

1-1-1995

Terrorism and the new international environment

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TERRORISM AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENT

by

Dong Jin Kim

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

in

Political Science

Department of Political Science
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
August, 1995

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
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
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
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
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
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August 1995

ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the characteristics of terrorism in the new international environment following the Cold War in which international terrorism is undergoing drastic changes in its sources and characteristics.

The breakdown of the bipolar system and concomitant diffusion of political power have given way to rivalry between regional states; especially, one of the key factors is the effect of weapons proliferation on the dynamics of conflict between regional rivals including nuclear, biological, and chemical-weapons capability. The world is also confronting an assortment of prodemocracy and anti-colonial movements which tend to erupt in civil disorder. The above ingredients are currently fomenting the new environment for terrorism.

This thesis first looks at the nature of terrorism and examines the background to the issue; it then assesses how the international environments characterizes the new trend of terrorism that necessitates international cooperation to cope with it.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A. Discussion of Current Settings of Terrorism

International terrorism is a relatively new phenomenon on the world stage, although the use of terror has been around since biblical times. And definition of terms relating to terrorism is constantly changing, depending on which side of the ideological divide they are viewed. Some older terms have been discarded and some new ones have become part of our language. However, there is no denying that international terrorism is inevitably conditioned by the existing international environment; and it is one of the byproducts from distortion of world politics. The new world order brought by the post Cold War situation, is also destined to entail substantial influences upon the resources and of current terrorism.

1. The End of Cold War Era

Since the end of World War II, international politics has been dominated by the political and military confrontation between the United States and Soviet Union. That competition, known generally as the Cold War, developed with the restructuring of the international system.

In the post World War II climate, the major concern was whether the two major powers could maintain the wartime collaboration. If they could, the United Nations Charter provided a vehicle for them to

organize peace around the principle of collective security (Chapter VII of the Charter). If the major powers could not maintain the war time collaboration or competition, the Charter allowed them to form a competitive alliance through Article 51, which provided for the individual and collective self-defense of the members.

What would not determine collaboration or competition was whether the two major powers could agree on a mutually acceptable world order that could be enforced. They could not. America's world of liberal democracies conflicted with Stalin's world of socialism and communism. The result was the Cold War international system, in which the competition between communism and anti-communism became the central international concern. It took several years for the collaboration to break down and for the competition to emerge. Collaboration was dead by 1947, though the hardened rules of Cold War competition were not firmly in place until June 1950, when North Korea invaded South Korea.

Under the Cold War international system, it was widely believed in Western society that the financial and psychological support by Eastern bloc countries was a major stimulant of the anti-American terrorist movements in the 1970s and 1980s. Libya, Syria, and Cuba, were the three countries most heavily linked to anti-western terrorism around the world. This Cold War view shows that terrorism has become an attractive strategy for the actors in international politics, preferable to conventional or nuclear warfare, which has become too risky and too expensive. Its use by hostile states gives terrorism the potential to alter the international balance of power.¹

The Cold War system now lies shattered. The most dramatic symbols of its end include the revolution of 1989 in Eastern Europe, the

destruction of Berlin Wall, and ultimately, the demise of the Soviet Union. Two major sets of dynamics came together to make the end of the Cold War inevitable: First, the East-West military paralysis that was caused largely by nuclear weapons; huge nuclear arsenals make nuclear war inconceivable not only between countries that possess them, but also because they can destroy societies worldwide. Any war between the superpowers has the potential of becoming nuclear war and so has to be avoided. It was precisely nuclear parity, the existence of nuclear weapons on both sides, that has preserved the peace. Nuclear paralysis, thereby, deters both nuclear and conventional military confrontations. On the other hand, military competition between the superpowers became expensive. Defense expenditures, many of which were devoted to East-West matters, consumed twenty five percent of the Soviet GNP in the late 1980s.² Mikhail Gorbachev and his associates reached the need to end the competition, particularly considering the troubled economical times in the Soviet Union.

Another major factor tied to the inevitable end of the Cold War was the economical revolution of the 1980s, a phenomenon with opposite pulls and effects. On one hand, the economies of the West experienced unprecedented growth and prosperity during this time; on the other hand, the economies of the countries of the Eastern Bloc specially in the Soviet Union, failed to expand during the 1980s. The reasons for the extraordinary growth in the West are complex, but three factors did play important roles: the high technology revolution; internationalization of economical activities; global privatization of the international economy.³

Soviet socialism was failing. The Stalinist command economy, which had been the envy of the world in the 1930s, was declining. In addition, the Soviets were excluded from the high technology revolution that might have stimulated their economy. The reason for their exclusion was that most of the technologies were "dual use," with both civilian and military threats, so the technologies were not shared with them. Thus, the Soviet economy and economies of Eastern European countries declined as the West grew. The gap became more obvious as the Western media penetrated the East. The Cold War ended because Gorbachev knew his country could not win the confrontation militarily, and because he realized the hollow competition had become ruinously expensive. In short, a military stalemate and economic necessity combined to produce the end of the Cold War, the political and military division of Europe, and the "enslaveement" of Eastern Europe.⁴

What are the post Cold War changes in the perspective of international terrorism? Russia becomes a more normal state within the international system. The first and most obvious change from this point of view were changes in foreign policy, especially toward the Third World. Before the rise of the new Russia, competing for influence with the United States in the Third World was an important part of Soviet policy— a means for promoting communism and reinforcing Soviet power worldwide without significantly raising the specter of military conflict between the super powers (state sponsorship of terrorism as a tool of foreign policy). New foreign policy renounced the Brezhnev doctrine, which asserted the right of the Soviet Union to intervene on behalf of beleaguered Socialist movements worldwide. It was replaced by the

which asserted the right of the Soviet Union to intervene on behalf of beleaguered Socialist movements worldwide. It was replaced by the assertion that the sovereignty right of nations should be honored without interference. One result was to reduce the competition between the East and West in Third World countries. Russia's motivation appeared to be twofold. On the one hand, the competition was usually costly and the benefits of it short-lived; on the other hand, East West competition in the Third World was just another irritant in overall relations in the face of a need to reduce tension in order to gain access to Western assistance.⁵

B. Regionalism

The new Security environment after the Cold War is currently fomenting a new trend of international terrorism, even though it is somewhat risky to attempt to isolate such characteristics, because the world is still undergoing transformation.

- The breakdown of the bipolar system and concomitant diffusion of political power has resulted in rivalry between regional states, especially in East Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East. Of particular concern is the ongoing rivalry between China and Taiwan, South Korea and North Korea, India and Pakistan, Iran and Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia, Israel and Syria. These have all flared up periodically in the past but they seem to have gained intensity in recent years as the inhibiting influence of the superpowers declined and regional power equations became more unsettled. Several countries would experience a fresh outbreak of fighting in the latter 1990s.

proliferation on the dynamics of conflict between regional rivals.

Nuclear, biological and chemical weapons capabilities are now possessed by numerous regional states, some of which have or are developing ballistic means of delivery. This could invite a preemptive strike by a rival. Such strikes have taken place before (1981 Israel's attack on Iraq's Ossirak reactor).

- The world is confronted with an assortment of prodemocracy and anti-colonial movements, which tend to erupt periodically in strikes or civil disorders(source of dissident terrorism)/ or provoke violence by the authorities(source of state or establishment terrorism). They include: popular drive for Western style electoral democracy and human rights, as have been working themselves out in Burma, China, Haiti, and the Philippines; struggles by disenfranchised minorities and majorities to abolish unrepresentative or discriminatory governments from Northern Ireland to the former South Africa; and efforts by subject people to cast off what is viewed as colonial rule in the West Bank and Gaza.

C. The Purpose of Thesis

This paper is to examine the difference of characteristics in the post-Cold War international environment from that of Cold War era. It will first examine the nature of terrorism and the background to the issue. Unfortunately, universally accepted definitions of terrorism do not exist for the reasons that we will examine later. It is analyzed in a wide perspective to help understand the implications in terms of roots and causes; political and working level implications; academic freezing of its characteristics; and other sociological background including its

relationship with media.

Also analyzed in Chapter III, are the new international environment and its source of terrorism. In this Chapter, I will first briefly touch on the new shifting political landscape in the post Cold War situation, and then introduce six forces that destabilize the world's security. The forces are: the pull of economic forces; the global diffusion of power; increased popular assertiveness at grass-roots level; the diminishing power and authority of nation-state; the rise of the "weapon" with new capability, and population growth and environmental decline.

This work then looks into the characteristics of post Cold War terrorism in Chapter IV: it assesses how a new international environment produced by the break-down of the bipolar system and concomitant diffusion of political power, has given the impetus and characterized the new trend of terrorism. First, it analyzes the elements which qualify international or transnational terrorism and the mechanism of contemporary state support terrorism, then proceeds to elaborate the process of changes from polarized manipulation of terrorism by two superpowers as an instrument of foreign policy to joint anti-terrorist efforts in global scale cooperating and sharing responsibility.

Second, it looks into the characteristics of current dissident terrorism that are categorized into nationalist and revolutionist terrorism. It covers the world decomposing empire and superstates (dissolution of Soviet Russia) as model cases of nationalist terrorism (ethno-nationalism in war), and makes a case study in Bosnian affairs. Though the appeal of Soviet-style communism has largely dissipated, revolutionary and millenarian movements continue to hold an attraction

for dispossessed people. As regards revolutionist terrorism, this paper discusses two main types of revolutionary crusade at present: ideological or political movements attempting to end exploitation of the poor by the rich; and religious fundamentalism, a drive to subject all social interaction to religious law and practice.

Third, since the use of terrorist violence and repression by states against their own citizens is a common phenomenon, even in post Cold War era, establishment(state) terrorism is covered in some depth: in terms of the relationship of state to society; characteristics of state terrorism; and conditions associated with the emergence of terrorism. And, a case study is made of "Iraqi State Terrorism to the Kurdish Minority."

Terrorism can be reduced but not eradicated, because however democratic a society, however near to perfection the social institution, there will be always alienated and disaffected people, some of whom will be aggressive and more interested in violence than in freedom and tolerance (the source of terrorism). The reaction to the terrorist, therefore, could not be ignored because fortunes of terrorism depend largely on the response it encounters both from the public and the authorities. In the post Cold War era, there exists no distinctive leader in world community. This situation inevitably requires international cooperation among responsible nations to cope with terrorism through world organization. This will be briefly touched on in the conclusion.

C. Literature

Since 1945, political violence literature, including terrorism, has evolved seemingly to keep pace with events, and has grown enormously during the last two decades. The problem with literature about terrorism is how accurate is the literature of the secret struggle and how much of it can we believe? The problem is compounded by an actual disinformation game being played on the reader in many instances by various secret agencies and legislatures around the world. In the past, the literature appearing in the media of communist and certain leftist countries has been so filled with ideology, propaganda, and inaccuracy that it remains virtually impossible to unravel the truth from the lie.

In the United States, the literature has fluctuated according to time and purpose. The most accurate journal, the CIA's quarterly *Studies In Intelligence*, is classified and not available to the public. The other, *Covert Action Information Bulletin*, while not classified, is extremely difficult to obtain by the layperson.⁶

Professor Harry Howe Ransome in his article "Strategic Intelligence and Foreign Policy" suggests that literature about international political violence may be classified in three different ways: First, there is the "memoir," a publication by former members of the secret war establishment. Next there is the "muckraking" product, a whistle blowing expose which can often provide certain insight but usually fails the standard test of serious scholarship. Finally, there is the "objective analysis" a scholarly work prepared by a professional specialist in history or another social science, which examine "How the system works in specific historical contexts."

Myron J. Smith Jr., the author of *The Secret Wars: A Guide to Sources in English* advises as a rule of thumb that secret war literature must be treated with a certain skepticism, adopt the code of the "investigative" journalist, and accept no fact that cannot be verified in at least two or three overt sources.⁷ This is understandable; if everyone knew what is going on and truthfully reported it, the secret political violence would not be secret.

As noted earlier, the literature on terrorism has grown enormously in the last two decades. Of the existing bibliographies and guide books the most recent and comprehensive is Alex P. Schmid, *Political Terrorism* (Amsterdam, 1983; New Brunswick, 1986). The following should also be mentioned: Augustus R. Norton and Martin H. Greenberg, *International Terrorism: An Annotated Bibliography and Research Guide* (Boulder, Colorado, 1980); and Edward Mickolus, *The literature of Terrorism* (Westport, Conn., 1980). Another useful handbook is Peter Janke, *Guerrilla and Terrorist Organization* (New York, 1983). Also L. Bonanate, *La Violenza Politica nel mondo contemporaneo* (Milan, 1979; M.J. Smith Jr. *The Secret Wars, vol, III: Terrorism 1960-1980* (Santabarbara, 1980). Unfortunately there is no truly international guide in this respect. The *Quarterly Terrorism* has published over the years many articles, documents and reports on conferences. Documents concerning the history of terrorism can be found in the *Terrorism Reader* (New York, 1978: new revised edn 1987), edited by the present writer.⁸

The books I have referred to, other than those listed in reparation of this work, are attached in a separate bibliography.

¹ Crenshaw, Martha. 1989,10, *Terrorism and International Cooperation*, New York: Institute for East-West Security Studies.

² Snow,Donald M. 1992,6, *Distant Thunder: Third World Conflict and New International Order*, New York: St. Martin's Press.

³ Snow, 7.

⁴ Snow, 8-9.

⁵ Snow,10-13

⁶ Smith, Myron J. Jr. 1980, 15-18, *The Secret War: A guide to Sources in English. Volume 1*, Santa Barbara, Ca.: Center for the Study of Armament and Disarmament, U.C.L.A.

⁷ Smith Jr.,20.

⁸ Laqueur, Walter,1987,323-24, *Age of Terrorism*, Toranto & Boston: Little, Brown and Company.

CHAPTER II

THE ANALYSIS OF TERRORISM

A. Complexity of Defining of Terrorism

The Term "Terrorism" and "terrorist," are of a relatively recent date: the meaning of terrorism was given in the 1798 supplement of the *Dictionnaire* of the academic Française as '*system regime de la terreur.*' 'Terror' originally referred to a period characterized by political execution, as during the French Revolution from May 1793 to July 1794. All together at least 300.000 people were arrested during the Reign of Terror and 17,000 were officially tried and executed, while many died in prison or without a trial.

The distinctive phenomena of our time, labeled as "terrorism," and "political violence" are steadily magnifying their intensity in recent years. Yet there is no universally or even generally accepted conception ² of what entails "terrorism" and "terrorist activities" where "political violence" by individuals and groups, or a sovereign states against its people, or one state or international entity against another, begins and ends. The author of a recent research guide to the concepts, Theory and Literature on Political Terrorism has collected 109

different definitions provided by various writers between 1936 and 1981. There is every reason to assume that there have been more since.²

Most authors agree that terrorism is the use or the threat of the use of violence, a method of combat, or strategy to achieve a certain targets that it aims to induce a state of fear in the victims, that it is ruthless and does not conform with humanitarian rules, and that publicity is an essential factor in the terrorist strategy. However, beyond these points definitions diverge, since high political stakes inevitably mean that many definitions are formulated to serve particular political agenda.

Former Senator Jeremiah Denton, in his introduction to the Anti-Terrorist Act of 1984, provides an example of the Western type definition:

Terrorism means the knowing use of force or violence against any person or property in violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any state, territory, possession, or district, with the intent to intimidate, coerce, or influence a government or person in furtherance of any political or ideological objective.³

Some nonaligned nations, with the following definition, clearly seek to reclassify in favor of liberation movements, the form of coercion considered "terrorist." Terrorism for them, consists of :

Acts of violence and other repressive acts by colonial, racist, ... and alien regimes against people struggling for their liberation .. tolerating or assisting by a state or organization.⁴

B. Working Definition

² These statistics come from *InTer 85: A Review of International Terrorism in 1985*, and similarly for 1986 and 1987, published by the *Jerusalem Post* and Jaffee Center for Strategy of Tel Aviv University.

All specific definitions of terrorism have their shortcomings simply because reality is always richer or more complicated than any generalization. Unlike some chemical elements, there is no such a thing as pure, unalloyed, unchanging terrorism, but there are many forms of terrorism.

Even though a comprehensive, generally accepted definition of terrorism does not exist and is unlikely to come into existence, a working definition is certainly not beyond our reach: in any case, political decision makers will not wait for a consensus to emerge among political scientists before they take the measures they deem necessary to combat terrorism. Physicians use many drugs, even though their exact physiological effects remain a mystery. What applies to medicine should be acceptable in the study of terrorism.

According to the definition of a US task force in the 1960s," terrorists engage in a "certain type of criminal activity."

Subsequent definitions by various branches of US Government were slightly more cautious, but they all mention the "specific use of force" (Department of Defense, States and Justice, and the FBI). This is certainly true inasmuch as terrorism violates both international and domestic laws. The application of the lethal norm is of little help in establishing the political character of a terrorist movement; plotters against Hitler also tried to use forces unlawfully, and the same is true of the rebels in Afghanistan and many other such groups. A 1983 Depart-

* See U.S. National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice, Standard, and Goals, *Report of Task Force on Disorder and Terrorism* (Washington DC., 1976). Also see FBI Terrorist Research and Analyst Center, *Terrorism in the United States: 1990* (Washington DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 1991).

ment of Defense definition emphasizes the use of force or violence by a "revolutionary organization," and the State Department mentioned in 1984 "Noncombatant targets." Both were controversial statements. The vice-president's Task Force on combating terrorism (Bush Committee, 1986) used a definition that is the mixture of those previously used by other government departments. It reads as follows: "unlawful use or threat of violence against persons or property to further political or social objectives. It is usually intended to intimidate or coerce a government, individuals, or groups, or to modify their behavior or politics."⁵ 'Terrorism,' of course, is in contravention of the laws of the land and of international law, but application of legal norms presents certain difficulties, legitimate resistance (legitimate according to natural law) against tyrants is also criminal if seen in this light.

