The role of affective information in the sociomoral development of preschool children

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The role of affective information in the sociomoral development of preschool children

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University of Nevada, Las Vegas, 1993
THE ROLE OF AFFECTIVE INFORMATION
IN THE SOCIOMORAL DEVELOPMENT
OF PRESCHOOL CHILDREN

by

Noelle Susanna Wiersma

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

in

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Department of Psychology
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ABSTRACT

Early theories of social-cognitive development emphasized children's unilateral respect for rules and authority (Piaget, 1932/65). Recently, however, children have been found to make conceptual distinctions among moral, conventional, and personal events. These distinctions are hypothesized to be related to the differential judgments that 6- to 8-year-old children have been shown to make about the emotional experience of others in these types of events (Arsenio & Ford, 1985). However, it is not known if preschoolers make similar distinctions between the affect of various participants in different event-types. The judgments of preschoolers regarding the affect of participants in sociomoral events were examined. Forty-two 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds were presented with scenarios depicting different sociomoral event-types, and asked to assess the affective consequences of events for story participants. Results show that preschoolers differentiate type of affect between sociomoral events and between event participants. Potential implications are that young children are aware of the emotional consequences of events and that this knowledge plays a role in their sociomoral judgments.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

According to Jean Piaget (1932/1965), preschool-age children have a heteronomous understanding of rules, subscribing to all rules as obligatory and unalterable due to the unilateral nature of children's interactions with adult authority. Lawrence Kohlberg (1969) applied the concept of stage development posited by Piaget in an effort to describe cognitive advances to the study of moral judgment. In this framework, very young children are thought to adhere to Stage 1 thinking characterized by "heteronomous morality", only to achieve more complex sociomoral reasoning in preadolescence following the attainment of Piaget's cognitive stage of concrete operations (Hersh, Paolitto, & Reimer, 1979). From these perspectives, moral development occurs as children move from an understanding during the preschool years of all rules as part of an undifferentiated single rule system, to a gradual ability in later childhood to distinguish between rules governing moral (e.g., universally wrong) and social-conventional (e.g., socially normative) behaviors.

Not until recently was it suggested that preschool-age children do in fact differentiate between moral and social-conventional rules (Turiel, 1978). Specifically, the moral domain involves acts that
pertain to the rights or well-being of others (such as hitting, namecalling, stealing, etc.) whereas the conventional domain involves acts that pertain to behavioral standards determined by the particular social setting and consensual norms (such as not participating in classroom activities, not putting one's toys away, not sitting in one's designated seat, etc.).

Subsequent research with normal, abused, and rejected children has substantiated the claim that 4- and 5-year olds differentiate moral from conventional rules and transgressions (Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Sanderson & Siegal, 1988; Siegal & Storey, 1985; Smetana, 1981, 1985; Smetana, Kelly, & Twentyman, 1984). In addition, personal issues, or matters of choice that affect primarily the person committing the act, have been found to represent a personal domain distinct from either moral or conventional concepts among 7- to 20-year-olds (Nucci, 1981). Empirical evidence thus supports Turiel's (1983) domain-specific model of moral development; moral, conventional, and possibly personal concepts actually appear to have distinct developmental origins in early childhood, rather than emerging through a gradual process of differentiation as proposed by Piaget (1932/1965).

One hypothesized basis for children's ability to make these early distinctions between various sociomoral domains concerns the nature of their social interactions with parents, teachers, and peers regarding the appropriateness or inappropriateness of moral, conventional, and personal acts (Much & Shweder, 1978; Nucci & Nucci, 1982a; Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Smetana, 1989). It appears that the social interactions children experience in response to each type of
event may in some ways be qualitatively different (Nucci & Nucci, 1982). Specifically, it has been proposed by Arsenio (1987) that the affective information available to children, including information about their own emotional experience as well as their perception of the emotional responses of others, may vary systematically as a function of the type of sociomoral event taking place. Evidence indicates that affective information is encoded in memory as part of one’s internal representation of events (Bower, 1981). Therefore, as children are repeatedly exposed to different types of sociomoral events with different associated emotions, they may come to reason about those with similar affective consequences as a unified concept (Arsenio, 1985; Hoffman, 1983). Children’s knowledge regarding the common emotional consequences of various sociomoral acts would thus form the basis for the development of abstract sociomoral reasoning and the capacity for domain differentiation (Arsenio, 1987).

To facilitate understanding of moral, conventional, and personal concepts, it is helpful to explore the domain distinctions children are known to make, and the criteria by which they make them. Evidence for the role of social interactions and, specifically, the importance of affective information as a contributor to the developmental origins of domain differentiation will be explored. The need for further investigations concerning the role of affective information in social-cognitive development will also be assessed.
CHAPTER 2

DOMAIN DIFFERENTIATION

In a challenge to Piaget's (1932/1965) assertion that children view all transgressions as violations of a single rule system to be equally evaluated and adhered to, subsequent research suggests that there are several different categories, or "domains", of prescriptive sociomoral events, and that children make important conceptual and behavioral distinctions between them (Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Turiel, 1977). Children's reasoning about moral, social-conventional, and personal events differs in a number of significant ways, particularly with respect to the criterion judgments that children make about each domain.

Criterion judgments refer to the categories used by individuals in order to identify the parameters of a domain of knowledge (Turiel, 1983). In other words, judgments that any given sociomoral event belongs to a particular domain are based on certain aspects or criteria that the event must meet. Empirical investigation of the criterion judgments that children make can help determine the boundaries of a given domain, and reveal whether or not, and in what ways, domains are distinguished (Turiel, 1983). These criterion judgments are based on variations along dimensions of obligatoriness, impersonality, alterability.
universality/generalizability and relativism, institutional status, including rule contingency and authority jurisdiction, and seriousness and deservedness of punishment (Turiel, 1983).

The criterion of obligatoriness refers to feelings of obligation to act as a matter of personal conscience or duty (Davidson, Turiel, & Black, 1983). Research investigating systematic differences between domains along the criterion of obligatoriness typically assesses whether a child would want to respond to a given transgression (either moral, conventional, or personal) committed by another child. Evidence indicates that a greater proportion of 6- and 8-year-old children feel obliged to respond to moral than to conventional transgressions (Arsenio & Ford, 1983). No significant age or gender differences in obligation judgments between domains have been reported. In addition, no information regarding the obligation to respond to acts within the personal domain has been reported.

The criterion of impersonality describes the extent to which an act falls within the realm of personal jurisdiction as a personal decision versus an act independent of personal desires (Turiel, 1983). Studies investigating domain differentiations made along the continuum of impersonality therefore assess whether or not a given act constitutes one's own personal business or preference, affecting only one's self, as opposed to an act that should be regulated by other individuals or the social structure. Research with subjects aged 7 to 20 indicates that while moral and conventional acts are considered impersonal, a variety of other acts can be identified in card sort tasks (Nucci, 1981) as legitimately based on personal inclination, thus constituting a personal domain.
The criterion of alterability refers to the extent to which a rule prohibiting an act is viewed as legitimately subject to revision or change within that same context. Studies by Nucci (1981) and Turiel (1978) indicate that whereas subjects from 6 to 25 years of age consider conventional rules to be changeable, largely because they are established merely by social consensus, moral rules are evaluated on the basis of factors intrinsic to the acts, such as harm and fairness, and are therefore fundamentally inalterable. Personal acts, by contrast, are viewed by children and adolescents as those events that should not be subject to rules at all.

