A modern synthesis of faith and reason

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A MODERN SYNTHESIS OF
FAITH AND REASON

by

Ralph Wm. Thomas

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Masters of Arts
in
Ethics and Policy Studies

Department of Ethics and Policy Studies
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
May 1995
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ABSTRACT

Today, modern man is uneasy. The current outcry for ethics in government and in social life reflects a need which has not been met. What distinguishes man as a rational and creative human being are his moral, abstract, artistic, creative, and spiritual ideas. In many instances, such ideas have been declared as meaningless by the 'reasoning' of the natural sciences.

This thesis will develop a modern paradigm that will synthesize subjective values coming from the 'faith' side of rational beings with the objective values obtained from their objective (abstract reasoning) side of themselves.

The paradigm will be illustrated by applying it to the Clark County's Health District Hospice Program for terminal cancer patients and their survivors. A typical case will show the paradigm's practicality for aiding persons to meaningfully participate in the solution and management of significant problems found in their every day lives.

Advisor  Craig Walton, Ph. D.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

SECTION ONE
PURPOSE

The purpose of this thesis to present a modern paradigm in which reason and faith can supplement each other for solving metaphysical issues and for applying those solutions to particular issues concerning ethical choices. The word 'faith' is defined as one's assumption that all the basic assumptions of his/her 'world view' are true. The term 'world view', as used in this presentation, is defined as the sum total of all the basic assumptions a person has concerning both the physical world and the metaphysical world. The term 'reason', unless designated otherwise, will be defined in the classical sense. (See chapter two for a detailed definition.)

Today, modern man is uneasy. The current outcry for ethics in government and in social life reflects a need which has not been met by the expertise of current sciences and technologies. What distinguishes Man as a rational and creative human being certainly includes his moral, abstract, artistic, creative, and spiritual ideas. Nevertheless, such ideas and the values based upon them have, in many instances, been declared meaningless by 'reasoning' as understood by those scientists who are positivistic when dealing with metaphysical issues; they see no reality in God, human freedom, or immortality.
Therefore, this paradigm will be offered for consideration primarily to those modern persons whose current world views have led them to believe there is an irreconcilable conflict between their spiritual selves ('faith') and their rational selves ('reason'). However, many of the concepts and premises proposed can be of ethical value to those persons who do not affirm belief in a supernatural, spiritual God.

The recent explosions of scientific technology and exchanges among associated scientific professions have given mankind much new information about the natural world. Recent publications are now presenting up-to-date, flexible, logical, and practical unifying paradigms in fields such as nuclear physics, evolution, and psychology.

This thesis will consolidate relevant material from these areas as well as material from social science areas and from the latest developments in theology. These concepts will be related to and correlated with older premises to derive a proposed modern unified ethical paradigm. It is designed for all persons who are aware they possess a finite autonomy and are willing to exercise it in situations that come up in their daily activities.

SECTION TWO
REVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN 'REASON' AND 'FAITH' IN THE 20TH CENTURY

The conflict between reason and faith is not a recent development. Through the first third of this century, religious philosophers, such as Lev Shestov,
found no solution to the dilemma. However, from the 1940s onward, developments in natural science (and new basic premises upon which modern science in general is based) have made possible tremendous advances in technology. They have also made possible reasoned alternative world views. Such an alternative is that in which reason and faith can be found to supplement each other in the realm of metaphysical issues.

Unfortunately, it has been only recently that the methodologies of the natural sciences have been recognized not to be the only methodologies applicable to the social sciences. The exactness needed for prediction and control in the physical world calls for as much objectivity as possible. However, relationships between objective facts and values (moral weights given to different solutions to problems concerning human beings and their relationships to each other) are vitally interrelated and must be correlated to a much higher degree than found in the field of natural sciences. These personal relationships need to be critically examined. Representative models can then be designed and utilized in the making of individual, as well as communal, policy decisions.

"Scientific positivism," as it will be used in this thesis, is defined by Peter Angeles's *Dictionary of Philosophy* as:

1. Acceptance of the "Verifiability Principle," which holds that a statement is meaningful if and only if it is empirically verified by sensory experience; 2. If necessary, tenet (1) can be modified to say that a statement is meaningful if and only if it is at least in principle empirically verifiable; 3. All statements in mathematics and logic are necessarily analytic.
(tautologies) and true by definition. Such concepts are not presuppositionally verified but are definitional conventions applied to reality; 4. Scientific method is the only source of correct knowledge of reality; 5. Metaphysical and ethical, religious, aesthetic, and political statements are meaningless because they are not scientifically verifiable. Therefore, there is no way to appeal their truth to experience--"pure being has no characteristics". (1)

The reader should not assume that positivistic views of technical science are now obsolete in today's social sciences. Rosemarie Tong's book, *Ethics in Policy Analysis*, written in 1986, points out that the 'fact versus value' problem is still with us. She found that, until very recently, many social scientists tried adamantly to make their models strictly dependent upon objective facts. The counterparts, value and subjectivity, were conspicuous by their absence. (2)

The underlying hypothesis throughout this thesis is that reason in its totality (of which technical reason is only a part) supplements faith in its search for more knowledge. (See chapter two for a short discussion of reason in its totality [called classical reason, or Logos].)

Readers may or may not be aware that many scientists in the natural sciences abandoned the positivistic world view around 1938. The 'Verification Principle' and the "sense-data" theory were dropped in favor of the 'Falsification Principle' and a working hypothesis known as the 'Statistical Method'. This shift emphasized counter-evidence, probability, or comparative judgments rather than categorical ones.
However, most of the value-oriented sciences, such as psychology, the social sciences, the political sciences, and even some branches of philosophy, have failed or have been slower to make this shift.

The phenomenal success of the natural sciences in the twentieth century enabled mankind to assume greater control of, and make more accurate predictions of, natural phenomena. Such success again renewed faith in the ancient concept that if Man had enough knowledge, he would automatically do the right (moral) things for himself and his fellow man.

However, the cruel and savage acts of Man against his fellow men in World Wars I and II (and since) have destroyed the illusion that human reason and knowledge would bring peace and harmony to those who possessed such knowledge.

This conviction that human reason and knowledge alone would bring peace and harmony was in essence the world view that Lev Shestov fought against with the weapons available to him during the early part of this century.

A brilliant religious philosopher, Shestov revolted against such a pre-determined world view that tried to take away from Man his inclination to a belief in God, and to the belief in freedom given to mankind by the Creator of the universe. Shestov therefore speaks for many in his time whose world view included a God who endowed man with creative power and freedom as well as reason. My interpretation and critique of Shestov's fight (see
chapter two) will be updated by material from both sides of the issue in the remaining chapters of this thesis.

Theoretical answers to the problems encountered by modern man in his daily existence are not practical or meaningful to him. In almost all areas of life, the facts, methods, etc., which a person will accept most readily are those which enable his life experiences to have more practicality and meaning.

Out of man's daily situations arise the problems and the questions to which natural science, philosophy, the arts, the social sciences, and religion attempt to give satisfactory answers. These disciplines and institutions also give methods, tools, etc., that persons can select and utilize to achieve their own answers.

Theological aspects of this thesis will be presented in light of the everyday situations we encounter. The term 'existential', as used in this thesis, will describe any philosophy that centers its analysis upon the reality of an individual who is subjectively conscious of his own failures, successes, hopes, and crises. The relationship of this individual self to the objective reality of the existing external world in which he lives is also part of the analysis.

This philosophy develops questions engendered by our existence on earth. Answers to such questions can be developed out of both atheistic and theistic world views. Further details about theistic answers will be developed in Tillich's theology (see chapter six).

We can now see how important a person's overall
world view of reality becomes. The pure idealistic view (essentialism) is that the essential structure of our being is providentially actualized in the history of man. This view is opposed by those who believe the estrangement and conflicts found in human existence are not reconciled in the individual, in society, or in life in general.

Shestov and other later faith proponents have included in their personal world views a belief in and a free acceptance of a personal supernatural God. This is a God who has given His created human beings the gift of limited finite freedom and immortality of spirit. This move combines some of the strengths of the existentialist view with some of the views of essentialism.

In essentialism, the die is cast--but for each modern rational human being, the existential and ontological questions still remain. What am I? Why am I? What is my purpose and meaning in life? Is there a physical life only? Is there a continuation of my essential and spiritual self after physical death? Why is there something? Why not nothing? Are we partially free and responsible to both decide and act upon moralistic decisions vital to our meaning and purpose in life? The unresolved tensions between these two views are palpable to many.

This thesis will show that modern scientific technology (which has been used so successfully to control and predict the natural environment) cannot intentionally (or even unintentionally) destroy or negate Man's need for a self-realization of freedom. Therefore, a new paradigm
is needed to correlate and correct those other unresolved tensions.

The search for freedom and meaning includes the following process of deliberation. Individually chosen actions based on a given world view are considered. Possible actions flowing from alternative world views are visualized, and the results are causally predicted. A mental comparison of results obtained then indicates which view would be most effective in achieving the results desired. Reflective reasoning will also show that individual autonomy is compromised if irrational inclinations (K1), or unreasonable premises issued by external 'authoritative edicts', are allowed to be the final authority upon which the individual bases his subsequent actions. To be authentic, these authorities must at least be consciously seconded by the moral agent. Such a deliberative process is equally valid when used to formulate actions to be taken to accomplish goals originating from spiritual world views (K3) as well as from the natural scientific world views (K2). (K1), (K2), and (K3) are symbols designating three different modes of knowledge. More explicit explanations will be given in the next section of this chapter (section three).

Numerous examples will be given to illustrate that rational moral actions can be corroborated by reasonable and testable means other than the objective demonstrable and corroborative techniques used mainly by technical sciences.

These other ways of corroboration justify the
inclusion of universally valid moral premises in an individual's total rational input towards obtaining and updating flexible solutions of daily problems. Such solutions have the greatest probability of easing those tensions created by rapidly changing conditions in the world and in one's personal life.

Analysis of modern world view points show that technological advances have not eliminated the striving for meanings, purposes, and goals sought by intelligent human beings. Many human beings are still willing to consider, deliberate upon, and then risk acting on moral and ethical (but still logically reasonable) hypotheses about themselves and the universe.

To logically show the soundness of the above arguments, we can now proceed to the means and methods for establishing our final paradigm. This paradigm is based upon the world view that an Absolute Spiritual Intelligence created the world and designed it to evolve towards an ultimate goal. This goal is one in which each singular entity will be in unity and harmony with all other entities in that universe.

SECTION THREE
METHODS AND PREMISES UTILIZED IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FINAL PARADIGM

The primary basic premises, the methods, and the means by which this thesis will establish its synthesized paradigm are as follows:

A. The scientific method, as a primary means of obtaining conceptual knowledge about reality, will be a common factor in the following three modes
of knowledge indicated in premise (2) below;
(2) All knowledge available to mankind can be
subsumed under one of the following three modes of
knowledge described by St. Bonaventure in the
thirteenth century:
   a. "Sensibilia" (knowledge obtained by sense
observation, or the "eye" of the flesh). This
mode will be identified by the symbol (K1).
   It is a subjective self-knowledge obtained by
the self's sensing, imagining, and perceptions
of sensory experience.
   b. The "eye" of reason, or the "eye" of
"intelligibilia." (This knowledge is otherwise
known as conceptual knowledge, a knowledge
based on empirical information as well as a
priori concepts.) This nomenal mode will be
subsequently represented by the symbol (K2).
   c. The "eye" of spiritual contemplation, or
"transcendelia". This mode of knowledge will
be the means used to reconcile (or at least
establish the possibility of) a working
relationship between 'faith' (K1) and 'reason'
(K2). (3) This mode will be identified by
the symbol (K3).
B. The scientific community seeks to classify,
differentiate, contrast, abstract, and categorize
specific objects. All objects falling into a given
category are to be understood by means of concepts
and the interrelations between combinations of
these generalizations. On such a basis, decisions are made in the realm of the natural world to predict, control, and even change natural objects and their relationships to each other. Consistent or predominant substantiation of these sensory objective experiments results in the establishment of laws for natural science procedures. Errors and counter-evidence lead to revision or replacement of these generalities or concepts. Later parts of this thesis will show the need to maintain such an orderly method in all three modes of knowledge, (K1), (K2), and (K3).

C. To facilitate (in the manner of mathematical symbols x, y, z, etc., and their relationships to each other) the application of the scientific method in short symbolic form, I have chosen to describe the scientific method to the reader as a digging process. I will assign the sentence, "D(1) = Dig," to represent part of the process. Then I will use the sentence "D(2) = Deliberate," to represent the conceptual way of processing universals involved in the problem to be solved. The final decision as to which alternative (putative) generalization to use to solve a given problem (in terms of practicality, efficiency, value, etc.,) will be represented in the rest of this thesis by the sentence, "D(3) = Decide." The execution of the selected method of solution will then be represented by the sentence, "D(4) = Do,"
(carry out actions necessary to achieve a viable solution to the problem). The method of testing and finding potential or actual errors via feedback will be represented by the sentence, "D(5) = Debug." Therefore, any utilization of the scientific method to justify premises (and/or substantiations of them) in support of the thesis's final paradigm will be accomplished by the symbolic use of the five D's. They will stand for the methodology of: (1) Digging; (2) Deliberating; (3) Deciding; (4) Doing; and (5) Debugging.

D. Utilization of the five D's provides us with a common ground and means by which each of the three modes of knowledge (a, b, and c of (2) on page 10) can be corroborated. This practical substantiation is as rationally sound for modes of knowledge concerning autonomous human beings as demonstrable empirical corroboration is sound in the world of 'natural science.' It will be shown that the only difference in the application of the scientific method to all three modes of knowledge is in step five ('D5' = "Debug"). This D5 includes the further steps of substantiating one's final results by checking them against standards set by the given communal group. This group consists of those persons trained in using group-established standard procedures to bring about the goals desired.

E. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's famous theory of the "Identity of the Opposites" can be shown to
be a rationally sound assumption that explains many of the past contradictory problems of physics. Excerpts from recent books (1990, 1992) detailing the latest advances in astronomy and in the areas of nuclear and quantum physics will be presented to corroborate Hegel's dialectical method in general. Such corroboration, in my opinion, lends additional justification for using Hegel's 'Notion' or 'Identity of Opposites' to reconcile 'faith' and 'reason' on a common, universal ground. Hegel's 'Notion' is explained in chapter four. The explanation given has been taken from W. T. Stace's book *The Philosophy of Hegel*. (4) (Excerpts from recent publications on Hegel will be included in chapter four to indicate that the basic concept explicated by Hegel's 'Notion' is not significantly different from that in Stace's explanation.)

F. This thesis will also incorporate certain aspects of Paul Tillich's "Method of Correlation" that illustrate the necessity to relate the contents of the theological message to the daily situations of life. This will be accomplished through the use of analogies between concrete experiences and universals.

These universals relate to what Tillich calls subjects of 'ultimate concern'. This latter term will be defined and elaborated in chapter six. (5) To supplement the above methods and premises, every effort will be made to have as few preconceptions
and presuppositions in the analyses as possible. My purpose is also to recognize any presuppositions that are unavoidable, and to state their possible effect on the interpretations given. A final comment introducing an additional factor in any analysis concerning vital moral concern is expressed by Ian E. Thompson. In his 1981 book, *Being and Meaning*, Thompson gives us an additional insight as to the problems involved when attempting to interpret styles of creative personalities (such as Paul Tillich's.) Thompson's book is a study of Tillich's theory of meaning, truth, and logic.

Thompson tells us:

It is an art as much as a science to "read styles", and it requires religious intuition, on the basis of ultimate concern, to look into the depth of a style, to penetrate to the level where an ultimate concern exercises its driving power. (6)

SECTION FOUR
A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO SUPPLEMENT THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD UTILIZED IN ALL THREE MODES OF RATIONAL KNOWLEDGE

The evaluations used in this thesis will be individually 'zero beat' against the ideas and concepts of various authors (and my own critically considered assumptions and beliefs). The term 'Zero Beat' is described as follows: It is a term which comes from a calibration procedure during which radio transmitters and radio receivers can be tuned to almost exactly the same frequency. When a transmitter, calibrated by a crystal (accurate to the highest degree possible) sends a given
signal, such as 14.2 thousand cycles per second, the receivers are also tuned to receive the same frequency. When the receiving station's meter reading of the frequency is off the sending station's signal by even a few hundred cycles per second, an audible intermediate frequency will be heard by the receiving station personnel. The further off the signal is off frequency, the higher the pitch will be until the signal frequency passes beyond the 16,000 to 18,000 cycles per second that the human ear can detect.

The pitch of the audible sound is used to bring both transmitter and the receivers into exact attunement. This is accomplished by adjustment of the receiving station's tuning dial to read 14.2 thousand cycles per second at the point where the intermediate frequency (or difference between the dial reading and the transmitted signal) has decreased in pitch and frequency until no audible sound is now heard. When this is done, both stations are on exactly (for all practical purposes) the same frequency, or at 'zero beat'.

It is my conviction that (as a visual and audio analogy) the term 'zero beat' may give a better insight as to Hegel's 'Notion' which plays a key part in this thesis. (The reader is asked again to refer to chapter four on Hegel for detailed explanations concerning terms such as the 'second moment' and the 'third moment.') In addition, evaluations used will be individually 'zero beat' against the ideas and concepts of various authors, by my own critically considered assumptions and beliefs,
and against the communal standards of the given mode of knowledge being used. Communal standards are defined as those standards, agreed upon by the consensus of trained peers in that particular mode of knowledge, to be used as a means of corroborating conclusions and final solutions.

We can make use of this analogy from radio communication techniques to visualize part of Hegel's 'Notion' by stating that individual actions (called particulars) may be taken to lead to results that may be compared to the experience of others going through the same actions. All transmitting and receiving stations (except the station designated as the base station) are the 'particulars' which, by 'zero beating,' reconcile their respective differences (as 'others'). They are now integral parts of a basic undifferentiated frequency transmitting and receiving system.

Thus, in the Hegelian 'Notion', all particulars that are apparently opposite (different) from their basic unity ('second moment' of his 'Notion') eventually come together in a common ground with the basic source. This transition from opposition to unity or identity is accomplished in Hegel's 'third moment,' called 'reflective reasoning'. Through this process, particular thoughts (like individual receiving and transmitting stations) continue to be individual thoughts while yet being joined in their commonality (as with the 14.2 thousand cycles per second) to a common source. This source is the original source of the frequency received through 'reflective reasoning' for 'zero beating' to the
original source of being. When this is done, there is now identity or unity with the original source.

Now, all (the original transmitting station and all of the individual receiving stations) can be said to be on the same frequency or, in Hegelian terminology, the 'Identity of the opposites' can be recognized as particulars in unity with the universal.

Science does the above process well when finite, non-free natural world objects follow pre-established laws or patterns essentially based on the principle of cause and effect or correlation. When such laws are followed, demonstrable results can be and are corroborated independently by all users, who thereby constitute a community to support each other by achieving approximately the same results from each of their individual efforts.

The 'zero beat' analogy presented here is, I hope, a helpful means by which a reader not totally familiar with Hegel's technical explanations of his 'Notion' can visualize a practical application of the principle of a communal consensus concerning the common experience of a group of individuals. These individuals have followed a commonly accepted and trained line of actions (using the five D's in the specific area of concern to achieve a common goal). Blind acceptance of 'authority' (or training methods by others) should be avoided by each individual seeking to become a member of this peer group ('unity').

To make the training methods and techniques of the group become a part of one's own personal belief, it is necessary to achieve the illumination of the 'eye of
reason' as proposed by St. Bonaventure. One does this by reflection upon the first two steps of the five D's (Dig, and Deliberate) while judging the lines of action to follow by which the goal desired may be achieved. Then, an individual's critical reasoning used during these steps should be literally grasped by intuitive insight that these actions are the right ones for him/her also. (Refer back again to Ian Thompson’s remarks about the part religious intuition plays to arrive at what Hegel calls 'reflective reasoning,' and to arrive at what St. Bonaventure attributes to the 'eye' of trans-rational reason, or [K3].)

Individual results of actions decided upon and acted upon in the above manner should then be and can be consistently verified by comparing ('zero beating') the individual results with standards previously determined by group consensus. If not too far off the standard, then one can reasonably assume that the individual experiences achieved have been properly verified as conforming to the accepted and valid standard for that mode of knowledge. Should an individual corroboration be too far off from the communal standard, then rechecking and finding the errors causing unacceptable deviations can be corrected. It may be, in special cases, that an individual's experience (in modes of supra-rational knowledge) will such that the new input will be tried by other communal members. The communal standards could then be modified according to the changed dynamics encountered. It is assumed that the original standard adhered to by the peer
group was not predetermined, but selected in a mutual interchange among all participants (all as free receiving and free sending agents). After mutual agreement, that standard could be said to be the locally selected station to act as the net control station (until changed by the mutual consent of the participating stations).

SECTION FIVE
CONCLUDING REMARKS

We can summarize the results of section three on the scientific methods found within the 5 D's by saying that any mode of knowledge must be corroborated by the experiences of others in order to be considered as the most probabilistic correct knowledge at that given time and in those circumstances.

The explanations and analogies in sections three and four have been presented at length because their significance to the syntheses and conclusions drawn from them is so great. One such significant factor is that they serve as necessary means to focus our critical reasoning powers on one of the chief problems of the past. This problem concerns the development of procedures and their use to substantiate the consolidation of reason under one of the three generally accepted modes of knowledge.

The success of working with finite and generally non-free objects and their interactions has led to empirical science's past assumption that sensory experience (stripped as much as possible from subjective bias and pre-conceptions) is the only acceptable form for rational corroboration concerning any mode of knowledge.
It is therefore necessary to show the primary reason why other modes of knowledge, \((K1)\) and \((K3)\), have so long been considered by empirical sciences as not being rationally justified knowledge. That sort of thinking in the past led to the dictum, "All knowledge is conceptual knowledge".

Today, what is the primary reason that some natural scientists use to deny substantiation of any mode of knowledge which includes subjective value factors? It certainly is not that the \((K1)\) and \((K3)\) modes of knowledge are being achieved by unscientific methodologies to arrive at their 'value' types of knowledge. Science's past rejection (and much of its current rejection) has largely been based on its insistence on observing specific and non-deviant rules for obtaining the corroborative evidence necessary to justify highly probabilistic solutions. All \((K2)\) modes of knowledge need virtual certainty or knowledge that is 'exact enough' to meet all practical requirements of it. Other modes of knowledge have been denied meaningfulness and usefulness in their respective areas on the basis of their introducing corroborative (subjective 'values'). These values are not nearly as applicable to the empirical sciences \((K2)\) as they have been found to be when operating within the \((K1)\) and \((K3)\) modes of knowledge.

This author believes that the evidence given so far is sufficient enough to show that the past empirical science's curtailment of other means of corroboration utilized by the \((K1)\) and \((K3)\) modes of knowledge (in conjunction with the corroborative techniques of empirical
science) was unjustifiable.

The same scientific method used to achieve the uniform results of the empirical sciences will be shown to be necessary to insure and corroborate commensurate results in the \( (K_1) \) and \( (K_3) \) modes of knowledge as presented in this thesis. The scientific method (five D's) will be used in all aspects, including the practical everyday utilization of our final paradigm. However, the means of practical and experiential substantiation will not be restricted to (nor be the same as) the objective sensory corroboration which has had such great success in substantiating the results of natural science laws and methodologies.

Insight by our rational minds is needed in each of the modes of knowledge. This insight will first be sought by utilizing the conceptual knowledge called 'understanding.' This form of knowledge is based on the Law of Identity 'A=A' and 'A cannot be equal to Not-A'. Insight will also be sought by application of Hegel's 'Notion' or the 'Identity of the Opposites'.(See chapter four of this thesis for review of Hegel's 'Notion').

The last commonality found in all three modes of knowledge is the communal agreement in each mode as to what standard (to 'zero beat' against) will be used for a comparative substantiation of each individual experience.

Past history corroborates the justification of using communal standards for setting acceptable ranges of deviation. Within this deviation, rational and revelatory ('faith') modes of knowledge will be found to provide
practical and emotionally acceptable structures for a rational, emotional, and judging being to utilize. These structures should allow more freedom for individual adjustments and holistic involvement in those decisions and actions that are vitally important in finding purpose and meaning in those areas of the greatest concern to the individual and to his/her community.

Therefore, this thesis will compare, abstract, evaluate, and synthesize entities examined under the appropriate (K1), (K2), and (K3) modes of knowledge. In all cases, the same rational techniques described previously will be utilized. This procedure to be used is felt to be both necessary and sufficient enough to justify the unified paradigm reached. This paradigm was made by dialectically synthesizing 'faith' and 'reason' on the common ground of a singular unified origin of their respective particularities.

The premises offered by the specific authors interpreted and my evaluations of them are analogous to the accidents, or 'others', in Hegel's 'Notion'.

The overall tradition of discussing implied basic premises and their evolution into explicit premises is analogous to the Hegelian dialectic which originates in an 'Absolute' (undifferentiated basic unity). This basic unity is the first step towards the evolution of Hegel's 'Notion' into a concrete philosophical stance which I will show contains implicitly that undefinable part of our knowledge called 'connatural knowledge'.

'Connatural knowledge' (very briefly defined) is a
form of knowledge that, according to Thomas Aquinas, is an innate knowledge available to rational spiritual human beings. However, it is of such nature that it cannot be conceptualized, nor be put into words.  

Connatural knowledge (the highest level within supra-rational knowledge or K3) will be heuristically correlated with man's reason by utilizing the concepts contained within Hegel's 'third moment' of his 'Identity of Opposites' or the 'Notion.' (see chapter four and chapter five for details on and the justification for this implicit correlation.)

It is anticipated and predicted that this third mode of knowledge will continue to evolve so that man's reason (K3) can see both with and through the eye' of the spirit. In this way, unforeseen vistas which lie ahead may be more comprehensively revealed to mankind. Therefore, the historical development of the spiritual side of the creature called the rational animal may yet qualify to justify Hegel's conviction that religion is, "a continuing elevation of the finite spirit into the infinite (or the Divine Spirit)". 

SECTION SIX
PARADIGM'S PRACTICAL ASPECT IN ETHICS

The structure elaborated upon in the body of this thesis and my main personal application of the concepts found therein will be focused primarily in the area of providing aid to bereaved survivors of terminally ill cancer patients. These concepts will also be a basis for my development of a future guidance model to aid these
survivors. Such survivors are often unable to make ethical decisions and assume or resume responsibility for a meaningful and purposeful life in the absence of the deceased.

An example of how the intended ethical guidance model will be utilized is given in section six of chapter seven in this thesis. I am convinced of the need for some kind of flexible, yet standardized model to be available for those Hospice volunteers who wish to aid the survivors in having procedures to help them make the readjustments necessary to carry out their remaining life in a meaningful, useful, and self-satisfying manner.
NOTES


4. Georg Wilhelm Hegel, *Logic Par. 307*, trans W. T. Stace, cp. 222 of *Philosophy of Hegel* (New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1955) (subsequent references to this work will be cited in the text parenthetically as e.g., *(Hegel, xx)*)


Lev Shestov, author of *Athens and Jerusalem*, was a Russian philosopher who lived from 1894 until 1938. He was recognized by the French and English speaking world as a promoter of existential thought. Shestov was also famed for his challenges to the pretensions of scientific positivism and its basic assumptions—Shestov's passionate spiritual convictions led to his denial of the scientific basic premises of a necessitated regularity (in the sequence of natural phenomena). He also denied the causal necessity assumed to govern the natural world. (1)

Shestov spent his lifetime in rebellion against dogmatism, the half lie, and any form of tyranny. He sought to stir the urge in his readers to learn honesty again. He felt such honesty could only come about when mankind would recognize the falsity of the concept that metaphysical truths arise solely from obedience and passive submission to the structures of being which are given in experience. Shestov sees these structures as contributing factors in formulating a concept known at that time as 'Necessity'. (Shestov, 38)

The terms 'Athens' and 'Jerusalem' will be used by Shestov as representing the terms 'reason' and 'faith' respectively. In some cases, the sense or particular
meanings of 'reason' and 'faith' (as used within a given context) will be seen to be ambiguous (and which interpretation we make in our modern time may or may not be the one Shestov intended us to have). Whenever this occurs, I will elaborate upon the reasons chosen for my particular interpretation in that specific context.

The author moves on by asking us several questions which are 'irritants' to positivist sciences. What are these 'ready made' mental categories and where do they come from? He also asks, why and how do we assure ourselves of their 'truthfulness' and 'reasonableness'? Shestov then puts the finishing touch to this line of questioning by asking the reader, "Are not 'facts' simply a pretext or a screen behind which quite other demands of the spirit are concealed?" (Shestov, 49)

Shestov saw that the critical philosophers ceded truth to be that which 'experience' portrays. However, he does acknowledge that certain philosophers have seen clearly that 'facts' are only basic materials which do not of themselves constitute 'truth'. He declares that these philosophers find it necessary to mold and even transform 'facts'. For example, to help substantiate his own declaration about molding, Paul Tillich, a modern philosophical theologian, states that in the classic sense, "Reason is that structure of the mind that enables it to grasp and shape reality." (2)

Shestov now identifies those selected philosophers who deny that 'facts' are in and of themselves the final and supreme court of judgment--He names Plato, Aristotle,
Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Kant as adhering to the conviction that facts do not solely furnish knowledge or truth. For example, Shestov quotes Kant as confessing:

Experience, which is content to tell us about what it is that it is, but does not tell us that what is "is" necessarily, does not give us knowledge; not only does it not satisfy, it irritates our reason, which avidly aspires to universal and necessary judgments. (Shestov, 52)

For Shestov, the importance of Kant's confession cannot be overemphasized. It shows that fact and experience irritate our reason because they do not give us the knowledge we so strongly desire. At this stage of the treatise, my conviction is that the 'irritant' factor can be attributed to the failure of fact and experience to surrender information that would enhance the ability of 'knowledge' and 'reason' to do a more effective job of aiding man to control his world.

Shestov asserts:

Only the knowledge which we never succeed in finding either in the 'facts' or in 'experience' is that which reason, our better part, seeks with all its powers. (Shestov, 49)

Shestov thinks the readers should be asking themselves the following questions:

(1) "How is critical philosophy distinguished from the dogmatic?" His partial answer is to recall for us a significant conflict that he claims the historians neglect. This conflict was between Descartes and Leibniz. Descartes took a firm stand on his conviction that:

Eternal truths do not exist from all Eternity and by their own will, as their eternity would require, but that they were created by God in the same way that He created all that possesses any real or ideal being. (Shestov, 49)
Leibniz was indignant and considered Descartes' declaration to be absurd. The reader is now asked to consider the question that would follow if Descartes is 'right' about Eternal truths not being autonomous, but dependent upon the will of the Creator.

(2) This crucial question is, "How would philosophy be possible?" or "How (in general) would 'truth' be possible?" Shestov recalls for us the two principles which Leibniz used in his search for 'truth'--the principle of contradiction, and the principle of sufficient reason. Descartes questioned the reliability of the principles for 'reasonable' proof upon which Leibniz later relied. Without these two principles as reliable presuppositions, the resultant proof is an illusory one according to Shestov. He saw this as leaving Leibniz with no stand but an indignant one. ('Indignant' can be interpreted as similar in use to Kant's use of the word 'irritant' when faced with the conflict between 'knowledge' and 'belief').

Our Russian philosopher continues to badger our 'reasoning' by asking us, "Are we obligated to flatter all of reason's desires and forbidden to 'irritate' them? Should not 'reason' be forced to satisfy us and avoid in any way stimulating our 'irritations'?" (Shestov, 51) Maybe we still use 'reason' by means of 'rationalization' to satisfy us (and thus quell our 'irritations').