Unlike some chemical elements, there is no such a thing as pure, unalloyed, unchanging terrorism, but there are many forms of terrorism. In some circumstances, a case can be made for broader and, of necessity, vague definitions, such as the one that appears in British Prevention of Terrorist Act of 1974. This Act states that, for the purpose of legislation, terrorism is the "use of violence for political ends, and includes any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear." For instance, mass violence in the form of a riot, violent demonstrations, street battles or civil war.

A working definition of terrorism also has to be examined in the global level of perspective. Although the international community appears to recognize the need for cooperation against terrorism, national interests have dominated the treatment of the issue and unanimity has

been rhetorical rather than practical. The issue of opposition terrorism appeared on the international agenda of the post-World War II-world only in 1972, as a result of the attack by the Black September organization on Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympic Games. An American initiative (The Draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of International Terrorism) was rejected. Subsequent efforts to draw up a treaty to submit to the General Assembly foundered on the issue of defining terrorism, which split Third World and Western states. Their differences centered on the issues of whether terrorism can be considered in isolation from the causes, which the Third World conceived to be racism and colonialism. The Third World insisted that state "terrorism" or oppression was the real priority.

However, as oppositional terrorism came to threaten more and more states; a body of international laws developed in a specific and limited area. Its approach was not to make "terrorism" a crime, given the imprecision and ambiguity of the term, but to outlaw the specific actions that are the components of terrorist strategies, such as hijackings or attacks on diplomatic agents. In 1973, the Convention on Prevention and Punishment of crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, including diplomatic agents urged international coordination to prevent attacks on diplomats. In 1979, the General Assembly adopted international convention on Prevention Against Taking of Hostage. Finally, in December 1985, the General Assembly passed a resolution condemning terrorism regardless of occasion or cause.

Since Gorbachev's accession to power, the former Soviet Union has expressed a new and specific interest in reducing international terror-

ism. In his speech to the 27th Congress of the CPSU in 1987, Gorbachev proposed that the development of effective ways of combating international terrorism be made part of a comprehensive international system. These changes seemed more than rhetorical. Soviet policy toward the Third World and national liberation movements appears to be undergoing parallel revisions, although the meaning of these changes in thinking and behavior is a source of dispute among Western analysts. The agreement on human rights reached by the conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in January 1989 is proof of the then Soviet and East European interest in cooperating with the West against terrorism. The agreement, signed by the United States, Canada, the Soviet Union and All European nations except Albania, contains a provision condemning terrorism as unjustifiable under any circumstances.

Implementation of the convention has been inconsistent; however, John F. Murphy, expressing a general consensus among American International law specialists, concludes: "The effectiveness of these global conventions as anti-terrorist measure is questionable. Even if fully implemented, limited and piecemeal solutions of these conventions would be of little use in combating the many manifestations of terrorism." ⁶

In short, the problem of terrorism is complicated, and what can be said without fear of contradiction about a terrorist group in one country is by no means true for other groups at other times and other societies. Different countries have different notions about the legitimacy of terrorism, which became manifest in various working definitions of terrorism. All these working definitions are of little consequence to academic attempts of the conception.

C. Isolating Characteristics of Terrorism.

In defining the concept of terrorism for the purpose of analysis it is critical to isolate terrorism from specific political goals; that is, all nationalists, revolutionists or far right extremists are not terrorist. No particular ideology or religion is responsible for terrorism. Terrorism as a mean is logically separable from the ends it purportedly serves. This approach has been necessary to the formation of international law on the subject, which has focused on the component parts of terrorism, such as hijacking or diplomatic kidnapping, in order to treat them as crimes as indicated above.

If one accepts that terrorism is a specific and identifiable type of political violence, then its attributes must be listed:

First, it is an organized and purposeful activity, not a spontaneous reaction to circumstances.

Second, terrorism involves violence perceived as unacceptable by society because of its cruelty and unexpectedness. The form of violence itself may be horrifying, such as mid-air explosions of airliners or kidnapping.

Third, terrorism usually occurs in situations of peace rather than war, and comes as a surprise to its victims. A particularly salient characteristic of this form of violence is the usual innocence of its victims, who are noncombatants, not prepared to defend themselves against attack, and only in the most tenuous way, responsible for the action of the government that terrorists oppose. The victims of terrorism are often those who bear the least offensive intention toward the terrorists — airline passengers, journalists, diplomats, educators, business executives and other civilians. Random assaults on civilian

populations are not a new form of terrorism; the anarchists and Irish nationalists of the nineteenth century threw bombs into crowded restaurants or concealed them in subway or train stations. Modern terrorists are more likely to choose this tactic rather than the traditional reliance on assassination of heads of state, prominent officials who are now well protected. Terrorists prefer easy targets. Yet the technical destructiveness of modern terrorism — the capacity of exploding bombs of sufficient force to kill hundreds of people — appears to coincide with a lessening of moral inhibitions about the use of violence. This erosion of inhibition may be due in part to the action of states whose brutalities against their own citizens in peace time and the use of strategic bombing of cities in war time set an example of disregard for innocent lives. Yet somehow, the psychological effects of oppositional terrorism are more shocking to world sensibility.

Fourth, Terrorism is also distinguished by secrecy. Its perpetrators are anonymous, their identities deliberately concealed behind facades of ordinariness or actual masks. Their violence is unexpected and frightening not only because it violates conventional expectations of behavior, but because their preparations are clandestine. Terrorists are not easily recognizable as enemies. Thus terrorists can be considered a form of deception.

Fifth, Terrorism is often referred to as the weapon of the weak, since it is frequently the resort of small ideological groups that lack a mass base. It is often a substitute for the mobilization of large numbers of supporters. However, terrorist tactics can accompany large-scale national movements. The Algerian FLN was responsible for the 1956-1957 campaign of bombing of European civilians in Algiers, which together

with the severely repressive French response constituted the "Battle of Algiers."

In turn, elements from the French military And the settled population of Algeria formed the terrorist Secret Army Organization to stop the movement toward independence. ⁷

D. Distinguishing from similar political violences

A frequent source of confusion is the lack of precision in terminology. The following example should suffice. When reporting the bomb attacks at Rome and Vienna airports on December 28, 1985 by the members of the Abu Nidal group, the London *Financial Times* used on its title page the term "terrorist" and "gunmen," whereas on the second page reference was made to "guerrillas." Terrorism is often confused with guerrilla warfare, since both activities involve low level violence (in terms of physical destructiveness) by weaker parties in conflicts. Both are convenient methods for challenging the power of the state. The rise of the concept of "urban guerrilla warfare" in Latin America in the 1960s further confuses the issue. Difficulties in distinguishing between the two are naturally compounded when Third World nationalist or revolutionary movements, with claims to substantial popular support or control of territory, use methods that are essentially terrorist. There is a tendency to type all users of terrorism as "terrorist organizations," as, for example, in the Israeli attitude toward the PLO. However, such a label seems to be a misnomer when applied to groups that do not rely exclusively on terrorism, for which in effect terrorism may be a quite peripheral tactic.

Another confusing problem is that in civil conflicts, the distinction between combatants and noncombatants is blurred. Attempts to define terrorism are in many ways' efforts to uphold that distinction. If terrorism is to be regarded as unacceptable violence, the rules for what is acceptable violence must be established. Guerrilla warfare is conventionally thought of as violence against military targets, primarily for military effect, although it necessarily avoids prolonged engagements with a more powerful government force. Its primary objectives are to seize territory and control populations, neither of which is a primary goal of terrorism. ⁸

E. Typology of Terrorism by Perpetrator

Terrorism, as it has been emphasized, is a coercive tactic that may be used for a variety of purposes by any side in a political contest. Dissidents who cannot make their voices heard in the political arena and regimes who cannot impose their will with the available formal instrument of rule may indeed succumb to the terrorist temptation. A more effective understanding of the significance of terrorist tactics must be sensitive to wider context within which terrorist events occur and how they might be integrated into broader political strategies. We must neither ignore how the norms that encourage radical politics relate to the wider political culture nor underestimate the utility of terrorism to regimes.

By keeping these points in mind, we may better grasp the diversity of political elements who use terrorist tactics. For the purpose of classification, we may develop two more broadly construed forms of terrorism -- dissident and establishment. After examining the varieties of

dissident and establishment terrorism, we are better able to make sense of the popular, crosscutting categories of "international" and "state-sponsored" terrorism.⁹

1. Dissident Terrorism

Dissident groups deviate from, and perhaps attack, the dominant system of power and values in a community. No community is blessed with complete consensus, but in most political communities certain values will be dominant and these will reinforce, by and large, a particular distribution of power. Those who believe themselves deprived under such a distribution, either because it discriminates against their values or power is insufficient to accomplish their aspiration, will come into conflict with this dominant order.

Dissident groups may be distinguished and compared according to the comprehensiveness and coherence of their political objective -- what we might term their ideological agenda. Such a comparison among types of dissident movements that may use terrorism is as follows:¹⁰

a. Criminal Terrorism

Criminal groups lack coherent ideological programs and usually simply pursue their own enrichment, but they do attend to the operation of the state, especially when it comes to protecting their activities. One disturbing instance of this form of criminal violence is what has come to be called "narcoterrorism," especially as it afflicts the South American country of Colombia. Narcoterrorism on the scale practiced in Colombia was not a "non-political" event -- the very independence of Colombian institution is at stake.¹¹

b. Nihilist Terrorism

Nihilists possess some systematic political agenda but it is essentially negative, the destruction of the existing order. They devote little if any thought to what follows destruction, beyond some vague anticipation that a new and better order will spontaneously arise once the structures of the old regime have been dismantled. The ideologue often taken to represent the nihilist agenda is the nineteenth century Russian anarchist Serge Nechayev. Contemporary examples of undulated nihilism are hard to come by, for most of the potential candidates still cling to some shred of a positive ideology, whether these involve a vague promise of national liberation or social transformation. Despite such ambiguities, some commentators see a rise in the role of nihilist terrorism over the past 15 years. Robert Kupperman and Darnel Trent, for example, contrast the political ideals of nineteenth-century radicals with those they see underlying contemporary terrorism. Commonly offered examples of the trend to nihilism include the Baader-Meinhoff Gang (or Red Army Faction), particularly active in Germany during the 1970s, the Japanese United Red Army, responsible for the death of two dozen victims gunned down at the Tel Aviv airport in 1972, and the Abu Nidal Faction among the Palestinians.¹²

c. National Terrorism

A more direct challenge to the state is raised by those dissidents who successfully appeal to the discontents of a significant segment of the population under these circumstances, a carefully structured campaign of violence, including terrorist tactics, may help to solidify this potential base of support.

We often speak too easily of the nation-state, entertaining the fiction of a coincidence between the political structure (the state) and a homogeneous cultural community (the nation). In fact, multi-national states, like the Soviet Union, India, or Canada, are common. Some multi-state nations, such as the former Germany and Korea, also exist. Even in those states fortunate enough to possess a widely shared national identity, communally based political organizations still exert a powerful appeal.

Commonly, particularistic communal ideologies advance the claims of ethno-cultural groups against the dominant order in the state, although in some specially nasty conflicts, racial differences reinforce ethnic and cultural divisions. These dissidents do not advocate simple destruction; rather, they pursue the protection of the integrity and interest of the groups whom they claim to represent. Typically, they demand greater autonomy and self-determination, ideas, though vague, which serve as powerful inducements for political mobilization. Important examples of communal groups that have resorted to terrorism in the past decade include:

1) *The Basque Separatist Movement*: The Basque people, concentrated in Northwest corner of Spain, have a centuries-old tradition of relative autonomy from Madrid.

2) *The Sikh Separatist Movement*: The Sikhs are essentially a religiously based cultural group concentrated in the Punjab state in northern India.

3) *The Irish Republican Army*: one of more resilient political movements of the twentieth century, the IRA has waged an intermittent campaign against British rule and Protestant dominance in Northern Ireland for more than 65 years.

4) *The Palestine Liberation Movement*: of all the nationalist or communal groups resorting to violence, the one most readily associated with terrorism are various groups claiming to fight for a Palestinian homeland.¹³

These four examples are among the more prominent of the communal groups indulging in terrorism, others include the Corsican nationalists who attack representatives of the French central government, and the Tamir separatists in Sri Lanka, who are demanding their own autonomous state on the northern part of the island.

d. Revolutionary Terrorism

Finally, dissident groups may advocate a program of social transformation that transcends the particularistic concern of any substate group. The aim is not to secede and alter it. In some cases, the revolutionary vision transcends the boundaries of any one state to encompass a larger, perhaps global, community. The original Marxist revolutionary idea certainly possessed such ambitions. The comprehensiveness of ideological principle is a matter of degree, and most contemporary examples of revolutionary dissent fail considerably short of universal appeal (communist revolution China and Vietnam largely succeeded because of their recognition and cooperation of nationalist aspiration).

Perhaps the most potent contemporary case of mixed appeal is that of Islamic fundamentalism, combining a rejection of the corrupting influence of Western culture with the desire to create a just order based on the social ethic embodied in the Koran.¹⁴

2. Establishment Terrorism

Coercion is an instrument of power used not only by those who rebel, but also by those who rule. The definition of "acceptable" coercion in any stable political community will be based in favor of these who

use it to defend the established distribution of power and value, usually some limits will be placed who can use it and to what degree it can be used. Acts of coercion in violation of these limits but intended to defend from some type of threat or subversion may be termed *Established (or state) Violence*.

Establishment terrorism may be a tactic of repression used by both a regime and by private citizens acting to emulate some perceived threat to the established order. Somewhat analogous to our preceding effort to differentiate among dissident groups who use terrorism according to their ideological coherence, we may distinguish among different forms of establishment terrorism according to the degree these tactics are integrated into the regular operation of the regime; the institutionalization of terrorist tactics transforms establishment terrorism from a form of "violence" into "force." ¹⁵

a. Vigilante Terrorism

Vigilantism may be defined as a form of establishment violence perpetrated by private citizens (including "off-duty" public officials). Like other forms of establishment coercion, "vigilantics" are intended to defend and preserve the established order, not destroy it. The familiar forms of vigilantism, displayed throughout American history and popular in the media, commonly involve private citizens stepping in and attempting to close the gap of inadequate law enforcement, but often some members of the establishment may see a threat emerging from groups who violate no law but who represent a different racial, cultural, or political identity. Vigilante violence against racial, cultural, or political groups poses perhaps the greatest likelihood of degeneration

into a type of terrorism. Although "crime control" vigilantism may degenerate into indiscriminate violence against the most unlikely of suspects, "social group control" vigilantism starts off by targeting those who cannot even be loosely described as combatants.¹⁶

For an example of this sort, in the rioting that took place after the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in October 1984, over 1,500 Sikhs across India were murdered, and thousand of others were beaten and their property destroyed.

b. Covert Official Terrorism

Vigilante terrorism consists of private citizens using indiscriminate violence against a perceived threat to the established order; however, the distinction between "private" and "public" is not clear-cut. People perform both private and public roles, and these are not always neatly compartmentalized. One of the better known campaigns of covert official terrorism was that inflicted on Argentina between 1976 and 1979. Many of the details have been revealed through the efforts of the civilian regime of President Alfonsin, in their efforts to combat a real threat from left-wing guerrillas, the military rulers unleashed "dirty war" against a wide range of suspects. During this period at least 7,000 people disappeared, including children and expectant mothers. The war was conducted by decentralized and secretive military commands in order to make it difficult to establish clear lines of authority and to make it difficult to trace the fate of those taken from their homes in the middle of night.¹⁷

Those who survived reported that their captors disguised their identities. The military, then, did not deny it was engaged in a major struggle against enemies of the regime, real or imaged, but the top leaders denied particular knowledge of the conduct of the campaign and deliberately obscured their responsibility.

c. Overt Regime Terrorism

Some regimes become sufficiently brazen about their terrorist tactics that they embrace them openly as a major enforcement strategy of their rule. No longer is it a matter of tolerating vigilante terrorism, the blurring of the boundary between private and public enforcement roles, or even the deliberate implementation of a covert program of terrorism. In all of these cases, at least some recognition survives that establishment terrorism violates the formal rules and norms defining the acceptable use of coercion. Consequently, these types of establishment terrorism can still be arguably labeled as violence. We can find representative cases of official terrorism of this sort in Stalin, Hitler, and Pol Pot. Stalin's domination over the Soviet Union from about 1928 to his death in 1953, provides a wide range of regime terrorism. Perhaps the clearest case of terrorism as official policy is not the campaign against the peasants who resisted collectivization, but the purge of the regime itself in the late 1930s. Old Bolsheviks, current party and government leaders, regular party members, and military officers all fell victims to his purge. ¹⁸

d. Genocide

The ultimate extension of establishment terrorism carries the institutionalization of this tactic to an extreme conclusion. Whatever we

might say about the efforts of Stalin to consolidate his power and eliminate any conceivable challenger, the terrorist policy still had some limits. Stalin was not intending to liquidate the entire structure of party and government. With genocide, in contrast, such tacit limits are absent: A particular group is identified as undesirable for one reason or another and then simply eliminated. A policy such as this generally demands the mobilization of considerable energies and organization. Genocide, admittedly, is a term fraught even more layers of emotion and ambiguity than the general concept of terrorism.

