Quality judgment: Toward the "essentially human" in ethics and policy

Kenneth Wayne Johnson
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/rtds

Repository Citation
https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/rtds/498

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Scholarship@UNLV. It has been accepted for inclusion in UNLV Retrospective Theses & Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital Scholarship@UNLV. For more information, please contact digitalscholarship@unlv.edu.
INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.
QUALITY JUDGMENT: TOWARD THE "ESSENTIALLY HUMAN"

IN ETHICS AND POLICY

by

Kenneth W. Johnson

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

in

Ethics and Policy Studies

Institute for Ethics and Policy Studies
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
August 1995
UMI Number: 1376189

Copyright 1995 by
Johnson, Kenneth Wayne
All rights reserved.

UMI Microform 1376189
Copyright 1995, by UMI Company. All rights reserved.
This microform edition is protected against unauthorized
copying under Title 17, United States Code.

UMI
300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, MI 48103
The Thesis of Kenneth W. Johnson for the degree of Master of Arts in Ethics and Policy Studies is approved.

Chairperson, Craig Walton, Ph.D.

Examiner Committee Member, Paul Schollmeier, Ph.D.

Examining Committee Member, Alan Zundel, Ph.D.

Graduate Faculty Representative, Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Ph.D.

Interim Dean of the Graduate College, Cheryl Bowles, Ed.D.

University of Nevada, Las Vegas
August 1995
ABSTRACT

This thesis describes a framework, a component of a larger paradigm, designed to improve the thinking, planning, and acting of individuals within society. It is based upon factors of human existence that most can agree are fundamental to pursuing matters of importance, however disparately we may see them. Assuming that human choice is a function of consciousness and compassion—it argues that insight from ethics and policy studies can be improved if founded upon an understanding of the implications of the full development and use of the essential human capacities that underlie consciousness and compassion: critical and creative thinking; communicating in symbols and concepts; and cooperating in inquiry and action. It argues that for any ethical or policy judgment to be "essentially human" it must both employ the essential human capacities of all those involved or affected and account for its impact upon those capacities, as far as is reasonably possible.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**ABSTRACT** .............................................. iii

**PREFACE** .............................................. vii

Acknowledgments ........................................... ix

**PART I. INTRODUCTION**

Chapter

1. PURPOSE OF THIS THESIS ........................ 1

   Essential Human Attributes ...................... 4
   Human Choice ....................................... 5
   Human Consciousness .............................. 6
   Human Compassion .................................. 7
   Procedural Values Behind the Values .............. 8
   Toward An Essentially
   Human Judgment Process ......................... 11
   Conclusion and Preview ........................... 16
   Chapter Notes/1 .................................... 19

2. FAULTY ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING
   ETHICAL AND POLICY DECISION-MAKING ............ 20

   Two Faulty Assumptions ........................... 20
   Attacks on Reason and Expertise ................. 23
   Conclusion and Preview ........................... 29
   Chapter Notes/2 .................................... 33

3. PHILOSOPHICAL AND
   PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS .................. 34

   Essential Human Capacities ...................... 34
   Optimal Performance and
   the Essential Human Capacities ................. 38
   Pragmatic, Ethical and
   Moral Decision-making ............................ 42
   Pragmatic Judgments .............................. 43
   Ethical Judgments .................................. 44
   Moral Judgments .................................... 48
   Moral Process for
   Ethical Decision-making ......................... 49
   Knowledge and Moral Behavior .................... 57
   Essential Human Truth ............................. 59
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>ASSUMPTIONS, CREATIVITY &amp; PARADIGM</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>CAPACITIES CONCEPTUALIZED</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>ELEMENTS OF TIME AND CONCEPTS OF QUALITY JUDGMENT AND QUALITY ACTION</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PART II: THE ESSENTIAL INTERDEPENDENCE PARADIGM**
PART III: IMPLICATIONS, GUIDELINES & APPLICATION

Chapter

7. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND METHODOLOGICAL GUIDELINES ........................................ 131
   Policy Implications of the Judgment Process .................................................. 131
   Methodological Guidelines ................................................................................. 137
   Definitions ........................................................................................................ 137
   Toward the "Essentially Human" ..................................................................... 139
   Conclusion and Preview ..................................................................................... 143
   Chapter Notes/7 .................................................................................................. 144

8. APPLICATION AND CONCLUSION ........................................................................... 146
   Application of the Framework and Methodological Guidelines ...................... 146
   An Essentially Human Welfare Policy ............................................................... 154
   Community Consciousness and Compassion Centers ....................................... 155
   Prospects for Successful Implementation ......................................................... 167
   Conclusion and New Beginning ........................................................................ 171
   Chapter Notes/8 .................................................................................................. 174

SOURCES CONSULTED ............................................................................................. 175
PREFACE

There is a certain risk of confusion inherent in what follows, which I should like to minimize through these comments.

Thesis as Part of a Broader Model

The purpose of this thesis is to develop and demonstrate a framework for achieving understanding, discovering questions, solving problems, and resolving conflicts as a process tending toward a well-considered, comprehensive and coherent product, or "Quality Judgment." This process, which I call an "Essentially Human Judgment Process," may also be called "Quality Judgment" in the sense that it is a product as well as a process. In any event, both process and product are but parts, though fundamental ones, of a broader model for ethics and policy study, which I call "Vision & Value-based Excellence" or, in its most robust form, the Essential Transconnection Paradigm. This paradigm, in turn, is based upon a number of assumptions, one of which relates to a fundamental world view, which I call "An Evolving World Ethic."

The risk of confusion arises from the fact that this framework is described here independently of the
broader contextual model. As a result, it may appear at first glance to be incomplete. This incompleteness is there by necessity. Unlike the more comprehensive nature of the more robust paradigm, the intent of the thesis is to build the minimally sufficient framework for a frame of reference employing, reflecting, and considering that which is essentially human.

As such, it is a meta-ethical, meta-political framework that is pre-constitution, pre-law, pre-principles, and pre-values. That is not to say that it is itself value-neutral. It might be accurate to say that the framework describes the values behind the values; the principles employed within the frame of reference as algorithms or heuristics are those dictated by the context, history, and relationships of those involved and affected by it. So, provided the framework is employed, it makes no difference what the actual purposes, visions, values or views of reality of all those involved and affected are. It is only "of the essence" that they be well-considered and that due weight is given to how well-formed they are.

Both the notions of "Vision & Value-based Excellence" and an "Essentially Human Judgment Process" are born of a quest for understanding my own life experiences, especially service during the Vietnam and Gulf Wars, practice as an attorney and businessman, and loves won and lost. The notion of a judgment being of "Quality" was
suggested by Daniel Yankelovich in his book *Coming to Public Judgment*. With the goal of trying to determine what a "Quality Public Judgment" would look like, the model, of which this thesis is a part, took shape. Thus, the working title of a work in progress developing the Essential Transconnection Paradigm is *Quality Public Judgment: Discussion, Dialogue, and Inquiry in Ethics and Policy*.

**Acknowledgments**

There are many people who have contributed, wittingly or unwittingly, to the development of the "Essential Transconnection Paradigm," one component of which is developed in this thesis.

Eduardo M. Caso, the late director of the Tucson Arizona Boys Chorus, sought excellence in art and living for many young men, including me. He taught by example that we create our own lives, but that we often do this best in cooperation with others. In so doing, he taught, we are responsible for the good, truth and beauty that we find there.

Susan T. Gardner, a philosophy instructor at Capilano College in Vancouver, B.C., was my severest and most loving critic and is a passionate proponent of the community of inquiry. It must be enough to say that no word made it into this writing without my wondering, What would Susie think of this? Would she see this to be
relevant in her life?

The late Murray N. Rothbard, an original member of the committee, likewise served as a constant presence. Though he never reviewed the thesis in its entirety, his libertarian model for a free society, and the passion with which he advocated it, served both as ideal and indictment of the Essential Transconnection Paradigm. His input is sorely missed, as will be his presence on the world stage.

To the three of them I owe a wondering sense of what life is about and a richer sense of what it can be. That the quest is so much a solo journey is a sad component of that sense.

A special thanks to Roger and Barbara McPike for their support and interest over the years. Roger's confidence as I first explored the national security aspects of cultural values at the Landing Force Training Command, Pacific was a crucial first step. Barbara's commonsense questions and observations increased my understanding of what I was saying as the broader model has developed.

My examining committee's helpful criticisms, comments, and suggestions deserve my heartfelt thanks. Their interest, insight, and input served to confirm the fundamental notion of the community of inquiry as foundational to a truth that is essentially human.

Finally, and especially if the premises and
inferences in this thesis are true, a special
acknowledgment and thanks to my parents, to whom I owe most
of what is "essentially human" in my life.
PART I

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 1

PURPOSE OF THIS THESIS

In the final, and most abstract, analysis, all ethical and policy judgments are concerned with notions of what is good, true, and beautiful for an individual, group, or community. More concretely, human action is a function of visions of a desired future, views of reality, and expectations as to the possibilities of action that must be well-formed for any individual or group or community to achieve their aims consistently. That is, visions of a desired future must be challenging, integrating, and achievable, lest lives be filled with apathy, missed opportunity, or failure. Views of reality must be comprehensive, sustaining, and accurate, lest lives be filled with unpleasant surprises, passivity, and wasted energy. Expectations as to the possibilities of action must permit anticipation, innovation, and excellence (see Barker 1992, 11-13, 139), lest lives be at the power of
events, mired in the solutions of the past. In short, if visions, views, and expectations are not well-formed, neither individual nor group nor community can consistently achieve the good, the true, and the beautiful in life.

Essential to developing any such vision, view, or expectation is a well-developed perspective—the faculty of seeing all relevant data, concepts, and valuations in a meaningful relationship, one to another. All individuals (regardless of perspective), however, think, plan, and act as parts of wholes that are themselves parts of greater wholes. Our thought processes, our languages, and our habits, customs, and traditions are all of the essence, at one and the same time, of both the part and the whole. This suggests that there might be some set of concepts that all policy makers and analysts can accept as fundamental to good public policy—the procedural values behind the substantive values, as it were. So, taken together, these suggest that any person or group striving to make well-formed ethical or policy judgments must take into account the well-developed perspectives of all those involved in, or affected by, the judgment.

The purpose of this thesis, then, is to develop and demonstrate the concept that a framework employing the well-developed perspectives of all persons affected by a judgment is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for any individual or group to reach and implement judgments of quality effectively and efficiently. As such,
it proposes a relatively simple conceptual framework to bring into play all the human perspectives that together constitute human reality when thinking, planning and acting for ethical and policy purposes. It is designed to be fundamental to any system, principle, or model that one would employ for ethical and policy decision-making. Thus, if one would employ principles of justice (however defined) or caring or utility, the concepts developed herein ought to be employed in acting on, and arguing from, those principles. Moreover, these concepts ought to be employed ab initio in deciding whether to adopt those principles.

This framework, together with the chosen set principles, etc., would constitute a frame of reference that one would employ in making ethical and policy judgments—a structure of views of reality, symbols and concepts, and valuations and values by means of which an individual, group, or community perceives or evaluates data, communicates ideas, and regulates behavior. Its goal is insight into, and understanding of, the diverse perspectives that make up our world as a means to truth (see Lipman 1988, 148; Sleinis 1994, Chap. 2).

Since it is designed to discover relevant principles or apply adopted principles, the concepts developed here are value-neutral as to what judgments should be reached. This is not to say that it is itself value-neutral. It is to say that the values are embedded in the framework itself, from which other values may be
inferred, not as judgments, but as necessary conditions. It is, in this sense, meta-ethical, meta-political, that is, pre-constitution, pre-law, pre-principles, and pre-values.

It is designed to be fundamental to action and argument, whatever the actor's ends-in-view or standards, criteria, principles, or values. Hence, its approach is meta-ethical. It assumes that—whether the actor values fairness or justice or caring; whether he or she orders his or her affairs according to a theory of social contract or rationally developed duty or virtue ethic; and whatever his or her notion of beauty—consistently achieving his or her ends-in-view over a lifetime requires that certain human attributes and capacities be developed, maintained, and employed for him or her to act and argue from a foundation of truth. Thus, if one wants to be just or pursue 'the greatest good for the greatest number' or care for all those deserving of care or fulfill a social contract that might have been developed behind a veil of ignorance, I assume that there are certain aspects of humanity, which all or most of us can agree, are necessary to do or argue well.

**Essential Human Attributes**

Life of the human being is characterized by action (*Nicomachean Ethics 1.7.1098a16-17; Mises 1966, chap. 1*) and argument (Hoppe 1993, 152-56; see, e.g., *Nicomachean*
Ethics). Human choice is a function of both (see Nicomachean Ethics 1.2.1112a17, 6.2.1139a31-34; Owens 1991; Mises 1966, 12-13; Hoppe 1993, 180-81). Consciousness and compassion are components of choice. If, taken together, choice, consciousness and compassion are considered to be essential human attributes, how does one develop, maintain, and employ one's essential human attributes such that one acts and argues well? That is, how does one expand one's consciousness such that one is able to make better choices of, and deal more appropriately with, the objects of one's compassion—all with a view to creating the life one truly desires to live (see Senge 1992).

Human Choice

Human choice is a fundamental attribute of the human being; it has been recognized as such at least since the ancient Greeks (see, e.g., Nicomachean Ethics 3.2.1111b4-1112a18) It is, in the words of Ludwig von Mises (1966), "a person's conscious adjustment to the state of the universe that determines his life" (11).

In this thesis, I follow Aristotle in distinguishing a choice from opinion (Nicomachean Ethics 3.2.1111b11-12). As Aristotle observed, "anything may be a matter of opinion—we form opinions about what is eternal, or impossible, just as much as what is within our power (3.1.1111b31-33). As he observed, people themselves differ, some excelling at choosing, others at opining. I
also join Aristotle, who concludes that choice is "voluntary action preceded by deliberation, since choice involves reasoning and some process of thought" (3.2.1112a14-17).

Human life is an unceasing sequence of choosing among various opportunities seen to be available to the choosing individual that results in a linked chain of actions (Mises 1966, 45). Human choice itself is largely a function of consciousness, specifically the attention we pay to the situation before us: what we see and feel, what we value, what relationships we recognize (Csikszentmihalyi 1991, 33). Thus, deliberation leading to choice must have some well-developed input in the form of data, concepts, and valuations to lead to effective and efficient judgments, arguments, and actions.

Human Consciousness

The notion of human consciousness, however, defies easy definition. Following Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi (1991), this thesis takes a phenomenological approach to consciousness, defining it as intentionally ordered information. Consciousness gives us the capacity to become aware of ourselves, the capacity to learn and grow, the capacity to imagine a future, the capacity to change the world. It allows us to choose to act in, rather than merely react or adapt to, the world surrounding us.

Human consciousness provides the fundamental
knowledge and understanding that the human being employs in making choices and acting. "Some people learn to use this priceless resource efficiently," Csikszentmihalyi (1991) declares, "while others waste it." He observes that:

The mark of a person who is in control of consciousness is the ability to focus attention at will, to be oblivious to distractions, to concentrate for as long as it takes to achieve a goal, and not longer. And the person who can do this usually enjoys the normal course of everyday life. (31)

Csikszentmihalyi (1993) concludes that, in addition to chance and necessity, "Consciousness, this third determinant of our behavior, can lead to safety or to destruction" (15). Consciousness, then, must be well-developed, maintained, and employed for judgments, arguments, and actions to be effective, efficient, and safe.

Human Compassion

Human choice is driven by more than consciousness. Human compassion, often inarticulable or unconscious, also drives human choice. Human compassion goes beyond animal altruism, which is limited to relatives or tribes, to a more universal compassion (Hume 1978, 487; A. Smith 1969, 1976, 47-48). Annette Baier (1991), for example, interprets David Hume to say that our nature is "to be social and passionate, before it is cognitive" (28-29). She points out that "our cognitive capacities, both in the species and in each human infant, develop along with our
social and emotional capacities." Human compassion is not without limits in time, space, and relationship, however.

Nicholas Capaldi (1989) notes that Hume distinguishes between "weak sympathy" and "strong sympathy":

Weak sympathy is limited to the present moment. Strong sympathy gives us a broader perspective, "a lively notion of all the circumstances of that person, whether past, present, or future; possible, probable or certain." (183)

Among the foremost proponents of an ethic of compassion or caring are feminist philosophers, such as Carol Gilligan, Annette Baier, Claudia Card, Nel Noddings, and Rita Manning. Manning (1992), for example, has observed that an ethic of caring requires both a disposition to care and an obligation to care for (61-62). She concludes, however, that:

Finally, one need not respond to every need. In choosing how and when to respond, one should consider the seriousness of the need, the benefit to the one needing care of filling this particular need, one's own capacity to fill the need, and the competing needs of others, including oneself, that will be affected by filling this particular need. (64)

Procedural Values Behind the Values

Following Csikszentmihalyi (1993), this thesis considers the various ethical and policy systems, principles, and models that have been espoused over human recorded history to have been well-intentioned, but driven, in either concept or application, by:

genetic instructions, which were once necessary to our survival, but are often in conflict with present
reality; the distortions of the culture in which we were born[;] and [the distortions] that result from the emergence of the self as a separate entity making its own claims on the mind. (xvii)

This results in attention, awareness, memories, patterns of thought, and hierarchies of goals in consciousness that result in different visions, values, and notions of excellence driving our choices. It also results in differing notions of who (or what) should be the objects of our compassion—and what should be done to deal with them—within those visions and reflecting those values and notions of excellence.

Having assumed these ethical and policy systems, principles, and models to be well-intentioned, the question remains, how do we develop, maintain, and employ our fundamental human attributes in a world of disparate systems, principles, and models? The underlying premise of this thesis is that human beings are characterized by choice, consciousness, and compassion, which are implemented through thinking, planning and human action. This having been said, however, the essential human attributes are not capacities subject to nurturance and development such that they might be said to be "essentially human." For example, if one is to expand, raise, or enlarge one's consciousness; make better choices; or deal more appropriately with the objects of one's compassion, there are more basic human capacities that must be well-developed, maintained, and employed for one to do so.
Certain human capacities allow us to further develop and employ consciousness, choice and compassion. I assume these to be critical and creative thinking; communicating in symbols and concepts; and cooperating in inquiry and action. Together, these capacities give us the unique capability to appreciate the nature of the world and our relationships to it. These three capacities, then, may be said to be the "Essential Human Capacities" in that they are of the essence and essential to our ability to relate to the world around us, to choose wisely, and to deal appropriately with the objects of our compassion: in short, our abilities to think, to choose, to plan, to act, and to reflect and learn successfully in a changing, often challenging, environment.

In the history of philosophy, the problem of the relationship between existence and essence has been one of the most difficult (New Catholic Encyclopedia 1967b, 552). From the ideals of Plato before the Christian Era to the medieval thought of St. Thomas Aquinas, much of philosophy had sought an abstract, universal frame of reference that might define existence. Hence, the Thomistic notion of "essence" as signifying "a mode or manner according to which reality might be fashioned" (1967a, 547; 1967b, 550). As rationalism came to dominate the philosophical scene, essence and existence came to be replaced by the Hegelian notion of idealism: "Existential reality is there but a backdrop or, even less, a kind of concept that combines
with concepts of essence to weave the abstract texture of the real" (1967b, 552). The 'existentialists' reacted insisting in various ways that the fundamental question was, how does one exist as a true human being?" (1967d, 731). In this view, "the concern of the existentialist is not with the general and the universal but with the singular and the individual" (ibid.).

Having said this, and having used the term "essential" throughout this thesis, it is not my purpose to join that battle. Richard Shusterman (1992) points to the paradox involved in claiming that one is not an essentialist--it may "turn into an inverted essentialism of anti-essentialism which asserts 'the universality and necessity of the individual and contingent'" (Shusterman 1992, 83, quoting, in part, Rorty 1989, 26). My perspective, as set forth in more detail in the next Chapter, is existentialist, implying a focus on the concrete and the individual as opposed to the abstract and the universal (New Catholic Encyclopedia 1967c, 724-25).

To avoid the Shusterman Paradox, I use the terms "essential" and "of the essence" in the common, descriptive dictionary sense of something necessary and fundamental or basic to human action or argument.

Toward An Essentially Human Judgment Process

This approach concentrates on the human capacities that human beings employ to expand consciousness, to make
intelligent choices, and to deal properly with the objects of our compassion so that they may argue and act well. It makes a case for the development, maintenance, and employment of the Essential Human Capacities, which have evolved to exercise those attributes—critical and creative thinking; communicating in symbols and concepts; and cooperating in inquiry and action—as integral to our perception, participation, processes, and policies in an increasingly challenging world.

In broad terms, one might say that there are two alternative consensual ethical systems: (1) an autonomous, rational set of ethical principles employed to pursue the individual, concerted, and mutual ends of all affected by a decision, which ends are sought of their own accord, or (2) a heteronomous, faithful set of ethical principles requiring adherence to the authority of another to pursue individual, collective, or universal ends urged by the other (Mises 1966, 147-48; see also Rothbard 1982, 17; Neuhaus 1992; Novak 1993). The essential difference between the two is that in the first instance acceptance of the principles follows understanding and in the second acceptance follows deference.

Neither is inherently right. At any particular point in time, the situation, as then understood, may be such that it would be appropriate for an individual—given his or her limited capacity for understanding, lack of time, or dearth of information available to make a
judgment—to defer to another's judgment as to what constitutes an appropriate set of principles. It is just such a division of labor in policy matters that St. Thomas Aquinas urges in "On Kingship or The Governance of Rulers":

> it is not possible for one man to arrive at the knowledge of all [things that are necessary for human life] through the use of his reason. Thus it is necessary for him to live in society so that one person can help another and different men can employ their reason in different ways... (quoted in Sigmund 1988, 14-17; see also Niebuhr 1932, 21)

Such deference is indeed the lot for most of us, most of the time. As Ludwig von Mises (1966) observed:

> Common man does not speculate about the great problems. With regard to them he relies upon other people's authority, he behaves as "every decent fellow must behave," he is like a sheep in the herd. It is precisely this intellectual inertia that characterizes a man as a common man. Yet the common man does choose. He chooses to adopt traditional patterns or patterns adopted by other people because he is convinced that this procedure is best fitted to achieve his own welfare. And he is ready to change his ideology and consequently his mode of action whenever he becomes convinced that this would better serve his own interests. (46)

In any event, it is often the case that the ends sought by both approaches appear to be roughly the same. Whether the individual or community actively identifies and develops its principles, or whether she or they defer to the authority of another, seems to depend upon the situation and state of development of the Essential Human Capacities.

For example, following Aldo Leopold in A Sand County Almanac (1949), in part, I consider an "ethic" to be
a limitation on freedom of action in the struggle to exist (202, 203), but, going beyond Leopold, I would add "... to have energy, and to evolve."

Neither the world nor human beings have merely existed over time. Our power to choose, based upon our consciousness and compassion, have evolved and are a part of the world. Thus, I look at ethics, first and foremost, as a component of a vision of that life that is deemed to be good, together with the role that truth and beauty play in that vision, and what it means to be a human being within such a vision. If, as will be demonstrated later, that which any individual values at any given point in time is subjective, in the sense of being the result of individual intellect and moral agency, then no person or body of persons could have the knowledge required to make intelligent decisions for the entire community. It follows, therefore, that an ethical system ought to include an autonomous, rational set of ethical principles employed to pursue the individual, concerted, and mutual ends of all affected by a decision, which ends are sought of their own accord.

This approach is intended to provide a meta-ethical framework toward developing them. If the goal for an ethics and policy decision-making process is to reach a judgment that allows each and every individual to create and live the life he or she deems worth living, then an "essentially human" decision-making process seems to be of
the essence and essential. The underlying theme of this thesis, therefore, is an ethics and policy framework based upon the development, maintenance, and employment of the Essential Human Capacities as components, which could be widely held to serve as the procedural values underlying the substantial values. This framework will be called an "Essentially Human Judgment Process."

As founded, this meta-ethical and policy system itself may be said to be humanistic, atheistic or agnostic, but it is designed rather to be "entirely neutral with regard to religious beliefs which do not pretend to interfere with the conduct of social, political, and economic affairs" (Mises 1966, 155). The values contained in religious beliefs are accounted for in the frames of reference of those arguing and acting, but are not included as a component of the framework itself. Its ultimate objective is aid decision-makers to arrive at good arguments and action-guiding principles leading to ethical and policy judgments that will avoid the violent conflicts that must disintegrate the social cooperation of acting individuals.

