

1-1-1998

The midwife and birth of conservatism in 1960: Barry Goldwater and the ascendancy of the right in the Gop

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<http://dx.doi.org/10.25669/rin6-isp4>

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**THE MIDWIFE AND BIRTH OF CONSERVATISM IN 1960:
BARRY GOLDWATER AND THE ASCENDANCY
OF THE RIGHT IN THE GOP**

By

Thomas R. Wahl

**Bachelor of Arts
Seattle University
1981**

**Bachelor of Science
Seattle University
1981**

**A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of**

Master of Arts

In

Communication

**Hank Greenspun School of Communication
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
August, 1998**

UMI Number: 1392315

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
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
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ABSTRACT

The Midwife and Birth of Conservatism in 1960: Barry Goldwater and the Ascendancy Of the Right in the GOP

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The Midwife and Birth of Conservatism in 1960 studies the rise of the dissident minority conservative faction of the Republican Party during the 1950s and early 1960s and its takeover of the Republican Party in 1964. Using established communication theories that define a social movement and a movement leader, the paper attempts to judge if the conservative movement and its leader, Barry Goldwater, can be viewed as, respectively, a full-fledged social movement and social movement leader. The thesis examines its subjects in a rhetorical and historical context by studying the rhetoric and historical events surrounding the ascension of the right and Goldwater's leadership position.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In the United States at this time [1950], liberalism is not only the dominant but even the sole intellectual tradition. For it is the plain fact that nowadays there are no conservative...ideas in general circulation.

Lionel Trilling (Dunn & Woodard, 1996, p. 1)

Studies of the 1960s, whether political examinations, journalistic reviews, or historical analyses, typically focus on the era's liberal movements and their leaders. Therefore, while covering areas such as the rise of the New Left, the ascension of the Great Society, and the influence of student leaders and groups (such as Tom Hayden and the Students for a Democratic Society), research ignores equally momentous events and leaders of the right. As Mary Brennan notes in her study of the sixties:

A one-dimensional view of the 1960s as a decade of radical movements drew the focus away from other important developments occurring during that time. Journalists and scholars, by spotlighting only the protesters, students, hippies, and demonstrators, ignored the action taking place at stage right and therefore presented a lopsided view of the decade. They spoke of political and social polarization but concentrated their attention and study on the Left. (1995, p. 1)

Charles Dunn and J. David Woodard provide further acknowledgement of the lack of study of conservatives:

The 1994 election confirmed a realignment of American politics along conservative lines in the general electorate, but in the halls of academe conservatism remains a neglected subject, on the fringes of the curriculum

and outside the door of the faculty lounge. Many academics are politically liberal, and few scholars in the social science disciplines take conservative intellectual positions seriously. (1996, p. vii)

The lack of attention given to studies of the right is certainly not due to limited public interest in conservative ideas. Indeed, an increasing interest in conservative thought and its acceptance in all realms of society were evident in the 1950s and early 1960s. On the literary side, for example, conservative publications such as National Review and Human Events were becoming increasingly popular. The period also witnessed an increase in the popularity of the books and ideas of libertarian Ayn Rand among those disenchanted with big government and “big brother.” Further, in 1960, Senator Barry Goldwater published what would become the best selling political book of the century, The Conscience of a Conservative (Edwards, 1988, p. 60).

Another example of the breadth of society's interest in conservative ideas is seen among the college students of the time. In 1960, conservative college students founded the Young Americans for Freedom (YAF). Clubs quickly spread across the country's campuses and YAF members actively supported numerous conservative causes. Youthful members demonstrated at the White House; worked for political campaigns (such as William F. Buckley, Jr.'s race for mayor of New York and Goldwater's run for the presidency in 1964); organized food, medicine and clothing drives for Vietnamese war refugees; and, put together “bleed-ins” (blood drives) and mail campaigns for American soldiers fighting in Vietnam (Edwards, 1988, p. 58). As early as 1962, the YAF was strong enough to sponsor a political rally in New York City at Madison Square

Garden. The event drew over 18,000 people and grossed \$80,000 from ticket sales (Rusher, 1984, p. 129). The significance of the conservative youth movement is described by Theodore White in his book, The Making of the President 1964: “The Young Republicans are far, far more important in their party than any junior Democrats on the other side of the divide” (White, 1966, p. 114).

As a result of the previously mentioned focus on events and issues of the left, there is a deficiency today of analyses of the conservative movement of the 1960s and its leaders. The intent of this study is to address this void by examining a significant segment of the early nineteen-sixties culture that has been neglected in prior studies: the shift in power in the Republican Party in 1964 from the ruling liberal establishment to the minority conservative right wing.

Using established theories as parameters (outlined later in this chapter and detailed in Chapter 2), the study will analyze whether the actions of the dissident right wing in the 1950s and early 1960s against the Republican Party’s ruling power was a social movement. In addition, the thesis will ascertain whether Barry Goldwater, the conservatives’ spokesperson (Brennan, 1995, p. 24) and, as described by the Los Angeles Times, the “leading conservative thinker in American public life” (Iverson, 1997, p. 94), can be viewed as a movement leader.¹

Two factors influenced the takeover of the Republican Party by the conservative faction. The first was a string of events that occurred during the 1950s and 1960 and the responses to those events by the ruling party establishment (the specific events will be described in Chapter 2). As a

consequence of the establishment's actions, members of the right wing were left feeling that their ideas and candidates had been ignored, neglected, and purposely isolated by the ruling establishment.

A second development was that America's postwar growth during the nineteen-fifties was creating a factionalization in the Republican Party between the liberal ruling sector and the conservative wing. To understand this factionalization and the tension it was creating in the party, the makeup of the establishment and the right must be defined.

First, the party's ruling establishment was "predominantly Eastern, internationalist, urban types they [the conservatives] contemptuously called 'me-too' Republicans [in response to their similarities to the Democrats]" (Wicker, 1963, p. 26). Additionally, the establishment members were seen as being "high-minded, sometimes high-handed, moderate Republicans from the Eastern Establishment, and they ran the party – and the nation – during the Eisenhower years" (Stengel, 1986, p. 24).

Key players in the Eastern Establishment included attorney Herbert Brownell, Jr.; diplomat John Foster Dulles; Massachusetts Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.; Eastern corporate leaders and financiers (such as the Aldrich-Rockefeller family that controlled Chase Bank); and, East coast media publications (the New York Herald Tribune, the New York Times, and Time Magazine) (Kolkey, 1983, p. 22). As Brennan describes them:

These Republicans shared a common background of Ivy League educations, exclusive club memberships, and financial success. Operating many of the major corporations of the United States, they

controlled the purse strings of the party and of any candidate who wanted to win on the national level. Although some members were from outside the Northeast, such as Thomas Dewey and Wendell Willkie, they had only succeeded after they moved to the East. Members of the "Establishment," assuming that they knew what was best for the entire country, held sway through their occupation of policy-making positions throughout the executive branch as well as their manipulation of the party machinery. (1995, p. 8)

The programs and budgets advanced by the Eastern establishment were New Deal type policies that maintained and expanded the role of government. Behind this strategy was the "belief that such policies would alleviate class conflicts, lead to economic stability, and keep governmental control in their hands" (Brennan, 1995, p. 8).

In contrast, the conservative wing was made up primarily of people from the growing West and the South. They were entrepreneurs who made money off the postwar boom and the oil industry and wanted a greater voice in national politics. They "stressed individual initiative over welfare programs, preferred free enterprise rather than government regulation, and desired a return to local control over matters such as schools, taxes, and race relations" (Brennan, 1995, p. 8). As such, the New Deal type programs that the establishment was embracing appalled them.

Thus, there were philosophical disagreements between the party's two wings, as well as geographic and socioeconomic divisions. As a result of these differences, the Republican right wing had come to view the establishment with disdain. In the conservatives' eyes, the establishment was essentially no different than the New Deal Democrats whose programs had ruled the country

since before World War II. In other words, the right's view of what the establishment offered as programs mirrored sociologist Daniel Bell's assessment of the consensus politics of the U.S., namely "that politicians no longer argued over issues, only over the degree to which policies should be implemented" (quoted in Brennan, 1995, p. 20).

This study will attempt to determine if the conservative movement within the Republican Party during the late 1950s and early 1960s was a social movement. The movement was not a collection of isolated incidents within a small segment of the population, nor was it a short-term phenomenon. In fact, the shift in power produced repercussions that had dramatic long-term effects on the nation's political scene. The power base of the Republican Party switched to the South and the West, where it remains today. This shift ensured the conservative influence in the party. In addition, beginning in 1968, Republican candidates won five of the next six presidential elections. This trend ultimately affected the Democratic Party. In order to regain the White House, Democrats had to re-shape their image and incorporate conservative ideas into their campaigns. Thus, voters in 1996 witnessed President Clinton running for re-election with a conservative campaign manager while calling for welfare reform and tax cuts--ideas previously anathema to Democrats.

As such, the study of Barry Goldwater and the rise of the conservative movement in the sixties warrant coverage commensurate to other movements of the time.

Literature Review

A variety of types of literature will be used in this study. First, newspaper and magazine accounts will be reviewed. These accounts include media outlets such as The New York Times, The New York Times Magazine; the Washington Post, US News & World Report, Time, The Economist and The Wall Street Journal. Magazine and newspaper sources will provide independent accounts from the 1950s and 1960s of events related to and surrounding the rise of the conservative faction. These analyses will add “eye witness” perspectives of the right’s rise in the context of the specific time period as a balance to studies of the study’s subject that offer historical perspectives from a later time.

The second source of literature will be books and professional articles that either address the rise of the conservatives or deal with issues pertinent to their ascension to power. These books include Mary Brennan’s Turning Right in the Sixties: The Conservative Capture of the GOP; Godfrey Hodgson’s The World Turned Right Side Up; Charles Dunn and J. David Woodard’s The Conservative Tradition in America, Theodore White’s The Making of the President 1964, Sara Diamond’s Roads to Dominion: Right-Wing Movements and Political Power in the United States, Peter Iverson’s Barry Goldwater: Native Arizonan, Robert Goldberg’s Barry Goldwater, Paul Gottfried’s The Conservative Movement; William Rusher’s The Rise of the Right; Russell Kirk’s The Conservative Mind; and, Clinton Rossiter’s Conservatism in America. These books are useful in that they provide a summary the conservative movement’s rise, the people involved,

and the events that led to the rise as viewed by different participants and observers. Thus, a balanced look at the study's subject will be attained.

In addition to the above, Barry Goldwater's books will also be incorporated into the study. These are his two autobiographies, Goldwater and With No Apologies; and, The Conscience of a Conservative and Why Not Victory. His books are useful for studying because they provide a first person perspective of the movement and of his decisions and actions.

Academic articles to be studied come from a variety of sources, including journals in the areas of communication, political science, and history. One article in particular addresses the subject of this paper, Mary Brennan's "A Step in the 'Right' Direction: Conservative Republicans and the Election of 1960" from Presidential Studies Quarterly. Other articles offer analyses of events relevant to Goldwater and the conservative movement in the 1960s. These include David Castle's "Goldwater's Presidential Candidacy and Political Realignment" from Presidential Studies Quarterly and Kurt Schuppara's "Freedom vs. Tyranny: The 1958 California Election and the Origins of the State's Conservative Movement" from Pacific Historical Review.

There are also articles from communication journals that address subjects relevant to this thesis. These studies are pertinent in that the articles offer a rhetorical perspective of the events surrounding rise of the right. The Quarterly Journal of Speech offers studies of each presidential election and as such will be useful for this study. John C. Hammerback's "Barry Goldwater's Rhetoric of Rugged Individualism" in the Quarterly Journal of Speech and his collaboration

with Richard J. Jensen in "Barry Morris Goldwater" in American Orators of the Twentieth Century both provide insight into the rhetoric of Goldwater as leader of the right wing. In addition, Dale Leathers' "Fundamentalism of the Radical Right" in The Southern Speech Journal and Barbara Warnick's "The Rhetoric of Conservative Resistance" in The Southern Speech Communication Journal offer analyses of the extreme right which will be helpful in studying Goldwater and his base of right wing supporters.

Other academic articles to be used in this study deal specifically with social movements. These studies outline the definitions and characteristics of a social movement, the elements of which can be applied to the analysis of Goldwater and the rise of the right. Specific articles include Herbert W. Simons' "Requirements, Problems, and Strategies: A Theory of Persuasion for Social Movements" from The Quarterly Journal of Speech; Simons' "On the Rhetoric of Social Movements, Historical Movements, and 'Top Down' Movements: A Commentary" written in Communication Studies; Malcolm O. Sillars "Defining Movements Rhetorically: Casting the Widest Net" in The Southern Speech Communication Journal; and, Charles J. Stewart's "The Evolution of a Revolution: Stokely Carmichael and the Rhetoric of Black Power" in Quarterly Journal of Speech.

Finally, the Internet will be explored for articles of interest to this study. Internet sites from think tanks, periodicals, and web journals can provide useful insights that may not be found through traditional resource centers such as

libraries. However, the information found and its source will be carefully reviewed and checked for its credibility.

Methodology

As mentioned earlier, this study will examine the ascent of the conservative movement within the Republican Party, and Goldwater's position in the movement. The purpose of this analysis is to determine if the conservatives' revolt can be considered a social movement and if Goldwater can be viewed as a movement leader.

Various alternatives exist as to the definition of a social movement. Most theories are collective oriented and focus on, as William Bruce Cameron (1966) describes it, the groups aim to "alter or supplant some portion of the existing culture or social order" (p. 7). Additionally, to distinguish a movement from a trend, agitation, or unruly disturbance, there must be a recognized organization to the group in the form of "leaders (spokespersons), membership (followers and believers), and organizations" (Stewart, Smith & Denton, 1994, p. 3). For example, in his work on grassroots movements, Robert A. Goldberg (1991) defines a social movement as "a formally organized group that acts consciously and with some continuity to promote or resist change through collective action" (p. 2). John W. Bowers, Donovan J. Ochs, and Richard J. Jensen in The Rhetoric of Agitation and Control (1993) offer an additional definition that incorporates a movement's rhetorical needs. The authors state that social movements exist when "(1) people outside the normal decision-making

establishment (2) advocate significant social change and (3) encounter a degree of resistance within the establishment such as to require more than the normal discursive means of persuasion” (p. 4).

This paper though will focus on Stewart, Smith and Denton’s (1989) definition that a movement is an organized group whose focus is “to bring about or to resist a program of change in societal norms and values” (p. 17). Additionally, the paper will include as organized groups those collectivities that are part of established order within society (e.g., political parties). As Simons (1991) states, movements are not solely “bottom up struggles by groups at the margins of society” (p. 100), but are also “top down” from within an institution. Thus, the spectrum of social movements include struggles “by people in positions of institutional authority on behalf of a cause whose guiding ideas, characteristic modes of actions, or organizational structures have not been fully institutionalized” by their organization (Simons, 1991, p. 100).