Collectively, the criterion judgments of universality, also known as generalizability, and rule relativity relate to whether an act is perceived as being universally wrong, despite its context, or whether an act's perceived wrongness is somehow relative to or modified by the context in which it occurs. Research investigating distinctions between domains on the basis of these criteria typically assesses whether a given act would, or should, be viewed as wrong in a different context, such as in a different country with no rule governing the event, or at home versus at school. Research with 3- to 25-year-olds indicates that while moral transgressions are judged as universally wrong, conventional acts will be viewed as wrong only in certain contexts (Turiel, 1978). For example, Smetana (1981) found that in response to 10 pictorially-presented stimulus items representing moral and conventional transgressions, 3- and 4-year-old children judged conventional events as more likely to be o.k. at home or in another school than moral events. Additional studies (Smetana & Braeges, 1990; Smetana, Kelly, & Twentyman, 1984)
provide support for the position that moral acts are less likely to be seen as relative to the social context than are conventional acts, even among preschoolers.

The institutional status criteria, including rule contingency and authority jurisdiction, relate to whether or not an act would be perceived as wrong in the absence of a rule governing it (rule contingency), or wrong when permitted by a social institution (such as a school) and its authorities (authority contingency). Nucci (1981) found that 7- to 20-year-olds consistently judged moral acts as wrong under all circumstances, regardless of the presence of specific rules prohibiting them, whereas conventional acts were viewed as wrong only if there were regulations against them. Personal acts, by comparison, were rarely judged as wrong at all. As with universality and rule relativity, evidence overwhelmingly suggests that the criterion of rule contingency differentiates moral from conventional domains for children as young as three years of age (Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Smetana, 1981; Smetana, Kelly, & Twentyman, 1984). In a study by Weston and Turiel (1980), results indicate that while 5- to 11-year-old children did not accept the legitimacy of a school policy permitting moral transgressions such as hitting, they did accept the legitimacy of policies permitting conventional acts. It therefore appears that children also make conceptual distinctions between moral and conventional domains with respect to the criterion of institutional authority jurisdiction.

Seriousness and deservedness of punishment are two related criteria that locate acts along a continuum of how bad (or wrong) children perceive them to be, and how much a child should be
punished for committing it. Research with normal, abused or neglected, and rejected 3- and 4-year-olds reveals that moral transgressions are viewed as more serious and more deserving of punishment than are conventional transgressions (Sanderson & Siegal, 1988; Smetana, 1981; Smetana, Kelly, & Twentyman, 1984). Evidence regarding children with limited daycare experience, although differing somewhat on the deservedness of punishment criterion, likewise demonstrates that moral infractions are viewed as naughtier than conventional infractions (Siegal & Storey, 1985). Finally, Nucci's (1981) research with 7- to 20-year-olds indicates that moral transgressions will be viewed as most wrong, followed by conventional and personal transgressions, respectively.

In an interesting variation on research examining domain differentiation and criterion judgments, Smetana (1985) determined that, even when reference to a specific transgression was omitted, preschoolers were able to differentiate between domains just as consistently as when a specific act was named. Even when knowledge of the exact transgression that occurred was withheld from children, they were still able to arrive at judgments consistent with distinct moral and conventional domains on the basis of other domain attributes or criteria, such as consistency of prohibitions against and consequences of the unknown acts. These results therefore suggest additional criteria by which children's conceptual knowledge may be organized and differentiated between domains.

Most recently, several of the above criteria, including rule relativity, rule contingency, authority contingency, permissibility, and seriousness, have been used to assess the ability to differentiate
moral from conventional domains in even younger children. Smetana and Braeges (1990) found that 2-year-olds do not distinguish moral from conventional transgressions using any of the above criteria. Ability to distinguish the conceptual domains appears to be demonstrated first on the basis of the universality criterion at 34 months. By age 3 1/2, transgressions were distinguished on all criteria, with moral violations deemed significantly more generalizably wrong, independent of rules, sanctions, and authority, and more serious than conventional transgressions.

Overall, the research to date regarding the criterion judgments that children make strongly indicates that by the age of three, children can distinguish between familiar moral and conventional rules and transgressions. Additionally, children are able to distinguish a unique personal domain by the age of seven, or possibly earlier. Children's judgments of transgressions vary depending on the nature of the act itself, and specific features common to the conceptual domain to which it belongs, rather than on a unilateral respect for rules or adult authority as earlier developmental theories would suggest. What is needed, however, is a developmental explanation of how very young children are able to make these distinctions (Arsenio & Ford, 1985).
In an attempt to explain young children's ability to make conceptual distinctions between domains, it has been proposed that the process of domain differentiation, as outlined above, occurs as a result of variations in the nature of social interactions children experience in the context of moral, conventional, and personal acts (Much & Shweder, 1978; Nucci & Nucci, 1982a; Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Smetana, 1989). Moral, conventional, and personal judgments are hypothesized to have different conceptual and developmental frameworks emerging from the differential response patterns of self and others to varying types of acts experienced by children. It has repeatedly been shown that distinctions between moral and conventional judgments develop during the third year of life. Therefore, corresponding differences in their own and others' reactions to moral and conventional acts in the social interactions of children should also be apparent at this age or younger if this theory of social-cognitive development is to be substantiated (Smetana, 1989). Another primary focus of research in preschoolers' social-cognitive development, then, is the consideration of who responds (adults, other children, or one's own reaction) to acts in each domain, including transgressions, and in what ways. The goal of such
research is to determine if children’s social interactions with adults and peers are in fact qualitatively different among moral, conventional, and personal acts (Smetana, 1989).

Several observational studies have investigated the nature of social interactions in the context of moral and conventional transgressions. Using a ten category response coding system, Nucci and Turiel (1978) found that adults tend to respond to the moral transgressions of 4- and 5-year-old children by drawing attention to the consequences of the act for the victim (such as personal loss or injury). Adult responses to the children’s conventional transgressions, however, focused on drawing attention to rules and regulations. Both adults and other children responded to moral transgressions; however, because social convention is generally regulated by adults, it was found that adults are far more likely to respond overtly to a child’s social transgressions (for example, by making reference to or correcting the child’s breach) than are the child’s classmates or peers.