To flatter reason (and to ask it to avoid irritating us) is a solution that does not fulfill the honesty that Shestov asserts is necessary to break the
bonds of 'Necessity' which 'reason' has imposed upon us. He finds no evidence that any of the critical philosophers (or pre-critical philosophers whom he mentions) asked such questions of reason.

Shestov thinks that all of the philosophers he mentions are passionate seekers of universal and necessary truths. He finds these men as being convinced that universal and necessary truths are the only things worthy of being called 'knowledge'. He found them to be convinced not only of the worthiness and need for such 'knowledge', but that it is the only source of truth. Shestov then quotes Leibniz as proclaiming:

Eternal truths are not content to constrain, but do more: they persuade.

Shestov concludes that the others were also persuaded by 'reason' alone to accept such 'knowledge' without question. They did so because they believed they could not (and therefore should not try to) escape from such immutable and eternal truths.

We can understand Shestov's difficulty in accepting 'knowledge' as being an 'eternal truth' when such acceptance is based upon meeting the condition that a knowledge statement can be demonstrably proven by scientifically accepted methods of corroboration. Only the mode of knowledge we have identified in the introduction as (K2) meets such criteria for demonstrable corroboration.

Up until now, we can view the material Shestov has covered as belonging under the term 'Athens'. To show us the incompatibility of such reason to the views held by
a man of faith, he presents the 'Jerusalem' side of modern man in the following section.

SECTION TWO
JERUSALEM

Shestov now presents basic concepts he understands to be pertinent to the man of 'faith'. He sees each of us as seekers of evidence needed to justify our own personal beliefs and our understanding of ourselves and our external world.

Shestov leads off into the 'Jerusalem' (or 'faith') concepts by reminding the reader of Kant's attitude towards three metaphysical problems—God, free will, and immortality of the human soul. Shestov finds the conclusion of the Kantian evaluation (that the three metaphysical problems are not demonstrable) very easy for a spiritual soul to accept. Then he quotes Kant's response to Kant's own findings, "I had to renounce knowledge (Wissen) in order to make room for faith (Glauben)."

Shestov now presents us with Kant's own view about his renouncement:

It is a scandal for philosophy and human reason that mankind must accept the existence of things outside ourselves merely on faith. (Shestov, 53)

Shestov takes very seriously Kant's remarks about our incapability of giving ourselves proof for the existence of things outside of ourselves—proof sufficient enough to remove all doubt.

Staying only with the information Shestov has presented to this point, I interpret his next few assertions as being crucial to achieve the purpose of his
book, namely, to give the reader hope, and to enable one to not be misled by misuse of the power of non-spiritual and impersonal truths. He is convinced that knowledge, as it has heretofore been used by mankind, has transformed real truths into non-representative nonspiritual and impersonal truths. He feels we should not view the impossibility of proving God's reality, our free will, or the immortality of our souls, as being repugnant for human reason. Shestov holds that we can be content to accept these three metaphysical truths on faith alone.

However, this thesis will demonstrate in later chapters that human 'reason' does not have to be cut out of the world view held by those possessing a religious 'faith'. It will be shown that we do have other reasonable means of affirming an individual's freely accepted 'faith'. Such a faith cannot, by its individual nature, be corroborated by the same techniques natural science utilizes to insure its tremendous success to control objects in the finite nature world. These other 'substantiating' methods as support for 'faith' actions have been suggested in chapter one—they allow for individual deviations based on subjective inclinations and sensual experiences. In spite of such deviations, they are means of obtaining rationally reasonable affirmations of intellectual inquiries and their structural solutions when put into action to accomplish goals based on a rational 'faith' content. We can individually utilize these other reasonable 'corroboration' techniques to affirm (with virtual certainty) our individual actions and
thoughts in trying to reach spiritual and moral goals in our own every day life experiences.

Getting back to Shestov (who did not have the knowledge we now possess), we find him asking us to go along with Kant's conclusion that we must accept the reality of things outside of ourselves merely on 'faith'. (Modern spiritual views of what is meant by 'faith' will be elaborated upon in later chapters of this thesis.) However, to give us a better insight of Shestov's early grasp of what is currently proposed in some theological circles, we can quote one modern spiritual view of what is meant by 'faith'. Schubert Ogden's book On Theology (which was published in 1986) gives us this definition of faith:

Faith is fundamentally to accept one's life and its setting, and to adjust oneself to them in a self conscious way. (3)

For the present, I believe that a reader can see that this modern definition incorporates both truths—the inner subjective and non-demonstrable relationships to both inner concepts and entities outside of oneself, and adjustment to the external existence of objects and events in the physical world.

After deliberating upon the evidence for both 'faith' and 'reason', Shestov concludes both need postulates—postulates which by their nature are of faith. He tells us that the scandal of philosophers (at not knowing that things exist outside of themselves) is misplaced—that scandal should be felt in attempting the impossibility of proving the existence of God!
Shestov thereforeblames 'reason' as the culprit who desires necessity and universality. The quest for necessity and universality irritated reason which could not assimilate these questions honestly, but had to call them absurd to avoid thinking about them.

Shestov could have used 'reason' in place of the word 'thinking' in the preceding sentence. Many people use the terms reason and thinking interchangeably, but a real difference can be (and I believe should be) made between them. I would like to point out this drastic difference by first quoting Martin Heidegger. He states:

Thinking only begins at the point where reason, glorified for centuries, is recognized as thinking's greatest adversary. (4)

In addition, Paul Tillich's distinction between 'reason' and what Heidegger calls 'thinking' should clarify the issue for Shestov's readers. As a distinction, we can view 'reason' (as it appears to be used by both science and Shestov) as that which Paul Tillich calls technical reason. Tillich makes a distinction between this type of technical reason (which he sees as serving as a means to an end) as opposed to the concept of classical reason.

Tillich tells us that classical reason is, "a structure of the mind which enables it to grasp and shape reality". (Tillich I, 72) Such reason, according to Tillich, is effective in cognitive, esthetic, practical, and technical functions of the human mind. Tillich sees this as being an ontological concept of reason.

However, Tillich finds that the classical concept
of reason is often replaced by a technical concept of reason which tends to reduce reason to a technical capacity (or methodology) for 'reasoning'. He explains that reason (in its classical sense) determines primarily the ends, while secondarily performing the function of obtaining means to the ends.

Tillich realizes (and I believe that this is also Shestov's conviction) that scientific reasoning should not be used to determine the end as well as the means. Technical reason (K2) should, according to Tillich, be willing to accept its ends from elsewhere. He finds no danger in this situation so long as technical 'reason' is willing to fulfill the demands of ontological 'reason' ([K1], [K2], [K3], and combinations of them).

(Tillich I, 73)

The above distinction is a crucial one and will allow the major premise of this thesis to be a plausible alternative to Shestov's conclusion that Athens and Jerusalem cannot be reconciled. (The following chapters are placed in their respective order to progressively construct the logical structure of the thesis's final paradigm--one that amalgamates the latest human knowledge in the areas currently considered under the terms 'reason' and 'faith'.)

Shestov realizes that the 'Necessity which not only constrains, but persuades' cannot have a God that lies out of reason's ability to comprehend--the existence of such a God would prevent reason's capability to obtain full knowledge.
Such thoughts on the gap between 'reason' and 'faith' (already expressed by him) led Shestov to believe that they contributed to what he sees as failure on the part of Kant's Critiques to shake the foundations upon which European philosophers based their investigative thoughts.

Shestov starts out the last part of his Foreword by informing the reader that Spinoza's fundamental ideas were accepted and assimilated by critical philosophy. Shestov believed such ideas led to the formulation of a Law of Necessity. This necessity (which determines the order and structure of being) does not constrain, but persuades reason to accept that man is determined.

I interpret Shestov as being convinced that if anyone accepts and sees life under the Spinozan concept of 'Necessity', then the greatest good for man is man's ability to understand this law. It logically follows (if these premises are accepted as being true) that one can search for the determinate causes, understand them, and in contemplation of these eternal necessities, find man's highest joy. (I encourage the reader at this point, to ponder over one's own existential response to this declaration of the 'highest joy' of man.)

Shestov's own response to such a declaration is immediate. He asks the reader to grasp what Shestov claims the critical philosophers holding the above view overlooked. He explains that this oversight was due to the fact that man needs a special and strong foundation if man is to occupy a special place in the physical world.
Shestov claims this foundation can only lie in the belief in a Supreme Being—the very same Supreme Being which he feels these critical philosophers have denied as ever existing. He sees them as striving to convince themselves that the destiny and meaning of Man's existence can only be achieved through pure intelligere. (Shestov, 57)

As one might anticipate, Shestov lays most of the blame for this upon Spinoza. He finds Spinoza rejecting any concept of the biblical deity. Shestov believes Spinoza's reasoning leads to a rejection of one's possessing an immortal soul. He states that the proof of critical philosophy for such a conclusion is that an eternal truth tells man, "Everything that has a beginning has also an end". (Shestov, 58) Shestov tells us that the man of 'reason alone' will accept this, but the man of faith is not persuaded by this supposed 'truth'.

Whether or not Spinoza is well characterized by him, Shestov's presentation clearly shows the conflicting view of life that prevailed between certain rationalist philosophers and the biblical man of faith. He concludes that the enlightened thinkers arrive at their conclusion that eternal truths not only constrain, but persuade, and inspire those who succeed in acquiring them. Shestov quickly points out that to accept this viewpoint, one must give up those aspects of man associated with weeping, laughter, cursing, and other human emotions. He flatly states that these human emotions and feelings (as a part of human thought) are left completely out of consideration by the speculative thought of those led by 'reason alone'. 
Again, the reader should realize the difficulty some of Shestov's terminology is (or will be) causing. It should now be clear that 'reason' (as Shestov uses the term) is only a part of what he believes the term human thought to stand for. This distinction (and its ramifications for us) is very important, and will developed throughout the remaining chapters.

He continues by showing us how easy it is to rationalize one's conclusion (based upon the acceptance of the assumption that the world is governed by 'Necessity') that mankind needs to strive for autonomous ethics—ethics which are fitting for the autonomous laws of being.

(Shestov, 59) He adds to this concept with his comments about the 'Ancients'. He understands that the Ancients recognized man as being only one of the links of the phenomena found in the physical world. He sees this concept as one which constrains and persuades man that the 'Necessity' of the physical world (and its natural laws) is all there is.

The author of Athens and Jerusalem now asks his readers to consider a question he felt was not asked by those philosophers who believed that 'eternal truths' not only constrain, but also persuade. He asks us, "Do we know what is essential in our relationship to 'eternal truths'?" He then puts the question in another way—-if the 'truth' which constrains us does not succeed in persuading us, does it thereby lose its status as 'truth'?

To provide a background on this question, Shestov points out that early philosophers were considered to be
constrained by 'truth' itself. However, Aristotle after making such a statement added that, "Necessity does not allow itself to be persuaded". Shestov interprets Aristotle's comments as implicitly allowing the constraining 'truth' to persuade also. (Shestov, 60)

I believe that at this point of Shestov's presentation, one must interpret for oneself what Shestov meant by bringing in Aristotle's reluctance to accept what appears to be so true--that "Necessity does not allow itself to be persuaded." My interpretation is that Shestov used this to justify the need to make a definite distinction as to the usage of the term 'persuade' as it is used with the term 'Necessity' and with the term 'Eternal truths'.

Shestov firmly believes that the use of the term persuasion and Spinoza's "vera contemplatione gaudere" are hidden substitutes for the natural emotions and feelings of the biblical man. He feels that these critical philosophers of his time are still trying to convince all men that their type of philosophical truths are ones that have the gift of persuading all men. They see this kind of truth as being the only type of truth that 'reason' will recognize as being true 'knowledge'.

Shestov perceives that the reason no limits were placed upon the pretensions of these critical philosophers was that they failed to see that 'truths' are only true for those whom they persuade.

He now summarizes his above thoughts on persuasion by giving what he calls a concrete example of the
fundamental difference between Hellenist thought and Biblical thought. Shestov claims that when the Psalmist (or any spiritually seeking individual) cries out to God in heart felt prayer, the supplicant's thoughts and truths he receives are not only connected to the facts given in the experience, but are certainties of truths based on something to which the given in experience finds itself subordinate. By this example, Shestov attempts to show us that 'facts' about the material world of necessity can have a beginning and therefore an end. However, Man (by having a dual relationship with that which underlies himself and the 'facts' of the physical world) is therefore spiritually excluded from having an absolute ending.

When critical philosophy denies the possibility of Shestov's above example, I believe Shestov has given the open minded bystander to this scenario an insight into the man of 'reason alone'. We, as objective bystanders, can see how the man of reason alone must let 'Necessity' guarantee any facts (created by 'Necessity') to be 'eternal truths'. While this appears to let the man of reason alone acquire only that 'knowledge' which is true 'knowledge', we bystanders should be able to see that this sort of 'knowledge' is limited to the forever immutable. We can see (and hopefully empathize) that the view point of the man of reason alone is to understand that comprehension of 'true knowledge' is the ultimate happiness. (Shestov, 62)

This above view does not consider the content
of such knowledge, but finds that contemplation of such eternal necessity is the greatest good for mankind. (For those familiar with the atheistic existentialists, one finds they are in almost complete accordance with this way of accepting and adjusting oneself to the reality of life.)

Shestov finishes his above lines of thought by reminding us that the more men were preoccupied with denying the authority of the Bible, the less they tried to account for its contents.

Shestov now seeks to justify his contention that critical philosophy's great error was failure to examine the unstated assumptions they had which provided the certainty of their concept of what constituted 'true knowledge'. To do this, he calls upon some of the thinkers in Medieval philosophy. In regard as to how some of these Medieval philosophers subjected the words of Scripture to their reasoning powers, Shestov quotes Duns Scotus,

*I believe Lord what your great prophets said, but if it be possible, make me understand it.*

He uses the above example to illustrate his own belief about most (if not all) of the critical philosophers. He thinks they failed to seek, in Biblical lore, an evaluation of the knowledge which pure reason brings to man. For example, Shestov tells us that when Scotus hears the words, "Rise, take up your bed and go ", he replies, "give me my crutches that I may have something upon which to lean".

*I understand Shestov as comprehending the assistance needed by Scotus was knowledge that is obtained*
by pure reason alone. Shestov now wants his readers to ask themselves if they also believe that knowledge by pure reason is above faith, and that such a conviction is believed as an 'eternal truth'. Shestov then quotes Leibniz's answering words about the priority of reason over faith, "It not only constrains, but also persuades". (Shestov, 64)

Such a concept of knowledge is seen by our author to have not only seduced the first man, but since that time, the fruits of the tree of knowledge became the source of philosophy for all time. He pursues this issue by elucidating that the constraining truths of knowledge subdue and persuade men while the free truth of revelation (which does not seek 'sufficient' reason) 'irritates' men just as 'experience' irritates them. (Shestov, 65)

Now, can we see it as possible that the critical philosophy's 'Eternal truth' about pure reason is itself a presupposed truth that not only constrains, but also falsely persuades those who have been seduced by it? Our Russian philosopher, in my opinion, is right when he sees the 'Eternal truth' (in which reason sees that knowledge [K2] is above faith) is itself a form of truth that not only constrains reason, but also persuades reason that it has obtained 'true knowledge'. (The reader is asked at this point to temporarily refrain from taking sides on the issue.) I strongly feel that Shestov would not have been so adamant in his challenge to the place of reason had he not been posing the problem as an either-or one. No consideration of Hegel's 'Notion' and its impact on the
concepts of what constitutes human freedom was indicated in Shestov's book. (See chapter four on Hegel's 'Identity of Opposites' for the view that there is no such a thing [as an either/or] when considering elements that are polarities—for example, finite versus infinite and one versus many.)

SECTION THREE
CONCLUDING REMARKS

I found Shestov's last few convictions as being the crux of his whole book. He believes it is possible that such knowledge (as that obtained by pure reason alone) will inevitably lead to the injunction 'one will die'—die, if one accepts as 'Eternal truths' those premises obtained by 'reason alone'.

At this juncture, the inquisitive reader will discern the difficulty Shestov had when we consider our own individual interpretations of what is meant by the terms 'faith' and 'knowledge'. I perceive Shestov as being convinced that the 'knowledge' which is above 'faith' (and thus a truth that constrains as it also persuades) is not an 'eternal truth'. Nevertheless, he comprehends it as a concept which does constrain and subdue necessarily—therefore he feels it limits or eliminates the truths of revelation.

This chapter has attempted to show that this early nineteenth century division between one's 'faith' and ones 'reason' is one that we will still find existing with modern human beings today. Modern technology and 'technical reason' (K2) have been projected as giving man
self-made answers to all problems including spiritual and moral ones. It is the purpose of this thesis to illustrate (in the following chapters) conceptual tools that each person can utilize to achieve more effectiveness in becoming the autonomous, spiritual, and rational beings they desire to be.

Shestov believes that a person must be in the world, as well as beyond it, in order to obtain the primordial freedom he maintains was lost in the mythical Fall. He perceives 'reason' (in the form of a necessity) has eliminated the side of man that laughs, weeps, laments, etc.—a side that is so readily found in the life of the biblical man of faith.

We can easily interpret Shestov as seeking to drive all of us to critically examine the basic unexpressed assumptions—assumptions that are utilized to substantiate the certainty of premises 'reason' asserts are 'eternal truths and are self evident. Kant, in chapter three, will critically examine how these two opposing views (subjective faith as freedom and objective reason as finite necessity) can be combined in a single relationship within us. Hegel, in chapter four, will progress beyond Kant's advancements. Through Hegel's concept of the 'Identity of the Opposites', the human being (as a finite and spiritual particular) is connected with the universal source of all being—a source which Hegel will present to us as a 'Divine Inclusive Subjectivity'. Paul Tillich, in chapter six, will go beyond the Hegelian concept of pure reason in its speculative and idealistic form. Tillich
will present to us that (in both the subjective and objective aspects of human reason) distortions occur that cause reason to search for what the world calls 'revelation'. He will show us that through 'revelation' (K3), a progressive unity can be obtained between subjective reason and objective reason--his amalgamation of the two is called 'theonomy'. In each of these succeeding chapters, a progressive development of both the structure and the content found within 'faith' and 'reason' concepts should be able to be either implicitly or explicitly identified by the reader.

I believe that a thoughtful reader can, by temporarily accepting the insights given by Shestov so far, understand why he fought those seeking to establish true knowledge through reason alone. Why should the critical examination of all else under the critical eye of 'Necessity' philosophy exclude the same critical examination--examination of the basic assumptions of 'reason' alone about the certainty of its unnamed source of self evident truths that 'reason' alone found to be 'eternal truths'?

In contrast to the Hellenist world viewpoint, Shestov tells us that to find God, man must tear away from the seduction of reason. When man does so, Shestov passionately believes that the believer (by 'faith') will be able to receive 'faith' truths (or what are called biblical revelatory truths). He is convinced such revelatory truths (K3) are necessary to transfigure reality into a return to original freedom. (Shestov, 70)
Therefore, I understand Shestov's overall intent as being one to convince his readers to be open to all of the evidences within and without oneself. I comprehend him as feeling that anyone who does this will find himself to be a fallen creature needing help. If a person openly and truthfully seeks the wisdom, love, and help of a Universal Divine Being, then all that is needed for his/her finite spiritual growth towards infinite spirit will be available to him/her. (Biblical sources for reasonable corroborations of this interpretation are numerous. See End Note 5 for two specific examples.)

The 5 D's within the appropriate mode of knowledge (K1, K2, and K3), were only implicitly utilized in this chapter. The remainder of the thesis establishes criteria for our use in arriving at the best solutions and their application of both 'faith' and 'reason' concepts towards solving the real problems that arise in our everyday lives.

All readers are encouraged to experiment with the 'tools' presented in the Introduction. Through application of this logical approach, the reader may 'test' the method's practicality by a progressive recycling back to previous chapters found in this thesis when an 'opposite' cannot be reconciled in the reader's own judgment. Based on evolving or new concepts spontaneously appearing in one's thinking, such a recycling should dialectically narrow any remaining gap one may perceive between the originally conflicting world views held by 'faith' and by 'reason'--such a gap has heretofore prevented many
rational individuals from obtaining an integrated self-will that is essential to achieve greater harmony (in spite of existential distortions) within him/her-self. Once such unity is being progressively achieved within, then such integration can be extended to other persons—also to the natural world, and to the 'Creative Originator of all Being' (or that which is the ground of all Being and called by many by the name of 'GOD').
NOTES

1. Lev Shestov, *Athens and Jerusalem*, (Athens Ohio: University Press, 1966), 19. Subsequent references to this work will be cited in the text parenthetically as, e.g., (Shestov, 19)

2. Paul Tillich, *Systematic Theology*, Vol I, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 72. Subsequent references to this work will be cited in the text parenthetically as e.g., (Tillich I, 72)


5. Two Biblical examples corroborating the fruits of intentional unity with the ground of Being-Itself (GOD) are; (1) *N.T. Matt 6: 33* where we are told, "Seek ye first the Kingdom of God and all that you need will be given to you"; and (2) *N.T. II Timothy 1: 7* where it is stated, "God does not give us a Spirit of Fear, but He gives us a Spirit of Love, a Spirit of Power, and a Spirit of a sound mind".
CHAPTER 3

KANT

The opinion of many philosophers in the past and during modern times is that Immanuel Kant's ethical treatise, *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, is one of the most important ethical treatises ever written. Published in 1785, this book is an argument for axioms which could be used in erecting a general structure of moral freedom. This general structure is one that the world needed and still needs as a basis for greater unification among individuals (and between the civil communities of human agents). (1)

This chapter will therefore attempt to summarize Kant's main premises in a continuous synthesis of interpretation, explanation, and substantiation of his premises by consideration of his own and other philosophers' views.

Three main premises are presented in his treatise. Section one of this chapter will develop his first premise (the concept of duty concerning morality). Section two will summarize Kant's second premise (the autonomy of the human will.) Section three will give Kant's third premise (the concept of human freedom), a concept by which Kant's "Categorical Imperative" becomes possible--possible for a mortal and imperfect human will to recognize the oughtness of his sensible self to obey, and the capacity of his reason freely to give such an obeyable law to itself.
The purpose of such an approach is to give the reader unfamiliar with Kant's treatise a basic grasp of his concepts—concepts that may be utilized to reevaluate the reader's world view in which 'faith' and 'reason' are not in cooperative unity with each other.

Kant gives an invaluable contribution to each rational being seeking to be real, alive, and whole as a person—a whole person being defined as one who has relatively unified the emotional, rational, and judgmental aspects of his human and spiritual nature.

Kant's *Foundations* focuses on his famous statement that, "There is nothing in or out of the world that is absolutely good except a good will". (*Kant FMM*, 9) This chapter will interpret and comment on Kant's teachings as he reasons how such an absolute premise is possible. He will show us that if we dwell upon his 'Categorical Imperative', we can see it is possible and we can intuitively comprehend what it means. Kant is convinced that an autonomous person will freely acknowledge the 'Categorical Imperative' as an unconditional universal, and that one's own moral 'maxim' should be in accord with it.

According to Kant, there is only one moral 'Categorical Imperative' which is, "Act only according to that 'maxim' by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law." (*Kant FMM*, 18)

The term 'maxim' was defined in Kant's treatise, but it is a very short and generalized definition given in section one. There, Kant stated that "A maxim is the
subjective principle of volition". (Kant FMM, 17) He follows this definition by explaining that the objective principle of volition is the practical law—a law which would be a practical principle to all rational beings subjectively as well (if full power over desires and inclinations could be accomplished by reason).

It therefore appears that a personal 'maxim' could be viewed as a principle or moral rule of self-conduct decided upon by one's will to guide actions taken to achieve the intent (final choice) of the will to be morally good.

Natural philosophy (dealing with the natural world and definite objects in it) was concerned with basic principles and laws the natural world was subject to. Kant saw however, that for the finite rational human being, these basic laws and principles are obtained from either laws of nature, or laws of freedom.

He saw natural philosophy concerned with the laws concerning physics of natural man. He saw moral philosophy as being concerned with moral laws from which a free will could obtain the influence necessary to decide upon what personal 'maxim' one ought to have (if it was to be in accordance with a universal moral maxim).

Such moral laws, according to Kant, need a person's power of judgment (aided by experience) to make decisions as to which cases the laws are applicable. In addition, the laws need one's judgment in order to get access to the decision process. (Kant FMM, 5)

The reader is led to see that a metaphysics of
morals is absolutely necessary for practical reason to speculate on the unseen source of the principles achieved through a priori reason. We can also see that without guides and norms that are absolutely universal and binding, our human morals are open to error and corruption.

His metaphysical foundations were built upon the premise that a personal 'maxim' which conforms to the moral law is not necessarily 'morally good', unless it conforms for the sake of the law. Such conformity, according to Kant, is done out of duty (or obligation) to the universal moral law out of respect for it.

Kant surely realized that persons possessing a common knowledge would feel more comfortable with a conception of a universal moral law that can rest on testimony of its truth through one's own experience of living. In addition, he was fighting a philosophical climate that was deterministic in nature concerning natural man in the natural world. We will therefore find him starting to establish his foundation principles of morality by literally proving, by common experience, that man does find himself doing actions that he feels he must do, but does not really want to nor understand why he does them.

Inclinations and desire do not enter into such necessitated but undesired action and therefore are incapable of explaining why he responds to a demand he does not want to do. However, Kant believes there is a rational explanation for this demand. He therefore
analytically proceeds from this commonly experienced phenomenon to eventually arrive at a rational determination of an absolute and universally binding moral law (via section two) that supplies the explanation for doing one's duty in regard to the moral law. Kant then (via section three) synthetically derives step by step the return from sources of the universal moral law and its principles to its practical application in everyday moral life experiences.

SECTION ONE
PRACTICAL REASON, AND DUTY OF OBEDIENCE TO MORAL LAW

The first section of Kant's treatise starts with his famous statement, "There is nothing in or out of the world that is absolutely good except a good will." (Kant FMM, 9) We can interpret Kant as recognizing man is subject to the negation of a good will through distortion of fundamental principles needed for the will to intend to be morally good. Kant sees reason as a faculty of the mind whose proper function is to influence the will. He sees reason's function as being first, the means by which a will becomes aware of the 'Categorical Imperative'. Secondly, Kant finds reason creatively influencing the will to freely establish its 'maxim' so that it is in accordance with the 'Categorical Imperative'. Kant does not see that use of reason which justifies the natural means to happiness (inclinations) as being a morally worthy use of reason. These latter uses are 'Hypothetical Imperatives.'

Many people today still believe that man has yet to
rationally communicate to others (and to himself) the essence of an intelligible justification for one's inner sense of duty. Kant tells us this duty or oughtness comes from man's 'common sense of morality'. He does not go into detail, but it is supposedly a knowledge able to be held by all rational creatures. An illustration from the Biblical literature can indirectly aid us in our comprehension of it. King David looks upon a beautiful woman called Bathsheba who is the wife of one of King David's soldiers named Uriah. David desires her and takes it upon himself to call her to court during Uriah's absence and gets her pregnant. Unwilling to face Uriah with this breach of morality, David tries but fails to pass the cause of pregnancy to Uriah. He solves the problem by putting Uriah in the front rank in battle and getting him killed. Inclinations and desire crowded out any moral law obligations in David's mind.

How to tell David of his immorality was a problem for Nathan (the priest). So he told David a story of a very wealthy rich man with many sheep and lambs. Upon the arrival of a guest, the rich man does not want to use one of his own lambs for a feast, so he steals the only lamb of a poor neighbor and uses it to give a feast to his guest. David was indignant, he said that such a person should be punished severely. He asked Nathan, "Let me know who he was". David was then told, "King David, thou art the man." David could not rationally avoid what he previously disregarded, and therefore repented of his act. However, Nathan told him that his violation of God's moral
law would result in the death of one of David's sons. (2)

We can see from this story how much easier it is to objectively condemn the other person for failure to perform his/her duty to a law one does not really desire to obey as a duty to it. David condemned the first injustice, so could not excuse the second, his own! When posed as a universal law for all others, one (disregarding impulses from non-moral inclinations and desires) can innately know, without knowing the reason why, that such a call to obey is an obligatory one for every rational being.

Yet, many people today are still so impressed by the empirical authority of modern science that they do not see how often in their own daily lives that they do things they do not wish to do, and that these necessitated actions cannot be explained by the cause and effect methods of the empirical sciences. In such cases, relying upon empirical science and not inquiring deeper into such unexplainable actions that most persons have actually experienced themselves, there is some justification for this general belief—that man has yet to rationally communicate to others (and to himself) the essence of an intelligible justification for one's inner sense of duty.

Kant sets forth the argument that if the universal impulse to happiness did not determine a person's will, there would still be a necessary law that the person ought to seek his happiness from duty only. In this way, his conduct would then possess true moral worth. (Kant FMM, 15) However, even though duty be opposed by natural
impulses, Kant believes the love commanded by Scripture can be equated with beneficence from duty (which can be considered as the practical love residing in the good will). (Kant FMM, 16)

He also believes that such practical love can be commanded and rooted in three principles of action: (1) Action must be done from duty for it to have moral worth; (2) The moral worth of (1) is in the maxim by which it is determined, and not in the purpose which is to be achieved through such duty-bound action. From his analysis of the first two principles of action, he concludes that the purposes we have for our actions and their effects as ends (as individual purposes) are incapable of giving any unconditional moral worth. Therefore he arrives at the third principle; (3) Duty is the necessity of an action carried out from respect for the law. (Kant FMM, 16)

Our moral philosopher sees the law as something to respect. Only a universal and necessary moral law that is unconditionally binding upon all moral persons is worthy of such respect. It must also be recognized and treated as a command also. (Kant FMM, 18)

At this point of section one, we can review and correlate the material presented so far by applying the concepts given to one's own experiences in the moral realm. We can mentally create a moral situation and then apply the five D's to these concepts. During the reflective and contemplative mental review, one 'D' at a time is applied. In this manner, one can see if self
insight is aware of its sense of the rightness or wrongness of each stage of action taken up to and including the final one. The anticipated results can then be mentally compared with one's peer group's range of acceptability of what constitutes a moral person, or a moral act. (It is assumed that the peer group uses the concepts of the 'Categorical Imperative' as they have been disclosed at this stage of Kant's development of it).

In his analysis of the moral law to the concept of the autonomy of the human will, Kant's logic makes its appeal to common human reason through consideration of how we find ourselves actually responding when we find ourselves in this situation. First, our internal feelings tend to strongly resist those commands of duty based on respect without regard to desire or inclinations. Reason does not seem to seek consensus by a compromise with the needs of the inclinations. Are the duties too strict for man? Is a compromise with inclinations a corruption and destruction of what duty is really about?

Our common knowledge has a need to go into practical philosophy to find the source and determination of the laws of duty. Why? Because duty demands are opposed by man's natural inclinations that seduce common reason with the promise of happiness. This opposition can cause a temptation to compromise the strict demand of duty itself.

Practical common sense recognizes the danger of compromise which would destroy the ultimate worth of laws of duty, and thus destroy our respect for them—such recognition causes it to seek a practical philosophy to
help practical reason obtain the source of and determination of the duty principle. By means of practical philosophy, practical reason obtains the universally applicable and unconditional premises it needs to establish for our will. It also sees the necessity of choosing the laws of duty and to exclude those maxims considered in order to fulfill the needs of one's inclinations. (Kant FMM, 22)

In summation, the human being experiences, at times, taking certain spontaneous moral actions which, despite not feeling like doing them, are a response that is elicited by an unknown sense of obligation to do so. Kant, through practical philosophy, gives his readers a rational source of strength which will aid the will to resist or overcome the natural impulses within man to dilute the laws of duty.

