
Maureen Stephanie Carroll

University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/rtds

Repository Citation


This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Scholarship@UNLV. It has been accepted for inclusion in UNLV Retrospective Theses & Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital Scholarship@UNLV. For more information, please contact digitalscholarship@unlv.edu.
INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.
Ethics and foreign policy decisions: Iran-Contra United States-Iraq interaction, 1988–91

Carroll, Maureen Stephanie, M.A.
University of Nevada, Las Vegas, 1993

Copyright ©1994 by Carroll, Maureen Stephanie. All rights reserved.
ETHICS AND FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS: IRAN-CONTRA
UNITED STATES-IRAQ INTERACTION, 1988-91

by

Maureen S. Carroll

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
in
Ethics and Policy Studies
Department of Ethics and Policy Studies
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
December 1993
The Thesis of Maureen S. Carroll for the degree of Master of Arts in Ethics and Policy Studies is approved.

Chairperson, Craig Walton, Ph.D.

Examinig Committee Member, Barbara Brents, Ph.D.

Examinig Committee Member, Fay Coughtry, Ph.D.

Graduate Faculty Representative, Satish Sharma, Ph.D.

Dean of the Graduate College, Ronald Smith, Ph.D.

University of Nevada, Las Vegas
December 1993
ABSTRACT

As industrialized nations, particularly the United States, continue to rely on oil to support their standard of living and production, the Middle East increases as a strategic location. *Ethics and Foreign Policy Decisions: Iran-Contra - United States-Iraq Interaction, 1988-91* explores the ethics of policy making which employ the 'many hands' and 'dirty hands' approach. The Iran-Contra affair and United States-Iraq interaction from 1988-91 are used as case studies. Suggestions for counteracting the usage of the 'many hands' and 'dirty hands' practices are discussed. These suggestions include real communication and accountability for the many players involved in decision making and reflection and critique of possible institutional coercive actions, among others.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................ iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS............................................................................................... vi

INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 1

CHAPTER 1  RECENT HISTORY OF THE MIDDLE EAST.......................... 3

CHAPTER 2  ROSEMARIE TONG'S ETHICS OF POLICY DECISIONS
AND MODELS OF RESPONSIBILITY................................................................. 20
  Dirty Hands........................................................................................................ 20
  Many Hands........................................................................................................ 23
  The Hierarchical Model of Responsibility...................................................... 25
  The Collective Model of Responsibility......................................................... 26
  The Personal Model of Responsibility........................................................... 27

CHAPTER 3 CASE STUDY ONE: THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR........ 36
  Many Hands........................................................................................................ 36
  Dirty Hands........................................................................................................ 38
  Responsibility Models: Hierarchical, Collective, Personal.......................... 40
  Excuses: Causal, Volitional and Coercion...................................................... 42

CHAPTER 4 CASE STUDY TWO: UNITED STATES-IRAQ
  IN Volvement, 1988-91..................................................................................... 46
  Background......................................................................................................... 46
  Many Hands........................................................................................................ 49
  Dirty Hands........................................................................................................ 50
  Responsibility Models: Hierarchical, Collective, Personal.......................... 54
  Excuses: Causal, Volitional and
## Chapter 5: A Concluding Synthesis and Suggestions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conclusion</th>
<th>59</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iran-Contra Affair</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States Involvement with Iraq:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988-91</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suggestions</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many Hands</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dirty Hands</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran-Contra: Review the National</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Council</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States Policy Decisions with</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq: 1988-91</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Tax Allocations</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Bibliography

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>78</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First, I want to express my thanks to my thesis committee. Dr. Jay Coughtry encouraged me to look at the material I had to see the connections available for this project. He definitely got me started on this final work. I greatly appreciate his help and support. Dr. Barbara Brents skillfully edited my earliest drafts and gave valuable suggestions for tightening up my ideas. Dr. Craig Walton shared valuable thoughts concerning the direction of policy suggestions and a surprising, to me, suggestion for additional information for me to consider, the movie Judgment at Nuremberg. When I saw that movie in 1961 at the age of 13, my life’s journey began. Dr. Satish Sharma expanded my knowledge of M.K. Gandhi and his life - his experiments with truth; God is truth; truth is God (or Goddess, I imagine). I appreciate Dr. Sharma’s constant pacific supportive care which I carry in my spirit always.

Shannon Nadeau, who is in charge of command central at the Institute of Ethics and Policy Studies, has been particularly helpful, but most of all, she has been cheerful, kind and understanding in her dealings with me. Thanks so much, Shannon.

I would like to thank some of my friends in my justice community: Erynne Ansel, Peg Bean, Joan Brown, Joan Cutuly, Phyllis Hallam, Mary Lehman, Richard Lewnau, Sydney Minckler, Tobia Minckler, Alain Richard, Rob Rosenthal, Mary Ann Smith, Denise Stevenson, Susie Taylor and Erik Thompson. You are there for me to share insightful conversations and to listen to me complain when I become stuck. I especially want to thank Ken Butigan and Julia Occhiogrosso for reading one of the later drafts of my thesis and assuring me that it was "hot". The presence of all of you during the Gulf
War secured my broken heart. I would also like to mention my cute little mother, Lydia Nobs. As I continue with my own experiments with truth, she finds me more and more amusing. Thanks, Mom. And in memory, I thank my father, Ken Nobs, who had an intense sense of right and wrong. He passed on to me this awareness of justice, along with a dry sense of humor.

My high school students offer me insights into the hopes, dreams, and fears of our next generation. My interactions with them help me see not only the necessity for infusing justice and truth into our weary world but also the ramifications of decades of deceit. My hope is that they will find our world a place in which they can engage in positive, love-filled lives.

Finally, I want to remember my dear friend, Father Neil O'Reilly. As a teenager, I learned from him the importance of believing in courage, honesty, integrity, justice, and truth encased in the greatest commandment of all, love. Neil died in the middle of my masters program. Thank you for letting me know that while my vision of the world may not be popular nor easy to see nor in adherence to the status quo, it is felicitous to be on the path of the Way, to the spirit of shalom. In the words of the singer, songwriter Tracy Chapman: "Hunger for a taste of justice; hunger for a world of truth."
INTRODUCTION

Foreign policy directs the course of action between nations. It establishes trade practices, aid programs, diplomatic relations, and responses to hostile actions. Through foreign policy decisions, determination can be made as to who will live and who will die as well as which countries and economies will flourish and which will languish.

Does ethics play a part in foreign policy decisions, or is it merely expedient with only the short-term objectives in mind? Are foreign policy decisions made openly so that citizens of the country know what is being done in their name and with their tax money, or are they clandestine so that the ramifications as well as costs are hidden unless scandalously exposed? In a representative democracy, is there a moral need for openness, honesty, and accountability in foreign policy decisions?

For the United States, the Middle East has become an especially important and volatile region. In chapter one, a recent history of the Middle East will be discussed. Since Iraq has become particularly prominent, the diplomatic and trade practices of a variety of countries, including the United States, will be discussed. Iraq's human rights record will also be discussed.

Chapter two will explain Rosemary Tong's discourse on the use of 'many hands' and 'dirty hands' in policy making. Models for the assumption of responsibility and excuses to avoid accepting responsibility will be examined.

The Iran-Contra affair will be discussed in chapter three as a case study in which the 'many hands' and 'dirty hands' concepts can be applied. Possible candidates for responsibility will be named and the excuses available to avoid responsibility will be
discussed.

After eight years of battle with Iran, Iraq was able with three years of preparation to launch war once again with the invasion of Kuwait. In chapter four, the United States interaction with Iraq which helped Iraq rearm will be explored.

Chapter five will draw together a synthesis of the information presented and will explain policy suggestions that could enable ethics to be introduced in foreign policy making.
CHAPTER 1

RECENT HISTORY OF THE MIDDLE EAST

Prior to the Persian Gulf War of 1991, what guided foreign policy in the Middle East, especially United States foreign policy? Since the end of World War II, the United States has seen itself in a bipolar military competition with the Soviet Union. Their major theaters of action contained Europe and Northeast Asia. Beginning with the Carter administration and continuing through the Reagan and Bush administrations, a third theater emerged - the Persian Gulf. A knowledge of the recent past expands an attempt to understand foreign policy regarding the Middle East.

As the 1970s began, the importance of the Persian Gulf area became apparent to U.S. policy makers with the withdrawal of the British from East of the Suez, the United States' expanding reliance on Gulf oil, and a gradual increase in Soviet involvement. Three important events fueled U.S. military planning. During the 1973 Middle East war, Arab oil producers imposed an oil embargo against the United States and the Netherlands. Concerned that this strategy would use oil as a weapon, some individuals in policy discussions proposed the use of U.S. military force to secure oil fields should this condition of oil-as-a-weapon arise. Second, following the disposition of the Shah of Iran, chaos within the country caused oil production to fall which made oil prices rise significantly. Iran and Saudi Arabia had been the pillars of stability in the region, and one pillar, Iran, had toppled.
Finally, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, President Carter included in his 1980 State of the Union address what later was called the "Carter Doctrine":

Any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America and such assault will be repelled by any means necessary including military force. (Johnson, 1989, 123-124)

By March 1980, a "Rapid Deployment Task Force" (RDJTF or RDF) was created and an effort was made to secure bases in the Middle East. President Reagan transformed the RDF "into a new military command, the U.S. Central Command or CENTCOM." (Johnson, 1989, 124)

Because Iran was destabilized after the fall of the shah, the United States was afraid that the Soviet Union might exploit the political disorder and invade. The U.S. military services and the State Department wanted to avoid messy local conflicts and saw the real problems as broader difficulties in the region and increased strain in U.S.-Soviet relations. Anti-Soviet feelings fueled by fear opened the door for planning to use force if all else failed and made a public case for embracing RDF. Johnson says, "Not for the first time, a conception of the Soviet threat that was designed to sell a policy or program came to be accepted as genuine." (Johnson, 1989, 127)

Robert E. Hunter¹, in an article titled, "The Reagan Administration and the Middle East" asserts, "Under Secretary of State Alexander Haig, the administration tried to put the Middle East in a broader context, a 'strategic consensus' of regional states in alliance against a Soviet advance." (Hunter, 1987, 49) By 1981, the Carter Doctrine, by then the Reagan Doctrine, focused on the Soviet Union as Haig attempted to enlist regional powers against the U.S.S.R. Both Egypt and Israel accepted the concept of strategic consensus. Egypt had
assisted the U.S. effort to rescue hostages in Teheran, was prepared to provide base access to U.S. forces, and had joined military exercises. Israel granted U.S. forces participation in its defense by allowing elements of the United States 101st Airborne Division to serve in the multinational force in the Sinai Desert. (Hunter, 1987, 49-50)

Neither Jordan nor Saudi Arabia became involved in supporting the U.S. with regards to strategic consensus because they saw it as dependent on changes in Israel's position in Jerusalem and the West Bank; they saw the Soviet Union's power as removed from them and the United States preoccupations as not applying to them. At this point the United States' effort to make the Middle East into a global strategic environment did not reach fruition. (Hunter, 1987, 50)

Concurrently, an Arab-Israeli peace process did not deeply interest the Reagan administration. Because of the 1979 Egypt-Israeli peace treaty, the Reagan administration seemed rarely to engage in the United States' traditional role as peacemaker. Hunter suggests that opportunities for peace within the Middle East "rarely seemed promising to policy makers in Washington, ...(since) peacemaking (was) time-consuming, and the peace process (had) often proved to be the graveyard of political ambitions." (Hunter, 1987, 49) These factors contributed to the administration's reduced contributions to try to negotiate peace.

Following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, it became clear that the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty had kept the conflict confined to the region and that for the first time "since Israel's successful struggle for independence and statehood in 1947-49 ...there was no hint of United States-Soviet confrontation." (Hunter 1987, 50) At this point, the United States decided to become militarily involved in Lebanon. The first mission, to remove Palestine Liberation Organization fighters from Beirut, went well. The second which followed the massacres in the Sabra
and Shatila Palestinian refugee camps by Christian Phalangist forces did not fair as well. (Hunter, 1987, 50)

The United States attempted to help bring about the withdrawal of Israeli and Syrian troops from Lebanon and to help Lebanon recover. Both Syria and Israel had their own agendas in Lebanon and neither had complete withdrawal in mind. Syria had reasons of political influence to remain in Lebanon, and for Israel the reason was security. "...(H)elping to resolve what was, indeed, a civil war in Lebanon would have required a degree of knowledge, subtlety, diplomatic skill and political commitment lacking in the Reagan administration." (Hunter 1987, 50) These deficiencies on the part of the administration allowed both the Israelis and the Syrians to remain in Lebanon, while the Syrians heavily rearmed. The administration did not understand the agenda of Lebanon's Maronite Christian President, Amin Gemayel, which was the Maronite dream to keep primacy throughout Lebanon. (Hunter, 1987, 50)

What did occur was that the United States forces which were part of a multinational peacekeeping force became the target for many political activists and finally resulted in the October, 1983, terrorist bombing of the Marine barracks which killed 241 Marines. The administration's response to this was to declare Lebanon of vital interest and the key to the future of the Middle East. By February, 1984, this no longer rang true for the administration and the United States forces withdrew. What followed was that Syria gained primacy in Lebanon which became the locus for further terrorism against people from the United States. (Hunter, 1987, 50-51)

During this same time, the Iran-Iraq War continued. Both the Soviet Union and the United States publicly practiced policies of neutrality in the war. By 1981, the United States had begun rapprochement with Iraq for the first time
since the Ba'ath Party gained control in 1968. In 1982, Iraq was removed from the official list of countries supporting terrorism. This action was implemented by the Commerce Department. On March 18, 1982, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee met with Vincent DeCain, Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration; Ernest Johnston, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, Department of State; Joe Twinam, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs; William A. Root, Office for Combating Terrorism; Frank Perez, Acting Director, Office for Combating Terrorism; and David B. Dlouhy, Country Officer for South Africa to discuss this new export status for Iraq and other countries. (U.S. Congress, Senate 1982, III)

According to the Fenwick amendment of 1979,

Congress is to be notified 30 days in advance before export licenses can be issued for goods or services valued at more than $7 million (and) which would enhance the military potential or terrorism-support capabilities of countries which have repeatedly supported acts of international terrorism." (U.S. Congress, Senate 1982, 1)

