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A Palestinian state

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A PALESTINIAN STATE

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December 2009

ABSTRACT

A Palestinian State

by

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Should an independent, sovereign state of Palestine have the right to exist? The establishment of an independent Palestinian state is important because it could possibly end an extended period of violence with Israel, where civilian casualties have been high, and it could help to solidify a foundation of political tolerance and acceptance in the Middle East. Under the proposed two-state solution, an independent Palestinian state is possible. However, to determine if a Palestinian state is viable, it will be necessary to examine internal political struggles, economic resources, systems of communication, political systems and internal and external political policies. This qualitative research will focus on examining the resources and systems that would be essential in creating a solid infrastructure and foundation for the Palestinian people and a strong, sovereign, internationally recognized Palestinian state.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	iv
INTRODUCTION.....	1
CHAPTER 1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.....	7
Nation and State Building.....	7
Environmental Theory.....	13
Institution Building.....	19
CHAPTER 2 PALESTINIAN HISTORY.....	23
The Canaanites and Phillistines.....	23
Zionism.....	25
British Mandate of Palestine.....	28
The White Paper.....	31
The War of 1948.....	36
The Arab Nations and the Palestinian Issue.....	38
The Six-Day War.....	42
Israel and the Palestinian Issue.....	46
The Oslo Peace Accord.....	51
CHAPTER 3 CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL ISSUES.....	57
Palestinian Political Structure.....	57
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.....	57
Palestine Liberation Organization.....	58
Fatah.....	60
Palestinian Authority.....	62
Hamas.....	65
Hamas vs. Fatah: Competition for Control.....	68
Hamas and Israel: Confrontation and Resistance.....	69
The United States and the Palestinian Issue.....	71
The UN and the Palestinian Issue.....	72
Arab States and the Palestinian Issue.....	74
Israel and the Current Palestinian Conflict.....	77
CHAPTER 4 STATE BUILDING: SEARCH FOR A PALESTINIAN STATE.....	82
Demographics.....	82
Economic Indicators.....	85
Current Economic Impacts of the Israeli Policies.....	91
Physical Infrastructures.....	94
Political Institutions.....	99
CONCLUSION.....	103

BIBLIOGRAPHY	108
VITA	112

INTRODUCTION

The conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians has been raging since the establishment of Israel after World War II. The European Jews displaced after the Holocaust desired the present state of Israel, formerly Palestine, and they were encouraged by other states. It did not seem to matter, to the Zionists or to the rest of the world, that the land was already occupied and belonged to the Palestinians. Since the late 1940's the Palestinians have been fighting for their right to exist in their homeland and reclaim their homes. Popular media, however, especially in the western world, does not paint a realistic picture of the conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians. The western world, the United States in particular, fully and blindly, supports Israel and their oppressive, violent actions against the Palestinians. Over the years, as Palestinians have fought for their land and homes, different political groups have come into power to represent the interests of Palestine as a whole. The Palestine Liberation Organization, the political group Fatah, and the controversial political group Hamas, have all stood up to Israel in an attempt to reclaim their land, more presently in the areas of Gaza and the West Bank. Hamas is controversial because of their violent acts towards Israel, in an attempt towards resolution, and as a result has offended parts of the international community. The interference of these institutions and the international scrutiny of others have made it even

more difficult for the Palestinians to make a united stand and establish a sovereign state. The establishment of a Palestinian state is important because it could possibly end an extended period of violence, where civilian casualties have been high, it could help to solidify a foundation of political tolerance and acceptance in the Middle East and it can promote positive global change for human rights.

The viability of a Palestinian state has been affected by economic, political and geographic factors. Several of these obstacles are compounded by the role that larger countries play. Economically, the Palestinians are completely dependent on Israel for their success and survival. If Israel places limitations or restrictions on the Palestinians and their economic livelihood, the Palestinians are at their mercy as they have no recourse to supplement their economic earning base. The political obstacles that Palestinians face are some of the most far reaching and detrimental to their independent existence. The internal political corruption in the Palestinian Authority creates problems for the Palestinians before they even begin to cross international borders. The lack of political cohesion among Palestinians and their well founded distrust in their political leaders, results in a disjointed political system that is not legitimized by the people. To move beyond the internal obstacles and look at the international political issues only multiplies the issues facing the Palestinians. The Middle East, as a region, does not exude a sense of solidarity and unification. Any type of regional support

that the Palestinians could use to enforce their political standing is virtually non-existent. One of the Palestinians' major obstacles is their political relationship with Israel in that externally affects both the Palestinian's economic and geographical situations. The fact that the United States is such a major factor, with their continuous support for Israel, it compounds the political scenario even further. Geographically the Palestinians have been separated. The result of the Six Days war in 1967 divided the Palestinian areas of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The borders that were established and are being resiliently reinforced prevent the Palestinian people from creating a strong unified state or sense of community. This major geographic separation of land is not conducive to the establishment of a state. One of the four characteristics that a state must have in order to be called a state is territory. Presently, in addition to the limited territory the Palestinians do have, Israel continues to enter the West Bank and Gaza Strip, in densely populated Palestinian communities, to build Jewish settlements. In addition to tackling the national border issue, Palestinians are also struggling with the internal geographic problem of communities being divided by the Israelis. Observing all of the obstacles, both internal and external, that the Palestinian people are facing, explains why they have been unable to focus on themselves directly and try to establish a legitimate state.

Several conditions must be met to create a strong, legitimate, viable Palestinian state. Those characteristics would be a unified

geographic territory, a stable, legitimate government, a group of people or population, typically with cultural ties, and the right to a sovereign nation. Geographically the issue of a fractured territory has been introduced. In addition, the Palestinian political system suffers from several limitations as well. Internally, the Palestinian Authority struggles to be legitimized. The political struggle between Hamas and Fatah further complicates the internal dynamic. The Palestinians, as a people, struggle to unite for their determined agenda. Palestinians are physically separated. Due to this separation, the Palestinians have many different loyalties and identities. Ranging from Pan Arabism to Nationalism, Palestinians do not know how to unite. One overarching, all encompassing solution seems to undermine the complexity of the Palestinian people. Sovereignty, the idea that the supreme and absolute authority of the state rests with the people of that state is a concept that is being outrageously violated, when it comes to the Palestinians, most specifically by Israel. Even if the Palestinians were able to overcome all of the other internal obstacles that face them, if they are not recognized as a sovereign entity, any progress would be fruitless. The establishment of a strong, sovereign nation is that the only way that a Palestinian state will be viable.

A comprehensive look at the history of Palestine and its people, in addition to an empirical analysis of contemporary issues, through secondary sources, is necessary to assess the viability of a Palestinian

state. Historically, a review of Palestine under British rule, before and during World War II, would be necessary in establishing the series of events that have lead to the present Palestinian situation. Next, a closer look at the history of violence and conflict between the Palestinians and Israelis will also assist in painting the reality of the present day situation. The internal and external factors will be evaluated to determine the interconnectedness of both challenges. A discussion of the foundation of a solid infrastructure is also necessary in determining how prepared, or unprepared, the Palestinians are in establishing a viable state. Will new geographic boundaries be necessary? Is there sufficient political organization to build roads and schools and develop communities? Is there enough money to build a solid infrastructure? All of these questions will be addressed to explain the viability of a Palestinian state.

The fractured internal dynamics of the Palestinians is one of the major contributing factors to their present day struggle. The internal issues, such as culture and Palestinian identity, establish and compound any external issues they might have. Most external obstacles are a direct result of the internal ones. The Palestinian people are strong enough to stand on their own and exist in a sovereign state, free from any interference of large, core states. Once the Palestinians are able to establish and solidify a strong internal identity, they can begin to build their state from the inside out. To assist in their internal development, it is going to be necessary for Israel to relinquish the lands gained in the

Six Days war and allow the Palestinians to return to the 1967 borders. Once the Palestinians have a geographically united territory, they can begin to establish a unified, national state. In addition, a solid political system is going to need to be discussed and negotiated and compromises are going to have to be made. Perhaps a complete overhaul, of the already established Palestinian Authority, is necessary for the success of an independent state to ascertain a legitimate system that is respected and supported by the people. The restructuring of the political system will probably be one of the most difficult internal obstacles to accomplish. The politics and political leaders can not remain as divided and self serving as they are now. It will be important for the different political groups to work together to create a unified system. If it remains separated and fractured, the political leaders will not be legitimized by the people and they will have a hopeless time moving to the next step of state development. Once the obstacles of national identity and internal politics have been addressed, the Palestinians can focus on building their state infrastructure. The development of roads and schools and natural resources will lead to a strong economic system. Palestinians can then focus on a defense system that will protect themselves and their interests. Concluding their course of internal development, the Palestinians will then be able to focus on external matters. At that time they will be able to demonstrate to the world that they, indeed, are a viable state that can exist on its own and participate on a global stage.

CHAPTER 1

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

For decades now, Palestinians have been trying to get back on their feet and establish a sovereign Palestinian state. This has proved nearly impossible with Israel's hegemonic domination supported by the international community. International groups and countries verbally condemn Israel for their treatment of the Palestinians, yet no action is ever taken to stop the Israelis and to support the Palestinians. However, there are several obstacles, both external and internal, that need to be addressed by the Palestinians and their political leaders before a sovereign, legitimate state can be created.

Nation and State Building

Creating a state or building a nation requires the attention of several different variables. Political Scientists developed a renewed focus on nation building after World War II as several countries were being rebuilt and new nations were being established. Nation and state building theories have suggested that either external factors or internal factors can stand in the way of establishing a state; either one or the other or even both. External obstacles can be examined through Developmental and Dependency theories. Developmental theories do not focus on the lack of development by a group or territory; instead they focus on possible solutions using different variables. One variable is a

strong democratic political system, suggesting that for a state to develop, a democratic system is necessary. However, for industrialized, democratic, capitalist nations to apply their policies on smaller, undeveloped nations is sufficiently useless. The typical outcome is the increased repression and exploitation of the people and a textbook definition of a state cannot be forced on just any developing nation. Theories of Underdevelopment are closely related as they suggest a dependency of weaker, underdeveloped satellite states on larger capitalist states.

Internal obstacles, that developing nations face, are hurdles such as Nationalism and class structure, which are major themes in Structuralist theory. Comparativists explain that political development is co-dependent on Nationalism.¹ Nationalism is the promotion of a citizen's pride in their nation, it helps foster respect and obedience of governmental authority and it helps legitimize the government. It is the collective emotional response that people elicit for their country and it can be a movement for protecting a state's freedom and independence from the face of an external threat. It has played a role in economic, social, cultural and psychological development. All of the things that Nationalism represents work smoothly in a democratic government, but when Nationalism is applied to a state that does not have a strong

¹ Chilcote, Ronald H. Theories of Comparative Politics: The Search for a Paradigm Reconsidered. Colorado: Westview Press, 1981. Page 99.

European tradition and influence that is when Nationalism can begin to create all kinds of problems. The “classical” origins of Nationalism are deeply rooted in European traditions. Over the centuries, several different takes on Nationalism have been constructed and utilized. Modern nationalism has been viewed as liberal or republican, reconstructive, integral, cultural, and religious and secessionist. Each new wave of nationalism developed as the people in Europe, or the people controlled by Europe, saw fit. The tradition of Nationalism was taken on the boats to the Americas where the US was created in a European image. It is extremely difficult to apply the idea of Nationalism to areas such as Africa, South America and the Middle East. They do not have a strong European influence that has emphasized concepts such as Nationalism. These regions have rich, non-European histories that make it extremely hard for them to adjust to a phenomenon like Nationalism. However, can a unified pride and identity of a particular nation help to solidify and legitimize that nation?

Arab Nationalism is a type of Nationalism that was created by the Arabs at the turn of the twentieth century. It emerged as a way for Middle Eastern Arabs to unite over their experiences with imperialism. Arab Nationalism represented diverse and fragmented ideas that came from a diverse and fragmented Arab world. It provided Arabs with an alternate reality, a reality away from the one in which they found themselves. The process of forming a nationalist self-view among the

Arabs began with the adaptation to Near Eastern conditions of the European concept of patria and patriotism.² The Middle East is made up of such a variety of cultures, and each culture has their own unique and specific history. Arab Nationalism incorporated all of those differences and reflected the diversity of the people and their cultures. The foundation of this Nationalism was rooted in the belief that the Arab world was united by language, history, geography and the ideology that a new reality was possible for the Arab people. The consistency of this belief is what has propelled the idea of Arab Nationalism forward and has helped to homogenize the Arab experience. One of the first hurdles for the Arabs and their Arab Nationalism was the struggle for political independence. It was not a success early on as each state was struggling to identify themselves within the region, while at the same time acting in the best interest of their country. The Arab-Israeli conflict has become a major focal point of Arab Nationalism as it is associated with the intrusion of Western powers into the Middle East.³

The Structuralist perspective perceives that the functions of the state are determined by the structures of society and not by the people who hold positions of power. In social sciences, Structuralist theories

² Khalidi, Rashid. The Origins of Arab Nationalism. Columbia University Press, 1991. Page 4.

³ Khalidi, Rashid. The Iron Cage: the Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood. Massachusetts: Beacon Press, 2007. Page 83.

focus on the all inclusive general significance of the internal systemic relation of elements and their role in specific events. Two types of Structuralist theories that lend themselves to state and nation building are neo-realism and world systems theory. Neo-realism explains that the international system is the major deciding factor of the developments in international politics. Immanuel Wallerstein's world systems theory describes the inter-relationship between core, semi-periphery and periphery states. He accounts for the different levels of states, by first identifying what a state is. The modern state is a sovereign state. Sovereignty is a concept that was invented in the modern world-system. Its prima facie meaning is totally autonomous state power.⁴ Wallerstein explains how states organize themselves internally and how that can affect states relationships with one another. The most significant arena of social action was that which occurred within the boundaries of the state. Using this premise, many things seemed obvious: States were sovereign, they also had historical roots. They had economies, political systems, social norms and structures, and cultural heritages, each of which could be specified by social scientists. What distinguished one state from another was its specific combination of these parallel spheres.⁵ He explains that the world-economy develops a pattern where

⁴ Wallerstein, Immanuel. World Systems Analysis: An Introduction. United States: Duke University Press, 2004. Page 42.

⁵ Wallerstein, Immanuel. Page 25.

state structures are relatively strong in the core areas and relatively weak in the periphery.⁶ Dependency theory is a direct offshoot of Wallerstein's world systems theory that has been explored in both developed and developing countries. The theory suggests that poor underdeveloped states in the periphery are exploited by the developed imperialistic states of the core. The core states exploit the periphery states to increase their economic development and gain and maintain wealth. It also argues that the economic deprivation of the periphery states is a direct result of their integration into the world system.⁷ Some premises of Dependency theories are; periphery states provide a home for obsolete technology and markets for the core states, a state of dependence is perpetuated through policies and proposals, and when periphery states attempt to resist the core states, economic sanctions are placed or even military force is used. However, the world-system is much less reliant on direct political-military coercion, and more reliant on economic exploitation which is organized through the production and sale of commodities.⁸ It is suggested that this vicious circle can lead to social revolution. In his Structural theory of Imperialism, Johan Galtung explains that the relationship between the core and periphery states is at the expense of a

⁶ Wallerstein, Immanuel. "The Modern World System." New York: Academic Press, 1976. Page 6

⁷ Chilcote, 243.

