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Interest-Based Bargaining: Changing Employer-Employee Relations at Youngstown State University

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This study is based upon interviews conducted with over two dozen individuals centrally involved with the collective bargaining movement at Youngstown State University of Ohio. (YSU) The experiences and memories of several participants extend back to the 1960’s, at which time they were newly appointed faculty members. Within the group are several retired persons who spoke from the comfortable position of relative political invulnerability. Others were at the time of their interviews actively engaged in university teaching and administration. Initial interviews concerning the newly-established Interest-based bargaining process took place within eight months of the negotiatory events, well
before the “ravages of short term memory loss” had damaged the database. Placed alongside the historical “paper trail”\textsuperscript{1} this oral testimony enabled the writer to reconstruct and describe with a significant degree of accuracy the events occurring during the negotiation of the 1993 faculty collective bargaining agreement at YSU. In 2004 the author revisited the issues involved through contact with retired, as well as still active members of the YSU community. The new data collected enabled him to “bring current” the earlier investigation, thus providing an update on the evolution of the bargaining process since 1993-4.

**Historical Background**

Collective bargaining at YSU has a long history, stretching from the 1970’s to the present time. YSU was the first public university in Ohio to organize for bargaining, with the creation of a chapter of the Ohio Educational Association (YSU-OEA) in 1970. The chapter was designated as exclusive bargaining representative for all faculty members in June, 1972. In gaining this recognition, YSU-OEA became the second group of employees on campus to gain exclusive recognition, the maintenance, custodial and parking employees having affiliated with unions and gained bargaining representation in early 1969.\textsuperscript{2} The reasons for this faculty organizational activity are several in number. As Dr. Tom Shipka, then a newly hired Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Religion\textsuperscript{3} stated:
Soon after I … [came]… in 1969 two people were fired…. There did not seem to me to be just cause for their dismissals. As that was happening … comparative information became available which showed … that the Youngstown faculty were paid the lowest [in the state system] and were required to work the most. They taught more hours, more classes …. Now with all that, two other things became apparent. One is that the faculty had very little say so about the governance of the institution. We had no significant input into the formation of academic policy. Beyond that, from 1969 to 1971, YSU experienced a decline in enrollment. The president at that time … scared the devil out of us by calling a general faculty meeting and announcing that the enrollment picture was bleak and that he contemplated retrenchment …. So the threat of losing our jobs, the low pay, the lack of participation in governance, heavy work loads, the apparently unjust and illegitimate firings, all of this converged to convince me that there was a need for this faculty to consolidate, to collaborate, to organize.4

In addition, 1969 was a year during which tensions over the Vietnam War ran high, both within Ohio and throughout the United States. The shootings at Kent State University had sent shock waves through the country. A demonstration protesting the war was held on the YSU campus in October, 1969, resulting in allegations that the university administration planned to
sanction those members of the faculty who had canceled classes without permission, and who had taken part in that activity.\textsuperscript{5} While the allegations proved unfounded, the specter of arbitrary administrative action generated thereby clearly contributed to the sense of faculty dissatisfaction with current conditions. Dr. Sally Hotchkiss, then a newly minted Assistant professor in the Psychology Department, stated:

\ldots sentiments were running very strongly for and against the war in Vietnam, where there were many dissidents expressing positions on a variety of issues [and] where protest against the status quo seemed to be in vogue and [to] hold high currency.\textsuperscript{6}

The YSU-OEA, having been accepted by the administration as exclusive bargaining representative for the faculty, commenced the bargaining of its first contract in August, 1972. As often happens with initial contracts, things did not go smoothly. Both administration and trustees resisted the process. As their chief negotiator, John W. Powers, said:

\ldots they were very leery of getting involved in this. They didn’t feel it was appropriate for faculty members to organize….So it was kind of a classic case of…getting acquainted with the process of negotiations….\textsuperscript{7}

Negotiations proceeded by fits and starts. The chairman of the YSU Board of Trustees, John Newman, a local attorney, is reported to have announced his intention to take a “hard line” in the bargaining relationship.\textsuperscript{8} Nevertheless, progress was made in a number of areas, so
much so that the union president was cautiously optimistic matters could be “wrapped up” by spring, 1973. Unfortunately, the Board of Trustees as a whole refused to accept some concessions made by the administrative bargaining team and withdrew that team’s bargaining authority. This, in turn, caused the OEA, in April, 1973, to call for a strike authorization vote, which gave their negotiators the authority to break off talks and call for a strike unless the bargaining climate improved. Within two days the Board of Trustees restored the bargaining authority of the administrative bargaining team and the first faculty contract ever negotiated at YSU was ratified in May, 1973.

The years between 1973 and 1992 were characterized by the typical strains and stresses that collective bargaining—like flesh—“is heir to.” A sense of labor-management stability was achieved based upon the two to three year contract negotiations cycle. As one professor described the relationship:

On the whole, relationships between management and the faculty … are generally pretty civil, not often confrontational until the time draws near to go back to the bargaining table. Then suddenly, tensions rise, hostilities flare, and civility goes, unfortunately, largely out the window.9

In terms of salary, YSU achieved significant gains relative to other state institutions of higher education between 1972 and 1993. Starting in 1972 in last place in average salary among Ohio’s state colleges (all ranks), by 1992 YSU ranked sixth among eleven participating institutions, although the university
dropped back to tenth of eleven following an early retirement incentive plan (ERIP) which was implemented in the same year.\textsuperscript{10}

The overall quality of language and inclusions in successive contracts continued to improve as the participants learned more about the process, with the result that most at YSU agreed that they had one of the strongest contracts among the almost 350 contracts bargained by higher education affiliates of the National Education Association. The process itself could best be described as traditional and adversarial in nature—what is usually called positional bargaining. One informant, a past-president of the union, indicated that tensions began to build during the 1980’s as a result of disagreements and hardening of viewpoints. Disagreement flared among members of the union team during the 1986 bargaining process, with the result that the team agreed to submit the completed contract to the membership by a vote of only four to two, one vote short of rejection. As Dr. John Russo, a former union president, stated “…changes were already blowing in the wind.\textsuperscript{11}

The climate of labor relations continued to worsen during the next two years, with the result that, by 1989 “… a budding insurrection … was about to happen….\textsuperscript{12} Negotiations went badly and a fact finder had to be called in, as had been traditional during several previous rounds of negotiations. Russo, then serving as union president, said:

The fact finder’s report came in; the administration rejected it;
they came back into bargaining and started “bargaining down.”
We said “we’re not bargaining down.” …We went through the
motions of bargaining for a couple of weeks and then they decided they were going to play “chicken.” There was a strike. … The strike lasted a day …. Nobody got hurt. The strike ended after one day, but they were shocked that the university was surrounded by 400 faculty members. Only 14 people crossed the picket line. We had teamsters and philosophers driving cars together, which was quite something. The response [from management] was [that] these were ingrates and children, and the vice-president for personnel resigned and the board of trustees went out and hired a notorious anti-union law firm from Akron. The ideas was that they were going to get tough… and they lost three major grievances in a row…. This added another set of humiliations.¹³

Negotiations during 1991 were conducted by the Akron law firm of Milisor and Nobil in a traditional adversarial manner. ¹⁴ Once more, the matter was placed before a fact finder. Both the union and the board of trustees eventually accepted the fact finder’s report despite a negative recommendation by their attorney. This particular round of negotiations left a further residue of ill-will among the members of both labor and management groups at YSU. It was probably at this point that the parties began to realize that “playing tough” in the future would very likely be counterproductive and that it might be appropriate to reevaluate available alternatives.¹⁵
A New Approach to Old Problems

In mid-1992, Dr. Leslie H. Cochran became the fifth president of Youngstown State University. Cochran, a veteran administrator, had a strong background in participative management and brought a difference management style to the campus. In a recent paper President Cochran said that

At the time the perception of many was that the institution was “dead in the water.” There were significant budget shortfalls, enrollment declines, employee labor strife, a perception of poor academic quality, little initiative for change, open Board of Trustees conflict, and a myriad of pressing, yet less visible, problems….the campus was a mirror of the community. During the preceding two decades over 40,000 union steel workers had been permanently displaced. The community exemplified all of the stereotypes of a “rust belt” community. Labor strife was commonplace. Similarly, employee relations at the University had totally eroded….16

Cochran soon began to initiate positive campus changes. Within a few months of his arrival, the YSU Board of Trustees approved Cochran’s Campus 2000 Plan, which had as its theme the establishment of Youngstown State as a major metropolitan university. He said that

The plan emerged from a broad-based participatory process, unique for the campus, and delineated thirteen strategies and over 120 objectives. An overriding concept of the plan called for
shared governance, decentralized decision-making, and open deliberative processes.”

Using a “take what’s available” approach to leadership, in which he marshaled the resources then in place on behalf of the university, President Cochran began the process of organizational change. As an example, having determined that there was a significant amount of scholarship money available, but that it had until that time been parceled out in small amounts on what amounted to a “first come-first served” basis, the President arranged for the combining of these funds and initiated a University Scholar’s program designed to attract up to forty of the region’s “best and brightest” to YSU through provision, in the initial year of operation (1993-94), of full-cost four year scholarships. The initiative called for the addition of forty more scholarship during each of the next three years. Cochran believed that these scholarships would attract scholars who would help to add an additional measure of intellectual excitement to the campus atmosphere. The money to support this initiative had been there all along. Through Cochran’s leadership it was repackaged to serve a somewhat different academic purpose.

Dr. Cochran set forth his vision as follows: “We can shape our own future and build a great metropolitan university … likewise we are committed to being a good community citizen and serving as a catalyst for change in the [Mahoning] valley.”

President Cochran’s philosophy and his actions signaled a willingness to entertain new approaches to the labor relations process, a “sea change” that
was welcomed by the faculty and staff members. Following informal oral
probes by the union president, in mid-November 1992 the chief negotiator for
the union, Dr. Sidney Roberts, sent President Cochran a letter suggesting

… That we abandon our traditional mode of adversarial contract
negotiations in favor of what is known as Interest-based
bargaining … The Association believes that Interest-based
bargaining could also be a significant move toward eliminating
the unpleasantness that has been associated with past collective
bargaining at Youngstown State University. Further, interest-
based bargaining could save the University a large sum of money
that might otherwise be spent on legal fees for traditional
collective bargaining.\textsuperscript{20}

President Cochran found the proposal to be compatible with his own thinking and,
during the next two months, staffed the matter with the members of the board of
trustees. He indicated that

…John Russo …shared with me a book that he had been reading and
was sharing with his people because he sensed, I think … the growing
interest I had in this area. He shared with me the book \textit{Getting to Yes},
[by Roger Fisher and William Ury] which I read over the holidays ….I
started drafting a couple of pages to see if I could put this in the context
of what it might look like. I had a few people react to it in the
administration and shared it with the board …. Then I called each of the
board members … and found that there was a real interest in …

considering this, particularly because I was making the point that in the internal governance of the institution, you have to be consistent. You can’t … be Mr. Nice Guy today and tomorrow wear a black hat.  

The trustees were cautious in their response to this idea at first, since they had experienced only the adversarial/positional approach to bargaining in recent years, but by this time several of President Cochran’s initiatives had come to fruition. As he said:

I’d been on campus for four or five months, and things were off to a pretty good start as far as opening up the campus [to] an open dialogue …. They [the trustees] were getting positive reinforcement that this leadership thing was … working all right.  

The trustees were willing to support the new president’s initiatives and board concurrence was forthcoming by early 1993. In January, 1993 it was agreed that training in the Interest-based bargaining approach would be provided for the members of the union and management teams on a trial basis, with the understanding that “the use or outcomes of Interest-based bargaining during the ‘trial period’ would not be binding on either party and, therefore, on a non-precedent basis.”

Dr. Cochran issued a statement in which he initially referred to the process as “continuous improvement bargaining,” a euphemism that was soon
dropped in favor of the more widely known terms, “mutual gains or interest-based bargaining.”

He stated:

The time has come for YSU to adopt a new approach to collective bargaining that bonds the mutual goals of the institution with the interests of its work force. The institution needs to create processes that result in shared realities rather than those that foster individual differences. In this way, the University can function on a daily basis in a more open, collegial, fashion. Communication processes can be enhanced in a manner that facilitates changes. The University can move beyond its traditional, static mode of operation to one that is more dynamic, flexible, and change-oriented.

