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## The impact of foreign aid on voting inside the United Nations

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THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN AID ON VOTING  
INSIDE THE UNITED NATIONS

by

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Associate of Arts  
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1995

Bachelor of Science  
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1997

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the

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**Department of Political Science**  
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
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
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## **ABSTRACT**

### **The Impact of Foreign Aid on Voting Inside the United Nations**

by

Daniel Shayne Morey

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Associate Professor of Political Science  
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The purpose of this thesis is to determine if there is a connection between United States foreign aid donations and a recipient nation's voting patterns in the United Nations General Assembly. Tests in the past have not employed thorough methodologies to deal with the abundance of variables that influence a nation's voting behavior. The methodology created in this research focuses on three important conceptualizations. First, this work creates a new definition of foreign aid; specifically, the inclusion of military aid in a nation's aid package as well as loans and grants, despite their different characteristics. Second, this analysis considers only important votes to the donor nation, not all votes in the General Assembly. This research also develops a new understanding of abstentions, capturing the strategic nature of this voting choice. Finally, this study creates a classification scheme to break nations into homogenous groups.



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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

Does United States bilateral foreign aid win votes in the United Nations General Assembly? This has been a question for students of international relations since the establishment of the United Nations. However, to date there has been no satisfactory answer to this question, mainly because the methods employed and the understanding of United Nations policies have not been equal to the daunting task of interpreting the actions of nations in the United Nations. This research introduces a new way of exploring this topic with the hope of influencing future research and to provide an answer to whether aid influences nations in the United Nations.

There are three reasons why political scientists should reexamine the question of aid as a tool of influence in the United Nations. First, the foreign aid program of the United States is under political attack from both ends of the political spectrum. Conservatives in this country do not want taxpayers burdened with providing foreign aid because they feel it does not forward the national interest. Liberals view the aid budget as a potential target for cuts to allow continued funding of social policies under the tight fiscal conditions of the 1990s. However, recent presidential administrations have fought drastic alterations to aid budgets, stating it is a necessary component of American diplomatic and national security efforts. It is clear only one side can be right in these

political arguments; it is the task of international researchers to determine which, if possible. Exploring the connection between aid and voting is one step in this process.

Second, the United Nations is becoming a more popular topic in national politics and among average citizens. While an anti-United Nations movement is not sweeping the nation, discontent does appear to be rising. Many people view the United Nations as an anti-American institution working against the interest of the United States. Studies focusing on what truly takes place inside the United Nations will allow for rational debate of the issues, instead of the wild speculation currently circulates in this country.

Finally, the United Nations and the world have changed since the early 1990s. The end of the Cold War altered the structure of global politics without alleviating the problems facing nations. Even if past studies were correct in their analysis of the influence of aid, these conclusions are no longer reliable as evidence regarding the influence of aid today. It is time to reexamine this issue and test modern behavior in the United Nations.

This study is essentially an extensive methodology for how to approach the study of aid and United Nations voting. It details the complexities of this research providing the reader with a full understanding the issues. Moving beyond description, this research offers prescriptions for dealing with these elements. Finally, this study offers some conclusion from an analysis of voting in the United Nations from 1995-1997.

Three topical areas divide this work. Chapters two and three provide relevant background information on this research. Chapter two outlines various theoretical approaches to studying aid to allow this works placement among other research on this topic. With specific attention paid to international relations theories of aid, which guide

this research. Chapter three reviews pertinent past studies on this topic. The review covers only the essential points, instead of providing a full review of each article.

Further, a brief description of each work accompanies the discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the methods employed.

Chapters four, five, and six outline how to perform an accurate test of aid and voting. Chapter four describes the issues dealing with aid; specifically what to include in a nations aid package and how to measure the strength of aid (expected influence the amount of aid should have). Chapter five covers the multiple issues concerning votes in the United Nations. With attention focused on the idea of important versus unimportant votes. Further, this chapter covers the multiple meanings of abstentions. Finally, chapter six categorizes nations for comparison by focusing only on essential variables of national voting behavior.

The conclusion comprises the final section of this work covering the results and policy implications of the study. Further, this section provides an outline for future research on this topic.



## CHAPTER 2

### IN THEORY

Establishing a firm theoretical base is necessary to understand the issues in this research. As with all studies, this theoretical model will determine the questions asked as well as the manner in which they are answer. This chapter will survey the four theoretical camps dealing with foreign aid, with special attention given to the international relations approach. Further, this chapter will show the progression from the general question of “Why nations give foreign aid?” to a specific question of “Does aid influence voting in the UN?” In the end, this chapter will construct a testable hypothesis firmly grounded in international relations theory.

It is important to note that not all of these theoretical camps derive from international relations studies. Instead, they derive from multiple fields of political science as well as economics. Further, it is easy to envision the use of research methods from other academic fields, particularly psychology and sociology, in answering these questions. Although, the primary focus of this study is the impact of aid upon the relationship between nations, international relations, its base is not completely in this field. While other fields will not play a primary role in exploring the relationship between aid and voting, they do take on prominence in answering the larger question of “Why nations provide and accept foreign aid?” Even though this paper will focus only on the question of aids’ influence on UN voting, it can never truly escape the larger

question in which it is embedded. Further, reviewing these other theoretical understandings will allow for the correct placement of this work among the multitudes of research performed on foreign aid.

In reviewing these theoretical designs, this research will rely upon the typology created by John White.<sup>1</sup> This typology clearly divides the work on foreign aid into meaningful sub-fields, which clarifies the discussion of the topic. The four sub-fields White creates are supplemental, displacement, recipient-oriented, and donor-oriented theories.<sup>2</sup> The first two sub-fields deal primarily with economic issues, the latter two cover political issues.

### Economic Theories

Supplemental theories, also called positive theories, deal with the role of foreign in the economic development of recipient nations.<sup>3</sup> These theories state that some essential factor of development is missing (savings, foreign exchange, or skilled labor) and that foreign aid can replace, or supplement, these missing ingredients. By supplementing these factors of growth, foreign aid allows a nation to develop economically.<sup>4</sup> In the end, the recipient nation will reach a certain development level and be able to sustain its growth without further aid.

Supplemental theories explain the purpose of aid, but do not directly provide an answer to why a nation would provide aid. Unfortunately, the cohesiveness of this theoretical group dissolves when answering this question. The answers vary from fulfilling the obligations of developed nations towards underdeveloped nations to developing markets for donor exports. With the exception of fulfilling the duty of the

developed to the less developed, all of these answers to why a nation provides foreign aid incorporate some form of direct advantage for the donor. These answers all provide an economic benefit to the donor and are not purely altruistic in nature.<sup>5</sup>

Displacement, or negative, theories comprise the second camp of economic theories.<sup>6</sup> This group follows the same basic ideas of supplemental theories: aid replaces a needed resource of growth inside recipient nations. However, instead of being helpful to the recipient, the aid is harmful. Instead of merely supplementing existing behavior, the aid replaces the needed behavior, or displaces it, causing the needed markets never to develop because the recipient nation sees no reason to invest in their development.<sup>7</sup> If the needed markets never develop, the recipient nation is forever dependent upon foreign aid. This theory further states that this might be intentional to maintain the subservient relationship between donor and recipient. Displacement theorists believe aid is a tool of control and oppression designed not to encourage development but to stop or at least hinder it. Whether accidental or designed, displacement theories argue that aid harms development instead of fostering it as supplemental theorists maintain.<sup>8</sup>

### Political Theories

Along with these competing economic theories, there exist two political science theories. Although not contradictory to one another, the two theories promote different ways of exploring foreign aid. The first theory focuses on how recipients use aid, the second concentrates on the uses of aid from the donor's perspective.

Recipient based theories, which derive from comparative politics, focus on the use of aid by recipient nations. More importantly, since aid goes to governments instead

of people, it focuses on how governments use aid resources.<sup>9</sup> Accordingly, aid is a resource that individual governments use to support their reigns. In short, aid keeps governments from making hard political choices, such as cutting government social programs or raising taxes, which would be unpopular and lead to widespread discontent with the regime. Thus, aid underwrites the policies of a regime, enabling it to remain in power.

Recipient based theories, like the supplemental economic theories, answers how nations use aid, but does not inherently answer why a nation provides aid. To answer this question requires a return to the donor's goals, not the recipients. These theorist believe that donors desire global stability that results from maintaining ruling regimes, especially regimes fostering favorable foreign policies. Again, as with the economic theories, aid is far from altruistic.

