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## The Defense Intelligence Agency: An in-depth study of the development of the intelligence agency

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**THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY:  
AN IN-DEPTH STUDY OF THE  
DEVELOPMENT OF THE  
INTELLIGENCE  
AGENCY**

by

**Stacie D. Neff**

**Bachelor of Arts  
Angelo State University  
1992**

**A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree of**

**Master of Arts**

**in**

**Political Science**

**Department of Political Science  
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
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
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## ABSTRACT

### **The Defense Intelligence Agency: An In-depth Study of the Development of the Intelligence Agency**

by

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Professor of Political Science  
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This thesis will examine the history of intelligence leading to the creation of DIA, DIA's changing and emerging roles, its missions and organization, agency contribution during military operations, criticisms of the agency, and lastly the intelligence outlook for the future of DIA. Since its creation in 1961, DIA has undergone numerous reorganizations in This thesis will examine the history of intelligence leading to the creation of the attempts to streamline intelligence and provide the best product possible. Most of these changes have occurred after major campaigns in which intelligence either failed, was inaccurate or could have played a better or bigger role in the campaigns: Cuban Missile Crisis, Vietnam, Grenada, and Desert Storm are some examples. Today DIA, as a powerful intelligence agency, plays a significant role in the intelligence community.



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## LIST OF ACRONYMS

AFMIC	Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center
AFSA	Armed Forces Security Agency
AOR	Area of Operations
ASDC3I	Assistant Secretary of Defense of Command Control and
BDA	Battle Damage Assessment
CENTCOM	Central Command
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIG	Central Intelligence Group (replaced by CIA)
CIIC	Current Intelligence and Indications Center
CINC	Commander In Charge
CJCS	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
COI	Coordinator of Information
COMINT	Communications Intelligence
	Communications
CSS	Central Security Service
DAC	Counterintelligence and Security Activity
DAS	Defense Attache Service
DCI	Director, Central Intelligence
DGIAP	Defense General Intelligence Applications Program
DHS	Defense HUMINT Service
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DIAC	Defense Intelligence Agency Center
DIARP	Defense Intelligence Agency Representative Group
DIC	Defense Intelligence College
DIO	Defense Intelligence Officers
DIS	Defense Investigative Service
DMA	Defense Mapping Agency
DoD	Department of Defense
DoDD	Department of Defense Directive
DODIIS	Department of Defense Intelligence Information System
DODJIC	Department of Defense Joint Intelligence Center
ELINT	Electronics Intelligence
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigations
FIAB	Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
G-2	Army Intelligence
GDIP	General Defense Intelligence Program
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
I&W	Indications and Warning
IAC	Intelligence Advisory Committee

ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
INTELINK	Intelligence Link
ITF	Intelligence Task Force
IZKUWG	Iraq/Kuwait Working Group
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JDIS	Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System
JIC	Joint Intelligence Committee
JIG	Joint Intelligence Group
JMIP	Joint Military Intelligence Program
JMITC	Joint Military Intelligence Training Center
JSG	Joint Study Group
JWICS	Joint World-Wide Intelligence Communication System
MAGIC	Code-name for Japanese Correspondence during WWII
MASINT	Measurement and Signals Intelligence
MC&G	Maps, Charts and Geodesy
MCS	Military Capabilities Study
MIA	Military Intelligence Agency
MIA	Missing in Action
MIB	Military Intelligence Board
MID	Military Intelligence Division
MRBM	Medium Range Ballistic Missile
MSIC	Missile and Space Intelligence Center
MSS	Military Situation Summaries
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NFTP	National Foreign Intelligence Program
NIE	National Intelligence Estimate
NIST	National Intelligence Support Teams
NME	National Military Establishment
NMIC	National Military Intelligence Center
NMIST	National Military Intelligence Support Teams
NMJIC	National Military Joint Intelligence Center
NPIC	National Photographic Intelligence Center
NRO	National Reconnaissance Organization
NSA	National Security Agency
NSC	National Security Council
OB	Order of Battle
OICC	Operational Intelligence Crisis Center
ONI	Office of Naval Intelligence
OP-20-G	Code and Signals Section
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSO	Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
POW	Prisoner of War
R&D	Research and Development
RDF	Rapid Deployment Force

<b>S&amp;T</b>	<b>Science and Technology</b>
<b>SECDEF</b>	<b>Secretary of Defense</b>
<b>SES</b>	<b>Senior Executive Service</b>
<b>SIDS</b>	<b>Secondary Imagery Dissemination System</b>
<b>SIGINT</b>	<b>Signals Intelligence</b>
<b>SIS</b>	<b>Signal Intelligence Section</b>
<b>SNIE</b>	<b>Special National Intelligence Estimate</b>
<b>SO</b>	<b>Special Operations branch of OSS</b>
<b>SRBM</b>	<b>Short Range Ballistic Missile</b>
<b>USIB</b>	<b>United States Intelligence Board</b>
<b>USSR</b>	<b>Union of Soviet Socialist Republic</b>
<b>WATCHCON</b>	<b>Watch Controls</b>
<b>WMD</b>	<b>Weapons of Mass Destruction</b>

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

Prior to World War II, intelligence was valued mostly for its tactical use, ie. target information and troop movements, and was limited mostly to war time use. However, with the start of the Cold War in the 1950s, the need for strategic intelligence arose thereby creating the need for centralized agencies to provide assessments to political and military leadership. This trend began with the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) under the National Security Act of 1947 and effectively ended with the creation of the newest major member of the intelligence community, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in 1961.

The DIA, created nearly 15 years after its main rival, the CIA, was a product of the concept of a centralized defense intelligence organization. The question of a more streamlined military intelligence system had been under study since before the end of World War II. Two major themes stood out prior to the creation of DIA; a lack of management efficiency in military intelligence and the often-poor quality products they produced.<sup>1</sup> Each military service maintained its own intelligence branches, concentrating on its own particular needs. This caused conflicting intelligence estimates to national

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<sup>1</sup> Allen, Deane J. , "Overview of the Origins of DIA," (Defense Intelligence Agency: Historian Office, Nov 1995), pg. 1.

leadership, and duplication of effort. The separate military intelligence units were not eliminated with the creation of DIA, however, DIA took over their representation in the high councils of the intelligence community.<sup>2</sup> Further, there existed the need for centralized foreign and military intelligence which could effectively meet the requirements of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Unified and Specified Commands as well as numerous other defense and non-defense agencies.<sup>3</sup> Up until the creation of DIA, no central organization existed to give national decision-makers fused, all-source military intelligence. On August 1, 1961, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara announced his decision to create the Defense Intelligence Agency and on October 1, 1961, it became operational. It was not a single event that led to the creation of DIA, but rather a dawning of a new era in the political, military and social environments that necessitated its creation.

### Intelligence: A Definition

To better understand the basis of the Defense Intelligence Agency, a few key concepts of intelligence must first be considered. The concept of intelligence has been defined in many ways and is often debated among scholars due to the many aspects of the concept. It is true in fact that the word intelligence can have numerous meanings from simple – intelligence is information that someone wants or needs – to more specific definitions as defined by Jeffrey Richelson – intelligence is the “product resulting from the

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<sup>2</sup> Ransom, Harvey H. The Intelligence Establishment, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), 104.

<sup>3</sup> Allen, “Overview of the Origins of DIA”, 1.



collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas.”<sup>4</sup> Despite its endless possible definitions, intelligence may best be defined by Jennifer Sims as “information collected, organized or analyzed on behalf of actors or decision makers.”<sup>5</sup> This simple description identifies the activity, conducted by someone or some organization, of seeking out relevant information and providing it to leadership assisting in the development of national strategy/policy.

### Elements of Intelligence

In an effort to better define the craft of intelligence, Abram Shulsky identifies four elements of intelligence: collection, analysis, covert action, and counterintelligence.

Collection is the process of gathering raw (or unanalyzed) material through a variety of methods including photography, interception of communications, espionage, and open sources such as any type of publication. However, without the second element of intelligence, analysis, this raw material is rarely useful. Analysis includes making “judgements about the capabilities, intentions, and actions of another party.”<sup>6</sup>

Covert action is a more interactive element of intelligence, seeking to directly influence political events. Shulsky describes it as “any activity midway between diplomacy

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<sup>4</sup> Richelson, Jeffrey T., The US Intelligence Community, (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1995), p. 2.

<sup>5</sup> Shulsky, Abram N. and Jennifer Sims, What is Intelligence, (Washington, DC: Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, 1993), p. 2.

<sup>6</sup> Shulsky, Abram N., Silent Warfare, (Washington, DC: Brassey’s (US), Inc., 1991), p. 8.

and war”<sup>7</sup> which is carried out in anonymity – meaning it is not public knowledge nor is it readily apparent. Counterintelligence, the last element of intelligence is the protection of the society as well as protection of the society’s intelligence gathering capabilities from hostile intent. The four elements described here better define what intelligence is and what it does to protect, serve and ensure that leadership makes well-informed decisions regarding national strategy and policy.

### Categories of Intelligence

In addition to these elements, there are several categories of intelligence. Jeffrey Richelson defines six categories, four of which are: political, military, scientific and technological, and economic. Political intelligence encompasses both domestic and international politics.<sup>8</sup> It is important for the U.S. to be aware of the ever-evolving relations between countries around the world in order to make international policy. Domestically, the stability of a certain country affects international relations. For example Poland, once a Warsaw Pact country under Communism is now an upcoming member of NATO, changing U.S. relations and support to Poland. In addition, a domestic crisis in a foreign country could spur US involvement in humanitarian or military aid. Therefore, changes within a nation can severely affect U.S. relations with that country and/or its neighbors.

Military intelligence is the most obvious in importance of intelligence categories. Military capabilities of potential adversaries must be studied to provide the U.S. military

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Richelson, The US Intelligence Community, 7-8.

establishment with a basis not for only budgeting for forces and new weapon systems, but also for training, equipping and arming U.S. troops. Additionally, military intelligence is important in assessing the balance of power between nations (such as Iran/Iraq) whose conflict may affect the United States.<sup>9</sup>

Scientific and technological developments in both the military and civilian sector are important. Obviously military technological developments are of concern to the U.S. when trying to stay ahead of the “arms race.” However, civilian scientific and technological advances may also have military implications. For example, a country developing nuclear power for the first time as a power source, might also use that reactive material to build weapons of mass destruction, therefore giving the world a new nuclear capable country and changing the balance of power in a particular region as a result.

Economic intelligence concerns international development of economic organizations, such as OPEC or ASEAN. Rates of production, consumption, pricing and trade embargoes affect the world market and could in the event of a major economic collapse of a country affect the balance of power in a particular region. In addition, these economic arrangements often have underlying military implications to include military alliances. These categories emphasize the need for intelligence today in order to have as clear a picture as possible into a highly dynamic world arena to once again ensure sound policy making in pursuit of national security.

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid, 8.

## Strategic and Tactical Intelligence

Intelligence plays numerous roles in the pursuit of national security. Decision-makers use intelligence at different levels: strategic and tactical. At the strategic level, intelligence includes “evaluated information needed at high-level policy-making levels for the economic allocation of resources” toward the formulation of national objectives and the execution of those objectives.<sup>10</sup> Strategic intelligence is produced and used mainly at decision-making levels to guide national strategy in peace or wartime. This type of intelligence is organized into three basic categories, as described by Harry Ransom, a noted scholar of intelligence: generalized information, current estimate information, and evaluative information.<sup>11</sup> The basic information most often pertains to known data such as a country’s population, ethnic origin, and other statistics which are produced in regular publications. Current intelligence comes in a variety of forms ranging from raw, unevaluated data to coordinated National Intelligence Estimates (NIE’s) produced by a variety of analysts from different agencies to provide the best overall analysis of a developing situation. In addition the most typical type of current intelligence comes in the form of daily, weekly or monthly reports, estimates or briefings to decision-makers. These regular updates keep commanders informed on specific developments or on worldwide trends ensuring the decision-maker is well informed to do his job. Evaluative intelligence is making educated predictions on the course of events relating to a particular subject, such as when a weak government may fall, or the direction a regional conflict may

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<sup>10</sup> Ransom, Harry H. “Strategic Intelligence”, (Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press, 1973), p. 2.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 5.

turn. These evaluations are also included in the current intelligence estimates given to commanders and in NIE's presented to high level decision-makers. Strategic intelligence in the course of its evaluations, often overlaps with tactical level intelligence methods.

Tactical intelligence, often referred to as operational intelligence, is, for the most part, used by military commanders at the "local" or operational level. Tactical intelligence includes a more specific, detailed look at enemy capabilities in order to train in peacetime or plan campaigns in wartime. These include orders of battle detailing the military strength of a country, operational capabilities, defensive posturing and other important military factors needed for military commanders to conduct operations and meet national objectives. The same current intelligence briefed to high level decision-makers is also available to lower level commanders giving them the same knowledge of major developments for planning and training purposes. It is easy to see that the overlap between strategic and tactical intelligence occurs regularly depending on the amount of information the decision-maker requires to formulate his objectives.

#### History: 1917-1961

##### Intelligence Prior to and during WWI

Prior to World War II, intelligence organizations were for the most part small divisions of the military branches and relatively unimportant due to the popular ideas of isolationism during this period in U.S. history. The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) was formed by the Navy in 1882 for the purpose of gathering and processing information on technological naval advances around the world, and thereby the U.S. Navy became the

first to establish a military intelligence agency.<sup>12</sup> The Army organized the Military Intelligence Division (MID) in 1885 to collect and disseminated foreign intelligence. (The MID later became the G-2 in 1903.) However, despite the creation of these agencies, both were sparsely staffed making them essentially ineffective. In 1917, when the U.S. entered WWI, American intelligence resources were not extensive enough, largely as a result of undermanning, to provide the tactical information the commander's required. In the early years of World War I, U.S. commanders overseas tended to rely on foreign British and French intelligence assessments for tactical estimates.<sup>13</sup>

However, as WWI progressed, the Army's G-2 grew in size and capabilities and earned a reputation for its advances in the cryptological field (coding and decoding secure transmissions, the first SIGINT (Signals Intelligence)). By 1918, G-2 was one of the four divisions of the Army's General Staff responsible for "planning, coordinating, and supervising military intelligence."<sup>14</sup> Despite its avid growth and accomplishments during the war, the G-2 waned in the postwar years, mainly as a result of the negative American attitude toward continued involvement in international relations after the war. However, both the ONI and G-2 continued to operate and as World War II began in Europe, the intelligence community started to grow by leaps and bounds.

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<sup>12</sup> Ameringer, Charles D. U.S. Foreign Intelligence: The Secret Side of American History, (Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1990), 66.

<sup>13</sup> Ameringer, 110.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 111.

## Attempts to Establish Joint Intelligence

The direct origins of DIA and the need for a unified military intelligence organization can be traced to the late 1930s and early 1940s. In June of 1939, President Roosevelt established the Interdepartmental Intelligence Committee consisting of the FBI, G-2 and ONI for the purpose of investigating matters of espionage, counterespionage, and sabotage. ONI was responsible for the Pacific; G-2 took responsibility for Europe, Africa, and the Canal Zone and the FBI was responsible for the Western Hemisphere. This committee created the basis for integration of intelligence efforts while maintaining separate intelligence organizations.<sup>15</sup>

Two years later, in 1941, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) was established and broadened the idea of integration, acting as a coordinating organization to advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The JIC consisted of the directors/representatives from the intelligence branches of the Army, Navy, State Department, Board of Economic Warfare, and the Coordinator of Information (COI).<sup>16</sup> The COI, the forerunner of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), was headed by William Donovan, who later became the head of the OSS in 1942. The COI, unlike the OSS, reported directly to the President and was financed in “unvouchered funds”<sup>17</sup> The working body of the JIC itself, was the Joint Intelligence Subcommittee Staff which became the Joint Intelligence Group (JIG) or J-2. Reports from the JIC and the J-2 went directly to the JCS creating a dual chain of

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 125.

<sup>16</sup> Allen, “Overview of the Origins of DIA”, 2.

<sup>17</sup> Andrew. Christopher. For the President’s Eyes Only, (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1995), 127.

reporting; a recurring concept in defense intelligence.<sup>18</sup> The JIC failed to successfully unify military intelligence because it lacked the authority to combine the efforts and estimates of the three services. However, the concept behind its creation served as an important organizational precedent for the creation of DIA.