This Essentially Human Judgment Process operates within a broader framework of human decision-making and action within society, which I style the "Essential Interdependence Paradigm," and develop in Part II, Chapter 4. The notion of "Essential Interdependence" is used to emphasize the role of the Essential Human Capacities in
social functioning and to distinguish it from a deceptively similar "model" developed by Emile Durkheim, which stresses "organic solidarity" and "functional interdependence" (Giddens 1971, 76-79). Of course, neither his paradigm nor the Essential Interdependence Paradigm developed in this thesis rises to being a model in the sense of being a frame of reference.

Conclusion and Preview

Having assumed that these Essential Human Capacities are critical and creative thinking, communicating in symbols and concepts, and cooperating in inquiry and action (cf., Watson 1990, 459) and having identified them for inclusion into an "Essentially Human Judgment Process, the next task is to develop a framework for reaching ethical and policy judgments that (1) employs these Essential Human Capacities where appropriate, (2) evaluates the input from participants in terms of its own criteria for good judgment, and (3) takes into account the impact of the judgment upon the Essential Human Capacities of all those affected by it. Only through such a process might we approximate, what might be styled, "Essential Human Truth," that is, an approximation of reality as a means toward creating the lives we truly desire to live: an approximation as accurate as the employment of the well-developed Essential Human Capacities of those involved and affected will permit.
The thesis is developed in three multi-Chapter Parts. In the balance of Part I, I will argue against two faulty assumptions underlying most modern ethical and policy theory and develop a number of philosophical and psychological concepts, which lend both credit and detail to elements of the proposed framework. With this background in mind, Part II will develop a meta-ethical/political framework for an essentially human ethics and policy judgment process based upon the human capacities for critical and creative thinking; communicating in symbols and concepts; and cooperating in inquiry and action. It will place special emphasis upon the impact of various aspects of time on human judgment.

The core theme of Part II is that these capacities must be well-developed and employed, or facilitated, for ethical and policy judgments of all sorts to be effective, efficient, and safe. Moreover, to the extent those involved or affected do not fully employ these capacities, that should be accounted for expressly in evaluating the input to our judgments. Finally, the purpose of any resulting ethical or policy judgment ought to be expressed in terms of its impact, as made and implemented, upon the Essential Human Capacities.

Part III applies the framework deriving a number of policy implications and describing developing some methodological guidelines, which can be used to estimate the degree to which a community, its judgment processes,
and its policies approach the ideal of being essentially human. Though the framework has general applicability to all ethical and policy analysis, evaluation, making and implementation—including, but not limited to environmental, foreign, social, and economic policy—the guidelines will be used in this thesis to consider a single policy issue of great import on the current scene: single-parent welfare policy.
Chapter Notes/1

1 The sense in which "essence" and "essential" are used in this thesis is developed later in this chapter.

2 The political scientist Charles Lindblom would suggest a third consensual system, persuasion, in the form of education, advertising, and propaganda (see deHaven-Smith 1988, 52).

3 I could follow here the reasoning of Michael Scriven that critical thinking necessarily includes creative thinking, but I am persuaded by the rationale of Matthew Lipman that distinguishes, and integrates them, as higher-order thinking. I reject, for the purposes of this thesis, the notion that truly comprehensive thinking requires "systems thinking," but would allude to that requirement by calling the capacity "comprehensive thinking" (compare Scriven 1976, 35-36 with Wilber 1995, 19-24; Lipman 1991, 19-25; Senge 1990).
CHAPTER 2

FAULTY ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING ETHICAL
AND POLICY DECISION-MAKING

Two Faulty Assumptions

The nature of the assumptions underlying ethical and policy decision making are not idle matters; they are fundamental to the manner in which we see the world, we relate to it, and we act in it. As Amitai Etzioni (1988) has declared in another context:

At issue is the paradigm we use in trying to make sense out of the social world that surrounds us, and of which we are an integral part; the paradigm we apply in the quest to understand and improve ourselves, those dear to us, and those not so dear. (ix)

Before proceeding further, it is important to address two common assumptions regarding human nature that underlie the ethical and policy decision-making processes that this thesis is designed to replace or supplement.

The first assumption is that human behavior can be analyzed and understood, to the relevant degree, in terms of general ideas considered as though they have an existence independent of the accumulated experiences in which they originated. The second assumption is that human behavior can be analyzed and understood, to the relevant
degree, in terms of formal and impersonal relationships.

Since World War II, Anglophone writing on ethical and policy systems, principles, and models--both private and public--tends, for the most part, to be based upon these two faulty assumptions. Social policies based upon theories founded on these two assumptions frequently (often, necessarily) exclude the agency of the individuals affected, directly or indirectly, including their characters and subjective ends. They are, unwittingly, a return to the abstract and universal of the essentialists and the idealists, even to the extent they are felt to be derived from experience.

David Hume (1977) described well the difficulty in applying general rules derived from experience:

The forming of general maxims from particular observation is a very nice operation; and nothing is more usual, from haste or narrowness of mind, which sees not all sides, than to commit mistakes in this particular. (71 n. 36, emphasis added)

He concludes noting that: "It would be easy to discover many other circumstances that make a difference in the understanding of men" (ibid.).

Indeed, the issue is deeper than merely the potential for error due to haste or narrowness of mind. Claudia Card (1990), for example, summarizing and extending feminist ethical theory, argues in an essay entitled "Gender and Moral Luck," that, to the extent that ethical and policy decision-making are based upon the assumptions
described above, they fail to consider relationships, characters, and experiences that have an experiential, historical richness that purely formal theory cannot reach and cannot capture. She attempts to go beyond the abstract notions, or values (see Lipman 1993), of justice and caring, in isolation, to explore the relation between formal and impersonal relationships with their emphasis on justice (to the exclusion of caring) and informal and personal relationships with their emphasis on caring (to the exclusion of fairness) (200-21).

Card follows Carol Gilligan in arguing that a helpful ethical perspective is relationship, both separation (essentially masculine) and connection (essentially feminine). Ultimately, she contrasts rights-based theory with a responsiveness-based theory, i.e., "the idea of taking responsibility for someone or something" (209). Observing that modern ethical theory, with the exception of David Hume, has been "preoccupied with power and control--its uses, its distribution, its forms" (208), she concludes that ethical theory lacks an ethic of attachment, independent of "the issues of control that have preoccupied contractualist and utilitarian theorists" (214). But, in her view, an ethic of attachment is not necessarily an ethic of care. Accordingly, an ethic of relationships, attachment, and responsiveness should operate as the starting point for ethical inquiry in her view.
There is an old saying that, "To one whose only tool is a hammer, every problem looks like a nail." The same idea may be true in ethics and policy studies. By analogy, "Where one pursues understanding preoccupied with power and control, all basic social institutions will come to be seen in formal and impersonal terms." As a result, for epistemological reasons (especially the unavailability of sufficient knowledge in a timely fashion) formal and impersonal social institutions must necessarily ignore informal and personal relationships. Especially where distribution and control are confirmed through the coercive power of the state, abstract issues of justice must prevail over the myriad relationships that characterize a society.

Moreover, concentration upon general ideas in the form of prescriptions and proscriptions—and formal and impersonal relationships—is based upon, or at least supports, the notion that society may be organized as one pleases (Mises 1966, 2). Ultimately, failure to consider the characters and relationships of the individuals affected may result in ethical and policy decisions that negatively affect, or even destroy, the agency of the very individuals intended to be benefited.

Attacks on Reason and Expertise

A related development has been a reaction to the preoccupation with power and control described above, which has led to attacks against reason itself, especially to the
extent that its exercise has been preempted by experts.

Robert Formaini (1990), for example, has observed that:

Public policy in the United state is debated, analyzed, and implemented within a framework characterized by the acceptance, explicitly or implicitly, of certain assumptions. One of the main assumptions is the objective nature of the reality which surrounds us, along with a subsidiary assumption concerning the ability of our techniques to explore and to control that reality. (1)

In the selection of the ends or goals of policy—either public or private—the most common framework for choosing among competing goals is "some version of policy analysis, including cost-benefit, cost-effective, and risk-benefit" or a social welfare model based upon Pareto Optimization (Gutmann and Thompson 1990). As Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson observe:

All of these approaches rest on the moral foundation of utilitarianism (insofar as they have any moral foundation at all). They assume (1) that the ends or values of policies can be compared by a common measure of expected utility (also called happiness, satisfaction, or welfare) and (2) that the best policy or set of policies is that which maximizes the total expected utility.

Though the appeal of this approach is that it appears to resolve conflicts among competing ends in a neutral way, Gutmann and Thompson outline a number of attacks against the basic assumptions underlying these various frameworks, e.g., problems of aggregation and distribution (139).³

More fundamentally, Bryan D. Jones suggests that there are major limitations to social science theories. First, they are partial, incomplete, and "[suffer] in the
extreme from problems in linking theory to data." (Jones 1988, 164-65) Second, "they fail to specify the linkages between observable human actions and characteristics of complex social systems." As a result, Jones argues:

Quantitative empirical studies have tended to test, more and more rigorously, uninteresting and atheoretical but statistically precise hypotheses. Theoreticians are only vaguely aware of rigorous statistical methods, and tend to be contemptuous of them. Because theory and data are so weakly linked, and because various theories are not integrated, both empirical studies and theoretical studies have been driven as much by fad and fashion as by scientific design. (175)

Jones urges that these circumstances "ought to make social scientists humble in their theoretical pretensions, meticulous in their empirical analysis, and cautious in their policy advice."

By way of contrast, Douglas Muzzio and Gerald De Maio (1988, 129) view the same circumstances and observe that "most policy studies are empirical, providing only a summary of statistical associations, unable to explain the observed relationships." They urge, however, that formal theory based upon a deductive approach "can be integrated with policy analysis" and that, in any event, "formal theory is the sum of the science" (128). Thus, they cite Ernest Nagel, who "notes that since Aristotle it has been held that scientific explanations must always be rendered in the form of logical deduction, that the most comprehensive and impressive systems of explanation are of that form" (128 n. 3). From this they argue that:
formal theory can be and has been relevant to major policy issues, [and] provides a useful way of thinking about problems and suggests predictive hypotheses. [I]t permits rigorous thinking about values and goals and alternative mechanisms of achieving them. (128)

The latter insight has been explored by Eugene J. Meehan (1990), who reported that following testing of federal policy making with a theoretical apparatus he developed for policy analysis:

first, the knowledge required for directing actions on defensible grounds was not usually available; second, where such knowledge was available, it was usually ignored by those responsible for making policy. Both those who directed the rule-making apparatus and those who criticized the performance depended heavily on procedural rather than substantive issues; there were few signs of significant learning and fewer still of the use of such learning to improve performance.4  (18)

At bottom, the difficulty may be what Friedrich A. Hayek, a Nobel Prize laureate in Economics, and a dean of the "Austrian" school of economics, described as the "scientistic" approach, that is, the "propensity to imitate as closely as possible the procedures of the brilliantly successful physical sciences—an attempt which in our field [economics] may lead to outright error" (23).

These assumptions are not, however, the core of Formaini's (1989) objections to policy debate as currently experienced. Rather, the vehemence of his objections to the current policy debate centers rather on the role of experts:

Yet it may be that our confidence is not a function of the objective reality we seek to model, but is rather the result of our having accepted the pronouncements of
philosophers, scientists, consultants, policy analysts, and others who have succeeded in convincing most people of the efficacy of their methods of analysis. (1; see also Saul 1992; McCollough 1991, 3, 5, 61, and 82-84)

He declares that for purposes of policy formation, implementation, and assessment, we are "a nation addicted to inductive advocacy." Hence, in a society dominated by battles between experts, Formaini (1990) observes:

Quite simply, all this expertise has succeeded in accomplishing nothing so much as it has made it virtually impossible to tell the serious, knowledgeable individual from the army of bogus, politically motivated hucksters that dominate our modern system of information dissemination. (3)

Rejecting both risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis as decisive means of policy implementation and assessment, Formaini concludes that, since ultimately the populace's beliefs about policies must be dealt with in any event, current attitudes of policy elites are:

examples of the very unscientific mindset that experts so often deplore in other people, for they explicitly ignore reality by positing a world where perfectly-informed elites enact correct policies for the good of all, whether or not such policies are publicly supported. (98)

In the same vein, John Ralston Saul, in his book Voltaire's Bastards (1992), purports to condemn the impact of reason on public policy, when what he actually supports is a condemnation of the elitism of experts, who tend to compartmentalize knowledge. So, for Saul, "The essence of rational leadership is control justified by expertise" (10-11; see also 476-77). He makes this point saying:
The possession and control of knowledge have become their central theme—the theme song of their expertise. However, their power depends not on the effect with which they use that knowledge but on the effectiveness with which they control its use. Thus, among the illusions which have invested our civilization is an absolute belief that the solution to our problems must be a more determined application of rationally organized expertise. The reality is that the division of knowledge into feudal fiefdoms of expertise has made general understanding and coordinated action not simply impossible but despised and distrusted. (8)

Daniel Yankelovich, for example, makes the same point in *Coming to Public Judgment: Making Democracy Work in a Complex World* (1991). Yankelovich demonstrates that on the issue of American competitiveness on a global scale, four obstacles to public understanding arise from the "expert perspective." First, the issue is "owned" by the experts as the issue is defined in technical terms staking an "intellectual and a turf-related claim." Second, the experts hold different values from the public. Third, the experts in various fields transmit "confusing and contradictory messages to the public." Finally, the experts and public proceed from different frameworks and points of departure (105-06).

Friedrich von Hayek (1989) suggests that it is precisely because of an inappropriate faith in human-kind's ability to use reason to "construct" the world we want that we have many of the problems we now have. In *The Fatal Conceit*, his last book, Hayek describes "the revolt of instinct and reason" and cites literary figures (H.G. Wells, George Orwell); scientists (Jacques Monod, Joseph
Needham, Albert Einstein); and economists (John Stuart Mill, John Maynard Keynes) for the following four presuppositions regarding what constitutes actionable knowledge:

(1) The idea that it is unreasonable to follow what one cannot justify scientifically or prove observationally (Monod, Born);

(2) The idea that it is unreasonable to follow what one does not understand (Popper);

(3) The related idea that it is unreasonable to follow a particular course unless its purpose is fully specified in advance (Einstein, Russell, Keynes);

(4) The idea, also closely related, that it is unreasonable to do anything unless its effects are not only fully known in advance but also fully observable and seen to be beneficial (the utilitarians). (61-62)

Hayek notes that, applying these four presuppositions:

most tenets, institutions, and practices of traditional morality and of capitalism do not meet the requirements or criteria stated and are—from the perspective of this theory of reason and science—"unreasonable" and "unscientific". (66)

Conclusion and Preview

It appears that our ethics and policy decision-making models are too narrowly focused, hence not interdisciplinary or systemic or integrative or holistic enough, to serve the individual and society well. It also appears that the philosophical search for concepts supporting the development of the autonomous individual as opposed to the heteronomous society has not provided the conceptual foundation adequate for an ethics and policy
decision-making model of use to the autonomous individual trying to understand and choose within an increasingly complex social universe.⁵

This tension is demonstrated, for example, in Matthew Lipman's (1993) approach to education. Acknowledging that the model of education he espouses (a reflective model described in more detail in Chapter 5 of this thesis) has an objective of "the autonomy of the learner," he notes that "unfortunately, autonomy has been associated with a kind of rugged individualism: the independent thinker as a self-sufficient cognitive macho type, protected by an umbrella of invincibly powerful arguments" (Lipman 1993, 19). He concludes that his model is actually:

thoroughly social and communal. Its aim is to articulate the friction-causing differences in the community, develop arguments in support of competing claims, and then, through deliberation, achieve an understanding of the larger picture that will permit a more objective judgment. (ibid.)

In conclusion, then, one can predict that where ethical and policy judgments are made on a model of general prescriptions and proscriptions reflecting formal and impersonal relationships, they are destined to fail to the degree that they ignore informal, often personal, relationships and the "different ethical preoccupations, methods, priorities, even concepts" that surround them and the experiences that spring from them. Following Claudia Card, one would expect that to the extent that ethical and
policy theory takes "only formal and impersonal relationships as paradigms of obligation and responsibility [they will have] produced arbitrarily biased and probably superficial theory" (Card 1990, 201; see also Baier 1986: 231-260; Flanagan and Jackson 1987: 622-37; Solomon 1992, 114). Moreover, to the extent that the models are purely rational, that is, models that ignore that which is felt, but not thought; that which is known, but not articulable; and that which is embedded in practices, institutions, customs, and traditions, but not directly observable, they fail to consider relationships, characters, histories, and experiences that have an inductive richness, which purely formal theory and formal theories of judgment cannot reach and cannot capture.

This is not to suggest that problems may be solved by disregarding the general principles derived from the accumulated experience of the human race or by arriving at a better understanding of informal and personal relationships alone. It does suggest, however, that effective, efficient, and safe ethical and policy decision-making require a framework that goes beyond inductive advocacy or ideology dictating what we should choose and how we should act. Such a framework, which could be said to be essentially, uniquely or characteristically human, should employ and take into account the human capacities underlying consciousness, choice and compassion in general, and thinking, communicating, and cooperating in particular.
It also suggests that a framework that considers the variety of formal and informal relationships, as well as the "different ethical preoccupations, methods, priorities, even concepts" applied in them, will include a human process in which each individual affected--directly or indirectly--participates actively, or at least has his or her interests well-considered by those who do participate.

These two chapters have raised the challenge and problem of ethics and policy decision-making by giving some attention to two faulty assumptions underlying ethical and policy theory. They have suggested that the problem with existing methods is fundamentally two-fold. First, these methods are based upon the belief that human behavior can be analyzed and understood in terms of general ideas considered as though they have an existence independent of the accumulated experiences in which they originated. Second, they are based on the belief that they need not be firmly rooted in an understanding that different relationships suggest different approaches to understanding. These chapters have further suggested that an approach rooted in that which is "essentially human" may meet their challenges.

The remainder of Part I treats a number of fundamental philosophical and psychological issues, lending credit and detail to the elements of the framework to be developed.
Chapter Notes/2

1See e.g., the modified central thesis of John Rawls' *Theory of Justice* as interpreted by Roberto Alejandro (1993: 75-100).

2Card (1990) asserts that:

Different kinds of relationships have been differently distributed among men and women in patriarchal society: a larger share of the responsibilities of certain personal and informal relationships to women, a larger share of the responsibilities of formal and impersonal relationships defined by institutions to men. It is plausible that a result has been the creation of a significant difference in ethical orientation. (200)

3Other commentators have raised others (see, e.g., Tong 1986, 12-38; see also Clark 1991).

4Following a study of federal public housing policy, Meehan equated twentieth century public policy makers with eighteenth century doctors and hospitals.

5Mises (1966) notes that it is the rational appreciation of the division of labor, especially as elaborated by British political economy, that: "substituted an autonomous rational morality for the heteronomous and intuitionist ethics of older days" (147).
CHAPTER 3

PHILOSOPHICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Before turning to elaborate on the framework itself, there are a number of basic philosophical and psychological concepts to develop. For many, each is a controversial issue perhaps worthy of a thesis in and of itself.

Essential Human Capacities

The primary assumption of this thesis is that the essential human attributes of choice, consciousness, and compassion are exercised through the essentially human capacities of thinking, communicating, and cooperating in inquiry and action. Thus, an "essentially human" process would consider cognition, including reason, intuition, and imagination, in the form of critical and creative thinking; communicating in symbols and concepts; and social cooperation in inquiry and action as capacities "essential" to individuals acting within a society. Moreover, the process would be seen to be "not essentially human" to the extent that the Essential Human Capacities of any of those involved or affected by a judgment are not employed. As
the purpose of this thesis is to develop a framework based upon what an "Essentially Human Judgment Process" might look like, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to make an argument for, or defend, these three capacities as being "of the essence" of humanity, but it is appropriate to indicate the philosophical and psychological support from which the framework proceeds.

The basic grounding for the Essential Human Capacities can be found in the works of Aristotle, especially the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Politics*. Though Aristotle based his ethical and political writings on the *ergon* or function of the human being and concluded that "what is peculiar to" human beings is *logos* or rational principle (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1.7.1098a7-18), he also noted two other essentially human abilities, speech (*Politics* 1253a9-16), and social cooperation in perceiving and doing the good, the right and the other moral qualities (*Politics* 1253a17-19; 1253a25-29). Thus, taking Aristotle's basic approach, i.e., that the end of human life is for the individual to live an active life of *arete* (human excellence, or virtue), ethical and policy decision-making intended to contribute to the human good should employ these Essential Human Capacities and consider the impact of a judgment upon them.

The role of rationality in social living is a fascinating issue, worthy of more attention than this thesis is able to grant it, but a few observations are
appropriate, by way of extension and limitation. Robert Nozick (1993), for example, suggests that rationality itself may have a social component:

If rationality evolved alongside the concurrent rationality of others, then each person's rationality may have a character that fits it to work in tandem with that similar rationality of others. (178)

Indeed, as Ludwig von Mises (1966) has observed, our working assumption throughout our lives is that other people's thought processes are essentially the same as our own though what they are conscious of and value may differ dramatically (25, 32-36).

The psychologist Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi has qualified the rational Aristotelian approach insofar as he has pointed to other mental activities in which human beings must become proficient if we are to create the lives we truly desire to live. Csikszentmihalyi (1993) acknowledges that "[m]uch of what we call civilization consists of attempts at rationalizing life, so that action can be predictable and reasonable" (41). This takes the form of "rational, logical structures by which to order thoughts and actions." Nonetheless, he asserts:

The future . . . is not constrained by rules and predictable outcomes. We need to cultivate more than logic if we want to thrive in it. We must foster intuition to anticipate changes before they occur; empathy to understand that which cannot be clearly expressed; wisdom to see the connection between apparently unrelated events; and creativity to discover new ways of defining problems, new rules that will make it possible to adapt to the unexpected. (42)

Reading Aristotle, Nozick, and Csikszentmihalyi
together, then, these abilities may be seen to encourage,
permit and even compel rationally the individual to employ
these capacities in functioning within a society of other
human beings. For purposes of this thesis, then, there are
three essentially human capacities that must be developed
and that are amenable to good or bad nurturance. The first
such capacity is our capacity for thought: not just our
rationality (see, e.g., Nagel 1990, 7-14), but our
intuition and imagination as well.\footnote{The second is our
capacity to communicate in symbols and concepts, our
ability to speak of more than pain and pleasure. The third
is our social nature, which requires life with "parents,
children, [spouse], and generally friends and fellow
citizens" (Kullman 1991, 99).} The second is our
capacity to communicate in symbols and concepts, our
ability to speak of more than pain and pleasure. The third
is our social nature, which requires life with "parents,
children, [spouse], and generally friends and fellow
citizens" (Kullman 1991, 99).

From this, I take it as given that such an
individual is partly a product of the society in which he
or she is born and grows and has the rational capacity and
knowledge to understand the benefits of the division of
effort and recombination of effort, in the form of
cooperative inquiry and action, to attain individual ends
within society (Mises 1966, 157-65).

In this thesis, the three essential capacities are
defined as follows:

*Critical and creative thinking* is that purposeful,
intuitive, imaginative and self-regulatory process that
results in interpretative, analytical, evaluative,
inventive and constructive judgments, together with a
sound explanation of the evidential, conceptual,
understanding, systemic or methodological
considerations upon which they are based.

*Communicating in symbols and concepts* is that mutually purposeful, reflectively open process that results in understanding, consensus, appreciation, illumination, resolution, and elevation.

*Cooperating in inquiry and action* is concerted critical and creative thinking; communicating in symbols and concepts; and action aiming at the attainment of common ends, together with an understanding of how to complement one another's efforts, including, but not limited to, cooperative action aiming at the free and creative exploration of complex and subtle issues.

