

1-1-1996

## The peace process: A case study

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THE PEACE PROCESS:

A CASE STUDY

by

Erika Lee Berlant

Bachelor of Arts  
University of Nevada, Las Vegas  
1995

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

in

Political Science

Department of Political Science  
University of Nevada, Las Vegas  
May 1998

**UMI Number: 1390630**

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## Thesis Approval

The Graduate College

University of Nevada, Las Vegas

April 24, 19 98

The Thesis prepared by

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Entitled

The Peace Process: A Case Study

is approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of the Arts

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## ABSTRACT

### The Peace Process: A Case Study

by

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This thesis is a case study of the ongoing peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, and the lack of impact that past agreements have made on the recent Oslo Accords. The thesis will attempt to show that past failures in 'land for peace' agreements between Israel and Arab countries only illustrate what is in store for the Oslo Accords. In addition, the current Israeli administration's failure to concede the disputed land in the occupied territories is in part, due to the fear of an emerging Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The dangers of an independent Palestinian state will be examined, both the strategic and geographic implications, and some economic difficulties the Israelis will be faced with. Finally, the continuing impact of the PLO's role in this arena will be examined.

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## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First and foremost, this is for my grandpa, for instilling in me the drive and self confidence to see this through.

To the rest of my family: grandma, mom, dad, Tony, and my best friend Kim, thank you for your encouragement, patience, and belief in me. Without that, I would never have finished.

I would like to extend my utmost appreciation to Dr. Tuttle and Dr. Simich, for pushing me to get through graduate school, for being great professors, and an enormous support.

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

#### Land for Peace

The concept of "land for peace" was created by Israel as a possible bargaining tool. Israel would grant autonomy or sovereignty to the Palestinians over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and this sacrifice would be in exchange for peace with its Arab neighbors. It is a situation that is not easily solved and a policy that could eventually do more harm than good. It will always be hard to determine the outcome of these exchanges, unless certain historical facts are examined. History has shown that Israel's concession of land to Arabs has not had the effect that was hoped for. In fact, in some instances, the opposite of peace has been the outcome. There has been more violence and aggression on the part of Arab nations.

There have been many attempts by the Israeli government to give back land in exchange for peace. The Israelis have constantly given back land acquired from the Arabs after being attacked by them. There were UN Resolutions 242 and 338. These were the beginnings of the

failing concept of "land for peace." Soon after, there were the famous Camp David Accords, which were supposed to further the lingering peace process. These particular Accords were signed by both Israel and Egypt with the persistence of then President Jimmy Carter. These accords have yet to show the results intended. Finally, there is the present Oslo Accords, signed by Yitzhak Rabin (Former Israeli Prime Minister) and PLO leader, Yasser Arafat. Yet, again, this proposes Israeli concession of land for hopes of change. There has always been the hope on the behalf of the Israelis', that terrorism will cease and that concession will bring peace and non-aggression. So far, the pursuit of concessions has not been a fruitful strategy. The Israeli government's history of proposed concessions should speak for itself.

The Arabs have not shown good faith and have not once lived up to their end of the peace negotiations. Terrorism and aggression continued during each of these pacts, and continue at this moment in time. Historically, this strategy has been a failure and the Israelis must find a new direction towards peace, if possible.

Furthermore, it is too naive for the Israeli government to think that Oslo will be different. Time after time, Israel has given back land that was conquered in war waged on them by Arab countries. It was usually at the request of the United states or other nations that thought

it unfair to occupy another country's land, even though the acquisition was in self-defense.

Since the Jewish state was established, Israel has tried to make concessions to various Arab countries, to stop violence and curb their feelings of anger regarding the supposed displacement of their Palestinian Arab brethren. These concessions to Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and others, were never enough and concluding from history, never will be. The Arabs did not want some land, they wanted all of Israel to be extinguished. Trying to appease them by giving up a little land, was and is not the answer.

#### The Security of Israel

What could the consequences be for Israel if a greater portion of the land that surrounds it is given back to an obviously hostile people? There is much dissent in Israel over the long term implications of relinquishing these territories. Yitzak Rabin believed that peace would have been the outcome, when he decided to sign Oslo, but there are those that doubt that peace will ever exist, because underlying every issue that the Arabs have raised over Israeli borders, the main issue is still the hatred of the Jews and the hostility towards Israel's existence. Furthermore, the West Bank and Gaza will most likely not be enough in the future. Arab nations such as; Syria, portions of Lebanon, Iran, Iraq, and other extremist Islamic groups, still call for the destruction of Israel and some would

claim that all of Palestine belongs to them, as the PLO (in its Covenant and in its 1974 Cairo Declaration) does. The consequences of these feelings could wreak havoc on Israel. Israel cannot really afford to deny these realities.

The geographical location of Israel is another security problem. Does the fact that Israel is surrounded by hostile neighbors pose a threat to its security if it were reduced to an indefensible size? The Palestinians might look at this new size as an opportunity to try to seize the rest of the territory they see as theirs. Syria has always thought of Israel as a part of Greater Syria. So, it becomes a possibility that Syria might try to take advantage of a considerably smaller Israel. On all fronts, the Israelis are surrounded by people who have been their sworn enemies for over 50 years, and if these territories are relinquished, Israel has two new fronts to fear. This geographical disadvantage should have been, and should still be, a basis for reconsidering Oslo's suggestions. The West Bank and Gaza should never be totally relinquished.

#### Inter-Arab Conflict

Inter-Arab conflict has been a problem in the Middle East for centuries, and could very easily be heightened by granting total independence to Palestinian Arabs. It is what Arabs have been fighting for over 50 years, but a new Palestinian state would have a direct effect on how they conduct their foreign affairs. When the Palestinians have

been granted a home, the Arab coalition will have no scapegoat to use as leverage for universal demands.

Arab nations fear for their own security. For instance, a Palestinian state on the West Bank could threaten Jordan. It is no secret that the Hashemite regime's relationship with the PLO is on shaky grounds and Jordan is seen by Palestinian militants as the other half of Palestine. There is a legitimate fear here. The majority of Jordan's population is Palestinian and a substantial amount will want to join the East Bank with a Palestinian Arab state on the West Bank.

The same idea stretches to cover the Arab nation of Syria. Syria will predictably not allow a Palestinian state to exist for too long. How long will Syria hesitate before trying to take back what is supposedly its own?

It is worthy to mention that there are hostile factions within the PLO that certainly will and do, fight amongst themselves, and with others to control a new Palestinian state and preserve it. These facts contribute to the doubts that "land for peace" can really bring about its objectives.

### Conclusion

The conclusion will try to show that the Israeli attempt to buy peace will not be fruitful. There might be dangers facing Israel in the future, like its own security and the inter-Arab conflicts that will be laid at its

doorstep. The possibility of harmony does look dismal under the circumstances noted above.

## CHAPTER 2

### THE HISTORY OF LAND FOR PEACE

#### Land for Peace

At the beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Zionists in Israel would recognize different British proposals for a peaceful settlements. After the Arabs rejected a proposal put before them by the Zionists in the early 1930's to create separate, but equal political recognition (which gave them equality without giving notice to the fact of majority/minority status), the Zionists continued to try to appease the Arabs.<sup>1</sup> Samuel Katz writes in his book Battleground:

...in 1937, the Zionist leaders agreed, again *for the sake of peace* [italics mine], to share out the Country, dividing what remained of the original Mandated territory of Palestine after Eastern Palestine had been given to the Arabs by the British. They accepted as a basis the partition scheme proposed by the British Royal Commission. The proposed Jewish miniature state would have been highly indefensible. The Arab leaders rejected the plan out of hand, and the British government buried it.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Samuel Katz, Battleground: Fact and Fantasy in Palestine (Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, New York: Steimatzky/Shapolsky, 1985) 254-56.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., 256.



Katz writes again of a rejected Israeli concession:

A third effort at accommodation was made in 1947. The Jewish underground having compelled the British to relinquish their hold on Palestine, the Zionist leaders once again announced their willingness to accept a scheme of partition *as a means of putting an end to the conflict* [italics mine]. The Zionist leaders accepted the United Nations partition proposal, which included a ludicrously vulnerable Jewish state. They persuaded themselves once more that a heavy sacrifice would win the hearts of the Arabs.<sup>3</sup>

These rejections by the Arabs were just the beginnings of a long line of peace proposals that were either buried, rejected, or accepted only later to be violated. For example, after the 1956 Suez War, the "Israelis withdrew from the Sinai to the armistice Line in exchange for Egyptian promises to keep the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran open to Israeli shipping; to prevent guerilla activities against Israel from its territory; and in due course make peace...The Six Day War in 1967 was precipitated by Egypt's use of force to close the Straits to Israeli shipping."<sup>4</sup> In addition, Egypt never halted terrorist activities against Israel. Quite the opposite took place; Egypt still proposed the destruction of Israel and continued

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<sup>3</sup>Samuel Katz, Battleground: Fact and Fantasy in Palestine (Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, New York: Steimatzsky/Shapolsky, 1985) 257.

<sup>4</sup>Eugene Rostow, "Resolution 242-A Historical" in Can Israel Survive a Palestinian State?, ed. Michael Widlanski (Jerusalem: Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies), 102.

its anti-Semitic propaganda.

UN Resolution 242 and 338

In 1967 and 1973, the United Nations proposed two separate resolutions, that were designed to work together, to bring peace between the Israelis and the Arabs, "The 338 rule defines the vehicle through which peace should be reached: negotiations between parties; while the 242 rule describes this future peace environment."<sup>5</sup> On November 22, 1967, after the Six Day War between Israel and the Arabs, Resolution 242 was originated. War was being waged from distances extremely close to the Israeli borders. Israel defended itself with great success and "gained control of the remainder of Western Palestine clear to the Jordan River, of the Golan Heights, and of the Sinai Peninsula down to the Suez Canal and the Red Sea."<sup>6</sup> Resolution 242 stated that the Israelis would discontinue occupation of some or all of the territories in question-the West Bank, Gaza, and the Golan Heights, as long as a true and durable peace settlement could be agreed upon by both parties.<sup>7</sup>

Legally, according to this document, Israel may

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<sup>5</sup>Ze'ev Begin, A Zionist Stand (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1993)133.

<sup>6</sup>Samuel Katz, Battleground: Fact and Fantasy in Palestine (Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, New York: Steimatzky/Shapolsky, 1985)2.

<sup>7</sup>Benjamin Netanyahu, A Place Among Nations (New York: Bantam Books, 1993)289-90.

continue to occupy those areas in question until there is a cessation of aggression towards it, and recognition of its right to exist in peace and security is concluded. The resolution was carefully written this way because of events between Israel and Egypt in 1956, when Egypt violated its agreement and used force to keep Israel out of the Straits of Tiran.<sup>9</sup> It was clear that this clause was necessary because, otherwise, the Arabs might concentrate solely on the statement of withdrawal. As it turned out, it did not matter what other requirements may have been necessary for Israeli withdrawal from the regions, the Arabs still concentrated on mandatory Israeli withdrawal.

The objectives of Resolution 242 proved to be a source of tension for over twenty years. The Arabs consistently refused to make peace with the Israelis ostensibly because they would not withdraw from the territories in question (but in reality because they refused to accept Israel), and the Israelis refused to withdraw because the Arabs would not sign any agreements of peace. And, the Israelis had the right to remain exactly where they were and the Arabs chose to ignore the very clear instructions set forth in Resolution 242. Eugene Rostow cites part of the Resolution in his essay Resolution 242-A Historical Perspective:

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<sup>9</sup>Eugene Rostow, "Resolution 242-A Historical Perspective" in Can Israel Survive a Palestinian State? Ed. Michael Widlanski (Jerusalem: Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, 1990)102.

