Germany's pivotal role in the construction of a common European house

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Germany's pivotal role in the construction of a common European house

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Germany's Pivotal Role in the Construction of a Common European House

by
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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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Abstract

In the wake of the bipolar order, a political and strategic reconfiguration of Europe is necessary that reflects the current international atmosphere. Germany’s reunification has prompted a reappraisal of that country’s economic, political, and security role in Europe. Germany is a central element to any new European order due to its geography, economic and political clout, and its unique historical position between East and West.

In light of recent changes, the relevance of neofunctional integration theory has been revived. The intergovernmental conferences at Maastricht on economic and political union demonstrate that functional and political “spill-over” are complemented by cultivated “spill-over”—the use of diplomacy to upgrade the common interest of integrating members. This refinement lends neofunctionalism a new relevancy in light of Europe’s emerging order.

Germany has demonstrated a dramatic break with its militaristic past and demonstrated its commitment to the institutions of the West. The German polity has undergone a fundamental change and the country has become a stable liberal democracy. Its commitment to restructuring European economic, political, and security institutions to incorporate all European nations should mitigate the fears of Germany’s neighbors of a return to its hegemonic, militaristic past.
## Contents

**Introduction**  
Europe's Political Landscape  
1

**Chapter 1**  
A Theoretical Framework  
Integration, Interdependence, and Intergovernmentalism:  
A Conceptual Understanding  
Functional and Neofunctional Approaches to European Integration  
Functional, Political, and Cultivated Spill-over  
The Context of German Reunification  
10

**Chapter 2**  
Identity, Culture, and Foreign Policy in Germany  
Identity and Political Culture in Pre-War Germany  
Nationalism Discredited  
Foreign Policy in the FRG: Shifting Traditions, International Acceptance, and the Drive for Unification  
Adenauer and a Supranational, Western Orientation  
Detente and Ostpolitik  
The FRG Ascendent  
The FRG as Equal Partner  
32

**Chapter 3**  
Germany and the EC: Solving the German Question in a European Context  
A Change in Foreign Policy Orientation  
German Reunification and the EC  
Maastricht: A Move Toward Monetary Union and Political Cooperation  
61

**Chapter 4**  
Germany and European Security  
The Two-plus-Four Talks  
Maintaining the Atlantic Link  
The CSCE  
The WEU  
83
Conclusion 106
Glossary 109
Bibliography 111
Introduction

On the threshold of the 21st century, the nations of Europe face an array of challenges. Some are familiar to European history; the violent outbreak of ethnic tensions in the Balkans and the suspicions surrounding the unification of Germany are visitations to Europe's historical animosities and rivalries. Other phenomena, however, are new to the post-war European experience: the level of economic potential and political aspiration of the new Germany are two of several new circumstances which provide prospects for a more prosperous and peaceful Europe.

The demise of the Soviet Union and the subsequent disapproval of her influence in Eastern Europe thrust Germany into an unfamiliar and uncomfortable position at the head of the European integration movement. Overnight, Germany changed from a subordinate, partitioned member of the Atlantic alliance to a politically unified and economically dominant Central European power. As a result, Germany finds itself adjusting to its new, more assertive role in Europe. It must focus its efforts in three particular areas. First, Germany must consolidate internal reunification processes and launch the reconstruction of Eastern Germany's economy. Second, it must assuage the fears of its neighbors of a return to a hegemonic and militaristic Germany by remaining committed to the European Community (EC) and its institutions. Finally, due to its size and economic power, Germany must take a lead in aiding the construction
of a new European security order which accurately reflects the current international environment.

The role of Germany today is unique in Europe. In addition to its geographic location, it is also the only country which is directly involved in both the Western European process of integration—through its participation in the EC—and the Eastern process of economic and political reform—through its experience in the reconstruction of Eastern Germany. Thus, a Germany which has been the focal point of European conflict for most of the 20th century is in an unprecedented position to promote cooperation between East and West.

Under the bipolar geopolitical structure, both East and West Germany were objects of superpower policy. Reunified Germany, however, must adopt a foreign policy that reflects its stature as Europe's dominant regional power. It will assume such a role by continuing to strengthen and work within the framework of the EC, the organization that has been Germany's ticket to international respectability and presently assuages European fears of German revanchism.

Europe's Political Landscape

The current European political landscape is muddled. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the liberalization of Eastern Europe have created a power vacuum in Central Europe which can only be filled by a reunified Germany. This is so for two reasons. First is the ascendency in the global arena of economic issues over
security issues. The countries of the European Community and Germany in particular are now less concerned about an invasion by Warsaw Pact forces and more concerned about an invasion of economic refugees from the East. Consequently, economic support flowing from the West to the East is essential. Despite the economic burdens of unification, Germany has the greatest capacity to provide technical and economic support. The second reason is that unification enables Germany to fulfill its primary foreign policy dilemma and thus exercise greater control over its foreign policy decisions. Freed from the yoke of subordinate partnership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and possessing Europe's strongest economy, Germany must assert itself both politically and economically. As one commentator has said, "...united Germany cannot behave like a big Switzerland, wealthy and neutral. As a normal state of its size and wealth it must make its voice heard and its presence felt." 

The rapid and unexpected consummation of German unification has created anxiety throughout Europe. Fears of a united Germany are manifold: that Germany will return to its militaristic and revanchist past; that decades of careful integration in the West will be lost as Germany's interests drift eastward; that Germany will eschew its role in the Atlantic Alliance for neutrality; and that the economic might of Europe's largest population will dominate the continent. The extent of this concern is evident in the West as allies and Community members simultaneously espouse support for

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unification while keeping a watchful eye on German actions in the East. Newly liberalizing Eastern European countries clamor for German financial aid and technical assistance with uneasy recollections of Nazi occupation.

While it is clear that the new Federal Republic of Germany is a different country politically, socially, and culturally than the Third Reich, some concerns about Germany's prospective new role are justified. The demise of the bipolar order—felt most dramatically in Europe—has solved one German Question and replaced it with a series of others. Many of the institutions and organizations with which Germany is associated were predicated on confronting the "East-West" struggle and ensuring the development of a peaceful, cooperative German state. For the NATO, the EC, and the "Helsinki process," German reunification has prompted a difficult reappraisal of their role in post-Cold War Europe.

This thesis seeks to demonstrate that a reunited Germany will not be a threat to the progress toward European integration in the past 40 years. To be sure, Germany will no longer be content to occupy a subordinate and passive role in the international community. This will mean a Germany that asserts itself diplomatically and economically as never before in the post-war era. However, such assertiveness should not be construed as a return to Germany's bellicose past. It will rather be a simple function of the country's historical dynamism and of its remarkable success in reconstituting German statehood from the ashes of World War II.
The level of integration attained in Western Europe since the Treaty of Rome in 1957 is unprecedented. While this integration may fall short of fulfilling the federal dream of many ardent European federalists, it is also far more successful than its most outspoken critics imagined. For Germans in particular, the opportunities presented through membership in the EC have demonstrated the promise of regional integration: it has been Germany's ticket to international respectability and influence.

The breakdown of the bipolar order was a necessary but not a sufficient condition for German reunification. While the post-war order collapsed around them, Europeans were terrified at the prospect of German reunification. As events rapidly outpaced appeals for a cautious approach to reunification, Europeans grudgingly acknowledged the German right to self-determination. The critical support of the United States gave the Germans a powerful ally and demonstrated that Germany had attained equality within the alliance as a partner in leadership.

After years of subordinate status within the Western alliance, the Germans will experience some growing pains as they assume a political and military orientation commensurate with their economic power. As has been the case with the United States, Germany will sometimes falter in its leadership role. These instances should not be interpreted as attempts by Germany to break away from the West and a return to its militaristic past. Rather, as this thesis seeks to demonstrate, reunited Germany will pursue its new international role in much the same fashion as West Germany carved out a new
international image for itself: through pragmatic, sensitive diplomacy and a acute awareness of its historical legacy.

In reunited Germany, with a population of 78 million, there are dramatic social and economic divisions between East and West. It is natural that, at times, German policy makers will be preoccupied with internal concerns wrought by unification. Again, this should not be construed as a German attempt to withdraw from its responsibilities in Europe and in the world. The historical consequences of domestic political unrest in Germany for the rest of Europe have been tragic; that German policy makers feel the need to pay particular attention to problems at home should be comforting to Europeans.

This thesis is divided into four chapters, each of which examines issues which demonstrate the fundamental changes in Germany since the end of World War II, and particularly in the wake of the bipolar order. These changes have resulted in an atmosphere in which European integration proceeds through a combination of two factors: diplomatic cultivation of the idea of European Union in the form of intergovernmental conferences, and the functional and political cooperation of trans-national groups and organizations which recognize the need for closer cooperation among member states in today's interdependent global economy.

The first chapter seeks to provide a framework with which to analyze Germany's role in the emerging Europe. That chapter: 1) begins with the clarification of key conceptual elements of integration; 2) assesses the contributions of functionalism and neofunctionalism to the study of European integration; 3) examines
the "new dynamism" of the EC which has witnessed a re-emergence of neofunctionalism as a viable approach to the study of integration; and finally, 4) assesses the current climate of European integration in light of recent significant developments in the internal and external environments of the EC. By establishing a framework that encompasses both traditional tenets of functionalism and the new realities of negotiations among Europeans for closer political and economic union, we can better understand that process as it evolves into more flexible and adaptable plans for European union.

The second chapter seeks to demonstrate the decisive break with traditional German foreign policy by Konrad Adenauer in the late 1940's. Historically, German foreign policy since Bismarck was marked by aggressiveness and an inferiority complex which derived from Germany's uncertain status among the continent's powers. Was it a continental power whose primary interests were in Eastern Europe? Or was it an aspiring colonial power, waiting in the wings to challenge Britain and France for their overseas empires?

The answers to these questions can perhaps be found in the establishment of the West German state in the aftermath of the Second World War. In the early years of West German statehood, Adenauer's firm commitment to the Western alliance and the United States enabled the Germans to establish a new political identity as democratic, free-market oriented members of the West. Although this has not solved the "German Question" entirely it has mitigated somewhat the traditional confusion among Germans as to what their national identity was.
The third chapter examines the centrality of Germany to European integration. It charts the supportive West German role in the EC and demonstrates that reunified Germany will continue to support integration. Through their support of European political cooperation and European monetary union, the Germans have demonstrated that they have a vested interest in further European integration. Protests that German recognition of Croatia and Slovenia demonstrated that Germans were breaking out of the constraints of the EC were unfounded. Taking the diplomatic initiative, Germany was actually carefully stepping into its new shoes as a powerful regional leader.

In an elaboration of the theme of European political cooperation, chapter four examines the implications of German reunification on European security. While traditionally effective Cold War institutions such as NATO attempt to adapt to the new international environment by altering their missions, there is a genuine need for a new pan-European security system which accurately reflects the changes in Europe. While NATO may still have some utility, two particular opportunities present themselves to Europeans for new security arrangements. First, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) has a pan-European membership and widespread support among that membership for an increased, institutionalized role. However, until this institutionalization occurs, the CSCE is likely to remain merely a consultative body.

The Western European Union (WEU) also holds promise as an effective all-European force which can augment the defensive role of
NATO by providing a peacekeeping force that can operate outside of NATO jurisdiction. Such a force would lend credibility to European efforts a speaking with a common voice in the areas of defense and security policy for Europe.

And finally, there is a brief conclusion which summarizes the findings of this thesis and contains remarks by the author on the future German role in Europe.

It is hoped that this study can serve a twofold purpose. The first is to demonstrate that reunited Germany is a fundamentally more European country than those German states of the early 20th century; as such, it will be an ardent supporter of European integration and closer cooperation between both Eastern and Western European states. The second purpose is to attempt to shed some light on the importance of regional integration. The European experiment has been by far the most successful of its kind; if we can apply knowledge gained to other unstable areas of the world, it may allow us to better understand the character of an emerging world order in the wake of bipolarity.

A glossary has been provided at the end to help the reader sort through the myriad of acronyms and names present in any discussion of European integration.
Chapter 1: A Theoretical Framework

As in other social science endeavors, the study of Europe's integration efforts entails an understanding of key conceptual elements. The following section will discuss these conceptual definitions and attempt to eliminate ambiguity where concepts tend to overlap and converge.

Such conceptual ambiguity is evident in the very notion of what constitutes "Europe." "Europe" can mean many different things. Do we adopt a geographical-historical or a linguistic-cultural definition of Europe? The problem is not confined to academia. Mikhail Gorbachev envisioned a Europe that stretches from "the Atlantic to the Urals." During her tenure as British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher repeatedly espoused a vision of Europe as a vast free trade area of Western European countries. U.S. Secretary of State James Baker has consistently reiterated that any conception of Europe which does not include the U.S. and NATO is unacceptable. And to Jacques Delors, the EC Commission President, Europe means the institutions of the EC, developing inexorably toward a federal organization of nation-states.

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Integration has traditionally been treated as either a condition or a process. Functionalist and neofunctionalist writers such as David Mitrany and Ernst Haas focus on the processes by which political communities become integrated. To Haas, the process of integration was characterized by the transferring of political allegiances from one center to another. Integration was characterized by a process in which "political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the preexisting nation-states."³

Leon Lindberg also defines integration as a process in which actors shift their loyalties and expectations. In addition, he notes that "nations forgo the desire and ability to conduct foreign and key domestic policies independently of each other, seeking instead to make joint decisions or to delegate the decision-making process to new central organs."⁴ Such central organs are developed both to represent common interests of the political actors and to arbitrate conflicts of interest between them.

Other writers attempt to examine processes that lead to the condition of integration. Karl Deutsch defines integration as "the attainment, within a territory, of a 'sense of community' and of

institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure...dependable expectations of 'peaceful change' among its population."5 Amitai Etzioni sees integration as a condition which results from the unification process. The level and scope of integration is determined by the forces of unification such as control over the use of the means of violence, a recognized effective center of decision-making that can effectively oversee resource distribution, and a center which is the "dominant focus of political identification for the large majority of politically aware citizens."6

**Functional and Neofunctional Approaches to the Study of Integration:**  
**A Framework for the Analysis of European Integration**

In the wake of the Second World War, the political and economic climate of Europe was in flux. The debilitating brush with fascism had cast a dark cloud over the nation-state system and nationalist tendencies. With a decimated population and crippled economic infrastructure, Europe was presented with a historically unique opportunity to begin anew. Amid the disillusionment with the nation-state system, European leaders recognized the opportunity at hand to fundamentally reorder the relations of European countries. Entering the void created by the demise of

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nationalism were leaders committed to a functional approach to integration.

Functionalism as an approach to political integration was first articulated by David Mitrany in the 1930s. While there is great diversity in functionalist literature, there are certain basic tenets which distinguish it from traditional approaches to international relations. Traditional approaches to international relations were hampered by a rigid overemphasis on the nation-state system as a political unit capable of fulfilling social, economic, and technical needs of its citizens. According to the traditional approach to international politics, non-state actors such as functional organizations lack the ability to guarantee the most important need of citizens: territorial integrity, or protection from other states. Thus, power centered in the state is the true determinant of a state's ability to provide for its citizens.

The primary distinction between the traditional and functional approaches is found in functionalism's questioning of the invincibility of the nation-state system. Functionalism recognizes a more complex world consisting of numerous actors which are not derived from nation-states themselves. These actors are international or transnational organizations which are created to fulfill needs without regard to national boundaries, yet nevertheless operate within a nation-state global system. The institutions of the EC, for example, create a supranational form of functional organization which provide

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specific technical or economic functions that the nation-state system, with its emphasis on power vested in the state, neglects.

Thus, functionalist doctrine constitutes a frontal assault on traditional, nation-state-based power politics in two primary areas. First, it suggests that the nation-state is not able to fulfill all of its citizen’s needs. Second, functionalism criticizes the nation-state for its preoccupation with issues of territorial integrity and military security; the dominance of these issues at the national level comes at the expense of public welfare and the satisfaction of other needs of citizens. Functionalist doctrine further suggests that the nation-state is inadequate to keep pace with changing global economic, technological, and social forces. Instead, it promotes a proliferating regime of cooperation in non-controversial areas—traditionally the domain of "low politics"—by taking "small, incremental steps in areas where national sovereignty was not seriously threatened." 8 Ultimately, functional organization of global relations would go a long way toward not only providing for public welfare, but in developing a "working peace system" in which the bellicose tendencies of nation-states are mitigated by the extent of their integration and integration with other political units.