For the purpose of this paper, two established social movement related studies (described in Chapter 2) will be used: Charles J. Stewart, Craig Allen Smith, and Robert E. Denton, Jr.’s “The Life Cycle of Social Movements” (1989); and Herbert W. Simons’ “Requirements, Problems, and Strategies: A Theory of Persuasion for Social Movements” (1970). The first study provides the framework by which the life cycles of a social movement can be outlined and analyzed and the latter work outlines the characteristics of a movement leader. Using these two studies as an apparatus, this paper’s analysis will be able to judge:

1. Whether the rise of the minority conservative faction within the structure of an established political organization (the Republican Party) can be viewed as a social movement; and,
2. If Goldwater, as the publicly viewed leader of the right wing, fits the description of a social movement leader.

In summary, the methodology of this paper will incorporate established theories (Stewart, Smith, and Denton, and Simons) that outline parameters defining what is a social movement and who are its leaders. Using an historical and rhetorical perspective, these theories will be applied to the rise of the conservatives in the Republican Party and Goldwater's position as the conservatives' leader. As such, the thesis will be able to conclude whether the revolt against the Republican Party's ruling establishment by the right wing constitutes a takeover by a defined social movement from within the party, and if Goldwater can be considered a movement leader of the right's ascension to power.

Summary

Chapter 1 will introduce the purpose of the study--to determine if the rise of the conservative movement within the Republican Party during the late 1950s and early 1960s was a social movement and if Goldwater, the right's leader, can be viewed as a movement leader. The chapter will also summarize the materials to be used to describe the historical events surrounding the rise of the right, and

to analyze the study's stated purpose. Finally, the chapter will describe the methodology to be used in the study.

The second chapter will define the methodology the paper will use to determine if the conservative movement fits the characteristics of a social movement; and, Goldwater's position as leader of the movement. This methodology will be from Simons' findings on social movements' leaders and Stewart, Smith, and Denton's analysis of the life cycle of social movements.

Chapter 3 will contain a summary of the events that contributed to the frustration and anger of the Republican Party's right wing and led to their revolt against the Party's establishment. The chapter will also review Goldwater's path to leader of the conservative movement.

In Chapter 4, the paper's methodology will be applied to the events detailed in Chapter 3.

Finally, Chapter 5 will make a judgement concerning the paper's thesis based on application of the methodology applied in Chapter 4. In addition to concluding whether the rise of the right wing represented a true social movement, this chapter will discuss what has been learned about Goldwater and the conservative movement, about communication and its relation to social movements, and what future studies the study's findings give rise to.

Chapter Notes

¹This thesis is studying the possibility of a social movement that exists within one of society's established political organization, as opposed to a movement that is pitted against society's established organizations. Therefore, it is useful to define certain terms that will be used throughout the paper. The terms "movement," "minority," or "conservatives" in a phrase or sentence will refer to the conservative faction (or the right wing) of the Republican Party. Use of the terms "ruling," "establishment," or "liberal" will refer to the ruling powers of the Republican Party. Also, unless otherwise stated, "party" will mean the Republican Party.

CHAPTER 2

METHODOLOGY

As mentioned in Chapter 1, this paper will study the ascent of the conservative movement within the Republican Party and Barry Goldwater's role in the movement. The study will be conducted by incorporating elements from two social movement studies that offer definitions of social movements and of movement leaders. Using these two studies as vehicles to define a social movement and a movement leader, this study's analysis will attempt to judge the following two issues:

1. Whether the rise of the minority conservative faction within the structure of an established political organization (the Republican Party) can be viewed as a social movement; and,
2. If Goldwater, as the publicly viewed leader of the right wing, fits the description of a social movement leader.

The theories employed for this paper's study are elaborated in the following pages. The study will then apply these theories to the study of the right. This process will consist of two steps: (a) looking at the actions, strategy, and discourse (e.g., publications, statements, speeches, writings, etc.) surrounding historical events significant to the movement; and (b) evaluating the applicability

of the reviewed elements as respects the definitions established by the selected theories.

Issue 1

As a framework for defining a social movement, the study will use Charles J. Stewart, Craig Allen Smith, and Robert E. Denton, Jr.'s "The Life Cycle of Social Movements" (1989). Even though the variables that make up a social movement (e.g., its success or failure, rate of growth, strategies, etc) "will not fit any *a priori* formula" (Cameron, 1966, pp. 27-29), common traits can be found in a movement that will identify it as one. Testifying to the commonalties of movements, Sillars (1980) writes "Each movement exhibits a pattern of events which can be seen in other movements....[There are] laws or rules which are revealed in a variety of movements and which will predict the stages and activities of some new movement (p. 20).

Therefore, in analyzing the rise of the right as a social movement, Stewart, Smith, and Denton's work is useful because it effectively defines the life cycle of a social movement. Stewart, Smith, and Denton's model defines a movement through the existence of five distinct stages. They are as follows:

Stage 1. Genesis

Social movements begin during what is generally considered to be peaceful times as regards the problem to be addressed by the movement. The establishment either does not see the problem or else views it as inconsequential in comparison to the matters it has at hand. However, a

perceived frustration, or “imperfection in the existing order” (Stewart, et al., 1994, p. 72) (i.e., abuse of power, inequality, etc.) is present among certain individuals, who typically are unaware of each other due to geographic separateness. As opposed to the establishment, the concerned individuals perceive the flaw as alarming and becoming more so unless the institution addresses the problem quickly and resolutely.

In this stage, early leaders appear who attempt to bring to light what they perceive as the establishment’s neglect of the imperfection and the exigency of the situation. The leaders, often naively, believe that the establishment will act quickly once the institution’s leaders and followers are informed of the imperfection and the urgent need for a solution. As such, the leaders act more as educators than agitators, putting forth various communiqués (e.g., books, articles, speeches, etc.) in an attempt to “create interest within an audience for perceiving and solving the problem” (Stewart, et al., 1994, p. 73). Few establishment members give the leaders serious attention and therefore, little opposition exists to the fledgling movement.

The life of the first stage varies. It may last months or years. Eventually though, the cycle ends when a “triggering event” occurs--a catalyst that upheaves the unorganized individuals into the next stage of “social unrest.” This event generally comes from outside the movement in the form of a Supreme Court decision, continued dismissal by the establishment of the movement’s concerns, a new law, or an infuriating

comment by the establishment. For example, in 1915, a North Dakota legislator's statement to Midwest farmers that they "go home and slop [their] hogs" led to the formation of the Nonpartisan League (Stewart, et al., 1994, p. 73).

Stage 2. Social Unrest

The second stage is evidenced by increasing numbers of disaffected members who step forward to voice their distress over the perceived exigency. Movement members start to join as they hear agitators within the movement speak out. Listening to their calls to action, disparate members now begin to organize. As a result, members develop a doctrine that presents the movement's basic ideology. Included in the discourse is the perceived problem, its cause, and its solution.

In response, the establishment starts to openly recognize the existence of the young movement. However, it dismisses the significance of the problem and the movement's reputability. The establishment usually ignores and is derisive of the cause, hoping that the movement simply fades away. Along with the establishment, the media pays little interest, usually echoing the institution's sentiments toward the movement.

Additionally, a spirit of collectivity begins in this stage. A slogan is created that unifies the members (e.g., the pro-choice movement's "Never to laugh or love" or Black Power's "All power to the people" (Stewart, et al., 1994, p. [76])). Also, the act of joining the movement distinguishes its

members from establishment members. Finally, as members of a movement, they begin to view its purpose as a mission.

As with the first stage, movement members and leaders in stage two still believe that the institution will respond to the movement's exigence with timely and appropriate actions. As stated by the authors, the movement's "faith in progress through the social chain-of-command remains strong" (Stewart, et al., 1994, p. 77).

The time span of stage two is dependent on a number of factors. These include the number of people who join the movement, the establishment's responses, and further catalytic events.

The last item is important because it lays the groundwork for the next stage. As more events of this sort occur, and the establishment fails to respond, members begin to lose confidence in the desire and ability of the establishment to address the movement's concerns. Also, members begin realizing that persuasive petitioning through the established norms will not initiate action from the establishment. Finally, members begin to realize that either the establishment is the problem or that it is working to squelch reasonable efforts to effect imperative solutions to the movement's exigencies. As such, members' "*frustration* leads to *disaffection* with institutions and their abilities to resolve problems," (Stewart, et al., 1994, p. 77). At this point, the social movement enters the stage of enthusiastic mobilization.

Stage 3. Enthusiastic Mobilization

Next, movements enter a stage where members “have grown ‘sick and tired of being sick and tired’” (Stewart, et al., 1994, p. 77). Members conclude that the establishment will not implement change and that change will not come via petitions through the normal channels. Therefore, members look outside the institution to initiate change. Members start to hold mass meetings, demonstrations, and take their appeal directly to the people. To members, working outside the establishment is the avenue to implement needed change.

Additionally, word of the movement spreads. As a result, its ranks start to include individuals who lend credibility to the cause (e.g., politicians, professionals, civic leaders, entertainers, etc.).

Among the opposition, increased notice is taken of the movement’s actions, growth and mobilization; and, the movement begins to be seen as a peril to the establishment’s authority. Establishment leaders start to mobilize. They respond through such actions as labeling the movement leaders as extreme and out of touch, or instigating and supporting new “grass roots” counter movements meant to divert the social movement’s resources.

As a result, the movement has to adjust strategies to deal with the establishments’ responses. Leaders are required who are knowledgeable at responding to its reactions and adept at consolidating the movement’s power by coalescing groups within it.

Leaders also start utilizing severe rhetoric to “pressure institutions into capitulation or compromise, to polarize the movement and its opposition (all who are not actively supporting the movement), and to provoke repressive acts that reveal the true ugliness of institutions and counterefforts” (Stewart, et al., 1994, p. 79). This is a sensitive area. Rhetoric too harsh or actions too drastic may result in a loss of support. Leaders must be cognizant of the fact that rhetoric and actions in the movement’s name are perceived as rhetoric and actions by the movement.

Finally, splinter organizations (sometimes antagonistic) emerge within the movement. The movement must carefully work to keep the groups together under one tent working in one direction. Fracturing of the overall movement, or extreme demands, can direct energy away from the original exigence and deplete internal and external support.

Stage 4. Maintenance

The fourth stage is important in that it sets the stage for some form of victory or defeat. Movement activity and attention paid to the movement quiets down. Means of persuasion return to established channels, such as “pen and printer and from legislative, judicial, conference, convention, and lecture halls” (Stewart, et al., 1994, p. 81).

Consequently, the movement’s needs for leadership changes. How well this is handled determines the success of the movement. The

leaders' principal persuasive purpose now becomes sustaining the movement's progress. Leaders must go beyond being an agitator to being a statesman. While they still have to communicate their ideology, mobilize the followers, and attract new members, leaders must now also be adept at dealing in a rational manner with differing internal elements as well as establishment leaders. Additionally, leaders need to be capable of attending to organizational and administrative duties. The qualifications are necessary so the leaders can maintain the gains they have achieved and "sustain the movement's forward progress as it emerges from its 'trial by fire'" (Stewart, et al., 1994, p. 81).

Stage 5. Termination

At this point, the movement ends. "If a social movement maintains an effective organization and its principles come to match the current mores," (Stewart, et al., 1994, p. 83) the movement becomes the new establishment. The other outcome is that the movement is "absorbed or coopted by established institutions....with no recognition of the social movements that championed them for years" (Stewart, et al., 1994, p. 84). With either new status, members fade away or become part of the establishment.

This paper will undertake an analysis of those stages germane to the rise of the conservative movement as it centers on Goldwater's leadership. This relationship concludes in 1964, the point when Goldwater won the Republican

presidential nomination, subsequently lost the presidential race, and then returned to Arizona. Within this framework, only the first three stages are relevant to the paper's focus.

After 1964, the movement does go on to at least the first of the final two stages (maintenance and termination). This progression represents a future area for study. Although Goldwater lost his bid for President in 1964, the conservatives achieved control of the Republican Party. With this takeover, the movement entered the maintenance stage and new leaders stepped in and former movement leaders stepped aside (e.g. Goldwater lost the presidential nomination and, in seeking the nomination, gave up his Senate seat until 1968 when he won the retiring Carl Hayden's seat). To illustrate the achievement of stage four, the following two examples exemplify the right's newfound influence and its lasting power.

The first example is the 1968 presidential contest. To obtain the Republican nomination, Richard Nixon knew "that he could not win the nomination without conservative support" and "set out to woo the Right even before he announced his candidacy" (Brennan, 1995, p. 122). To members of the right, Nixon's attention to party conservatives represented a "welcome break with the 'me-too,' 'yes-but' school of Republicanism of the years of frustration and apology" (Hodgson, 1996, p. 120). As an illustration of the right's ascendancy to power in the Republican Party, the 1968 nomination is succinctly described in the following quote:

The 1968 nomination battle between Nixon and Reagan indicated how far the Republican Party had shifted to the right. From the quarrelsome, tiny band of true believers who had attempted to nominate Goldwater in 1960, conservatives had expanded and organized a movement that drafted a presidential candidate in 1964 and played the decisive role in choosing a nominee in 1968. They [the conservatives] used their growing organizational strength and public appeal to decide the nomination in 1968 after the politically astute Nixon ran on a conservative platform. (Brennan, 1995, p. 138)

A second example confirming the conservatives' lasting influence is seen in the 1980 presidential race. The conservatives' influence was such that the party's nominee, Ronald Reagan, was one of their own (Brennan, 1995, p. 1). Reagan was a staunch conservative whose credentials included "a highly acclaimed speech supporting Goldwater" (Brennan, 1995, pp. 124) at the 1964 convention (that introduced him as a conservative spokesman), and having forced Nixon to the right in the 1968 presidential election with his last minute candidacy (Brennan 1995: 124-127).

Issue 2

The study applicable to Goldwater as a movement leader is Herbert W. Simons' "Requirements, Problems, and Strategies: A Theory of Persuasion for Social Movements" (1970). In this analysis, Simons' defines a movement leader as one who meets the following characteristics.

1. The leader "must attract, maintain, and mold workers (i.e., followers) into an efficiently organized unit" and the movement's success is dependent on "loyalty to its leadership." (Simons, 1970, p. 3)

2. The leader both “must secure adoption of their product by the larger structure,” and insist that a “new order and a vast regeneration of values are necessary to smite the agents of the old and to provide happiness, harmony, and stability.” (Simons, 1970, p. 4)
3. Leaders “must react to resistance generated by the larger structure.” (Simons, 1970, p. 4) According to Simons, the establishment, in response to a movement against the power structure, will do one of two things. First, it may incorporate the movement’s demands or promise to act on them. Their second option is to come down strong against the movement. The movement’s leader must be able to adjust to any actions and take advantage of any overreactions.

Simons’ theory is useful in this paper for two reasons. First, Goldwater’s rise and acceptance were rhetorically driven. He expressed his ideas and attracted supporters via books, newspaper columns, and speeches. Second, Simons argues that a movement’s leader must be able to adjust to any actions and take advantage of any overreactions. One of the reasons Goldwater was able to attain his position as the conservative leader and maintain his following was his ability to make adjustments to the actions of the establishment. For instance, when the establishment publicly described Goldwater and his followers as extremists and fanatics during the 1964 Republican convention, Goldwater mobilized his following and, once in control, shut out any possibility of their participation in the makeover of the Party establishment.