SECTION TWO
CONCEPT OF THE AUTONOMY OF THE HUMAN WILL

Kant now primarily deals with the discovery and construction of basic principles of morality in what modern man lacks, a practical philosophy. Kant states man has never been able to describe how pure ethics accounts for the way men actually behave. He claims it is impossible to pick out a single instance where an action showed that the maxim of that action depended solely on moral grounds. (Kant FMM, 23)

Biblically we could corroborate the above conclusion by Christ's statement in the Gospel of John where he told his disciples and others that without him,
they could do nothing. I interpret Christ to mean the maxim of a person's intent would be contaminated to the degree that Paul expressed in Romans 7:14-16 where he declared:

We know that the law is spiritual; but I am carnal, sold under sin. I do not understand my own actions. For I do not do what I want [intend by will], but I do the very thing I hate. Now if I do what I do not want, I agree the law [comparable to the "Categorical Imperative" of Kant] is good.

Kant cannot find temporal man as achieving holiness of will by carrying out completely (in action) the "Categorical Imperative". Therefore, he finds man is concerned as to how reason (by itself) can command what ought to be done on grounds that are not empirically based nor empirically corroborated. Kant sees the answer coming from an *a priori* knowledge. He tells us that if such a supreme principle of morality does exist (holiness of an absolutely good will), then such a principle must be rationally established as a doctrine of morals outside the realm of 'common rational knowledge'.

The above principle is a different concept than that of the reason of technical understanding (K2), which likes all of its knowledge to fall within the limits of common rational knowledge. Philosophers in the latter part of the eighteenth century called the 'necessity philosophers' were irritated by the limitations imposed on technical reason (K2). We can see their refusal to let Kant's attempt to justify any knowledge lying outside practical reason (such as speculative knowledge derived from pure reason) was based on the grounds that no demonstrable and independent corroboration
could be found for such postulates. Kant's approach was to isolate pure reason from all taint of anthropology, psychology, or physics.

We find him convinced that there is a human temporal limitation to acting in an absolutely moral manner. Kant uses human limitations to arrive at his conclusion that all works (actions) are distorted by inputs to the will other than the will's consideration of and attempted application of the 'Categorical Imperative.' He therefore realizes that no one should derive morality from activities and experiences of seeing morality in action. Because Kant cannot find it possible to prove in a rational way that freedom is real in human nature, he attempts (by analogy) to find a way out of this dilemma by resorting to our world sense experiences—He uses them to convince us that we can only know what the appearances of external objects reveal to us, and can never know their true inward identity. This analogy hits home for we all know, as rational beings, that we too often judge others by their outward actions.

His study takes the reader by logical progression to advance from popular philosophy (bound by experiential examples) to a metaphysics to extend rational knowledge to its maximum. He sees it necessary to do this by presenting reason's practical faculty from its universal rules of determination. The rather revolutionary way Kant sought to establish the rules of universality, necessity, and pure thought (as a priori constructions of the mind) is found in his transcendental method. Kant examines rational
knowledge from this higher level of reason so he can show us the source of our 'Pure Practical Reason' and freedom for moral duty. Because his transcendental method was a new method of philosophical thought, a brief definition of it will give the reader an insight into Kant's utilization of its logic in his presentation of the principle of morality—a principle found in all rational moral maxims.

(3)

The Catholic Encyclopedia gives us extracts from Kant's Critique of Pure Reason to help us get a brief explanation of his new method. The encyclopedia informs us that Kant himself described the transcendental method as:

I apply the term transcendental to all knowledge which is not so much occupied with objects as with the mode of our cognition of these objects, so far as this mode of cognition is possible a priori. (Kant CPR, A 11)

Another excerpt found in the encyclopedia tells us a priori knowledge of objects is not possible on the basis of the traditional assumption that all man's knowledge should conform to objects—one must start from the supposition that objects should conform to man's knowledge. (Kant CPR, B xvi) Kant looks for the conditions that make a priori knowledge possible—a knowledge distinguished by its necessity and universality. He states such conditions cannot be found in the objects, but only in the forms that already inhere in the subject before it receives the external impressions. He goes on to tell us it is only through these forms that phenomena and objects are constituted or produced. Therefore, man is only able to know a priori as much of things as he himself
projects into them. (Kant CPR, B xviii) Kant assigns to these inherent forms the pure perceptions of the sensitive faculties (space & time), the twelve concepts or categories of the intellect, and the three ideas of reason (existence of God, immortality, and free will).

The key element of the transcendental method is the transcendental deduction of purely rational concepts, which shows that the "conditions of the possibility of experience" are also the conditions "of all objects of experience". (Kant CPR, B 161) For Kant, the last sentence uses the term 'objects' to mean objects-for-us, but not objects of the things-in-themselves. Therefore, "no a priori cognition is possible for us, except of objects of possible experience" (i.e., of human experience). (Kant CPR, B 166)

Proceeding from the premise that everything in nature is determined by laws, Kant finds that only rational beings have the capability of acting according to their conception of universal laws or principles. He shows us that the reason of a rational person's will is required for the will to derive actions required by the moral law. He states that will is a faculty of choosing that which reason recognizes both subjectively and objectively as practically necessary or good.

In man, subjective volition can go the other way and seek to satisfy inclinational desires. So practical objective reason is, according to Kant, a restraint on the subjective needs of an individual. This restraint, as a command, is what Kant calls an imperative (Kant FMM, 30).
By examining the grounds for a possible categorical imperative (i.e., of a practical law), Kant, by use of the transcendental method, leads the reader to a necessary conclusion—that for there to be a supreme practical principle for the human will, it must an objective principle which is an unconditional end for all rational beings because it is an end in itself. As an objective principle, it is universal and therefore holds for all other rational beings as a means by which all laws of the will can be derived. As a practical imperative (or duty), the maxim is to treat all rational beings also as ends, and never as means only.

By means of the presented principles, Kant shows that there can be a organized union of rational beings through common objective principles. He gives the name of a 'realm of ends' to such a union. A rational being (being a person who recognizes himself as one giving universal principles through the maxims of one's own will) therefore belongs to the 'realm of ends' as a member—as such, he is subject to the universal laws that he gives to himself as well as giving to those other wills that are also members of the 'realm of ends'. All this is done, according to Kant, from the idea of the dignity of a rational being who freely obeys no law unless he himself also gives it. (Kant FMM, 53)

We can conclude with Kant, on the basis of his logic to this point, that the principle of each human will (as a will which can act in accordance with universal law via all of its maxims) is capable of being equivalent to a
'categorical imperative'. (Kant FMM, 50) Kant now points out to us that the rational human being is bound to moral laws by duty to them, but only when that being has subjected himself to his own, but also universal legislation, and is therefore (freely) bound to it also. He calls this principle of morality the principle of the 'autonomy of the will'.

To conclude this section, three of Kant's main premises concerning the role of the autonomy of the will in the formulation of his "Categorical Imperative" are:

1. The absolutely good will is one whose principle must be an unconditional 'Categorical Imperative'. (Kant FMM 23);
2. The absolutely good will contains only the form of volition. Autonomy is the form of volition in the rational being. (Kant FMM, 24); and
3. Practical reasoning, using a universally conceived concept of morals, has shown that the autonomy of the will is founded in the postulate of freedom. (Kant FMM, 71)

SECTION THREE
POSTULATE OF FREEDOM TO MAKE "CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE" POSSIBLE

Section two was an analysis of the development of a universal concept of morals that showed that its foundation was to be found in the autonomy of the will. However, as Kant indicated, to prove morality is not an illusion of the mind, and the autonomy of the will is real, it must be possible that a synthetical principle that is both necessary and universal can be found in pure practical reason. He needs to and does show that if the freedom of the will is presupposed (as the only
universal and necessary premise that can account for the autonomy of the will), then morality and its principle can be shown by an analysis of the concept of the will's freedom. This seems to be a contradiction in that the principle arrived at by an analysis is a synthetical premise—that is, an absolutely good will is one whose maxim can always include itself as a universal law. It is synthetical because an analysis of the proposition of an absolutely good will shows that its maxim (as being included as universal law) cannot be found. Kant shows us that the concept of freedom is the only necessary and universal cognition which is a common ground for a union of the autonomy of the will and the categorical imperative.

Kant's concept of freedom, as being the necessary premise to the explanation of the autonomy of the will, has to include sufficient evidence to show freedom as a transcendental condition of the will of all rational beings. The certainty of such evidence cannot be obtained from experiences of human nature, so it must be proved a priori. During such proof, freedom must be proved as being possessed by rational beings having a will.

For us, Kant has already defined natural necessity as a property of causality whereby non-rational beings (entities not capable of making free choices) are determined in their actions by external causes. He now uses an analogy between natural necessity and freedom. Freedom is understood as being the property of the will by which the will can be effective as a cause. This cause
is independent of any foreign cause which could have an undue influence on the will. From what we have learned to this point, we can see that the will, as self determined, has the possibility to give this freedom up in response to outside influences other than the 'Categorical Imperative.' Kant recognizes this danger and says that if such influences are allowed by the will to influence it, it is no longer an autonomous will but a heteronomous one. (Kant *Fmm*, 26) It is not difficult to find ourselves in agreement with Kant's rationale to this point.

He now uses his knowledge of the then current scientific reasons and conclusions which were formulated in mathematical equations (laws) that were considered as being equivalent to the actual 'laws of nature' itself. From this knowledge, he draws the premise that a free will is also subject to laws in that it cannot be lawless. His conclusion, if his premises are assumed to be correct, is a logical one. The freedom of the will is autonomy--the will's property is to be a law to itself in all of its actions.

Like ourselves, Kant is not content with being unable to comprehend the metaphysical grounds underlying the freedom of the will's reason. He explains to his readers that the compulsion felt by practical reason to think itself into the intelligible world is not an act which transcends the limits of reason. He posits the intelligible world as a positive thought only upon the condition that the concept of freedom can be seen
to be connected to a positive faculty called reason.  
(\textit{Kant FMM, 71})

He continues in this train of thought by considering pure practical thought as the cause of a person's will to act in a manner that will result in external actions moving in accord with the maxims that are in accordance with universal laws.

At first reading, it would appear at this point in Kant's ethical treatise that he is presenting us with a contradiction. He has told us that reason is not able to grasp the presuppositions supporting the premise of an intelligible world. From this, he drew the conclusion that if man is to think of his reason as being practical to his well being, then man must assume and accept the concept of an intelligible world.

Let us compare the above premise and conclusion to the premises and conclusions found in previous paragraphs concerning the sensory world and man-made laws in regard to the cause/effect relationships found in this world. Upon making such a comparison, there seems to be an inconsistency because Kant continues by implying limits to pure practical reason when and if pure thought oversteps its boundary. He sees such an overstepping if pure reason attempts to give an explanation of how pure reason can be practical.

Kant now seems to leap over this difficulty by postulating that a declaration of finding freedom in the intelligible world as impossible for reason's comprehension can be reversed! Explanation of such a
reversal has Kant requiring us to go through another step. We can assume that beneath outward appearances, things in themselves are hidden from us. But, instead of assuming the laws governing the activity of the hidden are the same as those which govern the world of appearance, we can just as logically expect them to be different. (Kant FMM, 79)

Law, order, unity, harmony, freedom, love, truth, beauty, and justice are terms that we can assume to be universal and necessary concepts that rational man accepts as being appropriate ones. Kant states that for our subjective thought, there is no possibility of explaining the will's freedom, just as there is no possibility of discovering and explaining the interest of man in moral laws. But, Kant tells us, man does take an interest in them. Kant tells us this moral feeling is not a standard for moral judgments, but has an effect on man. He sees the law (given by objective reason alone) as the cause practical reason needs to accept this subjective effect on the will. (Kant FMM, 80)

We find that Kant's above assumption that the laws of intelligibility are different (opposite and free) from the law of necessity (non-free determinations of objects) in the natural world is a logically possible assumption. If so, then how can the two laws be reconciled? This is similar to the original problem of this thesis. Is 'reason alone' (as the deterministic factor of the finite natural world) in conflict with or compatible with 'faith' (the concept of man's freedom to have an input into his own destiny)?
We can perceive that if the natural world concepts are grounded in the intelligible world, and the fact that Kant tells us pure practical reason cannot comprehend suppositions of freedom, then we have a case of two different synthetic a priori propositions that need a synthesis—a connection that we hope will be one that establishes the unity necessary between them to work for the universal and necessity premises previously posited. Kant tells us that such a connection must be a cognition in which the two different synthetic a priori propositions are grounded. (Kant FMM, 65)

However, Kant goes no further than this. In fact, it was earlier in his treatise (concerning the postulate of autonomy of the will, and his drawing the principle of morality from it), that we were first told that two different synthetic a priori propositions must be connected by a third cognition in which these two are grounded. (Hegel's 'Notion' does this task for us. The term 'Notion' is not a simple one to explain nor to understand. It is defined and interpreted in the next chapter of this thesis called the Hegelian chapter).

At this stage of his ethical metaphysical foundations, Kant stopped short of showing how a reversal of the natural law did not create conflict with reason in the intelligible world, but was unified with it. We need to go beyond this original treatise of Kant to find that Hegel gives us a solution identifying the ground of both in the original Oneness of the Absolute Mind (also the Absolute Idea, and Absolute Spirit) as explicitly stated
in the Hegelian chapter. Hegel shows this 'Oneness' by way of a deductive, and logically necessitated set of universal categories emanating from that original Being called God. Chapter four gives Hegel's reasoning to substantiate such unification.

Theodore M. Greene and John R. Silber wrote an English translation of Kant's book *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone* (first published in 1793). (4) According to the opinion of these authors in their introductory remarks, Kant had not laid a foundation in his analysis of human will to rationally justify the interrelationships between freedom, rationality and sensibility that he proposed. Without a common ground as a basis for the unity needed, Kant had merely defined will as abstract reason by the word ('Wille') and as a faculty of desire by the word ('Willkur'). He did not show how these two aspects of the will could be united in a single faculty of volition.

Rationality and sensibility need unity to account for the experience of obligation. The *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morality* was written in 1885 and did not (according to Greene) give sufficient grounds within the concept of the human will to establish a basis for the unity needed for the required interrelationships proposed in Kant's theory of ethics. Therefore the next section is considered as highly essential for the reader to see the essential contributions Kant made in later years to his analysis of his concept of the human will—an elaboration which was amplified even further by Hegel's
premise of the 'Oneness of the Absolute Mind' being the common ground of all (which would include the basic connection or ground between duty and autonomy as found in the human will).

SECTION FOUR
BATTLE WITHIN THE WILL

In Kant's second critique, The Critique of Practical Reason (written in 1788), he posed the will as being either heteronomous or autonomous. Man, however, finds by his experience of guilt (caused by failure to carry out his maxim which is in accordance with the Categorical Imperative) that his will is heteronomous in action while being autonomous in its conscious intentionality. (Kant R/LR, Ixxvii)

Greene continues in his Introduction to the Religion to argue that prior to this book, Kant's concept of the human will was not sufficient enough in its depth to account for man's moral experience in regard to his will. Greene found that the Religion is Kant's earliest and only sustained analysis of the human will that shows a faculty of volition sufficiently capable of willing both happiness (through the sensual input of 'Willkur') and virtue (through the rational input of will called 'Wille' by Kant).

Faced with these two alternatives (and both good in their basically different ways), the 'Willkur' seeks an immediate solution. However, the 'Willkur' realizes from input from the 'Wille' that it needs to be free from such temptation in order to freely declare a self-maxim that is
in accordance with a self-accepted universal 'Categorical Imperative.' This course of choice is needed in order to act in one's external conduct in accordance with the universal demands of a moral maxim that can be created only by an absolutely good will.

We see Kant finding the will (as 'Willkur') as a unitary faculty where sense and rationality have a common meeting place--here, obligation is a constraint of the law on the temptation of will to reject it. (Kant R/LR, xcvi) Kant makes an issue of what constitutes an evil nature of man versus a good nature. He finds this in the order of subordination--does man subordinate the demands of the moral law ('Wille') to the immediate solution for the specific moral problem at hand as demanded by natural sensual inclinations? If so, the decision maker is considered morally evil. On the other hand, a good man is one who consciously subordinates his sensible nature to that of his moral nature. Kant sees this latter alternative as expressing one's freedom and power as a truly free being.

The above tendency to subordinate the desires of the 'Willkur' to that of the 'Wille' or visa versa is what Kant now finds expression in his concept of 'Gesinnung' (or in English, 'disposition'). In the Religion, Kant develops his concept of 'disposition' as being the ultimate subjective ground within a person--the ground where one chooses to subordinate his sensory impulses to the rational law (or to do the opposite) each time an ethical decision is to be reached.
Greene now explains why he thinks Kant's concept called the 'disposition' is the most important single contribution of this work to Kant's ethics. He feels that this concept allows Kant to keep continuity and responsibility (in the free workings of the 'Willkur'), and to have an ambivalent volition to be included in complexities found within the faculty called the human will. (Kant R/LR, cxv)

Greene goes on to quote Kant as saying:

> The disposition, i.e., the ultimate subjective ground of the adoption of maxims, can only be one and applies universally to the whole use of freedom. (Kant /LR, cxv)

As such, the disposition (as the incentive behind the willing or rejecting of the spirit of moral law) establishes the morality of the acts of the 'Willkur'. Included within the 'Willkur' is another of the 'Willkur's' functions--it must freely accept the disposition's choice of its maxim (if man is morally responsible). The disposition therefore determines the intelligible or noumenal character of the 'willkur' while specific actions (those performed in the external world stemming from one's internal maxims) create its phenomenal character.

My short summary of a translator's explanation of Kant's concept of the 'disposition' found in the human will may be acceptable only to those familiar with Kant's total presentation of it. Readers desiring further details substantiating the high points I have selected to give a general basis for Kant's 'disposition' can find them on or
near the pages quoted in my end notes concerning these high points.

As free, the 'Willkur' is spontaneous in each separate specific maxim, and not predetermined by what it was prior to such a new determination. It is also not undetermined nor indeterminate. The disposition, in its freedom, is its own law. Acts are determined by whom the subject-self is. Kant sees us as finding out who we are not only by observation of our external actions, but by inferring from them the quality of our moral character. He sees our 'disposition' as being an indication of our full true nature which is freely (but not always consciously) willed in every present moment. It is a continuity unsupported by outside predeterminable forces and as such, is essential to moral self-identity. (Kant R/LR, 38)

According to Greene, Kant thus leads us to see our 'Willkur' (acting in its fully integrated capacity which includes 'disposition') is the ground of our moral responsibility. We can therefore conclude with Kant, that the 'Willkur' (as defined) must select and reflect one incentive above all others--this incentive is made a self-maxim which will be the determinate foundation for a person's subsequent moral conduct in the external world.

Another conclusion of Kant's analysis of the will was that, dispositionally, there is no compromise between the good and the evil will. The will is either one or the other. He shows the reader the range of what constitutes his concept of the good and the range of what constitutes his concept of evil. With no compromise between the two
concepts, there can be no intermediate transition at the midpoint between the two alternatives. (*Kant R/LR, cxxvi*)

A brief injection of information from natural science may be helpful at this point. Kant has made a spontaneous jump between evil and good. Such action is known in science as a second order discontinuity or a spontaneous jump from one line of continuation to an entirely new line of continuation without any continuity found to exist between them. This phenomena is found in the field of physics where a linear function does not continue in a linear fashion as previously, but with an additional cause/effect increment, it spontaneously discontinues its former path as predicted and establishes a new and different string of cause and effect relationships.

The above analogy (taken from the realm of physical science as experienced in the natural world) seems significant to show that Kant has logical justification for posing an alternative view to the one which finds polar opposites as ratio mixtures where there is no such thing as either opposite being entirely cleansed and completely independent of the other.

The overall effect of the 'Willkur' as described in this section does give us a rational basis for an understanding of the constraint of the law (through persuasion of its testimony) upon the temptations of the 'Willkur's' desires to reject such a proposed moral law. Greene states that by such a conception of the 'Willkur', Kant's 'Categorical Imperative' is confirmed by his
analysis of evil volition—an analysis which shows the
decline of virtue and power of the good to a point it
spontaneously ceases to be good and leaps into the realm
of the evil volition.

SECTION FIVE
MODERN SCIENTIFIC VIEWS AND THEIR EFFECT
ON THE CONCEPT OF LIMITED FREEDOM FOR
RATIONAL AND SPIRITUAL MAN

In light of modern scientific laws (based on
empirical observation and subsequent demonstrable sensory
examples, some readers may be interested in Appendix I
which gives a detailed example to show logical,
experimental, and experiential corroboration of the
premise that modern man has a realistic certainty of a
limited freedom of choice in influencing his own personal
destiny. (See Appendix I, 223)

My own convictions (based on many examples of the
scale of observation creating the phenomenon man observes)
are similar to those of many other scientists in dealing
with laws made to express relationships of objects in our
natural world (and the similar reactions of all rational
beings have to external objects).

A conclusion to the above is that there is a common
rational ground of being which maintains the connection
(or a commonality) between the particular entities of the
entire universe. Unfortunately, this premise is a 'first
premise' and therefore cannot be substantiated in the same
manner we corroborate subsequent dependent facts by
demonstrable repetitions of specifically given determinate
causes and their subsequent binding effects—relationships
that allow man reasonable control of his finite and relatively non-free material world.

Therefore, we can only hope (on faith in the natural unity and harmony generally prevailing in the world) that there is a high degree of correspondence to the universal laws applicable to the entire range of phenomena and to those universal laws applicable to nomena.

SECTION SIX
CONCLUDING REMARKS

In concluding this chapter, pertinent paragraphs giving correlations and explanatory parallels to appropriate aspects of Kant's *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals* are in order.

Like all pure practical reason, empirical proof of any practical premises cannot be obtained by reason itself, but these premises can be reasonably interpreted as guides to action. However, no action can change the pure objective status of the Categorical Imperative against which the moral agent can only zero beat her/his moral choices. For Kant, no human actions can ever fulfill or justify the (K2) Categorical Imperative.

We find St Paul in Chapter 7 of the *Book of Romans* in the *New Testament* implicitly corroborating the "Categorical Imperative" by his famous "woe is me" confession:

I can will what is right ["Categorical Imperative"] but I cannot do it. For I do not do the good I want [my actions do not carry out the intent of the will or the maxim of the 'Categorical Imperative'] but the evil I do not want is what I do! ...... So then, I of myself serve the law of God [moral law similar
to Kant's 'Categorical Imperative'], but with my flesh I serve the law of sin.

We can easily correlate this scripture to Kant's eventual conviction that we cannot determine the moral worth of an action because it will always be contaminated by outside influences other than the categorical imperative. However, Kant agrees with St. Paul (who said it first) that the law of his inner self is in accordance with the law of God. Kant proclaims the law of the will as being free. It does desire to act freely in accordance with the "Categorical Imperative." Significant insights (showing how the Biblical imperatives can be correlated with the intent of an autonomous will's maxim) can be achieved if the reader subjects each imperative to the criteria and methodology of this thesis's final paradigm.

The above premises are used by Kant to logically connect the fact of the will being a law to itself. He connects it by its also being an expression of the principle of acting to no other maxim than that which can also have itself as a universal law or its object. As this principle is also the formula for his "Categorical Imperative", the logical conclusion is that a free will and a will under moral laws are identical.

Perhaps, at this point, an non-verbalizable sense of danger is felt by applying as a true analogy, the necessitated knowledge of the cause and effect of the natural finite world as being similar to the unknown free world of uncontaminated reason—an analogy which necessitates freedom as being subject to the same law of cause and effect as it is found in the finite necessity of
the natural world.

Postulating a presupposed freedom of the will, Kant can state the principle of morality. He finds it to be a synthetic proposition that "an absolutely good will is one whose maxim can always include itself as a universal law." (Kant FMM, 56)

We recall it is necessary for the cognition of different synthetic propositions to be connected through their common ground in a third cognition. At this stage, Kant states that pure practical reason in itself is not capable of providing a basis (a posteriori experience of the connection) for the deduction of the concept of freedom.

To deduce the concept of freedom, Kant first states a premise that freedom must be presupposed as the property of the will of all rational beings. Freedom must also be demonstrated. The will must also be shown to be that of a rational person. If a rational being regards reason as the source of reason's principles, then that being must regard itself as free. Kant states that if we act as if we were free, the results of subsequent actions taken on decisions made in believed freedom will demonstrate to that individual rational being that he did have indeed a free will. Use of such premises can lead to practical results never to be obtained unless tried.

I am sure that most rational beings seek substantiation of conclusions reached that are primarily based upon their own personal experiences. Most find that they believe they possess at least a limited free will in
a moral sense. Reality of the results achieved in acting in a moral manner forces us to cognitively accept the limitation of the will's power. It does this by the fact that our intended results never measured up to what our will really wanted to accomplish.

Therefore, we can see Kant as giving us in his reasoning, a definition of 'faith' in the following sense—that when one tests out a untried hypothesis (based on 'faith' in a presupposed and non-deductive premise), the subsequent experience itself gives us an understanding that we could not have had otherwise. The results obtained by this type of a self-experience are substantiated by St. Anselm's experiences when he risked acting on belief, then experienced, and after experiencing, understood.

Now, reflective reasoning helps us understand the freedom of our will in a rational way as well as the experiential way that Jesus Christ promised when He asked rational beings to actively seek the truth. If one did, then the truth of the morality laws would make us free—free to freely accept a unity offered to us in spite of our rebellion to being a unified part of the universal whole.

It is difficult for many modern rational beings to understand the concept Kant had when he stated that reason would overstep its bounds if it tried to explain (in conceptual terms) how pure reason can be practical. Kant considered this situation as being the same problem as giving a conceptual idea of how freedom is possible. The law of cause and effect, which has been so effectively
used in the control of finite necessity entities, has no room for free choice to interfere with its concepts which work so well in the finite natural world. We find Kant as stating freedom is a mere idea, the objective reality of which can in no way be shown according to natural laws, or in any possible experience. (Kant FMM. 66)

Freedom of the will, according to Kant, must be presupposed as the property of all rational beings. He sees morality as a law for rational beings. However, one cannot be held responsible to do an ought, unless man is capable of and free to do so. In Kant's presentation of the 'Categorical Imperative', he admits that in this temporal world, man cannot achieve that which the imperative demands, a holiness of will. A contradiction exists when a demand for moral achievement is made, a demand which cannot be met and yet holds man accountable for. Such a choice constitutes not only the necessity of the autonomy of the rational will, but also requires a postulate of immortality in order to be able to give man hope to achieve the moral perfection of a holy will. We therefore find in Kant's treatise two of his three main metaphysical postulates--those of freedom, and immortality.

Before leaving Kant, it needs to be again mentioned that he felt that our sincere intentions to carry out moralistic actions in accordance with the "Categorical Imperative" justify our 'moral worthiness' in spite of the fact our actions fall far short of carrying out the universal maxim as a perfect 'holiness of will'.
Nevertheless, of the readers who have a fairly educated Christian religious background, many will know of others who have a feeling that a spiritual person can earn moral worthiness by his/her actions. Such a premise is a legalistic and logically reasonable solution for obtaining immortality.

However, Biblical teachings (especially St. Paul's) view such legalistic and logical solutions as unacceptable. Therefore Kant's answer to man's potential propensity to radical evil as being justifiably offset by God's Divine Grace can be elaborated upon by different Biblical teachings pertaining to 'Grace' and its relationship to evil.

Kant has indicated to us that moral perfection must be 'posited' in the holiness of a man's disposition. However, he is wary enough to not equate the holy disposition as identical with the concept of a supreme righteousness of moral perfection in the deed itself. This position allows Kant to recognize that any such righteousness attained by a good disposition is "A righteousness that is not our own." We can also see with him that such a righteousness is one that logically can be given to us by such a concept as that of God's divine grace.

Who really knows? We must have lost sight that both worlds that Kant took into consideration have their initial premises based on faith (an innate feeling of conviction that we are in the grasp of what Tillich calls the power of Being (K3), and others call 'GOD') rather
than upon rational proof (K2). We test our actions taken on our initial beliefs when guided by models we now call paradigms. These paradigms are practical according to the measure they can help us attain our moral (and hopefully practically realistic) intentions in our worldly lives.

This chapter has briefly presented Kant's proposed *Foundations* and excerpts from the *Religion* in support of metaphysical moral premises. Such premises serve as a general foundation for subsequent generations to create appropriate moral paradigms—models that reflect our increasing knowledge in this area. It has also presented additional substantiations to support the thesis that Kant's 'Categorical Imperative' is a highly rational proposal that is applicable to all rational beings. It can be conceived as a universally valid concept for people of various cultures and stages of technological, sociological, and spiritual development in our human history.

We can perceive and perhaps experience it if we can combine our innate desire for peace and unity with Kant's rational persuasion—that (although not provable by a virtual certainty obtained by repeatable and demonstrable sensory evidence), the idea of a pure intelligible and moral world can still be a useful and permissible idea. Such an idea is one that corroborates the concept of a rational faith.
NOTES

1. Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Lewis White Beck (New York: Bobbs Merril Company, 1959) 9. Subsequent references to this work will be cited in the text parenthetically as, e.g., (Kant FMM, 9.)

2. 2 Samuel 11: 1 through 12: 15

3. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, (quotes and excerpts taken from Catholic Encyclopedia article TRANSCENDENTAL [KANTIAN] on Kant's book) 235-236. Subsequent references to this work will be cited in the text parenthetically as, e.g., (Kant CPR, B xviii)

4. Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Limits of Reason, trans. Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson, Essay by John R. Silber (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960) cxxvii Subsequent references to this work will be cited in the text parenthetically as, e.g., (Kant R/LR, cxiv)

CHAPTER 4

HEGEL

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) has been credited by many as having developed the most complete comprehensive and systematic philosophy of modern times. A German Idealist, Hegel followed a path set by Kant's Transcendental Idealism, which was a synthesis of sensory experience (Empiricism) with truths obtained by reason alone (Rationalism). However, to solve the problem of the non-freedom of the human will in the phenomenal world (K1) and the freedom of the will in the noumenal world (K2), Kant had to split reality into a world of appearances (phenomena) and the (noumenal) world of things in themselves as they really are. (In chapter one, page ten, (K1) was identified as a subjective self-knowledge characterized by the self's sensing, imagining, and perceptions of sensory experience; (K2) as "unbiased rational (noumenal) conceptional knowledge based on external data as well as objective-self a priori concepts"; and (K3) was defined as "that mode of knowledge which is a result of self-mediation—a means by which a commonality is established to reconcile or establish a working relationships between polarities such as 'faith' and 'reason'". These supposedly irreconcilable opposites (determination of phenomenon in the nature world [including natural man] versus the freedom of moral acts in the noumenal world of man) were
asserted by Kant to be independent of each other and not interacting with each other. (3)

Yet Kant could not speak of moral problems without presupposing their complete interaction. The human experience of moral action can be taken as an illustration of such interaction between the opposites of determinism (non-freedom) and freedom. If the same human will was not both moral and natural at the same time in both realms, moral experience would be impossible. Such an experience presupposes a temptation in (K1) subjective inclination (in the 'willkur') to be present in the noumenal realm (K2) of man's will (wille). At the same time, moral experience presupposes the ability of the moral self (wille) to change the perceived world of appearances to an order of what ought-to-be according to the obligation to the moral law within the will. A conclusion drawn by Kant from the above reasoning was that a rational moral person in the phenomenal world is obligated to seek a change in it in order that the highest good (a union of the two opposites) might be more effectively achieved in the phenomenal world.

