Running to win: The utility of the ticket-splitter theory in presidential elections

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RUNNING TO WIN: THE UTILITY OF THE TICKET-SPLITTER THEORY IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

by

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

in

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ABSTRACT

Theory suggests that ticket-splitters often are the balance of power in elections, and constitute at least one-fourth of the American electorate. Ticket-splitting is not, however, motivated by party identification. Instead the voter's evaluation of the candidate, pertinent issues, and party attitudes contribute to their choice. Candidates, therefore, can attract electoral majorities by communicating certain messages through the identification, location, and targeting of ticket-splitters. This thesis will examine election data from 1952-1990. If the theory proves reliable and valid, the usefulness of the traditional two-party analysis of the modern electoral environment will be questioned.
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CHAPTER 1

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Party Identification

The function of government in a democracy is to decide how competing interests are to be arbitrated in a fair and peaceful manner. How well the government, a representative democracy, serves this end is to be decided by the citizenry (Cantor 1975, 119). Elections are a constitutionally designed means by which knowledgeable voters can express their satisfaction with the performance of the government. The citizenry casts votes for candidates who they believe will best represent their interests and values through the forum of public debate.

All individuals have a rudimentary ability to understand and organize the political milieu (Niemi 1993, 95). Political identity based on party membership, for example, serves as a means of enlightenment when deciding which candidate will represent one's interests best. Political party identification, along with views on specific policy
questions and candidate approval judgements, are "psychological variables" that the voters consider when making an electoral decision (Cantor 1975, 16). Walter DeVries, borrowing from V.O.Key (1968) writes that "Voters' attitudes toward the issues, the candidates, and the parties are what is needed to understand elections" (DeVries 1972, 47). Traditionally, the extant literature suggests partisan identification by the voter has been the most capable predictor of voting behavior (Whiteley 1988, 961). As such, Robert Cantor, applying the conclusion of *The Voter Decides* (1954), wrote that party identification can be considered the single most important component in the voting decision among the general public (Cantor 1975, 17).

The classical study of political cognizance found in *The American Voter*, (Campbell et al., 1960) concludes that the electorate is neither overly ideological, nor are they aware of the issues, largely as a result of a general lack of interest in politics and its effect on their lives. They do, however, possess a partisan identification which is relatively stable (Kaufmann 1993, 3).

The strength of partisan stability allows for party strategies to play a preeminent role in the aggregation of voters. The party seeks to influence the electorate by running candidates on platforms,
providing the means to enhance voter turnout, winning over the undecided and Independent voters, and generally trying to remove voter indifference (Flanigan 1972, 41). According to Walter Dean Burnham, these activities are meant to "generate countervailing collective power" (Burnham 1972, p.257). Parties also allow the individual to gain political efficacy by coalescing with others to form an electoral majority.

In The Voter Decides (1954) and The American Voter (1960), party identification is given great primacy. The importance of partisan sentiments is crucial in understanding and predicting voter behavior. Robert Erikson contends that "party identification is one of the most central and stable elements to a person's belief system" (Erikson 1988, 9). Moreover, it directly influences the voting act by affecting the political attitudes of the individual (Boyd 1969, 498). Because of this fact, Bruce Keith and his associates, borrowing from the Handbook of Social Psychology (1985), write that the National Election Studies use party identification as the "'foundation' of the 'edifice' of conceptualizing and measuring voting" (Keith et al. 1986, 156).

Party identification is obtained early in life (Erikson 1988, 137). A 1963 study by Hess and Torney found that by the second grade, thirty-six percent of
the children identified with one of the major political parties. This increased to fifty-five percent by the fifth grade (Hess 1967, 96). Once a partisan identification is assumed, it takes a considerable amount of conflicting information before it can be rejected (Erikson 1988, 137).

Clearly, the reliability of partisan identity as it applies to the voting decision is still useful. It is the validity of the characteristic that is undergoing some consideration. Put another way, is the concept of partisan ideological self-identification an accurate measurement of future voting behavior?

This classical view is now being questioned by political scientists. It is being posited that elections and their results have less-and-less to do with the activities of political parties (Flanigan 1972, 129). Instead, success depends on the self-created and manufactured image of the candidate utilizing the current political issues and circumstances, and tactics to form a coalition of partisans with a critical and decisive minority of Independent voters (DeVries 1972, 91). This new school of thought suggests that the prediction probability of voter behavior is based less in partisan identity and party efforts, and has more to do with whether a voter finds a candidate appealing and has a positive
affection for him or her (Erikson 1988, 274). Dr. Rob Melnick, of Arizona State University's Morrison Institute for Public Policy, warns that "...elected officials will have to build different coalitions for different issues, instead of relying on a single support base."¹

This modern view of the electoral process questions the stability of partisan identification. The image of the candidate is manipulated by the presentation of what William Flanigan describes as "short-run forces", which influence the election-specific voting decision of the voter, and mollify but do not alter past partisan identification (Flanigan 1972, 48).

The method employed to gain electoral victory has less to do with party organizational effort and partisan loyalties, and more to do with the employment of mass media as a means of persuasion. Robert Erikson, among others, suggests that "television has allowed the candidate to campaign directly to the American people" (Erikson 1988, 228). The candidates themselves do not have to depend on the past electoral regime based around political parties, and the voters. Likewise, they are less inclined to use their partisan identification as a means of determining their vote. The political process rests less with organizational
activities based on party loyalty, and can be better understood as an on-going two-way communication process conducted between the candidate and the voter (DeVries 1972, 73). Norman H. Nie and his associates (1979) write that "the frequency with which candidates are preferred or rejected because of party ties has declined" (Niemi 1993, 241).

Partisan identification as a political attitude does not exist in a vacuum. There has always been present within the American ethos a strong inclination towards independence, the antithesis of party identification. This mistrust is evident in the writings of the Founding Fathers. It is fed by the mistrust of government and fueled by anti-factionalism (Dennis 1988b, 204).

Initial inquiries into the nature of independence occurred at the beginning of this century. By 1936, George Gallup, of Gallup Poll fame, was measuring independence through a self-identified question in his polls (DeVries 1972, 40-41). This psychological affinity for independence was considered an accurate and sufficient method for defining the Independent voter. Put simply, to be an Independent meant that one was not a partisan.

Independence

Political scientists now are reevaluating the
concept of partisan identity to include not only partisanship, but also independence (Valentine 1980, 165). Bruce Keith and his associates write, "Partisanship and independence are not mutually exclusive" (Keith 1986, 180). But, cautions by Jack Dennis, they "may constitute two empirically distinguishable dimensions of attitudes." (Dennis 1988a, p.84).

Prior scholarly analysis into independence, from George Gallup to Jack Dennis, has failed to develop a sufficient theory to explain the phenomenon. As Jack Dennis reports, "there is no convincing account of what it has come to mean to be independent" (Dennis 1988b, p.198). Motivated by the lack of a comprehensive theory concerning independence, scholars have been actively working towards that end. Jack Dennis reports that it is known, for example, "that independence is a multidimensional phenomenon" that includes "a complex of attitudes, meanings and associations" when it is used in self-labeling polling questions (Dennis 1988b, p.201).

The main interest of this study is not in defining the voting patterns of the electorate by placing them into nominal classifications. Rather, the specific intent is to understand actual voting behavior. It must be clearly understood that self-identification as
an "Independent" by a poll respondent is not the same as actually demonstrating independence by virtue of splitting one's vote in an election (DeVries 1972, 14). DeVries' research conducted in 1967 reveals that voters whose self-perception is as an Independent is in reality an amalgam composed of Straight-Ticket Democrats and Republicans, along with ticket-splitters (DeVries 1972, 54). Independent self-identification is merely a psychological attribute, whereas ticket-splitting is a behavioral classification ascribed to real actions that directly influence electoral outcomes. The actions of the ticket-splitters is the truest test of independence irrespective of self-identification. For the purpose of this study, actions do speak louder than words.

In The American Voter (1960), Independents are characterized in a rather negative manner. They did not possess good knowledge about the issues, nor clear images of the candidates; nor were they interested in campaigns in general (DeVries 1972, 42). The theoretical impression left by Campbell and his associates is that Independents are either apolitical in their mind set, or they have latent partisan affections, which they seek to obscure (Dennis 1988b, p.201).

Subsequent studies have modified the earlier
characterization. The apathy described in *The American Voter* (1960) is not convincingly inherent in independence. Indeed, any member of the electorate who is so apathetic that he or she does not vote, should be considered apolitical, not an Independent. Studies by Burnham (1970) and Keith (1977), among others, show that Independents display characteristics of political awareness on the issues, feel politically competent, and are actively engaged in the politics surrounding them (Valentine 1980, 169). By virtue of shunning partisan party voting cues, Independents also are, to varying degrees, engaged sufficiently to make clear and logical electoral decisions. They knowledgeably cast their votes after autonomously considering the issues and candidates involved in any particular elections (Valentine 1980, 169).

The classical description of Independents found in *The American Voter* (1960) depicts those members of the electorate who are apolitical in their views. The modern view of this voting group is, however, more complex. Even though Independents shun a partisan identification, they are still motivated and are able to consider each election on the merits of their observations, and then make informed voting decisions (Asher 1980, 129). Accordingly, Independents appear to cast their votes based on a reasonable and sound
decision making process.

The complexity inherent in considering a concept that can contain both the diverse dimensions of partisanship and independence demands careful scrutiny. Jack Dennis' typology of partisan support lists four categories that arise when considering the multidimensionality of independence based on two self-description questions from the 1989 National Election Study. Respondents who identify with one of the political parties and think of themselves as a political Independent are classified as Independent Partisan Supporters. Respondents who profess no partisan preference and think of themselves as Independents are classified as Ordinary Independents. Respondents who hold to a partisan identity and do not think of themselves as Independents are classified as Ordinary Partisans. And finally, respondents who do not self-identify as either a partisan nor as an Independent are classified as Unattached (Dennis 1988a, p.85).

This study will consider the so-called Ordinary Independent and Independent Partisan Supporter categories. Both categories reflect an Independent self-identification, and the difference between the two on the issue of partisan identity will prove illustrative in explaining ticket-splitting voter
behavior.

The members of the Independent Partisan Supporter category will be defined here as Partisan Independents. Partisan Independents illustrate the multidimensional characteristics involved when observing voter motivations. Partisan Independents possess a strong sense of independence, while still associating themselves with a political party (Valentine 1980, 167). David Valentine and John Van Wingen (1980) conclude that these Partisan Independents "are more independent, not more partisan, than are weak partisans" (Valentine 1980, 179). When the values of independence and partisan identity conflict, Partisan Independents seem less partisan than weak partisans. On the other hand, if the values are harmonious, David Valentine concludes that a Partisan Independent will "appear to be neither less partisan nor more partisan than the weak partisans" (Valentine 1980, 179).