The Resolution specifies that "the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which would include the application of the following Principles: (i) withdrawal of armed forces from territories of recent conflict; and (ii)...respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.'

The Resolution did not require the Israelis to withdraw from all territories, period. Furthermore, it did not require that the Israelis withdraw *at all* until peace and recognition of sovereignty were agreed upon by all parties. Rostow further notes, "It is not possible to say that the Resolution is ambiguous on this point or that it requires Israel to accept the 1967 boundaries."<sup>10</sup>

Resolution 338, which was written six years later on October 22, 1973, originated at a time when Resolution 242 still had not been recognized. Resolution 338 orders that "negotiations start between the parties concerned under the appropriate auspices, aimed at establishing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East."<sup>11</sup> These Resolutions never resulted in their original intent, which was to bring peace and stability to the region.

Israel has, over the years, shown good faith. They

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<sup>9</sup>Michael Widlanski, Can Israel Survive a Palestinian State? (Jerusalem: Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, 1990) 103.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., 103.

<sup>11</sup>Ze'ev Begin, "The Likud Vision," Foreign Affairs Fall (1991) 25.

have consistently agreed to relinquish territory, as long as Arab terrorism ceased and an agreement on their sovereignty could be reached. Since these Resolutions were written, Israel has offered to make further concessions. These consist of 1) the return of the Sinai Peninsula to the Egyptians, and 2) the return of *portions* of the Golan Heights to Syria. The return of the Peninsula was a dangerous move, considering it was vital to Israeli security and the Golan Heights sits above the Northern half of Israel. Still, Israel offered these concessions.<sup>12</sup> Even with Israeli cooperation, the Arab nations have not felt compelled to do the same. It is the Arab contention that Israel must relinquish all territory, period. Benjamin Netanyahu wrote:

It took twelve years for Egypt to comply with Security Council Resolution. In explicitly refusing to make peace with Israel, the other twenty Arab states flout the dictates of Resolution 242 to this day. Yet, with unsurpassed hypocrisy, they reverse casualty yet again and claim that it is Israel that is in violation of the Resolution with which they themselves have yet to make the slightest gesture of compliance.<sup>13</sup>

Netanyahu goes on to observe that the Arabs have completely misused the wording of the Resolution to fit their argument:

Their accusations are based on an additional clause in Resolution 242, which calls for "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from areas occupied in the recent conflict." Israel, claim the Arabs, have

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<sup>12</sup>Benjamin Netanyahu, A Place Among Nations (New York: Bantam Books, 1993) 290-91.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., 290-91.

never obeyed the directive to withdraw from "the territories." Why should they make peace, when Israel is still in possession of the West Bank, the Golan, and Gaza? They conveniently chose to forget that any Israeli withdrawal was supposed to follow the signing of peace agreements, which the Arab states adamantly refuse to sign.<sup>14</sup>

The Arabs have never changed their hostile sentiments towards the Israelis. This continual hostility should have made the process of giving back land for peace look futile. However, and for whatever reasons, Israel tried this again in the 1970's with the Camp David Accords. As expected, the results were quite the same.

#### The Camp David Accords

The first peace treaty ever signed with an Arab country came into existence twelve years after the UN Resolutions. After twelve years, an Arab country decided to make some concessions after Israel had made so many in those intermittent years. The treaty, a direct result of the negotiations at Camp David, was influenced by another war that had been waged upon Israel: the Yom Kippur War. During the Yom Kippur War, Israel was able to regain its occupation of the Golan Heights, taken from Syria in the 1967 attack (it took Israel approximately ten days to recapture the Golan from Syria, who conquered the Heights in the Yom Kippur attack). In addition, Israel took control of some of

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<sup>14</sup>Benjamin Netanyahu, A Place Among Nations (New York: Bantam Books, 1993)291.

Egypt's land inside its borders.<sup>15</sup>

Jimmy Carter, the U.S. President at the time, proposed the negotiations between Menahim Begin, of Israel, and Anwar Sadat, of Egypt. This was the beginning of the Camp David Accords, taking the name from the location of the negotiations in Camp David, Maryland. The framework of the Accords were as such:

The two nations were to conclude a peace treaty within three months. Israel would withdraw from the entire Sinai Peninsula and turn it back to Egypt. The area would be demilitarized. The Israeli pullout would occur in phases...the first one taking place within three to nine months after the signing of the peace treaty. Normal diplomatic relations would then be established. The final withdrawal would be carried out within two to three years after the pact was signed.<sup>16</sup>

The pact had two parts:

The first part included Israel's promise to withdraw from all of the Sinai in return for peace and normalization of relations. Although Egypt was to exercise its sovereignty over the relinquished areas, it agreed to certain security arrangements. The second part contained self-rule, or autonomy, plan for the Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza.<sup>17</sup>

The West Bank and Gaza were given special attention. It was agreed that "Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and elected Palestinian representatives would negotiate the key

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<sup>15</sup>Samuel Katz, Battleground: Fact and Fantasy in Palestine (Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, New York: Steimatzky/Shapolsky, 1985)223.

<sup>16</sup>Lester A. Sobel, Peace-Making in the Middle East (New York: Facts-on-File, Inc., 1980)223.

<sup>17</sup>Yael Yishai, Land or Peace: Whither Israel? (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1987)21.

questions of sovereignty of the Israeli-occupied territory after a five year transition period. Israel would conclude a peace treaty at the end of that time."<sup>18</sup>

There were additional provision added, such as keeping Israeli troops in the Israeli-occupied territories until the five year period was over; the eventual *autonomy* of the Palestinians, although "there was a tacit acknowledgment of Israel's special position in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, which granted it a veto on issues such as the setting up of a Palestinian state, a strong role in internal security, and a substantial say in the determination of the specific powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority"<sup>19</sup>; and sharing police duties with Jordan and Egypt.<sup>20</sup>

The utopian vision behind the drafting of these Accords was that other Arab nations would be an eventual party to the treaty. However, other Arab nations wanted nothing to do with the treaty or the signing of it. Most of Egypt's Arab neighbors branded Sadat a traitor and an opposition coalition began. King Hussein of Jordan refused to be a party to the Accords because "Amman was not a party to the pacts" and PLO leader Yasser Arafat accused Sadat of

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<sup>18</sup>Lester A. Sobel, Peace-Making in the Middle East (New York: Facts-on-File, Inc., 1980)223.

<sup>19</sup>Yael Yishai, Land or Peace: Whither Israel (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1987)21.

<sup>20</sup>Lester A. Sobel, Peace-Making in the Middle East (New York: Facts-on-File, Inc.)223-24.



making agreements that did not accurately represent the people.<sup>21</sup> The Arabs made attempts to block peace by cutting all ties with Egypt and boycotting Egyptian business. In addition, there were massive terrorist attacks upon Israel and Egypt.<sup>22</sup> Again, Israel was agreeing to give up land for peace and the Arabs balked at the gesture.

As years passed, it seemed as if Egypt had a difficult time upholding its end of the agreement. Martin Sicker, author of Israel's Quest for Security, wrote that "The provisions in the treaty that call for normalization of relations were never really taken seriously in Egypt, and the peace accord soon dwindled to nothing more than a treaty of nonbelligerence."<sup>23</sup> Egypt's idea of peace was probably one of a simple cessation of tensions, and not a long term commitment. In an article entitled "The Illusion of Land for Peace", it has been written that "The Camp David Accords (Article 3, Clause 5) call for Egypt and Israel to 'refrain from hostile propaganda [directed at one another]...'. Egypt's government controlled press repeatedly violated this obligation..."<sup>24</sup> After Israel had already given up vital

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<sup>21</sup>Lester A. Sobel, Peace-Making in the Middle East (New York: Facts-on-File, Inc) 226.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 262-64.

<sup>23</sup>Martin Sicker, Israel's Quest for Security (New York: Praeger Publishing, 1989) 161.

<sup>24</sup>Joel Weingarten, "The Illusion of Land for Peace," The National Interest Summer (1989) 114.

territory on the Peninsula, Egypt had the opportunity to abrogate the agreement:

On April 21 and May 3, 1987,...*El Abram*...affirmed that Israel exports irradiated foodstuffs to Egypt, saying that this was an Israeli conspiracy aimed at spreading death. In December 1988, the government owned newspaper *El Akkbar* claimed that Israel was the most likely culprit in the terrorist bombing of Pan Am flight 103 which exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland on December 21, killing 259 passengers...<sup>25</sup>

On these dates noted above, Egypt was under different leadership than the time of the treaty signing. However, the treaty was still binding, although not according to Egypt. Leadership was irrelevant, however, because neither Sadat, nor the newer Mubarak, considered the treaty legally binding until Israel rescinded Gaza and the West Bank.<sup>26</sup> This was not a requirement of Israel until certain conditions were met and those conditions were not met. This is another example of Arab leaders negating their responsibilities.

Diplomatic relations were supposed to be in effect as a condition of the treaty. Israel would withdraw from the Sinai and Egypt would cease negative propaganda and violence

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<sup>25</sup>Joel Weingarten "The Illusion of Land for Peace," The National Interest Summer(1989), 115.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., 114. Weingarten writes that "As Egyptian President Sadat made clear, and as his successor Mr. Mubarak has affirmed, Egypt sees maintenance of the treaty predicated upon Israel's forfeiture of Judea and Samaria to the Arab Palestinians. Therefore, Egypt sees no obligation to uphold the treaty if Israel does not give back additional territories to third parties. However, Mr. Mubarak has not said that Egypt would be willing to return the Sinai to Israel if Egypt declares the treaty null and void."

and enter diplomacy. Of course, this idea of diplomacy dwindled away:

At the height of the Lebanese War in 1982, Egypt's President Mubarak withdrew his ambassador to Israel. He then laid down terms for a resumption of diplomatic ties which called for Israel to withdraw from Lebanon in a manner 'not contingent' upon a Syrian withdrawal. Ultimately, Egypt did not agree to return its ambassador to Israel until the end of 1986. It should further be noted that since 1981 Egypt has only agreed to one summit meeting between the Egyptian and Israeli leaders-and that was at the behest of the United States.<sup>27</sup>

Egypt decided to react and abide by the treaty on its own terms, as if the original treaty did not exist. Other terms of the agreement have been violated. For instance, a normalization of trade and tourism was to develop but this never materialized, "...Egypt has placed an almost total embargo on trade with Israel, and tourism has evolved into a one way street. Though Israelis are eager to spend their leisure dollars in Cairo, Egypt discourages its citizens from traveling to Israel."<sup>28</sup>

The most important violation of the Accords has been Egypt's resistance to the deterrence of terrorist activities directed against Israeli citizens. In fact, "Egypt has aided the PLO by providing its terrorist with safe havens in Cairo and allowing them to launch attacks against Israel

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<sup>27</sup>Joel Weingarten, "The Illusion of Land for Peace," The National Interest Summer (1989)115.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid.

from its borders."<sup>29</sup> The Accords proved to be a failure in the ongoing strategy of "land for peace." Israel conceded and Arab nations demanded more. Egypt literally made the treaty defunct.

So, what was different in Oslo? The Oslo Accords have been signed, but the Accords have not been any more effective than others of the past; with the primary emphasis being on Israel withdrawal from the occupied territories, and not on a cessation of terrorism and violence.

