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The Intifada, the PLO, and the Middle East peace process, 1987-1993

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THE INTIFADA, THE PLO, AND THE
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS,
1987-93

by
Roger A. Duzenack

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts
in
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Department of Political Science
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

This thesis presents a qualitative theoretical analysis of the variables leading to the 13 September 1993 signing of the Declaration of Principles between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization. The global and regional implications of the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, the Second Gulf War, and developments in the occupied territories culminating in the Intifada are examined. The end of the Cold War meant the end of superpower patronage and unlimited military support for radical regimes such as Syria and non-state actors such as the PLO. The Second Gulf War further eroded the position of the PLO, while propelling Syria into a leadership role in the ensuing peace negotiations begun at the Madrid Conference. A weakened PLO led to the dominance of Hamas in the occupied territories. The result of these forces was the 1993 peace agreement between Israel and the PLO.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	v
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER 2 A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS	5
Conceptualization	5
Methodology	7
Theoretical Approaches	11
Conflict Theory	12
Realist and Bargaining Theory	22
CHAPTER 3 THE GLOBAL AND REGIONAL CONTEXT	31
The End of the Cold War	31
The Second Gulf War	41
CHAPTER 4 THE LOCAL CONTEXT	54
The Intifada	60
The Influence of Hamas	65
CHAPTER 5 THE MOVE TOWARDS PEACE	74
CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION	84
BIBLIOGRAPHY	91

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

DFLP	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
IDF	Israeli Defense Force
PFLP	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PNC	Palestine National Council
PNF	Palestine National Front
UNLU	Unified National Leadership of the Uprising
US	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The signing of the Declaration of Principles on 13 September 1993 between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) at the White House was heralded by many as the end of the Arab-Israeli conflict in general, and of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular. As events since that time have shown, such an enthusiastic conclusion may have been overly optimistic. Still, it was a watershed event that created much hope for an improvement over the status quo of the last twenty-six years.

Perhaps much of the optimism sprang from the mutual recognition of the actors and the involvement of radical regimes long perceived to be hostile toward Israel, who were seen as waiting for the day to come when Israel would finally be defeated. This long-standing Arab perception regarding Israel was illustrated by Hasayn Haikal, editor of the Cairo daily Al-Ahram, in an editorial following the 1967 Six Day War.

There is one Arab nation which lives on a territory stretching from the Arab Gulf to the Atlantic Ocean and numbers 100 million souls. The unity of this nation is not a subject for debate.... At the heart of this nation a

foreign unit has been formed, in the shape of a sharpangled triangle.... This triangle separates the Eastern Arab territory and peoples from the Western Arab territory and peoples. In this way, Israel's geographic location forms an artificial island in the midst of the Arab ocean. This situation cannot persist no matter what extraordinary resources are supplied. The waves on both sides will continue to beat against this artificial island and in the course of time will wear it down until it breaks and falls apart and is swept away in the mighty expanse of the ocean.¹

What was it that changed this perception for a few key actors and led to the creation of an environment conducive to mutual recognition and the signing of a peace agreement? The analysis of a conflict should begin by "...examining the goals of the adversaries...the focal points of their positions, which in turn create their collision."² The focal point of the conflict between Israel and the Arabs in general, and Israel and the PLO and Palestinians in particular, is a clash for control over the same piece of land, "...known to the former as Israel and to the latter as Palestine."³

Zionists lay claim to this piece of land based on the belief that Jews have the right to a national home there because of the presence of a Jewish nation there two thousand years ago. Further justification is given by

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¹Quoted in Michael Brecher, "The Middle East Subordinate System and Its Impact on Israel's Foreign Policy," International Studies Quarterly 13, no. 2 (June 1969): 138.

²Yehoshafat Harkabi, Israel's Fateful Hour, trans. Lenn Schramm (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1988), 1.

³James A. Bill and Robert Springborg, Politics in the Middle East, 3rd ed. (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman/Little, Brown Higher Education, 1990), 300.

referring to world-wide anti-Semitism, the suffering of the Holocaust, and the development and modernization of a democratic state in the region. Many Zionists also claim that since the Palestinians are Arabs, they should simply move to one of the Arab states, Jordan being the one most commonly referred to. Palestinians deny the claim on the land by Zionists, arguing that they have owned and occupied it for centuries. In addition, Palestinians have refused to recognize a state created by colonial powers, and resent being made to pay for the sins of the rest of the world.⁴

The change in perceptions and creation of an environment conducive to peaceful coexistence occurred in a larger context than that of the local conflict over land. In this thesis, I shall describe and explain developments in the peace process by examining the role of the Intifada⁵ and the PLO in the global, regional, and domestic contexts of the move toward peace. Since 1987, the Intifada has placed increased pressure and demands on Israel for some sort of resolution to the conflict between it and the PLO. While the Intifada as an event, and the PLO as a major actor in the whole process, are important in examining the move toward peace, this analysis cannot concentrate solely on the Intifada and the PLO, however, since the interaction between them and each with other actors and influences must

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⁴Ibid.

⁵The Intifada is the Palestinian uprising in the occupied territories. The word "Intifada" is the English equivalent of the Arabic *Intifadah*.

be taken into account. What were the other determinants and influences that compelled Israel and the PLO to pursue peace? Answering this question requires a theoretical analysis of three key variables: the global and regional implications of the end of the Cold War and demise of the Soviet Union, the Second Gulf War between Iraq and the United States—led Multinational Coalition, and developments in the occupied territories culminating in the Intifada. The purpose of the analysis will be to test the proposition that were it not for the conjunction of these three variables, the signing of the Declaration of Principles between Israel and the PLO would not have occurred.

CHAPTER 2

A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

It is commonly accepted in political science today that no single grand or universal theory exists that is capable of explaining great changes in the world.⁶ The peace agreement between Israel and the PLO certainly qualifies as a major change. Without a single theory to establish the parameters of inquiry in describing and explaining the developments that led to the peace accord, it is necessary to employ several theories at different levels of analysis. This approach allows examination of the whole--the global, regional, and domestic contexts and actors involved--rather than an examination of a single actor operating at only one level of analysis.

Conceptualization

What were the determinants and influences that compelled Israel and the PLO to pursue peace? Identifying the determinants and influences produce concepts to be used as variables. These variables in turn become indicators

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⁶Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory (New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., 1993), vii.

subject to qualitative analysis. Identification of the levels of analysis and actors involved produces the concepts to be operationalized. They may be individuals, subnational groups, states, transnational groups, international groups or organizations with states as members, or the international system as a whole.⁷

A state, Israel, and a transnational group, the PLO, acted together to produce peace. Israel and the PLO then become the dependent variable who were influenced toward this end. Other "actors"--sometimes taking the form of historical events--operating at various levels combine as independent variables. They include the global and regional implications of the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, the Second Gulf War, and developments in the occupied territories culminating in the Intifada. The 1948 War of Independence, the 1967 and 1973 wars, and the 1982 invasion of Lebanon may all be considered as antecedent variables. World pressure on Israel for some sort of resolution of the conflict, a need to break up the united Arab negotiating front they faced at the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991, and the bargaining power of the parties are all alternative variables.

These variables are not strictly independent since they do not act autonomously from one another. They combine in

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⁷James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1990), 22-25.

a conjuncture to influence Israel and the PLO. Arranged in hierarchical fashion at different levels the variables can be employed theoretically to construct a framework for analysis. By operationalizing the variables in this manner they serve as indicators to be used in a qualitative theoretical analysis. This comparative analysis will test the proposition that were it not for the conjuncture of these variables, the signing of the Declaration of Principles would never have occurred.

Methodology

It is necessary to identify the approach in the presentation of the information and arguments used to test this proposition. Any approach proceeds from the point of view of the person conducting the research. This point of view determines how the research is conducted and this is "...determined by the evaluative ideas that dominate the investigator and his age."⁸

The evaluative ideas that have dominated the discipline of political science can be divided into three phases. The first was the traditional approach. It was historical, non-comparative, normative, conservative, and focused on the legal documents and institutions of government.⁹

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⁸Max Weber quoted in Viotti and Kauppi, International Relations Theory, 2.

⁹See, for example, Alfred Zimmern, The League of Nations and the Rule of Law, 1918-1935 (New York: MacMillan & Co., 1936).

Behavioralism was the second. It was ahistorical, empiricist, abstract, and focused on the scientific method used in the natural sciences in an effort to be explanatory.¹⁰ This focus led to the study of topics that could be quantitatively measured and led to a primacy of method over substance. Both the traditional and behavioral approaches were criticized for being too conservative and ethnocentric. The third or current phase is the post-behavioral approach. This approach is both empirical and normative and is primarily oriented toward an interpretation of the Third World. It seeks to be less abstract, conservative, and ethnocentric with a focus on substance rather than method. It is radical, holistic, and change-oriented.¹¹

The differences between the behavioral and post-behavioral approaches are the result of two distinct views of the world and how knowledge is perceived. When applied, these two views, positivism and historicism, result in either a behavioral orthodox approach or a post-behavioral radical approach, shaping the methodology used in conducting research.¹²

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¹⁰See, for example, Samuel A. Kirkpatrick, Quantitative Analysis of Political Data (Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1974).

¹¹See, for example, Immanuel Wallerstein, Geopolitics and Geoculture: Essays on the Changing World-System (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

¹²Ronald H. Chilcote, Theories of Comparative Politics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981), 63.

Positivist thought can be traced to the French Enlightenment and British empiricism. This approach stresses the use of natural science methods and technology in acquiring knowledge. Knowledge is based on objectivity and the observation of real experience. This sensory experience is independent of time, place, and circumstance. The mind perceives knowledge the same way regardless of time or place. Facts that lead to knowledge can be known and verified through the empirical observation of reality and are valid only if observed and tested.¹³ This is the foundation of behavioralism and the use of quantitative methods for testing theory. It is ahistorical, abstract, and relies on breaking down the whole into component parts that can be isolated and subjected to empirical testing.¹⁴

In contrast, historicist thought focuses on the whole of history and believes that all knowledge is essentially relative to time and place. It is traced back to Giambattista Vico and Johann Herder and is closely associated with the nineteenth century German theories of Georg Hegel and Karl Marx. This approach argues that knowledge based on sensory experience obtained through empirical observation is not objective. Prior awareness and bias play a part. There are a variety of views of the world, and the perception of knowledge changes through time

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¹³Ibid., 62.

¹⁴Ibid., 74.

and across cultures.¹⁵ This approach is historical, substantive, interdisciplinary, holistic, and relies principally on qualitative methods. Since knowledge cannot be separated from the observer, the relations of component parts must be examined in the context of the whole.¹⁶

My approach is radical post-behavioral in the sense that it is holistic, historical, interdisciplinary, and utilizes different theories at different levels to inform and shape a descriptive comparative analysis.¹⁷ This approach is flexible and allows an examination of several variables together, rather than studying each in isolation, using qualitative empirical methodology.

This methodology is substantive content analysis. Content analysis, the "...systematic counting, assessing, and interpreting of the form and substance of communication,"¹⁸ produces information for use in a descriptive analysis. Describing the parts or relations of things is "...intended to provide an accurate representation of some phenomenon...,"¹⁹ in this case the conjuncture of several variables that led to the signing of the Declaration of Principles between Israel and the PLO.

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¹⁵Ibid., 62-70.

¹⁶Ibid., 74.

¹⁷Ibid., 402.

¹⁸Jarol B. Manheim and Richard C. Rich, Empirical Political Analysis: Research Methods in Political Science, 3d ed. (New York: Longman Publishing Group, 1991), 160.

¹⁹Ibid., 73.

The unit of measure in content analysis can be a word, a theme, or an item. An item is the communication itself taken as a whole, such as a journal article or book.²⁰ This is the unit of measurement I will use. Substantive content analysis is concerned with the substance of the item. Focusing on what is said gleans salient references and ideas used to support and inform the analysis.²¹ Using this method for descriptive analysis enables me to "...summarize fairly rigorously certain direct physical evidences of the behaviors of, and the relationships between, various types of political actors."²²

Theoretical Approaches

Various types of political actors operating at different levels of analysis necessitate the use of several theories in order to examine the whole context since no single theory is capable of doing so. These different theories "...provide sets of reasons why facts should be connected in given ways and make facts useful by providing us with a framework for interpreting them and seeing their relationship to one another."²³

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²⁰Ibid., 162-3.

²¹Ibid., 164.

²²Ibid., 161.

²³Ibid., 19.

Conflict Theory

The term "conflict" generally refers to a condition where one group of people, united by tribal, ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious, socioeconomic, or political traits, are opposed to or engaged in confrontation with another group. This occurs as a result of the opposing groups "...pursuing what are or appear to be incompatible goals,"²⁴ such as trying to control or occupy the same piece of land.