⁸ Chase-Dunn, Christopher K. Global Formation: Structures of the World Economy. Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998. Page 204.

majority of the people in the periphery state and is only in the best interest of the core state. Hegemonic relations between nations and other collectivities will not disappear with the disappearance of imperialism; nor will the end to one type of imperialism (e.g. political, or economic) guarantee the end to another type of imperialism (e.g. economic or cultural).⁹

The case of the Palestinians is unique in that they are struggling from both internal and external obstacles. Their struggle to self govern is compounded by the fact that not only are there external complications, those complications are leading to internal complications as well. In this particular case, the external obstacles are creating the internal obstacles. The complexity and diversity of these wide ranging obstacles can better be explained through the environmental theory. The environmental theory explains several dynamics of a state, such as the geography, culture, population, climate and the political geography.

Environmental Theories

Environmental theory explains that geographic and climatic circumstances influence national characteristics, foreign policies of

⁹ Galtung, Johan. "A Structural Theory of Imperialism." *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (1971). Page 2.

states and state identity.¹⁰ The United States and their pursuit of national land expansion under the widely accepted idea of Manifest Destiny is an example of how geography influenced a nation and their characteristics. The US government was able to accomplish their expansion by nurturing a unified attitude among Americans and fostering a national concept at a national level. Environmental theory includes a discussion on political geography, which is the relationship between politics and geography.¹¹ An examination of political geography includes factors such as: individuals, government, groups of people, and social institutions. The environmental factors that are considered when measuring the political geography are: national and human-created systems, national resources and urban areas. Political geography is a concept that goes hand in hand with the current Palestinian situation. Ultimately it is an internal obstacle that is influenced, at each level, by an outside external obstacle.

Geopolitics is another aspect of Environmental theory that focuses on the study of people, the state, and the world as organic units.¹² The state is viewed as a living organism that occupies space, contracts, grows and eventually dies. The state is then modified to be only an aggregate-

¹⁰ Pfaltzgraff Jr., Robert L. and James E. Dougherty. Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey. New York: Longman, 1997. Page 144-145

¹¹ Dougherty, Pfaltzgraff, 147

¹² Dougherty, Pfaltzgraff, 158

organism which is forged by moral and spiritual forces.¹³ What is people's relationship to nature? Geopolitics evaluates climate, topography, and natural resources. It is hypothesized that humans are in an unending struggle for living space because a state's land area indicates that state's power. Due to this correlation, states make every effort to expand their borders. This urge to expand causes boundaries to shift and change all the time, creating conflict between the states. States are in a relentless struggle for survival.¹⁴ Geopolitics has evolved over the years as a measure of the relationship between geography and power. Can a state's geography influence their political power? This question is addressed in the core-periphery model based on dependency theory. According to the realist school of thought, the geographic location of states will condition that state's political behavior. Both neo-realists and neo-liberals suggest that human culture and physical features are a major part of Environmental theory.

Arnold Toynbee, an early twentieth century historian, intensifies Environmental theory by suggesting that civilizations come into existence in environments that harbor difficult challenges. Civilizations then develop a unified force to overcome the difficulty allowing them to move on to the next challenge. In turn, the subsequent challenge elicits a new

¹³ Dougherty, Pfaltzgraff, 158

¹⁴ Dougherty, Pfaltzgraff, 158

response or solution that provides the civilization with the tools to problem solve and advance their community.¹⁵ Toynbee's idea is known as the challenge-response cycle. The possibilities for a civilization are potentially infinite, but his theory does not allow for the prediction of possible obstacles or solutions. Toynbee provides 5 types of challenging stimuli to support his hypothesis. Two of his stimuli are physical; they are hard country and new ground. Hard country is a country possessing a harsh climate, terrain and soil. New ground is the exploration, opening up, and development of a wilderness into productive land. Toynbee's last three stimuli are non-physical; they are, challenges emanating from another state, continuous external pressure against a state, and a stimulus of penalization- that is if a state loses the use of a particular component, it is likely to respond by increasing correspondingly the efficiency of another component.¹⁶ The stimulus of penalization can also be demonstrated through racial discrimination. Certain classes and races have suffered for centuries from various forms of penalization imposed upon them by other classes or races that have had mastery over them. Penalized classes or races generally respond to this challenge of being excluded from certain opportunities and privileges by putting forth exceptional energy and showing exceptional capacity in such directions

¹⁵ Toynbee, Arnold and David Churchill Somerville. A Study of History: Abridgement of Volumes I-VI, Volume 1. New York: Oxford University Press, 1946. Page 48.

¹⁶ Dougherty, Pfaltzgraff, 150

as are left open to them.¹⁷ Toynbee notes that an overly severe physical challenge can hinder a civilization's development. The Arabian nomad falls into the latter category.

Harold and Margaret Sprout have made major contributions to Environmental theory. They have examined the role that geography plays in examining political behavior by suggesting that most human activity is affected by the uneven distribution of resources. The interrelationship of geography, demography, technology and resources are compared and examined. This examination not only focuses on the internal, domestic aspects of a state, but how states interact with one another. The Sprouts assess the environment in its relationship to human activity. They imply that operation milieu affects human activity in that, factors can limit individual performance or the outcome of decisions, based on perceptions of the environment.¹⁸ Environmental factors become related to the attitudes and decisions which comprise a state's foreign policy only by being perceived and taken into account in the policy-forming process. The statesman's psycho-logical environment (that is, his image, or estimate, of the situation, setting, or milieu) may or may not correspond to the operational environment (in which his

¹⁷ Toynbee, Arnold. *A Study of History*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1946. Page 572

¹⁸ Dougherty, Pfaltzgraff, 159

decisions are executed).¹⁹ To strengthen the argument for the Palestinian people, the application of cognitive behavioralism provides the assumption that a person consciously responds to the environment through perception and no other way. Political decisions are based on what the state leaders' perception of the environment is.

Resource scarcity and conflict are two major components of Environmental theories that help demonstrate the relationships between core and periphery states. The depletion of natural resources can lead to conflict as states and people become so desperate they resort to violence to attain them. Nonrenewable resources cause the biggest conflict because once they are consumed, they are gone. In terms of renewable resources, water causes the most conflict. Environmental scarcity can lead to economic deprivation and conflict which contributes to civil strife and increases economic and political pressures on governments, possibly resulting in a weakening of state legitimacy.²⁰ To compound the issue of economic development and resource scarcity, the chance of conflict increases because of their geographic location. Geography, and specifically the location of political entities in close proximity to each other, is said to create opportunity for conflict to the extent that states sharing borders with each other are more likely to engage in conflict than

¹⁹ Sprout, Harold and Margaret. "Environmental Factors in the Study of International Politics". Sage Publications, Inc. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Dec., 1957), pp. 309-328

²⁰ Dougherty, Pfaltzgraff, 164

are states that are noncontiguous.²¹ Throughout history, conflict has been more about territorial issues than political goals. Environmental theories suggest that a war in one state increases the chances that there will be war in one or more other states, demonstrating a domino type effect.

Institution Building

Institution building is an important component in the development of a state. The internal system of a state relies upon the effectiveness and efficiency of state institutions. Institutions serve as a link between a state's political system and the people of that state. At times institutions link states to one another and play a major role in the development of a state. Max Weber argued that states are compulsory associations claiming control over territories and the people within them.

Administrative, legal, extractive, and coercive organizations are the core of any state.²² The Weberian perspective suggests that the state must be considered as more than the "government." It is the continuous administrative, legal, bureaucratic and coercive systems that attempt not only to structure relationships between civil society and public authority

²¹ Dougherty, Pfaltzgraff, 165

²² Skocpol, Theda. Peter B. Evans and Dietrich Rueschemeyer. Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research. Australia: Cambridge University Press, 1985. Page 3.

in a polity, but also to structure many crucial relationships within civil society as well.²³ The institutional structure of a state can influence private entrepreneurial groups and their role in the future development of the state. As long as the state provides a stable frame of rules so that the returns from investment are predictable, private agents will do the rest.²⁴ Economic and financial institutions play a significant role in the development and subsequent success of a state. It is quite likely that economies that are rich choose or can afford better institutions. Perhaps more important, economies that are different for a variety of reasons will differ both in their institutions and in their income per capita.²⁵ The state's ability to support markets and capitalist accumulation depend on the bureaucracy being a corporately coherent entity in which individuals see furtherance of corporate goals as the best means of maximizing their individual self-interest. The concentration of expertise in the bureaucracy through meritocratic recruitment and the provision of opportunities for long-term career rewards are also central to the bureaucracy's effectiveness.²⁶ It is also beneficial to observe the

²³ Skocpol, 7

²⁴ Evans, Peter B. Embedded Autonomy. New Jersey: Princeton, 1995. Page 31

²⁵ Robinson, James A. Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson. "The Colonial Origins of Political Development: An Empirical Investigation." *The American Economic Review*. 2001, June. Page 2.

²⁶ Evans, Peter B. "Predatory, Developmental, and Other Apparatuses: A Comparative Political Economy Perspective on the Third World State." *Sociological Forum*, Vol. 4, No.

institution structures and activities of states and how they unintentionally influence the formations of groups and the political capacities, ideas and demands of various sectors of society.²⁷ Social scientists have spent the last thirty years trying to maneuver around the idea of a neo-utilitarian system and its theories on institution building. If historically derived institutional patterns define individual interests and constrain the way they are pursued, then “one size fits all” diagnoses will not work.²⁸ Measuring a state in comparative historical terms could be beneficial in that it is a tradition that takes institutions seriously.²⁹ However, returning to Weber’s discussion, imposing different policies on a separate apparatus without changing the structure of the state will not work. Real changes in policies and behavior depend on the possibility of erecting new state structures.³⁰ The relationship between a state’s institutions and its society can be either helpful or detrimental to the development of that state. It is social capital built in the interstices between state and society that keeps growth on track.³¹ The mutual

4, Special Issue: Comparative National Development: Theory and Facts for the 1990s (Dec., 1989), 561-587.

²⁷ Skocpol, 21

²⁸ Evans, 29

²⁹ Evans, 29

³⁰ Evans, 30

³¹ Evans, Peter B. “Government Action, Social Capital and Development: Reviewing the Evidence on Synergy” Global, Area, and International Archive. 1997. <<http://escholarship.org/uc/item/1f0812j7>>

development of a state's political system and institutions combine with the certain aspects of a society, such as economic development, leads to the healthy development of that state. When public agents and citizens have sufficiently different (but equally necessary) kinds of inputs, they can produce more efficiently by combining their efforts than by either producing everything privately or everything publicly.³² If the two are interconnected in a way that is not conducive to the success of the state, it can prevent the state from making any positive changes. Some states are weak because diffused fragments of society have stayed strong, retaining at the local level the ability to frustrate state actions.³³

³² Evans, 11

³³ Evans, 36

CHAPTER 2

PALESTINIAN HISTORY

The Canaanites and Phillistines

As early as the third millennium BCE, Palestine existed and was inhabited by the Canaanites. Like most other civilizations during that time, the Canaanites existed in several organized city-states, one of which was Jericho being the best known. Around the second millennium BCE, during the 14th century, the Canaanite city-states were invaded by several groups, two of which were the Hebrews and the Philistines. The Hebrews, together, united several different tribes and called themselves Israelites. They then attempted to gain control of Palestine, but were unable to conquer and defeat the Philistines. The Philistines settled in the southern part of Palestine and controlled the Canaanite city of Jerusalem. Around 1050 BCE, the Philistines, with their iron weapons and well organized military, fought and defeated the Israelites. During the first millennium BCE, King David of Israel came into Palestine and defeated the Philistines. Over the next couple hundred of years, the Israelites became internally divided and were conquered by the Assyrians. Palestine's Assyrian domination ended with Alexander the Great of Macedonia and the destruction of the Second Temple by the Romans in 70 CE and the formation of the Jewish diaspora after the formation of the autonomous Jewish kingdom of the Hasmoneans, who broke free of the Hellenistic kingdoms. In 313 CE, Palestine became a

focus of Roman Emperor Constantine after his conversion to Christianity. Jerusalem and Palestine became a focus as both a Christian and Jewish holy site and became a major destination for pilgrimage. By 638 CE, Palestine was invaded and conquered by Muslim Arabs who took control of Jerusalem and Palestine. The takeover of Jerusalem was peaceful as the Arabs showed mercy to those they conquered and the area came to be known as Filastin. This would begin an era of Muslim control that would last the next 1300 years.

The Muslim Arabs were interested in Palestine in part because it was known that the Prophet Mohammad had initially indicated Jerusalem as the first *qibla*, or direction that Muslims face when they pray. Over time, Jerusalem became the third holiest city in Islam. The Muslims generally did not force their religion or beliefs on the Palestinians once they had taken control and it would be centuries before a majority of the people in Palestine began to convert to Islam. The remaining Christian and Jewish Palestinians were granted autonomous control of their communities and allowed to practice their religion because they were viewed as “People of the Book” [*ahl al-kitab*]. The Ottoman Turks overran Palestine in 1516 CE and remained in control there until 1917. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Ottoman Empire had one of the most powerful militaries in the world. Due to their military strength, the Ottoman Empire entered into foreign negotiations and economic agreements with an attitude of superiority.

However, from the end of the seventeenth century onward, they struggled to find their place in a newly changing world as the international dynamic shifted around them. The Ottomans were unable to modernize the Empire's institutions as quickly as other states and they became increasingly prone to external interventions by outside powers. The foreign and economic agreements, or Capitulations, that they had made with other countries were now being exploited and abused.³⁴ Eventually, the Ottoman military became weak and after the Great War they suffered a series of defeats. After World War I, the empire collapsed and was replaced by the Turkish Republic, which renounced its claim to the Ottoman Arab provinces.

Zionism

In the decades leading up to the fall of the Ottoman Empire, a fervent Jewish ideology began to take root in some parts of Europe that came to center on the land of Palestine. Ever since the expulsion of large parts of the Jewish population of Palestine by the Romans after 70 CE, some Jews had kept alive the messianic idea of returning to the Holy Land. For the purposes of this study, the term "Zionism" refers to the ideological belief among Jewish communities that God has destined the Jewish people to re-create the fallen kingdom of ancient Israel, otherwise

³⁴ Cleveland, William L. *A History of the Modern Middle East*. Colorado: Westview Press, 2004. Page 50.

referred to as Zion; and “Zionists” are those who believe that Jews have a right to a modern national home in historic Palestine—with the claim to this land based on the existence of a Jewish kingdom dating from roughly three thousand years ago. These beliefs would later receive further justification from perceptions of abiding anti-Semitism and by the trauma of the Holocaust.³⁵

Although the concept of Zionism was always prevalent in Jewish life, it was never well-organized, planned or put into action with any lasting success. But the growth of modern nationalist ideas in nineteenth-century Europe would change all of that. In Europe, and particularly in Eastern Europe, Jewish communities faced discrimination from both their governments and other communal populations.³⁶ They were denied entry into certain professions, universities and state employment. Zionism offered a focus and escape and this Zionism that they began focusing on was not the old religious Zionism that had been passed down generation to generation, this was a new political Zionism that was inspired by both religion and modern concepts of nationalism.³⁷ In 1884, pro-Zionist Jews coordinated themselves under the name Lovers of Zion. They organized for the sole purpose of focusing their efforts on

³⁵ Bill, James A. and Robert Springborg. Politics in the Middle East. New York: Addison Wesley Longman, Inc. 1993. Page 223

³⁶ Cleveland, 240

³⁷ Ibid.

building a Jewish settlement in Palestine. From the beginning, the new political Zionism did look at Palestine as a possible home for their future Jewish state. A booklet by Leo Pinsker was one of the first publications that verbalized the new Zionist agenda. Pinsker explained that anti-Semitism was so deeply rooted in European culture and society, that no matter what steps European governments took to change the laws, it would never make any difference.³⁸ He urged European Jews to stop waiting for Western culture to change and instead put their efforts towards the establishment of an independent Jewish state. However, it is important to know that Pinsker did not insist that this new Jewish state be established in Palestine. Although Pinsker urged young European Jews to establish an independent Jewish state, the idea of Zionism was still unorganized and did not have a strong leadership or sense of direction. However, it would take the western European figure of Theodor Herzl to organize the Zionist ideology and mold it into an international movement. Herzl agreed with Pinsker's notion that anti-Semitism was deeply rooted in European society, and he created an ideological blueprint for a more explicitly defined form of political Zionism. His main argument in his work, The Jewish State, was that the Jewish people constituted a nation but lacked a political state to go with

³⁸ Cleveland, 241

it.³⁹ He explained that the only way for the Jewish people to escape persecution was to create an independent sovereign state. Like Pinsker, Herzl did not insist that the new Jewish state be established in Palestine, but he was. After the hundreds of years that a Jewish state had been discussed, Herzl was the first to define a clear political objective and maneuver the Zionist agenda into a coherent, unified movement.⁴⁰ However, Herzl knew, during his lifetime, that the Zionist objective would not be achieved without the support of a Great power that would be willing to financially assist in their establishment.