### Intelligence Failures of Pearl Harbor

The failure of Pearl Harbor was a failure of intelligence analysis; the ability to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant material, according to one historian. As WWII approached, the American intelligence community consisted of: the FBI, ONI, G-2, as well as the two SIGINT sections Signals Intelligence Section (SIS) and the Code and Signals Section (OP-20-G) which were controlled by the Army and Navy branches, respectively. Although the two SIGINT sections of the Army and Navy did cooperate with each other, they did so rather haphazardly and amidst inter-service rivalry. The sheer number of messages decoded from Japan (code-named MAGIC) were too great in number to all be read and were routinely hand selected for the leadership to read. Yet, there was no one coded message from the Japan that would have given the U.S. an absolute indication of attack on Pearl. However, perhaps if they had all been read, or if someone had noticed the increase in volume of messages in the days that preceded Pearl, the sheer yield of the information may have been enough to indicate the impending attack.<sup>19</sup> Roberta Wohlstetter, concludes that “we failed to anticipate Pearl Harbor not for

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<sup>18</sup> Allen, “Overview of the Origins of DIA”, 3.

<sup>19</sup> Ameringer, 134.



a want of the relevant materials, but because of a plethora of irrelevant ones.”<sup>20</sup> Pearl Harbor starkly illustrated the lack of attention and resources as well as the shortcomings of U.S. intelligence. What Pearl Harbor did for the intelligence community was to bolster the creation of an agency which was the predecessor of the CIA as well as lay the groundwork for the creation of the DIA – giving intelligence a permanent presence in the postwar America.

### Creation of the Office of Strategic Services

In 1942, the COI was redesigned into the OSS, largely because of President Roosevelt’s lack of confidence in the COI in the aftermath of the intelligence failure at Pearl Harbor as well as a result of the “turf battles” which continued to fragment the intelligence community. The new organization was tasked with collecting and analyzing “strategic information” as well as planning and operating “special services” and reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff instead of FDR himself.<sup>21</sup> The OSS was America’s first real “spy” agency, and was headed by former COI director, William Donovan. The OSS had two main components for accomplishing its mission: the Intelligence and Operations components, each supervised by deputy directors. The organization was further structured by Donovan into branches which conducted research and analysis, espionage, and black propaganda (information designed to appear as if it came from enemy sources).<sup>22</sup> Under the Intelligence Component, the Communications Branch was in charge of processing and delivering messages, providing secure communications between the

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<sup>20</sup> Andrew, 120.

<sup>21</sup> Andrew, 131.

OSS and Washington as well as overseas. The Research and Analysis Branch designed “spy paraphernalia”, and special weapons for agents in the field. Within the Research and Development (R & D) branch the Documentation and Camouflage divisions created “agent authentication.” The Secret Intelligence Branch conducted espionage and operated out of an extensive network of stations in mostly neutral countries. The Counter-Espionage Branch (X-2) was a clandestine service which “spied on Axis secret services in order to prevent penetration of U.S. and Allied intelligence” i.e., the double agent. The Research and Analysis Section was the heart of the Intelligence component gathering information and producing comprehensive intelligence products.<sup>23</sup>

Within the Operational Component of the OSS fell the Special Operations Branch (SO) which housed small teams of agents who conducted sabotage behind enemy lines as well as the Operational Group which trained guerilla units and the Marine Unit which performed similar functions as the SO in the marine arena. The final part of the Operational component was the Morale Operations Branch which conducted the black propaganda.<sup>24</sup>

One of the main problems of the OSS was its extreme compartmentalization which complicated communication between branches within the OSS. In addition, the creation of the OSS did little to end the continual conflict within the intelligence community. Dovovan’s ideas to further centralize intelligence were not taken well and his main supporter, President Roosevelt died before any further action could be taken toward expanding the powers of the OSS. The OSS’s continual competition with the military

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<sup>23</sup> Ameringer, 162-167.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., 168-172.

intelligence branches and Truman's inexperience in intelligence policy and power along with his disdain for espionage ultimately led to disbandment of the OSS in September of 1945.<sup>25</sup> Upon its disbandment, the Research and Analysis branch was transferred to the State Department and Secret Intelligence Branch and X-2 were tasked to the War Department.

In January 1946, President Truman authorized the consideration of a post-war intelligence organization for the coordination, planning, evaluation and dissemination of intelligence based on recommendations of the 1945 Eberstadt Report. Out of this consideration came the National Intelligence Authority, a senior executive body, and its operational element, the Central Intelligence Group (CIG).<sup>26</sup> In addition, Truman appointed the first Director of Central Intelligence, Admiral Sidney Sours to head the CIG. Both groups were budgeted and manned by the War and State departments, therefore, both departments retained control over their own resources. As a result, there was still no real integration of intelligence servicing agencies.

Despite efforts to establish an independent intelligence agency during the 1945-1947 period, the War and State departments fought and convinced national leaders that each department should retain autonomy of its intelligence functions although they acknowledged that greater coordination was needed.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> Allen., "Overview of the Origins of DIA", 2.

<sup>26</sup> Richelson, The US Intelligence Community, 12-13.

<sup>27</sup> Ransom, 103.

### National Security Act of 1947

As a result of WWII, the nature of the United States power and influence was globally widened and by 1947 there was a growing realization that in order to keep up with all of the post WWII challenges, integration of services intelligence as well as joint operations was essential. The National Security Act of 1947 was an essential first step. This act for the first time consolidated the separate military services into the National Military Establishment, created the National Security Council (NSC) -- an advisory group to the President -- and established the Central Intelligence Agency (replacing the CIG). It also gave the CIA and the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) the responsibility for coordinating intelligence activities of all government agencies.<sup>28</sup> Despite this charter, and due partly to the vagueness of the provision that established the CIA, the military services continued to, for the most part, retain control over military intelligence collection as no agency had been established to centralize their independent collections. As a result, the function of the CIA came to be that of a ““coordinator” in a confederation of departmental intelligence organizations.”<sup>29</sup> As a result, when DIA was created, it was designed as a union--not a confederation of defense intelligence activities.

### Central Intelligence Agency

The National Security Act of 1947 charged the CIA with coordinating intelligence activities and correlating, evaluating and disseminating intelligence information in the pursuit of National Security. In addition, the agency was to perform other duties as

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<sup>28</sup> Allen, “Overview of the Origins of DIA”, 2

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

directed by the National Security Council. It was this charter function that laid the groundwork for authorizing covert action. The position of Director of Central Intelligence was created and was responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods. The agency was further tasked, although in hindsight ineffectively, to centralize intelligence activities. CIA was "to perform for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies such additional services of common concern as the <NSC> determines can be more effectively accomplished centrally."<sup>30</sup> However, despite this provision, the inter-service intelligence agencies had been disagreeing for years and the establishment of the CIA did nothing to reverse that trend. For example, the Army, Navy, and Air Force estimates on the capabilities of the Soviets as well as their intentions were widely varied, presenting basic problems in coordination among intelligence agencies.<sup>31</sup> Therefore at the first meeting of the NSC, in September of 1947, the DCI presented a plan for centralizing the efforts of the intelligence community which was approved in December of that same year. Essentially, the heads of the armed service intelligence branches, the State Department's Office of Intelligence and Research, the FBI and the Atomic Energy Commission comprised the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) lead by the DCI. A second NSC direction in January of 1948, specified the types of intelligence estimates to be coordinated within the IAC. Despite these efforts, it remained extremely difficult to achieve cooperation on national intelligence estimates from all members of the intelligence

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<sup>30</sup> Richelson, The US Intelligence Community, 13.

<sup>31</sup> Prados, John. The Soviet Estimate (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982). 8.

community.<sup>32</sup> This theme reigned in endless subsequent investigations and reports on the efforts of the CIA to coordinate intelligence from 1948 until the creation of DIA in 1961.

#### 1948 Hoover Commission

In 1948, Truman appointed Herbert Hoover to determine if the provisions of the 1947 National Security Act actually did what it had it been conceived to do -- provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the US. The commission determined not only that the National Military Establishment lacked centralized authority, but more importantly, that individual service intelligence branches were subjective, biased, inadequate, and reeked of wasteful duplication, unsatisfactory coordination and conflicting intelligence estimates.<sup>33</sup> Each service regularly used its own intelligence system for budgeteering purposes; the Air Force saw a need for extensive numbers of bombers and strategic missiles to counter their perceived threat, while the Navy and Army exaggerated Soviet fire power, all of which led to inflated budgets for the armed services at a time when funds were decreasing. Furthermore, it was determined that the JCS was "too remote" from the related intelligence groups such as the NSC and the CIA. The Hoover Commission emphasized that teamwork was necessary between related intelligence functions and advised such coordinating control be managed by the Secretary of Defense.<sup>34</sup> Ultimately, the commission recommended creation of an agency, under the Secretary of Defense, for coordinating inter-service intelligence activities which led to the

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<sup>32</sup> Ibid., 9.

<sup>33</sup> Allen, "Overview of the Origins of DIA", 3.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., 3.

1949 amendments to the National Security Act of 1947 as well as the creation of the Central Intelligence Act of 1949.<sup>35</sup> This new act provided for better coordination in the JCS and permitted the Agency to use confidential fiscal and administrative procedures in the expenditure of federal funds. It provided the basis for the authority to maintain secrecy of the CIA's budget, as well as its functions, names, organization, etc. However, despite the fact that the Hoover commission determined the need centralized military intelligence, another twelve years would pass before the establishment of DIA.

### Start of the Cold War 1950s

The beginning of the Cold War started the arms race with the first atomic bomb and continued into the Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and space programs of the 1950s to 1980s. This exploding technological race served to restrain cooperation between services once again. Technology was expensive, and government resources at this time were diminishing which resulted in competition for project funding. Inter-service rivalry over specialized intelligence functions also emerged most noticeably in the debate over the service's participation in the targeting function. The Air Force had been given this function in 1947, and had maintained a joint effort in the process until 1952, when the new Air Force director of intelligence expressed a desire to staff the section with Air Force personnel only. The other services protested, noting their vested interest in the targeting function as well. From this controversy, a new activity for the JIC was created-- to provide for partial joint participation in the area of air intelligence. This joint activity in air intelligence continued up until the establishment of DIA. Also in 1953, the Secretary

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<sup>35</sup> Ibid., 4.

of Defense created the position of Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations (OSO) as an arm to recommend policies, review and provide guidance on program development of all Department of Defense (DoD) components and develop DoD positions on intelligence programs, making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. It was to be a coordination point for all DoD intelligence, however, the OSO lacked the authority to accomplish such coordination. Despite shortfalls, this was the first DoD effort to coordinate defense intelligence.<sup>36</sup> For the most part, during this period from 1949-1955, the plague of inaccurate intelligence and duplication of effort continued with no further studies or attempts made to integrate the military intelligence system.

#### Creation of the National Security Agency

In the early 1950s as well, the National Security Agency (NSA) was created (November 4, 1952) in response to a Top Secret directive. NSA took over the responsibilities of the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) established in 1949 in an attempt to integrate the cryptologic effort among the defense organizations. It controlled all SIGINT activities through the Central Security Service (CSS) which represented the various service SIGINT requirements and assets and was headed by the NSA Director who reported directly to the Secretary of Defense. NSA's mission:

. . . is directed to foreign intelligence obtained from foreign electrical communications and also from other foreign signals such as radars. The foreign intelligence derived from these signals is then reported to various agencies of the government in response to their approved requirements for foreign intelligence.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> Ibid., 5.

<sup>37</sup> Fain, Tyrus G., The Intelligence Community: History, Organization, and Issues, (London: R.R. Bowker Company, 1977), 303.



“On the surface, it appeared that a model for jointly manned, centralized intelligence activity under DoD had been established.”<sup>38</sup> However, there were numerous obvious differences between the new NSA and what would become DIA. The principle difference was in the competition for resources. NSA’s functions were highly specialized, making few demands on the military departments for resources or manpower. Conversely, when DIA was created, its missions were broad and the new agency dependent on the services for resources and staffing. Additionally, the classified organization did not have to compete for funds with the services, as it’s resources came from classified funding, unlike DIA which competed among other government agencies for monies. Also, because of its highly specialized mission, the demands on the agency were not as intense as the demands on DIA would be in times of crisis. NSA provided a part of the intelligence picture that DIA would be required to interpret and disseminate to its users. Where DIA would experience criticism over its performance, NSA, as a secret agency was very much protected from a majority of that criticism. Technically, NSA was the first DoD intelligence organization combining efforts of the four services, but due to its unilateral secrecy, it didn’t experience the difficulties that DIA would in the struggle for survival and legitimacy.

### 1955 Hoover Commission

This second Hoover Commission was created to make recommendations on the structure and administration of the intelligence community and its final report received much debate in Congress. The commission warned of the need for more intelligence

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<sup>38</sup> Allen. Deane J. “The Defense Intelligence Agency: A 21-Year Organizational Overview”, (Washington, D.C.: DIA, 1983), p. 20.

collection on Russia and China -- behind the Iron Curtain. It once again, noted the lack of accountability in the current intelligence system, and therefore, a need for better organizational structure in order to adequately keep astride of technological advancements around the world.<sup>39</sup> Partly as a result of this commission and the widely held belief that major revision was needed in the Defense Department (to provide more efficient products and eliminate duplication) came the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958.

#### Department of Defense Reorganization of 1958

This act did not specifically call for a consolidated DoD intelligence organization, despite its provisions. The main goal was to streamline channels of authority in the DoD without disrupting the individual authority of the military departments by extreme consolidation.<sup>40</sup> The act did move the decision making arm from the individual military branches into the hands of the JCS and the Secretary of Defense and provided a chain of command for decision making. Prior to the act, each branch's intelligence departments submitted intelligence reports directly to the Secretary of Defense. The JCS was now responsible for coordinating intelligence estimates and providing intelligence to the Secretary of Defense through the former JIG, now J-2. Size limitations of the J-2, however, ultimately sent some of the "weeding out" process back down to the individual services elements resulting in unresolved differences over programs and plans and failed, once again, to produce timely and credible intelligence estimates.<sup>41</sup> Thus, the system

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<sup>39</sup> Richelson, The US Intelligence Community, 42.

<sup>40</sup> Allen, "Overview of the Origins of DIA", 6.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

continued to be duplicative, cumbersome, and uncoordinated for the most part. Despite its shortcomings, this act was the first major reorganization of the Defense Department since its inception in 1947 and it established the unquestionable authority of the Secretary of Defense and placed the JCS in the chain of command for decision making.

Also rooted in the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 was the creation the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), created by a National Security Council directive in September of 1958, replacing the former IAC from 1948. This board represented the highest level of intelligence coordination and included representatives from: the JCS, Army, Navy, Air Force, Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency, Atomic Energy Commission, FBI as well as the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and the Director of the National Security Agency as equal members.<sup>42</sup> The USIB provided guidance to the intelligence community regarding requirements and priorities as well as coordinating intelligence activities and issuing National Intelligence Estimates (NIE). This board combined service and outside intelligence elements with senior national defense representatives for the first time.<sup>43</sup>

#### Joint Study Group of 1959/1960

Still faced with continued “disparate estimates of Soviet missile strength from each of the armed services: the US Intelligence Board created a Joint Study Group (JSG) in 1959 to study the intelligence agencies.”<sup>44</sup> The Secretary directed the JCS to identify the

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<sup>42</sup> The Secretary of Defense for Special Operations position was eliminated in 1961, when DIA replaced its seat on the USIB.

<sup>43</sup> Allen, “Overview of the Origins of DIA”, 28.

<sup>44</sup> Richelson, The US Intelligence Community, 42.

intelligence requirements for all military departments in an effort to reduce duplication and prioritize requirements. The Joint Study Group (JSG) was a special task force under the chairmanship of Lyman Kirkpatrick (former CIA Inspector General) to review military intelligence coordination.<sup>45</sup> Once again, an attempt was made to centralize military intelligence. At this time, service channels still followed the same chain of command used since WWII and although the DoD Reorganization Act had streamlined the chain at the upper end, it still needed one centralized point of control capable of taking in, organizing and disseminating intelligence information for the military intelligence community. Thus, came the notion for the Defense Intelligence Agency. However, the group also recognized the obstacles of creating such an agency. With the specialized missions of each military branch, it would be difficult to have one agency understanding and coordinating all branches.<sup>46</sup> The final recommendation of the JSG provided that the Secretary of Defense take appropriate action to bring the military intelligence organization under the Department of Defense within the concept of the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. This program would include:

1. Establishment of review authority of all military intelligence programs, providing coordination of all foreign intelligence activities.
2. Authority of the JCS would be strengthened by requiring the JCS to coordinate intelligence views, specifically estimates with the DoD, and provide guidance to specified commands

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<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid..

3. Increased intelligence resources should be drawn from existing resources.
4. Intelligence guidance to components of unified commands should be passed through the J-2<sup>47</sup>

The JCS was concerned with some of these recommendations, notably that this process should be a result of careful planning so as not to lose valuable intelligence as the changes occurred. In January 1961, the JCS suggested to the Secretary that such changes should be made, but only after a careful plan was developed by the Joint Chiefs. Meanwhile, two of the services reacted to the JSG recommendations with their own ideas for control and coordination of the intelligence efforts. However, before the separate services could present their ideas, the new Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, decided to establish a defense intelligence agency stemming from within the JCS.<sup>48</sup>

#### The Creation of DIA - 1961

On March 2, 1961, the JCS, under direction from McNamara to present a concept for a defense intelligence agency, sent recommendations for the creation of a Military Intelligence Agency (MIA). The MIA would include estimating, targeting, and basic intelligence functions, but would leave the individual military departments in charge of acquiring, producing, and disseminating intelligence as required to fulfill their departmental missions. The JCS envisioned an MIA which did not call for total integration.<sup>49</sup> Three critical points of contention arose among the JCS and the Secretary

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<sup>47</sup>Allen, "Overview of the Origins of DIA", 8.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid., 9.