Conflict, as opposition or confrontation between groups, involves human interaction. It does not, in this sense, refer to the struggle of people against their environment or to mere competition between them. This interaction as conflict may be manifest or underlying. Manifest conflict refers to conflict over something tangible such as land or some other resource. Underlying conflict is the psychological component of the interaction. It may involve personal dislike, hate, prejudice, or distrust at the individual level, and competing ideology or nationalism at the group level. Manifest conflict is almost always accompanied by some form of underlying conflict and "...often cannot be resolved more than temporarily unless the underlying conflict is dealt with."²⁵

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²⁴Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories, 187.

²⁵Bertram H. Raven and Arie W. Kruglanski, "Conflict and Power," in The Structure of Conflict, ed. Paul Swingle (New York: Academic Press, Inc., 1970), 71.

Manifest conflict may occur in the form of international war, civil war, revolution, guerrilla insurgency, political assassination, sabotage, terrorism, seizure of hostages, strikes, popular revolt, and economic sanctions and reprisals. Underlying conflict can be manipulated through psychological warfare, propaganda, speeches, media reports, and pamphlets to assist or oppose some form of manifest conflict.²⁶

In these various forms, conflict may be violent or nonviolent, controllable or uncontrollable, and subject to resolution depending on these and other circumstances. It may not be continuous or uniformly intense, fluctuating as circumstances and the environment change, but it is a recurring phenomenon common to all societies. The resolution of all conflict is often referred to as a necessity for human progress, but many social scientists hold the view that the "...total elimination of conflict from the human situation is not only impossible but undesirable, because conflict in some forms is a condition of social change and progress."²⁷ Whether conflict is good or bad depends on the context in which it arises, the resources and values at stake, and the cost versus the gain and outcomes for the groups involved.

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²⁶Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories, 192.

²⁷Ibid., 188.

There are usually multiple causes of conflict in its various forms and different theories have been constructed in an attempt to explain them. These theories generally fall into one of two categories: microcosmic and macrocosmic. Microcosmic theories of conflict assume that the origins of conflict are within the person and are a basic part of human nature. The behavior of the individual leads or contributes to the behavior of the group. Macrocosmic theories assume that the origins of conflict are found in human institutions. They study conflict at the group level of classes, movements, collectives, coalitions, or other social institutions. The difference between the two might be described as an analysis of conflict based on knowledge of the individual versus knowledge of collective behavior.²⁸

A microcosmic analysis of conflict proceeds from the presumption that the origin is related to human nature. The key concept in this approach is aggression on the part of the individual. Is this aggression a result of genetic predisposition or is it a psychological response to society? According to Sigmund Freud, aggression is a psychological response to society resulting from frustration.²⁹ Freud's concept of frustration-aggression was based on his notion that the basic function of an

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²⁸Ibid., 189.

²⁹Ibid., 276.

individual was the seeking of pleasure and avoidance of pain. Whenever one or both of these functions were blocked, the result was aggression. This aggression was most often directed at the external world.³⁰

John Dollard, expanding on Freud's work in a more deterministic way, assumed that aggression is always a consequence of frustration. "The proposition is that the occurrence of aggressive behavior always presupposes the existence of frustration and, contrariwise, that the existence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression."³¹ Dollard believed that all forms of conflict--class struggle, revolt, revolution, civil war, etc.--manifest themselves in frustration-aggression tendencies.³²

These tendencies resulting in aggression can be taught to children and passed from generation to generation. This socialization of aggression allows it to perpetuate and continue, but only if social permission is given. This permission, a form of socialization in itself, may take two forms. Rivalry, which is direct and a form of manifest conflict, is the first. The second is traditional patterning. This form of underlying conflict gives social permission by identifying patterns that justify or give a

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³⁰John Dollard et al., eds., Frustration and Aggression (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939), 21.

³¹Ibid., 1.

³²Ibid., 23.

historical reason for aggression.³³ The result of this pattern identification is a determination of who will be perceived as the source of the frustration and, therefore, the target of aggression. It is communicated through and reinforced by culture, ideology, and nationalism.³⁴

Recently social scientists in general and psychologists in particular have been more inclined to agree with Freud and Dollard that the source of aggression is some form of frustration. This approach has been reinforced by conflict studies of the Third World that focus on the causes of revolution. Many believe that "...the high conflict potential of the developing areas is a function of frustration caused by economic deprivation."³⁵

Macrocosmic theories approach conflict at the group level and often view revolts or revolutions as social movements. James Denfronzo defines a social movement as a "...persistent and organized effort on the part of a relatively large number of people either to bring about or resist social change."³⁶ A social movement may be classified as either a reform or a revolutionary movement. A reform movement seeks to change only limited aspects of a society without drastically changing or replacing the

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³³Ibid., 152.

³⁴Ibid., 158.

³⁵Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories, 282.

³⁶James Denfronzo, Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 7.

existing social, political, and economic institutions of the society. An example might be a movement the goal of which is to change an existing policy of a government. Revolutionary movements seek to extensively change or even totally replace existing institutions. Most use violence as a means of implementing this change. This violence may take one of the forms of manifest conflict such as guerrilla insurgency, terrorism, or popular revolt.³⁷

Revolutionary movements may be further classified into two ideal types. A "left-wing" revolution's main goal is the redistribution of resources. It seeks to change or replace major institutions in order to alter the social, political, and economic relations within a society. A "right-wing" revolution's central aim is to restore or reestablish traditional institutions that have been lost. This ideal type emphasizes maintaining social order and traditional authority over the pursuit of social equality through institutional change.³⁸

Denfronzo identifies five critical factors that are necessary and sufficient conditions for a successful revolutionary movement if they occur simultaneously. They are: mass frustration resulting in a popular uprising, dissident elite political movements, unifying motivations, state political crisis, and a permissive world context.³⁹

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³⁷Ibid., 8.

³⁸Ibid., 9.

³⁹Ibid., 10-11.

Mass frustration resulting in popular uprisings occurs when a large portion of the population becomes discontented. Denfronzo believes this popular discontent is a consequence of "relative deprivation." Relative deprivation is the result of the gap between expectations and the ability to realize those expectations in the present society under current conditions. This may be the result of rapidly deteriorating economic conditions or standards of living, a period of economic growth followed by decline, military defeat resulting in occupation and exploitation, a perception that the current situation is morally wrong, or increased knowledge (and therefore expectations) through communication, experience, and education. Relative deprivation leads to popular discontent, popular discontent to mass frustration, mass frustration to mass mobilization, and mass mobilization to mass participation in the uprising.⁴⁰

Dissident elite political movements usually emerge from a combination of state crisis and relative deprivation causing mass frustration. They are important because it is often elites who play a key role in forming or expanding and communicating an ideology to be used as an additional unifying motivator in support of the revolution. The ideology may be of any type (socialist, nationalist,

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⁴⁰Ibid., 11.

religious, etc.) so long as it is successful in helping to mobilize mass support and participation.⁴¹

Successful mobilization of mass support and participation in a revolutionary movement requires a strong unifying motivation. This motivation often takes the form of nationalism. Nationalism emerges as a reaction to occupation, exploitation, and rule by a foreign power whose actions are perceived not to be in the national interest of the occupied. Regardless of individual or small group differences, "...people sharing the same language, culture, and historical experience who perceive that their ethnic or national group has been the victim of exploitation by another group or country can join together in an effort to end their domination."⁴²

Most successful revolutions occur in conjunction with a state political crisis. This crisis may be a result of a defeat in war, natural disaster, economic depression, withdrawal of support from a key ally, or changes in the global or regional political, economic, and military conditions. The consequence of the crisis is that the state is incapable of coopting the revolutionary movement or of successfully ending it through the application of force. A state in crisis, not capable of putting down a

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⁴¹Ibid., 14.

⁴²Ibid., 16.

revolution but not threatened by it either, often turns to a negotiated settlement to end the conflict.⁴³

The last factor Denfronzo identifies as necessary for a successful revolution is the existence of a permissive or tolerant world context. This means that foreign actors do not intervene in an attempt to prevent or put down a revolutionary movement. It may be that outside actors interfere or provide assistance of some sort in support of the revolution. During the Cold War many revolutions were greatly influenced and their outcomes determined by the presence or absence of a superpower.⁴⁴

The five factors identified by Denfronzo as necessary for a successful revolution represent a more modern, detailed, and systematic version of the frustration-aggression proposition of Dollard. Farrokh Moshiri and Jack A. Goldstone formulate a theory of modern revolution that incorporates the same factors as Denfronzo's theory, but also identify several other important characteristics.

The barriers that prevent the realization of rising expectations must be perceived by the collective mass as being illegitimate.⁴⁵ All societies have barriers to expectations, but most are recognized as being penetrable

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⁴³Ibid., 18.

⁴⁴Ibid., 19.

⁴⁵Farrokh Moshiri, "Revolutionary Conflict Theory in an Evolutionary Perspective," in Revolutions of the Late Twentieth Century, eds. Jack A. Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, and Farrokh Moshiri (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 14.

if certain conditions are met, such as getting an education or working hard for promotion. Illegitimate barriers cannot be overcome since they are constructed or maintained for the sole purpose of preventing advancement. The perception of illegitimacy is strengthened further when the state responds with force to the ensuing mass uprisings. Force usually fails and in fact becomes a unifying motivator and fuels more mass frustration and uprising.

Another important component of discontent leading to mass frustration and popular uprising is population growth. A surge in population growth producing a large proportion of youth who are discontented due mainly to economic factors (falling wages, rising prices, unemployment, underemployment) make willing participants in a popular uprising. This is especially true when they are concentrated in small urban areas and are easily mobilized.⁴⁶ In order for mass mobilization and participation to be successful there must exist at the local community level groups, institutions, and leaders willing to organize and motivate participation despite the presence of oppressive state authority.⁴⁷ Mass mobilization for uprising and revolution may be dependent upon relative deprivation, discontent, and frustration, but

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⁴⁶Ibid., 30.

⁴⁷Jack A. Goldstone, "An Analytical Framework," in Revolutions of the Late Twentieth Century, eds. Jack A. Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, and Farrokh Moshiri (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 40.

popular support for the cause is most easily catalyzed by seizing on an opportunity such as a spontaneous demonstration or a riot. Communicated through pamphlet literature and speeches the catalytic event is used to motivate and mobilize the population.⁴⁸

The microcosmic conflict theory of frustration-aggression and the macrocosmic theory of revolution are useful in examining the Palestinian struggle against Israel. From its establishment until 1982 the PLO was engaged in a revolutionary movement using manifest conflict against Israel. Beginning in 1987 the locus of the Palestinian struggle moved to the occupied territories. All five of Denfronzo's necessary factors were relevant in this move and it resulted in a popular revolutionary uprising, the Intifada.

Realist and Bargaining Theory

Realist and bargaining theory also proceed from certain presumptions about human nature. Realism holds the view that problems in the world are the "...result of forces inherent in human nature."⁴⁹ Human nature is power hungry, untrusting, unmalleable, and prone to conflict rather than cooperation. Improvements in the world are obtained by

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⁴⁸Ibid., 43.

⁴⁹Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 6th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1985), 3.

accepting these forces and working with them. Since conflict is inevitable, a reliance on moral principles is insufficient. Conflict must be managed by pursuing self-interests through the manipulation of power.

Self-interests are pursued and conflict managed via relationships among various actors through international politics. International politics becomes "...the effort of one state, or other international actor, to influence in some way another state, or other international actor."⁵⁰ The actors involved in international politics are viewed by realism as being rational in the sense that given particular goals they always "...consider feasible alternatives to achieve these goals in the light of their existing capabilities."⁵¹ The primary goal, or self-interest, is national security and the preservation of the state. Military and political issues dominate the agenda of international politics in an attempt to maximize this national self-interest. Referring to Niccolo Machiavelli's The Prince, Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi put it this way:

"...The security of the state is so important that it may justify certain acts by the prince that would be forbidden to other individuals not burdened by the princely responsibility of assuring that security. The end--security of the state--is understood to justify any means necessary to achieve that end."⁵²

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⁵⁰Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories, 14.

⁵¹Viotti and Kauppi, International Relations Theory, 35.

⁵²Ibid., 39.

Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson viewed the pursuit of national self-interest as being the pursuit of power. All of international politics is a struggle for power. How power is defined and used depends on the political and cultural environment of the actor, but it "...may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man."⁵³ In this view power dictates the content and nature of all social relationships, but it is especially important for the relations between actors in international politics. In international politics, the primary objective in peace or war is "...neither war nor peace but something common to both: the enhancement of the power of your state to resist the will of others and impose your will upon them, and the diminution of the power of others to resist your will and impose their will upon you."⁵⁴ During times of peace the primary means of achieving this is through "...bargaining supported by threats of force."⁵⁵

Bargaining is usually conducted through diplomatic channels and conferences. According to Morgenthau, diplomacy has four basic tasks:

- 1) Diplomacy must determine its objectives in the light of the power actually and potentially available for the pursuit

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⁵³Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations, 11.