Nucci and Turiel (1978) also classified potential responses to transgressions into 10 major categories. Responses could include injury or loss statements, emotional/affective exclamations, rationale providing, references to the feelings of others, physical responses such as retaliation, requests for adult intervention, disorder statements (drawing attention to the mess or chaos the behavior is causing), rule statements, sanction statements, or commands. Whereas adults responded more frequently to moral transgressions by providing rationale for the behavior or referring to feelings of others, they responded to conventional events with more command,
rule, sanction, and disorder responses. The 4- and 5-year-old children were unlikely to respond at all to conventional transgressions, but responded to moral transgressions (often as victims) with emotional responses, injury or loss statements and, less frequently, with commands, and requests for adult intervention.

In a naturalistic study of older children, Nucci and Nucci (1982b) examined the social interactions of second-, fifth-, and seventh-graders by coding the responses of teachers and peers to children's moral and conventional transgressions. Overall, even at these ages, children remained much more likely to respond overtly to moral events than conventional ones. Responses of both children and teachers to moral events centered on the negative (hurtful or unfair) consequences of the acts for victims, whereas responses to conventional events focused on aspects of social order such as rules and normative expectations.

Much and Shweder (1978) conducted a discourse analysis of preschoolers' conversations about moral and conventional transgressions that the children had witnessed. Findings were consistent with those of Nucci and Turiel (1978) in that both adults and children responded to moral transgressions. As expected, only adults responded overtly to children's breaches of social convention such as breaking a school rule. When breaches of social convention were of a type that involved the breaking of a more widely applicable cultural expectation (such as a boy wearing a girl's swimsuit), however, both children and adults responded. These results suggest that a finer distinction can be made within the social-conventional domain, in that broader cultural standards (such as sex-
role transgressions) are viewed as more wrong and worthy of punishment than other more circumscribed social regulations (such as remaining seated).

Smetana (1984) observed and recorded similar social interactions surrounding moral and social transgressions in 1 1/2- to 2 1/2- year-old children, and found that for both age groups, adult caregivers, but not children, overtly responded to conventional transgressions. Further, responses to moral transgressions were more frequent among younger toddlers, whereas responses to conventional transgressions increased with age. In response to conventional violations, adults were observed to issue commands or, far less frequently, to provide rationales, refer to rules or sanctions, make disorder statements, or, for younger children, refer to the caregivers feelings. Adult responses to moral transgressions included commands, physical restraint, and attempts to divert attention. Childrens' responses to moral transgressions were namely emotional reactions, physical retaliation, and, as age increased, injury or loss statements. Using sequential recording of responses, Smetana (1984) found that only after other children, as victims of transgressions, responded with emotional reactions or injury statements did adults respond with statements regarding the wrongness of the act and its consequences for others.

Most recently, Smetana (1989) sought to generalize these findings by investigating the social interactions of toddlers surrounding moral and conventional transgressions in the home, as previous research efforts had been limited to daycare settings. Again, results indicated that who responded to a transgression, and
how, varied as a function of the type of transgression, either moral or conventional. Children, as victims of transgressions, and mothers both responded to moral transgressions. Childrens' responses included injury-loss statements, emotional reactions, physical retaliation, and commands to cease the offending behavior. As expected, mothers responded to conventional transgressions with commands that the behavior cease and, less often, with disorder statements and references to rules and sanctions.

Overall, research strongly indicates that the social interactions of children vary with respect to moral and conventional events by the age of three, and possibly by the age of two. The evidence that social interactions differ qualitatively by domain lends credence to their importance in the process of social-cognitive development. It may be reasonable to assume that the nature of children's social interactions surrounding personal events also differ qualitatively from those regarding moral or conventional events, although there is a paucity of research addressing this assumption. Nevertheless, in light of empirical evidence that preschool-age children make distinctions between moral, conventional, and possibly personal domains, and that they do so largely as a result of the qualitatively different social interactions they experience in each domain, research efforts have begun to focus on precisely which aspects of those social interactions may be most salient and useful to children in making moral judgments.
CHAPTER 4

AFFECTIVE INFORMATION

One aspect of children's social interactions that has only recently begun to receive attention is that of affect, or emotional experience. It has been demonstrated that infants and very young children use affective information from the environment to regulate their behavior (Hoffman, 1975). For instance, 1 1/2- to 2 1/2-year-old children have been found to exhibit empathy in response to emotional distress in others (Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, & King, 1979). According to Dunn (1988), children are affectively tuned to the distress and amusement of others, are able to grasp how certain actions can result in the anger and disapproval of others, and are more generally interested in all of the feeling states of others by early in the second year. Nonetheless, little attention has been given to the affect children experience or attribute to others in response to moral, conventional, and personal events.

However, Arsenio (1987) has developed an integrative model of affect and cognition based on the work of Hoffman (1975) suggesting that affect can have an informational function in children's sociomoral development. Specifically, it is proposed that in the context of different sociomoral events, children may experience distress or pleasure which affords them a greater understanding of
their own and others emotional reactions. With sufficient repetition, children may then form stable conceptions of the affective consequences of different sociomoral acts, and therefore come to reason about them in distinctly different ways (Arsenio, 1985).

Several studies have investigated this idea that the capacity for domain differentiation may be facilitated by the nature of affective information associated with each type of sociomoral event that children encounter (Arsenio & Ford, 1985; Smetana, 1985; Smetana, 1989). Some of these studies, as cited previously, involve naturalistic observation of the interactions that take place following different types of transgressions. These studies typically involve the recording or rating of affective behavioral responses to those transgressions by various parties, including transgressors, victims, parents, teachers, or observers. Research using this methodology to investigate affect generally suggests that adults will respond to the moral transgressions of 4- to 12-year-old children by referring to the feelings of others and the negative, hurtful, or unfair consequences to the victim, including injury and loss (Nucci & Nucci, 1982b; Nucci & Turiel, 1978;). Adult responses to the moral transgressions of younger children, aged 1 1/2- to 2 1/2- years, include issuing commands, employing physical restraint, or attempting to divert attention (Smetana, 1984). By contrast, adult responses to the conventional transgressions of 1 1/2- to 12-year-old children tend to focus on commands, rules, sanctions, and disorder, and typically omit any reference to affect (Nucci & Nucci, 1982b; Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Smetana, 1984). Similarly, the responses of other children, aged 1 1/2 to 5, to moral transgressions
involve primarily emotional reactions and injury or loss consequences for victims, whereas responses to conventional transgressions by children of any age are relatively infrequent (Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Smetana, 1984). Together, these results suggest that affective experience may be more salient to children in the context of moral, as opposed to conventional, events.