Ierving Louis Horowitz suggests that a structural characterization of genocide should include two points:

First, genocide represents a systematic effort over time to liquidate a national population, usually a minority; Second, it functions as a fundamental political policy to Ensure the conformity and participation by the citizenry.¹⁹

The clearest case of twentieth century genocide, in terms of the coherent identity of the population affected and the institutionalized nature of the means of destruction, remains the Nazi Holocaust against the European Jew. The Nazi program came horribly close to achieving complete success. The Nazis, then, legalized, rationalized a policy of terrorist extermination as a "final solution" to a population they defined as surplus, subhuman, and expendable.²⁰

F. Roots, Justification, and Source of Terrorism

1. Roots and Justification

Of our subject matters under consideration, we find their "root" in the nature and innate character of person.²¹ * In justifying activities stemming from these "roots" and/ or in identifying such activities, being stimulated or influenced by some factors external to minds of men, some of us put forth what might be regarded as relevant ideological, religions, educational, moral, and other bases, or find media as an extremely important factor to be delved into.

More specifically, in the Communist ideology, for Marx the issue was not whether violence was right or wrong, but rather whether it was effective or useless "for proletariat revolution in the capitalist society," according to John Dinse.²² As a matter of fact, he continues, Marx "often condemns violence, especially terrorism as ineffective" because it was out of step with historic process. Given the historic framework of Marx's thought, Marx's basic conclusion on violence is that it should be truly revolutionary. Violence is not efficacious unless it takes place in the context developed material conditions. He was unequivocally critical of terrorism on the grounds that it was out of step with the larger, impersonal historic process of revolution.

At the same time, Marx was not opposed to violence in principle. He foresaw it as a necessary ingredient in the complex evolution of events culminating in socialist revolution. The mobilization of class conscious

* Eric Fromm posit two particular character traits strongly associated with malignant sadism and necrophilia. Sadism embodies passion to have absolute and unrestricted control over a living being. Necrophilia generally denote the erotic attention to the dead, decayed, putrid, sickly; it is the passion to transform that which is alive into something unalives. Stalin and Hitler may well be ultimate expression, but Fromm suggests that these traits are shared, though not be same degree. Far more people possess some capacity for cruel and destructive behavior.

proletariat under the condition of advanced capitalism probably would produce an irresistible political force capable of achieving revolutionary change with a minimum of violence.

In terms of modern day increases in violence, John Cantelon sheds some meaningful light on its "roots" within the educational and religious perspectives, and the lessons to be learned from the modern day educational and religious lives that serve to engender or justify such destructive activities of person. In contradiction to the expectations of our liberal heritage, there has been an acceleration in violence in our modern age. This is contrary to the assumption of continued social progress; and universal education and enlightened religion were to cause a decrease in human violence and increase in human cooperation. A compilation of the number of battles fought over the last five centuries is enough to contradict that hypothesis:

1. 15th century -- 9 battles
2. 16th century -- 87 battles
3. 17th century -- 239 battles
4. 18th century -- 781 battles
5. 19th century -- 651 battles; and
6. 20th century (so far) -- 892 battles ²³.

The three major interrelated religions, Judaism, Christianity, Islam, all coming out of the same cultural background, also share not only a common fratricidal history which J. Toynbee blamed on their exclusiveness claim that each had bad truth but also common concept of religion being based upon a covenant.²⁴ In the contemporary scene funda-

mentalist elements arising to ascendancy within the religious groups, use the primitive covenant motif to justify their particular forms of violence.

Furthermore, John Cantelon goes on delve into the attitudes and responses of the so-called moral majority of any given society towards the terrorist activities in recent years.²⁵ To the extent, in addition to general ideological, religious, educational, moral and other factors serving as roots of terrorism, the "three key components are contained within the left terrorist ideology," according to John Dinse: First is the assessment of conditions confronting the group or movement, with emphasis upon the relative strength and weakness of the revolutionary forces *vis-à-vis* the ruling class.

Secondly, tactics follow from the previous assessment. This dimension focuses on the organization and action needed in order to bring about a revolutionary cataclysm. Finally, although often undeveloped, there is usually some sort of post revolutionary vision or program which projects outlines of a future "just" society. Inevitably, the strategy as a whole stresses capturing or destroying the governmental power and economical control of the bourgeoisie with the primary use of abolishing existing structure of social privilege.²⁶

2. Contemporary Sources of Terrorism

There will be no shortage of potential causes for terrorism: rising population; increased poverty and scarcity of resources; racial tension; inflation and unemployment; increased tension between the "haves" and "have nots"; waves of refugees shoved about by war and repression; immigrants moving from poor states to wealthier ones, often bringing with

them the conflicts of their home countries, sometimes causing resentment among native citizens; rapid urbanization; the disintegration of traditional authority structures; the emergence of single issue groups; the rise of aggressive fundamentalist religious groups or religious cult. Yet there is no demonstrable connection between poverty, scarcity, inflation or any other socioeconomic indicators and terrorism. Indeed, countries experiencing the highest level of terrorism are often among the economically and socially most advanced nations in their regions or in the world, and often the least authoritarian. ²⁷

Contemporary terrorism seems to come with modern society. Traditional authority structures have collapsed with ensuing violence throughout the history and the present time is no exception.

Ideology and ethnic nationalism have been two major engines of modern terrorism. ideology drove the urban guerrillas in Latin America and their terrorist imitators in Western Europe and the USA. Most of these groups adhered to some variation of Marxism. Dreams of independent homelands have inspired groups from the IRA to Armenians, and more recently religious fanaticism, although directed toward secular ends, and secret wars waged by states have accounted for growing share of the world's terrorist violence. ²⁸

3. Media

All the forgoing factors notwithstanding, "terrorism" and "political violence" are further influenced by media. One of the most noticeable developments in recent years has been the increasingly skillful use of publicity by terrorist organizations. The media are of paramount importance in their campaigns; the terrorist act by itself is

next to nothing, whereas publicity is all. The real danger of facing the terrorist is that of being ignored, receiving insufficient publicity, losing the image of the desperate freedom fighter. But the media, constantly in need of diversity and new angles, make fickle friends. Terrorists will always have to innovate. They are, in some respects, the superentertainers. With the growth of inexpensive video equipment, these groups are very often able to provide news organizations with television -- ready footage: messages from terrorist leaders, interviews with captives, and even visual records of execution. The PLO owns a share in an Arab communication satellite. The western media is vulnerable to misuse by international terrorists; the fact that terrorism by definition tends to be dramatic and pictorial through the terrorist acts which take place, make the media vulnerable.

Again, it is not the magnitude of the terrorist operation that counts but to whole campaigns. The media have always magnified terrorist exploits quite irrespective of their intrinsic importance. Groups numbering perhaps a dozen members have been described as armies, their official communiqués have been discussed in countless television shows, radio broadcasts, articles and editorials. Even an apparently illogical or senseless attack becomes more effective if given wide coverage in the media than an operation against a seemingly obvious target that is ignored. These strategies work only in societies that have no censorship.²⁹

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- ¹ *Dictionnaire, Supplement*, 1978, 775 (Paris, an VII).
- ² Schmid, Alex P., 1983' 119-58, *Political Terrorism*, Amsterdam.
- ³ Quoted in Sederberg Peter C. 1989, 23-24, *Terrorist: Myths*, Englewood, NJ: Prentice Hall.
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- ⁷ Crenshaw, Martha, 1989, 144-45, *Terrorism and International Cooperation*, New York: Institute for East West Security Studies.
- ⁸ Ibid.
- ⁹ Sederberg, 48.
- ¹⁰ Ibid., 49-50.
- ¹¹ Ibid., 50
- ¹² Ibid., 52-53
- ¹³ Ibid., 51
- ¹⁴ Ibid., 56-58
- ¹⁵ Ibid., 59-60
- ¹⁶ Ibid., 60-62
- ¹⁷ Ibid., 62-63
- ¹⁸ Ibid., 64-65
- ¹⁹ Rubenstein, Richard E., 1987, 197-98, *Alchemists of Revolution: Terrorism in the modern World*, New York: Basic Books.
- ²⁰ Sederberg, 66.
- ²¹ Fromm, Eric, 1973, 288-289/321-332/396-404, *Anatomy of Human Destructiveness*, New York: Holt, Reinhart & Winston.
- ²² Dinse, John, 1984, 59-64, *The Role of Violence in Marx's Theory of Revolution* in Han, H. H. *Terrorism, Political Violence and World Order*.
- ²³ Cantelon, John, 65, *Violence: Educational and religious Perspective* in Han. H. H.
- ²⁴ Ibid., 69-71.
- ²⁵ Cantelon, John, 73-78, *Terrorism and moral majority* in Han H. H.
- ²⁶ Dinse, John, 79-85, *Ideological Orientation of Contemporary Left Terrorism* in Han. H. H.
- ²⁷ Thackrah, John Richard, 258-259, *Encyclopedia of Terrorism and Political Violence*, London and New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- ²⁸ Jenkin, Brian, 1988, 249-250, *Future trend in international Terrorism* in Slatore Robert O. and Michael Stohl eds. *International Terrorism Current Perspective on International Terrorism*, New York: St. Martin's Press.
- ²⁹ Laqueur, W., 121-127, *Age of terrorism*, Boston, Toronto: Little, Brown and Company.

CHAPTER III

The New International Environment and Its Source of Terrorism

The characteristics of the current terrorism have been deeply rooted in the new environment after Cold-War period. Therefore, it requires us to look into the ingredients in the current situation which is fomenting a new trend of international terrorism.

For forty five years, from World War II's finish to the end of the Cold War, most agree that the greatest threat to global security was an all-out war between the two superpowers that could perhaps culminate in the use of nuclear weapons. In fear of this, government officials and concerned citizens sought to diminish the risk of nuclear conflict through intensive diplomacy, improved crisis management, arms control, and cultural and other exchanges. Because of these efforts and the reforms that former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev set in motion in 1985, the risk of a superpower conflict has largely vanished, and the world no longer dreads a nuclear conflagration.

The post Cold War era, however, is by no means free of the threat of armed conflict, as demonstrated by continuing warfare in areas as diverse as Afghanistan, Angola, Burma, Indonesia, Liberia, Peru, Somalia, Sri Lanka, the Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan), and the former Yugoslavia. While those conflicts do not have the potential to erupt into a nuclear holocaust, they do pose a threat of wide soared regional fighting with fearsome death tolls and destruction. Moreover, as weapons

of mass destruction become more widely diffused, A growing number of those original wars will entail a risk of chemical and even nuclear attack. Preventing, controlling, and resolving these conflicts, and impeding the spread of advanced weaponry will, therefore, constitute the principal world security tasks of the 1990s and beyond.

A. The Shifting political Landscape

A metaphor popular among analysts thinking about the current reshaping of the world is that of "tectonic motion," or the movement of the giant "plates" that make up the earth's rocky crust. Because this movement can shape continents and alter climates through earthquakes and volcanoes it produces, tectonic motion serves as an apt analogy for the end of the Cold War and other dramatic changes now occurring throughout the world. ¹

The geographical metaphor conveys the scale of the changes now under way around the globe and illustrates how surface events are the product of deeper sociohistorical forces. Thus, we sense that the drive for democracy and human rights in Russia and Eastern Europe is related to similar pressure in Burma, Chile, China, Haiti, Mexico, the Philippines, and Thailand. The image of tectonic motion also suggests the havoc wreaked by the break up of large empires and federations (notably the Soviet Empire and Yugoslavia) and the fracturing of established alliances such as the Warsaw Pact and, to a lesser degree, NATO. ²

But to adequately describe the security environment of this era after the Cold War, the tectonics metaphor must be supplemented by an additional image -- one that captures the profusion of ethnic, tribal, religious, and national conflicts that we are witnessing today. Imagine a

piece of glass laid over a map of the world and then struck by a large, heavy weight. The result would be an intricate web of cracks across the world, with heavy concentration in some areas but none left entirely unscathed.

These cracks represent the many fissures in our multiethnic, multi-class, and multilingual society - the divisions between rich and poor, black and white, Hindu and Muslim, Muslim and Jew, Czech and Slovak, Serb and Croat, Azeri and Armenian, and so on. The fissures are stressed by the tectonic shifts occurring beneath the surface, but it is along their jagged lines that the battles of the post Cold War era are being fought.

The fractured-glass analogy suggests that multiplicity of conflictual relationship in the world. Consider for a moment the situation in the middle East, which is not just a conflict between the Arab states and Israel, or between Iran and Iraq, but rather a far more elaborate configuration of animosities. In Lebanon, for instance, it involves Maronite Christians, Sunni and Shiite Muslim, the Druse, and Palestinians; In Syria, the Alawites and other Muslims; and in Iraq, Kurds, Sunnis, and Shiite. A similar diversity in the conflictual pattern is found in the former Yugoslavia, and in the Caucasus region of what was once the Soviet Union.

Each of these images - tectonic motion and fractured glass - is helpful in identifying features of the current World security environment. However, to best describe this environment it is useful to combine the images; for tectonic movement it is useful to combine the images; tectonic movements causing massive shifts beneath the surface that in turn accentuate and extend the cracks appearing on the surface. By as-

sessing both the tectonic movements and networks of cracks, we can arrive at a comprehensive picture of current world issues.³

B. Forces that Destabilize the World Security

It is risky, of course, to attempt an analysis while the world is still undergoing transformation. But enough has already occurred on the surface for us to be able to begin to understand what is happening below: Six tectonic shifts in particular are worthy of discussion:

1. The Pull of Economic Forces

There was a time, not so long ago, when the "fate of nations" was determined largely by political and military factors; most significantly, ability of the state to marshall a country's resources for war, conquest or defense. Today the state remains a major international actor, but its capacity to organize resources for its purposes has been circumscribed by what has been called 'supranational capitalism.' As the economist Robert Heilbroner sees it, the global nexus of multinational corporations and international financial institution has accumulated vast power and influence at the expense of national capitalism and state agencies. This, Hilbroner notes, endows supranational capitalism with the ability "to rearrange the global division and distribution of political and economic power" -- a capacity that, when exercised, is often "seismic" in its impact.⁴

Obviously it is impossible to establish a one-to-one corporation between broad economic phenomena and specific world events. But the failure of the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites to keep pace with economic growth in the West contributed to the debilitation of

the Communist Regime is certain. Unable to generate funds for investment in economic and social revitalization, these regimes stagnated and lost what remained of their political legitimacy. The eventual result was a rapid slide from power, with what had become a corrupt and demoralized ruling class putting up little resistance.

The same economic forces are now exacerbating intergroup conflicts around the globe. The dissolution of Yugoslavia can be partially attributed to the desire of the country's stronger units, Croatia and Slovenia, to break away from their less advantaged fellow republics and to integrate more closely with the Western European economy. Similarly, the breakup of Czechoslovakia can be explained in part by growing resentment in Slovakia over the faster pace of economic activities in the Czech Republic.

Perhaps even more destabilizing is the widening economic gap between the industrialized 'North' and underdeveloped 'South'. Most of less developed countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America have seen the difference between their standard of living and that of the wealthier nations widen over the past decade. At the same time, the global spread of western culture and consumption pattern via the mass media have inculcated an appetite for goods and services not attainable by masses of the poor and unemployed. The result is increased North-South tensions ranging from the growing militancy of political and religious movements with anti-Western theme (movements, for example, like Maoist Shining Path in Peru and the Islamic Jihad in Egypt) to more South-to-North drug smuggling. Depressed economies in the South are also behind the rise in migration to the nations the North itself a growing cause of violence in the countries. ⁵

2. The Global Diffusion of Power

The rise of supranational capitalism has been accompanied by a diffusion of political, military, and economic power away from the United States and the Soviet Union, the two main poles of the Cold war era, to other actors in the international order. This has been in progress since the 1950s and 1960s, When the Western European countries and Japan began to recover from the devastating effects of World War II and many Third World countries secured their independence; It gained further momentum in the 1970s and 1980s with the slowdown of economic growth in the United States and the Soviet Union and the acquisition of major military capabilities by emerging Third World powers. The process culminated in 1989-1991 with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and the resulting disappearance of the bipolar world.⁶

As of yet, no clearly defined system of power relationships has developed in the place of the bipolar system and the tight alliances of the Cold War period. Rather a number of regional power centers - Japan in Asia, Germany in Europe, Russia in central Eurasia, the United States in North America - have emerged, each surrounded by a cluster of associated states. These centers cooperate with each other in some matters and compete in others; states not aligned with any of the principal clusters manage as best they can.