⁵⁴Adel Safty, "The Arab-Israeli Balance of Power After the Storm," International Relations XII, no. 3 (December 1994): 53.

⁵⁵Ibid.

of these objectives.

2) Diplomacy must assess the objectives of other nations and the power actually and potentially available for the pursuit of these objectives.

3) Diplomacy must determine to what extent these different objectives are compatible with each other.

4) Diplomacy must employ the means suited to the pursuit of its objectives.⁵⁶

In determining and assessing objectives, their compatibility, and the means suited to their pursuit and the power required to obtain them, diplomacy becomes bargaining in itself. "It seeks outcomes that, though not ideal for either party, are better for both than some of the alternatives."⁵⁷ These outcomes reflect a common interest to avoid a bad alternative that usually takes the form of mutual damage and physical harm resulting from an application of force. An application of force, however, can also be an exercise to demonstrate bargaining power. The potential to damage property and inflict physical harm by violent acts is used by an actor to influence behavior, to affect the decisions and choices made by another actor. In this way the power to hurt is bargaining power and its use is coercive diplomacy.⁵⁸

In coercive diplomacy, "whether it is sheer terroristic violence to induce an irrational response, or cool premeditated violence to persuade somebody that you mean it

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⁵⁶Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations, 563.

⁵⁷Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 1.

⁵⁸Ibid., 2.

and may do it again, it is not the pain and damage itself but its influence on somebody's behavior that matters."⁵⁹ Its use entails a strategy to alter the nature of power relations in a conflict situation, and therefore influence the bargaining process and potential outcomes.⁶⁰

This strategy, the "exploitation of potential force" to gain advantage or concessions in a conflict situation relies on the realist assumption that rational actors will consciously calculate the cost versus the gains of various outcomes.⁶¹ This approach also assumes that:

...Most conflict situations are essentially bargaining situations. They are situations in which the ability of one participant to gain his ends is dependent to an important degree on the choices or decisions that the other participant will make. The bargaining may be explicit, as when one offers a concession; or it may be by tacit maneuver, as when one occupies or evacuates strategic territory.⁶²

Explicit bargaining takes place at a conference table. Tacit bargaining can be ongoing and take place anywhere. Actors may watch and interpret each other's behavior with the awareness that actions are being interpreted on both sides. Actions are undertaken based on the expectations of what the other will do in reaction, and the subsequent

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⁵⁹Ibid., 3.

⁶⁰Raven and Kruglanski, "Conflict and Power," 69.

⁶¹Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), 5.

⁶²Ibid.

reaction is interpreted and leads to further action again.⁶³

The distributional aspect of bargaining is where one actor gets more out of the deal than the other. This is explicit bargaining and each actor is "...guided mainly by his expectations of what the other will accept."⁶⁴ As the bargaining proceeds and expectations get more complex, an agreement is reached when an actor makes a final concession because of the expectation that the other will not concede further. This final concession, resulting in an agreement, is a commitment that Thomas C. Schelling refers to as an "irreversible sacrifice of freedom of choice."⁶⁵ Usually the actor to make the commitment emerges with the best terms in the agreement, and the other is forced to make the best of it or lose face.

A commitment can be enhanced by the public pledge of an actor's reputation to it and any agreement reached. Public exposure to the process and public opinion concerning it are also crucial to the overall success or failure of bargaining. Public opinion and pressure are often utilized to derail the bargaining process. If negotiations take place in secret, none of the normal tactics need be used, and none of the normal hazards come into play. By

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⁶³Ibid., 21.

⁶⁴Ibid.

⁶⁵Ibid., 22.

excluding the public both sides reduce the fear of a stalemate or charges of appeasement through concession. Done in secret, the public has no knowledge of the process, tactics, concessions made, how they were reached, or the actors involved. By waiting to inform the public until after an agreement has been reached, the actors force all concerned to become participants in a done deal.⁶⁶

A commitment on the part of one actor is also a tactic designed to leave the other with the decision of whether the bargaining will result in an agreement. By making a commitment an actor is forcing the other party in the negotiations to accept the terms or risk losing any agreement and take responsibility for the failure.⁶⁷ Any agreement, no matter how small or ambiguous, sets a precedent and pattern to be followed in future bargaining by establishing mutual expectations. This also works by establishing expectations on the part of the public based on the commitments made by the actors in any initial agreement.

This chapter has presented a framework for analyzing theoretically the conjunction of variables that led to the 1993 peace agreement between Israel and the PLO. The theories presented all deal with the origins, management, and resolution of conflict. The analysis will be conducted

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⁶⁶Ibid., 28-29.

⁶⁷Ibid., 37.

using this multi-theoretical approach so that an examination of the whole context-- rather than just a single actor or event-- can be used to study the influence of variables operating at different levels of analysis.

The microcosmic conflict theory of frustration-aggression and the macrocosmic theory of revolution are useful in examining the Palestinian struggle against Israel. From its establishment until 1982 the PLO was engaged in a revolutionary movement using manifest conflict against Israel. Beginning in 1987 the locus of the Palestinian struggle moved to the occupied territories. All five of Denfronzo's factors: a tolerant world context, a political crisis of the state, dissident elite political movements, unifying motivations of nationalism and religion, and relative deprivation leading to mass frustration and participation, were relevant and resulted in a popular revolutionary uprising, the Intifada. I will also argue that these same five factors were present and can help to explain the "revolutionary" peace agreement between Israel and the PLO.

Realist theory, with its view of managing conflict through the use of power to maximize the primary self-interest of national security, helps to explain the actions of Israel and Syria in their relations with each other and other actors. Adel Safty characterized Israel's international relations this way:

There is probably no clearer example of the pursuit of power as an instrument of policy to impose a certain balance of power and accomplish political goals which would otherwise be impossible through international law and multilateral treaty channels, than that provided by the establishment and aggrandizement of Israel whose leaders made of war a prime instrument of their policy.... What Taylor said about the Bismarkian vision of nineteenth century Europe is applicable to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Citing Bismark's famous sentence: "The great questions of our time will not be settled by resolutions and majority votes--that was the mistake of the men of 1848 and 1849--but by blood and iron," A.J.P. Taylor asks: "Who can deny that this is true as a statement of fact." Certainly not the Palestinians or the Arabs; not even candid Israeli leaders such as Moshe Sharret who admitted: "I have learned that the state of Israel cannot be ruled in our generation without deceit and adventurism. These are historical facts that cannot be altered."⁶⁸

Bargaining theory, with its use of the same concepts and assumptions, is an extension of realist thinking. It sets the parameters for an analysis of the tactics used by Israel, Syria, and, to a lesser extent, the PLO, in the negotiations that led to the 1993 signing of the Declaration of Principles. Using this multi-theoretical framework, the following chapters examine and analyze the variables--end of the Cold War and demise of the USSR, the Second Gulf War, the Intifada--whose conjunction produced the peace agreement.

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⁶⁸Safty, "Balance of Power," 53.

CHAPTER 3

THE GLOBAL AND REGIONAL CONTEXT

An event such as the peace accord between Israel and the PLO does not occur in a vacuum. It takes place in a larger geopolitical environment that may help to explain the event. This chapter examines two of the independent variables: the end of the Cold War and the Second Gulf War.

The End of the Cold War

During the Cold War, international relations were dominated by the political and ideological confrontation between the two superpowers, the United States (US) and the Soviet Union (USSR). This confrontation followed the basic premises of realism, with influence and control pursued through a manipulation of political and military power. In places such as the Middle East, the confrontation was pursued via arms transfers and economic aid to exploit existing conflicts in an attempt to gain spheres of influence in the rivalry between East and West. The alignment of states with one side or the other was seen as an important symbol "...of success and failure in the

global competition between the United States and the Soviet Union."⁶⁹

The primary self-interest for American action in the Middle East was, and is, to gain and protect access to energy reserves in the region. The policy goal of the US was to establish influence, and possibly even control, over those who had the energy reserves since "whoever controls the oil tap in the Middle East will possess sufficient leverage to dominate the world."⁷⁰ This desire was reciprocated by the USSR, if for no other reason than to counter the US. Without invading and occupying the region, the only way to "control the oil tap" was to influence and control those regimes in possession of the tap. Competition in this regard was merely an extension of the political and ideological confrontation between the superpowers. Former US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Alexander Kirk, thought it made sense for the US to take initiative in the region to counter the USSR since "...a stable world order can be achieved only under the American system" and only the American system would "...help backward countries to help themselves in order that they may lay the foundation for real self-dependence."⁷¹

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⁶⁹Barry Buzan, "New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century," International Affairs 67, no. 3 (July 1991): 433.

⁷⁰Safty, "Balance of Power," 54.

⁷¹Quoted in Noam Chomsky, World Orders Old and New (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 191.

For the US, countering communist presence and expansion (as well as nationalist forces hostile to the USA) was accomplished through the support of a few key states. Since its creation, Israel has been, and remains, a key strategic ally in the region. Washington viewed Israel as its "...unsinkable aircraft carrier in the Eastern Mediterranean."⁷² This notion came from a conclusion by the National Security Council in January 1958 that the "logical corollary" of opposition to communism and growing Arab nationalism that threatened US interests "...would be to support Israel as the only strong pro-Western Power..." in the region.⁷³ Turkey and Iran under the Shah were also key states, each giving the US a military presence on the border of the USSR. With the expulsion of Soviet military presence, the signing of the Camp David peace agreement, and increased ties with the West, Egypt under Anwar Sadat replaced Iran after the fall of the Shah.

Soviet interest in the region is often traced back to traditional Russian concern over the security of its borders and the desire to gain naval access to the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf.⁷⁴ William B. Quandt

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⁷²Theodore H. Friedgut, "Israel's Turn Toward Peace," in Israel Under Rabin, ed. Robert O. Freedman (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 74.

⁷³Chomsky, World Orders, 204.

⁷⁴Avraham Tamir, "The Use of Military Force: An Israeli Analysis," in The Middle East in Global Perspective, eds. Judith Kipper and Harold H. Saunders (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 221-2.

suggests that too much has been made of this assumption. Quandt believes that Soviet strategic naval interests were best served through their presence in the Horn of Africa and South Yemen, where they could control shipping in and out of the region, and that Soviet actions in the Middle East were simply the result of Cold War rivalry.⁷⁵

The emergence of Soviet influence in the rivalry began in Egypt in the 1950's with the goal of promoting "...Third-World neutrality in order to eliminate Western influence and presence there."⁷⁶ The USSR became a major supplier of arms to, and a source of economic development for, regimes hostile to the US. After the Sadat initiative, Iraq (to be abandoned by the USSR in the Second Gulf War), Libya, South Yemen, and Syria were the USSR's main allies. Of these states, Syria was the actor to play a major role in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

Throughout the Cold War, Soviet economic, political, and military support was used by Syria to support and enhance its doctrine of strategic parity. This doctrine was a strategy to enable Syria to compete one on one with Israel following the defection of Egypt from the radical Arab camp. The strategy had three basic components.

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⁷⁵William B. Quandt, "U.S.-Soviet Rivalry in the Middle East," in East-West Tensions in the Third World, ed. Marshall D. Shulman (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1986), 22.

⁷⁶Jamal R. Nassar, The Palestine Liberation Organization: From Armed Struggle to the Declaration of Independence (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1991), 158.

First, arms shipments from the USSR would give Syria the military hardware needed to close the gap in areas where Israel had superiority. Between 1975 and 1982 over \$4 billion in arms was shipped to Syria by the USSR.⁷⁷ This hardware enabled Syria to engage in limited warfare with Israel over territory without the prospect of outright defeat. Second, the increased military power of Syria would serve as a deterrent to possible Israeli aggression. Third, Syria held that no lasting peace could be achieved given Israel's preponderance of military power and US support. Increased Syrian capabilities coupled with Soviet support would have a positive impact on the Arab position and increase their bargaining power in any peace negotiations that might develop.⁷⁸ With this increased power, Syria also had the capability to unilaterally derail any developments that did not take its own interests into account.

The PLO also benefited from Soviet patronage during the Cold War. Prior to 1967, the USSR tended to view the Palestinian problem as primarily a refugee problem. After the 1967 war and Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, the USSR supported the PLO in its armed struggle

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⁷⁷Tareq Y. Ismael, International Relations of the Contemporary Middle East (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1986), 190.