**Optimal Performance and the Essential Human Capacities**

The goal of this thesis is to develop an essentially human judgment process involving thinking, planning, and acting as part of an autonomous, rational set of meta-ethical principles that recognizes the value of multiple perspectives in developing the understanding necessary to achieve optimal performance (but see Lomasky 1987, 42-45). It is beyond the scope of this thesis to fully develop the rich notion of "optimal performance," which is developed and documented by Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi in *Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience* (1991) and *The Evolving Self: A Psychology for the Third Millennium* (1993), but it will be helpful to touch on the main conditions he describes and touch on its relationship to what Peter M. Senge (1990) describes a "creative tension."

In his books, Csikszentmihalyi presents what he
describes as a "summary of the principles that make living worthwhile" (1993, xi). Csikszentmihalyi describes the rare state of consciousness in action that is both exciting and involving. He describes this state as "flow."

Aristotle argued that the truly virtuous would find pleasure in doing the right thing at the right time in the right way (Nicomachean Ethics 1.7.1098a16-17; 2.6.1106b36-1107a2). Csikszentmihalyi (1990; 1993), acknowledges Aristotle (1990, 1) and suggests that if certain conditions are met, one will experience flow, which he describes as:

1. A sense of pleasure
2. A merging of awareness and action
3. A sense of control
4. An altered sense of time, which usually seems to pass faster
5. A sense of harmony and growth
6. A sense that the experience is worth doing for its own sake

Csikszentmihalyi lays out six conditions for flow to occur:

1. It must be a meaningful activity for the agent;
2. The agent must know what has to be done; 
3. The project must present a balance of challenges and skills, relative to that particular agent;
4. The environment must provide the opportunity for the agent's concentration and involvement; and
5. There must be unambiguous feedback.
6. A sense that control is possible in principle.

According to Csikszentmihalyi (1993), meaningful activity includes:

1. Purpose and vision, which identify us as a part of the universal order and identify us with harmonious growth;

2. Challenges that allow us to express our potential, to learn about our limits, to stretch our being.
At first glance, these conditions appear to be too narrowly focused, essentially unattainable, except for the few closely bounded and rules-based activities that he describes: rock climbing, chess, driving, and conversation. Life is too complex, fluid, even chaotic for such conditions to pertain. However, an approach that refers to a similar "feeling" derived from activity is Peter M. Senge's notion of "creative tension."

Temporarily abandoning my scheme of not addressing standards and criteria in favor of addressing capacities and processes, one of Senge's five disciplines of the "learning organization" is that of "personal mastery." It is "the discipline of continually clarifying and deepening our personal vision, of focusing our energies, of developing patience, and of seeing reality objectively" (Senge 1990, 7). It embodies four underlying movements:

1. continually clarifying what is important to us
2. continually learning how to see current reality more clearly
3. continually focusing on what one truly wants, that is, one's visions
4. having the character—e.g., the integrity and courage—to hold, and stand for, a vision outside of the social mainstream. (141, 149)

When the foregoing is accomplished, Senge maintains that there is a natural tendency to seek resolution that tends to result in creative tension, that is, a force to bring them together. An accompanying result is emotional tension, which is the state of anxiety that often arises from creative tension.7 The essence of personal mastery is
learning how to generate and sustain creative tension in all aspects of our lives—and over the course of our lifetimes—while managing the emotional tension that accompanies it.⁸ One is committed to generating and sustaining creative tension. While holding this creative tension, one remains clear on one's vision and continues to inquire into current reality (211-12, 226). One feels as though one is a part of a larger creative process, which they can influence but cannot unilaterally control (142).

Reading these together with Aristotle and Csikszentmihalyi suggests the conditions for excellence that more closely approximate life as we must frequently live it. Thus, the restated conditions of excellence followed in this thesis are:

1. It must be a meaningful activity for the agent;
2. The agent must know what has to be done;
3. The project must present a balance of challenges and abilities, relative to that particular agent;
4. The environment must provide the opportunity for the agent's concentration and involvement;
5. There must be sufficient feedback to permit a clear vision, an accurate, insightful view of current reality, and reasonable expectations of the possibilities of future action; and
6. A sense that influencing the creative process is possible in principle.

This thesis, then, follows the conditions and definitions of Flow and Creative Tension as necessary components of Quality Action within the Essential Interdependence Paradigm, which is developed in Part II, Chapter 4. It concludes with Aristotle, Csikszentmihalyi and Senge, who wrote from different perspectives in time
and space, that approaching life as an aesthetic performance is a project of creating our own lives: applying complex skills, leading to challenging goals; going beyond what one has already achieved; and mastering new skills, new knowledge, new understanding, new attitudes (Csikszentmihalyi 1993, 180; Senge 1990, passim).  

Summarized in the Essential Interdependence Paradigm as "embracing change as an opportunity for learning and growth," happiness is equivalent to individual excellence.

**Pragmatic, Ethical, and Moral Decision-making**

Here, we distinguish between pragmatic, ethical, and moral judgments, in a vein similar to that suggested by Jürgen Habermas (1993). It may be, as one of the dominant texts in business ethics (Singer 1993) suggests, that:

> in everyday parlance, we interchange "ethical" and "moral" to describe people we consider good and actions we consider right. And we interchange "unethical" and "immoral" to describe what we consider bad people and wrong actions. (1)

Nonetheless, it appears to be of value to distinguish between an ethical and a moral judgment, as set forth below (see Williams 1985).

Though the tripartite division among judgments is suggested by Habermas, the interpretation of all three--pragmatic, ethical and moral--judgments used in this thesis differ greatly from those of Habermas. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to set forth in detail the reasons why
I think Habermas' definitions are faulty—and the implications that flow from them, dangerous—but for the most part, they are based on his analysis that all ethical and moral judgments stem from discourse between the affected persons. Thus, he restricts ethical decision-making to the individual and moral decision-making to judgments affecting others solely as developed through discourse. This thesis follows the more Aristotelian-Hayekian notion of ethics as being a matter of understanding "the better view" as incorporated in custom and tradition (the endoxa) and a more narrowly drawn notion of morality following Immanuel Kant as an autonomous rational process of determining the right thing to do among autonomous, rational beings, especially those involved and affected, as far as is reasonably possible (see also McCollough 1991, 9-10).

**Pragmatic Judgments**

A pragmatic judgment involves making a rational choice of means in the light of:

- fixed purposes or of the rational assessment of goals in the light of existing preferences. [Here, o]ur will is already fixed as a matter of fact by our wishes and values; it is open to further determination only in respect of alternative possible choices of means or specification of ends. (Habermas 1993, 3)

A pragmatic judgment, for these purposes, is either ego- or ethno-centric and is pursued solely from the perspective(s) of the individual judgment maker(s). The question asked
in this context is, what must I do, in a particular situation, to realize certain values or goals? 14

**Ethical Judgments**

An ethical judgment involves the values themselves; it is a question of what is a good life for an individual and for a community. According to Habermas (1993):

> From this point of view, other persons, other life histories, and structures of interests acquire importance only to the extent that they are interrelated or interwoven with my identity, my life history, and my interests within the framework of an intersubjectively shared life. My development unfolds against a background of traditions that I share with other persons; moreover my identity is shaped by collective identities, and my life history is embedded in encompassing historical forms of life. To that extent the life that is good for me also concerns the forms of life that are common to us. (6, citing Sandel 1982; see also Hall 1987)

Unlike pragmatic judgments, ethical judgments—and, more broadly, policy or political judgments—are not fixed with regard to values and the ultimate ends sought by action. Ethical judgments start from one of two premises: (1) that all members of a given organization or community have certain shared values and views of, "What it is that makes for a good life in the company of others" or (2) that certain individuals, or a group of individuals, have at least one shared end, that is, to determine what it is they can, and must, mutually value in order to cooperate successfully.

Ethical judgment, then, may be seen as the process
of defining what a successful life is for a human being at a particular time and place; determining ends, goals and objectives one should strive to attain; identifying appropriate means to reach appropriate ends; and developing or discovering the values, principles, and tenets one should apply in choosing among the competing means and ends available to him or her. As Mises (1966), declared:

    Ethical doctrines are intent upon establishing scales of value according to which man should act, but does not always act. They claim for themselves the vocation of telling right from wrong and of advising man concerning what he should aim at as the supreme good. They are normative disciplines aiming at the cognition of what ought to be. (95)

So, ethical judgments, driven in part by ethical doctrines, should be seen to operate as filters. One type of ethical judgment determines what ends should be pursued and what ends should be rejected for an individual or community to live a good life. Another type determines which means might be employed toward which ends, and which means should be rejected. Yet another deals with apparent and real conflicts in choosing between otherwise appropriate, but competing, ends and means. Ethical judgments as to ends, means, and values bring to the decision-making process the product of earlier reflection or deliberation—or the wisdom of accumulated experience, either personal or social—that limited the range of ends, means, and values deemed to be good. This reflection or wisdom usually involved that deemed conducive to the good
over the long-run: making it all the more valuable (and
hard to follow) in the short-run (see, e.g., Niebuhr 1932,
86-87).15

If the acting individual were free of any social
forces, we might follow Mises (1966) in declaring that:

In making his choice man chooses not only between
various material things and means. All human values
are offered for option. All ends and all means, both
material and ideal issues, the sublime and the base,
the noble and the ignoble, are ranged in a single row
and subjected to a decision which picks one and sets
aside another. Nothing that men aim at or want to
avoid remains outside of this arrangement into a unique
scale of gradation and preference. (3)

Despite having claimed that "all ends and all means, both
material and ideal issues" are "offered for option," Mises
acknowledges that:

The mores of their social environment are a power which
people are forced to consider. Those recognizing the
spuriousness of the generally accepted opinions and
habits must in each instance choose between the
advantages to be derived from resorting to a more
efficient mode of acting and the disadvantages
resulting from the contempt of popular prejudices,
superstitions, and folkways. (648)

Thus, this process applies even where the judgment maker is
not convinced that the end or means or values are correct,
but rather bows to the fact that they are endorsed by
others.

Ethical judgments are highly ego-centric and ethno-
centric; they are concerned with the individual and social
goals accepted by that individual and that community at
that time and place. Whether the society derives from a
"community of beliefs" or is one based on cooperation, which has its own has its own intrinsic morality (Durkheim 1961 quoted in Giddens 1971, 76-77; see also Rorty 1992, 38-62), the sense of self operates to determine who one is and who one believes that one should be. This sense of self, however, is bound up in tradition, being the embodiment of the thoughts of others preserved through language (Mises 1966, 176-77). Ethical judgments, in this sense, involve autonomous rationality, that is, the person is self-legislating, but it is a subjective autonomy. Though self-legislating and subjective, they are not without limits. First, the autonomous rationality of other individuals, in that time or place must be respected. Second, the actions of other acting individuals are data that they must take into account in their actions. Third, those who contend that there is a conflict between the autonomous purposeful actions of individuals or between the autonomous purposeful actions of individuals on the one hand and the commonweal on the other, "cannot avoid advocating the suppression of the individuals' right to choose and to act" (730).

Ethical judgments are holistic in that they situate a person squarely in the middle of his or her environment and consider the "goodness" of the individual (or group) at that time and that place (see, e.g., Nozick 70-71, 208 n. 11). Further, this holism considers it to be "of the essence" that a person doing the right thing does it
habitually and cheerfully. So, emotions and rationality are considered relevant to an ethical judgment. The questions asked in this circumstance are, "Who am I [are we], and who would I [we] like to be?" And, "Is it 'good' for me [us] to act in a particular way in the long run, all things considered?" (Habermas 1993, 4-5; see also Solomon 1984, 3).

**Moral Judgments**

Jürgen Habermas suggests a distinction between pragmatic, ethical and moral judgments that has some value for purposes of this thesis, though I embrace the distinction for reasons other than those given by Habermas. At first, Habermas argues that a moral judgment is one that asks the question, "Whether I can will that a maxim should be followed by everyone as a general law." Though this is formulated in terms of the Kantian categorical imperative, Habermas later argues that a moral judgment, by contrast, involves the examination of "our maxims as to their compatibility with the maxims of others." Here, Habermas cites Kant as providing that a moral judgment requires that "Everyone must be able to will that the maxims of our action should become universal law." This thesis follows Habermas' first formulation, but assumes that a moral decision is one made by a rational, autonomous person for articulable reasons that are "universal" because any rational, autonomous person would have made that
decision. The question asked is, "Whether I can will that a maxim should be followed by everyone as a general law" (see also Nozick 1993, 5).20

**Moral Process for Ethical Decision-making**

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to develop fully, but here we distinguish between universal laws (moral law) that are procedural and may never be violated, especially in making ethical judgments (maxims implemented through empathy, patience, integrity and courage in a particular place and time) and universal laws that are substantive (not lying, not killing). If we assume for the moment that our capacities for critical and creative thinking; communicating in symbols and concepts; and cooperating in inquiry and action are "of the essence" of a human being, then we abuse the very capacities that make us human beings if we violate the procedural laws. For example, under no circumstances--if we are to act as free, dignified human beings--can we fail to honestly employ our reason in our judgment processes, relying instead solely on the views of others. Under no circumstances--if we are to act as free, dignified human beings--can we fail to afford the time, energy and patience necessary to strive for mutual understanding. Under no circumstances--if we are to act as free, dignified human beings--can we fail to cooperate with others in inquiry and action in order to develop a better understanding of reality and our abilities
to create a future more in keeping with our purposes and visions. Even when qualified by "reasonableness ("as far as is reasonably possible"), these same values apply to determining what is reasonable under the circumstances.

In another context, Mises refers to this as the alter ego problem. In response to the empiricists, behaviorists and positivists, Mises argues that, though it cannot be proven, it is a workable proposition that:

there is only one "logic" that is intelligible to the human mind, and that there is only one mode of action that is human and comprehensible to the human mind. (Mises 1966, 25)

So, Mises concludes that any workable world view or ideology concerned with human action in the world as we know it must operate under the principle that each of us "deals with every other human being as if the other were a thinking and acting being like himself" for the very utilitarian reason that it works (24).

This suggests that there is a rational basis for certain generally accepted "universal values" deriving not from their beneficial consequences, but from the principle that every human being must deal with every other human being as a thinking, planning, and acting being. Universal values, such as honesty, promisekeeping, and civic responsibility, can now be seen to be derived from a purely rational theory of social cooperation.

These fundamental moral principles are open to examination by reason and to demonstration by logical
methods. It follows from these that we must, to avoid contradiction, think and act as though the other human beings with whom we are dealing are thinking moral agents, just as we are, even, or especially, when they advocate different thoughts, feelings, and actions than would we.

If we treat other people as thinking moral agents and if we are going to pursue our own purposes; visions; and goals and objectives in the society of others, we cannot expect to succeed over time unless we recognize that they likewise have purposes; visions; and goals and objectives of their own worthy of respect. Moreover, even (or especially) we should think of people as feeling moral agents who must "reach out towards the discovery of the value of life, not through the acceptance of standards of good feeling, nor through the imposition of conceptions of goodness upon his emotional life, but through the free exercise of his own emotional life" (Macmurray 1962, 1992, 38-39). It follows from this that nothing may be permitted to silence rational discussion and dialogue or reflection and inquiry, but, far to the contrary, everything must be attempted to promote such inquiry (see, e.g., Mill 1859, 1956).

Ten "universal" value statements developed by the Josephson Institute of Ethics (1991) may be representative. The Institute suggests ten statements that people from all cultures, religions and communities would use to describe a "good" person:
1. Honesty: being truthful, straightforward, forthright, frank, candid.

2. Integrity: being principled, courageous, scrupulous, honorable, upright.

3. Loyalty: being faithful and devoted, but not blind obedience or unquestioning acceptance of the status quo.

4. Accountability: accepting responsibility, leading by example, avoiding the appearance of impropriety.

5. Fairness: being open-minded and impartial, avoiding making arbitrary, capricious or biased decisions.

6. Caring for Others: being courteous, prompt, decent, preserving dignity and privacy of others.

7. Respect: treating people with respect and honoring their privacy.

8. Promise-keeping: being trustworthy, reliable, abiding by the spirit and letter of agreements.

9. Responsible Citizenship: law abiding, opposing unjust laws, exercising democratic rights.

10. Pursuit of Excellence: being committed, doing one's best, maintaining one's competence.

It appears that these universal values (as defined by the Institute) are "universal" only insofar as they are essentially procedural rules setting norms for translating thought into action. In other words, the "devil is in the details" of applying these rules to situation in which one finds oneself.

For example, there is no universal agreement on "never lying" as Immanuel Kant suggested in his essay On the Supposed Right to Lie Out of Love for Mankind (Jaspers 1962, 71-72). However, there could be universal agreement
with the proposition that in determining what is reality, including the points of view of others, nothing is to be gained by being dishonest. This is so even if in following the process one reaches the decision to lie under the circumstances has concluded that the results of lying are less severe than the results of not lying could be (e.g., lying as a social grace, lying to a killer asking for the location of his intended victim). One must have integrity in pursuing the process of making a decision, though one may act in a manner that might seem unprincipled under other circumstances (e.g., paying bribes to have access to a country to save lives). Fidelity in the process of determining reality is essential, though being unfaithful where circumstances so dictate would reflect life in a world not populated solely by other rational people (e.g., maintaining the attorney-client privilege as to past crimes, but disclosing as to intended future crimes).

Though this smacks of ethical relativism, it should not be seen as artificial to distinguish between universal values in procedure and universal values in judgments. Conceptually, there is great value in consciously determining how thought would be applied in action in a world populated by rational beings. This describes the substantive maxim to be considered, as well as a world that fully nurtures and employs the Essential Human Capacities. That the substantive maxim has to be modified or even abandoned in the concrete world in which the individual
thinks and acts serves to vividly reflect that ultimately we are responsible through our choices for who we are and the quality of the world around us. For this choice to be rational, however, the ethical judgments that modify or abandon the substantive moral judgments can only be arrived at by following the procedural universal values. The substantive moral judgments in turn might only be appropriate without modification in a wholly rational world, e.g., Kant's Kingdom of Ends.

From this it follows that, in all our ethical and policy decision-making, we should also test the pragmatic judgment by testing it for its "essential humanity." A quality judgment that involves (and considers the impact upon) that which is essentially human should result in autonomous acting human beings who learn, have a sense of community, and are of good character. Thus it is possible that a pragmatic, essentially utilitarian, judgment, may be unethical in the sense that it has not considered the Essential Human Capacities of all those involved or affected, i.e., it is not essentially human. Further, it is possible that a judgment that is ethical may be immoral because it is not universalizable beyond its time and place and the Essential Human Capacities of all those involved or affected. Finally, it is possible that a moral judgment may be unethical because it does not reflect the time and place of the action, and the degree of Essential Human Capacity development.
It is this distinction between the ethical and the moral that explains much of the confusion in the area of ethics. As there is no universally accepted definition of either the "ethical" or the "moral," for the purposes of this thesis, an ethical (including policy) judgment is one that clarifies individual self-understanding, individual or community values, or the notion of what is a good life for that individual or that community. Those judgments then become the givens that pragmatic judgments strive to accomplish. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are those arrived at through pure reason (based upon an individual's own understanding of reality,) or pure faith, based upon authority accepted on faith, which are independent of his or her character and community's values, goals or projects. These commands are truly universalizable throughout the kingdom of rational ends, or by omnipotent and omniscient authority.

Such moral judgments may also provide procedural rules used to regulate the processes of arriving at pragmatic or ethical judgments. Honesty and integrity (in the sense of completeness or wholeness), for example, are two values without which any other judgment is necessarily flawed. For example, to the extent communications or reflection is not honest or whole, the arguments made, the knowledge relied upon, and the actions taken are potentially fraught with unnecessary risk. These judgments do not, however, suggest the conclusions to be reached in
this context. They do provide the basic rational values that suggest how a rational society should organize various ends.

Human action within a society that does not see the value in ideal actions would be nonetheless considered ethical, if embraced by the community. That community might, from another perspective, be immoral or even unethical when it acts within a greater society, but its actions would not be considered unethical within its own values structure.

For example, from a purely rational point of view, an autonomous individual could will that all commercial transactions be conducted honestly without any puffing or bargaining, since only the real value of a good or service to the vendor could honestly be conveyed. This would be a moral command, a duty of a rational person in a community of rational persons. In the Middle East bazaar, however, bargaining is expected and, indeed, its absence would deny one of the joys in life. Thus, this activity would not be considered unethical, though in a purely rational sense, neither ego-centered nor ethno-centered, setting a high "asking price" is immoral. This may explain why it is so easy to agree as to the identity of "universal values," yet so difficult to apply them. Universal values are the way we ought to act if everyone acted, or could be made to act, that way. But, since everyone does not act in accordance with those values, it may be perfectly rational, at least
from a short-term perspective, to act contrary to them. Thus, the principal path to developing a "good" society may be less in teaching universal values, than broadening perspective, i. e., expanding consciousness and compassion as means toward better choices.

**Knowledge and Moral Behavior**

It may be that social norms are irrational. It may be that over time, if everyone told the truth, even to killers, the world would be a better place. It may be that taking personal responsibility for one's place in, and understanding of, the world, dictates that one should embrace fate, *amor fati,*\(^2^4\) rather than have someone intervene to relieve oneself of the consequences of decisions made. But, there is yet another reason why that which is "merely ethical" might be more "right" than a purely moral judgment.

We, as individual human beings, create the world in which we live. Much that we "know" we cannot articulate, as much knowledge is embedded in customs, traditions, or practices. If, however, deeply-held understandings of the situation cannot be articulated, except in terms of traditions or customs or practices, then a moral judgment based upon all known *communicable* facts could not take into account all of the relevant facts. Without the knowledge that is embedded in traditions or customs or practices, the context can not be understood well enough for a rational
decision to be made, hence intuition or imagination must complete the thinking process.

Moreover, to the extent that knowledge is embedded in traditions, customs, and practices, then an ethical judgment apparently contrary to a moral judgment might be the "right" decision under the circumstances. Thus, the values implicit in traditions, customs, or practices, which seem irrational on their face, may actually translate knowledge, otherwise unattainable, that make them quite rational (see, e.g., Mises 1981, 95-105; Gray 1984, 28, 36-39; Hayek 1989, 75-76).25

In the final analysis, applying a purely rational maxim in the real world, where much that is knowledge cannot be expressed or ascertained except through custom, tradition, etc., may not be rational. As Thomas E. McCollough (1991) observed:

If what we know is reduced to technological knowledge, it will exclude that which gives it meaning and value and that which would enable human beings--political beings--to appropriate it in humanly meaningful ways. . . . The more bits and pieces of knowledge are fitted together in social and technical theory, the more necessary it is to relate them to the intangibles, the tacit values, human qualities of community. (17)

McCollough quotes Michael Polanyi (1966, 61-62) saying:

traditionalism, which requires us to believe before we know, and in order that we may know, is based on a deeper insight into the nature of knowledge and of the communication of knowledge than is a scientific rationalism that would permit us to believe only explicit statements based on tangible data and derived from these by a formal inference, open to repeated
As Friedrich A. Hayek (1989) observed in discussing the famous John Maynard Keynes' justification for his economic views:

The slogan that "in the long run we are all dead" is also a characteristic manifestation of an unwillingness to recognize that morals are concerned with effects in the long run—effects beyond our possible perception—and of a tendency to spurn the learnt discipline of the long view. (57)

Hayek (1978) anticipated this thought in his Nobel Prize acceptance speech declaring:

If man is not to do more harm than good in his efforts to improve the social order, he will have to learn that in this, as in all other fields where essential complexity of an organized kind prevails, he cannot acquire the full knowledge which would make mastery of the events possible. (23-24)

**Essential Human Truth**

It remains to consider what the product of an Essentially Human Judgment Process would be. I have already given it a name, Essential Human Truth; it is the product of human action and human argument employing the well developed, maintained, and employed Essential Human Capacities. As the product of an Essentially Human Judgment Process, it follows that it would involve input from all those involved in or affected by the judgment. We need now to consider what that input itself would be.

Essential Human Truth must be the product of an Essentially Human Judgment Process that has as its input
the desires, beliefs, and expectations of all those involved or affected, which desires, beliefs, and expectations are themselves evaluated in terms of the Essentially Human Judgment Process. That is to say that all desires, beliefs, and expectations would not be given equal dignity. Desires, beliefs, and expectations would be rationally criticized with the Essentially Human Judgment Process as criterion at a minimum.