Kant's approach to the problem of man's nomenal sense of ought-to-be versus what he finds 'is' in the phenomenal world was rationally limited by his inability to establish a rational unity between two different synthetic a priori propositions; (1) Rational beings can perceive that natural world concepts are grounded in the intelligible world (K2); and (2) Pure practical reason cannot comprehend the presuppositions of freedom.
Any unity to be established between them must be by a
cognition in which the two are grounded. (5)

Kant saw the rational necessity of establishing a
common ground between the opposites of non-freedom and
freedom in the will of a rational being, but (within the
subjective (K1) and objective (K2) modes of knowledge he
was operating with) could not rationally justify such a
ground.

To the inquiring mind which seeks knowledge for
knowledge's sake, Hegel's 'Notion' performs the task of
establishing a common ground for the unification of the
subjective self (K1) and its 'other' (the objective self
as [K2]). Therefore, this chapter examines the Hegelian
solution that identifies the ground that unites both (K1)
and (K2) as being in the original Oneness of the 'Absolute
Mind' (also known as the Absolute Idea' and 'Absolute
Spirit').

Why is Hegel so important to this thesis? He is
important because his system is an advancement on
Kant's in the realm of ethics and morality. However, the
primary reason is that his 'Notion' is a rational and
self-developed methodology that resolves the (K1) and (K2)
conflicts found in the initial phases of his spheres
of Logic, Nature, and Spirit (and in the derivations of
the subsystems within each sphere). Therefore, the
categories of Hegel's 'Notion' have been utilized as
foundation stones of my thesis paradigm. This paradigm has
been formulated to serve as a basic standard (exemplar) to
guide any solutions of (K1) and (K2) types of conflict
that arise in the minds of modern rational (spiritual) beings.

We, as finite human beings are also partially infinite (as participators in and as an effect of the infinite itself). Hegel's 'Notion' identifies the evolving relationship between all polarities (opposites such as hope versus despair). Such opposites are to be found in both the natural (phenomenal) world and the rational (nomenal) world. Hegel identifies a relationship between all such polarities in the term "Identity of the Opposites" while still allowing the polarities to maintain their individual identities such as finite versus infinite, the one and the many, and the subjective-self versus the objective-self. I see the 'Notion' as vitally relevant to rational spiritual beings. It gives hope and rational justification to a mode of knowledge (K3) which had not been acknowledged by those limiting all objective and unbiased knowledge to be the (K2) mode of knowledge. With the inception of the (K3) mode of knowledge, rational man now has hope of playing an important part of his own destiny rather than being a mere creature of nature and subject only to determinate causes and effects beyond his volitional will's ability to effect a change from what 'is' to what ought-to-be.

This chapter will therefore give Hegel's own definition of his doctrine 'Identity of the Opposites' before attempting a summary of its application to the Philosophy of Right, and the Philosophy of Religion as
they progressively appear in the development of the 'Notion'.

SECTION ONE
HEGEL'S 'NOTION'

Hegel's definition of his term 'Notion' is:

a being which in passing outwards into its opposite passes only into itself, and this opposite does not become anything different, but remains, even in the opposition, completely identical with itself. (2)

Hegel's 'Notion' became the primary "moment" of his ontology because of his predecessors' impasse between 'being' as immediacy and 'essence' as categorical mediation. The contradiction that resulted by such mediation could be resolved by what Hegel called self-mediation as the vital third phase of actualization. He accomplished this by presenting the 'Notion' as a concept of a being which in its 'opposite' remains identical with itself (or self-mediation). By going beyond the contradiction, the 'Notion' becomes a synthesis of being (K1) and essence as (K2) in a fully actualized essence 'identical' with itself.

Turning to Logic, Hegel sought a system of Logic with a method—a system that reaches judgments with a measure of certainty for its accumulative knowledge. He felt that only the dialectical method could obtain such desired results.

Paul Johnson, in his book The Critique of Thought, states that Hegel does not use the dialectic terms, thesis, antithesis, and synthesis in the way these terms are often attributed to Hegel. The three stages are
not two different propositions synthesized into a third proposition in order to obtain a unity of the identity and a unity of the differences between self and what seems to be another self. (3)

For Johnson, Hegel's first term is a determination of thought, not a thesis or proposition. Hegel's second term of his notion, when seen in dialectic, is not an opposing proposition (Antithesis) but some judgment formed by the understanding (my K2) based on simple apprehension (my K1). His third term then, as found in logical thought (my K3), (and as a term of unification of the first two determinations of thought) is expressed as the syllogism. (3)

Reflection upon Johnson's comments concerning the thoughts of the knower, (the structure of such thought by the knower about the being of that which is sought to be known by the knower) led to a dialogue with my advisors. My subsequent insight (on re-reading of Hegel's logic on the dialectical method) is that the third step of thought by the knower in his/her logical thought (to grasp the essence of the being the knower's thoughts are directed upon) must reflect the ontological concept of Hegel's 'Notion'--the concept that the third term is a self-mediation (my K3) of a being whose first two determinations (immediacy as being, and essence as mediation) are only moments that become unified in the self-mediation of a initial abstract being (reason)--a being whose flow of thought upon itself and about itself create not only its own content, but does so with a
rational structure of abstract thought in its first two movements to reach a culmination of relatively concrete actualization through thought's successive moments of thought—thought concerning a specific and determinate 'Other' (from its potentiality to its actual becoming in the existent world).

At this point, we can see Hegel's conclusion. Reason, as object, is reason from the side of being. Reason as subject, is reason as seen from the side of the knower. The 'concept' unites being and knowing in absolute reason. They are identical in their differences. Therefore, in the complete structure of thought (in a being of completed thought about itself), the form is the content, and the content is the form. The ontological steps of the dialectical flow are immediacy, mediation, and self-mediation. Their parallel identities in the structure of thought are simple apprehension, judgment, and syllogism.

By repeated cyclic use of the moments of the 'Notion', the "synthesis" of the subjective self-identity with its contradictory 'other' (or 'others') creates the resultant subjective identity—an open identity which continually grows goes through the same process of the moments within the 'Notion' to resolve contradictions and reach higher levels of dialectical "synthesis". By this means, Hegel seeks to deduce all subsequent categories, geneses, species, and individuals that exist in the sensory world and/or the mental world.

Our main emphasis in this chapter will be what
Hegel said about his newly introduced term of self-mediation as it is found within the unity of his 'Notion'. By such self-mediation, the 'absolute identity' absorbs the differences within itself and also becomes an 'identity of opposites'. This principle of reason allows 'opposites' to emerge as absolute identities while yet being absolutely distinct. Critical examination of the actual relationships between apparently completely opposite and irreconcilable polarities (plus and minus, good and evil, etc;) is carried out by self-reflective reasoning (vernunft) of the subjective self--this is a type of reasoning which I see as (K3).

(K3) at this point, may be viewed as a progressive mode of being (knowledge as that which is identical to being in the noumenal world of pure reason) which will include more and more concrete universals as temporal time passes for human thought. (We could consider this basic category of being (and mode of knowledge) as a gift of self-mediative perception from the 'Subjective' ground-of-being itself to all autonomous rational and spiritual temporal beings as they exist in the natural world.

(* please note that the utilization of the level of thinking considered under the (K3) designation can only rationally find an identity between the polarities of the opposites when operating under the self-explained premise of pure reason as the self-determined, self-posed, and self-developing antecedent to all consequences found in the noumenal and phenomenal worlds. See last paragraph
By means of a deductive movement of the three concepts of: (1) universality; (2) particularity; and (3) singularity, Hegel's 'Notion' is a self description of the dialectical method Hegel found as being a rational self-explanatory way of combining what each of the first two moments of the 'Notion' had kept separate. They kept: (1) understanding (K2) (which insisted upon distinction, difference, and negation between entities of different classes or categories from; (2) identities of all particulars within each distinctive category.

We can sum up the above by stating that (K2)'s principles find that different entities (such as A and B) are either distinctive or identical. 'Verstand' (K2), or (reflective) mediation, seems to express only the differences of the 'opposites', but Hegel shows us that in actual reflective self-mediation (K3), A and B are seen to be both identical and different. Therefore, the principle of reason (as 'vernunft') brings both natures of objects into unity by the formula Hegel calls the 'Identity of Opposites'. Pure reason has therefore found for itself, a reasonable explanation (as a self-explained and self-determined one) to logically show that what is different (A from B) is also identical (as expressed by the formula A is not [not-A]).

Such a resolution of all polarities is only rationally possible when the original cause of every thing is postulated as pure reason—a reason which in itself is self-determined, self-possited, and self-developing. By his
dialectic, everything in the noumenal and phenomenal world originates by the drive and self development of pure reason itself.

It is only by the culmination of successive recycling of the triadic steps of development in thought itself about itself, that the 'Absolute Idea' continues creating particular (concrete) universals that are either 'appearances' of or completed essences (actualities) of the phenomenal objects we perceive in our natural and temporal world.

The speculative characteristic forms of pure reason need to be associated with practical reason (through actual experience) for rational man to accept such speculative (pure reason alone) postulates. The next section will therefore deal with the ethical concepts of thought that become actualized in the form of ethical institutions in the external world man in which man exists.

SECTION TWO
PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT

In Hegelian philosophy, the third sphere of his system is called the category of the spirit. As the synthesis of the triad, Spirit is the unity of the Logical Idea and nature. The pure mind (pure reason) in the Logic went over into its opposite in nature (the irrational). Hegel's dialectic leads us through a thought process of reason that at first finds spirit separated from its structural form in the sphere of Logic. Seeking a solution to this conflict of opposites, thought (through a process
of self-mediation) realizes that through the spirits of particulars known as human beings, Spirit can become Absolute Spirit (or Absolute Idea). In its fullest development (through the realm of spirit in spiritual and rational human beings), Spirit can return to itself as an enriched rationality. In this way, Spirit becomes increasingly subjective and less a substance.

Hegel's dialectic applied to the philosophy of spirit falls into three main spheres; (1) the human spirit viewed subjectively (our thesis's (K1) wherein Spirit is only implicit); (2) Spirit progresses (by moments of reason) out of itself into an external objectivity (K2). This external world is not a world of irrational nature, but an objective world of spiritual institutions; and (3) through the process of self-mediation, Absolute Spirit is (K3) or the unification of the Logical Idea and nature. As (K3), it transcends the finitude of both the subjective spirit and the objective spirit. Absolute Spirit or Absolute Idea, as self-determined, self-posed, and self-developing is infinite in its potentialities. By reabsorbing the concrete particularities from the subjective spirit and the objective spirit stages of thought, the Absolute Idea (Absolute Spirit) needs to be both finite and infinite at the same time. (Hegel calls such a unity the 'true infinite'.

It has been previously mentioned that speculative forms of pure reason need to be associated with practical reason that is associated with actual experience for rational man to accept speculative (pure reason)
postulates. Therefore, we will look at the external objective spirit as it is expressed through the Philosophy of Right or Law. It is the first institution of the spiritual and objective institutions of law, morality and the state.

My thoughts and comments upon the Philosophy of Right, and the role of the human will in regard to the concept of right are based upon my study and subsequent acceptance of T. M. Knox's presentation of this concept in his introduction to his book Philosophy of Right. (5)

Knox's translative definitions of the terms used in (as he saw Hegel using them) are as follows: (1) 'Right' is a term meaning civil law, morality, ethical life, and world history; (2) Thought is defined as a product of thinking; (3) Philosophy is the thinking of the universal. Objective thoughts are universals, or abstract and different from concrete particulars. The universal is therefore the form (structure), and the content of this form is the particular; and (4) The 'concept' or 'Notion' is essentially the 'Identity of the opposites'.

Understanding (verstand) distinguishes between form and content, universal and particular, but does not find a common ground to unify these opposing concepts. The understanding faculty of mind (K2) does not comprehend that a 'thought' is not an empty or abstract entity, but is a determinant of itself. The essence of thought is its concreteness and such a concrete thought is what Hegel calls the 'concept' (Knox, viii) My presentation of the definitions of the concepts, as Hegel used them in the
development of the 'objective-Notion' of the final sphere of the triad (Spirit), was to let the reader see Hegel's consistency in his triadic development of the logic itself, natural man and nature, and in the development of spirit in the noumenal nature of the rational being called man.

Knox finds Hegel as viewing the 'concept' as the thought that determines itself and gives itself a content. It is therefore a 'universal' that particularizes itself—the thought that creates itself, forms itself, gives itself an content, and determines itself to be the form. Concrete is defined as a thought that is not empty, but is self-determining and self-particularizing. Knox finds Hegel viewing the 'concept' as being the inward principle of all reality.

Hegel used the term 'Idea' as being the concept viewed concretely, or in synthesis with the content it gives itself. As such, the 'Idea' is the 'concept' insofar as the 'concept' gives reality and existence to itself. As self-determined, the 'Idea' (or reason, or truth) is the unity (Identity) of subject and object, of form and content.

Knox finds Hegel telling us that in the objective spirit, human freedom is expressed through the will. The will is defined as that property of the subject which is active in molding and altering both the internal and external world to what the subject thinks these worlds ought to be. Will objectifies itself in the external world and this objective spirit is considered by Hegel as the
sphere of the 'right' or 'law'. 'Right' or 'law' is therefore the objective universality of the will in general (Knox, 36)

Hegel also tells us that a rationally conscious individual who is aware of itself as subject (but also aware of the external world of the 'other') is a person. As a person, self-determined and self-enclosed, this entity is an infinite universal and therefore cannot be treated as a means to an end. As a person, one has both rights and duties. Hegel therefore informs us that the general law of the 'right' is, "Be a person and respect other persons". (Hegel, 382)

The subject matter of the science of 'right' in the Philosophy of Right is the Idea of right (or the concept of right) in conjunction with the actualization of that concept. I felt that Knox's effort to help the reader apprehend the 'rights' of persons as something inherently rational was accomplished. Knox's Introduction to his book leads the reader through the origination and development of the rational will of persons. Hegel develops the idea of the absolutely free will by the first moment of the will being immediate and abstract. The embodiment of the 'concept' is seen to be an immediate externality—the sphere of abstract or formal 'right'. The next stage is the will's reflection from its objective and external embodiment back into its subjective-self. It becomes, at this point a subjective individuality in opposition to the universal (or the right of the subjective will compared to the right of the world). By
unifying the partial truths of both of these abstract moments, the Idea of the good is grasped by thought in the subjective will and in the objective world. This unity, in spite of the opposites still maintained, is accomplished through the freedom of the will (as the common ground of the unity of the subjective and objective aspects of the rational being). Therefore freedom is real in the sense that it is found in both the internal and external ethical life of a person. (Knox, 36)

Therefore, the reader's practical reason can grasp that an unity of seemingly opposing opposites can be reached through the dialectic of self-mediation. The 'Notion', or Absolute Idea is therefore the idea of a being which in its opposite is identical with itself and therefore mediates itself. (Hegel, 223)

We have followed the stages of thought Hegel discovered to arrive at his concept called by various names such as 'Identity of Opposites', 'The Absolute Idea', 'Divine Subjectivity (inclusive of objectivity)', the 'Absolute Mind', and the 'Ground of all Being'. The latter term will be used in the chapter on Paul Tillich. Bernard J. F. Lonergan in his book INSIGHT - A Study of Human Understanding described Metaphysics as "that department of human knowledge that underlies, penetrates, transforms, and unifies all other departments of human understanding". We can see that Lonergan's definition of Metaphysics is remarkably similar (in what it implies about Metaphysics) to Hegel's 'Notion'.


SECTION THREE
CONCLUDING REMARKS

The next few paragraphs are my distillation of the abstract comprehensions of Hegel and Lonergan in their solutions to unify all other (K1) and (K2) departments of knowledge by a (K3) form of knowledge—a form which does indeed underlie, penetrate, transform, and unify the polar opposites of subjective-self and objective-self as they are found in rational beings.

Briefly, the first moment of pure reason is described as an indeterminate being. As indeterminate initially), (K1) is a continual evolving totality or sum of its own rational drive of being, becoming, and the infinite substance field of identical no-things.

Reason, as a determinate form of thought about itself, becomes a progression of inward thoughts about itself. These determinate form of thoughts (K2) are moments during which (K2) forms of thought separate themselves from the absolute and infinite negativity of thought also included in the (K1) mode of knowledge. Each successive (K2) determinate thought is considered by the subjective whole (K1) (as an initial indeterminacy of thought and the previous accumulative concrete-universal forms of thought (K3) accepted by it and added to it—a cyclic process which progressively enriches (K1)'s basic subjectivity. It, (K1) in its pure form, is now a progressively greater Divine Subjectivity (really a previously completed unity of an infinite substance yet to
be realized and its current unity of concrete-particulars within itself.) The cycle thus becomes (K1) the undifferentiated beginning which returns to itself as an open end—in essence the infinite and developing beginning K1/K3 is at the completion of any given cycle of the dialectic (of pure thought about itself) pure philosophy itself. Such an end is an open one, especially in the minds of finite rational and spiritual beings.

These cumulative concrete/universals can be some of those previously and individually derived by the human subjective-selves who have progressed to at least a partial understanding of this abstract stage of pure reasoning. Human thought (also springing out of the infinite self-determined, self-deposited, and self-developing reason of Divine Subjectivity) has to be realistically recognized as having the distortions of being also a determinate part of the natural world. Therefore Hegel's idealistic form of pure reason does give us an idea of what our reason could achieve if it was in perfect unity with its source, the Divine Subjectivity (in Its process of evolving to the point that all thought as structure is also its own content in actuality).

Thus, the dialectical cycle goes on in the process of pure thought. Hegel saw the pure thought structure as being available for the development of thought in thinking finite individuals. I perceive such insight on his part as being significant in his concept of human religion as being a process of elevation of the finite mind towards the infinite 'Absolute Idea'.
In the Tillich chapter, we will discuss the distortions of the pure thought in those persons who pursue the attainment of Kant's goal for mankind—the goal of achieving an absolutely good will for oneself.

It is suggested that it would be practical for most readers to go back and review the practical application of the structural form of thought in the concepts formulated to carry out the Philosophy of Right—as expressed in the external forms created by the objective-self in its pursuance of the moral good.

The 'Notion's applicability to the objective spirit (as self-mediative and developing through the phases of; (1) abstract right; (2) morality; and (3) social ethics) can be directly related to an individual's own concept and experience of abstract 'right'. I therefore believe that going through the Hegelian 'Identity of Opposites' in such a practical manner will make it easier for the reader to grasp the Absolute Idea as it reaches its completion in the concept of the Absolute Spirit, the third triad (or sphere of spirit) in the doctrine of the 'Notion'.

The dialectical structure of the thought processes in the Absolute Spirit's Divine Subjectivity culminates in the unity of the subjective and the objectivity spirit in all the particular entities possessing independent and potentially autonomous wills. Under such unification, they become 'ones' of the 'One of the many ones'. Dale Schlitt, in his book Divine Subjectivity, carries us through the abstract thinking needed to comprehend pure abstract
reasoning. Therefore, Appendix II of this thesis will show the steps of the dialectic in the concept of religion. Religion is one of the three triads; (1) Art; (2) Religion; and (3) Philosophy--triads that are the elements of the Absolute Idea (which is the ultimate Idea). The Absolute Idea is an accumulation of and an ever evolving end result of the moments of Hegel's triadic phases of thought (as the Idea). The Absolute Idea progressively builds its concrete universals as the one's of itself. It then adds them to itself. This Idea is identical to the Divine Subjectivity and is utilized by such Subjectivity in its unfolding progression of movements of its pure thought--pure thought that actualizes its potential concrete-universals from the nothingness of its original indeterminacy. (1)

One of the most questionable parts of the Hegelian 'Notion' was the deduction of Nature and the dialectical transition from the Logic to Nature. I have not gone into detail on this aspect, but it is my suspicion that it was due to the premises underlying the sciences of nature that were prevalent during his productive periods of formulating his 'Notion'. Having a strong background in modern mathematics and physics, I found no difficulty with the idea of the 'Notion' providing the thought structures from which the actuality of thought's content is made manifest in the non-free objects or entities we find as existing in our natural world. Therefore I have written the following chapter as an intermediate one (chapter five) before the Tillich chapter (chapter six). It is
for those interested in more detail of 'Hegel reviewed in the light of modern scientific knowledge of the space-time natural world'. This intermediate chapter will also include my modification of the Hegelian 'Concept' to adapt it from its pure reason aspect of being an exemplar against which to 'zero beat' other systems claiming to be as open and modifiable as Hegel presents his to be. My adaptation will be to justify our human understanding of Hegel's pure reason' concepts and our need to have such a standard in order to pick out our best rational alternatives to achieve our individual and communal moral goals in life.

Chapter six (my Tillich chapter) will take what I believe to be the essentials of Hegel's 'Identity of the Opposites' and pursue the essentials further. Tillich does this by pointing out the distortions involved in the autonomy of the will, in the heteronomous aspects of the will, and in the unification of these two separate aspects which he dialectically examines. Tillich's result is 'Theonomy'.

My concept of a 'failed part' (T.E.R. or Transcendental Entropic Residue as that part of autonomous reason which fails to stay in line with the universal law of freedom) is to me, a needed modification of the Hegelian dialectic for my paradigm. When this term ('failed part') is included, the dialectic becomes not only a speculative pure reason mode of knowledge, but a practical paradigm—one that can be applicable under the existential conditions of modern life. Tillich's
contributions bring us a realistic picture of man as a personal, rational, and autonomous being. Such a being seeks to play (at least) a partial role in his/her destiny (in spite of the distortions found in this temporal world).
NOTES

1. Dale M. Schlitt, *Divine Subjectivity*, (London: Associated University Presses, 1990), 29-99. (Subsequent references to this work will be cited in the text parenthetically as e.g., (Schlitt, 30)

2. Georg Wilhelm Hegel, *Logic Par. 307*, trans. W.T. Stace, cp. 222 of *Philosophy of Hegel* (New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1955) (Subsequent references to this work will be cited in the text parenthetically as e.g., (Hegel, xx)


4. Immanuel Kant, *Religion within the Limits of Reason*, trans. Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson, Essay by John R. Silber (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960), xxxvii. (Subsequent references to this work will be cited in the text parenthetically as e.g., (Kant R/LR, xxxvii)

5. Georg W. F. Hegel, *Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, trans. T. M. Knox, (London: Oxford University Press, 1942), xxx. (Subsequent references to this work will be cited in the text parenthetically as e.g. (Knox, ww.)

CHAPTER 5

HEGEL REVIEWED IN LIGHT OF MODERN SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE OF THE SPACE-TIME NATURAL WORLD. AND NEED FOR MODIFICATION OF NOTION FOR PRACTICAL USE IN THE NATURAL WORLD

Recent immersion in Hegelian philosophy, coupled with my extensive scientific background, led me to an intuitive application of Hegel's 'Notion' to electricity. Reflection upon this connection illuminated and lent corroboration to my understanding's grasp of the Hegelian 'Notion' as a practical (as well as a speculative) insight.

In the field of electricity, the words 'electromotive force,' 'resistance,' and 'current' have been given these terms; the term 'voltage' (E) for electromotive force; 'ohms' (R) as an expression designating a given or derived amount of resistance to current flow; and 'ampere' (I) as an expression of the strength of the current flow. These electrical terms and the algebraic equations expressing their various relationships (E = IR, I = E/R, etc.) were memorized by many (including myself) without any understanding of why these relationships occurred so they could be symbolized and formulated into scientific laws.

If an appropriate path (called a conductor) is provided, current is supposed to flow from positively charged particles to combine with negatively charged particles until all the oppositely charged particles (+ for positive, and - for negative) have combined and become
neutralized particles that constitute what is called a common ground. Such a current is supposed to flow from the positive charges to their opposing charges called negatives—the high (positive) potential force is thereby drained to a common ground which is conventionally called negative. However, in reality, we are told that the negative particles, called electrons, flow as current (I) to eventually neutralize the excess positive particles contained within an insulated compartment such as we find within a car battery. The other insulated side of such a battery is full of negative electrons which are called the ground of the battery. This negative side of the battery can be directly connected to the universal common ground which we call Earth without any interchange (current flow) taking place.

Hegel's 'Notion' first considers determinate entities as opposites to the ground from which they emerge, a ground which, as an indeterminate negation, can be analogous to our mother Earth.

It is my conviction that the element we call a positive charged one, and in our concrete example designated as (A1), can be intuitively seen as a part of its common ground (C1), which is now missing its positive part (A1). The singular unified entity we are calling (C1) is an unity that is composed of two entities which we abstractly call a positive charge (A1) and a negative charge (B1).

In our abstract thinking, the element we call (A1) separates itself from the only ground of its source, the
unified singular entity we are calling (C1). With such a separation (in thought), we now need to bring in a term (CC), which we shall use to symbolize the total ground and sum of all the unified particular entities we shall call C1, C2, C3, ... Cn. This common ground (CC) now has one of its infinite and absolutely identical entities (C1..Cn) separate itself as (C1 in thought) into the positive part of itself (A1) and the negative part (B1).

The old (C1) is now different from the remaining common ground (CC) as well, and we shall call it (C1) minus (A1) or (B1). We can now comprehend, in this non-durational (instantaneous) point of abstraction (called a moment of the successive moments carried out within the 'Notion'), the following:

(1). The old (C1), although now in conceptual thought seen as (B1) for (A's) ground, is still the free self-determined subject which, except in thought, has not left its place as an indeterminate member of the immediate indeterminate ground called Being. It is, in the essence of thought, now only completely identical with the remainder of the original content of (C1) or (B1) (the negation part of the original no-thing [C1]);

(2). At the same moment, (A1) as a thought, has manifested itself as a determinate (A1) which sees itself as separate (difference) from its source. Therefore, it is a contradiction to its source (C1) which we now think of as (B1). Through the reflective process of thought Hegel calls by the German name
'Aufhebung', the apparent contradiction (A1) is recognized in thought's self-mediation as being an 'appearance' only. Thought can therefore abolish this conception of being 'appearance', but still preserve (A1) by taking it back into its ground (now B1). In doing so, it becomes again the identity we originally called (C1). However, Hegel tells us there is a difference now. Because of the process of pure thought or reason, the self-mediation within (C1) has now changed it into a concrete universal; (3). Such a process of thought within itself, when completed, changes the former initial ground of total immediacy (C1), and it is now at a higher level we have designated as (C1a). It is higher in that it has accumulated an determinant negation (A1a) element. This thought determinant element (accident) can now be kept track of by identifying its reabsorption into the old (C1) by renaming (C1) and now calling it (C1a); (4). This (C1a), although still identical with the other indeterminates (Cs), is also now different from them in that the opposites within itself are also identical in their differences within this unity. We see this in that the internal interactions between (A1) and (B1) come only from within (C1). Therefore, the entity (C1) is now both (A1) = (B1) and (A1) = not (A1), or (B1) as its opposite. The conclusion reached from the above is that the original ground of ground of indeterminacy now has a concrete
universal within itself. This process takes place by the instantaneous determinant and successive movements described by Hegel's 'Notion'.

The above process, or moments of thought determinations of Hegel's 'Notion' have been given symbols to identify them. We can visualize electrical patterns and relationships between voltage (E), resistance (R), and current (I). They constitute events we can measure as literally existent in our natural world. Thought concepts extracted from such visual imagery can then be accepted as representative of concrete contents--contents that have been realistically cognized by a structure of thought patterns. These patterns have shown that when the structural form of thought has been fully manifested and become real or actual, the form has become the content (the two are identical).

Before proceeding further, it is necessary to explain why my insight into the appropriateness of the analogies I can make concerning Hegel's 'Notion' is not finding difficulty in surmounting an age old problem--the problem of creating 'something' which is 'coming-to-be' out of 'nothing'. To state that an existent entity (determinate object) springs out of 'nothing' is a proposition which violates the law of contradiction. This law, in conjunction with the law of Identity (A=A, B=B), constitutes the mainstay of that form of knowledge called conceptual knowledge or understanding--or that knowledge which this thesis identifies as (K2).

Because the law of contradiction is so self-evident,
we have not in general questioned the abstract term 'nothing' (and the generally accepted use of it) to stand for the opposite of the term 'something'. By the same token, we have allowed ourselves to let the terms 'being' and 'non-being' be thought of in the same sense of opposition as 'something' and 'nothing' exhibit towards each other. It will be my contention, that in abstract thinking, the term 'nothing' can take on a different connotation. It must be looked at as that which cannot be distinguished from an infinite number of substances which are identical in nature to that 'particular' we designate as a no-thing. To be distinguished as a particular something, any particular thing must be different from all that which surrounds it.

The reader is now asked to temporarily accept this idea or concept that the term 'nothing' can also have a different meaning in a more abstract context. I am also asking the reader to accept a modified heuristic approach when evaluating my assumption concerning the reality of what the term 'nothing' stands for. A heuristic principle is defined as;

one which is neither asserted nor evaluated as true, but is assumed for the specific purpose on hand because of its previous usefulness as an investigative tool. (I)

My expansion of the above dictionary definition is that, as an inductive principle, a first trial that this concept tried had to be found successful in its application before it was rational to try it again. After many successive utilizations of it, it became to be known as a 'heuristic principle'.
Let us now return to the paragraph where the example of a particular no-thing (C1) is (among its infinite number of identical particular 'C's--C1=C2=C3....to = Cn. (C1), in abstract thought (a timeless moment of the interactions of the moments of determination within the 'Notion'), is the ground of the determinate abstraction (A1). As such, it is now minus its positive (A1). Therefore (C1), in abstraction, is no longer the no-thing (C1) it was prior to the removal (in thought) of its integral part called (A1). It is now, in pure thought, minus its positive so that it is no longer a true (C1). Therefore it is no longer a neutral particular of a non-determinate whole (a whole consisting of an infinite number of balanced [and therefore non-distinguishable or non-determinate] entities within the All itself).

I am convinced we are not violating Hegel's Science of Logic when we consider this infinite intelligent (rational) All, as initially being composed of all there is as 'Being-Itself. However, this 'All' is in the initial form of an infinite number (quantity) of similar units that are non-distinguishable from each other. As such, initially in thought, the infinite quantity of no-things are the source of pure reason's infinite potential for creating structural forms and therefore determinant contents.

Prior to the beginning or initial pure thought, there is no initial determinate thing to be distinguished from the indeterminate field of immediacy or the first
moment of the pure thought of Being itself.

Before this initial moment, we cannot find any structure as yet, no specific (determinant) content as yet. Nevertheless, mankind, in its early stages of human history, had my paraphrased statement as one given to man by revelation:

In the beginning was the Word [Reason or Logos], and the Word was with God [the Intelligent Being] and the Word [as Logos] was God [the rational structure or form of 'pure reason']. The Word became flesh [content] and dwelt among us. (6)

We, as readers of Hegel, are informed of and capable of abstractly applying Hegel's 'Notion' to the above discussion of the Word becoming flesh and dwelling among us. We now have a tool (the 'Notion') that we can use to logically visualize that the content of the personality known as 'Jesus' the man, was the full manifestation of the personalized essence of the universal Spirit known as God—this manifestation was concretely symbolized by the name Christ (a term recognized as synonymous with that of the term God).

We can also recall Aristotle's thought that there is no such thing as 'formless matter' nor 'matterless form.' If we do, we can say that relatively speaking, if the content of reason is the form of reason (at the initial point of the logic), the mix of the two opposites (form and matter) is maximized in favor of formless matter (the no-things of the immediacy of Hegel's Being). An infinitely small spark of reason as structure (or form or essence) of a thought in Being breaks away from its opposite (non-being or no-thing) and becomes a determinate
moment in the dialectical movements of the 'Notion'. Subsequent potential concrete universals (diverse particulars in unity with each other and with the universal 'All') have not at this point become the majority portion of the proportional mix of content and form within the 'All' as 'Subject'. Therefore, the manifestation of the potential possibilities of various creative essences are only potential, and the will of the 'All' has not subsequently started to manifest itself into those actualities that humans see as 'appearances' in the existent world.