⁷⁸Ahmed S. Khalidi and Hussein Agha, "The Syrian Doctrine of Strategic Parity," in The Middle East in Global Perspective, eds. Judith Kipper and Harold H. Saunders (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 189-190.

against Israel with monetary contributions, arms and training, and diplomatic support. The USSR had constantly demanded that any settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict take into account and include Palestinian representation through the PLO. The PLO's position was strengthened through the legitimacy and recognition it received from the superpower patronage of the USSR.⁷⁹

The end of the Cold War, and consequently Soviet support for Syria and the PLO, began when Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in March 1985. In a speech to the 27th Communist Party Congress, Gorbachev outlined his "new thinking" for the USSR. Historically, as the examples above show, the USSR had sought openings where US influence in particular, and Western influence in general, could be undermined or replaced by Soviet influence. Its support of nationalist forces such as the PLO, or radical regimes such as Syria, was used to advance its position through spheres of influence in an attempt to shift the balance of power in its favor. Gorbachev's new thinking would subordinate "...the promotion of revolutionary change and the advancement of Soviet power in the Third World areas to the pursuit of domestic objectives and broader foreign policy goals."⁸⁰

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⁷⁹Tamar Weinstein, "Soviet Union," in Echoes of the Intifada: Regional Repercussions of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict, ed. Rex Brynen (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 245.

⁸⁰W. Raymond Duncan and Carolyn McGiffert Ekedahl, Moscow and the Third World Under Gorbachev (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 71.

There were four basic tenets to this new thinking. First, the primary goal was to revitalize and restructure the seriously weakened USSR economy. This would necessitate an international environment conducive to economic growth through foreign investment and technology, so improved relations with the West and the US was needed. Gorbachev stressed a theme of mutual security whereby new Soviet policies would take into account the views and needs of other actors. This gave rise to the third tenet, a recognition that the future strength of the USSR's economy would be directly interconnected with the strength and stability of the international economic system. Fourth, the stability of the international economic system depended in large part upon political and military stability in the international arena. A new emphasis would be placed on diplomacy and the political settlement of regional conflicts to reduce competition and confrontation with the West in order to foster the more relaxed international environment needed for economic growth.⁸¹

One means of fostering a more relaxed international environment was to reestablish diplomatic ties with Israel. The USSR had broken off diplomatic relations with Israel in 1967 during the Six Day War. Beginning in 1986, high level meetings took place between Soviet and Israeli officials and in 1987 a Soviet consular delegation arrived in Israel.

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⁸¹Ibid., 49-52.

The result of this exchange was the USSR's permission for massive Jewish emigration to Israel to begin. This was seen as a major step in improving relations with Israel and the West.⁸²

Concurrent with this move was pressure on radical Arab client states to moderate their positions in regards to Israel and the West. The primary recipient of this pressure was Syria. In April 1987 Gorbachev, in a meeting with Syrian President Hafez al-Asad, let it be known that Syrian hostility toward Israel was having adverse repercussions on East-West relations. Gorbachev stated that "reliance on military force has completely lost its credibility as a way of solving the Middle East conflict," and that the USSR would cut back its military assistance that had been the cornerstone of Syria's doctrine of strategic parity.⁸³ These efforts by Gorbachev were consistent with the tenets of his "new thinking" for the USSR. The priority was to end Cold War competition that was weakening the economy and seek diplomatic solutions to regional conflicts that might compromise improving East-West relations. The result was the end of the Cold War.

For all of the USSR's clients, the end of the Cold War meant the end of economic assistance, arms shipments, diplomatic support, and even deterrence of US and Israeli

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⁸²Ibid., 120.

⁸³Weinstein, "Soviet Union," 253.

policies and actions in the Middle East. Syria and the PLO were among the major losers in this reshuffling of the international political system.⁸⁴ Many thought that the end of the Cold War and eventual demise of the USSR would signal an end to the strong support Israel had always received from the US, since Israel was no longer needed to counter Soviet influence in the area. In actuality, it signaled an end to any US need to influence or "...woo the PLO or Arab states away from the Soviet camp, extinguishing the old argument that only concessions to the PLO could prevent a pro-Moscow Middle East."⁸⁵ Aside from the cessation of the military, political, and economic support Syria had received from the USSR, the end of the Cold War and collapse of the communist system also undermined the legitimacy of Asad's authoritarian one-party political system in Syria. The durability of authoritarian regimes based on secular, radical ideologies was cast into doubt, and "for Asad, the fate of Ceausescu, Mengistu, Castro or Saddam Hussein cannot be appealing."⁸⁶ Asad, always pragmatic and intent on remaining in power, brought about a shift in Syrian foreign policy that sought out increased

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⁸⁴Robert J. Leiber, "American Hegemony, Regional Security and Proliferation in the Post-Cold War International System," Contemporary Security Policy 16, no. 1 (April 1995): 2.

⁸⁵Barry Rubin, Revolution Until Victory? (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 178.

⁸⁶Bradford R. McGuinn, "The Perils of Conventional Wisdom: A Reassessment of Syrian Options," Global Affairs 8, no. 1 (Winter 1993): 149.

ties and cooperation with the West to counter the absence of Soviet support. This new approach resulted in Syrian participation in the Second Gulf War and an even greater role in the peace negotiations that followed.

The Cold War competition between the US and USSR in the Middle East for spheres of influence followed the basic assumptions of realist thought. Human nature is power hungry, untrusting, and prone to conflict rather than cooperation. Managing this inevitable conflict between East and West was done by pursuing self-interests through the manipulation of power. Gaining client states and the ability to influence the political, economic, and military conditions of the Middle East enhanced each actor's power in the region. Manipulating this power allowed the USSR to pursue its goals of securing its southern borders and gaining access to warm water passages and military bases in the region. Manipulating this power allowed the US access to the abundant energy reserves of the region. For both actors, these goals, or self-interests, were seen as vital to their national security and the preservation of their respective states.

A change occurred when Gorbachev came to the conclusion that the crumbling Soviet economy could no longer support the USSR's Cold War competition with the West. If the power was no longer available to "resist the will of others and impose your will on them," then a new approach was needed. This also followed the realist assumption of a

rational actor considering feasible alternatives in light of existing capabilities. This new approach consisted of improving ties with the West, including Israel, and cutting ties with client states such as Syria, in order to foster a more stable and peaceful international environment that would produce Western investment and technology to assist the failing Soviet economy. Gorbachev's goal was still the primary goal of realist thought, to preserve the Soviet state before it completely collapsed. Former clients such as Syria and the PLO were also forced to consider feasible alternatives to preserve themselves. For Syria, this also meant improving ties with the West to replace lost Soviet support. The PLO, however, turned to Saddam Hussein of Iraq.

The Second Gulf War

"There can be little doubt that the conflict between the UN-authorized and US-led Multinational Coalition and Iraq at the start of 1991, as a result of the Iraqi Ba'athist regime's decision in August 1990 to invade and annex Kuwait, has produced profound changes in the political and diplomatic environment of the Middle East..."⁸⁷

For the US, multinational action against Iraq was a necessity due to the fact that Iraq was set to control one of the major oil producing states in the Persian Gulf.

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⁸⁷George Joffe, "Middle Eastern Views of the Gulf Conflict and its Aftermath," Review of International Studies 19, no. 2 (April 1993): 177.

Secondary reasons included the opportunity to diminish Iraq's military capability that threatened the balance of power in the region, and an opportunity to establish American military presence in the Gulf to counter the growing influence of resurgent or radical Islam, now commonly perceived as replacing communism as the greatest threat against American interests in the region.

For Arab states such as Syria, recently deprived of Soviet patronage, the Second Gulf War was an "...opportunity to take sides with the West at a moment when the United States needed Arab political support."⁸⁸ As payment for its cooperation, Syria received between one and two billion dollars from the Gulf states for participating in the Multinational Coalition. Syria also stands to benefit even more in the long term through improved economic and political ties with the West. In addition, with American support, Syria was able to end the civil war in Lebanon and put in place there a government compliant with its views.⁸⁹ Most importantly, by cooperating with the West, President Asad was able to guarantee that Syria would be a key player in the peace process that was promised to follow Desert Storm.

For the PLO, "the 1990-91 Gulf crisis resulted in one of the worst setbacks for the Palestinians in modern

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⁸⁸Volker Perthes, "Incremental Change in Syria," Current History 92, no. 570 (January 1993): 24.

⁸⁹Joffe, "Middle Eastern Views," 197.

times."⁹⁰ The thriving Palestinian community in Kuwait was destroyed and the financial and diplomatic support the PLO received from the Gulf states was cut off. Between 1980-90 it is estimated that the PLO received around ten billion dollars in direct contributions from the Gulf states. As a result of world recession and declining oil revenues, the annual amount had fallen at the time of the war to around 133 million dollars, but this was still a great loss of revenue for the PLO.⁹¹ The PLO also lost the tax revenue it had received from Palestinian workers in Kuwait which was estimated to be fifty million dollars a year. The defeat of Iraq also left Yasser Arafat and the PLO completely isolated politically and diplomatically, no longer able to benefit from what had been unanimous Arab support of the PLO in the Palestinian cause and an international consensus regarding the need for Palestinian self-determination. These were the most important weaknesses leading the PLO to enter secret negotiations with Israel.

The PLO position was a direct consequence of the end of the Cold War. Massive Jewish immigration to Israel and increased settlement construction coupled with the failure of PLO diplomatic initiatives and loss of Russian support

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⁹⁰Philip Mattar, "The PLO and the Gulf Crisis," Middle East Journal 48, no. 1 (Winter 1994): 31.

⁹¹Louise Leif, "A New Beginning," U.S. News & World Report, 13 September 1993, 30.

caused Arafat to seek out a powerful Arab ally that might influence Israel and the West in favor of the PLO. Arafat, in allying himself and the PLO with Iraq in the Second Gulf War, made the same mistaken assumptions that Saddam Hussein did. Arafat believed that the US would probably not go to war with Iraq over oil, and if they did, that "...Iraq would either win or the United States would get bogged down in the desert."⁹²

At a January 1991 rally in Baghdad shortly before the bombing started, Arafat said, in effect, if the US wants war then bring them on: "Then I say welcome, welcome, welcome to war...Iraq and Palestine will be together side by side in battle."⁹³ A month later, at it again, Arafat proclaimed that "if they want to have O-I-L, then they have to also take P-L-O," and he called for military attacks on Israel.⁹⁴ The PLO's pro-Iraqi position would continue even after the defeat of the Iraqi army, as exemplified by this statement from the PLO's Unified National Leadership of the Uprising in the occupied territories.

Sister Iraq remains steadfast in the face of the most brutal attack [ever carried out] on a people in modern history. Its courageous people and army have succeeded in thwarting, boldly and in the twinkling of an eye, the attempts to destroy Iraq's ability, its liquidation at the hands of the

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⁹²Mattar, "The PLO and the Gulf Crisis," 37.

⁹³Rubin, Revolution, 183.

⁹⁴Ibid.

Zionist imperialist interests in the region, and its subjugation as an American satellite.⁹⁵

The PLO's position, and its championing of Iraq, were reflections of popular Palestinian sentiment in the occupied territories. Palestinians were growing increasingly frustrated over the harshness of the Israeli response to the Intifada and the inability of the Intifada to produce tangible results. More than 800 civilians had been killed since the uprising began and Jewish immigration and settlement was skyrocketing. Israeli polls showed that 52 percent of Jewish Israelis supported the expulsion of the Palestinians and the annexation of the occupied territories in order to preserve the "...Jewish and democratic nature of the state...."⁹⁶

An unscientific telephone poll conducted in the West Bank revealed that 84 percent of Palestinians considered Saddam Hussein a national hero, 58 percent supported the invasion of Kuwait, and 83 percent approved of Arafat's support of Hussein.⁹⁷ The primary reason for this popular support was Hussein's support of the Palestinian cause by attempting to link any settlement of the Kuwait crisis with a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict,

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⁹⁵Shaul Mishal and Reuben Aharoni, Speaking Stones: Communiqués from the Intifada Underground (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1994), 188.

⁹⁶Mattar, "The PLO and the Gulf Crisis," 39.

⁹⁷Ibid., 40.

including the withdrawal of Israel from the occupied territories as a precursor to Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.

Equally important, however, and a source of popular sentiment for Hussein throughout the Middle East and North Africa, was Hussein's willingness to stand up to the West and the US and the near unanimous condemnation by Muslims of Western military presence on the land of Islam. Most people viewed the conflict as a "...hypocritical double standard in US behavior."⁹⁸ While the US moved quickly and forcefully against Iraq in support of United Nations resolutions, the US had done nothing against Israel in support of numerous United Nations resolutions condemning Israel's occupation of the West Bank, Gaza, Golan Heights, and Jerusalem, not to mention the 1982 invasion of Lebanon. The preferred outcome for the PLO in particular and Palestinians in general was some sort of resolution that accepted Hussein's linkage.