### The Oslo Accords

The newest venture in the land for peace agreements is the Oslo Accords, originally drafted and embarked upon by U.S. President Bill Clinton and the former Israeli Prime Minister Rabin. The draft is familiar, in that Israel gives up more than it will receive. In this last proposal, Israel comes dangerously close to authorizing a separate Palestinian state, which has been an avoided issue for years by all Israeli governments. Israel granted autonomy to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in return for peace, leaving itself completely vulnerable. Oslo has proved to be as ineffective as the others in convincing the Arabs to peacefully coexist.

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<sup>29</sup>Joel Weingarten, "The Illusion of Land for Peace," The National Interest Summer (1989)115. He cites examples of terrorist attacks against Israel. One example was in March 1988, when six Israeli civilians were killed on a bus that was attacked by terrorists. The terrorists might have been helped through the Israeli border by the Egyptians.

In 1991, the first phase of these negotiations took place at a conference in Madrid, which was overseen by the United States and the Soviet Union. In the article "Arabs and Israelis: Slow Walk Towards Peace", it is written that "the framework for negotiations called for bilateral discussions between Israel and Syria, Israel and Lebanon, and Israel and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Eight sets of bilateral sessions had taken place by the end of 1992."<sup>30</sup>

There were further issues that were discussed during these initial negotiations such as: arms control, regional security, economic development, refugees, the environment, and water resources.<sup>31</sup> The issues here were discussed along multilateral lines, with every negotiating party involved. The process was difficult because every side had reservations about the process. For instance, the Israelis did not want to negotiate with any member of the PLO and the Syrians were hesitant about attending as well.<sup>32</sup>

Nevertheless, Israel eventually met with not only Syria, but with Yasser Arafat, the leader of the PLO. Rabin's Labor Party was more flexible than earlier leaders like Shamir and his Likud Party, or the present Prime

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<sup>30</sup>M. Graeme Bannerman, "Arabs and Israelis: Slow Walk Towards Peace," Foreign Affairs vol.72, no.1 (1992-93)152.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid. The Syrians did not want multilateral talks until satisfactory bilateral talks were held.

Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Rabin started negotiating concessions on land that the Likud party would have never compromised on for the sake of security and peace, for instance, the possibility of relinquishing Jerusalem was contemplated. Bannerman asserts:

The...Israeli government appears to support the view that UN Security Council Resolution 242 does indeed apply to all fronts, including the Golan Heights. Rabin has worked to lead Israeli public opinion to perceive the benefits of peace as well as the need for additional concessions.<sup>33</sup>

Rabin put forth the idea that the Israelis were willing in the future to make even more sacrifices. At this point, the Israelis and the Palestinians had different principles laid out about interim self-government and the future of the Palestine becoming its own state. The Israelis opposed any interim government authority and the Palestinians thought it necessary. Israel was worried about its security and the Palestinians were worried about their pride.<sup>34</sup> However, it was expected that Rabin's party would become more flexible about interim self-governing and this was a correct assumption.

During the years from the Madrid Conference until the signing of the Declaration of Principles on September 13, 1993, between Israel and the PLO, many relevant events and

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<sup>33</sup>M. Graeme Bannerman, "Arabs and Israelis: Slow Walk Towards Peace," Foreign Affairs vol.72, no.1 (1992-93)154.

<sup>34</sup>Adam Garfinkle, "Documentation: Israeli and Palestinian Proposals for the West Bank," Orbis Summer (1992)432.

advances took place. In the CRS Issue Brief, they were summed up as follows:

Bilateral talks followed in Washington between December 1991 and September 1993, with Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and the Palestinians, emphasizing different sides of the "territory for peace" exchange enshrined in UN Resolution 242. Israel and the Palestinians discussed a 5-year period of interim self-rule leading to a final settlement.<sup>35</sup>

In addition to this progress, there were other discussions on land concessions. For example, "Israel and Syria discussed Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights in exchange for peace, with neither conceding priority to the other. Israel and Jordan agreed on the agenda, but delayed ratification pending Israeli-Palestinian progress..."<sup>36</sup>

The initial Declaration of Principles suggested that the Israeli government was caving in to Palestinian demands of self-rule. There were two agreements concluded, one of which was the "Israel-PLO Mutual Recognition."<sup>37</sup> This agreement concluded that:

...PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat recognized Israel's right to exist, accepted UN Security Council Resolution 242 and 338, the Middle East peace process, and the peaceful resolutions of conflict. He renounced terrorism and violence and undertook to prevent them. Stating that the articles of the Palestinian Covenant that contradict these commitments are invalid, he undertook to submit Covenant changes to the Palestinian National Council and

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<sup>35</sup>Carol Migdalovitz, "The Middle East Peace Process," CRS Issue Brief, September 2, 1994 ed.1.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid. CRS-1

<sup>37</sup>Ibid. CRS-1

and called upon the people of the West Bank and Gaza to reject violence. Prime Minister Rabin [at this time] recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and agreed to negotiate with it.<sup>38</sup>

The Declaration of Principles entailed agreements made about Palestinian interim self-government for the West Bank and Gaza. These were the Oslo agreements that were held secretly between Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and PLO official Mahmoud Abbas. These principle included:

Palestinian self-rule in Gaza and Jericho...to be implemented by Israeli withdrawal within four months thereafter..."Early Empowerment" or transfer of authority over education, culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism in the West Bank and Gaza to Palestinians...Elections in 9 months of a Palestinian to sit in Bethlehem with jurisdiction over the West Bank and Gaza. Palestinians who reside in East Jerusalem will vote. Israeli troops will redeploy from Palestinian population centers before the election and redeploy further as a Palestinian police force assumes responsibility for public order.<sup>39</sup>

There were further agreements:

Joint Israeli-Palestinian committees will deal with common issues such as economic cooperation and dispute resolution. The parties will invite Jordan and Egypt to establish cooperation arrangements that will decide modalities of admission of persons displaced in 1967,...During the interim period, Israel will be responsible for external security, settlements, Israelis, and foreign relations. Permanent status negotiations will begin in the third year of interim rule (April 13, 1996) and may include Jerusalem.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>38</sup>Carol Migdalovitz, "The Middle East Peace Process," CRS Issue Brief, September 2, 1994 ed.13.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid. CRS-14.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid.



Along with these agreements, Israel managed to make agreements with such other Arab nations as Jordan, in which Israel agreed to withdraw from "two small strips of land, one near the Dead Sea, and one near Lake Tiberias, that it seized in 1968."<sup>41</sup> The two countries signed a treaty in October 1994 to "terminate the state of belligerency" and conduct bilateral negotiations on issues like economics and combating crime.<sup>42</sup>

Oslo II, signed in September of 1995, called for further negotiations in expanding Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank. This has been labeled the "point of no return" for Israel.<sup>43</sup> Oslo II has been seen as giving Palestinians the chance to acquire an independent Palestine state, a reality that would be disastrous for Israel.

#### The Flaws in Oslo

Aside from the eventual security implications of an independent Palestinian state, there are fundamental flaws in the agreement between Israel and the PLO. The PLO has already violated the agreement, as has Israel, in retaliation.

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<sup>41</sup>Carol Migdalovitz "The Middle East Peace Process," CRS Issue Brief, September 2, 1994 ed.1, 15/16.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid.

<sup>43</sup>Dore Gold, "Caroming Down the Road to Peace," Jerusalem Post International October 7, 1995.

This is in part due to the idea that Israelis and Palestinians were not seeking the same results. The two parties had totally different agendas when devising and signing the DOP. Amos Perlmutter notes that the Israelis built the process among Israeli "needs and demands," not wanting to address the issue of Palestinian statehood until a later date. While Arafat was a "sooner than later" kind of diplomat that wanted every inch of territory that was seen as belonging to the Palestinians and sought eventual statehood for the West Bank and Gaza "including East Jerusalem," which the Israelis have been steadfastly refusing to compromise.<sup>44</sup>

The Israelis apparently did not consider the idea that Arafat might not be sincere in his quest for peace. Arafat did not hide his aspirations in the least. David Bar-Illan has documented that fact:

Addressing "the Palestinian people" on Jordanian television on the very day of the signing, September 13, 1993, Arafat never mentioned peace with Israel or the cessation of terrorism. But he did say that the Declaration of Principles was the first step in the PLO "plan of phases" of 1974.<sup>45</sup>

These phases Bar-Illan is quoting are the phases in which Israel will eventually become conquered and destroyed. Palestine becoming a sovereign state in the West Bank and

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<sup>44</sup>Amos Perlmutter, "The Israeli-PLO Accord is dead," Foreign Affairs May/June (1995) 63.

<sup>45</sup>David Bar-Illan, "If This Be Peace...", Commentary February (1995) 31.

Gaza is just one step closer to this eventuality. This probability could lead to the demise of Israel because of security risks, such as physical, geographic, and economic dangers.

There were numerous suppositions in the tenets of Oslo, one of which was the idea that Arafat was a diplomat, willing to stop terrorist attacks from the West Bank and Gaza, and by the PLO, against Israelis. Aside from this, negotiating with Arafat does not necessarily produce results. The reality is that Arafat has not done this, except to curtail them recently, not as an end, but as a means to facilitate IDF withdrawal. Also, some believe that Arafat is not the sole voice within the PLO as seen by many Palestinians. Arafat has lost his credibility and popularity over the years, and "just about everybody is opposed to him in one way or another...a generation of Palestinian nationalists and Muslim fundamentalists has emerged in the occupied territories to violently oppose Oslo, demanding the destruction of Israel proper and an end to land-for-peace diplomacy."<sup>46</sup> The former Rabin government apparently ignored Israeli intelligence estimates that Arafat no longer held the power he once did over this new generation of militants and that he was hated by many PLO

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<sup>46</sup>Amos Perlmutter, "The Israel-PLO Accord is Dead," Foreign Affairs May/June (1995) 61.

veterans.<sup>47</sup> Dore Gold describes Arafat as being "immeasurably weaker than any other head of state."<sup>48</sup> Therefore, it was imprudent to think that Arafat could, or would, for that matter, have halted terrorist activities being carried out by Hamas or Jihad, two notorious terrorist organizations. In fact, in an earlier article, written in 1995, before these terrorist groups started to feel a bit more unity, it was written that, "Hamas leaders use Arafat's agreement with Israel as a pretext to brand him a traitor."<sup>49</sup> However, these opposing Muslims would come to know that Arafat's land-for-peace agreement was just a phase in a strategy of phases to wipe out Israel. They will eventually stand with him again.

There have been quite a few terrorist attacks on Israel since Oslo's signing. In fact, the degree of attacks would make one think that Arafat had done absolutely nothing to curb these activities. Many attacks occurred very shortly after the signing, and were rumored to have been done by Arafat's own sect of the PLO, "in the months after the DOP was signed, there was intensified violence by Arabs against Jews, some of it perpetuated by Arafat's own Fatah

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<sup>47</sup>Amos Perlmutter, "The Israel-PLO Accord is Dead," Foreign Affairs May/June (1995)63.

<sup>48</sup>Dore Gold, "Where is the Peace Process Going?," Commentary August (1995)40.

<sup>49</sup>David Bar-Illan, "If This Be Peace....," Commentary February (1995)31.

faction."<sup>50</sup> And, in the few months prior to Oslo II, "in gross violation of his commitment under the agreement, Arafat's wing of the PLO, Fatah, carried out at least twelve terrorist attacks..."<sup>51</sup> Arafat had no real desire to prevent this violence and still does not.