The decision to move into interest-based collective bargaining involved soul-searching and risk taking on the part of both the newly appointed university president and the elected president of the union. Describing the pressures on President Cochran during the early months of 1993, the faculty union president said:

That put him, in some ways, in a very uncomfortable position … He’s trying to weigh these things on their merit … he’s got to figure out the politics of the campus as a new president. Ultimately, he does it. He steps up to the plate and does it! And we both know at this point … that there is a great deal of risk for
both parties … because this approach is not yet accepted by both faculty and administrators.26

A number of personnel from both the administration and the union expressed reservations about the projected change in approach, based upon their previous experiences and training in traditional positional bargaining and, perhaps, drawing upon their knowledge of the recent unsuccessful attempt to implement interest-based bargaining at the University of Cincinnati. As an example, the Executive Vice-President of the University, Dr. G.L. Mears, and the local representative of the Ohio Education Association, Mr. Mike Matusick, expressed initial skepticism about the process. Both were to be pleasantly surprised with the final results. Speaking of the initial reactions of the campus union’s executive committee, former union president Russo commented:

… At first there was uncertainty. It is always easiest for people to go [along] with what they are most familiar with …. I had a fairly young, inexperienced executive committee …. I kept talking to them about moving into support, and a sort of moment of truth came….27

It was decided to provide joint training for members of the management and union bargaining teams as a way of familiarizing them with the interest-based bargaining process.28 Representatives of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, who had been employing a variant of the process developed by the Harvard Negotiations Project, were asked to conduct the training, which took place in June, 1993. In keeping with the spirit of mutuality
which characterizes the interest-based approach, the management and labor teams were trained together, the first step in engendering the spirit of joint problem solving which is central to the process.

The new bargaining paradigm departs radically from traditional, adversarial or position-based bargaining, which normally involves displays of organizational power and the employment of intimidation tactics. Parties to the adversarial bargaining relationship prepare and present sets of proposals in areas of desired change, then respond to the counter proposals of the “other side” in a circular and repetitive process that is often both wearing and exhausting for the parties. Eventually, either agreement or impasse is reached. In the latter instance, dispute resolution machinery such as mediation, fact-finding and arbitration is employed to break the logjam. In instances of continued disagreement, strikes or lockouts may occur, usually to the disadvantage of both parties involved.

In the interest-based approach, the parties work together as teams to identify “issues” and, based thereon, areas of mutual “interest”, followed by the preparation of lists of “options” designed to meet the previously identified “interests.” They avoid taking hard and fast “positions” during the discussions. After the options are listed, the group discusses and agrees upon sets of objective “standards” that can be used to judge the desirability of various identified “options”. Decision-making is by consensus, with everyone involved agreeing to courses of action to be taken. No formal vote or “division of the house” is utilized in coming to closure. As part of the process of reaching
consensus, the group process techniques of “brainstorming” and “flip charting” are often employed.\textsuperscript{29} As mentioned earlier, the interest-based process depends upon joint solution of problems rather than confrontation and conflict.

Complete informational disclosure is both encouraged and viewed as necessary to the success of the interest-based process. Key to success is the rapid development of mutual trust among the members of the bargaining teams. A number of the participants at YSU commented that, as the relationship solidified, it became a challenge to tell “who was serving on which team,” since they were intermingled at the table and sometimes argued in favor of a position being espoused by the other team. The union president commented:

\ldots I think that once we gained the confidence of the administration \ldots there was a real sense that everybody wanted to make this thing work and that we really had a window of opportunity \ldots because there were forces on both sides that would just as soon go back to the adversarial model \ldots.\textsuperscript{30}

The teams commenced their meetings on June 23, 1993, and bargained regularly until early September, at which time agreement was reached and a three year contract signed. From all reports the interest-based approach worked reasonably well. This is not to suggest that there were no difficulties based on personality differences or disagreement on substantive matters, but the utility of the process itself, coupled with the commitment of those present to making the process work, ultimately produced a successful outcome. Among the “stickiest” of the problems encountered during negotiations was based upon the union’s
desire to add a faculty member to the university Board of Trustees. Dr. Russo had visited with President Cochran in this regard, coming away with the impression that Cochran might be willing to support such a move. Russo stated:

I said [to Cochran], ‘I want you to understand what I’m going to do …. I’m going to look for participatory management all throughout the university including, I want a member on the board of trustees …. He didn’t blanch at that point. He said, “Well, I have to think about that.”…So he played around with it, but he said to me that he couldn’t sell it.31

President Cochran, in turn, said the following on the subject:

… I had some conversations with John Russo …. He was using … examples, as I recall, of Saturn or some other industrial plants that had been recognized for having strong employee relationships with management …. They had in fact placed a union member or two on the board of that particular plant …. In the summer, he specifically asked if I would consider that and take that request to the board …. I talked … to the chairman of the board and maybe the vice chair or personnel subcommittee chair … and indicated to them, as I had reflected on this that I had some reservations about it, not only reservations about whether this was good idea or not, but equally whether this was the right time to consider that kind of question …. I thought in my own mind that this would be perceived … as one of the
... some of the board members were expressing about why we shouldn’t move in this direction [toward interest-based bargaining] .... I think they moved in this direction ... because they had invested pretty heavily in a new president .... I’m not sure if they were at the time ... enamored with interest-based bargaining.32

Dr. Cochran went on to explain his concern that faculty membership on the Board of Trustees might be viewed as a conflict of interest. Apparently he was a good deal less positive about the idea than Dr. Russo perceived him to be, an indication of “communication misinterpretation.” As a result, some hot debate occurred during team bargaining sessions, with strong feelings developing and various members “weighing in” on the issue. As the Chief Negotiator for management said:

...if the President really means to get his faculty involved in meaningful discussion at all levels within the university, then it’s a logical extension to suggest that the most important input is at level of the trustees .... And that, indeed, is the recommendation that came out of a subcommittee of the two negotiating teams ... and was not met with unanimous agreement, to put it mildly. I, among others, researched the law and found that that would be, in my opinion and in the university attorney’s opinion, illegal.33
At one point the atmosphere surrounding the debate over faculty membership on the Board of Trustees grew so heated that Hanzely suspended the discussion and left the meeting. He recalled the incident as follows:

… I don’t mind telling you, the university team just walked out in the heat of a very difficult and very tense discussion, and the talks were suspended for a day or two …. After a great deal of soul searching on my part and, I believe, on the part of the association team as well, we decided that … we had made too much progress to just throw that away …. We got back and succeeded …. We addressed the issues that brought us to that crisis. And frankly, things went very smoothly from that point on ….