In summary, Chapter 2 has defined the theories to be used to outline a social movement and a movement leader. Using the methodology described above as an apparatus, the paper will ascertain if (1) the dissident right of the GOP during the 50s and early 60s was a social movement and (2) if Goldwater, as the leader of the right, meets the definition of a movement leader. In the following chapter, the paper will review the historical events of the fifties and early sixties that set the stage for the ascendancy of the right and provoked it to action.

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
CHAPTER 3

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

As mentioned in Chapter 1, one of the factors that galvanized the right to wrest control of the Republican Party was a set of pivotal events during the 1950s and early 1960s and the establishment's responses to those events. Following is a discussion of these incidents and how they affected the division between the party's ruling establishment and the conservative wing.

The following events and the related actions of the establishment resulted in alienating the right and demonstrated a disregard of its ideas and input. The establishment's responses, because of their tendency to view the right as a fringe group, were a rejection of any potential compromise with the conservatives (Brennan, 1995, p. 4). The culmination of these events and actions was a feeling among the right wing that its ideas and candidates were being neglected and ignored by the establishment.

A listing of the events that hardened the conservatives' resolve and demonstrated the establishment's dismissal of the right wing is provided on the following time line. These events include the Korean War, the 1952 Republican Convention nominating process, the actions of the Eisenhower Administration, the 1958 mid-term elections, and the 1960 presidential primaries.



The Korean War

Conservatives were generally impressed with President Truman's initial reaction when the North Korean Army invaded South Korea in June of 1950. They applauded as he promptly ordered American troops to the Korean theater. Additionally, even given a few initial setbacks of United Nations troops, the right was encouraged with General Douglas MacArthur's rout of the North Korean Army at Inchon on September 5, and with the administration's subsequent stated goal of a reunited Korea through free elections (Reinhard, 1983, p. 69).

However, the sentiment did not last. By late November, the Chinese entered the war and helped the North Korean Army drive United Nations troops deep into South Korea. The Chinese participation changed the scope of the war in the administration's eyes and brought about a change in its strategy. Now the administration's objective was limited "only to a free South Korea" (Reinhard, 1983, p. 69). The right renounced this aim of limitation as they called on the

administration to either commit to what the right now viewed as a full-fledged Sino-American war or to depart Korea completely.

MacArthur also rejected the administration's limitation strategy. He strongly requested authority to confront the Chinese through such strategies as "blockading the Chinese coast, bombing Chinese targets, and using Chinese nationalist troops" (Reinhard, 1983, p. 69). When he was refused, MacArthur took his complaints to the House Republican leader, Joseph Martin. When Martin subsequently made public MacArthur's criticisms, Truman stripped the general of his command.

The right was outraged. For conservatives, MacArthur echoed their belief that America should pursue victory, not limited action. Some conservatives believed that the general was fired because he sought and could achieve a military victory. As Captain Eddie Rickenbacker opined, "General MacArthur, with victory within his grasp, was fired, and we lost the only war in our history" (quoted in Kolkey, 1983, pp. 21-22). In 1961, Major General Edwin Walker called MacArthur's firing "a turning point in our country's history and an obvious censorship of the determination to win" (quoted in Kolkey, 1983, p. 22).

As the war and the administration's policy of limitation progressed, the right wing became further infuriated when Truman decided to send American troops to Europe as part of the United States' commitment to NATO. Truman's action bewildered conservatives--why strengthen America's troop position in Europe when in Korea, the Chinese were overrunning the Army?

By the war's end in 1953, conservatives felt that the administration's war strategy, its treatment of General Douglas MacArthur in his quest to win the war, the results of the Korean War, and the Republican establishment's endorsement of these actions were scandalous and unpatriotic. As a result, the right was disturbed and irritated by the actions of the Truman administration and the Republican Party establishment. As conservatives saw it, the war cost the lives of more than 50,000 American soldiers (Goldwater, 1988, p. 113) and ended on terms that benefited the enemy. Goldwater observed, "Until 1950, America had never lost a shooting war" and "with victory in our hands, we chose instead the bitterness of stalemate" (Goldwater, 1962, p. 31). He elaborated on this statement in his autobiography, "We did not try to win the war in Korea. It was the first time in history that an American President sent men into battle and tied their hands" (Goldwater, 1988, p. 113). In addition, conservatives viewed the government's war strategy as evidence of the Democratic administration's and Republican Party establishment's reluctance to confront communism, even given America's military superiority.

The 1952 Republican Convention

Another event that angered the right wing was the 1952 presidential convention. Since 1940, the right had watched as liberal Republican nominees (Willkie in 1940 and Dewey in 1944 and 1948) were selected due to their close ties to the establishment and because "the Establishment of the East Coast...dominated the conventions of the Republican Party" (White, 1966, p. 88).

In 1952, though, conservatives believed their party had a good chance to take over the White House and that a conservative candidate, specifically Senator Robert Taft, would be the nominee.

However, in 1952 the Eastern establishment wanted as the Republican candidate, General Dwight D. Eisenhower - a well known, non-partisan war hero. To ensure Eisenhower's nomination, the establishment worked the delegates in whatever way possible to lock up votes. The efforts included such actions as spreading the idea that Taft could not win the general election, threatening delegates with loss of state jobs and loans, and bribing conventioners. The last action is recounted in a 1964 conversation between then Senator Hubert H. Humphrey and then President Lyndon B. Johnson:

Humphrey: I think it may, if he [Goldwater] hasn't got it [the Republican nomination] locked up and I doubt that he's got it really locked up. The big money in the East,¹ you know Mr. President, could move in as they've done before.

LBJ: I've seen 'em do it, like that '52, when Taft had Pennsylvania and Fine arrived strong for Taft and the next morning, when steel got through with him, he turned and flipped.²

¹Meaning Eastern Wall Street Republican interests.

²At the 1952 Republican convention in Chicago, Pennsylvania steel interests helped push Governor John Fine from backing Robert Taft to Eisenhower. (Beschloss, 1997, p. 420)

The tactics worked. Eisenhower won the nomination. As described by White, "The [Easterners] who had imposed Willkie in 1940, won the nomination for Dewey in 1944 and 1948, frustrated Taft and installed Eisenhower in 1952" (1966, p. 89). Hodgson comes to the same conclusion in his study of the right's ascendancy, "Taft was passed over again in favor of the candidate [Eisenhower]

the Eastern Republicans had cleverly brought in because he could win and they knew that one of their own could not" (1996, p. 50).

As a result, the right wing again felt jilted. After losing the nomination to Eisenhower, Taft stated that "every Republican candidate for President since 1936 has been nominated by the Chase Bank" (quoted in Kolkey, 1983, p. 22). Political analyst Morris Bealle observed that the "nomination was bought, stolen, bribed and blackmailed from the popular choice" (quoted in Kolkey, 1983, p. 24).

The Eisenhower Administration

The frustration of the right that resulted from Eisenhower's nomination was compounded by the actions of his administration during its two terms. Initially, the right felt as if it would be given some input by the nominee. Eisenhower and Taft met after the convention and the former agreed to promote a conservative agenda in return for Taft's blessings (Kolkey, 1983, p. 27). Eisenhower then went on to win the election promising a conservative administration.

Still, even given his pledges, conservatives realized Eisenhower would not be stalwart toward their doctrine. As Kolkey (1983) comments:

[conservatives] held no illusions about General Eisenhower as the GOP standard-bearer. He remained a very poor substitute for the beloved Taft. In addition, even as a military hero Eisenhower ranked well below the stature of the legendary General Douglas MacArthur. (p. 24)

Yet, Eisenhower's promises were enough to give most conservatives some hope. Goldwater supported Eisenhower over Taft at the 1952 Republican convention. He felt "that Ike was a fresh political personality, he could win, and the party needed a new beginning" (Goldwater, 1988, p. 96). And even into his

first term, Eisenhower's statements continued to satisfy Goldwater. As noted by Goldberg (1995) in his study of Goldwater:

President Eisenhower's call for "dynamic conservatism" cheered Goldwater. The Arizona senator approved of the administration's efforts to restrain spending, pare bureaucracy, and reduce government competition with private industry, especially in the public power area. (p. 101)

However the right's mood ultimately turned. By the time Eisenhower's two terms ended, conservatives were frustrated. As sociologist Daniel Bell stated, "eight years of moderation proved more frustrating than twenty years of opposition" (quoted in Kolkey, 1983, p. 27).

The right was disappointed on two fronts. First, instead of disassembling the programs of the New Deal, Eisenhower left them intact, focusing instead on controlling costs and bureaucracy. This non-action allowed New Deal programs to become further entrenched in society. Goldberg notes that "Eisenhower preserved the welfare state and, in accepting the expanded federal role in social and economic affairs, legitimized and consolidated liberal programs" (Goldberg, 1995, p. 105).

Taft soundly expressed the right's dissatisfaction along these lines. In responding to the administration's announcement that it would be unable to balance its budget, he fumed to Eisenhower: "With a program like this, we'll never elect a Republican congress in 1954. You're taking us down the same road Truman traveled. It's a repudiation of everything we promised in the campaign" (Reinhard, 1983, p. 103).

Goldwater also expressed dissatisfaction with Eisenhower's promise breaking and spending. In addition to feeling that Eisenhower had let down both conservatives and party principles (Goldberg, 1995, p. 105), Goldwater was dismayed by the administration's actions. As he recounts in his autobiography:

I just didn't understand Ike. During the 1952 campaign he had said, in the clearest terms agreeing with Ohio senator Robert Taft, that he'd reduce federal outlays to \$60 billion by fiscal 1955. Yet he proposed to spend nearly \$11 billion more than that in 1957. We were not at war, nor did the country face any national emergency necessitating such spending. (Goldwater, 1988, p. 109)

The second front that frustrated the right was the perception that the party's Eastern establishment was manipulating the administration and providing it with "me-too" advice. To conservatives, the establishment was promoting its self-interests and not those of the party or the country. As seen by Goldwater (1988):

They [the establishment] would, for example, support federal white-collar welfare while condemning welfare waste among the poor. More and more, they were joining the Democrats and bigger government for a larger slice of the federal pie. They called themselves Republicans but sought a GOP-run government not to lessen its intrusion on all our lives but to control more of how the federal establishment spent its funds....They wanted the big to get bigger and had abandoned the rest of us. (p. 116)

The right's frustration culminated in 1957. By this time, conservatives were vexed with the administration's leadership. Goldwater in particular was annoyed with Eisenhower's lack of action against the communists in the Hungarian Revolution in 1956 and "had grown impatient with the president over patronage issues and the administration's affirmation of New and Fair Deal programs" (Goldberg, 1995, p. 118). Thus, when the administration's \$71.8

billion 1958 budget was presented in April, Goldwater, in what was not an easy task for him, publicly confronted the administration on the Senate floor. He delivered a strongly worded speech that railed against the proposed programs – to such a degree that the incident caused a gap in his relationship with Eisenhower that was never bridged.¹

In his speech, Goldwater dissented with the President's proposed budget, denouncing it as a "dimestore New Deal" (quoted in Kolkey, 1983, p. 28) that demonstrated that the administration "had been lured by 'the siren song of socialism'" ("The Republican split", 1957, p. 26). From the Floor, Goldwater outlined the broken campaign promises, his bewilderment with the administration's programs, and his interpretation of the principles the administration was "peddling."

A \$71.7 billion budget not only shocks me, but it weakens my faith in the constant assurances we have received from this administration that its goal is to cut spending, balance the budget, reduce the national debt, cut taxes—in short, to live within our means.

How long can we can we in Washington bask in the shade of the money tree, thinking that somewhere in its branches grow dollar bills which we are going to use to place the rest of the world in this international welfare state in which we find ourselves.

Its [the administration and the Party establishment] spokesmen are peddlers of the philosophy that the Constitution is outmoded, that states' rights are void, and that the only hope for the future of these United States is for our people to be federally born, federally housed, federally clothed, federally supported in their occupations, and to be buried in a federal box in a federal cemetery. (quoted in Wood & Smith, 1961, pp. 139-141)

In addition to its rhetoric, there was an additional important implication that stemmed from Goldwater's speech. Namely, the speech was one in a line of more frequent comments from him dissenting with the administration. As a

result, Goldwater was beginning to take shape, both nationally and among the right, as a viable and attractive conservative alternative to the establishment's Republicanism. This attention was evidenced by Time's declaration, immediately following the budget speech, of Goldwater as the right's "most articulate spokesman" ("The Republican split", 1957, p. 26). As explained by Goldberg, Goldwater's "dissent, fused with a vision of change and new possibilities, quickly became the rallying cry for a generation of conservatives and made him a national figure" (Goldberg, 1995, p. 119).

In addition to politicians, conservatives outside the Capitol were also disappointed with the administration. Among the media, William F. Buckley, Jr. complained that "Eisenhower did nothing whatever for the Republican Party; nothing to develop a Republican philosophy of government; nothing to catalyze a meaty American conservatism" (quoted in Kolkey, 1983, p. 27).

Finally, in 1959, one more act of note by Goldwater occurred that helped solidify his standing among conservatives as a man willing to stand for their principles. As opposed to the actions described above, this one was done in tandem with the administration.

In April 1959, Senators John F. Kennedy and Sam Ervin proposed a bill aiming to help control union excesses. Against unanimous support in the Senate, Goldwater was adamant in his belief that the bill did not do what it was purported to do. With Eisenhower's Secretary of Labor providing direct input, Goldwater attempted to attach 18 amendments to rectify problem on the bill, all of which were rejected.

Goldwater then voted alone as the bill passed the Senate 90 to 1. He called it a “panty-waist bill’ that was ‘like a flea bite to a bull elephant’” (Goldberg, 1995, p. 135). Goldwater felt the bill lacked any substantive measures to protect against abuses of the unions, which he felt “now stand across the nation like a colossus and no power outside of Government can compare with them in magnitude” (quoted in Goldberg, 1995, p. 135).

Summoned by Eisenhower to explain his position, Goldwater willingly outlined the areas he felt were lacking. Eisenhower had his strategists re-study the bill and subsequently spoke on national television explaining the bill’s faults and calling on Congress to pass a more comprehensive bill. In September, the Senate reversed its previous support of the Kennedy-Ervin bill and voted 95 to 2 in support of a revised bill that contained most of Goldwater’s suggested revisions.

1958 Elections

Nationwide, the 1958 elections were disastrous to Republicans, the worst since 1936. In the House of Representatives, Democrats took forty-nine Republican seats while only one Republican won a Democratic seat. Among the Senate, Democrats won thirteen Republican seats versus no loss of Democratic seats. Additionally, in state elections, Republicans lost five governorships and approximately 700 legislative seats. As L. Brent Bozell observed: “Let us conservatives not look for the silver lining, there is none” (quoted in Reinhard, 1983, p. 147).

However, the elections are important in the study of the conservatives' rise in that they had a "defining effect for Goldwater and the Republican Party" (Goldberg, 1995, p. 132). This consequential aftermath resulted from two events.

First, Senator William Knowland, a Senate's conservative leader and the right wing's best hope for the 1960 presidential nomination lost his bid for Governor of California. Knowland's loss effectively ended his political career and national standing as a Republican political leader.