Functional structures are determined by the needs they are designed to satisfy. Mitrany has noted that, "functional dimensions...determine themselves. In a like manner the function determines its appropriate organs. It also reveals through practice

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the nature of the action required under the given conditions, and in that way the powers needed by the respective authority."

Central to functional theory is the doctrine of "ramification." Ramification suggests that increased cooperation in economic, technical, and developmental sectors will lead to a corollary increase in political cooperation. As ramification accelerates into other sectors, what will ideally emerge "is a complex interwoven network of cross-national organizations performing all the traditional... functions of the nation-state while at the same time rendering war impossible."

There are a number of shortcomings with functionalist doctrine that render it a rather deterministic approach. Functionalists, in their attempts to demonstrate the necessity of changing political structures to keep pace with economic and technical changes, seem to waver between a belief in an unstoppable "technical self-determination" and the need to change attitudes and attain a new political will. The functionalist's assumption of a global network of functional organizations seems to bury the nation state prematurely. As long as welfare is perceived as a national problem, it could be treated as such.

An additional suspect assumption of functionalist thinking is that in an era of increasing interdependence, governments make rational choices to delegate authority to newly arisen functional structures. If national leaders perceive that they are merely

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10 Ibid., p. 69.
delegating authority and not surrendering sovereignty, the functional organization is likely to be successful; but here functionalists are guilty of bestowing the nation-state with contradictory qualities. They seem to suggest that the normally bellicose and self-aggrandizing nation-state will acknowledge the benefits of a functional organization—and thereby *rationalize* its existence.\textsuperscript{11}

Thus, functionalist assumptions about the integration process suffer from questionable assumptions regarding the nature of the world system and the role of the nation-state in it. Among other mistaken assumptions about functionalism: 1) that jealousies of sovereignty are to be found only in territorial units, and not in functional ones, and that therefore the coordination of proliferating and overlapping agencies will not be as difficult as the conciliation of states; 2) that men are able to recognize, design, and agree upon the appropriate structures for each functional need, so that form follows as closely as possible the exigencies of the functionalist doctrine, placing unreasonable demands on human reason; and 3) the optimistic assumption that organizations designed for a specific need or problem will disappear as the need is met. This ignores the tendency for bureaucratic longevity and parochialism.\textsuperscript{12}

Neofunctionalism, as the intellectual successor of functionalism, recognized the extent to which cooperation in technical and ostensibly non-controversial fields gradually "spills" over into non-technical or political areas. Functionalism naively neglected the phenomenon of power; neofunctionalists, such as Ernst Haas, noted

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., p. 82-83.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., p. 71.
that integration was most likely to occur not to satisfy needs as the functionalists believed, but when parties with vested interests in the integrative act perceived gains from its successful conclusion. "Elites having expectations of gain from activity within a supranational organizational framework are likely to seek out like-minded elites across national frontiers."13

Thus, where functionalists saw integrative activity arising from mutual needs, neofunctionalists cited elite expectation of gain as the driving force behind integration. Functionalists saw the end of functional organization as the fulfillment of welfare needs and the eventual institutionalization of a world peace that could not be broken because it would not be feasible or desirable to threaten the interdependent relations. Neofunctionalism, on the other hand, seeks as an end functional federalism--the establishment of supranational bodies of authority which enjoy the same authoritative allocation power of nation-states.

Yet another critical distinction between the two approaches is found in Mitrany's doctrine of ramification and Haas' concept of spill-over. Where ramification leads to technical cooperation in multiple sectors, spill-over suggests that integration will be determined by elite perceptions of success. "If actors, on the basis of their interest-inspired perceptions, desire to adapt integrative lessons learned in one context to a new situation, the lesson will be generalized."14

Thus, where Mitrany and the functionalists see integration resulting

from the pressure of functional needs, Haas and the neofunctionalists see political integration occurring "through the interaction of political forces--interest groups, parties, governments, international agencies--which seek to exploit these pressures in pursuit of their own interests."15

Neofunctionalists perceive that the outcome of integration would be a "convergence of interests on the part of significant economic groups which derived, in turn, from a broader political consensus on macroeconomic goals."16 The neofunctionalists invested step by step economic integration with political ramifications, envisioning a transfer of political allegiances to a new center in Brussels. Where functional federalists like Jean Monnet, Paul Henri Spaak, and Hallstein ultimately envisioned a federal structure emerging from functional areas of cooperation, neofunctionalists tend to envision a supranational political form. Thus, Haas suggests that European integration can be seen as a process in which "the end result of a process of political integration is a new political community, superimposed over the preexisting ones."17

In elaborating on the neofunctionalism of Haas and others, Joseph Nye examines the "integrative potential" of actors. He establishes four conditions which determine the extent to which the integration process is successful: 1) the relative economic equality of units being integrated; 2) commonality of elite values; 3) pluralistic decision-making; and 4) adaptation and response capacity of units

15 Pentland, op. cit., p. 100.
being integrated.\textsuperscript{18} Seven "process mechanisms" are said to enhance the requisite conditions for the integration process: 1) spill-over, which can be positive or negative; 2) an increasing number of transactions, including trade, communications, and human migration; 3) the creation of coalitions and the grouping together of issues not based on technological necessity, but political feasibility; 4) elite socialization, in which national elites have a vested interest in the integration process; 5) development of regional groups in which general interests can be dealt with, leaving particular interests to be dealt with at the national level; 6) development and consolidation of a sense of identity which strengthens the community in the face of temporary setbacks; and 7) the impact of external actors on the integration process.\textsuperscript{19}

Nye's reformulation of neofunctionalism noted that "process mechanisms" which determine integrative potential can also produce negative consequences. For example, the concept of spill-over assumed positive integration; that is, groups would favor integration in other sectors as it became apparent that the initial integrative act was successful. However, Nye raised the possibility of "spill-back," in which failed integration in one sector dampens enthusiasm for other integrative attempts.

Similar "negative" integration, or disintegration, can occur in other "process mechanisms." Issue-linkage and political coalition building can backfire as political agendas of groups supporting integration change. The public perception of the benefits and success

\textsuperscript{18} Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, op. cit., pp.444-445.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., pp. 443-445.
of integration is closely tied to the political fortunes of groups associated with integration. Thus, if a group closely identified with integration falls out of favor with the public, it may damage the appeal of integration among the public.

As popular identification with integration increases, so too may opposition to integration. Segments of the population with nationalist sentiments may successfully dampen enthusiasm if there is a weak sense of ideological compatibility with the aims of integration. Thus, if the impetus of integration has widespread support, opponents will be less likely to attack it.

Finally, Nye notes the influence that external actors can have on the integration process. Previously, neofunctionalist doctrine viewed integration as an inexorable process occurring from within the community being unified. However, external state and non-state actors can act as catalysts or impediments of integration. The economies of the U.S. and Japan may provide incentive for developing economies of scale, for example, whereas the North Atlantic Treaty Organization may impede integration by discouraging the establishment of a purely European defense force. The quality and scope of integration is determined by a wide range of factors, but integration is most likely to succeed if it is driven by internal forces and not external coercion.

Several examples illustrate this point. In the origins of the EC, the driving force behind the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was the recognition by French and West German leaders in their mutual interests—for the French a constructive security policy, for the West Germans a ticket to international acceptance. The EC's
experiment with increasing the scope and level of integration has progressed best when individual members recognize the mutual benefits of such integration. The passage of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 represented a dramatic victory for European federalists.

Conversely, there are also numerous examples of federations whose cultural, economic, and political cohesion occurred through force or coercion. The most readily available examples are found in the plight of Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union. In both cases, disintegration of political units occurred in the wake of the demise of a central authority's ability to use force to coerce.

**Functional, Political, and Cultivated Spill-over**

Haas and Lindberg both based their analyses on the early experiences of the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Communities in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Drawing on the early successes of these integration attempts, their initial assessment of spill-over was that it would automatically lead to integration in other sectors. However, by the late 1960s optimism about the future of the EC waned as De Gaulle demonstrated that national concerns could effectively block efforts of the Community to increase the scope and level of integration. The spill-over of cooperation and integration into other sectors was no longer automatic. It was probable, but conditional.
Three dimensions to the spill-over process can be identified: functional, political, and cultivated, (or accentuated) spill-over.20 Functional spill-over arises from the technical characteristics of integration. The technical nature of the integrating sector is tied into other functional areas which must eventually also undergo integration. The primary example of this is the ECSC. Through *dirigisme* (state-dominated planning), the integration of coal and steel would naturally lead to the integration of other energy sectors. This spill-over would continue until the whole economy was integrated.21

Political spill-over arises from the pluralist character of Western Europe. The spill-over process turns political as national elites achieve their own benefits from integration and are convinced to shift their expectations and loyalties to a new center. As it becomes clear that their interests will be best served by integration, elites are prompted to call for further integration. Thus, both at the governmental and non-governmental levels elites generate pressures for greater levels of integration.22

Finally, cultivated or accentuated spill-over results from the central institutions of integration. The common interests of community members are both represented and arbitrated in community-level institutions. These institutions constantly reassess and upgrade the common interests of members when it is politically

20 George, op. cit., p. 22.
22 Ibid., p. 6.
desirable and feasible to do so. Thus, where functional and political spill-over are seen as probable, if not absolute, processes that are determined by the level of technical integration or the perception of gain, cultivated spill-over directly results from an effort to upgrade the common interest.

It is in this sense that spill-over is most useful as an analytic tool in examining Germany's role in the emerging European order. Functional and political spill-over have encouraged integration in some EC policy realms—agriculture, monetary, and social policies—but have thus far been ineffective in areas where national members are not yet willing to share decision-making authority—namely, defense and foreign policy. However, it is in cultivated spill-over—the development of pragmatic political strategies—that the promise for a united Europe lies in the future.

The integrative process in Europe has evolved into a pragmatic, consensual decision-making apparatus. Rather than envisioning integration as an idealistic and inexorable process, today's European federalists are willing to compromise and to subordinate larger federal dreams to an incremental strengthening of the scope and level of integration.

The intergovernmental conferences on monetary union and political cooperation held in the Dutch city of Maastricht in December 1991 demonstrate the willingness to compromise among proponents of a federal Europe. Concessions, such as those offered to Great Britain to "opt out" of joining a single currency and the deletion from

23 Ibid., p. 6.
the treaty text of the European Union's ultimate federal goal, allowed European federalists to pass through a watered-down version. In essence, there was something for every party to the treaty.

Thus, Germany will play a central role in Europe through a combination of newly won assertiveness in foreign policy and through adroit diplomatic maneuvering—or cultivated spill-over. The combination of functional and political spill-over allows integrative schemes in some realms to succeed; but without cultivating spill-over, the drive to a more federal Europe would stall in the technical policy-making sectors.

This is particularly important when one notes the relative demise of security-related issues in the international arena and the increasing importance of economic interdependence. Increased economic interdependence between the EC and Eastern Europe will enhance efforts to expand integration. Germany's role in this emerging order will be characterized by twin efforts at seizing the initiative in the East and solidifying its relationships within the West. As one commentator has cogently suggested:

> as economic and diplomatic issues become entangled, a common European identity, and desire for a more coherent foreign policy, based both on multiple bargains among members and empathy for one another's positions, may emerge. And, in the case of relations with Eastern Europe, a common West European policy may well be a way for Bonn to obtain broader legitimacy for its Ostpolitik and for Bonn's partners to try to exert some control over it.24

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We can discern several shared qualities among integration theorists examined here. First, there is a recognition that integration is a process in which political loyalties and expectations are shifted from one center to another. Second, internal elites are driving forces behind the integration process, due to the expectations of joint rewards. Third, functionalists recognize the centrality of collective decision-making and pluralism. And finally, spill-over is recognized as probable and not automatic.

The functional and neofunctional approaches to the study of international integration can thus be divided into two separate, although not mutually exclusive, orientations. First, there is the "mutual needs" orientation in which integration is said to arise to fulfill a specific technical, economic, or social need. These welfare needs, traditionally considered the domain of "low" politics, are underrepresented by the nation-state, which is overly concerned with "high" politics such as military and security issues. Consequently, the international system is one of discordance and conflict. With the elevation of "mutual needs" issues, the international system can be transformed into a global community characterized by cooperation and absence of war.

The other dominant orientation to international integration is categorized as "mutual benefit" or "perception of gain". In contrast to the mutual needs orientation, this approach emphasizes motivation over necessity. Integration will be determined by the benefits derived from the integrative act and whether those benefits gained are worth the costs of supporting and pursuing integration. Thus, it is likely that integration will not arise to fulfill a welfare
function but rather as a result of the competition between elites and
groups that have a stake in the integrative act.

In light of institutional developments within the EC and the
dramatic alteration of the external environment, neofunctional
theory, once considered obsolete by its main apologist,\textsuperscript{25} has a
newfound relevance. Since 1985 and the decision to proceed with
the consolidation of the single market, the concept of spill-over has
re-emerged as a useful analytic concept. The designation of three
specific methods by which spill-over can take place--functionally,
politically, and through upgrading the common interest--has lent
neofunctionalism new relevance that was evident in the formative
years of the EC.\textsuperscript{26}

There remain serious limitations to neofunctionalism. The
primary critics of neofunctionalism can be divided into two groups:
intergovernmentalists and interdependence theorists.
Intergovernmentalists suggest that the nation-state is more
adaptable and able to thrive in the geopolitical environment. While
neofunctionalists envision the development of supranational
institutions, intergovernmentalists stress the primacy of national
interests. As long as there are national interests and an external
environment based on the competition of nation states, neofunctional
integration would continue to dwell on less critical issues in
international relations--such as economic and developmental

\textsuperscript{25} Ernst B. Haas, \textit{The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory}. (Research
Series, No. 25, Institute for International Studies, University of California,

\textsuperscript{26} Mikkelsen, op. cit., p. 16.
concerns. Thus, intergovernmentalists advocate that international cooperation be achieved through the diplomacy of states. Any cooperative agreements or structures that would arise would be subjugated to state control for state purposes. This differs dramatically from the neofunctionalists who envision international organizations which would someday supplant the state's authority.

Interdependence theorists, on the other hand, share an intellectual affinity with neofunctionalists. Both downplay the role of national boundaries, believing that networks of interaction transcend borders at various levels in a multitude of sectors. However, as noted earlier,

"interdependence theory...does not necessarily imply integration and, where integration occurs, interdependence theorists do not profess predilections for any particular outcome. Integration is a condition, not a process, and the possible integrative consequences of interdependence are based on political acts that are not predicted by the theory." 28

Thus, integration can be seen as a form of institutionalized interdependency, an attempt to increase cooperation and exchanges of information, goods, and services across national boundaries. In doing so, integration theorists suggest that the increased interdependence that arises from increased scope and levels of integration will provide a system in which conflict can be managed.

27 Ibid., p. 10.
28 Ibid., p. 9.
The Context of German Reunification

The purpose of this thesis is to examine united Germany's role in post-Cold War Europe. The Federal Republic was created in the early post-war era to serve as a bulwark against Soviet expansionism and to fundamentally change the character of German statehood. Both purposes were effectively fulfilled as witnessed by the Federal Republic's absorption of East Germany in 1990.

The demise of the bipolar world order has created a fluid and uncertain political atmosphere in Europe. German unification was a necessary but not a sufficient condition for its new-found power. The relative decline of the U.S., the collapse of Soviet Communism, the "economic miracle" of the Federal Republic, the success of Western integration, and the appeal of the Western standard of living to Eastern Europeans have all been important factors in Germany's newfound status.