However, similar naturalistic observations of 2- and 3-year-old children in the home environment would seem to reveal no differences in intensity of emotional reactions observed in response to moral versus conventional transgressions, either by mothers or peers (Smetana, 1989). On the basis of these findings, Smetana proposes that the ability to distinguish between moral and conventional domains at these ages may be attributable to the content (such as reference to the affect of others), rather than the affective intensity, of others responses to a child's transgressions. However, ratings of affective intensity in this study were assigned only to responses that occurred. If children's observed lack of response to conventional transgressions are assigned an affective intensity rating of "0", then there is in fact a difference in affective valence between conventional transgressions and the emotional reactions and physical retaliations expressed by children in response to moral events. Similarly, there were many instances in which other children, but not mothers, responded to moral transgressions. If the mothers observed lack of response to many moral transgressions are assigned an affective intensity rating of "0", then there is a possible difference in affective intensity between respondent types. In effect, the lack of response may in itself be
viewed as providing affective information, communicating, for example, that when a child commits a conventional transgression other children do not become angry. The failure to include and code cases in which no response was observed therefore represents a potential confound in the Smetana (1989) study, and leaves the role of affective intensity in the development of distinct conceptual domains unresolved.

A second genre of studies investigating the role of affective information in domain differentiation relies on a child's judgment of the affect experienced by others, including transgressors, victims, parents, teachers, or observers, in response to various types of sociomoral transgressions presented in hypothetical story format. Using this methodology, Arsenio and Ford (1985) determined that first- and third-grade children rated conventional transgressions as affectively neutral, but moral transgressions as affectively negative. In response to story stimuli depicting moral and conventional transgressions, children were asked to indicate how they would feel if they were to witness the event, as well as how the victims of the transgression would feel, by selecting from a continuum of five faces ranging from very happy to very sad. Children reported that prototypical moral transgressions would elicit greater negative affective responses than prototypical conventional transgressions.

Further, the types of rationales that children used to justify their decisions to intervene or not intervene in hypothetical moral and conventional situations were coded using justification categories established by Nucci (1981). These categories included making the decision to intervene on the basis of fairness or injustice of the act,
disorder or deviation caused by the act, efficiency if the act is performed, existence of authority to sanction the act, simple prohibition that the act should not be performed, simple evaluative statement that the act is bad, or simple restatement of the act performed. However, one additional category of Affective Reference was created to accommodate reasons for intervention that focused on the emotional consequences the act had for others. Results indicate that children in both age groups justified their decisions to intervene in moral situations on the basis of the negative affective aspects of the event.

Subsequently, Arsenio and Ford (1985) employed an affect-induction procedure instructing subjects to think of a happy, sad, or neutral event. The first- and third-grade subjects were then tested for recall of the 10 moral and conventional stimulus items which had previously been presented. Results showed that an induced negative affective state aided recall of moral but not conventional stories. These findings therefore suggest that affect is in fact used to help organize and encode representations of various sociomoral events.

In further support of the salience of affective information in domain distinction, Smetana (1985) found that 3- to 6-year-old children seem to incorporate information regarding the emotional responses of other children in making domain distinctions. Specifically, even when the precise nature of an act remained unspecified, children used consequence information (such as another child, presumably a victim, crying) included in several story vignettes to differentiate between events. According to Smetana, children judged an act as right or wrong solely on the basis of the
criterion of whether or not it caused a negative emotional reaction in another child. The children were unable to provide any reason why an unspecified act might be viewed as wrong or prohibited in the absence of any negative emotional response. Furthermore, when children were told that there was no specific rule to prohibit an unspecified act, they were more likely to judge that act as wrong when negative consequences for others (such as a child crying) were shown.

In addition to these findings showing differences in affective information between sociomoral events, evidence has also begun to suggest that differences in affective valence exist within domains (Arsenio, 1985, 1988; Arsenio & Kramer, in press; Nunner-Winkler & Sodian, 1988). In other words, children may view the same act as having different emotional consequences which vary according to one's role in the sociomoral act.

For example, investigations within the moral domain alone have suggested a gradual developmental shift in children's understanding of the emotions of an event's participants. In a study by Nunner-Winkler & Sodian (1988), most 4-year-olds rated transgressors as experiencing positive emotions, whereas almost all 8-year-olds attributed negative feelings to the transgressor. Further, when evaluating a transgressor, only children above the age of 6 years took the transgressor's emotional reactions into account, judging a happy transgressor to be worse than a remorseful one. Younger children, ages 4 and 5 years, attributed positive emotions to a transgressor even following severe acts with no tangible rewards. They did not, however, attribute positive feelings to those who either
inflicted harm accidentally or merely observed someone being hurt. Additionally, an age trend was observed in justifications for emotional ratings, with primarily an outcome orientation among the 4-year-olds (characters felt that way because they did or did not get what they wanted) and a moral orientation among the 8-year-olds (characters felt that way because of inward or outward labels or sanctions).

In contrast, Arsenio & Kramer (in press) found that 8-year-olds, in addition to 4- and 6-year-olds, expected transgressors to feel positive emotions and victims to feel negative emotions. This finding was qualified, however, by the finding that 8-year-olds who rated victims first subsequently attributed less positive feelings to transgressors. A developmental difference similar to that observed by Nunner-Winkler & Sodian (1988) was found, in that 4-year-olds rated victimizers as extremely positive due to the material gains produced by the moral act, whereas 8-year-olds viewed transgressors as positive to a lesser degree due to the unfairness and harm produced by the moral act. In addition, the older children were able to attribute additional negative emotions to transgressors in response to probe questions about whether each character could be feeling anything in addition to the emotion originally provided. Therefore, transgressors appear to be viewed by older children as experiencing conflicting rather than exclusively positive emotions.

Incorporating other types of sociomoral events, Arsenio (1988) assessed the consequences of moral (inhibitive, active, and distributive justice), personal, conventional, and prosocial acts on several event participants (initiator and recipient of the
transgression, adult and child distal observers, and the subject as observer). Results indicate that children's conceptions of affective consequences were highly differentiated both with respect to the type of sociomoral event presented and to the roles of individuals within each event. On a 3-point scale of affective intensity, 5-, 8-, and 11-year-old children rated the recipient as more affectively negative than the transgressor for inhibitive and active moral events as well as for conventional events; for the personal event, however, the transgressor was viewed as experiencing more negative affect than the recipient. For violations of the conventional rule system, adult observers were also judged as more affectively negative than were child observers.

Similarly, Arsenio (1985) found that 6- and 8-year-old children did not rate the affective reactions of perpetrators, victims, and themselves as observers equivalently. There were overall differences in children's affective conceptions of the different roles, with perpetrators assessed as slightly happy, victims as sad, and observers as slightly sad. Affective conceptions, however, also varied depending on the particular story being evaluated. Specifically, the transgressor was viewed as significantly more happy following a moral violation, such as stealing, and significantly less happy following a conventional violation, such as refusing to line up. In addition, observer self-ratings indicated that children anticipated a much less happy response to witnessing moral infractions such as stealing and hitting than to either the moral act of blaming or to any conventional acts.
Overall, it is important to examine children's conceptions of affective consequences not only between event-types, but also for several participants within an event, because differences or similarities in participants' responses may be a characteristic feature of certain domains (Arsenio, 1988). To date, however, no research has been conducted with children under the age of five in order to accomplish this and to address the contribution of affective information to judgments regarding moral, conventional, and personal acts. This is surprising given that the capacity for domain differentiation has been consistently demonstrated in children as young as three years of age (Smetana & Braeges, 1990). Furthermore, no studies have examined whether or not preschool-age children reason about personal acts as a conceptually distinct domain, or whether they might do so on the basis of differences in affect associated with moral, conventional, and personal events.