Second, Goldwater decisively won re-election in Arizona despite the national Democratic landslide (he was the only Republican Senator west of the Mississippi River to win) and an influx of union funds targeting his defeat. As with his initial election in 1952, Goldwater defeated Ernest McFarland. In 1952, Goldwater defeated McFarland when he was the Senate Majority Leader. Then in 1958, McFarland was the Governor of Arizona when he challenged Goldwater. In the latter scenario, Goldwater's victory stood out among conservatives. He was a Republican who not only retained his Senate seat as other Republicans were losing theirs, but did so against a Democratic trend, by standing up to the unions, and defeating a strong Democratic opponent in a state where Democrats outnumbered Republicans two-to-one (Goldberg, 1995, p. 125).

As a result of his victory, Goldwater was being seen by some as the recognized leader of the right. Knowland had been defeated and Goldwater had decisively survived a Democratic onslaught amid a Republican rout. Additionally, his success further solidified the right wing's view that Goldwater's agenda, and

not the establishment's, was the winning strategy for Republicans. As Human Events declared, Goldwater was the "Man of the Hour" (Brennan, 1995, p. 30).

1960

Various events in 1960 played a pivotal role in shaping the upcoming conservative insurgency. The consequences resulting from these events gave the right the impetus needed to finally take action within the Party to make its voices heard. The results also made clear who would be the leader for its cause.

The first important event was the race between New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller and Vice President Richard Nixon for the Republican presidential nomination. For conservatives, Nixon was the choice. Even though he had never been a favorite of the right wing, he was more palatable than the liberal Rockefeller, "the hated bankroller of the Eastern Liberal Establishment" (Kolkey, 1983, p. 30). Goldwater accentuated the differences between the right and Rockefeller in 1959. At the Western Republican Conference he declared, in response to Rockefeller's presence there, "My kind of Republican party is committed to a free state, limited central power, a reduction in bureaucracy, and a balanced budget" (quoted in Stengel, 1986, p. 24).

An additional occurrence in 1960 that was important in shaping the Republican Party was Nixon's mid-convention acquiescence to Rockefeller as respects the latter's view on the direction of the Republican's election platform. After hearing of dissension by Rockefeller's strategists, Nixon asked an intermediary to telephone Rockefeller to request a meeting between the Vice-

President and Rockefeller. After conferring with his strategists, Rockefeller's responded by standing firm with tough demands for a meeting, confident that the Vice-President would capitulate. In his study of the 1960 election, White detailed the terms:

That Nixon telephone Rockefeller personally with his request for a meeting; that they meet at the Rockefeller apartment, not at Brownell's house; that the meeting be secret and later be announced in a press release from the Governor [Rockefeller], not Nixon; that the meeting clearly be announced as taking place at the Vice-President's request. (1961, p. 197)

In an action that was unknown to his entourage, Nixon acceded to all of Rockefeller's demands and agreed to fly that same night to New York. After meeting from 7:30 in the evening to 3:20 in the morning, Nixon came away unsuccessful in his bid to convince Rockefeller to be his Vice-President and having agreed to accommodations in the Republican plank that satisfied Rockefeller (White, 1961, pp. 197-198). Less than two hours after the end of the meeting, Nixon finally informed his office what occurred and the Rockefeller team released a national press release that began: "The Vice-President and I met today at my home in New York City. The meeting took place at the Vice-President's request" (White, 1961, p. 198).

The meeting and agreement, which became known as the "Fifth Avenue Compact," (named so after Rockefeller's Manhattan address) greatly infuriated and alienated the right for two reasons. First, they were not consulted. Goldwater had talked to Nixon the morning when he decided to telephone Brownell and was not told anything about the upcoming phone call. The right

had again been pushed aside as the Eastern establishment continued its imposition of its ideological will at a Party convention. Second, by his going to Rockefeller, Nixon was seen as subordinating himself to the establishment in order to compromise with them.

Goldwater expressed the views of the right. He bitterly called the pact a “surrender” and labeled it the “Munich of the Republican Party” (White, 1961, p. 199).

Consequently, a void was created among conservatives since they had no leader or candidate. Confidence in Nixon was lost and old leaders were either dead (Taft) or gone (Knowland). The natural selection to fill this void was Barry Goldwater. As noted in the National Review, the right had “no organization or even personal vehicle around which to build...the phenomenon of Barry Goldwater may change that” (quoted in Kolkey, 1983, p. 175).

Ultimately, the pact, the conservatives’ anger with it, and the conservatives’ need for a leader all contributed to the final paramount event in 1960--a “Goldwater for President” movement. At the convention, the Arizona and South Carolina delegations (against Goldwater’s request) placed Goldwater’s name in nomination. As a result, Goldwater was able to address the convention in order to withdraw his name and release his delegates. This opportunity provided an additional occasion for Goldwater to be introduced to a national Republican audience and solidify his position as the emerging leader among conservatives. The speech also provided Goldwater a chance to be seen as a

dynamic leader, as he made a plea for party unity by telling his followers to “grow up” and support Nixon:

We are conservatives. This great Republican Party is our historic house. This is our home...We have lost election after election in this country in the last several years because conservative Republicans get mad and stay home. Now I implore you. Forget it! We've had our chance, and I think the conservatives have made a splendid showing at this convention....Let's grow up conservatives. Let's if we want to take this party back – and I think we can someday – let's get to work.” (“Text of Goldwater's withdrawal speech”, 1961, p. 14)

Goldwater, for his part, led the way in supporting Nixon over Kennedy. Going into the November election, Goldwater made 126 speeches in 26 states (Brennan, 1995, p. 36). Though the right also moved ahead supporting Nixon over Kennedy, the support was halfhearted. To conservatives, Nixon versus Kennedy represented the lesser of two evils. As William F. Buckley wrote in the National Review, “We are ready for either President Nixon or President Kennedy; our bomb shelters are in good order” (Buckley, 1960, p. 234).

The 1960 elections ended up being a close race. On election night, the lead jostled back and forth between the two candidates until Nixon finally conceded to Kennedy (Brennan, 1995, p. 37). To conservatives, the reason for the defeat was obvious. The right blamed Nixon's loss on his “pulling his punches,” especially in light of his pact with Rockefeller. The conservative press concurred; National Review's editors stated that Nixon tried too much to be like his opponent and that the democrats intimidated him (Brennan, 1995, p. 39). Goldwater commented that Nixon was another “me-too” candidate.

However, in the face of their party's defeat, the right was strengthened in its resolve to develop a strategy for 1964, and one that would not be circumvented by another "me-too" candidate. Goldwater fired the first volley of the 1964 campaign by announcing that he was going to work for the Party toward the selection of a nominee (although not himself). And in a not so veiled reference to Rockefeller, Goldwater stated that he wanted a candidate who would be a conservative, not someone who would "ape the New Deal" (quoted in Reinhard, 1983, p. 156). Thus, after years as the ignored and abused minority, conservative activists were resolute in their determination to follow Goldwater's words and take control of their party.

A primary reason for the right's renewed energy was its recognition of a new and exciting leader. Throughout 1960, Goldwater's national name recognition and his standing among conservatives as a leading spokesman had grown. Critical to this growth were the following factors.

First, Goldwater continued to serve as the chairman of the Senate Republican campaign committee. Through this position, he traveled the nation stumping for Republicans, espousing his conservative philosophy, and enhancing his national exposure.

Second, 1960 saw the start of a successful literary career that resulted in increased exposure for Goldwater and his views. In January, the Los Angeles Times asked Goldwater to write a thrice-weekly column entitled "How Do You Stand Sir?" (Shadegg, 1965, p. 25). In April the column became syndicated and by the end of the year it was appearing in 80 newspapers (at its end in 1962, the

column was seen in over 140 newspapers (Shadegg, 1965, p. 27)). Soon after the start of the column, Goldwater was asked to write a book summarizing conservative philosophy. The Conscience of a Conservative was a "runaway success" that sold 3.5 million copies by 1964 (Hodgson, 1996, p. 97).

Finally, Goldwater's position as the conservative's choice to carry its torch toward the next election was solidified with his appearance and speech at the convention. Commenting on his performance, Brennan states that Goldwater "inspired conservative faith and raised hopes for the future (1995, p. 38). White observes that "One could almost fix the moment of its [Goldwater's place as nominee] at the Chicago convention in 1960" (1966, p. 112). Good looking, photogenic, rugged, bold, indomitable, and a stalwart conservative, Goldwater was the natural selection. For conservatives, "here, at last, was an electable conservative Republican" and who, as opposed to Taft and Nixon, "did not suffer from a loser's image" (Brennan, 1995, p. 32). His message resonated among those who were concerned with too much governmental control, a balanced budget

The Road to 1964

After the 1960 election, Goldwater actively spent the next few years stumping for the conservative cause. From talk shows to the lecture circuit to magazines and newspapers, Goldwater became a salesman for the right's views. "Tall and tan with a handsome, ruggedly sculptured face, dark horn-rimmed glasses, and wavy gray-white hair, Goldwater looked like a President" (Reinhard,

1983, p. 159). In addition, he had charm and vigor and was a jet pilot (he was a Major in the Air Force Reserve). With these attributes, Goldwater fast became the GOP's most popular speaker (Reinhard, 1983, p. 159).

At every opportunity to express himself, Goldwater never deviated from his staunch, pre-New Deal, conservative views. And he did so without thought to the political fallout. He wanted less government intrusion in people's lives, but he felt his views were different from the standard conservative blanket opposition to government programs. "I try to be for something," Goldwater said "I don't just say I'm against Federal aid--period. I say let the federal government reduce its costs and its burdens, and allow state and local governments to assure more responsibility" (quoted in Reinhard, 1983, p. 162). Goldwater claimed he could easily run for President on Franklin D. Roosevelt's platform--albeit his 1932 platform that called for a strong currency, less spending, a balanced budget, and a smaller federal payroll.

In a 1961 profile, Time noted Goldwater's emerging presence and influence in the Party. Time called Goldwater the "GOP salesman supreme and the political phenomenon of 1961." In addition, the article added that whether or not he would be the 1964 Republican candidate, he "will have plenty to say about the tone and spirit of his party's next platform, and even more to say about who will be standing on it" ("Republicans: Salesman for a cause", 1961, p. 16).

As a result of his exposure, Goldwater, by mid 1961, had fast become the candidate of choice for the GOP. A poll of 1960 convention delegates placed

Goldwater as the choice for President with 49.3% versus a combined 44.4% for Nixon or Rockefeller (Reinhard, 1983, p. 159).

However, Goldwater did not consider himself a candidate. In June of 1961, when asked about his desire for the White House, Goldwater replied "I have no plans for it. I have no staff for it, and no ambition for it. Besides I've got a Jewish name...I don't know if the country is ready for me" (quoted in "Republicans: Salesman for a cause", 1961, p. 16). Goldwater's lack of desire for the position is emphasized in his discounting of his and the other leading Republican candidates' chances: "Rockefeller would be a hard sell to the Middle West. I would be a hard sell to the Eastern seaboard. Nixon would be a hard sell to everybody" (quoted in "Republicans: Salesman for a cause", 1961, p. 16).

As early as 1961, the talk of Goldwater being a leading candidate for the 1964 GOP nomination was prevalent enough to have reached President Kennedy. As recounted by Goldwater, when summoned to the White House by President Kennedy to discuss privately the results of the first phase of the Bay of Pigs invasion, the first words from the President were, "So you want this fucking job, do you?" (Goldwater, 1979, p. 137) Goldwater replied that Kennedy had been reading too many conservative newspapers.

In addition to Goldwater's efforts, two events in the political arena also helped strengthen Goldwater's position as a leading prospect for the GOP nomination. First, the Republican members of Congress elected in the early sixties were increasingly conservative and regarded Goldwater as an advocate for their conservatism. The newly elected conservatives faulted the GOP

leadership for being too moderate and not offering Republican alternatives in response to Kennedy's proposals. As White (1966) observes, "the new mood of the [conservatives] insisted that the [government's] course of affairs be reversed" (p. 113).

The second event resulted in one less potential GOP candidate for 1964. In 1962, Nixon lost in his bid for the governorship of California. Nixon entered the race to solidify his political base that was needed if he was to make a run for the 1964 presidential race. However, Nixon lost to the popular Democratic incumbent Pat Brown. After the loss, Nixon did not help his already dim chances for 1964 when he proclaimed to the press that they "wouldn't have Nixon to kick around anymore, because...this is my last press conference" (quoted in Brennan, 1995, p. 52).

By the late fall of 1963, Goldwater had decided to run against Kennedy. His national appeal had grown. Democratic Senator William Proxmire of Wisconsin commented that his office received virtually the same number of letters praising Goldwater as praising Kennedy (Matthews, 1997, p. 663). In addition, poll numbers supported a run. The numbers indicated a surging Goldwater popularity (between February, 1963 and November, 1963, with Goldwater still undecided, his support for a presidential bid against Kennedy narrowed from a forty point deficit to a sixteen point deficit), as well as a vulnerable Kennedy. As respects the latter, by October, 1963, Kennedy's approval ratings had shrunk to 57%; 66% of the public disapproved of his spending record; his popularity had dropped by 16% in the East and even further

in the Midwest, far West, and South; and, among Catholics and Democrats, Kennedy's support had fallen by 11 points (Matthews, 1997, pp. 663-664).

The poll numbers and Goldwater's viability as a candidate were not lost on others. The Kennedy administration was concerned with possible defeat in the South and a tight race in other states. Journalist Stewart Alsop commented that "among the political professional, [there was] a feeling that Goldwater just might make it all the way to the White House" (Matthews, 1997, p. 664).

Another factor entering into Goldwater's decision to run against Kennedy, was that he was eager to do so. Even though the two differed politically, they were friends. Goldwater stated he "had developed a warm personal relationship with John F. Kennedy" (Goldwater, 1979, p. 137). In turn, "Kennedy had told Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. that Goldwater 'was a man of decency and character'" (Brennan, 1995, p. 70). Both had served in World War II and they had worked together as Senators investigating unions in the fifties. In addition, Goldwater looked forward to providing the country with an issues-oriented campaign. The two had even laid out plans for a Lincoln-Douglas style debate tour across the country that emphasized issues and Democrat vs. Republican philosophies as opposed to insults of character.

Ultimately, Goldwater's vision for the 1964 presidential race took a tragic turn as Kennedy was assassinated in 1963. In Kennedy's place was Lyndon Johnson. Losing his taste for the 1964 bid, Goldwater initially withdrew from the race. One reason was that he had detested Johnson. Goldwater thought he was a "dirty fighter" and a "master of manipulation" (Matthews, 1997, p. 665). In a

political race, Goldwater felt “that it was necessary to oppose, but to oppose without hate,” and he felt Johnson was “incapable of opposing without hate” (Goldwater, 1979, p. 160). Additionally, Johnson’s conservative reputation took away Goldwater’s edge in the South and the border states (e.g., Texas, North Carolina, Kentucky, Missouri, Tennessee, Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Virginia). As a final impetus to withdraw, Goldwater believed that a grieving country would not be in the mood to change presidents.