It appears from the evidence that President Cochran’s involvement in separate discussions with Dr. Russo had the effect of causing “crossed communications” and ill-will and served to “cut the legs from under” the Chief Negotiator for management, who was greatly embarrassed and chagrined as the situation developed.

The final and most serious difficulty encountered by the group, and one that came closest to derailing the entire process, concerned agreement on the salary package. Because the final state budget allocations in Ohio did not become available until July, 1993, it was necessary for the administration to employ tentative budget projections in their plans. Early in the negotiations it was decided by the teams to defer salary discussions until a point close to the
end of the process. In this way, it was felt by some participants, less potentially troublesome issues could be resolved and the momentum of the interest-based process ensured. As it turned out, deferral of the financial issue proved to be a source of significant difficulty, placing great strain on the process.

Working from tentative figures, the Chief Negotiator for Management went to the bargaining table with authorization to offer up to a 3% increase in annual compensation. Offers above that level were to made only with Presidential or Executive Vice-Presidential approval. However, as President Cochran noted, the teams had not done the careful front-end economic analysis on the issue needed to insure needed high levels of trust among the parties. Furthermore, for some reason the teams did not go through the interest-options-standards sequence routinely employed in dealing with other issues of concern. As a result, the situation moved quickly toward traditional positional bargaining and the specter of arbitration loomed on the horizon. President Cochran met with Chief Negotiator Hanzely and the members of the management negotiating team. Hanzely advised the President that too much had been invested in the process to “throw in the towel.” After Dr. Hanzely laid out a “side by side” comparison of the most recent positions of the two teams, Dr. Cochran suggested that a subset of the two teams meet to work out the differences. At that time he also offered to become involved as a way of heading off impasse and resort to arbitration. Hanzely and one other team member met with Union President Vern Haynes and their Chief Negotiator, during which time he suggested “splitting the difference” between the last offers of the two teams. He
also mentioned that President Cochran was willing to “talk about things over a cup of coffee.” Shortly thereafter Dr. Haynes dropped by to see President Cochran, who described these events as follows:

…on the second day … our bargaining team came in.

Steve [Hanzely] said, “I can’t believe it. They’re acting like we haven’t had any discussion all summer, and I think they’re in positional bargaining. They want X.’ The next day I happened to see Vern Haynes and he said, ‘I can’t believe your team, what they’re doing, because they’re in positional bargaining.’ … And so the process began to fray. Both teams were trying. They had built good relationships… but neither team had exchanged the kind of dialogue and interaction [necessary], and it got to the end of the week, and we had … a time frame in the agreement that if something didn’t happen by a certain date, we had mutually agreed that we would go to arbitration …. Arbitration is one of the foremost symbols, in my mind, of adversarial bargaining…..

I asked Vern to come in [and said] ‘you know, if there is a way to pull these pieces together, I’m interested in doing that because symbolically, if we go to arbitration no one will recognize all the progress both of you have made in the past three months’…so I said, I can’t bargain with you here, obviously, … but I would be very disappointed if you were to come back to me next Fall and say, ‘you know, Les, if we could have just come up with another
percent or two, we could have resolved it’... and if that’s how close we’ve gotten, I’m willing to talk ....

Union President Haynes returned to the bargaining table armed with this new information and continued the process of bargaining. Another member of the management team, Dean John Yemma, pointed out that the administration had expressed great interest in rebuilding a financial reserve, badly depleted in recent years, but that the Union representatives appeared interested in dipping into these funds in order to augment the salary package. Dean Yemma said that there was, by this point, a difference of two percent between the management position—3%, and the union position –5%. After Dr. Haynes’ now-famous “cup of coffee” meeting with President Cochran, it was agreed that the raise would total 4.25% in 1993-94, with further adjustments in each of the subsequent two years of the contract. Equity adjustments were built in for Associate and Full Professors as a way of correcting a pattern of economic “erosion” that had occurred in recent years.

Agreement on the financial package having been reached, negotiations were complete and the package was ratified by the union membership on September 15, 1993, and subsequently approved by the Board of Trustees. While it could be argued that the administration was generous in the financial settlement, several important benefits were realized. As reported by Chief Management Negotiator Hanzely:

1. The interest-based process succeeded .... 2. We got a three year contract. The association was all along pushing for a two
year contract. 3. …the association agreed to absorb half of all insurance premium increases during the third year …. This is really the first time in the history of collective bargaining on the campus where the employees may have to share the cost of health insurance.\footnote{38}

In the case of point 1, management was very anxious that the interest-based bargaining process succeed as a way of demonstrating to the skeptical that labor-management peace was possible at YSU, particularly in light of the extended period of discord that had characterized labor relations in recent years. Under point 2, the three year contract provided management with a more extensive period of relative labor-management tranquility, free from the distractions engendered by the necessity to bargain. The third point is rather straightforward, in that the union agreed that its members would participate in the increasingly expensive health care program, one that was in danger of assuming exorbitant proportions. Also of great importance was the fact that this labor-management success occurred during the first year of President Cochran’s service, setting a positive tone for faculty/staff relations and demonstrating to the Board of Trustees that Cochran’s term as chief campus administrator was off to a good start.

The union, on the other hand, received a relatively generous salary settlement totaling 10% over the course of the succeeding three years. In addition, the contract mandated a significantly greater voice in university governance than ever before, perhaps the most significant change of all. Under
the new arrangement, Deans’ Advisory Councils were established within each college, with specific roles defined. Ongoing discussions between union and management bargaining teams were mandated as a way of introducing an effective and continually operating problem-solving mechanism into the university governance structure. Changes of a major or minor nature were included in twenty-one of the twenty-seven articles comprising the collectively bargained agreement.