In light of such deficits, the present study examined the role of affect in the sociomoral development of 3-, 4-, and 5-year-old children, including their judgments regarding affective valence both between and within moral, conventional, and personal events. Previous research with children aged five (Arsenio, 1988) and older (Arsenio, 1985; Arsenio & Ford, 1985) has suggested that the capacity for domain differentiation may emerge from variations in affective intensity associated with different types of sociomoral events. Based on these findings, it was hypothesized that an overall main effect of domain-type on affective ratings would be observed. Specifically, it was hypothesized that moral events would be rated as
more affectively negative than conventional events, which in turn would be rated as more affectively negative than personal events.

More recent findings with children aged 4 (Arsenio & Kramer, in press) and older (Arsenio, 1985, 1988) indicate that differences in affective valence emerge not only between, but also within, sociomoral domains, depending on the type of event participant being assessed. It was therefore hypothesized that the mean affective ratings ascribed to those committing sociomoral acts would be significantly more positive than those ascribed to recipient-observers of those acts, to adult authority figures such as teachers, or to actors who have been reprimanded by a teacher. Further, a participant-type X event-type interaction was hypothesized; whereas mean affective ratings assigned to teachers and recipient-observers would be similarly negative for moral events, it was anticipated that affective ratings for conventional events may be more negative for teachers than for other children. This hypothesis is based on findings from observational studies indicating that adults, but not other children, respond overtly to conventional transgressions, whereas both groups respond to moral infractions (Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Smetana, 1984).

Fourth, as no previous studies are indicative of sex differences related to the capacity for domain differentiation, it was hypothesized that no main effect of gender would be observed.

Finally, it remains somewhat unclear how age might influence results. There is some evidence (Arsenio & Kramer, in press) to suggest that 6-year-old children may be more likely than 4-year-old children to expect transgressors in moral events to feel mixed
emotions. Whether this difference would manifest itself in a difference between 4- and 5-year-old age groups in an age X participant-type or event-type interaction was uncertain. Given the relative paucity of research examining the role of affect in the sociomoral development of preschoolers, no further effects of age were hypothesized.
CHAPTER 5

METHOD

Subjects

Forty-two 3-, 4-, and 5-year-old subjects were solicited from a Child Development Center at an Air Force Base in the southwestern United States. Subjects were from military families with incomes between $25,000 and $45,000 per year, and represented a wide range of ethnic backgrounds. The majority of children at the site attended daycare full-time. Subjects were classified into one of three age groups: 3 years 6 months to 4 years 2 months ($X = 3 \text{ years} 11 \text{ months}$), 4 years 3 months to 4 years 11 months ($X = 4 \text{ years} 7 \text{ months}$), or 5 years 0 months to 5 years 8 months ($X = 5 \text{ years} 5 \text{ months}$). Groups consisted of an equal number of males ($n=7$) and females ($n=7$) for a total of 14 subjects at each age level. Subjects were chosen for participation on the basis of random selection from among those who agreed to complete the interview, and whose parents or legal guardians granted written consent. Five of the original 42 children selected did not complete the interview and were replaced with subjects drawn from the remaining pool of eligible children.
Materials

Materials (see Appendix I) were adapted from those of Nucci (1981) and consisted of two sets of three stimulus cards depicting one each of hypothetical moral, conventional, and personal events. Each 5 in. x 8 in. stimulus card consisted of a line-drawing portraying two preschool-aged children of the same sex and unspecified ethnicity. One child character (actor) was portrayed engaging in an act, and the other represented the recipient-observer of that act. Two additional 5 in. x 8 in. cards, one depicting a line-drawing of an adult male and one depicting an adult female, represented authority figures (teachers). All story characters were drawn with affectively neutral expressions, and there was no mention of affect in the brief accompanying text. The texts for each of the hypothetical events were of approximately the same length, and each made explicit reference to the act taking place.

Each set of stimulus items included one moral story, either: (a) a child hits another child without provocation, or (b) a child takes another child's sweater without provocation and won't give it back. In addition, each set included one conventional story, either: (a) a child eats spaghetti using his or her fingers, or (b) a child chews gum at school. Finally, each set included one personal story, either: (a) a child chooses a friend to play with, or (b) a child wears a blue shirt to school. The resulting two sets of stories were reproduced twice, once with all male characters and once with all female characters, for a total of four complete sets in all.
Additionally, an affective rating scale with three schematically drawn circular faces, 5 in. x 5 in., was employed. Each face depicted an affective state, ranging from "sad" to "neutral" to "happy".

Design and Procedure

A 2 (gender) X 3 (age) X 3 (event-type) X 4 (participant-type) mixed factorial design was employed to examine the effects of the independent variables of age and gender (between-subject factors) as well as type of sociomoral domain and character role (within-subject factors) on mean affective valence scores (dependent variable).

Each subject for whom parental participation had been granted was approached by his or her teacher and the interviewer and asked if he or she would like to accompany the interviewer to a nearby room to hear some stories. In order to emphasize the voluntary nature of participation, a brief statement was read at the onset of each interview describing the interview procedure and the child's right to refuse or terminate participation at any time. Individual interviews, approximately 15 minutes in length, were then conducted with those children who agreed to participate. The set of stories presented to each subject was determined by counterbalancing Set 1 against Set 2. The order in which the child heard the stories within each set (moral vs. conventional vs. personal) was randomly assigned. Each subject received stories with main characters of the same sex as the child.

Interviews began with presentation of the affective rating scale to the child, who was asked to label each of three faces. Order of
presentation of faces was counterbalanced across subjects. Subjects who offered descriptors other than the intended "happy", "sad", or "in-between" were provided with the appropriate labels until they were able to apply them to the faces accordingly. In particular, the "neutral" face was described to the child as how someone might feel if he or she was neither happy nor sad but just in-between. Subjects were also familiarized with the concept of varying gradations of emotion (i.e., having "a little bit" or "a lot" of a given emotion).

Following the training procedure, the stimulus card for each story was displayed one at a time, and the appropriate accompanying text read by the interviewer. Subjects were then asked to use the affective scale to indicate how each character, including the actor, recipient-observer, teacher, and actor following the reprimand by the teacher might feel in the given situation. If it was indicated that a character felt either happy or sad, then the child was asked, "A little bit or a lot?", according to a counterbalancing procedure. Children were reminded that they could not tell how the characters felt by looking at the stimulus cards because all facial expressions were the same, but must pretend how the characters might feel.