The resultant growth of the human reason comes from a striving to ascend from the finitude of thought (the concepts of appearances in natural world) to infinite thought (complete unity, in spite of a human's particularity, with the original Being—a Being called the 'All' by many and 'God' by others).

The above striving and its progression is called 'Religion' by Hegel. (2) The role of 'Religion' in Hegel's categorical sphere (Spirit) is highly important as it occupies the position between Art (1st movement) and Philosophy (3d movement). There, it serves as the 'Identity of Differences' between Art and Philosophy. In this role, it preserves and reformulates the original unity which is now advancing in its production of 'concrete universals'. In full identity with such universals, the remaining and infinite number of indeterminate no-things found in this basic ground of all being can be viewed as the continuing source from which
'particulars' (called 'accidents' by Hegel) may be created. Such 'particulars', after reflective reasoning (found in the 'essence' of 'Religion' as a spontaneous movement within thought itself), are incorporated (preserved) as 'concrete universals' in the developing original ground of all being--Being as Absolute Divine Subjectivity.

My hypothesis and discussion on the indeterminate nothings of formless matter can be summarized by stating that the relative nothingness of space itself could actually be an infinite quantity of quantum matter--matter which consists of equally infinitely small and identical particles. Therefore any one particular particle cannot be distinguished from another. Any subsequent distinction only occurs when the energy of thought (in its various structural forms) distills the basic matter into different entities that appear to us as actualities we encounter in our physical world. Substantiation of such a concept being rationally possible came to light and was published in May 1994 in a magazine called World Report. The article was called Alternative Realities and stated that a recent laboratory test has corroborated that the top quark actually does exist rather than being a speculative assumption of physic scientists. A proposed ten dimensional universe is now being offered as a major assumption to support a new universal theory called the 'superstring theory'. This theory holds that all matter and energy are the result of the vibration of infinitesimally small loops that are one hundred billion
billion times smaller than a proton! (3)

Modern science (via calculus computations) assumes minute differences in materials used can be disregarded in various technologies, and the practical results work within the realm of virtual certainty (thus justifying their use of reductive formulations). It is my conviction that we can reasonably assume that such infinitesimally small loops of matter in the 'superstring theory' do not have any significant amount of differences between them, or there would be at least a small build up of subsets within this great group of indeterminate 'loops'. These subsets would adhere together as an 'Identity of Opposites' and therefore rearrange the initial and indeterminate field of 'no-things' into being a combination of no-things and some-things.

Hegel's 'Notion' can now be more easily envisioned as being a method of thought which creates the content of thought. Within its inner movements, thought finds those concepts we find within the category called 'Religion', as being essential and necessary concepts. They are needed to mend an apparent disunity between the categories of Art and Philosophy of the Spirit (as they are found in Hegel's last categorical sphere of progressive development which he calls the 'Absolute Idea'.

One result of our thinking to this point is that we can now logically see, as part of our moral growth, the practicality of the speculative pure reasoning Hegel gives us concerning the teleological aim of Being-Itself. As unified parts of this infinite source of all being, we
can conceive our individual goals as being the full actualization of our complete individual essences. In this sense, as eventual (perfected) entities, we will be a unified part of the Omega (end) for which Alpha, as the beginning, is striving to reach.

The concept of the 'Notion' comes sequentially in order after being (non-distinguishable immediacy) and essence (difference, limitation, and opposition). Nevertheless, it is really that structure of thought which, ontologically creative and teleologically oriented, selects the rational structural essence of a teleological oriented intention of pure reason. This is accomplished before the process of randomly (chaos) selecting rational alternatives (instantaneously) and processing them by what we can deem the scientific method (the five D's).

Reflective thinking now uses the five D method (in the respective mode of knowledge one is in) to arrive at the most reasonable means to achieve the process of the manifestation of that essence to reach its full manifestation. Full manifestation is that point where the content (matter of the determinate) is equal to the structure of thought that created the content. Such pure thought is not only the beginning, but the process and the completion. It may be noticed that such a procedure is flexible and can be repetitively followed by human thinking if and when future unaccountable contingencies (unpredicted) occur.

On a side thought, we can also recognize that, in Schlitt's terminology, the Absolute Reason of the Divine
Subjectivity we commonly call God, is capable of overcoming the short circuits induced by man's abuse of his finite freedom. Man does this by freely separating himself from God by breaking the bonds of unity of similarity and the bonds found in differences between God and his created creatures. God does not need to temporally overpower the contingent distortions to His original and ultimate volitions (distortions that Kant told us emanated from human desires and inclinations of the natural man).

God's answer to the problem of distortion is solved in that duration of what we call eternity. Therefore He does not need to lose patience. He needs only to weave any temporary delays into His intentional and ultimate will for His teleological aims to be achieved. Any such temporal delays are insufficient to destroy the ultimateness of God's 'Holy Will' to be accomplished.

Hegel also said (in light of his conviction that first philosophy should lose nothing reasonable) that "every thing that is, is reasonable". (4)

We can now conceive that his proposition (the identity of a finished teleological product is a a full manifestation of the essence of that particular entity) is a logically self-evident premise. That manifested essence is the product of the mind's dialectic starting from the original ground of its being, and proceeding within its self-identity by movements of determination within itself. Such a structure is explicated for us when we, by
thought, apply Hegel's 'Notion' when and where it is logically appropriate.

Appropriate, in the last part of the previous paragraph, must include the fact the appropriateness is also in accordance with the 5 D's and the three modes of knowledge (K1), (K2), and (K3). The 'Notion', as such, is not a propositional premise, but a dialectical tool to use in our continual strivings to gain control of our external environment. This tool also helps insure that our freedom can be more fully utilized in the creation and control of those individual maxims which determine our moral conduct in life.

If we reflect upon the assumption that the infinite number of no-things (as a plural sum of them) is not the 'Absolute All' in its entirety, then the mystery of the Original Reason, Spirit, Idea, is not only unknown, but unknowable to the (K2) mode of knowledge. If so (and the possibility of this premise is just as logically possible as its opposite), then the original 'All' cannot be subsumed under the guise of being the original pure Reason, Absolute Spirit, and Absolute Idea, all of which are supposedly potentially knowable.

The Absolute Idea, or the 'Notion' has to include more than that which the finite mind of man comprehends as pure reason. If such an element is a component of reality, then that which is posited as first cause (and therefore self-determined, self-sufficient, and self-developed) must have a mystery element (for finite man's reason). This element is an addition to the part the human reason calls
no-thingness. Conceptual knowledge (K2), if under this alternate premise, is only capable of achieving conceptual truths found in the indeterminate part of Being's original self—a self that in addition to its initial no-thingness also contains the potential for self-creating an infinite number of determinates in a manner we humans can only encompass with the term 'chaos'. We lack a better understanding because of our total lack of comprehension of the whole 'Absolute Idea' which cannot be subsumed under that part of knowledge known as (K2). How could man do so with his particular form of pure reason alone? Each of us is only one particular of an infinite number of particulars.

However, as finite beings, we have for our individual control only a discrete part of the real 'Whole' of all there is. As such, I am convinced that man's power over finite necessitated objects in the finite world gives us a sense of power that corrupts us. Supposedly absolute power (as some world leaders felt they had) absolutely corrupts and man's hubris (our innate desire to control and be the all ourselves) has led to (and will continue to lead to) our literal bodily deaths—deaths as temporal beings who have freely abdicated our innate freedom to retain our union with our common ground of all the particular entities we define as human individuals.

The road ahead divides as to how we view the future of life in a dimension beyond the four dimensions of this physical world. Our reason and faith in the future is
contingent, according to the actions we follow in consonance with our paradigms of how life should be conducted.

In my paradigm of man's spiritual now (and for the future beyond our temporal stage of reality), the split in the direction we take is either: (a) to continue in reality (in timelessness not endless time); or (b) to lose the freedom of self-identity and return to the void of non-entities or no-things as part of the term I will now define as being 'Transcendental Entropic Residue' (T.E.R).

By this phrase—which I have synthetically a priori conceived and coined to rationally justify a connection in my mind—I mean a connection between Hegel's pure reason (speculative reason) formulation of his 'notion' and that form of heteronomous understanding (conceptual) that we use to apply universal natural laws of cause and effect to control the natural world.

I am introducing this term in order to justify the adaptation of the Hegelian 'Notion' to practical usage by finite mankind and make his 'Universals' concrete ones rather than sensuous and abstract ones. I call it 'Transcendental Entropic Residue'. Just as when the time was right, calculus was discovered by Leibniz and Newton at approximately the same time, it may be that there is in current literature of which I am unaware, another, or others, who are expressing (or have expressed) in different terminology, a concept similar to that which I am introducing as 'Transcendental Entropic Residue' in my terminology. Nevertheless, I have created this term to
stand for 'a failed part' of that 'essence' of an entity which has manifested a part of its 'essence' by this part's 'appearance'. It appears in the actuality we call the 'existence' of an entity in the natural space-time world.

Before proceeding with further details of this part of the 'essence' of an entity, it is fruitful to sketch very briefly what Hegel meant by 'essence'. He defined this term as being a 'definition of the Absolute'. (Hegel, 179) He called the Absolute the 'essence' of the world. He saw it as being the unseen source of the appearances we find (and call actuality) in the space-time natural world. This source was what Hegel found to be the underlying unity which becomes manifest in the diversity and multiplicity of the natural world as we conceive it on our scale of observation.

Essence, as the inner part of the external objects we perceive in the space-time natural world, is an abstraction from the totality of the entity we perceive as 'appearance' in our space-time concepts of objects external to us. (Hegel, 198)

By use of our reason, Hegel shows us we can abstractly separate 'essence' into three spheres or categories; (1) ground of existence; (2) appearance; and (3) actuality. Further abstractions can be deduced (according to Hegel) as moments within each of these three basic categories.

Before expounding further on this potential and realistic 'failed part' of the essence of a spiritual
human being, it needs only to be said that we are considering here a problem that has existed throughout the history of mankind. It has been carried forward in Western culture in the form of a myth—A myth of the 'fall of man' as explicated in the 'Garden of Eden and the eating of the forbidden fruit'.

It is my conviction that most human beings today are not exempt from the ramifications of this problem, but can find themselves in full accord with Saint Paul and his dilemma which was so distinctly enunciated in the famous New Testament chapter in Romans 7:15-24. There, we are told:

For we know that the law is spiritual; but I am carnal, sold under sin. For that which I do, I allow not, for what I would, that I do not; but what I hate, that do I. If then, I do that which I would not, I consent unto the law that it is good. Now then, it is no longer I that do it, but the sin [separation from unity with source of being] that dwells in me. (5)

Few persons, in honest appraisal of themselves as moral creatures, feel that, in this existent and temporal world, they are truly autonomous persons. Instead, they see themselves as heteronomous ones like St. Paul confessed himself to be.

Under the assumption that the reader will accept St. Paul's assessment of the common human condition concerning moral intentions and moral actions, I have taken the liberty to abstract from and call that part of man's heteronomus will which is not in a full harmonious relationship with the total entity called a self, a 'failed part'. This means that this particular part is neither in harmony with other morally like-minded
humans, nor in unity with the source of all creation. As a contradiction unacceptable for unity, we can consider it as being a piece of 'Transcendent Entropic Residue'.

The above 'failed part' will not continue as a preserved return to its original source and become a part of an 'inverse funnel' effect. The 'inverse funnel' is my visual image that as the circle of a given dialectic is completed on the horizontal level of human reflection and understanding, it really represents an increase in the vertical direction as well. It can be visualized as a gradual winding upward like a spring coil, while gradually increasing in a horizontal direction. The vertical direction would correspond to Hegel's concept that religion is the movement of the finite mind towards the infinite. As one of those 'failed parts', it is logically and realistically (by metaphysical law) destined to start its entropic return to the literal no-thingness (chaos of the infinite non-determinate no-things). Thus it becomes again an indistinguishable part of the non-determinate immediacy found within the original ground of all being, a ground from which it was originally born.

In summation, this residual material (diverted from its intended participation in the eventual fully actualized 'essence' created by the 'absolute All') is now subject to the law of entropy. It qualifies for subjection to this law because it was the failure of the human rational will of a given person to totally possess the 'holiness of will' necessary to be realizing one hundred percent of its potentiality at that particular
location, and within the given contingencies of the situation at that time.

The word 'transcendental' is therefore used to signify the human spiritual reason that is within the world, but also transcendent to it. Thus my term 'Transcendental Entropic Residue' represents:

the whole process described above wherein the freedom of man allows man to distort a significant part of his rational spiritual self-being decisions. These distortions are very significant in that they (now separated from their unified identity with the ground of all being) have reached their fullest manifestation possible. The return to no-thingness of the Divine Subjectivity (God) will complete the process called 'Transcendental Entropic Residue'.

Such manifestations have cut themselves off from the only source of self-determined freedom and self-directed growth (the Divine Subjectivity known commonly as the one God). In conjunction with this premise, this author is truly convinced, spiritually, rationally, and holistically, that true free growth is that growth which will eventually achieve a destined teleological purpose (goal)—one which the respective entities were designed to meet as free particular individuals who are parts of the universal 'All'.

Out of connection with, and in disunity with the ultimate All's intention for our spiritual development, this undesired residue of our creativity is now ready to start the journey of dissolution—a journey in accordance with the laws of entropy. We can rationally justify such an assertion because the natural laws of physics still affirm that energy (as thought forms in Hegelian terminology) cannot be destroyed, but only change their
mode of appearance (manifestation as a visible reality, or as atomic elements, in electrical, material, magnetic, etc., modes).

Within the dialectical movements of man's finite reasoning, man may recycle (go through again one or more times) the series of instantaneous movements indicated by Hegel's 'Notion' that occur within pure thought. The number of successive so called instantaneous times such a cycle is performed (upon choosing the best method [for an intentional action to be performed] from various alternatives) is incidental to the final result of ignoring or resisting the development of thought and spirit within oneself. The final result is the same, distortion or failure of the self-constructed form to be in unity with the ground of all Being (God), will result in a temporary content (appearance in the natural world) only. It will start its spirit disintegration into the formless no-things from which it sprang. Its permanence and generation to be sustained and manifest in timeless reality is possible only if it is the partially fulfilled 'essential' form and manifestation of the original self-determined, self-positied, and self-developed source of being man has called Logos--or that ultimate spirit and the absolute idea of the original creative ground of Being-Itself. Hegel describes such a Being as a 'Divine Subjectivity inclusive of objectivity'. I regard this term as Hegel's attempt to describe a personalized God and not being a term to represent an abstract, non-personal objective entity. Instead it is a term to describe a
Being who is beyond the separation of self (I) and the 'other' as a non-personal 'It'.

Last, but not least, I am convinced that the content of this 'residue' concept rationally and logically helps Hegel's original and continuous intent to save all experience for reason—nothing examined should be lost but to be acknowledged, posited, perhaps negated, but yet be preserved (Aufheben-Aufhebung). (Hegel, 106)

Returning to our main subject, that of a self which is self-determined, self-posited, and self-developed, Hegel elaborates on the no-things which are logically potential to become some-things. He tells us it is immaterial as to which pole of a given polarity (for example positive versus negative) is selected and be called the base (ground or subject we can label as [C1a]) when the other opposite is removed from the original element (C1). In thought, the polarity we call positive (B1) has separated itself from the only ground of its source—its base (C1), where (C1) is only (C1) when it is the unity of [(A1) and (B1) only]. With such a separation (in thought), (CC), as the total ground of all unified particular entities called (C1-C2-C3-... Cn), now has one of the infinite (Cs) differentiate itself (and declare itself as an independent positive or determinant). At this non-durational point of abstraction, called a moment by Hegel, the original ground of this element (C1) becomes (C1 minus B1) or (A1) as it is now minus its positive (B1). This (B1), while separated in abstract
thought, is still a part of the ground (C1) from which it has arbitrarily separated itself.

Thus a finite part [(B1) of (C1)] which is one of the infinite ground of like particles or elements called C1-C2-C3 ...to Cn, has in thought, separated itself from its unity with (A1) in the original (C1). In this sense, and in analytic terminology, this separation from the basic element we call (C1) as subject, (B1) becomes a predicate extracted by thought in its creative excursions and search for its boundaries beyond those of its current status. Why cannot the attempt to think in terms of pure reason be conceptualized in this manner? Man in his limited reason (which is contaminated in its existential environment) attempts the same thing!

As we continue to look deeper into what Hegel explores in his 'Notion' as the 'other', let us reflectively conceive the (B1) in our example as a particular—It is a particular by creating, in the original ground, a negative (what is left of a negative and positive in balanced unity). This new negative is now not a unity as its positive has been temporarily abolished from it by abstract thought (Hegel). We see this in actuality in a car battery. The 'other' (in thought and in the positive side of the battery) is potentially available to be returned and preserved by its return in that it now changes the neutral non-entity (C1) into the negative (A1), a change created by the negative created by the temporary absence of (B1). The negation of this latter negative preserves the original unity in potential,
but (C1) has now returned (in thought) after reflective thinking on the situation. It is now back in a potential form to its original unity ('Identity of Opposites').

However, this original ground which was previously undifferentiated from the countless other nothings (C1-C2 etc) now is no longer totally indeterminate, but has a preserved concrete (real creative thought) of a positive determinate nature which stood out of its passive role to become an active determinate in thought. It therefore brings back, in its return to home ground (old C1), an infinitely small differentiation (distortion) accrued in its temporal escape (by instantaneous moments within the internal unity of thought itself) from its original and basic ground of thought itself.

Thought's understanding first sees this escaped determinate (escape in abstract thought only) as being a differentiation, and then as being an contradiction to its original unity with its basic ground of being. (Does not man's conceptual thought [K2] do this and then stop in its belief that the law of identity, \( A = A \) and the associated law of contradiction are sufficient proof of the determinate non-free nature of the natural world including man?)

Before continuing our practical application of Hegel's 'Notion' in our modern natural world, we can see the need of Hegel to go beyond Kant's apparent tendency to keep his critical reason within the limits set by the knowledge we designate as (K1) and (K2). We can apply this sort of reasoning to any entity's essence that has been
partially manifest as an actuality in the external world. For an example, a positive voltage retainer on the positive side of a car battery, has (as its opposite polarity) a negative container (holding an excess of negative electrons) in isolation from the positive charges. The negative charges are available as current (I) in the process of reunification with their positive counterparts.

So, if a common ground as a means of connecting these negatives is established, the particular voltage (E) will be negated (unless replaced by other means) and yet preserved by its return to a neutral entity we find in a common ground of all electrical phenomena.

To illustrate further, let us consider only the current 'now' appearance of an entity we see before us as an external existing object. Let us also assume that this entity we have before us is a rational being, or one which is free to separate its future actions from any cooperation (be in unity with) with its original ground of being. We now have, in opposition to free and whole hearted unity with its source, a determinate being who has been given the freedom to not cooperate in unity with its source. (We remember that the given commandments to not steal, cheat, lie, etc. would not need to be given, should those rational beings given the commandments, not have had the power [freedom] to reject their compliance to them). Such a rational being has the potentiality to totally will to be in tune with, or to be partially in tune with and partially out of tune with its self-determinate, self-
sufficient, and self-developing ground from which it came.

Let us further assume that what we now see is only a part of an entity which is potentially either autonomous or heteronomous— an entity which therefore has a responsible part in accomplishing its own destiny. This destiny is therefore composed of both the external contingencies, and the autonomous or heteronomous decisions made and acted upon by this rational and spiritual entity we call man.

Therefore, the entity called man (and symbolized as \[ A \]) is a predicate of the subject ground (ALL, or CC). However, \( A \) in its freedom, can be abolished from (CC) by its deliberate choice to remain separated, rather than be preserved in unity with its ground of being (CC). If in such unity, the entity \( A \) is preserved and remains united with (CC), it does this by making \( A \)'s maxim the same concept as that espoused by Kant's 'Categorical Imperative'.

It is my current contention that man, in his totality as a natural man and a spiritual man, is not capable (by himself) of accomplishing external actions that are in a one to one correspondence to his volitional intent. This failure includes any maxims found to be identical with those found in Kant's 'Categorical Imperative'.

I base my conviction on: (a) my identification with St. Paul's struggle with moral conduct; (b) my rational and intuitive acceptance of Kant's moral concepts as elucidated within the limits of man's conceptual knowledge.
(K2)—concepts subjected to the steps of the five D's within the appropriate mode of knowledge, (K1), (K2), (K3), or combinations thereof; and (c) my own post reflections (D5) after taking the leap of faith and operating as if such moral imperatives were really true premises.

Therefore, any opposing residue of independent action on the part of the human entity called the predicate (A) (as a singular from the human's creative source) is now self-cut-off from its potential source of power of 'being' and 'becoming.' Consequently, this cut off residue of independent non-cooperative and nonconforming actuality, will atrophy as its source of becoming is now abolished. It therefore eventually returns to the non-being (dust) from which it sprang. Evil is opposite in meaning as well as in spelling from the word live. Perhaps this is the basis for the warning or edict found in the Myth of the Garden of Eden. When man cuts himself off from the source of his being (by making his own self-determinations, apart from cooperation with and in unity with the universal source of power and being), then that person will eventually die, or atrophy back into the dust (indeterminate no-thingness) from which he/she came.
NOTES


2. Dale M. Schlitt, *Divine Subjectivity*, (London: Associated University Presses, 1990). 154. (Subsequent references to this work will be cited in the text parenthetically as e.g., (Schlitt, 155)

3. *U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT*. May 9, 1994


5. *N. T. ROMANS* 7: 15-24

6. *N. T. ST. JOHN* 1: 1, 14
CHAPTER 6

TILLICH

As stated earlier, the goal of this thesis is to develop a paradigm which synthesizes faith and reason, especially in reference to moral values.

The chapters preceding this one have established rational, emotional, and volitional aspects of the human personality that could be said to be mainly idealistic in nature. We know that the expansion of knowledge in the technical fields after the turn of the nineteenth century led to an optimism that knowledge was indeed virtue. Man, by himself alone, could now establish values and a mode of life that would be not only useful and self-satisfying, but would be one that fulfilled a sense of purpose and meaningfulness in life.

This optimism that technical science had all the necessary answers for a meaningful life was shattered by World War I. Mankind was left with a world where suffering, cruelty, meaninglessness, and despair are predominant. Essentialism has been primarily associated with idealism, and existentialism has been associated with the realism of our existent lives in this natural world.

Our goal is to help an individual achieve a unity of his subjective, objective, and volitional natures, especially in the area of ethical values and conduct. It is therefore necessary to show how such a unity of faith and reason can be at least partially accomplished over a
period of time in spite of the distortions of each of these functions when they operate in our natural existent world. Paul Tillich, a prominent philosopher, theologian, and an existential thinker, is the most familiar and modern person I have found that combines idealism with realism in a systematic and scientific manner—a manner that utilizes the very concept of Being (Ontology) to underlie and support all the modes of knowledge (the 3 K's, as previously proposed).

This chapter will review and analyze pertinent parts of his three volume work, Systematic Theology. (1) My analysis of his works (published in the period 1951-1963) will utilize the five D's (scientific methodological steps) and the three K's (three modes of knowledge) to corroborate Tillich's method of 'correlation' in relating essentialism to existentialism. His synthesis will lend considerable support to the final paradigm proposed by this thesis.

Step (D5), called the 'debug step', corroborates or corrects the conclusions reached by utilizing the five 'D' step procedures in the analysis of the philosophical concepts considered in this thesis. It does this by substantiating a person's conclusions by checking them against standards set by the given communal group. This group consists of those persons trained in using group-established standard procedures to bring about the goals desired. We have previously seen that 'corroboration' or 'substantiation' means a way by which we may decide whether our judgment is a true or false one.
Tillich proposes to us an ontological use of the term 'truth' which is quite different from the usage sought by 'technical reason'. This difference is a vital one, and in order to understand Tillich's efforts to unite the two 'truths' by his 'method of correlation', the next section will briefly establish Tillich's concepts of what he calls controlling knowledge (K2 or objective) and receiving knowledge (K1 or subjective knowledge).

SECTION ONE
SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE TRUTH

Earlier, we discussed one source of conflict between faith and reason. It was found that 'technical reason' operates under the assumption that 'truth' can be verified only by the criteria established by empirical science. The safest test for this science is the controlled and experimental one--where successive testing gives the same results over a continuing time period.

Although Tillich agrees that every cognitive presupposition must be tested, he refutes a long held assumption by many that the experimental method of corroboration is the exclusive pattern for substantiation. (Tillich I, 102) He reminds us that experiential cognition (which takes place in the total life process without holding all other factors constant except the one being tested) may give us results far less exact, but are far truer to life than are experimental (technical controlling) results. (Tillich I, 102)

Each reader can personally substantiate Tillich's conclusions that we have two cognitive attitudes, one
subjective and the other objective. He acknowledges we need both types in our life processes and feels science is justified in extending the experimental methods as far as they can be. He reminds us that our receiving knowledge (K1 and K3) is corroborated by a creative union of the two natures (subjective and objective), which he calls the 'union of the nature of knowing', and the 'nature of that which is known'. Such substantiation of an individual event in changing time and space is not a repeatable, exact, or final one. He tells us such a test is only indefinite, and there is always a risk associated with a judgment reached after such an encounter. (Tillich I, 103)

The reader is encouraged to relate Tillich's creative union of the knower (subject) and the known (object) with the Hegelian 'Notion' where the 'Notion's third moment takes the known (or the objective 'other') and preserves it by incorporating it into the first moment (or original subjective 'self'). Note also the similarity of the Notion's concept (that any remaining differences can be recycled in a later dialectic) to Tillich's idea of the indefiniteness of the judgment at a given moment--therefore providing a possibility for future openness to any change in the nature of the union.

At this point, we have established that there is a difference between experimental corroboration and experiential corroboration. However, it remains to be seen how an intuitive (K3) union comes about--a union in which one's life as a reasoning human being is both aware of itself as a knower, and of the 'other' as that which is
known. Tillich gives us his convictions on how this can be done without having the term 'truth' be restricted solely to empirically corroborative (experimentally and repeatable confirmed) propositions.

He reminds us that modern philosophy usually considers that the terms 'false' and 'true' are qualities of judgment. The reality of an entity is that which it 'is'—in and of itself, the entity is neither false nor true. What we see before us as an object (or entity) can be an appearance, or the true being of that which is before our intentional gaze. Tillich maintains that the seemingly real (appearance) is not unreal (not true) unless it is taken for the really real—where the really real is the total essence or nature of that which is appearing before us. (Tillich I, 101)

Upon the basis of ideas expressed above, Tillich now asks us to consider his concept of what constitutes a true judgment (when our minds grasp and shape what we see as the 'reality' confronting us). He defines a true judgment as being "that level of an object's being, the knowledge of which prevents wrong expectations and consequent disappointments." This concept of ontological 'truth' is important enough for the purposes of this thesis that his expansion of the definition needs to be mentioned. He tells us that the term 'truth' is similar to the term 'reason'. Both are subjective-objective. Truth is therefore a combination of the true nature (essence) of a thing known in addition to the cognitive act by
which the knower grasps and expresses the object's true
essence. (Tillich I, 104)

This thesis will consider Tillich's ontological
definition of 'truth' as a general standard against which
to "zero beat" other ontological definitions of what
constitutes a true judgment. If we accept his definition
as being the most inclusive one we are currently aware
of, we have a means of determining the degree to which a
self-derived judgment of an event (within a given mode
of knowledge) can be corroborated—corroborated within the
context of the total picture concerning the complete
nature (or essence) of what the given event 'is'. This
'is' is that which is now confronting us as an external or
internal object we recognize initially as an 'other' as it
appears to our senses, or to our reason independent of
sensory input.

One should apply Tillich's concept of 'ontological
truth' as a basic reference when utilizing the other tools
previously suggested for testing of the material utilized
in this thesis to establish its proposed paradigm—a
paradigm whose purpose is to provide an effective means to
aid each person in the establishment of her/his own
autonomous 'maxims' concerning her/his ethical values and
resultant conduct in all aspects of her/his daily life.

SECTION TWO
PHILOSOPHY (STRUCTURE) VERSUS
THEOLOGY (CONTENT)

Paul Tillich's Systematic Theology by its very
name implies the combination or synthesis of philosophy
(rational structure or form) and theology (content or
matter) when dealing with his basic subject matter, man's 'ultimate concern' (his/her very 'being'). His purpose in this work is to correlate the existential questions (arising from living in a world of constantly changing situations and conditions) with answers appropriate to such questions (concerning man's 'ultimate concern'). Tillich's answers are derived from the content of a Christian theology and are in interdependence with the questions. (Tillich I, 60)

In his development of the theological aspect of man's nature, Tillich begins with man having two needs to be satisfied— the statement of the truth of the Christian message and the interpretation of this truth for each new generation. Tillich's description of the general nature of theology and his method of theology includes two formal criteria which separate theology from other disciplines: (1) "The object of theology is what concerns us ultimately. Only those statements are theological which deal with their object when it can become or is an object of ultimate concern." (Tillich I, 12); (2) "Our ultimate concern is that which determines our being or our not-being. Only those statements are theological which deal with their object in so far as it can become a matter of being or not-being for us." (Tillich I, 14)

We are then told that the term 'ultimate concern' is an abstract translation of the great commandment:

The Lord, our God, the Lord is One; and you shall love the Lord with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind, and with all your strength." (2)

Understanding 'being' as being more than man's
existence in time and space, Tillich finds this term to means the whole of human reality (its structure, purpose, and goals). Therefore, a threat of its loss is a matter of infinite importance. (Tillich I, 14)

By such formal criteria, Christianity may be seen to be the ultimate answer of theology to the existential questions asked by man. Christianity does not exclude but includes the trends in other religions which are moving towards the Christian answer. (Tillich I, 15)

Belief in Christianity may be justified as being the ultimate answer in that an ultimate answer must be one that is universal and absolute—however, it must also satisfy the concrete particular known as the existential human being. Only in Christianity did the 'Word' become flesh and dwell among men. Only such an absolute universal and an absolute concrete object can be an adequate manifestation of our ultimate concern.

A relationship between the 'reason' of philosophy and the 'revelation' (or faith) of theology can be established only by finding a common ground between them. To do this, Tillich defines philosophy as "that cognitive approach to reality in which reality as such is the object." Tillich tells us that the term 'reality' means "that structure of categories and concepts which are presupposed in every cognitive engagement with reality." He sees philosophy as being the continuing search for those logical structures which make experience possible. He also sees 'being' as the basic common denominator which is found in everything that 'is'. (Tillich I, 18)
Returning to theology, Tillich now states that its object of ultimate concern must have reality in order to concern us. If it has reality, it has being, but must be a being that is not alongside other 'beings' or it would not be our ultimate concern. His conclusion is that the object of theology must be the very ground of all being, that Being which is the ultimate and unconditional power of all other beings. (Tillich I, 21)

Upon the establishment of a common ground (Being) upon which philosophy and theology both rest, Tillich then points out their differences. Philosophy deals with the structure of being, but must be objectively detached to maintain a unity within universal participation. It also must study everything in nature to find and comprehend the rational structure of all reality. The content of philosophy is knowledge in general about natural life as it is found subsumed under the (K2) categories of time, space, cause, and substance.

Theology deals with that aspect of being that is meaningful for us. Tillich proposes the ultimate concern of man is the continuation of his own being. Therefore the theological approach to being is found in an attitude of subjective, personal, and saving truth. The theologian's source is not a universal of pure reason that cannot be isolated to a particular place or time, but is the very Logos that became flesh. By means of this concrete universal, the believer is grasped by the power of the ground of being, and by the community established upon it. (Tillich I, 23-24)
The third point of difference between philosophy and theology deals with the categories of time, space, cause, and substance in their relationships to the finite existent material which is structured by these categories. Tillich sees the content of theology as being the search for a 'new being' that is reunified in its relationship to very ground of being. (Tillich I, 24)

In spite of the divergences between philosophy and theology, Tillich believes that the developments taking place in each include a convergence towards each other. He claims the philosopher within one's self can temporarily become a theologian. This happens when his desire to be detached, objective, and universal, becomes influenced by his existential situation and his ultimate concern about it.