<sup>49</sup>Richelson, The US Intelligence Community, 43.

of Defense in the forming of the new agency. An extensive debate ensued on whether the agency should be under the JCS and if it was placed under their jurisdiction, how would they manage, direct and oversee the intelligence activities of the services. Ultimately, this chain of command, under the JCS, was justified on the terms of the DoD Reorganization Act of 1958 which specifically tasked the Joint Chiefs with responsibility for strategic planning. Secondly, the Secretary was concerned over how the JCS would run the organization – as a confederation rather than a genuine union. To emphasize this point, the Secretary insisted on the name Defense Intelligence Agency rather than the proposed MIA, stressing the idea of a union of defense intelligence activities. McNamara was concerned lest this new agency be a confederation instead of a union. He insisted on the name DIA, implying it was a defense, not a military agency, controlled by the DoD, not the services. Further noted was that the DIA/MIA director should be allowed to closely monitor separate military intelligence activities and should be authorized to eliminate duplication, review all service programs and assign priorities as needed in order to prevent repeating the historical precedence of duplication and inconsistent reports.<sup>50</sup> Lastly, the Secretary insisted on a timetable outlining the progression of the agency's integration and the resources they would need to accomplish the goals set for the new organization.<sup>51</sup> The final result was a compromise and on July 5, 1961, McNamara suggested an agency which would report to the Secretary of Defense and through the JCS. On August 1, 1961 McNamara formally established the Defense Intelligence Agency via DoD directive 5105.21 as a DoD agency making it responsible for:

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<sup>50</sup> Allen, "Overview of the Origins of DIA", 10.

<sup>51</sup> Allen, "The Defense Intelligence Agency: A 21-Year Organizational Overview", 28.

1. Organization, direction, management and control of all DoD intelligence resources.
2. Review and coordination of DoD intelligence functions retained by Military Departments.
3. Supervision of the execution of all plans, policies and procedures exercising maximum economy and efficiency of all intelligence resources.
4. Responding to all priority requests by US Intelligence Board and fulfilling intelligence requirements of major DoD components.<sup>52</sup>

The services transferred intelligence functions and resources to the new agency on a “time phased basis to avoid rapidly degrading the overall effectiveness of defense intelligence.”<sup>53</sup>

With this directive, DIA finally brought military intelligence under a single umbrella, coordinating collection, analysis and dissemination of critical intelligence that would efficiently serve commanders, the JCS and the president.

Until the creation of DIA, military intelligence was not fully in accordance with the National Security Act of 1947 - the goal of which was to provide security for the United States. Intelligence was fragmented and difficult to use by top military and political leaders. The origin of DIA from 1941 to 1961 emerged from twenty years of inadequate, incoherent, and fragmented intelligence collection and dissemination. After thirty-five years of development, DIA has become the authoritative source for defense intelligence. With all of the individual services represented, DIA provides daily air, ground and naval

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<sup>52</sup>Richelson, The US Intelligence Community, 43-44.

<sup>53</sup> Department of Defense, “35 Year History of DIA”, (Washington D.C.: DIA History Office, 1996), p.1.

intelligence estimates to national leadership. This exchange provides for the most reliable, and consistent military intelligence ever available.

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## CHAPTER 2

### DIA: EVOLVEMENT FROM 1961-PRESENT

#### The 1960s

After its creation in 1961, DIA struggled through the remaining decade to define its role in the intelligence field and consolidate its internal and external management duties. As the agency developed, the need for more direct guidance became necessary. By September of 1963, the directive that had created DIA in 1961 had several amendatory revisions which broadened the responsibilities of the agency. This included assuming the duties of the J-2, Joint Staff in June of 1963 to include COMINT, ELINT, and non-SIGINT functions, target intelligence, and support to the JCS and Secretariat on intelligence areas. These revisions and changes were part of the phased plan to develop DIA, gradually integrating the necessary service intelligence functions and planned growth of the new agency. This plan was guided by two major objectives. First, the organization was to have a horizontal structure avoiding vertical compartments that might result in competing levels of operation and therefore duplication of effort.<sup>54</sup> And, secondly, a plan to increase communication between operations elements in the field and operational directors at DIA, was to increase the effectiveness of the overall management of the agency. Guided by these goals, the gradual development of DIA began.

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<sup>54</sup> Allen, "The Defense Intelligence Agency: A 21-Year Organizational Overview", 55.

### Command Element

DIA's functions were originally organized into three elements around which the directorates and branches of DIA were developed to fulfill the agency's missions: the Command, Management and Support, and Operations elements. The Command Element included those offices that supported headquarters or served as liaisons to headquarters. These functions included the *Inspector General*, providing routine inspections, the *Special Advisory Group*, performing specified studies and advising the command element, the *Special Security Office*, handled special intelligence and sensitive information within DIA, and lastly the *Special Activities Office*, which performed interagency functions within the intelligence community.<sup>55</sup> These offices provided the leadership arm of DIA and were a vital building block of the agency, providing a basis for action.

### Management And Support Element

The Management and Support element included five major offices designed to provide services for the agency. The *Plans and Policy* office was established with the creation of the agency in 1961 and in charge of the "Activation Plan" for DIA as well as long range plans and programs for different functions within DIA to include: collection plans, scientific and technological plans, counterintelligence plans, maps, charts and geodesy product plans, and training plans. In essence this office was responsible for the planning of all DIA programs. The *Administrative* arm of this element served the command structure in addition to providing personnel support, both military and civilian as well as, services, records management, security, and career development within the

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<sup>55</sup> Ibid., 67.

Agency.<sup>56</sup> The training role within DIA was indeed important, as much of the criticism of the intelligence community after WWII was directed toward the lack of training for its analysts which added to the negative image of the intelligence career field within the services. This negative image was basically a result of stunted career opportunities in the intelligence field. It was almost unheard of for a military intelligence officer to attain the rank of general and therefore a career minded officer was wise to avoid the path of intelligence specialization. As a result, a major effort needed to be undertaken to resolve this image with an emphasis on career development for intelligence personnel. Out of this requirement the Career Development Group was appointed to study and make recommendations on the training and career progression of intelligence officers. Under the advisement of this group the Intelligence Career Development Program was instituted in 1964 within the DIA organization.<sup>57</sup> Ultimately the goal was to develop a professional intelligence corps, which provided continuity through the retainment of experienced civilian analysts despite the rotating nature of the services within the agency. The emphasis in this concern wasn't the training but the planning of career progression in the intelligence field, yielding better intelligence officers for the future. This role only stayed in the administrative section briefly, as it was transferred to the *Plans and Policy* section in 1964.

In the *Administrative* branch, one of the biggest problems facing the agency in the immediate period following its creation was acquiring personnel. Personnel shortages

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<sup>56</sup> Ibid., 70.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid, 73-74.

were prevalent in the “functional elements” being transferred over to DIA.<sup>58</sup> In addition, the Services, unhappy about the creation of DIA to begin with, were slow in providing nominees to staff the agency. Obtaining clearances for all the new employees bogged down the administrative security branch and in an effort to accomplish the paperwork, DIA was forced to hire temporary help within the agency, a first at this time for a federal agency.<sup>59</sup> The administrative arm was also responsible for identifying where these new recruits would contribute their talents. In other words, a plan for creating appropriate job positions, and titles had to be drawn up and implemented amidst this hiring chaos. Therefore, it is easy to see that DIA’s period of establishment in the early 1960’s was not a smooth transition, especially in the realm of staffing the agency.

The production/dissemination and research and development (R&D) section of the management element of DIA was housed in the *Intelligence Support System* office. The purpose of this office was dual: consolidate information processed DoD wide as well as head the Department of Defense Research and Development processes. A goal in the establishment of DIA was to automate the processing of data for more effective dissemination of DoD products. Previously, each service had a different program for data processing, leading once again to duplication of effort. These functions too, were phased into DIA and in 1966, the agency became the “single manager of worldwide intelligence datahandling systems . . .”<sup>60</sup> As far as the R & D effort, DIA was responsible for U.S. domestic research and development as well as monitoring and coordination all R

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<sup>58</sup> Ibid., 76.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., 77.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid., 84.

& D efforts for the defense department. A short period later, these dramatically different functions under the Intelligence Support Systems Branch became separate directorates for more coordinated management.

The *Comptroller* office served as the functional authority for the “. . . financial management and direction <in> obtaining effective utilization of the DOD intelligence resources.”<sup>61</sup> This included the preparation of the DoD intelligence yearly budget, no small task for such a new organization. In addition, the comptroller office managed the manpower program for DIA. Lastly, the management and support element also included the establishment of the *Defense Intelligence School* in 1962 as a professional intelligence education institution. This is where DIA addressed the concerns over the continuing education of intelligence personnel, both military and civilian. The rapidly changing world situations after WWII demanded an educated corps of intelligence professionals capable of guiding leadership in military and political situations to come concerning a myriad of situations. The management and support element of DIA would change over the years; however, the element played a major role in the development of the DIA’s manpower and resources.

### Operations Element

The third and final original branch of DIA was the Operations element containing two major offices for collecting and processing intelligence. The *Collection Branch* was to serve as a “single integrated facility” for intelligence collection “in its complete cycle – from receipt, throughout the collection process, to a final evaluation of results obtained in

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<sup>61</sup> Ibid.,85.

terms of means, timeliness and cost involved.”<sup>62</sup> This involved establishing an overall list of DoD wide intelligence requirements and priorities as well as a means for coordinating collection operations throughout the Defense Department to include technical and human intelligence efforts. This was a monumental task as it involved meshing the requirement of all the services as well as the priorities of the DoD into one major plan for collection. Processing of intelligence was handled by a separate branch of the operations element which held the primary substantive intelligence functions of the agency. The *Processing* branch included a production office, estimates office, current intelligence office and an indications and warning center – all of which provided fused intelligence back to the services and up the chain to higher headquarters, thereby seeking to eliminate the duplication and inaccuracy of previous years. The production office coordinated the services products such as reference files, libraries and processing capabilities into centralized offices of production. As might be expected, the estimate element provided national leadership with inputs to National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) integrating the service inputs. “The DIA Estimates Office provided a central control point for the production of finished intelligence by “reviewing and coordinating as directed, the intelligence estimative functions retained by, or assigned to, the military departments.”<sup>63</sup> This was an area where DIA began to “shine” early in its creation. NIE’s became more reliable and requested by the national leadership, indicating that at least in one area, consolidation of military intelligence efforts was successful and meaningful from the start. To satisfy requirements for current intelligence, DIA

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<sup>62</sup> Ibid., 90.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., 100.

established a 24-hour Alert Center in order to provide military services and governmental leadership with round the clock, all-source current intelligence, especially in crisis situations. This broad mission included an endless number of tasks which were difficult to manage efficiently at first. Eventually, the tasks were organized functionally and geographically providing in-depth analysis and support especially during crisis situations, such as the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.

### Further Defining DIA's Roles

These three sections served as the primary building blocks around which DIA was built from 1961 to 1963. During the period until 1970, DIA struggled for operational effectiveness, following its initial establishment. This struggle was fought against a background of growing U.S. involvement in international relations. When the agency was created, the biggest foreign policy issue was the Korean War and then shortly before its creation, the Bay of Pigs. Since its creation worldwide events had included the Cuban Missile Crisis, Vietnam issues, and the emerging nations of Africa. Therefore, DIA's organizational structure required changes to accommodate the new intelligence requirements. This would become a useful trend in DIA's organization: restructuring after major political or military events in an effort to upgrade military intelligence support across the board. In this way, DIA used a "lessons learned" perspective to continually develop the young agency, successfully adapting to the changing needs of the intelligence consumers. This is quite apparent in the 1993 reorganization which occurred as a result of intelligence lessons learned from a successful campaign of Desert Storm. Despite this seemingly reactive nature of revision, DIA also took a forwarding looking

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attitude from its inception in its attempts to develop the agency to satisfy the goal of better-coordinated military intelligence.

The phased evolution of the agency was mostly completed by 1964; however, DIA added some major functions to its organization in that year in order to bring about the original intent of the 1961 charter. These new elements included: mapping, charting and geodesy, counterintelligence, science and technology, dissemination center and the defense attaché system. In assuming the duties of Mapping, Charting and Geodesy (MC&G), DIA consolidated the separate services products into products appropriate for use DoD-wide. In September 1963, DIA created an office of Counterintelligence and Security giving DIA an internal security check within the agency, a means for monitoring the service organizations counterintelligence programs as well as providing support to the JCS, Unified and Specific commands. However, the director was specific that the external aspects of counterintelligence, basically, assessing threats to U.S. intelligence activities, remain with the individual services.<sup>64</sup> The great majority of these types of assessments are made within the individual services specialized units which conduct vulnerability assessments to their specific intelligence functions. Additionally, up until 1962, the separate military departments also maintained their own Science and Technological (S&T) functions. S&T had become increasingly important since the end of WWII in an era of quickly advancing weapon systems and with the advent of the atomic age. However, service biases once again led to highly specialized assessments and duplication of effort on the part of the services. In addition, funding was decreasing for this function in the services while the need for technological intelligence was

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<sup>64</sup> Ibid., 120.



increasing. In an effort to rectify these disparate trends, DIA assumed the S&T role in 1962 – a role which became increasingly important over the course of time with the ongoing Cold War and arms race with the USSR.

In order to quickly and efficiently disseminate its materials to all of its customers, DIA formed a Dissemination Center in 1964. This role was one of the most difficult to take over from the services as it involved processing a massive number of intelligence reports from the services and molding them into products useful to all the branches of the military.<sup>65</sup> The accomplishment of this function was extremely important from a lessons learned prospective. The Korean War had illustrated the travesties of getting intelligence too late. Intelligence is only as good as your means to distribute it to the customers that need it. Therefore, DIA's assumption of this responsibility was of critical importance.<sup>66</sup>

Lastly, DIA co-managed the defense attaché functions with the services from 1961-1965. Prior to that, attaches had been controlled by the individual military services based on a 1949 DoD Directive that specified the services responsibility for this collection function. These programs were operated independently in each service brought together only by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) who jointly approved locations of attaché posts with the State Department. DIA took over this OSD function with its creation in 1961. In 1963, the importance of attaches gained increasing significance due to the type of intelligence they could provide on the new international scene. In addition, once again the independent operation of this system under the services brought about duplication of both effort and costs, as well as impeded the

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<sup>65</sup> Ibid., 125.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid., 126.

distribution of the intelligence products. DIA was the natural location to consolidate these intelligence efforts and in 1963, the Defense Attaché System was created under DIA, giving managerial control of the system to DIA. In 1965, DIA received full authority for the attaché system bringing an element of HUMINT into DIA's intelligence responsibilities. DIA's goals were to improve the reporting system and represent all interests of the military community in this area of collection. Therefore, DIA appointed all attaches on the recommendation of the services and controlled their post locations and duration of assignment based on the needs of the military intelligence community as a whole. This too was an example of the overall effectiveness of the notion under which DIA was created – consolidation of effort and resources for military intelligence.

#### 1966 Reorganization

A JCS inspection of DIA in 1965 recommended some additional organizational changes, however, reorganization would not occur until 1966. Two major goals drove the 1966 reorganization: improved “reaction time” of those elements which provided critical products to the military services, and reduction of the number of elements that reported to the DIA director.<sup>67</sup> This first goal was given priority, as it was a direct intelligence function of the agency. In the formative years of DIA, integration of the services functions was often just a process of changing the name and putting the authority under the new agency. However, as DIA progressed, real integration needed to occur to make intelligence more efficient. This was the case in the Operations element of DIA especially in the production/processing function. As discussed earlier, DIA maintained a processing function which provided NIE's, current intelligence and I&W to its customers

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<sup>67</sup> Ibid., 138.

who included: national leadership, Unified and Specified commands and component commanders. However, due to the varied needs of these customers, DIA needed to effectively adopt a plan in which all of their needs could be met effectively. The initial organization of the Processing branch was based mostly on function: providing the NIE's, supporting current intelligence requirements and so on. However, overlap in areas occurred frequently and the system became more time-consuming than productive. The new concept beginning in 1966 reorganized this branch geographically into four areas: Soviet, Eastern, Western and Latin America.<sup>68</sup> Each area was responsible for all functions of production in its area and was able to prioritize the function most needed at the time: current intelligence, I&W, NIE, or basic intelligence, thereby producing more timely and responsive intelligence to its varied customers. In addition to this significant change, in order to reduce the number of areas that reported directly to the Command element, some of the major branches in DIA were given additional responsibilities and authority to include: reorganizing the Plans and Programs branch, the Collection branch, as well as the Command branch. By the end of the 1960's, DIA was beginning to develop into a capable intelligence agency. However, the increasing role of the U.S. in world politics and decreasing resources would prove difficult for the agency as it continued to solidify its role in defense intelligence.