After consideration though, Goldwater thought that if he dropped out of the race, he would be disappointing the people who had supported and worked for him so far. He also questioned who the Party would turn to in his place and the resulting direction the Party would take. Thus, not wishing to abandon supporters or a cause, Goldwater decided to run, even realizing that he had limited chances of winning. Goldwater’s desire to support the right’s cause, even in a race he would lose, is noted by Kathleen Hall Jamieson in her study of presidential campaigns:

If ever there was a campaign in which one candidate sought to win the election while the other was more interested in winning the point, the 1964 presidential race between Lyndon Johnson and Barry Goldwater was that contest. (Jamieson, 1992, p. 169)

White’s observations of Goldwater’s motives to run in the first place helped shed light on his decision to re-enter a race he did not particularly care for, against an opponent he did not particularly like:

Essentially, Goldwater thought of himself, and still does, not as a man prepared to or even desiring to run and administer the government of the United States, but as a leader of a cause. This cause is precious to him; his loyalty to it is sincere and unblemished. (White, 1966, p. 112)

Finally, in addition to the above-mentioned components of “The Road to 1964,” there was an additional factor that contributed to the right’s ascension and its seizure of control of the Party’s control. Namely, the establishment’s continued disregard in the 60’s for the minority faction. Brennan sums up this factor effectively in the following:

In fact, liberal Republicans continued to overlook the increasing strength of the conservative wing. Whether the signs were not as clear then as they appear today, whether liberals assumed that conservatives would never gain the strength needed to take control of the party, or whether liberals arrogantly assumed conservatives would never attempt such a feat, liberal Republicans turned a blind eye to conservatives, except occasionally to disparage them as the “lunatic fringe.” Conservatives, meanwhile, used these four years to consolidate their membership, to attempt to root out the more irrational extremist elements from their movement, and to build an organization to draft their own presidential candidate, Barry Goldwater. (1995, p. 59)

Thus, the stage was set for the right wing’s ascension to power. The change in power eventually transpired in 1964 with the first ballot Republican nomination of the conservatives’ choice, Barry Goldwater, for President. His rise and nomination marked the end of the Eastern establishment’s domination of the party’s control and the beginning of influence from conservative party members from the West and the South.

Chapter 3 has chronicled the events surrounding the right’s insurgency that led to its drive to obtain power of the Party. In Chapter 4, the paper will apply to the events described above, the characteristics of a social movement and a movement leader as defined in the Chapter 2.

Chapter Notes

¹As a result of their breach, Eisenhower assigned staff members to keep an eye on comments made by Goldwater regarding him and the administration, a routine that he maintained even after he left the White House. (Goldberg, 1995, p. 121)

²From the convention in Chicago, Nixon telephoned Herbert Brownell, a former Attorney-General, key Eisenhower campaign strategist, and political confidant of Thomas Dewey. He asked Brownell to contact Rockefeller and relay that Nixon had no differences with Rockefeller, that he would like to come to New York immediately from Chicago to talk, and could they meet at Brownell's house (neutral ground).

³Similar to a conquering general savoring the spoils of victory, Rockefeller is described by White as a three hour four-way phone call is initiated at midnight to inform representatives of Nixon and Rockefeller in Chicago of the agreements:

Nixon, who sat at the desk in Rockefeller's private study; and Rockefeller...who lounged, sitting, on his bed in the handsome room that looks out at night over the twinkling vista beyond Central Park. Nixon boggling now and again at some portion...difficult to swallow, Rockefeller...insisting, and Nixon generally yielding. (1961, p. 198)

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Chapter 2 established the definitions of a social movement and a movement leader. The next chapter then chronicled the events surrounding Goldwater's ascent to movement leader and the conservatives' ensuing take over of the Republican Party. Chapter 4 will apply the framework developed in Chapter 2 to the events outlined in Chapter 3. Using Sillars contention that "each movement exhibits a pattern of events which can be seen in other movements" (1980, p. 20), Chapter 4 will assess if there is correlation between the events of Chapter 3 and the commonalties of movements established in Chapter 2 in order to judge:

1. Whether the minority conservative faction within the Republican Party can be identified as a social movement; and,
2. If Goldwater, as the publicly viewed leader of the right wing, can be described as a social movement leader.

Issue 1

Stewart, Smith and Denton define the recognizable life cycle of a social movement as consisting of five stages: (1) Genesis, (2) Social Unrest, (3)

Enthusiastic Mobilization, (4) Maintenance, and (5) Termination. This section will look at each stage individually in applying historical events from the right's rise.

Stage 1: Genesis

According to the authors, the genesis of a movement occurs during peaceful times. In the case of the right, the imperfections that called the movement into being (e.g., events surrounding the Korean War, the actions of the Eisenhower administration and the 1952 Republican convention, etc.) can be traced to the 1950s, a time of social tranquility, financial prosperity and political consensus.

Economically, the country was still experiencing the benefits of a post war industrial boom. As Todd Gitlin writes about the decade in his book The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage, "So much of America in the Fifties seemed content, so many of the old promises redeemed..." (p. 2) and affluence was "assumed to be a national condition" (p. 12).

Politically, there was a spirit of consensus. Eisenhower, a "determined non-ideologue" (Edwards, 1988, p. 58), was decisively elected President in 1952 with broad support from voters of both parties. His victory "herald[ed] a new era of bipartisanship" (Brennan, 1995, p. 7). Additionally, the political and ideological strategies of the Eastern establishment controlling the Republican Party did not call for major societal or economic changes. Ignoring the right's concerns about dismantling programs and balancing the budget, the establishment instead looked toward "following in the tradition of Theodore Roosevelt's progressivism

and embraced New Deal-style social and economic programs in the belief that such policies would alleviate class conflicts [and] lead to economic stability” (Brennan, 1995, p. 8).

The period was also peaceful as respects the right’s perceived imperfections (e.g., abuse of power, inequality, etc.). At the time, there was little discourse of the conservatives’ consternation, both in the general public and on the whole with conservatives. Therefore, to many people, the problems didn’t exist. To the public, the Republican capture of the presidency represented a conservative victory and resolution of the party’s disputes. From the right, limited dialogue was provided to the public of any perceived imperfections. As noted by Edwards, the decade was a “conservative wasteland,” where, “in the spring of 1953, there seemed to be no conservative movement in America” (Edwards, 1988, p. 58).

The scarcity of collective conservative discourse regarding imperfections is evidenced in the lack of right wing think tanks and journals. As respects the former, there were none. Among the latter, there were virtually none, as opposed to at least eight magazines in which liberal writers could write opinion pieces (Edwards, 1988, pp. 59,60). Even between the existing conservative publications, one (Human Events) was a newsletter and the other (The Freeman) was financially strained. It wasn’t until late 1955 that another conservative publication entered the market. William F. Buckley’s National Review was first published in November, 1955. However, its initial years were lean, and only toward the end of the decade did the magazine’s achieve a solid base circulation

of 30,000 (Goldberg, 1995, p. 136) and the justification for Buckley to finally claim that the magazine was widely accepted as “the voice of American conservatism” (Edwards, 1988, p. 60).

The lack of organized discourse from conservatives did not mean that there was a lack of conservative agitation. Indeed, there were a growing number of conservatives appalled by the actions of the establishment. However, the effected members were disparate groups, both geographically and philosophically. This separateness kept them from acting as a collective unit. In his book, To the Right, Jerome Himmelstein observes that “by the mid-1950s “several [conservative] waves of political reaction to the New Deal and its legacy” did exist, but were “still disorganized and powerless” (p. 63).

As described by Brennan in Turning Right in the Sixties, the factions ranged from businesspeople in the South and West who “stressed individual initiative over welfare programs, [and] preferred free enterprise rather than government regulation” (1995, p. 8), to “midwesterners who also felt excluded from the ‘Establishment’ (1995, p. 8). Philosophically, the groups included members who were foreign policy isolationists, to “Asia-Firsters” concerned with assisting the Far East, particularly with regard to the spread of communism (communism in the U.S. was a different matter and concern for it was expressed by establishment members as well as conservatives). Differing factions also existed among conservative intellectuals. A sampling of these groups included “traditionalists”, who “criticized the cult of conformity [in the Western world] and the emergence of what they labeled as the ‘mass man’” (1995, p. 9);

conservatives who, although apprehensive about the impending “Big Brother” state, recognized a role for government in community life; and libertarians who called limited, if any, government involvement and for free market economics.

An additional element of Stage 1 described by Stewart, Smith, and Denton is that the persuasion technique of the movement requires that it define the movement’s issues. This component is seen during the early fifties in the rhetoric of conservative spokespersons. As Brennan writes, “conservative writers [and]...editors helped acquaint the public with the philosophical and practical tenets of conservatism...” (Brennan, p. 11). In particular, this technique is evident in the discourse of two of the period’s principal sources of conservative thought—Buckley and Russell Kirk.

Buckley, as editor and founder of National Review, shaped readers’ perceptions of conservative issues. His conservative journal “was more than just a chronicler of contemporary events,” it “articulat[ed] conservative grievances” (Brennan, 1995, p. 11). As respects Kirk, the use of “defining” rhetoric was evident in his influential 1953 book The Conservative Mind.¹ The result was a “brilliant distillation of conservative thinking,” a “synthesis of the ideas of some of the greatest conservative thinkers of the 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries, men like Edmund Burke, the Adamses, deTocqueville, Disraeli, Brownson, Paul Elmer More, Santayana” (Edwards, 1988, p. 60).

In terms of their impact on the movement, Buckley and Kirk served as conservative intellectuals and prophets. As described by Edwards, Kirk and

Buckley were, respectively, “the man of ideas, the intellectual, the philosopher; then the man of interpretation, the journalist, the popularizer” (1988, p. 59).

Stewart, Smith, and Denton also write that movements are evidenced in Stage 1 by a continuing belief that working within the system will bring about the changes being called for by the burgeoning movement. Evidence of this trait is found in Goldwater’s actions. At the 1952 Republican convention, he was a delegate for Eisenhower, not Taft—even though Taft represented views more in line with Goldwater’s conservative principles. In addition, during Eisenhower’s tenure, Goldwater “muted his criticism of the Republican administration” (Himmelstein, 1990, p. 66). Even after his open break in 1957 with the White House and the Party’s liberal establishment,² Goldwater still worked closely with it to effect changes, as witnessed by his cooperation with the administration to defeat the Kennedy-Ervin labor reform bill. His support represented Goldwater’s faith in an establishment candidate as someone who would listen to the concerns and opinions of the minority faction and his belief in the viability of working through establishment channels.

Eventually, the frustrations of Stage 1 develop until a “triggering effect” pushes the movement to the second stage of social unrest. The event that was the catalyst for the right can be traced to the “Fifth Avenue Pact” between Nixon and Rockefeller during the 1960 Republican convention. Nixon’s “surrender” and “damned sellout” to Rockefeller and the “New York ‘kingmakers’” (Reinhard, 1983, p. 154) infuriated conservatives and spurred them into action against the establishment.

Goldwater, particularly incensed with Nixon for reversing a pledge to endorse a right-to-work plank in the Party platform (Goldberg, 1995, p. 145), changed his strategy for the convention. He had originally planned to release his delegates before the opening of the convention in a show of Party unity for Nixon. After the news of Nixon's trip surfaced though, Goldwater told his aide that his prepared statement "could wait" (Goldwater, 1979, p. 112).

Supporters of Goldwater (estimated by Nixon strategist Leonard Hall at almost 300 delegates (Reinhard, 1983, p. 154)) responded defiantly. For example, the Texas delegation voted to release its commitment to Nixon. However, in an action that laid the groundwork for Stage 2, conservatives at the delegation "placed [Goldwater's] name in nomination and paraded in support of their candidate" (Goldberg, 1995, p. 145).³

Goldwater realized that he could not win the nomination and, taking advantage of an unexpected opportunity, addressed the convention in order to withdraw his name. Through his speech, Goldwater was able to make a call for party unity: "This country is too important for anyone's feelings...to stay home and not work just because he doesn't agree" ("Text of Goldwater's withdrawal speech", 1961, p. 14). More importantly though, as respects the movement, Goldwater summoned the members to channel their anger and resentment into mobilization and action toward taking power of the Party: "Let's grow up conservatives. Let's if we want to take this party back—and I think we can someday—let's get to work" ("Text of Goldwater's withdrawal speech", 1961, p. 14).

The description of the 1960 convention as a “triggering event,” that propelled the movement into Stage 2, is borne out by Theodore H. White and George Will. White, in his analysis of the 1960 election, stated “One could almost fix the moment of [the conservative movement’s] birth at the Chicago convention of 1960” (1966, p. 112). Will commented that “the 1960s began as a decade of dissent....in Chicago in 1960, when Arizona’s junior senator strode to the podium” (Will, 1998, p. M5).

Additionally, the convention confirmed Goldwater’s position as the man movement members would follow in the next stage. The movement’s acceptance of Goldwater as its leader is evidenced in the New York Times post-convention declaration: “Now, their [conservatives] hearts belong to Barry” (quoted in Goldberg, 1995, p. 146). After the disorganization of the fifties, the 1960 convention galvanized the conservatives to work collectively and challenge the Eastern establishment’s control of the Party.

Stage 2. Social Unrest

Once in the second stage, there are factors that evidence the movement’s progression. These include further catalytic events that help propel the movement to Stage 3, increasing numbers of movement members, some recognition of the resistance by the establishment (albeit with dismissal of its significance), and a spirit of organization among the members. Further, the rhetoric seen in this stage serves the function of “transforming perceptions of

reality and society and prescribing courses of action” (Stewart, et al., 1994, p. 85).

In the social unrest stage, movement members start to coalesce, organize, and speak out. In addition, the movement creates a manifesto that identifies problems, the people who caused the problems and solutions to those problems. Applying these attributes to the conservative movement, one finds components of this cycle apparent in the movement.

First, there was greater interest in conservative journals and publications. In the early sixties, the readership of the National Review tripled from 30,000 to 90,000 (Himmelman, 1990, p. 67); Human Events had 50,000 subscribers; various other conservative publications had total circulation of over 300,000; and publishing companies such as Henry Regnery and Victor Publishing Company focussed solely on conservative issues and writers (Goldberg, 1995, p. 136). Conservative figures also were starting to be published and mass marketed. Buckley, in addition to his National Review duties began writing a newspaper column in 1961. Also, Goldwater published his best selling book The Conscience of a Conservative. Co-written with L. Brent Bozell (Buckley’s brother-in-law), the book was a compilation of Goldwater’s syndicated column “How Do You Stand, Sir?” Written by Stephen Shadegg (Goldwater’s political manager), and based on subjects selected by Goldwater, the column appeared in over 140 newspapers by mid-1961 (Shadegg, 1965, p. 25). Between 1960 and mid-1961, the book sold 700,000 copies.

The publication of The Conscience of a Conservative is pivotal to the study of the right as a movement in that it fulfills an important part of Stewart, Smith, and Denton's Stage 2. According to the authors, a movement manifesto emerges during this stage. In line with the function of the movement's rhetoric ("transforming perceptions of reality and society and prescribing courses of action" (Stewart, et al., 1994, p. 85)), the movement's proclamation accomplishes three objectives--it identifies imperfections, the sources of the imperfections, and the solutions.