Additionally, a yearly review determines if a country may be removed from the list of countries supporting terrorism or not. During the hearing, Senator Boschwitz from Minnesota pointed out to Mr. DeCain that a study had just been completed by the Library of Congress Congressional Research Service which showed that Iraq had taken responsibility for at least a dozen terrorist attacks in 1980 and 1981. He continued by saying that despite Congressional scrutiny, sales to Iraq had increased from $443 million in 1979, to $913 million in 1981. The details of what these sales included were not discussed with the exception of five large airliners. Concern that commercial airliners could be converted to military purposes was discussed. Senator Boschwitz expressed concern that the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee had not been consulted, but that rather the Banking Committee had been privy to this change in Iraq's status. (U.S. Congress, Senate 1982, 3-5)

Mr. Johnston from the State Department explained during his statement that

...the Secretary of State decided to no longer include Iraq among those countries considered to be repeated supporters of international terrorism,... (the State Department) took particular notice of the fact that in 1981, Iraq continued the pattern in recent years of reducing (emphasis mine) assistance to individuals and groups which employ terrorist means. (U.S. Congress, Senate 1982, 9)

Later in the meeting, Mr. Johnston said that there had been consultation with the Department of Commerce when determining that Iraq was no longer designated a supporter of international terrorism. (U.S. Congress, Senate 1982, 33)

Mr. Johnston reaffirmed that this action would not affect military aid to Iraq because the U.S. was maintaining "a policy of strict neutrality in the Iran-Iraq War." (U.S. Congress, Senate 1982, 10) In his prepared statement, Mr. Johnston continued,

It is our policy not to establish a military supply relationship with Iraq or with Iran. All items which would significantly enhance the military capability of either side are denied. (U.S. Congress, Senate 1982, 13)

The testimony continued with a case being made that Iraq was moving closer to more moderate government in the Gulf area and that this was a move that the United States wanted to reinforce. As the discussion continued, a question arose about the foreign policy purpose of the sales to Iraq. What became clear was that part of the purpose was to get the market, since other countries or suppliers would be available to fill the gap if the U.S. did not. (U.S. Congress, Senate 1982, 17)

Also in Mr. Johnston's prepared statement he says that in the area of
human rights the rationale is "to distance the United States from governments with poor human rights records and to encourage improvements in the respect of human rights." (U.S. Congress, Senate 1982, 12) Although not discussed during this hearing, the Amnesty International report issued in 1981 told of fifteen Iraqi exiles who had been severely tortured, the severity of which had been corroborated by physicians in London was public knowledge (Miller, 1990, 245) as was the long record of Saddam Hussein and the Ba'ath Party of disregard for human life, including an extensive history of detention, torture, and executions. 'Official' executions were documented by Amnesty International when it reported over 350 in 1981 alone. This was augmented by the biographical particulars on 798 executions, 264 killings of unknown persons, and 428 cases of unsentenced detainees and disappeared persons reported by the Committee Against Repression. Rather than denying responsibility for the deaths, the Ba'ath party reportedly returned a sealed box containing the 'remains' of the corpse but did not allow the recipient to see them. The dead person died, they said, from something such as fire, drowning, or some other accident. (Al-Khalil, 1989, 64)

Mr. Johnston's reply to questioning about Iraq's continuing qualifications to remain off of the terrorist list reassured the committee: "Should Iraq's behavior warrant we will not hesitate to return Iraq to the list." (U. S. Congress, Senate 1982, 34) This example of promised retroactive law enforcement reminds me of how, after the United States has provided a government with materials, training, and technology, these same things can be used against the U.S. as shown by the Khomeini regime after the fall of the shah. As Senator Boschwitz questioned Mr. Johnston, the question of airplanes sold to terrorist countries arose. A case of selling planes to Libya was considered. Libya assured the United States that the planes would not be used for purposes of which the United States would
disapprove, but, in fact, they were used to transport soldiers to Uganda to fight with the army of Idi Amin. After the U.S. became aware of this, an embargo of spare parts was established. At the time of this meeting, 1982, the same kind of guarantee of cooperation was contracted with Iraq so that if something sold was misused something else, such as an embargo of spare parts, could be implemented to correct the situation. (U.S. Congress, Senate 1982, 18-19)

Although in 1982, most of the funds that Iraq had received from Arab supporters stopped, Iraq was able to reestablish Arab ties beginning with an agreement with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to export an estimated 300 thousand barrels per day (b/d) of oil under a time exchange agreement which would add an annual $3 billion in revenues for Iraq. (Axelgard, 1986, 9) Additionally, a 500 b/d pipeline from Iraq's southern oil fields to the trans-Saudi Arabia Petroline was contracted to begin in September 1984, with completion in 1985. (Axelgard, 1986, 10)

In early 1983, a $120 million Euroloan was secured to expand the trans-Turkey pipeline to increase the flow of oil to one million b/d. This increase in oil dependence contributed to a more solid tie between Iraq and Turkey. In 1983-84, Turkish troops help repel Kurdish insurgents who attempted to sabotage this pipeline. (Axelgard, 1986, 10) Alternative routes were sought "across Saudi Arabia to the Red Sea port of Yanbu and across Jordan to its main port of Aqaba." Both lines had U.S. firms involved. Brown & Root engineered the Saudi route and Bechtel planned the Jordan line. Italian and French contractors completed the first line that links Iraq's southern oil fields with Saudi's east-west Petroline. (Axelgard, 1986, 41)

By the beginning of 1983, Iraq had received $35 billion in loans from friendly Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates
and Qatar. Other such loans soon became available from other more international sources. (Axelgard, 1986, 36) The United Kingdom

offered a total of $362 million made up of a general-purpose line of credit for nominated capital goods and equipment, used for power stations, housing, hospital, water supply, and oil projects, and a loan for pharmaceutical projects. (Axelgard, 1986, 36)

In 1985, the British offered another loan along the same structure but with a larger portion to go for pharmaceutical projects. While Tokyo did not want to finance large projects, credit was extended for the purchase of medical equipment for thirteen Japanese-built hospitals. (Axelgard, 1986, 36-37)

In 1985, Austrian companies were awarded contracts in Iraq with lines of credit reaching $268 million. Italy made $500 million available to Iraq, Greece put up $100 million, and Ireland operated a $24 million roll-over credit deal. East Germany offered $200 million to support project work, the Soviet Union put up $2 billion in long-term credit, and Yugoslavia offered $500 million for which it would accept oil as repayment as would "some other East European countries, France, Japan, and some individual companies." (Axelgard, 1986, 37) Brazilian, Indian, and South Korean companies worked on a rail line to link Baghdad with the Syrian border, with Basra and the Kuwaiti border, and with the Turkish border. (Axelgard, 1986, 44)

The international community was involved in agricultural development in Iraq. The Yugoslavians set up the Dujayl agro-industrial project. South Koreans and Chinese contractors established the first stage of the Al Jazirah scheme to reclaim 100 hectares. The Chinese picked up "contracts to build river barges to store water for irrigation." (Axelgard, 1986, 45)

Following 1984, many U. S. firms did business in Iraq. These firms included: DeLeuw Cather International, Borg-Warner Corporation's York
International, Carrier International, NCR International, Mega Tech, and The Architects Collaborative (TAC), Howe-Baker Engineering, General Electric, Raymond International, Brown & Root, Ventauri Rauch, and Scott Brown. This interest by U.S. firms increased because of improved diplomatic relations between Washington and Baghdad in 1984. The Commerce Department advised U.S. firms by way of guidance that their best prospects (were) the supply of agricultural commodities, equipment and services, computers and software, irrigation equipment and services, water treatment equipment and services, and petroleum development and exploration equipment and services. (Axelgard, 1986, 53)

Baghdad had also become "interested in U.S. training programs and technology at all levels, as well as expertise in planning and operating transport activities in ports, airports, roads, and railways." (Axelgard, 1986, 53)

By sharp contrast, and also in 1984, after meeting with senior Iraqi officials, "Peter Galbraith, Claiborne Pell's Foreign Relations Committee aide, submitted a staff report warning that Hussein was running a neo-Stalinist state." (Waller, 1986, 13) At the request of the Committee's majority Republican staff, the impact of the report was lessened because the administration was planning to normalize diplomatic relations with Iraq and did not want to be embarrassed in the process. (Waller, 1986, 13-14)

Another example of U.S. strategy and policy in the Middle East with regards to acts of terrorism is the case of Libya and Muammar Qaddafi. After the 1985, hijacking of TWA fight 847 to Beirut and murder of a U.S. Navy frogman, President Reagan was faced with a difficult problem. He could take a position that said that the U.S. wanted the hostages freed with no deals, or he could end the situation by giving the hijackers what they wanted - Shiite prisoners held in Israel. The President ended the crisis by securing the freedom of the Shiites while
publicly stating he had held to his hard-line position of no compromise. (Hunter, 1987, 52)

This incident was followed by the hijacking of the *Achille Lauro* and the murder of Leon Klinghoffer. By this time, the United States media were fascinated with these events as were the people of the U.S. Many U.S. citizens refused to travel because they were so afraid of hijackings although the number of U.S. people killed by terrorists was only 39 in 1985, which, as Hunter points out, is slim compared to the number of people killed each year in the United States. But this left Mr. Reagan with quite a risky situation. He and his administration did not want to look impotent as the Carter administration had looked during the hostage crisis in Teheran.

...(N)iether the President nor his senior officials were prepared to put terrorism in perspective—an evil, but not crippling in terms of numbers—nor were they able to begin to do something about its causes. This would mean becoming reengaged, if only economically, with the morass called Lebanon, and taking a lead in Arab-Israeli peacemaking. Neither road promised the quick results apparently demanded by the American public. (Hunter, 1987, 52)

What could the President do to show the citizens of the United States that his administration was potent and able to fight back against terrorism? Military action against terrorist groups proved close to impossible because there was no one clear target. However, Muammar Qaddafi had shown himself to support and instigate terrorism, and the U.S. public was aware of this. "This was the main reason that the Reagan administration singled out Libya and Colonel Muammar Qaddafi for isolation and punishment." (Hunter, 1987, 52) Libya also was not closely tied to the Soviet Union, it was accessible to military action, and it was "barely able to shoot back." (Hunter, 1987, 52) "The United States attack on Libya in April, 1986, was thus less about trying to end terrorism than about assuring the American people that something was being done." (Hunter, 1987, 52)
One unfortunate side-effect of the U.S. military attack on Libya however was the alienation the U.S. experienced from virtually all European countries. This is worth recalling when considering the Persian Gulf War of 1991. Hunter states that "allied cooperation ... increased after the Libyan raid." (Hunter, 1987, 52) However, two camps appeared. On the one hand, European governments continued to criticize the United States government for running risks through military action that quite likely would not reduce terrorism, for choosing a lesser agent to attack, and "for failing either to put the terror problem in perspective or to deal with at least some of the causes of terrorism--most important, the Arab-Israeli conflict." (Hunter, 1987, 52) On the other hand, the government of the United States attacked the allies for not being stronger in their stand against terrorism. The British were spared because that government allowed the U.S. to use UK military bases during the attack on Libya. (Hunter, 1987, 52)

One consequence of United States policy strategy in the Middle East was the reflagging of the Kuwaiti oil tankers. Hunter refers to the relationship between Kuwait and Iraq as ambiguous at best and co-belligerent at worst. To protect its oil tankers, Kuwait, which was shipping and selling oil for Iraq, turned to the superpowers for help. The United States did not want the Soviet Union to reflag any of the ships and, therefore, agreed to reflag all eleven of them. The Congressional committees that were informed of the reflagging did not respond. The reflagging of the tankers was seen as a tilt toward Iraq since it was the Iranians who were attacking the Iraqi tankers. In what appeared to be an accident, the Iraqis attacked a U.S. frigate, killing 37 U.S. sailors; this was seen as a continuation of the tanker war. The Reagan administration reaffirmed its pledge to reflag Kuwaiti tankers and increased the naval deployments in the Gulf and the surrounding area--"where for 30 years United States Navy vessels have been
deployed—to about 35 ships and 25,000 men." (Hunter, 1988, 50)

Hunter suggests this increased involvement was not for the protection of oil. Rather the United States had three motives: the Soviet Union would not gain any benefits from reflagging Kuwaiti tankers; the morale of the Iraqis would be raised in the face of more intensified Iranian force; and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf would see the U.S. arms sales to Iran as a deviation instead of the standard. Reflagging the tankers was a political decision not a military one. (Hunter, 1988, 51) Iraq was hoping the U.S. presence would help convince Iran to go to the bargaining table, but with the flow of oil unimpeded, Iran actually benefited.

After the Iranians had accused the United States of being responsible for the deaths of Iranian Shia pilgrims at the hands of Saudi security forces at Mecca, the Iraqis resumed the tanker war to which the Iranians retaliated by firing Chinese Silkworm missiles which then hit a Kuwaiti oil platform. By the close of 1987, it was not clear if the United States wanted to engage in a major conflict with Iran or, if it did, if it would continue until the fall of Khomenini’s regime. The Iranians did not want this type of engagement mainly because of the toll that would be exacted by the superior firepower of the United States. (Hunter, 1988, 51)

What did emerge during 1984, was that Iran and the United States "shared two important strategic interests: ensuring that the flow of oil would not be halted and, more important, containing the influence of the Soviet Union." (Hunter, 1988, 51) What was also clear was that the United States did not want the spread of the Iranian revolution. Again the United States government found itself in a difficult position. On the one hand, it did not want an escalated military involvement with Iran, but on the other hand, it did not want to seem as though its presence in the Persian Gulf was being chased out. Additionally, members of
Congress had begun to question the reflagging of the Kuwaiti tankers and the naval deployments. While members of Congress called for invoking the War Powers Resolution of 1973, the administration did not want to do this for fear that it would be more difficult to stop an action than to start one. (Hunter, 1988, 51)

"...the United States was not in control of the situation in the Persian Gulf. By its own hand, it had become effectively held hostage to actions taken by Iraq’s President Saddam Hussein (the tanker war) and by Ayatollah Khomeini. (Hunter, 1988, 51)"

The United States needed a show of support from other Western oil-consuming, maritime nations, and thus sought help from its West European allies in the form of mine sweepers. Those countries responding were Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy, all of which sent ships to the Persian Gulf. West Germany prepared to do so but did not. This response on the part of the allies was to help insure continued influence in Washington on the course of the United States policy in the gulf region, and because they did not want the American people and their government to react against West European abstention in a crisis that affected the United States but also involved the interests of other Western states. They recalled the recriminations when no West European country except Britain provided support for the United States air raid on Libya in April, 1986. They feared American irritation as the United States began reconsidering the issues of burden-sharing within the Western alliance and the continued presence of 326,000 United States soldiers on the continent. (Hunter, 1988, 52)

The United States government wanted neither Iran nor Iraq to predominate in the war. It wanted the oil to continue to flow and good relations with local Arab states to be maintained. The United States also took the lead to force Iran to the bargaining table through means established by the United Nations. The UN Security Council Resolution 598 exceeded the needs of the U.S. It requested Iran and Iraq to recognize a cease-fire and to begin negotiations. This request was directed to Iran since Iraq wanted to negotiate. Iran’s key demand was that Iraq be
acknowledged as the aggressor in the war. As bargaining continued, the Soviet Union and China, members of the UN Security Council, blocked hopes for imposing sanctions for an arms embargo. Each had its own agenda: China feared gains by the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union could benefit from the United States continued conflict with Iran. (Hunter, 1988, 52)

In 1987, the Soviet Union was more active than usual in the Gulf area. It became an important element in the Persian Gulf and in the United States policy for the area. However, despite the Soviet Union's activity in the Persian Gulf area, the opportunities for expansion were limited first by geography and then by the proclivity of the local Arab states to make a pro-U.S. reaction to a Soviet buildup. The Soviets offered a joint East-West security arrangement for the area which the U.S. did not want because the United States government was concerned that its credibility would further erode. However, unless Iran engaged in a civil war and the Khomeini regime collapsed,

fear of a Soviet invasion had diminished radically since 1980. But the risk of major Soviet influence remained, and in 1987, Soviet diplomats were assiduous in keeping open the political lines to Teheran. (Hunter, 1988, 52)

Hunter continued, "because the United States was not in control of the pace of activity in the gulf, the risk of Soviet opportunity to realize a centuries-old dream of decisive influence" (Hunter, 1988, 52) lingered.