British Mandate of Palestine

When the Ottoman Empire decided to join World War I on the side of Germany with the Central Powers, the Allied Powers (Great Britain, France and Russia) began discussing how their territories would be divided up among themselves in the event of an Allied victory. Eventually, this discussion came to be intertwined with the politics of Zionism and its perceived role in influencing the outcome of the war. Some in the British government thought that the governments of Allied powers like Russia were being influenced by Jewish groups. Thus, they worried that if Germany came out in support of an independent Jewish

³⁹ Cleveland, 242

⁴⁰ Ibid.

state, they might gain enough support to swing the war in favor of the Central powers. Great Britain felt that if it could offer an indication of support for the Zionist agenda, then they could retain the support of influential Jewish members throughout the world. Although it is now known that this would not have been a decisive factor, it is important to understand what drove the British policy at the time.

Zionist spokesmen such as Chaim Weizmann in London helped to influence the British government in this direction by suggesting that an independent Jewish state would serve the imperial interests of Great Britain. There was no question in the minds of early Zionists that their desire to create a Jewish state in Palestine could succeed only were it to appeal to powerful forces within Western nations, especially Britain.⁴¹ If Britain sponsored a Jewish state in Palestine once the Ottoman Empire lost its sovereignty over the land, it would prevent France from taking control of that land to serve their own imperial interests. All of these factors contributed to the eventual decision to extend British support to the Zionist agenda in Palestine. In November of 1917, British foreign secretary Arthur Balfour and his cabinet approved and supported a Jewish Zionist agenda. The Balfour Declaration supported a Jewish state in Palestine, but at the same time tried to protect the non-Jewish communities already established there. While it was a success for

⁴¹ Bill-Springborg, 237

Zionist Jews, the Balfour Declaration was full of contradictions and was extremely confusing.⁴²

Due to the Balfour Declaration, Palestine's experience after the fall of the Ottoman Empire was much different from that of the other Arab territories. The Palestinian Arab notables that were trying to establish and maintain control of Palestine were wary of Great Britain and their support of Zionism.⁴³ At that time, the focus became the issue that there was a relatively small territory that had been inhabited by Arabs for some 1200 years and it was promised, by another state, as the national home to another group of people, a majority of whom were Askenazi Jews from Europe. The Palestinian notables resisted working with Great Britain and their mandate because they felt that any acceptance of the British imperial rule would be misconstrued as Arab support for the Balfour Declaration and that it would violate their right to self-determination they were going to achieve out of the Versailles process.

⁴² Cleveland, 244

⁴³ They actually were more interested in becoming a part of the Greater Syrian state that never materialized after the French crushed it and established their mandate over Lebanon/Syria—another thing that Britain had never quite promised in the Husayn-McMahon correspondence of 1915-16.

The White Paper

As Jewish immigration began to swell and Jewish settlements became more dominant in Palestine, the tensions rose to violent levels between the Arabs and Zionist Jews. With the outbreak of disturbances and riots by the end of the 1920s, Great Britain began investigating the conflicts with the formation of the Shaw Commission. In the fall of 1929, Great Britain sent this commission to Palestine to investigate the troubles of their mandate and find out why there was so much violence in the region. Shaw concluded that there was a widespread fear among the displaced Arab communities that the increasing Jewish immigration would create a Jewish-dominated Palestine.⁴⁴ Shaw recommended that the Jewish immigration be reined in by the British government and that Arabs should no longer be evicted in the name of land transfers.

The British government chose to ignore Shaw's findings and decided instead to send another commission into Palestine. In the summer of 1930, the Hope-Simpson Commission visited Palestine and presented their findings to the British government in what was referred to as the Passfield White Paper. The White Paper reminded Great Britain of its responsibility to both the Arab and Jewish communities as a mandatory power. It suggested that one of Great Britain's objectives should be the establishment of an independent Palestine by 1949, which

⁴⁴ Cleveland, 257

would include a discussion with the League of Nations to help terminate the mandate. It was expressed that the independent state be one in which Arabs and Jews would share in government as to ensure the essential interests of each community. The White Paper also discussed a necessary transitional period from the mandate into a state of independence.⁴⁵ However, the recommendations suggested in the White Papers were very clear about the involvement of both Jews and Arabs in the creation of Palestine's political system. If the state was not ready for full independent control within the suggested time frame, the White Papers explained that both Jewish and Arab heads of state would work cooperatively with Great Britain to achieve that end.

In regard to immigration, it was set forth that Jewish immigration to the region needed to be facilitated under suitable conditions.⁴⁶ In theory, Jewish immigration to Palestine was not to exceed the local economic capacity or become a burden upon the people of Palestine as a whole.⁴⁷ The White Paper suggested that land be set aside for all of the displaced Arabs and noted that Palestine had a limited economic capacity; therefore, restrictions needed to be made on Jewish

⁴⁵ Laquer, Walter. The Israeli-Arab Reader: a Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict. Bantam Books, 1976. Page 14

⁴⁶ Laqueur, 15

⁴⁷ Ibid.

immigration.⁴⁸ However, it soon became clear that the provisions outlined in the White Paper would not be met. When Zionists were made aware of the White Paper, they mounted a large, concerted effort to have the document withdrawn altogether. By 1931, they had succeeded in their efforts and the White Paper was stricken from record. This, in turn, demonstrated to the Palestinian Arabs the power and sway that the Zionists had over the British government at their own expense. Essentially, the White Paper was the beginning of the end. The British Mandate began to spiral down as they would soon no longer have any control over the situation in Palestine.

In April of 1936 riots broke out in Palestine that led to what has been historically referred to as the Arab Revolt. The Arab Palestinians began to boycott Jewish goods and businesses and they made demands of Great Britain. These demands included an end to Jewish immigration, transfers of land to Jewish owners and a new general government. The conflict and violence continued sporadically for the next three years. The revolt ended with the White Paper of 1939. The MacDonald White Paper was a policy paper in which the idea of partitioning the British Mandate of Palestine was abandoned in favor of Jews and Arabs sharing one government. It called for the creation of a unified Palestinian State. Even though the White Paper stated that it was committed to the Balfour

⁴⁸ Cleveland, 257

Declaration, it imposed very substantial limits on both Jewish immigration and their ability to purchase land. In terms of the status quo, it was a significant defeat for the Jewish side who viewed this as a great betrayal of British promises for a Jewish National Homeland in Palestine. However, due to impending World War II, opposition from all sides, and the fall of the Chamberlain government, forced the paper into the background. Israel would declare itself an independent state before the paper could ever be reviewed again.

In the late 1940s, the Zionist movement, that was attempting to establish an independent Jewish state of Israel, became wary and tired of British control. Although the Zionist movement had needed the initial support of a powerful state, like Great Britain, they were beginning to feel limited and betrayed by the control of the British government and they wanted to move out from under their shadow. Moreover, it had always been part of the Zionist goals of self-determination to become an independent sovereign state free from the control of any country. Thus, Jewish groups began actively undertaking acts of rebellion aimed at weakening British control over the mandate of Palestine. By February of 1947, Britain realized that they had lost control of the situation in Palestine and they requested an intervention from the United Nations. The UN put together a committee that was in charge of investigating the situation in Palestine known as UNSCOP, or the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, which was composed of delegates from 11

different nations.⁴⁹ They arrived in Jerusalem in June of 1947 and spent five weeks investigating the situation of ferment in Palestine. As part of its conclusions, the recommendations that UNSCOP produced suggested the immediate termination of the British mandate and a declaration of the independence of Palestine. However, the means by which to implement an independent Palestine was a divisive subject among the members of the committee. Some felt that Palestine should be formed into a unitary federal state, while others felt that a two-state solution, one Arab and one Jewish, was the only viable option. A majority of members did conclude that Jerusalem should be categorized as an international city, belonging to no one.⁵⁰ The Zionist leaders initially favored the report, while the Arab leaders rejected its conclusions. Zionist leaders, including pro-Zionist member states of the UN such as the United States, favored the report because it eliminated the British mandate and would assure the Zionists a fighting chance at achieving a sovereign state. Great Britain, meanwhile, did not even wait for the UNSCOP reports to be released before they withdrew from Palestine entirely. Due to the absence of the British and their refusal to assist in the UN partition plan, Palestine was thrown into a state of chaos before any attempt to implement the UNSCOP recommendations could take

⁴⁹ Cleveland, 263

⁵⁰ Ibid.

place. Events on the ground turned into a violent race to see who could claim the most land for their group. Since there was no official transfer of power from Great Britain to any sovereign entity as they withdrew from Palestine, the struggle for supremacy between the Arab and Jewish communities boiled over. Zionist leaders declared an independent state of Israel and explicitly moved in favor of the two-state solution.⁵¹ It was immediately recognized by both the United States and the Soviet Union.

The War of 1948

Around the end of World War II, Arabs made up an absolute majority of the population in Palestine and owned close to ninety percent of the country's privately owned land. With the outbreak of the first Arab-Israeli War in 1947 and 1948, more than half of the country's Arab majority, probably over 750,000 people were expelled from or forced to flee the areas that became part of the state of Israel. About half were obliged to depart from their homes before the formal establishment of Israel and the entry of several Arab armies into Palestine on May 15; the rest left after that date.⁵² The state of Israel was being established in Palestine because European Jews claimed that the land was the site of a Hebrew Kingdom, during the first millennium B.C., which they had

⁵¹ Cleveland, 267

⁵² Khalidi, Rashid. The Iron Cage: the Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood. Massachusetts: Beacon Press, 2007. Page 1

ancient rights to including the role it played in their self-determination. In addition, they wanted to escape discrimination in Europe. By the spring of 1948, the largest Arab cities had been taken over by the Zionist militias that would later be reconstituted as the Israeli military, and those Palestinians who had fled were turned into refugees. Often, the Palestinians that had fled were the most educated, and had a greater share of wealth and status in their former society. Although they were displaced and reduced to refugees, they were only a fraction of the Arabs affected by the establishment of the new state. The outlying villages and urban areas that were homes to millions of Arabs became the new homes to the displaced Arabs who were forced to move out of the cities when the Israeli army came in and destroyed most of their homes.

In late 1948, after the declaration of Israel as an independent state, the surrounding Arab states invaded Israel. Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan and Iraq invaded Israel under the idea that they were supporting a unified Arab region.⁵³ However, the reality quickly became apparent that they also entered Israel for their own mutually-exclusive and state-specific reasons. The underlying rivalry between the Arab states, paired with a lack of military resources, low numbers of trained soldiers and disunity among the Arab combatant states allowed for a decisive Israeli victory. In part due to the confusion surrounding

⁵³ Cleveland, 267

this complex early stage of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Israel denied for years that they had any influence in the migration of the Palestinians; they claimed that the Palestinian leadership had voluntarily withdrawn to join with the Arab states. However, it has been successfully proven in more recent historiography of the conflict that Israel did indeed threaten, coerce and forcibly expel Palestinian communities from their homes in many cases.

The Arab Nations and the Palestinian Issue

As a result of the Israeli fight for independence, the existence of Israel was not acknowledged or welcomed by any neighboring states. The other Arab states of the Middle East felt that Israel was an extension of imperialistic Western culture and that Israel planned to suppress Arab culture and aid in the cultural corruption by the long arm of the Western powers.⁵⁴ In the following decade, the gradual decline of European colonial power saw the Arab states move toward defining their sovereignty and acting in the best interest of their individual states. They had no interest in playing a role in the Cold War that the United States and the Soviet Union had created to further advance their own agendas. However, pragmatism soon dictated that they would be unable to avoid it entirely.

⁵⁴ Cleveland, 337

Around 1954, Egypt came under the authoritarian rule of Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasir, who advocated a new approach to Egyptian foreign policy. He was a leading figure in the Pan-Arab movement aimed at building confidence in the Arab states of the Middle East and moving out of the shadow of the imperialistic West. ‘Abd al-Nasir was able to burnish his pan-Arab and anti-imperial credentials by forcing Great Britain to withdraw from the Suez Canal Zone in Egypt. After long, structured negotiations, Great Britain withdrew from the Suez Canal. This was an example to the Middle East and the rest of the world that negotiations were possible without having the alignment with a great power. While the Arab states celebrated ‘Abd al-Nasir’s victory, the European states were furious. In part, however, the Egyptian victory was tied to the fact that the Baghdad Pact was being sold, simultaneously, to Middle Eastern states by the United States with the idea that their governments would accept military and financial aid from the US in an exchange for ideological alignment with US and Western thought.⁵⁵ Egypt ultimately rejected the Baghdad Pact, however, and ‘Abd al-Nasir was able to convince Jordan and Syria to reject the pact also. ‘Abd al-Nasir firmly believed that the Arab states did not need imperial alliances or Western influences to achieve a successful sovereign state. In addition, it should be noted that since the creation of Israel, many of the Palestinian

⁵⁵ Cleveland, 309

refugees had been forced to the Egyptian-Israeli border and several incidents had taken place that had reminded the Egyptian government that they did not have a military that could match that of Israel's. They realized that they would need newer weapons to advance their military, and previously, when Egypt had approached the United States for this assistance, they were turned away because of their unwillingness to cooperate with the Baghdad Pact.

Still in need of more updated weapons and newer technology, Egypt turned to Czechoslovakia to purchase the weapons—which was a thinly-veiled move toward the Soviets in western eyes. Egypt entered into a large arms agreement with them in exchange for Egyptian cotton. The rest of the world viewed this agreement as Egypt's alignment with Soviet Union.⁵⁶

Moreover, at this time Egypt was also aware that they needed more money to help in the development of their natural resources to sustain their economy. Egypt decided to implement an idea that had been talked about for some time by deciding to build another dam across the Nile. This idea was beneficial to the Egyptians because it would demonstrate to the world that they had the skill and capacity to implement an ambitious and sophisticated development project. It would also allow for an increase in the amount of land that could be irrigated, provide electric

⁵⁶ Cleveland, 310

power and supply the entire country.⁵⁷ The only roadblock to this plan was the massive funding that was required to make it possible. Egypt was forced to seek financial assistance.