All in all, most faculty members consulted felt that the final settlement was equitable for both management and labor. This was not the case among classified/support staff members, whose union had recently settled for a 3% per year increase, and who had assumed that the faculty settlement would be identical. This had been the case in years past. Mr. Tom Kane, the administration’s negotiator with classified staff, was placed in the position of appearing untruthful in this matter. As Dean Yemma explained it:

He was very upset, because he thought that we were going to settle for the three [percent]. The President never made that promise, and he felt there were reasons why. There’s an equity problem. When we looked at the whole state, our faculty was underpaid …. The classified people, though, are paid better than the state average, so …[President Cochran] said many times that he was going to bring the faculty up to the state average …. He didn’t feel he was bound to the negotiations that had taken place in previous union meetings … with the classified [staff.]
On the issue of the utility of the interest-based bargaining process, responses in some sectors of the faculty were more cautious. As former union president Russo said

I think for the most part that the people who were skeptical about it remain skeptical, and those who were in favor of it were overjoyed, because the reality of it is that we have made it through without any problems. Overall I am terrifically pleased with it. The university has come farther than I ever thought it could.\textsuperscript{40}

Dr. Vern Haynes, who succeeded John Russo as union president during the negotiations cycle, had this to say about the finally negotiated contract:

If you’re a faculty member who likes having everything done for you and/or to you and being told exactly what to do, how to do it, and when to do it, you probably won’t like the contract. This contract, I think, empowers faculty more than most faculty who have been here any length of time ever thought would be possible …. I think a lot of people, the majority of the people, are happier with it and I think as long as … most people feel that they are … empowered and have some control over their future, it’s going to work …. I think it’s much more useful to both sides. There are changes in this contract … that never
would have been accomplished through adversarial bargaining.\textsuperscript{41}

Chief administration negotiator Steve Hanzely was also positive in his remarks, stating that:

… I think this process has the distinct possibility of going beyond, of actually setting the stage for a long term relationship.

… The number of people involved and the fact that we continue to meet … [is a good indicator]. We’re going to try to make sure that this process is cultivated, that it isn’t just put on a shelf and then taken off … again three years later…. We continue to meet.

In my role as Director of Faculty Relations, I touch bases with Vern … almost daily. Vern and I … have a very good working relationship where we try to solve problems together…. This process … requires continuous interaction. I’m happy about it….

I can honestly tell you today that I’m more positive about the process than I was several months ago.\textsuperscript{42}

President Cochran was also cautiously optimistic at the time about next steps to be taken. He commented that:

We need to continue to work together in an open collaborative fashion, and we’re still learning …. You still have some people, I’m sure, on campus that are skeptics and are not very excited about this process …. We simply have to be aware that we are … still in the transition process; just because we were
able to solve one set of negotiations and agreements doesn’t mean the process has ended …. The success of this process, in my judgment, depends on the next two years; how we work together; how we identify common goals and problems and resolve those prior to the formal negotiation process …. The next two or three years are far more critical to the evolution of this process than the events of the [last] several months ….43

Chairman of the YSU Board of Trustees, Mr. Mark Lyden, felt that the confidence placed in the President was fully justified, and looked forward to better days ahead:

… I think we have made a dramatic change …. I would say that [employee relations] are going to be very positive in years to come …. Our negotiations are going to be handled in a lot more professional manner.44

All involved seemed to be painfully aware of the need to continue the dialogue that had been established and to fine-tune the system as problems arose. Following ratification of the agreement, the process moved forward with high energy and reasonable efficiency. Dr. Russo stated that he had never seen the campus so busy and productive. He also stated, however, that fatigue was beginning to set in as the faculty attempted to adjust to the greatly increased schedule of meeting and informal interactions generated by the process. In an early 1994 interview, Faculty Relations Director Hanzely said that, since ratification of the agreement in September, 1993, only one formal grievance had
been filed, an indication that the process was working. All involved in interest-based bargaining were painfully aware of the then-recent failure of the University of Cincinnati experiment with this process. Major reasons for that failure involved failure to maintain an ongoing and productive dialogue between periods of formal negotiation, coupled with loss of continuity and trust as key university personnel from labor and management departed. At YSU, attempts were made to forestall such developments by scheduling regular meetings between the bargaining teams and through the operations of a team appointment rotation system, designed to insure that new talent was periodically fed into the system as more “seasoned campaigners” withdrew. To institutionalize the process of participatory decision-making at all levels of academic governance, specific language was built into the YSU agreement:

The parties agree to the participatory governance system…. The parties also agree that the Administration and the Association shall provide training for faculty and chairpersons in consensus building and group problem solving techniques.45

Training for the faculty members was conducted by a team of personnel from the union and for administrators by a group designated from within management ranks. This training consisted of the provision of information and practical exercises in the use of group problem solving tactics; communications skills; techniques of active listening; proper questioning techniques; brainstorming”; and consensus building.46 Although there was a predicable amount of grumbling
and “rolling of eyes” among certain elements of both groups, those involved were generally receptive.

Those asking why such activities were required needed only to consider the context in which current events were taking place to find the answer. YSU had developed, over the years, not only a tradition of adversarial bargaining, but also an autocratic approach to administration and a hands-off attitude on the part of faculty members, who were generally quite willing to abrogate any participative responsibilities, insofar as governance was concerned. Stories abounded of dysfunctional department structures in which faculty members were either apathetic or else fought vigorously among themselves, while department chairs made decisions with little or no faculty consultation and, sometimes, in what was perceived as being done in a “high-handed” manner. Russo spoke of

… departments that have faculty members who do not even come to promotion meetings, who do not interview new candidates for positions, who basically turn over all their responsibilities to the department chair.47

As the inheritors of and participants in this somewhat dysfunctional organizational culture, it is not surprising that the YSU faculty felt the need to “brush up” on group process and consensus-building skills. The parties apparently came to the conclusion that employment of these simple mechanisms would help to ensure that the interest-based bargaining process persisted beyond the initial round of negotiations.
More Recent Events at Youngstown State University

This study documented the development of an organizational culture, followed by its slow evolution, stabilization, and eventual rapid transformation into a different form. As described earlier, YSU assumed the practices of organized labor during the 1970’s, heavily influenced by its geographical setting and by the presence on the campus of two important and conflicting figures—the University President and a young but assertive professor of Philosophy and Religion who was, coincidentally, the son of a major local union official. The fact that the administration chose at that time to engage in tactics viewed as repressive and exploitive, along with the general feelings of unrest engendered by the Vietnam War and the general economic climate in Youngstown, resulted in an alignment of forces supportive of campus unionization. Traditional positional bargaining became the norm on campus and, once “locked in” as a modus operandi, continued in place until the arrival of President Leslie H. Cochran in mid-1992.