#### DIA's Role in Military Operations of 1960s

During this period of early development for DIA, the agency faced some major intelligence challenges in the face of the developing Cold War, new technological advances and major political/military events, namely the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962,

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<sup>68</sup> Ibid., 143.

military action in the Dominican Republic, and growing involvement in Vietnam. Requirements arose not only from the need to provide accurate military intelligence to decision-makers, but also from taskings to account for American servicemen missing or captured in Southeast Asia.<sup>69</sup> In October 1962, the agency faced its first intelligence crisis in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis. For the most part, the CIA was the voice of intelligence during this crisis, as DIA had been in existence for just a year and barely had the manning much less the experience of the CIA. DIA did have within its Processing branch the Current Intelligence and Indications Center (CIIC) which provided for the formation of a special task force in times of crisis. Thus, in the fall of 1962, the Cuban Situation Room was established embodying a small, specialized group of intelligence analysts concentrating on producing special products in response to the crisis. DIA's Director as a member of the USIB participated in the daily meetings of the board during the crisis period.<sup>70</sup> Intelligence as a whole redeemed itself during the Cuban Missile Crisis after the disaster of the Bay of Pigs in 1961. Speculations by DIA analysts that the activities in Western Cuba were possibly preparations to install offensive equipment led to a request by the DIA director to increase U-2 flights over the island. The CIA agreed with the request and on 29 September placed Cuba on the collections list, making it the number one collection priority less than five days later.<sup>71</sup> Imagery from the U-2 on 14 October and subsequent imagery revealed what was assessed to be

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<sup>69</sup> Defense Intelligence Agency. "Defense Intelligence Agency, A Brief History" (Washington, DC: DIA History Office, 1996), p. 7.

<sup>70</sup> Kirkpatrick, Lyman B. The U.S. Intelligence Community, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1973), p. 96.

<sup>71</sup> Prados, 138.

MRBM sites being erected on the island. This “early warning” allowed national leadership to make informed decisions during the crisis and eventually gave them enough information with which to plan a course of action leading to the resolution of the crisis. Despite intelligence’s good showing, there were critics regarding the intelligence communities NIE prior to the crisis, which assessed that, the Soviets would not put offensive weapons on Cuba. This was a result of predisposition toward Soviet actions of the past which proved fallible. “On the balance the intelligence community provided the Kennedy administration with enough warning of the Soviet missile deployment to allow it to elaborate an effective response. Had the missiles been discovered sooner, the performance might have been brilliant, but as it was intelligence was creditable.” <sup>72</sup>

#### Congressional Review

Despite its enormous progress since its creation in 1961, problems still plagued the young agency. Internal and external resistance to DIA accomplishing the tasks it was assigned was still prevalent and felt deeply by the branches of the services in the external view. The original duties of the agency may have begun to sink in with the services, but continual absorption of their intelligence duties, such as the MC& G and the Attaché system in the mid-1960’s gave way to some resistance. This, despite the fact that DIA was adamant that the highly tactical elements of intelligence must stay with the individual branches in order to maximize the effectiveness of the intelligence products. Misperceptions of the role the defense intelligence community played in national decisions were also a problem, given the agency was young and just beginning to forge

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<sup>72</sup>Ibid., 149.

its way in intelligence. National leadership was slow to change and slow to realize that DIA was the defense intelligence source and another step in the U.S. intelligence community. The CIA, although young in its own right, was seen as the primary intelligence agency of the period and even today. This is evident in the lack of information on DIA's role in the intelligence community, compared with the plethora of information regarding CIA's involvement in events over the years. In addition to these "growing pains", DIA was created and formed in a period of continually decreasing resources and increasing demands. It had to do more with less and that was quite difficult in the formative years in the face of increasing international responsibility. Internal strife within the agency also plagued its development at times as well. As a result, DIA realized the need to develop an overall intelligence plan to guide the agency.<sup>73</sup> This was approved by the Secretary of Defense in February of 1967.

External criticism of the agency and suggestions for change also helped mold the agency in this period. The Froehlke Report in July 1969 emphasized the lack of a program which allocated intelligence resources against the intelligence requirements of the time. In response to this report and in an effort to streamline OSD management of the agency, the Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird directed that his office be responsible for making sure the agency had a clear direction for intelligence efforts. This effort included: comparisons and trade-offs of national intelligence programs, institution of a Five Year Intelligence Resource Plan, procedures for identifying major issues in intelligence resources, and a continual reviewing system. In addition, another report in July 1969, The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel under the leadership of Gilbert Fitzhugh,

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<sup>73</sup>Allen, "The Defense Intelligence Agency: A 21 Year Organizational History", 162.

emphasized that perhaps DIA was too compartmented and that there existed the potential for conflict as the agency's director reported to both the Secretary of Defense and the JCS. In addition, a lack of fiscal and management control over the services intelligence functions made DIA's mission of integrating intelligence difficult. The report recommended streamlining the reporting chain for DIA and creating a position within the OSD for an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence who would coordinate all DoD intelligence activities.<sup>74</sup> Aspects of these reports gave way to the reorganization of the agency again in 1970. Despite the challenges of establishing a new agency and amidst the crises of the period, DIA began to solidify its position in the intelligence community as an agency capable of being responsive to a worldwide theater of operations.

### The 1970s

The 1970's were turbulent years for DIA as they moved from establishing management arms to developing a credible intelligence arm. DIA underwent three major reorganizations during this period, one in 1970, another in 1976, and a third in 1979. All were attempts to overhaul management of the organization in order to produce better-integrated intelligence, establishing DIA's role in the national intelligence community. The original organization of DIA was based on the immediate need to establish the agency while the reorganization of 1966 addressed the problem of a more responsive intelligence product. The reorganization of 1970 touched every level of the organization elevating responsibilities and streamlining the organization. External criticism within the government indicated that DoD intelligence wasn't worth the heavy

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<sup>74</sup> Ibid., 165-66.

financial burden it cost to maintain. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration) believed DIA was “poorly managed, and needed improvements in collection, estimating, dissemination, and resource allocation.”<sup>75</sup> This observation as well as a 1968 report from the House Appropriation Committee emphasizing the management inadequacies of the agency, led to DIA Director, Lieutenant General Bennett’s decision to overhaul the agency’s organization in January 1970.

DIA’s objectives for this reorganization were based on the need to clarify the roles of the agency as well as improving the performance of its intelligence mission in the face of dwindling resources. This was done by adjusting responsibilities within the agency and consolidating like tasks into functional areas. The renovations of 1970 were complete by the end of the year and included no less than nine major changes. First of all, the *Deputy Directorate for Estimates* was created from the duties of the former Processing and Secretariat function and was solely responsible for all military intelligence estimates. The mission of the new directorate was to develop, coordinate and produce NIE’s and SNIE’s to support the Secretary of Defense, JCS, and the NSC, as well as estimate foreign military capabilities for the purpose of long range planning. As a result of a committee appointed by General Bennett to study all aspects of the Defense Attaché System, this function too was elevated to a *Deputy Director position for Attaché Affairs* and was led by a general/flag officer who reported directly to the DIA director. It became to focal point for all coordination and direction for attaché affairs within DIA and DoD. In the realm of collections, added requirements over the past few years dictated a need for a consolidated collection effort within the agency as well as an element of increased collection responsiveness in times of crisis. In July 1970, the *Current*

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<sup>75</sup> Ibid., 167.



*Collection Center* was established at the Pentagon and handled collection requirements requiring immediate action. Additionally, the *Directorate for Collection and Surveillance* was created and consolidated all DIA collection under one umbrella (except for attaché collection managed under the new Attaché system.) The new directorate was responsible for: the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC), the DIA Representative Group (DIARP) a liaison to NSA, the photo lab, previously in another division, and SIGINT and special Sensors, HUMINT collection, as well as processing this information. “It processed, validated, assigned priorities, and levied intelligence collection requirements on all Defense collection activities.”<sup>76</sup> Production activities for DIA’s multiple functions were consolidated under the *Deputy Directorate for Intelligence*. This was an area of constant change, as U.S. national security interests grew and shifted. These changing interests and customer requirements required flexibility. The new directorate was responsible for all-source finished general military intelligence, developing target systems, physical vulnerability research and bomb damage assessments (BDA), and in-depth assessments of military operations around the world. This included current intelligence and indications and warning support to the OSD and JCS, previously found in the Processing structure of the original DIA system. The new organization included a myriad of divisions which were divided operationally as well as geographically to cover the many aspects of intelligence research and analysis. The *Deputy Directorate for Science and Technology* was formed to allow increased attention to this area of intelligence. This directorate conducted research on foreign developments in air, missile, naval, space and ground system developments, reporting those

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<sup>76</sup> Ibid., 185.

technological advances significant enough to drive changes in NIE's or national strategy. This concluded the operational changes in DIA under the 1970 reorganization, however functional areas of DIA also required change in an effort to increase the responsiveness and capabilities of the agency.

The planning function grew into the *Deputy Directorate for Plans* where it continued its role in intelligence planning. However, new operational elements were added to the directorate giving it responsibility for MC&G, data processing, as well as some research and development tasks. The responsibility for SIGINT functions, as well as training responsibilities of the plans section were deleted and given to the new *Directorate for Collection and Surveillance* and *Directorate of Support*, respectively. The new *Deputy Directorate for Support* consolidated numerous functions previously strung-out among numerous DIA branches including: personnel and career management, administrative services, communications, central reference, counterintelligence and security and the Defense Intelligence School. The last major area of renovation was in the comptroller function which added increased responsibilities in planning for budgetary requirements which funded the agencies programs. In addition, the comptroller became responsible for managing DIA's manpower and advising the Director and the JCS on manpower issues.

Other changes that affected the agency in this early period of the 1970's included the creation of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence as a liaison between the DCI, CIA and other intelligence agencies.<sup>77</sup> As articulated by the Froehlke report in the late 1960's, DoD needed a central focal point for addressing intelligence issues within the

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<sup>77</sup> Defense Intelligence Agency. "Defense Intelligence Agency, A Brief History" 9.

Office of the Secretary of Defense, mainly to manage resource allocation issues among DIA, the service components and the unified and specified commands. Until this position was created, DIA had to rely on compromises between the players in the ongoing competition for resources. Another report in 1971 by James R. Schlesinger agreed with the recommendations of Froehlke and recommended to President Nixon the formation of an intelligence liaison position in the OSD. The position was created via a DoD Directive and held the new secretary responsible for the management of intelligence resources, programs and activities.<sup>78</sup> President Nixon also sought to improve intelligence management as a whole in this period, emphasizing the need for “clear lines of authority and responsibility . . .” within the intelligence community.<sup>79</sup> In the midst of this redefining of the intelligence role, three new agencies were created which took some responsibilities out of the hands of DIA: the Defense Investigation Service (DIS), the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA), and the National Cryptologic Command. They eliminated the MC&G functions of DIA totally, and downsized the agency in the counterintelligence area and SIGINT responsibilities.

The 1970 reorganization, and subsequent events were, on the whole successful based on the intent to streamline the organization. However, this new arrangement obscured the traditional three segments of command, management and operations within DIA. In addition, the new organization put all the offices on a horizontal level where they competed equally for resources and visibility, going against one of the original objectives for creating the agency. In addition, some of the ills of DIA could not be fixed

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<sup>78</sup> Allen, “The Defense Intelligence Agency: A 21-Year Organizational Overview”, 203-204

<sup>79</sup> Ibid., 205.

by reorganization: manpower reductions plagued the agency throughout the 1970's. Budgetary issues between 1968-1975 decreased the agency's manpower by thirty one percent prompting mission reductions and organizational restructuring once again.

### 1972-75 Organizational Changes

The most significant changes over the next five years occurred at the command level of the agency. The functions of the Secretariat, the JCS support division (which became the J-2 Support Division in 1974), and the Directorate for Plans were all subordinated under the Chief of Staff of the DIA. The J-2 function moved to show increased significance of the role of DIA to the JCS and the Plans Directorate was significantly reorganized after losing several of its missions with the creation of DMA and DIS. Additionally, in 1974, the agency further expanded its support to the JCS and established Defense Intelligence Officers (DIO's) to advise DIA's senior staff on substantive intelligence issues.<sup>80</sup> In addition these officers interfaced with the CIA National Intelligence Officers and promoted DIA products, increasing timeliness and quality of intelligence on the national scene. As for the rest of the agency during this period, numerous minor functional changes occurred, mostly elevating branch tasks to the directorate level. The three most important changes in this area included: elevating training to the *Deputy Directorate for Personnel, Development and Training*, establishing the *Deputy Directorate for Information Systems*, (removing it from the Directorate for Support) in an effort to provide a better defense automated data processing system, and establishing the *Defense Intelligence School* as a separate directorate. Organizational

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<sup>80</sup> Ibid., 11.

refinement for the *Attaché, Collection, and Production Directorates* resulted from a combination of decreasing resources and increasing worldwide responsibilities. In 1975, a major overhaul in the production arena occurred and the Deputy Directorate was elevated to a full directorate, stressing the emphasis the Agency placed on production and the “desire to gain acceptance for its products at the national level. . .”<sup>81</sup> Despite financial bureaucratic obstacles during this period, DIA’s reputation grew as it became recognized that its products were valuable in the decision making process.

### 1976 Reorganization Period

While DIA was building up its intelligence credibility, a combination of financial and bureaucratic factors forced the agency to modify its internal structure once again in 1976. The financial factors, previously discussed, continually cut manpower in the agency. An intense Congressional review in 1975-1976 once again brought charges of abuse across the intelligence field leading to an Executive Order which modified some functions of the intelligence community. As a result, DIA streamlined all of its production activities. The realignment included the creation of three new positions at the DoD level: the establishment of the DoD Inspector General, the redesignation of the Assistant Secretary of Defense on Intelligence as the Director of Defense Intelligence, giving him expanded control of not only DIA, but also NSA, and the creation of the Defense Intelligence Board, designed as a forum between intelligence producers and users. President Nixon also abolished the USIB and created the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (FIAB). Most important for the overall intelligence community at this time was the establishment of the Intelligence Oversight Board within

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<sup>81</sup> Ibid., 238.

the FIAB in charge of ensuring that intelligence agencies didn't overstep their boundaries.

At the organizational level of DIA, reform was focused around two themes: excellence and broad support.<sup>82</sup> Within the Command Element, the Deputy Director was renamed the *Vice-Director of Plans, Operations and Support* and tasked to manage seven major directorates: J-2, Systems planning, Plans and Policy, Collection, Attaches, the school, and a new directorate, the Resources and Support/Comptroller. The Chief of Staff position was replaced with the *Coordination Staff* responsible for all agency staff functions. The General Counsel, Inspector General, and Scientific Advisory Board reported directly to the agency director, however the DIO program now reported to the Vice instead of directly to the agency's top man. Two new positions were created, reporting to the director: the Director's Staff Group supported the Secretary of Defense and advisors on policy forming and the Senior Intelligence Advisor. These two positions rounded out the new leadership of DIA designed to provide better control of the agency in regards to responsiveness, accountability, and support to its customers.

Under the new organization, the Plans and Policy, Collection, and Attaché directorates received name changes and a few minor organizational changes. The Support directorate was redesignated the *Directorate for Resources and Support/Comptroller* and included support functions, comptroller duties, information systems function, personnel, career development and training functions organized into six deputy directorates and an administrative arm. The *Vice Director for Production* incorporated the estimates and S&T directorates as well as the DIO which formerly

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<sup>82</sup> Ibid., 248.

reported to the Director himself. A Current Intelligence division was created which encompassed the National Military Intelligence Center designed to provide integrated intelligence to decisionmakers in times of crisis. Later that year NMIC was revamped to centralize control of indications and warning functions, production and dissemination activities and the 24 hour Alert Center.<sup>83</sup> All of these changes were once again an effort to streamline intelligence activities in the DoD, making it more responsive. The pendulum swung from centralized to decentralized management of the agency.

In 1977, the charter that created DIA was revised for the first time clarifying the relationship with the JCS and the Secretary of Defense. It established a modified reporting chain for DIA to report directly to the Secretary of Defense through the Director of Defense Intelligence, with the Director continuing to report through the JCS and remaining under their operational control. In addition the charter included the NMIC function of DIA, institutionalizing its functions in the DIA charter. "Of the greatest significance was that the charter recognized DIA as the primary intelligence authority in military inputs to national level products."<sup>84</sup> DIA had finally achieved national recognition and credit for its function, basically solidifying its position within the intelligence community after 16 years of establishment.

