutionalist assumptions will become degenerative and inapplicable.

The third alternative, the critical theory approach, is the constellation of various paradigmatic methodological forms of analysis, ranging from Marxist analysis, to Neo-Gramscian theories, to general critiques of Western capitalism and the institutions that promote its proliferation. Critical theory is a singular approach, and as such, it is difficult to compare an issue-oriented approach (third-world exploitation, cultural hegemony,

Western dominance, etc.) to an entire paradigm. This thesis concedes that not only is critical theory highly valuable, but it also is not ephemeral, and for these reasons, serves an important purpose in the study of international relations. However, as an approach that encompasses scope and depth, critical theory is far too insufficient in comparison to classical realism. That is, while critical theory is a singular analytical approach, classical realism is a multi-theoretical paradigm.

The fourth alternative, world-systems theory, is a paradigmatic approach to addressing world-empires and world-economies as the two main forms of world systems through a structural systemic framework. World-systems theory primarily argues that the only existing world system in the modern international political system is the capitalist world-economy. Its analytical approach fuses structuralism with historicism to account for the development and dominance of the world capitalist system. This is further supplemented by the implementation of three structural positions in a world economy: core states (dominant in production, control over world economy, and exploiter of the lower strata); semi periphery states (serve the interests of the core, acting as exploiters of the periphery-states, but also being exploited by the core states); and periphery-states (provide the raw resources and materials necessary for the continued dominance of the core states, while being heavily dependent upon the two upper strata). World-systems theory attempts to structurally account for the continued exploitation of the periphery and semi-periphery by the core, with the semi-periphery serving as the destabilizing agent that allows the upper strata to deprive the lower strata from developing the capacity to potentially challenge the core states.  

166 World-systems theory is not only unique and non-

166 For a look at world-systems theory, see Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World system I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century, (New York:
ephemeral, but it provides for a use of structural analysis that is both historic and
dynamic, unlike the ahistoricism of neorealism. Its explanatory powers addresses historic
processes, development of world-systems within given historic epochs, and the structural
interactions of agents in the international political system. The analytical and theoretical
scope of this paradigm, however, is limited in comparison to classical realism. Relying on
third-level imagery, it cannot account for second or first level imagery analysis, while
realism accounts for all three levels. Its systemic approach limits states to given strata or
position, failing to account for inter-state conflict, and only accounting for inter-strata
conflict. In contrast, realism addresses inter-state conflict through second-imagery
analysis, while dealing with structural assessments through the balance of power theory.
Finally, world-systems theory reduces all forms of analysis to an economic genesis,
which limits its capacity to account for factors broader than the economic structure. In
sum, world-systems theory has been quite limited in modern scholarship, while realism
remains a central paradigm. However, a revival of world-systems theory could be highly
beneficial to the study of international relations, since it allows for a distinct analytical
approach that is both historical and non-static.

The fifth alternative, the liberal paradigm, proposes theories and explanations that
stress the value of exogenous variations in basic state preferences that are embedded in
domestic and transnational relations (such relations tend to be state-societal).

Academic Press, 1974); see also, The Modern World System II: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the
European World Economy 1600-1750, (New York: Academic Press, 1980); and “A World-System
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Theda Skocpol, “Wallerstein’s World Capitalist System: A Theoretical and Historical Critique,” American
Journal of Sociology, Vol. 82, No. 5 (1977), pp. 1083-1085. See also, Robert Brenner, “The Origins of
Paradigmatic liberal theoretical and conceptual models are primarily second-image, or second level analysis, concentrating on propositions about the autonomous impact of economic interdependence, domestic institutions and their effects, and socially oriented assessments such as the provision of public goods, ethnic identity, regulatory protection, socioeconomic redistribution, and political regime type. While the liberal paradigm cannot be deemed ephemeral, for it has existed as the heir to idealism, it is nonetheless subordinate to classical realism, since both paradigms have existed in international relations scholarship for the same amount of time, but the role of realism has been far more central. Furthermore, second-imagery analysis places liberalism at a disadvantage when compared to the explanatory powers of classical realism, for realism addresses all three levels of imagery analysis. While liberalism simply cannot be discarded as a paradigm, it nevertheless serves a subordinate role when compared to the theoretical depth, philosophical structure, and explanatory powers of realism.

The sixth alternative, the epistemic approach, contains theories and explanations concerning the causal role of collective beliefs and ideas as contributing variables in assessing how states calculate their underlying goals and objectives. The epistemic approach stresses exogenous variation in the shared beliefs that structure affect perceptions of the given environment. The epistemic research programs apply extensive attention to the strategic, organizational, economic, and industrial components of culture, the formulation of belief systems that produce epistemic communities, the social

structuration of ideas and identities, and the anti-essentialist foundations of its epistemological approach. The most prominent epistemic approach is constructivism, which holds many of the same postpostivist assumptions regarding the anti-essentialist premise that human association is determined primarily through shared ideas rather than material forces. The constructivist method of critique is deconstructivist, and to this end, its fundamental approach is epistemological. The fundamental claim of constructivism is that social structures constitute the construction of agents, while social structure, itself, is constituted by shared beliefs. In short, constructivism is about human consciousness and its ideational role in the international system. Its ontology, therefore, is idealistic and holistic. Because constructivism is an epistemological method of analysis, it lacks the structuration and theoretical framework to be deemed a paradigm. Adapted from social psychology and pedagogy, it is a postpostivist method of inquiry that questions the givenness, or the essence, of the presumed world. In this sense, constructivism, or any of the epistemic approaches, may be applied to any of the international relations paradigms, since they hold no core concepts, fundamental assumptions, or auxiliary hypotheses. Constructivists, therefore, accept the realist notions of anarchy, power and interest, and consider the state to be the unit of analysis. However, their assessment of these concepts vastly differs from realism, since the two have completely different epistemologies. In

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169 For a comprehensive look at international relations theory articulations through the constructivist approach, see Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Relations*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

170 John G. Ruggie confirms this point, “No general theory of the social construction of reality is available…and international relations constructivists have not as yet managed to formulate a fully fledged theory of their own. As a result, constructivism remains more of a philosophically and theoretically informed perspective on and approach to the empirical study of international relations.” See John G. Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist
this sense, realism presents a theory of international relations, while constructivism presents a model of inquiry.

The study of international relations is a study of the political forces that dominate and define the given world. International relations is comprehensive and exhaustive, for it aspires to scientifically explain and predict behavior on the international scene. The study of international relations, therefore, is not merely a study of specific issues, actors, or outcomes, but an extensive and collective study of all these factors. By virtue of its specific areas of concentration, certain paradigms formulate concepts, assumptions, or propositions that better address such specific realms of inquiry. But such paradigms are limited and ephemeral. A robust paradigm must possess the necessary tools to address the international system in its entirety, and not in piecemeal. Whereas certain paradigms base the structuration of their theories upon other paradigms, or rely on other disciplines to provide analytical or methodological tools to account for the international political system, a powerful paradigm does all this independently through its own theoretical and philosophical model. Whereas certain paradigms are degenerative and rely on ad hoc and contradictory auxiliaries, a progressive paradigm relies on its articulated concepts and refined auxiliaries to account for anomalies. A paradigm reigns dominant if it possesses the depth and scope necessary to account for the enormity that is the international political system. In the field of international relations, classical realism reigns supreme.

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