Donor-based theories occupy the rest of this chapter and serve as the theoretical base of this study. Employing donor-based theories supplies a clear answer to why a nation would provide aid. Unlike the other theoretical camps that discuss how nations can use aid and then speculate to why a nation would provide it, donor-based theories concentrate solely on why a nation provides foreign aid. Instead of looking at the economic issues involved or internal uses of aid, donor based theories take an international relations approach to examining aid. This theoretical model explores the changing relationship between nations when one provides aid to another. Inherent in the donor-based theories is the assumption that donor nations attempt to gain political advantage from recipient nations.<sup>10</sup>

The nature of the relationship between donor and recipient nation may vary. One version of this relationship has recipients becoming dependent upon aid and unable to survive without it. In order to ensure aids continued inflow, the recipient nation agrees to demands made by the donor nation, whether explicit or implicit. A second version has a voluntary basis in which recipients agree in advance to perform certain functions, or allow certain actions, in exchange for aid. Regardless of the exact mechanics of the relationship, the provision of aid is to win support from other nations. (See diagram 2-1) It is this belief that donor nations seek to influence recipient nations through foreign aid, and donor-based theories, that this research will test empirically.




Diagram 2-1

Hans Morgenthau provides the best elaboration of donor theories. Morgenthau developed a theory of foreign aid that outlined the basic goal of aid and attempted to show where aid policy has gotten away from its original purpose.<sup>11</sup> True to his realist roots<sup>12</sup>, Morgenthau states that aid is a tool of foreign policy with its sole purpose being to gain influence. According to Morgenthau, there are six types of aid: humanitarian, subsistence, economic, military, prestige, and bribery. In order to understand Morgenthau's point a brief review of these aid types is required.

The first type of aid, humanitarian, is the only type of aid that is not inherently political. As Morgenthau defines it, humanitarian aid is aid that governments extend to other governments which are "...victims of natural disasters".<sup>13</sup> If aid were attributable to certain governments then it would serve a political purpose by establishing a positive mindset inside of recipient governments and, less importantly, in the people.<sup>14</sup> To perceive a recipient nation as generous and benevolent establishes a favorable political connection between two nations and a favorable view of the donors system of government. Thus, even humanitarian aid develops influence for a donor nation, if conducted properly.

Subsistence aid is money provided to nations unable to "... maintain minimal public services".<sup>15</sup> In other words, subsistence aid eliminates budget deficits in nations not commanding enough resources to provide needed services to their citizens. The political impacts of this form of aid are clear. First, it defends the status quo maintaining governments that would likely fall in the absence of aid. Second, any government receiving subsistence aid will be unlikely to risk losing it for fear of falling from power. For if governments are unable to maintain "minimal public services" the citizens of the country will replace them. This fear offers a clear avenue of influence for donor nations.

Aid for economic development is the next type. This is aid designated to help build the economic infrastructure of a nation in hope of aiding the overall development of the nation. However, Morgenthau attacks this version of aid as unwise and unworkable. First, he attacks the idea that a deficiency causes slow development and the belief that foreign aid can overcome the problem. Morgenthau correctly states that in certain circumstances slow development is not caused by one deficiency, but rather development

is not possible for certain countries. Expending money on projects and training can not overcome the fact that some nations lack any ability to develop beyond a certain point.<sup>16</sup>

However, Morgenthau is most persuasive when he identifies political factors influencing developmental aid. In short, development is a destabilizing event that can, and likely will, lead to greater harm for American interests in the end. By altering the economic structure of any nation, the United States risks bringing to power a collection of individuals that may not be friendly in action or philosophy. Further instability accompanies the transformation between primitive and advanced economies; the turmoil in Russia is evidence of this fact. It is impossible to predict the conclusion of these upheavals and can lead to damage even if in the end a friendly government is established.<sup>17</sup>

Military aid, which dominated American foreign aid until the 1960's, is the third form of aid. However, Morgenthau states that military aid does not play a military role as much as a political one. He declares that donors "... seeks political advantage in exchange for military aid. It obligates by implication the recipient toward the giver".<sup>18</sup> Military aid operates as a bribe, obligating recipients to forgo actions that would cause the donor to revoke assistance.

The purpose of prestige aid is to outfit an underdeveloped nation with external appearances of modernity. In this function, aid funds vast projects that give appearances of technological and economic advancement. These projects take on a variety of forms from airports to roads – which do not need to serve a real function, especially economically. Donors and recipients do not openly recognize prestige aid; instead, they

hide projects under the categories of military or economic aid. Prestige aid operates, like military aid, as a bribe, according to Morgenthau.<sup>19</sup>

Bribes comprise the final form of aid, and its one true purpose according to Morgenthau. Bribes are transfers of money and/or services from one government to another as the "... price paid for political services rendered or to be rendered".<sup>20</sup> These services take on a variety of forms meant to provide the donor with some advantage, as identified in the following paragraphs. Bribery is the true purpose of all types of aid, with the possible exception of humanitarian aid. Further, this has been the purpose of aid throughout history. Morgenthau's theory of aid as a bribe puts the question at hand into clear relief. By replacing the word aid with bribe in diagram one, the basic principle of donor-based theories is clear. (See diagram 2-2)




Diagram 2-2

The problem with connecting aid as bribery comes from the fact that modern nations, especially the United States, have sought to hide the true nature of the relationship. They have developed complex cover stories, such as aid for development, and established government agencies to achieve these mythical goals. In the end, the cover story of aid for development has become mistaken for reality and both recipient



and donor nations are unhappy with the relationship. The recipient is unhappy over excess strings attached to aid and donors feel betrayed by the recipient for not following their end of the bargain, supporting the donor. Thus, disguising the connection of aid as a bribe confuses participants, each expecting something different from the relationship.<sup>21</sup> The recipient expects altruistic aid while the donor expects to gain influence over the recipient.

In summary, donor theories state that aid is a tool to influence recipient nations, or as Morgenthau states, it is a bribe presented in exchange for specific actions. As straightforward as this theory is there exist methodological problems with its application. The main obstacle attempting to measure the concept of influence.

### Applying Donor Theories

No comparisons of aid and influence can be performed without first defining when or how to measure influence. There are varied options open for research. One could look at government statements from recipient nations, or troop commitments to actions led by the donor nations. Alternatively, research may find influence in the text of bilateral treaties. However, all of these options pose very serious problems for researchers. Wars take place too infrequently to provide comparative value. The only major US engagements in the past 50 years have been Korea, Vietnam, and the Gulf War. This limited number does not provide enough data points to conduct a strong aggregated study. Further, the extreme differences between engagements, both in time and in substance, makes comparisons among them difficult, if not impossible. Official statements of governments can often be misleading or contradictory. Politicians can

design statements to meet multiple goals ranging from assuring an ally to winning domestic political support. Determining the true audience for a statement could also prove to be very difficult. Further, there is the question of whose statements to use. Are all statements a government makes, especially a coalition government with its multiple members, taken at equal value? These problems combine to make statement analysis studies very impractical. Finally, treaties happen irregularly and contain a combination of international forces and domestic politics. Further, after reviewing a variety of treaties, it is clear there are few similarities to test.<sup>22</sup> There is such a variety of subject matter for treaties with no topic uniformly applicable to all nations. Further, the number of multilateral treaties complicates this type of study. By increasing the number of signatories to a treaty, it becomes difficult to assess who has influenced whom in the negotiations.

With none of these research methods being adequate, researchers have concentrated on voting in the United Nations to gauge influence. The basic premise is simple. Donor nations use aid to buy or win votes from recipient nations within the United Nations (Diagram 2-3). If aid leads to influence, recipient nations should vote in agreement with donor nations, usually defined as an identical vote to the donor. According to this model, voting in the United Nations should be a function of the amount of aid received. (See formula 2-1)

The practice of using voting in the United Nations, as a gauge of influence, has become widespread but is not uniformly accepted. Some authors believe that United Nations votes have declined in importance over the years and donor nations no longer seek to influence the outcome of these votes.<sup>23</sup> However, evidence seems to be to the

contrary, especially for the United States. In recent years the United States has come to place a high value on UN support. Evidence of this can be seen from US efforts to ensure UN support of the Gulf War, as well as US concern over the new Secretary General. It would seem irrational for the US to exert these efforts if they viewed the UN, and votes of the General Assembly, as irrelevant.