This is not to say that there is no room for feelings, tacit knowledge, tradition or knowledge embedded in practices in Essential Human Truth; it is only necessary that they can be explained or put into perspective (see, e.g., Damasio 1994, 18-20, Chap. 11; Macmurray 1962, 1992). Further, as Thomas E. McCollough (1991) observes in another context, imagination is a component of comprehensive thinking in the form of "moral imagination:"

The moral imagination broadens and deepens the context of decision-making to include the less tangible but most meaningful feelings, aspirations, ideals, relationships. It encompasses the core values of personal identity, loyalties, obligations, promises, love, trust, and hope. Ethical judgment consists in making these values explicit and taking responsibility for judging their implications for action. (17)

So it is that, though Essential Human Truth must be the goal of any ethical and policy process, it will never be fully rational or communicable. It may remain buried in feelings, language, customs, traditions, and institutions, but it will be discoverable and explainable enough to be put to use. For example, with the expansion of global
trade, a plethora of books on etiquette around the globe has emerged for the business person. The books seldom give the "reasons" behind etiquette; it is enough that compliance with the demands of etiquette is of great instrumental value for successful international trade.

Through the development and use of the Essential Human Capacities, this Essential Human Truth may be found in what the accumulated and well-considered experiences of those involved or affected suggest might work in the struggle to create lives they truly desire to live. Thus, this approach is conservative in the sense that it honors the past, yet liberal in that it requires that new and broader perspectives be brought to bear on, "What we know to be true."26

**Bases of An "Essentially Human" Judgment Process**

What is required, then, is a framework of the individual within society that reflects a theory of action and argumentation that is "essentially human" in concept, process, and policy. It would be a framework that fully employs not only reason, but all of the essentially human capacities employed to intuit, to dream, to make sense of our world, to understand one another, and to function well within the society of our choosing or our making. Such a theory of action and argumentation could be expressed in the form of a framework that provides a set of assumptions, considerations, understandings, strategies, principles, and
practices to serve as foundations for the thinking, planning, and acting that permits us to engage in purposeful living. For purposes of this thesis, I will concentrate on the basic assumptions, considerations, and understandings that underlie the practice of making excellent pragmatic and ethical decisions rather than the specific skills, principles, algorithms, or heuristics that one would apply. These also should be selected as proper subjects of an Essentially Human Judgment Process, and are well developed, across the human spectrum elsewhere.

There are a number of assumptions underlying an essentially human judgment process. First, it seems appropriate that there be some process in which the individual human life appears as the primary unit of significance in arriving at quality judgments: pragmatic, ethical, and moral (Meehan 1990, 8). Second, because of the inherent subjectivity of our individual wants, desires, and purposeful actions, some relatively objective criteria, which reflect the "essence" of humanity, should be employed to evaluate both the process and the product of such judgment.27 Third, this suggests that a focus on the basic capacities that are essentially human, if not distinctively human, might bring some degree of objectivity to an otherwise subjective study. Fourth, since our goal is effective, efficient, and equitable policy—and since policy requires thinking, planning, and acting—we might limit the essences under consideration to those employed in
those activities.

Basic Assumptions

There are a number of fundamental assumptions that suggest the structure of this framework. First, if we value our rational nature, we are compelled to conclude that we are responsible beings (1) who have unique purposes and visions (see, e.g., Mises 1966; Meehan 1981, 5); (2) who see "reality" from unique perspectives (Damasio 1994, Chap. 5); (3) who make purposeful choices among alternatives and act (Mises 1966); and (4) whose lives are the consequences of those choices. Second, if we value our rational nature, there is no rational basis for not respecting other rational beings and their purposes and visions; their points of view; the choices they make; and their right to make those choices (Mises 1966, 24). Third, freedom to think, plan, and act--alone and in voluntary cooperation with others--is a necessary condition for a rational and purposeful being to live his or her life. Fourth, irrespective of human "nature" or the human "condition," there are certain traits, characteristics, and capacities that are "essentially human" that are employed in any judgment process and are often adversely affected by the implementation of a judgment made. Fifth, human beings who develop, maintain and employ these Essentially Human Capacities flourish as persons. Sixth, communities composed of such persons are more apt to flourish as the
individuals within them flourish. Seventh, policies whose ends and means employ and nurture the Essential Human Capacities of all those involved or affected can be expected to be more successful than those that do not. Eighth, and more specifically, policies are more successful, social organizations run more effectively, efficiently, and equitably, and persons flourish because employing the Essential Human Capacities results in Quality Judgments (as defined herein) which tend to encourage their employment and nurture. Finally, if we focus on the Essential Human Capacities, then the judgment process we seek should be one that (as far as is reasonably possible):

(1) consciously employs the Essentially Human Capacities of all persons directly or indirectly affected by a human action toward finding Essential Human Truth;

(2) has as an ultimate goal the achievement of optimal experience through the development, maintenance, and employment of those essentially human capacities; and

(3) expressly accounts for the extent to which a judgment or action is less than essentially human in either its understanding, making, implementation, or evaluation, that is, in either the process or the resultant policy.

Society and the Individual

Society—whether the family, an organization, or a nation—has no life independent of the people composing it. In this sense, society can be defined as "concerted action, cooperation" (Mises 1966, 144-45; see also Giddens 1971,
76-77 and Elster 1985, 136-55). If we see the individual human being and collective human beings as engaged in purposeful actions, then there is a reciprocal relationship between the acts of the individual and the society as a whole, as the acts (over time) ultimately define both the individual and the society (see, e.g., Nicomachean Ethics; Habermas 1993).

Society is characterized by the rational appreciation of the benefits of a division of human effort and the association of human effort on the part of each individual that enables everyone to pursue his or her interests more effectively and efficiently in society than in isolation (Mises 1981, 418; Mises 1966, 143-45; but see Hayek, Forward to Mises 1981, xxiii-iv). Robert Nozick (1993), following Friedrich A. Hayek, has observed that:

The social nature of our economic, intellectual, and political lives enables us to benefit from imaginations we do not ourselves possess—and no one can be equally imaginative in all areas, if only because this requires an alert attention we are limited in. (174)

So, there is a knowledge component to the division of labor, in that specialization focuses attention and unleashes imagination and creativity. In short, a necessary consequence of a division of human effort—absent fraud, coercion or force—is that the ends of the individual can be best satisfied (or only satisfied) through some degree of cooperation with those others who supply the goods, services and relationships that meet
from this division derives what Emile Durkheim (1961, quoted in Giddens 1971) described as, "its own intrinsic morality:"

we may thus say that the division of labour produces solidarity only if it is spontaneous. But by spontaneity we must understand not simply the absence of express and overt violence, but of anything that might, even indirectly, shackle the free employment of the social force that each person carries in himself. This not only supposes that individuals are not relegated to particular functions by force, but also that no sort of obstacle whatsoever prevents them from occupying in the social framework the position which accords with their capacities.29 (81)

What the Framework Should Look Like

If the foregoing set of assumptions were true, or highly plausible, it would follow that a framework for an ethical and policy judgment process should be characterized by those "essentially human" aspects of the human individual within human society. If we divided the ethical ends of policy decision-making, they would relate to purposes, goals, and effects (see, e.g., Nagel and Mills 1993, 37-42): the well-considered purposes of all those affected by the judgment; the well-considered goals implied by those purposes of all those affected; and the effects of the judgment, not only in reaching any set of goals, but upon the Essential Human Capacities. Failure to follow such a framework should suggest that either one has failed to employ the fullest human capacity or has ignored the potential impact of the judgment upon the essentially human traits, characteristics and abilities of the persons
affected by the judgment. Thus, the fundamental concept is that, at least presumptively, an ethical and policy judgment process applied by humans to make decisions affecting other humans ought to employ the Essential Human Capacities and consider the impact of the judgment upon the Essential Human Capacities of the persons affected thereby, as far as is reasonably possible.

**Writer's Perspective on Ethical and Policy Matters**

I approach this problem as one attempting to develop a framework for understanding, analyzing, and creating ethical private and public policies. I come from a strong existential, individualistic, classical liberal, and free market perspective. My perspective is strongly influenced by the Austrian School of Economics, especially Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich A. Hayek. But, I see this as only the starting point: a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the truly civilized society. Such a society, in my view, requires a well-developed character ethic; government limited to protecting the society from the coercion and fraud of enemies, foreign and domestic; a free market morality; and a vital role recognized for an independent sector. The challenge, as I see it, is not so much to describe what constitutes a good life (or how an individual or society should live one), but to describe a framework of the individual within society that (1) allows a community to approach ethical and
policy decision-making with a common frame of reference emphasizing what is "essentially human," (2) permits the rational treatment of those considerations that are "ultimate givens"—individual happiness and the production of definite ideas, judgments of value, and actions (Mises 1966, 17-19); (3) has room for other ideological assumptions not inconsistent with the framework itself; (4) encourages them to employ and nurture that which is essentially human in all those affected by a judgment; (5) suggests the end product of applying such a process without suggesting what specific ends should be sought or policies adopted at any particular point in time or space; and (6) provides a basis for developing transitional rules to getting to the desired end state from where the community finds itself.

As an ethical (rather than moral, as defined above) judgment process, it is designed to take the members of a family, organization, or society as we find them. That is to say, their preferences, values, beliefs, and capacities are to be input into the decision-making process as they exist. Thus, the framework permits activities within one society, reflecting their values or beliefs or the state of their poorly developed capacities, that would be considered unethical in another having different values or beliefs or better developed capacities. The principal virtue of the framework is that it would not be conservative—in the sense that it would accept any poorly conceived or
communicated thought, feeling, or desire as of equal dignity with a well-conceived or communicated thought, feeling, or desire. Moreover, it would expressly account for the impact of any judgment upon the capacities themselves.

In addition, I see my starting point as Nietzschean in the sense that the Essential Interdependence Paradigm chooses to affirm this life in this world, celebrating life for what it is and may become, rather than condemning it for what it is not, and/or cannot be. Further, it adopts his principle of "going beyond good and evil" as a struggle for understanding. Hence, honesty and integrity—rooted in a firm belief in the need for ever increasing multiples of perspective—might be said to be the Essentially Human Virtues. Though the framework is designed to achieve excellence in living, it rejects violence and slavery as necessary conditions for human excellence (see, e.g., Ansell-Pearson 1995, 43-44).

My approach is Aristotelian in nature, basing its process and policies upon the development, maintenance, and employment of certain essentially human traits, characteristics and abilities. Unlike the scholastics alluded to in Chapter 1, I do not believe that there is an "end" or essence to being human that precedes our existence. In this sense I am existentialist as described by Jean-Paul Sartre in his famous 1945 speech, "Existentialism is Humanism" (1945, 1970, 31).
I expressly reject the utilitarian school in so far as it suggests that the end of all ethical and policy judgment is toward happiness or pleasure or the greatest good for the greatest number. I embrace the Kantian school insofar as it embraces rationality, freedom and autonomy, but reject its approach to that which is moral as opposed to that which is ethical as described above.

Civilization and Intervention

This thesis employs a number of definitions of civilization. First, following Robert Nozick and Friedrich A. Hayek we may define "the degree of civilization as the extent to which we benefit from the knowledge we do not ourselves possess" (Nozick 1993, 216 n. 59). Second, following Ludwig von Mises, who was describing the philosophy of individualism: we may define civilization as "social cooperation and the progressive intensification of the social nexus" (Mises 1966, 152). The issue, of course, is how to achieve civilized society without employing coercion or violence. Or, if a society is in such a state that the people making it up can see no solution short of coercion, then the goal is to apply no more coercion, for no longer a period of time, and to no more people, than is required.32

Throughout this thesis I will make occasional reference to "the intervention required" to implement a policy, especially one designed to develop and maintain the
Essential Human Capacities. It should be clearly understood that, to a greater or lesser degree, all kinds of "intervention" (many generally considered quite benevolent) require some degree of coercion. However subtle this "intervention" might be, it reduces the autonomy of the persons acted upon to that degree. Thus is raised the issue of the ethics of intervention (see, e.g., Hall 1987, 193-97).33

For the purposes of this thesis, there are four kinds of intervention: coercion, manipulation, persuasion, and facilitation. As all categories tend to be, these are somewhat arbitrary and represent more points along a spectrum than discrete forms of action. An example of the spectrum-like nature of them is given by David T. Beito when he wrote of a medical society and state commission "offensive to destroy the 'lodge practice' evil," where fraternal associations negotiated low per capita annual fees for its membership. Quoting researchers in the field (Rosen 1977, 378; Burrows 1977, 128, 131), Beito writes:

The Committee on Contract Work of the Erie County, New York medical society recommended "antagonistic measures" against the contract practitioner "if persuasion fails to convince him of his error." (717)

Most of these terms are self-explanatory, but contrasting manipulation, persuasion, and facilitation might be instructive. Manipulation is the practice of controlling another (by means short of coercion), without due regard for the Essential Human Capacities of another.
It has a substantive component in that there is some conclusion that the other is expected to reach, or some thing to do. By contrast, persuasion is the practice of influencing another, with due regard for the Essential Human Capacities of another. It likewise has a substantive component. Facilitation, on the other hand, has no substantive component. While the facilitator may convey information of use to the other, facilitation is intended to make the process of employing the Essential Human Capacities more effective, efficient, and safe: to help forward an Essentially Human Judgment Process. Thus, for example, mediation, as a process of facilitating the resolution of conflict, is more "essentially human" than litigation, which has elements of coercion, manipulation, and persuasion, and even, sequestration.

State Action as Inherently Coercive

We are not speaking here of the state reserving to itself the monopoly of coercion and violence to preserve its society from enemies, foreign and domestic, that is, "to safeguard the smooth functioning of social cooperation" (Mises 1966, 722). A basic assumption of an ethics characterized by autonomous, rational judgment and action is that society and state are essential means for all people to attain their unique and private ends (148). Hence, Mises (though one of the foremost advocates of the free market) argues:
Seen from the point of view of the individual, society is the great means for the attainment of all his ends. The preservation of society is an essential condition of any plans an individual may want to realize by any action whatever. Even the refractory delinquent who fails to adjust his conduct to the requirements of life within the societal system of cooperation does not want to miss any of the advantages derived from the division of labor. He does not consciously aim at the destruction of society.\(^3^4\) (165)

That there could be no mistaking his view of the role of the state, Mises declares:

The state or government is the social apparatus of compulsion and coercion. It has the monopoly of violent action. No individual is free to use violence or the threat of violence if the government has not accorded this right to him. The state is essentially an institution for the preservation of peaceful interhuman relations. However, for the preservation of peace it must be prepared to crush the onslaughts of peace-breakers. (149; but see Rothbard 1982)

Rather, when we speak here of intervention, we are speaking of the application of state power in the public realm, or manipulation, persuasion or sanction in the private realm, that are inconsistent with the autonomy of the individual.

Most ideologies presuppose that within the social system some figure has power to intervene or abstain from intervening in individual and social action. For example, parents have power over children, the owner over employees, and the state over those within its jurisdiction. If "freedom" refers to the sphere within which an acting individual is in a position to choose between alternative modes of action, one is free insofar as one is able to choose ends and the means to be used for the attainment of
those ends (Mises 1966, 279). Conversely, a figure may be said to have "intervened" where this freedom to determine one's fate is restricted, directly or indirectly (287).

This intervention is always of the same kind essentially, whether it involves the family, an organization, a community, or a nation. It may take the form of "rules" of the house, the education of the young, the requirement to do chores, and so forth. It may take the form of rules of the company; compulsory training, education, and development; and limitations on privacy for those voluntarily in the employ of an organization. It may take the form of health and safety codes in communities; mandatory education in public schools; and taxation of residents. It may reach its most severe form in a draft for the national defense.

One must not lightly accept coercion as legitimate intervention, but there are circumstances that suggest that it may be appropriate, provided that judgment is made conscious of its potentially adverse effects from an essentially human point of view. Thus, coercion may be appropriate under the following conditions:

1. The situation is such that important values of the community (including existence) are threatened;

2. There is insufficient time or opportunity for the Essential Human Capacities of those involved or affected to be developed and/or employed; and

3. No other form of intervention is reasonably possible.
Finally, if coercion is deemed appropriate and is employed, the impact of the coercion upon the Essential Human Capacities must be accounted for, as is the case with any Essentially Human Judgment Process.

A simple example may illustrate the application of these conditions. As Aristotle did from time to time, consider the Captain, crew, and passengers aboard a ship at sea. Learning that the ship is sinking and the crew has manned the lifeboats, you are racing to save yourself when you notice that two people are standing on opposite sides of the ship. One has apparently panicked and is frozen with fear. The other is the Captain of the ship, who has, by all appearances, made a conscious decision to honor an ancient tradition of the sea and go down with his ship.

For both the passenger and the Captain, important values are at stake. For both, existence is at stake, but for the Captain there are other values, perhaps even tacit knowledge, involved in the tradition of the Captain going down with the ship. The contrary value is true for the passenger. The Essential Human Capacities of the passenger, in this situation, are overwhelmed by panic and there is insufficient time to develop or employ them. This is not the case for the Captain, who, by all appearances is perfectly aware of his or her situation and making a considered judgment. By all appearances no other form of intervention would succeed in getting the panicked passenger into a lifeboat in time to survive. There is not
time to exercise any other form of intervention with either person in any event. Finally, saving the passenger's life and subsequent dialogue with him or her might have a beneficial effect on the Essential Human Capacities of all those involved and affected. At the very least, human existence is a *sin qua non* for their employment.

In this situation, coercion would be appropriate to save the passenger's life as it meets all three conditions and the impact is accounted for. It would not be appropriate, as developed, for the Captain. For human beings, there are values higher than mere existence. Having risen to be a ship's Captain, his or her Essential Human Capacities are presumptively well-developed and apparently being employed. There is insufficient time or opportunity to employ any of the other forms of intervention.

I am sensitive to the claim that the framework might support intrusions into the lives of human beings that are inconsistent with the development, maintenance, and/or employment of the Essential Human Capacities in general (cf. Hoppe 1989, Chap. 8), or in one country that would be considered unconscionable in another country, in particular. However, I take comfort in proposing this framework as one highly likely, if it were to become a framework from which dialogue and discussion started, to permit only legitimate intervention—limited in scope and duration and to legitimate purpose.
Conclusion to Part I

These three chapters have raised the challenge and problem of ethics and policy decision-making, giving some attention to the nature and severity of the problem. They have argued that the problem with existing methods is that they have not been firmly rooted in an understanding that different relationships suggest different approaches to understanding. They further suggest that what fundamentally unifies various theories of ethics and policy study is their requirement for well-developed, maintained, and employed Essential Human Capacities for the theories to be well applied.

I have developed and defined certain assumptions and concepts that underlie and define the structure of an Essentially Human Judgment Process. With these in mind, and the need for an "essentially human" judgment framework established, I will develop the framework in Part II.
Chapter Notes/3

1Annette C. Baier (1991), for example, argues that David Hume urged "a turn from a one-sided reliance on intellect and its methods of proceeding to an attempt to use, in our philosophy, all the capacities of the human mind: memory, passion, and sentiment as well as a chastened intellect" (1; see also Howard 1982, 134-36).


3"Knowing that."

4"Knowing how."

5V. A. Howard (1982), following John Dewey in part, points to imagination "as the central element of control in an ends-means continuum characteristic of creative craftsmanship" (136).

6Note that the first refers to the result of a process while the latter is the development of the competencies and skills required to apply a process toward a result. There is an assumed competence for the first "movement" and an assumed incompetence for the second "movement" (Senge 1990, 141).

7Creative tension is a positive force, emotional tension is a negative force that tends to predispose ourselves to lowering the vision (ibid., 150-55).

As Mises (1966) has said in the context of action:

He who acts under an emotional impulse also acts. What distinguishes an emotional action from other actions is the valuation of input and output. Emotions disarrange valuations. Inflamed with passion, man sees the goal as more desirable and the price he has to pay for it as less burdensome than he would in cool deliberation. (17)

8This learning is generative learning which is defined as the ability to produce the results we truly want in life.
See also Nietzsche on art in life and life as an aesthetic performance:

Art is valued by Nietzsche for two main reasons; firstly, because it enables human beings to endure life in the face of the terror and absurdity of existence; and secondly, it acts as the great stimulus of life, encouraging human beings not to recoil from the horror of existence, but to seek its furtherance and perpetual self-overcoming. (Ansell-Pearson 1994, 158-59).

In an earlier work, Habermas had contrasted the "moral questions," that can be dealt with rationally and which deal with universalization or justice, and "evaluative questions" that can only be dealt with through rational discussion within a concrete society and deal with questions of the "good life" (White 1988, 48). On the difference between the ethical and the moral see also Bernard Williams (1985, Chap. 10). On the difference between an ethics of justice versus an ethics of care see Flanagan and Jackson (1987: 622-37).

McCollough (1991) references a number of authors who distinguish between:

the moral point of view as that in which one does things on principle, universalizes one's principles, and considers the good of everyone alike" and "visional ethics" [that] has more to do with character, virtue, vision, and the stories of the communities that shape the moral life. (9)

Habermas says these judgments are reached through purposive "rationality."

Thus, the methodology followed here is methodological individualism, singularism, and subjectivism (see, e.g., Mises 1966, 41-43 (individualism), 44-46 (singularism), and 3, 21, 242, 395-96 (subjectivism)). Methodological individualism is expressly opposed to those who believe that the "only adequate method for the scientific treatment of human problems is the method of universalism and collectivism" (42). Methodological individualism holds that the individual human being is a social being, but that thinking, feeling, and acting can only be understood as individual events:

As a thinking and acting being man emerges from his
prehuman existence already as a social being. The
evolution of reason, language, and cooperation is the
outcome of the same process; there were inseparably and
necessarily linked together. But this process took
place in individuals... There is no other substance
in which it occurred than the individuals. (43)

Singularism rejects "universalism, collectivism and
conceptual realism[, which] see only wholes and universals"
(45; see also Wilber 1995). Singularism asks:

What happens in acting? What does it mean to say that
an individual then and there, today and here, at any
time and at any place, acts? What results if he chooses
one thing and rejects another? (45)

Subjectivism, in this context, underlies what Mises calls
the "general science of human action or praxeology.
According to this notion, the only standard that applies is
"whether or not the means chosen are fit for the attainment
of the ends aimed at" (21).

With regard to the choice of these ends there is no
question of truth; all that matters is value. Value
judgments are necessarily always subjective, whether
they are passed by one man only or by many men, by a
blockhead, a professor, or a statesman. (395-96; but
see Hoppe 1993, Chap. 6)

Pragmatic judgments should be seen as the purest
subject of what Mises calls the "Science of Human Action"
or "Praxeology" (Mises 1966, 3, 7, 12, 21, 28-29, 32, 92,
142, 234. It is a central tenet of this thesis that--
properly understood--ethical and moral judgments deal with
ultimate ends or values, but always, if the Essential Human
Capacities are given due consideration, take into
consideration the agency of all those persons affected by
the judgment. Ethical judgments take into account people
as the judgment maker finds them. Some forms of moral
judgments take into account all such other rational,
autonomous beings as the judgment maker is best able to
determine are involved or affected at that point in time
and space.

It is, of course, beyond the scope of this thesis
to consider why, in the heat of decision-making, we do not
follow our own ethical judgments as to what ends or means
are appropriate to pursue or which values to follow (see,
e.g., McIntyre 1990, 379-400; see also M. Smith 1995).
Thus following an Aristotelian notion that "actions in accordance with virtue must be essentially pleasant" see, e.g., *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.8.1099a22).

This is but one of the three formulations of the Kantian categorical imperative. For all three formulations of the categorical imperative, see Kant (1785, 1956, 74-75).

This is a very different formulation from his first. Kant's goal in his ethics was autonomy of the individual and freedom. The universalization requirement was born of rationality, hence his Kingdom of Ends, not an application of democracy, in determining what was right.

I know of no support for Habermas' statement at the point cited, nor in any other part of *The Groundwork*.

There is, of course, the notion of morality that is derived from religious beliefs. Such a distinction would, of course, mark a clear distinction between the *ethos* of a given community and the revealed word of God (see, e.g., Novak 1993; Neuhaus 1992).

The ten consensus core values were reorganized into the "Six Pillars of Character" in the 1992 edition.

The easiest cases, of course, are those where a pragmatic judgment is unethical or immoral. As we will see in Chapter 8 (Application and Policy Implications), this is the typical case in public policy making today.

For the difference between intentional and deliberative perspectives on intentional action see, e.g., M. Smith (1995, 131-33).