European and international concerns about the foreign policy intentions of an unfettered Germany are significant. Such concerns are born from the historical image of Germany as an imperial power bent on European conquest. Traditionally considered a truly "Central European" power, trusted by neither West nor East, Germany has spent most of the 20th century as the defining divisive force in Europe. However, the character of German statehood has metamorphosed from its autocratic and militaristic origins into a representative democracy with constitutional constraints on its use of military power.
Thus, the unification of Germany must be seen in its proper context. Germany possesses none of the hegemonic designs of its predecessors, largely due to the fact that it is woven so tightly into the military and economic fabric of the West. This has been made possible by a number of factors, not least significant of which is its domestic political resocialization. Other indications of Germany's transformation include its abandonment of any claims to former German territory, and its pledge not to produce or control any nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, and to limit its armed forces to 370,000. Finally, it is unprecedented that German unification has taken place with the acceptance of Germany's neighbors.

In the emerging European order, Germany's interests will not drift eastward, resulting in a new Rapallo.* Rather, as one commentator has noted, "new questions the united Germany has to face--reordering of security structures, aiding Eastern Europe, expanding scope and level of integration--are inseparable from those of the wider Europe. The fact that Germany will take the initiative more often than it did in the past should not be misunderstood as replaying the old and unsettling national game of Germany as the central but 'outsider' nation." 29 German actions in the international arena will likely adhere to principles so carefully developed in the post-war era: multilateralism, a continued emphasis on maintaining

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* A reference to the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922 when the pariah states of Europe, Germany and the newly consolidated Soviet Union, signed a friendship agreement. The word connotes the suspicion of Europeans that the Germans will turn East at the expense of their Western alliances.
some form of the Atlantic alliance, and the continued support for European integration through the EC.

This thesis argues that the character of the "new European order" will to a great extent depend on Germany's ability to clarify and define its new international role. This is a significant task for Germany in the sense that its international position has always been explicit, imposed on the country from greater external powers. Critical to Germany's success in securing a constructive role is the recognition of the dramatically altered international environment, both on behalf of Germany and on behalf of its allies. As it strives to establish itself in the new European environment, Germans must succeed in a difficult balancing act, pacifying fears while at the same time leading constructive change.

That German unification has forced a reexamination of that country's international role is obvious. However, the unexpected events surrounding the unification process also call for a reexamination of the EC's role. In the West, integration efforts of recent years have been instructive as to how to expand cooperation and integration toward the liberalizing countries of Eastern Europe. As the debate on how best to manage change in Europe progresses, a conception of European unity which encompasses interdependence, intergovernmentalism, and integration theory is useful. The diversity of countries which desire to become part of "Europe" is great; they range from traditionally neutral members of the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA), such as Austria and Norway, to former Warsaw Pact members such as Czechoslovakia and Poland. For this reason, any conception of "European unity" must include any
non-integrative relationships which nevertheless contribute to a more cooperative and peaceful relationship.

Thus, Germany will play a central role in expanding the level and scope of European integration. The central institutions of Europe (NATO, EC, and the Helsinki process) of which Germany has been and will remain a pivotal member, must adapt their roles to a changing international context. Some of these institutions already include most European countries, others still have memberships which reflect their Cold War origins. Increased economic interdependence that has resulted from the fall of the Iron Curtain will inevitably result in greater economic integration. The key issue at stake is the ability of European nations (with Germany assuming a more active role) to cultivate conditions which will lead to a greater scope and level of European integration.
Chapter 2: The Role of Identity and Culture in German Foreign Policy

Since Bismarck’s Reich, German history has been dominated by an awkward and often debilitating search for an equal position among the world’s major powers. The journey has been awkward in the sense that Germany’s neighbors have often viewed it as a parvenu power with sinister motives; it has had a debilitating effect when international and domestic circumstances have conspired to destroy the German nation-state. Thus, the focal point of German and European history since Bismarck has been the solution to what is commonly referred to as the “German Question.” How can an inevitably powerful united Germany be incorporated into the family of nations without threatening her neighbors?

The extent of the “German Problem” is influenced considerably by its geography. Located in the heart of Central Europe, the Land in der Mitte (land in the middle) has historically had to cast a watchful eye to both the West and the East for potential allies and foes. Bismarck himself undertook diplomatic maneuvering to prevent dreaded encirclement in which Germany’s neighbors joined together in an alliance to prevent the Reich from becoming a dominant power. Without overseas colonial possessions and heavily dependent on exports, Germany’s rapid rise to continental dominance was perceived by existing major powers as a direct threat to their status and wealth.

The temporary answer to this question was found in the catharsis of World War II and in the separation of Germany into Western and Eastern spheres of influence. This exacerbated the already difficult search for a German identity, creating two states out of one people linguistically and, to
a lesser extent, culturally linked. The existence of two German states which offered diametrically opposed social and economic systems prompted vigorous public and academic debate on whether it was possible to unify Germany and still maintain the security of her neighbors.

The following section traces the role of Germany's search for national identity from Bismarck's Reich to the fall of the Third Reich in 1945. It also examines the political culture of the Federal Republic and the diminished emphasis on nationality among the younger generation at the expense of support for European integration.

**Identity and Political Culture in Pre-War Germany**

Compared to other nation-states of Western Europe, German unity arrived late and uncertainly. German territory had historically served as Europe's battleground, devastated by campaigns such as the Hundred Years War and Napoleon's attempt at empire-building. While other nation-states of Europe were establishing overseas colonial empires and wielded vast economic and military capabilities, "Germany" remained fractured into hundreds of minor principalities. As economic modernization and political development proceeded in countries such as Britain and France the splintered area constituting Germany remained preoccupied with feudal economic structures and religious divisiveness.

In 1871, under the weight of Prussian militarism and Bismarck's adroit leadership, hundreds of principalities were united into the Second German Reich. Germany at that time was in the midst of a period of rapid industrialization which created a burgeoning middle class. Unlike the middle classes in Britain and France, however, the German middle class did
not experience an increase in political power commensurate with economic modernization.

Despite its rapidly industrializing economy, Germany’s international status was largely due to the might of the Prussian military. Compared to countries and kingdoms in the East and Southeast, the German Reich was indeed a dominant power. However, the perpetual coalition-building and balance-of-power system of the West effectively checked the Reich’s ambitions of world-power status.

Because German unification occurred by virtue of force rather than by internal integration of principalities, Germans suffered from an identity crisis. As unification was an artificial imposition on the Germans, they never developed a strong identification with the German nation-state the way the British and French had. This lack of identity contributed to a pessimistic sense of underachievement and failure among Germans relative to their French and British counterparts.

There have been a number of scholarly attempts to study the causes of the German “identity crisis.” Harold James has noted that the development of a national identity must be preceded by the existence of institutional identity. Without institutional arrangements around which people can form a common identity, a national identity is not possible.

In establishing their vision of a nation in the century before 1871, Germans could not look to the present to establish what German identity meant. Their territory was politically fragmented, and most of its units were highly ineffective in international politics. Often when the present looks threatening and hostile, we look back to the comfort of heroic stories from the past. In common with other ‘new nations’ of the nineteenth century—Italians, Hungarians, Czechs, South Slavs—Germans could find no justification for national existence in any existing set of institutions.1

Institutional identity in Britain and France—in the form of constitutional arrangements of authority between executives and legislatures—enabled their citizens to forge an idea of what it meant to be British or French. Political and institutional arrangements provide a focal point of identity and national purpose which "generate a sense of legitimacy in themselves and in the community of which they are part, and which they come to represent. In the end they create patterns of behavior which can be eventually identified as national properties."²

Germany could look towards the feudal East and feel superiority in military and bureaucratic organization. However, Germany lacked a political foundation for its nationalism that other major nation-states had. Germans observed the consolidation of British and French overseas empires and "acknowledged the historical superiority and the eventual inevitability of the nation-state. Some of them deduced that they should imitate this form of political organization if they were not to be defeated and subjected to the rule of other nations. The nation-state became not simply a blueprint for desirable development, but a necessary formula for political survival."³

It is clear that nineteenth-century Germany was no more guilty of self-aggrandizement than Britain or France, nation-states which vigorously pursued overseas empires through military subjugation of indigenous peoples. However, Germany's central geographical position on the continent prompted the British and the French to cast a wary eye towards any of her foreign policies. Added to this was the fact that Germans

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² Ibid., p. 9.
³ Ibid., p. 11.
suffered from a political identity crisis. Was Germany merely a regional power or a country destined to compete globally with other major powers? Due in large part to the military emphasis on nationalism, its inferiority complex toward the West, and its arrogance toward the East, the Germans developed a blustery diplomatic assertiveness which would define their image in Europe until 1945. As two political scientists have noted:

Throughout much of her history, Germany has been a country without equals. One or more of her Western neighbors have usually appeared to her as wealthier, more powerful, and more highly respected in the world. Her eastern neighbors, on the other hand, the Poles, the Czechs, Hungarians, Russians, and Baltic peoples, have usually been looked down upon by Germans as inferior—in wealth, technology, civilization, or military power.4

Domestically, Germany’s rapid industrialization occurred without the attendant liberalization of political institutions. Atavistic elites such as the agrarian Junkers remained powerful. Prussian military elites and newly emerging industrial interests combined to dominate the structures and purposes of the political process. Thus, in contrast to Britain and France, whose polities were undergoing change commensurate with economic modernization, German political culture lagged behind its rapid industrialization. The result in Germany was

an authoritarian structure that was based on a constitutional theory that specifically repudiated the idea of popular sovereignty, and, in its brief and power-obsessed career, it denied to its citizens any opportunity to grow in self-reliance and political responsibility.5

The Bismarckian Reich experienced success in developing its industrial base and ascending to continental major power status. Germans

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increasingly believed they were destined to fulfill a global role as the British and French had. That this caused enormous apprehension in its neighbors was of little concern to Germans; they perceived their rapid ascendency as the logical progression of German history in which Germany assumed its equal (or, at times, superior) position among the powers. The British and French saw Germany as a parvenu aggressor who challenged the traditional balance of power on the continent. To Germans, "preserving the European balance, while extra-European giants formed all around, meant condemning Germany to mediocrity and, ultimately, all of Europe to external domination. That was the German Problem as the Germans saw it." In short, the issue was less a matter of Germany's aggressiveness than it was the fact that Germany's rise in stature "threatened the political independence and economic well-being of its neighbors."7

Bismarck's Reich was successful in elbowing its way into the group of major powers without shattering the balance of power largely because of the skill of Chancellor Bismarck. His prestige and political acumen allowed him to dominate domestic politics, mitigating the radical positions of the military. However, after his demise in 1890 the latent contradictions of the system began to manifest themselves. Without the diplomatic foresight of Bismarck, the German system was eventually bound to confront the incongruities of the social and political order.

As long as traditional elites dominated domestic politics and pursued aggressive foreign policies, such incongruities remained insignificant. Irresponsible and reckless foreign policies could be pursued to promote

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7 Ibid., p. 1.
the interests of the dominant groups without subjecting them to the scrutiny of opposition groups. However, the failure to secure a decisive victory in World War I created domestic dissent which questioned the wisdom of the war. As David Conradt has noted,

While the political power of the middle classes in Britain and France grew and generally exerted a moderating influence on policy, in the Prussian-dominated Second Reich the old “feudal” classes--nobility, military, large landowners--maintained and expanded their domestic hegemony and pursued defense and foreign policies designed to unify society and maintain their position of power...This faulted social and political order could not survive a lengthy war, and World War I exposed its fatal weaknesses. After the failure of the initial German offensive in the West, designed to produce a quick victory, the prospect of a protracted conflict began to make manifest the latent tensions and contradictions in the social and political order of the Second Reich.8

The fractured chaos of the ensuing Weimar Republic complicated Germany’s historical sense of impotence in foreign affairs. The harsh armistice of the Treaty of Versailles humiliated Germans and planted seeds of resentment among conservatives who blamed the country’s deteriorated standing on the liberals and socialists who had forced the Kaiser’s abdication. Contradictory forces competed for influence in a new government based on a liberal constitution which sought universal suffrage and parliamentary democracy. While the Weimar Republic enjoyed a fleeting period of stabilization, a number of international and domestic factors combined to undermine its potential success.

One event in particular demonstrates the continuation of the German feeling of impotence in the international arena. In 1923, the French military occupied the Rhineland, the industrial heartland of Germany.

Acting in response to Germany’s failure to maintain crippling war reparations, the French exacerbated an already volatile situation. Resentment of the French action grew rapidly among Germans. This resentment played into the hands of conservative political parties who continued to emphasize German militaristic nationalism. Despite the election of war hero Paul von Hindenburgh as president of the republic, conservatives were hesitant to fully support a regime constituted by liberals. The inability of the government to defend the German heartland further discredited Weimar among conservatives.

In 1929, the incremental development of the Weimar democracy came to a grinding halt. The world economic depression initiated by the American stock market crash served as the final destabilizing event in Weimar’s short history. As inflation and unemployment soared, democratically-minded parties lost legitimacy to extremist communist and conservative nationalist parties. After steadily increasing their influence in parliament to the point where they were the strongest party, the Nazis succeeded in brokering from a conservative coalition the chancellorship for their leader, Adolf Hitler. By March of 1933, Hitler had succeeded in eliminating his opposition in parliament through the passage of the “Enabling Act,” which granted him dictatorial powers.9

Thus, the Weimar Republic was seriously hampered by internal discord which resulted in a lack of consensus on a uniform foreign policy. International events such as the French occupation of the Rhineland and the world economic depression were disabling factors in leaders’ attempts to consolidate Weimar democracy and establish Germany as a respected

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9 Ibid., p. 8.
member of the international community. This period was followed by a conservative retrenchment which drove Germany's international conduct back into familiar patterns of aggressive militarism.

Ironically, the polarization of domestic politics in the Weimar Republic was controlled to a certain extent by conditions imposed on the government from the international system. The single most effective unifying force in Weimar was the government's ability to blame "foreign" nations for problems. Economic policies were justifiable with a reference to reparations payments which drastically limited the government's available courses of action. However, the republic was responsible for the unenviable task of presiding over a rapidly changing society without the ability to act independently and decisively. Dramatic and rapid social change outpaced the development of the political system:

Weimar's politicians lived in a world shaped by the hopes and expectations generated by the political transformation of 1918-19, which had produced a powerful and costly push for social reform: limitation of the hours of work, the institution of wage contracts and of state arbitration of labour conflicts. At the same time they lived in a world shaped by the Allies' hopes and expectations of 1918-19: in particular the French insistence that the Germans should pay a major part of the costs of the war; and the American demand for the repayment of the inter-Allied war debt. And finally, they were in a world whose real economic performance was so weak that expectations were likely to be disappointed.10

In such an atmosphere, it was only a matter of time before democratically-minded parties lost support to extremist communist and right-wing parties that pandered to the fears of Germans. It was in this climate that the Nazis proved particularly adept at gaining support.

The virulent brand of nationalism practiced by Hitler and the Nazis

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10 James, op. cit., p. 134.
clearly demonstrated that the traditions of militarism and authoritarianism were alive and well. The blustery, aggressive diplomacy conducted by the Third Reich also highlighted the traditional German inferiority complex vis-a-vis western powers such as Britain and France and the superiority complex toward less-developed countries in eastern Europe. One commentator has suggested that this attitude permeated Germany's foreign policy after 1871:

There does appear to have been an adolescent assertiveness accompanied by a preference for drama, a preference so deep and abiding as to be unaffected by the weakness or strength of Germany's position in the world at any given moment. This proclivity for the abrasive touch may well grow out of a—largely if not entirely unwarranted—concern over not being taken seriously enough by others, especially as a new arrival on the international scene.11

Hitler's "grand design" for Europe magnified the tensions that arose from a lack of German self-confidence. As Bismarck's Prussia sought to establish the Second Reich and a universal "German" identity from hundreds of fiefdoms, Hitler too attempted to create a German identity through annexation and *Gleichschaltung*. Austria and former German territories to the East were swallowed up by the Nazi regime. Throughout the newly established Third Reich, the policy of *Gleichschaltung* sought to harmonize all areas of life. Through propaganda and harmonization of social life, a new German race would be created which would expand eastward in search of *lebensraum*, or living space.

It is clear that the experiment of Weimar democracy failed to consolidate the ambitious program of social and political change. The historical continuity of Hitler's foreign policy--annexation and the desire to

establish a Greater German Reich—demonstrates this well. While the overwhelming Nazi preoccupation with race was a significant departure from Germany’s conservative past, there remained similarities. Most significant of these was the concern with “Germany’s precarious position in the world of superstates.” Encircled by potentially hostile nations on all sides, the historic German predicament was to seize a role internationally which would ensure that Germany would retain a prominent place among nations. Hitler, however, had grander designs of continental and world domination.