Also in 1977, upon the advice of a Task Force formed to look at the over all design of defense intelligence, two more Assistant Secretary of Defense positions were created: one to manage the resources of the agency and the other to manage policy

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<sup>83</sup> Allen, "The Defense Intelligence Agency: A 21-Year Organizational Overview", 262.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid., 264.

matters.<sup>85</sup> Between 1977-1978, there were minor changes to the directorates established in the 1976 Reorganization, but not until 1979 did substantive change come again, changes that would finally settle the agency into a period of stability. In 1979, Executive Order 12036 completely restructured the Intelligence community better defining DIA's national and departmental responsibilities. "The agency was reorganized around five major directorates: production, operations, resources, external affairs, and J-2 support."<sup>86</sup>

### 1979 Reorganization

The goals of this reorganization were to strengthen management of the agency and simplify its organization, better manage resources, increase support to the JCS, and improve external intelligence coordination. The former Vice Directorate for Plans, Operations and Support was redesignated *the Vice Directorate for Management and Operations* responsible for production management, collection management, and attaches and training. This put all intelligence operations into one directorate for the first time. The Vice Director for Production was renamed the *Director for Foreign Intelligence* and was assigned a civilian as the head. All of the production functions of intelligence were incorporated here to include estimates, intelligence research, and S&T. However, the current intelligence function, normally associated with production was moved to the JCS Support Directorate during this period where it remained indefinitely. *The Assistant Directorate for Resources and Systems* was established and reported directly to the Command element of DIA in an attempt to streamline all resource allocations for the agency. Included in this directorate were the downgraded offices of Comptroller,

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<sup>85</sup> Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community, 44.

<sup>86</sup> Defense Intelligence Agency. "Defense Intelligence Agency, A Brief History" 12.



Communications, Security Services and Personnel. The support functions of this directorate included administrative, reference, photographic, imagery, and support as well as publication branches. Additionally, DIA's automated information handling systems were subordinated in this directorate, giving full control of resources to its director. In an effort to satisfy the JCS more effectively, the *Assistant Directorate for JCS Support* was created and encompassed current intelligence, strategic warning systems, and a J-2 support office. This new directorate also reported directly to the Command element. Finally, the position of *Deputy Director for Defense Intelligence* was created to coordinate DIA's relationship with external agencies and entities important in its mission. These offices started with the Executive Office of the President and ran all the way down to cooperation with foreign military attaches.<sup>87</sup> This position was organized into a directorate and further incorporated the plans and policy functions of DIA. This final reorganization of the 1970's prepared DIA for the new decade. Its organization was simple and further solidified the agency's position in the intelligence community.

#### Support to Military Action in the 1970s

Despite efforts to improve national intelligence during this decade, budgetary constraints and limited resources restricted intelligence collection and the ability to produce timely intelligence. This, at a time when the international "field of play" was expanding. The 1970's saw the emergence of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the development of arms control and détente with China, and increasing independence movements around the world all of which created new areas for intelligence collection. Toward the end of the decade, analysts were focused in the Middle East with the Iranian

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<sup>87</sup> Allen, "The Defense Intelligence Agency: A 21-Year Organizational Overview", 292.

overthrow of the Shah of Iran and the taking of U.S. hostages in Tehran. The rapidly changing world environment combined with the lack of resources during this period ultimately made for increasing intelligence shortcomings.

Intelligence's role in Vietnam began to develop in the mid to late 1960's and continued into the 1970's. Vietnam had a significant impact on the intelligence community as a whole. "For DIA, the heavy processing burden detracted from efforts to improve the organization's management efficiency."<sup>88</sup> From the beginning, even before the creation of DIA, NIE's by the CIA had predicted that military action in Vietnam would be attainable. However, the new national goal of the United States was to fight Communism in the worldwide arena, and so, in hindsight, the U.S. emerged into a losing battle for democracy. DIA set up the Southeast Asia Task Force in February of 1964 just as it had done during the Cuban Missile Crisis, to provide detailed support to the national leadership and commanders in the conduct of the Vietnam conflict. Even as President Johnson threatened the bombing of industry in North Vietnam in 1964 in an effort to halt Hanoi's support of the Vietcong, the intelligence community advised that the majority of the support to the Vietcong was indigenous within South Vietnam and that the policy would not be productive. Despite this assessment, the politicians of the day were convinced that the threats and the bombings would reverse the tide of support to the Vietcong. Lyman Kirkpatrick, a former CIA officer assessed that, "In effect, this was to remain the key difference between the intelligence community and the policy makers: the former skeptical about bombing breaking the will of the North; the latter convinced it

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<sup>88</sup> Allen, "The Defense Intelligence Agency: A 21-Year Organizational Overview", 161.

would force concessions.”<sup>89</sup> This was the position of both the CIA and DIA at the time. A DIA estimate in 1965 as to the effects of the bombings in the north indicated that the current military actions were having little if no affect on North Vietnam.

The idea that destroying, or threatening to destroy, North Vietnam’s industry would pressure Hanoi into calling it quits, seems, in retrospect, a colossal misjudgment.<sup>90</sup>

The CIA agreed with this estimate and confirmed it in replies to the Secretary of Defense. These estimates changed little over the years in which conflict continued in Vietnam. The intelligence estimates of the individual services usually held the opposite view. This emphasized a significant problem in the overall picture of the roles and responsibilities of DIA which were later identified. The major failure of intelligence in Vietnam was not necessarily the estimates, but the fact that intelligence and policy-makers never sat down together to hash out a plan of action based on U.S. interests and goals in the area based on intelligence estimates. Internally, DIA played a major role in producing military estimates during Vietnam, however, the effectiveness of these products was reduced mainly due to a problem in dissemination and its timeliness. Although the agency produced massive amounts of information that might have been helpful to the war-fighter as well as the decision-makers, the majority of this information was haphazardly disseminated reducing its usefulness. This was a significant problem which was resolved nearly thirty years later leading to the intelligence successes of Desert Storm.

### Congressional Review

The reorganization of the intelligence community as a whole in 1976 was a direct

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<sup>89</sup> Kirkpatrick, 101.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid, 104.

result of the investigations of the House and Senate committee's review of intelligence during the period following the end of Vietnam in 1975. Both committees identified the strengths, of which there were few it seemed and the weaknesses of the intelligence community, identifying the need for congressional oversight of intelligence activities. With respect to DIA, the House Select Committee on Intelligence under the chairmanship of Representative Pike recommended that DIA be abolished and the responsibilities of the agency be transferred to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and to the CIA.<sup>91</sup> This, the committee thought was a result of the failure of the agency to coordinate military intelligence adequately.

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, under Senator Church took an in-depth look at the deficiencies and problems in the agency and recommended improving oversight of intelligence in general in order to better guide the nations intelligence arms. According to the Church Committee, DIA's problem was one of "too many jobs and too many masters."<sup>92</sup> In examining the structure of DIA, the committee noted DIA was heavily loaded down with management problems due to its attempts to meet massive intelligence requirements. DIA had a charter to provide a level of strategic intelligence to the Secretary and JCS as well as tactical intelligence to the services. It had yet to effectively organize its missions and to effectively meet the needs of the services, resulting in smaller intelligence efforts at the services level. They did note, however, that DIA had provided the Secretary with improved military intelligence than the individual services had provided in the past. In addition, the requirement to provide the Secretary of

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<sup>91</sup> Bain, Tyrus G. ed. The Intelligence Community: History, Organization and Issues, (New York: R.R. Bowker Company, 1977), p. 608.

<sup>92</sup> Bain, 138.

Defense military intelligence was often overlooked by the Secretary's. Many of the Secretaries had looked elsewhere for strategic intelligence guidance because historically, CIA was the "primary producer of national intelligence", while the majority of intelligence needed by the military was tactical at the services level and the JCS level.<sup>93</sup> In addition, DIA did not produce the quality intelligence products nor did it eliminate the duplication of information for which it was designed.

The reasons behind these deficiencies were two fold according to the committee: problems of manpower and budget control. The manpower of DIA, provided by the services and civilian sectors had ingrained problems which resulted in often poor motivation to produce quality intelligence. Additionally, the inability of DIA to control the budget for the military intelligence activities, resulted in the services, using intelligence funds for other purposes. In conclusion the committee recommended that the position of the agency Director be strengthened to fulfill the needs of the agency, or choice number two, disband the agency. The Church Committee report helped to identify the direction of the agency reforms in the 1976 Reorganization.

#### The 1980s

During the 1980's, unlike the previous decade, world events strengthened DIA's mission molding it with each challenge. This period marked an increase in defense spending as President Reagan began a significant build-up of American forces giving DIA the funds it had needed to begin development of the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center (DIAC) which would better consolidate DIA operations. From its creation in

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<sup>93</sup> Ibid.

1961 until the completion of the DIAC in 1984, DIA was “housed” in four separate buildings which contributed to some early problems in consolidation. After relocating to its new facility at Bolling AFB in 1984, DIA vacated the previous facilities except for the Command Element, NMIC, and Current Intelligence which remained located in the Pentagon to facilitate direct support to the Secretary of Defense, and the CJCS.<sup>94</sup> The DIAC marked a new era for the agency and was a monument to all that the agency had achieved over the past 23 years. Amidst undergoing three major reorganizations, resource constraints, and attempts to dissolve the agency, DIA had emerged as a credible arm of the U.S. intelligence community.

By the early 1980’s DIA had finally dispelled the negativeness associated with a career in intelligence and received the authority to establish a Senior Executive Service (SES), enabling the agency to recruit and promote highly experienced civilian personnel. On the military side of the house, general and flag officer billets were expanded and the Defense Intelligence College was growing tremendously and earning a distinguished reputation. Studies during this period comparing the quality of intelligence from both the CIA and DIA reinforced the credibility of DIA as a producer of national estimates.<sup>95</sup> The publishing in 1981 of the first unclassified “white papers” titled Soviet Military Power, which discussed the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet military power was so well received that a series of papers were written on the subject, all of which were met with “wide acclaim.”<sup>96</sup>

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<sup>94</sup> Allen, Deane. “The Building”. (Washington D.C., Defense Intelligence Agency, 1983).

<sup>95</sup> Allen, “The Defense Intelligence Agency: A 21-Year Organizational Overview”, 305.

<sup>96</sup> Defense Intelligence Agency. “Defense Intelligence Agency, A Brief History” 14.

In the 1980's DIA concentrated on reforming its missions to better provide critical intelligence to tactical and theater commanders. This included a role for intelligence support to the newly created Rapid Deployment Force (RDF).

The Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) began under the Carter Administration in 1979, driven by the U.S. national interest in the Persian Gulf area and a strong desire to preserve uninterrupted access to oil in the region. Establishment of the RDF revolved around three distinct initiatives: strategic mobility, organizational initiatives, and diplomatic undertakings.<sup>97</sup> First, the U.S. needed to be able to deploy forces faster to the Persian Gulf, which translated into a much-expanded initiative in air and sealift capabilities. This was based on the concept that a small portion of the RDF would be based in the Gulf area, while the reinforcement troops were retained in the U.S. The second objective was accomplished with the establishment of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force in March of 1980. This new command included Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps units to form its foundation. Total manpower with all combined units was approximately 200,000 with another 100,000 reserve forces designated for additional support. Lastly, with the mission and the manpower, the U.S. sought limited access to land-based military bases in the Gulf region for RDF operations. With this, the RDF began to operate as a distinct function of the U.S. military community.

The RDF included Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force elements capable of short notice deployments supporting remote contingencies to protect U.S. interest worldwide. Out of this new role for DIA came a concerted effort to refine the indications

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<sup>97</sup> Record, Jeffery. The Rapid Deployment Force, (Washington D.C.: Corporate Press, 1981), p. 43.

and warning system in order to better monitor the expanding “hotspots” around the world giving the military intelligence community a “quick look” at situations around the globe.<sup>98</sup> The concept of intelligence as a “force multiplier” continued to strengthen DIA’s credibility in the early 1980’s.<sup>99</sup> Intelligence acting as a “force multiplier,” provided accurate and timely intelligence to leadership and commanders allowing them to make informed decisions concerning war/crisis management. DIA was capable of providing this specific information, not only to national leadership, but also more in more precise terms to commanders because of its streamlined, integrated structure. This focus on being a “force multiplier” to the unified and specified commanders also created a need for dedicated crisis support teams, from which grew the Operational Intelligence Crisis Center (OICC) in 1987, tasked to provide analytical support during worldwide crisis situations. This center was designed to stand up quickly and translate analytical information into operationally relevant products in support of on ongoing crisis.<sup>100</sup> The OICC was an important player in Desert Storm along with the National Military Intelligence Support Team (NMIST) also initiated in 1987. The NMIST unlike the OICC, which disseminated information from a central DIA location, were designed to augment intelligence support to commanders in crisis operations. Designed to be mobile support teams, they deployed with commands to provide analytical support and rapid dissemination of extremely time-sensitive intelligence products.<sup>101</sup> The NMIST concept

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<sup>98</sup> Ibid.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid.

<sup>101</sup> Shellum, Brian. A Chronology of Defense Intelligence in the Gulf War: A Research Aid for Analysis. (Washington D.C., DIA History Office, 1997), p. 2.



proved itself in Desert Shield/Desert Storm and continues to be a crisis support element of DIA today. In addition to these new dedicated components of intelligence, DIA also improved its communications structure in order to disseminate the critical tactical intelligence to commanders during contingency situations. The culmination of all of these efforts was DIA's designation as a "Combat Support Agency" in 1986 under the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act. As a result of this designation, DIA further expanded its responsibilities to U.S. Commands and began to develop joint military doctrine.

The theme in the 1980's involved DIA focusing its missions, organization and support to military commands/commanders as well as to the JCS, involving the production of both strategic and tactical intelligence. As regional concerns mounted around the world, DIA was positioning itself to provide military intelligence to its most important customers.

#### Support to Military Action in the 1980s

The 1980's saw an explosion of world-wide crises ranging from military intervention to terrorist activity and including: the downing of two Libyan SU-22's by U.S. F-14's, the U.S. invasion of Grenada, the Iran-Iraq War, Soviet shoot-down of the Korean Air Lines Flight 007, as well as the attack on the Marine barracks in Lebanon, high-jackings of TWA Flight 847 and of the cruise ship ACHILLE LAURO. As a result of the rapidly changing national security environment, DIA applied additional resources to monitoring terrorist activities and groups, illegal arms sales and even drug trafficking and began to concentrate on low-intensity conflict planning to include warfighting

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capabilities and sustainability issues.<sup>102</sup> DIA's roles in intelligence were expanding with each militarily significant event.

In supporting the U.S. invasion of Grenada during Operation URGENT FURY in 1983, a special task force was organized and provided briefings, papers, and general intelligence information to field commanders during the operation. DIA's reorganization in 1979 and the ongoing efforts to improve support to tactical commanders, greatly contributed to the agencies capability to respond to planning and theater requirements during Operation URGENT FURY, speeding up the process of dissemination to the end users. The planning and execution for the operation was done very quickly in efforts to protect American citizens in the country which was in danger of succumbing to Communism. Surprise was key and therefore required precise intelligence on the small country: the Cuban presence on the island, estimates on Soviet involvement, strengths and weaknesses on the reigning army presence, and the precise location of the students to be rescued. However, this intelligence was for the most part unavailable to the planners and commanders despite the fact the small island had come under a Marxist regime four years previously neither the CIA nor DIA had decent maps, recent imagery, or a good estimate of troop capabilities on Grenada. DIA assessed there could be significant military reaction to the U.S. invasion while others implied that minimum resistance was likely. Although the invasion was ultimately highly successful, it likely was the element of luck instead of intelligence that produced this result. Despite the obvious intelligence shortfalls, for the most part, no major revisions in the intelligence community occurred in this period as a result of the intelligence shortfalls during Grenada.

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<sup>102</sup> Defense Intelligence Agency. "Defense Intelligence Agency, A Brief History" 15.

As a result of its concerted and effective intelligence capabilities during the first half of the decade, DIA received its first Joint Meritorious Unit Award in 1986 for outstanding intelligence support over the years. This was a direct result of the outstanding military intelligence support and coordination during international crisis situations. The fall of the Soviet Union in 1989 also presented DIA with a new challenge to start the new decade. The Cold War was officially over and once again the defense budget took a hit decreasing funds for DIA's ever expanding responsibilities in the post Cold War world. This new world order produced not one strategic enemy, but in its place endless tactical enemies around the globe and the U.S. was drawn into conflicts from S. America to the Middle East. No one could have predicted that the end of the Cold War would place the U.S. in the largest military action since Vietnam: Desert Storm.