The diffusion of political and military power and the realignment of global power relationships have multiple implications for world security. With the erosion of superpower influence and the proliferation of modern weapons, newly strengthened regional powers see an opportunity to

pursue their hegemonic ambitions, often provoking fierce conflict in the process (as in the case of Iraq's 1980 invasion of Iran and its 1990 invasion of Kuwait). Furthermore, the collapse of control over the periphery of what was the Soviet Union has resulted in a series of ethnic and territorial clashes between components of the empire. And worldwide diffusion of nonnuclear weapons has contributed to the duration and intensity of insurgence and civil and ethnic conflicts. ⁷

3. Increased Popular Assertiveness at the Grass Roots Level

Paralleling the growth of globalized economic institution and the diffusion of political power among international players is the increased assertion at the local and national level of people power. Wherever we look in the world today, we find grass-roots citizens movements striving for fundamental change in key social, economic, and political structures. In China, Haiti, eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union, this assertiveness has entailed a drive for democratic rights; it has also, however, appeared as anti-foreigner sentiment in Germany and increased anti-Semitism in Russia.

By far the most potent manifestation of this grass-roots assertiveness is the militant expression of ethnic, national linguistic, and religious affiliation by peoples who have previously lived peacefully in multinational, multicultural societies. This expression takes many forms such as the calls for secession by the constituent nationalities of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia; militant assertion of Hindu fundamentalism in India and Islamic fundamentalism in Egypt; the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq and the Tamil rebellion in Sri Lanka; and Palestinian intifada. As suggested by Myron Weiner of the Massachusetts Institute of

Technology, "Peoples"—however they identify themselves by race, religion, language, tribe, or shared history—want new political institutions or new relationships within existing institutions; when accommodation is not forthcoming, they are likely to escalate their demands.⁸

The growing assertion of populist claims, whether of a political or an ethnic nature, has significant implications for world security. At the very least it is jeopardizing the ability of current leaders from North and South, East and West, to hold on to power. In many areas it has led to violent clashes between members of opposing groups. And in Yugoslavia it has created a maelstrom of ethnic fury that threatens to engulf much of southeastern Europe.

4. Diminishing power and Authority of Nation-State

Caught between ever more powerful supranational capitalism on one side and restive population on the other is the modern nation-state. Although still among the actors with most clout on the international stage, the state is steadily losing ground to international financial institutions and well-organized ethnic and religious constituencies. This is evident both in the ability of the International Monetary Fund to dictate government spending practices in many Third World and eastern European countries, and in that of Muslim clerics to affect foreign policy in Iran and Saudi Arabia.

To a great extent, the decline in the power of the nation-state is a product of a global revolution of rising expectations at a time of increased international economic competition. People still count on their state to play the game of wealth effectively and thus attain or protect high standards of living. But state authorities have less control over

their economies than before, and when they fail to satisfy popular expectations invite popular revolt -- through electoral channels where that option exists, through rioting and civil strife where it does not. ⁹

The replacement of older, unrepresentative regimes by new, popularity backed governments in the Soviet bloc and elsewhere has not, unfortunately, always resulted in greater social stability. In many cases new regimes have played the game of wealth with even less success than their predecessors, resulting in widespread discontent and a risk of coups and mob action. To retain their hold on power, some of these regimes -- notably those in Serbia -- have turned to ultranationalism as a solution, thereby provoking fresh outbreaks of ethnic violence. In other cases, there has been a ceding of authority to local warlords and secretarial forces; in extreme cases, the state has simply withered away, giving free rein to the sort of gang warfare seen in Liberia and Somalia.

5. The Rise of the "Weapon" State with New Capabilities

Adding to dangers posed by all the factors described above is the global proliferation of modern weapons and the technologies for producing them.

Such proliferation entails not only the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons -- the so-called weapon of mass destruction but also a wide range of "conventional" arms (tanks, planes, guns, and missiles used by regular military forces). Both sorts of weapons are finding their way into arsenals of more and more nations, thereby stimu-

lating local arms races and ensuring that future wars will be fought ever-ascending lethality and destructiveness.¹⁰

In the nuclear realm, the five declared nuclear weapons powers (United States, Russia, Great Britain, France, and China) have been joined by three undeclared nucleated ones (Israel, India, and Pakistan). While Iran, Iraq, and North Korea continue their efforts to develop such weapon, and Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, South Korea, and Taiwan retain a capacity to do so in the future (Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine inherited some nuclear weapons from the former Soviet Union, but have pledged to turn them over to Russian authorities. Still, many analysts worry about the possible spread of former Soviet nuclear materials and technology).

As for chemical weapons, American intelligence officials have identified 14 Third World countries believed to possess an offensive chemical warfare capability: Burma, China, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, North Korea, Pakistan, South Korea, Syria, Taiwan, and Vietnam.¹¹ Many of these nations have also engaged in research on biological weapons, and have acquired ballistic missiles that can be used to deliver nuclear, chemical, and biological warheads. We have already witnessed the extensive use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war, and in Iraq's subsequent campaign to liquidate Kurdish villages in strategic border areas. Iraq also threatened chemical attacks against Israel in 1990 and 1991, and Israel officials responded with threat of possible nuclear retaliation. Central Intelligence Agency officials have reported that India and Pakistan were prepared to use nuclear weapons in 1990, when it was feared that the fighting in Kashmir would spark a full-scale conflict.¹²

The proliferation of advanced conventional arms has proceeded at a pace with that of weapons of mass destruction. According to estimates by the Congressional Research Service, Third World countries spent \$339.5 billion on imported weapons from 1983 to 1990 (in constant 1990 US dollars) -- which translates into some 13,010 tanks and self-propelled guns, 27,430 pieces of heavy artillery, 2,920 supersonic combat planes, 38,430 surface to air missiles, and 53,790 surface-to-surface missiles. These weapons sustained the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988 and other regional conflicts, and swelled the arsenals of emerging powers in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. ¹³

Security analysts are also worried about the growing diffusion of advanced conventional weapons. As military spending in NATO and the former Warsaw pact falls, arms manufactures in these countries, whether state-owned or private, are increasingly disposed to export their products to the Third World, where the demand for modern weapons is high and likelihood of their being used in combat is growing. The stockpiles built up by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies during the Cold War era constitute a vast reservoir of surplus arms that are increasingly finding their way into the black market — and thus, into the hands of terrorists, guerrillas, separatist forces, and other irregular formations that threaten the peace in many areas of the world.

Chemical and biological weapons add several complications to already difficult regional conflicts.

First, their potential use can add to heightened tensions before war occurs, panicking the populations and making the decision to war more likely. Second, destroying these weapons before they are used would be a high priority target. Third, the use of such weapons can only

increase the desperation of the participants as well as the motivation for revenge in the target population, thereby making it more difficult to end a war already begun. The fourth problem is that, if chemical possession is perceived as desirable or necessary, the proliferation of such weapons may be more difficult to control than even nuclear weapons.

The key to nuclear nonproliferation has been the denial of access to fuel grade plutonium. However, the basic ingredients from which chemical weapons are produced are commonly available; monitoring and controlling the situation is difficult.

Our recent experience with chemical weapons is limited to two cases, both involving Iraq. In the later stage of the 1980-88 war with Iran, Iraq used chemicals against Iranian troops as well as its own Kurdish minority. It also engaged in terrorist missile attack against Iranian cities. Experts disagree about how effective the chemical weapons were in these situations, but they agree that the Iranian-Iraq war proved that ability to employ such weapons. ¹⁴

Proliferation of arms of all types is certain to figure as a primary security concern in the 1990s and beyond because it helps increase the number, length, and duration of conventional conflicts and also increases the risk that future wars will involve the use of weapons of mass destruction, whether deliberate or accidental.

6. Population Growth Environmental Decline

The erosion of the state's power and authority has been accelerated, in many instances, by a sixth tectonic force: rapid population growth is not by itself a cause of instability - historically, it has

often contributed to the health and vigor of societies, as in the case of the United States. But when population increases exceed the rate of economic growth (as in many Third World countries today), and when they contribute to the depletion of valuable resources (such as tropical forests and tillable soil), the ability of states to engage in long-term economic and social development is impaired - thus ensuring worse hardship and unrest in future.

The world population now stands at about 5.5 billion people, and this figure is expected to double by the middle of the twenty first century.¹⁵ Such a jump could theoretically be sustained if the planet's products were developed to replace those natural substances being depleted. But resources are not evenly distributed, and new products might not be available at an affordable price to all who need them. As things stand now, many states in Asia, Africa, and in Latin America are not able to provide for burgeoning number of young people, and will be even less able to do in the future. The consequences include a rising incidence of hunger and malnutrition; increased migration from the impoverished countryside to the urban shantytown, soaring unemployment (especially among youth), and the growing appeal of extremist movements.¹⁶

Even if population growth is stabilized, the world must still contend with the problem arising from human-induced degradation of the environment. Much has been written about the long-term effects of global warming and depletion of the atmosphere's ozone layer, and on their implications for human, plants, and animal population; much less, however, is known about the impact of environmental decline on intergroup and interstate relation. Preliminary research suggests that environmental de-

cline, especially when it occurs in environmentally stressed areas of the Third World (deserts, rainforests, hillsides, coastal lowlands) will exacerbate intergroup competition and conflict and drive yet more people into crowded urban shantytowns where the prospects for meaningful employment are dim and the danger of unrest is high. ¹⁷

¹ Gaddis, John Lewis, 1992, 4, *Tectonic History, and the End of the Cold War*, Columbus, Ohio: Occasional Paper from the Mershon Center of the Ohio University.

² Klare, Michael T., 1993, 155, "New Challenge to Global Security" *Current History*, April.

³ Ibid., 156

⁴ Heibroner, Robert L., 1990, 114-156, "The future of Capitalism" in Nicholas X. Rizopoulos, ed., *Sea changes: American Foreign policy in a world Transformed*, New York: Council on Foreign Relation.

⁵ Ollapilly, Deepa, 1993, 175, *The South Looks North: Third World in the New World Order*, *Current History*, April.

⁶ Heibroner, 176.

⁷ Snow, Donal M., 13, *Distant Thunder: Third World Conflict and the New International Order*, New York: St.Martins Press).

⁸ Klare, 155-156.

⁹ Ibid., 157.

¹⁰ Snow, 149.

¹¹ Ibid., 153.

¹² Snow, 154.

¹³ McCain, John, 1991, 84, "Controlling Arms Sale to the Third World,"

Washington Quarterly 14, no.2.

¹⁴ Snow, 149-155.

¹⁵ Klare, 158.

¹⁶ Snow, 33.

¹⁷ Thomas, Horner-Dixon, Jeffery Boutwell, and George Rathjens, 1993, 38-45, "Environmental Change and Violence Conflict," *Scientific American*, February.

CHAPTER IV
CHARACTERISTICS OF POST COLD WAR
TERRORISM

A. Terrorist Sponsorship and Instruments of Foreign Policy

1. The Implication of International Terrorism

United States Secretary of Defense, W. Weinberger in remarks made in 1986 to the American Bar Association National Conference on terrorism stated:

The face of international terrorism is constantly changing as it increases ... The number of terrorist groups has multiplied. We have also seen the advent or at least resurgence, of suicidal terrorist and fanatical, pseudo-religious doctrines that extol terrorism. Terrorists have developed collaborative networks. They have gained better access to international arms market and have acquired more sophisticated weapons and explosives...Terrorists have refined their planning, intelligence and targeting methods, often surveying their victims for months...Terrorists have discovered new source of funding through crime. In addition to their traditional bank robberies, they have entered the lucrative narcotics trade. Terrorists have become skilled managers of their financial assets using secretive banking channels and investing large sums in legitimate business in the United States and elsewhere. Finally, we are confronted with the spread of state-sponsored terrorism...

These comments do reflect an evolution in the understanding of international terrorism, suggesting a deeper understanding of terrorists that goes beyond the traditional and outdated perspective of terrorism as an act performed only by madmen.¹

The term international terrorism covers a number of different issues in the contemporary world, from state sponsored terrorism against foreign

countries to cooperation between various terrorist groups. It also frequently refers to attacks against foreign nationals or property in the terrorists' own country or anywhere else. None of this is new: there have been conspiratorial ties between revolutionary (and counter revolutionary) groups in Europe since the early part of the nineteenth century. A British committee of investigation into terrorism in India noted that, together with the emphasis on religious motives, Bengali terrorist propaganda dwelt heavily upon the Russian rules of revolutionary violence. ²

Terrorism that qualifies as international or transnational involves actions in which the nationality of the victims is different from that of the perpetrators, or the operation is extraterritorial, located outside the boundaries of a contested area. The US State Department defines terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine state agents, usually intended to influence an audience." To be international, it must involve the citizens or territory of more than one country. ³

Such terrorism strongly reflects the interdependence of the international system. It would not be possible if nations were not linked in complex networks of mutual political and economical interest. Were there no tourists, no diplomats and no business travelers, terrorism could not have assumed the form it has. International terrorism has been characterized most notably by attacks on diplomats or diplomatic facilities, on civil aviation (aircraft and airports) and on foreign businessmen, journalists and educators. Its second important character-

istic is the seizure of hostages in order to bargain with their governments or with the host government where the kidnapping or barricade occurs. Terrorism has become a modern form of coercive bargaining, in which the terrorists have the initiative. Their demands usually include the release of prisoners, the payment of a monetary ransom, or the publication of a communication.

2. Support Mechanism in International Terrorism

There are seven essential prerequisites for mounting terrorism. There must be some main aim or motivation among the perpetrators, even if it ultimately amounts to little more than an intense hatred of their perceived enemies or a desire for violent revenge against some alleged injustice. There must be leaders to instigate and direct the struggle. In any sustained and significant campaign, there will also need to be some degree of organization, some training in the special skill of terrorism, and cash that helps to buy weapons and ammunitions and other essential needs. Finally, it is clearly vital for the terrorists that they should have access to the target country and precise targets selected within that country.

Exactly the same basic ingredients are required to mount a viable campaign of international terrorism. But they will require significantly greater level of organization, training expertise, cash and means of access to foreign states, to wage a full international campaign. Let us identify some of the major types of support mechanisms involved in contemporary international terrorism:

- a. Cells of predominantly indigenous Terrorist Organizations

Very few cases exist of purely indigenous movements. Terrorism tends to have inherent tendencies toward internationalization. But by no means do all groups operate outside their borders or resort to hijacking airliners or attacking foreign diplomats. The Basque ETA and the IRA, for example, generally confine their actions to the domestic arena of conflict (which for the IRA includes Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland).

So, too, to do Tamil separatists in Srilanka. However, as the interests of such groups shift, so do their targets. ETA, for example, has begun to attack French targets because of French decision to extradite ETA members to Spain. Sikh separatists and Armenian terrorists have local aims but act on the international scene. International terrorism represents a type of strategy, not a type of terrorism.

b. Cells of Terrorist Groups in Exile

These groups are utterly dependent on their international support base because they have been forced by political circumstances or necessity to operate entirely abroad. Well-known examples are the Armenian terrorist groups, such as the Armenian Secret Army for the liberation of Armenia (ASALA), and the Croatians scattered in many Western countries. These groups can draw on invaluable local bases of support among sympathizers in the emigrant population of major western cities. These provide sanctuary, fundraising sources of weapon and explosives: on the other hand, they are generally desperately conscious of their weakness in political and military terms, and find it impossible to gain state sponsorship. Few states wish to back a loser. They are potentially vulnerable to police and political reaction by their hosts in the states to which they have immigrated. They can be easily identified, and they

risk a backlash against their small countries if they make trouble abroad.

All terrorist groups are prone to schism and splits, sometimes over matters of fundamentalism and program but more often on questions of leadership, organization and tactics. Exile groups are especially vulnerable to this type of organizational fragmentation. Many exiled terrorist movements have been paralyzed, or rendered virtually ineffective, by internecine conflict. For example, the Palestinian movement in exile suffers from a bitter split between the pro-Arafat and anti-Arafat factions, frequently spilling over into assassination and revenge killings of Palestinian leaders abroad.

c. Mixed indigenous and Multinational groups and Alliances

The mixing of indigenous and international terrorist support bases can be easily illustrated in relation to the Shi'ite fundamentalist revolutionaries. In Iran, in Lebanon, and the other major centers of Shiite population there is a constant emphasis on achieving dominance of their religious ideas in their own societies. Yet simultaneously, and interdependent with these efforts, the Shiite movements, such as the Islamic Jihad, are also consciously engaged in wider "holy war" to export Ayatollah Khomeini's ideas and practice to the whole of the Muslim world. For this wider purpose, the Shiite militants can call an impressive support base in Iran in the form of religious ideas and propaganda, religious leadership, a fair degree of centralized coordination and organization, cash weapon, and Iran's diplomatic and spying network.

Another interesting variant of the "mixed" support base is the

comparatively new alliance of extreme left terrorist groups in Western Europe against NATO and defense-related targets. It is clear that all the groups involved — Red Army Faction (RAF) in West Germany, Action Directe (AD) in France, and the Fighting Communist Cells in Belgium — on the one hand continue to wage their own private war against governments, law-enforcement systems and other key institutions in their respective states. Hence, the hunger-strike campaign of the RAF in early 1985, was aiming, without success, to intimidate the authorities into relocating all RAF prisoners in the same goal.

Yet on the other hand, those who study the evidence surely cannot doubt that a genuinely new, if loosely coordinated, international alliance of these groups is attempting to mount a West European campaign against NATO.

d. Indirect State Sponsorship, via Surrogate and Client Groups

Indirect state sponsorship occurs when a government decides to aid a particular movement or group on the ground that it will serve the strategic and political interest of the sponsor. It is generally adopted as a policy for one or more of the following purpose: to redress an international grievance, to export revolution, to hunt down and eradicate exiled dissidents or to intimidate them into silence, to weaken an adversary state, and a auxiliary weapon in a wider war of intervention or international war.