Leaners

Most Independents, though valuing independence, profess to be closer to one of the parties. Keith classifies these Independents as "leaners", and observes that leaners vote just like strong partisans (Keith et al. 1986, 155). "Leaners are partisan, not neutral." "In fact, the leaners display an impressive tendency to vote for the candidate of the party they
feel closer to; indeed, they are frequently more loyal to their party than weak partisans" (Keith 1986, 161). This observation has been noted by other studies involving the partisan personality of leaners (Abramson 1983; LeBlanc 1979; Miller 1980). Leaners are Independents who have only a psychological identification with the classification. Behaviorally, their voting performance is the same as a partisan identifier.

Ticket-splitters

Independents who are behaviorally unconstrained by party identification, irrespective of professed psychological identification, are classified as ticket-splitters. Since, ultimately, it is the behavior of the voter that affects election results, actual ticket-splitting is the surest test of true independence (DeVries 1972, 23). It is evident that the psychological classification of Independent and the behavioral classification of ticket-splitter are not interchangeable. For the purpose of this thesis, ticket-splitting will be defined by the traditional behavioral conceptualization presented by Walter DeVries in The Ticket-Splitter; that is, "the difference between the vote for candidates for President and the U. S. House of Representatives." (DeVries 1972, 29).
The significance of observing the voting behavior of ticket splitters is, according to DeVries, that they are "the balance of power in elections and makes about one-forth (or more) of the total electorate." In close elections, and where a political party is in the minority, the ticket-splitter supplies the electoral margin of victory (DeVries 1972, 72).

The behavioral independence of ticket-splitters is supplemented by involvement in the political process. These Independents make carefully reasoned electoral decisions and consider the virtues of competing candidates and parties. Because of these actions, they are the most likely to split the ticket (Meyer 1962, 73-74).

Building on previous theoretical framework, Charles Atkin (1976) proposes the notion that voters who are involved in the political process are susceptible to responding to the media supplying political information and advertising (Kaufmann 1993, 10). Because of the nonpartisan nature of the Independent ticket-splitter, they are more sensitive to the short-term forces promulgated by the media (Erikson 1988, 248).

The careful reasoning demonstrated by ticket-splitters is applied by analyzing a candidate's personality, the candidate's aptitude in solving the
problems present in society, and the candidate's positions on the significant issues surrounding a specific election. The influence of party identification is inconsequential to ticket-splitters when making electoral decisions (DeVries 1972, 15). Based on the research of Robert McClure and Thomas Patterson (1974), the voting decision, according to Karen Kaufmann, "is the aggregation of one's issue attitudes and one's beliefs about the candidates and their stances regarding the issues" (Kaufmann 1993, 7). For the ticket-splitter, the voting act is a series of autonomous decisions about first, the candidates, then the issues, with party identification and group affiliations playing a diminished role in the analyses (DeVries 1972, 90).

Studies conducted in 1972 by Miller, Schulman, and Declercq, which statistically measure the relative effects of candidate image, issues, and party identification on voting decisions, found that these effects are important. When viewed in the aggregate, the mean weights derived from the above studies reveal that the relative effect of candidate image is greater than for issues, and the issues are of greater consequence than party identification. (Erikson 1988, 277).²

As society changes, large social coalitions are
fragmenting into smaller social arrangements (Havlicek 1984, 94). Today, the two main political parties do not stand as monolithic blocks of contending ideology. Theoretically, each party is composed of people who have historically coalesced around party principles. In reality, party principles must compete with the individual party member's specific conditions, needs and values. Rather than identifying as either just a Democrat or Republican, citizens also see themselves as being young or old; wealthy, middle class, or poor; urban or rural; professional or working class. This increases the primacy of voter observations of the candidates and issues, and diminishes the role of political parties.

A 1986 study by Miller, Wattenberg, and Malanchuk found evidence that because of the attentiveness demonstrated by sophisticated voters, they are more sensitive to the quality of the candidate's personal characteristics (Erikson 1988, 279). Erikson strongly concurs with Miller and his associates that "one of the best predictors of a person's vote is simply whether the voter likes the personal qualities of the Democratic candidate more or less than the personal qualities of the Republican candidate". Voters choose their preferred candidate on the qualities of character, competence, or trustworthiness, making their
decision in a completely rational manner. (Erikson 1988, 274).

Voter policy stands, when considered over multiple issues, are also as sound a predictor of voting behavior as candidate evaluations that consider competence and personality characteristics. In fact, both candidate and issue evaluations function as effectively as party identification in predicting voter behavior (Erikson, p.258).

This chapter has presented various theoretical considerations promulgated by scholars trying to explain voting behavior. This study will draw specifically from the ticket-splitter section of the above presentation. The author will consider the voter's perceptions of the candidates, issues, and parties involved in presidential elections since 1952 to see if the ticket-splitter theory is an accurate and useful means of interpreting modern voting behavior.
Endnotes


CHAPTER 2

METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The function of the ticket-splitter theory is to explain electoral victory in terms of the voting behavior of a segment of the electorate that does not respond to the classical electoral typology centered around party identification and influence. The impact of this portion of the voting public on electoral outcomes is of such consequence that an empirical understanding of this group provides the basis of creating the winning plurality in modern electoral campaigns.

The prediction capability provided by the classical model is to be questioned by the ticket-splitter theory (DeVries 1972, 37). The unit of analysis, the individual voter who rationally splits his vote between a presidential candidate of one party and a congressional candidate of another, must be analyzed by a more complex method than nominal party identification. Analysis of this nature will help to define the reliability and validity of the ticket-splitter theory as a useful empirical tool in
understanding voting behavior in the modern electoral environment. Concomitantly, it will also bring into question the usefulness of the classical theory of voting behavior. The previous chapter of this study provided empirical generalizations that can be analyzed to determine how predictive the ticket-splitter theory actually is.

Burnham (1972) observes that voters who are an Independent make a considered vote on the basis of their observations of the candidates, the relevant issues of the moment, and, to a diminished degree, the political parties. DeVries and Tarrance (1972) attribute ticket-splitting behavior to the careful and reasoned analysis demonstrated in Burnham's typology.

For the purpose of this analysis, the research hypothesis is:

Ticket-splitters tend to cast their vote on the basis of their evaluation of the candidates, issues, and lastly political parties.

This operational definition will consider those voters who split their ticket and their views on the relevant factors.

Opinion polling of both ticket-splitters and straight ticket partisans will provide an empirical basis for testing the research hypothesis. This method of data collection is an accepted research method. The
The data file utilized in this analysis is the AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTION STUDIES CUMULATIVE DATA FILE 1952-1990, sixth release, November 1991. The data file was compiled by the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research, Ann Arbor, Michigan. Most ANES data are collected from in-person interviews of voting age citizens, living in households within the contiguous United States, with the exception of military bases. Samples in the data set are derived from multistage area probability designs.¹

Because of the universally-accepted quality of the Inter-University Consortium's data set, it is reasonable to assume that threats to validity have been minimized. All due diligence has been exercised in sampling, question wording, and question order, questionnaire design, and response rate considerations.

Polling questions that are utilized in this study consider, first, the respondent's opinion of their political self-identification. Then, attitudes will be measured on the traits, affects, and affinity toward presidential candidates. Also, the respondents' attitudes toward how they perceive each candidate's issue stance over four domestic social polices, along with their attitudes toward political parties will be included.

The data file utilized in this study is a
cumulative collection spanning elections from 1952-1990. In its totality the data file contains a weighted cross-section of 37,706 cases. The empirical data derived from the data file provides a baseline study of ticket-splitting over a 20 election, 38 year period. The instrument contains approximately 1200 variables, of which 33 variables are analyzed using the SPSS statistical package crosstabulation function. Thirty-two independent variables are crosstabulated with one dependent variable which measures both straight ticket and ticket-splitting voting behavior. Question wording will be provided in an appendix of this study. The sample error for this study is +/- 3%.

The research hypothesis will be tested by analyzing the correlations between a respondent's attitudes and his voting decision. I expect to find that when deciding on which candidate for whom to vote, the voter will respond to and vote for the individual who most positively correlates to his opinions on the candidates, the issues, and political parties. If the research hypothesis tests to be correct, the predictive value of the ticket-splitter theory to forecast electoral decisions will be strengthened through the empirical verification of theoretical assumptions.

It must be noted that not all of the variables
utilized in the study are compiled from the entire 38 year span of 1952-1990. This limitation being acknowledged, the data file is still valuable in studying ticket-splitter voting behavior, and makes it possible to reasonably test the ticket-splitter theory against empirical reality. Every period of time covered by every poll question displays a high incidence of ticket-splitting behavior, even when the time span of some polling questions are limited to just four years.

The reader must make a mental note of the following conditions. Variable number 0709, the dependent variable, along with variables 0401; 0405; 0402; 0406; 0403; 0407 and 0409 were asked every presidential election year from 1952 through 1988. Variable number 0301 was asked every two years from 1952 through 1990. Variables 0350; 0362; 9086 and 9094 were asked in 1984 and 1988 only. Variables 0353; 0365; 0354; 0366; 0356; 0368 and 9022 were asked every presidential election year from 1980 through 1988. Variables 9084; 9092; 9087 and 9095 were asked every presidential election year from 1972 through 1988. Variables 9083 and 9091 were asked in 1972; 1976; 1980 and 1988. Variable 0564 was asked every two years from 1970 through 1990. Variable 0570 was asked every two years from 1972 through 1984 and in 1988. Variable
0571 was asked in 1972 and 1976; every two years from 1978 through 1982; and in 1988. Variable 0572 was asked every two years from 1982 and 1990. And finally, variables 0316; 0320 and 0322 were asked in 1952 and 1956; 1958; every four years between 1960 and 1972; and every two years between 1976 and 1990.
1. In this study, this method is used to sample the population of the United States by defined geographic areas. The population is divided into very specific, mutually exclusive units called subareas. These subareas have identifiable geographic perimeters, which allow for a sample of subareas to be extracted. Then a list is created made up of housing units existing within designated subareas, and a sample of listed units is chosen from the designated subareas. Finally, all individuals of voting age within the selected subareas are interviewed. It is permissible to delineate the sample further by drawing a cross section of people from within the defined subareas.