In return, a person's theology (as an ultimate concern) is infused with a philosophical bent when that individual seeks to demonstrate the universality of such a concern. Tillich sees such a situation as being a constant tension and burden to any theological work. (Tillich I, 26)

The analysis to this point of the relation between philosophy and theology leads Tillich to the conclusion that there is neither conflict nor synthesis possible between them. He justifies his position of no conflict upon the supposition that there must be a common ground for conflict. He contends the ground of theology is its ultimate concern and philosophy's concern is the
ontological analysis of the structure of being.

(Tillich I, 27)

If a discussion deals with this structure of being, the analysis must come from the philosophic side of one's self. He then argues that there can be no real synthesis of the two. He justifies this conviction by stating that any restriction on philosophy by religion diminishes the logos of being generally. In a similar fashion, Tillich sees Christianity as not being in need of a Christian philosophy in that Christianity believes the Logos who appeared as concrete in Jesus is at the same time the universal Logos. This claim includes within itself, the assertion that wherever the classical Logos is at work, it is in accordance with the Christian message. Therefore, Tillich understands that no philosophy which is obedient to the universal Logos can contradict the concrete Logos ("the Logos which became flesh"). (Tillich I, 28)

My analysis of Tillich (at this point) is that he has denied the possibility of conflict and of synthesis between philosophy (structure) and theology (content) on the level of the pure reason of Logos itself. However, it is the conviction of this author that both subjective reason and objective reason, which constitute the basic ontological structure of the self and the world about the self, can be in a constant conflict, tempered by temporary moments of synthesis. Tillich sees that if a church, such as the Catholic Church, adopts a given philosopher (Thomas Aquinas), then that adoption limits the
philosopher to special conditions and given purposes to justify.

Therefore, I see Tillich as using his 'method of correlation' in order to make sense of a practical relationship between the questions asked by man in his human situations and the revelatory answers given by theology in a mutual and ongoing interdependence between them. (Tillich I, 18)

We can conclude that Tillich's 'correlation' means a relationship in which both philosophy and theology have an effect on each other, and yet remain independent of each other. If such a conclusion is accepted, then it remains difficult to see where the 'common ground' in Tillich's 'method of correlation' differs significantly from the 'common ground' premises underlying Hegel's 'Identity of Opposites'.

We shall later see that the structure of 'being' is based upon the polarity of the subjective (sensibility or K1) and the objective (reason or K2). The spirit (relationship or unity of K1 and K2 in K3) becomes the common ground of both (K1) and (K2) in Hegel's 'Identity of the Opposites'.

In addition, Tillich's 'method of correlation' not only corroborates the basic premises of Kant and Hegel that we have emphasized, but will provide modifications of these basic premises where and when necessary. Such modifications are given in light of the reality of the existential distortions of both 'reason' and 'faith' in our modern and rapidly changing world. (Refer ahead to
We have seen (in chapter three) Kant's assertion that autonomy of the modern human being is necessary if such an individual is to be held responsible for her/his moral decisions made and acted upon while living in this existent natural world. In addition to the questions asked about our very being, our sense of moral conduct, and what can we hope to accomplish as individuals, many other questions address the problem of what we can know and how we know that we know it. Hopefully, such acquired knowledge establishes the basic philosophical point of view from which we start when forced to make changes in our way of life today. Tillich suggests that we use the following definition of philosophy, which he understands to include most of the important philosophies appearing in history: "Philosophy is that cognitive approach to reality in which reality as such is the object." (Tillich I, 18)

Elements of the two philosophical viewpoints (essentialism and existentialism) can be found in each other. They need not be mutually exclusive and totally independent of each other. Therefore, it is necessary to clarify in the next section what Tillich means by his use of the terms "existential," "existentialist," and "existentialism." We need to be aware of how he uses each term in order for us to 'existentially', yet with critical reasoning, examine the two viewpoints we have before us. Then we can use our tools to analyze, critically examine, and reasonably
justify the conclusions we select to support the subsequent decisions that we risk making and carrying out in order truly to be ourselves both individually and within our collective groups.

SECTION THREE
CONCEPTS CONCERNING THE TERMS 'EXISTENTIAL', 'EXISTENTIALIST', AND 'EXISTENTIALISM'

We have seen that Tillich is primarily concerned with the problem of making theology relevant to the cultural periods of history and the practical life situations found within these periods. His 'method of correlation' seeks to show the relevance of religion to the estranged state man finds himself in while attempting to find meaning and purpose in existent life, especially in periods of rapid and chaotic cultural change. He insists that, to avoid ambiguities of terms used in modern times, any system or method (such as his 'correlation' method) must not only define the terms used, but must show how and why they are used as such.

To justify Tillich's particular use of terms involving the word 'exist', he takes the reader back to the original 'root' meaning. Tillich takes this path because he thinks that words are a result of the human mind's encounter with reality. As a result, words are not only signs, but can also be symbols. Tillich distinguishes between signs and symbols, in that symbols are expressions that participate in that total experience of an object--participate as an expression of the experienced relationship between the knower and that which is known. Signs only point to reality as totally other. (3)
Our word "exist" comes from the Latin word 'existere' meaning "to stand out." The English equivalent meaning is "outstanding". In both cases, Tillich reminds us that to 'stand out' must mean that there is something in which the 'outstanding' must also be 'standing in'. He goes on to state that 'being' (or that which exists) stands out of its non-being. It can do this if we regard being as participating in potentiality (not yet being in actuality or in existence in time and space). Tillich also points out to us that potentiality is that which is more than logically possible— it is that which has the power of becoming, but is not yet manifest as an existent entity. (Tillich II, 20)

We readers have been given the above background because Tillich deems it necessary to show the difference between actuality and potentiality. Potentialities have been considered even in pre-philosophy, as being 'essential' and as such, are the structures of true being. Plato saw existences as shadows from their true, eternal, and essential ideas.

He also reminds us that Aristotle tried to bridge the gap between existence and essence by his conviction that there was no such thing as 'matterless form' or 'formless matter'. (We have already seen in the chapter on Hegel how Hegel continued development of this Aristotelian concept by his 'Identity of the Opposites'.)

Another factor that Tillich makes known to the reader is his belief that the interpretation of Hegel's universal system of essences as classically 'essentialist'
that caused the revolt against it—a revolt eventually called 'existentialism'. Hegel was seen as proclaiming existence to be the logically necessary actualization of essence. Hegel was believed to interpret the natural universe as being a reasonable progression of the self-development of the Divine Idea, so that existence is not a fall from essence, but an expression of it (Tillich II, 24)

We can reasonably sympathize with the reactions of those in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries who were filled with anxieties, guilt, and loss of meaning about life that were brought about by detached (objective technical) reasoning. 'Existentialist' is now a term that applies to any individual whose world viewpoint is that the reality of man in this temporal life is one of distortion and a series of unresolved conflicts. Tillich found life's anxieties could be classified under three types: (1) fate and death; (2) guilt and condemnation, and; (3) emptiness and meaninglessness. (Tillich II, 25)

To avoid misunderstanding when talking about these terms pertaining to existence, Tillich asks us to further distinguish between the term 'Existentialist' just defined and the term 'Existential.' 'Existential', as the term is defined by Tillich, is first of all, "a human attitude of involvement in and towards life." We might think that this is a subjective attitude in opposition to an objective cognitive attitude, but Tillich tells us that, in the sense of an attitude, 'existential' is a total self involvement
participating in a given event—especially in a cognitive one. (Tillich II, 26)

His concept of this attitude includes man's finite freedom. This freedom allows man to participate to the point she/he can elicit changes in the situations she/he is involved in. Tillich anticipates that existential knowledge may appear to negate the objectivity needed in cognitive acts. He (and Hegel also) grant areas of reality that call for the detached abstraction (K2). He therefore points out that, in existential knowledge, both the subject and the object are transformed by the act of knowing—such knowledge does not exclude, but only limits objective detachment to those elements isolated and abstracted from what Tillich calls 'reality in its infinite concreteness.' (Tillich II, 28)

The other meaning Tillich finds in the term "existential" is a content. Tillich finds this content pointing to that form of philosophy which is called "Existentialism." (This term will be defined after Tillich shows us the connection or commonality between the existential attitude and the existential content.) Tillich sees this content in Kierkegaard's doctrine of man—a doctrine that finds man in a state of estrangement, despair, and anxiety. Kierkegaard also knew that only when man is ultimately concerned can he become knowledgeable of the object of his concern. Therefore, any existential situation keeps the cognitive function of man, as well as all aspects of his being, from a pure abstract participation in the essential knowledge of all that
exists or 'is'. Only in an existential attitude can man possibly hope to glimpse the truth of Absolute Being or God above all gods. (*Tillich II, 25-26*)

In Platonic and Christian thought, we have an existential attitude that is found within the essentialism viewpoint that man is estranged from what he essentially is, but has the possibility of reaching his essential potentiality. Tillich points out that the finite freedom of man is, in the above viewpoint, encouraged to act and to be as a part of the universal. We will see in 'Existentialism' the rejection of man's dependence upon anything other than himself. This latter viewpoint assumes that the freedom of man can be used to overcome or face the contingencies of temporal life. Man, in this sense, is alone and must by himself overcome the anxieties caused by a lack of any ultimate purpose or necessity in life for himself or the world in which he exists.

Tillich's whole system of theology is based upon the need for the basic truths of Christianity to be expressed in symbolic expressions that practically connect (correlate) spiritual truths and values to the everyday situations we find ourselves in. We have seen to this point the part essentialism plays in emphasizing the objective or universal part of one's being as one progresses on his/her path toward meaningful goals in life.

'Existentialism' is a protest against the idea that man here on earth is becoming essentially perfect in accordance with structures not of his own choosing. It
emphasizes that individual man, as a subjective free self, must be his own exclusive creation. Tillich will maintain that when man becomes aware of his need for answers to his questions about his true ultimate concern, then his open search will find an eventual unity of his subjective and objective self—a unity that will transcend both aspects of self.

According to Tillich, all 'existentialists' find their answers within theistic or quasi-religious traditions that cannot be derived from the analysis itself. He justifies this conclusion by defining any object of ultimate concern for a person as that person's God. (Refer back to section two, page 141 for Tillich's criteria for the nature of theology.) (Tillich II, 25)

We can see where making the above distinctions allows Tillich to state that, in general, essential structures can be described in terms of objective detachment. The problems caused by distortions found in existence can be described or analyzed in terms of subjective involvement. Tillich again points out that 'essentialist' and 'existentialist' philosophical views are not polarities isolated from each other. Each has a certain mixture of the other in it. Tillich therefore sees that we can have an objective cognitive attitude (K2) in which the element of subjective involvement (K1) is dominant. Such an attitude is what he calls 'existential'. (Tillich II, 26)

His definition of the term 'Existentialism' could be briefly summarized by describing it as being an
analysis of life situations in which man finds himself estranged to the point that 'rational' objective reasoning no longer gives him satisfactory answers, but only establishes questions as to where and how man can find meaning and purpose in life under such estranged conditions. (Tillich II, 25) We need to emphasize again, as Tillich does in his description, 'existentialism' does not attempt to find answers within its descriptions. He finds that all existentialists find their answers within the theistic or quasi-religious traditions that cannot be derived from the analysis itself. (Tillich II, 25-26)

The importance of the above paragraphs may become more apparent when we look deeper into what Tillich meant by his expression 'existential thinking'. 'Existential' is a term that Tillich uses to symbolize an attitude—an attitude on the part of an involved knower who participates with his/her whole being in the being of another person. Tillich calls the result of such an attitude and participation an 'existential' knowledge. (Tillich II, 26) We can now see more explicitly that detached reasoning (K2) can play a part as an element of the total involvement, but more is needed. (K1) and (K3) modes of knowledge are also needed to establish the interchange and relationship between two unique individuals—individuals whose 'existential' interchange can create new meaning for the respective knower and the known in their reciprocal interchanges.

It is hoped that the reader, at this point, is establishing connections between the data of the previous
chapters and the material now being presented, or will establish connections with material forthcoming. For example, the concept of being has categories or structures which are more universal than any concept involving a given realm of existent beings, but are less universal than the concept of 'being' itself. Tillich sees the basic ontological question (the question of being itself) as presupposing a asking subject (self). This subject asks questions about the world (seen as 'objects') that exists externally to himself. Tillich finds this ontological structure (which is dialectical in nature) to logically and experientially precede all other ontological concepts. (Tillich II, 26)

The next section will examine Tillich's concepts of 'reason' and 'faith' (revelation), and the existential distortions of both. Deep reflection upon the material presented there should help anyone to substantiate her/his own judgment as to the feasibility of Tillich's eventual goal—that of showing that Christianity gives us the most useful, truthful, and 'soul satisfying' answers available to us in response to the mind-boggling questions arising out of daily life. If we find them appropriate, then we can overcome the inability of 'technical reason' to give us spiritual (yet pragmatic) answers—we can then engage ourselves in a risky, but meaningful response to life, and obtain results that can help offset the despair and meaninglessness that is so prevalent in our world today.
SECTION FOUR
STATIC AND DYNAMIC ELEMENTS OF ONTOLOGICAL REASON, AND THEIR EXISTENTIAL DISTORTIONS LEAD TO QUEST FOR REVELATION ('FAITH')

Tillich starts each major part of his Systematic Theology with a phenomenological description of the major concepts he will develop. Such a means of description clearly defines the meaning of the concepts he is establishing. This first step fulfills a two-fold purpose:
(1) It helps insure that the definitions are carefully made and can be utilized in a logically sound manner; and
(2) It compels any criticism to understand first what Tillich's concepts mean before evaluating them.
(Tillich I, 164)

In this section, Tillich shows us that any relationship between reason and faith (revelation) must be established upon the level of 'ontological reason' and not upon 'technical reason'. The term "Logos", in the classical philosophical tradition, is synonymous with the term "ontological reason". Tillich recalls for us that the definition of these synonymous terms is:

that structure of the mind that enables the mind to grasp and transform reality. Such reason is effective in the technical, practical, esthetic, cognitive, and emotional functions of our human mind.
(Tillich, I, 106)

We can now grasp, from this definition of reason, that its total meaning cannot be reduced to the meaning of one of its components. But somehow, this has happened in the minds of the public. Technical reason (K2) has succeeded so well in enabling mankind to obtain control
over the natural environment that man himself has become a victim of such impersonal control. The previous section gave some details of the revolt called 'Existentialism' in response to man's dehumanization of his fellow men. We can now see that reason, only when used in its ontological meaning, can sufficiently determine the end goal of one's intentionality. On the other hand, 'technical reason' establishes the means by which the end is to be achieved.

If not before, we can now be aware of the functions of the Logos (which 'technical reason' has conveniently set aside). The final paradigm of this thesis will include the esthetic, practical, emotional, and the cognitive aspects of the (K1), (K2) and (K3) modes of knowledge, and the inter-relationships between all these functions that constitute the structure of ontological reason.

'Ontology', in the Dictionary of Philosophy by Peter Angeles, has five definitions. The first is:

The study of the essential characteristics of Being itself apart from the study of particular existing things. In studying Being, in its most abstract form, it asks questions such as "What is Being-in-itself?" or "What is the nature of Being as Being?" (4)

Likewise, Tillich tells us that ontology is possible because there are concepts which are less abstract than Being, but are more universal than any concept specifying a a given realm of beings. These lesser abstractions than that of Being itself have been called 'principles' or 'ultimate ideas' or 'categories'. Tillich sees a basic ontological structure which is the implied presupposed condition of the ontological questions. This structure consists of an asking subject and the objects
towards which the questions are directed. Thus a subject-object dialectical structure exists which logically and experientially precedes all other structures. (Tillich I, 164) In this light, we can return to Tillich's breakdown of ontological reason into its two elements within the mind. Tillich defines 'subjective' reason as "the rational structure of the mind itself", and 'objective reason' as "the rational structure of reality which the mind can grasp and according to which it can shape reality." (Tillich I, 75)

Tillich makes sure that the readers do not forget that ontological reason in its above two forms is still vulnerable to distortions in existence. He declares that there are three distinct elements to be found in every rational act: a static element, a dynamic element, and existential distortions that can be found in both of them. Tillich again reminds us that structural possibilities are created by reality from within itself. He finds that living beings are successful results of reality actualizing itself within the bounds of objective reason. (Tillich I, 78) Tillich's comments seem to corroborate Hegel's view that successful creation must not contradict reason.

If we are willing to accept for the moment, the concepts given in the above two paragraphs, then we can understand Tillich's proposal that the depth (ground) of reason is not reason itself, though it appears in these finite structures of reason while transcending them in meaning and power. This depth permeates both the
structures of the mind and of reality in a way that both actualizes and transforms them. He finds this depth of reason to be essentially implicit in all acts and processes of reason. (See end note (5) for corroboration of this by Bernard Lonergan's definition of metaphysics.)

It is also pointed out to the reader's attention that enlightenment and rationalism have misunderstood reason's essential nature with reason as it is experienced in finite existence. Man finds life as self-contradictory and ambiguous. His finite reason has no satisfactory answers to the questions about the ultimate which the human being finds himself seeking. Tillich uses his analysis of the situation of the reasoning being to conclude that finite reason fails to grasp its origin, yet this reason is instinctively aware that such an infinite source is present in himself and all that is finite. (Tillich I, 79)

Therefore Tillich finds, in reason's search, the structures of reason conflict with each other. However, in actual life, they are found to be separated, but united at the same time. We should again be able to note that while the terminology is different, Hegel's basic concepts involving separation and union are significantly similar to Tillich's, 'separated, but united at the same time.' (Tillich I, 83)

Conditions of the subjective and objective structures of our minds are located by Tillich in the self-destructive conflicts between them in our existent world. He claims the conflicts cannot be solved on the
basis of our existent actual reason. He asserts that, in our attempts to resolve the problem and obtain union of our finite reason with its ground of mystery, we are driven to seek aid from our depth of reason (the ground from which our reason comes forth).

Concepts of the terms "autonomy" and "heteronomy" are now given to us by Tillich (as he sees them in conflict with each other). He finds that reason, which disregards its depth and tries to establish and actualize its own structure, can be considered 'autonomous'. He finds autonomy, not as the freedom to be a law to oneself, but one's obedience to the law of his own reason. Tillich considers such a law to be one of both the objective and the subjective reason. He finds it not to be willfulness, but an independent self-submission to its own essential structure. Tillich sees such a law of nature as divine law which is rooted in the ground of being itself. *(Tillich I, 84)*

Now introduced to his concept of 'heteronomy', Tillich tells us its root meaning is 'heteros' (strange) 'nomos'(law). He sees this strange (therefore outside the self) law as both external to one's being and well as being able to be seen as that coming from the depth of one's own finite reason. Tillich finds the problem here as the problem of an authority which claims to represent the depth of reason against human reason's autonomous actualization. That is, heteronomy claims its authority from an external source that is not from the depth of one's being.
We are shown that when the autonomous person has severed himself from his depth of reason, such autonomy is shallow and lacks power. It is therefore open to destructive tendencies from outside influences claiming absolute authority and becomes an illusory autonomy akin to heteronomy.

The root of both autonomy and genuine heteronomy has been established by Tillich in the law of the divine ground of being. He calls such a law 'theonomy'. If such a concept is assumed to be a correct one, then it follows that when either constituent element is separated from the other, the unity of the two as found in theonomy is broken. Tillich assures us that 'theonomy' is not a divine law arbitrarily imposed on reason from a supreme authority. It means that, in a theonomous situation, reason actualizes itself in obedience to its own innate structural laws and in the power of its own infinite depth of being. *(Tillich I, 85)*

To be pragmatic at this moment, we could also recall Jesus's statement in the King James Version of the *New Testament, Gospel of John* 7: 16-17:

My doctrine is not mine but His who sent me. Whoever shall do the will of God shall know of that which I speak, whether it be of me, or of He who sent me.

Man does have the capability to transcend his ordinary range of reason, and realize the power entailed by such transcendence when he takes the risk and exercises his 'courage to be' beyond the limitations of existent reason. Mankind, by doing this, can truly appreciate St. Anselm's conclusions which he reached by
reflecting upon his experience of the results of his actions taken in a theonomous manner. It is only through such reflection that one can truly understand her/his experience in a fashion (K3) not to be understood by those failing to take such a leap of faith.

We have been logically led to where we can now see that the conflicts of the structures of reason in the existent world do not lead to the resistance of reason to revelation, but to the search for 'revelation' as a solution to the disunity found in existence. The next section will briefly summarize Tillich's analysis of the cognitive function of reason in its search for revelation.

SECTION FIVE
ANALYSIS OF THE TWO ELEMENTS OF COGNITIVE REASON

Tillich realizes that his systematic theology needs the cognitive element of ontological reason (Logos) for the conceptual development of revelation. Revelation is described by Tillich as the ground of Being's manifestation to the finite mind. Tillich states that it is the polar structure of cognitive reason that sets up the existential conflicts. He sees knowledge as a form of union that is achieved through separation. He finds detachment as a condition of cognitive union.

Looking at earlier attempts of philosophy, Tillich found them to be designed to have finite reason understand how (in light of differences between subject and object) there still exists a cognitive union. He tells us that the failures of these previous attempts to solve the problem were due to their inability to explain the
estrangement between object and subject. Tillich finds as a correlative that, as reason in general enters the conflict between relativism and absolutism, so cognitive reason becomes susceptible to the conflict between detachment and union found in all acts of knowledge. (Tillich I, 97)

His analysis of the elements of cognitive (K2) reason shows that there are different mixes of detachment and participation in the different realms of knowledge. He maintains that no realm of knowledge exists without the inclusion of both cognitive elements. He identifies the mode of knowledge which is predominantly determined by detachment as 'controlling knowledge' (K2). He considers this type (K2) as being the outstanding example of what we have identified previously as 'technical reason'. Tillich maintains that a truly objective relation, to man himself, is one that is determined by the element of union.

A cognitive attitude which is based on union is given the term "receiving knowledge" by Tillich. Such knowledge takes the object into the Logos of the subject --a Logos which includes the element of emotion. This analysis of cognitive reason by Tillich concludes that the unity of union and detachment can be described by defining the term "understanding." Tillich sees that the root meaning literally is 'to stand under' the object and be in an interpenetrating participation with it. (Tillich I, 98)

We have seen that reason, driven beyond its finite limitations, seeks in its own finite self-depth a saving
knowledge to preserve itself as a self.

The next and final chapter of this thesis will include Tillich's conviction that a God beyond the God of theism will give 'faith'—faith as it is found in the depth of being, a courage to be. Such a courage is found in those able to become morally independent individuals in spite of obstacles trying to prevent them from doing so.
NOTES

1. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol 1. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 102. Subsequent references to this work will be cited in the text parenthetically as, e.g., (Tillich I, 103).


3. Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol 2, 19. Subsequent references to this volume will be cited in the text parenthetically as, e.g., (Tillich II, 20).


CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

The ultimate purpose of this thesis is to present to the modern and moderately educated person a practical paradigm for testing the credibility of various world views. Such views are often proposed to be basic, clear, and distinct forms of knowledge that are self-evident (at least to those proposing them). They are proposed as the basic foundations upon which our rational structures of thought are subsequently built. As such, these views are offered as sufficient means to achieve life goals by way of three modes of knowledge:

(1) the empirical world of what 'is' (objective-self), and identified by the symbol (K2); (2) the world of the subjective-self) or (K1); and (3) the reflective unifying factor within the centered self, and identified by (K3).

The (K1) and (K3) modes of knowledge differ from the (K2) mode in that they operate in a world of what ought-to-be rather than a world of what 'is'. This reasonable moral world of what-ought-to-be is a world that, if achieved, would be not only of the true, but also of the good. A possible world of absolute good gives man the promise of eventual satisfaction, happiness, and a proposed goal to strive for—a goal that Kant told us is the good achieved as a result of an absolutely good 'holiness of will'. (See chapter three, 81)
The paradigm designed to help meet these needs was formulated in response to my own personal desire to know, and to have such knowledge be in line with what 'ought-to-be' as well as what 'is'.

A paradigm that tests various competing world views is expected to be effective not only in the short run, but by internal and self-corrective procedures to prove credible in the long term also. Its methodology requires that its users maintain an open attitude toward the need of any and all corrective reformulation(s) when necessary. Such a built-in self-corrective feedback procedure is essential for this model to maintain its credibility as a testing standard for corroborating newer concepts. These concepts are needed to amalgamate the latest changing conditions in our natural world as well as the changes in the rational world, the psychological world, and the spiritual world. Any resultant reformulation of our model should enable all users to play a more effective role in the continuing quest to reach their ultimate purposes and goals in life.

The preceding chapters included presentations concerning some basic polarities found in speculative and practical concepts of man's reason. Such polarities were also found to exist in man's concepts of his natural bodily sensations, needs, desires, and functions in order to survive successfully in this temporal natural world.

One's self-conscious actions are structured to achieve practical results in their relationships to entities in the natural world. Some of these entities are
literally non-free in the self-determination of their final natures. Other organic entities are found to possess increasing degrees of self-determination. The ultimate level of autonomy in determining the means of achieving a self-determined goal is to be found in the rational and spiritual man.

Therefore, before the presentation of the thesis's final testing paradigm, a very brief summarization will be made of concepts found in each of the preceding chapters, concepts that are constituent parts of the final formulation of our paradigm.

To convince another person effectively to adopt a world view that is in varying degrees opposed to his present world view, a purely objective (emotionally detached [K2]) argument is usually insufficient. Therefore section two will present integrative (K3) factors not presented in section one, but are deemed necessary for one's subjective beliefs (K1) to be successfully merged with the objective arguments (K2) already given.

Section three will present the author's current world view and its coalescence into a paradigm that will also aid persons to select the most appropriate goals for themselves. The paradigm will also enable them to participate in, modify, and utilize the most effective means of achieving their significant purposes in life.

Section four will present modern movements in counseling that substantiate the use of Hegelian concepts in the thesis paradigm for aiding persons in problem solving and problem management.
Section five will present a schematic of the thesis's final paradigm. Upon the completed explanation of the schematic, the projected use of the paradigm in the author's volunteer care-giver work in the Clark County Hospice Program will be presented in the final section, section six.

This final section will include a detailed example of how the paradigm could have been utilized in the author's care-giving to a terminal cancer patient and his bereaved survivors.

SECTION ONE
BRIEF SUMMARIES OF CRITICAL CONCEPTS TAKEN FROM CHAPTERS ON KANT, HEGEL, AND TILLICH

KANT

In 1785, Immanuel Kant wrote an ethical treatise called *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*. It established an understandable philosophical theory of morality and made it available to the general reader, one who had previously acquired a common knowledge of ethics and morality, but could not rationally defend his position against opposing viewpoints.

Kant wanted to establish some 'axioms' for any subsequent formulation of a system of moral laws; such laws could not be obtained by empirical observation (induction) of moral actions, but required reason for their establishment. (1) Kant believed that there is nothing in or out of the natural world that is absolutely good except a good will. Kant had to postulate both immortality and freedom in order for man to accept
the responsibility to work toward and yet not reach such a goal (attainment of a personal absolute good will) in historical time.

Individuals can strive to realize a gradually higher grade of moral perfection. However, one's free moral choices need to be checked against Kant's concept of the content of an absolutely good will—a will to be used as an universal standard against which all individual moral intentions can be 'zero beat'. Corroboration of the need for such a standard is given by Thomas Aquinas. (2) Aquinas sees the essence of every individual at a given moment in time as a measure of the being and perfection of that individual. To make such a measure, a principle of universal value is needed which is held by all moral individuals and established by the ground of all being (God). This principle states that a greater or lesser degree of moral perfection can be appraised and put in proper order only in relationship to the maximum or absolute degree of perfection. However, Kant's absolute good will was only identified as being a universal and necessary duty, without God being specified as the source of it.

Other major premises in chapter three dwelt with the various aspects of the human will (including its 'disposition'). Kant saw good and evil intentions as opposing dispositions. He felt that, in spite of the real possibility of man's autonomy, actual autonomy could be surrendered. If so, a decline of the rational will and an increase of the inclinations would occur to the point that
the will towards good would spontaneously cease and yield to a disposition of evil volitions. (3)

It is my contention that the presentation of Kant's duality of human nature and lack of any identity in common between the polarities of good and evil is what Hegel criticized as the limitation of the (K2) objective type of reasoning. To see and appreciate the advanced form of reason (called 'reflective reason' by Hegel—a type of reason which overcame the limitations imposed by (K2) or understanding), we need to advance beyond Kant. We will do this next by briefly looking at the Hegelian development of the Absolute Idea—an eventual concept of a Divine Subjectivity.

HEGEL

The Hegelian 'Notion' (with the modifications made for its practical applicability to the finite reason of mankind today) is the keystone of the thesis's final paradigm. Recollection of the details given to Hegel's definition of his 'Notion' in chapter four helps us to remember the bare bones of his definition as being:

The idea of a being which in passing outwards into its opposite, passes only into itself, and this opposite does not become anything different, but remains in the opposition, completely identical with itself. (4)

This final paradigm synthesizes the (K1) and (K2) modes of human knowledge through the movements of reason (described more fully in the Hegelian chapter). My use of his dialectic is predicated upon my conviction that Hegel's 'Notion' can be rationally interpreted as a
synthesis of idealistic, realistic, and existential concepts. As an unified concept, it is also a self-correcting mechanism (in response to later data input). As such, its inclusion within my final paradigm helped me and can help other individuals formulate (and/or correct) their own freely chosen moral ends and the most effective means to carry out those decisions.

Hegel's 'Notion', in this writer's opinion, is also a systematic method that can help an individual evaluate the usefulness of other basic premises of various current world views. Therefore, the 'Notion' concept is considered and utilized as the most efficient and self-correcting means of providing a conceptual structure for my paradigm. This paradigm enables one to synthesize his/her own particular and universal viewpoints in their own ever-evolving moral adjustments to an ever-changing physical and mental environment.

TILLICH

To really grasp Hegel's 'Notion' as a useful tool in establishing individual goals and the means of reaching them, certain sources are needed. They include Tillich's existential theology and philosophy (subjective (K1) and objective (K2) reason) in unity, even though both are distorted by natural world ambiguities.

Tillich asserts his conviction that the resistance of recent philosophy to ontological truths has been due to the assumption that truth can only be corroborated within the methods utilized by empirical science. (5) The reader can recall that this thesis contends that all three modes
of knowledge (K1, K2, K3) and combinations thereof) need to utilize the scientific '5D method' to: (1) dig; (2) deliberate; (3) decide; (4) do; and (5) debug. The method is essential in deriving, justifying, or originating new conceptual structures of thought in the three respective modes. The argument throughout the thesis has been about the need to establish an individual and a collective group means of corroborating judgments (and actions taken on such judgments) for each mode of knowledge.

Comments by Tillich on ontological truths are corroborated by my personal experience. Tillich, in chapter six of this thesis, pointed out that methods of corroboration differ between the two cognitive functions that he calls controlling (K2) and receiving (K1) modes of knowledge. The (K3) mode of knowledge is a synthetic relationship of the (K1) and (K2) modes and therefore assumes the same risk entailed in the unique, spontaneous and total involvement found in (K1).