In the course of the Arab-Israel conflict on the issue of the Palestinians, many states have intervened by giving indirect sponsorship and help to factions of the PLO. The major funds of the PLO groupings are derived from the contribution of the rich Arab oil states, and there is abundant evidence of the very substantial military support given to

Al Fatah and other main PLO formations since the mid 1970s. The Soviets were happy to use Yassir Arafat and his movement as a stalking horse to try quietly to expand Russian influence in the Middle East. Documents captured in the 1982 war in Lebanon confirm also the substantial Soviet and Eastern European stake in training PLO members.

Normally it is exceedingly difficult to establish beyond doubt the identity of a state sponsor indirectly implicated in this type of international terrorist attack. A major aim of a state sponsor is to remain covert, at the very least to be able plausibly to deny any involvement. It should be also that sponsorship takes an any forms. Help and encouragement, even the provision of false documents and weapons does not necessarily mean that state sponsor has total control over the choice of target and method of attack. Many of the militants and experienced Palestinian groups, for example, are quite capable of running such operations autonomously, providing their own logistics, if need arises. A further complication is that some of these groups have a number of state sponsors helping them simultaneously in various ways. Consequently, they are able to establish safe havens and operational bases in several different countries. A logical consequence of this complex form of alliance with multilateral indirect state sponsorship is that even if coercion or pressure succeeds in one state sponsor to disengage from support the terrorist group itself will still be able to continue its activities using other resources. Hence, even if one state sponsor fears reprisal and does try to rein them in, it may not succeed.

e. Direct State Sponsorship

Some state sponsors have tried to avoid the uncertainty and problems of indirect sponsorship by resorting to direct state controlled in-

ternational terrorism, using their own hit-squads to assassinate opponents, disrupt, or undermine adversaries. The Libyan and Iranian regimes blatantly flout international norms and laws by such behavior. For example, Colonel Gaddafi openly boasts of his intention to murder President Mubarak and Western leaders and his plan to hunt down and murder his exiled opponents, whom he describes as the stray dogs. In 1985 alone there were seven major incidents involving actual or abortive attacks by Gaddafi hit-squads on opponents of the regime abroad, including murderers committed in Rome, Nicosia, and Bonn.

It should be noted that although diplomatic cover and facilities have frequently been used in recent years for direct state sponsored terrorism, especially by Libya, Syria, Iraq and Iran, there are many other ways in which such attacks can be mounted. The assassination squad used by the secret services of terrorist states may be sent on their missions under many different types of cover as students, business men even, simply tourists. In the open and easily accessible West hidden assassins are most impossible to identify and apprehend. ⁴

3. Terrorist Sponsorship and Instrument of Foreign Policy

With the Cold War over, the breakdown of the bi-polar system and accompanying diffusion of political power has brought substantial change in terrorist network and sponsorship.

An interpretation that gained popularity in the United States during the 1980s holds that terrorism primarily reflects conflict between the United States and the former Soviet Union or World Communism. ⁵ The proponents of this view argue that ideological affinity motivates radical non-state organizations to act as the pliant accomplices of en-

emy states, including Iran, and Libya as well as the then Soviet Union. To this school of thought, terrorist organizations and their government supports are linked to a global network, so that all incidents of terrorism, however disparate, are actually a manifestation of the same malicious intent. Terrorism is perceived as a potent yet widely ignorant threat to the internal stability and foreign interest of Western democracies.

This Cold War view finds that terrorism has become an attractive strategy for the actors in international politics, preferable to conventional or nuclear warfare, which has become too risky and too expensive, and that its uses by hostile states give terrorism the potential to alter the international balance of power. This position leads to advocacy of a tougher response to terrorism and accusation that the leaders of Western democracies are blind to the threat, lacking in resolve, confused, weak and vacillating. Its implication is that terrorism is the problem caused by states, not by dissident undergrounds with agendas of their own. Terrorist organizations are denied any autonomy. The threat of terrorism is thus elevated to a position of high significance for national security.

However, in reality there is no monolithic terrorist entity. Instead terrorism appears highly elective and pluralistic. In 1985, over sixty different organizations were noted as engaged in international terrorism. Fifty were counted in 1986 and fifty-six in 1987. ⁶

Major perpetrators of the acts of international terrorism account for roughly half of all incidents, which shows that the distribution of responsibility for terrorism is broad. The highest ranking group, the Islamic Jihad, accounted for 8.7 percent of all incidents in 1985. In

1986 the MRTA (Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement) in Peru led with 6.6 percent followed by the Colombian ELN (National Liberation Army) and the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Factions, each with 8.2 percent. In general, Middle Eastern terrorism, whether Palestinian or Lebanese, accounts for over half all international terrorist incidents, which in 1985 spilled over into Western Europe. In 1985, eighty-four countries were victimized by international terrorism; in 1986, the number was seventy-eight.

The alliance among these organizations is tenuous. A recent study of international terrorism concludes that coalition among groups is infrequent, ad hoc and short in duration. ⁷

The commonality of interest among terrorist organizations does not seem sufficient to sustain long-term operational cooperation, although the fact of transient linkage is undeniable. In 1987, the "Anti-Imperialist International Brigade," thought to be an alliance of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Japanese Red Army, carried out four relatively amateurish attacks against Western targets, including the Venice summit meeting. In 1972, however, their cooperation produced deadly results when an attack on an arriving Air France flight at Israel's Lod airport left 28 dead and 76 wounded.

An important reason for the conclusion that terrorism threatens international security is the charge of state sponsorship. Many observers think that terrorism is likely to become a form of surrogate warfare, employed equally by nonstates and by states too weak to mount a conventional military challenge. In 1985, the US Department of State considered 12 percent of international terrorist incidents to be state sup-

ported, the majority by Middle Eastern governments. State-support was thought to be linked to the increasing destructiveness of terrorism, which in 1984 killed 20 percent more people than the average of the preceding four years. The British strategic theorist Lawrence Freedman agrees that state sponsorship challenges international security, but warns that the need to justify policies of military retaliation is likely to lead to an exaggeration of this threat. ⁸

The precise relationship between states and the terrorist underground is difficult to determine. Some states have provided financial and logistical support that has made international terrorism possible, but whether the dependency relationship thus created entails state control over the actions of such groups is hard to know. Iran seems to influence but not determine the fate of foreign hostages held by Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Linkage between states and undergrounds are not uncommon, although they only came to the attention of Western governments in the 1980s. Since 1967, Arab states have maintained affiliation with various Palestinian-groups, the Fatah Revolutionary Council. Reliance on proxies seems to be favored over the direct use of government agents, but both practices are familiar in the Middle East.

These international conspiracy theories have no convincing evidence for a unified terrorist network, but a "Cold War" international situation provided circumstantial evidence that the bloc used terrorist sponsorship as an instrument of foreign policy.

Official former Soviet spokesmen have always condemned terrorism, denouncing it as adventurist, elitist and objectively serving the inter-

ests. Yet, at the same time, the Soviet Union has provided arms, financial aid, military training and, on occasion, political support to various terrorist groups. In practice, as distinctive from doctrine, Soviet Russia has given selective support to "national liberation movements" employing terrorist means. It has also assisted some groups, which even by stretching a vivid imagination, cannot be classified as belonging to the "national liberation" camp. Furthermore, it had closely cooperated with the countries that had been main sponsors of international terrorism, Libya and Syria. In the overall Soviet strategy of increasing its influence in the Third World and weakening the NATO allies, terrorist activities play a certain, albeit minor role. The difficulty as seen from Moscow is that support for terrorism is a fine art, that it is effective only in certain conditions, and that, like certain medicine, it may have unpleasant side effects.

If the Western government has charged the Soviet bloc with much of the responsibility for international terrorism, the Soviet Union and its allies have argued that Western governments, and above all the United States, have been the main inspirers of terrorism. Instances of Western involvement in various Third World insurgencies can be found without difficulty. The United States supported the "Contra" in Nicaragua and Angola, Israel has kept a militia in South Lebanon, the French intervened in Chad, the Britain (indirectly) in some of the minor Persian Gulf Principalities — not to mention the massive help given to the Afghan rebels by American via Pakistan.

The difference between Western and Soviet as well as Libyan, Syrian, and Iranian involvement was both quantitative and qualitative in

character. The Western countries are Status Quo oriented. They want to prevent insurgency and other forms of destabilization and, from a purely technical point of view, they are all ill-equipped to deal with such contingencies. The Russians and their allies had not only greater experience and competence in this field, they do not have to render accounts to their parliaments, and their media do not report the support given to terrorist allies. While Russia had its proxies such as Cuba or Bulgaria, America had no such substitutes. If, despite these handicaps, a terrorist plot is nevertheless hatched from time to time in the West, it is usually bungled, causing a major scandal and the downfall of those who ordered it. The French operation against the *Rainbow Warrior* ship in New Zealand was a perfect example. Moral and political inhibition quite apart, the question of Western and Eastern support for terrorism made little sense; it is like equating the achievements of professionals with amateurs. '9

With the advent of the post Cold War era, the change has brought little room for these bi-polarized manipulations of international terrorism. The fundamental effects on the end of the Cold War include not only the termination of the military confrontation between the former Soviet Union and United States, but also that old competition is highly unlikely to reoccur. First, a main change came in Russian foreign policy. New thinking in the changed policy renounced the Breznev doctrine, which asserted the right of Soviet Union to intervene on behalf of a beleaguered Socialist movement worldwide. It was replaced by the assertion that the sovereign right of nations should be honored without interference. One result was to reduce the competition between the East and West in Third World countries. Problems remained in the area of

long-standing competition (such as, Angola, and Mozambique), though there were attempts to work them out. Neither side looked for new commitments or opportunities. The Russian motivation appeared to be dual. On one hand, the competition was usually costly and the benefits of it short-lived. On the other hand, East-West competition in the Third World was just another irritant in overall relations. Faced with the need to reduce tension in order to gain success to Western assistance, backing away from a losing propositions was a mild price for the Russians to pay.

Also, the former Soviet Union simply cannot afford to subsidize Third World movements; in fact, they were cutting loose as many of their old clients as possible, including Castro's Cuba, before the Soviet Union dissolved, which helps make Russia and other republics appear as responsible members of the international system. Above all there is simply not much Third World interest in the new Russia. The old Soviet system is not something to emulate; rather, it is something to avoid at all costs.

Now, the United States and Russia are cooperating and sharing responsibility for the anti-terrorist effort on a global scale (as in the Gulf-War and Bosnian affairs). ¹⁰

B. The Characteristics of Dissident Terrorism

1. Nationalist Terrorism: Ethnic Nationalism in War

The forces, mentioned in the causes of post Cold War terrorism, act on the peoples, states, and societies of the world in such a way as to exacerbate existing tensions between groups and in many cases, to provoke or intensify conflict. The resulting struggles take several forms,

all of which have become all-too-common features of the global environment.

One manifestation is the world's decomposing empire and super-states. By far the most striking products of the Cold War's end and communism's demise, has been the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. The Soviet Union was an empire, assembled through centuries of conquest by both Russian Czars and their Communist successors, and the modern superstate, uniting many individual nations in one centrally administered, confederated system. Yugoslavia also possessed attributes of empire and confederation. A system of that sort can survive only when the center possessed enough strength to subdue separatist pressure in the periphery, and when there are sufficient social, economical, and political links between the disparate parts to resist the centrifugal force that inevitably tears at such an assemblage.

With the collapse of communism — the binding agent in both the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia — and growing impact of tectonic forces, these two superstates broke up in 1991. The individual groups that had constituted them sought to establish full sovereignty over what they viewed as their rightful territory. As suggested by past instances of imperial decomposition, such as the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empire after World War I, the process inevitably spawns discord and conflict. Pieces of new international boundaries (hence fighting between ethnic groups in Bosnia and between Armenian and Azarbaijans), and the ethnic minority find themselves trapped within alien and inhospitable states (hence the struggles of the Abkhazians and South Ossetians in Georgia, the Ingush and Chechens in Russia, the ethnic Russian in Modova, and the ethic Albanians in the Kosvo region of Serbia).

Such struggles are not limited to the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia; other multinational superstates are feeling the vibration of tectonic forces. Hence the survival of Canada remains in doubt as the French-speaking people of Quebec continue to seek greater autonomy from the English speaking provinces, while India has experienced significant separatist pressures in Kashmir, the Panjab, and Assam. Ethiopia, once an imperial kingdom, has long been troubled by armed separatist movements in the provinces of Eritrea and Tigre, and is likely to experience renewed conflict if these pressures are not relieved. Two other Third World superstates, China and Indonesia, continue to encounter resistance on their peripheries (the former in Tibet, the latter in East Timor) and will likely come under intensified pressure from separatist in the future.

Accompanying the breakup of large multinational states has come a surge in ethnonationalist and irredentist struggles as ethnic groups that have been denied a state (or have had theirs submerged in a larger multinational entity) seek to establish one, and as other groups already in possession of a state seek to enlarge it so as to incorporate adjacent territories occupied by large number of their kinsmen. Such impulses have long sparked fighting, but seems to have gained renewed vigor in recent years as the bipolar system broke the balance of power between state authorities and populist elements shifted in favor of the latter. As has been noted, ethnonationalist forces are evident in the separatist struggles in the former Yugoslavia, Georgia, India, China, and Indonesia. Other groups engaged in like struggles include the Kurds in Iraq and Turkey, the Palestinian in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the

Tamils in Sri Lanka, the Shan and Karen people of Burma, and the Basques of France and Spain.

Major irredentist struggles include the Serbians' campaign to create "Greater Serbia" out of the remains of the remnants of Yugoslavia, Armenia's push to gain control over Nagorno-Karabakh (now controlled by Azerbaizan), and China's continuing efforts to repossess Taiwan. Many fear that irredentists in Hungary will press for the incorporation of Hungarian-speaking regions of Slovakia, Romania, and the former Yugoslavia in a "Greater Hungary."

THE CASE IN THE POINT: New World order and Lessons of the Bosnian War

1. Reporting the tragic situation of the Bosnian War, the July 31, 1993 *New York Times* reported 200,000 dead, most of them civilian, including the victims of the detention camps and the children dying for lack of medical supplies. There has been mass rape. More than two million people are homeless; some 573,000 refugees sinking the already foundering economics of Croatia and the rump Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and 640,000 others destabilizing neighboring countries, the rest moving from town to town ahead of shifting battle lines. The number of people who have been killed or left homeless is on a scale not seen in Europe since the Second World War.

2. The disintegration of the Yugo federation and its interethnic violence cannot be attributed to any single factor. Internal political conflicts in the 1980s, and the effort by Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic to mobilize Serb nationalism on behalf of a strengthened federation, destroyed the cohesion of the country's regional Communist leader-

ship and weakened their control over society. Deteriorating economical conditions — especially plummeting living standards eroded the benefits of sustaining the Yugoslav state and stimulated the rise of mass nationalism and interethnic hostilities. The conflicting nationalist aspirations of the Yugoslav peoples and their leaders' effort to maximize power, led to conflict over the control of disputed territories.

The end of the Cold War left both Soviet and Western policy makers believing that Yugoslavia no longer held the strategic significance, or merited the attention it had enjoyed in a world divided between East and West. This mistaken belief, as well as the attention commanded by the Persian Gulf War, led to the neglect of the brewing crisis in Yugoslavia until the cost of meaningful action had risen beyond the point acceptable to Western policy makers and their publics. Even when less costly but still effective action remained possible, Western policy makers were deterred from acting by the fear that the dissolution of Yugoslavia, even if achieved through peaceful negotiations, would hasten the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

The fall of Yugoslavia thus can be attributed to internal conflict and the international community's failure to respond to the crisis effectively. However, forceful action by either Yugoslav leaders or American and European administration would have required innovative thinking about some of the most basic principles of the international system and the post Cold War security framework in Euro-Atlantic community. No political leadership -- Yugoslav, American, or European — was then ready to confront these tasks, therefore, it may be the stimulus that it has provided for such new thinking.

3. The wars in the former Yugoslavia have made it clear that the principles and practices that provided a stable frame work for international security in the era of the Cold War is no longer sufficient to preserve the peace. The principle of state sovereignty, territorial integrity, human rights, and self-determination embedded in the United Nations Charter and other United Nations Documents, and developed in details in the documents of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), have proved contradictory, or at least subject to contradictory interpretation. Moreover, the mounting human tragedy in Bosnia has revealed the inadequacies of the decision making principles, operational guidelines, and conflict management capabilities of Euro-Atlantic institutions such as the CSCE, NATO, and the European Community, as well as the United Nations.

New diplomatic and political mechanisms must be developed to cope with demands for self-determination in ways that do not undermine the basic foundation of international stability ~~the~~ the system of sovereign states.

The developments of such mechanisms require reconstruction of the meaning of self-determinations in the contemporary era and the careful reconsideration of the indivisibility of state sovereignty. At the very least, it requires limiting the ability of states to use their claim to sovereignty to shield abuses from international inequity. For any mechanism, however, individual state and international organization alike must become more provocative, undertaking preventive diplomatic and political efforts to solve interethnic and other conflicts before they threaten international peace.