2. Johnson writes that to weight a sample means "to make a disproportionate sample representative." A cross-sectional research design is where "measurements of independent and dependent variables are taken at the same time; naturally occurring differences in the independent variable are used to create quasi-experimental and quasi-control groups"; and where all irrelevant considerations are statistically controlled for. See Johnson, *Political Science Research Methods*, 167, 127.

3. Crosstabulation is a table that displays the distribution of one variable across the value categories of one or more additional variables.
CHAPTER 3

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

During the period covered in the data set, seven different men were elected into the presidency: Dwight Eisenhower, John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and George Bush. Three of these men, Eisenhower, Nixon and Reagan, all Republicans, were re-elected to a second term. In all, Republican presidential candidates won 7 out of the 10 presidential elections conducted between 1952 and 1990, and, consequently, controlled the White House for 26 out of a possible 38 years.

The same 38 year era saw 20 congresses elected. Seven out of the 20 congresses were controlled in both houses by the same party as the president. These congresses were the: 83rd, 87th, 88th through the 90th, and the 95th and 96th. The 97th through the 99th congresses saw a period where only the Senate was controlled by the same party as the president. In the 10 elections where both a president and a new House of Representatives were elected, the electorate voted for a Republican president and a Democratically controlled
House 6 times: 1956, 1968 and 1972, and 1980 through 1988. What could be the reason for the presence of divided government with a Republican president and a Democratically controlled Congress?

Since the early 1950s the relevancy of American political parties has been in transition. Scholars such as Martin Wattenberg (1986) believe that political parties are of decreasing consequence. Walter Dean Burnham (1970) discovered that many voters rely less and less on party cues to direct their decision when casting a vote. Gerald Pomper (1976) warns that this diminution of political parties as a factor in elections has dire implications for the nation. Others, like Phillip Converse (1976), do not believe the decline of party significance is a permanent destabilizing influence. Some like David Broder (1971) have written off the usefulness of political parties, while others, like Larry Sabato (1988), believe the partisan still play an important role in the electoral process. What can be agreed on is that due to the fact that voters rely less on political parties for cues on how to vote, there has been an increase in the presence of ticket-splitting in American politics.

Voting Behavior and Political Ideology

The survey employed in this study classified voters into seven categories of psychological
identification: 1) Strong Democrat; 2) Weak Democrat; 3) Independent-Democrat; 4) Independent-Independent; 5) Independent Republican; 6) Weak Republican; and 7) Strong Republican. These classifications are then compared by cross-tabulation to the respondents professed voting behavior. They were then sub-divided by voting behavior into four categories: straight-ticket Democrats, Democratic ticket-splitters, Republican ticket-splitters, and straight-ticket Republicans. A Democratic ticket-splitter is defined as voter who cast his vote for president for Democrat candidates, but voted for a Republican for their congressional seat. Conversely, a Republican ticket-splitter is a voter who cast his vote for president for Republican candidates, and voted for a Democrat for their congressional seat. For the sake of this study, straight-ticket Democrats and Democratic ticket-splitters will be defined as the Democrat coalition, and straight-ticket Republicans and Republican ticket-splitters will be described as the Republican coalition.

(Figure 1.1A about here)

Preliminary analysis displays the expected; Strong, Weak, and Independent Democrats strongly support Democrat presidential candidates, while Strong, Weak, and Independent Republicans strongly support
Republican presidential candidates. Independent-Independents generally split their vote between Democrat and Republican presidential candidates.

(Figure 1.1B about here)

Closer analysis of only ticket-splitter voting within the seven categories of psychological identification reveals Republican presidential candidates' electoral advantage as explained by the ticket-splitter theory. There is demonstrated defection by Strong, Weak, and Independent Democrats to Republican candidates. Most Strong, Weak, and Independent Republicans stay loyal to their party's presidential candidate. Independent-Independents supported Republican presidential candidates by a margin of more than 3.5 to 1. The data reveal that there was some defection to Democratic presidential candidates by some Independent, Weak, and Strong Republican identifiers, but their influence was minimal on presidential elections between 1952 and 1990, with the possible exception of the closely contested 1960 presidential election. The ticket-splitter theory holds that the margin of victory is to be found primarily in the ticket-splitter voting behavior. This is clearly demonstrated in these elections. Between 1952 and 1990, Republicans were in the presidency almost 70% of the time. Also, the data clearly reveal
that Republican presidential candidates have garnered 72% of the ticket-splitter vote during that period. This realization gives impetus to continue investigating presidential elections through the application of the ticket-splitter theory.

Voting Behavior and Candidate Trait Analysis

This section of the analysis appraises respondent voting behavior when considering four candidate character traits - intelligence, inspiration, knowledge and strong leadership; reasons to vote both for and against the candidates; strength of respondent's vote for the candidates; and the affect of the candidate on the voting respondent when considering the candidates' "LIKES" and "DISLIKES" in context.

(Figures 2.10A+B, 2.15A+B, 2.20A+B, 2.25A+B, 2.30A+B, 2.35A+B, 2.40A+B, 2.45A+B about here)

Analysis of the four character traits is applied to the two candidates over four opinion categories. The survey questions offer the respondent two positive responses - "EXTREMELY WELL" and "QUITE WELL", and two negative responses - "NOT TOO WELL" and "NOT WELL AT ALL". The respondents opinions reveal distinct patterns of voting behavior.

Generally, both the Republican and Democrat candidates were perceived as being intelligent and knowledgeable, but there was no consensus of perception
that the candidates possessed the characteristics of a strong leader who can inspire the electorate. It is apparent that the electorate as a whole perceives intelligence and knowledge as being necessary, but not sufficient, characteristics of an executive. Perceptions of presidential aptitude by a majority of the electorate must be accompanied by the acknowledgement that the candidate has actually demonstrated executive attributes before conviction in the candidate's executive abilities can replace admiration for the candidate's executive qualities.

When appraising the voting behavior displayed for the qualities of inspiration and strong leadership (Figures 2.20A+B and 2.25B, questions 0353 and 0365 and 2.40A+B and 2.45A+B, questions 0356 and 0368) a clear partisan distinction is revealed in the voting behavior. The Democrat coalition positively supports its candidates and is more negative when considering Republican candidates. The reverse is demonstrated by the Republican coalition. This performance supports Bruce Keith's theory (1986) on the nature of leaners. In this instance, ticket-splitters do demonstrate partisan inclinations and form coalitions with pure partisans. As illustrated by the data, with the electorate dividing rather evenly on party lines, there can be no general consensus of perception over any of
the candidates' abilities to engender inspiration or to lead.

The data presented in Figures 2.10A+B and 2.15A+B (questions 0350 and 0362) and 2.30A+B and 2.35A+B (questions 0354 and 0366) depict another facet of the Independent's voting behavior, which is the multidimensional aspect presented by Jack Dennis (1988) and David Valentine (1980). Here, there is general consensus by the electorate that, in general, Democrat and Republican presidential candidates are perceived as being intelligent and knowledgeable. These character traits generate complex patterns accommodating both partisan and nonpartisan voting behavior. The observations fall predominantly within a range of three categories even though the scale allows for four answer categories. The data reveal observations being placed into a range that goes from "EXTREMELY WELL" to "NOT TOO WELL". Partisan coalition support and opposition are present at the poles of these figures. That is, citizens who voted for a candidate, be they straight-ticket or ticket-splitting voters, will have a high regard for their candidate, and, conversely, citizens who voted against a candidate will have a low regard for the candidate. It is in the middle, or "QUITE WELL" category, that nonpartisan patterns appear. General unanimity is demonstrated irrespective of demonstrated
voting preference. Ticket-splitters do not demonstrate the partisan patterns represented in Figures 2.20A+B, 2.25A+B, 2.40A+B and 2.45A+B. Figures 2.10A+B, 2.15A+B, 2.30A+B, and 2.35A+B present empirical evidence that contending theories of the nature of independence can coexist within the same data set, increasing the difficulty of forming a general theory of political independence that will aide in predicting the voting behavior of ticket-splitters.

(Figures 3.10A+B, 3.15A+B, 4.10A+B, 4.15A+B about here)

Figures 3.10A to 4.15B again demonstrate the multidimensional characteristic inherent in voting behavior. The scale for Figures 3.10A+B and 3.15A+B (questions 0401 and 0405) range from "0" positive mentions to "5" positive mentions. Figures 4.10A+B and 4.15A+B (questions 0402 and 0406) range from "0" negative mentions to "5" negative mentions. "0" for all scales will be defined as neutral. When used in Figures 3.10A+B and 3.15A+B, the "0" category demonstrates a lack of any positive mentions regarding the candidates, rather than the presence of any negative mentions. And, for Figures 4.10A+B and 4.15A+B, the "0" category demonstrates the lack of any negative mentions regarding the candidates, rather than the presence of any positive mentions. For Figures 3.10A+B and 3.15A+B, the greater the score means a
higher number of positive mentions attributed to the candidates, and translates into greater perceived approval for them. For Figures 4.10A+B and 4.15A+B, the greater the score means a higher number of perceived negative mentions attributed to the candidates, and translates into greater perceived objection to them. All eight figures reveal similar patterns over the scales. The "0" category reveals partisan voting behavior in all the figures under discussion. For Figures 3.10A+B and 3.15A+B, it appears that straight-ticket voters and ticket-splitters who demonstrate the least appreciation toward the candidates, having nothing good to mention about them, have a propensity to vote against them. And, as revealed in Figures 4.10A+B and 4.15A+B, straight-ticket voters and ticket-splitters who demonstrate the least dislike toward certain candidates, having nothing negative to mention about them, have a propensity to vote for those candidates. Here, ticket-splitters behave like the "leaners" Keith (1986) defines them to be.

The "1" category in Figures 3.10A+B to 4.15A+B reveals a general nonpartisan consensus being demonstrated. Ticket-splitters especially show this nonpartisan characteristic. Whether they voted for Republican or Democratic candidates, ticket-splitters appear to be open-minded enough to consider that each
candidate is deserving of at least one positive and one negative mention. Considering this opinion category, ticket-splitters now seem to demonstrate the independent nature that DeVries attributes to them.

As both the positive and negative scales increase, nonpartisanship is eliminated, and partisanship returns. Categories "2" to "5" demonstrate this throughout all of the figures being considered. Ticket-splitters again appear to act like leaners, precipitating the reconstitution of the Democrat and Republican coalitions.

(Figures 5.10A+B, 5.15A+B, 6.1A+B about here)

Figures 5.10A+B and 5.15A+B (questions 0403 and 0407) represent the respondents' affect towards the candidates. The scales range from "-5" to "+5". The "0" category represents the neutral mid-point where neither 'likes' nor 'dislikes' are attributed to the candidates. The results for Figures 5.10A+B are computed by taking the number of Democratic presidential candidates "LIKES" minus the number of Democratic candidates "DISLIKES". Figures 5.15A+B are measured in the same manner, but consider opinion about the Republican presidential candidates. The more negative a score, the more negative the affective measure is for the candidates. The more positive a score, the more positive the affective measure is for
the candidates.