Throughout the interviews, children's justifications for their responses were obtained by asking them why each character might be experiencing the designated emotion. These rationales were included in order to provide information regarding which aspects of a given situation were salient to children in formulating their answers, and to help detect random response patterns. Rationales were subsequently coded into five categories adapted from Arsenio and Kramer (in press): (a) normative concerns, with a character's
emotions justified in terms of conformity to or departure from the rules (i.e., "The teacher was sad because Frank broke the rule"), (b) outcome orientation, with emotions justified in terms of possessing/not possessing a desired object or achieving/not achieving a desired outcome (i.e., "He was happy because he got the sweater"), (c) moral concerns, with emotions justified explicitly in terms of moral concepts such as fairness, injustice, harm, or welfare (i.e., "It was unfair for her to take a sweater that belonged to somebody else"), (d) implied victimization, with emotions justified by references to possible injustice or harm without explicit mention of moral concerns (i.e., "The other boy knocked him down"), and (e) other, including failure to elaborate or to provide a response (i.e., "I don't know", "Just because").

Following the interview, subjects were given an opportunity to ask questions about the faces and the stories. At the conclusion of the study, brief classroom demonstrations were made to provide the children with information about the research, including a description of the emotions typically assigned to various stories and characters.

Reliability

Test-retest reliability for both affective ratings and rationales was obtained 1 week after the initial interview for 21 of the 42 subjects, selected at random. Pearson correlations for affective ratings ranged from $-0.03, p > .05$ to $0.64, p < .01$ for the 12 affect questions. However, an average of 70% of the subjects attributed the same affective valence (positive, negative, or neutral) to the characters at Time 2 as at Time 1. The valence of affective ratings
switched from positive to negative, or the reverse, for an average of 7% of the subjects between Time 1 and Time 2. For moral actors, personal recipient-observers, and personal teachers, the percentage of subjects whose affective ratings changed from positive to negative (or vice versa) between Time 1 and Time 2 was slightly higher, at 19%. Among all cases in which affective valence reversed, the predominant movement was from positive ratings at Time 1 to negative ratings at Time 2, representing 75% to 100% of all reversals. Finally, affective valence ratings changed from neutral to either positive or negative for an average of 23% of the subjects. Percentage adjacent agreement for the 12 characters ranged from 67% to 100%, with the exception of personal teachers, for whom percentage adjacent agreement was 38%. For rationales, overall percentage agreement between Time 1 and Time 2 ranged from 53% to 62%.

In addition, interrater reliability was calculated for a 29% random subsample of subjects using an independent coder. For affective ratings, interrater reliability was .93. For rationale coding, a reliability coefficient of .91 was obtained.
CHAPTER 6

RESULTS

Affective Ratings

Preliminary analyses (repeated measures analysis of variance) indicated no significant effects of story set on affective ratings, \( F(1, 38) = 2.91, p > .05 \). Consequently, scores for these two sets of stories were collapsed for all subsequent analyses. Similarly, no significant effects for order of presentation (moral vs. conventional vs. personal) were found, \( F(2, 39) = .43, p > .05 \). Accordingly, order of story presentation did not receive further consideration in the remainder of analyses.

A 2 (gender) X 3 (age) X 3 (event-type) X 4 (participant-type) repeated measures analysis of variance, with gender and age as between-subject factors and event-type and participant-type as within-subject factors, was performed. No main effects of age, \( F(2, 36) = .82, p > .05 \), or gender, \( F(1, 36) = 1.09, p > .05 \), were obtained. However, a main effect of event-type was found, \( F(2, 72) = 93.90, p < .001 \). Table 1 shows the means and standard deviations for affective ratings assigned to events. A posteriori comparisons (Tukey HSD) revealed that moral events received more negative affective ratings than did conventional events, which in turn were rated more negatively than personal events, HSD.05 = .28.
Table 1

*Means and Standard Deviations of Affective Ratings for Event-type*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event-type</th>
<th>Moral</th>
<th>Conventional</th>
<th>Personal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>M</strong></td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>3.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SD</strong></td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>1.56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Additionally, a main effect of participant-type was observed, \( F(3, 108) = 69.35, \, p < .001 \). Table 2 gives the means and standard deviations for affective ratings assigned to participants. Post hoc comparisons (Tukey HSD) showed that before the teacher intervened, actors were judged to feel more positive than recipient-observers or teachers, who were assigned similar, moderately negative emotions, HSD.05 = .39. Reprimanded actors, however, were assigned more negative emotions than recipient-observers or teachers, HSD.05 = .39.

Table 2

Means and Standard Deviations of Affective Ratings for Participant-type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant-type</th>
<th>Actor observer</th>
<th>Recipient observer</th>
<th>Teacher</th>
<th>Reprimanded actor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>3.67</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>1.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>.83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These findings are qualified, however, by the interactions of these variables. Specifically, a participant \times event interaction was observed, \( F(6, 216) = 16.44, \, p < .001 \). Table 3 presents the means and standard deviations of affective ratings for events and participants. Post hoc analyses (Tukey HSD) revealed that, for moral events, actors were assigned more neutral emotions than recipient-
observers, teachers, or reprimanded actors, HSD.05 = .81, who were all assigned extremely negative emotions. For conventional events, actors were assigned more positive affective ratings than recipient-observers, teachers, or reprimanded actors, HSD.05 = .81. For personal events, reprimanded actors were rated as more affectively negative than recipient-observers, teachers, or actors prior to being reprimanded by a teacher, HSD.05 = .81.

Table 3

Means and Standard Deviations of Affective Ratings for Event- and Participant-type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Participant-type</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Actor</td>
<td>Recipient</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Reprimanded</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>observer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>actor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral event</td>
<td>M 3.02</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD 1.70</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conventional event</td>
<td>M 3.62</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD 1.51</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal event</td>
<td>M 4.38</td>
<td>3.86</td>
<td>4.38</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD .91</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Further post hoc tests (Tukey HSD) showed that personal actors were thought to experience more positive emotions than moral actors, who were seen as essentially neutral, HSD.05 = .81. Teachers in personal events were also rated as more affectively positive than teachers in moral and conventional events, who were assigned very negative emotions, HSD.05 = .81. In addition, recipient-observers in personal events received more positive affective ratings than recipient-observers in conventional events, who in turn received more positive ratings than recipient-observers in moral events, HSD.05 = .81. No significant differences were found among reprimanded actors in moral, conventional, and personal events, who were all given extremely negative affective ratings.

Finally, a gender X character interaction emerged, \( F(3, 108) = 3.07, p < .05 \). Table 4 reflects the means and standard deviations of affective ratings provided for participants by male and female subjects. Post hoc comparisons (Tukey HSD) revealed that male subjects attributed the most positive emotions to actors, who were rated as happier than the neutral recipient-observers and teachers, and happier than the very negative reprimanded actors, described by both males and females, HSD.05 = .67. Female subjects, in contrast, did not judge actors to be significantly happier than teachers.