#### Congressional Review

The Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986 had the most widespread impact on the National Defense structure since the National Security Act of 1947. This reform act grew out of the intelligence gaps of the 1980's and the need for a more streamlined national security structure. For the most part, the act strengthened the Joint Chiefs of Staff designating the office as the primary military advisor to the President, Secretary of Defense and the National Security Council and giving the JCS the primary responsibility for strategic planning. Previously this authority had been divided among the military departments. Further, the growing trend toward joint operations on the battlefield, as seen in creation of the RDF in 1979, as well as joint operations in Grenada and Panama, led to an increased emphasis on the role of joint doctrine, training and exercises also encompassed in this legislation.

For DIA, the impact of the Goldwater-Nichols Act was quite significant. Designated a Combat Support Agency in this act, DIA began to shift its focus to the needs of the joint war-fighter. This was reflected in the structural changes of this period in the 1980's and early 1990's with the creation of deployable intelligence support units like the NMIST's as well as the OICC. The top priority of the agency became providing the best intelligence in support of operational needs of the military forces and commanders, a significant shift from the purely policymaker support aspect of DIA's mission. DIA's function of support to the Joint Staff, embodied in DIA's J-2 was also strengthened by this Act. The J-2 assumed a wider role in developing intelligence doctrine and policy with the renewed focus of ensuring quality intelligence support to CINC's. In addition, DIA assumed the role of reporting annually to the Secretary on defense intelligence capabilities and recommending a course of action to plan for future requirements. The changes as a result of the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986 were significant for DIA in that they reflected the acknowledgement of a credible role that DIA played in the intelligence community.

### The 1990s

The end of the Cold War with the fall of communism in Russia started a new phase in history for the intelligence community. No longer was there one main area of focus, but now unlimited areas for regional conflict. DIA proved its capabilities in the first major conflict since its creation - Operation Desert Storm. DIA's intelligence activities in Desert Storm demonstrated the agency's capabilities and strengthened its credibility.

## DIA's Contribution to Desert Storm

DIA's contributions to unprecedented intelligence performance in Desert Storm started in the late 1980's. DIA began monitoring the Iraqi situation soon after the end of the Iran/Iraq War and in the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union. In the late 1989, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) predicted that Iraq would become the next major regional force in the Middle East. Although DIA believed Iraq would not attack or invade based on their motivation to preserve their international integrity, the agency did begin to develop Iraq/Kuwait scenarios for CENTCOM exercises. Despite these initial convictions, in 1990, DIA began to produce capabilities studies on Iraqi doctrine and tactics and in late April, Iraq was added to DIA's I&W list and assessed as an area for potential conflict (WATCHCON IV). In July of that year, the first unofficial indications of Iraqi troop movements South began to appear and DIA stepped up its production and imagery collection in support of CENTCOM requirements. The OICC created in 1987 began providing targeting support for CENTCOM. The OICC had a significant role in DIA's capabilities to produce useable intelligence over the next year and a half. The WATCHCON level changed to level III in late July with additional troop movements and equipment deployments, indicating an increased threat in Iraq. On July 22, DIA stood up the Iraq/Kuwait Working Group (IZKUWG) in order to provide the additional manpower needed to cover new requirements in the face of the developing crisis.<sup>103</sup> On July 25, 1990, DIA assessed that Iraq had amassed enough forces to invade Kuwait and take the city within 48 hours and the country within five days; the WATCHON level changed to II, indicating a significant threat in the area. The tension appeared to lessen over the next

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<sup>103</sup> Shellum, 6.

few days, however, when OPEC talks to stabilize the region failed, DIA raised the WATCHCON one last time to I indicating a clear and immediate threat in the area. Further, the IZKUWG was expanded into a regional Iraqi Intelligence Task Force (ITF) and on the second of August, Iraq invaded Kuwait. In the wake of the escalating crisis, DIA expanded OICC operations to begin target development packages. In addition, DIA was part of the J-5 team that drafted the proposal for action to the Secretary of Defense which included a set of clear goals for the U.S. These goals were translated into a set of comprehensive objectives heeded by the President which guided the conduct of the ensuing conflict.<sup>104</sup> DIA had already dedicated intelligence forces to study the situation, advise national leadership, and support unified and specified commands before Desert Shield even started. The new elements of its organization created at the end of the 1980's in response to a widening field of play were about to be tested in the largest U.S. operation in nearly 20 years.

DIA's support to military operations and national leadership over the course of Desert Storm and Desert Shield was broadly based and included: ITF support which oversaw the OICC activities, NMIST deployments, the creation of the DoDJIC, as well as managing collection requirements, publication and dissemination of wartime products and specialized study groups on biological and chemical warfare capabilities of Iraq. All of these elements provided DIA with the necessary tools to put together the most comprehensive intelligence picture ever presented and greatly contributed to the overall outcome of the war.

The test of the newly created OICC began with its support in July of 1990 in

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<sup>104</sup> Ibid., 12.

response to JCS requests to initiate the development of a target list to support CENTCOMs increasing responsibilities in the area. Under the direction of the ITF, the OICC coordinated a myriad of intelligence during the war to include developing current Orders of Battle which provided up to date assessments of Iraqi troop, naval and air strength. The Center was expanded to a 24 hour manning on notification of the Iraqi invasion and soon after began to produce Military Situation Summaries (MSS) and created Operational Support Packages for CENTCOM deployments to the area of operations (AOR). By the end of August, the OICC also included coalition support and MSIC analysts dedicated to assessing Iraqi Air Defense capabilities and their threat to coalition forces. The OICC gave commanders initial capabilities assessments supplementing existing documents and provided the planners with a first look at the situation. Over the course of the next year and a half, the ITF received over 5, 212 taskings of which the OICC responded to over 3,822 of these, or 73% indicating the importance of the OICC in the crisis situation.<sup>105</sup>

The reaching arm of the OICC were the National Military Intelligence Support Teams who deployed with the commands to supply time-critical intelligence in the field. CENTCOM notified DIA two days after the invasion to have NMIST ready to deploy with the initial troops; these included CENTAF personnel deploying to Riyadh on August seventh. Over the course of the next six months eight NMIST deployed to support not only all major U.S. Commands (CENTCOM, Special Operations Central Command, Army Central Command, Marine Central Command and Navy Central Command) but also the United Kingdom Strike Command in England. In addition, NMIST were sent to

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<sup>105</sup> Ibid., 39.

provide critical intelligence to specific Army, Navy and Marine Corps units in the course of the following conflict. For the most part, these deployments were highly successful, providing tactical, time-critical intelligence to the deployed Command structures, allowing for quick, decisive decisions. DIA retained this function after Desert Storm because of its success, redesignating them the National Intelligence Support Teams (NISTs) and incorporating CIA and NSA members to provide a better overall assessment. This element of DIA proved it worth in Desert Storm and exists today as a piece of a more complete puzzle in the realm of intelligence crisis support.

The last major piece of DIA's intelligence puzzle was the Department of Defense Joint Intelligence Center (DoDJIC) created at the request of the CJCS and located at the Pentagon. The purpose of this element was to ensure coordination of the services and DIA's intelligence capabilities. All four services along with DIA provided the manning for the DoDJIC which initially produced daily situation summaries and assessments, along with short suspense analysis to support national decision-makers.<sup>106</sup> However its tasks were expanded as needed and included taking over the MSS from the OICC, establishing a 24 hour I&W center to watch Iraqi indicators and assess course of action, and imagery analysis. Additionally the DoDJIC produced special assessments on high priority subjects such as the location and monitoring of Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBM) and SCUD sites in Iraq. The JIC also contained a Central Task Cell to coordinate and deconflict intelligence activities with the ITF. At the end of November 1990, CENTCOM established a forward JIC in Riyadh to which DIA sent over 100 personnel in support of theater operations. Over the course of Desert Storm, the DoDJIC

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<sup>106</sup> Ibid.



and the forward JIC produced Battle Damage Assessments (BDA) and I&W reports on a daily basis providing commanders and national leaders with the information on the course of the conflict as well as assessments of Iraq's dwindling capabilities toward the end of the war. The JIC was so successful, that DIA retained many of its functions after the war in the Pentagon to support the Joint Staff.<sup>107</sup>

DIA also supported the overall intelligence effort in a collection role and in providing special studies to the command structure concerning biological and chemical weapons capabilities of the Iraqi's. In late July 1990, DIA took over from CIA the task of coordinating all collection requirement taskings for CENTCOM, with CENTCOM's collection requirements taking precedent over any others. This was the first time the Soviet Union was in a secondary role in the collection world.<sup>108</sup> Designated the Executive Agency for imagery support by the DoD, DIA also provided imagery ranging from target products to collection on SCUD sites and including an "imagery blitz" in early October 1990 to obtain the information required to produce a reliable ground order of battle.<sup>109</sup> However, despite DIA's efforts, the lack of collection coordination among all agencies was one of the major downfalls of intelligence as a whole in the course of Desert Storm. On the other hand, DIA combined with CIA analysts to provide an overall picture of Iraq's biological and chemical weapons capabilities. Groups met to discuss the

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<sup>107</sup> Defense Intelligence Agency. "Defense Intelligence Agency, A Brief History" 21.

<sup>108</sup> Congress, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Intelligence Successes and Failures in Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, report prepared by Warren Nelson, Archie Barret, Robert Rangel and Christopher Williams, 103<sup>rd</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> session., 1992, p. 7.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid., 26.

threats and the intelligence gaps in this area and produced coordinated assessments providing commanders with the best possible idea of Iraq's capabilities and willingness to use the weapons.

DIA's accomplishments in the collection of intelligence was significantly overshadowed by her ability to disseminated the information. DIA already had means for dissemination, but over the course of time, it was realized that the information was not getting to the people who needed it soon enough. DIA was routinely producing updated orders of battle, escape and evasion studies, target material as well as BDA information. Yet despite its efforts, sometimes, imagery reports were lagging eight days behind before they reached CENTCOM.<sup>110</sup> DIA eventually established DoDIIS (Department of Defense Intelligence Information System) connectivity to pass critical information to CENTCOM and other commands. Despite DIA's best efforts, in the final evaluation, the different commands, having purchased different systems, were not always able to receive the information they needed. This became one of the major shortfalls of intelligence during Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

Overall, the performance of DIA in Desert Shield and Desert Storm was outstanding. The agency supported a myriad of identified intelligence requirements not only from the DIAC and the Pentagon, but also from deployed locations in Riyadh, Kuwait and as an intelligence advisor to General Schwartzkopf. In return for their outstanding efforts, General Colin Powell presented the agency with their second Joint

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<sup>110</sup> Ibid., 24.

Meritorious Unit Award for exemplary performance during Desert Storm. General

Powell considered the overall intelligence effort in this crisis a success.

No combat commander has ever had as full and complete a view of his adversary as did our field commander. Intelligence support to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm was a success story.<sup>111</sup>

### Congressional Review

After-Action-Reports indicated that DIA led intelligence support during Desert Storm provided commanders with the most complete picture of the enemy ever available allowing them to better determine the course of the operation. .<sup>112</sup> However despite these successes, there were some intelligence problems and shortfalls. A study of intelligence successes and failure in Desert Storm/Desert Shield was presented by the House Committee on Armed Services in which they determined that problems existed in all three main areas of intelligence: collection, distribution and analysis.

Although collection on the whole was very good, it had some significant problems. Intelligence agencies often did not understand the role of intelligence at the command and tactical level, although this was not as significant a problem for DIA. Further, CENTCOM commanders were unfamiliar with collection platforms and the type of information that could be derived from them. Therefore, capabilities were not exploited to the fullest. The committee recommended more extensive training on collection platforms and their capabilities.

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<sup>111</sup> Defense Intelligence Agency. "Defense Intelligence Agency, A Brief History" 20.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid., 10.

As far as dissemination of intelligence information during Desert Storm, the committee assessed that it was very poor indeed and went so far to deem it an intelligence failure. The key to this lay in the lack of interoperable hardware. For example, out of twelve secondary imagery dissemination systems (SIDS) available in theater, only four could communicate with each other.<sup>113</sup> This problem existed because no service was willing to give up its system and adopt another one from a different service and there was no one person or group powerful enough to force the issue at the time the SIDS entered the picture in the early 1980's. By the time the SecDef for intelligence was strengthened, the money had already been spent and the different systems deployed. Therefore, much of the imagery information had to pass through much slower channels delaying critical pieces of information to the commanders. The committee recommended "the overall integration of DoD intelligence resources into a coherent defense intelligence community."<sup>114</sup>

Intelligence analysis of information was also deemed a partial failure as there was no accepted doctrine for devising battle damage assessments and therefore inaccurate assessments were made. In addition, analysis from national intelligence agencies, including DIA was often characterized by "wishy-washy" assessments.

The analysis we received was unhelpful. And it was unhelpful because it ended up being so caveated . . . There were so many disclaimers that by the time you got done reading many of the intelligence estimates you received, no matter what happened, they would have been right. And that's not helpful to the guy in the field.<sup>115</sup>

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<sup>113</sup> U.S. Congress, House 1992, 3.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid., 22.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid., 34.

However, despite these claims, the committee believed that the assessments of chemical and biological capabilities in Iraq were accurate and indeed helpful. On the other side of the NBC picture, the nuclear estimates were not, due to an apparent lack of attention to this subject.

. . . In July 1990, the Defense Intelligence Agency has 42 persons in its Washington HQ assigned exclusively to the POW/MIA issue and two assigned to Iraq. The former reflects the political sensitivity of the POW/MIA issue. And given recent developments, the numbers assigned to this topic are now rising.<sup>116</sup>

General Schwarzkopf agreed with these assessments of intelligence failure and added that overall intelligence support during the conflict was excellent, however, there was definitely room for improvement. Out of these recommendations and criticisms, DIA began to remold its organization once again.

#### Changes following Desert Storm

Changes immediately following Desert Storm included improved crisis management and support to the decisionmaker and warfighter.<sup>117</sup> The agency also established the NMJIC replacing the NMIC, as well as retained some of the positive elements of the wartime JIC. DIA improved on NMIST by adding CIA and NSA as members and redesignating them NIST's. The Air Force's Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC) and the Army's Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC) were added as elements of DIA in an effort to further consolidate intelligence analysis and production. These were the immediate affects of intelligence restructuring, however, expanding commitments and constricting resources would force a major reorganization in 1993. As

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<sup>116</sup> Ibid., 36.

<sup>117</sup> Defense Intelligence Agency. "Defense Intelligence Agency, A Brief History" 21.

intelligence requirements escalated in view of the regional conflicts of the 1990's, defense cuts once again threatened to weaken the capabilities of DIA. In an attempt to avoid the intelligence gaps of the 1970's, DIA undertook an extensive reorganization from within, "essentially rebuilding the agency from the bottom up and in the process enhanced flexibility," improving coordination with the services and focusing on common intelligence areas of collection, production and infrastructure. This restructuring has allowed DIA to continue to provide coordinated, specialized intelligence to military and civilian leadership today.

## CHAPTER 3

### DIA'S MISSIONS AND ORGANIZATION

As a result of the lessons of Desert Storm, DIA undertook a massive reorganization in 1993 from the bottom up – radically changing its organization to meet developing requirements. DIA's mission evolved over the years since its original charter in 1961 which sought to finally organize military intelligence under one Department of Defense umbrella. DIA was established initially to :

- unify the intelligence efforts of the Department of Defense
- strengthen DoD capabilities in collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence
- provide efficient allocation and management of DoD resources
- eliminate unnecessary duplication of effort<sup>118</sup>

DIA has undergone no less than six reorganizations in its short history, each time attempting to adapt its mission with the changing times to adequately support the JCS, Secretary of Defense and the individual services. Today, as a Department of Defense Combat Support Agency, DIA's mission is:

*To provide timely, objective and cogent military intelligence to warfighters – soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines – and to the decisionmakers and policymakers of the U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. Government*<sup>119</sup>

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<sup>118</sup> Allen, "The Defense Intelligence Agency: A 21-Year Organizational Overview", 20.

<sup>119</sup> Defense Intelligence Agency, "Defense Intelligence Agency, Vector 21: A Strategic Plan for DIA", (Washington DC: DIA Plans, programs and Operations Staff (PO), 1997), p. 4.

The Director of the DIA, appointed by the Secretary of Defense, reports directly to the Secretary through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). Today, DIA's mission involves support to a wide range of intelligence consumers which includes: the above mentioned Secretary of Defense and CJCS, CINCs of the military Combatant Commands and their subordinate component commanders for carrying out operations, and supporting deployed tactical forces. In addition, other "special interest" customers include Congress and law enforcement agencies. Designated a Combat Support Agency in 1986, DIA was tasked to increase support and cooperation to the U.S. Commands as well as to develop joint doctrine.<sup>120</sup> Today in its role as A Combat Support Agency, DIA is;

*On Duty with the Warfighter, the Defense Policymaker, the Defense Planner  
<with> over 7,000 Women and Men Located Worldwide<sup>121</sup>*

### DIA's Organization

In order to meet the requirements of the Warfighter, the Policymaker and the Decisionmaker, DIA is organized functionally along the lines of: collection, analysis and production, dissemination, policy, and administration all tied into the command element of DIA. The military intelligence agency is led by the Director, a three-star general or flag officer. The Deputy Director holds the second in command position while the Chief of Staff manages the headquarters element. These missions have changed over the years evolving into areas of significant authority today as opposed to the period of DIA's

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<sup>120</sup> Defense Intelligence Agency, "Defense Intelligence Agency, A Brief History". 17.