Figures 5.10A+B show that Republican partisans and Republican ticket-splitters are, expectedly, much more negative to neutral in the affective measure towards Democrat candidates, while Democrat partisans and Democratic ticket-splitters are positive in their evaluation of the candidate. In Figures 5.15A+B, where the question of affect is directed towards Republican candidates, the data show the opposite of what was presented in Figures 5.10A+B. Again a strong partisan correlation is presented. Ticket-splitters acting as "leaners" joined with loyal partisans to form coalitions. The data clearly show that positive affection for the candidate will be manifested as electoral support.

Figures 6.1A+B (question 0409) represents the respondents' net affect towards both candidates. The scales range from "-10", representing the maximum Republican candidate affective measure, to "+10", which represents the maximum Democratic candidate affective measure. Again, the "0" category represents the neutral mid-point where neither "LIKES" nor "DISLIKES" are attributed to either candidate. The result of the net affect measurement is the difference between two sums: the sum of the Democratic presidential candidate "LIKES" and Republican presidential candidate
"DISLIKES" MINUS the sum of the Democratic presidential candidate "DISLIKES" and Republican presidential candidate "LIKES". Again, ticket-splitters acting as leaners joined with loyal partisans to form coalitions. Those ticket-splitters and Republican partisans who vote for Republican presidential candidates demonstrate a higher net affective measure for them than for Democrat presidential candidates. And conversely, ticket-splitters and partisan Democrats who support Democrat presidential candidates evidence a higher net affective measure for them than for Republican presidential candidates. The data, again, clearly show that positive affection for a candidate will engender electoral support.

(Figures 7.1A+B about here)

Figures 7.1A+B (question 9022) reflect how respondents answered the question of whether their voting preference for president could be defined as "STRONG" or "NOT STRONG". The data reflect the fact that Republican partisans and Republican ticket-splitters acted in consort and preferred Republican presidential candidates more strongly than Democratic partisans and Democratic ticket-splitters acting in consort. Republican partisans were 20% stronger in their support of Republican candidates than Democratic partisans were in supporting Democrat candidates. And
Republican ticket-splitters were almost 20% stronger in their decision to vote for Republican candidates than Democratic ticket-splitters were in their decision. The considerable electoral success evidenced by Republican presidential candidates in the period between 1980 and 1988 is accompanied by a confidence and strength of conviction by the electors in their candidate choices. The ability to generate this strength of conviction appears to be a motivating component towards achieving electoral victory, and also generates the most crossover voting.

Voting Behavior and Perceived Issue Stands by Presidential Candidates

This section analyzes the perceptions of the respondents when considering the candidates' stands on domestic issues. Again, voting behavior is sub-divided into four categories: straight-ticket Democrats, Democratic ticket-splitters, Republican ticket-splitters, and straight-ticket Republicans. These categories are cross-tabulated over a 7-point scale used to measure the respondents perceived candidate placement over four policy issue choices. The issues considered are: Should the federal government be responsible for the improvement of the social and economic position of blacks? Is the federal government responsible to see to it that every person has a good
job and standard of living? Should women have an equal role with men in running business, industry, and government? And should the federal government reduce services even in areas such as health and education in order to reduce spending, or should the government increase spending in these areas?


The 7-point scale for three of the perceived policy stances: Government aid to blacks (questions 9084 and 9092 - Figures 8.10A+B and Figures 8.15A+B); guaranteed jobs and standard of living (questions 9087 and 9095 - Figures 9.10A+B and 9.15A+B); and women's role in society (questions 9083 and 9091 - 10.10A+B and 10.15A+B), range from "1" to "7". For these questions, perceptions in the "1" to "2" range are categorized as liberal. Perceptions falling into the "3" to "5" range are categorized as moderate, and the "6" to "7" are categorized as conservative. The scale regarding services and spending (questions 9086 and 9094, Figures 11.10A+B and 11.15A+B) also range from "1" to "7". For these questions, perceptions in the "1" to "2" range are categorized as conservative, "3" to "5" are categorized as moderate, and "6" to "7" are categorized as liberal.

Two patterns emerge from this set of questions. First, Democrats are viewed as liberal to moderate when
considering the four questions, and Republicans are viewed as a moderate to conservative on three of the questions. On the fourth question, women's equal role in society, opinion is more dispersed. Here Republicans are generally seen as a liberal to moderate, but there is also substantial amount of opinion defining Republicans as conservative on this question.

The second pattern to appear is that partisan Republicans and Republican ticket-splitters view Democrats as being more liberal than moderate on three issues, while partisan Democrats and Democratic ticket-splitters view Republicans as more conservative than moderate on all four questions. It appears that supporters see their candidate as being more moderate than the opponent on the issues examined. In light of the scope of this investigation, it is very significant to observe that these patterns are consistent when considering just ticket-splitters. The data plainly reveal that on the domestic policies investigated, ticket-splitters are motivated to support the candidate whom they perceive as moderate, and eschew supporting candidates whom they discern as too liberal or too conservative.

Voting Behavior and Party Proximity to Respondent

This section examines the perceptions of the
respondents when considering their proximity to the two major parties on the same four domestic issues presented in the previous section. Again, voting behavior is sub-divided into four categories: straight-ticket Democrats, Democratic ticket-splitters, Republican ticket-splitters, and straight-ticket Republicans. These categories are cross-tabulated over three categories: Closer to Democrats, Equidistant, and Closer to Republicans. Also, this section examines the affect and net affect of the Democratic and Republican party on the respondents.

(Figures 12.1A+B, 13.1A+B, 14.1A+B, 15.1A+B, 16.10A+B, 16.15A+B, 17.1A+B about here)

All four policy questions reveal an interesting pattern which corroborates the theoretical considerations of Valentine (1980) and Dennis (1988a, 1988b) presented in the first chapter. That is, when voting behavior is viewed in the aggregate, the electorate demonstrates the presence of both partisanship and nonpartisan independence existing together. Also, DeVries' (1972) observation that party identification is playing a diminished role in the minds of the electorate is corroborated. The substantial opinion formation around the equidistant scores reveal that, for many respondents, neither party's position on the issues is attractive.

Figures 12.1A+B (question 0564) reveal that
overall, the respondents feel slightly closer to the Republican party on the issue of aid to blacks. The data show that 43.8% percent of Democratic ticket-splitters feel closer to the Democratic party while only 23.1% feel closer to the Republicans. Conversely, 50.1% of the Republican ticket-splitters identify with the Republican party, and only 17.0% feel closer to the Democrats. Almost one-third of both the Democrat and Republican ticket-splitters are in the equidistant category when considering this policy issue. These figures reveal the partisan and independent characteristics that coexist concomitantly in the mind of the voters as theorized by Valentine (1980).

Complex multidimensionality inherent in ticket-splitting voting behavior, namely the presence of two seemingly contradictory attributes in the same measurement, is clearly demonstrated in Figure 12.1B.

The same pattern of partisanship and independence emerges when studying Figures 13.1A+B (question 0570). Generally, the respondents feel closer to the Republican party on the issue of whether the government should guarantee jobs and a standard of living to the citizenry. Most ticket-splitters feel closer to the party of the candidate they voted for, yet almost one-third of the Democrat and Republican ticket-splitters are equidistantly positioned between the two parties.
Figures 15.1A+B (question 0572) again show both partisanship and independence existing together, but the respondents are very evenly divided over the issue of government spending and services. Neither party, nor its respective candidates, can claim any advantage when considering this issue. On this issue, only one-fifth of the Democrat and Republican ticket-splitters defined their position as equidistant between the parties.

Only the issue of women's role in society (Figures 14.1A+B, question 0571) provides an advantage to the Democratic party over the Republican party. What is interesting though is the high number of ticket-splitters who do not identify with either party on this policy question. Fully 47.1% of the Democrat and 58.1% of the Republican ticket-splitters do not identify with the party of the candidate they voted for.

Figures 16.10A+B and 16.15A+B (questions 0316 and 0320) are very vivid in describing both the partisan and independent nature of the electorate when considering the major political parties. The scales range from "-5" to "+5". The "0" category represents the neutral mid-point where neither 'likes' nor 'dislikes' are attributed to a party. The results for Figures 16.10A+B are computed by taking the number of Democratic party 'likes' minus the number of Democratic
party 'dislikes'. Figures 16.15A+B are measured in the same manner, but consider opinion about the Republican party. The more negative a score, the more negative the affective measure is for the party. The more positive a score, the more positive the affective measure is for the party. Figures 16.10A+B show that Republican partisans and Republican ticket-splitters are, expectedly, much more negative to neutral in the affective measure towards the Democratic party, while Democratic partisans and Democratic ticket-splitters are neutral to positive in their evaluation of the party. In Figures 16.15A+B, where the question of affect is directed towards the Republican party, the data show the opposite of what was presented in Figures 16.10A+B. Again a strong partisan correlation is presented. Ticket-splitters acting as "leaners" joined with loyal partisans to form coalitions.

Figures 17.1A+B (question 0322) represent the respondents' net affect towards both political parties. The scales range from "-10", representing the maximum Republican party affective measure, to "+10", which represents the maximum Democratic party affective measure. As before, the "0" category represents the neutral mid-point where neither 'likes' nor 'dislikes' are attributed to either party. The result of the net affect measurement is the difference between two sums:
the sum of the Democratic party "LIKES" and Republican party "DISLIKES" MINUS the sum of the Democratic party "DISLIKES" and Republican presidential party "LIKES". Again, ticket-splitters acting as "leaners" joined with loyal partisans to form coalitions. Those Republican ticket-splitters and Republican partisans who vote demonstrate a higher net affective measure for the Republican party than the Democratic party. And conversely, Democratic ticket-splitters and partisan Democrats evidence a higher net affective measure for the Democratic party than the Republican party.

The data presented in Figures 16.10A+B, 16.15A+B and 17.1A+B, clearly shows that positive affection for a party will translate into electoral support for that party's candidate. But it also demonstrates that the majority of the ticket-splitters fall between the maximum Republican party and maximum Democratic party affective measure, with a large percentage finding themselves neutral to the positive or negative influences of either political party.