Thus, Hitler’s solution to the “German Problem” was to aggrandize the German nation at the political, racial, and territorial expense of the rest of Europe. Such a policy orientation was unlikely to win allies in Europe; in this respect the Third Reich’s policies represent the traditional German penchant for arrogance and diplomatic bullying:

Hitler’s vision for Europe, based on its exclusive racist creed, offered little to other Europeans. If racially suitable, they might expect to become reconditioned Germans. Otherwise, they would be exterminated or enslaved. It was an uncompromising program out of which to concoct an acceptable ideology—a decent drapery—to legitimize and soften German domination.

The concept of a German identity—whether political, cultural, or social—has proved elusive to German leaders and scholars of Germany. Lacking the political institutions and liberal political culture of Britain and France, Germans emphasized their linguistic affinity, their central geographic position, and cultural nationalism. In an attempt to discover their identity, Germans imitated successful nation-states:

12 Calleo, op. cit., p. 85.
13 Ibid., p. 115.
The combination of uncertainty about where Germans lived, and of what--apart from a fictitious linguistic group--they were, led to an unstable sense of national identity. Germans learnt bourgeois manners from the French, politics from the Greeks, economics from the British, and consumerism from the Americans. It is not surprising that the rich diversity of German borrowing produced some very confused reactions.14

Germany's search for a national identity was different from the other Great Powers. Whereas Britain, France, and America represented examples of the modern "western" nation-state, in which the state developed autonomously from a national movement, the Germans found themselves in 1871 the only country among the Great Powers whose polity had yet to fulfill its nationalistic desires and ambitions. As a consequence Germany was also the Great Power with the greatest problem of meeting the expectations and demands of its citizenry.15

Identity and Culture in Post-War Germany:
Nationalism Discredited

From a political and social standpoint, the cathartic experience of the Third Reich was a watershed period in German history. Prior to 1945, a number of factors were evident which highlight the dilemmas of trying to define the idea of German identity. The question of "what Germany is and is not, the persistent mystique of the Reich, delayed national unification, and the illiberal nature of traditional German nationalism," remained, but were dramatically altered by new circumstances.16

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14 James, op. cit., p. 31.
15 Ibid., p. 33.
16 Verheyen, op. cit., p. 65.
The new Germany completely rejected the harsh brand of Nazi racial nationalism. A new Germany would eventually seek to reenter the world community, many of whose members suffered greatly from Nazi atrocities. The Nazi legacy was a liability which required a tremendous amount of diplomatic reconciliation and sensitivity to overcome. Thus, while nationalism did not entirely disappear, it was shaped by new forces.

Three particular aspects of the German identity problem are evident since the end of World War II. The first aspect is that of historical consciousness. Because so much of German history is fraught with an illiberal and anti-Western approach to nationhood, the democratic Federal Republic could not look to its past for a foundation. However, like other nations, the Federal Republic cannot divorce itself from its past. Thus, while 1945 can be seen as a watershed moment in German history, the events prior to 1945 cannot be divorced from the current German state.

Second, the establishment of a common German identity was unlikely to come about with the establishment of two states, each under the influence of diametrically-opposed ideological blocs. In the Federal Republic, a gradual identification with the institutions, values, and processes of democracy indicated a significant shift in public opinion since the 1950s. In the German Democratic Republic (GDR), forty years of communist rule inevitably shaped political culture in a divergent path from its Western counterpart. Like the Federal Republic, the GDR’s sense of identity reaches back into the German past, drawing on its Prussian heritage and nascent socialist movements present in Germany in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It also resembles the FRG in the

17 Ibid., p. 66.
18 Conradt, op. cit., p. 55.
sense that its identity has been dramatically influenced by its bloc's
hegemonial power: hence the development of an authoritarian socialist
state on German soil.

C. Bradley Scharf has described the difficulty of ascribing any one
factor as critical in the development of a separate identity in the GDR:

...it is tempting to isolate a single attribute as the most essential defining
element. The GDR is a nation at a crossroads in a very profound sense. It
is pulled in four directions simultaneously. It is intensely aware of its German
past, while aspiring vigorously to a socialist future. It is a West European
nation because of its shared popular culture, and the highly visible presence
of the Federal Republic as a point of interest and comparison. It is also
an East European nation because of its military dependence on the Soviet
Union and its more or less compulsory adoption of Soviet forms of political
organization and public values.19

Thus, the physical division of the German nation into two separate
states resulted in the development of divergent identities, or national
orientations. The differences were only in kind. For each German state
served as the model, bulwark member of their respective alliances, and
both drew substantially from the German past. However, both political
cultures were not necessarily durable. This fact is highlighted by the
gradual but certain adoption of Western values by the former East German
populace.

The third significant factor in the development of a German identity
after 1945 is found in its sensitivity to the international environment. The
anxieties and uncertainties of the Federal Republic's central position—a
potential nuclear battleground—heighten the sense of insecurity. More
than any other Western state, the Federal Republic served as a barometer
of East-West tensions and the progress of European integration.

19 C. Bradley Scharf, Politics and Change in East Germany. Boulder, CO.: Westview
An early goal of European integration was to promote the acceptance of the new West German regime, thereby giving it a strong affinity with European identity. National sentiments remained, but after initial successes in integration and the consolidation of democratic institutions its effects were much less severe.\textsuperscript{20}

The dramatic rise in nationalistic feelings among the German populace in 1989-90 revived old concerns of the viability of the Federal Republic's democracy. Nationalist sentiment had survived in traditional regional affinities and the slow pace of social change suggested that nationalism was still a factor. To Germany's neighbors, the eruption of nationalism in Germany was reminiscent of a not-too-distant past, a repeat of which they would avoid at all costs. Yet, two factors provide a compelling restraint on a return to Germany's past. First is the acute sensitivity of Germany's Nazi legacy; German leaders today understand that they have a special responsibility in light of their country's past. The second factor, a direct result of the first, is that Germany has pursued integration into the economic, military, and political fabric of the West with unparalleled zeal. It is too early to say for certain whether the Federal Republic's democratic political culture will predominate in a united Germany. However, with the total collapse of the GDR and the scope and level of the FRG's integration in the West, it would appear that this will be the case.

The following section examines the foreign policy orientations of the Federal Republic in the post-war era. The foreign policy patterns of the FRG developed in a corollary fashion to its democratic institutions. The

\textsuperscript{20} Verheyen, op. cit., p. 69.
Federal Republic early on was a reactive power, its diplomatic ability severely hampered by the bipolar Cold War order and its burdensome Nazi legacy. However, as the German populace slowly warmed to democratic values, processes, and institutions, so was the government able to incrementally gain more leeway in the conduct of its foreign policy. As both time and events continued to separate the FRG from the Nazi regime, the evolution of a new German diplomatic acumen and sensitivity became evident.

**Foreign Policy in the FRG: Shifting Traditions.**

**International Acceptance, and the Drive For Unification**

The story of the FRG's conduct of its foreign relations has been characterized by an incremental process of gaining international acceptance and gradually obtaining greater degrees of autonomy in foreign policy decision-making. Out of the ashes of the Third Reich, Germans had to reconstitute their political and social system. Sovereignty and nationalism were all but eradicated by occupying armies, narrowing the average German citizen's concerns to providing for basic survival. Due to the savage and destructive twelve years of the Third Reich, there seemed to be universal agreement among the victors that Germany's punishment should be severe and lasting.

The erosion of the wartime alliance changed this. With the rise in East-West tensions, the Cold War superimposed itself on any prior post-war plans of occupation. In the West, the FRG was established in the mold of other liberal democratic societies. In the East, the GDR was established as a socialist German state under the dominance of the Soviet Union. Thus,
from an early moment in the post-war period, the FRG’s foreign policy formation and implementation abilities were clearly constrained by Allied preferences and interests. The new German state was “an offspring of bipolarity, conceived and nurtured by the strategic imperatives of the West. Yet while the Federal Republic was bound to profit from the transformation of the dominant international conflict, it was also its prostrate captive and, by virtue of its partition, its starkest symbol.”

Several distinct phases of the foreign policy orientation of the FRG may be discerned. The chancellorship of Konrad Adenauer, from 1949 to 1962, was characterized by a recognition that sovereignty and German unity could only be attained incrementally and through close cooperation within the Western community. Characteristic of this period was the acknowledgement of Germany’s relative impotence for policy initiation, despite its central position in the Western Alliance. During this time, the FRG, as stated in its Basic Law, refused to recognize the GDR as a separate German state.

The warming of relations between the FRG and the communist-bloc countries was characteristic of this period. The FRG gradually moved toward peaceful coexistence with European members of the Soviet bloc, opening trade missions in a number of Eastern European countries in the mid-1960s. This was Ostpolitik in its embryonic form.

The election of the Social Democratic Party’s (SPD) Willy Brandt to the office of chancellor in 1969 signalled a deepening of Ostpolitik. In this period, the FRG officially recognized the post-war status quo, made strides

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to deepen inter-German detente, and succeeded in reducing Cold War
tensions that had dominated bloc and inter-German affairs since 1949.

From 1974 to 1982, the SPD-led government of Helmut Schmidt
presided over a dramatic rise in the FRG's international reputation. The
economy grew rapidly and the FRG gradually seized more initiative in its
conduct of foreign policy. Also, the 1970's saw a dramatic alteration in
West German public opinion. As the conservative preoccupation with
unification receded in the national consciousness, recognition of two
separate German states as a part of the status-quo post-war era became a
reality.

The period from 1982 to the present has been marked by Helmut
Kohl's Christian Democratic Union (CDU) government. During this period,
the FRG rose to become the world's third largest economy. Kohl has also
presided over the German drive toward unification in the wake of the
demise of the bipolar order.

Thus, the forty-plus years of foreign policy in the FRG have been
marked by an incremental recapturing of sovereignty. As the FRG's
international status improved and as the durability of its democratic
constitution was repeatedly tested, so too did its ability rise to control its
destiny. In short, the last forty years have seen the FRG go from an
occupied nation deprived of its sovereignty to a nation divided into two
ideologically opposed states and into a unified, democratic country firmly
integrated into the West.
Adenauer and a Supranational, Western Orientation

The defeat of Nazi Germany left Europe ravaged. Millions of lives were lost, millions were displaced from their homes, and millions more faced imminent starvation. The devastation of Germany was complete and all of Europe faced a daunting task of reconstruction. Thus, with both Germany and Europe no longer able to influence world politics in a meaningful way, the victorious powers settled into the confines of a bipolar world order.

The devastation of Germany provided an opportunity to fundamentally reconstitute its political and social system. Due to the rapidly deteriorating alliance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the Germans were given a new chance at statehood. In the East, the GDR was established as a socialist German state under dominating Soviet influence. In the West, a former mayor of Cologne sought to reconstitute the German state through closer ties to the West.

Konrad Adenauer sought to support long-frustrated attempts at European integration while at the same time closely cooperating with American occupying authorities. His goal was to forever anchor the new Federal Republic in the Western camp. In doing so, he sought to incrementally regain German sovereignty and acceptance into the international community.

Central to Adenauer's world view was that Franco-German rapprochement was critical to the Federal Republic’s ability to integrate into the European and world communities. Through its participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Communities (EC),
and the Council of Europe, Adenauer hoped to eventually position the Federal Republic as an equal among the Western powers.

Adenauer's belief was that two factors limited the choices available to Germany. First was the fact of Germany's geopolitical location in the center of Europe. Second, the central position occupied by Germany left it sandwiched between two opposing ideological blocs. In order to survive, the Germans would have to choose sides if they didn't want to be overwhelmed. The West was the obvious choice for Adenauer, because of "our form of life which has developed throughout many centuries and is based on the Christian humanistic view of the world."22

Adenauer's Catholic background and childhood in the Rhineland, not far from the Franco-German border, convinced him that the Federal Republic's best interests lay in a strong Western union:

Adenauer gave priority to Western European integration over the reunification of Germany. Western integration for him was a means to tame German nationalism, to attain sovereignty, and to overcome the traditional Franco-German hostility.23

Thus, Adenauer felt that integration of Western Europe would strengthen the democratic institutions of the Federal Republic. At the same time, pursuing supranationalization and westernization deepened the division of Germany and precluded any talk of German reunification in the near future. It was Adenauer's belief that these Western ties would isolate the GDR. In effect, the "German question was to be solved [at a future date]
from a position of strength with a 'magnetic effect' on the Eastern parts of Germany or Europe."^{24}

**Detente and the Development of Ostpolitik**

A central feature of the FRG's foreign policy in the 1960s was the Hallstein Doctrine, which stated that the FRG would break off relations with any country that recognized the GDR. The doctrine attempted to isolate and alienate the socialist German state from the international community. However, the doctrine was ineffective. With the construction of the Berlin Wall and the deepening of alliance ties in both German states, the *de facto* existence of two German states could not be denied.

A relaxation of tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the late 1960s engendered a dramatic shift in the FRG's foreign policy. Whereas Adenauer's policy of a westernized FRG combined with a confrontational stance toward the East, the relaxation of superpower tensions offered, indeed required, a relaxation of inter-German tensions. Enter the SPD mayor of Berlin, Willy Brandt, who formulated *Ostpolitik* as a practical and incremental way by which to lessen tensions and nurture inter-German contacts.

Western allies at first viewed *Ostpolitik* with some suspicion. In particular, the French were concerned that such a German initiative might signal that the FRG was straying from its Western course and looking

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^{24} Ibid., p. 187.
toward the East with nostalgia. The FRG’s Western allies feared that Germany might repeat history and conclude another Rapallo.

However, Ostpolitik did not seek to increase the FRG’s Eastern relations at the expense of its carefully-crafted western integration.

The Ostpolitik was not a policy of switching sides or a policy of balance between the East and West, but was based on the foundations of the Western Alliance and a multinationally conceived concept. Brandt continuously emphasized that all important states within the Eastern bloc (those that had or have a common border with Germany) should be included in this policy and that the Ostpolitik should and would not be pursued individually or isolated in bilateral relationships.25

Thus, the FRG, like other nation-states in the global arena, acted opportunistically in taking advantage of detente. While the bipolar world order still acted as a constraint on the German ability to conduct its foreign relations, the FRG became less a passive object of the bipolar world order and more an active participant in it.

The FRG concluded treaties with Poland, the Soviet Union, and Czechoslovakia in 1970 and 1971 before concluding the Basic Treaty with the GDR. These treaties lessened tensions between the two blocs, renunciating the use of force, recognizing the inviolability of post-war borders, and respecting the sovereignty of each nation. In recognizing the status quo in Europe and in Germany, the FRG made great strides in promoting security in Europe. The conclusion of the treaties also helped the FRG to slowly eradicate the pariah image of Nazi Germany. The moralistic undercurrent of Ostpolitik was evident when, in December 1970, then-Chancellor Willy Brandt knelt down at a Polish war memorial to those who died during the Warsaw Ghetto uprising.26

25 Ibid., p. 200.
26 Ibid., p. 209.
Thus, Ostpolitik provided the FRG with a number of benefits. In addition to recognizing what had long since been a reality—the division of Europe and the existence of two German states—the policy enabled the FRG to regain a modicum of control over the conduct of its foreign relations. It also served well as a venue through which the new Germans—citizens of the democratic FRG—could increase contacts with the East, despite the existence of an artificial division between East and West. In doing so, the West Germans were able to retain past links to the East; but perhaps more importantly, they were able to slowly erase the horrors of the Nazi regime.

The FRG Ascendent: The Internationalization of Foreign Policy

Ostpolitik served to enhance the Federal Republic’s international image. Whereas the rigid intractability of the Hallstein Doctrine had created conflict and disruptions in the FRG’s international relations, the consensus-building approach of Ostpolitik opened doors for the FRG to assume a greater role internationally. Through its participation in the United Nations, the European Community, and the Conference on Security and cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the West Germans increased their diplomatic maneuverability.