In the first few years surrounding the agreement, Arafat failed to abide by his commitments:

Arafat...has failed to keep several commitments he made in Oslo: to discipline PLO members who engage in terrorism; to pursue, apprehend, and extradite terrorists to Israel; to refrain from hiring fugitive terrorists as policemen; and to condemn terrorist attacks explicitly. In addition to all that, Farouk Kaddoumi (who, in another violation of the agreement, has appeared at the UN as the "Foreign Minister of Palestine") consistently and openly calls for the continuation of the "armed struggle."<sup>52</sup>

And in the intermittent years between 1995 and the present, there has been no end to the accounts of terrorist activities in Israel.

In 1996 the new Likud party took office in Israel, with Benjamin Netanyahu as the Prime Minister. No one doubts his opposition to Oslo; however, with the

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<sup>50</sup>Douglas Feith, "Land for no Peace," Commentary June (1994) 33.

<sup>51</sup>David Bar-Illan, "If This Be Peace...", Commentary (1995): 30. He gives an example of an attack on an Israeli policeman by known members of Fatah. It was reported in the Palestinian newspaper as being committed by members of Hamas. In addition, the reporters were threatened if they revealed any true identities.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid.

assassination of Rabin in 1995, Netanyahu had no choice but to continue the process, with care. There are, however, issues attached to Oslo that Mr. Netanyahu will not bend on.

The Netanyahu government decided in 1996, for reasons of tourism, to open an exit from a "Hasmonean-era tunnel in the vicinity of the Temple Mount in Jerusalem."<sup>53</sup> The Palestinians, Arafat, in particular, denounced this as a violation of their religion, being so close to their holy mosque, and retaliated by throwing stones and Molotov cocktails and firing upon Israeli soldiers with the very automatic weapons that Israel itself gave the Palestinian Authority when they were finally granted autonomy. In the end, seventy three people died and fifteen hundred people were injured.<sup>54</sup> As it turned out, the tunnel's new exit was nowhere near the holy mosque, it was just another excuse for violence.

In February of 1996:

...suicide bombers had blown themselves up in two Jerusalem buses, at a soldiers' pick up station in Ashkelon, and on a crosswalk in a Tel Aviv shopping center; an Islamic fanatic had plowed his car into a crowd waiting at a bus stop in Jerusalem; and five youths loaded with explosives had been apprehended while trying to penetrate an Israeli settlement in the Gaza district. Except for the Gaza attack, every one of these operations resulted in deaths-62 all told. This brought the total terror fatalities in the 31 months since the

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<sup>53</sup>Douglas Feith, "A Strategy for Israel," Commentary September (1997) 25.

<sup>54</sup>Norman Podhoretz, "The Tragic Predicament of Benjamin Netanyahu," Commentary December (1996) 34.

signing of the Oslo agreements to 213, the largest number in any such period since the establishment of the state...<sup>55</sup>

It has been speculated that terrorism is not only increasing since Oslo, but it is more efficient in its taking of lives. The PLO and the PA are more advanced in their weaponry and more organized, because of their new mini-state.<sup>56</sup>

Furthermore, the new PA has been consistent in its own violations of Oslo. The PA has failed to "confiscate the illegal arms in the hands of terrorist groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad; the recruitment of terrorists into the PA security forces; the refusal to hand over terrorism suspects to Israel for prosecution; the rapid release of terrorists from PA prisons; the conduct of official PA operations in Jerusalem; the use of incendiary anti-Israeli rhetoric by Arafat and other PA officials, including calls for *jihad* and praise of suicide bombers as "martyrs and heroes"; and the PA's failure to amend the Palestinian Covenant, which calls for the eventual destruction of Israel."<sup>57</sup> The Palestinian Covenant was supposed to be amended at the signing of Oslo and has yet to be changed. The Palestinian National Council had announced that it had been amended, but not a single

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<sup>55</sup>David Bar-Illan, "The Wages of Oslo," Commentary May (1996) 23.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid., 23-24.

<sup>57</sup>Douglas Feith, "A Strategy for Israel," Commentary September (1997): 25.

word is different; it still calls for the destruction of Israel.<sup>58</sup>

### The Future

With all these violations, terrorism and anti-Israeli rhetoric, how can Israel prevail? The answer seems to be that it will not. The Palestinians have proved recently what other Arab nations have proven in the in the past. There is no prospect of real peace. Israel has just given the Palestinians their own state, essentially,, and the violence continues. What can Israel do now? There is no turning back.

One option for Israel now is to take back the West Bank and Gaza from the Palestinians, in direct violation of Oslo.<sup>59</sup> The world seems disgusted at Benjamin Netanyahu's hard line policy, but has not addressed the problems of the many Israelis and Arabs that are dying as a result of PLO, PA, and other Islamic militant groups that violate the Accords every day. The option of Palestinian statehood is forgotten at this point because security dangers are too risky. If the Palestinians are granted their own state, the Israelis will not be able to take it back once accepted. It will be sovereign and the violence will only increase on Israel's small borders.

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<sup>58</sup>Norman Podhoretz, "The Tragic Predicament of Netanyahu," Commentary December (1997) 32.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid., 40.



Another option may be to continue stalling, and "pay lip service" to Oslo supporters, without granting anything further. Israel will continue to try and avert terrorism and continue to watch its partners in the treaty abrogate the demands put on them by its signing. However, "stalling is not a winning strategy. The appearance of stalling damages the government's credibility at home and abroad. If it claims to be committed to Oslo but fails for weeks and months to move the process along, Israel looks disingenuous..."<sup>60</sup> So, unfortunately, Israel is caught in a bind, of which there is no way out now, and which furthermore, could have been avoided in 1991, 1993 and 1995. A fact that cannot now be ignored is the prospect of Palestinian statehood. The dangers that might emerge from this prospect for Israel are endless.

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<sup>60</sup>Douglas Feith, "A Strategy for Israel," Commentary September (1996) 28.

## CHAPTER 3

### SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF A PALESTINIAN STATE

#### Surrounded by Hostility

In relinquishing these territories and granting autonomy to the Palestinians, Israel has helped to pave the way for an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank. It is no secret that this is the aspiration of Yasser Arafat. He has been quoted in the Jerusalem Post on September 3, 1993, as saying "The Palestinian state is within our grasp. Soon the Palestinian flag will fly on the walls, the minarets and the cathedrals of Jerusalem."<sup>61</sup> Arafat has been quoted in the Jerusalem Post on September 19, 1993, as claiming "Our first goal is the liberation of all occupied territories and return of all refugees, self-determination for the Palestinians and the establishment of

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<sup>61</sup>Americans for a Safe Israel, "Quotes You Can Use," Organizing for Israel: A Guide to Zionist Activities.

a Palestinian state whose capitol is Jerusalem."<sup>62</sup> An establishment of a Palestinian state will be detrimental to Israel.

Historically, Israeli concession of land for peace never helped to counter any feelings of anti-Semitism. It will be unlikely that a new concession of land will change those feelings. Years of occupation and defeat have aggravated these anti-Semitic feelings. It is a bizarre mistake to compare the Israeli occupation and treatment of the Palestinians in those occupied areas, to the treatment of the Jews by the Nazis. David Bar-Illan writes that "Portraying Israel as a latter-day Nazi-Germany is, of course, a favorite Arab propaganda line."<sup>63</sup> This portrayal of Israel as a modern Nazi-machine, helps Arab propagandists create a tarnished and evil Israeli image, one inviting hatred and invoking violence.

This hostility will prove to be a vital security threat to Israel. Peace is not something that will happen overnight. The long time refusal most Arab states to

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<sup>62</sup>Americans for a Safe Israel, "Quotes You Can Use," Organizing for Israel: A Guide to Zionist Activities. There are also quotes by Nabil Sha'ath, the senior aide to Arafat, as saying, "Gaza-Jericho first means total exercise of Palestinian sovereignty over the two regions as a first step toward an independent Palestinian state." This was in the Jerusalem Post on Sept. 10, 1993. Another quote is by Sari Nusseibeh, a PLO negotiations leader that states "its no secret that we are working towards Palestinian state in less than five years. Jerusalem Post Sept. 22, 1993.

<sup>63</sup>David Bar-Illan, "Israel: Guilt and Politics," Commentary May (1994) 25.

recognize Israel cannot be believed to change with the signature of an agreement. One fact is, that the only way true peace can become a reality is if the Arabs truly recognize Israel as a sovereign entity. This attempt has been made before with the Camp David Accords. Egypt failed, in practice, to recognize Israel as legitimate. Douglas Feith wrote that peace "has to do with attitudes of mind - with a mutual belief that each state has sovereign rights and a shared conviction that no party should take what belongs to another."<sup>64</sup> Since it is clear that the Arabs believe that Israel has robbed land in the past, it is highly probable that they have not changed their minds.

The hostile attitude, the terrorist activity, and the outward aggression aimed at Israel does not seem to be suspended. Israel is the enemy, past and present. Syria's long time hatred of the Israelis and Egypt's call to "throw the Jews into the sea" is not a sentiment that it is easily changed by relinquishing territory. Israel will always be in danger in the midst of this hostility. A treaty will not change this and the Palestinian Covenant proves this.

#### The Palestinian Covenant

There has been a continual call for the destruction of Israel. The most vocal organization is the Palestinian Liberation Organization. A vital part of the Oslo Accords

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<sup>64</sup>Douglas Feith, "A Mandate for Israel," The National Interest Spring (1993)

was the promise of Yasser Arafat to change the Palestinian Covenant, which calls for the destruction of Israel.

Arafat and the followers of his ideology believe the land that Israel occupies to be Arab homeland. This is not just the West Bank and Gaza, but all land integral to Palestine before the British Mandate in the 1920's. In the Palestinian Covenant, it states in Article 2 that "Palestine, with the boundaries it had during the British Mandate, is an indivisible territorial unit."<sup>65</sup>

The entire Covenant repeatedly calls for the liberation of Palestine and the return of this land to its rightful owners-the Palestinian people. The Covenant declares the Balfour Declaration and the Partition Plans of 1947 completely illegal (this Declaration and partition designs gave Israel its tiny beginning). Some excerpts from the Covenant are as follows:

Article 3: The Palestinian people possess the legal right to their homeland and have the right to determine their destiny...

Article 19: The partition of Palestine in 1947 and the establishment of the State of Israel are entirely illegal regardless of the passage of time, because they were contrary to the will of the Palestinian people and to their natural right in their homeland...

Article 20: The Balfour Declaration, the Mandate for Palestine and everything that has been based

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<sup>65</sup>Jillian Becker, The PLO-The Rise and Fall of Palestinian Liberation Organization (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1984)231.

upon them, are deemed null and void...<sup>66</sup>

The Covenant also insists on liberating the land through an armed struggle and that this struggle will not cease until the Palestinians have their victory. Articles 9, 10, and 30 illustrate this point:

Article 9: Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine. Thus it is the overall strategy, not merely a tactical phase. The Palestinian Arab people assert their absolute determination and firm resolution to continue their armed struggle and to work for an armed popular revolution for the liberation of their country and their return to it...

Article 10: Commando action constitutes the nucleus of the Palestinian popular liberation war. This requires its escalation, comprehensiveness and mobilization of all the Palestinian popular and educational efforts and their organization and involvement in the armed Palestinian revolution...