Moderate Arab friends of the United States continued to exert a degree of pressure on the U.S. stemming from the revelation of the arms sales to Iran and the United States government's lack of effort in the Arab-Israeli peace process. For reasons already stated, the U.S. continued not to want to become involved in that process. This omission contributed to the inability of moderate Arab states to regain confidence in the United States. The U.S. was not alone in the Gulf area,
and though the Soviet Union was not viewed as a government to be trusted nor did it possess desirable economic or ideological goods, U.S. "diplomacy was being compared to that of the Soviet Union." (Hunter, 1988, 90) Again the U.S. steadfastness and staying power were being questioned. Hunter ends his article, "United States Policy in the Middle East" by saying,

Unless the United States manages to shore up its fading reputation for leadership, wisdom and creativity, the questions posed about United States policy toward the Middle East in 1987 will mark that year as the nadir of the United States position in the region. (Hunter, 1988, 90)

In 1988, the Iran-Iraq war ended. Because the number of available martyrs had declined and the economy was in a state of collapse, those advisors close to Khomeini persuaded him to consider the UN cease-fire. While realizing he had to accept the cease-fire, "(h)e told his people that taking the decision 'was more deadly than taking poison.'" (Mansfield, 1991, 333) Even though the Islamic Republic had not been overthrown, Iraq had won the war "by not losing, just as Khomeini had lost by not winning." (Mansfield, 1991, 333)

How is it that policy decisions can be made which favor and even enhance governments whose practices seem contraindicated to those values, such as natural rights, life, and liberty to name a few, which are the very cornerstones of the United States republic? In chapter two, Rosemarie Tong explores some possibilities when she discusses a reality of bureaucracy described as "dirty hands, many hands, and no hands."
ENDNOTES

1. Robert E. Hunter served as director of Middle East affairs at the National Security Council from 1979-81 under President Jimmy Carter. He also has been a senior fellow (1989) and vice president (1990) at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. For more information concerning Middle East history during this time see the articles from *Current History, Foreign Affairs, Middle East Journal, and Washington Quarterly* listed in the Bibliography.
CHAPTER 2

ROSEMARIE TONG'S
ETHICS OF POLICY DECISIONS
AND MODELS OF RESPONSIBILITY

Is foreign policy a well-orchestrated, well-thought out, morally-based doctrine or an expedient, secrecy-laden clandestine operation, or both? When the time comes for a policy maker or politician to take responsibility for a popular or unpopular policy decision, how is that responsibility assumed? Rosemarie Tong's "Dirty Hands, Many Hands, No Hands: The Policy Expert Within the Bowels of the Bureaucracy" explores these questions.

The intricacies of United States foreign policy are extensive. Who are the U.S. allies? It depends on what year is discussed or what objective is to be met. How does one international and even one national event affect another? By looking at Tong's work, I have become aware that many possibilities exist not only for how and why a policy decision is made but also about how a policy maker or politician assumes or avoids responsibility.

DIRTY HANDS

How is that a policy maker can make decisions that as personal decisions she would consider immoral? When someone makes this type of decision, Tong and others describe this as a case of 'dirty hands'.

An example of 'dirty hands' decision making is explained by looking at
Machiavelli's prince. For the prince, a need to redefine 'vice' and 'virtue' exists. "A vice is that which, if followed, would lead to the state's ruin; a virtue is that which, if followed, would lead to the state's greater security and well-being." (62) Whether on a personal level an act would be seen as a virtuous act or not is irrelevant. The greater good of the security of the state is more important than any moral guideline. On a personal level an act may be seen as one creating 'dirty hands' but on a state level the act would be seen as virtuous and necessary.

Following the line of 'dirty hands,' Michael Walzer suggests that when a politician acts for "the greatest ratio of good to evil (the Principle of Utility) for everyone," she may feel guilty because she may have had to violate her duty "as specified by the Ten Commandments." (64) For instance, she might violate 'Thou shalt not steal' while supporting the acquisition of land seen as needed for mineral rights. She might see this as a violation against stealing because through native tradition as well as former treaty the land belongs to Native Americans. Should the politician be unable to support the acquisition of this tract of land thus avoiding her conscientious guilt for violating the invocation not to steal, she would also not maximize the greater good of her industrialized constituents by acquiring the mineral rights existing under the land. One problem faced by politicians is that some of the same people who would castigate them for not performing the utility-maximizing action will also condemn them for not adhering to the Ten Commandments or other generally accepted rules of moral conduct.

One choice a politician has is to proclaim "'Utilitarianism is the moral point of view. Not only politicians but everyone at all times and in all places should abide by the Principle of Utility'" (64); thus the action for the greater good would always be followed. For Walzer this is not true. He believes that if a politician cannot be morally justified for her actions, people ought to be able to excuse the actions or forgive them for 'them' could just as easily be 'us'. We, as a society, not only want decisions made based on what will
be done for our greater good, but we also want to be able to bring the politician back into
the community just as we would want to be brought back into the community after
committing a transgression. However, these same excuses and forgiveness do not come
freely or without recourse. Excuses and forgiveness should be allowed only to the
politicians who "not only feel regret for their wrong actions but also are willing to accept
responsibility--and even punishment--for them." (64)

An example of committing an act which produces 'dirty hands' while still
assuming responsibility for the action is Camus' assassins who are willing to accept the
consequences, even unto death, for their actions. Camus' assassins are the example for
those politicians who violate the Ten Commandments and other moral codes to maximize
the greatest good to evil and are willing to accept what happens to them because of their
actions. According to Walzer, Camus' assassins are justified and their actions are
rendered right actions because they do maximize the greatest good to evil and accept
responsibility for their actions.

In the case of assassination, a law has been broken and therefore, a course of
punishment exists. However, no such punishment exists for the politician who breaks
moral rules for political reasons. If, in fact, such a recourse were available for the
punishment of moral violations committed to maximize the greater good to evil, we, as a
society, would honor the person who did a wrong or immoral deed and still punish him.
If all that Oliver North had done was lie to Congress and no law existed to prohibit this
action, then he could be honored by many citizens of the United States as he is, and,
rather than having his charges dropped, he would have been punished for lying and
obstructing the search for truth by lying to Congress.

As far as moral transgressions go, while a politician may not be incarcerated, we
citizens may take solace because she still will not be free of a sinner's fate of conscience.

Somehow the knowledge that a politician suffers pangs of conscience
reassures us. Indeed, even the bare belief that a politician is the type of person who would do private penance for politically expedient but morally unjustifiable actions enables us to excuse and to forgive him or her—if not to justify and to forget his or her actions. (65)

For Machiavelli's prince, dirty hands are inevitable and excusable because the terms that create the idea of dirty hands, vice and virtue, can be redefined so that if one is working for the security and well-being of the state, one is acting in a virtuous manner, even if by another definition of virtue the situation could be defined as vice. In other words, dirty hands are relative. Michael Walzer is able to justify actions which may not adhere to the Ten Commandments or other moral codes by having the agent willingly accept punishment, as in the case of Camus' assassins. Additionally, the notion that politicians may make morally questionable decisions that may maximize the greater good to evil but then also feel pangs of guilt and do private purgation can help citizens forgive violations done in their names.

While policy makers and politicians may employ 'dirty hands' to achieve objectives they deem for the greater good, a more difficult route to track for culpability is the problem of the 'many hands' which forms the network of many policy decisions today.

MANY HANDS

In the province of policy making, many individuals speaking different languages and discussing a multitude of issues are the players.

The persons who initially formulate a problem are generally not the ones who ultimately resolve it; and quite often no one really knows how many people did or did not contribute to its solution. (67)

So in addition to having simply 'dirty hands' where one individual formulates policy decisions, one is also faced with a problem of the 'many hands' involved in policy making. Numerous agents render arduous the identification of whom to hold morally, and
in some cases even legally, responsible for political decisions.

Given that the nation-state consists of citizens, who work together to form society and to form the government of the nation-state, the loss to society for not knowing who will accept responsibility for political decisions is the loss of the nation's ethical sensitivities. (68)

Because so many individuals are involved in the process of political decision making, no one person may be accountable for decisions. Thus when some event, such as the Iran-Contra affair or policy decisions regarding trade practices in the Middle East occurs, it is not so much a matter that one person, enticed to commit transgressions, provided the direction for the action, as it is a tale "of foiled and/or flaunted lines of responsibility." (68)

Tong proposes

What is frightening about contemporary policy making is the feeling that the decisions most likely to affect society for better or worse are made not by identifiable persons but by an amorphous collectively whose willy-nilly processes cannot be stopped once they are started. (68)

Dennis F. Thompson states that although it may be difficult to figure out who is morally responsible among those who make public policy, it is not impossible. Through the application of an idea of "personal responsibility grounded on a combination of causal criteria, the concept of intention, and the idea of role," (68) Thompson believes the agent can be discovered. Thus, through implementing various models of responsibility, indications of those accountable can become apparent. These models include the Hierarchical Model of Responsibility, the Collective Model of Responsibility, and the Personal Model of Responsibility.
THE HIERARCHICAL MODEL OF RESPONSIBILITY

In a hierarchical model, each individual is responsible for one set of functions, and the individual does not go outside the boundaries of this set. Higher up the hierarchical ladder, supervisors direct operations; below, individuals have fewer decisions to make.

The people on the top, the elected policy makers, make decisions; the people on the bottom, among whom are situated most policy experts, simply rubber-stamp and/or carry them out. (68)

Ultimate responsibility would then go to the person highest on the totem pole. What this allows for is that the leader takes the blame or praise and the underlings are able to be absolved of culpability or reward because they "were either following the orders of (their) superiors or adhering to the procedures of (their) organization." (68)

Tong believes this hierarchical model is deficient in several ways. First, because, in bureaucracies, there are so many people involved and time constraints may prevail, authority will necessarily be delegated. This authority may not go to the person best qualified to work through a task but rather to the individual who will put in the most time. Second, taking blame or praise may be unfair both to the superior and to an underling. The superior may not be aware of what the underling has done. In like kind, it is unfair to the underling because it strips her of both disapprobation and approbation, depending on the opinion of the work. This does not allow for the development of either individual as a moral agent. (69) If one does not take feedback, both positive and negative, one's moral development is retarded because it is through careful consideration of the responses one receives concerning one's activities as well as the outcome of one's decisions that one is able to mature in many aspects of one's life, including moral maturity.

While with the hierarchical model, the person highest up on the ladder of
command is held responsible, accountability is not insured. The superior may simply
delate tasks leading to decisions. I believe, however, that if the hierarchical model were
accepted, then just as in the Nuremberg Principles those giving the orders would have to
be held responsible. This would not excuse the actions of the underling (as was seen in
the Nuremberg Principles), but it, too, would not allow the superior to feign innocence
and thus be freed from responsibility for decisions made during his command (as we saw
during the Iran-Contra affair when President Reagan continually stated he knew nothing
of the plan).

Since bureaucracy and policy making consist of groups of people working toward
various objectives, the collective model of responsibility may offer a more adequate
illustration.

THE COLLECTIVE MODEL
OF RESPONSIBILITY

When examining groups working on projects, to keep from employing the
hierarchical model of responsibility which allows both superiors and subordinates to avoid
responsibility and to be denied praise, some theorists use a collective model for assigning
responsibility, although not for an individual.

One version of the collective model holds that no individual is morally
responsible for any of the collectivity's decisions and actions; rather, the
collectivity as a whole is responsible. (69)

At some point a decision is made, but there is no one to be held responsible. Thompson
says he believes that this is more a form of non responsibility that

overlooks what is obvious; namely, that people act in the context of
ongoing institutions, and that they may be culpable for creating the
structural faults of the institution, or for making inadequate efforts to
correct them. (69)

Bureaucrats do not have to be passive in the environment in which they work for
they can contribute to the development of that same environment. A collective responsibility can be created in which each individual is accountable. When a condition "of homogeneity, stability, and collectivism" is established among agents, "the notion of collective responsibility ..., (which means) that state of affairs in which each individual is accountable for every decision and action of the collectivity, is likely to take root and flourish." (70) Thus the deeds of the group become the deeds of the individual who, in theory, cannot hide behind the group mask for accepting praise or blame because it is the individual who has constituted what the actions of the group will be.

While this collective responsibility helps make each individual aware that she shares the responsibility, the downside of this is that things may be left undone because everyone thinks someone else will do them. It may also lead "people to adopt the psychology of the contented committee member who is able to solve any pricks of conscience with the balm of 'It must be okay because the group says it is okay.'" (70) An individual may lose sight of how much or how little input she had in the collective decision making instead of accepting that her involvement in the group's decisions carries weight, responsibility, as any other member.

Since individuals in the collective model can still escape accountability, the personal model of responsibility should place responsibility at each individual's doorstep, or, as President Truman said, "The buck stops here."