Perhaps most significant was the increasingly interdependent world economy in which the FRG’s export-oriented economy thrived. The rise of issues concerning economic disparities between the North and South, at the expense of the East-West conflict, also enabled the FRG to flex its economic power more effectively.
Through its participation in the EC and the Lome Convention, the FRG saw its control over foreign policy increase substantially while the drive toward deeper economic integration decreased its authority over its domestic policy. As Chancellor Helmut Schmidt said in 1979, “As far as foreign policy is concerned, our freedom of action has increased, with regard to domestic policy it has definitely declined.” The more enlightened policy of Ostpolitik created economic opportunities that would otherwise have remained closed to the FRG’s export-oriented economy.

Schmidt continued to strengthen the Franco-German relationship through his personal relationship with French President Valery Giscard-D’Estaing. Other developments in this period saw the FRG assuming a more active role in the Third World, using the following guidelines: no arms deliveries into areas of tension and no interference into the internal affairs of other states.

This period also witnessed continuing vindication for Ostpolitik. Although reunification remained a stated goal of the FRG’s Basic Law, a premium was placed on recognizing international realities by maintaining stable and peaceful relations with the GDR. Policy makers and citizens in the Federal Republic understood that reunification was still possible, but only after a prolonged period of stability and peace had proved that Germans deserved a united country. As Helmut Schmidt said in his 1979 state of the nation address,

The idea that one day a state of 75 million Germans could arise in the middle of Europe arouses concern in many of our neighbors and partners in Europe...We ought not overlook the fact that, in the eyes of others, the German division is today part of the European balance of power that secures peace in Europe...In our geopolitical position, and

27 Ibid., p. 219.
with our recent history, we Germans cannot allow ourselves a political schizophrenia, which on the one hand pursues a realistic policy of peace and at the same time carries on an illusionary debate about reunification.28

The FRG as an Equal Partner

The ascendency in 1982 to the office of chancellor by conservative CDU leader Helmut Kohl again brought the national question to the forefront of the FRG’s foreign policy efforts. However, even as the Federal Republic increased its stature as an economic power, external influences continued to limit the country’s ability to direct policy within the constraints of the bipolar order.

The renewal of East-West tensions after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 helped to chill inter-German relations. Multiple attempts at closer cooperation in the 1980s were thwarted and not until 1987 did the East German leader Erich Honecker return to the Federal Republic for a visit to his home in the Saarland.29

The early 1980s were marked by the raging “Euromissile” debate. West German peace activists were not successful in preventing the deployment of the Pershing missiles but the vehemence of their protests was a clear indication that Germans were no longer satisfied with being subordinate partners in the Atlantic alliance. The economic power wielded by the Federal Republic did not, even in the increasingly interdependent world, translate into corollary political power; the Federal Republic was still dependent on external factors for its security. As Josef Joffe noted in

28 Craig, op. cit., p. 309.
29 Pfetsch, op. cit., p. 172.
the late 1980s, "The Federal Republic is still the most vulnerable member of the Western European state system, under a security deficit which only massive loans of power from the United States can cover. But as the ruptured defense consensus of the early 1980s demonstrated, the comforts of protection also breed resentment--against the very Atlantic order that has determined West German policy choices in decades past."  

With the demise of the Soviet Union's influence in Eastern Europe, the Kohl government received an unexpected chance to attain German unity. The collapse of the East German economy and the cost to the FRG have created a unified Germany within the EC. EC members who initially feared an eastward-looking Germany have had those fears assuaged through Germany's continued commitment to the European Monetary System (EMS) and its reaffirmation of its ties to the Atlantic Alliance.

To be sure, German unification occurred only with the hesitant consent of the victorious powers of World War II. What was a dramatic shift was the ability of both German states to participate in the "two-plus-four" talks which ended the division of Germany and made unification possible. Although Helmut Kohl made the mistake of pandering to the far right when he questioned the legitimacy of the Polish-East German border, Germans have displayed a diplomatic saavy and adroitness lacking in their predecessors.

In assuming a major financial burden to help the Soviet Union, Germany is demonstrating the leadership towards Eastern Europe that harkens back to earlier German ties to the East. However, in its contemporary guise, German financial assistance to the East has been less

30 Joffe, op. cit., p. 111.
nefarious than some historical examples of German "aid." This is demonstrated particularly by the fact that Germany is providing half of all international aid to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.\(^{31}\)

**Summary**

If a characteristic of the FRG's foreign policy in the post-war period has been the subordination of its foreign policy to the bipolar order for the peace and security of Europe, it may well be a characteristic of its foreign policy in the 1990's and beyond that it assumes the leadership role denied to it since the end of World War II. The past 40 or so years of German foreign policy have been characterized by a gradual regaining of sovereignty. In the early post-war years, the FRG was under the occupation yoke and subordinate to Allied decisions in most aspects of domestic policy and total dominance in foreign affairs.

Adenauer's policies pursuing both a stronger Western European union and Atlantic ties secured for the Federal Republic international legitimacy. These policies also served to rule out unification until such a time that the West German state was securely integrated into the Western economic, political, and military system. The early and unflinching pro-western stance allowed the FRG to secure American protection and a long term European presence; through the liberal economic order, the Federal Republic was able to reconstruct its economy and develop one of the largest export-oriented economies in the world.

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\(^{31}\) Foreign Affairs, sp 1992 p.126
However, as the division of Germany and Europe was consolidated and became a precondition of the bipolar world order, German policy makers reacted with a policy which recognized this reality. Rather than dwell on its national division, policy makers engaged in a policy of peaceful coexistence. This was evidence of a new mentality in Germany which recognized its relative impotence, yet worked for positive change where possible.

As Ostpolitik became a fixture of the FRG’s foreign policy, it assumed greater leeway in other aspects of its primarily economic foreign policy. As a member of the Group of Seven and multiple international organizations, the FRG increased its international legitimacy. Its regular support for United Nations’ resolutions and EC policy stances indicated that it was indeed an increasingly important member of the world community.

However, until the demise of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe and the ensuing events that made possible German unification, the FRG remained dependent on the U.S. for its basic territorial security. With the demise of the bipolar order, Germany could assume greater control over its foreign policy. This is evidenced in its increasing ties to Eastern Europe and its unilateral recognition of Slovenian and Croatia independence.

Finally, as the Federal Republic regained sovereignty and greater flexibility in the conduct of its international affairs, the German polity underwent a significant change. The reaction to Nazism in the 1950s was dramatic, but not to the extent that all vestiges of German nationalism were eradicated. The development of a strong political party system, best identified with the broad-based Christian Democrats, allowed the political system to largely eliminate the fractious divisiveness that was characteristic of the Weimar parliamentary system. As the institutions of
representative democracy in the Federal Republic were consolidated, the German populace began to identify with them.

Also indicative of a dramatic change in the political culture and identity of Germans in the post-war era is the popularity of the pan-European ideal. Integration in the European Community initially provided the Federal Republic with international legitimacy and stable foundations for Franco-German amity and economic reconstruction. Today, a generation of Germans born after World War II have lived with both the guilt of Germany's Nazi past and the success of European integration. It is clear to the overwhelming majority of this generation that Germany's future lies in tandem with Europe's. In short, this new political generation adheres to the idea that a more European Germany should supersede a more German Europe.\textsuperscript{32}

\textsuperscript{32} Pfetsch, op. cit., p. 132.
Solving the German Question in a European Context

The German Question, as noted in the preceding chapter, generally comprises two different problems. The first refers to Germany’s crucial role in the stabilization, or destabilization, of Europe. The country’s geographic position and internal political structures often resulted in closely tying Germany’s actions to Europe’s fate.

The second problem of the German Question refers to the post-war division of Germany and Europe and the political and social problems that resulted from it. The resulting stability provided by the two blocs made Europeans and the superpowers hesitant to take political action to address the German Question. It seemed better to have a divided Germany, with a limited role in Europe, than to have risked opening old wounds by attempting to resolve the German Question.

Thus, the German Question “does not belong to the Germans alone: it can only be solved in a European context.”¹ This truth is demonstrated by the Western Allies’ decision at the end of World War II to incorporate Germany’s western zone into the economic, political, and military fabric of the West. Rather than reducing Germany to an agrarian state isolated and dominated by her European neighbors, the Western Allies understood well that such a system would be unrealistic and unstable. For in the wake of

the war, it was clear that German economic reconstruction was imminent. Consequently, a reordering of economic and political structures in Europe was required if Europeans were to rebuild alongside vanquished Germany.

A number of factors in the post-war order then prompted a new drive for European integration. In addition to recognizing Germany’s inevitable reconstruction, Europeans faced a continent that had experienced horrendous physical destruction—both of the economic infrastructure and the human population. This created a twofold threat in the emergent bipolar world: that Europe would be subjected to the economic hegemony of the United States and vulnerable militarily to the Soviet Union. There was a new urgency among Europeans to form the structures and institutions necessary for Europe to politically and economically assert itself.

Numerous attempts in the early post-war years were made to enhance the position of Western Europe through integrative processes. The Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was established to administer Marshall Fund recovery aid and to work to establish free trade practices in Western Europe. Later this organization expanded into the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) which "brought worldwide membership and thus gave expression to the world liberal trading area which forms part of the environment within which the EC has taken root."\(^2\)

In addition to economic organizations, defense and human rights organizations sprouted. The Brussels Treaty of 1948 was a mutual

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assistance pact between Britain, France, and the Benelux countries, which recognized the traditional German threat as well as the emerging Soviet threat. A year later, the Council of Europe, a group with wide-ranging political and cultural objectives was created. It sought to emphasize the common heritage of Western Europe based on similar spiritual and moral values, legalism, and democracy. These organizations fell short of attaining widespread membership. They also failed to allay fears of Western European countries, particularly France, that the impending reconstruction and remilitarization of West Germany was a painfully familiar threat to their future security.

This chapter seeks to clarify Germany's relationship with the EC. In particular, what does Germany gain from continued membership in the EC? What policies demonstrate German commitment to strengthening the EC? And, finally, how will a reunified Germany continue to support the EC without overwhelming its other members?

In its infancy, West European integration was guided by and beholden to the international context in which it originated. American economic dominance led the way to a liberal capitalist world economy; consequently, West Europeans served as a bulwark of confrontation between the Western liberal capitalist world and the Soviet-dominated socialist bloc.

The dominance of the U.S. economy was slowly eroded in the late 1960s and 1970s by rapid economic growth in Japan and Western Europe. The post-war economic order faltered as prior rules and institutions

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governing that order became increasingly ineffective. This created a situation in which “the international economic context within which the EC functioned in the 1970s was marked by a much higher degree of turbulence than had been the case in the previous two decades.” In the 1980s, economic and technological competition between the U.S., Japan, and Western Europe dominated the global economy, forcing the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev to attempt to join the world capitalist system.

Thus, the development of the EC had, until the end of the Cold War, occurred within the confines of East-West bipolarity. The progress and stagnation of the EC depended largely on the current nature of East-West relations:

The level of East-West tension affected the degree of internal unity of the EC; it interacted with economic factors to change the relationship between the EC and the United States; and it affected EC external relations indirectly through its influence on perceptions of developments in the Third World and in Eastern Europe.

However, as the U.S. was increasingly unable or unwilling to act as the stabilizing force of the world economy, the EC adopted a greater political role for itself. In doing so, there were frequently conflicts of interest between the EC and the U.S.

Today, the EC still operates within the limits of the international system. However, since the mid 1980s it has gained for itself greater flexibility in promoting its interests in the international arena. Due to the

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5 Ibid., p. 36.
strength of its economy, Germany has also found for itself a greater international role. Indeed, one can note with some accuracy that the interests of the EC and Germany have become, for better or worse, intertwined.

As in other potential foreign policy dilemmas for Germany, the answers to the above questions lie in the country's economic capabilities and her domestic political requirements and capabilities. As the richest and by far the largest member of the EC, Germany will have to exercise great care in asserting its national will within the framework of the EC. In the past, Germany's support for the EC was justified because it was first a ticket to international respectability, and then because it ensured continued economic growth. In the future, observers wonder whether these same reasons will be enough to keep Germany in the EC as an ardent supporter of integration.

The following section examines the historical dimension of West Germany's involvement in the EC. It explains the decisive shift in foreign policy orientation that occurred in West Germany under Adenauer's chancellorship, and provides a background for understanding German reunification as it affects the EC.

A Change in Foreign Policy Orientation

In May 1950 French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman proposed placing French and German (and that of other interested European countries) iron, steel, and coal production under the auspices of a "High Authority" which would have decision-making predominance in that industry over national governments. The recognition that West Germany's
economic revival was inevitable led the French to the conclusion that their best interests were not in blocking that development, but in controlling it. In essence, the Schuman Plan was a security policy for France that was also in the interests of other European nations. While it controlled the German behemoth from within, it also gave Europeans a more united voice in the bipolar order. One observer has noted the

boldness of the Schuman Plan as a solution to the most deep-seated problem of French foreign policy: if the German economy [its production of iron, coal and steel, the main tools of war] could not be contained on a discriminatory basis, then France would propose to place what were thought to be its core elements, and those of its own economy too, under a system of control external to both.  

By making war with Germany “unthinkable but also materially impossible,” France was taking a significant first step in realizing a “European federation which is indispensable to peace.”

For the French the ECSC would provide them with security against any possible future German aggression. For the West Germans, the organization provided international respectability and was the best way to break free from postwar economic restrictions placed on them. For Western Europe in general the plan provided an opportunity to strengthen it against an economically pervasive American ally.

The first German chancellor in the post-war era, Konrad Adenauer, embraced the European Community as an opportunity for West Germany

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to transform itself from pariah to partner. According to Adenauer:

...the purpose of his [Schuman's] proposal was not economic, but eminently political...Rearmament always showed first in an increased production of coal, iron, and steel. If any organization such as he was proposing were to be set up it would enable each country to detect the first signs of rearmament, and would have an extraordinarily calming effect in France...Schuman's plan corresponded entirely with the ideas I had been advocating for a long time concerning the integration of the key industries of Europe. I informed Schuman at once that I accepted this proposal wholeheartedly.9

Thus, the ECSC was the first integrative attempt that encouraged, indeed necessitated, West Germany's participation. As an offspring of the Cold War, the Federal Republic under Adenauer understood that pursuing a pro-American, hard-line anticomunist policy was critical to regaining international acceptance and respectability. Though Adenauer and much of the German electorate still gave lip service to the importance of reunification with the Soviet-dominated German Democratic Republic (GDR), the real and seemingly more attainable goal was to attend to the economic and political reconstruction of the Federal Republic through integration with the West.

Two domestic political developments in early post-war West Germany solidified the CDU's position and set the country on a policy course that positively influenced the country's attitudes towards the EC. The first was Adenauer's move to remake West Germany's national identity. The second was to follow Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard's recommendation to pursue free-market and free trade principles.10

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10 George, op. cit., p. 66.
As discussed in the previous chapter, the national identity of Germans in the wake of World War II bore the heavy legacy of the Nazis. As an ardent anticommunist, Adenauer promoted West Germany as a staunchly pro-Western, pro-integration country. The best things from Germany were promoted as West German and the West German electorate gradually identified with this stance.

The acceptance of the western-oriented economy also helped secure support for West German participation in Western integration. Whether or not the "economic miracle" could have happened with other policies as well is insignificant; what was important was that the West German electorate linked economic and foreign policy successes with Adenauer's CDU. Thus, in a bold choice of foreign policy orientations, Adenauer solidly entrenched the West Germans into the desired pro-Western, pro-American image.11

Other political parties had to adjust their stances in acknowledgement of the CDU successes in the 1950s and early 1960s. In particular, the SPD had to abandon its advocacy of neutrality as the price of German unity. The pursuit of a new and less confrontational policy towards the East began in 1969 when the SPD and the Free Democratic Party (FDP) formed a coalition government. Many observers in both West Germany and in the EC feared that Ostpolitik signalled a historical throwback to Rapallo, when in 1922 the German government concluded secret agreements with the Soviet Union.

However, SPD Chancellor Willy Brandt was careful to assuage those fears. He sought U.S. support for his policies in Eastern Europe and was

11 Ibid., p. 68.
careful to reiterate the Federal Republic’s staunch support for the EC. Although his Chancellorship ignobly came to an abrupt end in 1974 with the discovery of an East German agent in his cabinet, he left his successor, Helmut Schmidt, with a clear mandate to continue Ostpolitik.