It was fortuitous that Dr. Cochran, an advocate of open and participative management, was paired with union President John Russo, who had been trained in interest-based bargaining at the Harvard Negotiations Project. Dr. Russo and other union members successfully convinced Dr. Cochran that this alternative bargaining approach should be explored. The decision to proceed in this direction took courage on the part of both management and labor. In the
case of Cochran, as a newly arrived President he was “feeling his way” in uncharted waters, while on the part of labor, persistent feelings of ill-will and bitterness clouded the perceptions of many members, making it risky for union President Russo to promote the concept to his membership. Fortunately, the overall characteristics of the faculty had changed, with the percentage of Ph.D.’s climbing steadily and the number of YSU graduates on staff declining sharply, which brought fresh views to the campus and made it possible for both labor and management to embrace this substantial shift in philosophy and practice.

The question now becomes what transpired in labor relations during the intervening years between 1994 and 2004. An interview with former president John Russo yielded information to the effect that the 1996 agreement was a good one, yielding significant financial gains for the faculty. In return, the faculty agreed to “raising the bar” in terms of required research activity and agreed to tighter tenure and promotion requirements.\(^{48}\) It appears that the interest-based process was working at that time. As it turned out, however, the 1999 salary negotiations were difficult, based at least in part on personality differences between the chief negotiators for the teams. Management negotiator Tom Maraffa described the negotiation as “very contentious.” He went on to say that the teams “…reached a settlement relatively quickly using the [interest-based] process. I think between the two teams the process worked OK.”\(^{49}\) Union negotiator John Russo, on the other hand, said that the contract agreed to was “terrible.” He went on to report that the administration claimed there were
no dollars, given the tight financial situation in Ohio at the time, but that he was able to help “find some [money] as part of the process.” He also reported that there were internal problems within the union, with some leaders “grandstanding” for the administration during the negotiations process. He said that the union leadership was replaced soon thereafter.\textsuperscript{50} These tensions tended to detract from the perceived success of the bargaining sequence.

The economic situation in Ohio continued to constrain the ability of the administration to fully meet the financial desires of labor, with the result that negotiations during 2002 were very contentious and hard fought. President Cochran had developed health problems during the late 1990’s and had retired in 2001. A former union president reported that “toward the end of the Cochran administration, there was an increasing amount of dissatisfaction with Cochran’s fiscal performance, and with Provost Scanlon’s dealing with numerous academic issues.”\textsuperscript{51} The negotiations themselves were described as positional and adversarial, not interest-based in characteristics. Management Negotiator Maraffa said that during 2002

\ldots We didn’t do interest-based [bargaining], and John [Russo] was the chief [union] negotiator. It was a very contentious negotiation – very bad behavior on his part all the way around\ldots I think there were some personality issues there. I think he [Russo] felt he had to play a very hard line in order to get what he viewed as a reasonable contract. He played it to the hilt\ldots I think part of his problem always was that [interest-based
bargaining] was never really followed, particularly by the administration, in … subsequent years. The teams exhausted the time specified for negotiations and entered the fact-finding process. The settlement arrived at was relatively substantial, given the economic climate and in comparison with raises being awarded at other Ohio universities. However, representatives from both management and labor agreed that the interest-based bargaining process had been abandoned during the most recent negotiatory cycles. Former union president Vern Haynes said, speaking of future prospects that

The process has varied significantly from negotiation to negotiation since 1993. Interest-based bargaining depends upon the willingness of all participants, and even one or two players who don’t want to work with the system can foul things up. Frankly, members of both teams have thrown monkey wrenches into the works on numerous occasions. This year the team will again try to use some form of interest-based bargaining, but my early take is that the administration is coming into the process with clear lines drawn, and will be led by the new vice-president, an attorney. Therefore, I am not particularly optimistic…. The mechanics of interest-based bargaining may still be around, but I’m not sure that the spirit is there. In other words, their mind is made up, and finding a common interest… is not a priority for them…. 
John Russo, former union president and negotiator, echoed these sentiments, saying that the “…bottom line is that the process has regressed toward traditional collective bargaining. By 2000 the interest-based process was no longer being practiced.”

Chief Management Negotiator Maraffa was somewhat more sanguine in his comments, saying

The group [of negotiators] we have now, (even though we’re not doing interest-based bargaining), I have a good feeling that we’re going to have professionally conducted negotiations. In fact we’re meeting tomorrow [November 16, 2004] for some FMCS training on negotiating styles, and we … agreed that we’re going to use a method that is “in between” interest-based and adversarial [bargaining.] They have two in-between methods that they train people on. One is called “Enhanced Conventional Negotiation” and the other is called “Modified Traditional Bargaining.”… On a continuum they’re in the middle. They are blends of the elements of the two extremes.

The last three years I’ve been real happy with the general tone of things here. It … bottomed out after the last negotiations, and then there was a changing of the guard in the union, and they’ve made a real effort to be cooperative….

Former President Cochran, speaking from the vantage point of retirement, sees pros and cons in connection with the process. He said in
a recent communication that “Interest-based bargaining (IBB) made a significant contribution to the reform and transformation YSU.” and that “… IBB matured significantly during the first 5 or 6 years.” He went on to comment that the process “…improved faculty relations” and said that “good agreements [were] completed earlier each time.” Another point he emphasized was that the process helped people forget “…the past negatives.” On the other hand, he was quick to admit that “Some personalities focused on other issues, thereby lessening the perceived effectiveness of IBB,” thus making the maintenance of commitment to the process harder in later years.57

The differences in view concerning the current state of affairs at YSU and on prospects for the future are both interesting and instructive, providing support for the view that how one views things depends on “what part of the elephant you have hold of,” to paraphrase an ancient parable. Maraffa speaks from the vantage point of central administration, apparently hoping that better negotiatory days are in the offing. Haynes, an “older hand” at YSU, appears to reflect a significant level of skepticism (he might say “realism”) based upon years of difficult union-management relations. His assessment seems also to be influenced by his impressions of current President David Sweet, who replaced Leslie Cochran in 2001. He said, in that regard:

… Dr. Sweet doesn’t seem to have much, if any interest in maintaining good relations with the faculty. He is widely viewed as being aloof and frequently hostile to others, be they faculty or
Patrick W. Carlton, “Interest-Based Bargaining”. 35

staff….In general, the continuing budget crisis in Ohio has led to a steady decline in state support for YSU and other universities, which obviously increased the strain between employees, who want pay raises and benefits, and the administration, which has limited financial capacity. Putting that all together, (a relatively indifferent or hostile president and declining budgets), I think that the morale on campus is about as low as I have seen in the twenty years I have been here. That is particularly true for the classified employees’ union…. They are convinced (and I suspect that they are right), that the administration has a goal of weakening or eliminating the union in the next few years.58