Rationales

Two-dimensional chi-square analyses were performed on all 12 story characters to determine if rationales provided for positive and negative affective ratings varied systematically by subject age or
Table 4

Means and Standard Deviations of Affective Ratings for Participant-type by Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant-type</th>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Recipient observer</th>
<th>Teacher</th>
<th>Reprimanded actor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>3.97</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>1.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>3.38</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>1.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>.93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
gender. Results revealed that rationales provided by boys were different than those provided by girls in two cases. First, when asked why recipient-observers in a moral event would feel sad, more males responded, "I don't know". In contrast, more females offered implied or overt references to being harmed or treated unfairly, $\chi^2 (3, N=40) = 8.48, p < .05$ (see Table 5).

Table 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of Rationales Provided for Sad Moral Recipient-observers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome-oriented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implied victimization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral concerns</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Second, when asked why actors in moral events would feel happy, more male subjects responded, "I don't know". Female subjects, however, provided more complex rationales, such as those focused on the outcome of the act indicating that the actors would be happy because they were getting what they wanted and achieving a desired result, $\chi^2 (2, N=19) = 7.06, p < .05$. Subsequent chi-square analyses controlling for age revealed that it was only 3-year-old males who indicated that they didn't know why moral actors would
feel happy. Most 4-year-old, and all 5-year-old, males provided more complex justifications similar to those provided by females, $X(2, N=12) = 8.91, p < .05$ (see Table 6).

Table 6
Percentage of Rationales Provided for Happy Moral Actors by Age and Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>3 years</th>
<th>4 years</th>
<th>5 years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome-oriented</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implied victimization</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Age differences were also found among rationales provided for happy actors in conventional events. Overall, more 3- and 4-year-olds responded that they did not know why conventional actors would be happy. All 5-year-olds, however, responded that conventional actors would be happy due to outcome-oriented reasons such as getting what they want, $X(6, N=26) = 15.70, p < .05$. In addition, 34% of 3-year-olds, 37% of 4-year-olds, and 29% of 5-year-olds failed to provide any justification for teachers' emotions in all
types of events, answering "I don't know" when asked to indicate why a teacher might be experiencing a given emotion (see Table 7).

Table 7

**Percentage of Subjects Failing to Provide Rationales for Teachers' Emotions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event Type</th>
<th>Age 3 years</th>
<th>Age 4 years</th>
<th>Age 5 years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moral events</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conventional events</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>38.9%</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal events</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean 33.9% 37.4% 28.7%
CHAPTER 7

DISCUSSION

The present study showed for the first time that, contrary to earlier developmental theory stressing the heteronomous nature of preschoolers' understanding (Kohlberg, 1969; Piaget, 1932/1965), children as young as 3 years can make complex judgments regarding the affect of participants in moral, conventional, and personal events. The results indicate that preschoolers differentiate type of affect between sociomoral event-types and between event participants. Apparently, information regarding the affective consequences of moral, conventional, and personal acts is an important factor related to children's reasoning about social events at even younger ages than hypothesized by Arsenio and Ford (1985).

Specifically, results support the hypothesis that children would differentiate between sociomoral domains on the basis of affect, with moral events being rated as more affectively negative than conventional events, in turn rated as more affectively negative than personal events. These findings are consistent with previous research indicating that older children ascribe more negative affect to moral events than to conventional events (Arsenio, 1988; Arsenio & Ford, 1985).
Findings also support prior studies conducted with older children demonstrating that differences in affective valence emerge not only between, but also within, sociomoral domains, depending on the participant being assessed (Arsenio, 1988; Arsenio & Kramer, in press). As hypothesized, affective ratings assigned to actors were more positive than those assigned to recipient-observers, to adult authority figures, or to actors following their reprimand by the teacher.

Such results are further relevant to research regarding the "happy victimizer" phenomenon, in which actors in moral events are judged to feel happy after committing moral transgressions such as hitting or stealing. Several studies have indicated that 4- to 8-year-olds expect actors who violate moral rules or commit undetected dishonest acts to experience positive emotions (Arsenio, 1988; Arsenio & Kramer, in press; Nunner-Winkler & Sodian, 1988). The present findings, however, indicate that preschoolers expect such moral actors to experience essentially "neutral" emotions (neither happy nor sad). Furthermore, based on statistical analysis of order of story presentation, it does not appear that moral actors in the current study were rated as less happy because of the anticipated presence of or reprimand by a teacher. This study would thus provide support for neutral moral actors as opposed to "happy victimizers". Additional research is recommended in an effort to determine under what circumstances actors in moral events will be described as happy versus neutral.

Affective ratings of characters were additionally found to vary according to domain, in an event X participant interaction. Based on
previous observational studies indicating that both adults and preschoolers respond to moral infractions, but only adults respond overtly to conventional infractions (Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Smetana, 1984), it was hypothesized that both teachers and children would receive negative affective ratings in moral events, whereas only teachers would receive negative affective ratings in conventional events. In partial support of this hypothesis, mean affective ratings ascribed to both recipient-observers and to teachers were highly negative for moral events. Contrary to expectations, however, there was no significant difference in affective ratings given to recipient-observers and to teachers for conventional events. Instead, affective ratings for recipient-observers in conventional events were somewhat more negative than anticipated, and more like the negative ratings given to recipient-observers by older children in previous studies (Arsenio, 1987, 1988). This discrepancy may be attributable to the difference between the overt, observable responses to sociomoral events addressed by previous research with preschoolers (Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Smetana, 1984), and the more internal emotional responses and affective judgments that are the focus of the present study. These findings suggest that preschoolers who witness conventional transgressions expect to experience some negative feelings about the incident, despite the fact that they may not respond overtly to such violations or intervene in the situation.

Contrary to the hypothesis that no gender differences would be observed, a gender X character interaction emerged showing that males and females differed somewhat in the intensity of affect assigned to specific characters. In particular, female subjects did not
consider actors to be significantly happier than teachers, as did male subjects. This difference would appear to be related to the elevated affective ratings given to actors by male subjects, reflecting a trend in the data for males to view actors more positively than females that approached, but did not achieve, significance. Any such gender-related finding was unexpected given that no previous studies have reported sex differences related to the capacity for domain differentiation among preschoolers (Smetana, 1981, 1985) or older children (Nucci, 1981). Similarly, no gender differences have previously been reported in studies specifically concerning the affective judgments of older children (Arsenio, 1987, 1988; Arsenio & Ford, 1985; Arsenio & Kramer, in press). None of the aforementioned studies, however, have explicitly addressed the combination of particularly young subjects and affective judgments examined by the present study, and further research would be needed to clarify the nature of any relationship between gender and affective judgments about sociomoral event participants.