Article 30: Fighters and carriers of arms in the war of liberation are the nucleus of the popular army which will be the protective force for the gains of the Palestinian Arab people.<sup>67</sup>

Finally, the Covenant describes Zionism as an entity that is to be regarded as racist and aggressive and should be destroyed:

Article 22: Zionism is a political movement organically associated with international imperialism and antagonistic to all action for liberation and to progressive movements in the world. It is racist and fanatic in its nature, aggressive, expansionist, and colonial in its aims,

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<sup>66</sup>Jillian Becker, The PLO-The Rise and Fall of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1984), 233. The article goes on to say that the Jews insistence that Palestine is their homeland is inconsistent with history and that Judaism is a religion not a nationality, so Israel cannot be a state based on religion.

<sup>67</sup>Ibid., 231-234.

and fascist in its methods. Israel is the instrument of the Zionist movement, and a geographical base for world imperialism placed strategically in the midst of the Arab homeland to combat the hopes of the Arab nation for liberation, unity, and progress. Israel is a constant source of threat vis-a'-vis peace in the Middle East and the whole world...<sup>68</sup>

The articles of the Covenant makes the PLO's intentions clear. By Arafat's own reluctance to change these provisions, his announcement that peace is the intention is not authentic. The Covenant has not yet been modified and this poses a threat to Israel. The prospect for its destruction by aggressive means is not preposterous.

The original Israeli hope was that an autonomous Palestinian entity will be satisfied with it's new identity. There was the vision of a demilitarized, autonomous region in the West Bank, but adherence to this demilitarization is improbable. As Rabin himself once phrased it, "the number of broken treaties in the Middle East is equal to the number signed."<sup>69</sup> In addition, there is no way to stop a country from breaking these kind of demilitarization agreements, if they are being devious and covert.<sup>70</sup> David Bar-Illan has given an example of this type of covert betrayal in

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<sup>68</sup>Jillian Becker, The PLO-The Rise and Fall of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1984), 233. The article asks for help from other progressive forces and declares that the liberation of Palestine will destroy the Zionist movement.

<sup>69</sup>David Bar-Illan, "Why a Palestinian State is Still a Mortal Threat," Commentary November (1993) 29.

<sup>70</sup>Ibid.

describing what could happen in an independent Palestinian state:

...Iraq has shown, despite all the sophisticated monitoring available today, a sovereign country can accumulate heavy arms undetected. With its own airports and seaport, and with free movement across the Jordanian border, the new Palestinian state could acquire not only tanks but also fighter planes and heavy artillery.<sup>71</sup>

In addition, if a state becomes sovereign, how would Israel enforce such standards? The Palestinians will most likely ignore any agreements, for three reasons. Aharon Levran explains these reasons as, "First and foremost, because such arrangements are by nature restrictive and humiliating-inhibiting independence, freedom of action, and certainly sovereignty...Second, the likely circumstances in which their state would be born will certainly stiffen their positions and affect their willingness to remain restricted and humiliated...Third, when the discussions on security arrangements took place it would mean that a Palestinian state was already fait accompli, and what remained was a question of price."<sup>72</sup>

After all, if Palestine becomes a separate entity and an independent state, they should be able to have a military

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<sup>71</sup>David Bar-Illan, "Why a Palestinian State is Still a Mortal Threat," Commentary November (1993)29.

<sup>72</sup>Aharon Levran, "The Military Dangers of a Palestinian State," Global Affairs Fall (1989)144. His explanations were written before the Oslo Accords and the official peace process was started. There were security discussions in the Accords of which the Palestinians did agree to comply with, but his premonitions may turn out to be correct.



force like all other sovereign nations. In an article written by Louis Rene' Benes and Zalma Shoval, it is declared that, "Because of the right of sovereign states to maintain military forces essential to self-defense is certainly such a rule, Palestine could...be entirely within its right to abrogate any treaty that had compelled its demilitarization."<sup>73</sup> Any kind of military force, very possibly a combined Arab force, is a threat to Israel because of Israel's geographic vulnerability in the event of Palestinian statehood.

Geographical Implications of an Independent Palestinian State on Israel

Geographically, Israel is a small country. The relinquishment of this additional land will bring Israel back to its original pre-war 1967 borders. This proposes grave dangers for Israel with no hope for anything but grave consequences. The territory that Israel returns is vital to its security and the location vis-a'-vis Israel could bring unfortunate disaster to Israel if surrounded by hostile neighbors.

Benjamin Netanyahu asserts that "There can be no disputing that the protective wall of the West Bank is crucial for Israel's defense. But there can also be no

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<sup>73</sup>Louis Rene Benes and Zalma Shoval ed. by Patrick M. Cronin, "Why a Demilitarized Palestinian "Entity" Would Not Remain Demilitarized: The View According to International Law," Strategic Review Summer (1995) 73.

disputing that a large number of Arabs live on this wall. If Israel were to relinquish control of the West Bank, it would create a security nightmare."<sup>74</sup> This sheds light on Netanyahu's current 1998 position on Palestinian autonomy.

In sizing up Israel, after returning the land and a new Palestinian state eventually emerges, Aharon Levran explains that:

Israel within the Green Line [pre-'67 lines] is only 14 kilometers wide at the narrow waistline of the coastal plain, four times smaller than the West Bank, which is 55 kilometers broad as the crow flies (Qalqilia to Jordan). Roughly two-thirds of the population of Israel resides along the coastal strip from Akko to Ashod, as well as 80 percent of its industrial plants.<sup>75</sup>

Levran continues:

The main geo-military implications of this data indicate the importance of Judea and Samaria to Israel's security, particularly in terms of the defense of its most vital territory. The facts point out the vulnerability of most of the cities and population of Israel, which are at the very mercy of whoever commands the mountain range to the east. They also indicate that the defensive capability from the eastern slopes of Judea and Samaria is far more efficient than that of the western slopes...Above all, it is patently clear that Israel lacks the ability to build a plausible defensive disposition in the flat strip 14-20 kilometers wide that is its vital territory.<sup>76</sup>

Benjamin Netanyahu shares this same line of reasoning. He maintains that:

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<sup>74</sup>Benjamin Netanyahu, A Place Among Nations (New York: Bantam Books, 1993)294.

<sup>75</sup>Aharon Levran, "The Military Dangers of a Palestinian State," Global Affairs Fall (1989)134.

<sup>76</sup>Ibid.,135.

The topography of the Judean and Samarian mountains is particularly well suited for the delaying actions necessary for Israel's defense. To an invader from the east, this range is an extraordinary obstacle that must be overcome to reach the Israeli coastline ...The West Bank thus provides Israel not only with strategic depth but with strategic height.<sup>77</sup>

In an article entitled "The West Bank and Military Technology," Edward Sar illustrates:

The West Bank...was divided into three north-south trending topographic and strategic zones. The Eastern Zone, adjacent to the central sector of the of the Israel-Jordan border, comprises Israel's side of the Jordan River floodplain and the step like cliffs that form the rim of the Rift Valley. The The Central Zone is a narrow strip defined by the mountainous spine, rising in several locations to three thousand feet above sea level and providing ideal sites for early warning radar stations. The Western Zone encompasses the Judean and Samarian foothills that dominate Israel's populated coastal plain.<sup>78</sup>

When clarifying his in-depth study of the geographic importance of the West Bank, Sar concludes the three-fold zone system has "war deterrent qualities in a static confrontation... movement-impeding characteristics, natural

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<sup>77</sup>Benjamin Netanyahu, A Place Among Nations (New York: Bantam Books, 1993)263-65. The strategic depth that Netanyahu describes is the amount of space that Israel has a buffer zone. He defines strategic depth as "the distance the enemy has to cover before it can enter Israel's populated areas, inflict enormous civilian casualties, and conquer its cities translates into the time that Israel has to mobilize. The farther the advancing column has to travel, the more likely it is that air harassment and resistance on the ground will be able to stem the advance and therefore purchase time for the mobilization and deployment of reserves."

<sup>78</sup>Edward Sar, "The West Bank and Military Technology," Global Affairs Summer/Fall (1990)148.

obstacles, and vantage points..." that are "vital to the dynamics of modern war."<sup>79</sup>

In discussing the Gaza Strip, Aharon Levran states that it does not pose the same scale of threat to Israel as the West Bank, but nevertheless the threat is still there. Levran explains, "Because of its geographical proximity to the Southern settlements and to the center of Israel, and its location on a principal axis of access from the south to Israel's vital territory and Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip has the potential to serve as a forward hostile base..."<sup>80</sup> The importance of these lands to Israel's security is geographically apparent.

#### Military Implications of an Independent Palestinian State on Israel

Aside from the obvious geographical security implications of Palestine becoming an independent state, there are serious military dangers as well. Geography points out the vulnerable position that Israel will be in, surrounded by land that can provide for an easy attack on its most vital areas. The military implications point out the more serious danger to Israel posed by the surrounding Arabs.

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<sup>79</sup>Edward Sar, "The West Bank and Military Technology," Global Affairs Summer/Fall (1990)148.

<sup>80</sup>Aharon Levran, "The Military Dangers of a Palestinian State," Global Affairs Fall (1989)135.

Although it would take some time for an independent Palestinian state to do damage to Israel on its own, it would never have to act unilaterally, because the possibility of a unified Arab coalition is promising. This kind of coalition, if attempted, could feasibly wipe out an Israeli force. In The Military Dangers of a Palestinian State, Aharon Levran gives a frightening scenario for Israel:

Two such kinds of coalitions are: an "eastern front" coalition including the armies of Syria, Jordan, and expeditionary forces from Iraq and Saudi Arabia at the least, and a comprehensive Arab coalition including the Egyptian army as well.<sup>81</sup>

If something like this were to occur, Israeli forces would be outnumbered. An eastern front coalition would outnumber Israel's defense force 4:1, but if Israel had the advantage of being able to mobilize its reserve forces, the number changes in Israel's favor to 2:1.<sup>82</sup> In Israel's Quest for Security, it is written that:

A recent estimate by Israeli Major General Avraham Rotem suggests that in a future war, 'an Arab coalition including Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and Saudi-Arabia-without Egypt, and including a limited Iraqi force and a symbolic presence of additional forces-will pit Israel against some against some 7,000 tanks, 1,500 quality armored personnel carriers, 200 combat helicopters, almost 3,000 artillery guns, 50-60 surface-to-surface missile Launchers, approximately 1,000 planes...and a total armed force of between 800,000-900,000 soldiers

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<sup>81</sup>Aharon Levran, "The Military Dangers of a Palestinian State," Global Affairs Fall (1989)135.

<sup>82</sup>Ibid.

and officers.'<sup>83</sup>

Of course, the key here is that Israel would have to have the time and forewarning of an attack to mobilize its reserves and this is an advantage that most likely will not be there.<sup>84</sup> An independent Palestinian state will not allow Israel to keep intelligence installations in those vital areas that it will need to prepare for an attack, for this would defeat Palestinian purposes. This kind of surprise attack would restrict Israeli defensive capability.<sup>85</sup>

There is the argument that Israel was able to ward off a combined attack once before and it will be able to do so in the future. The problem with this argument is that it is not 1967 or 1973 anymore and there have been many evolutions in the Middle East since then. Levran states that:

...in 1967 the Israeli Air Force was able to

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<sup>83</sup>Martin Sicker, Israel's Quest for Security (New York: Praeger Publishing, 1989)188.

<sup>84</sup>Ibid., 136.