Diagram 2-3

#### Formula 2-1

$$\text{Support} = \text{Votes} = f(\text{aid})$$

This chapter reviewed the four contending theories dealing with foreign aid, allowing for a better understanding of the issues involved with this research. Further, the donor-based perspective on aid, when elaborated in detail provides a firm understanding of how to study foreign aid, as a bribe for specific actions. Finally, and most importantly, the general question of why a nation provides foreign aid has been transformed through several steps into a testable question, “Does aid influence voting in the UN?” Before

proceeding with the layout of this study it is necessary to review other research on aid and UN voting, reexamining the results these studies have found and the methods employed.

## Endnotes

1. John White, *The Politics of Foreign Aid* (New York: St. Martins Press, 1974), 105. For an alternative classification scheme see James Meernik, Eric Kruger, and Steven Poe. "Testing Models of U.S. Foreign Policy: Foreign Aid during and after the Cold War." *The Journal of Politics*, vol. 60, no. 1 (February 1998), p. 63-85.

2. White, 105.

3. This is the most common form of research regarding foreign aid. For examples see Sarah J. Tisch and Michael B. Wallace, *Dilemmas of Development Assistance: The What, Why, and Who of Foreign Aid* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994); James W. Fox, 'Applied Economic in Action: The U.S. Foreign-Aid Program What do Economists Know that Policymakers Need to?,' *American Economic Review* 87, no. 2 (May 1997).

4. White, 109-122.

5. Tisch and Wallace, 5.

6. White, 105.

7. White, 122.

8. Tisch and Wallace, 5.

9. White, 131.

10. White, 128 – 131.

11. Hans Morgenthau "A Political Theory of Foreign Aid," *American Political Science Review* 56, no. 2 (1962), 301-309.

12. For a further discussion of realist thought see Hans J. Morgenthau *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 4th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), 4-14.

13. Morgenthau 1962, 301.

14. Tisch and Wallace, 66-68.

15. Morgenthau 1962, 302.

16. Morgenthau 1962, 305.

17. Morgenthau 1962, 304-308.
18. Morgenthau 1962, 303.
19. Morgenthau 1962, 303.
20. Morgenthau 1962, 302.
21. Morgenthau 1962, 302.
22. *U.S Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols, and Agreements* vol I-IV New York: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1968. and Henry W. Degenhardt *Treaties and Alliance of the World*. Detroit, MI: Gale Research Company, 1986.
23. John White, 130.

## CHAPTER 3

### IN PRACTICE

Flowing from the theoretical work of chapter two, many scholars have attempted to determine the correlation between aid and voting patterns. These studies are the primary focus here in the third chapter. A review of the methods and results of these diverse studies will demonstrate the need for a new approach, especially in the new post Cold War environment.

As with all research the first question that must be asked is how best to approach the question. When exploring whether aid alters voting two different types of studies are typical. The first type, the case study, follows a particular issue over time and measuring the influence of aid against voting on that single issue, or set of related issues. The second approach involves aggregate studies covering several years and votes on numerous issues. Most of the studies of aid and voting have been the second type; in fact, there has been only one well-circulated case study on this subject. Because it was the first study performed and because of its conceptual significance, considerable attention is devoted to the case study before turning to the aggregate studies.

#### Case Study

The only published example of a voting and foreign aid case study is Bernstein and Alpert's 1971 article "Foreign Aid and Voting Behavior in the United Nations: The

Admission of Communist China". This study sought to measure the connection between foreign aid and voting in the UN by looking at one single issue, which nation would receive the credentials as the representative of China.<sup>1</sup> With multiple votes on this issue spanning a number of years, this case provides a chance to study the impact of changes in aid on the same topic. This assumes that the position of a nation on the topic remains constant over time, which they do not. However, within the confines of the Cold War it is a safe assumption that very few nations would have a spontaneous change of heart regarding the admission of a communist nation thus minimizing the impact of outside factors.

Bernstein and Alpert start with a very simple set of assumptions. First, both the United States and the Soviet Union would seek to build the necessary coalition to win the vote and then would seek to conserve resources by not expending any more than absolutely necessary.<sup>2</sup> Second, nations do not make all important decisions on the floor, but behind the scenes permitting a certain degree of bargaining. Finally, neither of the Cold War camps would suffer any defections during voting. Instead, to gain the number of votes needed to win, both camps would have to obtain the support of non-aligned nations, particularly those in the Third World.<sup>3</sup>

Based on these assumptions, they hypothesized that a nation has three choices depending on who is providing aid. If the nation is receiving aid from both camps then they should abstain. If the nation is receiving aid from only one of the two donors, the United States or the Soviet Union, then they should vote with the donor. Finally, a nation receiving no aid should abstain. According to Bernstein and Alpert's theory no recipient would vote directly against a donor, which did occur.



When they conducted their test, they found that nations did not behave completely as predicted. First, nations receiving aid from both camps overwhelmingly voted yes (for PRC admission) when they should have abstained. Further, when nations received no aid the plurality voted no (46 percent).<sup>4</sup> However, when a nation received aid from only one camp they voted as predicted 90 percent of the time. Despite the anomalies, Bernstein and Alpert concluded that foreign aid and voting are connected and that aid is an effective instrument of foreign policy.

While instructive, the Bernstein and Alpert piece suffers from multiple deficiencies. The first and most obvious is that it is hard to generalize from a case study. Since the votes dealt with only one topic, it is hard to determine if the subject matter or foreign aid was the crucial factor.

Further, Bernstein and Alpert assume that an abstention is a neutral vote that would not harm either camp. Thus, a nation receiving aid from both should abstain. However, in this case, since the Soviet Union needed a supermajority according to United Nations rules, an abstention by a nation receiving aid from them meant the Soviet Union had wasted resources, while the United States in effect gained a vote.

Along this same line, the authors did not attempt to correlate levels of aid and voting. Instead aid is a binary variable, simply on or off. It is irrational to believe that a nation would run the risk of losing a large amount of aid simply to protect a smaller amount. It makes sense to assume that when a nation received aid from both camps the relative amount of aid determined its vote. A nation would only abstain if the amounts were equal. Consideration of relative levels of aid should improve the predictions for nations receiving aid from both camps.

Bernstein and Alpert also do not account for the strategic nature of nations. They predict that nations receiving no aid should abstain from voting because they do not have a stake in the matter. However, since abstention maintained the status quo, forcing further votes, the nations not receiving aid increased their chances of receiving aid in the future giving them a stake in the outcome. Strategically minded nations have a built-in preference for forcing future votes, a preference that Bernstein and Alpert neglected and the Soviets had to overcome.

Finally, Bernstein and Alpert assume that each camp was only attempting to achieve one goal. In their design, nations provided aid to ensure the proper vote on one issue. However, the two camps could have been providing aid for votes on other issues. This is a special concern in the case of the United States, which needed only a few votes to block the entry of the PRC. Following this logic, the United States might have provided aid to nations that voted yes to ensure their votes on other issues because they were already sure of victory on the China issue. Thus, the United States could have been working toward multiple goals that might have clouded the results of this study. Only by looking at voting tendencies as a whole, which was outside the scope of this case study, could control for this contingency.

Although this case study did not conclusively answer the question at hand, it did establish the link between aid and UN voting and it further provided the starting point for future research. Building on this work, other scholars have attempted to correct some of its basic problems to strengthen the case for or against foreign aid. However, solutions vary widely. The only true commonality is that they are all aggregate studies of voting and aid.

### Aggregate Studies

When performing an aggregated study a researcher must address certain issues. The approach to these issues largely determines the conclusions each study reaches. By looking at each issue and the authors method for dealing with it the complexity of each study becomes clear. This level of complexity is what distinguishes these works.