THE PERSONAL MODEL OF RESPONSIBILITY

Allowing that in the hierarchical model, the superior may delegate deeds and thus believe she is not responsible for the outcomes of these deeds, and the underling may believe she is free of responsibility because the superior must assume it, and that in the collective model a spirit of 'all for one and one for all' might prevail without anyone rising
to accept accountability and that the group as the responsible agent lessens the degree to which blame or praise may be offered or accepted by any one individual, the personal model of responsibility can, perhaps, assign accountability to none other than the individual. Although the individual is responsible according to the personal model, excuses for behavior can be made. These excuses include [a] *causal* (something that happens in such a way as to go toward a result other than assuming responsibility) and [b] *volitional* (a choice or decision made willingly but which depends on what exactly is known by the agent).

One main causal excuse is the excuse from alternative cause. The excuse from the alternative cause states that had one individual not done something then another would have. Tong says in its strong form this excuse has little force because one can never be certain that someone else will replace another. In its weak form, however, it has some validity. Tong uses the example of George, a scientist, who cannot get any job except as a biochemist working on germ warfare. George knows he is not brilliant and will not enable any great breakthroughs in deadly viruses so he takes the job thus saving the world from the possible research of a more capable scientist. One problem with this seen by Bernard Williams is that the individual, in this case George, will destroy his image to himself as a humanitarian, which is why in the first place he decided to take the job, and thus he will pursue research or contribute input in his field of study with little or no regard for the outcome of his research. Tong counters this with

(d)espite the force of Williams's objection to the excuse from alternative cause, integrity may not be too high a price to pay at all times and in all places. Ideological purity can degenerate into smug self-righteousness. (72)

For Tong, times exist when compromising one's integrity and putting oneself in a situation such as George in his job as the biochemist performing mediocre research is preferable to allowing a competent scientist to take the job. George's taking the job is to
society's benefit regardless of the personal cost to George.

One problem I see with Tong's rationale of relinquishing integrity and Williams notion of the individual becoming apathetic about the consequences of her actions is that no means exists for the person who witnesses morally questionable activities to bring these activities to the attention of superiors or even to outside agents who may be affected by the results of these activities. Perhaps George would not degenerate into apathy about his research if he knew that a protected course for whistle blowers existed. Therefore, he would be able to continue to see his act of taking the research job as a humanitarian effort.

The second causal excuse is the excuse from null cause which says that an individual cannot be blamed because she is only a 'cog in the wheel' and it is not she who makes the decisions, but rather those above her. Robert Jackall objects to this excuse because the individual cannot remove herself from the causal chain just because she does not "have the final say in a project, or because those who have more say than (she) does are free either to accept or to reject (her) data." (72) The example Tong uses is that of falsifying data. The supervisor of a research project believes that he and his staff are simply drawing lines and that what is done with the data is out of their hands. Jackell, who studied this example, says that the supervisor cannot be considered out of the responsibility loop just because he does not have the final say. His input influences the final outcome and is thus accountable as is he. (72)

Causal excuses for personal responsibility do exist, but they do not absolve the individual. With the alternative cause perhaps something worse would have occurred had the individual not done what she did. While Tong believes that the lesser of two evils are at times morally excusable, I think she would be quite prudent in employing this excuse. Null cause seems to me to be quite weak. Decisions should be based on all available data and behind each piece of data is a person. If someone were to falsify data, as in the example, or simply to take the stand that what she had done was merely a part of the
whole and therefore she is innocent, the individual is not realizing that it is through many pieces that the whole is formed and each of those pieces is responsible for the intellectual and moral strength or weakness of the whole.

Volitional excuses for personal responsibility that may be employed are gauged by how much an individual knew was involved in doing an act and whether she was able to do or not to do that thing. Volitional excuses for personal responsibility do exist and are based on two factors: the absence of intention and/or the presence of compulsion.

An act is intentional if it meets at least one of the following two conditions:

1. A person **consciously desires** the outcome of his/her act, whatever the likelihood of that outcome may be; or
2. a person knows (subjectively) that the outcome of his/her act is practically certain to follow from his/her conduct, whatever his/her conscious desire may be as to that outcome. (72)

When an individual acts intentionally, she can be held "at least partially responsible for the direct or indirect harmful outcomes of (her) actions." (73) If, however, an individual commits unintentional actions, she is less accountable for harmful outcomes of her actions, and thus is eligible for a volitional excuse for her actions. Nevertheless, if there are steps the individual could have taken which she did not, no matter how unintentional, she can be held at least partially responsible for the harmful outcomes of her actions.

"Willful blindness is no excuse for lack of foresight." (73) Further,

(w)hen policy experts, or policy makers for that matter, make themselves the 'instruments of their own ignorance' by blithely adopting the motto, 'See no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil,' we excuse their lack of foresight at the risk of encouraging an atmosphere of deliberate moral benightedness. (73)

As I have read the U.S. foreign policy decisions with Iraq which followed the Iran-Iraq war and have become more aware of how these decisions allowed Saddam Hussein and the Ba'ath Party to rearm to continue what Samir Al-Khalil named a republic of fear, I wonder where the foresight was in these decisions. Because of George Bush's experiences as CIA director, vice-president for eight years and then president, this volitional excuse of absence of intention does not stand. (see chapters 3 and 4)
Another volitional excuse is one based on coercion. This coercion can be in the form of physical force or psychological constraint or, to a lesser degree, may be physical or psychological rewards. A policy analyst may be threatened with firing if she does not produce the data necessary for a certain project. In like kind, an individual may be offered a reward which may compel her to act in a way in which she might not necessarily act. "Bribes are not necessarily less coercive than threats; kind offers that meet resistance easily mutate into cruel threats." (73) When one works within a bureaucracy, one may be subjected to coercion which emanates from the institution so while we may think that through individual coercion people alter their actions, we see that also through institutional coercion, pressure can be applied.

One kind of institutional coercion may proceed from the general structure of the institution--what we might call institutional ethos: This does not mean, however, that individuals are powerless within those institutions. There may be within an institution an ethos of the institution (that) shapes in its employees 'a strong orientation to their bureaucracy's goals, habits of careful calculation, and a distrust of intangible issues of value which threaten to disrupt the calculated achievement of goals.' (74)

While the institutions or bureaucracies with which people are associated do in fact mold them, these same individuals do not sign a pledge to do everything in their power to make the institution bloom and grow. On the contrary! The process whereby their consciences are taken over by the institution's ethos is far more insidious than this for at least three reasons. (75)

First, through the many equations required of a policy expert, policy maker, or politician, the world may become merely 'numerate'--people and their activities merely quantified. Second, the neutral language (bombs called 'ordnance' or bombings called 'interdiction') of the policy work may cause a moral numbness. And third, due to the duration of involvement in bureaucracy, the policy expert, policy maker, or politician may separate herself from the consequences of her actions, developing a sort of professional callous
moral awareness.

The example Tong gives is of a policy analyst who never came into contact with those people for whom his decisions had a negative impact. Because of his distance from these people, he believed he was not responsible for any harm that came to them because "of his negligent, reckless, or intentional miscalculations." (75) I believe this can apply to policy makers and politicians as well. The term 'collateral damage', meaning civilian lives and property destroyed, has been coined as a result of this absence of awareness of the impact of policy decisions.

The reason that the bureaucrat can embrace this attitude of insulation is because the efficiency of bureaucracy is based on segmentation and specialization. Segmentation, which breaks tasks into small parts, "separates experts from the final product of their effort." (75) While specialization, which demands that an individual be an expert on one narrow element of a problem, "separates experts from the use to which their knowledge is put." (75) Even when the parts are put together to create the whole, neither "the team leader nor the team members will have any clear sense about the fate of their report." (75) This separation and specialization was masterfully conducted during the Manhattan Project. For the institution, the U.S. government-national security, each part of the project was both a whole project in itself and a piece of the whole of the atomic bombs, and the agents in the project complied, many without knowing to the full extent what they were finally creating. This example may, in fact, be one of an institutional coercive ethos exacerbated by the demands of a world war.

While bureaucratic structures work against ideas of personal responsibility, people may be able to shape these "institutions so that their structures can support us in our efforts to achieve the good life." (77) From Alasdair MacIntyre a distinction between practice and institution is formulated.
For MacIntyre,

(a) practice is ... a cooperative human activity that has its own standards of excellence. ... If any ... practice (is) to flourish, then (its) practitioners must appreciate those satisfactions or goods internal to (it). ...To enter into a practice is to accept the authority of those standards and the inadequacy of my own performance as judged by them. It is to subject my own attitudes, choices, preferences and tastes to the standards which currently and partially define the practice. (77)

Within a practice there are standards of excellence which include the virtues of justice, courage and honesty. Practices are concerned with internal goods and are held together with human cooperation.

Institutions are concerned with external goods such as money, power, and status and "are energized by the fragmentary fires of human competition." (78) This is, according to MacIntyre, the way it ought to be "provided that 'the ideals and the creativity of the practice' do not succumb to 'the acquisitiveness of the institution.'" (78) Although institutions can support positive practices, they can also distort them.

Within bureaucracy, policy expertise is a practice. However, "(w)ithout internal standards of excellence and without internal goods, policy analyzing, advising, and consulting cannot develop into a mature practice." (79) Through standards of excellence and internal goods, policy experts can see themselves as just, courageous, and honest people who can "create an institutional framework ... that will permit them to make a major contribution to the so-called good life... ."(79) Since policy makers and politicians base many of their decisions on data compiled through this policy expertise, one would think that they, too, would see themselves as just, courageous, and honest in the application of these data.

Two recent examples of United States policy situations in the Middle East can be examined using Tong's models of responsibility to see which hands are directing the actions and to see whether or not responsibility or excuses appear. In the mid-1980s, members of the U.S. government became involved in an event which came to be known
as the Iran-Contra affair. Following the cessation of combat in the Iran/Iraq war, United States policy decisions concerning Iraq and business in Iraq aided Saddam Hussein and the Ba'ath government in rebuilding the military might of their repressive regime. Tong's explanations help develop an understanding of these events and are discussed in chapters three and four.
ENDNOTES

1. Information in this chapter is based on Rosemarie Tong's *Ethics in Policy Analysis*, chapter 4, "Dirty Hands, Many Hands, No Hands: the Policy Expert Within the Bowels of the Bureaucracy." References are noted with parentheses and the page number, e.g. (68).

CHAPTER 3

CASE STUDY ONE:
THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR

Within Tong's models of responsibility many choices are available against which the Iran-Contra affair can be examined. Are 'many hands' present thus clouding the trail or so diffusing responsibility that identifying the accountable players is difficult? Are individuals making decisions for the greater good against the evil they perceive whether these decisions are legally or morally acceptable thus having 'dirty hands'? If they do make 'dirty-hands' decisions, do they avoid responsibility through the excuse system examined in Tong, or do they do what may be morally and legally wrong, but for what reasons they see as for the greater good and accept the punishment, whether through enforcement of law or through self-imposed guilt? When attempting to assign responsibility, do the models of responsibility (hierarchical, collective, and personal) apply, or does the excuse system available within each model seem more apparent? The Iran-Contra affair is a canvas woven of many threads and the tools Tong gives us help name and examine these threads.

MANY HANDS

From 1980 to 1988, Iran and Iraq were engaged in war. United States' public foreign policy toward the warring factions was one of neutrality. The U.S. government wanted neither side to predominate; oil from the region was important as was the
maintenance of good relations with the Arab states. (Hunter 1988, 52) In November, 1986, however, a plan which is now known as the Iran-Contra affair became public in an article in a pro-Syrian newspaper. In direct contradiction of a policy called 'Operation Staunch' which declared that arms would not be sold to the regime of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the United States had been selling armaments to Iran. Soon it was revealed that the sales were designed to aid in the release of several United States citizens who were being held hostage in Lebanon. Also,

> (w)hen former National Security Council advisor Robert "Bud" McFarlane, Oliver North, and others took their ... trip to Iran in May 1986, they were told by an Iranian official that the United States would have to press Kuwait for the release of the Da'wa prisoners before U.S. hostages could be set free by the Shi'a-allied Hezbollah in Lebanon. (Armstrong 1990, 27)

This was a direct contradiction of what President Reagan had claimed when he said during his presidential campaign that he would not deal for hostages. Additionally, the money gained from the sale of these arms was used to support the Contras fighting in Nicaragua to which in 1984 the Congress had voted to cut off aid. (Wallis 1989, 23)

Robert Hunter asserts that the arms deal with Iran can be traced to two strategic calculations. First, the Israeli government employed a 'periphery' policy with Iran whereby Israel maintained good relations with the Iranian government. In order to promote that policy, it was the Israelis who first suggested the value of armaments sales to Iran to the U.S. government. Then for the U.S., the arms deal could create an opening to the Iranian revolutionary government. Strategically, Iran was important in the Middle East and with the Carter Doctrine (later embraced by the Reagan administration) the U.S. had pledged to defend the region (Hunter says this means Iran) from external threat (meaning the Soviet Union) with all means necessary. (Hunter 1988, 49) The strategic importance of Iran included its population size, its oil reserves (second only to Saudi Arabia), the border with the Soviet Union, its shoreline on the Persian Gulf, and its partial encasement
of the Strait of Hormuz which connects the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean, and then open waters.

Hunter believes these strategic objectives were and are sound; however, when Mr. Reagan's attempt to convince the public failed,

the strategic arguments were not pursued consistently thereafter (and)...by the middle of 1987, few senior officials in the United States were talking about Iran's strategic importance to the United States and the West. (Hunter 1987, 50)

Hunter continues that friendly Arab states viewed the arms sales with bewilderment. The United States' substance and trustworthiness were questioned and a sense of betrayal existed by 1987.

Many individuals and governments with different agendas existed here. Even within the United States government, different agendas existed. On the one hand, the Congress had engaged in a policy, Operation Staunch, by which the Iranian government would not be sold arms. Additionally, Congress had agreed that the Contras of Nicaragua were not to be financed. In the meantime, Robert McFarlane, Oliver North and others were selling arms to Iran and then funneling the money to the Contras. This transaction hinged also on the release of U.S. hostages in Lebanon in return for the Da'wa prisoner which was in direct contradiction of what President Reagan was saying publicly. Many hands guided the plot of this affair. The questions remain if any of these hands are 'dirty' and who will assume responsibility for these actions.

DIRTY HANDS

In the dirty hands concept, an agent makes decisions which she knows are legally or morally wrong because she acts for the greater good against the evil she perceives. She may accept that she has dirty hands and repent or accept punishment as necessary, or she may find relief from accountability through the excuses offered with responsibility.
I think those individuals who were involved in the Iran-Contra affair, in fact, may have believed, and may still believe, that they were maximizing the greatest good-to-evil ratio. Through the sale of arms, inroads to more moderate Iranians may have been made, so the story goes. The proceeds from the sales, money which could not be procured any other way, was available for the support of the pro-U.S. Contras. But what about the idea of moral versus legal? Are Camus' assassins a model for this situation? As Tong says, there is no punishment for politicians or policy makers who break moral rules, but what about those who break laws and still do not have to be punished? Oliver North knew he had lied to a Congressional committee in August 1986, but he did not believe it was unlawful. (Magnuson 1989, 23) How can this be? Perhaps it was a case of his believing the 'virtue', as defined by the prince, of insuring the state's security and well-being. What about applying the theory of Camus' assassins?