As respects the conservative movement, The Conscience of a Conservative represents the movement's manifesto. Following the above-described direction, Goldwater's declaration serves three functions:

(1) "to describe the problem,"

communism, the welfare state, increased taxes and spending, and deterioration of states' rights

(2) "to identify the devils," and

communists, unions, and big government

(3) "to prescribe the solution..." (Stewart, et al., 1994, p. 22)

"reduce and to localize governmental activities and responsibilities....protect private property," and "oppose and defeat communism" (Hammerback, 1987, p. 174)

A further element of Stage 2 that the movement exhibited is a coalescing and organization of members during the early sixties. A sampling of formal groups included Americans for Constitutional Action, the Conservative Society of America, the Cardinal Mindszenty Foundation, and Defenders of the American Constitution. Additionally, the ranks of the movement started to include supporters of national stature and popularity. To potential members, these supporters added an air of credibility and legitimacy to the movement. The supporters included scholars (Clarence Manion,⁴ the retired Dean of Notre Dame Law School); politicians (former Senator William Knowland agreed to head Goldwater's California primary campaign); celebrities (John Wayne, Efrem Zimbalist, Jr., and Hedda Hopper); and business leaders (Leonard Firestone, Justin Dart, and Jack Warner).

Within the emergence of conservative organizations, growth was especially strong on the country's college campuses. In a 1961 article titled "Campus Conservatives," Time focused on the "high birth rate" of new conservative campus organizations and the revitalization of old ones across the country—even at places such as "Wisconsin, Yale, Harvard, and other academic bastions of liberalism" (Goldberg, 1995, p. 136). Specific organizations cited by Time were Milione's Intercollegiate Society of Individualists and the Young Americans for Freedom (YAF). The former had grown to 12,000 members from its founding in 1953, while the latter had gained 21,000 members on 115 campuses in less than a year of existence ("Campus conservatives", 1961, p. 34). The YAF's popularity was demonstrated at a rally in Washington supporting

the House Un-American Activities Committee where YAF supporters outnumbered opposition demonstrators.

Among the conservative organizations formed, the YAF is a good example of the period's growth in organization by individual conservatives. The group began shortly after the 1960 convention when 90 students from 44 colleges met at Buckley's Connecticut estate. The stated goal was to support conservative candidates and issues. The manifesto created at the meeting pledged support for "the individual's use of his...free will," "economic freedom," and that the U.S. "should stress victory over" communism ("The Sharon Statement", 1960, p. 173). Less than six months later, there were almost 27,000 members at over 100 campuses (Reinhard, 1983, p. 172).

Away from the campuses, the YAF held rallies and provided workers for conservative candidates. One of the highlights of these efforts was a 1962 rally at Madison Square Garden. Gathering in the heart of the Eastern liberal establishment's domain, the rally attracted more than 18,000 attendees who listened to various conservative speakers, including Goldwater as the last speaker.

A further element common to Stage 2 that is found among the right is the atmosphere of collectivity among members and the affectivity that being a member distinguishes one from establishment members. This frame of mind is especially evident among the campus right, who exhibited a "spirit of defiance" (Goldberg, 1995, p. 136). As stated by the President of the University of Wisconsin's Conservative Club at the time, "You walk around with your

Goldwater button, and you feel the thrill of treason" ("Campus conservatives", 1961, p. 37).

Stage 3. Enthusiastic Mobilization

According to Stewart, Smith and Denton, "when frustration leads to disaffection with institutions and their ability to change, the social movement enters the stage of enthusiastic mobilization" (1994, p. 25). At this point, movement members go outside the establishment since it is the only way the movement will initiate change. To accomplish change through this avenue, the movement requires a leader who is "a charismatic agitator who confronts and polarizes, excites and insults, unites and fragments" (Stewart, et al., 1994, p. 85).

One item that evidences this stage in the conservative movement is the Draft Goldwater movement. The movement was started in October, 1961, when F. Clifton White, a former political science instructor at Cornell, experienced campaign organizer, and a leader of the Young Republicans, heeded Goldwater's exhortation of "lets get to work." With the help of key strategists, Representative John Ashbrook of Ohio and National Review publisher William Rusher, twenty-two like-minded conservatives from sixteen states met at a motel in Chicago to discuss nominating a conservative Republican for president. Included in the meeting were businessmen, congressmen, state Party chairmen, and national committeemen (Hodgson, 1996, p. 99). From this and subsequent meetings, a decision was made to work toward gaining conservative power in the Republican Party, enlisting local conservative delegates for the 1964 convention,

and, with these inroads, securing a conservative nominee for the 1964 election. Eventually, the group came to the same conclusion as columnist Tom Anderson, who wrote that Goldwater was the “only electable conservative” (Brennan, 1995, p. 72). White’s group then became the National Draft Goldwater Committee⁵ and worked to build a foundation which would provide the support necessary to nominate Goldwater.

White was elected chairman and organized an office. In order to further the group’s interests, White went about “setting up state organizations to choose Goldwater delegates through primaries or at state conventions” (Hodgson, 1996, p. 99). Volunteer regional directors were chosen to oversee state, county, and local precincts. The directors’ goals were to learn how delegates were selected, secure leaders, and organize local conservatives. White’s success was evident within a year, as forty-two states had organizations set up by the end of 1962.

The Draft Goldwater Committee was a volunteer movement that worked to obtain the nomination for Goldwater. At this point, movement members had realized that a candidate to their liking was not going to come through the establishment’s party mechanism. Therefore, they went outside the Party structure to choose a candidate and set up grass roots support to ensure Goldwater’s nomination. The correlation this group has with Stewart, Smith and Denton’s definition of Stage 3 is seen in the different strategies White took. First, the group had no desire to work toward designing the Party platform (an establishment mechanism). Instead, the group wanted control of the state and local Republican precincts. From this base, the conservatives could win precinct

caucuses and county conventions that would provide the opportunity to place conservative delegates at the Party convention.

Second, White set up ties with groups independent of the Party establishment, such as the Young Republicans and the National Federation of Republican Women. In addition, White obtained convention delegate lists from as far back as 1948 in order to appeal directly to potential movement members. These moves allowed the movement to bypass the establishment and to go directly to potential supporters, as opposed to working through the usual Party mechanism (e.g., the Party's convention).

The above mentioned strategy of working outside establishment channels and directly with movement supporters are corroborated by Brennan in her assessment of White's work:

Ignoring party "bigwigs" in the early stages, White concentrated on gaining influence with such vital organizations as the Young Republicans, the Federation of Republican Women, and the Republican National Committee. He reminded committee members that their "primary goal was to build delegate strength for the 1964 national convention" and to that end urged them to organize conservatives at the precinct, district, and state level. (1995, p. 66)

The mobilization continued through to the convention. From the movement's mobilization of supporters from the local level to the state level, 130 of the 205 delegates available from non-primary states were secured for Goldwater. As noted by Rae in his study The Decline and Fall of Liberal Republicans, this count "put [Goldwater] far ahead of the other contenders and illustrated the effectiveness of the activist-oriented campaign conducted by White and his associates at the Republican grass roots" (p. 55). Combined with the

delegates won at the primary level, Goldwater gained the nomination on the first ballot with almost 300 more votes than necessary for the nomination.

Another element that Stewart, Smith, and Denton find in movements during this stage is the mobilization of the establishment against the movement and its leader, including rhetorical attacks on the opposition that label it as extreme and out of touch. These attacks are found in the actions of the establishment throughout Stage 3 as it became clear that Goldwater was going to obtain the nomination over an establishment candidate. Former Vice President Richard Nixon publicly stated that Goldwater and his views must be challenged by the Party (to which Goldwater replied that “Nixon sounded more like Harold Stassen everyday”) (Reinhard, 1983, p. 188)).

As the convention drew near, the establishment’s actions continue to track those as described by Stewart, Smith, and Denton as common establishment reaction during this stage. First, realizing that Rockefeller was not going to win the nomination, the establishment mobilized and “launched a last-minute crusade for a substitute” (Iverson, 1997, p. 112). Next, the establishment’s new candidate, Pennsylvania Governor William W. Scranton, labeled the movement as extreme and pursued grass roots support among the Party members and delegates. He and his staff began by launching a rhetorical attack against “Goldwaterism” and contacted Republican Congressional candidates telling them that they could expect to lose if Goldwater was selected as the Republican candidate. Scranton also attacked Goldwater as a fanatic. He “reinforced the image of Goldwater as an extremist....[and] continually evoked warmongering

and racist images of Goldwater” (Brennan, 1995, p. 76). Scranton’s strategy culminated on the eve of the convention as he circulated a letter to all delegates. In his letter, Scranton called the movement “a whole crazy-quilt collection of absurd and dangerous positions,” and labeled conservative delegates “a flock of chickens whose necks will be wrung at will”⁶ (quoted in Brennan, 1995, p. 76). In the end his appeal for grass roots support did not succeed. The letter further alienated staunch conservative supporters and swayed undecided delegates to Goldwater. This result was apparent in the final delegate count. Goldwater received 883 votes to Scranton’s second place tally of 214 votes.

An additional element of commonality to be addressed is Stewart, Smith, and Denton’s leadership profile and the rhetoric required during this stage. As respects rhetorical tactics, movement leaders must be careful not to use language which is too inflammatory. While strong messages are required to mobilize the movement, speeches that are too harsh can result in a loss of support. In a very close California primary race with Rockefeller, Goldwater’s speeches evidence a tempering. In describing Goldwater’s rhetoric, Rienhard states:

Goldwater...watered down the content of his message. He assured California voters that he had no plans to make Social Security voluntary. Nor did he advocate selling of the entire TVA. Although Goldwater did get entangled on the issue of the use of low-yield atomic bombs in Vietnam, detailed policy proposals generally gave way to “Fourth of July Oratory.” (1983, p. 186)

The final similarity between the conservative movement and the elements of a social movement addresses the personality of the movement leader.

According to Stewart, Smith, and Denton, the movement leader in this stage is one who is “a charismatic agitator” and a person of contradiction—one who “confronts and polarizes, excites and insults, unites and fragments” (Stewart, et al., 1994, p. 85).

As the leader of the conservative movement and its choice as Republican nominee, Goldwater epitomizes the authors' profile. His style and language contained the components necessary to fit the characteristics described by the authors. Specifically, Goldwater was unabashed, candid, unapologetic, no-nonsense, and offered simplified reasoning. He personified the adage of “he says what he means, and means what he says.” Through Goldwater's rhetoric and speeches, he mobilized and excited movement members while disdaining liberal Party members. The latter was done without trepidation or apprehension toward using conciliatory language to assuage audiences in order to win their vote.

The extent to which Goldwater's rhetoric demonstrated the characteristics described by the authors is seen in Goldwater's language. The presence of characteristics is also evident and confirmed in the comments of varied observers of the rise of the right, including authors, biographers, journalists, scholars, and historians. To demonstrate the elements common to both movement leaders and Goldwater, a sampling of his quotes as well as analyses from observers of Goldwater are provided below outlining Goldwater's rhetoric that “confronts and polarizes, excites and insults, unites and fragments” (Stewart, et al., 1994, p. 85):

Comments by Goldwater:

On the unemployed

"we are told...that many people lack skills and cannot find jobs because they did not have an education...The fact is that most people who have no skills have no education for the same reason—low intelligence or ambition." (quoted in White, 1966, p. 130)

As respects the Cuban government turning off the water at Guantanamo

"[Goldwater said] he hoped President Johnson would have the courage to say, 'Turn it on or the Marines are going to turn it on for you and keep it on.'" (White, 1966, p. 130)

Commenting on the Eastern establishment

"Sometimes I think this country would be better off if we could just saw off the Eastern Seaboard and let it float out to sea." (quoted in White, 1966, p. 130)

Commenting on how to handle the Soviet Union

"Let's lob one into the men's room of the Kremlin." (quoted in White, 1966, p. 130)

Regarding Milton Eisenhower as a last minute Establishment candidate

"One Eisenhower in a decade is enough." (quoted in Reinhard, 1983, p. 186)

Regarding his speaking style

"...the message must be direct, understandable, and unequivocal: no hedging; no qualifications; no use of language susceptible to more than one interpretation." (quoted in Hammerback, 1987, p. 176)

"Some people say that I oversimplify complicated issues. They want complexity, I want understanding." (quoted in Hammerback, 1987, p. 176)

On civil rights

"If I were a Negro, I don't think I would be patient." (quoted in Edwards, 1988, p. 62)

I am unalterably opposed to discrimination of any sort, and I believe that though the problem is fundamentally one of the heart, some law can help, but not law that embodies features like these, provisions which fly in the face of the Constitution....If my vote is misconstrued, let it be, and let me suffer the consequences.” (quoted in Edwards, 1988, p. 63)

(The second comment was made explaining his vote against the 1964 Civil Rights Bill less than one month before the Republican National Convention and shortly after the first comment):

Uniting and fragmenting

“Any who joins us in all sincerity, we welcome. Those who do not care for our cause we do not expect to enter our ranks in any case” (Rosenthal, 1964, p. 401).

“I would remind you that extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice. And let me remind you that moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue’ brought the delegates to their feet for the longest applause...” (Rosenthal, 1964, p. 402)⁷

Comments by observers:

Regarding his dichotomous style of speaking

“He was a man of contradictions: inspiring and infuriating, courageous and cantankerous, profane and profound, impulsive and stubborn.” (Edwards, 1998, p. A18)

As an agitator and his ability to confront

“...he invariably did what he wanted to, when he wanted to—regardless of the consequences.” (Edwards, 1998, p. A18)

“He gave people his 100-proof opinions, which he did not originate in focus groups and were not mediated by consultants.” (Will, 1998, p. M5)

“He insisted on speaking his mind, regardless of the consequences.” (Edwards, 1988, p. 60)

"He has always been candid, even if the result is to bring discomfort to fellow conservatives..." (Hammerback, 1987, p. 174)

"He thinks nothing of voting all by himself in the Senate against 90-odd others." (Wicker, 1963, p. 29)

On his ability to excite and unite

"...the delegates savored their passionate hero's blunt version of the 'truth.' The Senator, their 'symbol, the jut-jawed Man of the West, bluff, candid, simple, direct, and an apostle of change,' thrilled their hearts, if not their minds." (Rosenthal, 1964, p. 403)

On his charisma

"The candidate looked every inch as if central casting had come up with exactly what the director asked for: the good-looking, Western outdoorsman who rode tall in the saddle and hewed true to his core of old American principle." (Hodgson, 1996, p. 91)

"...even his political opponents agree that Goldwater has that rarest of attributes—star quality. A tanned, trim (185 lbs.) six footer with searching blue eyes behind his dark-rimmed glasses....Barry Goldwater is almost too good to be true: a businessman, politician, jet pilot, folklorist, explorer, photographer, and athlete." ("Republicans: Salesman for a cause", 1961, p. 12)

Issue 2

The second theory addressed by the study concerns the traits of a movement leader. The theory, Simons' "leader-centered conception," will be applied to the historical events that surrounded Goldwater's rise to leader of the conservative movement.

Simons' theory is useful in this paper for two reasons. First, Goldwater's rise and acceptance by the right were rhetorically driven. He expressed his ideas and attracted supporters via books, newspaper columns and speeches. Second, Simons argues that a movement's leader must be able to adjust to any actions

and take advantage of any overreactions. This theory fits well with this paper's premise that the takeover of the Republican Party by the conservative movement was due in large part to the establishment's reactions to the conservative movement.