Under Schmidt, the Federal Republic came into its own as a world power. The economic success of West Germany had endowed its citizens with greater confidence to assert itself diplomatically. The late 1970s and early 1980s also witnessed the strengthening of the Franco-German core of the EC, based on the close personal relationship between Schmidt and French President Valery Giscard D’Estaing. Although Schmidt was a Social Democrat and D’Estaing a conservative-liberal, the two in reality were not politically far apart.12

By the early 1980s West Germany had firmly established itself as an economic power, a staunch supporter of the Western Alliance, and the leader of the EC. Schmidt and his FDP Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher pursued Ostpolitik within a larger framework of continued support for NATO.

Commensurate with the beginning of the Reagan Administration in 1981, security issues again came to dominate the West German domestic policy agenda. The hard-line anticomunist stance of the Reagan Administration threw West Germany’s political coalition into chaos. Schmidt, who supported deployment of NATO Pershing II missiles, was assailed by both ends of the spectrum: on the left wing by his own SPD, which sought a less confrontational stance towards the East, and on the right wing by the Christian Social Union (CSU) for not unconditionally

12 Ibid., p.71.
supporting the American position. Schmidt was given a vote of no confidence by the Bundestag in 1982, and CDU Chancellor Helmut Kohl replaced him.

During this time, West German leaders consistently sought to reassure their Atlantic and European allies that the country was indeed committed to the West. A Rappallo was simply not possible. As Schmidt stated in a 1980 speech to the Bundestag:

As far as the future of the German nation is concerned, we must soberly conclude that the political constellations in the world and in Europe at the present time do not offer possibilities to overcome the division of Germany... The division of Germany is at the same time the division of Europe. In a concrete sense, this means that the German problem is only soluble in a European context. Everything that Europeans on both sides can do in order to smooth the trenches between us and create greater solidarity is at the same time of service to the German cause.  

Schmidt thus repeatedly stated an accepted truth in post-war foreign policy: that the German Question was one for all of Europe to decide.

In another example, Genscher noted that West Germans and Europeans who complained about security dependence on America were actually discontent that a common European voice was lacking:

Whoever in Europe complains about the dependence on America, complains in reality about insufficient progress toward European unity... The supreme peace task for Europe and for the world today concerns the pursuit of as constructive an East-West relationship as possible. 

Such comments help demonstrate the significant shift in traditional German foreign policy since Bismarck. The ability of political leaders like Genscher and Schmidt to articulate a German foreign policy to be pursued

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13 Verheyen, op. cit., 164.
14 Ibid., p. 165.
in a larger Western and European framework represents a diplomatic sensitivity that was not common in pre-1945 German statesmen.

To be sure, this has not eliminated remarks by German leaders that have the potential to offend. As Germans rushed to reunify in 1990, Chancellor Kohl attempted to retain the electoral support of right wing expellees from the East bloc by not ruling out any international boundary changes. By hesitating to declare the Oder-Neisse line as the definitive border with Poland, Kohl convinced Europeans of the necessity to bind the new Germany firmly to the Western alliance.\(^\text{15}\)

The growth and development of the EC and Germany's role within it has been vast and complex. In the next section, I will examine a number of programs which demonstrate the extent of Germany's commitment to strengthening the EC and the degree to which German reunification changes the political and institutional landscape of the EC. The impact of debates on the intergovernmental conferences (IGCs) on monetary union and political cooperation will be examined, as will Germany's position on enlarging the EC.

**German Reunification and the EC**

The reunification of Germany implied the inclusion of the former lands of East Germany in the European Community. Two constitutional paths to a new German state were evident. The first was found in Article 23 of the Basic Law by which East German Laender could opt for

\(^{15}\) Ibid., p. 199.
membership in the Federal Republic. Another possible route was found in Article 146 of the Basic Law which provided for a new constitution resulting from negotiations between the two German states.16

Neither Article 23 nor Article 146 provided an ideal route to unification. Article 23 referred to pre-1937 borders and was consequently unacceptable to the Soviet Union and Poland. Article 146 was also a suspect route for it would ignore the external realities: allies from both the West and East would have had vehement objections to a reunification process that excluded their input.

Thus, in the “two plus four” talks, the two German states and France, Britain, the Soviet Union, and the U.S.A., German reunification was achieved. Article 23 was repealed in the German Bundestag and the international “Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany” became its counterpart in international law.

Chancellor Kohl, wary of repeating the Oder-Neisse diplomatic disaster, (in which he questioned the inviolability of the Oder-Neisse River as a permanent border) presented his view of German reunification as a European issue to the Bundestag on November 28, 1989. He concluded that although reunification remained "the political objective of the Federal Republic," a firm link was "necessary between the development of intra-German unity and the establishment of a secure political architecture for Europe as a whole."17

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16 Heisenberg, op. cit., p. 28.
17 Ibid., p. 18.
Maastricht: A Move Towards Monetary Union
and Political Cooperation

In December 1991, EC leaders met in the Dutch town of Maastricht to formulate treaties on monetary union (EMU) and political cooperation (EPC). The agreements chart the course of the EC towards an eventual European Union. Several elements of the treaty—a single currency, a common foreign and defense policy, a common citizenship—seem to lay the foundation for a federal Europe. However, other observers suggest that the agreements on EMU and EPC merely enable the Community to meet the emerging challenges of helping Eastern Europe and creating a more efficient market.\(^{18}\)

In April 1990, in conjunction with French President Francois Mitterand, Helmut Kohl proposed the two intergovernmental conferences. Pointing to the dramatically changing international environment, Kohl suggested that the EC could only progress if the reforms proposed by the IGCs were ratified by national parliaments by the end of 1992:

> Only if these reforms [on common defense and security policy and EMU] reach a successful conclusion will the European Community be able to meet the challenges facing it internally and externally and to shoulder its share of political and economic responsibility for the whole of Europe and towards its partners in the world.\(^{19}\)

The EMU

\(^{18}\) (Economist: Dec. 14, 1991, 52)

Among the objectives Kohl ranked highly, the establishment of EMU and a common defense and foreign policy perhaps best demonstrate the extent to which Germany will pursue her own interests through a European framework. The EMU serves as an excellent example of Germany's commitment to the European federal idea.

Since the end of the Second World War, the Germans have struggled to associate their national identity with symbols untainted by the country's past. Germans have no royal family; the national flag has been altered in acknowledgement of the country's destructive imperial past; and any display of nationalist sentiment has traditionally drawn the ire of her European neighbors.

To Germans, the great national symbol of pride has become the hallowed Deutsche-mark. In a country where instability and political fragmentation has historically wrought disastrous results, the stable and strong D mark has become a symbol of the West Germans' successful transformation into a powerful economy and stable democracy.

Maastricht set the timetable for European Monetary Union at 1999. The treaty set standards to attain a single currency (ECU). Chancellor Kohl assured worried Germans that surrendering the D-mark to a European currency would not end their cherished monetary stability. Five criteria must be met before the EC members qualify for the single currency. First, there must be price stability. The inflation rate of a country seeking to qualify should not be more than 1.5% above the average of the three EC countries with the lowest prices.

Second, long term interest rates must be within two percentage points of the average of the three members with the lowest rates. Third, national budget deficits must be less than 3% of Gross Domestic Product
(GDP). Fourth, the public-debt ratio must not exceed 60% of GDP. And finally, national currencies must not have been devalued in the past two years and must have remained within the normal 2.25% fluctuation margins of the exchange rate mechanism.20

These stringent criteria are designed to ensure the stability of the single currency once it does come into existence. However, the momentum toward monetary union can be seen, in light of the Maastricht proposal, in two different perspectives. First, it can be seen as an effort by Germany's European neighbors to attempt to "craft an instrument that promised to provide a counterweight to the preponderant and growing influence of Germany." By tying Germany's greatest asset, the D-mark, into a European monetary framework, Germany's EC allies were attempting to ensure that the country would find its interests in European cooperation in the long run.21

From the German perspective, they were willing to support the European initiative, believing that in the long term German interests would be best served by allowing European input into their financial and security futures. "That effort was willingly supported by policy-makers from both governing and opposition parties, whose perceptions of German interests went far beyond complicated financial questions to the most fundamental questions of security. In short, a shared sense of history may plausibly be seen as shaping a basic consensus among German leaders--some of whom probably thought about the extension of German power, while others

20 (Economist, Dec. 24., 52)
thought about its containment."22

Political Cooperation: The Gulf

With regard to a common defense and foreign policy, Kohl recognized the importance of a united European voice in those areas. Referring to the EC’s less-than-uniform policy stance towards the Persian Gulf and the Yugoslavian crises, Kohl said

It remains our conviction that unification is incomplete without fully including development policy. It remains our conviction that unification is incomplete without fully including security policy and hence defense matters in the long term. Particularly the events of recent months have made it clear to us that we need an effective set of instruments in order to bring our common interests to bear even better in the world.23

The difficulties of establishing a common defense and foreign policy among the twelve EC members, each of whom has widely divergent perceptions and expectations of their role in the world, are numerous. In the case of Germany anxieties about their proper role in the world are particularly acute. Although Germany has begun to demonstrate greater assertiveness in foreign policy, she hesitates to seize the initiative for fear of renewing neighbors’ fears of a return to Germany’s militant past. The current leadership of reunited Germany primarily consists of an older generation who are acutely sensitive to Germany’s legacy. Indeed, the quandry of making the transition to a more responsible and less inhibited foreign policy is summarized as follows:

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22 Ibid., p. 103.
23 Krause, op. cit., p. 309.
Chancellor Kohl and other older Germans in high office feel an urgent need to knit their country into an interwoven Europe before ceding their posts to a generation they fear might be less inhibited by German history and therefore less European. And many Germans, who in the past enjoyed invisible American security but felt morally superior because they did not have to dirty their own hands with fighting, may well gain more appreciation for the United States as they themselves inherit part of the old American security function.24

This problem first revealed itself in 1990 during the Gulf crisis. As the possibility of war became greater the EC (and by extension the Germans) acted indecisively and ineffectively. In the EC in general there was a question of what institutions would take action. Germans were preoccupied with unification and the cost of supporting the Soviet Union’s troop withdrawals from eastern Germany. However, Americans and others who were critical of Germany’s tepid support of the Gulf crisis failed to understand the constitutional restraints on German leaders.

Germany’s Basic Law contains three articles which did not offer German leaders a clear rationale for taking part in the material support of the Gulf crisis. Article 24 states that “The Federation may enter a system of mutual collective security; in doing so it will consent to such limitations upon its sovereignty as will bring about and secure a peaceful and lasting order in Europe and among the nations of the world.” Article 26 was equally vague: “Acts tending to and undertaken to disturb the peaceful relations between nations, especially to prepare for aggressive war, shall be unconstitutional. They shall be made a punishable offense.” And finally, Article 87a states that “The Federation shall build up Armed Forces for defence purposes...Apart from defence, the Armed Forces may only be

used to the extent explicitly permitted by law."25

There was a great deal of debate in the Federal Republic as to what was prohibited by these articles. Initially, there was a conflict between Kohl's CDU and the opposition SPD as to which articles applied to the Gulf crisis. The SPD believed the sentence "'Apart from defence, the Armed Forces may only be used to the extent explicitly permitted by this Basic Law' implied that the use of German force anywhere outside the NATO area was prohibited."26

Helmut Kohl was inclined to interpret the Basic Law in a way which would allow him to repay the United States for its support of reunification. In his opinion, it was time for Germany to assume the leadership role it had earned. And he believed that if Germany was to be respected as a world power, it needed to make a contribution towards security and stability outside of Europe and not just within.

However, in September of 1990 Kohl bowed to domestic pressure and instead pledged financial and economic support and pledged to try to lift some of the constitutional restraints on "offensive" German military activity.27 Despite the reservations of the German public, the country did commit forces as part of NATO's obligation to Turkey, sent Patriot missiles to Israel, and sent a flotilla of minesweepers after the war to clean up the Gulf.

Thus, while the Germans did contribute financial and, to a lesser extent, material support to the Gulf crisis, they were criticized by all sides.

27 Ibid., p. 238.
Germany's hesitation to station fighter personnel and aircraft in Turkey prompted some to suggest hypocrisy, having been the recipient of NATO protection for over 40 years. Yet, criticism was also levied at the Germans for refusing in line with its policy of not exporting arms to areas of tension.28

Thus, in the Gulf crisis Germany was hampered in pursuing a decisive policy with clear popular support because of three factors. First, the Germans, like other EC members, had no clear institutionalized decision-making process within the framework of the EC. Second, the Germans also had their own constitutional restraints to consider, unlike many other EC actors. And, finally, the legacy of German militarism prompted a maelstrom of public opinion at home and abroad, denying German leaders of a clear mandate from their allies and domestic constituencies. Formulating a coherent and just policy in the face of so many cross pressures proved extremely difficult for the Germans who were already preoccupied with the reunification process.

The Crisis in Yugoslavia

The initial EC response to the crisis in Yugoslavia in the spring of 1991 was to levy economic and diplomatic pressure on Serbians in order to prevent the imminent disintegration of that country. Since over 50 percent of Yugoslavia's foreign trade was with EC members it was assumed that the country's leaders would respond to Western pleas to prevent civil war and disintegration. EC leaders hoped that their previous relationship

28 Ibid., p.238.
with Yugoslavia and the future dominant role the community would play in European affairs would influence Belgrade to pursue a peaceful solution to the crisis.\footnote{Ibid., p. 249.}

Into the fall of 1991 the threat of sanctions had been applied by the EC to Serbia through weakly worded statements that failed to deter the emboldened Serbian governments. Frequent visits to Belgrade by EC emissaries failed to emphasize to the Serbian leadership the EC position on solving the crisis through force.

As violence mounted in the breakaway republics of Croatia and Slovenia, public opinion in Germany favored a strong German response. With many Croatians living in Germany as permanent residents, the crisis was brought home to many Germans to a degree not found in other EC member states. In addition, the Roman Catholic Croatians and Slovenians found the favor of Kohl's Christian Democrat/Christian Social Unions, who saw aid to the region as a religious duty.\footnote{Ibid., p. 252.}

German leaders were hesitant to recognize Croatia and Slovenia outside of the framework of EC cooperation. Yet, as 1991 progressed, domestic pressure to take action combined with the EC's ineffectiveness to prompt German leaders to consider recognizing Croatian and Slovenian sovereignty. This would recognize that the disintegration of Yugoslavia was irreversible and that the establishment of a Greater Serbia was against the best interests of Europe as a whole. In recognizing the republics, Germany would also be seizing the initiative in its foreign policy to a greater extent than at anytime in the post-war era.
The Germans also felt that some EC members would follow their lead. As pressure mounted, EC foreign ministers met to adopt a resolution allowing the recognition of republics under general tests that included human rights guarantees, rights for minorities, commitments to changing borders through peaceful means, and commitments to non-proliferation and arms control. In December 1991, they stated that if the republics met these goals the EC states could recognize them by January 15, 1992.31

When Germany extended formal recognition to the republics on December 23, Kohl hailed it as "a great victory for German foreign policy." In response to Belgrade's claims that Germany was trying to build a sphere of influence as a foundation for a Fourth Reich, Kohl stated, "We Germans are concerned about the fate of these people and about their future in democracy—nothing else." 32

Thus, the early recognition of Croatia and Slovenia represented a new German assertiveness in foreign policy that was criticized in many quarters. Not only did the Germans break out of the Community mold, but they welcomed the opportunity to do so. This new German willingness to take the initiative in foreign policy matters is clearly indicative of the Germans flexing diplomatic muscle commensurate with their status as a world power.

Germany's bold move to defuse tension in Yugoslavia by recognizing the country's inevitable disintegration signalled an end to its political deference and meekness. Some in the EC are particularly sensitive about the German willingness to take its own route to crisis management.