This concludes the presentation of the empirical data. The next chapter examines the data within the hypothetical and theoretical framework introduced in the first chapter.
CHAPTER 4

DISCUSSION

Hypothetical Considerations

The empirical data presented in the preceding chapter substantiates the relationship between the ticket-splitters' evaluation of the candidates, issues, and parties, and their voting behavior. These evaluations defy partisan self-identification, and it is the cumulative effect of ticket-splitter behavior that creates the margin of victory in modern presidential elections. Generally there is a positive correlation between the positive evaluation of the candidates, issues and the candidates' parties by the ticket-splitter and his support for that candidate. There is also evidence that a positive evaluation alone may not be motivation enough to inspire the ticket-splitter's support. This anomaly complicates the definition of ticket-splitter behavior, but it does confirm the independent nature of the ticket-splitter, which confirms the primary supposition of DeVries' ticket-splitter theory.
Theoretical Considerations

To reiterate, the ticket-splitter theory rests on some fundamental premises. Devries (1972) posits that the electoral sub-group of ticket-splitters makes up to about one-quarter of the electorate in any presidential election, and is the balance of power in an election. Because of the ticket-splitters importance and apparent independence, the prediction probability of the modern campaign environment has less to do with the supporting roles of political parties, and more to do with issue evaluations and the appeal and positive affection that a voter possesses for the candidate he chooses to cast his vote for. Partisan identification is a diminished influencing agent, and the primary mode of persuasion is a two way direct communication between the candidate and the electorate via primarily electronic media.

Since the ticket-splitter theory is based on the independent behavior of the voter, the studies of other scholars concerning the phenomenon of independence was included in this thesis. Alan Meyer (1962) wrote that Independents make deliberate voting decisions only after appraising the merits of the contending candidates and their respective parties. Robert Erikson (1988) found that one of the best predictors of future voting behavior is simply whether the voter likes the traits of one candidate over those of the

In apparent contradiction to the above observations, Keith and his associates (1986) discovered that Independents are actually bound by partisan inclinations that motivate them to vote for the political party they feel closer to. Most so-called Independents behave this way; any declaration to the contrary is a falsehood.

Theoretical Points of Agreement

One has only to observe Table 1. and Figure 1.1B to see the truth inherent in DeVries statement that ticket-splitters constitute a considerable part of the electorate and could be the balance of power in electoral victories. The data show this clearly in presidential elections between 1952 and 1988. The ROW TOTALS column of Table 1. presents the fact that straight-ticket voters made up 78.8% of the electorate and ticket-splitters constituted the remaining 21.2%. In fact, ticket-splitters voted for Republican presidential candidates by an almost three to one margin. Figure 1.1B illustrates the defection of
Strong, Weak, and Independent Democrats, along with Independent-Independents. These pure Independents voted Republican by an almost four to one margin. Republican presidential candidates are able to retain the self-identifying Republicans who ticket-split. The primacy placed on the ticket-splitters' vote by DeVries cannot be refuted. Over the thirty-eight year period of the study, Republican candidates have demonstrated an ability to both attract ticket-splitters and win presidential elections.

Robert Erikson's (1988) observation that a positive affection towards a candidate is a legitimate predictor of future voting behavior can be seen in Figures 5.10A to 5.15B. The more the candidates' perceived "LIKES" outnumber their "DISLIKES" the greater the chance of the candidates attracting the vote. Figures 6.1A and 6.1B demonstrate Erikson's statement even more clearly. This pattern of positive affection and voting propensity can also be seen in Figures 16.10A to 17.1B where political parties are concerned.

Figures 7.1A and 7.1B can lend insight into the success enjoyed by Republican presidential candidates during the 1980s. Those who voted for Republican presidential candidates were obviously stronger in conviction than those who voted for Democratic
presidential candidates. This apparent aggregate strength of conviction appears to be a reliable explanation of electoral success.

In Figures 8.10A to 11.15B, the data suggest that the key to interpreting the traits of a candidate in relation to issues is the perception of moderation. Voters seem to aggregate around the center of the ideological spectrum and will vote for the candidate they perceive to be there also. Opposition to a candidate is found at the poles of the ideological spectrum. To like a candidate means to perceive his issue positions as moderate.

Jack Dennis' (1988a, 1988b) and David Valentine's (1980) theoretical observations are corollaries. The multidimensionality and complexity of the self-identifying polling question concerning independence can be explained by Valentine's observation that partisanship and independence can coexist in the mind of the voter. The data suggest that this complex coexistence is present not only in the psychological, self-identifying sense, but also in the behavioral sense of actual voting conduct.

Figure 2.10B demonstrates that more Republican ticket-splitters perceive the "QUITE WELL" classification as more descriptive of Democrat candidates than Democratic ticket-splitters do.
Conversely, Figure 2.15B reveals that more Democratic ticket-splitters perceive this classification as more descriptive of Republican presidential candidates than it is for Democrat presidential candidates.

Now, consider Figures 12.1B, 13.1B and 15.1B. Ticket-splitters demonstrate both partisan and independent tendencies existing for the same issues at the same time. One would expect that ticket-splitters would be equidistant between the two parties. This is a clear demonstration of independence, but what about the two other classifications? The data clearly show a partisan inclination within the ticket-splitter subgroup. The presence of partisanship and independence coexisting at the same time is indeed curious, it adds complexity, and demonstrates the multidimensional nature of the ticket-splitter. It also leads the observer to reconsider the efficacy of the ticket-splitter theory itself.

Theoretical Points of Contention

The work completed by Keith (1986) gives insight into the phenomena of self-identifying Independents who lean toward one party. The data compiled in this study confirms Keith's observation concerning Independents. Here, it is not psychologically self-identified Independents showing partisan leanings, but rather it is behavioral Independents who demonstrate partisanship.
in their voting behavior. It is this fact that directly challenges the ticket-splitter theory.

DeVries' (1972) theory is based on the diminution of parties as an influence in voting behavior. Also, DeVries finds little affinity between self-identifying Independents and ticket-splitters. Much of the data in this report suggests the converse.

It is to be noted though that DeVries' observations are also substantiated by some of the data. In Figure 1.1B the presence of partisanship is so vague as to make self-identified partisan Democrats who split their ticket generally find Republican presidential candidates more acceptable than Democratic presidential candidates. Figures 2.10B and 2.15B also suggest the apparent diminution of partisanship. The QUITE WELL category in Figure 2.10B shows that Republican ticket-splitters held Democratic candidates' intelligence in higher regard than Democratic ticket-splitters. Figure 2.15B shows the opposite; Democratic ticket-splitters held Republican presidential candidates' intelligence in higher regard than Republican ticket-splitters. This observation is seemingly anomalous to the presence of partisanship. But this fact is to be considered in relation to the presence of partisanship in the EXTREMELY WELL and NOT TOO WELL categories. The multidimensional nature of
ticket-splitters is observed in many other instances throughout the data set. Figures 3.10B, 4.15B, 12.1B, 13.1B, and 15.1B, for example, reveal how the ticket-splitter's voting behavior can accommodate both independence and partisanship. This reality has the curious quality of both confirming and denying DeVries' theory with the same measurement. What is certain is that DeVries' observations concerning the voting behavior of ticket-splitters deserves more investigation.

Theoretical Accommodation

To be fair, any investigation into the usefulness of the ticket-splitter theory must consider all the components, which together, constitute the supposition. This thesis has investigated the theory through the application of only one of the elements - voting behavior based on opinion polling. The theory in its entirety is composed of not only the application of opinion polling, but it also employs demographic data, media market applications and designations, and voting behavior culled from voter registration and election documents. These components are then administered through organizational activities. The true worth of the ticket-splitter theory is not in explaining abstractions, but rather it is to be found in its application as a methodological blueprint utilized to
gain an electoral majority. The scope of considering the theory in its entirety is beyond this thesis. To do so would entail investigating the actual records of a given campaign that employs this methodology. Instead, this thesis is a rudimentary investigation into the basic premises that are essential in assessing its utility.

The application of this narrow criteria is proving to be both expositive and perplexing. The data show that, indeed, the ticket-splitter sub-group makes up a considerable portion of the electorate in the period of 1952 to 1990. Also, in the aggregate, the candidate and the party who was successful in motivating ticket-splitters to vote for them have controlled the White House the predominance of the time. But this is countered by the discovery that ticket-splitters, when considering the candidates, issues, and parties, demonstrate behavior that is reminiscent of a party partisan. This appears to be a direct contradiction to the premise that political parties are of no predictive value in assessing the future voting behavior of ticket-splitters. It would be difficult to argue that this behavior occurs merely by chance. It would be equally difficult to discount the significance of the ticket-splitter theory as a means of organizing a victorious political campaign. The size, presence, and
importance of the sub-group to electoral success necessitates further investigation into the nature of the ticket-splitter voter.

Questions and Recommendations for Further Study

The ANES instrument, although voluminous, is not sensitive enough to thoroughly illuminate the voting behavior of ticket-splitters. Future investigation into the voting behavior of ticket-splitters should include more accurate measures of opinion, along with investigation into the two-way communication process between a candidate and the electorate. Also, demographic and legal voting records would have to be included to complete a sufficient analysis for predicting ticket-splitter voting behavior.

The completion of the data collection and analysis leaves me with more questions than answers. For instance, is the partisanship observed by ticket-splitters authentic or just coincidence? Could the voting phenomena be a result of the fact that, in most instances, only two candidates are running in an election, and the ticket-splitter's behavior is simply a response to an either-or proposition and the result gives only the appearance of partisanship? Or, could it be that the observed partisanship is real as a result of both partisans and ticket-splitters evaluating the candidates, issues, and parties and
coming to the same conclusion? And, if the observed partisanship is factual, do partisans and ticket-splitters arrive at the same conclusion by the same method of evaluation? Considering the questions presented above, I would like to offer some ideas on improving opinion polling measures, and also, how to generate meaningful measures concerning the two-way communication process.

Opinion measures should be concerned with evaluating the candidate, issues, and political parties involved in specific elections. To accomplish these measurements with more precision than that afforded in the ANES instrument, opinions concerning the candidates and the parties could better be measured using a semantic differential scale.¹ This method would afford the researcher to more meticulously judge the electorate's opinion on the candidates and parties by measuring three implicit dimensions: evaluation, potency, and activity (Johnson, p.89). The questions employed in the ANES poll only evaluates opinion, they do not render any indication of potency or activity that a semantic differential technique would afford. Concerning the issues, the employment of a Guttman scale would allow the researcher to deduce not only if the electorate judges an issue in a favorable or unfavorable light, but also the strength or weakness of
opinion concerning the issue.²

The two-way communication procedure is an integral element of the ticket-splitter campaign methodology (DeVries 1972, 73). Because ticket-splitters are theorized to not be dependent upon partisan cues, they respond to short-term forces originating primarily from the electronic media as the prime orientation method in their voting decision (Erikson 1988, 248). Considering the primacy of the information and communication process to attracting the ticket-splitter, it is absolutely necessary to any further examination of ticket-splitter voting behavior to perfect and include a methodology for investigation into how ticket-splitters are motivated to vote for a candidate by the utilization of voting cues promulgated by the media.