They received an offer to have the project funded by the United States and Great Britain, but both attached provisions and conditions to the aid. While Egypt was considering the offer, the United States changed its mind and rescinded its offer of financial assistance altogether. ‘Abd al-Nasir responded with a dramatic move. On July 26, 1956, Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal and declared that the money made off of the canal would go to fund Egyptian projects the West refused to sponsor. The Suez Canal had been built by the Egyptian ruler Khedive Isma‘IL in the nineteenth century, but financed by European banks and it was owned and operated by the French. ‘Abd al-Nasir tried to resolve this lingering problem by offering financial compensation for the Canal. The Western states reactions to his unilateral action were that of fury and hostility.

In the fall of 1956, international conferences were convened to determine a resolution that would be acceptable to all parties, but Great Britain, France and Israel had secretly decided upon their own resolution to the Suez Canal crisis.⁵⁸ In late October, Israel launched a military

⁵⁷ Cleveland, 311

⁵⁸ Cleveland, 312

attack into Sinai, and a couple of days later, Great Britain bombed Egypt to allow Israeli troops to advance to the Suez Canal itself. France also supported the Israeli attack until a UN-sponsored cease fire was reached. All three states were condemned by the international community, particularly by the United States and the Soviet Union. All three were forced to withdraw from Egypt because of the terrific pressure to do so on the part of both the United States and Soviet Union. While the Security Council did not condemn the tripartite invasion of Egypt because France and Great Britain, as permanent council members, enjoyed power of veto⁵⁹, strong pressure from the United States soon forced Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip as well. Even then, Israel would not leave Egypt for another four months and a UN emergency force had to be placed in Gaza to act as a buffer between Israel and Egypt. The entire situation reinforced the Arab notion that Israel was part of a continued European colonial agenda and that they would attempt to reverse gains made by Arab states at any cost.

The Six-Day War

Since the establishment of the state in 1948, as a result of various conflicts, Israel had expanded its control into various border regions of the surrounding Arab nations. This was a continual source of conflict

⁵⁹ Quigley, John. Palestine and Israel: a Challenge to Justice. North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1990. Page 156

and hostility with its surrounding neighbors. Israel had also developed a raging insecurity over the possibility of a unified Arab nation and the military threat that would come with it. In the meantime, the Palestinian refugees that were forced to live in camps on the Israeli borders were becoming increasingly frustrated by the lack of attention to their plight. Since the collapse of Palestine, the Palestinian refugees had been practically forgotten. One of the most noteworthy conflicts between Israel and the wider Arab world that decisively turned the balance of power in favor of Israel was that of the Six-Day War.

The Six-Day War grew out of the instability that marked the armistice lines and state borders that had been drawn to end the fighting over the Palestinian land between Israel and the surrounding Arab states in the 1940s. By 1967, Israel's attempts to violate those lines and agreements had been numerous. Israel would not honor the armistice line with Syria as Israel felt that shelling from the Golan Heights was threatening and they made several public overtures that military force would be used, if necessary, to get what they wanted. Syria turned to Egypt for help and both states remained in constant communication with the UN. In May of 1967, as a response to the full mobilization of the Israeli military, Egypt announced that it would close the Straits of Tiran to Israeli-flag vessels and to any vessels carrying strategic goods to Israel. Egypt said its purpose was to prevent Israel from transporting strategic

goods it might use in an attack on Syria. It cited Israel's threats against Syria and the presumed Israeli troop buildup facing Syria.⁶⁰

On June 5, Israel responded to the Egyptian action by launching a surprise attack on Egypt, marked by a simultaneous entry into the Palestinian area of the Gaza Strip.⁶¹ This culminated in the complete victory of the Israeli forces on all fronts by June 11. Jordan attacked Israel in response to the attack on Egypt and claimed their right of collective self-defense under the UN charter. Israel did launch attacks on both Jordan and Syria and with the help of the United States, they swiftly defeated Egypt. Within days Israel had also taken control of the West Bank, the other Palestinian occupied land, in addition to the Gaza Strip. After taking control of the West Bank, Israel renamed the area around Jerusalem, Judea and the northern sector as Samaria. The Israeli government granted individual Israelis permission to purchase and develop the land. The Master Plan to incorporate the West Bank into Israel aimed to disperse maximally large Jewish population in areas of high settlement priority, using small national inputs and in a relatively short period by using the settlement potential of the West Bank to achieve the incorporation [of the West Bank] into the Israeli national

⁶⁰ Quigley, 161

⁶¹ Jordan's King Husayn joined the Syrian-Egyptian alliance that had suddenly emerged over the Israeli-Arab conflict.

system.⁶² Although most of the international focus was on the conflict with the surrounding Arab nations, the occupation of the Palestinian land was a major catalyst for the increasingly agitated Palestinian refugees.

Once Israel had control, Prime Minister Eshkol explained that the new areas would remain occupied for security reasons: “Be under no illusion that the State of Israel is prepared to return to the situation that reigned up to a week ago...The position that existed until now shall never again return”.⁶³ With the Cold War in full swing, an escalating situation in Vietnam, and the social discord going on in the United States in the forms of war protests and Civil Rights movements, Israel’s oppression of the Palestinians did not achieve high-priority status in the international community, and when it was addressed, it did not take precedence over other global issues going on at the time. The first anti-Israeli uprising occurred immediately following the Israeli victory and occupation in June 1967. Subsequently, in 1977 a victory for the Likud party made the Israeli government and public much more aggressive about the Jewish settlement issue in the occupied territories. As civil-disobedience campaigns in the occupied territories devolved into rebellion in Gaza, the Israeli army stepped in, forcefully suppressed the demonstrators, and

⁶² Quigley, 175

⁶³ Quigley, 179

restored order.⁶⁴ The defeat in the Six-Day War and the events that followed saw Palestinians attempting to find their own voice in all of the change that had occurred. Up until this point, their voice had largely been bound into the wider pan-Arab nationalist project and they needed new avenues to seek a resolution to their expulsion from their homes twenty years before.

Israel and the Palestinian Issue

By 1986, Yitzhak Rabin was Israel's Defense Minister and Yitzhak Shamir was Israel's Prime Minister, and together they implemented a plan referred to as the "Iron Fist" policy which toughened the treatment of Palestinian demonstrators. During the Israeli elections of 1984 and 1988, a sufficient number of smaller minor political groups won enough seats in the Israeli Knesset to prevent either of the large parties from obtaining a workable majority in the government. The two major Israeli political parties remained the Labor Party and Likud Party. As a result, the two parties were forced to work together under a new National Unity government. In reality, the elections created a total paralysis of the Israeli political system because the two parties have such opposing views and agendas. The Labor Party remains in favor of territorial compromise with the Palestinians, whereas the Likud party continues to be fiercely

⁶⁴Husain, Mir Zohair. Global Islamic Politics. Harpercollins College Publishers, 1995. Page 173

opposed to relinquishing any control of the West Bank or Gaza Strip. During this time, the Israeli government focused on the construction of new Jewish settlements in Palestinian controlled areas, and adopted new measures of separating and isolating Palestinians in their communities. These policies were marked by Israeli government confiscation of Arab lands and the arrest and detention of Palestinians suspected of participating in political activism. The new policies required Palestinians to carry ID cards and pay specific taxes for the simplest of acts, such as crossing the border to go to work or obtain licenses. The Israeli acts heightened Palestinians awareness of their occupied status. Fearing their eradication as a political and social unit, the Palestinians, provoked by a relatively minor incident, rose against their Israeli occupiers.⁶⁵

In December of 1987, an Israeli military tank hit a truck on its way to the Gaza Strip, with four Palestinian workers in it, and all four men were killed. This event triggered an outpouring of rage against all the oppression endured by the Palestinians that came to be called the first Palestinian Intifada. The *Intifadah*, which means “uprising” or “shaking off,” for the first time drew world attention to the Arab-Israeli conflict and to the plight of the long-forgotten Palestinians living in the Israeli-occupied territories.⁶⁶ Palestinians gathered by the thousands to protest

⁶⁵ Husain, 174

⁶⁶ Husain, 174

the incident. The Israeli military responded by shooting and killing several Palestinian protestors and the result was widespread revolt among the Palestinians. It was the uprising of the Palestinians against the Israeli occupation. It demanded worldwide attention as to the impact of the Israeli occupation and its effects on the Palestinian people. Images of rock-throwing Palestinians confronting Israeli military hardware proved to be a very effective message that demonstrated Palestinian willingness to oppose Israeli activities against all odds, which did away with the idea that the problem was going to go away of its own accord.

At first the rebellion was spontaneous, but as it gathered momentum in both Gaza and the West Bank, the Palestinians came to create an underground leadership called the Unified National Leadership. The UNL began organizing the uprising while, at the same time, supporting the PLO. The PLO maintained its support as most Palestinians remained loyal to the organization and its agenda. Using its position as an umbrella organization, the PLO invited Islamist groups to join the uprising. Islamists focused on local *masjids*, schools, colleges, and universities, where Muslim clerics and teachers taught Palestinian youth a politically motivated activist Islamic message. Islamism had been growing since the 1970s because of the outcome of revolutions in both Iran and Lebanon. The Palestinians actually felt like they had a chance at creating their own state and moving out from the oppressive shadow of the Israeli government.

However, as the uprising gained popularity, other organizations began forming as rivals to the UNL and PLO. The most significant opposition was that of the Islamic Resistance Movement, known more commonly as, Hamas. As an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas was composed of Palestinian refugees and young college-educated Palestinians. They began to compete with the UNL for the loyalty and support of the Palestinian people.

A problem with the Intifada was that although the PLO was the organization in control, it encompassed several different groups who did not always see eye-to-eye on tactics or strategy. There was no unity or cohesion among the different Islamist groups, for instance. Their lack of solidarity made it impossible for them to fully unite all of the Palestinians. Moreover, in the wake of the First Intifada, a new major international obstacle faced the Palestinians in the form of the outbreak of the Gulf War. Although the initial intensity of the uprising had faded, and the Palestinian people were still struggling with its meaning, the Gulf War promptly shifted all international attention away from the Palestinians and the Arab-Israeli conflict toward Iraq and the Gulf states. Any international sympathies that the Palestinians had created were now subsumed into the Gulf War and its politics.

Arafat and the PLO came out in support of Saddam Husayn and his invasion of Kuwait, which was a very unpopular international position at that time. Islamist support for Hussein, however, represented

no love for the Iraqi dictator's pan-Arabism or Arab nationalism; it represented a more intrinsic rejection of Western intervention in the *ummah* and an attack on "the presence of foreign troops in Saudi Arabia," which defiled "the holiest land for Islam."⁶⁷ While the rest of the world was focused on the conflict in the Gulf, the Intifada, meanwhile, increasingly stagnated. Before the crisis, the uprising's impact had been receding, and with the outbreak of this new crisis it was eclipsed, though it never permanently died out.

The defeat and weak political position of the Palestinians only increased the conflict within the Palestinian community after the end of the Gulf War. The major obstacle facing the Palestinians, from this point forward, became their lack of unity and solidarity. Corruption in the Palestinian leadership has not helped in overcoming this disadvantage, in particular Yasser Arafat's unwillingness to share power or confront growing corruption within the ranks the PLO. Arafat's increasing autocratic behavior did not allow for the best possible political outcomes for the Palestinians. Arafat brooked no opposition from the elected Palestinian Legislative Council, refused for years to sign a Basic Law (meant to serve as a transitional constitution) that it had passed, bullied the legislators, and generally established the unfortunate precedent of serious imbalances between the powers of the executive and legislative

⁶⁷ Husain, 178

branches.⁶⁸ The lack of sovereignty, absence of concrete law, government corruption and continued conflict discouraged any outside investment in Palestinian areas, which perpetuated the pattern of dependency on external sources for financial support.

The Oslo Peace Accords

The role of the Oslo Peace Accords has contributed enormously to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, despite its organization as a foundation of peace between them. It was created as a framework in which Israel would trade land for peace and negotiate a final "divorce" between the two communities. In theory, Oslo envisaged the Israelis' progressively transferring portions of the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip to the control of an interim body called the Palestinian Authority (PA), the elections for which would include Arafat's previously banned Palestine Liberation Organization. The Palestinian Authority would guarantee Israel's security by clamping down on terrorism, as both sides prepared their people for a final agreement involving a mutual recognition of each other's claims to Middle Eastern land that would once have been unthinkable.⁶⁹ The Oslo process had enemies on both sides: Israeli right-wingers led by Netanyahu opposed the very principle of

⁶⁸ Khalidi, 203

⁶⁹ "A Peace Process Primer." 2000. TIME.com. 26 Oct. 2009.
<<http://www.time.com/time/daily/special/mideast/>>

trading land for peace and vowed to resist the surrender of any territory over which the Israeli flag flew; whereas Islamic fundamentalist Palestinians rallied around the Hamas movement to denounce a peace agreement that would involve Palestinian and Arab acceptance of Israel's right to exist on what was once Palestinian land.⁷⁰ The result was that the Oslo Peace process and U.S. involvement in it has actually hindered any Palestinian progress in creating an autonomous state. Instead, it has only given Israel more time to continue occupying Palestinian territory and building Jewish settlements. The growing failure of the Oslo Peace Accords fueled support for rejectionist Palestinian groups such as Hamas, into taking a more aggressive and violent strategy toward Israel. Many Palestinians in the Israeli-occupied territories and in the diaspora saw the Oslo Peace Process and the Arafat-Rabin handshake as a raw deal because Palestinians are worse off today than they were in 1993. The Arafat-Rabin peace agreements brought new recruits into the ranks of Revolutionary Islamist Palestinian organizations such as Hamas and the Islamic Jihad.⁷¹

At the Oslo Peace Process, in Washington D.C., Yasser Arafat was there representing the Palestinian people through his position as the leader of the PLO and the Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, was

⁷⁰ "A Peace Process Primer." 2000. TIME.com. 26 Oct. 2009.
<<http://www.time.com/time/daily/special/mideast/>>

⁷¹ Husain, 192

representing the state of Israel. Rabin committed Israel to the discontinuation of building Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories. This was a commitment that many Israelis were not willing or prepared to make, and when Benjamin Netanyahu became Prime Minister shortly thereafter, he violated the agreement and resumed building and expanding Jewish settlements. On the other hand, the Oslo Peace process demonstrated to the world how unprepared and ill-equipped the PLO was to negotiate with Israel for their independent state. This has been a problem that has plagued Palestinians with their international negotiations from the beginning. In regards to the Oslo Accords, it became particularly acute at the moment when the PLO leadership in 1992-93 in effect took negotiations with Israel out of the hands of the relatively competent delegation of generally respected figures from the occupied territories and others from the Palestinian diaspora that they had chosen and sent to Washington. Instead, they placed it instead in the hands of the team of loyal PLO officials that they appointed to negotiate the Oslo Accords, while calling all the shots from Tunis.⁷² Had a more competent, less corrupt group of Palestinian leaders attended that Oslo Peace Process, perhaps the Israel and the United States would not have gotten away with as much as they did. As a result of U.S. involvement in the Oslo Peace process, and their

⁷² Khalidi, 162-163

unwavering support for Israel, the Peace process only addressed minor issues that existed between Israel and the PLO. The United States and Israel purposefully left major issues, such as Palestinian sovereignty, Jerusalem, Palestinian statehood and refugees, off the table for discussion during the entirety of the so called Peace Process. In fact, the real logic of the partial interim approach was that it was intended by its Israeli and American architects to relieve Israel of having to make any hard decisions on ending the occupation and settlement of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem. Instead, Israeli occupation and settlement were massively reinforced during the period of negotiations.⁷³ It is for these reasons, and many other, that so many Palestinians were angered and displeased with the Oslo Peace Process. The Oslo Peace Accords and the United States involvement, particularly on behalf of Israel, is another factor in the Israeli, Palestinian conflict.