31 Ibid., p. 253.
According to one French EC official, "'You get the feeling that the Germans are thinking, 'We've reached the limits of what we can do for others and now we have to take care of ourselves.'" 33

Yet, the Germans are caught in a seemingly inescapable bind as they attempt to help reforge a European consensus while at the same time seizing an appropriate role. As was highlighted by the Gulf and Yugoslavian crises, the Germans are susceptible to criticism from those who feel they do too little, and from those who feel they are assuming too much initiative. As one German diplomat said, "It's another case of damned if you do, damned if you don't."34 The German experience with European political cooperation is inextricably linked to the designs of the security framework of Europe. In the aftermath of the Soviet pullout in the East, the threat of traditional animosities resurfacing is increasingly evident. Also, Europeans are justifiably concerned that a German hegemon lies in their midst without the comforting restraints of a superpower presence. The next chapter examines these security concerns in the wake of bipolarity, noting both the concerns of the countries involved and the steps that Germans have taken to assuage those concerns.

33 Ibid., p. 1.
34 Ibid., p. 1.
Chapter 4: United Germany and European Security

With the end of the bipolar order and German reunification, traditional security structures in Europe are undergoing a dramatic transition. The security arrangements of the Cold War—bipolarity, the division of Europe and Germany into spheres of influence—no longer apply in light of the dramatic changes in Europe in the last three years. The debate has shifted from one characterized by the East-West conflict to one in which the speed of the transition to new security arrangements and the very composition of these security arrangements is highly contentious.

As with other issues discussed in this thesis, Germany’s role in the new security apparatus is a matter of grave concern to the international community. For forty years the bipolar order had kept Germany divided; to her European neighbors, this was synonymous with peace. Although Germany remains a central factor in the European security debate, this time it will be as a policy formulator and not merely an object of Western security policy.

The very notion of what constitutes security is also debatable. The threat to Europe today is less of a military invasion by Russia than it is one of the spread of destabilizing regional tensions—as in Yugoslavia. Indeed, attempting to define what constitutes security threats and thus the new “architecture” of a European security system is an almost impossible task. We may only hypothesize on
the process of establishing new security structures. As one commentator has noted:

The new security system in Europe is unlikely to be produced through bargains struck by statesmen—as happened four decades ago—but rather will evolve, step by step, from a host of developments that cannot all yet be divined. Virtually all of the states have pluralistic societies and advanced, interdependent economies; and many factors in the security equation—both challenge and response—will be determined by the success or failure of political and economic experiments within individual states.\(^1\)

The Western security frameworks established during the Cold War—anchored on NATO with peripheral organizations such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the Western European Union (WEU)—have partially laid the groundwork for a new security system that is effective in crisis management and confidence building. However, any new security system in Europe must encompass a culturally, politically, and economically diverse body of nations which possess sometimes divergent security imperatives. Thus, the process of establishing an inclusionary security framework that reflects the changing security atmosphere will be an arduous and gradual one. The only accepted fact is that existing Western security organizations such as NATO must move beyond the traditional confines of the East-West conflict.

Given the remarkable fluidity of events in Europe, it is perhaps more useful to identify the central issues involved than it is to make concrete statements as to the exact structures of the new security system. The central issues of the new European security structure

include: 1) the maintenance of the Atlantic link with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and facilitating German “containment” within NATO; 2) the possibility of institutionalizing the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE); and, finally, 3) the strengthening of a “European pillar” within the Atlantic alliance and the establishment of a Franco-German brigade.

Germany occupies a central role in each of these prospective new arrangements. NATO for years served a dual role: containing the Soviets and containing the West Germans within a Western security framework. While the disintegration of the Soviet Union has deprived NATO of that function, many Europeans and Americans would like to see NATO remain on the continent to allay fears of a reunited and unfettered German military.

The CSCE represents the only security body which encompasses both Eastern and Western European nations. However, it is merely a consultative body which makes recommendations only unanimously. Without some institutionalization of decision-making and a method of binding member states to its decisions, the CSCE will remain an ineffective consultative body with no power to formulate or implement security policy. As Germany is located in roughly the geographic center of the CSCE map, both its role and its obligations are of central importance.

For years, the establishment of a European defense pillar within NATO has foundered on the lukewarm enthusiasm of the nine members of the Western European Union (WEU). Recent attempts to strengthen the European pillar through the pursuit of a Franco-German “Eurocorps” demonstrate that Europeans, with Germans at
the forefront, are seeking an expansion of security functions commensurate with their political and economic clout.

Before discussing Germany's role in the emerging security order in Europe, it is necessary to understand both the international and domestic implications surrounding German reunification. In particular, the conditions surrounding the "Two plus Four" negotiations on German reunification must be examined. The role of the Soviet Union in these talks is significant, both because it was unexpectedly flexible about the conditions for Germany's reunification and because its internal political position weakened its ability to exercise greater control over the dissolution of its former satellites. For the purpose of providing a backdrop for the discussion on emerging security arrangements, it is to the "Two plus Four" talks that we now turn.

**The "Two plus Four" Talks**

In February 1990, the two German states concluded an agreement with the Allies of World War II (the U.S., Britain, France, and the Soviet Union) concerning their remaining legal rights within the "Two-plus-Four" negotiations. It was determined that the two German states would be responsible for the internal dynamics of their reunification and that international aspects would be addressed by the Four Powers.²

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² Verheyen, op. cit., p. 191.
The "Two-plus-Four" negotiations were not only significant for the formality of returning Germany to full sovereignty. There was also a symbolic meaning to the talks that was directed at Europeans, and indeed the Germans themselves. Both the Europeans and the Germans needed to know what would be expected of them in the new Europe. As Peter Ludlow has stated, the negotiations

...reflected the need of the two Germanies to reconcile their own ambitions and internal necessities with the interests of Europe as a whole. The fears that the prospect of a reunited Germany awakened amongst its neighbors and partners were never far from the surface. For this reason...they were a vital part of the unification process itself, which, as the Federal Chancellor and the Foreign Minister and indeed all leading German politicians constantly maintained, could only be achieved and sustained if it was seen as a step towards the creation of a new, peaceful European structure rather than a potentially destabilising development.³

Of the Four Powers, only the Americans ardently supported Germany's reunification. The U.S. was undergoing a comprehensive reassessment of its own global role. American policy makers in Washington and Bonn agreed that in the emerging order in Europe, strong ties with Germany were critical. As the single strongest member of the European Community, the Germans were welcomed as equal partners.⁴

Although the British and French were initially cool towards the prospect of German reunification, their reservations waned in the face of staunch American support and the unexpected advocacy of the European Community's institutions. Jacques Delors, the European

⁴ Ibid., p. 22.
Commission President, developed close personal ties with policy makers in Bonn which resulted in a series of strongly supportive statements about Germany's impending reunification:

We seek the strengthening of the state of peace in Europe in which the German people will regain its unity through free self-determination. This process should take place peacefully and democratically...in the perspective of European integration. The Community is and must remain a point of reference and influence. It remains the cornerstone of a new European architecture and will permit the further development of a range of effective and harmonious relations with the other countries of Europe.5

In light of these and other constructive comments from the multinational Commission, the British and in particular the French (whose fellow countryman Delors headed the Commission) were pushed into a constructive stance on German reunification.

The Soviet Union was understandably the least pliable of the Four Powers. The prospect of allowing a rapid reunification of Germany was an unattractive option both for Soviet leaders and for the Soviet population, in whom the memories of the sacrifices of World War II loomed large. As impetus for German unification gained steam in December 1989 when Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, in a speech in Brussels, stated that "it is necessary to proceed on the basis of the post-war realities, namely, the existence of two sovereign states...a retreat from that would be fraught with destabilization in Europe."6

The Soviets were hesitant, as a victorious power of World War II, to renounce legal rights in East Germany. The question of what

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5 Ibid., p. 23.
6 Ibid., p. 21.
alliance the new Germany would be a member of, and by extension what the role of Soviet forces in East Germany would be, proved to be the most difficult negotiating points for the Soviets. Yet, two events in July 1990 provided conditions amenable to a compromise. The first was the NATO summit in early July in London "which redefined the role of the alliance in European security and called for a new relationship with members of the Warsaw Pact".7

The second event was a bilateral agreement between Kohl and Gorbachev in mid-July. Gorbachev agreed to full German sovereignty, including the right to NATO membership. All Soviet forces would be withdrawn by 1994. In return, Kohl committed to reduce the level of German military forces to 370,000 and to help pay for the withdrawal of Soviet troops in East Germany.8

In September 1990, the foreign ministers of the two German states and their counterparts met in Moscow to sign the "Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany". This agreement restored full sovereignty to the Germans and led to a formal treaty of friendship and cooperation between the Germans and the Soviets.9 The main body of the final settlement covered five points: 1) territorial issues--the external borders of the new Germany would be the external borders of the FRG and GDR; 2) the non-aggressive character of a new Germany--constitutional provisions prohibiting the preparation for an aggressive war; 3) Germany's renunciation of the manufacture, possession and control of nuclear, biological, and

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7 Ibid., p. 25.
8 Ibid., p. 25.
9 Verheyen, op. cit., p. 203.
chemical weapons (coupled with a pledge to reduce troop levels to 370,000); 4) bilateral arrangements for the withdrawal of Soviet armed forces from German territory; and 5) undertakings regarding German troops on the territory of the former GDR—until Soviet forces were completely withdrawn, the new Germany would only assign German territorial defense units which were not part of NATO.10

**Maintaining the Atlantic Link**

For over 40 years the bipolar order induced a tense but effective stability on the European continent. Throughout the Cold War the threat of previously unimaginable destruction on both sides prevented the outbreak of war. Today, however, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact has deprived NATO of its primary function: to act as a Western security bulwark against the Soviet Union. While few would question NATO's stabilizing influence in the Cold War, many analysts argue that NATO, like the Warsaw Pact, has lost its utility in light of recent developments.11

However, NATO has traditionally "had to perform a triple function: to keep the Soviet Union out, the Germans down, and the United States in; or in other words, to meet the threats and challenges posed by Soviet power and harmonize relations between the European members of the Alliance, while deferring ultimate

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defense responsibilities to the United States."\textsuperscript{12} The changes in the international environment in Europe now demand a security structure that can meet any military threat from successor states of the former Soviet Union and, more critically, continue to promote harmony between European countries. The U.S. presence in Europe remains useful to reassure Europeans, but the redefinition of security in the wake of the bipolar order away from one of rigid East-West tension requires new structures which provide Europeans with greater participation in determining their security future.

A dramatic alteration of NATO's role in European security seems necessary. Numerous proposals exist for revamping NATO to fit the current demands of European security, in which greater political concerns are addressed and the traditional East-West conflict orientation is altered. Wolfgang Heisenberg has noted that the debate over which direction the Western Alliance should proceed has resulted in a vast number of proposals:

Many of these go well beyond evolutionary reform, in particular proposals to transform the alliance into a primarily political institution, or to give it an "all-European" character by incorporating into it the East European states or even the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{13}

For Germany and other Europeans, NATO has also fulfilled another role: that of providing containment of Germany within the Western Alliance. As Wolfram Hanrieder has noted:

\textsuperscript{13} Heisenberg, op. cit., p. 111.
A central feature of allied and especially American policies towards the Federal Republic in the postwar era was the intention, only superficially a paradox, to make the West Germans free and at the same time not free: free with respect to the personal liberties and constitutional safeguards that are the essence of a democratic political order, but not free to formulate and implement an independent foreign policy.14

In the current European security climate the maintenance of NATO and the Atlantic link no longer serves the purpose of keeping Soviet armed forces at bay. However, a NATO and American presence in Europe can still be justified by offering an additional restraint on reunited Germany's military forces, and insurance against the possible threat of turmoil in Russia that could overflow into Europe. The utility of NATO is perhaps best seen in a political light, as it represents a form of stability to Eastern European countries whose leaders "believe that NATO's existence makes their neighborhood more stable, a perception that it can moderate actions in times of tension."14

German leaders have ironically been the staunchest advocates of a continued American military presence in Europe. Although this can be partially attributed to Germany's gratitude for America's unhesitating support for reunification, it also suggests that there will be areas in which German interests coincide more closely with those of the Americans than with the British or French. As Elizabeth Pond has noted:

Germany will value its augmented influence in European councils arising from its American connection in NATO. Indeed it is natural for Germany to want to retain NATO's military prowess and practiced political crisis management. It is an existing institution that can perpetuate the American habit of political engagement in Europe...It is a forum that Europeans trust and understand. The Germans and the British—as well as the former Soviet Republics—realize that maintaining NATO is the only way to keep the Americans in Germany, as all wish to do.15

While NATO's (and by extension the United States') continued presence can be justified, it is clear that NATO "will not be central to Europe's new security problems."16 This is a consequence of a different security environment in which traditional security concerns such as nuclear confrontation and conventional arms stockpiling yield to ethnic strife and civil war as the most urgent security dilemmas. The fear of unrest in Eastern republics spilling over into stable prosperous Western Europe has superseded the fear of a military invasion from the West.

For this reason it is important for Americans to support not only the Atlantic Alliance, but also the development of a European pillar of NATO, as embodied by the Western European Union (WEU). The "United States must swallow its reservations and support an all-European security compact, which would first augment and later supplant the Cold War alliances by creating a stable and mutually acceptable framework for the legitimate interests of Germany, the Soviet Union, and their European neighbors."17 To ignore the benefits of an all-European peacekeeping force that can deal with problems

17 Hanrieder, op. cit., p. 411.
that arise outside of NATO's jurisdiction would be to deny the realities of the international environment.

Aside from NATO, there are two other existing forums which have the potential to establish a new security framework for Europe. One, the Western European Union (WEU), is being revitalized as a European pillar of the Atlantic alliance with an eye towards giving Europeans greater flexibility in conducting military-political business outside of NATO's jurisdiction. Central to the revitalization of the WEU has been the renewed impetus for Franco-German cooperation that has resulted in a "Eurocorps"—a joint Franco-German Brigade.

The other existing forum is the 35-country CSCE, which is the only organization which has a membership that spans the traditional East-West divide. While that body's lack of institutionalization (it has no secretariat, and recommendations are made by unanimous vote) hampers its ability to manage crises, it does hold the promise that it could evolve into a collective security arrangement in Europe that includes both the United States and the Soviet Union. It is to this possibility that we now turn.

The CSCE

Although the artificial division of Europe was eradicated when the Berlin Wall fell in November 1989, there remained a natural partition between East and West. Due to widely divergent cultural and economic development in the post-war era, it will be difficult for any new security arrangement to meet basic requirements of both Western Europe and the nascent democracies of the East. As Robert
Hunter has noted: "In addition to the potential tensions caused by this difference between West and East in Europe, it is also clear that the two sides cannot soon share basic understandings, attitudes, and experiences that will enable them to develop an all-European security system that can meet basic requirements."  

The CSCE was an outgrowth of the 1975 Helsinki Conference, in which the signatories agreed to focus on three policy areas: military relationships, economic relations, and human rights. Two factors provide promise that the CSCE could become an effective European security body. First, it is truly a pan-European body that incorporates nations from both sides of the continent. As such, it can provide a link to countries in the East which have no realistic prospect of joining the EC or NATO. Second, the issues it deals with—military, economic, and human rights—effectively incorporate a broader definition of what constitutes "security" in the wake of the bipolar order in Europe.

The 1975 Helsinki Final Act represented an attempt to establish a multilateral security agenda which established confidence-and-security-building measures (CSBMs) that could be undertaken without regard to bloc affiliation. Such security measures included notification of major military movements in advance, the exchange of military observers, and the exchange of military personnel. While the Helsinki CSBMs were not legally

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19 Ibid., p. 59.
20 Manfred Efinger and Volker Rittberger, "The CSBM Regime in and for Europe: Confidence Building and Peaceful Conflict Management," in Michael C.
binding, they did lay the groundwork for an international regime in which parties to the agreements have access to information that they otherwise would not have access to, and it provided countries with a forum for creating and fulfilling expectations.\textsuperscript{21}

The effectiveness of the CSCE and CSBMs during the Cold War was hampered by the fact that it had no authority to force compliance among countries which were parties to the agreements. The nature of the ideological conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States superseded security concerns of smaller European countries. With the demise of the bipolar order, however, the CSCE promises to be the only institution which can effectively represent all European countries.