According to Simons, there are three requirements for a leader. First, leaders "must attract, maintain, and mold workers (i.e., followers) into an efficiently organized unit" and the movement's success is dependent on "loyalty to its leadership" (1970, p. 3).

Goldwater's supporters were an essential element to his rise. They were dedicated and unwavering in their support for him and saw Goldwater as the "spiritual and intellectual leader of the Republican Party" (Kolkey, 1983, p. 177). In summarizing the movement as it rallied around Goldwater, columnist Tom Wicker offered these observations of Goldwater's following:

It is more nearly a radical revolt, a gathering of the forces of the discontented and embittered – as nearly united as they can be in idolatry or exploitation of the most attractive "conservative" since Herbert Hoover came home a hero from World War I. (1963, p. 7)

Simons' second requirement is that a leader "must secure adoption of their product by the larger structure [and insist that a] new order and a vast regeneration of values are necessary to smite the agents of the old and to provide happiness, harmony, and stability" (1970, p. 4).

As a leader, Goldwater did not seek approval of the establishment. Instead, he worked to replace the established order with his supporters. Here he was successful as well as undeviating in his purpose. His supporters had

assumed control of local Republican organizations which helped him obtain a run-away first ballot nomination for President. In response, he installed his people to top spots in the national party, including Republican Committee Chairman and Vice Presidential nominee.

Goldwater was not shy about letting the establishment know of his and the movement's intent. He stated in his acceptance speech: "Any who joins us in all sincerity, we welcome. Those who do not care for our cause we do not expect to enter our ranks in any case" (Rosenthal, 1964, p. 401).

Another example of the spirit of disdain for reconciliation was Goldwater's remarks in his acceptance speech in which he said, "Extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice...Moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue" (Harwood, 1964, p. 2). This exhortation was a retort to the establishment who had shunned and derided him and his more extreme supporters.

The speech also represented the zenith of the confrontation between the right and the establishment. It delineated a clear separation between the two groups. Through his words, Goldwater identified where the right stood and made clear its identity for those that wished to join. As Robert Catchcart describes:

The enactment of confrontation gives a movement its identity, its substance and its form. No movement for radical change can be taken seriously without acts of confrontation....Confrontational rhetoric shouts "Stop!" at the system, saying, "You cannot go on assuming you are the true and correct order; you must see yourself as the evil thing you are. (Catchcart, 1978, p. 234)

The latter item in Simons' second requirement is evident in the themes stressed by Goldwater. These were traditional conservative ideas that

conservatives thought had been abandoned and ignored by the party establishment as they continually acquiesced to the Democrats and the New Deal, thus earning the establishment the nickname "me-too Republicans" (Cook, 1996, p. 942). The themes are succinctly summed up in The Conscience of a Conservative, when Goldwater said his intent was "to reduce the size of government. Not to pass laws but to repeal them. Not to institute new programs but to eliminate old ones" (1960, p. 23).

Goldwater enunciated the differences between the two factions when Nelson Rockefeller (the quintessential "Eastern" Republican) claimed that Goldwater was outside the mainstream. Goldwater responded, "the American People want a choice, not an echo" (Rosenthal, 1964, p. 400).

The third requirement according to Simons is that leaders "must react to resistance generated by the larger structure." According to Simons, the establishment, in response to a movement against the power structure, will do one of two things. First, they may incorporate the movement's demands or promise to act on them. Their second option is to come down strong against the movement. The movement's leader must be able to adjust to any actions and take advantage of any overreactions.

In response to the conservative movement, the establishment did not pursue Simons' first option. As has been stated, they continually ignored the right wing in pursuit of their own interests. Their course of strategy mirrored Simons' second option. In 1964, the establishment derided Goldwater and his followers' ideas. As mentioned before, Goldwater was accused of having

simplified beliefs and answers. In addition, “Rockefeller blasted” the Goldwater followers “as the ‘lunatic fringe’” and “Richard Nixon called” them “the nuts and the kooks” (Wicker, 1963, p. 24).

However, the major resistance from the establishment was to continually ignore the conservative movement. As discussed earlier, this occurred from 1940 through 1960. The mistake here though, is that in their disregard for the conservatives, the establishment did not take into account the burgeoning size and influence of the source of the conservatives’ support, which was the post-war growth in the western and southern states. Therefore, in 1964, with Goldwater as their candidate, the conservatives had sufficient strength to push him to nomination.

In summary, Chapter 4 has assessed the correlation between the events of Chapter 3 and the commonalties found in movements as established in Chapter 2. The following and final chapter will address the paper’s two issues of study (whether the rise of the right wing represented a true social movement, and if Goldwater can be viewed as a movement leader) based on application of the methodology applied in this chapter. In addition to these issues, the next chapter will also discuss what has been learned about Goldwater and the conservative movement, about communication and its relation to social movements, and what future studies the study’s findings give rise to.

Chapter Notes

¹Although liberals called the title an oxymoron, a senior editor at Time labeled it “the most important book of the 20th century.” In addition, it received favorable reviews from 47 of its first 50 reviews, including from the New York Times (Edwards, 1988, p. 59).

²Along with voicing his displeasure with Eisenhower’s budget, Goldwater was also blunt with his comments and criticism of the Party’s liberal members. In his autobiography, Goldwater recounts his battle during this time with establishment leaders:

This [the budget speech] was the start of a long public debate and the eventual conservative break with the party’s so-called moderate wing, which was headed by...Rockefeller, Senator Jacob Javits....Rocky and Javits, the “Me Too” Twins, claimed I was “alienating” liberal Republicans and was outside the political mainstream—as defined by them. I waved a political good-bye to Javits...by suggesting that Jake “go straight” and join the Democrats.

³Further infuriating the boosters was the impression that their demonstrations in support of Goldwater were being stifled by building security forces under the direction of Nixon staffers.

⁴Manion was the impetus for Conscience of a Conservative, he originally approached Goldwater with the idea and helped set up the book’s publication.

⁵The decision to go through with, and public with, its intent to draft Goldwater was done so without Goldwater’s blessing. This did not deter the group. As Theodore H. White notes, the group decided “they would ‘draft the son of a bitch’ whether he wanted to run or not” (1966, p. 117). Goldwater even tersely told Clifton White that he was not a candidate. However, even with his

ambivalence about running, Goldwater did not publicly repudiate the group. He did stay clear of the group's headquarters and rallies though.

⁶Scranton's actions are particularly interesting given that he served under Goldwater in the Air Force Reserve and that Goldwater considered him "his only friend among possible GOP presidential contenders" (Reinhard, 1983, p. 188). In fact, Goldwater's probable first choice for a running mate was Scranton, until the letter was distributed.

⁷According to the writer of this speech, Harry Jaffa, Goldwater's use of this phrase was because he was tired of being labeled an extremist throughout the convention. In response, "he turned his detractors' favorite epithet back upon them" (Jaffa, 1984, p. 36). The inspiration for the quote came from Thomas Paine's The Rights of Man, "Moderation in temper is always a virtue; but moderation in principle is always a vice" (Jaffa, 1984, p. 36). Jaffa states that he tried to submit commentary on Goldwater's speech but that no editor would accept his articles.

CHAPTER 5

SUMMARY

Introduction

Chapter 2 outlined the methodology to be used as the apparatus in defining the profile of a social movement and a movement leader. The next chapter then reviewed the historical events surrounding the takeover of the Republican Party by the conservative right wing. Chapter 4 applied the common elements found in movements and its leaders described in Chapter 2 to the events that comprised the right's ascension to power as described in Chapter 3.

These chapters have established the groundwork for the purpose of this study. As such, Chapter 5 will analyze the conservative movement of the fifties and early sixties as a social movement and Goldwater as a movement leader.

Following the discussion of the above two issues, the chapter will address further issues pertinent to, and arising from, the study of the right and Goldwater.

The focus of these issues will be what has been learned from the study about:

- a. The conservative movement of the 1950s and the early 1960s
- b. Barry Goldwater
- c. Social movements
- d. Communications

e. Relevant issues of further study as respects the paper's study

Analysis

As respects Issues 1 and 2, an appraisal of the previous chapters affirms that the actions of the right were indeed that of a social movement. Similarly, Goldwater's position as leader of the conservative movement can be equated with that of a social movement leader. This parallel was evidenced in Chapter 4 through the numerous commonalties noted that existed between the conservative movement and the accepted definition and characteristics of social movements. Chapter 4 also confirmed that Goldwater's rhetoric and actions conformed to the criterion of a movement leader, as established by Simons and, to a lesser degree, by Stewart, Smith, and Denton.

Thus, applying Simons' as well as Stewart, Smith, and Denton's studies of social movements to the right and Goldwater's leadership affirms that the two exhibit the traits necessary to view the two as a social movement and a movement leader. However, there is still an additional issue to be addressed before this judgement can be conceded. That question is whether a movement within an established societal organization can be considered a social movement. Studies do not provide a consensus opinion on this issue. Most scholars follow the lead of Bowers, Ochs, and Jensen as outlined in their study, The Rhetoric of Agitation and Confrontation. The authors clearly state, "This book does not classify those who attempt to persuade within the establishment as agitators..." (Bowers, et al., 1993, p. 4).

This “non-establishment” position, which has probably contributed to the lack of study of the right wing as a social movement, can be traced to the movement theories of Simons and Cathcart. Simons has stated that “a social movement may be defined...as an *uninstitutionalized* (italics added) collectivity that mobilizes for action to implement a program for the reconstitution of social norms or values” (Simons, 1970, p. 3). Cathcart argues, as stated in Barbara Warnick’s study The Rhetoric of Conservative Resistance, that “aggressor rhetors in these movements are seeking a new order--one which cannot come about through the established agencies of change” (1977, p. 257).

Given Simons’ and Cathcart’s theories, the collective action of the conservatives would not be considered a movement. First, because it is a faction within the Republican Party, it is an institutionalized collectivity and does not fit Simons’ definition. Second, per Cathcart, the right is not a social movement because it sought to implement changes through Republican precinct elections, state delegations, and party conventions--all of which are “established agencies of change.”

In addition to Simons’ and Cathcart’s studies, Warnick goes a step further. In her study of conservative movements, she re-defines conservative movements as something other than a social movement. Expanding on Simons’ and Cathcart’s original definitions, she argues that conservative movements are “counter-movements.” By this she means that conservative movements, as opposed to other ideology based social movements, seek to “prevent a proposed change” rather than “advocating a basic change in the existing social order”

(Warnick, 1977, p. 257). In addition, Warnick claims that conservative movements are identifiable by unique characteristics--the movement's ideology, its moralism, and its resistance to compromise.

Addressing the argument of what groups constitute social movements, this thesis contends that the definition includes movements acting within institutions. Justification for broadening the definition of a movement is that there are common characteristics institutionalized movements share with movements from outside the establishment. As with non-institutionalized movements, groups such as the conservative movement also experience feelings of alienation, anger, and frustration with established powers. These feelings produce support among the ranks of "within institution" movements as fervent as seen in non-institutional movements.

Simons express the justification for this conclusion in his later article on movements in which he changed his perspective on the issue. He argues that movements are not solely "bottom up struggles by groups at the margins of society" (Simons, 1991, p. 100) or outside the establishment. He adjusted his original position to conclude "movements are struggles on behalf of a cause by groups whose core organizations, modes of action, and/or guiding ideas are not fully legitimated by the larger society" (Simons, 1991, p. 100). In the case of the right, its ideas were not accepted as norms by the Republican Party, which in this case was the "larger society." Also, the fact that institutionalized groups are factions from within and intend only to discard or amend current mechanisms or programs, as opposed to the whole system, should not preclude their legitimacy

as a social movement. Not all movements are going to be from organizations on the fringe of society that are looking to overthrow or discard the current establishment. Further, considering how institutionalized government programs become, it takes a movement to implement even minor changes.

In any event though, it is difficult today to set a limited framework for defining a social movement given the ongoing changes and advances in society and technology. As a result of the increasing number of communication avenues available to promote a position (e.g., the Internet, fax broadcasts, e-mail, mailing lists, talk shows, cable access channels, etc) more and more special interest groups have opportunities to promote their message. Additionally, society's increasing access to these media outlets increases the exposure of a group's message. Therefore, a movement that earlier would have floundered, or not have achieved becoming a full-fledged movement, due to the inability to get their message out to large numbers of people, can today develop into a strong social movement due to the media and technology access available to everyone

Regarding Warnick's study of conservative movements, her conclusion is too restrictive, particularly the practice of classifying conservative movements by using specific characteristics. As Martin T. Medhurst argues in his study of conservative resistance, Warnick's theory results in equating the conservative movement solely with the radical right and reactive uncompromising positions--as opposed to conservative movements that represent "substantive policy positions that carry within themselves the possibility for change" (Medhurst, 1985, p. 109). He also argues that Warnick is incorrect because movement strategy and

rhetoric have similar characteristics on both sides of the political spectrum. As Medhurst states:

Conservative rhetoric, like its liberal sister, is neither monolithic nor homogeneous. To assert that the rhetoric of conservative resistance is invariably characterized by moralism, reiteration of ideology, and resistance to compromise is to confuse one species with an entire genre. (Medhurst, 1982, p. 18)

Finally, the use of an expanded definition of what constitutes a social movement is summed up well by Sillars. In his movement study, he argues that critics have been too narrow in their definition of a movement, thus limiting the usefulness of their studies. Future analyses should “cast the widest net” in defining a movement. As a basis for this, he states that “there are an infinite number of acts that may be put together in an infinite number of combinations. These combinations, which we call movements, are continually changing.” (Sillars, 1980, p. 27).

The above discussion of the right as a social movement also addresses the issue of what has been learned about social movements. First, the study has shown that movements can exist within an institutional structure. Minority movements within established structures are still subjected to the same factors as similar groups outside of establishments that drive them to organizing a movement—feelings of alienation, rejection, and also of concern with what the members see as critical imperfections. Furthermore, as demonstrated in the previous chapters, institutionalized movements must employ the same strategies in order to implement change.

As respects the conservative movement of the fifties and early sixties, the thesis has demonstrated that the movement was an important one and warrants study. Theodore White, in his study of the 1964 elections, confirms the classification of the right's collective effort as a movement and also its place in history:

'Movement' was the proper word. The wordless resentments, angers, frustrations, fears and hopes that were shaping this force...had welled up long before Goldwater took his Presidential chances seriously. But the movement was something deep, a change or a reflection of change in American life that qualified as more than American politics—it was history. (White, 1966, p. 112)

The reasons for the movement's significance are many, but are manifested in its resiliency and the long-term effect the movement had on the Party. Even though the conservatives' candidate suffered a crushing defeat in 1964, the movement did not die. Rather, "[Goldwater's] defeat became the preface rather than the epitaph for a conservative movement that has reshaped American politics" (Gerson, 1998, p. 12).