Thus the researcher and the reader are faced with differing and conflicting testimony concerning the experiment in “new age” labor relations attempted by brave and forward looking faculty members and administrative representatives. Based on the evidence at hand it seems clear that the experiment has delivered mixed results during the past 10 years. It is equally apparent, however, that the experiment was worth the time and effort invested by all involved, and that the future of labor-management relations at YSU will be different than would have been the case if the proponents had not dared to travel uncharted waters in an attempt to make positive changes in procedure and for the benefit of the academic community. Historians of change speak of a cyclical model of progress in which daily practices and events circle in a progressive-regressive manner, edging periodically upward in a gently
ascending gyre. This model may, perhaps, describe the events taking place at YSU, as time and future evidence will either support or refute.⁵⁰

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⁵⁰ This term is used by Charles Morrisey, well-known oral historian, to describe documentary evidence.

² Campus parking employees gained representation by Teamsters Local 377, while maintenance and custodial employees affiliated with AFL-CIO Local 47. “Though…union representative(s) could (not) specify particular demands at this time, both (Thomas) White and (John) Angelo gave better wages and job security as reasons why University employees want to unionize.” The Jambar, Friday, 21 February 1969. (The Jambar is the YSU student newspaper.)

³ Dr. Shipka was characterized by those present at the time of organizational activity as the prime “mover and shaker.”

⁴ Unpublished interview with Thomas A. Shipka, O.H. 1366, Youngstown State University, 9 October 1990, Matthew T. Butts, Interviewer, 7.

⁵ The Jambar reported that “University President, Dr. Al(bert) Pugsley stated yesterday that a report would be made at the regular University Senate meeting….Without commenting on individual instructors, Dr. Pugsley called the situation a ‘disregard for University policy.’ He was unable yesterday to say what action from the Senate he would recommend but advised that the University ‘cannot condone disregard of official policy.’” The Jambar, 17 October 1969, 1.

⁶ Unpublished interview with Dr. Sally Hotchkiss, Youngstown State University, 23 October 1992, Frank Lazzeri, interviewer, 2.

⁷ Unpublished interview with John W. Powers, Esq., 11 November 1992, Youngstown State University, Frank Lazzeri, interviewer, 3.
Mr. Newman had succeeded Robert Williams, former President of Youngstown Sheet and Tube, in June, 1972. Mr. Williams is credited with persuading the trustees to authorize a collective bargaining election, stating that the onset of the process was an inevitability and that “…they would have to live with it.” The Youngstown State University OEA Chapter: An Association Story (Columbus: Ohio Education Association, 1973), 9.

Hotchkiss interview, 5.

Sources: Memorandum entitled “Salary Adjustment” from W. Swan, Faculty Personnel and Administration Office, n.d., .4; notes on conversation with Dr. Steve Hanzely, Director of Faculty Affairs, 29 September 1993, 1.

Unpublished interview with Dr. John Russo, Youngstown State University, 17 February 1994, Patrick W. Carlton, interviewer, 2.

Russo, Ibid.

Russo, Ibid.

The attorney representing the firm of Milisor and Nobil, James Wilkins, Esq., became notorious among union officials. Union negotiator Sidney Roberts stated that, “…the attorney …was more interested… in billing hours than he was in arriving at a collective bargaining agreement.” Unpublished interview with Dr. Sidney I. Roberts, Youngstown State University, 5 May 1994, Patrick W. Carlton, interviewer, 14.

In the union’s publication he was referred to as “Billable Hours WILKINS.” The Advocate, Official publication of the Youngstown State University Chapter of the Ohio Education Association, 26 November 1992, 2.

“The 1991 negotiations have been completed and no one is entirely satisfied with the outcome…. The mistrust engendered by their [Board of Trustees] actions will undermine
confidence in future bargaining and only add to the faculty’s lack of confidence in the university.” Statement by Dr. John Russo in The Advocate, 15 October 1991, 1-2.


18 Working with and through his administrative staff, Cochran was also able to secure funds to build an eight million dollar dormitory to house the University Scholars, and pushed forward the building of a new College of Education building.


20 Letter from Professor Sidney I. Roberts to Dr. Leslie H. Cochran, 18 November 1992, Youngstown State University.

Dr. Roberts had been involved in union activities for many years. A seasoned negotiator, he personally favored the adversarial bargaining approach, although he had taken training in mutual-gains bargaining. As an astute student of campus politics, Roberts felt it appropriate to recommend implementation of interest-based bargaining, despite his personal reservations concerning its utility. He said: “I had told the executive committee … that if the administration agreed to interest-based bargaining, I would not be part of that process because I do not believe … in [it] as being in the best interest of the faculty…. My motivation in suggesting interest-based bargaining … was primarily political and educational. [My interest] was educational in that it was to the advantage of the association to let all of the faculty members know that we were not the ones who are negative about the collective bargaining process, that we were open to any variety of processes that would result in an acceptable … agreement …. The faculty could now
relax and say, ‘hey, we’re the good guys. We’re wearing the white hats. You guys want to find a different way of negotiating, that’s all right …. Of course, that’s contrary to my individual philosophy and … I would have nothing to do with it.” Unpublished interview with Dr. Sidney I. Roberts, Youngstown State University, 5 May 1994, Patrick W. Carlton, interviewer, 12-15.

21 Cochran interview, 7-8. In 2005 Cochran revisited these events, saying that “…the meeting was brief and to the point. President Russo asked the university president if he was really serious about faculty participatory governance. President Cochran responded with a resounding “yes” and reaffirmed his belief that YSU could only become a premier metropolitan university if it was fundamentally committed to the broad-base concepts of shared governance. President Russo said “fine”, as he handed President Cochran a book to read on mutual-gains bargaining (now commonly referred to as interest-based bargaining.) A meeting was scheduled for the next week and the rest, so to speak, is history.” Cochran, “Lessons Learned,” 3.

22 Cochran interview, 7. President Cochran stated that “…we were setting up certain kinds of policies and procedures that would depend on open collegial input. Yet … all of a sudden we would … beat up on each other for two or three months of negotiations …and then we’d go back to this open friendly relationship. And I don’t think you can do that.”