<sup>121</sup> "A Combat Support Agency", (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency), pamphlet.



history when the Chief of Staff position was eliminated in lieu a less top-heavy organization. The Deputy Director and Chief of Staff are both staffed by senior civilian executives to create a balance within the agency leadership as DIA is staffed by both military and civilian personnel. DIA is staffed by the Military Departments for assignment to joint duty as well as by the civilian sector. In his role as a military officer, the Director is responsible for employing all the DoD intelligence personnel and resources to satisfy DoD requirements.<sup>122</sup>

As far as his intelligence role, the Director of DIA has the responsibility to advise the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, the CJCS, Combatant Commanders and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command Control and Communications and Intelligence (ASDC3I) on matters of military intelligence in peacetime, during times of crisis or contingencies, and in wartime. The director of DIA is the head of the Military Intelligence Board (MIB), a committee designed to serve as a forum for discussion on defense intelligence requirements as well a forum to assist the director. The MIB serves as a advising and decision-making body for DIA and includes the membership of all four services intelligence chiefs, and the Director of NSA. This board is the setting for internal discussion on the agencies performance, trends for the future and plans for how DIA will adapt to new situations and the needs of the defense intelligence community. The director uses this board as a tool in assessing the continuing requirements the agency provides to its consumers.

DIA's director is further tasked to provide a military intelligence contribution to national foreign intelligence as well as counterintelligence. This includes providing a

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<sup>122</sup> Department of Defense, Defense Intelligence Agency, Directive 5105.21 DA&M, February 18, 1997, Section E and F.

coordinated military assessments to National Intelligence Estimates and Special Estimates, a task once performed individually by the services. In this function, DIA produces integrated military intelligence estimates to decision-makers, effectively eliminating duplication of effort and toning down service rivalries as was the intention of the creators of the agency in 1961.

### Command Element

The command element or headquarters consist of the Director (DR), Deputy Director (DD), Chief of Staff (CS) as well as the Executive Secretariat (ES) encompassing the leadership of the organization. The ES serves to provide administrative support to the leadership.

Directly under the headquarters are numerous offices providing a myriad of services to DIA. The *Director of Military Intelligence Staff (DM)* administers a team to provide plans, policies, and programs to manage and coordinate resources, which support DIA, the Services and the Unified Commands. This management includes running the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) and coordinating defense intelligence inputs to the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP). The GDIP is part of the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) and includes specialized national reconnaissance sub systems and communications intelligence components of multi-sensor systems. DIA's tasking under the NFIP umbrella includes planning, programming and budgeting resources to ensure that the GDIP activities support national and DoD intelligence goals, objective and priorities in the overall national reconnaissance picture.

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For the most part, however, GDIP specific activities are classified due to the nature the type of intelligence it involves.

The JMIP, run by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, was designed to “improve the effectiveness of DoD intelligence activities when those activities involve resources from more than one DoD Component. The JMIP is comprised of numerous components including: Defense Cryptologic Program, Defense Imagery Program, Defense Mapping, Charting and Geodesy Program, and the Defense General Intelligence and Applications Program. .”<sup>123</sup> DIA serves as the coordinator for the Defense General Intelligence and Applications Program (DGIAP), the largest element of the JMIP. For DIA’s part, it coordinates the activities, and manages the resources of the DGIAP which include the following programs: the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Program, Defense Intelligence Counterdrug Program, Defense Intelligence Agency’s Tactical Program, Defense Space Reconnaissance Program and the Defense Intelligence Special Technology Program. As the DGIAP comprises the bulk of the JMIP participants, DIA has a significant role in coordinating defense intelligence activities with other DoD agencies. This new role for DIA is one as a coordination body for military intelligence – just as the creators of the agency envisioned in 1961.

*The Plans, Programs and Operations Staff (PO)* under the command staff of DIA are responsible for internal planning, serve as a Congressional liaison as well as provide liaison services for the press, public and foreign attaches. This is an important function not only in the coordination of intelligence around the globe, but also in the role of approved disclosure of intelligence activities to public agencies and cooperating with

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<sup>123</sup> Department of Defense Directive, 5205.9, Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP), April 7, 1995.

Congressional Oversight Programs. This role has grown greatly over the past nearly two decades -- as the role of the military expands, so has the role of intelligence and thus the public curiosity of intelligence activities. The Congressional Liaison Office is responsible for keeping the elected representative apprised of Defense intelligence activities as well as justifying DIA operations and expenditures, and answering all valid congressional requests on military intelligence activities.<sup>124</sup> PO serves as the liaison for DIA in all of these activities, playing an growing role in the public awareness of intelligence activities. Other advisory offices also exist to further provide oversight and advisory services to the command structure. These support offices form the management team for the agency. This separation of administrative support and intelligence support is a major departure from the past DIA structure which smattered support and intelligence functions in to numerous directorates.

### Analysis and Production

#### Directorate for Intelligence (J-2)

Analysis and production within DIA is located in three main directorates: Directorate for Intelligence (J-2), Directorate for Intelligence Production (DI) and the Directorate for Policy Support (DP). As there is no established staff officer assigned to the Joint Staff who deals with intelligence, DIA informally holds this position as the J-2. An officer assigned to DIA acts as the J-2 and reports to the CJCS. The J-2 serves the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, and Unified Commands as the focal point for crisis support and maintains the DoD Indications and

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<sup>124</sup> "DIA: Moving Toward the 21<sup>st</sup> Century", (Washington DC, DIA Public Liaison Office, December 1995), p. 6.

Warnings Center. The J-2 provides operational and current intelligence to the CJCS on a daily basis to keep the chairman abreast of current developments around the world. These briefings consist of political, military and technological topics on various areas of the globe. The J-2 also coordinates joint intelligence doctrine and serves as the Director of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council's Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment.<sup>125</sup>

The J-2 further houses the National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC) to support military planning, operations and preparations in the "conduct of coalition operations with international forces."<sup>126</sup> In connection with NMJIC, DIA manages and controls the DoD Indications and Warning System (I&W). The I&W system monitors activity in countries around the world and displays indicators for crisis in the various nations or regions of the world as a decisionmaking tool for the JCS and Secretary of Defense. The Defense Intelligence Network, also connected with NMJIC, disseminates timely, all-source intelligence during crisis periods in a multi-media format.

The J-2 function has evolved over the past 25 years starting as an outgrowth of the Joint Intelligence Committee, created by the National Security Act of 1947, which provided intelligence in various forms to the JCS during wartime. However, size limitations of the J-2 at that time resulted in an ineffective accomplishment of the mission. After the Reorganization of 1958, the J-2 was established as part of the JCS and after DIA was created in 1961, reporting directly to the JCS, the J-2 mission was absorbed by the new agency. However, the mission was suspended in 1963 and its duties

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<sup>125</sup> "Defense Intelligence Agency, Vector 21: A Strategic Plan for DIA", p. 10.

<sup>126</sup> Department of Defense Directive, 5105.21, Section W.

assigned to various parts of the agency. It was not until 1974 that the duties of support to the JCS were again reorganized and the branch developed to coordinate that support was established again as the J-2. From 1974 to current, the J-2 has undergone numerous changes, despite the fact that no assigned Joint Staff personnel deal with intelligence, DIA supports the JCS requirements for intelligence, expanding its capabilities to accomplish that mission.

### Directorate for Intelligence Production (DI)

The Directorate for Intelligence Production (DI) manages the production of all-source military intelligence to operational, planning, and policy requirements of the armed forces, Unified Commands, DoD policymakers, and national level agencies ensuring production requirements are within DoD and national guidance. DI modifies production based on re-evaluations of mission, technical capabilities and threat environment during a crisis. DI's maintains expertise in: military capabilities, scientific and technological advancements, missile, medical, estimative, military production, geography, databases, as well as operational and targeting support to tactical, theatre and national customers.<sup>127</sup>

One of the main tasks of the production arm is to manage crisis-related military intelligence support which is accomplished through the Operational Intelligence Crisis Center (OICC). The OICC was created in 1986 in response to the large number of hijackings, bombings, and other acts of terrorism during 1985 to include the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 and the cruise ship ACHILLE LAURO to be an established center for crisis management, thereby reducing the time immediate support became available to

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<sup>127</sup> "Defense Intelligence Agency, Vector 21: A Strategic Plan for DIA", p. 13.

DIA's customers. The performance of the OICC in Desert Storm proved its capabilities in providing intelligence support for CENTCOM before and during the crisis. The OICC's existence today is a result of the outstanding support it provided. It continues to be DIA's primary tool for managing joint analytical support and production in crisis situations.

Further, for specified intelligence requirements, the production branch also manages the Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC) and the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC) to provide expertise to its military and civilian intelligence customers. Previously associated with the Army and Air Force respectively, MSIC and AFMIC became elements of DIA in 1992 in a continuing effort to consolidate intelligence making it more effective and efficient. MSIC analysts produce scientific and technological (S & T) intelligence on foreign missile systems and directed energy weapons. It is the primary source of information on: short range ballistic missiles, anti-tank guided missiles, defensive missile systems, as well as the aforementioned directed energy weapons providing threat analysis through testing of foreign systems obtained or assessed via the foreign material exploitation program.<sup>128</sup> In line with the mission of the Intelligence Production Directorate, MSIC operates 24 hours during crisis situations as well to give expert analysis on threats to deployed forces and operations worldwide.

The Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC) provides the U.S. intelligence community with the unique capability to provide assessments on foreign, civilian and military healthcare, foreign biological warfare capabilities and health risk

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<sup>128</sup> "Missile and Space Intelligence Center" (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, 1995), pamphlet.

factors around the world.<sup>129</sup> AFMIC supports U.S. forces on a 24-hour basis when required and provides assessments of potential health threats to leadership as troops prepare for deployments allowing for medical preparations and immunizations to troops, thereby increasing mission effectiveness. Both MSIC and AFMIC give DIA an expanded community of intelligence experts available to produce estimates on enemy capabilities directly to the military services or as part of an overall assessment of the capabilities of a potential enemy in NIE's. The acquisition of these two centers not only broadened DIA's intelligence capabilities but also gave DIA additional credibility in their intelligence support.

### Intelligence Collection

#### Directorate for Operations

The all source intelligence collection capabilities of DIA are contained in the Directorate of Operations. The DO manages all DoD intelligence collection requirements in support of national and theater commanders. This includes the management of the DoD HUMINT Service (DHS) and operation of the Defense Attache System.

#### Defense HUMINT System

In October 1995, DIA assumed the duties of managing all DoD HUMINT collections as another step in streamlining the intelligence community. Until then, under the direction of the National Security Act of 1947, the separate military services maintained and operated their own HUMINT collections. Their operations included clandestine and overt collection. In using clandestine collection, the services recruited

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<sup>129</sup> "Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center" (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, 1995), pamphlet.



members of foreign military to provide the U.S. with classified information. Overt collection consisted mainly of military officers acquiring information through debriefing individuals such as defectors or obtaining foreign publications, etc.<sup>130</sup> The Army had the most well developed HUMINT program housed in the Army Foreign Intelligence Activity division as well as Military Intelligence Brigades with members of these divisions stationed all around the globe. While the Army's program was relatively large and enjoyed a steady role in Army intelligence until the merge into DIA, the naval role in HUMINT has waxed and waned since WWII. The Office of Naval Intelligence conducted numerous HUMINT operations during WWII, however shortly after the end of the war, naval participation in this area of intelligence can be described as negligible.<sup>131</sup> It was revived in the 1960's in Task Force 157, which conducted clandestine HUMINT operations, only to be disestablished again in 1976. However, Task Force 168 took over the non-clandestine operations and conducted HUMINT operations during the Gulf War. Air Force participation in HUMINT has also waffled. Originally prohibited by the Air Force in 1948, information collected by Air Attaché's during the Korean War convinced the service of the utility of such intelligence. DIA has also collected HUMINT since its inception in 1962 through two basic channels: the Defense Attache System, and a specialized group of clandestine case officers.<sup>132</sup>

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<sup>130</sup> Richelson, Jeffrey T., "From the MONARCH EAGLE to MODERN AGE: The Consolidation of U.S. Defense HUMINT," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence Vol 10, Number 2 (1995): 133.

<sup>131</sup> Richelson, "From the MONARCH EAGLE to MODERN AGE", 134.

<sup>132</sup> Ibid, 135.

Despite the services' freedom to collect HUMINT information, the CIA's DCI served as a coordinator for all activities so as to deconflict operations worldwide. When DIA was created, it took a more active role in managing DoD human intelligence collection. However, these efforts met with resistance from the armed services, especially the Navy who said that DIA's attempt to "streamline or coordinate HUMINT activities" was not a meaningful attempt.<sup>133</sup> The first attempts at consolidating all HUMINT activities occurred in 1982 but was vetoed by Congress as it was perceived to be an effort to create a mini-CIA within the DIA – staffing it with civilians. Eight years later as a result of the end of the Cold War and a subsequent cutting of the defense budget, Congress instructed the services to find a way to consolidate their HUMINT efforts. This led to a plan which would give resources and operational control to DIA. Met by massive resistance from the Army it wasn't until 1992 that a plan was developed to combine HUMINT efforts under DIA. This plan called for "centralized management and decentralized execution of <HUMINT> activities."<sup>134</sup> The process of implementation began before the actual turnover in October of 1995, gradually incorporating the elements of the different services.

#### Defense Attache System

As with HUMINT collection, the separate services also originally maintained their own attaches per a 1949 DoD Directive that stated "each Military Service is

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<sup>133</sup> Ibid, 137.

<sup>134</sup> Ibid, 143.

individually responsible for its own Attache System. . .”<sup>135</sup> However, for a period of time the Secretary of Defense established a department to coordinate these activities setting the precedent for the involvement of DIA at a later date. Poor distribution, high costs, and duplication of effort – a recurring theme in the intelligence business it seems, led to Mr. McNamara’s decision to incorporate the attaché system within DIA in 1964. Once again the services opposed this new direction for assumption of duties under one organization. However, ‘the necessity for coordinating the activities of the attaches abroad and the attaches potential for collecting intelligence valuable to DIA served to override the Services’ objections. . .”<sup>136</sup>

Defense Attaches stationed abroad have a variety of methods they collect intelligence:

- *identifying and capturing collection opportunities presented by trade fairs, military demonstrations, parades, . . .*
- *identifying and gaining cooperation of human sources believed to possess the ability to furnish intelligence information*
- *traveling to identified geographic target areas to observe, photograph, and report information specifically needed by consumers*
- *identifying, establishing contact, and maintaining liaison with foreign military officers who. . . can supply the potential intelligence information . . .*
- *gaining and maintaining area reality to observe and report political, sociological, psychological and economic developments. . .*
- *identifying and gaining access to assist in the acquisition and exploitation of foreign military equipment and material*<sup>137</sup>

Since its beginning in 1965, the DAS has undergone numerous organizational changes but for the most part exists today as a consolidated military Attache service.

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<sup>135</sup> Defense Intelligence Agency, “The Defense Attaché”, (Washington, DC: DIA History Office, 1994), p.1.

<sup>136</sup> Ibid.

<sup>137</sup> Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community, 246.

## Dissemination of Intelligence Products

### Directorate for Information Systems and Services

Directorate for Information Systems and Services (DS) manages DIA's information technology and services. Specifically, DS provides: data processing engineering, development and operations support, information and library services, hardcopy and electronic publication, imagery processing, video and visual information services, as well as the dissemination of these services.<sup>138</sup> This section also manages the Department of Defense Intelligence Information System (DoDIIS) which effectively maintains a database of products available and required by each unit, command, or agency.

In addition to the DODIIS system, DIA manages an information and communication network called JWICS (Joint WorldWide Intelligence Communications System) which securely connects collectors, producers and consumers of intelligence information together on one main "intelligence superhighway" whether in the US or deployed anywhere worldwide. JWICS incorporates advanced technologies to incorporate multi-media technology and video conferencing. The smaller, sister to JWICS is JDISS (Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System) which provides a transportable communication network.<sup>139</sup> These systems supply all-source-integrated intelligence critical to theatre battle management. These systems are the key to DIA's continued efforts to improve dissemination to its consumers, especially in the wake of intelligence criticism of Desert Storm which included problems in product dissemination.

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<sup>138</sup> "Defense Intelligence Agency, Vector 21: A Strategic Plan for DIA", p. 14.