Commenting on the successful tenure of the conservative movement, George Will makes a comparison to its counterpart on the left, that "the residue of dissent on the left has long since gone to earth on campuses, there to nurse frustrations and fantasies. Dissent on the right rose to power" (Will, 1998, p. M5). With Goldwater's nomination in 1964, the movement gained a "commanding voice in the Republican Party that [it] would never wholly relinquish" (Himmelstein, 1990, p. 69) and made an impact on the shape of the Party that is still visible almost forty years later. The significant aftereffects include the legacy

of Ronald Reagan, whose career was launched with “The Speech”, his introduction of Goldwater at the 1964 convention; a shift in the Party’s power base from the east to the South and the West; the start of political fund raising through direct mail as Richard Viguerie developed his “direct-mail fund-raising empire” with 12,500 names of Goldwater contributors (Himmelstein, 1990, p. 69); and a generation of youthful activists, described by U.S. News & World Report as “the other counterculture of the 1960s” (Gerson, 1998, p. 14), inspired to enter and remain in politics. Commenting on the last point in a 1998 article, Edwards states, “Today, these no-longer-young conservatives sit in Congress, manage campaigns, head think tanks, edit magazines, and host television talk shows” (p. A18).

The right’s impact is summed up in the title of conservative philosopher Richard Weaver’s book Ideas Have Consequences (1948). The conservatives’ ideas of the 1950s provided the inspiration for the movement to organize. As a result of its organizing, two goals were achieved, Goldwater’s winning the Republican nomination in 1964 and the implementation of the conservative’s ideas. Republican economist Martin Anderson (a veteran of both the Nixon and Reagan administrations) summed up the impact of the conservative revolution when he said:

The election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 and many of the events that followed were the political results of an intellectual movement building...for many years....That movement was no accident, but rather the logical outgrowth of policy ideas and political forces set in motion during the 1950s and 1960s, ideas and forces that gathered strength and speed during the 1970’s, then achieved power in the 1980’s, and promise to

dominate national policy in the United States for the remainder of the twentieth century. (Hodgson, 1996, p. 8)

The next step in the thesis is to appraise what has been discerned about Goldwater. In line with the conservative movement, the study has demonstrated that Goldwater is a movement leader who merits study. The basis for studying Goldwater is best seen by reviewing some of the unique facets of the Goldwater mystique.

First, Goldwater was as a leader. He inspired his followers by being able to “stir up great excitement” (Stewart, et al., 1994, p. 79). This ability is seen among movement members who state that Goldwater manifested a “passionate love affair” and his message “took our breath away” (Gerson, 1998, p. 16). As White writes, “Goldwater’s favorite style in politics is exhortation; he is a moralizer....He preaches, he does not direct. He arouses emotion...” (White, 1966, p. 112). Goldwater also sees himself as a leader, “I have the unmitigated gall to think that I could lead men anywhere, business, politics or combat” (quoted in Goldberg, 1995, p. 118).

Goldwater was also a unique and unlikely movement leader. As opposed to the Eastern, Wall Street, blue blooded establishment, he was a principled individualist from the West who had dropped out of college to run the family’s business (Goldwater is even on the record as admitting “I haven’t really got a first class mind” (Will, 1998, p. M5)). To further enhance the image, he was also an experienced pilot and adventurer. When World War II started, Goldwater, after meeting initial denials by the Army Air Corps because of his eyesight, flew C-47s

to the Pacific theatre over the treacherous Himalayan “Hump.” After the War, Goldwater continued his flying, tallying hours in more than 170 types of planes and, at age 50, flew at twice the speed of sound. When he received Kennedy’s message to come to the White House to discuss the Bay of Pigs, Goldwater was sitting in the cockpit of a fighter jet getting ready to log hours on a flight to Luke Air Force Base in Phoenix.

Another facet of Goldwater was that he placed conservative philosophy and tenets at the center of his message, even at the risk of alienating others or losing less committed members. Goldwater recognized this trait and the associated risks when he commented, “I am quite aware of the risks in speaking frankly and candidly” (Hammerback, 1987, p. 174). Candid and open talk was evident as he campaigned for President. Goldwater criticized the TVA while campaigning in Tennessee and tobacco subsidies while in North Carolina. He also called for privatizing Social Security during campaign trips in Florida. As his deputy press secretary recalled, “Goldwater told me if he was going to lose, it would be on his terms” (Gerson, 1998, p. 14).

Perhaps the most glaring example of his disregard for political fallout while maintaining his principles is his 1964 Civil Rights Act vote. Goldwater voted against the bill, even though he was in the middle of his campaign for President, behind in the polls to the incumbent, and 80% of his fellow congressional Republicans were supporting the bill (a higher percentage than among the Democrats). Yet, his vote was not the act of a bigot. Goldwater had integrated the Arizona Air National Guard and the Goldwater department stores. Also, as a

Phoenix City Council member, he threatened to pull the lease from a Phoenix airport restaurant that refused to serve black customers. Instead though, Goldwater's vote was an act of principle, defiant of public opinion polls. To Goldwater, the Civil Rights Act was a violation of states' rights and an affront to the Constitution.

An additional contributor to Goldwater's significance is his foresight. Goldwater introduced positions that were ridiculed by opponents and the press as reactionary, but that today are accepted on both sides of the aisle. These issues include school vouchers, a flat tax, voluntary participation in Social Security, and an end to the farm subsidies program.

To sum up Goldwater's importance as a leader and a subject of study it is best to look at quotes from White and Edwards. White writes:

Again and again in American history it has happened that the loser of the presidency contributed almost as much to the permanent tone and dialogue of politics as did the winners. Goldwater was such a defining candidate. His presidential bid was essential to the development of modern American conservatism. (White, 1966, p. 132)

Edwards echoes White's judgement as he calls Goldwater "the most important loser in American politics" (Gerson, 1998, p. 14).

Another area to be addressed in this chapter that is of relevance to the study's subject is the interplay of communication and social movements. In particular, two issues warrant mention.

First, the study demonstrates that rhetoric and discourse can provoke and sustain a movement. Through language that is defined with terms such as "candid," "blunt," "unmistakable," "gutsy," "unabashed," and "unapologetic,"

Goldwater's speeches aroused members both as a Senator and a candidate. He was able to mobilize the members, excite, and inspire them. For example, Goldwater's speech at the 1960 Republican convention scolded and inspired activists to take action as he told them to "grow up" and that "if we want to take this party back—and I think we can someday—let's get to work" ("Text of Goldwater's withdrawal speech", 1961, p. 14). Further, the rhetoric of the movement, even in the face of defeat in 1964, sustained the members' spirit to continue their cause.

An additional lesson about social movements concerns the methods of persuasion and the strategies used to achieve power. The conservative movement established that a movement can be effective in gaining supporters and achieving power by using rhetorical persuasion and by working within available channels, as opposed to using threats or violent machinations (such as bombings or building takeovers), as a means to obtain support and implement programs.

In their quest for power, conservatives used journals, speeches, rallies, and signature drives to rhetorically state their case and obtain and solidify support. Additionally, they worked within established avenues to invoke change and to forge new power and a new philosophy in the Party. Members set about learning the delegate nominating system and finding the options available to them for taking command, thus obtaining control of the Party's nomination process. The movement worked to place sympathetic members in local and

state Republican organizations--groups independent of the Eastern led national Party organization and taken for granted by the establishment.

Thus, the rhetorical and strategic methods used by the conservative movement, albeit less dramatic, demonstrate that movements can be successful without using coercive methods that threaten continued violence until the group's views are implemented. This course of action can be considered a reason why the right was able to organize such a committed following. As opposed to contemporary groups such as Operation Rescue, the right's method of persuasion was based on changing attitudes through rhetorical communication, as opposed to gaining support because people fear the possibility of further violent acts (e.g., takeovers of buildings, bombings of clinics, broken windows, disrupted classes, etc.).

An additional topic to consider about communication as respects social movements is that rhetoric is a necessary tool for the growth and development of a social movement. Through the movement leader's speeches and discourse, its ideas and philosophy are conveyed to members. Thus, the members are mobilized and inspired. In addition, communication is a necessary tool that gains committed members. As seen with the right, committed members will continue supporting the cause even in the face of dramatic setbacks, such as Goldwater's defeat in 1964. This commitment was the result of Goldwater's passionate communication.

A further item that can be noted is that through the works of Stewart, Smith, and Denton, and Simons, a framework exists for studying social

movements. Their efforts allow one to look at collective actions through the group's rhetoric, leaders, members, and actions to establish whether "the phenomenon under study is a trend, a fad, or unrest" or a "full-fledged social movement" (Stewart, et al., 1994, p. 3).

The final issue to be considered in this chapter deals with areas of further study. This paper's study of the right suggests many routes that warrant such study.

The first subject is the right as it achieved Stewart, Smith, and Denton's Stages 4 and 5. The conservative movement did achieve power of the Party. As such, it would be of interest to analyze the actions and rhetoric of the dissidents after they became members of the establishment. In the same vein, the philosophies of Goldwater should be compared to the principles espoused by the new leaders as well as the programs implemented via their control.

A further study related to the progression of the conservatives is of Goldwater's role proceeding his 1964 loss. Did he maintain his leadership position? Were his previously inspired followers still moved to action by Goldwater's statements? Did his rhetorical style remain consistent? Did he remain staunchly committed to conservative ideals and candidates? Did he retain his independence in his later years, or did his loss of leadership make him spiteful to new conservative leaders?

This subject is interesting for a couple of reasons. First, after his presidential loss, Goldwater returned to government under different circumstances. In order to run for president, he was forced to give up his senate

seat. Therefore, when he entered the senate again in 1968 he had lost seniority and much of his power. Second, Goldwater's later actions were unlike that of a man known as "Mr. Conservative." For instance, in later years he did not offer blanket support of conservative causes or candidates. He supported Nixon over Reagan and Ford over Reagan. Goldwater also defended liberal social views such as abortion rights and support for gays in the military (to which he commented "You don't need to be straight to shoot straight"). He also voted against airline deregulation; for the Lockheed bailout; and for funding of the Central Arizona Water project, a \$3.6 billion federal project originally "designed to water desert agriculture but now underwrites [Phoenix's] urban growth" (Goldberg, 1995, p. 337).

A third area for further study is the press coverage of Goldwater's campaign—was it biased and did the movement have to fight an additional institution, the main-stream press? Did it play a role in the outcome of Goldwater's campaign?

The basis for this proposal is from recent analyses of the conservative movement and of Goldwater's campaign that have commented on the bias of the press' coverage against Goldwater. For instance, A&E television network's "Biography This Week" noted in their review of Goldwater's life how liberal Republicans attacked Goldwater, and added that even "the press joined the charge....There were insinuations he was a Nazi" (Baker, 1998). Jeffrey Matthews, writing in Presidential Quarterly, commented that "the press distorted [Goldwater's] positions" (Matthews, 1997, p. 673) and quotes David Broder's

confirmation that the press presented a “fundamentally distorted picture of who Goldwater was or what he represented” (Matthews, 1997, p. 678). Finally, Hodgson, in his study of the right’s rise, writes that coverage of Goldwater’s campaign was “perhaps the most one-sided and unfair press coverage ever deployed in a presidential campaign” (Hodgson, 1996, p. 104). The press, “not content with outrageously negative comment...vied with one another to misreport what Goldwater actually said” (Hodgson, 1996, p. 104).¹ Specific examples cited by Hodgson include CBS’ Daniel Schorr’s uncorroborated report that Goldwater was “in touch with the Right Wing in Germany,” and Good Housekeeping’s “completely untrue and unsourced” story that Goldwater had previously suffered two nervous breakdowns (Hodgson, 1996, p. 104).²

A final area of consideration for future study is institutionalized movements. Expanding the definition of a movement to include those within established organizations would result in an expanded field of study and a greater breadth of knowledge gained about how movements can be identified. As has been justified by this study’s analysis of the rise of right’s ascension, there are valuable lessons to be learned from the collective actions of minority factions within institutionalized organizations—What rhetorical actions were taken? What inspired the members to maintain their faith, even against daunting setbacks? What were the characteristics of a successful leader?

Summary

To summarize the thesis, the previous chapters outlined the events that led to the right wing's ascension to power. The change in power eventually transpired in 1964 with the first ballot Republican nomination of the conservatives' choice, Barry Goldwater, for President. His rise and nomination marked the end of the Eastern establishment's domination of the party's control and the beginning of influence from conservative party members from the West and the South, an arrangement that still exists today.

Goldwater was the perfect leader for the rise of the conservative movement. There was a strong faction in the Republican Party of conservatives who were not being heard. What the movement needed was a leader who loyal supporters could rally around; inspire their confidence enough to draw them into the political process; rhetorically seize the issues and concerns of the movement; and, react to the establishment, either their cooperation or backlash. Goldwater met these requirements.

Goldwater, through his books, newspaper columns, and speeches engaged his supporters on their own ground. By not coming to them through the establishment's machinery, he was able to firm up the dedication of the supporters who then became tireless workers for the movement. His message would not have had the same effect had he worked within the establishment's channels. Without this effect, he would not have been able to be the leader of the conservative movement or be able to convince the followers to participate in the movement.

In addition, it should be noted that the Eastern establishment created and could have prevented their 1964 exclusion from the Party's new establishment. The establishment's own prior exclusion of, and lack of credence toward, both the right wing's candidates and concerns pushed the right to the point of disenfranchisement. Also, members of the Eastern establishment were not team players when their candidate lost in 1964. They offered lackluster or no support for the victors, even though the right had previously accepted and supported, albeit reluctantly, the establishment's candidates when conservative candidates lost (for example, in 1960, Goldwater made 126 speeches in 26 states for Nixon's campaign (Brennan, 1992, p. 81)). As such, the anger generated by the actions of the establishment prior to and during 1964 created a spirit of retribution. The liberal Republicans were kept out of the Republican tent and the power of the party was transferred to the right.

By applying the sequence of events that led to the takeover of the Party to the framework established defining a social movement and a movement leader the study confirmed the right's place as a social movement. In addition, the analysis verifies Goldwater's position as a movement leader.

The most appropriate way to close the thesis is to quote the comments of Mary Brennan and George Will on, respectively, the conservative movement and Goldwater. The comments touch on some of the ideas brought up in this study and verify the right and Goldwater as significant areas of study:

The Right's capture of the Republican Party fully legitimized conservatism. The growth of an energized constituency paved the way for right-wingers to seize control of the GOP. Intent on building from the precinct level up

instead of merely imposing their ideas from the top, conservatives cultivated the support of county chairs and state workers who felt neglected by the national party. This strategy avoided direct confrontations with liberal Republicans and ensured that when victory came on the national level, it was complete. (Brennan, 1995, p. 141)

Regarding Goldwater, Will writes, “he was one of the creative losers—William Jennings Bryan was another—of American politics. Which means that neither he nor Bryan really were losers, having left larger marks on the nation than many a winner has done. (1998, p. M5)

Chapter Notes

¹Hodgson goes on to comment that the misrepresentations weren't all that necessary, since Goldwater's off-the-cuff style and his devoid of concern as to how his comments might be construed provided straight quotes that were "scary enough."

²It is interesting to note how members of the media viewed Goldwater upon his death in 1998. Analysts who thought his original positions were unacceptable, now claim that he has become more moderate and thus more "reasonable". Conversely, conservative reporter Robert Novak opined that he "set back the conservative movement by 16 years" (Baker, 1998). However, in 1963, Novak commented that Goldwater was leading a "transformation in the party's power structure" and that "conservative young Republicans from the ...West and South are seizing power" (Hodgson, 1996, p. 101).

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




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