23 Letter from Dr. John Russo, YSU-OEA President, to Dr. Leslie Cochran, 27 January 1993. An additional letter of inquiry on the matter had been sent to Dr. Paul E. Dalbec, newly elected Chief Negotiator for Management, on 14 January 1993. Dr. Sidney Roberts, having carried out his commitment to withdraw from the process if interest-based bargaining were to be adopted. Indeed, Dr. Roberts had taken advantage of the Early Retirement Incentive Program then available to faculty members.
The process has also been referred to as “win-win bargaining and “principled negotiations”.

The terms share a similar core of operational concepts which depend upon credibility and trust between the parties to the negotiations.


Dr. Russo had been lobbying Cochran intensively, “…pushing at every point I could for the process.” Ibid.

Russo interview, 7.

“…the University administration will … fund a $10,000 account for the purposes of jointly training all negotiating team members on the concepts of interest-based bargaining….” Cochran, “Continuous Improvement Bargaining”, Ibid.


“… your position is the concrete things you say you want—the dollars and cents, the terms and conditions. Your interests are the intangible motivations that lead you to take that position—your needs, desires, concerns, fears and aspirations.”

“An option is a possible agreement or part of an agreement. Inventing options for mutual gains is a negotiator’s single greatest opportunity …. By opening yourself up to consideration of a multitude of options, you may generate new possibilities, one of which might meet your interests while also satisfying the other side’s.”

“An independent standard is a measuring stick that allows you to decide what a fair solution is. Common standards are market value, equal treatment, the law, or simply the way the issue has

“Consensus decision-making: Arriving at agreements that all members of the bargaining teams can support. Used when selecting criteria for judging options, selecting options that meet the criteria, and arriving at Solutions.”

“Brainstorming: Used to develop options and criteria. Helps the parties to be creative by restricting evaluation and not assigning ownership of ideas.”


30 Russo interview, 18

31 Russo interview, 16.

32 Cochran interview, pp. 14-15. The Saturn contract referenced in President Cochran’s comments is a Memorandum of Agreement between Saturn Corporation, a wholly-owned subsidiary of General Motors Corporation (GM) and the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of American. (UAW.) The “Saturn People Philosophy”, which constitutes Section 6 of the agreement, stated: “We believe that all people want to be involved in decisions that affect them, care about their job, take pride in themselves and in their contributions, and want to share in the success of their efforts.”

Section 10, “Structure and Decision-Making Process”, states: “The structure of Saturn reflects certain basic principles, eg. Recognition of the stakes and equities of everyone in the organization; full participation by the Union; use of a consensus decision-making process;
placement of authority and decision-making in the most appropriate part of the organization, with emphasis on the Work Unit; and free flow of information and clear definition of the decision-making process.” The structure implemented included employee representation at all levels of the organization, beginning with the basic “work unit” and extending to the highest organizational level, the Strategic Action Council, which concerns itself with the “long range goals and health of Saturn.” Memorandum of Understanding between Saturn Corporation and UAW”, 23 July 1985, 3-6.

33 Unpublished interview with Dr. Steve Hanzely, Youngstown State University, 22 February 1994, interviewer Patrick W. Carlton, 16-17. Dr. Hanzely was a past president of the union, and had been one of the “founding fathers.” He had accepted the newly established position of Director of Faculty Affairs just prior to the onset of the 1993 bargaining cycle, so was learning his assigned duties.

34 Hanzely interview, 18-19.

35 Cochran interview, 18-20.

36 Unpublished interview with Dean John Yemma, Youngstown State University, 9 December 1993, Patrick W. Carlton, interviewer, 15-16.

In 1993-94, faculty members received a 3% increase plus a 1.25% “equity adjustment” by rank, the latter designed to establish a greater salary difference between those serving in various academic ranks. In 1994-95, faculty members were to receive a 1.5% increase plus an equity increase totaling 2%. For 1995-96, faculty members were to receive a 2.25% increase plus an additional flat increase of $1000. Minima at each salary level were also increased during each of the three years of the contract. “Agreement between Youngstown State University and Youngstown State University Chapter of the Ohio Education Association, 1993-1996.”
The union vote was 227 in favor and 26 against. “Memo to All Full-Service Faculty members,” 21 September 1993.


Yemma interview, 16-17.

Russo interview, 23 and 28.

Unpublished interview with Dr. Vernon Haynes, Youngstown State University, 10 February 1994, Patrick W. Carlton, Interviewer, 44-46.

Hanzely interview, 29-30.

Cochran interview, 21-22.

Interview with Mr. Mark Lyden, Youngstown State University, 11 April 1994, Patrick W. Carlton, interviewer, 15-16.

YSU Agreement—1993-96, Article 9.2, p. 25. A footnote to the section added the following language: “Training for participatory governance shall be initiated immediately upon the approval of the agreement, with initial training for members of the Deans’ Advisory Councils to be completed not later than January 1, 1994. It is understood that the process of consensus building requires ongoing training.” YSU Agreement, footnote 4, 25.

“Training Materials for Group Problem Solving and Consensus Building.” n.a.; n.d. (photocopy.)

Russo interview, 10.

Telephone interview with Dr. John Russo, Youngstown State University, 8 November 2004, Patrick W. Carlton, interviewer, 1.
Russo reported that faculty salaries were increased 2% in 1996-97; 4% in 1997-98; and 3% in 1998-99. In addition, salary adjustments were made for full professors as a way of combating the “salary compression” then prevalent at the University.

49 Telephone interview with Dr. Tom Marafa, Youngstown State University, 16 November 2004, Patrick W. Carlton, interviewer, 2.

50 Russo telephone interview, Ibid.

51 Vernon Haynes. “Greetings….” Message to author. 6 November 2004, 1.

52 Maraffa telephonic interview, Ibid.

53 Nine-month raises of 3.5% plus $1000 equity raises were awarded in each academic rank for each of years 2002 through 2005.

54 Haynes message, 1-2.

55 Russo telephone interview, Ibid.

56 Maraffa telephone conversation, 3.


58 Haynes message, Ibid.

59 For more on information on cyclical-spiral theories of progress, see Johan Galtung and Sohail Inayatullah, eds. Macrohistory and Macrohistorians (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997), Ch. 3.