By July of 2000, it had become clear to Palestinians and the rest of the world that a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict over state sovereignty was nowhere close to being solved. It had been almost a decade since the Camp David Accords and it was abundantly clear that the Oslo Peace process had failed. Fueled not only by the failure of the peace process and the continued development of Jewish settlements, the Palestinians became deeply offended, in September of 2000, when Israeli

⁷³ Khalidi, 162

opposition leader, Ariel Sharon, visited the site of Al-Aqsa Mosque and walked among its ruins, since the mosque was located in East Jerusalem and it is extremely sacred to Palestinian Muslims. It is also referred to as the Temple Mount by the Zionists and it is a disputed area between the Palestinians and Israelis. This calculated act of perceived disrespect on Sharon's part triggered the second Palestinian Intifada, also referred to as the Al-Aqsa Intifada. This Intifada lasted until the winter of 2005 in an exchange of violence between the Palestinians and the Israeli military. Images of Palestinian children being gunned down and killed by the Israeli military were matched with images of Palestinian suicide bombers killing unarmed citizens at a time in Jerusalem. To the wider world, this was the picture being painted. Palestinians were armed with their stones as they fought a military that is backed and funded by the most powerful military in the world. The Al-Aqsa Intifada turned the international spotlight back on the Palestinians and their never ending struggle with the Israeli government.

Since the second Intifada, Palestinians have re-entered global headlines for their election of the Islamist rejectionist group Hamas into the government of the Palestinian Authority. Hamas' representation of the Gaza Strip further limited the flow of international aid and money supplied to the Palestinian people. Inability to stem continued violence culminated in Hamas launching missile attacks into Israel. On December 27, 2008, Israel launched a major military campaign dubbed

“Operation Cast Lead” against Hamas in the Gaza Strip. The Israeli offensive came in response to markedly increased Palestinian rocket fire following the expiration of a six-month cease-fire on December 19, followed by a ground offensive into Gaza. Despite international pressure to halt the fighting (including the passage of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1860 on January 8), the conflict continued until January 18, when Israel unilaterally issued a cease-fire and Hamas followed suit shortly thereafter. Israel’s technological superiority and reliance on heavy armor and firepower contributed to a wide disparity in casualties—approximately 1,440 Palestinians died (with some organizations estimating that at least half of the dead are civilians), as compared with 13 dead (including four civilians) on the Israeli side.⁷⁴ International attention has turned to brokering a sustainable cease-fire arrangement and to addressing the needs of the Gazan population—both in terms of continued humanitarian assistance and of reconstruction.⁷⁵ However, this work contends that instead of trying to rebuild the Gaza Strip and focus on reconstruction, it would be more beneficial to focus on the reconstruction of a Palestinian state, and it is to that which we must now turn.

⁷⁴ Zanutti, Jim, Carol Migdalovitz, Jeremy M. Sharp, Casey L. Addis, Christopher M. Blanchard, Rhonda Margesson. “Israel and Hamas: Conflict in Gaza (2008-2009).” 19 Feb. 2009. < <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R40101.pdf> > 26 Oct. 2009.

⁷⁵ Zanutti, 2

CHAPTER 3

CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL ISSUES

Palestinian Political Structure

One of the major obstacles facing the Palestinians is their internal conflict over contemporary political issues. Palestinians find themselves engaged in an ideological battle with Palestinian political groups such as Fatah, Hamas and the PLO. A controversial issue is their situation with Israel and the status of their independent state. Each political group has a different philosophy and roadmap as to how to achieve that end. It pulls the Palestinians in different directions and prevents a sense of unity. To better understand the conflict, it is important to understand the history and roles of the political players.

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) was established on December 11, 1967, six months after the end of the Six Day War. PFLP's founder and General Secretary was George Habash.⁷⁶ Habash's leadership of PFLP was supplemented by Wadi' Haddad. Both men were medical doctors who helped found the Arab Nationalist Movement, a Pan Arab and Arab Socialist initiative seeking to destroy Israel and to create, in its stead, a secular, socialist Palestinian nation. In its fledgling stage, PFLP enjoyed the support of then-Egyptian

⁷⁶ "Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine." 2009. BBCNews.com. 26 Oct. 2009. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1604540.stm>

President Gamal Abdul Nasser.⁷⁷ In 1968, PFLP joined the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and quickly became its second-largest faction (behind Fatah); but unlike Fatah, which sought support from Arab nations, PFLP looked to Russia and China for assistance. Blending Palestinian nationalism with Marxist ideology, PFLP describes itself as "a progressive vanguard organization of the Palestinian working class dedicated to liberating all of Palestine and establishing a democratic socialist Palestinian state."⁷⁸ Today, the PFLP has approximately 800 registered members and is headquartered in Syria.

Palestine Liberation Organization

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was created in 1964. The PLO was founded at a congress in the Jordanian sector of Jerusalem in May. Formed as an umbrella organization by refugee groups and fedayeen (Arab., "commando") forces, such as Al Fatah, Al Saiqa, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, it was also joined by professional, labor, and student associations, as well as some individual members; the fedayeen, however, have always dominated it. The functions of the PLO are carried out by three main organs: the Executive Committee, a decision-making body in which the major fedayeen groups

⁷⁷ "Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine." 2009. BBCNews.com. 26 Oct. 2009. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1604540.stm>

⁷⁸ "Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine." 2009. BBCNews.com. 26 Oct. 2009. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1604540.stm>

are represented; the Central Committee, an advisory body; and the Palestine National Council, which is seen as an assembly of the Palestinian people.⁷⁹ For several years it was viewed as the responsible, mature, state-like framework that they had lacked throughout their modern history, operating as the almost universally accepted representative of the Palestinian people.⁸⁰ It was created to unify the fractured voices of the Palestinians and represent their interests towards the creation of their state. Several different political groups belonged to the PLO, but since its inception it has been controlled by Fatah. The PLO deserves credit, wholly or partially, in three major areas of achievement for the Palestinians. The first achievement is for creating a vehicle for the pursuit of their national aims that was universally accepted among the entirety of the Palestinian people. The creation of an accepted forum grouping all major Palestinian political forces was something that no earlier Palestinian political leadership had been able to achieve.⁸¹ For decades, the PLO was the face of the Palestinian national movement. The second achievement attributed to the PLO is the recognition of the Palestinian people by the Arab states and later by the international community. Starting in the early 1970's, the PLO was

⁷⁹ "PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION." 2009. History.com. 26 Oct 2009, 02:09 <<http://www.history.com/encyclopedia.do?articleId=218499>>

⁸⁰ Khalidi, 150

⁸¹ Khalidi, 166

recognized by the Arab League, the United Nations, and eventually, after decades of foot-dragging, even by Israel and the United States as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.⁸² The PLO forced the world to legitimize the Palestinian people. As a result, the international recognition of the Palestinians and the PLO should be able to influence global policy that represents the rights of the Palestinian people. This will only be the case, however, if the PLO does not succumb to the demands of those who hope to minimize the interests of the Palestinians. The PLO has also been credited with its recognition of the ultimate futility of exile politics, and to make the difficult decision to shift its center of gravity from the countries bordering Israel to the occupied territories.⁸³ This tactic was implemented while simultaneously suggesting a two-state solution to the conflict with Israel and was executed after the Oslo Peace Accords. While the PLO has made several advances for the Palestinian community, it has also had its share of turmoil and political losses.

Fatah

Fatah has been extremely dominant in the PLO's existence. Fatah was created in the late 1950's by Arab leaders such as Yasser Arafat and Khalil al-Wazir. It was a political and military organization initially set

⁸² Khalidi, 167

⁸³ Khalidi, 169

up as the Palestine National Liberation Movement. One of Fatah's goals was to wrestle Palestine away from Israel's military control through guerilla warfare. Fatah was accepted by the Palestinians in the 1950s and 1960s due to their insistent preaching of direct, armed action against Israel, combined with its independence from Arab governments.⁸⁴ Fatah was the strongest and most organized of the underground Palestinian political groups. They were accepted by the Palestinians because their initial goal was to secure a Palestinian state and rescue the Palestinians from the Israeli control. It was not until the fifth session of the Palestine National Council in February of 1969 that Arafat, the leader of Fatah, was elected chairman of the PLO's executive committee. Fatah then took a majority of the seats on the board that had been reserved for guerilla organizations. This move placed Fatah in political control where it has remained since. Although Fatah created and held a monopoly in Palestinian politics for several years, they failed to create unity and discipline throughout the Palestinian political movement. The need for power and control by Arafat and his upper level leaders, blurred and eventually buried the original intent of Fatah thus leaving the door wide open for other political groups, such as Hamas, to walk in and take control with the support of the Palestinian masses.

⁸⁴ Khalidi, 141

Yasser Arafat and his role in Palestinian politics are important because he was a major player in the Palestinians struggle for independence since the creation of Israel. Arafat was born in the late 1920's, in Cairo. Both his mother and father were Palestinians. Throughout his childhood he moved between Egypt and Jerusalem and by the time he was in his late teens he was smuggling weapons into Israel to support the uprising of the Palestinian people. Arafat lived several places after he received his education including; Jordan, Kuwait, Egypt and Lebanon. After gaining control of the PLO, Arafat and the rest of the PLO leaders would relocate to different Arab states when necessary. During the Oslo Peace Accords Arafat was appointed the leader of the Palestinian Authority. He was in control of the PA from its inception. When Arafat gave a speech that renounced terrorism and accepted Israel's right to exist, he won the Nobel Peace Award for his gesture of peace with the Israelis. The problem with Arafat was that as the years went on he became increasingly autocratic and ran the Palestinian Authority like a Dictatorship. His self serving ideas and agendas in cooperation with a very conservative Israeli government put a halt to any progress in the creation of a Palestinian state.

The Palestinian Authority

The Palestinian Authority (PA) was created in September of 1993 at the Oslo Peace Accord in Washington D.C. The Oslo Peace Accord was an attempt by the Clinton administration to create a peace deal between

Israel and Palestine. The Palestinian Authority is a legislative council and interim self-governing body responsible for the areas of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank which fall under Palestinian control. It was at this time that Israel formally recognized the PLO as representatives of the Palestinian people and granted the Palestinians limited autonomy in the area of Gaza. The PA was to exercise complete civil and security control in three different zones of the West Bank as defined and divided by Israel.⁸⁵ At the time, the PA was largely viewed as a major success for the Palestinian people. However, their success would be short lived. Today, the PA is used to describe the ineffectiveness and corruption of the Palestinian political establishment. The PA leadership failed to do much of what it could have done on its own, even in such impossibly restrictive circumstances. This includes establishing a corruption-free system of governance based on a rule of law, establishing a balance between the executive and legislative branches, attracting massive investment, and creating jobs.⁸⁶ It is also important to know that the PA was created under the guise of the United States, with Israeli support, and has been limited by those political actors. The PA has continuously had to answer and succumb to the wishes of both the United States and Israel. The political pressure and interference of these states

⁸⁵ Husain, 193

⁸⁶ Khalidi, 203

demonstrated the PLO's inexperience and inability to deal with outside actors. The first decade of the existence of the PA has been testimony to the unpreparedness of the PLO leadership for the duties attendant on creating a real state. It is true that the PLO leaders who dominated the PA, such as Arafat, were severely inhibited by Israel's overwhelming power. In addition, the restrictions written into the Oslo Accords, to which they themselves had consented, prevented them from obtaining sovereignty, statehood, or even jurisdiction and real control in most of the occupied territories. When the PA was established it failed to create a solid framework for the rule of law, a constitutional system, a balance of powers, and many of the other building blocks of a modern state.⁸⁷ In addition to that, more complications arose when it was immediately turned over to and controlled by Yasser Arafat. In January 1996, radical Islamist parties, who did not support the Oslo Peace process, boycotted scheduled Palestinian elections: this effectively threw the PA entirely into Arafat's hands. Arafat was elected president of the Palestinian Authority, and his supporters won two-thirds of the eighty seats in the Palestine Legislative Council.⁸⁸ He now had control of all three major Palestinian political entities; the PLO, Fatah, and finally the PA. Arafat's increasing autocratic behavior was not yielding the best possible political outcomes

⁸⁷ Khalidi, 159

⁸⁸ Husain, 185

for the Palestinians. Arafat brooked no opposition from the elected Palestinian Legislative Council, refused for years to sign a Basic Law that the PA had passed, bullied the legislators, and generally established the unfortunate precedent of a serious imbalance between the powers of the executive and legislative branches.⁸⁹ The lack of sovereignty, absence of concrete law, government corruption and war discouraged private investors from investing in Palestinian areas. This lack of investment has led to a weak economic system and a dependency on other nations for financial support. However, in spite of the numerous disappointments and downfalls of the PA, there is a reason it is still around. The Palestinians need some sort of political entity, corrupt or not, to help fulfill their ultimate goal of achieving an independent Palestinian state. For Palestinians, the PLO and PA symbolize their national aspirations; to abandon them is to abandon hope for an independent state.⁹⁰ This Palestinian attitude will help to explain why Hamas became involved in the corrupt political system.

Hamas

Hamas was created around 1988, during the first Intifada, as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood. It was created to allow members of the Muslim Brotherhood to participate in the Intifada. Shaykh Ahmed

⁸⁹ Khalidi, 203

⁹⁰ Bill-Springborg, 238

Yassin, the founder, believed in the idea of defying Western powers and ideals and believed that Palestinian Muslims should actively fight for an Islamic state of Palestine. Hamas was also created, in part, as a reaction to the ineffectiveness of the PLO since the 1967 conflict with Israel. The PLO's position of all talk and no action against Israel, and the Israeli agenda to dominate Palestinians and their land, led to the formation of Hamas who wanted the opportunity to represent Palestinians interests. Hamas set out with an agenda separate from that of the PLO; they wanted to recognize the Palestinian refugees and their needs. Hamas was able to gain the support of refugees by focusing on social policies and the liberation of Palestine from Israel. A one state solution of a Palestinian state, which is embraced by Hamas, calls for the removal of all Zionist Jews. Arab Jews that lived in Palestine before the creation of Israel are able to remain. Hamas built itself on an Islamic fundamentalist program, which, on the issues of Palestine, is an Islamic version of the maximalist program that Arab nationalism and Palestinian nationalism used to uphold in the 1950s-that is, an Islamic Palestinian state on the whole of Palestine, from which nonindigenous Jews should leave.⁹¹ Hamas is organized into two sectors; military and political. The political component focuses on humanitarian needs and tends to be diplomatic. In a genuine spirit of caring for fellow Palestinians, Hamas

⁹¹ Chomsky, Noam and Gilbert Achcar. Perilous Power: The Middle East and U.S. Foreign Policy. Hamish Hamilton, 2007. Page 188

has helped to build schools, charity organizations, hospitals and religious institutions. The role of the military is much more problematic. Hamas has resorted to suicide bombing as a military strategy to get the attention of Israel and the rest of the International community. It is this strategy that has resulted in the United States title of Hamas as a “terrorist organization”. However, suicide bombing can be an effective military strategy as it can command wanted attention. Suicide attacks are designed to achieve specific political purposes: to coerce a target government to change policy, to mobilize additional recruits and financial support or both.⁹² This could become a potential problem as suicide bombing can become ineffective as it has the probability to deliver diminishing returns. The Western media tends to focus on the military side and less on the humanitarian efforts. The biased attention sheds a negative light on Hamas and helps to contribute to a skewed perception of the group. While Hamas has demanded and received recognition, it has yet to influence any serious policy change. An alternative would be to gain legitimate, political momentum which is what seems to be happening as is evident by the 2006 Palestinian elections. In 2006, Hamas received landslide victories in the Palestinian Authority over Fatah. A struggle for power has since ensued between Hamas and

⁹² Pape, Robert. *The Strategic Logic of Suicide Bombing*. -Mingst, Karen A. and Snyder, Jack L. 2008. Essential Readings in World Politics New York, W.W. Norton and Company, Inc. Page 399

Fatah. Hamas has refused to recognize Israel as a legitimate state and they do not practice nonviolence, as Fatah has done in the recent past. Hamas has used its own, newly acquired, legitimacy to pursue a new Palestinian agenda. They have offered Israel a ten year cease fire agreement for a return to the 1967 borders which would give the Palestinians back Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Hamas does not accept Israel's establishment of Jewish homes in previously occupied Palestinian homes. Under Hamas, the Palestinian position is as equally passionate about the removal of Zionist Jews as the Israelis are of establishing a completely Zionist state. This, of course, threatens Israel's very existence and is not very conducive to the creation of a timely resolution.