Saddam Hussein's proposed peace initiative of 12 August 1990, linking his withdrawal from Kuwait to the withdrawal of Israel from the occupied territories was mostly a ploy to divert attention from his own occupation, but it had the effect of striking "...a blow for Palestinian liberation without doing a great deal to accomplish it. But by explicitly shifting focus to the Arab-Israeli conflict and restoring the question of Palestine to pride of place, he

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⁹⁸Ibid., 39.

was, on another level, tapping into deep springs of Muslim concern."⁹⁹ This would have important repercussions in the occupied territories where the Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas, was already eclipsing the PLO even prior to its loss of support and funding from the Gulf states. The Islamist sentiment toward Israel's occupation of the territories is reflected in this statement by Shaikh Abd al-Aziz Bin Baz, a religious scholar in Saudi Arabia: "The Palestinian problem is an Islamic problem first and last.... Muslims must fight an Islamic *jihad* (holy war) against the Jews until the land returns to its owners."¹⁰⁰

The failure thus far to achieve any Arab or Palestinian victory against Israel is seen by Islamists to be a result of Israel sticking to its Jewish religion, while secular Arabs and the PLO have been unsuccessful due to their abandonment of Islam as a way of life. Iraq's failure has been attributed to the same cause. Islamists viewed the Second Gulf War as an excuse for the US to put forces on the ground and occupy Muslim land. Even if done to protect energy reserves at the request of Gulf states, they see it as a violation of the integrity of Islam.¹⁰¹ Stating that

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⁹⁹James Piscatori, "Religion and RealPolitik: Islamic Responses to the Gulf War," in Islamic Fundamentalisms and the Gulf Crisis, ed. James Piscatori (New York: The American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1991), 5-6.

¹⁰⁰Ibid., 6.

¹⁰¹Ghassam Salame, "Islam and the West," Foreign Policy 90 (Spring 1993): 28-29.

"America has become your God," Safar al-Hawali, Dean of Islamic Studies at Umm al-Qura University in Mecca, chastised Persian Gulf Muslims for putting their faith in the US rather than in God.¹⁰² An Imam at a Riyadh mosque, echoing this feeling, asked: "If a dog has come onto your land, would you invite a lion to get rid of it?"¹⁰³

These convictions were echoed throughout the Muslim world, but had a particular resonance in the occupied territories where Hamas and the PLO had been competing for the loyalty of the Palestinian people. Hamas, although vocal in its opposition to Western presence in the region, never came out in support of Iraq despite popular sentiment in Hussein's favor. By limiting its attack to the US, Hamas was able to tap into the strong anti-Western mood of the population without alienating the Gulf states on which it also depended for funding. The devastation of PLO finances as a result of their loss of Gulf funding caused the PLO to drastically cut back services and payments to Palestinians in the occupied territories. This cutback is estimated to be almost as much as the annual funding the PLO lost. Hamas, in contrast, by taking the tack it did, was able to preserve its funding, estimated at 100 million dollars annually from the Gulf states, 60 to 70 million of that from Kuwait alone. As a result, Hamas stepped into

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¹⁰²Piscatori, "Religion and RealPolitik," 9.

¹⁰³Ibid.

the void left by the PLO and significantly increased its popularity and loyal following in the occupied territories, directly challenging the PLO for representation of Palestinians. Israel perceived a stronger Hamas, coupled with growing Islamist influence and anti-Western sentiment across the region, as an even greater threat than the PLO had been. Syrian leadership on behalf of the Arab states at the Madrid Peace Conference following the war presented Israel with a unified Arab negotiating front attempting the same sort of linkage that Hussein had. Peace with Syria and Israel's other Arab neighbors would be reached through a comprehensive framework and settlement, with a basic condition being the withdrawal of Israel from the occupied territories. These positions were untenable for Israel in pursuing its foremost interest, the security of the Jewish state. What was needed was an entirely new strategy, one that would deal with all of these problems at once. The PLO would provide the answer.

In terms of realist thought, the manipulation of power by the US that led to the defeat of Iraq strengthened American influence and presence in the Middle East and guaranteed that its primary self-interest--access to the abundant energy reserves of the region--would not be threatened. It also established a balance of power in the region favorable to the US that might help it in combating Islamic Fundamentalism, seen by many American officials as replacing communism as the greatest threat against American

interests. For actors such as Syria, this event confirmed that the best alternative in light of existing capabilities would be to improve ties with the West. Besides replacing lost Soviet patronage, it would give Syria far greater influence and bargaining power in the peace negotiations that followed the end of the war.

This chapter has presented an analysis of the influence of two of the independent variables: the end of the Cold War and demise of the USSR, and the Second Gulf War. While the end of the Cold War was cause for change in the approach of some actors toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, in itself it was not responsible for the conflict.

It is not true that the Arab-Israeli conflict is simply a reflection of the Cold War. Such a view has been maintained in the past by both Arabs and Israelis, for it enabled both sides to diminish their responsibility. The Cold War did not create the conflict but, rather, aggravated it.¹⁰⁴

The end of the Cold War meant the end of flexibility for some actors. With independent non-alignment now a thing of the past, there was no longer the ability to maneuver back and forth playing the superpowers against one another. There was a significant "...awareness that Arab options over regional affairs had been significantly reduced by the decline of Soviet influence as the Cold War came to an end."¹⁰⁵

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¹⁰⁴Harkabi, Israel's Fateful Hour, xvii.

¹⁰⁵Joffe, "Middle Eastern Views," 183.

For actors such as Syria, the end of the Cold War meant the end of superpower patronage and "...that the source of the almost inexhaustible military support for the Arabs has now dried up, and the source of almost automatic political support for their cause has also run low."¹⁰⁶ For the PLO, the end of the Cold War meant that "in the space of a few short years, almost the entire culture into which the PLO was born and by which it was nourished has disappeared," and in the process "...deprived the PLO of a major moral and material patron and a kind of echo chamber for the PLO's old anti-imperialist rhetoric."¹⁰⁷

Prior to the end of the Cold War, unilateral moves on the part of the US were curtailed because of fear of a Soviet response there or somewhere else in the world. Now the US was able to act to make things such as the Second Gulf War happen in accordance with its own interests. Soviet interest in fostering peaceful coexistence with the West in order to help its flagging economy led to cooperation in executing Desert Storm and in setting up the peace negotiations that followed. Russia co-chaired the opening rounds of the Madrid Peace Conference, and its presence made it easier for former clients such as Syria to participate while lessening the perception back home that

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¹⁰⁶Shimon Peres, Battling for Peace, ed. David Landau (New York: Random House, 1995), 276.

¹⁰⁷Daniel Williams, "Dateline Tunis: PLO RIP?" Foreign Policy 90 (Spring 1993): 160.

the whole affair was the US's doing.¹⁰⁸ In reality, Syrian presence was also the result of the US's initiative to develop a framework for the conference that would include all the principal actors (except the PLO) in an effort to set the foundations for a comprehensive peace process and reward those Arab states who had participated in the coalition against Iraq. Israel was unable to object to the presence of longtime radical foes such as Syria who had participated in the diminution of Iraq's military power, since the outcome was seen as being more beneficial to Kuwait than Israel.

The outcome of the Second Gulf War also had the effect of depriving the PLO of its backup patron following the end of the Cold War. Saddam Hussein's pledges on behalf of the PLO and the Palestinian struggle to liberate the occupied territories "...reawoke the old Palestinian dream of finding an Arab knight on horseback to liberate historical Palestine from the Zionists."¹⁰⁹ In the end, PLO support of this knight would lead to no patronage at all and the costly loss of its funding from the oil-rich Gulf states. Coupled with a growing tide of Islamic radicalism in the whole region, the effect of PLO losses was to increase Islamist gains in the occupied territories, a development detrimental to both the PLO and Israel. "Israel had

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¹⁰⁸Steven R. David, "Why the Third World Still Matters," International Security 17, no. 3 (Winter 1992-93): 130.

¹⁰⁹Williams, "Dateline Tunis," 161.

countenanced, if not encouraged, the first organizational efforts of Hamas in the Gaza area, on the grounds that it would be a counterforce to the PLO."¹¹⁰ This strategy proved to be seriously flawed in the long run as Hamas, in conjunction with other radical Islamist movements, proved to be a much greater security risk for Israel than the PLO had ever been.

All of these various factors, emerging as influences due to the independent variables, led Israel and the PLO to look for a new strategy to solve their mutual problems. This strategy would take the form of bargaining in secret to produce the September 1993 peace accord. For Israel, this tactic produced results while staying within its realist framework of protecting, and in this case even enhancing, its security. If there were any final lessons gained from the end of the Cold War and the Second Gulf War, they are probably best summed up by India's Foreign Minister who said, "the lesson of the Gulf War is not to fight the United States unless you have nuclear weapons."¹¹¹

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¹¹⁰Friedgut, "Israel's Turn Toward Peace," 75.

¹¹¹Leiber, "American Hegemony," 4.

CHAPTER 4

THE LOCAL CONTEXT

The Arab struggle against Israel began even before the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. In the 1960's however, the struggle took on new meaning, and new looks, due in large part to the leadership of President Gamel Abdel Nasser of Egypt. Nasser called a summit conference of Arab heads of state in Cairo from January 13-16, 1964 to address Arab concerns over Israel's plan to divert water from the Jordan River for irrigation projects within Israel. It was at this conference that Nasser proposed the formation of a "Palestinian entity" to represent Palestinian interests in the Arab struggle against Israel.¹¹²

Arab reaction to this proposal was mixed. Amin al-Hafez, President of Syria, "...actually suggested making the West Bank and the Gaza Strip the territorial domain of a Palestinian state."¹¹³ This was the first time that these areas were proposed as being the place for any sort of

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¹¹²Brecher, "Middle East Subordinate Systems," 134.

¹¹³Nassar, Palestine Liberation Organization, 20.

Palestinian autonomy. King Hussein of Jordan worried that any organized Palestinian activity seeking a state might jeopardize the stability of Jordan owing to its large Palestinian population, and also undermine Jordan's control over the West Bank. King Saud called for establishing a Palestinian government in exile. The leaders of Tunisia and Algeria advocated the formation of a Palestinian national liberation movement, which would be the eventual result of Nasser's proposal. Nasser, however, came to view the Palestinian movement as competition for leadership in the struggle against Israel and had really only wanted the "symbolic creation of a limited official institution with propaganda functions only."¹¹⁴

The official statement of the conference recommended that:

Mr. Ahmad al-Shukairy, Palestine's representative at the Arab League, should resume contacts with the member states and with the Palestinian people for the purpose of establishing a sound basis for organizing the Palestinian people in order to enable them to assume their duties in liberating their homeland and determining their destiny.¹¹⁵

On 24 February 1964 in Jerusalem, al-Shukairy announced that a draft constitution of twenty-nine articles had been written and included the basic principles for Palestinian liberation. In May of the same year, a Palestine National

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¹¹⁴Ibid., 20.

¹¹⁵Ibid.

Council (PNC) of 422 Palestinians selected by committees from the Palestinian populations of the various Arab states met in Jerusalem to discuss the draft constitution. On 1 June 1964, the PNC announced the following decisions:

- 1) Proclaimed the existence of the PLO.
- 2) Elected Ahmad al-Shukairy as the first chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO.
- 3) Elected Abdul Jaleed Shuman as chairman of the Palestine National Fund.
- 4) That it had transformed itself into the First National Congress of the PLO.
- 5) Authorized the chairman to select an executive committee of the PLO consisting of fifteen Palestinian representatives.¹¹⁶

This marked the official beginning of organized Palestinian resistance against Israel, a development due in large part to a younger generation of Palestinians "...dedicated to the principle that national liberation can only be achieved by armed struggle."¹¹⁷

This struggle would be transformed again following the 1967 Six Day War in which Israel captured and occupied the West Bank and Gaza Strip, considered now to be the territorial base for any Palestinian autonomy, in addition to the Sinai and the Golan Heights. For Israel, these moves were seen as necessary in order to guarantee its security. As a result of the war, Israel acquired control over territory three times the size of the state before the war started and gave it more defensible borders. Yitzhak

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¹¹⁶Ibid.

¹¹⁷Ibid., 1.

Rabin, Israeli Chief of Staff during the war, described Israel's new borders as essential to security because the "present borders run along natural barriers: Egypt--the canal; Jordan--the Jordan River, a less impressive barrier than the Suez Canal but nevertheless a barrier; and with Syria, there will no longer be a need to climb up mountains."¹¹⁸ The newly acquired territory was now a strategic asset for Israel, and not one that it wanted to give up.