Given the paucity of research examining the affective judgments of preschoolers, it was unclear how age would influence results. Notably, no developmental differences were observed in the affective ratings provided by 3-, 4-, and 5-year-old children. Apparently, 3-year-olds are able to reason about the emotional consequences of acts in much the same way that older children have been shown to do (Arsenio, 1987, 1988; Arsenio & Ford, 1985; Arsenio & Kramer, in press). Namely, preschoolers are capable of differentiating type of affect between sociomoral events and between participants as outlined above. Overall, this capacity for
affective differentiation by domain and participant among children as young as 3-years-old lends indirect support to Turriél's (1983) domain-specific model of moral development, in which moral, conventional, and personal concepts have distinct developmental origins in early childhood, rather than emerging through a gradual process of differentiation as proposed by Piaget (1932/1965).

Collectively, the findings concerning rationales provided for affective ratings would seem to suggest an age-related progression in the ability to reason about or to articulate the justifications for others' emotions, with older children providing more sophisticated rationales for some characters than younger children. This would represent an extension of Arsenio and Kramer's (in press) finding that rationales provided for victims and victimizers seem to increase in complexity from age 4 years to 8 years. In addition, present results suggest a tendency for males in general, and younger males in particular, to be unable or unwilling to provide more sophisticated rationales, as females do, for some characters' emotional states. It remains unclear, however, whether the findings of the present study represent a gender difference in the cognitive ability to take on the perspective of victimizers and their victims or in the linguistic ability necessary to articulate complex reasoning and rationales. Further research is needed to explore the parameters, origins, and implications of such age and gender differences.

Additionally, a substantial portion of subjects experienced some difficulty in providing rationales for teachers' emotions in all three event-types. Instead of offering a justification, roughly 33% of the 3-year-olds, 37% of the 4-year-olds, and 29% of the 5-year-olds
responded "I don’t know" when asked to indicate why a teacher would experience a designated emotion. This failure to provide rationales for the emotions of teachers may reflect a limited capacity among preschoolers for taking on the perspective of adults in roles dissimilar to those of children in terms of age and authority (Selman, 1971).

One potential criticism of the present study concerns the admittedly low test-retest Pearson correlations achieved for some affective ratings when tested at a 1-week interval. However, an average of 70% of all subjects attributed the same affective valence (positive, negative, or neutral) to characters at Time 2 as at Time 1. Percentage adjacent agreement for all subjects across the 12 questions ranged from 67% to 100%, with the exception of teachers in personal events, for whom adjacent agreement was 38%. Only infrequently did subjects who had initially assigned a positive or negative emotion to a character switch to the opposite emotion at post-test, representing an average of 7% of the cases. In some instances, it appears that the affective judgments made by subjects at Time 2 were affected by their memory of certain aspects of the Time 1 measure, such as the subsequent introduction of, and reprimand by, the teacher. For example, all subjects who reversed their affective ratings of personal teachers between pre-test and post-test reported that teachers in personal events would feel more negative at Time 2 than at Time 1, apparently influenced by their memory of the fact that the personal act was unsatisfactory to the teacher, as previously presented. Similar findings can be demonstrated for other story characters, such as moral actors and
personal recipient-observers. Such findings increase confidence that subjects are answering fairly consistently with respect to affective valence from Time 1 to Time 2 rather than responding at random.

In conclusion, it has been hypothesized that children's ability to differentiate moral, conventional, and personal events arises from the different type and intensity of affect associated with each sociomoral domain (Arsenio & Ford, 1985). Present findings show that the intense negative affect attributed to reprimanded actors in conventional events is comparable to that attributed to reprimanded actors in moral acts. However, despite such instances of similarity in affect between moral and conventional events, evidence overwhelmingly indicates that conventional acts are conceptually and behaviorally distinct from moral acts (Nucci, 1981; Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Turiel, 1978). Apparently, direction and intensity of affect alone is not sufficient to determine if an act will be conceptualized as moral, conventional, or personal in nature. In this respect, the present study lends indirect support to the theoretical position that judgments about the emotional experience of self and others certainly contribute to the capacity for complex conceptual distinctions between domains, but it is unlikely that children develop such a capacity solely on the basis of affect. The role of affective information is undoubtedly important in the sociomoral development of young children, yet other aspects such as cognitive advances play a complimentary part. As concluded by Hoffman (1975), it appears that the processes of social cognition and sociomoral development may emerge through the reciprocal interaction of affective and cognitive factors.
APPENDIX I

INTERVIEW FORMAT AND STORY TEXTS

Moral Event A:

This is (Susie/Jim) and this is (Mary/Tom), and they're at their school. (Susie/Jim) is hitting (Mary/Tom) on the arm.

How does (Susie/Jim) feel? Why?

How does (Mary/Tom) feel? Why?

Just then their teacher comes up and sees (Susie/Jim) hit (Mary/Tom).

How does their teacher feel? Why?

Then the teacher says, "(Susie/Jim), don't hit".

How does (Susie/Jim) feel? Why?

Moral Event B:

This is (Lisa/Bill) and this is (Becky/Ted), and they're at their school. (Becky/Ted) takes (Lisa's/Bill's) sweater out of (her/his) cubby and won't give it back. (ASK AFFECT QUESTIONS) Just then their teacher comes up, and sees (Becky/Ted) take the sweater. (ASK AFFECT QUESTIONS) Then the teacher says, "(Becky/Ted), don't take (Lisa's/Bill's) sweater". (ASK AFFECT QUESTIONS)

Conventional Event A:

This is (Patty/Mike) and this is (Gina/Bob), and they're at their school. At lunchtime, (Patty/Mike) is eating spaghetti with (her/his) hands. (ASK AFFECT QUESTIONS) Just then their teacher comes up, and sees (Patty/Mike) eating with (her/his) hands. (ASK AFFECT QUESTIONS) Then the teacher says, "(Patty/Mike), don't eat
spaghetti with your hands". (ASK AFFECT QUESTIONS)

Conventional Event B:

This is (Laurie/Ben) and this is (Jill/Eric), and they’re at their school. (Jill/Eric) is chewing gum in the classroom. (ASK AFFECT QUESTIONS) Just then their teacher comes up, and sees that (Jill/Eric) is chewing gum. (ASK AFFECT QUESTIONS) Then the teacher says, "(Jill/Eric), don't chew gum at school". (ASK AFFECT QUESTIONS)

Personal Event A:

This is (Martha/Frank) and this is (Stephanie/Dave), and they’re at their school. (Martha/Frank is playing with (Stephanie/Dave) out on the playground. (ASK AFFECT QUESTIONS) Just then their teacher comes up, and sees (Martha/Frank) playing with (Stephanie/Dave). (ASK AFFECT QUESTIONS) Then the teacher says, "(Martha/Frank), I don't want you to play with (Stephanie/Dave). (ASK AFFECT QUESTIONS)

Personal Event B:

This is (Jackie/Brad) and this is (Irene/Carl), and they’re at their school. (Irene/Carl) is wearing a blue shirt at school. (ASK AFFECT QUESTIONS) Just then their teacher comes up, and sees that (Irene/Carl) is wearing a blue shirt. (ASK AFFECT QUESTIONS) Then the teacher says, "(Irene/Carl), don't wear a blue shirt to school". (ASK AFFECT QUESTIONS)
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