This was Nietzsche's (1967) "formula for greatness" (10); see also Danto 1965, 21,34, 212-13. for the comparable notions in Eastern philosophy see Danto (1987): Buddhist theory (81-82) and the *Bhagavad Gita* (91-93).

As to the difference between desiring and valuing see M. Smith (1995, 133-36).

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to investigate how closely this approximates the "perspectivism" of Nietzsche (but see Danto 1965, Chap. 3; Sleinis 1994, Chap. 2).
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to treat Ken Wilber's (1995) notion of both processes and things (products) as "holons" (whole/parts), though it is thought provoking and worthy of consideration both supporting and limiting the notion of an Essentially Human Judgment Process (see, e.g., 35-40).

Meehan divides these purposes into three, that he terms: anticipation, control, and choice.

Durkheim—though he believed that neither family, religion, nor government could provide the necessary "moral" regulation—nonetheless believed that some such regulation was required. He proposed a council of industrial and professional associations (see Hall 1987, Chap. "Social Theory as Intervention"; see also 150-51).

The latter—a well-developed independent sector taking up where the government has no role and the free market either does not or fails to operate—is absolutely essential for a society to be truly civilized (see, e.g., Cornuelle 1993; Olasky 1992; see also Beito 1990). I leave for another day just how 'independent' our independent sector is today. See, e.g., Merline (1995):

"We believe that only the government has the resource capacity [read power to tax]--not to mention the final political and moral responsibility in justice--to promote the general welfare," said the Rev. Fred Kammer, president of Catholic Charities USA [$1.225 billion in government grant money, or 65% of revenues in 1993], the largest charity in the country [emphasis added]." (A1-A2)

Mises (1966) notes, for example:

Reason and experience show us two separate realms: the external world of physical, chemical, and physiological phenomena and the internal world of thought, feeling, valuation, and purposeful action. No bridge connects—as far as we can see today—these two spheres. Identical external events result sometimes in different human responses, and different external events produce sometimes the same human response. We do not know why. (18)

See also Dewey (1929):

Values are values, things immediately having certain
intrinsic qualities. Of them as values there is accordingly nothing to be said; they are what they are. (321)

32T. Alexander Smith (1988) notes that the intervention of government affects the time preferences of those affected by the intervention, since short-run gains come to be seen as more readily available through such intervention than the effort required to make them through one's own efforts. This creates rising expectations as to the benefits of political action (19, 101-03, 246).

33See also Riane Eisler (1987) who distinguishes between "domination hierarchies . . . based upon force or the implied threat of force" and "actualization hierarchies [whose] function is to maximize the organism's potentials."

...Human hierarchies based on force or the threat of force not only inhibit personal creativity but also result in social systems in which the lowest (basest) human qualities are reinforced and humanity's higher aspirations (traits such as compassion and empathy as well as the striving for truth and justice) are systematically suppressed. (205 n. 5)

34Though widely considered one of the champions of the free market, Mises (1966) expressly rejected anarchism (148-49) and natural law as the foundation for his science of human action (174, 720), though he appears to recognize a notion of laws of nature expressed in physical phenomena and the connectedness between human reason and action (761; cf. Rothbard 1982, 205 et seq.; Hoppe 1993, Chap. 6).
The human being faces the world as he or she sees it. He or she strives, consciously or unconsciously, to recreate it as an aesthetic and/or ethical performance. Ultimately, the arts of living as well as can be—toward life plans as well-made as can be—are the creative tools at issue here. The tasks facing him or her are three-fold: to assimilate an already known reality, to accommodate himself or herself to a reality at odds to the subject, or to transform reality. The issue met by this framework, then, is, How does one develop a balanced system of assimilation, accommodation, and transformation leading from knowledge to action within the context of a world of both cultural and natural objects?

Primary Action-guiding Assumptions

There are a number of primary normative assumptions that would lead one to believe that there can be an
effective ethical and policy judgment process that might aptly be labeled "essentially human" and that suggest the possible implications for measurement and general policy prescriptions. Thus, among the normative assumptions that follow, assumptions A1 through A10 suggest what the process might be; assumptions A11 through A15 suggest the criteria to be employed in determining the essentially humanity of the process, judgment, and action taken on them.

A. Assumptions (herein referred to as "A") that point to what the process might be:

A1 The individual human being is a self-comprehending, essentially social being whose rational, communicative, and social capacities characterize the "essentially human" life.

A2 Any essentially human judgment process, and the product thereof, ought to reflect those capacities most characteristically or essentially human.

A3 The specific skills reflecting characteristically or essentially human capacities are critical and creative thinking; communicating in symbols and concepts; and cooperating in inquiry and action.

A4 An essentially human judgment process must include understanding to grasp what is going on in the minds of the persons involved or affected. Understanding [herein referred to as "U"] is important because:

U1 It establishes to one's own satisfaction the fact that an individual or group of individuals engaged in an action--motivated by certain value judgments--aimed at certain ends, and that they applied for the attainment of these ends means suggested by certain technological, therapeutical, and praxeological doctrines.
U2 It tries to appreciate the effects and the intensity of the effects brought about by a definite action; it tries to assign to every action its relevance, i.e., its bearing upon the course of events (Mises 1966, 50-55).³

A5 There is a continuity between the acquiring of knowledge, the having of knowledge, and the using of knowledge. Thus, "knowledge," in the strict sense of something possessed, consists of our intellectual resources that enable us to adapt the environment to our needs and to adapt our aims and desires to the situation in which we live (Dewey 1916, 344; see also Dicker 1976).

A6 Human institutions, practices, and cultures are, for the most part, "self-organizing and self-replicating structures [that] arise without design or even the possibility of design, such that knowledge of some of the elements of these structures allows the formation of correct explanations about the structure (herein referred to as "S") of the whole" (Gray 1984, 31).⁴ This principle has three elements:

S1 The "invisible-hand" thesis--Social institutions arise as a result of human action, but not always, or wholly, from human design (see, e.g., Mandeville 1732, 1924; see also Gray 1984, 33-4; Shand 1990).

S2 The "primacy of tacit or practical knowledge" thesis--Our knowledge of the world, and especially of the social world, is embodied first of all in practices and skills, and only secondarily in theories, and at least part of this practical knowledge cannot be articulated.

S3 The "natural selection of competitive traditions" thesis--Traditions are understood to refer to whole complexes of practices and rules of action and perception and the claim is that there is a continuous evolutionary filtering of these traditions under the requirements of adaptability.

A7 The distinctive reasoning of the acting human being is that "action necessarily always aims at future and therefore uncertain conditions and thus is always speculation" (Mises 1966, 58; cf. Dewey 1980, 145; see also Dewey 1929, 15).
The responsibilities of different kinds of relationships yield different ethical preoccupations, methods, priorities, even concepts (Card 1990, 199-200).

The Essential Human Capacities tend to be developed, maintained, and employed more through informal and personal relationships than through formal impersonal relationships.

Essential Human Excellence is a practice that employs the essential human capacities, over time, under such conditions, and in such a manner that a person develops the ability to master consciousness, itself, in order to take control of his or her own life. There are six necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for essential human excellence (herein referred to as "E"):

E1 Meaningful activity (a bundle of opportunities for action, or "challenges"), which is goal-directed and bounded by clear rules for action;

E2 Skills, knowledge, understanding, and attitude appropriate to what must be done;

E3 Challenges that are well-matched by a person's ability to employ the Essential Human Capacities;

E4 A situation that provides the opportunity to become concentrated and involved;

E5 Sufficient feedback to permit a clear vision, an accurate, insightful view of current reality, and reasonable expectations of the possibilities of action.

E6 A sense that influencing the creative process is possible in principle.

Assumptions regarding measurement of the essential humanity of the process, judgment, and action:

There is no standard unit for measuring the desirability of human lives; no single concept or variable adequately represents human life; each human life is, to a greater or lesser degree, unique; and
preferences and priorities cannot be tested (Meehan 1990, 111).

A12 Value is the importance that an agent attaches to ultimate ends. Means are valued derivatively according to their serviceability in contributing to the attainment of ultimate ends. Value is not intrinsic; it is not in things. It is within us; it is the way in which a person reacts to the conditions of his or her environment (Mises 1966, 96).

A13 There are two distinct human capacities to measure physical events and human events (herein referred to as "K"):6

K1 For physical and chemical events there exist constant relationships between magnitudes, capable of human discovery and measurement with precision.

K2 For essentially human events there are no constant relations between magnitudes capable of human discovery and measurement with precision (Nicomachean Ethics 1.3.1094b21-25; Mises 1966, 55).

A14 Though not constant, the character of a relationship can be determined and measured to a relevant degree (hereinafter referred to as "R"): R1 Formal and impersonal
R2 Informal and personal
R3 Informal and impersonal

A15 Happiness is a consequence of excellence and includes, but is not limited to, the following feelings (herein referred to as "F"): F1 A sense of pleasure
F2 A merging of awareness and action
F3 A sense of control of one's life
F4 An altered sense of time, which usually seems to pass faster, or "timelessly," in engrossment or ecstasy
A sense of harmony and growth
A sense that the experience is worth doing for its own sake

Creativity and Quality Action

One major definitional task remains, setting the relationship of the Essential Human Capacities to creativity, which, for purposes of this thesis, might be called the "craft" of artistry in life. We will be looking at what is required to generate or create the lives we truly desire to live. As V. A. Howard (1982) suggests:

In the end, for artist, artisan, or athlete, it is a matter of finding the right response, the "better way" of doing things. Practitioners in these areas instinctively grasp the significance of critical, creative, imaginative skill in the quest for a better way, though seldom with the intention of producing a better theory of craft. (189; see also Macmurray 1962, 1992, 14-15)

While this thesis follows the classic distinction between the good, the true, and the beautiful, it has as a goal the development of a framework to aid us in creating the lives we truly want to live—presumptively, lives that are subjectively good, true and beautiful. In this vein, Richard Shusterman (1992) has interpreted, and expanded upon, a cryptic assertion by Ludwig Wittgenstein, that "ethics and aesthetics are one and the same" (Ludwig Wittgenstein 1921, 1963, 6.421, quoted in Shusterman 1992, 236). Shusterman believes that Wittgenstein was asserting the idea that ethics and aesthetics were fundamentally the
same in at least three significant respects:

1. Both involve seeing things transcendentally, with the whole world as background;

2. Both concern the realm of the mystical as both employ a "transcendental global perspective"; and

3. Both are essentially concerned with happiness.

While these hardly establish that ethics and aesthetics are "one," they do establish a unifying theme that Shusterman developed as pointing to the need for a broader perspective based upon the world as it is, with a goal of happiness in social life.

Shusterman uses Wittgenstein's ambiguous dictum as a point from which to inquire into the relationship between ethics and aesthetics, concluding by "erecting the aesthetic as the proper ethical ideal, the preferred model and criterion for the good life" (Shusterman 1992, 237).

After treating various modern approaches to ethical theory, he concludes that ethical and aesthetic judgments:

should not be the outcome of strict application of rules but the product of creative and critical imagination. Ethics and aesthetics become one in this meaningful and sensible sense; and the project of an ethical life becomes an exercise in living aesthetically [emphasis added]. (244)

For purposes of the Essential Interdependence Paradigm, it is assumed that all three capacities are involved to a greater or lesser degree in creativity. This is so because, as developed below, creativity is a systemic, rather than purely individual, accomplishment
requiring social capacities.

It is important to distinguish why creativity should be seen as a function of all three capacities, rather than simply intelligence. Here, I follow David H. Feldman, a coauthor of *Changing the World: A Framework for the Study of Creativity* (Feldman, Csikszentmihalyi, and Gardner 1994) in defining, what he (Feldman 1994) terms, "'Big' creativity" to mean:

- the purposeful transformation of a body of knowledge, where that transformation is so significant that the body of knowledge is irrevocably changed from the way it was before. This kind of transformation can be accomplished conceptually, as in the case of proposing a new theory, or by making new products or representations, developing new technologies, or proposing innovative practical techniques. (86)

Thus, when a body of knowledge, or domain, is reorganized, both qualitatively and irreversibly, creativity is deemed to have occurred (87).

There are, of course, many other definitions of creativity. At first glance, Feldman's notion of creativity appears to be too demanding, too far beyond the norm to be a model for ethics and policy study for us all, and it is. Feldman and his colleagues aimed at Big creativity, that is, "the kinds of things that people do that change the world" (Feldman, Csikszentmihalyi, and Gardner 1994, 1-2). Their study is expressly not aimed at "small' creativity . . . , the more humble (but perhaps equally vital) tendency to bring a fresh and lively interpretation to any endeavor, whether humble or exalted"
(2). For purposes of this thesis, we too are seeking something more than small creativity, though something less than big creativity. We are seeking something that we might call "generative activity," the kinds of things that people do that create the lives they truly desire to live (see Senge 1990, 14, 22, 142, 187, 206, 286).

The kind and degree of creativity in individual lives has been problematical in the literature, since aesthetic creation has been considered to be limited to a narrow elite. Shusterman (1992), for example, treats a variety of philosophical approaches to creativity, especially Richard Rorty's (1986; 1989), and tentatively concludes with Rorty that the aesthetic life is, for the most part, "a distinctly private ethic, essentially independent of the public ethics of social life" and that "no philosophy or theory can synthesize the 'private' goal of self-creation with the public one of social solidarity" (Shusterman 1992, 255, quoting and interpreting Rorty 1989, xiii-xiv). It is beyond the scope of this thesis to develop this debate further, but Shusterman, having reviewed the theories of Richard Rorty, notes:

Rorty explicitly urges us to see the prime value and "aim of a just and free society as letting its citizens be as privatistic, 'irrationalist,' and aestheticist as they please so long as they do it on their own time—causing no harm to others and using no resources needed by those less advantaged." (239)

Shusterman concludes by making an excellent case for a renewed examination of creativity and its relationship to
ethics and politics to achieve a notion of "living beauty" offering "not so much a final solution but a 'program for more work'" (255-61).

The tie between the attribute of human consciousness and one's ability to create the life one truly desires to live, that is, one's capability to make choices and effect changes, is developed in the Feldman, Csikszentmihalyi, and Gardner (1994) notion that:

The uniquely human ability to reflect upon the state of the world and of one's own capabilities and make changes in them is perhaps the most dramatic way in which humans differ from other organisms.7 (29)

Similar to our discussion of Flow and Essential Human Excellence, David H. Feldman, Howard Gardner, and Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi declare that their notion of creativity "assumes a quality of purposefulness, an unusual set of talents, and probably optimal circumstances for developing those talents in a distinctive direction" (86). Moreover, since they consider even a field such as synchronized swimming to be worthy of study in their work on creativity, I assume that what I have styled "generative creativity" must require many of the conditions for creativity they describe.

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to develop fully the tripartite framework of the person, the domain, and the field that Feldman and his colleagues have developed for further study in the field of human creativity, but a few observations are necessary to flesh
out the notion of Quality Action developed herein. Feldman assumes three aspects of the creative person: "a quality of human purposefulness, an unusual set of talents, and probably optimal circumstances" (1994, 86). First, to Feldman, Csikszentmihalyi, and Gardner (1994), creativity is purposeful:

an ability to reflect on experience, both from inside and outside the skin, as well as a tendency to believe in the possibility of making changes to better achieve ends. (31)

Second, Feldman (1994, 86) assumes an unusual set of talents. This would be for purposes of big creativity. For the purposes of the Essential Human Paradigm, the minimum required talents include well-developed (or facilitated) Essential Human Capacities, a cognitive orientation toward discovery, and intrinsic motivation (see, e.g., Csikszentmihalyi 1994, 147). Third, Feldman (1994, 86) assumes optimal circumstances. Later, Csikszentmihalyi (1994, 135) suggests that these optimal circumstances include being part of a creative system, "the social and cultural context in which the "creative" person operates."

Thus, creativity is a systemic phenomenon:

But even in the best of cases, when real-life adult accomplishments are evaluated by experts, judgments are based on criteria that cannot be separated from current values and norms. Hence one must conclude that creativity is not an attribute of individuals but of social systems making judgments about individuals. (144)

For the most part, then, all attempts of the human being to
develop knowledge and act upon it in order to assimilate, accommodate, or transform reality is essentially a systemic function.

Csikszentmihalyi (1994) lists a number of questions that help describe the impact of the field, or community, on creativity. These may be stated, in terms of the Essential Interdependence Paradigm, to be:

1. Is the main concern of the community to preserve or change the community?

2. How many variations is the community equipped to recognize?

3. What are its resources for controlling the rate of individual variations?

4. What are its selection criteria concerning new variations?

5. What is the status of the community relative to other communities in the social system?

6. Is the community autonomous, made up of persons controlling their own destiny, or is it controlled by external institutions? (152)

Since human institutions rise and develop through human action, but not always or wholly through human design, there is a predictable, though perhaps unquantifiable, loss in human creativity when a minority of a community arrogates to itself the right to set standards for creativity, which interferes with the creativity of individuals. To this list, then, should be added the question, To what extent is human creativity stifled by the control of the community?
For purposes of the Essential Interdependence Paradigm, therefore, generative creativity is assumed to be a fundamental aspect of Quality Judgment, but neither a necessary nor sufficient condition of any particular judgment. Generative creativity involves a quality of human purposefulness that impels the individual to create the life he or she truly desires to live. This, in turn, requires that the individual's Essential Human Capacities are well enough developed and employed to be able to effectively assimilate, accommodate or transform the world around him or her. Finally, he or she must have surrounded him or herself with a supportive community.

Essential Interdependence Paradigm.

This framework of the individual within society, which employs and accounts for the Essential Human Capacities, is called the Essential Interdependence Paradigm. It stands in contrast to any number of other paradigms that treat the individual as a subordinate part of society (see, e.g., Giddens 1971; Etzioni 1988) or which make unreasonable assumptions regarding human capacities, especially knowledge. The Essential Interdependence Paradigm refers to the processes and policy considerations necessary to the use and development of those capacities of agents acting within society, which are "of the essence" of humanity and which, correspondingly, are "essential" to living the good life in society, irrespective of how one
defines it. It includes what is called an Essentially Human Judgment Process and the impact of pursuing such a process within a community over time. This framework can be expressed verbally as follows:

Where a judgment process (as far as is reasonably possible) employs—and accounts for the effects of a proposed judgment on—the Essential Human Capacities of all persons affected by a judgment, there results Quality Judgment. The judgment process itself will consider (a) the time available to employ the process, (b) the time frame(s) within which the judgment is to be effective, and (c) the differing time value orientations of all those affected.

Where Quality Judgment is implemented by persons for whom the project is a meaningful activity and there is a balance of challenge and ability; an opportunity for concentration and involvement; sufficient feedback to permit a clear vision, an accurate, insightful view of current reality, and reasonable expectations of the possibilities of action; and a sense of the possibility of control of one's life, there results Quality Action. The action process itself must provide enough time for the actors (a) to employ their Essential Human Capacities in reaching augmenting Quality Judgments, (b) to implement the resulting Quality Judgments, and (c) to reflect on the experience in order to consider its long-term impacts and learn from it.

If the norms of Quality Judgment and Quality Action are followed over long enough periods of time, there results change in behavior, and, if the changed behavior becomes the custom of the community, there result autonomous agents of good character, who embrace uncertainty and change as opportunities for learning and growth and who comprise a community having shared vision and core values consistent with the development and maintenance of the Essential Human Capacities.

The Essential Interdependence Paradigm requires diligent accounting for the development and employment of the Essentially Human Capacities of all those affected thereby. This standard applies no matter what the type of
judgment (e.g., moral, ethical, or pragmatic), what part in
the management process the judgment is made (e.g., path-
finding, problem-solving, or implementing)(see Leavitt
1989, 33-42). or whether it is the judgment process, the
judgment itself, the implementation process, or the
consequences upon implementation that are to be evaluated.
Under such a system, the process and policy are integrated:
that which characterizes the process, also characterizes
the policy. Finally, the process and its judgments are
parts of a framework of human action within society that
aids in understanding past human events and in projecting
future human events and their consequences. It allows
ethical and policy judgments to reflect the life-histories
and life-worlds of the decision-makers while applying
universalistic norms, essentially rational, to the
procedure itself and to the policy insofar as it affects
the capacities of those affected by the judgment (Habermas
1993, 171-72). In short, it allows the individual to
assimilate, accommodate, or transform more successfully the
world he or she sees.

Conclusion and Preview

I have described the basic assumptions underlying
the Essential Interdependence Paradigm, with a special
emphasis on creativity, and described the framework itself.
I turn now to a brief description of the capacities that I
assume, for purposes of this thesis, to be "Essential Human
"Capacities" in Chapter 5, and of the various aspects of time and the concepts of Quality Judgment and Quality Action in Chapter 6.
This approach is based upon the Feldman adaptation of Piaget's theory of equilibration of knowledge (Feldman 1994).

Mises distinguishes between knowledge of physical phenomenon, conception, and understanding (Mises 1966, 50). A related aspect of knowledge is the concept of "tacit knowledge" or "fragmented knowledge" (see, e.g., Gray, 1984, 28, 37, 82-83).

Mises (1966) declares, e.g., "Acting man looks, as it were, with the eyes of a historian into the future" (58).

This is based upon the notion that knowledge is essentially practical knowledge. As such it is embedded in practices, institutions, language, habits, customs, and traditions. Much of it is only dimly understood and cannot be articulated. So, theory, models, and frameworks such as this one, can never be more than abstract and speculative as to what patterns have occurred in the past, and might occur in the future.


It is assumed that there are three dimensions of experience: perceptual objects that are really existing things or events; all other objects that may or may not exist, may have existed but no longer exist, and that do not exist but may exist in the future; and the subjective experiences that exist only for the individual mind that has them (Adler 1985, 29).

This supports the notion that such reflection or consciousness might be considered an "essential" human capacity or attribute. For the purposes of this thesis, it will be considered the capacity that compels the development of the Essential Human Capacities, or an attribute of humanity, which requires the capacities to be developed itself.

Csikszentmihalyi (1994) discusses the relationship between personality traits and values, cognitive orientation toward discovery, and intrinsic motivation in "The Domain of Creativity." He also refers to discovery orientation as "problem finding orientation" (147).
related vein regarding problem definition, see Rochefort and Cobb (1994).

According to Leavitt: implementing is about "acting, changing, doing"; problem-solving is about "analysis, thought, reason"; and path-finding is about "vision, innovation, mission" (Leavitt 1989, 34).
CHAPTER 5
CAPACITIES CONCEPTUALIZED

Capacities Characterized as "Essentially Human"

The first capacity among equally "essentially human" capacities would seem to be critical and creative thinking. This capacity is best employed, however, (and perhaps only well-employed) within a context of social cooperation in the form of effective communication and cooperative inquiry and action among and between all those involved in, and affected by, a judgment of quality. Thus, we will discuss the other two capacities—communicating in symbols and concepts, and cooperating in inquiry and action—before turning to critical and creative thinking.

Significance of symbolic communication

Symbolic communication can be seen as an essentially (though not exclusively) human process for two reasons: (a) the individual human develops his or her "sense of self" within the broader community through symbolic communication and (b) the human environment, as opposed to the physical environment, is the construction of communicating humans.
The human becomes "human," in the sense of being self-conscious, through language. This first concept is best illustrated by the work of George Herbert Mead, as interpreted by Jürgen Habermas (1991):

A person is a personality because he belongs to a community, because he takes over the institutions of that community into his own conduct. He takes its language as a medium by which he gets his personality, and then through a process of taking the different roles that all the others furnish he comes to get the attitude of the members of the community. (159)

Thus, Habermas declares that:

The formation of identity and the emergence of institutions can now be approached along the following lines: the extralinguistic context of behavioral dispositions and schemes is in a certain sense permeated by language, that is to say, symbolically restructured. Previously, only instruments for reaching understanding were transformed into signals, into signs with conventionally fixed meanings; at the stage of normatively guided action, however, the symbolism permeates even into motivation and the behavioral repertoire. It creates both subjective orientations and suprasubjective orientation systems, socialized individuals, and social institutions. (160)

The human environment is a construct of communication. The notion of communicating in symbols and concepts ties together a number of concepts. First, human action is purposeful behavior aiming at the attainment of definite ends (Mises 1966, Chap. I) and based upon each human being's subjective understanding of experience and the meaning each ascribes to a thing or event. Second, human beings are "capable of argumentation and hence know the meaning of truth and validity" (Hoppe 1993, 152).
Third, while the meaning is, in some sense, unique to each individual, the words with which we think are a social phenomenon and the significance of things and events are the result, in large part, of our social interactions.