### Nations

The first issue of concern is how to treat the nations under study. The first and most obvious division is between donor and recipient. However, among the recipient nations there exists a wide degree of diversity to account for in any study of this nature. In a survey of factors affecting UN voting, Kul B. Rai illustrated the impact of these kinds of differences. Relevant differences involve military alliances, ideological orientation of the government, the electoral system, level of economic development, geographic location, and colonial status.<sup>5</sup> Rai speculates that all of these variables affect how a nation is disposed to vote on an issue before the General Assembly. Even though not all of the variables tested turned out to be significant several did including geography, former colonial status, military alliances, and economic circumstances.<sup>6</sup> Clearly some attempt to divide nations into more homogeneous groupings is required to study the impact of aid and voting accurately.<sup>7</sup>

It should not be surprising that not all research has capitalized on these findings, or at least has not taken full advantage of them. First, Wittkopf's 1973 study preceded Rai's work. However, later works have not heeded Rai's results nearly enough. Ironically, not even Rai integrated his original findings fully in his follow-up study on

voting and aid performed in 1980. Here Rai only divided nations along geographic lines. While this study did find a stronger correlation between aid and voting when factoring in geography, it still might have underestimated this impact because of the exclusion of other variables.

The most extensive attempt to control for outside factors comes from Sexton and Decker. They divided nations by type of government and level of economic development. However, Sexton and Decker only had two categories for nations in each division. In their design, nations were either democratic or totalitarian and developed or less developed economically.<sup>8</sup> This provided for only four total types of nations: democratic developed, democratic undeveloped, totalitarian developed, and totalitarian undeveloped. This scheme does not come close to capturing the essence of the differences among nations. This effort is clearly the most complex attempt to classify nations but it is far from adequate. In order to fully divide nations into meaningful homogeneous groups research must look at more issues than government type and economic development. Further, by having only two types of governments and levels of development is overly simplistic and does not provide an adequate classification scheme.

Another question concerning nations is which or how many to include in the study. This may seem like a very non-conflictual question; however, it defies an easy answer. In fact, existing studies have used different groups of nations in their tests. In their study, Sexton and Decker generally used all nations in the United Nations, though they excluded Israel from some analyses arguing that it was skewing the results. It is interesting to note that they do not make any direct comparison between the nations receiving aid and those that are not.<sup>9</sup> This seems to be a rather important omission when

attempting to answer the question of aid's impact on voting. Without making a comparison between the group receiving aid and the group not receiving aid, it is difficult to observe the true influence of aid. Nations not receiving aid provide comparison for recipient behavior.

Two other studies<sup>10</sup> use very select samples for their test. First, Wittkopf uses only nations receiving 'positive aid', (i.e., those actually receiving aid) from one of sixteen potential donors during the years of his study. He further restricts his sample by requiring that recipient nations were present for at least 60 percent of the votes for the General Assembly sessions in question.<sup>11</sup> Nonetheless, 96 of 115 potential nations make it into the sample, a high percentage.<sup>12</sup>

Rai includes only nations classified as less developed that were receiving aid. This is by far the most restrictive sample employed. Under this method the number of nations studied shrinks to as low as 66 in some years.<sup>13</sup> This may not seem like a huge decrease from Wittkopf's 96; however, the UN had grown between the two studies.

The biggest problem with Rai's sample is that by excluding nations not classified as "less developed" (an exact definition of this term is not given) the sample may have been biased towards weak results. In particular in 1972 Rai had found that economic development was an important factor in the voting behavior of nations. By intentionally excluding better developed nations receiving aid Rai may have weakened his results. Given his earlier evidence it does not seem wise to limit the sample in such a manner when looking for a general trend among nations.

The final question concerning nations in these studies is how many donor nations to study simultaneously. In most studies, multiple donors are used.<sup>14</sup> In both of Rai's

studies he explores Soviet and American aid together and compares the results each nation has achieved. His findings, which show Soviet economic aid more effective at the same time U.S. military aid was more effective, are interesting but do not necessarily answer the question at hand. Wittkopf also compares many donor nations. He finds that they all achieve about the same level of success with their aid programs. Finally, Sexton and Decker use only the United States for their design.

Based on Wittkopf's finding that all nations have about the same success rate, and the fact that as the number of donor nations grows the amount of data needed becomes very unmanageable, it seems sensible to test only one donor nation at a time. Further, the fact that the United States provides aid to more nations than any other country, especially with the demise of the Soviet Union, warrants Sexton and Decker's concentration on the United States.

### Aid

The second set of issues facing researchers concerns the conceptualization of aid. Although this may seem minor, it does take on a high level of importance. When looking at this type of study altering what is included in the calculation of aid has a deep impact. Further, the inclusion or exclusion of certain types of aid allows for the manipulation of outcomes.

In this research, there are two basic types of aid: economic and military. The purpose of economic aid is to stimulate economic growth while military aid is to secure alliances and promote the defense of the recipient nations. In his first study, Rai found that both types of aid have an impact; however, the impact varies according to the nation

studied.<sup>15</sup> Further, he found that military aid was more effective for the United States than economic aid.

Most research, however, has focused on economic aid. In fact, only Sexton and Decker use a model that includes anything other than economic aid. Focusing on only one form of aid leads to an under-evaluation of the amount of aid a nation receives because military aid comprises a large portion of many nations' aid packages. The most extreme case of this is Israel, which receives annually over one billion dollars in military aid.<sup>16</sup> Leaving this out of the calculation seems not only unwarranted but to cause a definite skew in the data presented.

Another issue involves how to calculate the importance of aid to the nation receiving it. Currently, there are three different ways to conceptualize what I will refer to as 'strength of aid': total aid in raw amounts (however defined), aid per capita of the recipient nation, and aid as a percentage of the recipient's GDP.<sup>17</sup>

Wittkopf used only total aid amounts (over a three year time span) to test for correlations. Sexton and Decker tested both total amounts and per capita aid in their study. Rai employed all three measures of the strength of aid. Rai and Wittkopf found that aggregate aid did not have an impact; however, Rai did find that per capita had a strong effect. In contrast, Sexton and Decker found no connections using any strength of aid measures.

Another issue concerning aid is the conceptualization of the role it plays. Rai has symbolized the importance of aid in two different ways. First, Rai thinks donors use aid to induce certain behaviors from recipient nations. Second, aid can function as a punishment for nations past actions. Sexton and Decker along with Wittkopf both

assume that aid induces future behavior, not punish past actions. Wittkopf explicitly tests the punishment hypothesis finding that it is not accurate for U.S. aid, which is what Rai also found. However, the conceptualization of aid is very important for it determines the direction of the correlation performed. If aid wins votes, then increased aid should win more votes thus, a forward (linearly speaking) connection. However, if aid punishes for voting behavior in the past then the correlation is a backward one. Put another way if aid wins support an increase in aid one year then should lead to favorable votes increasing in the next year. Conversely if aid rewards or punishes past behavior then favorable votes increasing in year one should lead us to expect aid to increase in year two. Thus, how aid is conceptualizes determines the direction of the correlation that we expect to find.

### Votes

The final issue facing researchers is how to define votes in the United Nations. There are four choices open to every nation (yes, no, abstain, absent); studies of this type would be much easier if only the first two were options. The meaning of the latter two choices is not always easy to identify. Further, not all votes have the same degree of importance to all nations. Certain subjects affect a nation directly while others are relatively unimportant. By this logic, nations, especially donor nations, would seek to influence only those votes that are important to them. Surprisingly, there has been a great deal of consensus among researchers on these two questions.

First, following Wittkopf's lead, no study has attempted to explore the relationship between important votes to donors and aid. Wittkopf focused attention

... on the relationship between aid and voting preference of developing states identifiable on the basis of all of these votes: no attempt will be



made to identify “critical” votes or specific issues of particular significance to either aid donors or recipients.<sup>18</sup>

In order to prove a general trend Wittkopf felt that all votes should be included, not just important ones. Unfortunately, he does not provide a logical reason for this abstention. He does mention that other research has attempted to discover the connection between aid and important issues but dismisses them because “Generally speaking” the results have not suggested a connection.<sup>19</sup>

Wittkopf cites a study he performed with James Green on voting behavior and the Chinese admission question as proof of his point.<sup>20</sup> Nevertheless, he ignores other studies such as the Bernstein and Albert piece. At best, it is safe to say that the question of important votes versus general votes is still open; however, Wittkopf assumed it was closed without providing reasonable evidence why, establishing the practice of ignoring the differences between critical and general votes.<sup>21</sup>

When exploring abstentions there has again been remarkable similarity between the studies. Only Rai's 1980 work has deviated from the norm. Sexton and Decker as well as Wittkopf do not attempt to explore the meaning of abstention. This is not surprising because both studies theorize that aid recipients should vote exactly as the donor did. Thus, abstention should only happen when the donor abstains. Using this methodology there are no alternatives for how to view abstentions. Although this is certainly easier when dealing with such a wide array of data, it may not be entirely accurate. As Rai highlights there are multiple meanings to non-votes.<sup>22</sup> He states that nations may be absent (non-vote) because they object to the vote and refuse to take part.<sup>23</sup> In this case, the non-vote is indeed a very strong vote no. Other meanings are also possible. Rai does not attempt to sort out these problems. Instead, he limits his study to

counting an absence as an abstention, except when a nation is absent to protest a vote.