In November 1990, the CSCE Summit in Paris resulted in the establishment of a permanent institutional structure. Regular meetings of heads of state are to take place every two years, and foreign ministers are to meet annually. This institutional structure has allowed the CSCE to lay the groundwork for a collective security framework and provided an institutional mechanism for conflict prevention and crisis management.\textsuperscript{22}

Although there is widespread agreement among Europeans that the CSCE provides an excellent opportunity for a pan-European security framework, there are a number of obstacles. First, the CSCE operates on the principle of unanimity. Because all decisions of the


\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., p. 116.

CSCE must be approved unanimously by numerous countries with different security requirements, the organization's effectiveness is severely hampered as an authoritative security structure. Coupled with this is the lack of a mechanism for enforcing its decisions. As Adrian Hyde-Price has noted, "Without an enforcement capability (ranging from diplomatic ostracism through economic sanctions to military force), no collective security arrangement can command credibility."23

As in other security organizations in Europe, German support for and participation in the CSCE is critical to its success. While the U.S. and other German allies in Europe often tend to see Germany as breaking out of the carefully cultivated restraints of the EC and NATO, German efforts at strengthening the CSCE are designed to complement and not replace those organizations. When Chancellor Kohl proposed his "ten points" upon which German reunification could be attained in December 1989 (which events would quickly outpace), three of them referred to Germany's role in larger political organizations and frameworks. The eighth point identified the CSCE as the institution in which Germany would work closely to eliminate tensions of the past.24

The CSCE is what Robert Hunter calls "security neutral." It has "never been premised on a greater moral claim by one side or another to be secure. This neutrality with regard to security is all the more impressive against the background of past human rights

23 Ibid., p. 133.
discussions in which the Soviet Union and its allies were always at a moral disadvantage." 25 Through its pan-European and consensus-bound orientation, the CSCE is the organization that has the best opportunity to underwrite and monitor further confidence-building measures.

Thus, the CSCE is a logical complement to NATO, the EC, and other European security organizations. Further institutionalization of the CSCE would help to create an umbrella organization which, together with existing institutions, will provide more opportunities to address crucial security issues than in the past. As Harald Mueller has noted, the change in the international climate provides a propitious opportunity to reorder security structures in Europe:

The recent positive assessment of international law by the Soviet Union should be taken seriously in the view of the German government. The CSCE is the appropriate forum within which such institutions can be developed. This requires the broadening of the mandate, creation of permanent institutions within the CSCE framework, and the investment of some authority in these new institutions. A foreign ministers council, a secretariat, a verification agency, a conflict management center, should give the CSCE the character of a permanent organization concerned with matters of European security. 26

The CSCE then can play a constructive role in European security by seizing greater initiative in the realms of arms control verification, refugee policy, human rights, and economic aid transfers from the West to the East. However, although it is an organization with a pan-European membership, it must act as a complement to Western security structures already in place. It is with this fact in

mind that we now turn to an examination of the WEU and its efforts to carve out a greater role in providing for European security.

The WEU

As stated earlier, NATO has had to redefine its role in Europe but at the same time establish itself as an indispensable component for future European security. As NATO redefines its role in light of dramatic geopolitical change, one European security organization has an opportunity to break out of its subordinate role and provide the continent with a purely European defense organization. That organization is the Western European Union (WEU).

The ability of West Europeans to forge a viable security organization separate from NATO is critical to the establishment of greater political cooperation discussed in the last chapter. The rapid disintegration of the Soviet glacis in Eastern Europe has created special demands and obligations on the EC to take the lead in helping them make the transition to democracy and market economies. While the multinational institutions of the EC have made tremendous progress in dealing with economic and welfare issues, they have yet to effectively converge defense and security policies. In order to help Eastern Europeans to the fullest extent, and to promote stability and integration in volatile areas of Europe, the EC must develop a security structure autonomous from NATO.
This will be difficult for West Europeans, whose security for so long has depended on American power in the NATO framework. As one commentator has noted:

Until the revolution of 1989, West European security cooperation was a subordinate element of the restructuring of the Western Alliance. In the wake of the breakup of the bloc system and the emphasis on the 1992 process, West European security cooperation may well be placed at the vanguard role in creating the new Europe. Put in negative terms, if Western Europe cannot create a common security identity, it may not be able to create the political identity so essential to the redefinition of sovereignty in a multinational Europe.27

The WEU currently counts as members nine of the twelve countries in the EC. At the Maastricht meetings in December 1991, EC member states set up the provisions for a bolder and more flexible WEU to handle European concerns outside of NATO. Soldiers fighting in the WEU would fight under the banner of the European Union. Such a force would give the EC greater leeway in the event of crises such as Yugoslavia; NATO would continue to handle defense against an attack on one of its members.28 However, such a configuration of security organizations with different but sometimes overlapping functions would require some coordination through an inter-organizational agency. Such an agency could effectively identify jurisdictional areas and prevent redundancy of security functions.

The imperative for an effective WEU is only now beginning to reveal itself to the U.S. Previously, American policy-makers saw the establishment of a separate European defense organization as a

threat to NATO. In effect, the U.S. was hesitant to provide a nuclear umbrella for defense policy that it did not write. However, as one commentator has noted:

Development of a coordinated European defense capability can now relieve the United States of what it has long felt was an excessive share in the burden of maintaining security in Europe. It can facilitate any further out-of-area expeditions that allies might decide are necessary. And, in the hidden agenda, it can make available European units with U.S. logistics and intelligence that might be able to intervene in emergencies in the Middle East and in nearby Eastern Europe.29

Thus, there is a strong strategic as well as political rationale for consummating the WEU.

Reinhardt Rummel has suggested that the emerging security framework for Europe will require clear guidelines for the roles of the WEU, NATO, and the establishment of European Political Union as envisioned by Maastricht. Much of the difficulty in establishing the common defense and security policy that the WEU would require is found in divergent national expectations. Thus, the complete transference of sovereignty in this area to Brussels is unlikely. As Rummel notes, "National political leaders have drawn diverse conclusions from external challenges such as the Gulf War or the instability in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union."30 In short, some countries, such as Britain, prefer not to actively pursue a common defense and security policy on the grounds that NATO provides adequate defense for Europe. On the other hand, France and Germany see the British stance as out of step with the changes in

29 Pond, op. cit., p. 124.
Europe. These countries "think that if this model were to guide the evolution of a common policy, the economic giant would be likely to remain a political dwarf and a military appendix."  

A central element to strengthening the "European pillar" has been the establishment of the "Eurocorps"--a Franco-German military division. The French and Germans have long understood that their continued cooperation is at the heart of Europe's integration efforts. This understanding is derived from different goals on each side. For the French, outside NATO's military command, the WEU and the Franco-German brigade is a manifestation of "the desire to expand the European capability to take independent decisions commensurate with the French concept of security independence. For the West Germans, enhanced Europeanization has been desirable as a way of avoiding the constraints of the superpower-dominated East-West system."  

The Eurocorps was established in the wake of Maastricht in order to support the treaty's guidelines for European defense policy to be operated through the WEU. Membership is open to other European states and it is to reach full strength by 1995. Three broad tasks will be assigned to the Eurocorps: first, it will support NATO within the NATO area (thus, as the Germans claim, bringing France closer to NATO); second, it will back the WEU in non-NATO areas of Europe; and finally, it will take part in peacekeeping missions outside of Europe.  

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31 Ibid., p. 81.
32 Laird, op. cit., p. 113.
These tasks present some difficult problems for German policy makers. First, it does present the specter of a clash of interests between Germany's role in NATO and the WEU. Second, while there is wide support in the Bundestag for German participation in the U.N. peacekeeping forces, the use of German forces outside NATO is prohibited by the Basic Law. The security role that Germany will eventually play is part of a larger issue of constitutional and political changes to be wrought by German reunification. As German defense minister Volker Ruehe has noted, "it could be a decade before Germany is psychologically ready for a wider 'out of area' military role."  

Thus, the development of the Eurocorps as a supplement to the WEU and NATO represents an attempt at linking successful Cold War security institutions with new attempts at forging a security framework that is more responsive to new security problems. The German role in this has been supportive of further integration at each level. By supporting political union and taking a lead in establishing close security ties with other Europeans, Germany seeks to establish a European defense capability that reaches out to the countries of the East and emphasizes diplomatic persuasion over military deterrence. Robin Laird captured the essence of the German strategy as such:

In effect, the Germans would seek to Westernize the East and at the same time maintain clear military and political commitments within the Western Alliance. The military effort would be characterized as a drawdown of existing forces and doctrine while the political effort would be leading the dimension for German security policy.  

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34 Ibid., p. 53.
35 Laird, op. cit., p. 119.
In the current European security environment, Europeans, together with the U.S. and Russia, are groping their way toward a new framework which accurately reflects recent changes in the international environment. Western security has traditionally been centered on NATO and has sought to fulfill three critical functions: 1) to protect Western Europe from the Soviet military threat; 2) to embrace the Germans closely within the Western alliance so as to allay fears of an assertive and independent West Germany; and 3) to ensure an American presence in Europe. The need for defense against a possible Russian attack has greatly diminished as Russia tries to enter the economic fold of the West.

However, with regard to NATO's latter two functions—acting as a restraint on Germany and ensuring an American presence in Germany—there is still a strong rationale for NATO's existence. That organization can act as a stable anchor of Western security as the continent proceeds to examine possible new security structures.

In addition to NATO, there are other existing institutions which can be adapted or revived to fill the security void and provide greater possibilities for the establishment of a pan-European security framework. The CSCE is at once the most promising and most difficult to adapt. It has the pan-European membership that any comprehensive security system will require; it also has the capacity to address new security concerns outside the confines of the traditional East-West conflict such as human rights and economic
issues. However, before the CSCE can evolve into a truly effective and credible security organization, it must be endowed with greater institutional authority and an ability to make its decisions binding on its members.

The WEU also has new-found promise for strengthening the Western security fabric. With the renewed impetus of political cooperation prompted by the Maastricht Treaty, the WEU will seek to exert itself as a European pillar within NATO. It will attempt to serve European defense and peacekeeping needs that are outside NATO jurisdiction; in doing so, it will seek to exert a common European voice in security and foreign policy that has thus far eluded the EC.

A significant element of this European effort to speak with one voice is found in the establishment of the Franco-German Eurocorps. This corps represents an attempt by the French and Germans to promote political cooperation and spur the WEU to assume a greater responsibility for European defense that is commensurate with European economic power. While the WEU and the Eurocorps present unlikely but possible clashes of interest with NATO, both German and French policy makers assert that the development of a separate and more flexible European defense capability will not undermine existing security structures, but rather augment them in an attempt to respond to the current security environment.
Conclusion

The liberalization of Eastern Europe and the ensuing German reunification has vindicated the pattern of Western European development in the post-war era. The anchorage of the West in institutions such as NATO and the EC and their firm commitment to free-market principles created a unified position against the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites. While there were often serious differences among the West as to economic, political, and security strategies, these institutions ensured an unprecedented period of stability and peace in Europe.

However, amid the euphoria and optimism for a new Europe there are numerous significant challenges. Certainly the greatest of the challenges is to continue to strengthen the integration of Western Europe so that region may guide Eastern Europeans through the difficult transition to democratic government and free-market economies. The role of Germany is central to this mission.

Due to its geopolitical location, economic might, and its historical ties to the East, Eastern Europeans naturally look to Germany for economic and technical assistance. It is understandable, given the Germans' history, that Europeans on both sides of the East-West divide eye German reunification with concern. However, old assumptions must not outweigh current political realities. After over 40 years as a vital member of the Western community, Germany will remain committed to a vision of Europe which emphasizes closer integration.

The character of European integration has changed dramatically in
recent years. In its embryonic stages, the EC was envisioned by its creators as an institutionalization of an inexorable process—one which would gain momentum and spill-over into all aspects of society. While this integration would be initiated in technical and economic fields, the success of these experiments would eventually produce similar dynamics in the political realm.

However, this was clearly a utopian vision of what integration could accomplish, and at what speed. After early successes, the integrative schemes faltered in the face of national governments which saw little benefit in yielding to supranational organizations the nation-state's greatest asset: its ability to use force. Integration, it seemed, would not work after all. There was simply too much national opposition.

However, with time the supporters of European integration adapted to national opposition by developing a more flexible approach to promoting integration. These supporters recognized that cooperation and integration could be enhanced not only through automatic spill-over from various technical realms, but from cultivating spill-over through diplomatic negotiation. This enabled the integration process to continue incrementally, and it offered a potential solution to the obstinacy of nation-states.

Germany has played a central role in this "new dynamism" of the EC. Adenauer first broke with the traditions of German foreign policy by firmly committing Germany to the West and European integration. This gave both the West German state and the West German people a new orientation as members of the Western community. There was for the first time a strong sense of identification with Western economic and political values.
As Germany's economic stature increased, so too did its role in the EC rise. With a firm commitment to multilateralism and closer integration in Europe, the Germans gradually rose to a leadership position within the EC. With reunification, that role has been consolidated. The German efforts at increasing monetary and political union at the Maastricht intergovernmental conferences demonstrate that Germany is both willing to subjugate a hallowed national symbol in the Deutsch mark, and to take the lead politically as it did in the case of the Yugoslavian crises.

The same is true in the security realm. The centrality of Germany's role in constructing a new security apparatus is obvious. As in other issues discussed in this thesis, Germans have assiduously cultivated cooperation among existing institutions such as NATO and the CSCE. Germany's support for a continued NATO presence and its support for a further institutionalization of the CSCE as a pan-European solution demonstrate that the Germans are quite cognizant of the value of multilateral security organizations. Because of this, they will remain committed to increasing confidence-building and security measures in both West and East.

For some time, Europeans will continue to look askance at the Germans. While it is true that domestic developments in Germany should be closely watched, it should also be recognized that the Federal Republic has proven itself a vibrant democratic state. As such, it will act as other major powers—with a strong voice on international matters and with the resiliency of a strong democracy to overcome internal crises. This should mitigate concern of a return to Germany's unstable domestic, and thus international, political past.
Glossary

**Basic Law**—Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany.

**Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU)**—Conservative catch-all parties established in the wake of World War II in the Federal Republic. Adenauer’s leadership of the CDU firmly established that party in the electorate’s mind as the party of the “economic miracle”.

**European Free Trade Association (EFTA)**—organization formed in 1959 to eliminate tariffs and other trade barriers among members. (Austria, Britain, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland) Britain and Denmark joined the EC in 1973, and other members plan to apply for EC membership as soon as 1994.

**European Community (EC)**—established in 1957, this organization seeks to promote integration and closer political cooperation among its members. (Belgium, Britain, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) Consists of three original organizations: European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), European Atomic Energy Commission (Euratom), European Economic Community (EC).

**European Currency Unit (ECU)**—European currency to replace all national currencies upon implementing European Monetary Union.

**Free Democratic Party (FDP)**—Coalition partner of both the CDU and the SPD in governments throughout post-war era. Like the CDU, it is a conservative party; however, it eschews the role of religion in politics.

**Helsinki process**—term referring to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. Major diplomatic agreements on issues of security, human rights, and economic cooperation. Signed by 35 countries in Europe from both the East and West blocs, neutral and nonaligned countries.

**North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)**—established in 1949 to provide security for North Atlantic area. Membership: Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey and the United States. In the wake of the bipolar order, the organization is seeking a new political role for
itself in Europe.

**Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)**--established in 1961 to promote economic growth and freer trade among Western countries.

**Ostpolitik**--policy of conciliation with Eastern Europe and a recognition of the division of Germany. Formulated by SPD Mayor of Berlin Willy Brandt.

**Single European Act (SEA)**--1986 agreement among EC members to establish a single market by the end of 1992. Laid plans for the elimination of physical, technical, and fiscal barriers to freer trade within the EC.

**Social Democratic Party (SPD)**--Next to CDU, the largest party in the FRG. Desired neutrality for Germany in the early post-war era as an acceptable price for German unification.

**Western European Union (WEU)**--alliance within NATO creating a "European pillar". Established in 1955, the WEU was long subordinate to NATO. Maastricht Treaty proposals call for a greater role for the WEU to act as peacekeepers and defensive forces outside of NATO jurisdiction.

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