<sup>139</sup> Ibid. p. 16-19.

Further, DIA's forward-looking vision for the future includes better integrated systems and intelligence products on-line to increase the usability of its products. This will be a major area of growth for the agency as the 21<sup>st</sup> century approaches.

## **Administration**

### **Directorate for Administration**

The Directorate for Administration (DA) provides not only administrative support but also training both for internal DIA members as well as external customers (Joint Military Intelligence Training Center) and houses the Counterintelligence and Security Activity which identifies foreign threats to DIA's intelligence activities.

The Counterintelligence and Security Activity (DAC) is the central point for coordinating issues on counterintelligence – recognizing and dealing with foreign threats to intelligence collection by DIA. In addition, DAC provides staff support to the CJCS and the combatant commands essentially providing them with the same investigation and evaluation services. Counterintelligence analysis of foreign capabilities to detect US intelligence activity provides intelligence collectors with information on how to better protect sources, the flow of information as well as protection of other collection means. DAC also serves as a coordination point for Counterintelligence activities conducted by other services and agencies.

Obviously, the administrative directorate in DIA provides much more than just administrative services. The Joint Military Intelligence Training Center (JMITC) manages the General Intelligence Training System for the Department of Defense ensuring training is provided in management, analysis, collection management, and systems as well as basic training for all DIA job positions, as well as prepares military

and civilian personnel for joint duty in the intelligence world. The Defense Intelligence College (DIC), managed by the General Intelligence Training System, is tasked to conduct academic research on topics that are significant to the present and future intelligence community as well as prepare attaches for duty in the Defense Attaché System. The DIC also prepares both military and civilian intelligence personnel for duty as senior commanders, staff and policy-making positions in the intelligence field. These academic branches of DIA grew out of the 1970's realization of the growing importance of intelligence and the need for training as well as to enable military and civilians alike to make a career in intelligence, giving the field more respectability. In addition to these, DIA also runs the Congressionally established Joint Military Intelligence College, located at Bolling AFB, Washington, D.C.

The Joint Military Intelligence College is a unique joint service intelligence school authorized by Congress. The institution awards accredited Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence degrees to its graduates, better preparing both military and civilian students of intelligence throughout the US Intelligence Community. This is a unique degree, available only through the joint institution. In addition, the college also sponsors and conducts research on intelligence issues, disseminating its findings to the intelligence community at large.

#### Interaction with other Intelligence Agencies

##### Service Branches

While many aspects of defense intelligence have been absorbed into DIA for overall military intelligence management, all four separate services continue to maintain intelligence elements within their ranks. Why? DIA was created not to take the place of

services intelligence functions, but to align significant intelligence assets in order to provide strategic and tactical intelligence to OSD, JCS, and Unified and Specified Commands. DIA's charter specified its relationship with the services and defined its principle role as an advisor to the JCS, OSD, Defense Agencies and the Commands. Furthermore, DIA coordinated all National Intelligence Estimates for the USIB representing all of the services. Before DIA, the separate services each provided NIE's which for the most part were slanted toward service requirements and goals. Basically, DIA took over representation of the separate services in higher intelligence discussions, providing a coordinated view from the defense department. As DIA established this new role, it assumed some of the key responsibilities of the services. In some cases this included consolidating some of the services activities, such as the attaché functions and HUMINT functions. For the most part, however, the services retain their intelligence capabilities in order to provide commanders with tactical intelligence relating to individual missions on a daily basis and in times of crisis. General Carroll, the first DIA director responded to the House Committee on Appropriations criticism of DIA's role indicating that,

By design, the Services still retained very significant prerogatives and responsibilities in the preparation of major items of military intelligence. . . . By the very broad nature of national-level requirements to which DIA products in general respond, the tactical usability factor often declines as the intelligence products is disseminated from the Washington level through the major commands and down to the commanders in the field.<sup>140</sup>

DIA as the primary producer of all intelligence documents, produces intelligence studies used by the military services for overall intelligence support, however the services must also produce intelligence that relates to their specific functions as DIA could not possibly

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<sup>140</sup> Allen., "The Defense Intelligence Agency: A 21-Year Organizational Overview", 112.

produce all products for all services at a competent level. In essence, this was a result of the very distinct difference between national and tactical intelligence. Lyman Kirkpatrick, former CIA Inspector General wrote in 1973, further explaining the distinct role of DIA and the individual services.

The DIA was conceived as an organization to assist in the coordination of the military contributions to national estimates, to produce the current intelligence essential to top officials . . . and to supervise the military intelligence collection effort in order to eliminate duplication. The . . . service intelligence agencies. . . were to continue to process the specialized intelligence essential to their services.  
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So, what does DIA do for the services? To begin, the agency is staffed not only by civilian intelligence analysts, but also by all of the services on a rotating basis. The services assign personnel to the agency to assist in intelligence production ensuring that the individual services are an active part in DIA's intelligence production. DIA produces the majority of intelligence documents disseminated to the defense community, many of which are used by the services intelligence branches in their daily missions. These include documents such as Military Capabilities Studies (MCS), Orders of Battle, and other comprehensive intelligence studies that all of the services use as a base line source for intelligence estimates. Along this line, DIA also manages communication products to such as JDISS and JWICS which serve to tie together intelligence communication among all the services and DIA. Overall, DIA serves as a coordinator of information at the national level, leaving tactical intelligence activities to the services who are able to provide the service specific information to their commanders.

DIA also interacts with other intelligence agencies abroad, coordinating intelligence information. DIA has established liaisons with Britain, Canada, and

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<sup>141</sup> Kirkpatrick, 35-36.



Australia with whom a vast amount of intelligence cooperation is maintained. For cooperation with the British Defense Intelligence Staff, the parameters of the “mutual intelligence interests”<sup>142</sup> were established via the DIA/DIS Agreement in 1969. Under this agreement, various U.S./UK intelligence programs were consolidated into one DIA Liaison Detachment located in London. In addition, DIA maintains a Liaison Detachment in Ottawa, Canada, to coordinate U.S./Canadian intelligence activities.

### Conclusion

DIA’s organization has undergone numerous periods of reorganization since its creation in 1961. These reorganizations were both results of congressional criticism and internal checks within the agency to improve the quality of intelligence output to the users. Advancements were made in leaps and bounds after Desert Storm in 1991 as a result of the high quality of intelligence provided during the war and the experience, preciseness and speed of intelligence required to conduct a successful campaign. Desert Storm is the basis from which intelligence has grown tremendously in only the last eight years. Even today, DIA is preparing for the 21<sup>st</sup> century and improving upon current systems.

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<sup>142</sup> Allen, “The Defense Intelligence Agency: A 21-Year Organizational Overview”, 137.

## CHAPTER IV

### DIA'S FUTURE ROLE IN INTELLIGENCE

The international environment has changed greatly in the post Cold War World. The bi-polar world characterized by U.S./Soviet dominance for the most part kept in check regional, political and religious conflict. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, these conflicts have begun to escalate as evidenced in nations around the globe. The renewed conflicts have also served as an impetus for efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional weapons. Additionally, advances in communications while increasing intelligence gathering capabilities have also increased the likelihood of information warfare. In light of these changing world situations, the U.S. and its military are frequently called on to stabilize regional conflicts, serve in humanitarian aid and defend growing national interests.

In addition to restructuring for the present world environment, DIA has also constructed a view of the future and a vision for adapting intelligence needs to supply the war-fighter, policymaker and decision-maker with the tools they need to ensure America's continuance as a globally dominant power. In a recent report to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, DIA outlined its perspective on the threats and challenges facing the United States in the next decade. For the most part, Lieutenant General Patrick M. Hughes, DIA Director, concluded that the U.S. will continue to be highly involved in a growing complexity of international situations to include:

peacekeeping, peace enforcement, counter-narcotics, humanitarian emergencies, non-combatant evacuations, military assistance, and limited conflict when absolutely necessary.<sup>143</sup> This increasingly broad military mission will require a new direction for intelligence in order to be able to support military action taken at any time and as often is necessary simultaneous operations as well. Where will these events take place around the world?

Currently, a plethora of nations continue to pose direct threats to U.S. national security. North Korea, a threat since the 1950's, continues to remain in crisis – politically, economically and militarily. Despite these bleak circumstances however, they have made gains in WMD programs as well as continuing upgrades in missile technology and strengthening their special forces. As U.S. forces continue a presence in South Korea, these advances remain a plausible threat to American interests. Also in Asia, China's rapid modernization both economically and militarily poses an increasing threat as the world's largest remaining Communist power. A potential revolutionary power China possesses a determinant to regain Taiwan into Chinese territory. On the same continent, Russia too continues to be a valid threat as she still maintains a sizeable nuclear force. A depressed economy and declining military presence have resulted in internal disorder as Russia attempts to forge a new role in international politics. Nearby, the Middle East, a flashpoint for generations will continue to draw U.S. attention in obvious areas including Iraq and Iran as these revolutionary states attempt to assert their power in the region. India and Pakistan's ongoing rivalry remains an important security concern as both countries continue to view their situation as a zero-sum game and both

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<sup>143</sup> General Patrick M. Hughes, Director DIA, "Global Threats and Challenges in the Decade Ahead," Report for Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 28 January 1998.

retain the potential to assemble WMD including nuclear weapons. Further, regions like Bosnia and Sub-Sahara Africa will continue to conflict over religious and racial issues. Overall, these nations pose threats to the current balance of power, and thereby could potentially draw the U.S. into their crisis. These worldwide situations continue to ebb and wane, increasing the need for adaptable military intelligence.

In addition to the growing world conflicts, there also exists a transnational threat. Included in this group is the continued proliferation of nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional weapons. DIA assesses that, “more than 20 states are actively pursuing weapons of mass destruction, motivated either by regional competition or the desire to develop a deterrent or counter to the concomitant superiority of others, including the U.S.”<sup>144</sup> International terrorism is another threat transcending national borders, and a paramount security concern for America both domestically and abroad. American troops are being deployed to increasingly more areas of the world and often the mere presence of the U.S. in a hostile region will spark terrorist activity as evidenced in the Khobar Towers attack of 1996. For this reason, intelligence must maintain standing efforts to assess capabilities and plausibility for terrorist action on a grand scale – a difficult task as these groups grow, splinter and change on almost a daily basis. Aside from the obvious military implications of the first two transnational threats, international narcotics trafficking, and organized crime are growing problems in which the U.S. military may be required to “lend a hand.” These actions pose a threat to the stability of a nation. The influence of these such groups could pose a serious threat to an unstable government, such as that of Russia and ultimately might, once again, affect the balance of power in a

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<sup>144</sup>General Patrick M. Hughes

region. The final transnational threat is a new one created as a result of the communications revolution, information warfare. While this revolution has sparked better information processing, transmission and storage, it has also made it possible to commit electronic theft, data modification, and shut down systems entirely.<sup>145</sup> The implications are innumerable: including the leaking of classified information or the collapse of a critical system during a crisis period. Intelligence efforts to counter these threats are crucial to protect information. Some aspects of all of these transnational threats have national security implications that will continue to involve the U.S. military capability in the future.

International as well as transnational threats in combination with the constantly changing nature of warfare calls for constant attention to national strategy, doctrine, force structure and weapons development. All of these amidst a shrinking defense budget. The trend has been to decrease defense spending in the post Cold War era due to a perceived lessening of threats. However, as previously and specifically noted, the international scene in the wake the collapse of the Soviet Union has created a more dangerous, less predictable world in which the U.S. is the primary power. The aforementioned concerns and threats are much widened from the previous almost single target of aggression – the Soviet Union. America used to look at the world in terms of how a conflict would affect the balance of power between the U.S. and the Soviets. However, now, the intelligence community must be able to assess how regional conflicts may threaten U.S. interests – a much broader task. How do you rectify a shrinking budget with increasing responsibility when it comes to intelligence? It is a difficult task. Just as the military itself now has to

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<sup>145</sup> Report from the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community, 1996.

“do more with less”, so must the intelligence community. DIA has responded to this task with its plan for adapting intelligence to future requirements – a plan for the twenty-first century – Vector 21.

DIA is committed to providing the best possible military intelligence support to commanders engaged in planning and acting in contingencies or crises. In efforts to continually upgrade its capabilities with the changing environment, DIA emphasized six areas to concentrate their efforts: Mission, People, Technology, Infrastructure, Readiness and Relationships. DIA’s mission will continue to emphasize intelligence support to the war-fighter, decision-maker and policymaker. In efforts to intensify this support, DIA plans to strength their internal Military Intelligence Board as a forum to match defense intelligence needs and efforts, streamlining the process to expedite decision-making on important intelligence issues. These issues include the collection, analysis and production of intelligence. Overall, DIA’s emphasis on collection will be focused on the war-fighter and defense department needs, enhancing the Defense HUMINT service to encompass joint capabilities and operations as well as expanding the MASINT mission to support consumers needs in peace, crisis or war times. In an effort to upgrade analysis capabilities to make them more timely to the war-fighter, DIA has plans to establish an Intelligence Analyst Development program as a training aid to improve analysis. This effort ties in with DIA’s emphasis on the people in the agency. Additionally, in order to disseminate analysis quickly during critical periods, the agency conceived a process to provide immediate analytic efforts focused on 24-hour support to deploying forces including targeting and planning.<sup>146</sup> Standardizing intelligence products and integrating

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<sup>146</sup> Defense Intelligence Agency, “Defense Intelligence Agency, A Brief History”, 25.

diverse intelligence systems which provide these products is a significant goal and hurdle DIA is focused on overcoming. This was one of the areas in which intelligence failed to effectively perform during Desert Storm and DIA is determined to rectify and consolidate from the upper echelon. In keeping with the goal of real-time intelligence to the war-fighter, DIA is currently in the process of distributing products online and in alternate media forms to forces both stateside and deployed. Part of this process is currently displayed on DIA's homepage on the Intelligence Link (INTELINK) system whereby units, and commands have access to electronic products from DIA – decreasing not only costs but also the time factor for passing critical information.

As technology advances by leaps and bounds, DIA plans to be right in the center of the activity, keeping up with new ideas and integrating them into the intelligence process in an effort to speed intelligence support to the user. This is an important aspect in a growing technologically dominated world.

The Defense Intelligence Agency's vision for the 21<sup>st</sup> century is highly systems-centered. Advances in sensor, information processing, and communications technologies will lead to capabilities that will enable the United States to achieve and maintain information dominance. Automated data processing and telecommunications systems are resource multipliers, providing the Intelligence Community the ability to connect reliably, directly and instantly to knowledge, resources and capabilities at all levels. .<sup>147</sup>

Ultimately, DIA plans to link the Defense intelligence structure, national-level intelligence, U.S. and Allied cooperation, active and reserve intelligence units together to provide experience and skill as a whole to the community at large. As part of the original DIA charter to consolidate the defense intelligence efforts, DIA continues to bring all

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<sup>147</sup> Ibid.

related national level efforts under its wing centralizing them at the agency's headquarters at DIAC on Bolling Air Force Base. This is necessary to ensure that the agency is ready at a moments notice to perform its duties as a Combat Support Agency. All of DIA's efforts are in preparation to be "prepared, properly manned, trained, and equipped to execute the mission" in times of crisis. Lastly, in its plan for the future of defense intelligence, DIA must strengthen its relationships with other intelligence agencies as well as foreign governments, not only to prevent duplication, but share information, ensuring compatibility in order to provide the best overall picture to decision-makers at critical times in the future.

Defense intelligence is a supreme task to which DIA was given a significant part. On the whole, the defense intelligence community including NSA, the NRO, and the military intelligence units could benefit from a stronger role of DIA, however, that question of power is still under debate today as it has been since before DIA's creation. The agency was created to integrate military intelligence in such a manner to provide a succinct picture to national leadership. Its mission differs greatly from the CIA who concentrates more on the political aspect of intelligence guiding leadership in foreign policymaking, etc. DIA's mission is specific: intelligence support to defense leadership and unified commands and now to the war-fighter as well. No matter how broad DIA's mission is in supporting the war-fighter, it can not take the place of service intelligence operations. Only the services know the particulars of the men and machines they must support and only the services can provide the immediacy, urgency and confidence the man behind the machine must know to do his job. DIA's achievements are not be overshadowed by what they are not chartered to do, however. As DIA borders on four



**decades of military intelligence service, they have surpassed the vision for which they were created and are a necessary and vital member of the U.S. intelligence community.**

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




**Graduated Magna Cum Laud with BA**

**Thesis Title: The Defense Intelligence Agency: An In-depth Study of the Development  
of the Agency**

**Thesis Examination Committee:**

**Chairperson, Dr. Andrew C. Tuttle, Ph. D.  
Committee Member, Dr. Jerry L. Simich, Ph. D.  
Committee Member, Dr. Dina Titus, Ph. D  
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# IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (QA-3)



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