Fourth, meaning is a function of perception, reason, and understanding. To understand a thing or event, each individual must perceive it and make use of all the knowledge "provided by logic, mathematics, the natural sciences" and his or her understanding of the meanings other individuals placed on the thing (Mises 1966, 49). Thus, the meaning of any thing is open to change in the mind of the individual as his or her knowledge and experience affect his or her understanding.

Even so basic a human physical characteristic as speech, has ethical implications. As Ernest Barker observes, the human "faculty of speech . . . is not only the basis of justice; it is an impulse towards good fellowship and sociability" (Barker 1959, 267). Thus, the entirety of human nature, including our capacities for speech, for sociability, and ultimately for reasoning is inseparably a part of our nature and, thus, our end, happiness being the exercise of the best part of the human being to the extent possible. Indeed, while happiness (in its common use) can be found along a continuum between brute pleasure on the low end and contemplation of the gods on the high end, the animal pleasures in which we may
indulge at the low end of the continuum are too far removed from the *ergon* of the human being for them to constitute the life of the individual in the *polis*.

With the foregoing in mind, the framework will employ the following results-oriented definition of communication:

*Communicating in symbols and concepts* is that mutually purposeful, reflectively open process that results in understanding, consensus, appreciation, illumination, resolution, and elevation.

**Cooperative Inquiry**

The philosophical view supporting the notion of cooperative inquiry, especially in a structured "community of inquiry," is perhaps best set forth by Matthew Lipman, a modern pioneer in justifying philosophy as a core subject in early education. Lipman's case for cooperative inquiry, which he often refers to as a "community of inquiry," is justified philosophically, and pursued, in a context of philosophically oriented readings. His philosophical justification lies in the notion that Socrates' admonition, "Know thyself," was, in practice, accomplished through "shared inquiry as a way of life."

Thus, in contrast to typical academic or theoretical interchange, Lipman (1988, 14, 16-17) argues that the "Socratic Method" should be:

the continued prosecution of philosophical inquiry by following the reasoning wherever it leads (confident that, wherever it leads, wisdom lies in that
direction), not the heavy breathing and clanging of armor in dialectical battles, where the premium is not on insight but on victory. (14)

Inquiry, following the Socratic way of life, is "perseverance in self-corrective exploration of issues that are felt to be both important and problematic (20)." The community of inquiry is a number of persons "committed to self-corrective exploration and creativity," who together form "a reflective community that thinks in the disciplines about the world and about its thinking about the world," though thinking is always done by individuals (Lipman 1988, 20; Mises 1966, 177). Moreover, in theory, a network of interconnected and/or nested communities of inquiry, each pursuing the problematic issues of importance to itself and all holding "the same allegiance to the same procedures of inquiry" will come to form ever more inclusive such communities (20).

Though speaking primarily to educators, and frequently urging the study of philosophy as the means of developing "reasonableness" as opposed to rationality, Lipman gives a picture in the educational context of the conduct of a community of inquiry. Lipman urges:

converting the classroom into a community of inquiry, where students and teachers can talk together as persons and as members of the same community, where they can read together, appropriate ideas together, build on one another's ideas as well as think independently, [become profoundly aware of how much they can learn from other participants with whom they strongly disagree]. (42)
In such an environment, he maintains, participants will:

seek reasons for their views, explore their presuppositions, so as to bring into their lives a fresh sense of what it is to discover, to invent, to interpret, and to criticize. (42)

Ultimately, according to him, such:

A place [where the spoken dialogue among the members of the class, when internalized and rendered an inner forum in the mind of the participant, is the basis of the process known as thinking.] (11)

Fundamental to the Community of Inquiry is the ability to self-correct, not only in the sense of correction of error, but in the sense of correction of partiality. In this sense, the Community of Inquiry can be perceived as a device to develop good moral character, the ability to inquire and act cooperatively, and a strong sense of mutually supportive community founded upon cooperative inquiry and cooperative action. As Lipman describes the process:

To correct the partiality of what is gained by observing from a single perspective, we must take into account what is observed from other perspectives, and still others. The greater the number of perspectives, the greater the comprehensiveness of information and evidence, and the more we move in the direction of impartiality. Thus inquiry is necessarily perspectival, social, and communal.7 (148)

Taking a system's view of a problem requires cooperative inquiry. David Bohm, as interpreted by Peter M. Senge in The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization (1992), bases his work on the theory and practice of dialogue on the quantum theory of
physics, which:

implies that the universe is basically an indivisible whole, even though on the larger scale it may be represented approximately as divisible into separately existing parts. In particular, this means that at a quantum theoretical level of accuracy, the observing instrument and the observed object participate in each other in an irreducible way. At this level perception and action therefore cannot be separated. (242-43)

Thus, at the bottom of the notion of cooperative inquiry are "two major intellectual currents":

the systems or holistic view of nature and the interactions between our thinking and internal "models" and our perceptions and actions. (239)

Applying the electron sea as metaphor, Bohm asserts that:

we must look on thought as a systemic phenomena [sic] arising from how we interact and discourse with one another. (240)

Bohm further refines our notion of effective communication to distinguish between two primary types of discourse: dialogue and discussion. For Bohm, the preferred type is "dialogue," that is,

meaning passing or moving through . . . a free flow of meaning between people, in the sense of a stream that flows between two banks. (249)

The principal benefit of dialogue is that a community "accesses a larger 'pool of common meaning,' which cannot be accessed individually" (240-41). In dialogue, the complex phenomena that are human affairs and human events are explored by a community from many points of view. For Bohm, "collective learning is not only possible but vital to realize the potentials of human intelligence":
Through dialogue people can help each other to become aware of the incoherence in each other's thoughts, and in this way the collective thought becomes more and more coherent. . . . It is difficult to give a simple definition of coherence, beyond saying that one may sense in it as order, consistency, beauty, or harmony.8 (242-43)

There are three specific conditions that are necessary for dialogue, according to Bohm:

1. All participants must "suspend" their assumptions, literally to hold them "as if suspended before us";

2. All participants must regard one another as colleagues;

3. There must be a "facilitator" who "holds the context" of dialogue. (243)

Senge adds a fourth condition that provides that dialogue and discussion must be balanced. In Senge's view, "discussion is the necessary counterpart of dialogue" (247). Senge distinguishes dialogue from discussion as follows:

In dialogue, different views are presented as a means toward discovering a new view. In a discussion, decisions are made. In a dialogue, complex issues are explored. . . . When they are productive, discussions converge on a conclusion or course of action. On the other hand, dialogues are diverging; they do not seek agreement, but a richer grasp of complex issues. (247)

This notion of the community of inquiry, or cooperative inquiry, can be seen to be fundamental to basic concepts of the Austrian school of economics, probably the foremost proponent of free markets and limited government interference in economic and social affairs. To my knowledge, no such explicit "Austrian" case for cooperative
inquiry has been made, though the case for cooperative action is "of the essence" of the Austrian paradigm. But, in my view, a realistic view of human knowledge lends itself as support for the crucial importance of cooperative inquiry and the Austrian claims for free markets, especially as advanced by Friedrich A. Hayek.

To Hayek, the central economic problem has to do "not with the efficient utilization of scarce resources, but rather with the generation and utilization of dispersed knowledge" (Gray 1984, 82-83). At bottom, only a system that permits genuinely cooperative inquiry and cooperative action can avoid the Prisoner's Dilemma "in which agents acting severally produce a situation which thwarts their goals and harms their interests" (121).

Within a community sharing such understanding, a diversity of individual, group, and intergroup cultures is to be encouraged. But, as T. Alexander Smith proposes, "congruence between the demands of temporality, diversity of values, and institutional arrangements" must be achieved for the community to remain stable or progress. Smith (1988) suggests that these demands can be:

most likely achieved (1) when social norms and values are oriented more strongly to future ends than to present gratification; (2) when free markets predominate in economic life; and (3) when the "rule of law" and clearly defined policy rules govern the political community. (9)

While the policy implications drawn from the essentially
human judgment process suggest a similar formula for public policy, it is not the purpose of either the Essentially Human Judgment Process or the Essential Interdependence Paradigm to reach that result. Rather, it is the sole purpose of the process to encourage as much human cooperation in the form of inquiry and action as is reasonably possible. It is true that I believe that a transition to a state similar to that espoused by Smith above will tend to result as one takes into account, uses and develops the human capacities of the persons affected by a judgment, both in the judgment process and upon implementation. Thus, in my view—at a faster or slower rate depending upon the individual, group and intergroup cultures—if an Essentially Human Judgment Process is undertaken, the policy implications will suggest and impose themselves.

Finally, and in a related vein, Smith proposes that individual, group, and intergroup cultures be analyzed in terms of its ideological (meanings, values, norms), behavioral, and material aspects (206) with particular attention given to whether these three aspects are "integrated, nonintegrated, or indeed quite contradictory to one another." From a policy point of view, it is perhaps more helpful to think of this integration as another situation where congruence should be tested. Thus, paraphrasing two of Smith's definitions, in the Essentially
Human Judgment Process:

we are concerned with "cultural congruence," that is, that any meanings, values and norms regarding purposive actions under the judgment be objectified or objectifiable in the overt behaviors and material vehicles of individuals and groups. (206, 207)

With these views in mind, this framework will employ a definition of cooperative inquiry and action as follows:

_Cooperating in inquiry and action_ is concerted critical and creative thinking; communicating in symbols and concepts; and action aiming at the attainment of common ends, together with an understanding of how to complement one another's efforts, including, but not limited to, cooperative action aiming at the free and creative exploration of complex and subtle issues.

Role of the Facilitator in the Community of Inquiry

As noted above, Bohm and Senge point to the essential role of the facilitator to keep the cooperative inquiry on track. If we think of the teacher as being a facilitator of the community rather than as an "informational authority," Lipman (1988) provides for the following role:

[T]he teacher must always take ultimate responsibility for establishing those arrangements that will guide and nudge the class into more and more productive, more and more self-corrective discursive inquiry. The teacher must always be on alert for illogical conduct among the students, just as a person chairing a meeting must be alert to any possible transgression of the rules of parliamentary procedure. But even here the teacher need not rule with a heavy hand.⁹ (97)

Significantly, from the perspective of the Essentially
Human Judgment Process, facilitation is an intervention that encourages the employment of the Essential Human Capacities of all those involved or affected.

**Critical and Creative Thinking**

Critical and creative thinking is purposefully, yet paradoxically, the last developed of the Essential Human Capacities. It is the process that receives the most attention in books on policy analysis or problem-solving, yet it is highly dependent upon the other two capacities for it to be effective. Indeed, it is precisely because the current processes focus upon thinking to the relative ignoring of symbolic communication and cooperative inquiry, they invariably become focused upon the thought process and assume away problems of knowledge and understanding. Most processes that require the consideration of other points of view and the challenging of assumptions, inferences, and implications do not emphasize would constitute adequate communication or encourage the forming of a community of inquiry (but see Paul 1992; Lipman 1991).

Though thinking is always done by the individual, thinking that leads to judgment affecting others, that is conducted without due regard for communication and cooperative inquiry, cannot help being deficient in its grasp of facts and understanding of human events. In short, in a world of uncertainty, one thinking in isolation
cannot hope to understand the human events of the past or present or their relevance to the future.

**Critical and creative thinking** is that purposeful, intuitive, imaginative and self-regulatory process that results in interpretative, analytical, evaluative, inventive and constructive judgments, together with a sound explanation of the evidential, conceptual, understanding, systemic or methodological considerations upon which they are based.

Of the essence of critical and creative thinking within a judgment process is the need to reach a comprehensive understanding of the human events involved and the points of view of all those involved or affected by the judgment process and the judgment (see, e.g., Paul 1992, 240-318).

Critical and creative thinking within an essentially human judgment process is highly dependent upon symbolic communication and is generally most effective when employed within a community of cooperative inquiry. Whether or not critical and creative thinking is performed individually or in a group depends upon the time available or the context within which the judgment is to be made, for example, a leader may ultimately form the judgment after individual reflection, or one placed in a difficult ethical position may not be able to involve others in making a judgment. Regardless of the circumstances, critical and creative thinking within the essentially human judgment process is still employed.
Bringing it All Together

There is a skill and knowledge component that integrates critical and creative thinking and dialogue and discussion. The foregoing can be brought together if the Essential Human Capacities are applied effectively and efficiently in a systematic way. Thus, for example, provided an otherwise "essentially human" process is used in ethical and policy study, a structured approach, such as Michael Scriven's (1976) "Seven Steps in Argument Analysis" integrates the employment of the Essential Human Capacities (39-53).¹¹

As Scriven argues:

Learning a new jargon or some technical calculus would give you a sense of having learned something, but it would not teach you something useful for . . . the assessment and presentation of everyday arguments. So remember that the trick here is to do a familiar task better, not to learn a new terminology for talking. (39)

Having said this, however, it also true that, even the prospects of doing a familiar task better, will be greatly enhanced where the social aspects of critical and creative thinking; communicating in symbols and concepts; and cooperating in inquiry and action are appreciated.
Chapter Notes/5

1Marine mammals and great apes may also communicate.

2Mortimer J. Adler (1985) asserts that there are three dimensions of experience:

   Perceptual objects that are really existing things or events;

   All other objects that may or may not exist, may have existed in the past but no longer exist, or that do not exist at present but may exist in the future; and

   The subjective experiences that exist only for the individual mind that has them. (29)

3Mises (1966) observes:

   As a thinking and acting being man emerges from his prehuman existence already as a social being. The evolution of reason, language, and cooperation is the outcome of the same process; they were inseparably and necessarily linked together. But this process took place in individuals. (43)

4Things are ultimately merely means toward ends which humans aim at. As such, the meaning of a thing to an individual is a function of the values derivatively placed on a thing as a means to an end.

5Aristotle wrote:

   For nature . . . does nothing without a purpose; and man alone of the animals possesses speech. The mere voice, it is true, can indicate pain and pleasure, and therefore is possessed by other animals as well . . . , but speech is designed to indicate the advantageous and the harmful, and therefore also the right and the wrong; for it is the special property of man in distinction from the other animals that he alone has perception of good and bad and right and wrong and the other moral qualities, and it is partnership in these things that makes a household and a city-state. (Politics 1.1.1253a17-18)

6Lipman is only the "modern" proponent because, at
least as early as Plato and Aristotle, the notion of treating serious subjects for children through play, which I read to mean, at bottom, their voluntary and guided, but otherwise self-directed, efforts at understanding and relating to the world around them as individuals and as a community.

7 For purposes of this treatise, this is considered to be a search for shared vision, rather than for uniformity or conformity.

8 Whitehead (1938) declares that:

Morality is always aimed at that union of harmony, intensity, and vividness which involves the perfection of importance for that occasion. (14)

9 Lipman gives a number of examples of what would defeat the "heavy hand":

He or she may ask the other students whether, for example, a remark was, in their opinion, relevant; whether an inference made did, in fact, follow logically from the premises that had been established; whether the most useful method of construing terms was being utilized; or whether they agreed with the assumptions that apparently underlay [sic] the speaker's assertions. (97)

10 That is, there may be joint acting, but there is no joint thinking (Mises 1966, 177-78).

11 This raises the issue, beyond the scope of this thesis, as to the proper balance between didactically teaching about the structure of such an approach and experiencing the community of inquiry. It is a difficult balance for the "facilitator" to reach since topic development, process guidance, modeling, facilitation, and even leadership are necessary for the successful community of inquiry, yet each role tends to detract from what the other roles have to add to the community. See, e.g., Gardner (1995).
CHAPTER 6

ELEMENTS OF TIME AND CONCEPTS OF QUALITY JUDGMENT AND ACTION

Time in General

In developing or employing the Essential Human Capacities, "time" remains an important, often critical, factor both as to the time available to form a judgment (see, e.g., T. Smith 1988; McIntyre 1990, 390), the time periods applicable,\(^1\) and the time preferences of all those involved or affected (Mises 1966, Chap. V). Essential elements in any Essentially Human Judgment Process are the time available to acquire the needed knowledge, to employ the process, to implement the judgment, to reconsider or reevaluate the solution implemented, and to so habituate the individuals in a community that the process becomes custom (see, e.g., Burnyeat 1990, 69-92).\(^2\) Moreover, time figures as a factor in reaching judgment in terms of the time frame over which the judgment is to be implemented and the value orientation of the individuals affected as to time.\(^3\)

Though not a skill as such, the various aspects of time must be understood and treated as factors integral to
the employment of the Essential Human Capacities. As T. Alexander Smith (1988) declares:

We ignore the constraints which time places upon us at our collective peril. Human beings necessarily act through time, so its mere passage has important consequences for individuals and societies alike. In particular, our plans for the more or less distant future are likely to go awry, since we perforce make choices without prior knowledge and current information about what others have done, are doing, and will do. Our social worlds are accordingly uncertain and unpredictable. (239)

Smith points out that time also has a function in the uncertainty that surrounds us all:

Moreover, since each of us possesses a different stock of knowledge accumulated through earlier experiences, our imagined futures will likewise diverge. Were any two individuals to call somehow upon similar experiences, it by no means follows that their interpretations of the future would lead each to form similar expectations about the course of subsequent events. We are thus doomed to live with uncertainty and unpredictability. (ibid.)

A related time function is the notion of time preference and its impact upon human judgment. All purposeful action is made with reference to time preference, i.e., any thing desired, ceteris paribus, is preferred sooner rather than later. As a result, the time preferences of the persons affected by a judgment will affect their valuation of the various ends sought, and derivatively, the means to those ends (Mises 1966, 99-104, 483-90, 499-512). The impact of time preference is so significant that Smith declares that:

It follows that policies whose benefits are indirect, and which occur in the long run, will receive far less
support than those policies which are experienced in the present, whose expected impacts are direct, and which take place in the present. (99)

There is, of course, more involved than time preference in policies that emphasize the more immediate and the more direct impacts. The very nature of politics, especially in a democracy, may well reflect more the intensity of the interests involved in the public policy-making process, themselves a function of time preference and self-interest, than a short-term time preference in the process as a whole. Our challenge is to develop a framework that overcomes myopia, parochialism, and impulsiveness.

**Time and the Essential Interdependence Paradigm**

The Essential Interdependence Paradigm has seven time considerations at three distinct points therein:

1. The amount of time available to the judgment formulators;

2. The time frame(s) within which the judgment is to be effective, i.e., short-term, medium-term, and long-term;

3. The value orientation forming the basis of the judgment: past, present, or future;

4. The amount of time available to use Quality Judgment during the implementation phase;

5. The amount of time available to implement the Judgment;

6. The time available to reflect upon, and learn from, the action, and

7. The period of time over which an individual and/or community exercises the Essential Human Capacities so as to habituate the individual and/or community
so that it becomes a custom.

**Quality Judgment and Quality Action**

For purposes of this process, and by definition, Quality Judgment is that which results from employing the above process, which includes (but is not limited to) choices, decisions, plans, policies, and visions (see also Yankelovich 1991, 24, 38). A more precise description of Quality Judgment, as a product, might be as follows: Quality Judgment results when one (as far as is reasonably possible) has acquired comprehensive understanding of a matter; is able to make a clear statement of the conditions that must be met for success; accepts responsibility for the judgment; and remains open to reevaluating it.

For purposes of this process, and by definition, Quality Action results when implementing a Quality Judgment with sufficient time and latitude that the agents implementing the judgment, and all those affected thereby, are able to employ (as far as is reasonably possible) their Essential Human Capacities in cooperative action. A more precise definition of Quality Action might be as follows: Quality Action results when one (as far as is reasonably possible) acts upon a Quality Judgment with comprehensive understanding of its impact on all those affected thereby; is able to form appropriate Quality Judgments in order to implement the original judgment; engages in cooperative action with those persons affected by the action; and
accepts responsibility for his or her part therein.

**Quality Judgment**

A Quality Judgment may be any one of two general types: path-finding and problem-solving. Each is designed to answer different questions. Path-finding questions are: What is the good life? What visions do I have for the future? What expectations can I have for the possibilities of future action? What is the problem? What is my mission? Problem-solving questions are more common: What can I do to make the hurt go away? What can I do to bring my reality closer to my vision?

Quality Judgment is not static; it is the result of a continuous process of employing the Essential Human Capacities in cooperative inquiry, preferably in a community or communities of inquiry. An agent making a Quality Judgment must be willing and able to adjust the judgment to new understandings or events and know when an adjustment strays too far from the community's understanding of the complex issues upon which the judgment was based.

**Quality Action**

Quality Judgment is as static as necessary for action to be taken, but as dynamic as necessary for the action taken to be cooperative rather than merely commanded or coordinated. Thus, Quality Action results when
sufficient time and latitude are afforded the implementors such that they are able to make those Quality Judgments necessary to "flesh out" the original Quality Judgment.

Quality Action is to be distinguished from commanded action or coordinated action. For purposes of this thesis, commanded action is directive in nature; it may require little or no critical and creative thinking; communicating in symbols and concepts; or cooperating in inquiry or action. Coordinated action is also directive in nature as people are told what to do, but it typically requires some critical and creative thinking within the rules pronounced and some communication and joint action between people is possible. Quality Action (as far as is reasonably possible) is cooperative action, that is, it is not directed, it has strong informal elements and requires a high degree of critical and creative thinking; communicating in symbols and concepts; and cooperating in inquiry and action. Thus, for Quality Action, each agent must cooperatively implement that part of a judgment for which he or she is responsible while adjusting to reality as he or she sees it, which includes how one's colleagues are adjusting to the environment as they see it.

At first glance, this definition of Quality Action may seem to preclude the autonomous action of the craftsman, innovator, or "rugged individual." On reflection, however, Quality Action can be seen to include the truly autonomous agent. First, in the narrower sense,
the definition is qualified by the condition "as far as is reasonably possible." Thus, certain "quality" actions may have to be performed in isolation. But, in the broader sense, no action that is in any practical sense "quality" is done in isolation. Whether it is the identification of the thing or service to produce or provide, the procuring of the raw materials, the sustenance required throughout the process, or the distribution of the product or provision of the service, the Essential Human Capacities must be employed for the agent's limited time and effort to be productive.

It may happen that an agent will expend time and effort in isolation and without employing the Essential Human Capacities and create, or do, something of value. But, this should not be seen to be an essentially human act. Thus, where assembly-line workers or riflemen in the attack have been deprived of the autonomy to employ their Essential Human Capacities or act cooperatively, their acts (though they may be of great social value) are not, at that time and in that place, essentially human unless it is reasonable under the circumstances to defer to the will of another.

"As Far As Is Reasonably Possible"

A key qualifying clause in the definitions of the Essential Human Judgment Process, Quality Judgment, and Quality Action is "As Far As Is Reasonably Possible." This
clause basically transforms these concepts into presumptions. The effect is to treat them as standards against which decision-making, policy making, and policy implementation are measured, subject always to a reasoned, communicable argument as to why the standards should not be applied in a particular instance.

For example, let us return to our example of the sinking ship. The crew is standing by lifeboats, people are climbing into the boats preparing to abandon ship. You are running toward the last of the lifeboats when you notice two people standing on opposite sides of the ship. One is the Captain, who is calmly watching the ship take on water, giving every indication that he intends to go down with the ship. The other is a person who has quite clearly panicked and is frozen with fear.

Here, the lack of time, the gravity of the situation, and panic involved would together constitute a good argument against meeting the formal requirements of an Essentially Human Judgment Process, Quality Judgment, and Quality Action as to the person overcome by panic. We previously concluded that intervention in the form of actually coercing the person into the lifeboat would be reasonable. The judgment and action themselves would be "quality" under these circumstances because that was all that was reasonable under the circumstances.

The Captain's situation, however, is dramatically different. Here, he is apparently in full control of his
capacities and has apparently made a decision in full accordance with the customs and traditions of his profession. While these customs and traditions may make little sense to us, they embody knowledge dating from ancient times, presumably reflecting some values that have withstood the test of time. Provided the Captain is apparently able to exercise his Essential Human Capacities, both you and he have met the formal requirements of the concepts. It would violate those requirements to disregard his will and force him into the lifeboat.