Would it be more moral, and thus more acceptable, if North and the others simply admitted yes, they broke the law; yes, they did wrong, but then, like the assassins, take the punishment? Jim Wallis in Sojourners magazine discusses the idea of civil disobedience and Oliver North and his co-conspirators. He says, "When one breaks the law for reasons of conscience, a crucial component of such principled civil disobedience is a willingness to accept the consequences of one's actions." (Wallis 1989, 23) Both M.K. Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr. followed this principle. Perhaps Oliver North saw Congress' ban on arms to the Contras as an example of the evil administration which M.K. Gandhi describes when he says

... civil disobedience is a necessary part of non-co-operation. ... An evil administration never deserves ... allegiance. ... A good man will therefore resist an evil system or administration with his whole soul. Disobedience of the laws of an evil State is therefore a duty." (Gandhi, 1951, 238)

Gandhi, however, has a responsibility attached to civil disobedience, and that is an acceptance of going to jail. He says non-co-operators "seek arrest and imprisonment"
(Gandhi, 1951, 172) to emphasize the valor of their cause. Jim Wallis points out North, rather than taking responsibility, had done "everything possible to hide his actions and shift the blame elsewhere." (Wallis 1989, 23) North is definitely not as morally responsible as one of Camus' assassins.

North is not the only player in this affair with dirty hands. Lawrence Walsh, the special prosecutor who sifted through the many layers covering the players in this affair, continued to ferret out who the players were, what they had done, and who was responsible until President Bush pardoned them. As we look at the possibilities for responsibility, some of these players will appear.

**RESPONSIBILITY MODELS: HIERARCHICAL, COLLECTIVE, PERSONAL**

As we can see from the many ramifications of this sale of arms to Iran, nothing happened in a vacuum. The hierarchical model is certainly one to be considered here. Oliver North has testified "that these acts were either implicitly condoned or explicitly directed by higher officials (and that he) 'was authorized to do everything that (he) did.'" (Magnuson 1989, 22-23) For the hierarchical model to work, those who are superiors need to assume responsibility. This has not happened in the Iran-contra affair.

In December 1992, President George Bush, who was vice-president during the time of the Iran-Contra affair, revealed a personal diary which special prosecutor Lawrence Walsh believes contained information relevant to the case. *(Time, 1/11/93, 8)* Walsh also suspects that testimony from Casper Weinberger, who was awaiting trial in January *(Time, 1/4/93, 11)*, would have contained information showing that he knew the November, 1985, shipment of arms to Iran from Israel was in violation of the Arms Export Control Act. *(Doherty 1993, 325)* On December 24, 1992, less than one month
before President Bush left office, he pardoned six officials, two of whom had been
indicted and four of whom had been judged guilty of criminal conduct. (Wall 1993, 75)
Those pardoned are Casper Weinberger, "former National Security Adviser Robert
McFarlane, former Secretary of State Elliot Abrams and three ex-CIA officials: Duane
Clarridge, Alan Fiers and Clair George." (Time, 1/4/93, 11) North believes that, in the
case of CIA involvement, "(e)very bit of that CIA responsibility had been passed on to
me,..." (Magnson 1989, 23) so that while North would not accept ultimate
responsibility, he did believe it had been foisted on him.

In continuing to consider the hierarchical model, Tong says that this model is
unfair to both the superior and the underling. One suggestion she gives is that the
superior may not be aware of the actions of the underling. This fact could be the case
with Oliver North. Perhaps his direct supervisors and the president did not know that he
was negotiating deals for hostage releases, selling arms, and directing the profits of the
sale to a military group Congress had voted not to support. However, this seems highly
unlikely. North has claimed that he was told by William Casey, then head of the CIA,
Robert McFarlane, former National Security Adviser, and John Poindexter, National
Security Adviser, that his actions could not be revealed. (Magnson 1989, 23) If they
knew enough to tell him this, it would seem they knew about what it was he was doing
that could not be revealed. With the charges against North dropped, his accusations
against Casey (who is dead), McFarlane and Poindexter will not be proven or disproven.
Also Tong asserts that this model denies the underling the opportunity for personal
reactions, positive or negative, from others for her actions. One negative outcome of this
is that the individual does not have the opportunity to use this critique to continue moral
development.

In the collective model, the collectivity as a whole is responsible for the decisions
made by the group. This Iran-Contra collectivity passed responsibility off to one another,
withheld information so that the investigation ran aground and was delayed, or believed that they, in fact, did what was for the greater good as they saw it and for the most part, unlike Camus' assassins, do not deserve punishment.

In the personal model of responsibility, the individual accepts responsibility for his decisions and actions and accepts the consequences of them. Alan Fiers did come forward in 1991, with information (*Sun*, 1991, 1[A]); he was pardoned of any wrong doing by President Bush. Robert McFarlane did attempt suicide shortly after the Iran-contra story broke. Was this his attempt to accept personal responsibility? He was pardoned of any wrong doing by President Bush. Oliver North continues to speak around the country and raise money for various organizations including a political action committee called V-PAC (*Com* 1993, 440) and to believe he is a hero despite testifying that he was responsible for some of the crimes committed during the Iran-Contra affair. (*Kornbluh* 1991, 33) The charges against him were dropped. Perhaps then the excuses used in these models of responsibility are important in understanding the Iran-Contra affair.

EXCUSES: CAUSAL, VOLITIONAL AND COERCION

The excuse from alternative cause may have motivated some of the decisions in the Iran-Contra affair. It has been said that, had the U.S. not supplied Iran with arms, some other country would have (and undoubtedly did) and the U.S. would have lost the opportunity to negotiate the release of hostages. In a desire to believe as true what one is doing, those players who said that this arms deal would open the door to more moderate Iranians may have believed that if they did not take this opportunity that door would not be budged again for perhaps a long time and that some other government would take the U.S.'s place with these moderate Iranian individuals.

Also, the Contras were determined to continue fighting in Nicaragua, and their
purpose for the U.S. was to fight Communism in the Western Hemisphere; therefore, supporting the Contra effort was undoubtedly seen as a valid excuse for the illegality of the decision. Had the U.S. not armed the Contras their resolve might have been broken or another less friendly government might have provided the necessary supplies. Since the establishment of the Monroe Doctrine, the U.S. has worked to keep European countries (and thus unfriendly forms of governments) from gaining control of Latin American countries. With the advent of the Roosevelt Corollary the U.S. has taken it upon itself to keep order as it has seen necessary in Latin America. Perhaps the funding of the Contras was an example of keeping Latin America secure, especially from the establishment of a perceived communist government.

The excuse from null cause says that an individual cannot be held responsible because he is only a 'cog in the wheel' who does not make the ultimate decisions. Since in the case of Iran-Contra we have what has been referred to as a secret government making decisions, I do not see how this can apply, especially to the principal players I have mentioned. The players knew of Congress' decisions and decided to circumvent them. These players are not cogs but rather active agents.

Can personal responsibility be excused in the Iran-Contra case? First, volitional excuses of personal responsibility simply will not work here. Presently, I am unaware of any of the players who did not intentionally become involved, and, to my knowledge, no one appears to have been overtly coerced. A case might be made that if there were institutional coercion afoot within the National Security Council and the CIA at the time, the implicit coercion to cooperate with the policy was so strong that to question or refuse would have been seen as disloyal, perhaps unpatriotic, or lacking some other virtue. But acting unintentionally does not absolve the individual because she is still responsible. Tong reminds us

(w)illful blindness is no excuse for lack of foresight. When policy experts,
or policy makers for that matter, make themselves the 'instruments of their own ignorance' by blithely adopting the motto, 'See no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil,' we excuse their lack of foresight at the risk of encouraging an atmosphere of deliberate moral benightedness. (Tong, 1986, 73)

As mentioned before, President Reagan's statements of not knowing what was going on within his administration does not make me feel any better about this operation. If what George Shultz says in his book, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State, is true, he worked at warning President Reagan about what was going on but to no avail for the President believed what he wanted to believe. (Shultz 1993, 45-46)

The revelation by former CIA officer Alan Fiers that he withheld information from Congress about the diversion of money gained through the sale of arms to Iran to the Contras and about Oliver North's secret operation to resupply the Contras with weapons in 1985 and 1986 makes me wonder how there could have been an absence of intention and how since intention is present, the players can continue with clear consciences. Perhaps their consciences have in fact been taken over by the three insidious reasons Tong mentions:

First, policy experts can do only so many cost-effectiveness, cost-benefit, and risk-benefit analyses before they start to see the world in terms of dollar signs, or in terms of hedons (units of pleasures)... and dolors (units of pain)... Second, policy experts can speak the neutral language of the bureaucrat only so long before a moral numbness occurs. ... Third, policy experts can stay buried in the bureaucracy only so long before they begin to separate themselves from the consequences of their actions. (Tong, 1986, 75)

This may in fact be what has happened with the Iran-Contra affair. Given the Reagan Doctrine of supporting any proclaimed anti-Communist regime, a separation of the players from the consequences of their actions might have occurred as the Reagan administration saw Congress' unwillingness to fund the Contras as 'soft on Communism.'

Since President George Bush pardoned the primary players in the Iran-Contra affair and since the crises of daily national and international life allow many people to focus for only Andy Warhol's fifteen minutes on any given event, the intricacies of policy
decisions influenced by this situation made during both the Reagan and the Bush administrations might be known only to historians. The long-term ramifications of the web of these international policy decisions will remain, catching the flies of allies and enemies as the international scene varies. Only when a critical juncture appears will United States citizens become aware once again that some fissure between the government of the United States and the government of some other nation has occurred. This awareness will lack the complexities created during this time and will respond only to the immediacy of the dilemma.

Through examining events such as the Iran-Contra affair, we can see how this institutional coercive ethos can harm our country as well as produce distrust with our allies. Furthermore, this type of analysis explored here leads to suggestions for institutional transformation which will be discussed in chapter five.

From 1988 to 1991, the United States government made policy decisions both for government interaction and business investment in Iraq. Before Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, which created "the immediacy of the dilemma," the U.S. and many countries which would later make up the United Nations coalition forces paved the road on which Saddam Hussein, the Ba'ath government, the Republican Guard, and the impoverished, terrified conscripts marched into war.
CHAPTER 4

CASE STUDY TWO:
UNITED STATES-IRAQ
INVOLVEMENT, 1988-91

Just as the Iran-Contra affair can be considered using Tong's "Dirty Hands, Many Hands, No Hands" criteria so can the policy decisions of the United States with Iraq following the Iran-Iraq war but preceding the Gulf War of 1991. For while the citizens of the United States and perhaps other coalition nations were introduced on August 2, 1990, to Saddam Hussein as the "new Hitler", "the satan of the desert", the vile vermin to be exterminated, foreign policy decisions and business investments made from 1988 to 1991 created the tanks and trucks and conscripts who swarmed into Kuwait and the rungs of the ladders leading to cockpits of the bombers which flew the tens of thousands of sorties over Iraq, shattering it back to a pre-industrial state.

BACKGROUND

Subsequent to the Iran-Iraq war, the U.S. Department of Commerce published a document prepared by the American Embassy in Baghdad which discusses what the possible post-war opportunities for U.S. businesses were in Iraq. Remember that the United States government was able to allow corporations to do business with Iraq because the Commerce Department had, in 1982, removed Iraq from the terrorist list. (U.S. Congress, Senate 1982, 17) These post Iran-Iraq war opportunities were speculated for
the years 1989-1998. When this report was issued in 1988, Iraq was still engaged in a war economy because there was no official cease-fire. Because of a steady decline in oil prices, the higher earnings Iraq expected to realize in 1988, did not come to pass. The Iraqi government found it difficult "to ... meet principal and interest payments obligations to even favored creditors like the United States, Great Britain, Canada, and Australia." (U.S. Department of Commerce 1989, 4) The estimate of Iraq's external hard debt was put at approximately $50 billion. Iraq owed certain OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) creditor countries, Eastern European and other non-Arab creditors over $40 billion while as much as $8 billion of an estimated $30 billion to $50 billion received from Arab sources during the war was lent on terms requiring repayment. (U.S. Department of Commerce 1989, 5)

As stated earlier, during the Iran-Iraq war Saudi Arabia and Kuwait sold relief crude from the Saudi/Kuwaiti Divided Zone to aid Iraq's war effort. Those sales were halted in December 1988. Other countries carrying large Iraqi debts, such as Japan, France, and the Soviet Union, were having to reschedule debt maturities. This became increasingly difficult for the non-Arab countries involved. Sixty percent of Iraq's 16.3 million people were under the age of 20. The country's inflation rate was estimated to be 40%. With this in mind, what would be the future of United States' financial involvement with Iraq?

In 1988, U. S.'s exports rose sharply by 76 percent from $683 million in 1987 to nearly $1.2 billion while oil imports from Iraq rose by 205 percent from $526 million in 1987 to $1.6 billion. (U.S. Department of Commerce 1989, 8)

Agricultural commodities, such as rice, wheat, soybean meal, poultry, hatching eggs, sugar, tobacco, tallow, pulses, butter and other dairy products, comprised over $1 billion of the U.S. exports to Iraq. This was "financed under insurance coverage from the Department of Agriculture's Commodity Credit Corporation." (U.S. Department of Commerce 1989, 9) Major U.S. oil companies imported the crude oil, nearly 400,000 b/d, from Iraq. Exports from the U.S. to Iraq were financed while imports of oil were
paid in cash.

The Commerce report suggests that

(1)he best prospects for American firms in the near term will include agricultural products, health care products and equipment, pharmaceuticals, oil field and refinery equipment, computers, and other high-technology goods and services. These are products which appear to be of sufficiently high priority to obtain the necessary Iraqi Government import licenses and foreign currency allocations. (U.S. Department of Commerce 1989, 15)

The implications for U.S. business continues with a list of other areas of investment such as, iron, steel and aluminum works, fertilizer plants and a second petrochemicals complex, and projects such as power plants, refineries, highways, pipelines and ports. Projects that would benefit the Iraqi civilian population included public housing, health, education, water, sewerage (a system of sewers), and electricity. This section of the report ends with

(1)he procurement of military hardware will continue to be a major import item as Iraq replenishes its military hardware and attempts to maintain its technical superiority through state-of-the-art weaponry and logistical supplies. (U.S. Department of Commerce 1989, 16)

This document concludes with a warning about Iraqi's adherence to the Arab League boycott of Israel which might prevent some U.S. firms from doing business in Iraq. However, there is also an address for information on U.S. boycott regulations which indicates that it is not impossible to do business with Iraq.