International engagement in the Yugo crisis as early as 1990 would have remained futile if the Western states had continued to refuse to support the redrawing of borders as a possible path to a peacefully negotiated solution to the crisis. The declaration of independence by a territorially compact ethnic community, such as that of the Serbs in Croatia or any other group in Yugoslavia, could have been recognized as a legitimate demand for self-determination. By recognizing the equal rights of all peoples in the country to self-determination, international mediators might have been able to lead local actors toward mutual concession. The key to such negotiations, however, lies in the recognition that international principles, and the rights derived from them, are equally applicable to all parties, as well as in a willingness to undertake the negotiation of borders. This, the international community failed to do.

Early insistence by outside powers on the democratic legitimization of existing borders might have encouraged greater concern for the protection of human rights and avoided the escalation of ethnic tensions in Croatia and Bosnia. The Communist order that held Yugoslavia together began to disintegrate as early as 1986. It entered into a crisis in December 1989. This left sufficient opportunity for international actors to influence events. The importance in such a situation of clearly and forcefully articulating and enforcing the human rights standards to which states seeking recognition will be held cannot be overemphasized. By doing so international actors may affect popular perceptions and politics. In Yugoslavia, for example, the regional elections held in 1990 might have produced more moderate governments if the human rights standards of potential ruling parties had been at issue.

The existence of competing claims to territory complicated the Yugoslav crisis. But it does not by itself account for the magnitude of human destruction that has occurred. The extreme violence in Yugoslavia must also be attributed to the establishment of ethnically defined governments that failed to provide democratic safeguards for the human rights of minority communities. This reinforces the conclusion that if the international community is to facilitate the peaceful settlement of such conflicts elsewhere, it must devise the means to prevent ethnic domination and safeguard human rights. In short, principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national self determination must be integrated into a single framework for determining the legitimacy of claims to political authority. And that framework must be based on the superiority of principle human rights and democracy.¹¹

2. Revolutionist Terrorism

a. Though the appeal of Soviet-style communism has largely dissipated, revolutionary and millenarian movements continue to hold an attraction for downtrodden and dispossessed peoples. Such movements promise a change of leaders but a sweeping transformation of society, typically involving the elimination of existing institutions and their replacement by more righteous or egalitarian structures. Movements of this sort appear to be gaining strength in areas, where economic conditions have worsened for the majority (or for particular groups) and where the capacity or inclination of state authorities to overcome widespread impoverishment and millenarians groups in such areas appear increasingly willing to employ violence in their effort to reform society.

At present two main types of revolutionary crusades can be discerned: ideological or political movements, usually attempting to end exploitation of the poor by the middle class and the rich; and religious fundamentalism, entailing a drive to subject all social interaction to religious law and practice. Examples of the first types include the Shining Path in Peru, the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front of Elsalvador, Cambodia's Khmer Rouge, and the new Peoples Army in the Philippines; example of the second category would be the Hindu fundamentalist Bharatiya Janata in India, the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria, the Islamic Jihad in Egypt, and the various Islamic fundamentalist forces in Afghanistan.

b. Political Islam should be especially noted with concern. From Ayatollah Khomeini to Sheik Omar Abdel Rhaman, from Iran to World Trade Center, government leaders and opinion makers in the West and in the Middle East have warned of the dangers of militant Islam. If the 1980s were dominated by image of embassies under siege, American hostage, and hijackings, the 1990s bring prophecies of insurgent movements wielding nuclear weapons and employing urban terrorism. Headlines announce the possibilities of a worldwide Islamic uprising and a clash of civilizations in which Islam may overwhelm the West. Television viewers see bodies of Coptic Christian and tourists killed by Egyptian extremists and take in reports of Algerian militants, and pitched battles with police. All fuel alarmist concerns reflected in publication and conferences with titles like "Roots of Muslim Rage," "Islam: Deadly Duel with Zealots," and "Awaiting God's Wrath: Islamic Fundamentalism and the West."

The 1990s reveal the diversity and complexity of political Islam and point to a twenty-first century that will shake the assumption of many. While some Islamic organizations engage in terrorism seeking to topple governments, others spread their message through preaching and social services and demand the right to gain legitimate power with ballots rather than bullets. However, their movement is directed toward changing the regional balance of power and driving outside interests from their region. Its aims are clearly international, going far beyond the issue of who governs Lebanon.

C. Finally, the world is confronted with an assortment of pro-democracy and anti-colonial movements, which tend to erupt periodically in strikes or civil disorders and/or to provoke repressive violence by the authorities. All these movements reflect the tectonic increase in grass-roots activism decried earlier, and while they may experience setbacks in the short term they are not likely disappear any time soon. They include: popular drive for Western-style electoral democracy and human rights, that have been working themselves out in Burma, China, Haiti, the Philippines, Thailand, and Zaire; struggles by disenfranchised minorities to abolish unrepresentative or discriminatory governments, from Northern Ireland to the former South Africa, and efforts by subject peoples to cast off what is viewed as colonial rule, as in East Timor, Kashmir, the Western Sahara, and the West Bank and Gaza. Paralleling these movements are the increasingly vigorous efforts of indigenous people to reclaim rights and lands that have long been denied them by the dominant cultures. ¹²

C. Establishment (State) Terrorism

1. Introduction

The use of terroristic violence and repression by states against their own citizens is a common phenomenon. In this century alone, tens of million people, living in most regions of the world, under communist, democratic, military, and theocratic governments have been and continue to be victims of state organized repression and violence. The prototypical episodes of state violence against its own citizens were those perpetrated by the Nazi and Stalinist regimes in the 1930s and 1940s.

The unprecedented evils of the Nazi Holocaust and the Great Soviet Purges have often been viewed as the special consequences of Nazism and Soviet Communism. Yet, with frequent recurrence of massive and violent state repression in other parts of world since the 1940s, there has been greater awareness that these horrors are not restricted to a narrow range of cultures or types of regime. It has become evident that the phenomenon has deeper, or more global roots and is tied to increasingly sophisticated and continuously expanding bureaucratic and technical capabilities of states everywhere for violence and repression.¹³

Recent developments in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union seem to indicate a global trend toward the liberalization of society and the diminution of state organized terror. Politicians, journalists, and scholars, around the world, are already trumpeting the coming of a better and more human world. A closer look, however, at the nations of world shows that the phenomenon of state organized terror is far from vanquished. Even as Eastern Europe and Soviet Russia liberalize, other states continue unabated in the repression of their own citizens. The salient case is China and that new symbol of state terror, Tianamen

Square. Others that come to mind easily are the cases of South Africa, Iraq, Iran, Haiti, El Salvador, Burma, and Sri Lanka. These are but the most obvious cases that have been subjected to the glare of media attention. There are numerous others that are little known because of state control and secrecy, or because the violence has not been dramatic enough to draw media attention. North Korea, Guatemala, and Burundi are but a few of the examples that would fit into this category.

In spite of this increased awareness, there is little theoretical knowledge available about the nature and sources of state organized terror. Unfortunately, the severe scholarly neglect of the subject of violence and terror is just a part of neglect of more general subject of repression. Even when histories and political accounts of extremely repressive regimes have been written, they usually have not analyzed the origins, the instruments, the politics, and the effects of terror itself. At least three fundamental factors are responsible for this lack of attention. First, information on violent internal repression is extremely scarce since most of the relevant documents have been intentionally destroyed or kept secret, while journalistic investigation has been severely restricted. To compound the problem, victims of violent terror often disappear or fear bearing witness to events. Second, outside investigation of the state's terroristic exercise of power over its own population has been viewed as interference with state sovereignty. Only recently has the protection of human and civil rights become a legitimate issue of international concern. Third, predominant theoretical frameworks have failed to identify repressive state violence and terror as phenomena that are central to the modern state and which therefore require attention. ¹⁴

Some serious attempts were made at the end of the 1960s toward extending the theoretical understanding of state organized terror by broadening the comparative frame work. Alexander Dallin and George Breslauer, in their book *Political Terror in the Communist System*, took the logical step of searching for parallels between China and the Soviet Block countries by looking at the relationship of terror to political and economical development. E.V. Walter, in his book *Terror and Resistance*, attempted to provide a new perspective on totalitarian terror by examining terror in the Zulu empire of the nineteenth century. Virtually no one built on either these works until the 1980.

The most notable works are a volume on secret police in communist states by Jonathan Adelman, and three volumes on state violence and repression edited by Michael Stohl and George Lopez, which aim to provide a framework for a broader comparative analysis and to define a relevant body of literature.

2. The Relationship of State to Society

The ideal relationship of state to society was articulated by such thinkers as Hobbes, Hegel, and Rousseau prior to the disasters of the twentieth century. It may be said that most of them saw the state as an institution that, like a gift from heaven, could bring peace to mankind, prevent people from mutual destruction, and introduce some measure of order into their lives. It was unthinkable to them that the state could, like ferocious beast, assail its own citizens, Rousseau contended that the subjects do not need to assume that the organism will want to damage its members.¹⁵

Much of this respect for the state was based on its performance of three essential functions: a) maintenance of internal peace and order,

b) organization and protection of economic activity, and, c) defense of national independence and national interests.

Today, the state has lost some of its authority as the guardian of order and the protector of its own citizens. In the twentieth century, the state, like an unchained beast, has ferociously attacked that whose claim to be its master, its own citizens.

In most cases, people could not understand the cause of this rage or the desire to destroy those who seemingly were an important means of support for the state, and ultimately its very reason for existence. The fruit of this perversion of the state has been the human rights movement whose theme has been liberation from the iron grip of the state and whose greatest fulfillment and validation has been the price set in motion by Gorbachev's *glasnost*.

The image of state as the defender of national integrity and independence has also been seen as misleading in its neglect of the state's behavior in multi-ethnic and multi-national dominions. The states tend to be chauvinistic and jingoistic, often seeing in the persecution of minorities in the territory the best way to gain the support of the state in the twentieth century, and acted aggressively against the members of minority ethnic group much more than it has come to their defense. The states of Hitler and Stalin are just the most terrible examples of this general tendency.¹⁶

3. The Characteristics of State Terrorism

Politics is the process whereby we deliberately set out to shape our communities of interaction. We do so by drawing upon the power resources at our disposal. One of these resources, whether we wish to recognize it or not, is the capacity to do harm, or coercive resources.

Violence is a form of coercion, and terrorism is usually a type of violence. Physical coercion, or its threat, is commonly considered the resource of last resort, to be used only when other available resources have failed to shape community interaction. Basically, coercion includes all acts intended to harm others or their valued possessions.

Coercion permeates political life, from mild acts of parental discipline to devastating acts of war. Stable political communities establish and enforce limits on the use of coercion in social relations. Acts of coercion that violate the limits within a particular community may be termed force. The notion of acceptable coercion or force implies a dominant consensus that the benefits of the coercive acts outweigh the harm done, as when the police use coercion to apprehend a criminal.

Acts of coercion in violation of these limits but intended to defend the dominant order from a type of threat subversion may be termed establishment (state) violence.¹⁷

Establishment violence, we must emphasize, need not be terrorist in nature, nor is it confined to public officials exceeding their authority (for example, police violation). Moreover, establishment terrorism needs not to be a form of violence, in that a regime could conceivably carry out a terrorist policy that conforms with the dominant definition of acceptable coercion. We need to make, therefore, some careful distinctions.

First, some analysts distinguish between oppression and depression. Oppression is essentially a condition of exploitation and deprivation (somewhat akin to the notion of "structural violence"), and

repression is action against those who are seen to be threats to the established order. Repression, then, may serve to maintain an oppressive system, but the oppression itself arises out of the realities of social existence for the people it oppresses. A land tenure system, for example, may ensure the economical oppression of the majority peasants, who may require periodic repression when they demonstrate signs of unrest.

Repression may be within or in violation of the boundaries defining acceptable coercion, or force. In addition, strategies of repression may be undertaken by both private citizens and public officials. Sometimes private repression may stay within authorized limits, as when citizens "taken the law into their hands."

Some instances of both officials and private repression may be a form of violence but still not be terrorist. Terrorism depends on the nature of the target and the indiscriminateness of the means. If group of persons track down and knife the rapist of their friend, they may be vigilantes, but they are not terrorists. On the other hand, the random violence of the Ku Klux Klan against southern blacks certainly appears to be terrorism. Some but not all cases of private vigilantism, therefore, may be terrorist.¹⁸

4. Conditions Associated with the Emergence of State Organized Terror

What follows is proposed as a theoretical template for the phenomenon of state organized terror. It has been constructed out of an analysis of all papers presented at the International Conference entitled, "State Organized Terror," hosted by Michigan State University, November 2-5, 1988.

Four general conditions seemed to be associated with the emergence of state organized terror. They are: a) distorted conception of the state and society and their interrelationship, b) the disarray of state institutions, c) the presence of deep economical and or/ ethnic conflicts in society or between the society and the state, and 4) state dependence on foreign power. ¹⁹

The first fundamental condition associated with state organized terror is that terrorist regimes are typically animated by ideologies sharply at odds with reality and by unrealistic ambition for social and economical control. Communist regimes, such as those in the Soviet Union, China, Afghanistan, and Kampuchea, see society in term of class struggle and attempts to radically transform feudal and capitalist structures of land tenure and enterprise. One party, military-dominated regimes, on the other hand, tend to see the nations as an organism that must be dedicated to survival in the face of external aggressors whose agents are seen behind all independent political movements within the country. The National Security Doctrine of the Argentine military in the 1970s and the concept of "total onslaught" guiding the South African government until very recently are examples of this world view.

The second fundamental condition is great institutional chaos and disorganization, which breeds particularly intense political rivalries within state apparatus. Terror has grown out of such a context even in cases, such as Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia, where the state has seemed monolithic and all powerful to its victims and external enemies. The chaos of state may exist because its various agencies have no clearly defined missions or means of carrying out their duties, or have

overlapping responsibilities. The danger in such political chaos, particularly where the state is facing obvious and severe economical problems or military threat, is the emergence of political rhetoric emphasizing boundless will and energy and simplistic absolutes. Such rhetoric can take root and thrive because there are no established bureaucratic structures of decision making or political norms to support measured evaluation of policies.

Economical and ethnic division is the third general condition associated with state organized terror. Economical growth has often been created from a large group of landless peasants and new industrial working class that has lost their economical security while commercial and political elites have grown wealthy. The resulting political volatility and motivated severe repression response has caused revolutions that have installed repressive regimes. Economical factors in state terror have been most salient in Latin America and are becoming more important in Africa with increased industrialization.

The violence of a state against its citizens is also often built upon to reinforce preexisting racial and ethnic conflicts. Ethnic conflicts, however, rarely lead to massive violence unless cultural and religious differences correspond to some degree with differences in economical or political status. Often ethnic differences will be exaggerated by a regime, such as Hitler's, as a way of crystallizing a definition of the enemy, which will add the force of ethnic antagonism to their own political support. Where subjugated ethnic groups are culturally cohesive and engage in subversion or violence against dominant groups, as Kurds have in Iraq the way is clear for legitimization of mass political murder by the dominant group. This is the case in many

Third World states that had not previously developed a common political culture or means of balancing interest.

The fourth condition associated with state organized terror involves its international context. Repressive and terroristic regimes have often been regimes that have gained power with the military, financial, and political support of another, more powerful state. The clearest examples are the Eastern European nations and Afghanistan, but several severely repressive regimes in Latin America and elsewhere have come to power as a result of US support. Such externally installed regimes tend to violent repression for control. Many violent regimes in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America, though not installed by external power, have built up their security and police forces with heavy foreign assistance. Such foreign aid has been aimed largely at maintaining secure conditions for production and trade by keeping volatile opposition political activity in check, and at increasing influence to achieve geopolitical goals. ²⁰

THE CASE IN THE POINT: Iraqi State Terrorism to the Kurdish Minority

A. The Historical and Socio-Political Background of Kurdish Problem in Iraq

Because of history and geography, the Kurdish question has been one of the thorniest problems of twentieth-century Iraq. A distinctive ethnic group of Indo-European origins and of Muslim, mainly Sunni faith, the Kurdish community comprises more than twenty percent of Iraq's population (18 million), and resides in northern part of the country. In the wake of World War I, as a great power re-carved the Middle East following the collapse of Ottoman Empire, the Kurd was promised autonomy

by the Treaty of Sevres (1920), with an option for complete independence, only to realize three years later that they had been cheated out of this pledge: the Treaty of Lausanne between Turkey and the victorious allies bore no specific reference to the Kurds, promising only tolerance for minorities.

Since then the Kurds have been one of the largest aggrieved national minorities in the Middle East, the intractability of their situation stemming from their dispersion in four Middle Eastern countries -- Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Syria (there is also a small Kurdish minority in the Soviet Union) -- each having a vested interest in suppressing the Kurds' national aspiration. The Kurdish predicament has been further irritated by the fragmentation of the community along linguistic, clan and tribal lines, which has impaired the crystallization of a collective Kurdish identity and has facilitated their suppression by the respective governments.²¹

In the Iraqi case, Kurdish separatism has been particularly disconcerting for the central government. It threatens Iraq's fragile sectarian edifice, thereby raising the fearful specter of the possible disintegration of the entire state into three entities: Kurdish, Shiite, and Sunni. This, in turn, might have rendered Iraq a non-viable whole, given the fact that approximately two thirds of country's oil production and oil reserves come from a predominantly Kurdish area, and Kurdish fertile lands make it Iraq's main granary.