The occupation of the West Bank and Gaza galvanized Palestinian resistance. Prior to the war, the PLO under al-Shukairy had pursued a strategy of regular military warfare against Israel to be carried out in large part by the Arab states. The Arab defeat marked a shift in PLO strategy toward guerrilla insurgency and terrorism as the principal form of resistance. This shift occurred in 1968 when Arafat's Fatah faction, George Habash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and Na'if Hawatima's Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), entered the PLO. In 1969, Arafat was elected Chairman of the Executive Committee, a position he still holds today. From their point of view, the only appropriate method of resistance to the Israeli occupation

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¹¹⁸Quoted in Brecher, "Middle East Subordinate Systems," 138.

was an armed struggle using guerrilla insurgency and terrorism.¹¹⁹

The PLO's guerrilla operations and terrorist attacks were generally carried out from bases outside the occupied territories. Prior to 1971 Jordan was the base for the PLO until being ousted from there in what was basically a civil war between the PLO and King Hussein. The PLO then moved to Lebanon until being driven from there as well in 1982 by Israel. Operating outside of the occupied territories, the PLO did not have much of a following or any institutional representation in the territories until after the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war. The Rabat Arab Summit's declaration that the PLO would be the "sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people," and Arafat's appearance before the United Nations General Assembly in 1974 elevated the status of both the PLO and Arafat and gained them an increased following and loyalty in the territories. In 1973, the PNC established the Palestine National Front (PNF) in the occupied territories to give the PLO institutional representation and allow it to play a larger role in local Palestinian politics.¹²⁰

This increased presence and influence in the territories coupled with the increasing international

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¹¹⁹Joshua Teitelbaum and Joseph Kostiner, "The West Bank and Gaza: The PLO and the Intifada," in Revolutions of the Late Twentieth Century, eds. Jack A. Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, and Farrokh Moshiri (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 306.

¹²⁰Ibid., 307.

legitimacy of PLO policies and actions was cause for concern on the part of Israel. In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon, the location of PLO headquarters and its military base, in an attempt to crush the PLO. Israel felt that if it were successful in eliminating the PLO, "...it could, with far less resistance, implement its plans for the occupied territories..."¹²¹ Former Israeli Defense Force (IDF) education officer Mordechai Bar-on wrote in the October 1982 issue of New Outlook that "there is no doubt that the central aim was to deal a crushing blow to the national aspirations of the Palestinians and to their very existence as a nation endeavoring to define itself and gain the right to self-determination."¹²²

The effect was just the opposite of what the Israelis had hoped for. The war in Lebanon, which was supposed to destroy the PLO and its infrastructure and in doing so, deprive Palestinians in the territories of their legitimate representative, only led to increased support for the PLO and a strong surge in Palestinian nationalism. Mayors from towns in the territories and the Supreme Islamic Council of Jerusalem even went so far as to send letters to the United Nations reiterating their recognition of the PLO as the only representative of the Palestinian people and pledged

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¹²¹Don Peretz, Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 19.

¹²²Noam Chomsky, The Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel, and the Palestinians (Boston: South End Press, 1983), 203.

their continuing support for the organization in its struggle against Israel.¹²³ With the defeat and ouster of the PLO from Lebanon, Palestinians in the occupied territories, while continuing to support the PLO, began to realize that liberation was not forthcoming and started paying more attention to their own conditions and what might be done about them.

The Intifada

Conditions in the occupied territories had been steadily declining since occupation in 1967. During the first twenty years of the occupation, Israel had requisitioned nearly half the land in the West Bank and one-third of the land in Gaza for Jewish settlement and usage.¹²⁴ This loss of land meant the loss of the agricultural economic base upon which the territories had been dependent. It was a part of the overall Israeli policy to prevent the development of an independent Palestinian economic base and infrastructure and promote dependence upon Israel. Palestinians were a source of cheap labor for Israel and provided an immediate market for Israeli goods.

Palestinian labor in Israel, while giving Palestinians the currency to buy Israeli goods, was also a source of tax

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¹²³Ibid., 205.

¹²⁴Peretz, Intifada, 9.

revenue. Between 1967–87 more than one billion dollars were deducted from the wages of workers for unemployment benefits for which they were not even eligible. An additional 800 million dollars in taxes were collected, representing two and a half times the total investments made by Israel in the occupied territories over that same period.¹²⁵ This outward flow of resources, coupled with a decline in employment both in Israel and the Gulf states, led to an economic slowdown and a two percent annual decline in the standard of living of Palestinians.¹²⁶ Combined with increases in education and a population explosion, the economic problems greatly contributed to relative deprivation and mass frustration.

The overall population in the occupied territories grew by just over fifty percent in the period between occupation and the outbreak of the Intifada. This increase led to a much larger proportion of young people. By 1985, one-half of the population in the occupied territories was under the age of fourteen, and one-third was between the ages of fifteen and thirty-four.¹²⁷ In Gaza, sixty percent of the population was under fifteen years of age, and two-thirds of the total population was male.¹²⁸ The increasing

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¹²⁵Bill and Springborg, Politics in the Middle East, 330.

¹²⁶Tietelbaum and Kostiner, "West Bank and Gaza," 303.

¹²⁷Ibid.

¹²⁸Sara Roy, "The Gaza Strip: Past, Present, and Future," Current History 93, no. 580 (February 1994): 68.

population and decreasing land due to Israeli acquisition also greatly increased the density. The Jabalya refugee camp in Gaza for example, has a population density of 133,400 people per square mile, over twice the density of Manhattan in New York. Israel, by comparison, has a population density of eighty people per square mile.¹²⁹

The increases in population were paralleled by increases in education. After 1967 seven universities opened in the occupied territories. In the 1970's there were only 1000 students attending a university. By the early 1980's there were 7,500 university students in the occupied territories. By the end of the decade there were 10,000 in the West Bank alone, with 4000 graduates per year.¹³⁰ Less than fifteen percent of these graduates were able to find employment commensurate with their qualifications. In 1985 there were 4000 unemployed university graduates. By the time of the outbreak of the Intifada that number had more than doubled.¹³¹ This gap between education and expectations and actual employment opportunities coupled with frustration over the continuing occupation "...nourished a climate of political radicalism" that was easily transformed into militant action.¹³²

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¹²⁹Ibid.

¹³⁰Mishal and Aharoni, Speaking Stones, 2.

¹³¹Ibid., 4.

¹³²Ibid., 4.

The occupied territories had a history of civil disobedience even prior to the outbreak of the Intifada. The first mass demonstration in the occupied territories was started by students in December 1968 and lasted for four months. In 1974 another demonstration occurred; it lasted for two weeks and marked the first time that the IDF imposed a curfew on the occupied territories in order to control the population and put down the demonstrations. The largest, longest lasting, and most violent demonstration prior to the Intifada occurred in 1976. In February the West Bank had violent demonstrations and general strikes in protest over an Israeli court ruling that allowed Jews to pray at the al-Aqsa Mosque. In July more demonstrations broke out to protest an increase in the sales tax and then continued through the end of the year.¹³³

In December 1986, following the deaths of two students killed in clashes at Bir Zeit University, the occupied territories erupted in mass demonstrations that lasted for ten days. On 18 May 1987 six members of the Islamic Jihad movement escaped from Gaza central prison and on August 8 assassinated an officer of the IDF in Gaza.¹³⁴ In September a Palestinian stone-thrower was killed by the IDF. On October 1, three Palestinians were killed trying to run a roadblock by the IDF, and later that week five more were

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¹³³Nassar, Palestine Liberation Organization, 39.

¹³⁴Mishal and Aharoni, Speaking Stones, 25.

killed in a shoot-out with the IDF.¹³⁵ On December 8, an Israeli citizen was stabbed to death in a Gaza market. On December 9, rioting broke out in the Jabalya refugee camp after four residents were killed and another seven injured in a traffic accident near the Erez checkpoint which was rumored to be an Israeli act of revenge for the stabbing victim. This incident marks the official beginning of the Intifada. The next day, massive riots and demonstrations broke out all over Gaza and eventually spread to the West Bank as well.

While the immediate source of the Intifada might have been a traffic accident, "the root causes of the uprising were embedded in twenty years of Israeli occupation and Israeli policies aimed at undermining the material and national existence of the Palestinians in their own land."¹³⁶ Generally translated in the West as "uprising", the literal meaning of Intifada is "shaking off",¹³⁷ in this case, the shaking off of the colonial style occupation of the Israelis. "Unlike classical patterns of colonialism, the Israeli occupation failed to win the sympathy or

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¹³⁵Helena Cobban, "The Palestinians: From the Hussein-Arafat Agreement to the Intifada," in The Middle East From the Iran-Contra Affair to the Intifada, ed. Robert O. Freedman (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1991), 249.

¹³⁶Ziad Abu-Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994), 53.

¹³⁷Williams, "Dateline Tunis," 162.

support of any meaningful sector of the occupied population."¹³⁸

In fact, not only were they not willing to support it, a growing number of Palestinians were willing to die in the fight against occupation. In the first three months of the Intifada 111 Palestinians were killed and another 1000 wounded.¹³⁹ The majority of these dead and wounded were young men who were followers of one of the Islamist movements.

The Influence of Hamas

The Islamist movements in the occupied territories all emerged from local chapters of the Muslim Brotherhood, the oldest and strongest of all Islamic groups. The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in Egypt in 1928 to promote a return to Islamic values and society with the goal of establishing an Islamic state in order to combat the growing influence of Western powers in the region.¹⁴⁰ This goal is echoed by all the Islamist groups who argue "...that the cause of all political, economic, and social conflicts engulfing the world today lies in the absence of this state."¹⁴¹

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¹³⁸Abu-Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism, 53.

¹³⁹Tietelbaum and Kostiner, "West Bank and Gaza," 310.

¹⁴⁰Hamid Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1982), 84.

¹⁴¹Abu-Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism, xiv.

During the first ten years of Israeli occupation Islam did not constitute much of a unifying motivator for resistance. Toward the end of the 1970's a local chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood emerged in Gaza under the leadership of Shaikh Ahmad Yasin.¹⁴² Prior to the Intifada the Brotherhood refrained from violent confrontation with Israel and concentrated instead on establishing political and social welfare networks in Gaza. Yasin's movement, the Islamic Assembly, was successful in making inroads into a majority of the local mosques and gained control over administrative and student groups at the Islamic University in Gaza. These moves were encouraged by Israeli authorities who saw increased Islamic influence as decreased support for the PLO and its secular revolt.¹⁴³

The Brotherhood, which emphasized that the way to change society was to reform the individual, would eventually be transformed by the emergence of a second Islamic movement. Membership in this second movement consisted of ex-Brotherhood members who felt that the Brotherhood was not confrontational enough in its approach to Israel. This rival movement, bolstered by members from the religious wing of Arafat's Fatah, called for *jihad*

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¹⁴²Jean Francois Legrain, "A Defining Moment: Palestinian Islamic Fundamentalism," in Islamic Fundamentalisms and the Gulf Crisis, ed. James Piscatori (New York: The American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1991), 72.

¹⁴³F. Robert Hunter, The Palestinian Uprising: A War by Other Means, rev. and exp. ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 34.

against Israel and advocated violent attacks against the IDF and Jews. This new approach signaled the beginning of the implementation of Islam as an ideology and unifying motivator in the resistance against Israeli occupation.¹⁴⁴ The movement eventually became known as the Brigades of Islamic Jihad, or Islamic Jihad, and they were responsible for the attacks against Israeli forces mentioned previously that set the stage for the Intifada.

The Brigades of Islamic Jihad were violently crushed and their leaders deported by the IDF in the first few months of the uprising. Out of this leadership vacuum the Islamic Resistance Movement, known by its Arabic acronym Hamas, emerged in February 1988.¹⁴⁵ Initially Hamas recruited individuals from the Brotherhood, but a few weeks later the Brotherhood "formally adopted Hamas as its militant arm."¹⁴⁶ Hamas assumed the Islamic Jihad's principle of armed struggle against Israel and the Brotherhood was transformed from a political and social movement into a revolutionary one. Hamas operated separately from the secular factions, who reported to the PLO's umbrella Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU). The UNLU was established by the PLO shortly after the Intifada began to capitalize on the uprising and attempt to gain some control over it.

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¹⁴⁴Legrain, "A Defining Moment," 72.

¹⁴⁵Hunter, The Palestinian Uprising, 116.

¹⁴⁶Legrain, "A Defining Moment," 74.