An article appearing in The Christian Science Monitor (12 April 1991) is titled, "Iraq Used US Loans to Finance Military Machine" with a subtitle of 'Washington agencies charged with ignoring Export-Import (Ex-Im) Bank warnings of the strategy.' In essence, the article alleges that in a desire to "buttress US-Iraqi ties, officials of the Treasury Department and officials of the US Agriculture, Commerce, and State Departments ignored years of the Export-Import Bank's warnings ... in favor of US exports and financing to Baghdad." (1) The former Iraqi ambassador to Washington,
Nizar Hamdoon, is quoted as follows: "In order to stabilize political ties you (United States corporations) should start stabilizing the trade ties... Involvement of US companies should have a substantial impact on US-Iraqi ties." (Kaslow 1991, 1-2)

In 1988, Iraqi planners offered U.S. and other Western suppliers $35 billion in postwar reconstruction contracts. In that same year, Iraq became almost completely dependent on outside financing. It was over $80 billion in debt. While Ex-Im tried to alert U.S. officials and business leaders to the problems of financing Iraqi ventures, "U.S.-Iraq Business Forum chairman Robert Abboud, chief of First City Bank Corporation of Texas, led the lobby in Washington for official U.S. backing..." and "... U.S. corporations--from Bell Helicopter/Textron to Westinghouse Electric Corporation--'supported by State,' descended on Ex-Im and challenged its analysis." (Kaslow 1991, 2) Ex-Im continued to draw the same conclusions that even though it had large oil reserves, Iraq might not pay its bills.

MANY HANDS

Moving into the realm of 'many hands' of businesses and departments involved creates an unlikely trail to follow. As mentioned, the Commerce Department took Iraq off the terrorist list in 1982, with the State the State Department following later that year; somehow I thought perhaps Foreign Relations would have imput into decisions of that magnitude. Even while being warned by Ex-Im Bank officers about Iraq's probable default on its loans, officials in the U.S. Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce, and State departments ignored warnings that Iraq would not repay. (Kaslow, 1991, 2)

Although the credit analyses of Ex-Im's board directed its path for loans with Iraq, "the Agriculture Department's Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) rejected" this information and "doled out $1 billion a year in credits to Baghdad." When August 2,
1990, arrived and Iraq invaded Kuwait, Ex-Im carried less that $50 million in loans while the CCC is left with a $1.9 billion loss that the US taxpayer will have to absorb.

Indeed, many hands fashioned the decisions regarding U.S. involvement in post-war Iraq. Not only executive departments of the U.S. government but also opportunities for corporate investment guided this engagement. Later we will consider which of these players assumes responsibility for the rebuilding of Iraq so that it can attack Kuwait or we will see which excuses may apply. For now, though, let us see if any dirty hands become apparent.

**DIRTY HANDS**

Tong's discussion of Machiavelli's prince, who defines vice as anything that will lead to a state's ruin and virtue as anything that will lead to a state's security and well-being, could be a starting point for the discussion of dirty hands. Perhaps the United States redefined 'vice' and 'virtue' so that nation's greater security and well-being came from the continued flow of Iraqi oil which increased from 1987 to 1988 by 205%. Or perhaps the security and well-being of the country came from the financial success of the many corporations that were encouraged to do business with Iraq. Interestingly enough we need to remember that agricultural commodities to Iraq were financed by insurance coverage through the Department of Agriculture's Commodity Credit Corporation and that in 1988, Iraq was $80 billion in debt and almost completely reliant on outside financing while at the same time major U.S. oil companies were paying cash for Iraqi oil.

Perhaps, rather than the question of vice and virtue, this financial involvement in Iraq might be seen simply as an example of doing the greatest good. The United States continues to have oil and U.S. corporations develop markets. What could be the problem? Why dirty hands? Saddam Hussein and the Ba'ath Party were by 1988 notorious, as
mentioned before, for creating what has been referred to as a reign of terror for the people of Iraq. Remember the gassing of the Kurds in the north which was reiterated during Desert Shield and Desert Storm, as an example. What does this have to do with dirty hands for the policy decisions made during this time period? Through "the billions of dollars Hussein received in Commodity Credit Corporations guaranteed loans, (he was able) to modernize his military." (Waller 1990, 13)

In a hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 15, 1990, eight U.S. companies are listed as having sold weapons or weapons components to Iraq, five in 1989 and three in 1990. (U.S. Congress, Senate 1990, 49) In early 1990, "when some senior administration officials were having second thoughts," the public policy toward Iraq was that, "Hussein was an important component of the Arab-Israeli peace process and must be coddled diplomatically." (Waller 1990, 14) Thus the U.S. can have 'dirty hands' in an effort to court Saddam Hussein into the Arab-Israeli peace process despite concerns raised about dealing with his government. As late as April 1990, even after arresting Iraqi agents trying to smuggle U.S.-made capacitors and a British journalist accused of spying had been executed in Iraq, "the Bush administration instructed the Dole delegation to convey a conciliatory message" to Baghdad. (Waller 1990, 14)

By April 26, 1990, the issue of sanctions against Iraq was discussed as John H. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, U.S. Department of State, spoke before the Subcommittee on Europe and The Near East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Because of increased criticism of Iraq, some members of Congress were suggesting sanctions against Iraq. Perhaps in policy making this type of suggestion is a form of washing one's hands. Mr. Kelly rebuffed this, saying that the State Department believe(s) Iraq has clearly received the important message of unanimous US Government concern over its recent actions, and we are hopeful that the government of Iraq will move quickly to bring US-Iraq relations back
The State Department further believed that without multilateral agreement the sanctions would be ineffective. Kelly continued by stressing that should the U.S. suspend trade with Iraq other "competitors in Canada, Australia, Europe, and Japan would step in quickly to fill the breach." (U.S. Department of State 1990, 3) This is the same argument as used in 1982 when Iraq was removed from the terrorist list by the Commerce Department. (U.S. Congress, Senate 1982, 17) On the issue of the import of oil and the export of other goods Mr. Kelly said,

Another result of sanctions would be to worsen the existing imbalance in our trade with Iraq. In the first 2 months of 1990, we imported Iraqi oil at a level of some 765,000 barrels per day. If this rate of purchase holds through the year, we will buy at least $3.7 billion worth of oil from Iraq. Our exports to Iraq last year amounted to some $1.2 billion, or roughly the levels of the CCC and Ex-Im Bank guarantee programs combined.

For these reasons, the Administration continues to oppose imposition of legislated sanctions. They would hurt US exporters and worsen our trade deficit. I do not see how sanctions would improve our ability to exercise a restraining influence on Iraqi actions. (U.S. Department of State 1990, 3)

This call for sanctions against Iraq is interesting since in both September and October of 1988, the Reagan administration had opposed efforts to impose sanctions against Iraq. At that time, sanctions were being recommended in response to Iraq’s abysmal human rights record with regard to the Kurds. August 25, 1988, Senators Pell, Helms, Byrd, Levine, Ford, Proxmire, and Gore introduced legislation in response to the gassing of the Kurds. The Pell bill, as it was known, unanimously passed the Senate on September 9, 1988. The Reagan administration described this bill as premature and the House of Representatives did not endorse it. Following a fact-finding mission to Eastern Turkey September 11-17, 1998, the Foreign Relations committee commissioned by Senator Pell drafted their findings in a document called Chemical Weapons Use in Kurdistan: Iraq’s Final Offensive. This document was available in October 1988.

September 30, 1988, Senator Pell and the other above-mentioned senators introduced and
secured Senate passage of another, reduced version of the bill introducing sanctions against Iraq. This bill was again rejected by the House. October 11, 1988, a House-Senate compromise version of sanction legislation was introduced by Senator Pell as an amendment to another bill. The House conferees agreed to accept this version of the sanctions and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was notified. On the last day of the session, October 21, 1988, the Reagan administration persuaded the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Ways and Means Committee to drop the Iraq sanctions provision; the Iraq sanction were killed. (U.S. Congress, Senate 1990, 42-43)

Are there any dirty hands playing the cards concerning Kuwait during the time prior to Iraq's invasion of the country? During the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing of June 15, 1990, Mr. Kelly was asked about the status of the dispute Iraq had with Kuwait. Mr. Kelly answered saying that Iraq had asserted that it had historical claims on Kuwaiti territory, which is a problem of an indistinct border with Kuwait. He said that in a letter to the Secretary General of the Arab League, Kuwait was accused of transgressing "Iraqi territory and oil fields and of seeking to undermine Iraq's economy." He continued saying that while the U.S. strongly supports a peaceful resolution between the two countries,

(t)he United States takes no position on the issues in dispute. ... Our gulf policy is unchanged: We remain determined to ensure the free flow of oil through the strait of Hormuz and to defend the principle of free navigation. We also remain strongly committed to defend the individual and collective security of our friends in the gulf with whom we have deep and long-standing ties. (U.S. Congress, Senate 1990, 92)

This last sentence is perhaps a reference to the Carter Doctrine which was originally embraced as a justification for retaliation against the Soviet Union should it engage in conflict in the Gulf area. Thus with August, 1990, a mere two months away, the need for trade within the Middle East, including Iraq, is reaffirmed, the requirement of the free flow of oil is stated, and the agreement to defend the United States friends in the gulf area
is expounded. Is 'virtue' for U.S. policy decisions defined, then, as continued trade and flow of oil from a country whose government has a reprehensible history and which has through U.S. complicity rearmed? Will those players with dirty hands come forward to accept their fate as with Camus' assassins and thus accept responsibility for their decisions or will excuses be more likely?

RESPONSIBILITY MODELS: HIERARCHICAL, COLLECTIVE, AND PERSONAL

The information of U.S. involvement in reestablishing Iraq's military capabilities seemed completely absent when the debate of Iraq's military threat rose to interest on August 2, 1990, and beyond. Who would assume responsibility for the development of this terror machine headed by Saddam Hussein who according to President Bush was Adolph Hitler reincarnate? Who would remember that the development of this military had been, at least in part, achieved through the billions of dollars of Commodity Credit Corporations guaranteed loans. (Waller, 1990, 13)

Using the hierarchical model, President George Bush, as the person on the top, would ultimately be responsible for the transactions which occurred between the United States government and corporations from the United States and Iraq from 1988 to 1990. However, as a revitalized Iraqi army crossed into the Kuwaiti desert, not a word of the U.S.'s aid in preparing this army issued from Mr. Bush's thin lips; only "This will not stand" was heard.

If we were to use the collective model of responsibility, then each corporation, executive department such as Commerce or Agriculture, Congress, and the executive branch of the government would be seen as a whole responsible equally for these policy decisions. I do not recall any corporate executives nor any other representatives from any
of the other entities coming on the news explaining how they were involved as a group of government policy makers and business leaders in rearming Iraq thus giving Saddam Hussein, the Ba'ath Party and the Republican Guard the capability to invade Kuwait and inflict significant damage along the way. As far as personal culpability goes, none of the above individuals has come forward either. How is it that these 'many hands' and 'dirty hands' can avoid responsibility? The excuses Tong explains may be of some help in understanding this condition.

EXCUSES:
CAUSAL, VOLITIONAL, COERCION

The excuse from alternative cause is used when something is done because had it not been done by that individual, or group, then some other individual, or group, would have done it. Remember that by April 26, 1990, some members of Congress were expressing doubts about trade with Iraq and were raising the question of imposing sanctions against Iraq. John H. Kelly assured the Congress members that Iraq had received the important message about its government's behavior and besides, if the U.S. did not trade with Iraq, other competitor nations would. (U.S. Department of State, 3) This is the same argument, remember, that was used for taking Iraq off the terrorist list in 1982. In light of what followed from the rearming of Iraq with the money from cash paid for oil, and given that Iraq's human rights violations were not a secret from policy makers, this excuse is not admissible for the agents involved. Perhaps it is with hindsight I am unable to understand how policy makers could approve rapprochement with Iraq, but because of this documented history of Iraq's human rights violations as well as the more recent concern expressed at the 1990 House subcommittee hearing, I find it hard to understand or accept this excuse for these policy decisions.

In the film *Judgment at Nuremberg*, four Nazi jurists are on trial for crimes against
humanity, specifically sentencing individuals to sterilization, imprisonment, and death. One of the defendants, a brilliant jurist who on occasion used his position as a Nazi judge to save lives, initially refuses to recognize the authority of the tribunal. After a case in which he sentenced an innocent man to death is brought before the court, he feels compelled to make a statement. In his statement he explains how Germany and the German people were dilapidated by despair prior to Hitler's infusion of pride. He testifies that despite understanding the rough nature of Hitler's rule, he went along with the Nazi party believing that it was a passing phase. Under Hitler's rule, Germany was able to succeed as it had been unable to under a democratic government, and the passing phase became a way of life. He states that the salvation of Germany depends on the telling of this not-so-easy truth: The judges in Germany knew about the concentration camps and they knew the ramifications of their decisions. They perhaps did not know of the millions who lost their lives, but they did know about the hundreds. If there were judges who did not know the truth, it was because they did not want to know.

The defense attorney, in an attempt to lessen the impact of his client's statement points out the complicity of the Soviet Union, the Vatican, and the industrialists in the United States who rearmed Germany and profited from it. The presiding judge agrees that others do share the responsibility of the success of Hitler and the Nazi party but that the men on trial are responsible for their actions, which is what the trial is about. He explains that if the men on trial and those who had been tried earlier had been maniacs or perverts, then their actions would have been no more that a natural disaster. But because they are ordinary, even honorable, people, they show how easily the drift to criminal behavior for the protection of the nation can occur.

At the close of the film, the presiding judge goes to the prison to see the defendant who testified that he was guilty. As their conversation comes to an end, the defendant says, "Those people, those millions of people. I never knew it would come to that." The
presiding judge responds, "It came to that the first time you sentenced a man to death that you knew to be innocent."

What does this have to do with trading with a government notorious for brutal behavior? If the United States did not deal with Iraq, then some other government, some other corporations would. How could these corporations know how their products would be used? The reign of terror in Iraq was not and is not a passing phase and those who have done business, especially in the area of state-of-the-art weaponry, with the government of Iraq have, just as the defendant did, sentenced innocent people to death. And if they do not know the ramifications of their actions, it is because they do not want to know.