<sup>85</sup>Aharon Levran, "The Military Dangers of a Palestinian State," Global Affairs Fall (1989)137. Levran gives a scenario of the swiftness of an Arab attack on Israel. He writes that an Arab coalition could transport forces "in a swift surprise movement to the Green Line, and from there attacking the narrow waistline of Israel on the coastal strip. Such an attack could be supported by advanced military preparations that the Palestinians would undertake such as stockpiling light arms and erecting concealed obstructions and fortifications on the areas. These obstacles could take shape despite restrictive security arrangements, through a slow and hidden process." Levran explains that this kind of an attack could be maneuvered "in less than twelve hours."

swiftly knock out the principle Arab forces in an operation that had a decisive influence on the course of the war. Repetition of such an operation is almost not feasible due to the extensive defensive measures that have been undertaken by the Arab air forces...Since then, the Arabs have certainly learned from their mistakes, and the name of the game is surprise and isolation of the battlefield, preventing Israeli troops from redressing the balance of forces. Also in 1967, Israel...launched the offensive...However, in the future there is little guarantee that Israel will be able to be the initiator.<sup>86</sup>

With these changes in mind, the Arabs have newer weapons at their disposal, and there is an emphasis on the proliferation of chemical weapons. Many Arab countries have been developing new technology or have supplied technology by other countries. Iraq proved that it could be a threat during the Gulf War with its attack on Israel with a Scud missile and in an article titled Israeli Security in a Changing World, it is written that "Egypt...has been developing new surface-to-surface weapons-weapons that could, especially if there is a violent transfer of power in Cairo, be used with devastating effect against the Jewish state."<sup>87</sup> In addition, Beres asserts that:

Syria continues to be another major threat to Israel. Late in 1988, Israeli officials expressed concern that the Soviet Union had concluded a deal to provide Syria with a Sukhoi 24, one of Moscow's most sophisticated bomber aircraft. This plane has the potential to reach strategic positions in central and southern Israel.

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<sup>86</sup>Aharon Levran, "The Military Dangers of a Palestinian State," Global Affairs Fall (1989)140.

<sup>87</sup>Louis Rene' Benes, "Israel's Security in a Changing World," Strategic Review Fall (1990)12.

The Soviets have also supplied to Damascus the MIG-29, an aircraft with a combat radius of 1,100 nautical miles, high performance look-down shoot-down radar, and short-range or over-the-horizon AA-9 and AA-10 missiles.<sup>88</sup>

There has also been a wide range of chemical and biological weapons proliferation among many of the Arab countries that are hostile towards Israel. For example:

Iraq began production of chemical weapons in the early 1960's and now has the capacity to make 1,000 tons annually. Iraq's use of chemical weapons in the Gulf War may have killed or injured as many as 45,000 Kurds or Iranians.

Egypt began production of chemical weapons in the early 1960's and used these weapons during its involvement in North Yemen's civil war in that period.

Iran began production of chemical arms in response to Iraqi use, and is believed to have used small quantities of poison gas by 1987.

Libya obtained poison gas in 1987, apparently from Iran, and used chemicals against Chad's military forces in 1987.

Syria first received chemical weapons from Egypt before the 1973 war, and now manufactures nerve gas and other chemical weapons, including warheads.<sup>89</sup>

Martin Sicker, in his book Israel's Quest for Security, suggests that there is no need for Israel to feel comfortable in this new era:

While Israel's security posture today is probably better than at any time in history, there is little reason for complacency...The unceasing flow of sophisticated and increasingly deadly

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<sup>88</sup>Louis Rene' Benes, "Israel's Security in a Changing World," Strategic Review Fall (1990)12.

<sup>89</sup>Ibid.



weapons, including ever longer range missiles, and the frightening readiness of some Middle Eastern states to engage in chemical warfare, may easily upset all rational calculations.<sup>90</sup>

With these changes taking place over the years in the Arab abilities to wage war efficiently, Israel is under constant threat. Giving up land and reducing its size to relatively nothing only increases the chances of an Arab coalition victory.

There are numerous threats posed to Israeli security by other Arab nations. If Israel is reduced to its pre-1967 borders, it will have more to fear than just a new Palestinian neighbor. For example, the small and vulnerable size of this new Israel will attract the likes of Syria, a long time enemy of the Jewish state.

#### The Threat of Syria and the Return of the Golan Heights

In addition to a peace agreement with the Palestinians, former Prime Minister Rabin entered into negotiations with Syria. The negotiations were to center on one issue, the Golan Heights. The Heights were captured by Israel in 1967, lost, and then recaptured again in the 1973 attack upon Israel by Syria and friends.

This territory has become a strategic necessity for Israel because it overlooks vital Israeli territory and was once a piece of land from which many attacks aimed at Israel

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<sup>90</sup>Martin Sicker, Israel's Quest for Security (New York: Praeger Publishing, 1989) 188.

took place. For example, many farms in Northern Israel have been shelled from the Golan in the past.<sup>31</sup> It is important that Israel keep this territory. As Ze'ev Begin states, "The tiny area-400 square kilometers-is of course vital to Israeli security."<sup>32</sup> Aside from the Israeli need to keep hold of the Golan Heights, the prospect of peace with Syria, in exchange of anything at all, is extremely questionable.

Syria has never been willing to acknowledge Israel's existence, much less acknowledge that Israel's occupation of the Golan Heights as legitimate. Syria wants that land back, there is no doubt about that, but it is not just the Golan that Syria would like to seize. Syria would like to have all land included inside Israel's borders and its surrounding territories of Gaza and the West Bank. However, Syria has never been willing to pay the peace price for it, as Egypt did and as Yasser Arafat purports to be doing today. In fact, Syria's war on Israel has never been solely about the Golan, or the Palestinian refugees, but rather Israel's right to claim legitimacy in the Arab world.

Benjamin Netanyahu, the present day Prime Minister of Israel and Likud Party leader, has always believed the fight

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<sup>31</sup>Daniel Pipes, "Is Damascus Ready for Peace?" Foreign Affairs Fall (1991)44.

<sup>32</sup>Ze'ev Begin, A Zionist Stand (London: Frank Cass &Co., 1993)147.

is not "territorial but existential."<sup>33</sup> Netanyahu discusses in his 1993 book, A Place Among Nations, that while attending the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991, the subject matter kept turning away from peace and always back to question of Israel's right to exist. He remembers sadly the Syrian Foreign Minister at the Peace Conference, continuously questioning Israel's right to exist as a nation, and ignoring what were to be the primary objectives of the Conference: water resources, controls over certain lands, and other pertinent issues.<sup>34</sup> Netanyahu quotes the Syrian Defense Minister Mustafa Tlas as once saying "The conflict between the Arab nation and Zionism is over existence, not borders."<sup>35</sup>

Nevertheless, Syria has continued the fight to take back the Golan Heights. It has charged that Israel has illegally occupied the lands by referring to a preamble in the UN Security Council document that claims that lands conquered in war are not recognized as belonging to the aggressor.<sup>36</sup> However, in this instance, Israel was not the

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<sup>33</sup>Benjamin Netanyahu, A Place Among Nations (New York: Bantam Books, 1993)329.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., 330.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid. This quote was given one year prior to the Madrid Peace Conference. It was footnoted by Netanyahu. It was obtained by Damascus Television Service, March 7, 1990.

<sup>36</sup>Samuel Katz, Battleground: Fact and Fantasy in Palestine (Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, New York: Steimatzsky/Shapolsky, 1985)188. The Security Council preamble talks specifically about "the inadmissability of

aggressor and the U.N. never branded Israel as an aggressor state. Israel preempted an attack on the Arab countries that were planning to attack it, so taking the lands was in self-defense. Netanyahu states that "Israel has at no point set out to conquer anything. It has been repeatedly forced into wars of self-defense against Arab regimes ideologically committed to its destruction."<sup>97</sup> He goes on to write that the territory of the Golan Heights was continually used as a strongpoint for Arab terrorist attacks before and after the 1967 war.<sup>98</sup>

Strategically, the relinquishment of the Golan Heights will jeopardize Israeli security. The strategic depth of Northern Israel, called the "the buffer zone", that allows Israel time to mobilize forces in an emergency, is nowhere to be found in these new agreements.<sup>99</sup> Martin Sicker differentiates between the relinquishment of the Sinai to Egypt, which still provided Israel with strategic depth in the Negev that separated Israel from the Egyptian frontier, and relinquishing the Golan Heights to Syria, which is the strategic depth Israel needs to protect itself, because

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the acquisition of territory by war..., " meaning war by aggressors, not self-defense.

<sup>97</sup>Benjamin Netanyahu, A Place Among Nations (New York: Bantam Books, 1993)140.

<sup>98</sup>Ibid.

<sup>99</sup>Martin Sicker, Israel's Quest for Security (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1989)186-87.

Northern Israel does not have that capacity.<sup>100</sup> Sicker goes on to write that "the Golan is much too close to the population centers of Northern Israel for the latter to seriously consider trading it for a peace agreement as generally envisioned by the territory for peace formula."<sup>101</sup> With this reality, what could have possibly been the basis for Rabin and Shimon Peres for considering returning the Golan? As Sicker notes, "the question to be answered is whether a Syrian signature on a piece of paper is worth turning over a piece of strategic real estate that Israel paid dearly in blood in 1967 and which was critical in preventing the destruction of a large part of Northern Israel in 1973...Israel's occupation of the Golan Heights is in itself a deterrent to a unilateral Syrian military initiative."<sup>102</sup>

More importantly, Syria's signature on a peace treaty could hardly be maintained as legitimate. This is not only because Syria does not recognize Israel, but because Syria has always maintained that it will only enter into a state of nonbelligerency with Israel. This is not peace. The concept of "state of nonbelligerency" is questionable, with

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<sup>100</sup>Martin Sicker, Israel's Quest for Security (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1989)186-87.

<sup>101</sup>Ibid.

<sup>102</sup>Ibid. Sicker notes that Israel's occupation of the Golan Heights also gives Israel the room to defend itself by being able to conduct major ground assaults on Damascus if attacked by Syria.

regards to Syria. Syria has a long history of signing agreements and shirking their responsibilities. David Bar-Illan cites some examples of these agreements:

In 1983, he [Assad] broke a pledge he had made to the Reagan Administration that he would accept the Israeli-Lebanese peace treaty and withdraw his troops from Lebanon. He did the opposite: as soon as Israel began to get out, he poured more troops into Lebanon.

Assad is also in violation of the Saudi-sponsored Taif agreement, endorsed by all the Arab states, which stipulates the withdrawal of Syrian troops and the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty. This September [1993] marks precisely a year since Syrian troops were supposed to have left Beirut.<sup>103</sup>

If Syria was so willing to abrogate it's agreements in the Arab arena, it is not likely that Syria will ever abide by an agreement with Israel.

There are other pertinent factors to examine, when investigating Syria's past relative to its future with Israel. For example, the PLO received financial backing from Syria to help train the Iranian terrorist organization Hezbollah, a group that has continuously aimed terrorist activities at Israel.<sup>104</sup> The PLO has been on a quest to annihilate Israel, and Syria helped them. Syria has enjoyed

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<sup>103</sup>David Bar-Illan, "Israel's New Pollyanna's," Commentary September (1993)29.

<sup>104</sup>David Bar-Illan, "If This Be Peace...", Commentary February (1995)29. Bar-Illan notes that Hezbollah could not have conducted any successful attacks on Israel if it were not for Syria because Syria equips them with weapons and trains their fighters on its territory.

waging "proxy war on Israel through Hezbollah."<sup>105</sup> There is also the issue of Syria trying to achieve military "parity" with Israel. Syria currently spends 50-60 percent of its government budget on the military and 30 percent of its GNP on military expenses.<sup>106</sup> This behavior is indicative of preparation, so Syria's quest for true peace should always be thoroughly questioned and examined before really believing that it is feasible.