DeVries (1988), among others, offers insightful recommendations on how this data can be generated. Because the media is stratifying into smaller and narrower special-audience segments, the complexity of understanding the influence of these exclusive venues on ticket-splitters requires that investigators initiate experimental research to examine media techniques for effectiveness in influencing these special-audience segments (DeVries 1972, 116).

In order to facilitate this experimental research, Steven Ansolabehere (1991) has divided media research
into four categories of media effects. The influence of media can, in Ansolabehere's opinion, "impart information, persuade individuals to support or oppose a candidate, set the agenda for political campaigns, and influence the criteria on which electoral preferences are based" (Ansolabehere 1991, 121). To best study these effects of the relationship between the media and the electoral process, Ansolabehere recommends joining research involving "information production" with "effects research", because "voter responses and candidate strategies are endogenous components of campaigns" (Ansolabehere 1991, 131). Ansolabehere suggests that "political research of the future should be less concerned with providing evidence of media influence and more concerned with explaining the difference between strong and weak communications" (Ansolabehere 1991, 135). Seemingly, this approach would be very useful in understanding the nuances of ticket-splitters and will further the examination of this critical and complex minority within the electorate. Once it is understood what influences ticket-splitters, questions as to how they are influenced could then be better understood, and the efficacy of the ticket-splitter theory could be more accurately discerned.

The accuracy of the most researched and refined
media strategy must be directed by an equally researched and refined targeting methodology. Political targeting is the means by which a sophisticated campaign can focus a specified motivational message to a finely defined audience of potential voters in any given political race. Targeting is accomplished by merging and then cross-references demographic databases with political databases (Havlicek 1984, 87).

The Census Bureau is the preeminent assembler and repository of population data within the United States. It dispenses, at a fee, neighborhood statistics containing demographic data on the general population by geographic sub-divisions called blocks and tracts. This information is then divided by zip code and area code (Havlicek 1984, 88,102).

Political data are collected by gathering voting behavior records from the appropriate authorities, and also by employing polling methodology. Voting behavior data consist of current voter registration records, along with past records of voting participation. The resultant compilation of information contains details on trends operating within the electorate at the time. This database is merged with opinion polling information concerning such levels of analysis as the respondent's life cycle, life style, issue concerns,
issue positions, and partisan predispositions (Havlicek 1984, 93).

Summary

During the 38 year period of this study, fully 21% of the electorate split their ticket. Ticket-splitters have voted for Republican presidential candidates 72% of the time, and helped to propel Republicans into the White House in 7 out of 10 elections. They have also voted for a Republican presidential candidate and a Democratically controlled House 6 times. Ticket-splintering clearly has been an important factor in American politics, and as such, the influence of this electoral behavior is worthy of study and understanding. This thesis has verified certain characteristics of ticket-splitting behavior that help explain the nature of these independent voters.

When considering presidential candidates, the ticket-splitter displays both partisan and independent voting behavior. Partisanship is manifested when the ticket-splitter joins straight-ticket partisans to form a coalition in support of one or the other candidate. Independence is demonstrated by the ticket-splitter's ability to consider both candidates in an election and to evaluate both the positive and negative traits of each.

The ticket-splitter will vote for the candidate he
has high regard for, and will vote against a candidate he holds in low esteem. Said another way, the ticket-splitter who has nothing negative to say about a candidate will vote for that candidate, and if the ticket-splitter has nothing positive to say about a candidate, he will vote against him. A Republican ticket-splitter will view the Democratic candidate in a negative to neutral light, while a Democratic ticket-splitter will give the same Democratic candidate a positive evaluation. When the same affective measure is directed towards the Republican candidate, the opposite result is seen. A positive or negative affective measure of a candidate by the ticket-splitter serves as a reliable predictor of his voting behavior.

The analysis of the perceptions of the ticket-splitter when considering a candidate's stand on domestic issues also proves useful in predicting voting behavior. Over the four domestic issues examined, Democrat candidates are perceived as liberal to moderate, while Republican candidates are perceived as moderate to conservative. The ticket-splitter will support a candidate when he perceives that candidate as more moderate than the candidate's opponent. The ticket-splitter will shun a candidate he perceives as too liberal or too conservative. Moderation is of more value than strong ideology to the ticket-splitter. So,
in essence, for the ticket-splitter, to like a candidate means to perceive his issue positions as moderate.

The ticket-splitter's voting behavior when considering his perceptions of his proximity to the major political parties on the same issues previously investigated again demonstrates multidimensional voting patterns. Generally, the ticket-splitter feels closer to the party of the presidential candidate he voted for, but this fact is tempered by the actuality that fully one-third of the ticket-splitter subgroup perceives itself as equidistant between the major parties. A Republican ticket-splitter feels negative to neutral when considering a Democrat, while feeling neutral to positive about the Republican opponent. Conversely, a Democratic ticket-splitter feels more negative to neutral towards the Republican candidate and neutral to positive towards the Democrat opponent.

Conclusion

The ability to accurately identify, locate and target the ticket-splitter and then predict his behavior is a challenge, and this will only grow more demanding as society continues to transform at an even more rapid pace. In order to better understand the nuances of ticket-splitting behavior, opinion polling will have to be refined. Polling will have to be
election specific, more frequent and more accurate, because of the influences of a highly specialized media on an increasingly fragmented electorate. Television's 500 channel future will provide a profusion of outlets for political persuasion, and pollsters must understand the effects of the technology on the electorate. All of these variables virtually assure that the cost of political campaigns will escalate as an arms race of technology, innovation and skill will be implemented to discern and manage campaigns in an environment of constant change.

The ticket-splitter phenomenon will be an increasing occurrence. Candidate-centered, media-driven campaigns rely less and less on political parties. Electoral victory will mean building coalitions of party partisans and sympathetic ticket-splitters as more and more of the electorate recognize no partisan identity when registering to vote. Ticket-splitting may also increase with the rise of a strong and viable third party acting as a countervailing force to the prevailing and seemingly ineffectual two-party system. The ticket-splitter phenomenon is the result of the electorate searching for real political leadership.

It is obvious that the challenges facing this nation will continue to get more urgent. Issues such
as the rising national debt and international trade imbalance, the declining standard of living being experienced by American citizens, and real potential for the bankruptcy of entitlement programs will inevitably demand attention. These realities leave the voter anxious for any candidate, irrespective of party identification, who can competently deal with the issues. The voter will probably remain undecided until just before the election as he critically evaluates the candidate he will support, and this critical disposition will compel him to be more prone to ticket-split. Unfortunately, the electorate will also be susceptible to demagoguery. Also, if there are no really qualified individuals elected to the White House, this nation will experience a series of one-term presidencies as the ticket-splitter moves his allegiance to the next candidate who can persuade the ticket-splitter that he has the skill to solve the nation's problems. Members of Congress will also be subject to the same discriminating evaluation. Another bi-product of ineffectual federal leadership will be an increase in ticket-splitting on the state level as the concerned voter will search for the candidate with the vision and ability to deal with the issue challenges created by an incompetent federal government.

It is apparent to this observer that a thorough
examination of the utility of the ticket-splitter theory is warranted, and that the investigator needs to consider all of the components of data collection discussed above, as well as the appropriate compilation of the data so that the investigator can say with absolute confidence that this theory is a suitable alternative to the present methodology of interpreting voting behavior strictly through partisan predispositions. I believe that the ticket-splitter theory is currently being utilized in modern campaigns; it is the mandate of good science to observe and study this active theory in order to accurately determine the nature and limits of its function in explaining voting behavior. I trust that this initial study provides reflective information to that end.
1. A semantic differential technique, Johnson writes, is used to measure "attitudes towards an object in which respondents are presented with a series of opposite adjective pairs." See Johnson, Political Science Research Methods, 91.

2. A Guttman Scale measures increasingly difficult evaluations of support for an issue attitude.
0709 TICKET-SPLITTING PRESIDENTIAL VS. CONGRESSIONAL VOTE. derived from V704 and V707


0. DK/NA who voted for in presidential or congressional race; did not vote; refused to say if voted ETC.

0704 Who did you vote for for President? (MAJOR PARTY VOTES)
1. Democrat
2. Republican

0707 How about the election for (Congressman)the House of Representatives in Washington. Did you vote for a candidate for (Congress)the U. S. House of Representatives? (IF YES:) Who did you vote for? Which party was that?

1. Democrat
2. Republican

(CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 1; FIGURES 1.1A, 1.1B)
0301 Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what? (IF REPUBLICAN OR DEMOCRAT) Would you call yourself a strong (REP/DEM) or a not very strong (REP/DEM)? (IF INDEPENDENT, OTHER, OR NO PREFERENCE) Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic party?

1. Strong Democrat
2. Weak Democrat
3. Independent - Democrat (also no-preference and minor party leaners)
4. Independent - Independent
5. Independent - Republican (also no-preference and minor party leaners)
6. Weak Republican
7. Strong Republican
I am going to read a list of words and phrases people may use to describe political figures... Think about the Democratic presidential candidate. The first phrase is "intelligent." In your opinion, does the phrase "intelligent" describe the Democratic presidential candidate...

1. Extremely well
2. Quite well
3. Not too well
4. Not well at all

I am going to read a list of words and phrases people may use to describe political figures... Think about the Republican presidential candidate. The first phrase is "intelligence." In your opinion, does the phrase "intelligence" describe the Republican presidential candidate...

1. Extremely well
2. Quite well
3. Not too well
4. Not well at all

I am going to read a list of words and phrases people may use to describe political figures... Think about the Democratic presidential candidate. The second phrase is "inspiring." In your opinion, does the phrase "inspiring" describe the Democratic presidential candidate...

1. Extremely well
2. Quite well
3. Not too well
4. Not well at all
I am going to read a list of words and phrases people may use to describe political figures... Think about the Republican presidential candidate. The second phrase is "inspiration." In your opinion, does the phrase "inspiration" describe the Republican presidential candidate...

1. Extremely well
2. Quite well
3. Not too well
4. Not well at all

I am going to read a list of words and phrases people may use to describe political figures... Think about the Democratic presidential candidate. The third phrase is "knowledge." In your opinion, does the phrase "knowledge" describe the Democratic presidential candidate...