Volitional excuses can be employed according to how much or how little the players knew when making their decisions. Even if the corporate players did not understand the ramifications of their investments, the government policy makers certainly should have been aware. If, in fact, policy makers acted out of what Tong calls "willful blindness," still no excuse prevails and as a nation as a whole we may have been placed woefully close to "an atmosphere of deliberate moral benightedness." (Tong, 1986, 73)

Could an institutional ethos of coercion have placed restraints on the policy makers? In the area of institutional coercion, perhaps we do find elements of the world becoming merely numerate or those individuals making decisions separating themselves from the consequences of their actions. (Tong, 1986, 75) The transactions, whether for oil, agriculture, building projects, or military technology, become simply so many supplies and so much technology for so much money or so much money for the government then to spend on so many supplies or so much technology. The long-term implications of what those supplies or what that technology might create eludes the policy makers. Since Iraq is geographically a long way from the United States and although keeping the Middle East oil protected from the Soviet Union was a strategy concern, the
real ramifications of what would be created by the Ba'ath Party might have been beyond the realm of realization of the policy makers. While I can understand how the economic exchanges of nations can become merely numeral, I find this latter excuse quite hard to consider, especially since the Bush administration used the atrocities committed by the Ba'ath Party as partial justification for Desert Storm.

Tong discusses the policy expert who separates herself from the decisions she makes using the example of the policy maker who never came into contact with those whose lives were negatively affected by her decisions. Tong says bureaucrats like this attitude because it segments and specializes tasks so that they are separated from the final product of their efforts. No one is left with a clear idea of the impact of her decisions. (Tong, 1986, 75) Could this be the feeling of all those who took part in the rebuilding of Iraq after the Iran-Iraq war? Policy makers were not ignorant of Iraq's prior human rights record nor of the means the Ba'ath Party and Saddam Hussein used to gain and maintain power.

Although we have Tong's models for responsibility and the situations in which excuses from responsibility can be used, neither has responsibility for enabling Iraq to rearm to the level necessary to engage in the invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent Gulf War been accepted by the U.S. government and the business community nor are the excuses for policy decisions acceptable given the guidelines for usage of those excuses. Tong believes that through standards of excellence and internal good (see chapter five), policy experts (and policy makers and politicians) can see themselves as just, courageous, and honest. Where were these just, courageous and honest policy makers in the years prior to the Gulf War of 1991?
CHAPTER 5

A CONCLUDING SYNTHESIS AND SUGGESTIONS

CONCLUSION

What does guide foreign policy decisions? Are they well-thought out, perhaps applying the Native American principle of considering their impact for seven generations? Are they principled with morals guiding them? Are they politically expedient applying to the moment only, without thought for future ramifications? Are they secret, clandestine actions? After looking at the Iran-Contra affair and the United States policy decisions with Iraq following the Iran-Iraq war, most of them seem to be "pragmatic", in the sense of being practical, "opportunistic, for that moment" considerations. Each case appears to be influenced by different components which then influence the course taken--so, generally short-sighted.

IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR

In the case of the Iran-Contra affair, the primary elements that appear to propel the actions of the agents are a desire to engage with moderate Iranians thus encouraging dialogue between two countries that had been experiencing hostile relations, a need to free U.S. hostages from Lebanon thus showing a determination to protect U.S. citizens in the Middle East, and an aspiration to fight Communism in Nicaragua thus keeping the Communist menace limited in the Western Hemisphere.
For the success of Iran-Contra, secrecy and lying were requirements; these distinguishing features may, for the principal players, be defined as virtues since they see them as necessary for the security and well-being of the United States. Thus the players have dirty hands "for the greater good", as they see it. Once the secrecy was broken when the story appeared in the Syrian press, lying became even more important to the operation. In a sense the players believed, and I think continue to believe, that what they were doing was far more dedicated to their notion of national security than the decisions of the Congress. Likewise they viewed the citizens of the United States as idiot wards of the state who neither understood the importance of the situation nor could be trusted to be educated about it nor trusted to make a politically savvy decision.

Trust in a representative government is one pillar maintaining the stability of structure between the elected politicians and their representatives and the electorate. What is interesting about Iran-Contra is that the majority of the main players are appointed members of government, not elected. They perhaps felt free to compromise the trust of the people of the U.S. because they did not have to worry about re-election. The electoral process is still important for them. When their party is out of the executive office, they, too, will be out of a job.

This breaking of trust is, consequently, an example of employing dirty hands to attain an objective. Elizabeth Wolgast states that utilizing dirty hands in a representative government is more difficult to justify than one might suppose. Part of her reasoning is that "(r)elations of trust are a necessity of democratic life, not an optional good that can be traded off, even for large future benefits." (Wolgast, 1992, 106)

Another character element about Iran-Contra that I find troubling is the hero-celebrity status that particularly Oliver North has taken on. For some citizens, this could be because they also believed that arming the Contras was worth any double dealing he and the others may have had to do. For others, it could be that he resisted Congress and
has essentially won. He is free; he makes large fees for speaking; and he is able to influence other candidates through the PAC he formed. Maybe this adulation comes from the notion that Congress itself is corrupt and makes infuriating decisions over which many constituents feel they have no power.

...Kenneth Howard argues (that) government is also a context in which individuals act, where some of their lives are carried out, and their characters shaped (emphasis mine) for the better or worse. (Wolgast, 1992, 104)

What concerns me here is that even as our Republican leaders and their followers tout the glories of 'family values' they have practiced deception without remorse. Wolgast comments that officials "should not engage in unjustified 'dirty hands' behavior." (Wolgast, 1992, 104-05) and then clarifies, in a footnote, this notion especially with regards to Iran-Contra by saying "this provision is important since it would preclude justified 'dirty hands' behavior such misdeeds as those committed in the Iran-Contra dealings of the mid-1980s." (Wolgast, 1992, 105)

As far as considering the long-term ramifications of the Iran-Contra affair, I see on the international stage problems arising from the perceptions of other leaders that U.S. officials or their representatives will 1) lie; 2) provide arms to governments which they publicly proclaim to be their enemy; 3) deal, as in the hostage release, with hostile governments and compromise their stated principles of engagement with those governments; and 4) disregard even the law of their own nation as established by the legislative branch of government. How are the U.S. government and its representatives to be trusted in their international dealings given these four traits? I am sure phenomenal distrust reigns in the international political realm, but this blatant disregard for one's own political system cannot help but discredit the United States as a leading nation claiming to display a functional democratic system, especially at a time when democracy continues to be sought after by so many emerging nations and dissidents around the world.
Additionally on a national level, I am concerned with the message about character development that has been sent to the citizens of the United States. I think especially of our young people. What are the long-term implications for them when they see a group of politically important people lie, double deal, and break the law, and they are rewarded, have their charges dropped, and are even pardoned by President Bush so that the investigation of their cases cannot be completed? Wolgast says that we have lost the idea of this character damage that can be done by government. She says,

But in both Plato and Aristotle, one important duty assigned to government was care for the moral well-being of the citizens, for improving them as citizens and for not doing them harm - particularly moral harm. Indeed the only harm that could be done one was to one's soul, one's character, Socrates argued. (Wolgast, 1992, 104)

I believe that even after the notability of this case recedes into the recesses of our collective societal unconsciousness, the residue of this duplicity will continue to influence the direction of the development for our national moral character - that, vaguely, we recall going along with morally harmful practices as if they were "realistic".

**UNITED STATES IN VOLVEMENT WITH IRAQ: 1988-1991**

For the policy decisions with Iraq after the Iran-Iraq war, the primary elements seem to be to enlist Iraq's support in the Arab-Israeli peace process and to maintain a possible ally against the Soviet Union, to land development contracts for U.S. corporations for the rebuilding of Iraq, and to insure continued U.S. access to Iraqi oil.

With the hindsight of the Gulf War, I look at these policy and business decisions made between the United States and Iraq. While the United States was not the only country, nor the only Gulf War coalition country, to help rebuild Iraq after the Iran-Iraq war, it was by far a major contributor and the leader of that coalition, and therefore its involvement in the rebuilding takes on a special importance. Were these decisions made
with clear and insightful thought for the future based on prior knowledge available?

If the United States had strained relations with Iraq from 1968 onward, and Iraq was on the U.S. terrorist list until 1982, a clear record was available for the type of government the Ba'ath Party created. While some players testified that Iraq's human rights policies were improving, others cautioned that Iraq was operating a neo-Stalinist government. I believe that enough is understood of the development of human beings to realize that for someone who has used terror tactics to change, a tremendous effort would have to be made. As mentioned in the Iran-Contra section about the government's responsibility in character building, even a quick look at the reign of the Ba'ath Party would leave one understanding the horror inflicted upon many people living in Iraq. If that were not enough, the gassing of the Kurds in the late 1980s was a vivid reminder. In *The Grammar of Justice*, Elizabeth Wolgast reminds us

...the good man becomes good by practicing—by repeatedly doing...what is good; this doing good things seems very like the art that characterized the good man; By doing just acts...the just man is produced, and by doing temperate acts the temperate man; without doing these no one would have even the prospect of becoming good. (Wolgast, 1988, 84-85)

She goes on to comment how by this doing of good, a man's manner of doing good becomes distinctive. (Wolgast, 1988, 85) Saddam Hussein's manner, his public record, was not of someone who practiced at doing good. With him, I believe that just the opposite was true. He practiced at doing evil, and he had other members of the government and the military around him practiced at doing evil too.

I suggest it is this well-known disrespect for human rights that makes the decisions of the U.S. government and therefore the corporations involved in Iraq a case of dirty hands and dirty hands with no excuses to absolve them from having to assume responsibility for their actions.

Many hands, of course, keep those agents involved safe from discovery or the necessity actually to come forward and admit what was done. "The multiplicity of agents
and of their roles protects people in bureaucracies and insures that Nobody does what ever is done." (Wolgast, 1992, 35) All players are safe and because this information about just how complicit the U.S. was in creating the military might of Iraq is never as publicly known as the anti-Iraqi propaganda which began August 2, 1990, the citizens of the United States are once again treated as though they cannot be educated (honesty) and trusted to make a savvy decision. This lie is carried out as a lie of omission.

From a political perspective, I can understand the Cold War mentality of needing Iraq as a possible outpost for buffering the Soviet threat, and given the lethargy with which the Arab-Israeli peace process had previously been pursued, I can understand how the U.S. government might want to begin negotiating with the various players in the Middle East. But what makes me sit and ponder are the contracts for U.S. corporations and the access to Iraqi oil.

First, let us consider the oil. During the years under discussion and for the eight years before that, there did not seem to be real political will for the United States to wean itself from massive amounts of oil. Conservation was absent from most discussions. Funds for mass transportation and research in alternative energy sources dried up like a dry river bed during a drought. No leadership prevailed with the idea that as a nation the citizens of the U.S. had to change their attitudes toward the use, over-use, and over-dependency on oil. Oil is a finite commodity, and it seems to me that as long as the U.S. and her people refuse to adapt to that reality, dirty hands policies that will lead politicians into deals with deplorable leaders will have to be employed simply to keep the oil addiction supplied, until the rest of the world demands the same share for all of the people (an impossibility) or the supply runs out.

I have been considering U.S. corporations in Iraq and the role of government. I realize that if a country does not have diplomatic relations with the United States, U.S. corporations cannot do business with or in that country. For instance, the United States
has had an embargo against Vietnam since 1964. Why, with the Iraq's adherence to the Arab League's boycott of Israel, were these politicians willing to negotiate around this? In *Citizens and Politics: A View from Main Street America*, the view of most people in the focus groups about who runs politics today was that

> a select group of power brokers is the ultimate decision maker on policy issues—and not citizens. Included among the elite club are lobbyists, political action committees (PACs), and special interest organizations. (Harwood, 1991, 19)

Corporate influence on the Iraq policy would explain many decisions that were made. Has a new oligarchy been created? Is this oligarchy led by the heads of corporations, perhaps multinational corporations, who through PACs influence both national and international policy decisions? How much money flows through Washington to wash away any considerations of the long-term effects of providing a government such as the Ba'ath Party with the ability to rebuild, rearm, and unleash terror once again? Remember one of the reasons given for doing business in Iraq was 'if not us, then some other country will.' In other words, short-term business profits outweighed the terror of the Ba'ath regime. Perhaps the only political benefits reaped were contributions to the 'war chests' of politicians who supported these investments in Iraq.

During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, President Bush introduced the rhetoric, if not the substance, of the Just War theory. During the war and since the end of the war, numerous articles and books have been written on whether the Gulf War was or was not just, according to this theory, and what the ethics of the war were. I believe that this interest was prompted by the President's use of this language, and philosophers and political scientists have had quite a time debating this issue. Whether the war has been judged just or not simply depends on who one reads. I was surprised and heartened by this outpouring of just war discussion. While this debate may influence future generations regarding what constitutes a just war, for me at this time that notion is beside the point.
The point is that the United States was one of the major players in rearming a notoriously heinous government, and then led the United Nations coalition to bomb that same government back to the pre-industrial age when it acted in a very predictable manner; after all, in 1980 that same government invaded Iran. Without U.S. assistance after fighting a massive, labor-intensive, debt-producing eight year war, Iraq would not have been as well armed as it was, and at that, especially once France cut Iraq's satellite images, the technology of the two sides was grossly disproportionate. The coalition forces knew where everything was in the desert and could navigate across the desert with accuracy through satellite images while the Iraqis relied on airplanes which they either did not fly or could not fly. (*Celestial Sentinels*, video)

Remember the important duty of government discussed in the Iran-Contra section: care for the moral well-being of the citizens and that the only real harm that could be done to someone was to harm her soul, her character. After the very typical enemy-making process undertaken by the U.S. government and the media, demonizing Saddam Hussein and dehumanizing the soldiers, for example, what followed was a glorification of the infliction of suffering. This suffering might prick the consciences of some policy makers, but these 'dirty hands' were necessary to combat the Iraqi aggression. In *After the War*, Bill Moyers discusses just how much joy was expressed at the bombing raids that were produced to appear like video games without any reflection on the damage that could be caused by tens of thousands of sorties. He also discusses the disproportionate amount of celebration that followed the end of the war. None or few of these jovial citizens were aware of the U.S. policy decisions that created the conditions for this war. Additionally, to return to *Citizens and Politics*, the Kettering Foundation decided to hold more focus group meetings in part to see if the United States victory had substantially changed the U.S. citizens' views on politics. What they found was that nobody in the groups brought up the war; the facilitators had to. Once the topic was brought up, the participants
explained that they saw no connection between politics and war. One person said, "I thought we were here to talk about politics. That's the reason I didn't bring it up."