This is an improvement but still missing some important points. For example, is an abstention to avoid voting against a donor nation to be considered support?

Consideration of these types of questions has yet to take place.

### Results

It is not surprising that with so many unresolved methodological issues there has been little agreement about whether aid affects voting in the UN. The three full studies focused on here cover the spectrum of possible outcomes. Sexton and Decker find no connection between the two variables, though when Israel is removed from the model the coefficients become negative.<sup>24</sup> Wittkopf finds strong support for a negative relationship, arguing that aid “rewards our enemies”.<sup>25</sup> However, he ultimately believes even this relationship to be spurious. Rai finds that, using per capita measures, there is a positive relationship between aid and votes.<sup>26</sup> With these various results, it is little wonder that there is no general agreement in the field about the connection between aid and voting and that the question is still actively debated. The last section discusses how to improve research on the connection between aid and voting.

### Conclusion: Towards a New Research Agenda

As if the research issues discussed above are not serious enough, this research also suffers from the passage of time. The world has changed greatly since even the most recent study in 1992. The end of the Cold War and the realignment of nations have made this research even more complicated. Research can not perform case studies between two

large blocks as Bernstein and Alpert did. Further, research must reexamine many of the past accepted assumptions.

First, Rai's 1972 study on what impacts voting patterns in the UN needs updating for the UN of the 1990s. In order to divide nations accurately into more homogeneous blocks to test the impact of aid, research must identify the important characteristics of nations. Then a classification scheme for nations must accurately control for outside variables that have tainted past studies. Rai's original work, along with Sexton and Decker's simple classification scheme, demonstrates clearly the need to stop treating all nations as equal. Performing aggregate studies comparing nations without controlling for differences will be to compare apples to oranges. To accurately assess the effects of foreign aid on voting behavior there must be a test performed on nations that are as similar as possible. Even though it is not possible to account for every trait or variable, there must be a more sophisticated model than employed in the past.

Further, an updated research design should include all members of the United Nations. Looking at only nations receiving aid ignores half of the question. If there is no comparison between aid recipients and non-recipients part of the impact of aid upon nations is omitted. Designing this control group, into the categorization of nations, will provide researchers with a great deal more data on the question. If it is possible to show that similar nations receiving aid vote at a higher rate with the donor nations than those not receiving aid, this would provide evidence for the influential powers of foreign aid.

Just as researchers must rethink their treatment of nations, they must also alter their understanding of aid. First, economic aid must lose its place of primacy. Future studies should not ignore the role military aid plays. Combining military and economic

aid will reflect the full amount of support a nation receives from aid. By excluding military aid past research has undervalued the influence donor nations have over recipients. Considering the amount of aid that is classified as military they may have done so in a drastic way. Research should continue to determine if there is a substantial difference between economic and military aid. However, until there is a satisfactory answer there should be no amount of aid excluded.

Finally, research needs to explore the various complexities of votes in the United Nations. Treating all votes as equal suffers from the same type of conceptual problems as treating all nations identically. The first issue to address is important vs. general votes. There may be no difference between the two types of votes but this should be resolved empirically. Second, researchers must develop a more sophisticated scheme for looking at abstentions and absences, one that accounts for strategic voting. The goal of a donor nation is not necessarily to achieve identical votes from all of its recipient nations. Instead, as the Bernstein and Alpert article shows, the goal of a nation is to win the overall vote on a resolution. By this logic, an abstention or an absence may be helpful to a donor nation, in determining the final outcome of the vote.

Successfully addressing these issues will move us closer to a definitive answer to the question of whether aid impacts voting in the United Nations. Although the research agenda above does not solve every problem, it moves in the right direction. Rewriting the formula of influence to incorporate these ideas creates Formula 3-1.

#### **Formula 3-1**

$$\text{Support} = f(\text{aid, vote, nation})$$

## Endnotes

1. This issues was not a matter of admission so the United Nations Security Council was not involved. The PRC applied to the General Assembly to receive the credentials of China.

2. This part of their theory is based on William H. Riker's, *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1962).

3. Samuel J. Bernstein and Eugene J. Alpert, "Foreign Aid and Voting Behavior in the United Nations: The Admission of Communist China," *Orbis* 15, no. 3 (1971) 964 – 965.

4. Bernstein and Alpert, 973.

5. Kul B. Rai, "Foreign Policy and Voting in the UN General Assembly," *International Organizations* 26, no. 3 (1972) 590.

6. Rai 1972, 590.

7. For an in-depth look at this topic see Bruce M. Russett, *International Regions and the International System: A Study in Political Ecology* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1979) and Arend Lijphart, "The Analysis of Bloc Voting in the General Assembly: A Critique and A Proposal," *American Political Science Review* 57, no. 4 (1963) 902-917.

8. Edwin A. Sexton and Terence N. Decker, "U.S. Foreign Aid: Is It for Friends, Development or Politics," *The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies* 17, no. 3 & 4 (Fall/Winter 1992) 304.

9. Sexton and Decker, 304.

10. Wittkopf 1973 and Rai 1980.

11. Eugene R. Wittkopf, "Foreign Aid and United Nations Votes: A Comparative Study," *American Political Science Review* 67, no. 3 (1973) 871.

12. In 1973 there were 131 members in the United Nations, 16 of these are considered donor nations by Wittkopf and could not be part of the pool of recipient nations; thus 115 potential nations are available for the sample.

13. This number varies across the years of Rai's 1980 study, see page 273 for a complete list of the numbers used for the various years.

14. Rai 1972, 1980; and Wittkopf 1973

15. Rai 1972, 591-594.

16. U.S. Agency for International Development, Office of Budget, Bureau for Management, *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance From International Organizations 1995*, (Washington, D.C., 1995) 13.

17. Kul B. Rai, "Foreign Aid and Voting in the UN General Assembly, 1967-1976," *Journal of Peace Research* 17, no. 3 (1980) 270.

18. Wittkopf, 870.

19. Wittkopf, 870 - see footnote 19.

20. Wittkopf, 870 - see footnote 19.

21. See Rai 1980, 270 - for example.

22. Other examples of this can be found in Arend Lijphart, "The Analysis of Bloc Voting in the General Assembly: A Critique and a Proposal," *American Political Science Review* 57, no. 4 (1963) 902-917 and Sydney D. Bailey *Voting in the Security Council* (London: Indiana University Press, 1977), particularly chapter six.

23. Rai 1980, 270.

24. Sexton and Decker, 304.

25. Wittkopf, 878.

26. Rai 1980, 273-4.

## CHAPTER 4

### DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS OF AID

In order to improve testing between foreign aid and United Nations voting there is a need to alter traditional understandings of the term “aid”. Research must reexamine and alter traditional beliefs and definitions in order to align this research with factual and logical evidence as well as the new global environment. There are three main issues to resolve: first, what categories of aid to use in calculating a nations total aid package, second, the differences between loans and grants, and finally, how to determine the strength of aid. This chapter will review these issues and define how this study will resolve them.

#### Military vs. Economic Aid

The first concept to clarify is the need to incorporate military aid into the calculations of a nation’s aid package. As noted in chapter three, most studies have only used economic aid to determine the amount of aid a nation receives. While this is expedient, it does not adequately capture the impact aid has on recipient nations. By underestimating the amount of aid received, past studies have not measured foreign aid against UN voting; instead they have measured economic aid and determined that it does not have a significant impact on voting. Supporting the claim to include military aid are

logical and factual reasons, along with empirical evidence. This section will explore these issues and demonstrate the need to include military aid.

Research must not ignore four essential observations when considering military aid. These observations do not provide all of the evidence for the inclusion of aid; however, they provide the base for the overall argument.