His final conclusions about controlling and receiving knowledge review the radical risk of acting upon a receiving type of knowledge that cannot be made secure by further corroboration. He outlines three areas of risk that may befall those who act on receiving knowledge: (1) fate and death; (2) guilt and condemnation; and (3) meaninglessness and despair. In his book *Courage to Be*, he defines 'courage-to-be' as "an ethical act in which a person affirms his own being in spite of the elements of his existence which conflict with his essential affirmation." (6) Tillich's question to all
of us is, "what do we affirm, ourselves as a particular self, or ourselves as a part of a collective whole?"

In this book on courage, Tillich discusses the risk involved in affirming oneself to the point of losing one's being. He proposes to the reader that the threats of non-being, expressed in the three areas listed above, can be overcome only by a courage-to-be that is rooted in a power of being which overcomes the three areas of risk. Such a power would have to be greater than the power of one's world of consciousness, or of oneself in such a world.

Upon further examination of Tillich's analysis of man's predicament in an existent world, we find the option of accepting or rejecting the help of the power of Being-Itself (God). Tillich finds that such transcendent help is the only way to achieve a courage-to-be that allows a person to affirm his/her self in spite of the threat of nonbeing. Tillich asserts very emphatically that there are no exceptions to this way of overcoming the threat of nonbeing.

His analysis of the human predicament gives a person practical reasons for thinking that all courageous self-affirmations must have an open or hidden religious root. This background allows his readers to see the depth of meaning underlying Tillich's concept of faith. He defines faith as "the state of being grasped by the power of Being-Itself." He finds that such a power is never completely absent, but always present in every thing that 'is'. Either personally or from a close friend, we can all
relate to such awareness of the power of Being-Itself, especially in experiences which expose us to an immediate threat of extinction or non-being. (Tillich, 156)

It has been my own personal experience (as well as the testimony of others) that when our moral intentions are sincere and unselfish, we often find ourselves accomplishing moral objectives in a manner we know our ordinary individual selves are not capable of handling. (At this point, we can recall my acronym of Lonergan's definition of metaphysics: 'UPTU' stands for knowledge that underlies, penetrates, transforms and unifies all other departments of human knowledge"). (7)

To Tillich, that power of Being-Itself is the possibility a being has to actualize itself against the resistance of other beings. He points out that the polarity of being and its opposite, nonbeing, allows human reason to affirm the dynamic self-affirmation of Being-Itself. (Tillich, 179) He tells us that only because Being-Itself has the character of self-affirmation in spite of nonbeing, can courage be possible. His argument is that because courage participates in the self-affirmation of Being-Itself, it participates in a power which is capable of overcoming the power of nonbeing. Therefore, any act of courage on the part of a particular rational and autonomous being is an act which points that individual's awareness to the source of such power. (Tillich, 181)

The final high point of Tillich's analysis of man's courage-to-be is his conclusion that all forms of
theology are transcended only in the experience he calls 'absolute faith.' He finds its source to be the power of Being-Itself which accepts one's self-affirmation to be oneself in spite of all obstacles to do this. A description of this transfer of power (that enables one to affirm one's own being) is not possible, since it would transcend all rational, mystical, or person-to-person encounters. (Tillich, 178)

The final conclusion of Tillich to this remarkable analysis of courage is that an absolute faith is "a state of being grasped by the very power of Being-Itself." Such a state enables one to accept the anxieties which befall us when we are nearly submerged by the meaninglessness of events that occur almost daily in our individual lives. Such a point calls for the courage-to-be which Tillich says will come only when one's subjective and objective God has seemingly been lost in a flurry of one's anxiety and doubt. (Tillich, 190)

SECTION TWO
FACTORS INVOLVED IN 'SUBJECTIVE BELIEF'

To convince another person effectively to adopt a given world-view (a view which in essence conflicts with a view the recipient has previously held), a purely rational argument to that objective side of oneself is insufficient. It is insufficient because any views or concerns involved in matters of ultimate concern to a person should have all aspects of one's nature taken into account and united to the degree necessary to arrive at final specific goals and the methods to attain such goals.
This author is convinced that his sensuous nature, the psychological, rational, and spiritual aspects of himself, need to be coordinated (with a certain degree of unity) and then made to stand behind his final moral choices dealing with specific problems found in everyday life. The following factors are based upon (K1) and (K3) modes of knowledge which can then become basic data for their integration with one's rational (K2) mode:

a. William James gave us the following conditions necessary for convincing a person's practical reason that we should will to believe a world-view in matters of metaphysical belief: (1) that such a world-view must be one which the individual would find to be meaningful to him/her; (2) that the belief offered may not be avoided but must be accepted or rejected as such; (3) that the option to be believed is one in which a person would be significantly affected by results achieved by acting upon such a belief ('live' option). (8)

b. In addition to a practical and objective type of appeal, a persuasive and subjective presentation concerning that new view may be also prove to be effective. Let us assume that a second person (B) sincerely believes that his/her given world-view is absolutely necessary in order to obtain the results striven for in given situations. Then (B)'s presentation and testimony (concerning the usefulness of his/her world-view) could persuade other persons emotionally, yet reasonably, to place their faith in the testimony from (B). The strength of such a subjective part of one's
belief would depend upon the degree one would trust the testimony of the persuader.

Jesus of Nazareth is an example of such persuasion. He asked those who saw and heard Him to trust that his religious world-view could achieve the results He desired when He attempted to adhere to the moral actions for which it called. He asked those who heard Him to accept His subjective (K1) world-view, but also to look beyond the subjective, and to test this view objectively (K2) by trying it for themselves. In this way, He told us we can know the truth of the view he is testifying about—whether it is of Him (viewed as an individual man) or of a universal (objective) nature both in and beyond the ken of man. (9)

I believe that the above example taken from the New Testament espouses a religious world-view which takes into account the basic polarity of the human being (the subjective and objective sides to his/her nature). It additionally asks that we experience and test the results obtained by the actions we take in following those unified moral concepts. Our reflections on the experience of taking such actions and the results achieved are then an individual way (as a part of a collective whole) of corroborating a universal (collective whole) standard for our individual moral conduct. As Jesus suggested, if honest reflection is taken after the experience, we will find that an individual's free choice of a given level of moral conduct reflects his level of being (as well as the mind's knowledge of it). The certitude of such a level is
obtained by a 'zero beating' of it against the universal (collective whole) standard of moral conduct expected for the given situation. In this way, an individual can progressively build up an elevation of his/her moral intentions towards the perfection of the infinite mind, which is the ground of all existence.

The doctrine Jesus was referring to was not a scientific one in which a person could be impartially involved and always get the same results as others. It was one of a personal relationship with one's source of being. The Bible is full of illustrations of those who on 'faith' tried living the newer ethical ways of life which far exceeded the previous legal requirements demanded by law. For one example, after doing and finding the proof Jesus said will follow, John (in I John) wrote, "That which we have seen and heard declare we unto you, that ye also may have fellowship with us." (10)

Can the reader consider the parallels found between this New Testament example and Hegel's 'Notion'? We can ponder the results obtained by the internal unity of our subjective and objective selves, and by our capability to make self-willed choices in the resolution of future differences between these sides of ourselves. In using the dialectical methodology in conjunction with the 5 D's involved in all modes of knowledge, we are using the best of human knowledge. From this knowledge, we can derive those specific methods necessary to most likely achieve the sought end result.
The Kantian Categorical Imperative for all persons (and the moral commandments of the various religions for their followers) would be the first consideration(s) for an individual who is tentatively selecting any moral goal pertaining to a given situation. The second consideration would be to use the dialectical method and appropriate application of the 5 D's to ascertain the best method(s) to achieve the moral goal. The reason this thesis supports the Categorical Imperative is that it is based on rational, practical, and supportive speculative reason concepts. If any religions base their moral commandments on authoritative dogma that is in conflict with sound reasoning principles, then active participants in such a group will have to find some way to resolve the internal conflict between their subjective (K1) and objective (K2) modes of knowledge.

It is assumed that the majority of problems encountered in everyday life will be management ones concerning non-moral issues (or primarily K2). In these cases, the 5 'D' method of getting the information, deliberating, and deciding on the best means (by subjecting each alternative possibility to a dialectical comparison) will be the most effective means of obtaining the desired results.

One can rationally sense, at this point in our concluding comments, that the means to an end could be a plurality of structures of logical thought. In such a case, the end result, or content of the final effect,
would be a singular effect of the coalescing pluralistic actions.

Therefore, by practicing and experiencing such events, we can conceptually conclude that the forms (the rational structures which frame our actions) coalesce to produce an intended end result. This one end result is therefore ultimately equal to the sum of the many means used to achieve it. However, no moral equations dealing with inputs from finitely free and rational beings can be simply put like the above example. (APPENDIX II, page 228 has been added to give the reader an idea of the complexity introduced to equations when the given factors are continually changing their inputs and their relationships to the unchanging [or constant] factors in the equation).

As parts of the creative whole of the universe, we can induce fairly close approximations to the whole in the area of finite quantities and their interrelationships. We cannot, as parts, know fully the whole of which we are only a part. Such knowledge, beyond that connected directly with our sense experiences, remains in the realm of speculative reason, intuition, a priori forms of knowledge, and revelations of a transcendental nature.

Complete knowledge of any unique entity which has a power of choice in its being and becoming will remain forever unknown to that attitude of mind that proclaims that all knowledge is conceptual (K2). Our conceptual way of thinking (K2) is primarily based upon observations taken from the empirical world and corroborated by results
obtained by observations in the empirical world of sense observation. A higher level of being, a level we associate with the term 'transcendental thought' (K3), cannot be reached directly from the level of knowledge we call (K1) or (K2).

From the end result of looking at Hegel's 'Notion' as a conceptual universal standard for human thought, we can have a reasonable comprehension of how to set up an analogous but modified model that will need continuous feedback from the results of using it. If we do this in a sincere drive for truths of a universal nature, we should not fear to accept and utilize the changes we become aware of—changes created from our and/or God's infinite potentialities of 'nothingness' yet to enter the finite world as existences.

My primary goal, emphasized throughout the thesis, is the establishment of a modern paradigm to test and evaluate alternative world-views. Its purpose is to provide a practical basic (yet evolving) standard for vulnerable existent human beings to test the empirical as well as the speculative and metaphysical world-views and universal premises (principles) to which they are exposed. Such views usually provide their own different standards in that they depend upon their basic premises as being so self-evidently clear and distinct that they are not in need of any further presuppositions or prior causes. However, to my knowledge, we are currently left without a consensus among us as to a universal standard against
which the respective world-views may be practically compared.

This section has given additional factors (including reason) that need to be considered when one's subjective part of his/her being is included in the testing and evaluating of one's beliefs and world-views. It has attempted to persuade the readers that no given world-view should be totally accepted by an autonomous human being without subjecting it to her/his own self-corroboration. Such corroboration would include testing this world view's comparative value versus other conflicting world views. To do the latter, one must have a means (self-correcting) and a criterion by which such comparative evaluation can be accomplished. (See section five for a schematic of my final paradigm that can provide the means by which such an evaluation can be achieved).

Section three gives an example of how an individual's current world-view(s) can be checked out by 'zero beating' its (their) respective concepts against the proposed testing paradigm. My current basic world view is based on my unified subjective beliefs (K1) and objective scientific beliefs (K2) (derived from my background as a professional meteorologist). This unified world view has been modified as a result of the amalgamation of basic concepts contained in sections one and two. The resultant concepts survived my "zero beating" of them against the proposed thesis paradigm.
Since the beginning of philosophical and metaphysical thought, we have had differing points of view concerning first causes. The ethical world awaits (and may await forever) a universal standard for self-conduct and self-control in all areas of human life. Different cultural conditions, different natural environments, etc., (plus the rapidly changing conditions to which all of these factors are subject) make it seem impossible to get a universal standard of conduct to which each of us could freely agree.

The problem is similar to that of knowing in full the truth of the entities that just 'are' in this existent world. However, this does not stop our desire for such knowledge in all of its modes in the areas of both what 'is' and what 'ought to be'. This proposed paradigm is not a panacea that gives one an exact method for achieving an acceptable solution to all moral issues. But it is the result of much struggle and searching for a tentative standard against which to test (zero beat) our own beliefs as well as the alternative basic premises of various philosophic or scientific world views on the market today.

Many such alternative views are ones which declare themselves (implicitly or explicitly) to be the
only and final truth upon which to 'zero beat' one's subjective and objective intentional relationships to external objects in the natural world. By placing all such views under our critical self-scrutiny through the application of the model's methodology to each particular view, we can find partial truths that are useful for the progression of our search for what is more wholly good and true. As such, these partial truths can be progressively accumulated, consolidated, and amalgamated into a composite whole that constitutes our basic world view. This evolving whole, as agreed upon by the members of the community holding these basic concepts, will constitute the basic standard which the group uses for corroboration by 'zero beating' their proposed individual choices of moral action against it.

We must include ourselves among those autonomous entities which are realistically found to be limited in their freedom to be the sole causes of their intended external effects. Our self-generated causes are open to further distortions incurred by the unknown number of self-free and self-determining entities existing in the external world of nature itself. Such a world is rather universally accepted as existing independently of us as individuals, whether we are conscious of it or not.

The above paragraphs are an attempt to portray what this author personally believes to be factors within the structure of a sound mind—a mind whose subjective side honestly seeks a unification with that objective side of itself in its particular form of being and becoming.
Although my views and convictions may be seen as a consolidation of other previously expressed viewpoints and therefore not my own, I reply that they also contain my 'subjective' self's wish for autonomy. If we are autonomous, we must be responsible for the acceptance or rejection of all ideas and concepts elicited by our everyday contact with ourselves, with other human beings, and with the natural world. We are as responsible for acting on views previously expressed by others as we would be if the views acted upon were of our own original creation. When all self-known moral views are 'zero beat' against one's own expanding set of moral standards before being accepted (as well as beat against one's objective knowledge of the group's basic standard for its members), then the final moral view taken can be said to be one's own.

The responsibility that accompanies actions based upon autonomous decisions by an individual also includes the responsibility for our acceptance or rejection of judgments based on critical inquiry of and the subsequent reasonable corroboration of the knowledge we consider as true and good. I therefore think the material presented in this final chapter is a result of my conceptions of what constitutes the means by which we obtain and corroborate our human truths concerning Being-Itself as the rational ground of all subsequent being. I have tested these conceptions and suppositions by much self-critical inquiry and 'zero beating' the results against those obtained by peers seeking answers to the same questions
for which I have sought answers. A reasonable corroboration was obtained from all the sources used.
Therefore, the final concepts I have included in the thesis should be considered as truths of my judgments also.

Advances in philosophy have led to a fuller explication of the nature of a rational and spiritual human being. They have expressed this nature in more comprehensive structures of thought. The search for the nature of one's being and its progressive apprehension in human thought goes back in historical time to Heraclitus (who spoke of change and progression in such a manner that he could say, "I am and I am not"). It has continued its evolving progression through the various combinations of partial truths expressed in the terminology and premises of the idealists, realists, pragmatists, etc., of yesterday and today.

The amalgamated factors with which I have chosen to formulate my final paradigm are not closed, but open to subsequent progressive enrichment, correction, and utilization in determining and in achieving my end goals in life. I have accepted these basic factors as contingent truths for my rational will (volition) to test itself against by 'zero beating' its practical reason against what I consider to be universal revelatory (through insight and experience) standards for all rational and spiritual human beings. The reader can recall, in my presentation of certain Hegelian concepts, that 'spirit' is defined as that reflective faculty of the
mind that works to find a common unity between the (K1) (subjective) and (K2) (objective) modes of knowledge accessible to human reason in its totality. By freely allowing my (K1) and (K2) modes of knowledge to present their preferences to my central 'Self', I have the choice of selecting from alternate ways of 'ought to', one (or ones) which I believe has (have) the greatest probability of helping me achieve my currently intended goals in life.

The search still goes on for the universal acceptance (by all moral beings) of a universal standard for morality and ethics. Such a standard would allow reasonable affirmation of the right of each rational human being to be creatively and freely different from all others. It would also, at the same time, be a universal (K3) standard freely accepted by each of those individuals adhering to such standards as constituting the basic premises for determining the proper mixes of individual self-concerns in conduct to the concerns of the group as a whole.

If such a conception of what constitutes one's responsibility to self and to one's community were progressively adopted by all rational and spiritual beings, then the world in which we live could become progressively liberated from the distortions we now find in it.

I have also rationally and intuitively accepted the fact that only the pure desire to know what 'is' (and an unbiased desire to do what 'ought to be done') can successfully counter the distortions we find in our
way while working to achieve our goals. Choices of conduct by other individuals vary considerably. Such free or non-free choices of moral intentions become distorted when applied in the existent natural and temporal world.

Let us now assume that we have a tentative acceptance of the basic principles that: (1) we are autonomous and spiritual human beings; (2) that our reasoning powers are transcendental in nature; and (3) we have the ability to resolve (in thought) the conflict between our (K1) and (K2) modes of knowledge by way of the reflective (K3) mode of knowledge. I believe that we can, with the use of the 5 D's and the successive cycling of the Hegelian moments of thought (as described in the schematic model in the next section of this chapter), become communal members alongside those who in their free choices become unified under and in a universal concept of morality.

In my attempts to subjectively persuade readers to test out for themselves the paradigm proposed in this thesis, I have not expanded on the importance of Kant's description of the nature of the human will. A deeper look into it certainly keeps one's will from rationally absolving itself of the responsibility in making or refraining from making ethical self-choices in the area of ethical conduct. The remaining paragraphs of this section will indicate the influence of Kant's concepts (concerning the human will) in the establishment of my moral independence and responsibility for my moral actions in daily life.
Emphasis is upon the (K1) and (K3) factors (without neglecting the (K2) input into them). The presentation is intended to be a subjectively persuasive one. It will illustrate my personal responses and conclusions based upon my experiential and experimental application of premises such as Kant's 'Categorical Imperative,' Hegel's 'Notion,' and usage of the 5 D's in the three modes of knowledge, (K1), (K2), and (K3).

Any action in the moral realm of the subjective side of me (emotion, feeling, and impulses) is a part of my human nature. If this side of me negates or dilutes the objective and rational faculty of my will) before this latter side of me makes its final choice of intentional moral conduct, then my natural inclinations and unconscious desires dominate my final decision (or final 'maxim of choice') about how to act morally in a particular situation. A choice of this sort is literally a heteronomous choice. A truly autonomous choice would be a spontaneous one undetermined by any previous experiences within or without oneself. After such a choice, one's practical reason can be 'zero beat' against a universal standard which one would be willing (as a part of that group which is in common agreement concerning the resultant 'universal standard') to accept. This gives one the means to check his/her autonomous volition to do what he/she ought to do. A tentative autonomous moral decision can be corroborated by seeing if it is sufficiently in accord with the group's standard. In this way, one can freely give up part of oneself to a communal standard and
yet feel he/she has maintained his/her own power of self-determination in one's moral conduct in the temporal world.

To avoid any implication of a 'sell out' by the individual's freely accepted adaptation to a group standard whose limits of variation do not go far enough to include an individual's moral maxim for action, the reader is reminded our paradigm (and our explanations previously made) have recognized such a possibility. Such communal standards have been recognized as being subject to change in accordance with changing internal and external conditions affecting the individuals composing the group. If so, it is up to the individual freely to attempt to persuade the group to modify its previous standards to accommodate new truths or changes necessary to make their basic standard the most effective means by which the individual objectives of the group are obtained. In all cases, the individual is still free to reconsider freely his autonomous moral choice of action that falls beyond 'acceptable group variation limitations'. He/she can then modify his/her moral choice accordingly, or can freely continue to maintain his/her convictions that do not conform to the 'group' standard.

I shall be the first one to admit that until I struggled with Kant, Hegel, and Tillich (and other philosophers, logicians, and theologians), my objective and rational self accepted on religious faith (K1 and K3) that the creator of all that exists (and will yet come to be) revealed to mankind some of its basic truths.
Being-Itself did this via many routes—routes such as revelation, experience, reason, intuition, a priori knowledge, and even that form of connatural knowledge subsumed under (K3) in this thesis.

I now can reasonably affirm Kant's explanation of the nature of our own volitions or wills in their production of spontaneous self-chosen moral intentions. Such acceptance makes myself and others basically responsible for all our intentional choices.

I strongly believe that if all of us, as individuals, give our maximum efforts to accept and carry out the objective (universal) truths recognized by that faculty of our minds that we mean by the term 'practical reason' (K2), then our volitional power to choose between alternatives will subsume or negate our competing desires. My will (as an exemplar of other wills operating under similar conditions) can then issue a rational moral 'maxim of choice'. Such a choice would be a result of my autonomous willingness to accept the responsibility of my subsequent actions being in line with what my practical reason identifies as a collective choice of moral beings (or a universal standard of moral conduct).

It is my firm conviction (based on past moral experience) that the (K1) and (K2) modes of knowledge and their unification under (K3) still lack the power needed to obtain perfectly in action that which the mind intentionally desires to do in the realm of moral conduct. The power to have the structure of intentional moral thought become actualized as a content equivalent
to one's structural intentionality lies in a higher concept of unification under (K3). Such unification occurs when one's moral choices of intentional action coincide with the universal standards of conduct. The only source of such universal standards for mankind (that is free of external influences on it) is the ground of all existent beings, the original self-caused, self-determined, and self-developed Being-Itself.

Such a concept lay hidden in my understanding of the religious concepts found in the Bible New Testament. Tillich expressed this underlying factor in terms that implicitly describe, to a degree, that unexpressible but tacit knowledge of a true oughtness—an oughtness that can only be obtained when the intentions desired are in unity with the ground source of all 'good wills' or with what Kant identified as an 'Absolutely Good Will'. This power of acting in line with the source of all being will be found to achieve in actions, a greater degree of adherence to the original 'maxim of choice' upon which subsequent moral actions are based.

An individual 'maxim of choice' by one's own will that is acceptable to one's affirmation that one would want this choice to also be a universal intentional mode of conduct that one could freely submit to is, in my judgment, the only 'maxim of choice'—one that could therefore be reasonably affirmed as a morally spontaneous and autonomous choice of my integrated thought's intention. It can, in my judgment, be carried out to a fair degree by dependence upon human reason.
seeking ultimate truths of a moral nature. However, my experience indicates that when one accepts a dependence upon, and a trust in the ground of all being as a foundation which underlies and supports us morally, then we are assisted in overcoming those parts of our existential nature that resist our physical actions to achieve our moral intentions.

In the areas of the non-moral aspects of my knowledge (as they pertain to the areas of finite necessity in the objective and external world), the realm of (K2) knowledge must be predominant and in some cases, as exclusive as possible. My convictions are that Hegel gave the world a dialectical method for thought correction that is equally applicable to the inductive methods of empirical science. This dialectical method enables us to approach the ideal structured concept as being the content of the achieved goal. Pragmatic results, achieved by different ways of testing in the different modes of knowledge (K1), (K2), and (K3), will ascertain this equivalency. To do so, the means and testing of the means must include all aspects of those factors significant to achieving the desired attainment of a given mode of knowledge.

While not found explicitly in much of the literature I studied (except in Lonergan), I believe that the common ground that must be found in order to unify polarities (such as the subjective and objective aspects of one's being) can only be reached by means of a dialectical method that is always open to further
refinement of its basic rational premises. The dualistic concept of man failed to find rational grounds for such a commonality. However, I found in Hegel, Lonergan, St. Thomas Aquinas, St. Bonaventure, Tillich, and portions of the Bible (at least implicitly), concepts that pertain to the mode of knowledge we call (K3) in this thesis. For them, (K3) does provide the common ground on which unity between (K1) and (K2) modes of knowledge can be built. These concepts, if accepted, provide a common ground between polarities so that their similarities as well as differences can be integrated to show a mutual independence and an interdependence upon each other.

It is my opinion (after much reflection and comparing of these similar concepts) that the best definition of metaphysics I have found is one that includes the understanding of (K3) by the above authors. It is found in Bernard Lonergan's book INSIGHT - A Study of Human Understanding. (11) He states that "metaphysics is that department of human knowledge that underlies, penetrates, transforms, and unifies all other departments." [emphasis added] I have referred to this definition in one of my chapters by the acronym 'UPTU'. This 'Up to you' (based on the first letters of the four predicates contained in the definition of metaphysics) is a way to remind all of us that it is up to each of us as to the degree we accept and apply our knowledge of metaphysics to the other departments of our human knowledge.

Many (including myself) see such a definition as
one that is representative of the nature of that which
metaphysics (as predominately a [K3] mode of knowledge)
intuits as an integral (even if unknown as such) part of
those modes of knowledge (K1) and (K2). The accepted
nature of such a metaphysics opens the door to utilization
of its possibilities. If such possibilities are
reflectively considered, they can be explicitly
incorporated into means of action to more fully achieve
the moral results man desires (but finds he does not
completely reach in actuality).

It is cautioned that (K3) is still a wide and open
mode of knowledge that Hegel was surely aware of when he
defined religion as "the elevation of human thought
towards the infinite". (Schlitt, xv, chapter four, 92)

My chief objective in this thesis is to submit
concepts that are sound because they essentially utilize
the application of the scientific method of (K2), the
5 D's, and use them appropriately in their methodology
and resultant conclusions. The 5 D's apply to the other
two modes of knowledge (K1 and K3) as well as to the
interrelationships that are potentially capable of
existing between and among all three modes. The testing
of all modes (in the pragmatic sense of content being
found as equivalent to the created thought structure being
existentially actualized) is necessary. Corroborative
evidence (showing the reliability of the judged mode of
actions to achieve the predicted future results) allows
rational justification of the true structural forms of
thought to be considered as equivalent to the content
found within the end effect desired to be achieved.

My proposals of different means of corroborating
the correctness of one's actions to achieve a desired
result (moral or otherwise) are not new. Each mode of
knowledge will essentially use the same 5D methodology
but differ in the particular means of justifying the
conclusions and content as they are used to solve problems
falling within the applicable mode and/or combinations of
modes appropriate for their solutions. (11)

The paradigm has been established to be a means by
which the teleological or final purposes and goals of
individuals can be most practically and effectively
accomplished. Such a claim can only be made with the
provision that the concepts constituting the current
model are ones that remain open and flexible to future
changes. Such changes will be needed to meet the changing
internal and external conditions which are yet to come in
this evolving world of nature and spirit in which mankind
dwells.

All proponents of change should encourage those who
are reluctant to accept change at least to give all open
systems (capable of being updated without losing their
basic truths) a chance. They ask that others try them
experientially and experimentally. If pragmatic testing
shows their failure to achieve the desired results, they
can be abandoned, or revised sufficiently to maintain
their old viability.
SECTION FOUR
MODERN MOVEMENTS IN COUNSELING THAT
SUBSTANTIATE THE UTILIZATION OF
HEGELIAN CONCEPTS IN MODELS
DESIGNED TO HELP PERSONS
IN PROBLEM SOLVING AND
PROBLEM MANAGEMENT.

Gerald Egan, author of The Skilled Helper - A
Systematic Approach to Effective Helping, has written over
a dozen books. (12) A professor of Psychology and
Organizational Studies at Loyola University of Chicago,
Egan currently teaches and writes in many areas including
communications, counseling, organization effectiveness,
and the management of change and innovation.

A comprehensive study of his 1990 book, The
Skilled Helper, will provide readers with an extensive
corroborations of the Hegelian dialectic as being a
meaningful, flexible, and reliable conceptual structure—a
basic ground structure that provides a common ground (K3)
for the union of subjective (K1) and objective (K2) forms
of knowledge.

Egan sees a general movement, in the many forms of
counseling and psychotherapy today, to consolidate the
good ideas and establish an integrative set of what he
calls 'converging themes'. A set of such principles, and
methodologies would constitute the basis for what Egan
tells us others would like to see as the future
establishment of a 'common paradigm'. Egan and others see
such a paradigm as a synthesis of several methods that can
meaningfully guide its users in what they do. (Egan,14)
For Egan, helping others is a process of education where
the goal of such help is measured by the learning achieved by the client. He defines learning as "What takes place when options are increased". (Egan, 6) Certainly, the movements of the Hegelian dialectic are designed to flexibly adjust to changing situations and to maximize the options potentially available to achieve a given goal.

The following schematic and explanation of my paradigm does not include any guidance for the training and accomplishment of communication skills. Such skills are necessary for any helper to effectively pass on to others the ability to: (1) efficiently utilize this paradigm in the development of the client's ability to set goals; (2) solve problems and; (3) maintain a high level of effectiveness in the face of changing conditions. Therefore, Egan's book is recommended to supplement my paradigm by its teaching of those communication skills necessary to accomplish the purpose of this thesis.

SECTION FIVE
PARADIGM SCHEMATIC INCORPORATING THE 5D's AND THE HEGELIAN 'NOTION' IN THE MODES OF KNOWLEDGE (K1), (K2), (K3), AND THEIR COMBINATIONS.
The letters (A, B, C, D, E, F, G,.. and H) in the above schematic designate the stages of the reasoning process in the establishment of human goals and the most effective means of achieving them. Their explanations and relationships will be expressed in terms or concepts that this thesis has put in modal terminology and subsumed under the three modes of knowledge known as (K1), (K2), and (K3).

Before the fuller explanation of the schematic from an epistemological view (or that of the knower seeking to know entities within him/her-self and/or the external world of existent entities), we need to be constantly aware of the vital point of Hegel's 'Notion'. The vital point is his ontological development of the being of existent entities in the externalized world of nature. Such entities are seen originally as 'others' in their opposition as objective (K2s) to the being of any subjective self (K1). So, considered as the content of our selves and of other beings in the world, Hegel's 'Notion' goes through the stages of the schematic in the following manner: (1) The (A) stage of the schematic is the immediacy stage of the being of reason itself; (2) The stage labeled (B) is the process of thought in developing its own content and structural nature simultaneously. The process at this stage is the mediation stage of thought itself as it develops towards its completion as the Absolute Idea or Divine Subjectivity (God as the ground of all subsequent being in and out of this natural world); (3) The stage labeled (D) is the unity of being in its
immediacy as stage (A) with its mediation with its 'otherness' in stage (B). This unity of the previous two stages is accomplished by self-mediation of thought itself; (4) Stage (C) in the schematic represents the abolishment of that aspect of being in the natural world which cannot be reconciled and brought into the unity found in the self-mediation of the stage called (D); (5) Stages E, F, G, .... represent the content (being) of those singular entities called human beings as they progress in thought (spirit) by various methods to achieve the content (nature of their being) in the ultimate goal or purpose of their singular being. That goal is stage (T).

To help relate the connectivity of the knower to the known, we recall that Hegel concluded that reason as object (essence) (K2) is from the side of being. Reason as subject (K1) is reason seen from the side of the knower. The stages of the above schematic are united by the concept into the unity known as (K3). In the complete structure of the 'Notion', we find that in any being of completed thought about itself, the form is the content, and the content is the form.

Because persons are concerned with the practical application of the Hegelian 'Notion' to improve their adaptations to the modern world and its rapidly changing condition, details of the stages will be now expressed in terms applicable for the usage of modern man in his daily life.

Explanations of the letters used (and the flow of
thought in the establishment of a final goal and the means of achieving it) in the above schematic of the thesis paradigm are as follows:

(A) is the subjective self associated with the mode of knowledge defined in this thesis as (K1). D1 or digging out basic data would take place initially in (A). (A1) represents the subject's internal potentialities logically possible, but not actualized. It also contains potentialities previously considered but rejected from the united synthesis of (K1) and (K2) known as (K3). (A2) represents the basic ground of subjective knowledge that includes the (K1's) acceptance of (K2's) input through (K3) reflection and the return to (K1) of the resultant unity of (K1) and (K2). This subjective self is an ever growing base in which the subject's potentialities change into actualities in the continual movement of reason from (K1) through (K2) by means of (K3). In this manner, the dialectic method gives itself an ever increasing and flexible base of alternatives from which to select the best way (pragmatically and ethically) to achieve the subject's teleological goals.