Hamas was critical of the UNLU, and of the PLO in particular, because "it is an organization that does not serve God," only its own leadership.¹⁴⁷ Hamas was also adamantly opposed to any sort of negotiated settlement and continued to expound the principle of armed struggle to overthrow the state of Israel and establish an Islamic state in its place. Hamas published a list of things the PLO would need to do before it could be accepted by the Islamist movement. These things included the following:

- 1) The PLO must renounce every commitment it has made...especially as regards the political solution or the so-called peaceful solution.
- 2) The PLO must extricate itself from the international political efforts that all world powers are making...
- 3) The PLO must oust from its ranks every group belonging to those...regimes...or international powers.
- 4) The PLO must reorganize itself, so that it becomes a resistance movement, not a political organization...
- 5) The PLO must forget the battle for its own interests...
- 6) The PLO must go back to view the Palestinian issue as an issue of occupied territories and a refugee people, and not an issue of leaders devoting themselves to agreements and disagreements...
- 7) The PLO must consider itself the representative of all the Palestinian people, including those who adhere to Islam and who are committed to it.
- 8) The PLO must include in its fold every son of the Islamic nation, and must consider all Islamic movements that are committed to Islam its strategic depth in its battle for civilization.¹⁴⁸

Even with the criticism from Hamas, the PLO and its UNLU were able to control the Intifada and command the loyalty of the majority of the population for the first few years of the uprising. That control would begin to crumble

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¹⁴⁷Abu-Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism, 29.

¹⁴⁸Ibid., 50.

in 1990, and totally collapse following the Second Gulf War. In 1990 two incidents took place that greatly elevated the stature of Hamas. The first was the killing of seven Palestinian workers and the wounding of ten others in an attack by a single Israeli settler in May. Mass rioting followed, with another seven killed and 500 wounded in clashes with the IDF. The second occurred in October at the esplanade of al-Haram al-Sharif, the location of the al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock. Clashes there produced twenty-one dead and 150 wounded and was followed by a strict curfew. In the aftermath, Hamas was successful in arguing to the Palestinian people that these incidents showed that "...our fight with Zionism is a fight between Islam and Judaism."¹⁴⁹

Hamas called for an even more radical approach and an escalation in violent attacks against the IDF and Jewish settlers. The PLO was hesitant to support anything like this, since it would hurt its status in the international arena, particularly with the US with whom it was trying to establish a dialogue for possible negotiations. As a result, the PLO was discredited in the eyes of many Palestinians and lost support. After these incidents, Hamas was thought to have the loyalty of more than 50 percent of the Palestinian population.¹⁵⁰ The resulting

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¹⁴⁹Legrain, "A Defining Moment," 83.

¹⁵⁰Ibid.

conflict between Hamas and the PLO eventually led to direct confrontations between followers of the two groups in the territories. Recognizing that such conflict played into the hands of the Israelis and would eventually destroy the Intifada, the PLO and Hamas agreed to coordinate policies through joint committees. Hamas ended up controlling these as well and virtually eclipsed the PLO as the main actor in the occupied territories.

Apart from its loss of funding and international stature as a result of the Second Gulf War, the eclipse of the PLO was furthered by its support of a negotiated settlement that would give it some autonomy in the occupied territories. Hamas had long held that all of Palestine was Muslim land, that Israel has no right to exist, and that "...no one has the right to concede any part of Palestine and [Hamas] considers any political settlement that leaves Israel intact a matter of treason."¹⁵¹ This stance coupled with a deteriorating economy in the occupied territories and the absence of PLO monetary support only increased frustration, and led to growing support for Hamas which was "...expressed in increased mosque attendance and in the spread of Islamic norms and dress codes."¹⁵² For Israel, this growing support meant that it would face greater numbers of increasingly hostile Palestinians in the

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¹⁵¹Abu-Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism, 23.

¹⁵²Hunter, The Palestinian Uprising, 265.

occupied territories. When combined with Hamas's principle of refusing to negotiate with Israel, Israeli officials found it virtually impossible to orchestrate any kind of settlement that would bring about a peaceful resolution to the Intifada. A new approach was needed that would neutralize Hamas and its influence in the occupied territories, and that approach would be to pursue separate and secret negotiations with the PLO.

The Intifada experience is best explained by the revolutionary conflict theory presented in the second chapter. Demographic expansion brought a significant increase in the proportion of young people in the population. Continued occupation and expanding Jewish settlements, increased education and decreased employment opportunities, and an overall economic decline contributed to relative deprivation resulting in mass frustration and participation in the uprising. A dissident elite political movement to motivate the masses emerged in Hamas, which also presented Islam as the principal unifying motivator for the Intifada. The state crisis took the form of colonial occupation by Israel that was seen as unjust and immoral by the Palestinians. A permissive and tolerant world context was created by worldwide media reports sympathetic to the Palestinian struggle for self-determination.

The struggle was not without cost however. By the end of September 1990, 861 Palestinians had been killed and

101,500 wounded since the beginning of the Intifada. Later that year the IDF reported that it had arrested 70,000 Palestinians and deported 65 since the uprising began.¹⁵³ The Intifada upset Israel's preponderance of power over the occupied territories and was very costly in both political and financial terms. It forced Israel to recognize that it could neither continue the occupation in its present form nor annex the occupied territories as many conservative Israeli leaders had hoped to do. The success of the Intifada reflected the fundamental law that any colonial occupation can only "...be defended and maintained successfully as long as the benefits a colonial power derives from the colonized exceed the costs."¹⁵⁴

The decline of the PLO and its loss of support in the occupied territories was a dream come true for many Israelis. The ascension of Hamas to take the place of the PLO, however, was a nightmare for those responsible for the security of Jewish settlers and the safety of the IDF in the occupied territories. With Hamas's more radical approach and advocacy of violent attacks on soldiers and settlers alike, the IDF found it could do nothing except wait for the next attack to happen. This scenario created the necessity for some new tactic to deal with Hamas and

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¹⁵³Legrain, "A Defining Moment," 81.

¹⁵⁴Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, "Introduction: On Achieving Independence," in Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads, eds. Jamal R. Nassar and Roger Heacock (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990), 7.

the escalating violence in the occupied territories. The tactic would be the same as Israel's response to the environment created by the end of the Cold War and the Second Gulf War, a secret deal with the PLO, which in this case would relieve Israel of the responsibility of dealing with Hamas and place that in the hands of the PLO. For the PLO, its decline and eventual eclipse by Hamas necessitated a separate deal to rescue it from irrelevance. This outcome reflects the importance of the influence of the Intifada, the third independent variable, in the creation of an environment that led to the 1993 peace accord between Israel and the PLO.

CHAPTER 5

THE MOVE TOWARDS PEACE

The Madrid Peace Conference, co-chaired by the US and Russia, began on 30 October 1991. The framework for negotiations agreed to at the conference was for the US to host a series of bilateral meetings bringing together Israel with Syria, Lebanon, and a joint delegation representing Jordan and the Palestinians of the occupied territories. The purpose of the talks between Israel and the Arab states would be to work out separate peace treaties. The Israeli and joint Jordanian-Palestinian meetings would set the parameters for a phase of self-rule in the occupied territories to last five years. Within three years of the beginning of the five year period, negotiations for a final settlement of the occupied territories would begin. The Palestinian delegation, without Jordan as agreed to in Madrid, held eleven meetings with Israeli officials in Washington during 1992 and 1993.¹⁵⁵

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¹⁵⁵Rubin, Revolution, 190.

These negotiations quickly bogged down, largely due to Syrian pressure that all Arab negotiations with Israel be coordinated so that Israel was faced with a united Arab bargaining front that would produce a comprehensive settlement beneficial to all the Arab parties. The PLO, although able to advise the Palestinian delegation, was for all intents and purposes left out of the process. They were under pressure, however, not to derail the negotiations as the Gulf states had promised to renew PLO funding if a settlement were reached between Israel and the Palestinians. This put the PLO in an awkward position, summed up by one PLO official as being "between the options of suicide and suicide."¹⁵⁶

Arafat was worried that any deal made between Israel and the Palestinian delegation would leave the PLO completely out and virtually ensure its extinction. During its almost thirty year history the PLO had employed a variety of strategies, ranging from guerrilla warfare and terrorism to seeking the patronage of Saddam Hussein to supporting the Intifada, none of which had produced tangible results. If a deal were to be made, Arafat wanted some sort of solution that would put him and the PLO in charge of any self-rule arrangement in the occupied territories. The turning point for the PLO was the June

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¹⁵⁶Ibid., 187.

1992 election of a Labor Alignment government in Israel under the leadership of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres. Rabin and Peres had run on a peace platform and promised that some sort of agreement with the Palestinians would be made concerning the occupied territories. In 1993 the Israeli Knesset repealed a law barring any Israeli contact or dialogue with the PLO, and officials from the Labor Alignment began meeting with PLO officials.¹⁵⁷

There were three contending Israeli military doctrines concerning the occupied territories following the outbreak of the Intifada. They were:

- 1) The occupied territories constitute the most important factor in the defense strategy for the next war. They must be kept under Israeli control, even if that means no peace. Israel should adopt Kissinger's strategy that no war is better for Israel than no peace.
- 2) There should be a withdrawal from some or most of the territories, under specified security arrangements. This would include some sort of autonomy for the Palestinians.
- 3) The territories are a security burden; they threaten internal security and increase the likelihood of war. This doctrine does not object to the formation of a Palestinian state so long as adequate security arrangements are made.¹⁵⁸

The move by Rabin and Peres to conduct a dialogue with the PLO was a reflection of both the second and third doctrines. Recognizing that the territories were becoming

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¹⁵⁷Ibid., 190.

¹⁵⁸Azmi Bishara, "The Third Factor," in Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads, eds. Jamal R. Nassar and Roger Heacock (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990), 276.

a security burden, but rejecting the idea of an independent Palestinian state, they pursued a policy of allowing limited autonomy for the Palestinians under the realization that an agreement with the PLO was the "...only antidote to the growing Islamist radicalism among Palestinians."¹⁵⁹

Coupled with concern over the rise of radical Islamist actions in the occupied territories was a concern over the future demographics of the occupied territories. Israeli demographers had concluded that "...the current generation of Palestinians was sufficiently large to produce a Palestinian majority in the next generation..." that could not be offset by massive Jewish immigration and would eventually threaten the Jewish identity of the state.¹⁶⁰

As the dialogue with the PLO was beginning, the negotiations in Washington were continuing, but not to Israel's satisfaction. Syria continued to stress the need for a united Arab stand against Israel in the bargaining, reflecting President Asad's deeply held belief "...that any settlement with Israel had to be comprehensive--Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the Palestinians had to sign together..."¹⁶¹ Syria's delegation to the Madrid conference conveyed Asad's belief by officially proposing to Israel

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¹⁵⁹Ghassan Salame, "Islam and the West," Foreign Policy 90 (Spring 1993): 35.

¹⁶⁰Friedgut, "Israel's Turn Toward Peace," 72.

¹⁶¹Michael Parks, "Giving Peace a Chance," Los Angeles Times, 14 September 1993, 3(H).

the "...readiness to trade 'total' peace for total withdrawal" from all occupied territory, including Lebanon and the Golan Heights.¹⁶² This essentially left Israel with two choices. Either continue the negotiations up against a united Arab front which placed a great deal of pressure on Israel, or pursue a separate deal with the PLO on limited self-government that would not place any immediate demands on Israel.¹⁶³ Israel chose the latter. This move would have the added benefit of placing the responsibility of controlling Hamas in the occupied territories with the PLO.

Over a period of eight months, Israel and the PLO held a series of eighteen secret meetings, fourteen of them in Oslo, Norway.¹⁶⁴ These talks were begun after the Norwegian Institute for Applied Science offered to facilitate them. Peres favored Norway because they had agreed to keep the negotiations secret even from the US. Norway's Foreign Minister, Johan Jorgen Holst, aided by four mediators and his wife (a Middle East specialist), hosted the meetings that took place in Oslo. The meetings began on 20 January 1993 with the PLO represented by Abu Mazin, a PLO Executive Committee member; Abu Ala, Director General of the PLO Economic Department and a member of Fatah's Central

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¹⁶²Eliahu Salpeter, "Slow Road to Peace," The New Leader LXXV, no. 13 (October 1992): 9.

¹⁶³Avi Shlaim, "Prelude to the Accord," Journal of Palestine Studies XXIII, no. 2 (Winter 1994): 18.

¹⁶⁴Parks, "Giving Peace a Chance," 2(H).

Committee; and Nabil Sha'ath, the chair of the PNC's Central Committee and a Fatah Central Committee member. By May Peres felt enough progress had been made to bring in an official Israeli presence and Uri Savir, Director General of Israel's Foreign Ministry, arrived to continue bargaining on Israel's behalf.