Hamas vs. Fatah: Competition for Control

The subsequent corruption of political groups such as Fatah and the PLO and the death of Yasser Arafat in the fall of 2004, have led Hamas to the center stage in Palestinian politics. The 2006 elections gave Hamas a voice in the PA, much to the disappointment of Fatah. Fatah had been the hegemonic political force in Palestinian politics for decades. After the political corruption and the death of Arafat, Fatah was practically paralyzed in the 2006 elections. The corrupt reputation Fatah maintained led to the demise of its legitimacy as the 3 million Palestinians that were in their control lost faith and instead turned

towards Hamas. Hamas and other smaller Islamist rival groups represent the initial ideals of Fatah. Fatah was given the opportunity to lead and protect the Palestinian interests and instead became wrapped up in power and control. They dominated the political arena and remained uncontested for years, until the political emergence of Hamas. Hamas realized that the only way they were going to be effective or legitimized was to “embrace” the PA and gain partial and eventually majority control. However, this division of Palestinian interests and fight for control is not beneficial for the overall goal of Palestinian autonomy and a Palestinian state. Struggles over the most fundamental issues of politics and state forms will continue until relatively stable new state organizations have been consolidated; thereafter political struggles continue about how to use state power in its broadly established form.⁹³ Even if Hamas has partial control of the PA, if political agendas are not carried out in a more conducive manner to the Palestinian goals, a Hamas led PA will be as ineffective as a Fatah led PA.

Hamas and Israel: Confrontation and Resistance

Although Hamas is presently being embraced by a majority of displaced Palestinians, Israel is doing everything it can to discredit the political group and have them replaced or eliminated. Israel wants to

⁹³ Skocpol, Theda. States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979. Page 165

push forward with their illegal Jewish settlements and Zionist agenda without any Palestinian or global interference. Hamas is making this almost impossible for Israel. Since the emergence of Hamas, as a radical Islamic group, Israel has been criticized about its illegal pursuit of the Palestinian occupied land particularly in the areas of Gaza and the West Bank. Hamas has been very upfront and honest about its solution to the Israeli Zionist agenda. According to Yassin, Hamas portrayed itself as the Muslim answer to Jewish Zionism. Palestinian Muslims were obliged to undertake a *jihad* against the Israeli occupiers, who had usurped Muslim land.⁹⁴ Yassin's view is remarkably similar to the Zionist ideology, which views the same land as a divine trust granted to the Jewish people for all time.⁹⁵ The entire conflict between Israel and the Palestinians is about who has the right to the land? Whether a two state solution is ever agreed upon, either returning to the 1949 Armistice Lines or to the 1967 borders, the question of who is entitled to the land is something that Muslims and Jews will disagree on for years to come. This is due in large part to the rivalry between the two groups. Relations between rivals have been argued to more conflictual than relations between other types of states, largely because of the distrust and

⁹⁴ Husain, 175

⁹⁵ Husain, 176

hostility that are said to characterize rivalry.⁹⁶ However, their disagreement should not prevent the right of two independent, sovereign nations to coexist close to one another.

The United States and the Palestinian Issue

In the establishment of a Palestinian state, the role of the United States and the Western world has been to support the state of Israel. There is an impression that the United States is so preoccupied with furthering its own interests that it is insensitive to the needs and aspirations of broad population segments in the Middle East. This lack of regard for popular opinion is potentially counterproductive to U.S. interests in that it promotes anti-American attitudes that can destabilize or even topple governments aligned with Washington.⁹⁷ The United States relationship with Israel is unsettling to surrounding Arab nations. The U.S. supports Israel by providing them with military weapons and technology, billions of dollars every year and continuous international influence and support. Every U.S. presidential administration continues to do this to obtain and maintain the Jewish vote and appease their Jewish constituents. If a candidate, who ran for any U.S. office, did not

⁹⁶ Hensel, Paul R. "Evolution in Domestic Politics and the Development of Rivalry: The Bolivia-Paraguay Case." Evolutionary Interpretations of World Politics. Ed. William R. Thompson. New York: Routledge, 2001. Page 176.

⁹⁷ Ismael, Tareq Y. International Relations of the Contemporary Middle East: A Study in World Politics. New York, Syracuse University Press, 1986. Page, 138.

publicly support the state of Israel they could have a difficult time being elected to office. It would be controversial for a candidate to support a two state solution that would return Israel and Palestine back to the 1967 borders. This is a reality because a majority of Americans are ignorant to the events going on in Israel. All they know is what the media tells them. Since the media tends to support Israel, most Americans support Israel. If more Americans were actually informed about the reality of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, chances are they would be less likely to blindly support Israel and then candidates that support a two state solution would actually have the opportunity to be elected to office.

The UN and the Palestinian Issue

The United Nations and the international community typically support Israel because the United States has the largest voice in the UN. The U.S. also holds the power of veto. Even if a majority of states belonging to the UN wanted to support a major Palestinian movement, they would be vetoed by the United States. However, the UN has done many things to support the Palestinians. When Israel was applying for admission into the UN in the late 1940s, the UN was very wary of accepting them. The UN even turned down Israel's initial application. Several months later, when Israel resubmitted their intent to join the UN, the UN Security Council granted their application, but the General

Assembly was, again, much wearier to accept. A major concern was that Israel would not meet Article 4 of the UN charter which mandates that all nations who join must be a peace-loving state. However, Israel was granted membership to the UN under addressed stipulations that the Palestinian question be resolved and be resolved quickly and fairly. Over the years, the UN has created several committees with an aim of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Some of the UN committees that have been formed are; Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, Palestine Commission, Palestine Conciliation Commission, Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, Special Committee on Palestine, Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practice Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, and many more. If the UN were able to exercise their right as a collective, global entity without the interference of other nations, they would probably be able to assist in resolving this conflict. With the help of the UN and a practice of nonviolence, Israel and the Palestinians could take the steps to resolve the current situation. The elected Palestinian political groups could then receive humanitarian and financial aid and properly rebuild their broken communities. However, the distrust Palestinians have for the Israeli government is to be expected, Israel has not followed through on a single commitment since its establishment in 1948. The international community needs to

recognize that and provide the proper support to both sides as long as each side is honoring their commitment.

Arab States and the Palestinian Issue

Middle Eastern involvement from other Arab states has played a large role in the political development of the Palestinians and their political relationship with Israel. After the creation of Israel, their role was much larger than it is today. After Israel was created, Arab states were doing whatever they could to preserve their culture. They did not want the influence of the Western world or to be controlled by it. To gain control over the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, Israel engaged in conflict with both Egypt and Transjordan and other Arab states such as Lebanon and Syria. However, although there might have been an initial rally by Arab nations on behalf of the Palestinians, there were other reasons for the Arab unity. While Egypt, Syria and Jordan have warred with Israel ostensibly in the name of the Palestinian plight, Palestinians recognize that Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian motives are not altruistic. National interests motivate the actions of the Arab states neighboring Israel. Their promotion of the Palestinian cause is often symbolic. It rarely takes the form of substantive economic or military assistance.⁹⁸ The Middle East, as a region, is politically fractured thus contributing to the

⁹⁸ Husain, 161-162

confusion and discourse of a legitimized Palestinian state. The weakness was shown most obviously in regard to what all Arab peoples regarded as their common problem: that of Israel and the fate of the Palestinians.⁹⁹ Overall, involvement by outside Arab states on behalf of the Palestinian people has had nothing but a negative affect on the Palestinian agenda. An overarching question is why can't the Middle East, as a region, wrestle Israel away from the Jews and help the Palestinians create an autonomous state? That these twenty-one states-which posses almost two-thirds of the world's proven oil reserves, now number 260 million people and have several million men under arms-have not been able to gain the upper hand diplomatically or militarily against Israel, to say nothing of regaining all of the West Bank and Gaza, attests to the fact that the Arab states have not really united behind the Palestinians. From the moment Jewish settlement began to pose a serious threat to Palestinians, Arab leaders sought to gain advantage for themselves and their states out of the confrontation between those two peoples.¹⁰⁰ Just as the Arab states have hesitated to dedicate themselves to the military objective of 'liberating Palestine,' so have they been unable to coordinate diplomatic strategies to that end.¹⁰¹ The political insecurities of the

⁹⁹ Hourani, Albert. A History of the Arab Peoples. New York: Harvard University Press, 1991. Page 427

¹⁰⁰ Bill-Springborg, 224

¹⁰¹ Bill-Springborg, 224-225

region create a “survival of the fittest” attitude for many Arab states. Most are trying to maintain their own sovereignty and autonomy. Some have suggested that for Arab regimes, the Palestinian cause is merely a pawn in inter-Arab rivalry.¹⁰² After the establishment of Israel, Egypt and Transjordan struggled to maintain control of Gaza and the West Bank. They were weak militarily and did not have access to the type of funds that Israel did and their governments were being thrown into turmoil as they were losing their legitimacy with the people. Also, with the United States backing Israel, many Arab states did not, at that time, want to engage in conflict with the United States. Arab states are aware that selfless national dedication to the Palestinian cause would lead immediately to a confrontation with Israel that no Arab state could win alone, even with the support of several others.¹⁰³ On the other hand, leaders of the Arab states hope a favorable resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict might emerge, but they are reluctant to take great risks to achieve that end.¹⁰⁴ A focus on Palestinian involvement and action with other Arab nations shows a detrimental effect to their political agenda. As a result of their position during the Gulf War, the PLO, Hamas, and other Palestinian organizations paid dearly for the so-called “principled

¹⁰² Bill-Springborg, 225

¹⁰³ Bill-Springborg, 225

¹⁰⁴ Bill-Springborg, 225

position” that the Palestinians took during the Gulf crisis.¹⁰⁵ Financial aid from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia ended and thousands of Palestinian workers and students were expelled from the Persian Gulf, forcing them to return to occupied territories where there was no money or jobs or homes. In addition, it contributed to the crowding and overpopulation of the area. The dysfunctional relationship that was created and continues between the Palestinian people and the surrounding Arab states contributes to Israel’s success in the area. Were the involved Arab states more stable and legitimized, both regionally and internationally, the Palestinian agenda of a sovereign Palestinian state would have been achieved by now.

Israel and the Current Palestinian Conflict

Israel plays a major role in the current conflict with the Palestinians. The policies and agendas that they implement contribute to the civil unrest between the Palestinians and Israelis. Israel’s main political agenda is to maintain their Jewish state. They are doing everything in their power to protect their sovereign, Zionist interests. They have made it abundantly clear that they are not going to allow anyone or anything to stand in the way of their Zionist state, even if that means expanding into new territory. However, not all Israelis support

¹⁰⁵ Husain, 178

the current Zionist agenda. There are Israelis that support a two state solution and want to see the establishment of a Palestinian state. Israel's internal political conflict is over the establishment of a Palestinian state. There are three major Israeli political parties that are all founded on a Zionist platform, but they differ from one another in their Zionist agendas. The three major parties are: center-left Labor, center-right Likud, and centrist Kadima.¹⁰⁶ The conservative party, Likud, supports the expansion of the Jewish settlements into the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Conservative Israelis support anything that expands the state of Israel and fulfills their Zionist obligation to God. Likud emphasizes the belief that peace can only come when groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah are dismantled. The party is now led by former (and current) Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.¹⁰⁷ The liberal party, Labor, is more sympathetic to the Palestinian people. In recent years, Labor has argued for increasing the minimum wage and emphasizing social democratic policies, while pushing for negotiations with Israel's Arab neighbors. The most famous Labor politician is Yitzhak Rabin, who signed the Oslo Accords and the Israel-Jordan Treaty, and won the Nobel Peace Prize with Yasser Arafat and Shimon Peres before being

¹⁰⁶ Kushner, Daniel. "Israeli Political Parties." Israeli Politics and Electoral System. <http://www.myjewishlearning.com/israel/Contemporary_Life/Politics/Electoral_System/Political_Parties.shtml> (17 Oct. 2009)

¹⁰⁷ Kushner

assassinated.¹⁰⁸ Kadima is the newest Israeli political party that was established in 2005 by former Likud party member, Ariel Sharon. Kadima's official platform combines traditional rightwing rhetoric--the Jewish people's right to the undivided Land of Israel--with pragmatic policies on peace and security: a negotiated settlement and the creation of a Palestinian state. Yet this leftist tendency is matched by a unilateralist and expansionist agenda more reminiscent of traditional Likud attitudes.¹⁰⁹ The undisputable division of the Israeli political community is testament to the internal friction due to the Palestinian question.

Nonetheless, Israel has had the oversight to create, establish and maintain a series of policies that both protect it from outside threats and simultaneously control the surrounding Palestinian community. The implementation of these policies has severely limited the Palestinians ability to do anything. Israel's position has been to control the Palestinians to help eliminate the threat they feel for their own independent state. One of the first policies that were implemented by the Israelis on the Palestinians was a system of martial law. The Defense Emergency Regulations provided a full set of regulations for martial law

¹⁰⁸ Kushner

¹⁰⁹ Plen, Matt. "Kadima's Big Bang."
<http://www.myjewishlearning.com/israel/Contemporary_Life/Politics/Electoral_System/Political_Parties/Kadima.shtml> (17 Oct. 2009)

rule, and the government imposed martial law.¹¹⁰ Israeli martial law included a curfew for all Palestinians, a travel permit for any Arab traveling out of their home village and military checkpoints to enforce the travel permits. It fined or imprisoned Arabs found without a pass, or with an expired pass, or on a route different from that prescribed in the pass.¹¹¹ The martial law over the Arabs is a colonial regime enforced by colonial law.¹¹² Another policy that Israel established was the Absentee's Property Law. This law, adopted in 1950, permitted confiscation of the land of a person deemed an 'absentee.' It defined 'absentee' to include any Palestinian who in 1948 left the land to go either to another state or to an area of Palestine held by Arab League Forces.¹¹³ This policy allowed the Israeli government to make large land claims and begin their Zionist expansion with the establishment of Jewish settlements. It also contributed to the refugee problem and encouraged a negative response from the Palestinian community. The situation only compounded in 1953 when the Land Acquisition Law passed and the Israeli government was given title to all of the absentee land. Economically, Israel also hit the Palestinians hard. The government sequestered as enemy property, the bank accounts of expelled Arabs, saying it would release them only if

¹¹⁰ Quigley, 106

¹¹¹ Quigley, 106

¹¹² Quigley, 107

¹¹³ Quigley, 107

the Arab states would make peace with Israel.¹¹⁴ The Arab families that had fled during the 1948 war, no longer had ownership of their homes and land, but also no access to their money. Once the Palestinian communities had been established in Gaza and the West Bank, Israel would pump money into cities, but only into the Jewish sectors. The Arab sectors, sometimes the most impoverished, received no financial aid or funding. Arab towns and villages struggle because it is Israeli policy to deny the foundations of a solid infrastructure, such as roads, sewage lines or communication systems. Education is another area where Israelis spend more money per student for Jewish students over Arab students.¹¹⁵ All of the Israeli policies that have hindered and slowed down the Palestinian people are the same policies that are fueling the violent state of affairs they find themselves engaged in now. The underlying fear for Israel is the safety of their state. It is what is preventing a solution to the Arab-Palestinian conflict. If Israel could unite politically with one agenda and they could recognize the civil rights of others, a solution could be reached with the Palestinians.