Along with these dilemmas, there is the historical issue of inter-Arab conflict that make a lasting peace impossible for the future of the Middle East. This is not just pertaining to Israel. Inter-Arab conflict is insolvable as well.

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<sup>105</sup>David Bar-Illan, "If This Be Peace...", Commentary February (1995)29.

<sup>106</sup>Daniel Pipes, "Is Damascus Ready for Peace?" Foreign Affairs Fall (1991)47.

## CHAPTER 4

### INTER-ARAB DIFFICULTY

#### The Inter-Arab Question

"For half a century, Arab governments have hidden behind the Arab-Israeli conflict"<sup>107</sup>

The Arab-Israeli conflict is not the only matter plaguing the Middle East, nor has it ever been. In fact, it could be noted that the majority of the conflict in the Middle East is due to inter-Arab conflicts and not the Israelis. Far more people have been killed in inter-Arab, inter-Islam wars, and by Arab leaders of their own people, than in the Arab-Israeli wars. This was just an additional problem and a clever way to mask the harsher realities.<sup>108</sup> It could be said that the problems with Israel are not really secondary but intertwined tightly. In any case,

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<sup>107</sup>Augustus Richard Norton and Robin Wright, "The Post Peace Crises in the Middle East," Survival Vol.36, No.4 (Winter 1994-5) 7.

<sup>108</sup>Dr. Joseph Churba, "The Middle East," Defense and Strategic Studies, Southwest Missouri State University, October 25, 1995. Dr. Churba specified in this lecture that Israel is the number one subscriber to the idea that they are the center of the conflict, but the center of the conflict has always been "who has the right to rule with legitimacy in the Middle East?"



inter-Arab tensions including basic tyranny, fighting over legitimacy, and a fear of an independent Palestinian state are just as crucial to peace in the Middle East.

For many years, the world has believed the myth that the core of the Middle Eastern problem was Israel. Benjamin Netanyahu believed that the advent of the Gulf War finally helped to change minds about this prospect. An Arab country had invaded another Arab country and it opened the eyes of many nations to the realities of the Middle East.<sup>109</sup>

However, it was not as if the reality had not been that way for many years prior, it was just not exposed. There are scores of wars and cruelty that have taken place in the Middle East among a supposed united Arab coalition. Netanyahu states that since the beginning of Arab statehood, that "virtually every one of them had been involved in wars, attempts at subversion and assassination, and unending intrigue against one or more of its Arab neighbors-and against its non-Arab neighbors."<sup>110</sup>

Iran and Iraq, until before the Gulf War had been at war for up to nine long years, "a devastating conflict that claimed well over a million lives and demolished vast

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<sup>109</sup>Benjamin Netanyahu, A Place Among Nations (New York: Bantam Books, 1993) 92.

<sup>110</sup>Ibid., 93.

sections of both countries."<sup>111</sup> Other examples are available pertaining to this:

Libya has clashed with Tunisia and bombed Sudan  
 ...Libya has financed numerous efforts to topple  
 other Arab regimes or assassinate their leaders  
 ...Egypt, under Nasser, tries to assassinate  
 the leaders of Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq...  
 Egypt attempted to impose its regime on Syria  
 ...and began brutal occupation of the nation of  
 Yemen...  
 When they have not been fighting with each other,  
 both Yemens have lived in constant fear of Saudi  
 Arabia...  
 Iraq...carried out an energetic campaign of sub-  
 version and terrorism against a number of Arab  
 states, including its traditional enemy Syria,  
 and its recent friend Jordan...  
 Syria...has repeatedly threatened Jordan, murdered  
 its diplomats, set off bombs in Amman, and even  
 invaded Jordanian territory...<sup>112</sup>

With these examples of Arab inter-fighting, it is an odd thing that Israel would have thought it could live in peace, simply because they gave land back.

The truth is that many Arab nations use the Palestinian problem as a justification for trying to gain what they want. For example, "The Palestinians have often been used on the inter-Arab scene as the spearhead against countries suspected of lack of real commitment to *qawmiyya*, Arab nationalism. They have also been used to weaken the position of leading Arab countries, by presenting them as weak in their commitment to Palestinians and to the Arab

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<sup>111</sup>Benjamin Netanyahu, A Place Among Nations (New York: Bantam Books, 1993) 93.

<sup>112</sup>Ibid, 93-95.

cause as a whole."<sup>113</sup> The Palestinians have been used to make certain Arab countries look important and be recognized in the Arab world and the rest of the world, as in the case of Syria or Iraq.<sup>114</sup> When Saddam Hussein attacked Israel with a Scud missile during the Gulf War and demanded its relinquishing of the occupied territories, it had very little to do with the invasion of Kuwait. It was a secondary issue. In fact, history shows that the Arabs cared very little about the Palestinian cause.

The controversial issue of the Palestinian refugees has been a constant source of debate among the Arab negotiators. Yet, the Arabs did very little for the refugees themselves when they left Israel at the Arab behest.<sup>115</sup> The Arabs used the refugee problem as a means of gaining monetary help, getting the world involved in the cause, and vilifying Israel. However, it is seldom remembered that there were more Jewish refugees from Arab states, than Arab refugees from Israel, and they have long been absorbed by Israel.

What if Israel, theoretically, will not pose a barrier to the independent state of Palestine, what will these Arab

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<sup>113</sup>Gabriel Ben Gurion, The Palestinians and the Middle East Conflict (Tel Aviv: Turtledove Publishing, 1979)157.

<sup>114</sup>Ibid.

<sup>115</sup>Sameul Katz, Battleground: Fact and Fantasy in Palestine (Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, New York: Steimatzsky/Shapolsky, 1985)21.

nations do? Chances are great that their countries will be full of conflict and strife because now their own regimes will be the focus.<sup>116</sup> It is likely that the civilians in these Arab countries will demand change and these "demands for change are a function of half a century or more of corruption, repression, and the arbitrary exercise of power."<sup>117</sup> Arab regimes have been able to cultivate and maintain this power, in part, due to the problems with Israel, but now the technicalities of Israeli occupation is over and Israel has recognized Palestinian autonomy. This leaves their cause lingering, with the exception of the fight to rule Palestine.

#### The Fight to Rule Palestine

There have been a number of countries in the past and present that will fight to rule over Palestine. There may be a new Arab state on the West Bank with specific claims and the will to fight for rule over all of Palestine. Syria has always maintained that the autonomous regions are a part of "Greater Syria" while Arafat claims that Syria is a part of Palestine, as well as the past fight between King Hussein of Jordan, who claims Palestine to be a part of Jordan,

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<sup>116</sup>Augustus Richard Norton and Robin Wright, "The Post Peace Crises in the Middle East," Survival Vol.36, No.4 (Winter, 1994-5)8.

<sup>117</sup>Ibid.

while Arafat believes Jordan to be a part Palestine, both being essentially true.<sup>118</sup>

In an article "Arab vs. Arab Over Palestine", Daniel Pipes argues that there are four groups that have been and will be, arguing over the outcome of Palestine. These include Palestinian separatists, Arab nationalists, the Jordanian government, of which might be ignored considering Hussein has since let go of the idea of Jordan's ownership of Palestine, and the Syrian government.

The PLO is now what Pipes referred to as Palestinian separatists. They assert their right to rule Palestine, but really they have just been puppets of other Arab governments. In addition to this, the PLO is fragmented severely, "made up of almost a dozen fractious groupings advocating contrary programs. One Palestinian group is pro-Syrian, another pro-Iraqi, and so forth. They disagree on ideology and on personnel, who should lead the Nashashibi or Husayni family, al-Fatah or the PLFP, As-Sa'iga or Abu Nidal, the West Bank notables or yet others?"<sup>119</sup> and there will be an internal struggle over the issue of Palestine.

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<sup>118</sup>Daniel Pipes, "Arab vs. Arab Over Palestine," Commentary July (1987)17. This article was written in 1987, Jordan has since cut his ties of ownership to Palestine, but Arafat has not given up the belief about Jordan, thus proving a danger to Jordan of an independent state of Palestine.

<sup>119</sup>Ibid.

As it is now, many Palestinians are upset over the way Arafat is conducting affairs. It has been noted that there is a significant amount of people that do not even see Arafat as the legitimate leader of the Palestinian people, but unfortunately, this has not weakened his position. Arafat has now what is called a "police state," tyrannical and repressive. It is probable that this will make the Palestinian people to beg the Israelis to return to the territories.

Arafat has not changed the territories into a possible legitimate state, not yet. In fact, Arafat has done relatively nothing in the way of electoral politics<sup>120</sup> but has managed to maintain the PLO as a "loosely constructed terrorist-guerilla-propaganda structure whose cohesiveness is based on loyalty to the man at the top."<sup>121</sup> It is debatable how far the loyalty to Arafat will travel. Many people regard him as a traitor for signing the Oslo Accords, many have just accepted it, and many applaud him for what he is accomplishing, but there is a small group of young Palestinians who regard Arafat as a foreigner. To make issues more complicated, within the divisions in the PLO, there is an unorganized youth coalition that could

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<sup>120</sup>Amos Perlmutter, "Arafat's Police State," Foreign Affairs July/August (1994) 9.

<sup>121</sup>Ibid.

present a challenge.<sup>122</sup> On the other point worth mentioning regarding the PLO is the issue of Arafat's harsh and tyrannical treatment of his own people. This is bound to pose serious problems internally over who should rule Palestine.<sup>123</sup>

The second group that Pipes points out, are the Arab nationalists. This group consists of a large Arab coalition that believes that Palestine should not become an independent entity, but should integrate itself into a larger Arab entity.<sup>124</sup> The Arab nationalists would like to unite into one Arab state "that will eventually comprise all Arabic speakers between the Atlantic ocean and the Persian Gulf, from Morocco to Oman, of which Palestine will be a small province."<sup>125</sup>

The third contender in the fight to control Palestine is Syria. Syria has always alleged that Palestine is a part of Southern Syria and that Palestine was taken from Syria to

<sup>122</sup>Amos Perlmutter, "Arafat's Police State," Foreign Affairs July/August (1994) 10.

<sup>123</sup>Nadav Haetzni, "Misery and Terror Reign in Jericho," The Yesha Report, May 1995. The article deals with specific instances of the Arafat government's treatment of its citizens, if they called that as of yet. These entail illegally imprisoning them for suspected Israeli commiserating and acts of severe torture, sometimes resulting in death.

<sup>124</sup>Daniel Pipes, "Arab vs. Arab Over Palestine," Commentary July/August (1987) 19.

<sup>125</sup>Ibid. This group would include the former Nasser of Egypt, Colonel Quaddafi of Libya, and in some cases Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

create Israel.<sup>126</sup> In fact, Syria would probably try to fight the creation of an independent Palestinian state on this basis, unless of course, if it would be a Syrian-puppet government.<sup>127</sup> It is possible that if Palestine did become an independent state, and it will if Netanyahu is not better supported, Syria will try to topple the existing regime, assuming it might not be Arafat in the future, and gain control of it by "proxy wars."<sup>128</sup> Syria poses the biggest threat here because it is more militarily capable than the former contenders. The idea of Syrian imperialism poses not just a threat to Israeli people and a Palestinian state, but to Jordan as well, since Jordan was a part of Palestine before the British Mandate.