(Harwood, 1991, 66-67) And yet it is those same politicians making policy decisions that form the politics of the country that set the stage for the Gulf War.

As with the long-term ramifications of the Iran-Contra affair, I believe that the precedent set by the United States complicity in rearming Iraq and then building a United Nations coalition military force to employ a massive strike to destroy that which it helped create is debilitating to the development of the United States national moral character and to the moral character of individuals in and out of government. Long after the "Support the Troops" bumper stickers have peeled off the cars, citizens of the United States will continue to believe that flexing military muscle is the appropriate response to the dangerous world. Mr. Clinton's rise in popularity following the U.S. bombing of Baghdad June 26, 1993, can be seen as an example of this belief.

SUGGESTIONS

MANY HANDS

Relying on 'many hands' to deflect responsibility must cease. As we have seen in both the Iran-Contra affair and in the U.S.-Iraq involvement from 1988-91, the 'many hands' notion applies. Regardless of who the players are or what agencies are involved openness and communication among them must be emplace and operative.

An ethos of communication in the sense of "communicare, to impart, share,...to make common," (Guralnik, 1980, 287) needs to exist among individuals working for the various governmental departments, including the Defense Department and State Department, and commercial enterprises. They must discuss and hear each other, even to the level of having to examine close-held notions, such as arming the Contras or
expanding loans, credits, and business in Iraq. In order to remove the 'many hands' screen which deflects responsibility, the eventual policy decisions made must reflect back on the discussions revealing the players efforts to co-ordinate and make policy decisions. This process must be codified, monitored and made public so that not just the players know of its existence but the citizens of the U.S. as well. Through this openness, trust can be established; a trust that is essential for an effective representative democracy.

**DIRTY HANDS**

For Machiavelli's prince, remember, vice and virtue are redefined so that "a vice is that which ... would lead to the state's ruin; a virtue is that which ... would lead to the state's greater security and well-being." (Tong, 1986, 62) By following this line of reasoning, a virtue may in fact become something which, if found in one's personal life, might be defined as vice. Lying, for instance, to someone who relies on one's truthfulness, perhaps a family member, would be seen as vice for it breaks the bonds of trust which bind the family together. However, lying to Congress, a body which one hopes relies on truthfulness, especially from players within government, became for the players in the Iran-contra affair a 'virtue'. This is an example of 'dirty hands' or working for the 'greater good' as seen by the players. Why might the players have lied?

One component of institutions which compels the use of the dirty hands rationale is the institutional ethos of coercion, getting caught up in the narrow agenda of the institution without examining the long-term ramifications of policy decisions. Dirty hands decisions are 'virtues' in that they might obtain the objectives of the institution's agenda, but they are 'vices' in that they might, and probably would, break the trust necessary especially in a representative democracy such as the United States. As Wolgast points out, "(r)elations of trust are a necessity of democratic life, ..." (Wolgast, 1992, 106)
Institutions which govern in representative democracies as well as corporate institutions which operate within representative democracies must critique and reflect on any practices or beliefs that encourage and condone an institutional ethos of coercion. Because trust is central to the effective implementation of democracy, these same institutions, whether government or corporate, must establish an ethos or moral habit which is conducive and supportive of the positive recognition and practice of honesty, responsibility, justice, and courage. Through acknowledging and rendering honor to these equitable characteristics, the cornerstones for the foundation of a vital representative democracy are laid.

IRAN-CONTRA: REVIEW
THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

In considering the Iran-Contra affair, I have come to believe that in this post-Cold War era covert operations by the CIA and the National Security Council (NSC) needs to be reviewed. Created in 1947 as a branch of the Central Intelligence Agency, (Domhoff, 1967, 127) the NSC's purpose was defined by the Cold War and the bipolar hostilities of the United States and the Soviet Union. These institutions are especially susceptible to both many hands and dirty hands which, given the secrecy in which they operate, are even more hidden.

The end of the Cold War has unleashed former recipients of U.S. covert aid to use the weapons and training "against governments that America supports and against America itself. (Schorr, 1993) Anti-Communist insurgencies, the Contras, the Unita rebels, and the mujahideen guerrillas, are now engaged in acts of violence which the United States does not support. In Angola, Savimbi has used his U.S. supplied weapons to reignite the civil war and perform what is now called 'ethnic cleansing'. In Nicaragua, remaining Contras violently oppose the government of President Violeta Chamorro. Factions of the
mujahideen are suspected of being responsible for "trying to drive tourists away from Egypt by terror and bring down the Mubarak government," (Schorr, 1993) and are wanted "for the shooting of five CIA employees ... last January." (Schorr, 1993) What consideration, other than their being anti-Communist, was given prior to allocating funds to these groups? How were the long-term consequences evaluated?

Elizabeth Wolgast suggests that the contexts of institutions are important in influencing the more fundamental idea of what a person is. Perhaps if we, in a representative democracy, "are to redeem the attribution of personal responsibility, our institutions may need reshaping." (Wolgast, 1992, 4) The agenda of the National Security Council and the means by which that agenda is realized need to be examined and perhaps a new agenda established. Given the new international political environment in which we find ourselves where notions of democracy are budding around the world, guidelines for implementation of the National Security Council's agenda need to be discussed and drafted. I would suggest that even the long-term moral implications of these actions be included in the discussion.

UNITED STATES POLICY DECISIONS WITH IRAQ: 1988-1990

With regard to the U.S. policy decisions with Iraq prior to the Gulf War, I have two suggestions. One involves the allocation of tax money for the implementation of policy decisions. The other recommends an increased awareness and use of human rights as a criterion for policy decisions.

DEMOCRATIC TAX ALLOCATIONS

Much of foreign policy cannot be executed without funding, for example the loans to Iraq through the Commodity Credit Corporation. Since 1977 the yearly Hyde
amendment has prohibited the use of federal money to provide poor women with abortions. (Rosenblatt, 1992, 96) This withholding of federal funds occurred, in part, because of the revulsion of many taxpayers toward the act of abortion and their pressure on their elected officials. Since the United States is a democratic country and one of the definitions of democracy is "a form of government in which the supreme power is vested in the people and exercised directly by them or by their elected agents under a free electoral system," (Stein, 1984, 353) I suggest the government open up all areas of funding to the choice of the electorate. I, for instance, have vehemently opposed the use of my tax money for nuclear weapons, but I have no choice about whether my money was used for them or not.

While I realize that this process could be quite cumbersome for the government, especially at first, I believe that along with the yearly tax forms, citizens should receive a check list on which they can designate the percentage of their taxes to be used for the various functions government supplies. My model for this idea is from Working Assets which uses a percentage of its profits for various social, justice, peace and environmental groups. Each year, all those individuals who use Working Assets credit cards or long distance service receive a ballot listing all of the organizations for their choices.

I see many benefits from this system. First, citizens will have the opportunity to see exactly where their money goes. If they have questions about any entry, they can call their representatives and ask about it. This would open a dialogue between the representatives and their constituents. One concern the members of the focus groups from Citizens and Politics had was that their representatives are out of touch with them and have no interest in their concerns. (Harwood, 1991, 31) This dialogue has the ability to keep the representatives accountable for and to inform citizens about how our money is used. Second, after a few years the use of our money would reflect what is important to us. I, for instance, would want to help poor women to have access to abortions and I
want well-maintained national parks. With this system, I would be able to know that the percentage of money used for certain expenditures comes from my money. Third, I believe this system would give taxpayers a sense of empowerment in their democratic government for they would be saying how they want their money spent. Presently, if someone does not approve of the way government uses her tax money, she has perhaps five choices. She can live beneath the income level established for paying taxes, in other words, live in poverty. She can lie on her tax returns and await discovery and prosecution. She can not pay taxes as many of the tax revolt people have done and also await discovery and prosecution. She can pay her taxes, not appreciate where the money is allocated and become cynical about the process of taxpaying and perhaps even the political process itself. And finally, she can pay her taxes and feel guilty and ashamed about how her taxes are spent. Wolgast states

(ο)ne writer remembers that it is an important fact, a personal fact, about people (who objected to the Vietnam war) that they were citizens of a nation guilty of war crimes and felt personally ashamed of actions they neither committed nor commanded. (Wolgast, 1992, 19)

They did, however, pay for it, and perhaps that is where some of the shame came from.

This plan to allow citizens to decide where their tax money is spent may sound far-fetched, but right now in the House Ways and Means Committee, HR 1870, the U.S. Peace Tax Bill languishes. This "bill would allow people to redirect to nonmilitary purposes that portion of their income tax that would ordinarily go toward military spending." ("Peace Tax Bill Given a Hearing" 1992, 27) The notion that U.S. taxpayers want control over how their money is spent is understandable. In the case of abortion, well-organized anti-choice constituents have prevented their money from being spent on abortions; people who object to their money used for military purposes have introduced HR 1870. I think the benefits of this plan would greatly enhance our democratic process,
allow people to feel more a part of their government, and create a model for other emerging democracy to follow.

HUMAN RIGHTS

Even before the United Nations Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna June 1993, I had been considering the awareness and use of human rights as a criterion for foreign policy. Unlike 'dirty hands' policies where it is acceptable to commit acts which are in opposition to moral codes, considering the human rights records of governments would lessen the possibility of rearming governments that commit heinous acts. In December 1948, the UN ratified the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In its thirty articles, the declaration outlines the criteria for a much more just and humane world and one in which democracy would truly flourish.

I believe policy makers and citizens, especially in democratic countries, need to read, consider, discuss, and understand the concepts presented in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Then perhaps, Zbigniew Brzezinski's 1989 statement "that the notion of human rights (as) 'the single most magnetic political idea of the contemporary time'" (Forsythe 1992, 40) could come to fruition. At the Vienna conference, some nations posited the idea that perhaps their cultural identity or religious practices were violated by this declaration. I agree with U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher's statement to the conference that

(w)e respect the religious, social, and cultural characteristics that make each country unique. But we cannot let cultural relativism become the last refuge of repression.

...We reject any attempt by any state to relegate its citizens to a lesser standard of human dignity. (Christopher, 1993, 4-5)

When I first considered human rights as important to policy decisions, I thought about how we could really be aware of human rights violations as well as the improvements countries might make with regards to human rights. My suggestion was,
and still is, that through representatives from all UN nations, along with non
governmental groups such as Amnesty International and Americas Watch, working
groups will meet at least yearly to review each nation's record. The groups would rotate
so that no "good old boy" clubs could develop to beat other nations over the head. Each
group should have a balance from each hemisphere as well as from developed and
developing nations. In *Faces of the Enemy*, Sam Keen says "Confucius claimed we could
have harmony in society if we named things accurately." (Keen, 1986, 96) I believe this
naming of abuses as well as successes would be very powerful and would contribute
significantly to the moral development not only of other countries but also of the United
States. I am encouraged that at the Vienna conference the establishment of a UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights was introduced and that the United States government
supports this action. (Christopher, 1993, 6)

I realize that much dirty dealing, what has been referred to in this paper as dirty
hands, goes on in international politics. Billions of dollars were paid to Iraq for oil while
allowing Iraq to buy products and technology with loans. In the Iran-Contra affair,
government players acted as though they were above the law as they sold arms to an
acknowledged enemy of the United States. They used the profits from these arms sales to
finance a rebel movement in Nicaragua that Congress had voted not to aid. However, in
"Human Rights in a Post-Cold War World," David P. Forsythe enumerates the
percentages of support for various treaties that further develop the notion of human rights
and he says, "(t)he broad acceptance of international legal obligations pertaining to human
rights by a clear majority of the world's states suggests a recognition of the basic concept
of such rights." (Forsythe 1992, 41) He continues by explaining the paradoxes and
hypocrisies apparent in the implementation of human rights by many nations, including
the United States. These difficulties while present are not defeating. The reality is that
human rights are being discussed, considered, and named as important in the international
realm. To refer back to Confucius, he said it is through naming things accurately that we could bring harmony to society. (Keen, 1986, 96)

If what Mr. Christopher said in Vienna is a true reflection of the Clinton administration, "reinforcing democracy and protecting human rights (as) a pillar of our foreign policy -- and a major focus of our foreign assistance programs," (Christopher, 1993, 1) then according to this speech, the Clinton administration has linked democracy and human rights as inseparable. Mr. Christopher extolled that his "delegation will support the forces of freedom ... every day in the conduct of our foreign policy throughout the world." (Christopher, 1993, 2) As we remember that what motivates me to want human rights as a focal point for policy decisions for the U.S. is that the U.S. rearmed Iraq even with its questionable human rights record, Mr. Christopher continues,

\[\text{(w)e will insist that our diplomats continue to report accurately and fully (emphasis mine) on human rights conditions around the world. Respect for human rights and the commitment to democracy-building will be major considerations as we determine how to spend our resources on foreign assistance. And we will weigh human rights considerations in trade policy... (Christopher, 1993, 8)}\]

I am not naive enough to believe that this speech will cause the U.S. to disengage in dirty dealings; there are too many political favors to pay and too much money to be made. In order for a significant change to occur in the United States policy decisions internationally, the U. S. needs to develop a national political will for human rights.

Just as the UN has suggested a High Commissioner for Human Rights, the U.S. too should have a High Commissioner for Human Rights. Then similar working groups formed from each of the states, Washington, DC and Puerto Rico would become well-versed on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other human rights documents and examine how each state and its inhabitants provide for these rights and how they might violate them. Again, it is through the process of naming these rights and becoming
familiar with them on a national level that the United States federal government would truly have the opportunity to use human rights as criteria for foreign policy and trade decisions.

Following the Gulf War, Mr. Bush talked extensively about the creation of a new world order. I do not believe we need a new world order. What we do need is a new world vision, and my suggestions presented in this paper are, perhaps, part of that new world vision.
END NOTES

1. For more information about Working Assets call 1-800-788-0898 or write Working Assets, 701 Montgomery Street #400, San Francisco CA 94111.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 97th Cong., 18 March 1982.

Corn, David, "V is for vampire," The Nation, 5 April 1993, 440.


Kemp, Geoffrey, "Middle East Opportunities," *Foreign Affairs*, America and the World 1988-89, 139-158.


Moyers, Bill, et. al., After the War, WNET/New York, WTTW/Chicago, Corporation for Public Broadcasting, video, 1992.


"Peace Tax Bill Given a Hearing," Pax Christi USA, Fall 1992, 27.


Schlesinger, James, "Reykjavik and Revelations: A Turn of the Tide?," Foreign Affairs, America and the World 1986, 426-457.


Seamans, Joe, Celestial Sentinels, WQED/Pittsburgh, NHK/Japan, in association with the National Academy of Sciences, video, 1992.