1. Extremely well
2. Quite well
3. Not too well
4. Not well at all

I am going to read a list of words and phrases people may use to describe political figures... Think about the Republican presidential candidate. The third phrase is "knowledge." In your opinion, does the phrase "knowledge" describe the Republican presidential candidate...

1. Extremely well
2. Quite well
3. Not too well
4. Not well at all
0356 I am going to read a list of words and phrases people may use to describe political figures... Think about the Democratic presidential candidate. The fourth phrase is "leadership." In your opinion, does the phrase "leadership" describe the Democratic presidential candidate...

1. Extremely well
2. Quite well
3. Not too well
4. Not well at all

0368 I am going to read a list of words and phrases people may use to describe political figures... Think about the Republican presidential candidate. The fourth phrase is "leadership." In your opinion, does the phrase "leadership" describe the Republican presidential candidate...

1. Extremely well
2. Quite well
3. Not too well
4. Not well at all

0401 Now I would like to ask you about the good and bad points of the two candidates for President. Is there anything in particular about the Democratic presidential candidate that might make you vote for him? What is that? Anything else?

0. Zero positive mentions (likes)
1. One positive mention (likes)
2. Two positive mentions (likes)
3. Three positive mentions (likes)
4. Four positive mentions (likes)
5. Five positive mentions (likes)
0405 Now I'd like to ask you about the good and bad points of the two candidates for President. Is there anything in particular about the particular Republican presidential candidate that might make you want to vote for him? What is that? Anything else?

0. Zero positive mentions (likes)
1. One positive mention (likes)
2. Two positive mentions (likes)
3. Three positive mentions (likes)
4. Four positive mentions (likes)
5. Five positive mentions (likes)

0402 Is there anything in particular about the Democratic presidential candidate that might make you want to vote against him? What is that? Anything else?

0. Zero negative mentions (dislikes)
1. One negative mention (dislikes)
2. Two negative mentions (dislikes)
3. Three negative mentions (dislikes)
4. Four negative mentions (dislikes)
5. Five negative mentions (dislikes)

0406 Is there anything in particular about the Republican presidential candidate that might make you want to vote against him? What is that? Anything else?

0. Zero negative mentions (dislikes)
1. One negative mention (dislikes)
2. Two negative mentions (dislikes)
3. Three negative mentions (dislikes)
4. Four negative mentions (dislikes)
5. Five negative mentions (dislikes)
(CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 5; FIGURES 5.10A, 5.10B)
0403 This is the number of Democratic presidential candidate 'likes' minus the number of Democratic presidential candidate 'dislikes' (V401-V402).

-5 Maximum negative
0 Neutral
+5 Maximum positive

(CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 5; FIGURES 5.15A, 5.15B)
0407 This is the number of Republican presidential candidate 'likes' minus the number of Republican presidential candidate 'dislikes' (V405-V406).

-5 Maximum negative
0 Neutral
+5 Maximum positive

(CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 6; FIGURES 6.1A, 6.1B)
0409 The net affect toward major party presidential candidates is the difference between two sums: the sum of Democratic presidential candidate 'likes' and Republican presidential candidate 'dislikes' MINUS the sum of Democratic presidential candidate 'dislikes' and Republican presidential candidate 'likes:' [V401+V406] -[V402+V405], which is the same as: V403-V407.

-10 Maximum Republican
0 Neutral
+10 Maximum Democrat

(CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 7; FIGURES 7.1A, 7.1B)
9022 (ASKED OF Rs WHO VOTED): How about the election for president? Did you vote for a candidate for president? (IF YES) Who did you vote for? Would you say that your preference for this candidate was strong or not strong?

1. Strong
2. Not Strong
Some people feel that the government in Washington should make every possible effort to improve the social and economic position of blacks. Others feel that the government should not make any special effort to help blacks because they should help themselves. Where would you place the Democratic presidential candidate on this scale? (7-POINT SCALE SHOWN TO R).

1. Government should help blacks/minorities
2. - 6.
7. Blacks/minorities should help themselves

Some people feel that the government in Washington should make every possible effort to improve the social and economic position of blacks. Others feel that the government should not make any special effort to help blacks because they should help themselves. Where would you place the Republican presidential candidate on this scale? (7-POINT SCALE SHOWN TO R).

1. Government should help blacks/minorities
2. - 6.
7. Blacks/minorities should help themselves

Some people feel that the government in Washington should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living. Others think the government should just let each person get ahead on their own. Where would you place the Democratic presidential candidate on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this? (7-POINT SCALE SHOWN TO R)

1. Government see to job and a good standard of living
2. - 6.
7. Government let each person get ahead on his own
Some people feel that the government in Washington should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living. Others think the government should just let each person get ahead on their own. Where would you place the Republican presidential candidate on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this? (7-POINT SCALE SHOWN TO R)

1. Government see to job and a good standard of living
2. - 6.
7. Government let each person get ahead on own

Recently there has been a lot of talk about women's rights. Some people feel that women should have an equal role with men in running business, industry and government. Others feel that women's place is in the home. Where would you place the Democratic presidential candidate on this scale or haven't you thought much about this? (7-POINT SCALE SHOWN TO R)

1. Women and men should have an equal role
2. - 6.
7. Women's place is in the home

Recently there has been a lot of talk about women's rights. Some people feel that women should have an equal role with men in running business, industry and government. Others feel that women's place is in the home. Where would you place the Republican presidential candidate on this scale or haven't you thought much about this? (7-POINT SCALE SHOWN TO R)

1. Women and men should have an equal role
2. - 6.
7. Women's place is in the home
Some people think the government should provide fewer services, even in areas such as health and education, in order to reduce spending. Other people feel that it important for the government to provide many more services even if it means an increase in spending. Where would you place the Democratic presidential candidate on this scale? (7-POINT SCALE SHOWN TO R)

1. Government should provide many fewer services: reduce spending a lot.
2. - 6.
7. Government should provide many more services: increase spending a lot.

Some people think the government should provide fewer services, even in areas such as health and education, in order to reduce spending. Other people feel that it important for the government to provide many more services even if it means an increase in spending. Where would you place the Republican presidential candidate on this scale? (7-POINT SCALE SHOWN TO R)

1. Government should provide many fewer services: reduce spending a lot
2. - 6.
7. Government should provide many more services: increase spending a lot

Derived from V830 and V517-V518.
0830 Some people feel that the government in Washington should make every possible effort to improve the social and economic position of blacks. Others feel that the government should not make any special effort to help blacks because they should help themselves. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about it? (7-POINT SCALE SHOWN TO R)

1. Government should help minority groups/ blacks
2. - 6.
7. Minority groups/ blacks should help themselves

0517 Some people feel that the government in Washington should make every possible effort to improve the social and economic position of blacks. Others feel that the government should not make any special effort to help blacks because they should help themselves. Where would you place the Democratic party on this scale? (7-POINT SCALE SHOWN TO R).

1. Government should help minority groups
2. - 6.
7. Minority groups should help themselves

0518 Some people feel that the government in Washington should make every possible effort to improve the social and economic position of blacks. Others feel that the government should not make any special effort to help blacks because they should help themselves. Where would you place the Republican party on this scale? (7-POINT SCALE SHOWN TO R)

1. Government should help minority groups
2. - 6.
7. Minority groups should help themselves

(CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 13; FIGURES 13.1A, 13.1B)
0570 Derived from V809 and V513-V514.

1. Closer to Democrats
2. Equidistant
3. Closer to Republican
Some people feel that the government in Washington should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living. Others think the government should just let each person get ahead on his own. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this? (7-POINT SCALE SHOWN TO R)

1. Government see to job and a good standard of living
2. - 6.
7. Government let each person get ahead on his own

Some people feel that the government in Washington should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living. Others think the government should just let each person get ahead on his own. Where would you place the Democratic party on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this? (7-POINT SCALE SHOWN TO R)

1. Government see to job and a good standard of living
2. - 6.
7. Government let each person get ahead on his own

Some people feel that the government in Washington should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living. Others think the government should just let each person get ahead on his own. Where would you place the Republican party on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this? (7-POINT SCALE SHOWN TO R)

1. Government see to job and a good standard of living
2. - 6.
7. Government let each person get ahead on his own
0571 Derived from V834 and V537-538.

1. Closer to Democrats
2. Equidistant
3. Closer to Republicans

0834 Recently there has been a lot of talk about women's rights. Some people feel that women should have an equal role with men in running business, industry and government. Others feel that women's place is in the home. Where would you place yourself on this scale or haven't you thought much about this? (7-POINT SCALE SHOWN TO R)

1. Women and men should have an equal role
2. - 6.
7. Women's place is in the home

0537 Recently there has been a lot of talk about women's rights. Some people feel that women should have an equal role with men in running business, industry and government. Others feel that women's place is in the home. Where would you place the Democratic party on this scale or haven't you thought much about this? (7-POINT SCALE SHOWN TO R)

1. Women and men should have an equal role
2. - 6.
7. Women's place is in the home

0538 Recently there has been a lot of talk about women's rights. Some people feel that women should have an equal role with men in running business, industry and government. Others feel that women's place is in the home. Where would you place the Republican party on this scale or haven't you thought much about this? (7-POINT SCALE SHOWN TO R)

1. Women and men should have an equal role
2. - 6.
7. Women's place is in the home
1. Closer to Democrats
2. Equidistant
3. Closer to Republicans

V839 Some people think the government should provide fewer services, even in areas such as health and education, in order to reduce spending. Other people feel that it important for the government to provide many more services even if it means an increase in spending. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this? (7-POINT SCALE SHOWN TO R)

1. Government should provide many fewer services: reduce spending a lot.
2. - 6.
7. Government should provide many more services: increase spending a lot.

V541 Some people think the government should provide fewer services, even in areas such as health and education, in order to reduce spending. Other people feel that it important for the government to provide many more services even if it means an increase in spending. Where would you place the Democratic party on this scale? (7-POINT SCALE SHOWN TO R)

1. Government should provide many fewer services: reduce spending a lot.
2. - 6.
7. Government should provide many more services: increase spending a lot.
Some people think the government should provide fewer services, even in areas such as health and education, in order to reduce spending. Other people feel that it important for the government to provide many more services even if it means an increase in spending. Where would you place the Republican party on this scale? (7-POINT SCALE SHOWN TO R)

1. Government should provide many fewer services: reduce spending a lot.

2. - 6.