(B) signifies that mode of knowledge (K2) which is two-fold: (1) the objective knowledge of the external world; and (2) those creative aspects of the subjective-self which are initially recognized by (A) as being different and contrary to it. Continuation of D1 plus D2 (deliberation) would take place during the attempts of (A) to reconcile the apparent conflict between the (A) and (B) aspects of a self.
(C) represents any data rejected by (A) of the information presented through (B) and mediated by the (K3) mode of knowledge. It represents material I gave the name of 'Transcendental Entropic Residue' (or 'TER')—(refer back to chapter five, pages 124-127 for further details.)

(D) represents the internal dialogue in which attempts are made to reconcile the differences between (A) and (B) in (A's) attempt to establish a unified basic decision upon which a realistic final goal can be formulated. This final goal is designated in the diagram as (T).

(D) also represents the positive results of D1, D2, and D3, under unifying role of (K3), to find a common ground between (A) and (B). The role of the will of the subjective self determines what degree of unity between (A) and (B) is needed before a specified goal (final end result designated as [T]) is accepted (without further reconsideration). All five D's should take place in the dialogue of stage (D). If the goal (T) is found to be both practical and possible, then reason proceeds towards its final goal by way of the stage indicated by (E,F,G, etc.)

(E,F,G, etc.) represent the various alternative means which reason finds capable of individually or collectively achieving the goal. In the consideration of each of these potential alternatives, moral aspects (as well as material means) need to be subjected to the 'five D' steps of the scientific method as they apply to the respective mode of knowledge under consideration. The
single or collective means by which the end goal is to be reached then constitute the path(s) of actualization the originating thoughts created in their formulation of the end goal \((T)\), and of the means to achieve \((T)\). The subsequent actualized actions, based on these originating concepts, will eventually coalesce and produce the end product, or content of the final goal \((T)\).

Stage \((T)\) may be called the teleological aim inasmuch as it logically precedes the beginning of determining the most effective and practical means of achieving this goal of the subject. Many goals of the subjective-self require a lifetime to achieve, and they are therefore subject to continuous revision to meet changing conditions. It may be that the means by which they are to be achieved must undergo revision to meet future changes in the person and/or his/her external environment. In either, or both cases, the whole process of reason (as indicated by the above paradigm) needs to be undertaken again (and tested by the corroborative means appropriate to each mode of knowledge).

It is felt by this author that in his individual testing of the principles involved and utilized in the order given by the schematic of the thesis's final paradigm, the model has justified itself as going on beyond that 'common paradigm' being sought by psychotherapists. Those who oppose Egan's (to me, Hegelian) synthesis of methods fear that one helping system would be imposed on everyone and diversity would be lost. \((Egan, 14)\) However, if honestly utilized, the thesis
paradigm is capable of the flexibility needed for all three modes of knowledge and their combinations. It will give us the basic foundation for the testing and updating of the model itself.

The author intends to utilize this paradigm in the teaching of its principles to those volunteer helpers in the hospice program. Communication skills and other factors found to be pertinent in this field will be sought out and the appropriate personnel to train the volunteer helpers in all of these areas must be found and utilized to make such a program successful.

Then, the appropriately trained field helpers can help the survivors of terminally ill cancer patients to become more proficient in the management of daily life problems and concerns. It is expected that the feedback from the field will allow this model to be adjusted in order to increase its usefulness in the future.

SECTION SIX
UTILIZATION OF PARADIGM IN AUTHOR'S VOLUNTEER CARE-GIVER WORK IN THE CLARK COUNTY HEALTH DISTRICT HOSPICE PROGRAM

The author intends to utilize this paradigm in his own volunteer care-giver work and eventually in the teaching of its principles to other volunteer care-givers in the Clark County Health District Hospice Program. Volunteer care-givers are a part of an interdisciplinary team. This team basically consists of a physician-directed and nurse-coordinated program to provide supportive care to the terminally ill patient and family in a home care setting. The Hospice program is designed to give the
necessary supportive care needed as a result of emotional, spiritual, social, physical, and economic stresses engendered during the final stages of illness. (See APPENDIX III, pages 231-233 for a historical background of Clark County Health District Hospice Program.)

Hospice recognizes the need to assess spirituality issues found in patients and their families. The program tries to insure that all care-givers get to understand the relationships between spiritual issues and religious or non-religious belief. To help do this, Hospice defines spirituality as:

that which is experienced as a capacity for transcending one's working realities (physical, sensory, rational, and psychological) in order to live and be loved within one's communities, and to search for and give meaning to existence while coping with the urgent needs of everyday life. (13)

By operating under this broad-based definition of spirituality, experienced Hospice workers feel they can address the spirituality issue in both non-religious and religious areas without imposing any of their beliefs upon the patient and family. They feel free to deal with the issues presented to them so they may assist others to strengthen their inner resources in order to give them more meaning to their existence. Therefore, when care is given to patients and families who have not had a religious affiliation as a part of their daily lives, Hospice team members feel they have a goal. This goal is to assess and deal with any issues that come up and lie within the Hospice definition of spirituality. Hospice workers should never try to impose their personal beliefs, but are allowed to state them if requested to do so. The
ideas of those given care and comfort should be listened to, but Hospice workers are discouraged from getting into any religious debates, for such may often be counter-productive to the services offered by Hospice. (Self, 5)

I believe that by utilizing the paradigm, I can be of greater help in assisting care-receivers work through any anxieties they express about fate and death, guilt and condemnation, and doubt and meaninglessness. I hope to let them see that as another self, I have struggled and am still struggling to become a more unified self—a self in which my expanding (K1), (K2), and (K3) modes of knowledge are aiding me to become a more self-responsible part of both the physical and the spiritual dimensions of the world. These modes, in addition to the 5 D methodology of checking out various methods of achieving a given goal(s) to be realized by the care-receiver, would be used by myself while aiding them. The paradigm itself would only be brought to the care receiver's specific attention if he/she expressed a desire to discuss it—otherwise, it would be held 'behind the scenes'.

For example, about seven years ago, I was a care-giver for a 72 year old engineer who was diagnosed as terminally ill with a brain tumor. John was a strong individual who did not want to appear weak to his family. His religious background was one in which authoritative church authorities dictated legal requirements necessary to be met or one was eternally damned. He rebuked such
legalism and separated himself from active church participation. I was able to strike a close relationship with John very shortly, as we were both professional scientists in our respective fields. After hearing about his religious background from his concerned family, I gradually shared with John a world view based upon my conviction of being accepted by the ground of all Being or God. John and I communicated well. By my willingness to share weaknesses I was working to overcome, I was accepted by him as a caring individual who was accepting him as he was, without any judgment. John eventually realized that by withholding and not sharing some of his doubts, fears and weaknesses with his family, he was preventing them from giving him the deeper sense of peace, trust, and acceptance which he needed to help him courageously face his eventual mortal death. Upon taking the risk of a much deeper sharing, John found the family acceptance he previously felt would not be there for him if he were to let them know him as he really was.

Needless to say, both John and the family were strengthened by new ties. John passed away shortly thereafter, but some spiritual needs were brought out into the open and met in a very comforting way for all the family.

This event took place before my research work in the Institute for Ethics & Policy Studies (and the establishment of my paradigm as a result). I did not have an opportunity to get into a serious dialogue with John on the effectiveness of the paradigm to rationally reconcile the opposition between the 'faith' (subjective) and
'reason' (objective) aspects of the human mind.

If that opportunity had been available, I am sure both of us would have elevated our finite reasoning powers towards the infinite even more than we did in our open exchanges about ultimate matters of concern that we shared together. I would have told him that I had a vital key to aid me in making and carrying out decisions I had to make about life (especially in areas of morality and my personal existence as a self looking for purpose and meaning in life). This key could be understood as an open-ended paradigm. Its basic structure would use the 5 D's of scientific methodology (D1 = dig; D2 = deliberate; D3 = decide; D4 = do; and D5 = debug), and apply them to each of the three modes of knowledge which I would identify to him as being: (1) a (K1) mode of self, which is a subjective self whose uniqueness and potential autonomy is (by the very act of its existence) in a constant state of becoming what its desired essentiality seeks to be; (2) a (K2) aspect of self (objective side of self) which would be not only a way of recognizing unique differences within the oneness of each living entity, but also include that aspect of oneself that is in unity and participation with other entities by sharing common values. This (K2) aspect of oneself would also include other things that seem to be different, impersonal, objects to be viewed without having personal interrelationships; and (3) All aspects of the (K1) and the (K2) modes of knowledge implicitly contain parts of (K3). (K3) is that mode of knowledge which is the basic
ground of unity between the (K1) and (K2) modes.

Later, as we discussed issues such as death and loss of self-being, I would have brought up the acronym 'UPTU'. I would have explained to him that it stood for the power of being that underlies, penetrates, transforms, and unifies all departments of human knowledge. As such, it stands for the power of Being-Itself—the power that is expressed in the very act-of-being of everything which 'is'. This power (or ground of being) is found as grounding all aspects of the (K3) mode of knowledge, and can be recognized within oneself as being a different manner of grounding for man's inclinations and virtues (such as courage to be and to become).

Thomas Aquinas integrates the three modes of knowledge in a helpful way. He sees such virtues as being found in a subjective self's (K1) own powers of will and desire. These virtues are embodied in oneself in a manner so as to be in a non-conceptual accord with it. (15) Saint Thomas sees the (K1) mode as that which is in union with or co-natured with the (K3) mode of knowledge so that (K1) and (K2) aspects of the human self are not in conflict, but the intellect (K2) works in conjunction with the affective inclinations (K1) and the dispositions of the autonomous human will. When we are asked to explain the integrative or, to him, "connatural" knowledge (K3), the very nature of it makes it incapable of being reduced to the abstract concepts which constitute the (K2) mode of knowledge.

With St. Thomas, I see mankind as continually
trying to grasp K3's elusive totality in its infinitude. Man does this by calling such a ground of being by a name, such as God or Intelligent Creator of all there is, or the Divine Subjectivity. In spite of the difficulties involved with noun-concepts, which are abstractions from entities that 'are' by their very existence, we can have a general structure within which we can progress in our search for knowledge of the ultimate. We can define it in a very limited sense by calling this (K3) mode of knowledge as that power of Being-Itself which underlies, penetrates, unifies, and transforms the finite self as subsumed under the modes of knowledge which fall under the categories of (K1) or subjective-self, and (K2) as the objective 'other'. 'Other' (in the case of the ultimate concerns of one's own being now threatened by physical death) would stand for the other aspect of self which is becoming or being considered via the process of the 5 D's to carry forward the process of becoming.

The paradigm schematic illustrates the progression of thought movements starting from the (K1) mode of knowledge through the (K2) mode. Critical reflection upon any apparent contradiction between these two modes is where the underlying aspects of (K3) (in response to one's intentional reflection) bring about the internal unity of the various aspects of oneself. In the process of change within oneself (as well as change due to the external changing environment), an updated feedback of new information will be necessary to start back at home base (K1 of subjective-self) and repeat the '5D' steps in each
of the three modes of knowledge.

This recycling can start from either end; (1) a creative postulate of potential becoming from which deductive processes via the 5D's can occur; or (2) from observation of external facts of one's conscious world and an inductive process to reach potential universals or knowledge posited under the mode called (K2). Following Hegel, this schematic is used in a dialectical manner. The dialectic process is one which not only includes both methods of reasoning (inductive and deductive), but also leaves the door open for further cycles of dialectic employing the 5 'D's and the (K1), (K2), and (K3) modes of knowledge available to the finite human mind.

John would have understood this quickly. Others (who had unexpressed or unknown religious convictions and a non-scientific background) could be given the same information, but in language they could understand and learn to apply so they could achieve a purposeful way of living while still physically alive. For example, John raised beautiful roses which he cultivated, cared for, and participated with them as if parts of himself. John and others could be shown this as an example of the beauty and goodness that results in the unification of all the various parts (many) of the whole unique rose plant. Its roots could be seen as in unity with a larger unity (water, soil, sunlight, etc.), so as to constitute the basic essence which in its becoming would be actuated into branches, leaves, and finally the roses themselves. Beauty has been defined as the unification of the variates
(the many). The whole plant itself needs each of its various (many) parts which are unified to reach its teleological (end) goal, or the production of the beautiful flower. It, the flower, is recognized by human thought as completed essence and therefore good in its perfection. So man can understand that in nature, beauty, truth, and goodness are universal attributes that man himself can comprehend. For such comprehension, the objects need to have actualized their full essential potentialities (as essential structures within which changes ultimately complete the process from uncompleted actuality to full actuality).

Man, in his finite reason and spirit, has the potentiality to utilize his autonomous will. In spite of a contingent external world, a person can be conceptualized as a spiritual creature who has infinite possibilities to play a significant part in his/her essential growth—a growth in which they can participate as both an individual part and as a participating part of a dimension (spirit or reason) of life that transcends the physical world in which we currently find ourselves.

Such a view helps to establish hope for a continuation of being in a dimension beyond our time-space world, and gives a person the courage to be what they desire to be, or to become in spite of impending physical death. Such a step requires risk and hopefully, an internal corroboration of being supported by the very power of Being-Itself when one takes such a risk and dares to become beyond that which one now 'is'.
A care-receiver may desire such a dialectical examination of current beliefs they hold (and their corroboration by a group holding similar conclusions). It is recognized by care-givers that many persons having a terminal illness have not been open with anybody concerning issues such as a belief in a Being-Itself who is in, under, and beyond the finite temporal world in which we exist. As indicated previously, all of us need to feel we are accepted by others. To insure this, we often hide from others (and ourselves) those weaker parts of ourselves that we are ashamed of or feel guilty about. Any relationship between a care-giver and a care-receiver is a unique and variable one. Listening and accepting the care-receiver as he/she is (without judgment) will establish a deeper relationship. Hopefully, it will be a relationship that enables the care-receiver to holistically ([K1] and [K2] united by way of [K3]) believe that God (ground of Being-Itself) will receive him/her in the same fashion she/he have been received by another concerned and loving human being.

If any of the above is brought out and mutually shared, then that care-receiver can be reassured by the testimony of other beings in similar situations ("We tell you these things we have seen and heard in order that you might know what you believe." ) (N.T. I John 1:3) We all seek assurances that any decisive course we have chosen to pursue for the remainder of our mortal lives is one in which we are acting, not only as (K1) selves, but are also acting in unity with our (K2)s. Such (K2)s work not only
in cooperation with our (K1)s, but also in participation and unity with others.

This author has applied the paradigm to the faith aspect of self (K1) as well as the (K2) or objective part of my being. I have accepted the Tillichean definition of both 'faith' and 'religion' as being "the state of being grasped by the power of Being-Itself." (Tillich, C. to Be. 173) We need to see that this concept of Being-Itself is not another being, but is the intelligent and spiritual source, power, and ground of all being. Even the courage of despair (which comes from not being able to see any hope or meaning in the existent world in which we live) is grounded in the power of Being-Itself. One must be existing in order to courageously declare that life as existence is only what one, alone in one's absolute freedom, makes oneself into essentially what he/she is in this temporal and existent world.

For an example of an application of the paradigm to the religious realm, we can look at the New Testament scripture II Timothy Chapter One. There we are told that "God does not give us a Spirit of fear, but gives us a Spirit of love, a Spirit of power, and a Spirit of a sound mind." John and I could have scrutinized the elements of this idea of Spirit. With John, I would have started on the sound mind (objective reason or [K2]) of man, and identified the Spirit of Love as the (K3) found underlying, penetrating, transforming, and unifying both (K2) and (K2)--doing all this within and between (K2) and (K1) as they progress in the process of becoming greater
integral parts of the sound mind promised to those who seek unity with the ground of their being. The Spirit of power would be also be primarily associated with the mode of knowledge called (K3) in the paradigm.

We could have mutually and methodically inquired into the basic questions of being asked by a self which finds itself in a world of which it is a part. The basic structure of a being which inquires into its own being is found in a self that has a world that is grasped and linked together by the human mind. We could have really looked at the polarities that start from the polarity of subjective self (K1) and its other (K2) as the objective and external world in which the self finds itself. From there, other polar elements can be considered, such as freedom and destiny, finitude and infinity, universal (many) and the singular (one as complete self). In the progressive examination of these polarities, we could come to see what Hegel gave to the world when he proposed the 'Identity of the Opposites'. No pole of any polarity can exist without its opposite pole. Therefore we can rationally seek for that unity or common ground that exists in spite of the differences of the opposite poles of any given polarity. We could have shared basic tenets of any of our convictions and accepted or debugged our eventual conclusions for this given time (and contingent factors found therein). We would have applied the schematic paradigm proposed in this chapter. The 5 D steps (applied diligently in each movement of reason) would have allowed us to spot errors, search for other
possibilities, debug, and cyclically run the dialectic again and again eliminating the contradictory factors. Eventually, we could have arrived at a mutual acceptance of that which would be the best possible goal of our problem and the best means of reaching it in a useful as well as ethical manner.

Such a basic view would be primarily sought as a base upon which to build our concepts involved in matters of ultimate concern to us. When accepted, we then have to live with them, die with them, and find the best ways we can to achieve any sort of progress towards reaching our ultimate moral goals in and beyond mortal life.

I do not have any reservations about the usefulness of the paradigm to provide a means by which the user can become more self-responsible and self-determined in achieving a personal and meaningful philosophy of life (world view), though of course, I am fallible and need to update the art of using it just as others should.

If called upon to justify my own meaningful philosophy of life, I most certainly would relate a corroboration of it by use of the paradigm proposed in this thesis. The paradigm would be explained by way of analogy and language found to be understandable by the inquirer. It would then be hoped that he/she could comprehend that by use of the reflection needed in the (K3) process, a basic unity between a person's opposing views (subjective and objective) can be found and grasped. Doubts and/or conflicts by the questioner can be openly and honestly reflected upon (via K3 in the paradigm
schematic) when the care-receiver is secure in the non-judgmental acceptance given by the care-giver. If so, it may be possible that the struggler can come to see (as previously stated) that he/she can maintain their perceived individuality and still be in a purposeful unity—a unity with Being-Itself (that which is the source of all entities) which is in and yet transcends finite existence.

I expect to document carefully the results of utilizing the paradigm in the assessment of and the aid given to the care-receivers in respect to their universal and also unique spiritual needs. Results will be summarized and documented on an extensive evaluation form that each volunteer now fills out. This form includes space for and encourages suggested changes (or documentation of new material to be incorporated) to both the training given and suggested manual procedures provided to aid the volunteers.

Examples of specific cases can corroborate how my paradigm was used as a systematic methodological inquiry into different alternative ways to present basic materials and information given to help care-receivers reach their goals—goals that were determined to be realistic ones by subjecting each to the 5 'D' methodology and the methodology based upon a modified form of the Hegelian dialectic. In this manner, the care-giver can corroborate if the basic procedures given in the training and guidance manual are maximally sufficient in each specific case. If not, by using the paradigm, one can seek out and test
alternatives. Then the best 'fit' alternative can be shown to and utilized by the user to afford maximum effectiveness in support of his/her needs. I am confident that the paradigm's usefulness, when adequately documented, will result in its incorporation into the overall program as an effective tool—a tool that Hospice can utilize in its efforts to provide maximum care and comfort to those it serves.

In conclusion, my paradigm was designed to be a foundational tool to help correct old views, or to reformulate another world view in lieu of world views which have not given morally satisfactory answers to the user's sincere search to find a moral meaning and purpose in life. The paradigm should be seen as a tool that allows objective reason (K2) to be combined with a reasoning found in the subjective mode of knowledge (K1) under the unifying principles identified in this thesis as belonging to a third mode of knowledge called (K3).

Rudolph Otto wrote a book called The Idea of the Holy. (14) He stated that he did not oppose reverent minds interpreting divine nature via ethical and rational categories. Otto felt these categories, although an essential part of the content of what we call sacred, are not the whole of it. If either the (K1) or the (K2) mode of human knowledge is addressed exclusively, it promotes the extreme opposition of the other mode. Otto made room for a common ground between the two modes without having either losing its respective differences. The translator (Harvey) noted that Blaise Pascal (a famous mathematician)
in the seventeenth century pointed out the same danger. John Harvey quoted Pascal as saying:

If one subjects everything to reason [K2], our religion will lose its mystery and its supernatural character. If one offends the principles of reason, our religion will be absurd and ridiculous ... There are two equally dangerous extremes, to shut reason out [K2] and to let nothing else [K1 and K3] in. (14)

An inherent drive for knowledge that lets mankind make sense out of life and death still goes on. A risk is always involved when one determines what he/she is and will eventually become, and then acts on this conviction to achieve life-goals. Adaptations to meet the contingencies of life yet to come will be necessary to find and utilize the most effective way(s) possible to achieve a meaningful existence in our striving to live daily in a moral and responsible manner. All methodologies to aid a person require that they be flexible and open ended to significant and relevant changes. This thesis paradigm includes flexible methodologies to insure its practical usefulness to any user. By fully utilizing the paradigm, a person can play a significant and responsible part in becoming that which one feels he/she is ultimately destined to be.
NOTES


10. *N. T. Ist. John 1:3*

11. See chapter one of this thesis, page 10 for examples of (K1), (K2), and (K3) modes of knowledge.

12. Gerald Egan, *The Skilled Helper*, (Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, Pacific Grove, California, 1990) Subsequent references to this work will be cited in the text parenthetically as, e.g., (Egan,14)

13. Edith Blanchard, *Hospice Volunteer's Manual*, (Clark County Health District Services, 1994), Chapter on Self, 5. Subsequent references to this work will be cited in the text parenthetically as, e.g., (Self-esteem, 39.)

APPENDIX I

EXAMPLES CORROBORATING FREE WILL OF MAN IN CHAPTER 3, SECTION FIVE

When Laplacian determinism was accepted, which was prior to 1900, this analogy was used to illustrate the deterministic point of view. A stone which is thrown into the air might think it is free, but rational man knows it is bound by cause and effect, the cause being gravity. The stone is therefore not free to act as it chooses. Rational man may feel free, in the same way, but those who believe the natural world (including man) is determined by natural laws also think that man only believes he is free. The deterministic observer feels he possesses a deeper knowledge of the natural world, and does not find freedom as being real. It is seen as being illusory and a subjective reaction to one's refusal or inability to reach objective reality. (A reasonable explanation of how a deterministic view is right in some situations and wrong in others will be given in the Hegelian chapter.)

However a statistical determinism replaced the Laplacian determinism about 1900. Chance alone is the prime mover in this form of determinism, but the statistical laws of randomness allows a theoretical possibility of fluctuations capable of eventually contradicting the known laws of probability.

Lecomte du Nouy, a French biologist, in his book *Human Destiny*, gives us this statistical argument and
conclusion on the stone versus man analogy. (End Note 5 of chapter three) A stone might not fall, but in experience, it always does. On logical grounds, the analogy is fallacious and unsound because the two events, man and stone, cannot be compared as if being in the same category.

The stone's notion of freedom is univocal (only one possibility) and man in his dual nature has two possibilities—(1) to obey his natural world sense impulses and inclinations and; (2) to freely reject such impulses and choose to follow a maxim in accordance with reason's input to his will.

Kant accepts this duality in man, but states the idea of freedom must be presupposed to be able to autonomously act in favor of pure practical reason's choice to follow the laws of the intelligible world. Kant also told us that we can experience and know the end results (effects), but we can not know the suppositions of the intelligible world which gives us universally valid laws.

The deterministic observer, under the Laplacian deterministic viewpoint, said a deeper knowledge of the world shows freedom is not real and is only a subjective reaction to one's inability to reach objective reality. Let those still subscribing to such a view consider du Nouy's explanation of an experimentally and corroborative means of establishing evidence for man's freedom—freedom from those man made laws established from the current scale of observation in our natural world.
If we agree with the above reasoning and premises, a statistical law, if no bias is introduced, allows each of two choices (calling the results of a flip of a coin) to determine heads or tails), to be equally possible. Therefore, man has no freedom of choice between two determinations of equal possibility. But man is not a rock nor a coin. Experiments and our practical life experiences show us that there is a large difference in the number of people choosing to act—act according to values arrived at by reason in the intelligible world and the number of people choosing to act according to their natural desires and inclinations as a members of the natural world. If a difference exists in the numbers of people in each category, the choices are not equally probable.

One could call this smaller number in the above example a fluctuation of those choosing the path of intelligible moral evolution. However, a fluctuation is not determined, but on the basis of the fluctuation's statistical definition, it is a fluctuation entirely due to chance. Therefore, logic can only proceed in one direction, and to the following conclusion. The attitude of man or his intent to go against his animalistic nature is not a pre-determined intent or attitude. The only other alternative is that man is free—he has an autonomy of will to make or deny the choice of going along with a rational being's concept—a concept of a natural deterministic law that tells him he has no such choice available to him.

It is my conviction that if Kant had a modern
scientific background, he would not have had to resort to speculative reason to show the possibility of presupposing the freedom of the will. His speculative approach was possible because such a possibility did not involve itself in a contradiction with the principle of natural necessity in the inner connection of appearances in the world of sense.

In the sense of the world, one can speak realistically only about the objects perceived on the human being's scale of observation. Such a scale limited by man's unaided senses and the extension of those senses by scientific instruments has been very prolific in recent years. Each time it has, the pseudo-natural laws (made by man) have had to become modified or even reversed. Newer models (that are now called paradigms) to utilize the new information are then made. Therefore, we have no logical reason for not anticipating other possible reversals of cause and effect laws in the intelligible world under given circumstances not yet established.

An example of the reversal of a deterministic law stating that equal pressure is exerted by a gas upon on all inner surfaces of any leakproof container is this—

On a scale of observation in the molecular realm, random movement of gas molecules will exert unequal pressures exerted by them in a vessel comparable in size to the molecules of gas. (De Nouy DM, 40)

At a microscopic level, let twenty molecules be contained in a micro size barbell container such as an hour glass with the containers at each end capable of
holding twenty molecules. These containers are connected to each other by a narrow tube whose diameter was such the molecules would have to go through single file. According to our natural world law of equal pressure, the random action of the molecules would find ten in each bulb on the ends and none in the process of passing from one side to the other. Randomness at this microscopic level would find equal numbers of molecules (pressure) in each bulb the exception rather than the rule.
APPENDIX II

MATHEMATICAL FACTORS INVOLVED IN EQUATING HEGEL'S 'ALL' WITH HIS 'MANY'

In simplified terms, as in objective mathematics, the whole (one) is equal to the sum of its parts (many). It is my belief that our 'hang-up' in accepting this form of abstract thinking comes from assuming the term 'identical' (or equal) means there is no difference between those entities deemed identical. Hegel's 'Identity of the Opposites' can now make more sense to us by our own experience of its practicality. We can now perceive that the terms being called equivalent contain the same number of the basic units of measurement. For example, 50 cents plus 2 quarters is equivalent and identical in value to a one dollar bill. We can perceive that the one bill is yet different by its oneness while identical in its equivalent value. The external appearances (show) are different, yet the common ground (internally speaking) is that both sides of this 'Identity of the Opposites' contain the same basic number of units we call cents or pennies.

Mankind tends to think in terms of that which can be shown to be equal (identities such as \( 8 = 5 + 3 \)). Reason (in the (K2) sense) seeks control by being able to get the same results or effects each time by working with relationships where causes are known and unchangeable. In such situations, the effects can be reliably predicted.
However, coming up with an equation that reflects the inexhaustible alternatives that a rational and moralistic human being could consider (when deciding upon a 'maxim of choice' in arriving at a moral goal to work toward achieving) is much more complex. Such an equation should never be considered as analogous to those equations used in the world of finite necessity and the relationships between such finitely necessitated objects. A 'First Intelligence' of pure thought, pure self-determination, and pure self-development can never be limited to an abstract 'finitely necessitated' concept.

The postulate of the 'Notion', in its pure form, pertains only to the self-generating movements found within the first cause itself. As a part of this first cause, each individual constitutes a part of the original whole; but the sum of all current parts does not equal the 'All'. Instead, in mathematical terminology, the equivalent equation of the original 'All' is equal to the sum of its many (infinite?) parts at a given time 'now', plus the infinite and mysterious potentialities of the 'nothingness' found within the ground of Being-Itself. These unpredictable potentialities are not irrational ones, but are logically possible for the selective choices made by the First Cause. The following paragraph is a brief mathematical derivation of this equation.

A mathematical equation that contains an infinite number of potential (but not yet expressed alternative ways an infinitely free entity possesses) put in a form of the 'All' (as one) equal to the sum of the particular
parts of the 'All' plus the infinite not yet actualized particulars is as follows: In as brief a symbolic form as we can make;

Let A (as 'All') - [minus] (nothings yet to become ....as X1, X2, X3, ..... Xnth) = the sum of (actualized particulars [and currently becoming actualized particulars] as Xla, X2a, X3a.... X[nth]a). We may algebraically add the expression (nothings yet to become X1, X2, X3.... Xnth) to both sides of the equation. This merely shifts the mystery of the yet to become (as particulars) from the left side of above equation (called the 'All' side) to the side of the sum of the particulars. Thus we have the equation A = (Sum of Xla, X2a ...X[nth]a) + [plus] [X1, X2...Xnth]). Either form of the above mathematical equation represents what the words of the previous paragraph attempted to portray. The purpose of this illustration is to point out that simplification can lead to loss of comprehension unless complex wholes are known and understood before the reduction of them to abstract conceptual expressions is made.
APPENDIX III

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF CLARK COUNTY HEALTH DISTRICT HOSPICE PROGRAM

During my active involvement as a volunteer care-giver during 1987-88, I was not utilized in the post-bereavement period of the survivors of the deceased. A need in this area of care (that I felt could be fulfilled by trained volunteer care-givers) was the basis of my original intent to submit my paradigm as a means of helping volunteer care-givers aid survivors in their readjustment period. This would include helping immediate family members become aware of goals they want to reach, and to help them find and correct deficiencies needed to be overcome to reach goals that are realistically achievable.

After completion of my paradigm in February 1994, I went to the Coordinator of Volunteer Services, and found that volunteer care-givers have a much larger role to play (which includes helping survivors in the post-bereavement period). Guidance for help in all areas is now included in an extensive 39-hour training course for volunteers prior to their initial assignment to a Hospice team. Also, a loose leaf notebook of detailed standard guidance (472 pages) and references to additional resources is issued to each volunteer. The current training and availability of methods to be used includes guidance in areas such as stress, pain, communication, dying, self-esteem, mental
and spiritual preparation for death, and post-death planning and support. However, I did not find any guidance manual material that proposed a solution to problems caused by a person's subjective knowledge (K1) being in opposition to his/her (K2) or objective knowledge. I therefore intend to use my paradigm (upon return to being a volunteer care-giver) to help those willing to work upon a resolution of any such self-conflicts.

To illustrate how my application of the five D's and the Hegelian dialectic can be used in conjunction with the guidance and data available in the Hospice Notebook Manual, I have selected material concerning the religious needs of the terminally ill. One article in the guidance manual again emphasizes the need for an assessment to be made as to where spirituality and/or religion fit in their lives and if it will be available to help them meet their needs. (Self,8) Religious needs are expressed in this article which the author feels are seldom or never openly expressed. Mudd (the author) feels these often-hidden needs should be addressed.

The first need stated is that of having a meaningful philosophy of life. Here, Mudd sees the terminally ill asking questions of themselves such as, "has my life had meaning?" "Am I meaningful to anyone?" "Will I be remembered?" He continues by telling us that as supportive care-givers we can listen, be a sounding board, and show the cared-for that they are meaningful to us by our entering into their struggle. Both Mudd and I see the care-givers as needing to accept non-judgmentally
whatever way care-receivers find meaning (even if we do not agree). Our task as care-givers is to assist them in discovering or affirming their own meaningful system. (Self, 8)