The first observation is that historically, military aid has been the largest portion of American foreign aid.<sup>1</sup> This is no surprise since most of American aid history has taken place under the shadow of the Cold War. However, in recent years economic aid has surpassed military aid although the latter remains a large and significant percentage of total aid. In 1995, military aid comprised approximately twenty-five percent of the total aid budget.<sup>2</sup> This is one of the lowest points, in percentage, for military aid. In 1995, emphasis shifted to providing transition assistance to many former communist nations, which drastically increased economic loans and grants while military aid remained unchanged. By 1997, military aid comprised approximately thirty-eight percent of the aid budget, restoring the balance.<sup>3</sup> It is important to note that the 1997 numbers are more representative of aid in recent times. The approximate split between economic and military aid is consistently sixty/forty.

Thus, not incorporating military aid amounts excludes approximately forty percent of American assistance. Even using the lower percentage of 1995 as a base line would exclude one-fourth of all aid. In order to test the full impact of aid on UN voting all aid must be included. Otherwise, only the impact of the counted portions of aid is analyzed not the effect of aid as a whole.



A second fact to take into account is which nations receive military aid. It is clear from reviewing military aid contributions that nations receiving military aid tend to be strong US allies. The United States does not provide military aid to all nations; instead, nations that are of strategic interest, and nations that have strong ties with the US, receive military aid. The best example of this is Israel, which receives 1.8 billion dollars in military aid, the largest amount to any single nation.<sup>4</sup> Examples of other nations receiving significant amounts of aid (one million dollars or more) also demonstrate the fact that the United States provides aid to militarily and politically important nations, such as Poland, Thailand, and Turkey. Even though not every nation fits this pattern, the overall trend does favor strong US allies receiving military aid. Excluding military aid weakens the correlation between aid and UN voting, especially for nations receiving the majority of their money in the form of military aid. Comparatively speaking, excluding military aid lowers the amount of aid that strong supporters receive at the same time raising the amount less supportive nations receive. This leads to weaker, less reliable results than are achievable.

The third fact is that certain nations receive only military aid. Examples of this class of nations in 1997 included Estonia, Comoros, Bahrain, and Argentina.<sup>5</sup> Although the total amounts of aid are limited, usually under one million dollars, by only counting economic aid these nations appear to receive no aid, which is very different than receiving a small amount of aid. This will be even more important when designing a new strength of aid indicator. Here it is sufficient to state by not counting military aid a sizable portion of nations are not counted as receiving any aid, which will skew any attempt at correlating aid and voting.

Finally, past studies have linked military aid and recipient behavior. First, Rai found economic and military aid both had some connection to voting support, Rai also found that different forms of aid had different success rates based on the donor nations studied.<sup>6</sup> By choosing between categories of aid, the researcher can manipulate results of these types of studies. Further, Morgenthau clearly links military aid and support, stating that nations understood the true nature of military aid (as a bribe) more than with economic aid.<sup>7</sup> In order to test Morgenthau's theory, military aid must be included.

Now that the logical and factual arguments for including military aid are clear, it is time to look at the actual impact of including military aid. The use of a ten-nation sample will illustrate the impact of the issues mentioned. This sample is not representative of the total population but includes nations from all geographic regions. Table 4-1 provides both the military and economic aid amounts for the sample.

Table 4-1 sorts the nations by amount of economic aid received. It is clear from comparing the economic and military aid columns that the ranking criteria (economic or military aid) drastically alters the ordering. Only three nations remain in the same position, Israel, El Salvador, and Albania, all of the others shift some dramatically. What this illustrates is if it is expected that nations receiving more aid support the United States more often, then how they are ranked will determine largely whether this expectation will be achieved.

To illustrate the importance of military aid to nations receiving it Table 4-1 also presents military aid as a percent of total aid. This best illustrates the importance of military aid, which has a different impact on almost every nation, percentages range from 100 to 0. What is important to note is the nations that are in the middle. Sixty percent of

Israel's aid would not be included in its total aid package without military aid. Thailand and Argentina are also excellent cases for including military aid; each of these nations would have sixteen percent of their aid unincorporated without military aid. In other years, utilizing only economic aid would result in counting certain nations as receiving no aid when in fact they received large amounts of military aid.<sup>8</sup>

Table 4- 1

## Ten Nation Sample - Aid Distribution

Name	Military Aid	Economic Aid	Total Aid	Percent Military Aid
Israel	1,800	1,200	3,000	60.0%
Ethiopia	.2	119.6	119.8	0.2%
El Salvador	.4	63.2	63.6	0.6%
Albania	.2	31.2	31.4	0.6%
Zimbabwe	.2	21.6	21.8	0.9%
Swaziland	.1	13.4	13.5	0.7%
Belarus	.1	11.1	11.2	0.9%
Yemen	0	8.1	8.1	0.0%
Thailand	1	5.1	6.1	16.4%
Argentina	.1	.5	.6	16.7%

Data from U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants 1995 – in millions.

It is important to note that when sorting the nations according to economic aid and total aid, the orderings are identical. This is not an indictment against military aid. Instead, it is a function of the sample chosen to illustrate these points. Further, even if economic and total aid rankings were the same for all nations, it would not justify the exclusion of military aid. Including only economic aid misrepresents the total aid package of nations exclusively receiving military aid.

This section outlined the reasons, both logical and empirical, for the inclusion of military aid in any correlation study between aid and voting in the UN. The purpose of

this section was to illustrate the significance of excluding military aid out on these studies. After observing the difference made by disregarding military aid, it becomes clear that it must be included in any true test of aid and voting in the UN.

### Grants and Loans

Past studies have not inquired into the different effects of grants and loans. Since each has different characteristics, each should have a different impact upon recipients; however, there has been no attempt to analyze this issue.

The basic difference between loans and grants determines the influence of each. Despite possessing low interest rates, loans are not gifts and the recipient must repay them. Unlike loans, donors provide grants to recipients without expectations of repayment. It is logical that a nation would be more likely to support a donor nation when they do not have to return the money. While not always the case, sometimes loans are a direct tool of bribery. This is not to say that loans, especially very low interest loans, do not affect recipient behavior; instead, it is likely that loans have a small impact. Because loans are contractual obligations extending over several years the donor nation can not withhold funds, or alter the agreement to the recipient's detriment, for unsupportive nations. However, donor nations can withhold grants for any reason because they appropriate them on a yearly basis. Reinforcing this is the fact that there are many multinational organizations that provide loans to nations, thus eliminating reliance on one source. If a nation did not have other borrowing opportunities the effect on their behavior would most likely be greater.

This study will not differentiate between loans and grants for two reasons. First, loans do have some impact on recipient behavior as discussed above. Second, and most important, America provides very little aid in the form of loans. In fact, 4.9 percent of all aid in 1995 was in the form of loans while 95 percent was grants.<sup>9</sup> These numbers are representative of aid disbursements in the 1990s with some variances: aid composition has gone as high as 10 percent loan with 90 percent grant. Currently few nations receive aid in the form of loans; America provides the majority of its foreign aid as grants to nations. Even Israel, the United States greatest aid recipient, receives all of its funds in grants. In the sample of nations from above (Table 4-1), only Belarus receives any of its funds as loans (76%). In Belarus aid may exercise less influence; however, there are few cases where the majority of aid is loans making a test of this proposition impossible. For this study, no differentiation between loans and grants will take place. Differentiating between loans and grants would not make a vast difference in the overall amount of aid provided. Further, as stated in the first section, research on this topic should incorporate all aid if possible.

### Strength of Aid

The final issue concerning aid is how to measure the expected impact of aid. Put another way, what measure best determines the effect of aid for comparison between nations. Exploring the different methods for measuring the strength of aid, which is a calculation to determine the degree of influence aid should have on a nation for comparative purposes, will answer this question.

Rai suggested that simple dollar amounts are not effective in testing the influence of aid upon voting. Rai felt that other measures, which control for certain national characteristics, would provide a more accurate measurement tool. He tests aid as a part of gross domestic product (GDP) and aid per capita. However, each of these methods has serious limitations that restrict their effectiveness.

Aid per capita is a potential measure because as John White claims nations receive a base amount of support, that is different for each nation, plus an additional preset amount per person.<sup>10</sup> If White is correct, then utilizing population would help to offset the effects of the extra aid amounts provided per person, allowing us to compare the base amounts more closely.