¹¹⁴ Quigley, 111

¹¹⁵ Quigley, 112

CHAPTER 4

STATE BUILDING: THE SEARCH FOR A PALESTINIAN STATE

For the Palestinians to be able to create a strong and independent state, time and attention needs to be focused on their infrastructure. What fundamental aspects of a state do the Palestinians already have and what aspects do they lack? An observation of road systems, communication systems, schools, sewage systems, natural resources and land are all necessary to measure the viability of a successful Palestinian state. It is also important to assess the Palestinians, as a people and culture and examine their role in the state building process. The Palestinian economy is also going to play a major role in the establishment of their state. An examination of the Palestinian economy, GDP, foreign aide and income distribution is mandatory for determining the possible success of an independent Palestinian state.

Demographics

According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, the 2008 data shows the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza was 3,825,512.¹¹⁶ The estimated population of the West Bank is 2.4 million; 1.2 million males and 1.2 million females. While the estimated population of Gaza Strip totaled 1.5 million; 755 thousand males and

¹¹⁶ Palestinian Investment Promotion Agency.
<http://www.pipa.gov.ps/country_profile.asp>

732 thousand females.¹¹⁷ Data revealed that the Palestinian Territory has a young population; the percentage of individuals aged (0-14) constitutes 41.9% of the total population in mid 2009, of which 40.0% reside in the West Bank and 44.9% in Gaza Strip. The elderly population aged (65 years and over) constitute 3.0% of the total population, 3.4% in the West Bank and 2.5% in Gaza Strip.¹¹⁸ The disparity between the young and old could play a crucial role in the establishment of a Palestinian state. The older generations of Palestinians have failed to create a Palestinian state. Their methods and actions were ineffective. If the younger generations of Palestinians can learn from those mistakes and embrace a new strategy in state building, they have more opportunity to create a successful independent state. For an independent state to become a reality, the younger generations of Palestinians are going to have to focus on literacy and their educations. The illiteracy rate among individuals aged 15 years or over in the Palestinian Territory was 5.9% in 2008. The illiteracy gap is significantly noticed among males and females, at 2.9% and 9.1% respectively. The results showed differences in the illiteracy rate between the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 6.1% and 5.6% respectively, while the illiteracy rate among males in West Bank is higher than in Gaza Strip (2.9% and 2.7%

¹¹⁷ Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics.

<http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_pcbs/PressRelease/population_dE.pdf> Page 1

¹¹⁸ PCBS, 1

respectively), while it is lower among females 15 years and over in Gaza Strip than in the West Bank (8.6% and 9.4% respectively).¹¹⁹ Education statistics show that the percentage of individuals (15 years and over) who have completed university education (Bachelor and above) was 8.8%. While the percentage of individuals who did not complete any stage of education, reached 12.5%. These results showed that there were differences between males and females in educational attainment, where the percentage of males who have completed university education (Bachelor and above) was 9.9% compared to 7.6% for females. As for those who did not complete any stage of education, the percentage among males was 9.4% compared to 15.7% for females.¹²⁰ The dedication of time and energy into a strong infrastructure for the Palestinians will create a strong educational system that will allow Palestinians to receive their education. The fact that there is no money available for or spent on Palestinian schools, explains the current educational statistics. The Palestinians that are educated work outside of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. In fact, most Palestinians who work, regardless of education, do not work in the West Bank or Gaza they work in Israel.¹²¹ The only way to gain employment to support their

¹¹⁹ PCBS, 3

¹²⁰ PCBS, 3

¹²¹ Diwan, Ishac, Radwan A. Shaban. Development Under Adversity: The Palestinian Economy in Transition. Washington D.C.: The International Bank for Reconstruction/The World Bank, 1999.

family is to work in the surrounding towns of Israel. In regard to Palestinian families, the fertility rate has dropped in the last forty years. According to UNICEF, in 1970 the fertility rate was 7.9 and when new statistics came out in 2007, the fertility rate had dropped to 5.2.¹²² With the establishment of strong education system, Palestinians will be able to utilize their education in their own towns and create new businesses that will in turn create new jobs. The overall demographics of the Palestinian people prove that they are not a small, irrelevant group of people whose interests should be cast aside. There are millions of Palestinians trying to survive and maintain their culture and families and sense of statehood.

Economic Indicators

Another critical component to the success of an independent Palestinian state is the Palestinian economy and its ability to provide for an independent state. The Palestinians have several profitable industries that could contribute to the overall economic welfare of their state. The Palestinians profitable industries include; stone, construction material, textiles and garments, handicrafts, metal and engineering, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, plastics, tourism and most importantly agriculture.¹²³

¹²² UNICEF < http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/oPt_statistics.html#61>.

¹²³ Palestinian Investment Promotion Agency. <<http://www.pipa.gov.ps/agriculture.asp>>

The agricultural sectors in the Palestinian territories are most known for their production of olives and olive oil. However, the economic sanctions that are imposed on the Palestinians by the Israelis prohibit the Palestinians from developing their economy to its true potential. There are very strong links between the Israeli and Palestinian agricultural markets. Israeli fruit, potato, and onion producers, packers and wholesalers have very efficient links to West Bank and Gaza wholesale markets. The West Bank and Gaza fruit and vegetable distribution is primarily through lower cost farmers' markets and through local retailers. The West Bank and Gaza supply the Israeli market with crops such as tomatoes, cucumbers, zucchini, eggplant, green peppers and guavas. Some high value added products such as strawberries and flowers are also supplied to the Israeli market for re-export.¹²⁴ The Palestinians overall income received in 2008 was US\$1.6 billion. There was a decline in the value of GDP for the rest of the West Bank and Gaza Strip during the third quarter of 2008 by 0.6% compared with the second quarter of the same year. Also the fourth quarter of 2008 attend to a decrease by 3.0% compared with the third quarter of the same year, while it rose from the corresponding quarter of 2007 by 2.3% at constant prices. The estimates indicate that the activities of agriculture and fisheries, transport and storage and communications, construction

¹²⁴ Palestinian Investment Promotion Agency.
<<http://www.pipa.gov.ps/agriculture.asp>>

activity, mining and quarrying, have seen a decline in the short-term economic indicators available during 2008 by 15.7%, 4.1%, 19.0%, 9.7% respectively, compared with 2007.¹²⁵ Palestinians do have the resources, labor force and knowledge to sustain a supportive economic system for an independent state. However, Israeli interference and economic sanctions are going to have to be eliminated for the Palestinians to be successful. Palestinian income distribution is another economic indicator of that was measured in 2006. The consequences of price rises in global markets were keenly felt in the life of the refugees, with an individual income of not more than \$2 a day. The year 2006 saw 35% of students from the refugee camps leave their university studies. The dropout rate for elementary-school students had also increased, which had led to new social problems such as child labor, theft, road accidents, and vandalism, as well as to new occupations, including the collection of scrap metal.¹²⁶ The lack of income distribution and earning potential among Palestinians forces them to rely on international foreign aid.

The Palestinian refugees grabbed the attention of the international community after the first Intifada. With the recognition of the Palestinian hardships, other states have provided monetary aid to the

¹²⁵ Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics
<http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_pcbs/PressRelease/forecast_e.pdf>

¹²⁶ UN
<<http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/5E55786A2DC49DDE8525743B0046780E>>

Palestinian community in hopes of preparing them for an independent state. On December 17, 2007, eighty-seven countries and international organizations met in Paris and pledged to provide \$7.4 billion over three years to the Palestinian Authority (PA), an amount far in excess of any previous level of U.S. or European aid to the Palestinians. The conference participants justified the aid as a means of providing "immediate support to the entire Palestinian population," and as a reward intended to strengthen those Palestinians who favor peaceful coexistence with Israel.¹²⁷ The Paris conference aid package continues fifteen years of international funding that has established the Palestinians as one of the world's leading per capita recipients of foreign support. Figures published by the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development for 2005 show that Palestinians received \$304 per person in foreign aid, second only to the war-torn Republic of Congo among entities with populations larger than one million.¹²⁸ The EU was the biggest aid donor to the Palestinian government until the Hamas militants came to power in March 2006. Since then, the EU has redirected its aid, worth 700m euros (US \$943m) in 2006, through a special mechanism to help the neediest people while bypassing the

¹²⁷ Stotsky, Steven. "Does Foreign Aid Fuel Palestinian Violence?" The Middle Easy Query. 2008. <<http://www.meforum.org/1926/does-foreign-aid-fuel-palestinian-violence>> (21 Oct. 2009)

¹²⁸ Stotsky, Steven. "Does Foreign Aid Fuel Palestinian Violence?" The Middle Easy Query. 2008. <<http://www.meforum.org/1926/does-foreign-aid-fuel-palestinian-violence>> (21 Oct. 2009)

government to avoid contact with Hamas.¹²⁹ In fiscal year 2005, the Bush Administration and Congress significantly increased U.S. economic aid to the Palestinians through supplemental appropriations and by reprogramming economic aid that had been appropriated in previous years. President Bush also used his authority to provide \$50 million in direct assistance to the Palestinian Authority, marking only the fourth time a U.S. president has used a congressionally authorized waiver to channel aid away from US AID programs and directly to the PA.¹³⁰ Since the signing of the Oslo Accord in 1993, the U.S. government has committed more than \$1.8 billion in economic assistance to the Palestinians. Approximately 80% of U.S. funding for the Palestinians has been channeled through USAID contractors and 20% through private voluntary organizations (PVOs). According to annual foreign operations legislation, congressionally approved funds for the West Bank and Gaza Strip cannot be used for the Palestinian Authority, unless the President submits a waiver to Congress citing that doing so is in the interest of national security.¹³¹ In 2006, Palestinians held a democratic election for seats in the Palestinian Authority. Hamas won the Gaza Strip and won several seats from the opposing party, Fatah. Due to the split in the PA

¹²⁹ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6551045.stm>

¹³⁰ Sharp, Jeremy M. "US Aid to the Palestinians." CRS Report for Congress. 2006, Feb 2. <http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/data/2006/upl-meta-crs-9973/RS22370_2006Feb02.pdf> (21 Oct. 2009) Page 1

¹³¹ Sharp, 2

by political groups Fatah and Hamas, international aid was dramatically reduced to the Palestinians. When Hamas took power the Bush Administration, along with its Quartet partners and Israel, responded by cutting off contact with and halting assistance to the PA. The Administration sought to isolate and remove Hamas while supporting moderates in Fatah, led by President Mahmud Abbas. The international sanctions have not driven Hamas from power, and instead, some assert they may have provided an opening for Iran to increase its influence among Palestinians by filling the void.¹³² Beginning in the early 1990s, Iran has supplied cash, arms, and training to Hamas, but most observers say the relationship has been an uneasy one.¹³³ Since the aid boycott was enacted by the United States and other states, Iran has increased its assistance to Hamas.¹³⁴ The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that in 2006 some \$70 million in cash was carried into the territories, most of it thought to be from Iran. After a visit to Iran in December 2006, Prime Minister Haniyeh said Iran had agreed to provide \$120 million in assistance in 2007 and up to \$250 million in total.¹³⁵ The

¹³² Morro, Paul. "International Reaction to the Palestinian Unity Government." CRS Report for Congress. 2007, May 9. <<http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA468092&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>> (21 Oct. 2009) Page 1

¹³³ Morro, 6

¹³⁴ Morro, 7

¹³⁵ Morro, 7

funds were earmarked to pay the wages of civil servants, bankroll Hamas security forces, and compensate Palestinian families that lost their homes during Israeli military operations.¹³⁶ Iran is a major supporter of Hamas because they have very similar views about Western influence and the corruption it can create for Arab states. Iran would like to see an independent Palestine, even if there are self-interested reasons behind it.

Current Economic Impacts of the Israeli Policies

Israel's control and interference with the Palestinian economy has created major difficulties for their overall economic performance. Ten percent of the Palestinian GDP is ordered to the Israeli treasury each year.¹³⁷ After the 1993 declaration of peace the Israeli and Palestinian economies became interconnected. While Israel benefited from the peace agreement, the Palestinian economy collapsed. The reality of the Palestinian refugee situation is that Palestinians are forced to find work in Israel. This is a mutually beneficial situation when the economy is flourishing and the Palestinians and Israelis are getting along. If either of those circumstances change, which they have, the Palestinians are the

¹³⁶ Wurmser, Meyrav. "The Iran-Hamas Alliance." Hudson Institute. 2007, Oct. 4. <https://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=5167> (21 Oct. 2009).

¹³⁷ Diwan-Radwan, 6

ones who are negatively affected. For example, after the first Intifada, Israel dramatically reduced the number of work permits that were issued and they became more hard lined in their work permit policies.¹³⁸ In addition, the working environments for Palestinians within Israel were not safe. Israel's control of the borders is also problematic at times. Israel has closed the borders, for days at a time, to prevent the Palestinian work force from their jobs.¹³⁹ When Israeli migration began to increase and there was a decline in the Israeli economy, Israel denied jobs to Palestinians to create more jobs for the new Jewish settlers. Israel restricts Palestinian manufacturing and agriculture and places additional restrictions on Palestinian exports to other countries. Israel bases its economic policy on their political concerns with the Palestinians.¹⁴⁰ This is a typical practice within most states. However, because the political situation with the Palestinians has been so volatile over the years, the Israeli economic policies have mirrored that volatility. Israeli economic policies are not at all beneficial for the Palestinians and their economic development. The economic integration of the two economies together was imposed by Israel to serve their better interests. Under this new system, the Israelis were able to control the welfare of the

¹³⁸ Diwan-Radwan, 45

¹³⁹ Diwan-Radwan, 51

¹⁴⁰ Arnon A. J. Weinblatt. "Sovereignty and Economic Development: The Case of Israel and Palestine." The Economic Journal. Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 2001.