The same analysis holds for public policy issues. A number of factors, individually or collectively, might militate against fully employing the Essential Human Capacities of any or all those involved or affected:

1. The gravity of the situation;
2. The lack of time available;
3. Separation in time, such as intergenerational issues;
4. Separation in space, such as distance or national or natural boundaries;
5. Any deficiencies in the Essential Human Capacities, including their poor state of development or maintenance, or their impairment, whether through passion, greed, etc.;
6. Any conflict in visions or values; and
7. Any conflict in views of reality or expectations.

Whatever the factor or factors involved that are deemed to constitute a reasonable argument against meeting the formal requirements for employing the essential Human Capacities, there is almost never justification for not taking into account the impact of the judgment on the capacities of all those affected.
For example, a political decision may be made by representatives of the citizenry with their minimal involvement in the decision itself. It may be the case that a portion of the citizenry participates by lobbying the politicians and bureaucrats involved in making policy, but the matter is considered too subject-sensitive or too time-sensitive to permit further public involvement. To the extent that this process reflects the shared vision and values of the citizenry, it may be said to have complied with the formal requirements of the Essential Human Judgment Process and a Quality Judgment. But, it will remain the case that the impact of the judgment on those affected, over time, may be such that their Essential Human Capacities are neither developed nor maintained, at least insofar as public judgment is concerned. The impact will be particularly detrimental to the development and maintenance of the Essential Human Capacities of the citizenry if the judgment is a law not in concert with the shared visions or values of the citizenry.

**Quality Judgment and Quality Action over Time**

A significant consequence of employing an Essentially Human Judgment Process and engaging in Quality Action over time is the habituation of the individual and the development of custom among a community. Through the exercise of critical and creative thinking and communication skills--over time and in supportive
communities of cooperative inquiry—individuals will develop the self-confidence, the self-discipline, the maturity, the empathy and the courage to see an ethical or policy issue; engage in the thinking and communication required to reach Quality Judgment; and act in accordance with that judgment. Thus, Quality Judgment and Quality Action over time are of the greatest significance for the individual and the community.

In sum, humans—through exercising an Essentially Human Judgment Process to reach Quality Judgment and Quality Action—grow, develop, and reinforce all that which is essentially human in themselves and their community. It follows from this that, from the perspective of the members of a community, any process that does not involve the reasonable participation of all persons affected by a decision (whether directly or indirectly) employs less human capacity than is available, cannot be Quality Judgment, and may actually lead to disharmony in a community. Moreover, the essentially human involvement of the persons affected by a judgment, both in the process and the policy, results in Quality Action, which tends to generate the necessary community support or consensus essential to maintenance of a policy over time and is of the essence of democracy.

Thus, the optimal outcome for an essentially human judgment process for the community is two-fold. First, Quality Judgment is arrived at as informally as possible
through the reasonable participation of all individuals affected, directly and indirectly, through critical and creative thinking; communicating in symbols and concepts; and cooperating in inquiry and action. Second, the original Quality Judgment is implemented through Quality Action with autonomous agents employing the Essential Human Capacities.
Chapter Notes/6

1Indeed, T. Alexander Smith (1989) has observed that:

Most policy disputes over the proper role of government in the economy are in reality disagreements over the long run or the short run. (97)

2See also Yankelovich (1991) as to the time necessary to permit the persons involved in the judgment process or affected by a judgment to "absorb and accept all the consequences of their own views" (118).

3As to the latter notion, see Spiegel (1974, 38-39); see also, Hofstede (1991, Chap. 7).

4Thus, there is a distinction drawn between "rules" and "commands" or "policy rules." Rules, which may or may not be personally and voluntarily agreed to, tell all members of the community what they cannot do, not what they must do. Commands or "policy rules" tend to "allocate resources of various kinds among selected groups" and therefore tell certain persons what they must do."
PART III

IMPLICATIONS, GUIDELINES & APPLICATION

CHAPTER 7

POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND METHODOLOGICAL GUIDELINES

Policy Implications of the Judgment Process

When a new human being is born, the process of its creation has only just begun. Indeed, the most significant part of the process may be the two or four years immediately ahead as the human child develops her consciousness of the world around her and her other essential human capacities so that she may consciously participate in it.

The implications of the assumptions underlying the Essential Interdependence Paradigm, as well the framework itself, have enormous policy implications. It can readily be seen that it would be irresponsible for parents to bear children where they are unable or unwilling to devote the time, energy and attention required to provide for the existence and energy of the child at a minimum, and, more importantly, to develop fully her essential human
capacities.

The implications of this approach for the debates over the significance of the sexual revolution and a return to "traditional values," the propriety of contraception and abortion, child custody, welfare reform, education, humanitarian assistance, and foreign aid to developing nations are many, varied, and significant.

For example, any significant devotion of time, energy and attention to sexual activity for the sake of pleasure that is not a part of an activity that is otherwise "essentially human" must be seen to be neither "essentially good" nor "responsible," since the Essential Human Capacities have not been employed and the activity itself does not lead to their development and maintenance. Moreover, even sexual activity that develops, maintains, and employs these capacities for one partner is not good to the degree that it does not do so for the other.

If there is any substantial potential that a life may be generated, and the partners know that they are neither willing nor able to nurture the child for those essential formative years, the sexual activity is not essentially responsible unless reasonably adequate contraception is used. Since contraception is not fool-proof at present, only knowing that abortion is an option would eliminate the probability that a fetus created would, with the passage of time, develop the Essential Human Capacities.
Where good sexual activity results in a potential life having an existence in utero, and a part in the evolutionary process, it would be presumptively unethical to terminate its existence unless there was no opportunity—throughout the entire society—for the child's existence and energy to be maintained and her Essential Human Capacities developed, maintained and employed. This framework implies that to the extent a society subsidizes the abortion of the fetus, without encouraging the adoption of the child it would probably have become by willing and capable persons, it is neither compassionate nor caring in any essentially human sense.

To the extent that parental involvement is required for the Essential Human Capacities of the child to be developed and maintained, it is irresponsible for the parents to pursue their life projects to the detriment of the development of the child's capacities. The child, after all, has but one chance to develop those capacities fully and well. To the extent that it does not value the child rearing role of its citizens, workers, and colleagues (traditionally women), it is not essentially good, true, or beautiful. To the extent that a society discourages this devotion of time, energy, and attention, it is not an essentially true, good, or beautiful society.

The same logic applies where a society essentially subsidizes the birth of children without regard to whether their Essential Human Capacities can or will be developed.
So, where a society subsidizes having children or mandates parental leave or day care that cannot substitute for the close and personal involvement of the parents, its policies are not essentially human and the society cannot be essentially good, true, or beautiful. It may espouse the importance of children; it may even love its children passionately. It may be powerful, cultured, and refined, but it is not essentially good, true, or beautiful.

Conversely, where an individual or couple has put in the energy, time, and attention to develop the Essential Human Capacities, they may be thought to be the "essential parents" of the child, having more claim to parenthood than those who merely conceived and bore the child. Where adopted children are routinely returned to biological parents, the society honors the biological parents over the essential parents. In so doing, it dishonors the essential humanity of the adoptive parents and the child as well.

To the extent that a society's notions of goodness, truth, and beauty are commanded or manipulated by a government—against the custom and traditions of its people and without their active involvement—that society is not essentially good, essentially true, or essentially beautiful. To the extent that the society glorifies coercion and violence over development, maintenance, and employment of the Essential Human Capacities, over expanding consciousness, choosing and acting, and dealing properly with the objects of our compassion, it cannot
become an essentially good, essentially true, or essentially beautiful society.

Finally, to the extent that its system of education, whether public or private, develops a citizenry that learns through didactic teaching methods that encourage data dumps followed by regurgitation of the data dumped, the society is not essentially good, essentially true, or essentially beautiful. Didactically teaching even the truest of skills and knowledge, the best of values, the most exquisite of beauty cannot make it an essentially true, essentially good, or essentially beautiful society.

A few principles, moreover, are implicit in the Essential Interdependence Paradigm:

A. While it is not essential that every person in a community participate in an essentially human judgment process to reach Quality Judgment, it is essential to realize that to the extent members of a community are excluded from participation, or are unable to participate, the outcome of the process is, to that extent, less than optimal.

B. Coercion and compulsion, from whatever source (whether from government interference or the violence of private individuals) and for whatever reason (however well-intentioned), should be seen as distorting the capacity of the individual to fully exercise his or her human capacities. This adversely affects both the perpetrator and the victim.
C. In order not to endanger the working of social cooperation, the individual must abstain from satisfying those desires whose satisfaction would hinder the establishment of societal institutions that permit or encourage cooperative inquiry and action.

D. All progress within any community is the direct result of the continuous development and expansion of its members' capacities for cooperative inquiry and cooperative action.

E. For any community that is structured or operated in such a fashion that judgments affecting the members of that community are made without the participation of the members affected, the outcome of a process is to that extent less than optimal.

F. Policy makers must take into account the "creative aspect or dimension" involved in implementing a judgment in an inherently uncertain environment and provide that whoever implements a judgment must have both the time and flexibility necessary to modify, adapt, or terminate the judgment as experience suggests.

G. In a community, based upon the division of labor and social cooperation, and composed of autonomous individuals, solidarity requires clear understanding of the community vision, core values, and principles underlying the policy and the rules implementing them.

H. Individuals who wish to create the lives they truly desire to live must seek to connect with others in a
community that supports, even applauds, such activity.

I. There can be no ethics or policy experts whose harm will not exceed his or her value to a human community to the extent that that expertise is not grounded on, and within, an essentially human judgment process.

Methodological Guidelines

Definitions

Though the Essential Interdependence Paradigm is a priori and conceptual in its origins and presentation, a certain degree of objectivity is possible. This measure of objectivity is possible not only by considering the amount of personal participation in making a judgment, but, the kinds and degrees of interpersonal relationships and the extent to which persons, in each relationship, are employing their Essentially Human Capacities to create the lives they truly desire to live. These methodological guidelines should be seen as representative, rather than comprehensive.

They do, however, suggest opportunities for further research. For example, to the extent that critical and creative thinking; communicating in symbols and concepts; and cooperating in inquiry and action can be objectively measured, such measurements can be applied to determining their correlation to arriving at Essential Human Truth. One might, for example, explore the correlation between effectiveness, efficiency, and safety and the development,
maintenance, and employment of the Essential Human Capacities in companies that consciously recruit, train, educate, and develop its employees with these capacities in mind.

Relationships can be characterized as varying along two principal dimensions, the formal/informal dimension (the kind of relationship) and the personal/impersonal dimension (the degree of relationship). Formal relationships are those that are "well-defined, limited, in ways that are publicly understood and publicly sanctioned" (Card 1990, 210). Having such a relationship "facilitates control where there would otherwise be a lack of trust or simply an inability to predict and plan." A "personal" relationship is "when it matters to the parties who the other parties are and when this mattering is important to the nature of the relationship." Characteristics of personal relationships are closeness and intimacy and raise issues of attachment and antipathy. Informal relationships are not necessarily personal, though they are "characterized by responsibilities that can facilitate relationships of attachment." Being able to estimate the formal/informal personal/impersonal dimensions is important because formality and impersonality tend to inhibit genuine communication between participants, one positively antithetical to the notion of community of inquiry, and to that degree tends to forestall critical and creative thinking particularly in persons occupying the lower rungs
of a hierarchical organization.

Toward the "Essentially Human"

As human affairs are too complex and subjective for the following standards to be precisely measured, the following guidelines should not be used for any purpose other than as a guide to, or as a presumptive basis for estimating, the kind and degree of interpersonal relationships in a community; the kind and degree of social cooperation; and the kind and degree of essentially human activities pursued.

To estimate the degree to which a community, its judgment processes, and its policies approach the ideal of being essentially human the following steps should be taken: first, determine the kind and degree of individual participation for the pathfinding, problem-solving and implementing required; second, determine the quality of individual participation in terms of the Essential Human Capacities; third, determine the kind and degree of interpersonal relationships established and maintained; fourth, apply certain presumptive preferences (ceteris paribus) as to the kind of participation and interpersonal relationships; fifth, apply certain presumptive preferences (ceteris paribus) as to the degree of participation and interpersonal relationships; sixth, determine the attention given to matters of time, time value orientation, time frames, and time preferences; and seventh, determine the
presence or absence of the conditions for Quality Action and creativity.

A. As to the degree and kind of individual participation and relationships established and maintained:

M1 Arithmetically, determine the number of persons involved in or affected by the judgment who (a) did not (or were unable) to participate fully in the process of arriving at the judgment, \(^3\) both path-finding and problem-solving, (b) did not have their point of view considered fully in the process of arriving at the judgment, or (c) will not be involved fully in the implementation of the action program.

M2 Any increase in participation by the involved or affected population in pathfinding, or making, implementing, or evaluating a judgment (or its program) is better than no such increase, a lesser increase or a decrease.

M3 Any increase in critical and creative thinking; communicating in symbols and concepts; and/or cooperating in inquiry or action in pathfinding or making, implementing, or evaluating of a judgment (or its program) is better than no such increase, a lesser increase, or a decrease.

B. In comparing the projected outcomes (assuming no coercion or fraud), the following presumptive preferences, ceteris paribus, apply as to the kind of relationships:\(^4\)

M4 Arithmetically and geometrically, compare the number and kind of relationships by category: (a) formal and impersonal, (b) formal and personal, (c) informal and impersonal; and (d) informal and personal.

M5 A greater number of informal relationships is better than a greater number of formal relationships.

M6 A greater number of informal relationships in either degree is better than fewer such relationships.

M7 Fewer new formal relationships are better than more such relationships.
M8 Any change in a formal relationship to an informal relationship is better than the status quo or the change of an informal relationship to a formal one.

C. In comparing the projected outcomes, and assuming no coercion or fraud, the following presumptive preference, ceteris paribus, applies as to the degree of relationships:

M9 A greater number of informal and personal relationships is better than a greater number of informal and impersonal relationships.

D. As to the quality of participation and action within interpersonal relationships:

M10 Congruence within individuals and within the groups and intergroup between the demands of temporality, diversity of values, and institutional arrangements must be achieved, that is, that any meanings, values and norms regarding purposive actions under the judgment be objectified or objectifiable in the overt behaviors and material vehicles of individuals and groups.

E. As to time, time frames, and time preferences:

M11 Was adequate time available to make the judgment?

M12 Did the judgment process give as much consideration to alternatives that take effect later rather than sooner, whose expected impacts are indirect, and whose benefits occur in the long run?

M13 Did the judgment take into account the time value orientation of all persons involved in making the judgment and affected by the judgment?

M14 Was adequate time available to use Quality Judgment during the implementation phase?

M15 Will the individual and/or community exercise critical and creative thinking; communicating in symbols and concepts; and cooperating in inquiry and action skills over such a period that they will become habit for the individual or custom for the community?
F. As to the possibility of Essential Human Excellence (optimal experience):

M16 To what degree were all those involved or affected engaged in meaningful activity?

M17 To what degree did all those involved know what must be done?

M18 To what degree are the challenges well-matched by abilities of all those involved or affected to employ well-developed Essential Human Capacities?

M19 To what degree were all those involved or affected able to balance their challenges against their Essential Human Capacities?

M20 To what degree were all those involved or affected given the opportunity for concentration and involvement?

M21 To what degree were all those involved or affected given sufficient feedback to permit a clear vision, an accurate, insightful view of current reality, and reasonable expectations of the possibilities of future action?

M22 To what degree did all persons involved or affected experience a sense that influencing the creative process is possible in principle?

G. As to the possibility of creativity:

M23 To what degree are the persons involved or affected motivated by the belief that, through his or her individual efforts, the world can be changed?

M24 To what degree do the persons involved or affected have well-developed Essential Human Capacities, a discovery orientation, and intrinsic motivation?

M25 To what degree are the persons involved or affected a part of a creative system: Is the main concern of the community to preserve or change the community? How many variations are the community equipped to recognize? What are its resources for controlling the rate of individual variations? What are its selection criteria concerning new variations?
What is the status of community relative to other communities in the social system? Is the community autonomous, made up of persons controlling their own destiny, or is it controlled by external institutions? To what extent is human creativity stifled by the control of the community?

Conclusion and Preview

Having detailed a psychological and philosophical basis for an Essentially Human Judgment Process, laid out the assumptions underlying an Essential Interdependence Paradigm, defined and discussed the most important concepts included in the framework, described the policy implications of the framework, and developed a number of methodological guidelines to aid in further inquiry, we are now ready to apply the Essentially Human Judgment Process to a fact situation, the current dilemma over what policy to apply for single-parent welfare.
Chapter Notes/7

Institutions are formal; rights are characteristic of very formal relationships (Card 1990, 210-11).

Spousehood is a formally defined status in law which nonetheless is characterized by informal and personal obligations. So, the relationship is one of mixed formal and informal and personal obligations.

The relationship of teacher to student under a didactic model is primarily formal and impersonal as the teacher has informational authority. The same relationship under a community of inquiry model is formal in the sense that the teacher has instructional authority, but informal and personal in the conduct of the community of inquiry itself.

The relationship of a doctor to a patient is often considered informal and personal, but it becomes more formal as the patient asserts rights, though it retains aspects of the personal.

The relationship of an attorney to his client is largely informal and personal, though like marriage, it is formal to the extent it is regulated by the state. The relationship of judge to a defendant, on the other hand, is both formal and impersonal.

Participation of members of the affected population should be considered to the degree that each is "informed and competent," that is, more weight should be given to those adept in the Essential Human Skills.

Accordingly, some participants' opinions will be Quality Judgments accorded great weight. Other participants' opinions will be considered "Mere Opinion" and given little weight beyond consideration of the fact that those indeed were the opinions (possibly only ill-considered desires) of those participants at the time and in that place.

Time is a factor here because, as members of a community are more-or-less informed and/or competent, it will be reasonable often to make more time available to those capable of making Quality Judgments rather than to those capable of only mere opinion.

Note that "informed and competent" in this context does not preclude the expert and his or her expertise, but it is unlikely that expertise alone, as presently offered and
used, will rise to being Quality Judgment. The principal shortcoming will be that one having such specialized knowledge will be less inclined to consider (as far as reasonably possible) the points of view of those of the affected population and will have concentrated on acquiring some knowledge to the exclusion of all other (see, e.g., Saul 1992; Formaini 1990; McCollough 1991, 3, 5, 61, 82-4).

4 As all progress within any community is the direct result of the continuous development and expansion of its members' capacities for cooperative inquiry and cooperative action, it is possible to establish normative standards to guide policy formulation and evaluation.

5 Called "cultural congruence" (T. Smith 1988, 206, 207).

6 For example, the stated norm or value of "empowering employees" would not be integrated with behaviors and material vehicles, if management did not behave as though employees actually had power or provide them with the material vehicles, e.g., access, tools, computers, communications equipment, communities of cooperative inquiry, etc. for employees to actually act autonomously, cooperatively, and constructively.

7 Csikszentmihalyi discusses the relationship between personality traits and values, cognitive orientation toward discovery, and intrinsic motivation in "The Domain of Creativity," Chap. in Feldman, Csikszentmihalyi, and Gardner 1994.

CHAPTER 8

APPLICATION AND CONCLUSION

Application of the Framework and Methodological Guidelines

By way of example, let us turn to a simple fact situation that illustrates the much larger social problem of "the impoverished single-parent." Using the Essential Interdependence Paradigm, especially its Essentially Human Judgment Process, I will evaluate the effects of a decision to institute a program similar to Aid to Families with Dependent Children.

This situation is chosen because of its currency and its importance to our society. Charles Murray, in a 1993 article in the Wall Street Journal, developed the significance of this problem. He observed that, in 1991, 1.2 million children were born to unmarried mothers, nearly 30 percent of all births. Murray noted that this percentage is four percentage points higher than the black illegitimacy rate in the early 1960s that prompted national concern. With the national percentage at 30 percent and the overall white illegitimacy rate at 22 percent, Murray concludes that not only had the public policy problem of
providing support to the unwed single mother become a
bigger problem, but that it was spreading to the dominant
white middle class from the marginalized black underclass.
Murray (1993) argues that:

My proposition is that illegitimacy is the single most
important social problem of our time—more important
than crime, drugs, poverty, illiteracy, welfare or
homelessness because it drives everything else. Doing
something about it is not just one more item on the
American policy agenda, but should be on top. (A14)

We will take as given that the single parent in our
case should not, as a matter of public policy, receive from
all sources, including the government, less than $10,000.00
per year in order to adequately care for her child or
children. Each guideline will be set forth followed by
discussion of its application to the problem presented.

M1 Arithmetically, determine the number of persons
involved in or affected by the judgment who (a) did not
(or were unable) to participate fully in the process of
arriving at the judgment, both path-finding and
problem-solving, (b) did not have their point of view
considered fully in the process of arriving at the
judgment, or (c) will not be involved fully in the
implementation of the action program.

Discussion: Pre-program, the typical single-parent is a
woman, usually under-educated, and if employed, unable to
make $10,000 per year. She uses modestly well-developed
critical and creative thinking skills, communication skills
and cooperation skills in eking out an existence for
herself and her child. She deals with an employer who is
unable or unwilling to pay her $10,000.00 per year. She
periodically has to approach charitable organizations or
her church and plead her case for why she should receive assistance. She occasionally turns to her parents or siblings for assistance who insist upon some accounting for the use of the funds. She occasionally gets support from the father of the child or children. She occasionally gets support from a lover or friends. In the end, however, she does not receive the needed $10,000.00 per year.

When the judgment process is followed to initiate the AFDC Program, none of the people described above are involved in the decision, except to the extent they had voted for their members of Congress. Their individual and community visions of what is a good life are not considered, except very indirectly, and their individual and community values, other than survival, are not considered, except through representation. Even this representation may not truly reflect the people involved or affected by the program, since it may have been authorized through manipulation in the political process, political advertising, speeches, and literature. There is no opportunity for innovation on the part of most of the participants, whether the bureaucrats or the recipients.

After the program is initiated, none of the people mentioned above participates in making the decision about whether or not she should receive assistance, to what ends, how much, for how long, or under what other conditions. Finally, none of the persons mentioned above are involved in implementing the program as a new bureaucracy has been
established, with a full set of implementing rules, which do not require critical and creative thinking; communicating in symbols and concepts; or cooperating in inquiry and action. Indeed, it is illegal for her to violate restrictions on receiving support from others so long as she receives program funds.

For our single parent to apply, she needs to communicate only in terms of description, that is she merely describes her status. There may be some communicating in symbols and concepts, but, for the most part, she needs only to describe her situation. Moreover, the bureaucrat's work is not characterized by use the Essential Human Capacities to make a decision. His or her discretion is limited essentially to matching the applicant's description to the requirements of the rules, though there is some evaluation as to the credibility of her description.

M2 Any increase in participation by the involved or affected population in path-finding, or making, implementing, or evaluating a judgment (or its program) is better than no such increase, a lesser increase or a decrease.

Discussion: We see from the description in M1 that there is significantly less "essentially human" activity after the program. To the extent that the single-parent receives the $10,000.00 from the government, she no longer deals with her employer; she no longer has to plead her case at a charity; she no longer has to appeal to her family; and she
is less dependent upon the father of the children. Moreover, she is able to have additional children through other lovers and receive more money through merely describing the fact that she now has one additional child. Moreover, assuming that the bureaucrat had used his or her Essential Human Capacities before landing his or her AFDC job, that person is now acting in far less of an "Essentially Human" capacity.

Under the M2 guideline, the situation is significantly less "essentially human." The consequences are more severe, however. The charity's role, which has now been largely supplanted by the government, had formerly made appeals to other persons for funds. Since these appeals were voluntary, they used their Essential Human Capacities to describe the social problem, show how that charity could help, and argue why it would be in the interests of contributors to assist. It is true that this frequently was persuasion rather than a community of inquiry, however, none of these capacities are required now to be used for this purpose. The government program does not need persuasion to accumulate the funds. By the same token, the contributors, who used to use the Essential Human Capacities to decide whether the problem was as the charity described and whether they should contribute their own assets to that charity toward solving that problem, now either no longer use the Essential Human Capacities or use them to avoid paying the taxes used for the AFDC Program.
Further, the impact on the child is problematical. If one follows George Herbert Mead and Jürgen Habermas as to the social aspect of development of consciousness, it may be that the child has been deprived of exposure to well-developed and employed Essential Human Capacities, unless the program provides for such exposure. This may be why the 25 percent threshold of illegitimacy among the white majority, which Charles Murray pointed to, is so significant. It may be that that high a percentage portends a community that makes such exposure for its children problematic.