However, there are two main reasons not to use aid per capita as a strength of aid indicator. First, donors do not directly provide aid to people; instead, it goes to governments.<sup>11</sup> Unless government leaders have the good of every person in mind when making decisions they would not be concerned with aid per capita; and since governments are concerned with winning the support of only a majority, in most cases, the good of the whole is discounted.<sup>12</sup> Second, if aid per capita was a vital factor in winning a nation's support the United States would have to invest the bulk of its funds into a few nations, such as India and China (PRC). However, this would be an irrational approach to maximizing global support, as it requires the sacrifice of many nations to gain the support of two, as long as aid funds remain limited. If aid per capita is important, the United States should focus its funds into smaller nations, which are more numerous, and forgo providing aid to larger populated states. However, this is not the case either as both India and the PRC receive foreign aid from the United States.<sup>13</sup> Given

the previous facts, using aid per capita is not a suitable choice for the strength of aid indicator.

The second strength of aid measure is aid as a portion of GDP. For this measure, divide aid by total GDP, with a larger product signifying a greater strength of aid. The logic of this indicator is that if aid makes up a large portion of the GDP of a nation it will strive to protect the aid, especially in the case where aid is greater than GDP. This counteracts the differences among nations, economically, and places the importance of aid in clear relief. In addition, since this data is relatively easy to assemble, it is accessible to policy makers in all nations. Further, building on the concepts of the comparative politics models, which looks at how aid keeps a governing body in power, the larger the aid as a portion of the overall economy the more the government will be able to do to maintain citizen support, at least majority support.

Wittkopf and Sexton and Decker found no connection between voting and aid as a portion of GDP. Only Rai found a connection between the two and this was not a strong connection. Given these results there is no need to test voting against aid as a portion of GDP. Also, chapter six develops a new classifications scheme of nations for this research, in the classification scheme the economic development of nations is a primary factor and controls for the level of economic development as this strength of aid indicator was designed to do.

Because of the weakness of alternative strength of aid indicators, it is best to use aggregate aid totals to compare potential influence among nations. While this is not an ideal measure due to the differences among nations, all attempts to construct a better measure have been unsuccessful. Due to the multitude of differences between nations,

strength of aid indicators will not be successful because they can only control for one variable at a time. Instead, what needs to be constructed is a classification scheme for nations that controls for as many important variables as possible allowing for a test between similar sets of nations. Following this path eliminates the need for the strength of aid indicator and allows the use of unaltered raw aid amounts. Developing this classification scheme will be the topic of the next chapter.

### Conclusion

In the end, there are three important conclusions for this study. First, calculating the amount of aid a nation receives involves adding both military and economic aid. Second, total aid calculations must include loans and grants. Although loans may be less influential, they still exert some influence on recipients that should not be lost. Finally, the best strength of aid measure is total aid. The other ways to calculate the strength of aid measure fail to produce results any better than using total aid. Formula 4-1 shows how to rewrite the formula of influence to incorporate these findings.

### Formula 4-1

$$\text{Influence} = f(\text{total aid, nation, vote})$$

With total aid defined as all military and economic aid whether loan or grants



## Endnotes

1. Hans Morgenthau, "A Political Theory of Foreign Aid," *American Political Science Review* 56, no. 2 (1962): 303.
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3. U.S. Agency For International Development, *Congressional Presentation Summary Tables, Fiscal Year 1998*, (Washington, D.C., 1997) 18-21.
4. Bernard Reich, *Securing the Covenant: United States-Israel Relations After the Cold War*, (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1995), 7.
5. U.S. Agency For International Development – 1998, 18-21.
6. Kul B. Rai, "Foreign Policy and Voting in the UN General Assembly," *International Organizations* 26, no. 3 (1972): 592-593.
7. Morgenthau, 303.
8. See Argentina and Yemen aid amounts for fiscal year 1997 for examples.
9. U.S. Agency for International Development – 1995, 4.
10. John White, *The Politics of Foreign Aid* (New York: St. Martins Press, 1974), 39-40.
11. Sarah J Tisch and Michael B. Wallace, *Dilemmas of Development Assistance: The What, Why, and Who of Foreign Aid* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 55.
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13. U.S. Agency For International Development – 1998, 19.

## CHAPTER 5

### VOTES

When researching votes in the United Nations there are several important issues to cover. First, is the United States concerned about what the United Nations does? More specifically, is the US concerned about what the General Assembly does? If so, why is the US concerned? Beyond the issue of whether or not the US is concerned with the GA actions there is the question of how to determine important votes for the United States. Finally, how to count abstentions in studies of aid and voting? This chapter will cover these issues and outline how a study of American foreign aid and UN voting should confront these challenges.

#### Does the United States Care About the United Nations?

It is an acceptable fact that the United States, along with most other nations, is concerned about actions of the United Nations Security Council. Since the Security Council is empowered to make binding decisions for the entire organization, all members must pay close attention to the actions this body.<sup>1</sup> However, the veto power of the five permanent members insures that the Security Council can not force the United States to act against its will.<sup>2</sup>

While most researchers consider the Security Council important, the General Assembly does not share this position of prominence. Many scholars feel the GA is

unimportant since in most cases it can not make binding decisions.<sup>3</sup> If the General Assembly is inconsequential or, more to the point, it is viewed as inconsequential by policy makers, then it would be irrational for the United States to expend resources to alter the actions of the body. However, it is very clear that the United States does care what the General Assembly does. In repeated scenes the Congress of the United States has taken issue with General Assembly actions and has attempted to draw attention to US tools of influence over nations in the UN. Undertaking a review of all of these episodes is not feasible; however, Heliodoro Gonzalez has compiled a particularly enlightening narrative that reveals the depth of US attention towards the UN.

In the early 1980s, the US Congress launched an investigation into the actions of nations at the UN. This investigation protested that “the United States is subject to irresponsible and irrelevant vilification and verbal assault.”<sup>4</sup> In these hearings, the members of the committee proposed that nations consistently voting against the United States, especially on important issues, should have their foreign aid packages altered as punishment.<sup>5</sup> They felt they could show their disapproval through bilateral aid commitments.

The hearings are compelling evidence that the United States government is concerned about the actions of UN and GA. Nations mentioned by name in the committee meeting were not members of the Security Council and could only offend the US in the General Assembly. The investigation and ensuing report also firmly establishes the link between aid and voting. The members of the committee, clearly, stated that the two are not separate items. The connection between aid and voting was made even stronger by recent Congressional actions, which ordered the annual report of

voting habits in the UN to print the amount of aid each nation receives next to the overall voting percentages.

Congress has further solidified the connection between aid and voting with Senate Bill 141<sup>6</sup>, entered by Senator Faircloth. Section 2 subsection A of this bill reads

**Prohibition.** – Funds may not be obligated or expended in any fiscal year for United States assistance for a foreign country if the government of that country did not cast its vote in agreement with the United States for at least 50 percent of the recorded votes taken in sessions of the General Assembly and Security Council of the United Nations during the calendar year preceding the year in which the fiscal year began.

This ties aid and voting together in the minds of members of Congress. If nations do not vote with the United States then they are risking their American aid. Although this bill did not become law, the Congress has incorporated the basic idea into other bills.

However, it does show, along with the statements from the Congressional report above, that Congress does care what happens in the United Nation General Assembly.

The actions of Congress support what most scholars believe, that the United States does take note of GA decisions. Bailey and Davis state that “All nations pay some heed to UN resolutions”.<sup>7</sup> Most nations, including the United States, consider the potential setbacks from not conforming to resolutions as too great, even if it is only a tarnished image.

Why must all nations pay heed to UN resolutions? The more sublime political reasons previously alluded to are not the only important issues regarding UN resolutions. Procedural issues also demand a nation's attention in the GA. A brief review of both of the procedural and political reasons the GA is important will clarify this issue.

The General Assembly does possess select authority to make binding decisions for the entire body. The first of these binding authorities comes in the form of the UN

budget. The GA assesses the budget commitment for each member nation, based on criteria that it outlines.<sup>8</sup> The GA can commit nations to pay a set amount of money into UN accounts. As it currently stands, over half of the members of the GA contribute one one-hundredth of one percent of the UN budget, while these same nations vote to force the United States to pay twenty-five percent of the total budget.<sup>9</sup> Despite the fact that nations can refuse to pay, which the US did, they eventually do pay the assessed fee, making the GA an important factor.