Palestinian people.¹⁴¹ The increased dependency of the Palestinians on the Israelis led to lower exports and higher imports. It eliminated any competition between producers. Palestinian entrepreneurs had to apply for licenses from the Israeli authorities for many of the economic activities they sought to initiate. Israel's policy, at least since the 1990's, has been to slow down local economic development. This policy, and the measures taken to implement it, also contributed to transforming important parts of the Palestinian economy into a captive market for Israeli producers.¹⁴² Israel has done nothing to promote the local Palestinian economy; it has been discouraged to protect the Israeli markets. When Palestinians wanted to implement their own trade policy, Israel insisted on a more protectionist policy.¹⁴³ Palestinians have pushed for a free trade agreement which would necessitate the demarcation of borders between their economy and Israel's. The Israelis rejected the notion of any borders being drawn that would separate the two economies. The reasons for both of their positions were both economic and political. Palestinians were trying to establish as many sovereign qualities as they could and Israelis wanted to defer as many decisions as possible over the possibility of independent Palestinian

¹⁴¹ Arnon-Weinblatt, 2

¹⁴² Arnon-Weinblatt, 2

¹⁴³ Arnon-Weinblatt, 6

state.¹⁴⁴ It was agreed on by both sides to create a Palestinian Monetary Authority to help solve the problems of financial intermediation. The PMA was to have all the powers vested in a central bank through a banking system, but not the power to issue an independent Palestinian currency due to its symbolic expression of independence.¹⁴⁵ Israeli trade regulation, labor flow control and the lack of a Palestinian currency all have been put in place to limit Palestinian sovereignty. The economic interdependence of the Palestinian and Israeli economies should be mutually beneficial and that it clearly not the case. Political stability plays a major role in economic development and it is necessary for economic growth and economic stability.¹⁴⁶ It encourages outside investment. In fact, it could be the political and economic instability and lack of Palestinian sovereignty that is contributing to the violence between the Israelis and Palestinians.

Physical Infrastructure

The reality of a strong, effective Palestinian infrastructure is necessary for the legitimate development of a viable, independent Palestinian state. The components of a strong infrastructure are; roads, schools, sewage systems, communication systems, territorial integrity

¹⁴⁴ Arnon-Weinblatt, 5

¹⁴⁵ Arnon-Weinblatt, 6

¹⁴⁶ Arnon-Weinblatt, 16

and natural resources. The Palestinians will need to be able to establish and maintain these necessities if they hope to be able to provide for and support their people. For an independent state of Palestine to be viable, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank are going to need to be joined to provide the state with the territorial integrity that they deserve.

Palestinians have lost their land and jeopardized their geographical integrity as a result of the expansion of Jewish settlements by the Zionist agenda of the Israeli government. The establishment of these settlements has limited the Palestinians ability to create their own state. The West Bank barrier wall that has been constructed by the Israeli government is another way in which the geographic identity of the Palestinians is being violated. Although the Israeli government claims the wall is necessary to protect Israeli citizens from Palestinian violence, some feel it is an illegal attempt by the Israelis to annex land from the Palestinians. The wall violates international law and yet it still remains. Palestinians need to be given the right to unite their territories. If Israel returns to the 1967 borders, the two territories will unite. If the Palestinian land remains divided, the people will become more divided than they already are. Palestinians need to be allowed to create their infrastructure in peace, without the outside threat of the Israelis.

The problem with the Palestinian infrastructure, at this time, is that there is no Palestinian infrastructure. Any roads that run throughout the West Bank or Gaza are developed and maintained by

Israel. The WBGs road network is just over 2,000 km in length, with 750 km of main roads, 550 km of regional roads, and 850 km of local roads. Virtually all the major roads were constructed before 1967 and have received minimal or no maintenance. International transportation (ports and airports) are almost entirely under Israeli control. The exceptions are the bridges to Jordan and the Rafah crossing to Egypt.¹⁴⁷

The same applies to the electricity utilized by the Palestinians. It is owned and operated by the Israelis. Over 95 percent of households have electricity connections. Those not connected tend to be located in remote communities. However, connection does not necessarily imply an adequate or steady supply of electricity. Presently, the WBGs has access to about 300 Mw of power, almost entirely supplied by the Israel Electric Company (IEC). Certain village communities not connected to the grid use local generators.¹⁴⁸

The lack of natural resources, or the Palestinians lack of access to the natural resources in their territory, is another important element of their infrastructure that needs to be retrieved from the Israelis. Water quality has been steadily deteriorating. With depleting aquifers, seawater seepage in the Gaza Strip has rendered the water brackish. The entry of sewage, fertilizers, and other chemicals into the water system continually

¹⁴⁷ Diwan-Radwan, 181

¹⁴⁸ Diwan-Radwan, 181-182

damages the water quality. Water supply is substantially, and increasingly, dependent upon the Israeli company, Mekoroth, though not quite to the same extent as electricity. Israel restricts the digging of new wells by Palestinians. New sources within the WBGS can be tapped by Mekoroth, which then supplies distributors in the Palestinian areas.¹⁴⁹ Amnesty International has done a recent investigation into the Palestinian water supply and has found Israeli water restrictions discriminate against Palestinians in the occupied West Bank. It says that in Gaza, Israel's blockade has pushed the already ailing water and sewage system to "crisis point". Amnesty says that on average Palestinian daily water consumption reaches 70 liters a day, compared with 300 liters for the Israelis. It says that some Palestinians barely get 20 liters a day, the minimum recommended even in humanitarian emergencies.¹⁵⁰ Water is the most important natural resource, not only for personal survival, but to maintain the Palestinians major economic market; their agriculture market. For the Palestinian agriculture market to succeed, Palestinians need to have access to as many natural resources as possible.

The Palestinian communication systems will also need to be assessed and developed. Restricted access to telecommunications

¹⁴⁹ Diwan-Radwan, 182

¹⁵⁰ "Palestinians Denied Water". BBCNews.com. 27, Oct. 2009. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8327188.stm> 28 Oct. 2009.

presents a major limitation for growth. With 78,000 phones, there are just over three phones for every 100 persons. Due to the extreme shortage of conventional phones, 25,000 mobile phones are in use (about one mobile phone for 100 persons). Prior to the peace process, telecommunication services were supplied by the Israeli company, Bezeq, and the ICA controlled the local access to service. Since 1993, the local loop is controlled by the PA's Ministry of Communications. However, most long-distance services, even within the Palestinian areas, and all international services, continue to be provided by Bezeq. The lack of phones is already proving a constraint to investment. In Ramallah, obtaining a phone connection is a major undertaking and has deterred investors. If the vision of an information society is to be seriously pursued, and if trade in services is to take off, basic phone service needs a major boost.¹⁵¹

The sewage and sanitation systems are also in serious need of a complete overhaul. The most serious immediate problem is the state of sanitation services. The share of households connected to sewage networks is small by any standard, at 25 percent. Collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage are growing problems. The networks, where they exist, are under great strain and are liable to burst frequently, risking

¹⁵¹ Diwan-Radwan, 182

people's health and causing severe disruption to the movement of goods and people as roads are flooded.¹⁵²

Political Institutions

The Palestinian political infrastructure needs to be modified and reorganized. The corruption that has been so prevalent within Fatah and the PA needs to be addressed and eliminated. The Palestinians have the ability and education to create and sustain a strong infrastructure that can contribute to the success of an independent Palestinian state. The best situation for the state may be a regular flow of elite university graduates, including many with sophisticated technical training, into official careers that are of such high status as to keep the most ambitious and successful from moving on to non-state positions.¹⁵³ A unified, legitimized Palestinian political system is possible if the political parties are willing to make compromises for the establishment of a Palestinian state. The political system needs to represent all of the Palestinians because Palestinians can no longer allow themselves to be segregated into Gaza and West Bank Palestinians. The Palestinian Authority needs to be held accountable for their actions. The PA was created to be the foundation of a Palestinian political system that the

¹⁵² Diwan-Radwan, 182-183

¹⁵³ Skocpol, 16

world wanted to deal with. It is time the Palestinians took ownership of their role in the establishment of their state and work towards creating a political system that can actually govern the Palestinians as a state. Obviously, sheer sovereign integrity and the stable administrative-military control of a given territory are preconditions for any state's ability to implement policies. Beyond this, loyal and skilled officials and plentiful financial resources are basic to state effectiveness in attaining all sorts of goals.¹⁵⁴ For the Palestinians to create a new, uncorrupt Palestinian Authority the issue of the number of people who are actually educated and qualified to fill those types of positions must be addressed. The number of Palestinians that are qualified for bureaucratic positions and the responsibility associated with it is extremely limited. The Palestinians that are educated and prepared for those positions are already in those positions, thus further exacerbating the situation. The meritocracy within the political positions creates a detrimental cycle for the future of Palestinian institutions. With the creation of a solid infrastructure and the development and progress of Palestinian education, the Palestinians will be able to fill and supplement bureaucratic positions and avoid an extended tradition of corruption. When a Palestinian institution is established that is accepted by the majority, Palestinians that have found work elsewhere will have a reason

¹⁵⁴ Skocpol, 16

to return and invest in their state. Qualified, educated Palestinians will not have to look outside for careers and Arab migration will have the opportunity to increase.

Palestinians need a political system that can handle and account for the millions of dollars they receive in foreign aid every year. The PA needs to be controlled by political leaders that are going to utilize and invest the money into a solid infrastructure for the Palestinians to build off of. The appearance of corruption and self interest must be avoided. Strategies in institution building suggest a successful framework that can include the introduction of elements of accountability into organizations, the de-layering or simplification of operations to reduce errors and opportunities to conceal corruption, as well as more fundamental reforms seeking to change the attitudes and beliefs of those who work in an institution. In some cases, institutions may be completely eliminated or restructured for a fresh start, or completely new institutions may be created.¹⁵⁵ The establishment of a new, unified PA will provide the foundation for a solid infrastructure to support a new Palestinian state. The PA will be able to organize and establish all the other components of a successful infrastructure, leading to the healthy development of a strong Palestinian state. As an institution, the PA has

¹⁵⁵ Viegas, Luciana. "A Broad Concept of Institution Building."
<http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/corruption/toolkit/AC_Toolkit_chap3.pdf >2009.
12 Nov. 2009.

the potential to be rebuilt and reorganized. The Palestinians do not have to create a brand new institution, they need to remake the PA into the institution it was meant to be, free of corruption. The target group at which institution-building reforms are directed must also be widened to include all parts of society interested in creating and maintaining national integrity.¹⁵⁶ To create an independent state of Palestine from the inside out, the Palestinians will need to evaluate and adjust all of the political institutions and their role within the political infrastructure.

¹⁵⁶ Viegas, Luciana. "A Broad Concept of Institution Building."
<http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/corruption/toolkit/AC_Toolkit_chap3.pdf >2009.
12 Nov. 2009.

CONCLUSION

Looking forward, what are the possible conflict resolutions, currently being discussed, that can bring an end to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict? A popular opinion is a two state solution which would re-establish the 1967 borders and give the Palestinians complete, autonomous control of the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Some unrealistic, alternate solutions that have been suggested are to create single states, one entirely Israeli, the other entirely Palestinian. The solution of a single Israeli state is proposed and supported by the Zionist movement. The single state solutions have no chance of being followed through to fruition. The most beneficial, all-encompassing solution would be the suggested two-state solution where the independent states of Israel and Palestine co-exist next to one another. However, for the two state solution to be successful, several things would need to transpire. One would be that the state of Palestine would need to be granted the territory of the 1967 borders, which will unite the Gaza Strip and West Bank to allow for territorial integrity. A unified territory is necessary in the establishment of a sovereign state. Another situation that needs to be addressed is the continuous development and expansion of Jewish settlements in Palestinian areas. Israel will have to grant the Palestinians an autonomous state which will eliminate the Zionist agenda of expanding Jewish settlements into Palestinian areas. Another suggested solution is that of Restoration.

This would mean that Israel would be required to allow Arabs to return to their original areas and homes and not only the refugees, but the Arabs that fled Palestine in 1948. Palestinians need to be granted the security to build a solid foundation for a new state.

Whether one of the above mentioned solutions or a new solution is suggested, it is time to put an end to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The Western attitude that all Arabs and Middle Easterners have been fighting since the beginning of time and will always continue to fight is a perspective the world can no longer accept. It is time to re-evaluate and challenge the entire situation and begin holding Israel responsible for their actions. If that also includes holding the United States responsible, then that time has come. Over the years both sides have created their own interpretations of the events that have made up this conflict during the course of the twentieth century. Each has sought to convince the rest of the world that its version is the correct one. Israel has enjoyed greater success in this effort for a variety of reasons. History is written by the victors. In this case the victors, largely of European descent, have the skills, contacts, and receptive audiences in the West that ensured the predominance of their arguments.¹⁵⁷ By removing the United States, as a major player, from the equation perhaps surrounding Arab states could make a united stand to protect the Palestinian interest. Their united

¹⁵⁷ Bill-Springborg, 227

front could benefit the current regimes in power by legitimizing their position and demonstrating a level of power. Muslims all over the world are understandably exacerbated with their leaders for having failed to defeat the Israelis, either militarily or diplomatically, in over five decades.¹⁵⁸ Concurrently, if Hamas were legitimized by their surrounding region as the elected representatives of the Palestinian people, that in turn could lead to their legitimacy in the international community which could influence support for the viability of an established Palestinian state. Hamas has made several attempts to propel themselves forward ideologically. There has been an evolution in the attitude of Hamas with regard to participation in the political process. They moved from an extremist position rejecting participation in any political process, like elections, under the occupation to a much cleverer one-as it proves now in light of the success they are achieving-of getting involved in the political process.¹⁵⁹ Just because Hamas is not embraced by the United States simply because they are a threat to the Israeli agenda, does not mean that the rest of the world needs to adopt the same attitude. In fact, if the U.S. were to create a more even-handed policy in regards to the West Bank and Gaza, it could actually contribute to the establishment of a Palestinian state.

¹⁵⁸ Husain, 164

¹⁵⁹ Chomsky-Achcar, 188-189

The Palestinians are ready for their own independent, sovereign state. The principle of respect for the sovereignty of nations is and must remain the cornerstone of international law.¹⁶⁰ Palestinians have the potential to be very successful with an autonomous state. For example, the Palestinian people are well educated and value higher education. They have both financial and social capital. Their social capital includes a well organized civil society, NGOs, Universities and hospitals that provide public services. Palestinians have a rich culture and before the 1967 War, Palestinians made a lot of their overall profits from tourism. Once the Arab-Israeli conflict comes to an end, people will feel more confident to travel back into Palestinian areas and revive their culture and traditions. Palestinians are debt free because they have a good tax system and they receive a lot of international aid. Combine with the financial aid they also have a lot of international sympathy and support. This support can lead to direct foreign investment which will help boost the Palestinian economy.

A solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state does not mean that there will never be another conflict between the two groups again. The rest of the world can only hope that non-violent agreements can be suggested and

¹⁶⁰ Amin, Samir. "Globalism or Apartheid on a Global Scale?" The Modern World-System in the Longue Duree. Ed. Immanuel Wallerstine. Colorado: Paradigm Publishers, 2004. Page 21.

accomplished. The struggle for peace is certainly not a struggle 'to abolish power' just as little as it is an attempt 'to get rid of conflicts'. It is an effort to steer the exercise of power in non-violent directions and to steer conflicts towards non-violent and creative forms of conflict resolution.¹⁶¹ A mutual respect for sovereign states is necessary for the Palestinians and Israelis to coexist in an ancient territory. Their further development within a peaceful conflict resolution will ensure the survival of that respect.

¹⁶¹ Galtung, Johan. "Twenty-Five Years of Peace Research: Ten Challenges and Some Responses." *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Jun., 1985), 141-158.

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