Because of these weighty considerations, the central government in Baghdad had always been adamant on keeping Kurdistan an integral part of Iraq. The Kurds, for their part, sheltered by rugged mountains terrain that made military operation in the area extremely difficult, embarked

on a sustained struggle against the regime, which has continued with varied intensity to date. They asked for a proportional representation in Iraq's official institution, including the cabinet, the parliament and the army, and demanded a proportional share in the country's economical resources. These demands were to no avail, as was their claim for autonomy in Kurdistan.²²

B. Early Ba'athi Regime's Terrorism to the Kurd

The Kurds waged continuous guerrilla warfare (1961-70) and open rebellion (1974-75) against the Iraqi government. When the first Ba'athi regime was established in February 1963, The Kurds quickly presented it with far a reaching plan for an autonomous region in Kurdistan. The plan was dismissed out of hand, and in the summer of 1963, the Ba'ath launched a ferocious military campaign in Kurdistan. This proved a serious mistake that contributed to the collapse of the first Ba'athi regime.

Fighting in Kurdistan continued throughout the 1960s. Bath's return to power in 1968 and responded to mounting rebellion by rushing most of the Iraqi army (four out of six divisions) to northern Iraq. Fierce fighting ensued in which the military did not shy away from indiscriminate attacks against helpless civilians. One of the better-known atrocities took place in the Kurdish state of Dukan in August 1969, and was painstakingly recorded by the *Kurdish Affairs Bulletin*:

The children and the women of the village escaped to one of the caves in the vicinity, for fear of artillery shelling and bombing by air-craft. After burning the village, the officers and mercenaries assembled near the entry of the cave, collected wood, and after sprinkling the wood with petrol they set fire to it. The cries of the children and women begun rising to God. They were shooting at the entry of the cave so that no one could escape, and so were burnt, 67 children and women in the cave.²³

C. The Kurd's open rebellion against Iraqi government

The events in Kurdistan were viewed by Saddam (then Vice Chairman of Bathi Party) with grave concern. He was mindful of the destabilizing impact of the Kurdish problem on the previous Ba'thi regime and feared that an overriding preoccupation with it yet again would threaten the Ba'this' rule and, what is more important, undermine his position within the party.

He knew that suppression of an all-out Kurdish rebellion would require a sustained military effort. Particularly considering massive Iranian support likely to be given to the Kurdish rebels. It was clear that the economical cost of such a civil war would be exorbitant, especially if the Kurds were to handicap Iraq's oil industry. Also he was fully aware that Iraq's immersion in Kurdistan would play into Iran's hand and would enable them to impose their will on Iraq on a variety of issues, most notably the navigation rules in the Shatt-al-Arab, Iraq's sole access to the Gulf. Saddam sought a peaceful resolution to the Kurdish problem.

In Autumn 1969 Hussein enter into secret negotiations with Kurdish leader, Mullah Mustafa al-Barzani and on March 11, 1970, his efforts culminated in a Fifteen Point Agreement which contained far-reaching concession to the Kurds, most importantly, the first Iraqi recognition of the Kurds as a distinct national entity and their consequent right to autonomy. Other concessions included a recognition of cultural, linguistic and administrative rights, the appointment of a Kurd as Vice President of Iraq and the enhancement of Kurdish representation within the state's ruling institutions. ²⁴

Had he adhered to the spirit of the March 1970 Manifesto, which he had personally engineered, and implemented into the letter, the Kurdish re-volt might have been averted. As things developed, Saddam overestimated his ability to impose his own solution on the Kurds and was consequently forced to fight simultaneously on two fronts, the Kurds and Iranian Shah.

Barzani demanded that main bulk of the Iraqi army be withdrawn from Kurdistan according to the agreement, but Saddam refused it. Barzani chose a close associate of his, Muhammed Habib Karim, secretary-general of the KDP, as the Kurdish candidate for the position of Vice President, but Baghdad did not accept this choice, Barzani also accused Saddam of "Arabizing" Kurdistan (in September 1971, some 40,000 Shi'ite Kurds were expelled to Iran on grounds that they were not Iraqi), and in 1972 alone, tens of thousands Kurds of Iranian origin were forced out of Iraq to make room for the growing numbers of Iraqi Arabs arriving in the area. On September 29, 1971, Barzani himself narrowly escaped an attempt on his life. He interpreted the attempt on his life as a defacto declaration of war by Hussein.

Saddam nationalized the Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC) in 1972, a consortium owned by several Western countries, which accounted for the entire oil production of Iraq and effectively controlled prices and quotas. This oil nationalization was particularly galling for Barzani who viewed this move as a blatant violation of the manifesto, aimed at dis-inheriting the Kurds of their right to the oil rich area of Kirkuk.

On April 9, 1972, Iraq and Soviet Russia, signed a bilateral treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. This was the second treaty of its kind

signed by the Soviet Union with a Middle Eastern country in the post World War II era after Egypt in 1971. Indeed, in these two important respects the Soviet Union alliance failed to live up to Hussein's expectations. While offering its good offices to mediate between Baghdad and Kurds, and between Iran and Iraq, Moscow was unable to bring about a political solution. Alarmed by the improvement in Soviet-Iraqi relations, the United States and Iran stepped up their support for the Kurdish insurgency. This, in return, made Barzani more defiant than ever. He dismissed Saddam's offer to join the National Patriotic Front, accused the government of consistent evasion of its commitments in the March Manifesto, and resumed the guerrilla warfare against the Iraqi forces in Kurdistan.²⁵

The Iraqi campaigning was initially successful, but by the fall of 1974 it had already ground to a halt. Having failed to sever the Kurdish supply lines with Iran (and Syria that also extended material help to Kurds), the Iraqi army was confronted by Bazaar's well-equipped guerrillas, armed with heavy artillery and surface-to-air missiles. The Iraqi predicament was decisively compounded when the Iranian army entered the fighting on the side of Kurds, going as far as to deploy two regiments inside Iraq in January 1975. The exorbitant cost of the rebellion -- over \$4 billion according to some estimates -- threatened to bring the country to the brink of economical disaster. As Saddam was to admit candidly several years later, the human toll exacted by the Kurdish campaign in the year between March 1974 and March 1975 exceeded 60,000 casualties.

With the Iraqi army on the verge of collapse and the economy severely afflicted, the Iranian Shah was virtually holding Baghdad by its

throat. At will, he could dismember Iraq; at will he could topple the Ba'thi regime. Fortunately for Saddam and his associates, all the Shah wanted was an unequivocal Iraqi recognition of Iran's geopolitical hegemony in the Gulf that concretely, required the legal revision of the navigation rule in Shatt-al-Arab and some minor territorial concession. Moreover, while using the Kurds as a pawn in imposing his will on Iraq, the Shah had no intention of allowing the Kurds to gain excessive power. Since Iran was burdened with its own Kurdish problem, an autonomous, let alone independent, Kurdistan would inevitably bode ill.

On March 6, 1975, Hussein and the Shah concluded the Algiers agreement that, at one stroke, terminated armed confrontation between two countries, settled the Shatt-al-Arab dispute, and paved the way for the suppression of the Kurdish rebellion. In concluding the Agreement, Saddam's mind was occupied by an immediate resolution of the Kurdish problem on his own terms, which was a matter of life and death. Had he not reached such a solution, his entire future would have been jeopardized; had he not bowed to the superior Iranian power, such a solution would not have been feasible. Faced with the choice between a humiliating foreign policy concession and political demise, the way out was self-evident. Saddam opted for the former and achieved his objective: forty-eight hours after the signature of the Algiers Agreement, Iran had withdrawn its support for the Kurds, and within two weeks the Kurdish rebellion had been effectively suppressed.²⁶

The Kurdish minority again became the victim of international power politics. What is noteworthy here is the attitude of American government: In May 1972, US President Richard Nixon approved a CIA plan to grant Barzani some \$16 million over a three-year period. Barzani be-

lieved that the United States, in the capacity as Iran's foremost ally, could provide a safety valve that the Shah would not be able to remove at will. His assumption proved wrong. The United States did not lift a finger to prevent the Shah from betraying the Kurds. ²⁷

D. Iraqi Genocidal Repression in the Iran-Iraq War

Iraqi Kurdish separatists later backed Iran in the Iran-Iraq War. Hussein found that the Kurdish threat during the early war years less ominous than previously anticipated. The tribal and linguistic fragmentation of the Kurdish community and long standing enmity between its two resistance groups, Mas'ud Barzani's KDP, and Jalal Talabani's PUK, precluded a joint Kurdish strategy and enabled the regime to pit them against each other. It was only after Iran had launched its first major offensive into Kurdistan in the summer of 1983 that the Kurdish opposition became a real irritant to central regime. Yet even Hussein managed to keep the two Kurdish Organizations apart.

While the KDP was brutally repressed, with some 8000 members of the Barzan's clan imprisoned, the PUK was carefully courted through substantial financial inducements and ambiguous political pledges. Before long, however, Talbani discovered that he had been double-crossed by Hussein who had no intention whatsoever of rehabilitating Kurdistan or promoting Kurdish autonomy at the expense of the central government. Frustrated and angry, he curtailed the dialogue with the authorities, buried his differences with Barzani and joined the KDP campaign against the regime. Thus, in early 1985, Hussein was confronted with full scale insurrection in Kurdistan. In a last-ditch effort to deflect the Kurd-

ish insurgency, the Iraqi President offered a general amnesty "for all Iraqis who conducted activities hostile to their country." When the offer was spurned by the disillusioned Kurds, a ferocious campaign was launched against them. With the passage of time and the deterioration in Iraq's military position, this campaign assumed genocidal proportions, when the Iraqi forces retaliated for what they viewed as treacherous Kurdish behavior. Not only were the 8,000 prisoner captured in 1983 executed, along with hundreds of other members of the Kurdish opposition, but the government embarked again on a systematic effort to uproot the rebellious population from its native environment. By the end of the Iran-Iraq war in the summer of 1988, more than half of the villages and numerous towns in Kurdistan had been razed and their population deported. Some half a million Kurds were placed either in easily controllable settlements in the vicinity of the main towns in Kurdistan, or in concentration camps in the south-western Iraqi dessert. ²⁸

Commended by Hussein's paternal cousin, Ali Hassan ai-Majid, this punitive campaign witnessed the extensive use of chemical weapons, including mustard gas, cynaide, and Tabun nerve agent against the unprotected civilian population. The first attacks of this kind were reported in May 1987, when some twenty villages were gassed in an attempt to deter the civilian population in Kurdistan from collaborating with the advancing Iranian forces. A month later several Kurdish villages in Iran were given the same "medicine," with some 100 people dead and 2,000 injured. The most appalling attack took place in March 1988, when the specter of a major Iranian breakthrough in Kurdistan drove Hussein to employ gas on an unprecedented scale against the Kurdish town of Ha-

labja. As the thick cloud of gas spread by the Iraqi plane evaporated into the clear sky, television crews were rushed into town by the Iranians and the world discovered the full extent of this horrendous massacre. Five thousand people — men, women, children and babies — were killed that day. Nearly 10,000 suffered injuries.²⁹

E. The Kurdish Revolt after the Gulf War

The Gulf war dramatically changed the opposition's fortune soon after its start. The allied coalition's mobilization against Saddam raised the hope among the opposition that it would no longer be ignored by the international community; dissident groups redoubled their efforts to reestablish a common anti-Saddam platform and began to court members of the coalition. In December 1990, almost all the members of the Iraqi opposition convened at a conference in Damascus and established a steering group, the Joint Action Committee, that condemned Saddam's dictatorship and called for his removal and free elections.

The Kurdish revolt erupted in both rural and urban area when Kurdish civilians, including professional and intellectuals as well as tens of thousands of Fursan members (Kurdish irregulars), joined the Iraqi Kurdistan front (IKF), which was made up of smaller Kurdish groups, and the rival Kurdish Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Massoud Barzani, the head of KDP, and Jalal Talabani, the leader of PUK, acted quickly to take control of the rebellion and engaged their veteran guerrilla units in attacks against government forces. Within days, and for the first time in their history, the guerrillas took several major urban centers, including the oil center of Kirkuk. By mid-March the IKF had declared that 75 percent of Kurdistan

was in rebel hands. The groups rapidly moved to restore essential services and civil administration in the "liberated" areas.

After crushing the revolt in the south, Baghdad moved its forces to north and launched an offensive to retake all urban centers by April 1. Lacking experience in urban warfare and hoping to spare urban population, the guerrillas fled into the mountains, but they found that they could not conduct war in rural areas because they had been depopulated and turned into free-fire zones.

The reason for the collapse is clear: the guerrillas were not as combat ready as the Iraqi forces. Talabani noted that he did not realize that the Republican Guards were still in good shape. Neither the IFK nor he and international community expected what happened as the revolt collapsed: hundred of thousands of civilians began an exodus from northern Iraq, that at its height, encompassed more than 50 percent of the Kurdish population. Thousands of people died because of cold weather or lack of food as they escaped to the safety of Iran or Turkey. The exodus may have been prompted by fear of reprisals by government forces, including the possibility that chemical weapons might be used, as they had been in 1988.

The refugee problem received enormous international media coverage, prompting a massive humanitarian effort to provide the refugees with food, medicine, and shelter. On April 5, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 688, which approved the establishment of "Safe Haven" in Iraqi north of the thirty-six parallels that were protected by coalition military forces; Kurdish civilians were encouraged to return to that protected zone.

Despite their commitment to overthrow Saddam, defeated Kurds had no choice but to negotiate. Bagdad balked at many of Kurds' demands: they adamantly refused to cede Kirkuk, arguing that the city did not have a Kurdish majority; it also had no intention of losing control over a substantial part of the country's oil. The Kurds were reluctant to sign an agreement, and there were reports of a growing rift between Barzani and Talabani. Barzani distrusted international guarantees and wished to conclude an agreement with Badgered, while Talabani supported the main stream opposition's belief that Kurdish autonomy and democracy in Iraq would develop if Saddam were overthrown.³⁰

F. The Safe Haven for the Kurd

As mentioned above, In mid-April 1991, the United States, Britain, France, and the Netherlands, acting on a plan first advanced by British Prime Minister John Major, created the safe haven north of the thirty-six parallel. With *Operation Provide Comfort*, coalition troops facilitated a massive Kurdish repatriation while squeezing out the Iraqi government's authority. When the last coalition soldier left northern Iraq on July 15, 1991. the four to five million Iraqi Kurds controlled an area that comprised 80 percent of the predominantly Kurdish areas in Iraq. By the end of September, all Kurdish-dominated areas in Iraq except the city of Kirkuk had come under local Kurdish control. The Kurdish zone covers 36,000 square miles, running from the Tigris River in the west eastward to the border with Iran, and including the Cizre-Dohuk-Amadiya triangle that made up original the safe haven; it also extends along the Iranian border south to Halabja and west to Suleimania and Arbil.

The Kurds maintain a Western-supported de facto government in the region, supported by some 100,000 armed Kurdish fighters. The zone remains under the UN embargo of Iraq as well as an internal Iraqi blockade.

G. The Typology of Iraqi State Terrorism to The Kurdish Minority

1. The condition associated with Iraqi state terrorism to the Kurdish minority could be classified mainly as ethnic conflicts in society. This condition is deeply related to the domestic economic stake and the regional struggle for hegemony among the peripheral countries: Iran, Turkey, Syria and Russia.

- As previously indicated, the Kurdish minority occupies more than twenty percent of Iraq's population, therefore, Kurdish separatism has been particularly disconcerting for the central government. It threatens Iraq's fragile sectarian edifice, raising the fearful specter of possible disintegration of the entire state into three entities: Kurdish, Shi'ite, and Sunni.

- Economically two thirds of the country's oil production and oil reserves come from a predominantly Kurdistan's fertile lands make it Iraq's main granary. The Iraqi government was shocked when Barzani declared in interview with the *Washington Post* in the summer of 1973, "The Kurdish territory is rich in petrol. We are lawful owners. If support were strong enough, we could control the Kirkuk field and give it to an American company to operate."

- The Kurd's total population is estimated at twenty-five million (1992), of which most are in Turkey (52 percent), Iraq (18 percent), and Iran (24 percent). ³¹

Because of this peculiar environment, the Kurds have been often used as a surrogate force in destabilizing others, in the struggle for hegemony in the region: for instance the Kurdish open rebellion with the support from the Shah of Iran in 1961-70 and Iraqi Kurdish support in the Iran-Iraqi War in 1980-1988.

- Because of this weighty consideration, central government in Baghdad had always been adamant about keeping Kurdistan an integral part of Iraq by whatever means available -- including state organized terrorism.

2. As mentioned above, Sederberge classify state terrorism into four models from an institutionalization point of view: vigilante, covert official, overt official, and genocide. What model Iraqi terrorism falls under is dependent upon specific individual situations.

It should be noted the Iraqi government does not always resort to the repressive measures in dealing with the Kurdish affairs. They often have employed domesticating efforts to assimilate the Kurd as well as divide-and-rule political technique, because suppression of all-out Kurdish rebellion would require a sustained military effort, particularly in the light of the massive support from the neighboring countries like Iran; economic cost of such civil war, especially if the Kurds were to handicap Iraq's oil industry would be great. For example, on March 11, 1970, the Iraqi government's domesticating efforts culminated in a 15 point agreement, which contained far reaching concessions to the Kurds

including recognition of Kurds as a distinctive national entirety and their right to autonomy. ³²

- Vigilante and covert terrorism models are quite limited in the effectiveness in application to the Kurds because their homogeneous communities shattered in rugged mountainous area in northern Iraq and even full scale military operations had been very difficult to achieve their missions — not to mention vigilante and covert terrorism activities. Of course Iraqi intelligence institutions have vigorously engaged in harassment and assassination of tribal leaders, but this rather repressive action could not be considered state terrorism; terrorism, as defined earlier, depends upon the nature of the target and the discrimination of the means.