M3 Any increase in critical and creative thinking; communicating in symbols and concepts; and/or cooperating in inquiry or action in pathfinding or making, implementing, or evaluating of a judgment (or its program) is better than no such increase, a lesser increase, or a decrease.

Discussion: Under this guideline, though the goal assisting the children may be admirable, the program as described is not "essentially human."

M4 Arithmetically and geometrically, compare the number and kind of relationships by category: (a) formal and impersonal, (b) informal and impersonal; and (c) informal and personal.

Discussion: We may summarize here by noting that, though the relationships that existed pre-program did not generate the $10,000.00, they were largely informal and usually personal. Post-program the relationships that generated the funds, both from the point of view of the government vis à vis the taxpayer and the single-parent vis à vis the
government are formal and impersonal.

M5 A greater number of informal relationships is better than a greater number of formal relationships.

Discussion: The program fails this guideline.

M6 A greater number of informal relationships in either degree is better than fewer such relationships.

Discussion: The program fails this guideline.

M7 Fewer new formal relationships are better than more such relationships.

Discussion: The Program fails this guideline.

M8 Any change in a formal relationship to an informal relationship is better than the status quo or the change of an informal relationship to a formal one.

Discussion: The program fails this guideline.

M9 A greater number of informal and personal relationships is better than a greater number of informal and impersonal relationships.

Discussion: The program fails this guideline.

Of the remaining guidelines, it is enough if we discuss them together, with emphasis on guideline, M15.

M15 Will the individual and/or community exercise critical and creative thinking; communicating in symbols and concepts; and cooperating in inquiry and action skills over such a period that they will become habit for the individual or custom for the community?

Discussion: Here, suffice it to say, if Aristotle is right—that a person becomes what his or her habits are, and a community becomes what the customs and traditions of its members are—then the AFDC program should not bode well for a community having a large portion of its members dependent upon it. As to the transfer of the $10,000.00
itself, significantly less employment of the Essential Human Capacities is in evidence, from a purely objective point of view, in the affected community. As the single-parent is transformed from an employee, and even as a supplicant, to a case file, she uses significantly fewer of her Essential Human Capacities than she would have before. The employer, family, friends and lovers are no longer involved. The charity that could every day redefine its vision of the community it desired to serve was replaced by laws and rules and constituencies of service providers changeable only thorough the political process. The contributors were replaced by taxpayers.

The system is essentially rules-following and bureaucratic, hence, it has little room for creativity or a sense of the possibility of control. Indeed, the very nature of the system, one of entitlement, however well-intentioned, does not tap the intrinsic motivation and use of the Essential Human Capacities that the Essential Interdependence Paradigm suggests is required if a system is to be "essentially human."

This is not to say that the conclusion to be drawn is that the end served by AFDC is wrong, or even that AFDC is a poor program. Assuming that the goal of having each such parent receive $10,000.00 per year is otherwise appropriate; the program is feasible and suitable; and the cost is acceptable, it is, in its processes and its policies, not "essentially human."
It is true that as the single-parent problem is identified, discussed, debated, and solved, certain members of the community become more involved and employ their Essential Human Capacities. Thus, from a utilitarian perspective, "the greatest good for the greatest number," the Essential Human Capacities, on balance, are employed and the impact of the process and judgment on their capacities considered. It would, nonetheless, remain true that such a program would still not be essentially human from the perspectives of those most involved or affected at the time and place of the judgment's most immediate impact.

Indeed, in its final effects, the community "served" is deprived of even the compassion presumably represented by the program. That is, until it happens that human beings come to love paying taxes and dealing with bureaucrats, the informal and personal involvement of autonomous, cooperating human beings that is the goal of the Essential Interdependence Paradigm cannot be reached by a program similar to AFDC.

**An Essentially Human Welfare Policy**

The purpose of this thesis was only to develop and propose a framework that would support or enclose the far richer frames of reference that are essential parts of the way we live in society. To propose a solution in this case requires a more comprehensive frame of reference. The framework proposed by this thesis works only as a skeletal
structure designed to support and/or enclose something more comprehensive. A frame of reference does more: it is a structure of views of reality; symbols and concepts, and valuations and values by means of which an individual or group perceives or evaluates data, communicates ideas, and regulates behavior. A frame of reference builds upon, or is contained by, a framework.

However, the framework developed herein does suggest the essentially human process, structures, and systems for a community to follow to arrive at a solution, though it cannot suggest the solution itself. Just as following the methodological guidelines suggested that the AFDC was essentially dehumanizing, the framework suggests a process that would mitigate that result or be essentially humanizing.

Community Consciousness and Compassion Centers

For the process and solution to be essentially human, community involvement in solving our single-parent's problem would revolve around established centers, based in neighborhoods or communities within the broader community. One is tempted to call these centers "resource centers," but they are much more than that. They are community centers that will facilitate the involvement of the community in solving community welfare problems. Their motto might be, "To Understand is To Care." As such, their function is to solve such problems through raising the
consciousness of the community and providing the opportunity for the exercise of community compassion, so that individuals, groups, and communities might make more effective, efficient, and safe choices for action and argument. Hence, something akin to "Community Consciousness and Compassion Centers" (c³ Centers) conveys their sense (see also Gott 1995).² The area they serve would be the modern day equivalent meeting the Aristotelian admonition that the polis should not extend beyond the herald's call (Politics 7.4.1326a6-b26). Technology may have increased that area, or it may remain much the same. This would be a fruitful topic for research.

The solution to the problem raised by this thesis would be approached by the community in three phases and be part of a larger community initiative (see Carpenter 1991; Folger 1991; Van Slyck and Stern 1991; Woolpert 1991), only one of which would be visible to point our single-parent enters this story.

Phase I includes the devolution of welfare policy to the community and the integration of the community's public agencies and private organizations to identify the full welfare services spectrum of support required in the community. Since the Federal government has greatly increased its welfare role since the 1960s (Rein 1974), and the private sector has not provided such services across the full welfare services spectrum (Katz 1984), present welfare policy would continue in this phase.
Initially, the government function would continue its welfare role while actively involving more and more of the community as possible while preparing its own employees and unions through education and attrition for the changes ahead. Social work degree curricula would begin to change to reflect the new vision, values, and notions of excellence of social welfare. Federal, state, and local governments would enact laws and regulations initiating and enabling the transition. The community would establish inter-agency/organization steering committees.

Government agencies would sponsor, facilitate, and participate in communities of inquiry of those involved or affected by the community's welfare requirements. Their purpose would be to determine what spectrum of welfare services the community requires. Their goal would be reaching Quality Public Judgments as to what services the community requires, yet are not delivered by government agency or private organization. Later the government would sponsor, facilitate, and participate in communities of inquiry tasked to determine how to further encourage the community, through privatization or "volunteerization," to assume all or some of the welfare services the government provides.

As a matter of policy, agencies and organizations would see problems, conflict and failure as opportunities for learning and growth. This notion would be embedded in agency and organization purpose, vision, and mission
statements. Methods of learning from services rendered
would be developed as well as the means to distribute the
skills, knowledge, or understanding derived from experience
to the community as a whole.

Phase I would require a change in tax policy
reducing Federal taxes and increasing state or local taxes
or voluntary contributions. In the transition, Federal tax
policy might increase the charitable deduction to increase
contributions to community-based non-profit organizations.
Federal welfare policy would include funding for community
conversion efforts, that is, privatization and/or
volunteerization. Other essentially human initiatives
would begin in parallel: community mediation programs for
public policy issues, neighborhood mediation centers for
dispute resolution, peer mediation for conflicts in the
schools, victim-offender reconciliation programs, and
public education pursued through expanded use of the
community of inquiry described. (Private education would
be persuaded to do likewise.) The goal of all these
initiatives would be to have action and argument in the
community conducted in an "essentially human" manner as a
matter of individual habit and community custom and
tradition.

Phase II would be devoted to the communities
developing C³ Centers: building the facilities, training
facilitators to staff them, developing systems and
structures to insure community agency interoperability, and
implementing the changes. Community participation would be the norm: local materials, architecture, art, steering committees, communications, and people would be employed as much as possible to encourage the community involvement theme.

Community meetings would be continuous throughout this phase. The community would organize and/or develop non-profit organizations to meet requirements of the full welfare services spectrum. Their purpose, vision, and mission statements would be developed or adapted to reflect clearly their role in meeting the community's needs. Their structures, strategies and systems would be developed or adapted to meet those needs. Their organizational frames of reference would expressly include cooperation in inquiry and action with other community agencies and organizations to meet community needs.

Learning from services offered would be an objective of all agencies and organizations. Formally educating the public as to the vision, values, and notions of excellence embodied in the C³ Centers would begin in this phase. Communications systems between community agencies and organizations would be put in place. Integrated triage and hand-off procedures from one agency or organization to another would be developed and exercised. Assessment of community requirements would be continuous.

Phase III would be where our single parent enters
the program. The C3 Centers, as far as can be reasonably projected, would be operated by the government or under government contract. The Centers would have on-site triage personnel to identify immediate needs and prioritize available resources. In an emergency, triage personnel could waive health and safety measures, such as the number of people to a room, the qualifications of day care personnel, or surge housing in temporary over-flow buildings that do not meet Federal Americans with Disabilities Act requirements—provided it was a Quality Judgment. Representatives, or points of contact, for all community agencies and organizations across the full welfare services spectrum would be available through open lines of communication.

The following steps would be taken, to a greater or lesser degree, depending upon the context of the applicant's problem. Since the precise nature of each applicant's problem is as varied as the persons involved and affected, the first step is the definition of the problem before proceeding to develop a process to find a solution or involve the persons affected. If one defines a problem as a gap between a desired future and current reality where there is no reasonable expectation that human action will bridge the gap, this would require an understanding of the visions, views of reality, and expectations of all those involved and affected. Using the methodological guides to identify those involved and
affected and the character of their relationships to the applicant, the facilitator would develop a history of the applicant and her involvement in the community, help the community sort out critical issues, identify persons involved or affected, and gain a sense of what the process might involve. At the same time, the facilitator would educate those involved or affected by the problem about the C³ Center's role, establish credibility, and encourage participation in the process of finding and implementing a solution.

The facilitator would work with those involved and affected to design and set up a process for productive discussions. She would work with them to define a problem in a way that all parties can accept as something to work together to solve, determine necessary roles and identify who should fill them, suggest a process frame of reference, establish a plan of action and milestones for the process, help those involved source resources to pursue the process, and integrate the possible solutions offered by participants. A steering committee drawn from those involved and affected might be selected. A resource group of professionals with expertise in the economic, social, psychological, political, and legal aspects of the applicant's situation would be identified and the logistics of their availability arranged.

Many of these situations will be routine or typical, so that few complex issues will be raised and
procedures will be fairly standardized. However, there may be larger community issues raised by the specific problem of the applicant. For example, the employer may argue that the applicant is not productive enough to justify a higher wage. If found to be true, education officials may be approached to see if some course of study should be developed or modified in some respect. So, initial sessions might deal with major issues raised during the interviews, but will always deal with process objectives. In any event, even if considered routine, the problem is still defined and the process selected relative to that applicant, rather than according to some centralized bureaucracy's notion of what the process should look like.

The participants might agree to have an expert participate and she, or one of the lay participants, might write a paper addressing issues raised by the participants. The resource group would be reasonably available for technical data research, conceptual development, or assistance in surfacing valuations and values during the process.

Early in the process, a plan of action and milestones tied to specific goals and objectives should emerge as a living document; revision would be continuous. Until the problem is resolved, dialogue and discussion would continue in plenary sessions, caucus meetings, and work group sessions. The caucuses would allow involved parties to discuss issues and possible revisions to the
program alone with the facilitator. A working group, drawn from the steering committee and resource group, might be created to facilitate resolution of problems that are shared by multiple persons.

Persons who would almost certainly be invited to participate are the parents of the child; the extended family; church and education representatives; employer(s); and a representative of the community agencies and organizations administering available funds. Under some circumstances, the child herself, or a representative or guardian ad litem, might be involved to fully garner all relevant perspectives.

Agency and organization representatives would be empowered to authorize the expenditure of funds in a manner tailored to the needs of the applicant with minimal reference to the sourcing agency or organization. He or she would be guided by broad principles reflecting the shared vision, values, and notions of excellence of the community and the agency or organization. The sources of the funds controlled by the community representative(s) would be the community itself; there would be no outside source to solve that which is considered a community problem.

The program itself would balance the vision, values, and notions of excellence of the community in the long-run with the essential humanity of the child and parents. Here is where the solution cannot be pursued
further with certainty. In our present communities, our vision, values, and notions of excellence do not truly support the fullest development of the essential human capacities of our children, as the norm is for both parents to work relatively soon after a child is born. The child is frequently left with a day care provider or in a day care center. Unless the community shares the assumption that the parents, presumptively, are the persons best situated to develop the Essential Human Capacities of the child, the program would not likely provide for the mother to stay home and raise her child for the two or three years that most experts agree is the essentially formative period in the child's life.

However, in a society where its vision, values, and notions of excellence include the fullest development of the essential human capacities—and the community shares the assumption that the parents, presumptively, are the persons best situated to develop the Essential Human Capacities of the child—the program would support such development. However, this is a rebuttable presumption. If the parents are incapable or unwilling of developing the child's Essential Human Capacities, such facilitation, persuasion, manipulation, or coercion as would be required, or appropriate (given the vision, values, and notions of excellence of the community) would be applied to insure that the child's capacities are so developed. It would be irresponsible, as a matter of public policy, to merely
support the existence of a parent and child where it was known that the parents were unwilling or incapable of developing the child's Essential Human Capacities.

Where appropriate, the program would provide for both the child's and the parents' development. Where even coercion fails to lead to the development of the child's capacities, the child would be considered endangered in an essentially human sense and removed from the biological parents. If required and available, foster parents for the child would be found relatively early in her life. If enough time passed that the foster parents became the child's essentially human parents, then they would be allowed to adopt the child to the exclusion of the biological parents. Biological parenting would not take priority over essential human parenting.

At various steps along the way, participants would describe what they have learned through the process. As the late Rear Admiral Jay Proust used to say, "Written out is thought out." So, these descriptions would be recorded and would be included in a lessons-learned library, similar to legal appellate court decisions. There would be walls of bookcases with bound reports of lessons-learned from involved or affected persons. Eventually they would be catalogued, digested, and have a citation system developed so that they could be readily referenced and valuable lessons would not be lost to the community.

The problem in our instant situation might be
resolved through skills enhancement or negotiation skills training; a facilitator may assist her in pleading her case for a raise; job counseling may find a situation paying more; an agency may supplement her wage during the foregoing efforts, or indefinitely; financial management may be provided to help her reduce her expenses; cooperative arrangements might be made to reduce expenses or improve the quality of her life (e.g., car pooling); or the community may weigh on the father, family, or church for support.

Such a relatively rule-free program would be subject to abuse, of course. For example, a wage supplement could operate as unfair competition for rivals to the employer who do not receive what is, in effect, a wage subsidy. But, in an environment where argument and action are based upon well-developed, maintained, and employed or facilitated Essential Human Capacities, those involved or affected would be expected to participate in a community of inquiry to resolve the problems of a member of the community.

If the process were to be pursued in this manner, as an isolated program, abuse would probably be the norm. But in an environment where other initiatives are likewise on-going—community mediation programs for public policy issues, neighborhood mediation centers for dispute resolution, peer mediation for conflicts in the schools, victim-offender reconciliation programs, and public
education pursued through expanded use of the community of
inquiry--abuse should be reduced. Where Quality Judgment
is an individual habit and community custom and tradition,
abuse should be reduced still further. In any event, the
marginal cost of paying for tailored solutions that involve
the members of the community in solving community problems
should be less over the long-term than current programs
that have less flexibility in remedies.

Prospects for Successful Implementation

The advantages of this process are numerous, though
the problems with it are probably insurmountable in the
present environment. Nonetheless, it is a valuable
exercise because it highlights just how flawed our present
society and its programs are in this area.

First, as an advantage, this process involves all
those affected, if they are willing to be involved. Its
disadvantage, in our present environment, is that it is
probable that many of those affected would not be willing
to participate and the process would not have the multiple
perspectives required to achieve Essential Human Truth.
Second, as an advantage, it tailors a solution to the
vision, values, and notions of excellence of the
participants and the community and employs the
participant's Essential Human Capacities. Its disadvantage
is that, in the present environment, there will be little
such vision, values, and notions of excellence shared by
the participants and the community. Thus, the community may come to see its resources as misused or wasted. Third, as an advantage, the government agency bureaucrats would be empowered to make a judgment based upon their own Quality Judgment—judgments based upon the well-formed visions, values, and notions of excellence of the participants and the community. Its disadvantage is that the process would consume more time, would produce results in different cases that might appear to be inconsistent to outside observers, and might invite corruption or be otherwise abused. Finally, as an advantage, the resources would be contributed by the members of the community to meet the community's vision, values, and notions of excellence such that they would actually have contributed to the welfare of their own community. Thus, this should increase the sense of involvement in, understanding of, and responsibility for the good of the community among its members. The disadvantages are that the moneys might still be the product of coercion in the form of taxation unless they were truly voluntary contributions, in which case some citizens may not make a reasonable contribution, breeding resentment. There could be no national standard in any event. Further, some reasonable limits to proselytizing of agency or organization vision, values, and notions of excellence would have to be imposed.

As I write this, every instinct screams that such a program is not practical. So, why propose it? The
perfectly reasonable question in reply is, if it is not practical, why not? And, if not, what does that tell us about present programs?

If we have agreed that consciousness and compassion are fundamental to the choices that lead to action and argument, why would we not make important choices such as these at some sort of community-based consciousness and compassion centers? If we understand the problems of a member of our community, why would we not care? If we care, would we not learn from that understanding? If we believe our communities and the lives of our children are important, why could we not find the time or resources to be involved in the welfare of our own communities?

If we do not have the time or resources to care voluntarily for the disadvantaged among us, how can we believe that we live in a community that is good and true and beautiful? If we, as a community, do not have shared visions, values, and notions of excellence, what do we believe is binding our communities together? If we cannot trust our "public servants" to make Quality Judgments in such matters, why do we believe that rules-bound bureaucrats can make the choices any better? If we cannot entrust the politicians and bureaucrats with these matters, what matters should we entrust to them? Nuclear weapons testing? Nuclear waste disposal and storage? Our retirement income and health care? Finally, if the individual communities are not willing to contribute or be
taxed to care for the disadvantaged, why should there be a national standard to maintain a community that is not willing or able to care for its members?

Our present welfare system begs these questions. If on analysis, this approach seems to be too impracticable and what has been demonstrated to be an essentially dehumanizing approach (AFDC and its kindred programs, or some variation thereof) is preferable, then this speaks volumes about our view of human nature, how we see ourselves, and how we see our communities: either our view of human nature is such that a good, true, and beautiful community is not even theoretically possible; or we have no shared vision; values, or notions of excellence sufficient to support an essential human welfare policy. If either is the case, then welfare policy in our nation stands less as an aspect of choice as a function of consciousness and compassion than as an exercise in power and crowd control.

There may, perhaps, be a more simple answer. Perhaps the answer is simply that welfare policy cannot be essentially human unless it is community-based merely for epistemological reasons. It may that we cannot otherwise know each other well enough to understand each other, to have insight into one another's problems, and, ultimately, to care. As Aristotle noted in the Politics over two thousand years ago:

in order to decide questions of justice and in order to distribute offices according to merit it is necessary
for the citizens to know each other's personal characters, since where this does not happen to be the case the business of electing officials and trying lawsuits is bound to go badly; haphazard decision is unjust in both matters, and this must obviously prevail in an excessively numerous community. (7.4.1326b14-21; see also Schollmeier 1994, 109-10)

Then again, as Robert Frost wrote: "Good fences make good neighbors." This framework cannot provide the complete answers, but it does raise the essential questions and suggests the process, structure, and systems required to answer them.

**Conclusion and New Beginning**

We have taken a journey from a description of the current state of ethics and policy studies through a discussion of the nature and severity of the problem and then developed a new framework for approaching ethics and policy studies based upon the Essential Human Capacities of critical and creative thinking; communicating in symbols and concepts; and cooperating in inquiry and action. We have implemented these capacities through an Essentially Human Judgment Process that requires that the Essential Human Capacities of all involved or affected be used, or facilitated, and the impact of the judgment upon those capacities taken into account. We have explored what Quality Judgment and Quality Action within an Essential Interdependence Paradigm would look like. We have considered a number of policy implications derived from the judgment process itself and a number of relatively
objective guidelines for judgment making, implementing, and evaluating.

Finally, having applied the guidelines to perhaps the most pressing issue of the day, we have found the existing programs to be essentially dehumanizing and have developed a concept of the Community Consciousness and Compasion Center as a process, structure, and system suggested by the framework itself. However, as this framework requires, even principles derived through the framework itself, if they are to be Quality Judgments, must be open to reexamination involving the whole community in cooperative inquiry.

This approach, then, goes beyond deontology, which looks at what duty we might have as we know the world today, to looking toward the implications of today's acts for the world of tomorrow. It goes beyond what can now be seen as a superficial consequentialism by looking at the type of world a policy would create, rather than what current problems a policy would solve. It goes beyond Friedrich Nietzsche (who went beyond good and evil) by seeing participation in life with others to be an integral part of living and an essential adjunct to a will to power. Moreover, it retains the burden of decision, for powerful epistemological reasons, on each of us as individuals because no single individual or group of individuals could have the essential human knowledge required to develop and maintain the essential human capacities of all those
This approach is not mandatory, of course. All persons have the power to choose among competing theories. However, an Essential Interdependence Paradigm places the burden of proof on the proponent to articulate what consistent principle she is applying in taking actions that are not essentially human. Thus, a person working within the Essential Interdependence Paradigm would be ethically free to follow any particular course in life, provided she could explain what principle, consistent with that framework, she is following in not respecting the development, maintenance, and employment of the Essential Human Capacities of all those involved or affected.

It is my hope that this thesis developed a framework that may aid in a coming to public judgment through inquiry and reflection, discussion and dialogue that develops, maintains, and employs that which is most essentially human in us all: critical and creative thinking; communicating in symbols and concepts; and cooperating in inquiry and action. Our resulting frames of reference should be richer, and serve us better, in creating the lives we truly desire to live.
Chapter Notes/8

1Participation of members of the affected population should be considered to the degree that each is "informed and competent," that is, more weight should be given to those adept in the skills that implement the Essential Human Capacities.

Accordingly, some participants' opinions will be Quality Judgments accorded great weight. Other participants' opinions will be considered "Mere Opinion" and given little weight beyond consideration of the fact that those were the opinions, possibly only ill-considered desires, of those participants at the time and in that place.

Time is a factor here because, as members of a community are more-or-less informed and/or competent, it will be reasonable often to make more time available to those capable of making Quality Judgments rather than to those capable of only mere opinion.

Note that "informed and competent" in this context does not preclude the expert and his or her expertise, but it is unlikely that expertise as presently offered and used will rise to being Quality Judgment. The principal shortcoming will be that one having such specialized knowledge will be less inclined to consider (as far as reasonably possible) the points of view of those of the affected population and will have concentrated on acquiring some knowledge to the exclusion of all other (see, e.g., Saul 1992; Formaini 1990; McCollough 1991).

2A related idea in the public policy arena are "neighborhood environmental justice centers," which would be part of what one writer styles "an emancipatory justice strategy" (see Gott 1995, chap. 7).
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY


Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics.

______ Politics


Gardner, Susan T. 1995. "Inquiry is No Mere Conversation (Or Discussion or Dialogue): Facilitation of Inquiry is Hard Work," draft of a paper to be presented at the annual meeting of the North American Association for Community of Inquiry, Cullowhee, North Carolina, Western Caroline University, 9-10 June 1995.


_______. 1967b, s.v. "Essence and Existence."

_______. 1967c, s.v. "Existential Ethics."

_______. 1967d, s.v. "Existentialism."