7. Government should provide many more services: increase spending a lot.

(CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 16; 16.10A, 16.10B)

0316 This is the number of Democratic party 'likes' minus the number of Democratic party 'dislikes' (V314-V315).

-5 Maximum negative

0 Neutral

+5 Maximum positive

0314 Is there anything in particular that you like about the Democratic party? What was that? Anything else?

0. Zero positive mentions (likes)
1. One positive mention (likes)
2. Two positive mentions (likes)
3. Three positive mentions (likes)
4. Four positive mentions (likes)
5. Five positive mentions (likes)

0315 Is there anything in particular that you dislike about the Democratic party? What is that? Anything else?

0. Zero negative mentions (dislikes)
1. One negative mention (dislikes)
2. Two negative mentions (dislikes)
3. Three negative mentions (dislikes)
4. Four negative mentions (dislikes)
5. Five negative mentions (dislikes)
0320 This is the number of Republican party 'likes' minus the number of Republican party 'dislikes' (V318-V319).

-5  Maximum negative

0  Neutral

+5  Maximum positive

0318 Is there anything in particular that you like about the Republican party? What was that? Anything else?

0. Zero positive mentions (likes)
1. One positive mention (likes)
2. Two positive mentions (likes)
3. Three positive mentions (likes)
4. Four positive mentions (likes)
5. Five positive mentions (likes)

0319 Is there anything in particular that you dislike about the Republican party? What is that? Anything else?

0. Zero negative mentions (dislikes)
1. One negative mention (dislikes)
2. Two negative mentions (dislikes)
3. Three negative mentions (dislikes)
4. Four negative mentions (dislikes)
5. Five negative mentions (dislikes)

(CORRESPONDSTO TABLE 17; FIGURES 17.1A, 17.1B)

0322 The net affect toward parties is the difference between two sums: the sum of the Democratic party 'likes' and Republican party 'dislikes' MINUS the sum of Democratic party 'dislikes' and Republican party 'likes': [V314+V319] - [V315+V318], which is the same as: V316-V320.

-10  Maximum Republican

0  Neutral

+10  Maximum Democrat
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strong</th>
<th>Weak</th>
<th>Dem</th>
<th>Ind</th>
<th>Rep</th>
<th>Totals</th>
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<tr>
<td>1 DEM/DEM</td>
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<td>10.9</td>
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<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 REP/DEM</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
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<td>4 REP/REP</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>67.4</td>
<td>70.6</td>
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N = 9861

Significance: .00000

All numbers in percent. These are from the table 'Idiosyncratic Identification and Voting Behavior'.
# Table 2. Presidential Candidates: Traits and Affects

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATES</th>
<th>EXTREMELY WELL</th>
<th>QUITE WELL</th>
<th>NOT TOO WELL</th>
<th>NOT WELL AT ALL</th>
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<tr>
<td>INTELLIGENCE</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>65.6</td>
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<td>7.6</td>
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<td>67.7</td>
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<td>INSPIRING</td>
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<td>63.6</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEM/REP</td>
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<td>63.5</td>
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<td>0.5</td>
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<td>63.7</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
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<td>59.2</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>4.4</td>
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<td>21.9</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>25.4</td>
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Significance .00000  All numbers in percent
Intelligence N = 2080; Inspiring N = 2774;
Knowledgeable N = 2793; Strong Leadership N = 2735
### Table 2. - Continued Presidential Candidates: Traits and Affects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Republican Candidates</th>
<th>Extremely Well</th>
<th>Quite Well</th>
<th>Not Too Well</th>
<th>Not Well At All</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Intelligence</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>46.7</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>10.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEM/DEM</td>
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Knowledgeable N = 2863; Strong Leadership N = 2816
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TABLE 6. NET AFFECT TOWARD MAJOR PARTY PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES
-10 = MAXIMUM REPUBLICAN, 0 = NEUTRAL, +10 = MAXIMUM DEMOCRATIC

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Significance .00000 All numbers in percent
Democratic N = 4153; Republican N = 4258
### TABLE 9. GUARANTEED JOBS/STANDARD OF LIVING -- PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES' RATING ON A 7 - POINT SCALE

1 = GOVERNMENT SHOULD SEE TO JOB AND STANDARD OF LIVING,
2 = GOVERNMENT LET EACH PERSON GET AHEAD ON THEIR OWN

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SIGNIFICANCE .00000  ALL NUMBERS IN PERCENT
DEMOCRATIC N = 3694; REPUBLICAN N = 3757
### Table 10. Women's Equal Role — Presidential Candidates' 7-Point Scale

1 = Women and men should have an equal role, 7 = Women's place is in the home

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Significance .02060 All numbers in percent
Democratic N = 2998; Republican N = 3213
TABLE 11. GOVERNMENT SERVICES AND SPENDING -- PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES' 7-POINT SCALE
1 = GOVERNMENT SHOULD PROVIDE MANY FEWER SERVICES, REDUCE SPENDING A LOT
7 = GOVERNMENT SHOULD PROVIDE MANY MORE SERVICES, INCREASE SPENDING A LOT

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SIGNIFICANCE .00000 ALL NUMBERS IN PERCENT
DEMOCRATIC N = 1739; REPUBLICAN N = 1803
### Table 12. Proximity to Parties: Aid to Minorities

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Significance .00000  All numbers in percent  
N = 4018

### Table 13. Proximity to Parties: Guaranteed Jobs/Standard of Living

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Significance .00000  All numbers in percent  
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TABLE 14. PROXIMITY TO PARTIES: WOMEN'S EQUAL ROLE

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SIGNIFICANCE .00000 ALL NUMBERS IN PERCENT
N = 2943

TABLE 15. PROXIMITY TO PARTIES: GOVERNMENT SERVICES/SPENDING

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**TABLE 16. AFFECT TOWARDS MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES**

-5 = MAXIMUM NEGATIVE, 0 = NEUTRAL, +5 = MAXIMUM POSITIVE

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SIGNIFICANCE .00000  ALL NUMBERS IN PERCENT  N = 9254
APPENDIX III

FIGURES
Figure 1.1A (CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 1; QUESTION 0301)

IDEOLOGICAL IDENTIFICATION

AND VOTING BEHAVIOR

% OF VOTE

1 = STRONG DEM

4 = STRONG REP

2 = DEM/DEM

3 = REP/REP

0 = DEM/REP
Figure 2.10A (Corresponds to Table 2; Question 0350)`
Figure 2.15A (CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 2; QUESTION 0362)
Figure 2.10B (Corresponds to Table 2: Question 0350)
REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES
INTELLIGENCE

Figure 2.15B (CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 2; QUESTION 0362)
Figure 2.20A (CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 2; QUESTION 0353)
Figure 2.20B (Corresponds to Table 2; Question 0353)
Figure 2.25B  (CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 2; QUESTION 0365)
Figure 2.30A  (CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 2; QUESTION 0354)
Figure 2.35A (corresponds to Table 2; Question 0366)
Figure 2.30B (CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 2; QUESTION 0354)
Figure 2.40A (CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 2; QUESTION 0356)
Figure 2.45A  (CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 2; QUESTION 0368)
Figure 2.40B (CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 2; QUESTION 0356)
Figure 3.10A  (CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 3; QUESTION 0401)
Figure 3.15A  (CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 3; QUESTION 0405)
Figure 3.10B (Corresponds to Table 3; Question 0401)

Democratic Presidential Candidates Reason to Vote for

# of Positive Mentions
DEM/REP

% of Vote

70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
0 1 2 3 4 5

Figure 3.10B (Corresponds to Table 3; Question 0401)
Figure 3.15B (corresponds to Table 3; question 0405)
Figure 4.15A (CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 4; QUESTION 0406)
Figure 4.10B (Corresponds to Table 4, Question 0402)
Figure 4.15B (CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 4; QUESTION 0406)
Figure 5.15A  (CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 5; QUESTION 0407)
Figure 6.1A (Corresponds to Table 6; Question 0409)
Figure 6.1B (CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 6; QUESTION 0409)
Figure 7.1A (CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 7; QUESTION 9022)
Figure 7.1B (Corresponds to Table 7; Question 9022)
7-POINT SCALE PLACEMENT OF DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES

% OF VOTE

1 = Government should help 2 = Government should help
3 = Help themselves 4 = Government aid to blacks
5 = Against blacks 6 = Against blacks

Figure 8.10A (Corresponds to Table 8; Question 9084)
Figure 8.15A (Corresponds to Table 8; Question 9092)
7-POINT SCALE PLACEMENT OF
DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES

GOVERNMENT AID TO BLACKS

Democratic Republicans
Democratic

Figure 8.10B (CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 8; QUESTION 9084)
7 - POINT SCALE PLACEMENT OF
REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES

Figure 8.15B (CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 8; QUESTION 9092)
Figure 9.10A (Corresponds to Table 9; Question 9087)

7 - POINT SCALE PLACEMENT OF
DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES

1 = GOVERNMENT SHOULD HIRE 7 = EACH PERSON ON THEIR OWN
3 = GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES 4 = GOVERNMENT
6 = STANDARD OF LIVING

% OF VOTE
Figure 9.15A (Corresponds to Table 9; Question 9095)
7 - POINT SCALE PLACEMENT OF
DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES

% OF VOTE

Figure 9.10B (Corresponds to Table 9; Question 9087)
Figure 9.15B (CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 9; QUESTION 9095)
Figure 10.10A (CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 10; QUESTION 9083)
7 - POINT SCALE PLACEMENT OF REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES

Figure 10.15A (CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 10; QUESTION 9091)
Figure 10.10B (Corresponds to Table 10: Question 9083)

7 -POINT SCALE PLACEMENT OF DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES

% OF VOTE

0 = EQUAL ROLE
3 = IN THE HOME
6 = WOMEN'S EQUAL ROLE
9 = DEM REP
Figure 10.15B (CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 10; QUESTION 9091)
Figure 11.10a (Corresponds to Table 11; Question 9086)
Figure 11.15A (Corresponds to Table 11; Question 9094)
Figure 11.10B (CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 11; QUESTION 9086)
Figure 11.15: (Corresponds to Table 11; Question 9094)
Figure 12.1A (CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 12; QUESTION 0564)
Figure 12.1B (Corresponds to Table 12: Question 0564)
Figure 13.1A (CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 13; QUESTION 0570)
Figure 13.1B (CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 13; QUESTION 0570)
Figure 14.1B (CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 14; QUESTION 0571)
Figure 15.1B (Corresponds to Table 15; Question 0572)
Figure 16.10B (CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 16; QUESTION 0316)
Figure 17.1A (Corresponds to Table 17; Question 0322)
Figure 17.1B  (CORRESPONDS TO TABLE 17; QUESTION 0322)
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Key, Jr., V.O., with the assistance of Milton Cummings. 1968. The Responsible Electorate. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.