Daniel Pipes mentions additional players in the competition over Palestine. These players include the Muslim fundamentalists, who identify Palestine as a "historic part of Muslim patrimony." The Saudi Arabian

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<sup>126</sup>Daniel Pipes, "Arab vs. Arab Over Palestine," Commentary July/August (1987), 21. See also Commentary, December 1986, in an article entitled "Palestine for the Syrians" there is a quote by Assad, saying "There is no Palestinian people, there is no Palestinian entity, there is only Syria!...It is we, the Syrian authorities, who are the real representatives of the Palestinian people." Pipes has another example from Damascus radio from June 1980 that says "Syria views Palestine-according to historic, cultural, and geographic factors-as its own southern province."

<sup>127</sup>Michael Widlanski, ed., Can Israel Survive a Palestinian State? (Jerusalem: Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, 1990) 81.

<sup>128</sup>Ibid.



government has been a long time supporter of this Islamic claim to Palestine and the Iranian government also claims Islamic ties to Palestine.<sup>129</sup>

There is going to be conflict in the Middle East long after the Arab-Israeli conflict is resolved, if it ever really is. There is far too much history of internal strife within Arab countries and communities, before and during the Israeli issue. There are many wars to look back upon to prove this. The fight for power and leadership of the Arab world will continue and the domestic problems within each country will be emphasized without the Israeli shield to hide behind. Most importantly, the fight for leadership in the future states of Palestine will be a great source of tension and possible disaster

#### Jordan and Fears of a Palestinian State

"At stake for Hussein is the economic and political future of his Kingdom"<sup>130</sup>

Jordan does support the creation of a third Palestinian state because it does not want to alienate itself from the rest of the Arab community. However, Jordan has almost as much to fear as Israel when it pertains to Palestinian statehood. Jordan is weak economically and

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<sup>129</sup>Daniel Pipes, "Arab vs. Arab Over Palestine," Commentary July/August (1987)22.

<sup>130</sup>Lawrence Tal, "Is Jordan Doomed?" Foreign Affairs Vol.72, No.5 (November/December 1993)52.

physically and stands to lose everything if Palestine becomes independent.<sup>131</sup>

There are a few major reasons why Jordan faces grave dangers at the creation of a Palestinian state. One, is that Yasser Arafat and most other Palestinian officials regard Jordan as Eastern Palestine, an integral part of the Palestinian state. In Can Israel Survive a Palestinian State?, it is written that "Arafat wants to use Jordan before he throttles Hashemite rule. The PLO Chairman has been willing to deal with King Hussein on a variety of joint ventures...in order to gain a power base which would be strengthened later at Hussein's expense."<sup>132</sup> This comes as no surprise, considering Hussein and Arafat have never been on stable terms. Aside from this, there are specific reasons why Jordan is viewed as the "other half" of Palestine:

First, there is a geographical bond and a historical connection between the two banks: the West Bank or Trans-Jordan. Secondly, there is a large Palestinian Arab population in the Kingdom of Jordan. There are independent estimates of over 65% Palestinian population throughout Jordan and as much as an 80% Palestinian predomination of key Jordanian cities.<sup>133</sup>

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<sup>131</sup>Michael Widlanski, ed. Can Israel Survive a Palestinian State? (Jerusalem: Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, 1990) 78-80.

<sup>132</sup>Ibid.

<sup>133</sup>Ibid.

This leads to the second grave danger facing Jordan. Because Jordan holds so many Palestinian people that makes very likely that they will want to join with the West Bank themselves, either out of loyalty or pressures. This could provide for future internal conflict for the Jordanian citizens that are not Palestinians.<sup>134</sup>

Economically, Jordan is a weak country. It has constantly relied upon the support of outside lenders for its livelihood, such as the United States. Hussein has a legitimate fear that such aid will eventually be given over to new Palestinian regions. The United States has already committed to aiding the Palestinians. This will cripple Jordan, because "Jordan's per capita income is lower than that of either the West Bank or Gaza, the unemployment rate is 25% and more than 30% of the population lives below the poverty line."<sup>135</sup>

There was the possibility of a joint confederation between Jordan and the PLO. However, even though once upon a time this would have been in Jordan's favor, the present situation is not so kind. The PLO is more powerful than before and Jordan is weaker.<sup>136</sup> The two entities have had

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<sup>134</sup>Michael Widlanski, ed. Can Israel Survive a Palestinian State? (Jerusalem: Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, 1990) 78.

<sup>135</sup>Lawrence Tal, "Is Jordan Doomed?" Foreign Affairs Vol. 72, No. 5 (November/December, 1993) 52.

<sup>136</sup>Ibid.

nothing lasting in the ways of agreements before and it is likely that will not change. In Can Israel Survive a Palestinian State?, it is asserted that "The confederation would soon dissolve. It would leave an independent Palestinian West-Bank/Gaza state or an even greater menace: a Palestinian state that had swallowed up Jordan."<sup>137</sup>

Jordan might find itself in a difficult position in the future, when Palestine becomes its own state. There is the possibility of the new Palestinian leadership trying to swallow Jordan. There is also the potential that the Palestinians in Jordan will want to reunite with the West Bank and this will create internal strife. Economically, Palestine could become stronger than Jordan. Since a confederation of the two entities would fail, Jordan has to sit back and watch like the rest of the world at the eventual outcome of a Palestinian state.

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<sup>137</sup>Michael Widlanski, ed. Can Israel Survive a Palestinian State? (Jerusalem: Institute for Advanced and Political Studies, 1990) 80.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSION

#### I.

Land for peace is an old idea for Israel. It is one that has never provided them with the conclusions that they had anticipated and hoped for. Early evidence of the outcome of Resolution 242 and 338 points out these agreements as failures, as well as later evidence of the Camp David Accords, and the almost immediate and current failures of the Oslo Accords.

With respect to Resolutions 242 and 338, these were generally rejected by every Arab country. The impossibility of the Arabs to understand that Israel did not have to relinquish all territory confiscated in self defense, unless borders were recognized and a "just and lasting peace" could prevail, made the prospects of peace totally unthinkable.

With respect to Camp David, there is something to be commended for an Arab country to actually engage in a peace treaty with Israel, especially at the expense of itself. It is often implied that Egypt sacrificed its place in the Arab community by signing a treaty with Israel. However, Egypt was eventually allowed to resume relations with other Arab

countries and Israel has rarely to see the desired results of the Accord. Egypt has not itself, engaged in attacks on Israel, but it has continually aided and abetted countries and organizations that have engaged in terrorist activities against Israel. For example, Egypt has provided safe havens for PLO members. Egypt violated the agreement by putting troops in the Sinai when it agreed not to, yet Egypt has retained the land that Israel has given back to them in that same treaty. Egypt basically signed a mere "treaty of nonbelligerence." This was not the idea behind Camp David, but this is what Israel got.

Oslo, has been violated by Arafat a number of times. The promise to halt terrorism and denounce it has not yet materialized, and yet the PLO has already implemented its power in the regions that Israel conceded. The PLO Covenant was supposed to have been changed years ago and only recently has it been modified, although there is no real proof of that. This Covenant calls for the complete destruction of Israel and it is still in existence at a time when there is constant Palestinian pressure on Israel to stop settlements and get out. Just to revert back to the day of the Oslo signing for a brief moment, Arafat pledged to his Arab audiences that this whole plan was just a phase in a number of phases to eliminate Israel, it should now be clear that peace will not come. It is written in the

Jerusalem Post Editorial that "Pledges to destroy Israel...are hardly indicative of peace."<sup>138</sup>

Golda Meir once stated that "The repeated failure of international arrangements to safeguard our country's vital interests has taught us a lesson we do not easily forget. International decisions proved meaningless in each crises that we faced...Hence, we inevitably reflect on this history when urged to take action which could result in diminishing our capacity for self-defense and make us dependent on international guarantees."<sup>139</sup> Israel should be reflecting back in the same way as their once great Prime Minister did and realize that peace will never likely surface.

## II

Israel should reconsider giving anything more back to Arafat for security reasons. Arabs have been opposed to Israeli existence from its birth and none of this is going to disappear. Virtually all Arab countries have expressed the desire to see Israel "thrown into the sea." It is more than just a desire for Arab hegemony. It is an underlying, and sometimes outright, anti-Semitism that drives them. Ideology does not change over a span of a few years and if it is really believed that this anti-Semitic sentiment will

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<sup>138</sup>Jerusalem Post Editorial, "Solid Paper Facts," Jerusalem Post International September 29, 1995, Friday ed.

<sup>139</sup>Golda Meir, "Israel in Search of Lasting Peace," Foreign Affairs April (1973)454.

subside by giving back territory, then this would appear to be naive.

Geographically, Israel is a small and vulnerable country. Israel will eventually have to "pack up and Leave" if it relinquishes any more territory. The territory it has already given back has not been reciprocated with peace. There should be no more movement on Israel's behalf. If so, it is viable that Israel will be defenseless in an attack, if it did occur. These boundaries leave Israel without the necessary strategic depth that it would need to deploy and mobilize. An independent state of Palestine, as is hoped by Arafat, does not have to stay demobilized. As an independent state, it will have the same right to have a defense capability as any other independent state. At that point, what will Israel really be able to do? Israel cannot tell them no, it might have to reconsider this all together.

Even though a Palestinian state could not do too much damage on its own, it will not have to. It will have twenty other Arab states that may oblige them. The argument that Israel was able to defend itself from those borders once before and it can do it again, may not prove true anymore. Arab nations have become more militarily advanced and the weapons they hold now are much more potent and damaging than in 1967.

Syria poses a threat in such confining borders. Syria, aside from the Palestinian Arabs, probably holds the



highest level of hatred. It would not be totally surprising if Syria tried to take advantage of the Israeli size, especially with its semi-modern military capabilities. The Golan Heights is helpful to Syria, to be able to wage an attack on Israel because it could destroy Northern Israel from this point. Yet, Israel was, at one point, willing to give the Golan back, and this would have been a mistake.

### III

Finally, Israel is not the center of the Middle East crises. It obviously plays a big role in the conflict, but not the number one role. Oslo will not bring peace to the region if other conflicts are not resolved beforehand. There is evidence of instability in these regions aside from Israel's existence. History shows that inter-Arab wars were taking place over a dozen issues, none of them were Israel in particular. The results of these inter-Arab conflicts were in the form of attempted regime overthrows and assassination attempts. In fact, half of the Arab states do not even agree on what should happen to the areas in question, those being West Bank and Gaza.

Many Arab states fight amongst themselves over who will be the best equipped nation to rule an independent Palestinian state and some Arab nations, such as Syria, vehemently oppose an independent state at all. Factions of the PLO vie for leadership. Furthermore, some Arab states have more to lose than to gain from this independence, like

Jordan. This security dilemma imposed on Jordan is both physical and economical. These issues would need to be addressed and solved if peace were ever foreseeable.

#### IV

The answer to Israel's dilemma is not really one that can be answered easily. If Israel does not relinquish land and rule to the Palestinians, terrorism and violence will not cease. If Israel does give back more land, if Netanyahu decides to cave to pressure, then not only does terrorism not cease, but it will be more at risk within such tiny borders. Once Israel gives up that land and an independent state emerges, there will be nothing short of war that Israel can do to reverse the process. Neither option sounds inviting, but at least by not releasing more land, Israel has a better chance of defending itself in the future.

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




Pi Sigma Alpha Political Honor Society  
Dean's List, Fall 1994 and Spring 1995

Thesis Title: The Peace Process: A Case Study

Thesis Examination Committee:

Chairperson, Dr. Andrew Tuttle, Ph.D.  
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