Syria continued to play a role even in these secret negotiations. Whenever some impasse was reached with the PLO, Peres would have word passed to the PLO that progress had been made with Syria and Israel might conclude a "...deal with Syria instead of concluding the accord with the PLO."¹⁶⁵ A draft agreement of the Declaration of Principles was reached in July, and on August 19 a final agreement was reached and a small signing ceremony held with Peres in attendance.¹⁶⁶ Informing Secretary of State Warren Christopher of the agreement on August 27, Peres played the Syrian card again, saying that "we believe that the progress with the Palestinians will help to spur the Syrians toward progress, too."¹⁶⁷

According to Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, "the conduct of an effective diplomacy is said to be difficult, if not impossible, if it must be subject, both in its conception and execution, to the continuous scrutiny of public

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¹⁶⁵Peres, Battling for Peace, 299.

¹⁶⁶Rubin, Revolution, 197.

¹⁶⁷Peres, Battling for Peace, 305.

opinion...."¹⁶⁸ Secret negotiations for the Israeli-PLO accord were certainly a necessity for their success. Had the Islamist factions of the Palestinians, or even Syria, found out about the pending deal it is probable they would have taken measures to stop it, even if it meant getting rid of Arafat. In signing the Declaration of Principles, Arafat destroyed what was left of Arab unity and broke up the united Arab negotiating front put in place by Asad. This new deal gave Israel the chance to announce a major breakthrough in the pursuit of Arab-Israeli peace without having to make any concessions. Reflecting on the negotiations, Yoel Singer, an Israeli Foreign Ministry legal advisor who took part in the talks, commented that the "...success in achieving the Declaration of Principles resulted mostly from the fact that there was no media coverage, and thus we had freedom to negotiate without our positions hardening through exposure."¹⁶⁹

An interesting aspect of the 1993 agreement is its striking similarity to the tactics and outcome of the Camp David agreement between Israel and Egypt. The Geneva Peace Conference, ongoing since the October 1973 war, had produced no results for Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. Feeling that "...there was a need to try a completely new approach which would bypass all formalities and procedural

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¹⁶⁸Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories, 111.

¹⁶⁹Parks, "Giving Peace a Chance," 2(H).

technicalities..." Sadat initiated secret meetings with Israel in an attempt to make a breakthrough.¹⁷⁰ Sadat hoped that a separate agreement made directly with Israel would force Jordan and Syria to go along with the deal once talks resumed in Geneva. Sadat needed an agreement with Israel in order to obtain the patronage of the US. Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin

"...saw a golden opportunity 'to use every ruse to sabotage the peace efforts' leading to Geneva and to promote Israel's long-standing goal of separating Egypt from the other Arab states as a means of weakening Arab bargaining power and making it easier for Israel to hold on to the remainder of the occupied territories..."¹⁷¹

These tactics were almost identical to those of the negotiations that led to the Israeli-Palestinian peace accord and produced the same result, the removal of an enemy from the playing field and the split of the united Arab bargaining front. The agreement legitimizes the idea of normal relations and puts pressure on the other party to go along or be seen as against the concept of peace.

In negotiations such as the ones that led to the 1993 peace accord "...agreement all too often becomes an end in itself."¹⁷² Arafat needed an agreement, any agreement, to

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¹⁷⁰Fred J. Khouri, The Arab-Israeli Dilemma, 3d ed. (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1985), 401.

¹⁷¹Ibid., 402.

¹⁷²Henry A. Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1961), 189.

reacquire legitimacy and funding in order to save himself and the PLO. When agreement becomes an end in and of itself the problems that are agreed upon "...are often soluble only because they are inconsequential."¹⁷³ The Declaration of Principles makes no mention of the important issues in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: the right of return for refugees, future borders, the issue of settlements, the status of Jerusalem.¹⁷⁴ Agreements such as this one, "...rather than contributing to a solution of the real issues, becomes a means of postponing coming to grips with them."¹⁷⁵

The bargaining theory presented in the second chapter helps to explain many aspects of the negotiations that produced the peace agreement between Israel and the PLO. In light of the three independent variables--end of the Cold War and the demise of the USSR, Second Gulf War, the Intifada--the parties to the Madrid Conference followed Morgenthau's four basic tasks of diplomacy in setting the stage for bargaining. Each actor determined its own objectives and those of the other actors in relation to the amount of power available to pursue them. These different objectives were then analyzed to determine if any

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¹⁷³Ibid.

¹⁷⁴Avi Shlaim, "The Oslo Accord," Journal of Palestine Studies XXIII, no. 3 (Spring 1994): 34.

¹⁷⁵Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice, 189.

compatibility existed, and if so, how bargaining might be used to reach the complementary objectives.

This process was equally important to both Israel and the PLO. Israel's primary objective was to prevent any collective Arab action that might result in the loss of territory that would diminish Israel's security. The united Arab bargaining front might also result in collective Arab action that would put Palestinians in the occupied territories in charge of limited autonomy and leave the PLO out of the process. This was an unacceptable alternative to the PLO. By pursuing a separate agreement, both the PLO and Israel were able to avoid these bad alternatives. Israel was able to take advantage of a weakened PLO and exploit its relative power gained after the end of the Cold War and the Second Gulf War. Without Soviet or Iraqi patronage, the PLO no longer had the means to influence Israeli action through coercive diplomacy.

The explicit bargaining that took place in secret in Norway allowed the PLO to make the necessary concessions to seal an agreement with Israel without public opinion jeopardizing the outcome. In waiting to announce the agreement until after it was completed, and publicly pledging their reputations on it, Rabin, Peres, and Arafat forced the rest of the world to go along with the deal or be seen as opposing a peaceful settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

This thesis has presented a qualitative theoretical analysis of the influence of three variables--the end of the Cold War and the demise of the USSR, the Second Gulf War, and developments in the occupied territories culminating in the Intifada--whose conjunction produced the conditions that led to the 13 September 1993 signing of the Declaration of Principles between Israel and the PLO.

The end of the Cold War deprived two key actors, Syria and the PLO, of their superpower patron and military supporter and created the permissive environment needed by the US to lead the Multinational Coalition in the Second Gulf War against Iraq. Without Russian deterrence, the US was free to pursue whatever policies most benefited it and Israel. This war cost the PLO the support of another patron, Saddam Hussein of Iraq, and in supporting Hussein in his invasion of Kuwait and fight against the coalition forces, also the funding of the oil-rich Gulf states upon which the PLO had become increasingly dependent. The loss of both Russia and Iraq also meant that any idea of someday defeating Israel in battle was also gone.

The Second Gulf War also precipitated a rise in radical Islamic movements throughout the region, including the occupied territories. In the occupied territories the Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas, seized on the PLO's misfortunes and expanded its own following and support while escalating its radical approach with increased violent attacks against the IDF and Jewish settlers. The Intifada itself had become a costly and embarrassing problem for Israel, only further exacerbated by the growing dominance of Hamas.

The conjunction of these variables produced a crisis for both Israel and the PLO. The Madrid Peace Conference, convened after the end of the Second Gulf War, put Israel in a position of having to pursue negotiations with a united Arab bargaining front. This front was led by Syria, now participating in the process as a result of its participation with the coalition forces against Iraq. Syrian participation was also motivated by the desire to establish relations with the West in order to replace the support it had lost with the demise of the USSR.

Syrian leadership in the negotiations followed the principle that only a united bargaining position could wrest the concessions it felt were necessary for a comprehensive peace, mainly the total withdrawal of Israel from all of the occupied territories. This position was untenable for Israel, who felt such a move would jeopardize its national security, its primary self-interest in all

policies that it pursued. The PLO, now without patronage, diplomatic support, or funding, found itself in the position of possibly being left completely out of any possible peace agreement and not being a party to the limited self-rule that was to take place in the occupied territories. This position was untenable for Arafat, for such an outcome would mean the eventual demise of the PLO and its leadership.

The solution to the mutual crisis of Israel and the PLO was to pursue the secret talks that led to the Declaration of Principles. This agreement saved the PLO and Arafat from oblivion, and enabled Israel to break up the united Arab bargaining front and pursue negotiations with each party separately, greatly increasing its bargaining power and the chances that it would be able to keep the majority of the occupied territories. All of these developments fit with Denfronzo's theoretical framework of revolutionary conflict.

The untenable positions in which both actors found themselves produced the frustration that led to participation in the negotiations, an uprising of sorts against the established channels of diplomacy and bargaining that were not producing results for either party, and in fact jeopardized Israeli security. Rabin, Peres, and Arafat participated in a dissident elite movement away from the official channels, and against the wishes of significant portions of their respective

constituencies in order to reach an agreement. The unifying motivator for both Israel and the PLO was self-preservation. The PLO needed an agreement to reestablish its lost funding and to prevent its total eclipse from the occupied territories by Hamas, or in the case of a negotiated settlement with the Palestinian delegation to the peace talks, by local Palestinians in the occupied territories. Israel preserved its self-interest of national security by breaking up the united Arab bargaining front that threatened collective Arab action to take away significant portions of the territory it had held since 1967. The agreement would also shift the security problem of dealing with Hamas to the PLO.

For the PLO, the state crisis was the loss of patronage and diplomatic support of first the USSR and then Iraq. For Israel, it was the possibility of having to give up territory that it felt was essential to its security in the face of united Arab bargaining pressure. The permissive and tolerant world context was created by the world-wide optimism that a comprehensive peace agreement would be achieved in the Middle East following the Second Gulf War. Four years of constant media coverage of the Intifada and the plight of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories also contributed to the optimism for an agreement.

Reaction to the peace agreement has, of course, been mixed. "Our salvaging the PLO today is like the United

States propping up the Soviet Union and Communism after winning the Cold War," said an advisor to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.¹⁷⁶ The Israeli writer Amos Oz said in a BBC interview shortly after the agreement was announced that, "this is the second biggest victory in the history of Zionism."¹⁷⁷ Former Secretary of State James Baker, when asked in an interview as to whether or not the PLO could be trusted, replied that it was irrelevant since the only concession Israel had made was to recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people.¹⁷⁸

Edward W. Said, University Professor at Columbia University and a leading Palestinian intellectual, wrote in response to the accords that it showed the need for Israel to find a Palestinian partner in order to produce a settlement that it could live with and would improve its "...public image, which had sunk to very new lows because of the Intifada..."¹⁷⁹ Said also wrote that the PLO "...has the distinction of being the first national liberation movement in history to sign an agreement to keep an occupying power in place."¹⁸⁰

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¹⁷⁶Parks, "Giving Peace a Chance," 4(H).

¹⁷⁷Quoted in Edward W. Said, The Politics of Dispossession (New York: Pantheon Books, 1994), xxxv.

¹⁷⁸Ibid.

¹⁷⁹Edward W. Said, The Pen and the Sword (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 1994), 132.

¹⁸⁰Edward W. Said, "Symbols Versus Substance," Journal of Palestine Studies XXIV, no. 2 (Winter 1995): 63.

The Israeli calculation is that by accepting the policing of Gaza--which Begin tried to give to Sadat fifteen years ago and which in 1992 Rabin and Peres said they wished would disappear into the sea--the PLO would soon fall afoul of local competitors, of whom Hamas is only one.¹⁸¹

The end result of this is a much weaker PLO which will be easier to bargain with in the future when it comes time to negotiate all of the final status issues.

In its competition with the PLO and its opposition to any negotiated settlement, Hamas has only to keep up the violent attacks against the IDF and Jewish settlers. In doing so, Hamas might succeed in discrediting both the PLO and the Labor Alignment government, causing Rabin and Peres to lose the next election. The Likud opposition has already announced that if it comes to power, the first thing it will do is to suspend the Declaration of Principles. This would be a victory for Hamas, and it could reinvigorate its struggle to overthrow Israel. Imad al-Falouji, a principal Hamas leader in Gaza said in an interview that, "Israel does not want Peace. It wants security, and we hold the key to that. And if they want their security, they have to listen to us. This is not peace yet."¹⁸² According to historian Richard W. Bulliet, "secular Muslims, with their foreign cheering sections,

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¹⁸¹Said, The Politics of Dispossession, xxxvii.

¹⁸²Serge Schemann, "For Gazans, Joy of Freedom has its Borders," New York Times, 25 August 1995, 1(A) and 5(A).

will be confronting religious Muslims long after an independent Palestinian state comes into being, and smart money will not be on the secularists."¹⁸³

Regardless of the final outcome, the signing of the Declaration of Principles between Israel and the PLO was a watershed event in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Such an event cannot be studied in isolation, but must take into account the wider context in which it occurs. Examining and analyzing the variables and influences that produced an environment conducive to the peace agreement necessitates the use of a multi-theoretical approach. By applying different theories at different levels of analysis the whole context can be examined, and in doing so, produce a better understanding of events such as the peace agreement between Israel and the PLO.

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¹⁸³Richard W. Bulliet, "The Future of the Islamic Movement," Foreign Affairs 72, no. 5 (November-December 1993): 40.

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