- The main characteristics of state terrorism by the Iraqi government, therefore, fall under overt terrorism models, in the face of open rebellions of Kurds, in many cases supported by a neighboring country. The Kurds most nationalist activity since 1946 was in Iraq. There Kurds waged continuous guerrilla warfare (1961-70), and open rebellion (1974-75), against the Iraqi government. This movement collapsed as mentioned before, unofficial Iranian support was withdrawn after a 1975 Iran-Iraq War.

In 1988, the Iraqi government was accused of using chemical weapons against the Kurds. They again revolted after Iraq's defeat in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. When rebellion failed, more than a million of them fled their homes. As the death toll among the Kurds mounted, US military forces built a camps for them in northern Iraq. The administration of this camp was later assumed by the United Nations.

I would like to introduce here two typical examples of the Iraqi government's terrorism to the Kurds.

- In a last-ditch effort to deflect the Kurdish insurgency in 1988, a ferocious campaign was launched. This campaign assumed genocidal proportions; not only were the 8,000 "prisoners" captured in 1983 executed, along with hundreds of other members of the Kurdish opposition, but government embarked again on a systematic effort to uproot the rebellious population from its native environment. By the end of the Iran-Iraq war in the summer of 1988, more than half of the villages and numerous towns in Kurdistan were razed and their population deported. Some half a million Kurds were placed in either easily controllable settlements in the vicinity of the main towns in Kurdistan, or in concentration camps in the south-western Iraqi dessert.

This punitive campaign witnessed the extensive use of chemical weapons, including mustard gas, cyanide, and Tabun nerve against the unprotected civilian population. The most appalling attack, as described earlier in detail, took place in March 1988. Five thousand people -- men, women, children and babies -- were killed in those days. Nearly 10,000 suffered injuries.³³

- Neither the Iraqi Kurdistan Front nor the international community expected what happened as the open revolt in March 1991 after Gulf War, crashed. Hundred of thousands of civilians began an exodus from northern Iraq that encompassed more than fifty percent of the Kurdish populations. Thousand of people died because of cold weather or lack of food as they escaped to the safety of Iran or Turkey. The exodus may have been prompted by fear of reprisals by the government

forces, including the possibility that chemical weapons might be used, as they had been in 1998. The refugee problem received enormous international media coverage, prompting a massive humanitarian effort to provide the refugees with food, medicines, and shelters. ³⁴

3. The world media often reported that Iraqi state terrorism, especially gassing of the Kurdish populace in 1988 were of genocidal proportion. We admit that Iraqi state terrorism in its savageness and in its enormous scale could be called "genocidal," but this terrorist policy still had some limits. It was not aimed to kill all the Kurdish populace, neither was it intended to liquidate the entire structure of Kurdish existing institutions. Genocide, already examined earlier, should include: first, genocide represents a systematic effort over time to liquidate a national population, usually a minority; second, it functions as a fundamental political policy to assure the conformity and participation by the citizenry. The Iraqi state terrorism has not been up to these points. So, we could still categorize it as overt terrorism but as a worst case. ³⁵

H. Conclusion

Could the Kurdish Safe Haven protected by the allied coalition survive in the future free from Iraqi state terrorism? It is a difficult question in view of the following considerations. At least the "haven" will be put under harsh challenge by the Iraqi state.

First, basically speaking, the Kurdish community comprises more than twenty percent of Iraq's population. Kurdish separatism is particularly discouraging for the central government. It threatens Iraq's fragile sectarian edifices — leading to the possible disintegration of

the entire state into three entities:Kurdish, Shiite; and moreover, two thirds of the country's oil production comes from a predominantly Kurdish area, and Kurdistant fertile lands make it Iraq's main granary. The Kurdish separation is a matter of life and death.

Second, the portrait of Saddam as an omnipotent ruler was shattered by his defeat in the war and by the intensity of the insurrections. Profound bitterness was expressed by many who felt that Saddam had badly miscalculated or blundered into a trap laid for him by the coalition. Yet, he is the symbol of Iraq's achievements; he brought Iraq into an era of military strength and scientific progress. The message is clear: only under Saddam can Iraq regain its former strength; and the main stream of people has shown their belief that if Saddam is overthrown the situation will not improve but, rather, deteriorate dramatically.³⁶

Third, according to the record of the UN inspection teams in mid-summer 1991, the war had destroyed between 45 and 50 percent of a huge inventory, but Iraq still retained 2,400 tanks, 4,400 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, between 1,000 and 2,000 artillery pieces, and 250 multiple rocket launchers. The army has been restructured; Iraq now has between 350,000 and 400,000 troops, of which the Republican Guard constitutes a substantial and growing element. The army is a more professional force that would be more formidable if Iraq were allowed to rearm. Saddam is in tight control of the entire army and will never hesitate to use it for maintaining integrity of nationhood — the coercion side of the political process.³⁷

And last, the Kurd are helplessly divided among themselves by various sections as already mentioned. Though they have a strong self-identity, the Kurds are not yet ethnically unified, separated as they

are by language, custom, neo-feudal obligations and physical distance. The formation of a united front for achieving political purpose, as evidenced in their tumultuous history, has often ended in frustration. This vulnerable point has expediently been used by Iraqi authority in divide and rule, and sometimes also by neighboring countries, getting them involved in regional power games.

It is difficult to believe that either side in negotiations that followed the Kurdish uprising in March 1991 was doing more than buying time before the next round of fighting began. After all, that is not what happened to previous negotiations in 1958 to 1961, during the 1960s, in 1970 to 1974, and in 1983 to 1984.

Saddam's objectives in starting the talks seem to have been to neutralize the Kurdish resistance movements, playing for time following his shattering defeat in the Gulf War, and dividing the Iraqi opposition.

¹ Wilkinson, Paul, 1998,10, "Support Mechanism in International Terrorism in International Terrorism" in Robert O. Slator, eds., *Current Perspective on International Terrorism*, New York: St. Martin's Press.

² Ibid., 347.

³ US Department of States, Office of the Ambassador at Large for Counter Terrorism, *Patterns of Global Terrorism*, 1986, Washington DC.

⁴ Wilkinson, Paul, 89-103.

⁵ Cline, Ray S. and Yonah Alexander, 1984, *Terrorism: The Soviet Connection*, New York: Crane, Rusk.

⁶ These statistics came from *In Ter 85, A review of International Terrorism* in 1985, and *Jerusalem Post* and similarly for 1986 and 1987, published by the Jaffe Center or Strategic Studies of Tel Aviv university.

⁷ Oots, Kent Layne, 1986, 132-133, *A Political Organization Approach to Transnational*, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

⁸ Freedman, Lawrence, 1986, "Terrorism and Strategy" in Lawrence Freedman, et al., *Terrorism and international Order*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Chatham House Special Paper.

⁹ Laqueur, Walter, 1957, 144-45, *The Age of Terrorism*, Boston Toronto: Little, Brown and Company.

¹⁰ Snow, David M., 1992, 164-69, *Distant Thunder: Third World Conflict and the New International Order*, New York: St. Martin's Press.

¹¹ Harsch, Joseph C., 1992, "Back to the future in the Balkan," *The Christian Science Monitor*, January 29.

¹² Esposito, John L., 1992, 25, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?* New York: Oxford University Press/ *The Islamic Threat*, *The Economist*, March 13, 1993, 25.

¹³ Sederberg, Peter c., 1989, 59-66, *Terrorist: Myths Illusion, Rhetoric, and Reality*, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc.

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- ¹⁴ Wilkinson, Paul, 1988, 10, "Support Mechanism in International Terrorism," in Robert O. Slaton, eds., *Current Perspective on International Terrorism*, New York: Martin's Press.
- ¹⁵ Bushnell, P. Timothy, 1991, 3-23, *State Organized Terror: The Case of Violent Internal Repression*, Boulder and San Francisco: Westview Press.
- ¹⁶ Bushnell, 41-49
- ¹⁷ Sederberg, 3-19
- ¹⁸ Sederverg, 59-67
- ¹⁹ Stohl, Michael and George A. Lopez, 1984, 59-83, *The State As Terrorist: The Dynamics of Governmental Violence and Repression*, West Port, Connecticut: Greenwood Press
- ²⁰ Stohl, 43-58
- ²¹ Karsh Effrain and Inari Routs, 1991, 69-84, *Saddam Hussein*, New York: The Free Press, a Division of Macmillan, Inc.
- ²² Gunter, Michel M. 1992, ix-x, *The Kurd of Iraq*, New York: St. Martin's Press.
- ²³ Karsh, 71
- ²⁴ Karsh, 72-74
- ²⁵ Hussein, Saddam, 1979, 31, *Social and Foreign Affairs in Iraq*, London: Groom Helm.
- ²⁶ Gunter, 32-35.
- ²⁷ Gunter, 26-29.
- ²⁸ Gunter, 37-39.
- ²⁹ Karsh, 169.
- ³⁰ Hashim, Ahmed, 12, *Iraq: The Pariah State*, "Current History," January 1992.
- ³¹ *Academic American Encyclopedia, The Kurd.*
- ³² Saddam, 72.
- ³³ Marr, Phebe, 1989, 15-23, *Modern History of Iraq*, Duke University Press.

³⁴ Galbrath, Peter, 1991, *Civil War in Iraq*, Staff Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, May 1991, Washington D.C. : US Government Printing Office.

³⁵ Horowitz, Irving L. *Taking Khives: Genocide and State Power*, Ni: Transaction Book.

³⁶ Hashim, 15-16, *Current History*, January 1992.

³⁷ Hashim, 14-15.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Terrorism can be reduced but not eradicated because however democratic society, however near to perfection the social institution, there will always be alienated and disaffected people, some of whom will be aggressive and more interested in violence than in freedom and tolerance -- the very source terrorism. The reaction to terrorists, can not be ignored because the fortunes of terrorism depend largely on the response it encounters both from the public and authorities. With the Cold War over and the superpowers no longer assuming responsibility for maintaining peace and stability within their respective spheres of influence, a greater burden has naturally fallen on the responsible nations of world community to cope with terrorism through international cooperation through world organization including the United Nations.

But the stark reality of the international community is not so friendly to international cooperation to cope with terrorism. Although the international community appears to recognize the needs for cooperation against terrorism, national interests have dominated the treatment of the issue and unanimity has been rhetorical rather than practicable. There can be no doubt that sensitivity to political implication of the issue of terrorism has limited international cooperation. The search for juridical solution in the United Nations has not been notably successful. Many Western observers agree that realistically the United Na-

tions is not the best forum for cooperation against terrorism. In fact, in the U.S. perspective, inability to agree on condemning terrorism has discredited the United Nations. Given the universal scope of UN treaties, as well as the controversial nature of terrorism, it is not surprising that international treaties are often ineffective because of understanding and reluctant implementation.

Also, we must concede that, despite the potential advantage of counter-terrorism, its usage remains controversial for at least three reasons. First, counter-terrorism is very difficult to execute, and even when done effectively it may cause the government to act in ways that the public may find morally and culturally unacceptable. Second, there is disagreement over whether a legal or military approach should be taken. Finally, counter terrorism is not the function of any one government agency, which creates a jurisdictional tangle that hinders the development of effective counter-terrorism policy. ¹

In addition, the difficulty of engaging in counter-terrorism has at least some interactive aspects. First, terrorist groups are clandestine organization headquartered in unfriendly countries where, for instance, U.S. intelligence assets may be deficient in Syria and Iraq. This difficulty was evident in the American hostage problem in Lebanon: most of the difficulty was in finding the hostages. Second, there is the problem of initiative. Although counter-terrorism is intended to take the initiative away from the terrorist, the terrorist effectiveness comes from attacking at unexpected times in places impossible to target. Third, there is related a problem of the idiosyncrasy of terrorist acts. Each terrorist act is very different in terms of anticipating when or if it will occur. Thus, anti-terrorist activities may prevent one terror-

ist act but have no effect on another. A fourth, difficulty is that terrorists are often accorded government protection by the countries in which they operate. The counter-terrorist must overcome not only the terrorist but also the host government.

The fifth problem involves identifying the center of gravity of the terrorist organization -- who and what to attack. Successful terrorists seek to imbed themselves in the population so as to make their identification more difficult as well as to make it harder for others to attack them without alienating the population. Sixth, many of the most effective counter-terrorist acts suffer from cultural offensiveness to most Americans. Effective action of anti-terrorism may cover a range of actions, up to and including the assassination of known terrorists. The US government is prohibited from abetting or committing assassinations, which is a reflection of American cultural value. ²

During the Cold War, the two superpowers defined the "red lines" of international behavior, signaling to other nation-states and political groupings what activities were off-limits because they threatened the interests of bi-polar contestants. Now, the Security Council, more than the East-West framework can be the forum in which those red line are drawn. If it chooses, the Security Council can define a structure for managing the use of force that would increase the clarity of its decision-making and the predictability of its actions. The various actors in today's civil war-like conflicts are unrestrained by a awareness of "red lines" and of whom will set or enforce them. Establishing limits will take time, but unless it is done, the alternative may be international anarchy. Yet, there are other roles that this new era has

brought upon the various UN institutions. The end of the Cold War has implicitly given the United Nations the monumental task of redefining the concept of enemy. The institution of the Secretary General may be the most appropriate to that task. It has to rally the world community against its new enemy -- intolerance -- and the Security Council has to draw the "red lines" of the emerging international system. Otherwise, member states produce leaders who can lead without an enemy. ³

Actually, following the end of the Cold War, the United Nations has greatly expanded its peace making and peace keeping operations around the world. Between 1991 and 1992 the United Nations established 13 new peace keeping operations -- exactly the number initiated by the world body in its entire previous 42 years of its existence. At the start of 1993, UN peace keeping forces were serving in Angola, Cambodia, Cyprus, El Salvador, Golan Heights, Kashmir, along the Kuwait-Iraqi border, in Lebanon, Mozambique, the Sinai, Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and Western Sahara; all told some 60,000 military and police personnel were involved in these operations, with the number expected to increase substantially in the future.

These operations have contributed to stability in many parts of the globe and given the United Nations enhanced international visibility and respectability. And while some of the operations have run into difficulties, most observers agree that conditions in these areas would probably be much worse without the presence of the blue helmets.

Nevertheless, world leaders generally agree that the United Nations' current capabilities and methods are inadequate for the wide range of conflicts and security challenges expected in years to come.

The Security Council has called on Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and his staff to suggest ways in which organizations and peacemaking activities can be improved. Development and implementation of this suggestion is likely to be the organization's top priority in the mid-1990s. To inform the discussion of peacemaking, Boutros Ghali published *An Agenda for Peace* in June 1992.⁴ In this document, the Secretary General identifies five key areas in need of improvement: preventive diplomacy, or the negotiated termination of conflicts; peacemaking, peacekeeping, or use of United Nations forces to monitor cease-fire and to prevent the reignition of hostilities; peace enforcement, or the use of force to prevent or resist aggression by a belligerent in violation of United Nations' resolutions; and post-conflict peace-building designed to alleviate human suffering and thus eliminate conditions that might contribute to the renewal of fighting. Boutros-Ghali proposed a number of initiatives in each of these areas, and broke new ground by calling for the formation of a permanent peacekeeping force under UN control.

The development of new approaches to local and regional conflicts has also been the matter of great concern in the United States, which has been under great pressure to step in resolve certain ongoing crises (notably those in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Somali). While the American leaders would prefer to delegate all such activities to the United Nations, others, including both President George Bush and Bill Clinton, contend that the United States has an obligation to act in certain cases where no other option appears viable. Thus in December 1992, President Bush, with only six weeks left in his term, ordered United States forces

to Somalia in order to restore order in a country torn by fictional warfare and to protect the delivery of relief supplies to starving Somalis. In announcing "Operation Restore Hope," the President indicated that the United States cannot assume such responsibility in every instance of regional disorder, but that it must be prepared to act when the survival of many human beings is at stake and when no other entity is available to do the job. "I understand [that] the United States cannot right the world's wrongs, but we also know that some crises in the world cannot be resolved without American involvement[and that] American action is often necessary as a catalyst for broader involvement of the community of nations." These comments, and the dispatch of American troops to Somali, sparked a heated debate in the United States over where and under what circumstances United States forces should be employed in such operations abroad.

Whatever the outcome in the United States and at the United Nations on the use of force in humanitarian and peacekeeping operations, it is apparent that the problem of preventing and controlling local, ethnic, and regional conflicts has become the premier world security concern of the post Cold War era. Because such conflicts are likely to proliferate in the years ahead, and because no single power or group is willing and able to guarantee global peace and stability, United States and world leaders will be forced to enhance existing peace-keeping instruments and to develop new techniques along the lines suggested by Secretary General Boutros-Ghali. How peaceful a world we inhabit in the twenty-first century will depend to a great extent on these endeavors.

¹ Snow, Donald M., 1993, 128, *Distant Thunder: Third World Conflict and New International Order*, New York: St. Martin's Press.

² Ibid., 129.

³ Giandomenico, 1994, The United Nation and Use of Force, *Foreign Affairs*, September/ October/October 1994.

⁴ Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 1992, *An Agenda for Peace*, New York: United Nations.

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