The GA can also order the bureaucracy of the UN to perform specific functions, such as fact-finding missions.<sup>10</sup> These orders range from compiling reports to forming ad hoc committees to investigate a certain issue. This may not bind a particular nation, except in helping to pay for it, but it can prove very embarrassing for the nation that is under investigation. This power to create reports and committees is a significant tool of influence for the GA providing it a degree of importance.

The most important binding power of the GA comes from a procedure known as 'Uniting for Peace'.<sup>11</sup> Under Uniting for Peace the GA can assume control over an outbreak of hostilities and establish directives for how to deal with the situation, including the deployment of troops. Uniting for Peace can only happen if the Security Council is grid locked by the veto of one (or two) permanent members. When the Security Council is grid locked the GA can pass recommendations that substitute for Security Council directives.<sup>12</sup> While United for Peace resolutions take a two-thirds majority, they have the same weight as Security Council decisions and constitute a shift in power from the Security Council to the GA. Although United for Peace has not

happened often, it has taken place during some very important international crises such as the Korean Conflict, the Soviet invasion of Hungary, and Suez Crisis.<sup>13</sup>

Several other issues under General Assembly control are important to the United States despite not being binding. The first of these is that the GA elects the non-permanent members of the Security Council.<sup>14</sup> This often takes on a great deal of importance. While the United States may be able to block Security Council action with the veto, it can not authorize favorable actions without a positive vote of the majority of nations. The requirement of a “positive” vote means that a majority of the members of the Security Council must vote in favor of a resolution otherwise it is defeated. Further, a majority of nations can defeat a resolution by abstaining, called a “hidden veto”.<sup>15</sup> Thus, in order for the United States to be able to claim it is following a UN resolution when it acts, it must win the support of non-permanent members as well as the permanent five members. If the GA elects members that are unwilling to support American policies then the United States can not employ United Nations resolutions to cover its foreign policy goals. This has taken on greater importance in recent years as the United States has sought to operate under the guise of the UN, the best example of this being the Gulf War against Iraq.

Another very important issue is that the GA votes to accept and expel members of the UN. This ability is tempered by the fact the SC must make a recommendation first; however, the GA is the final body to vote on these issues.<sup>16</sup> In order for the UN to accept nations the United States sponsors, they must win majority support in the GA. It is however agreed that permanent members can veto requests to join the UN before the General Assembly has the opportunity to vote on admission.

Further, the GA decides matters of credentials, which means they determine who is the actual representative from a nation. Most of the time this is unimportant but takes on great relevance in certain circumstances. This is true of the United States efforts to block the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) from taking over the China seat in the UN. In this case, the PRC applied to the GA for recognition as the rightful government of China and to claim its seat in the UN. Since this was a matter of representation and not membership, the United States could not act through the Security Council.<sup>17</sup> This forced the United States to attempt to block the entry of the PRC through the GA by denying it the needed two-thirds support to win the seat.<sup>18</sup> In this role, the decision of the GA took on great importance to the United States. Allowing an enemy to join at the same time expelling an ally would have been a great loss for the United States.

Finally, the GA elects the Secretary-General of the UN.<sup>19</sup> The Secretary-General is the chief executive of all UN organs and can attend, without voting privileges, both Security Council and GA meetings. Again, the Security Council forwards a nomination to the GA for its consideration and in most cases, the GA accepts the Security Council's decision, but it is not bound to do so. Even if the United States wins a vote on its preferred candidate a divided vote in the GA could be embarrassing for the United States, especially in the hands of anti-American propagandist.

Along with the procedural issues that make the GA critical there are larger political realities that require the United States to take notice of what the GA does. While these issues are more subtle than the issues above they are still of great relevance.

The UN and GA by design bear a certain moral authority.<sup>20</sup> This authority comes from the GA's universal nature; it is supposed to be the representative of all the world's

people. Further, the UN has a broad base of support both in the United States, which is one of the most skeptical of nations, and in the world. Given these facts, "... most governments will still try to avoid a direct confrontation with, or condemnation by, the General Assembly."<sup>21</sup> Further, since the United States attempts to wrap its foreign policy in moral righteousness it can not accept the condemnation of the UN. This is especially true in the current Iraqi situation where the United States has taken the moral high ground of upholding world peace and defending the weak. If the GA ever votes against United States policies in the Gulf region, it would force American policy makers to put a new spin on events, a spin that might undermine domestic support.

Issues of prestige also arise in the GA. Hans Morgenthau stated clearly that nations could not allow the tarnishing of their prestige in international relations. Once this happens, other nations will view the defamed power as weak or in decline, which could lead to challenges for authority, which is what every hegemonic power seeks to avoid. Although losing an important vote in the GA is not catastrophic, it could signal other nations to challenge US policies through the UN. Thus, the United States expends great effort to avoid critical defeats, or at least to avoid losing by a large margin.<sup>22</sup>

It should be clear from the discussion above that decisions made in the General Assembly concern the United States. Through procedural and political issues, the GA can exert great influence over UN and world politics. Even though the GA is weaker than the Security Council, it is still important to the United States. Due to this importance, the United States attempts to control certain actions taken by General Assembly.



### Important Votes

While it is apparent that the United States cares about the actions of the General Assembly, it is also apparent that not all actions vitally importance to the United States. Instead, a sub-group of votes exists which critically concern the United States. Up to this point, researchers have made no effort to distinguish between these groups of votes. Wittkopf did not distinguish between important and peripheral votes; instead testing aid against all votes. This section challenges the practice of not separating these votes and discusses guidelines for determining an important vote from an unimportant one.

Wittkopf never defended or explained his decision not to separate important votes, so examining his logic is not possible. Further, since all other studies relied upon Wittkopf no published arguments exist in favor of separating these votes. A possible explanation is that since the State Department did not provide a list of important votes when Wittkopf performed his study he did not feel it was a necessary issue to consider. Instead, this section makes the argument for differentiating the two types of votes. This will lead directly to the method for determining an important vote.

As should be apparent the United States is not profoundly concerned with all issues attended to in the General Assembly. In fact, of the hundreds of votes that annually take place there may be only about twenty of vital interest. Past studies have asserted that if aid wins support, increased support will be evident in all actions, even if unimportant to the donor. However, it seems an irrational waste of scarce resources for the United States to use its influence to alter votes on items of no relevance. While nations may agree with the position of the United States on these peripheral matters and vote with them, the United States would not waste its influence to alter these votes.

Instead, the United States, and any donor nation, would save their influence for important issues. To follow Morgenthau's analogy, donor nations would only bribe other nations on issues of great concern. Thus, any test of aid and influence should place emphasis on the issues important to the donor.

This logic holds true for recipient nations as well. It is irrational to expect nations to accept aid if they must alter all of their actions to satisfy the donor. Instead, the recipients are willing to alter select actions in exchange for foreign aid. No nation would be willing to trade all of its sovereignty for aid, at least not for the amount of aid that the United States can provide. Thus, from both perspectives it is unlikely that a donor of aid attempts to alter all votes in the UN. Instead, aid is a tool to influence votes on select issues.

How can researchers tell an important vote from a peripheral one? The best approach is to rely upon individual government statements concerning what they regard as important votes. It is possible to design strict criteria to categorize votes as important or not. However, if individual governments pressure recipient governments to act in a certain matter, it is the individual government's view of important issues that is consequential.

However, since a governmental agency may be under pressure to demonstrate its effectiveness there should be some general criteria outlined. This will allow researchers to shift through government statements and ensure that they are not receiving biased information slanted towards success. In addition, since, unlike the United States, not all nations publish their important votes these criteria are applicable to other nations.

There are five factors to determine the relative importance of individual issues. First, anything binding must be important to a nation. If the United States is committed to taking certain actions by a GA resolution, it will use its influence to ensure the achievement of its most favorable outcome. The best example of this is the Uniting for Peace resolution. Especially since the United States no longer controls the majority in the General Assembly on a regular basis, it fears the use such resolutions against American interests.<sup>23</sup> Budget resolutions also fall into the category of committing actions. However, since these resolutions happen yearly, only resolutions that drastically alter the funding commitments are important, under normal circumstances. Exceptions to this may arise if the current United States administration is particularly anti-UN or has campaigned heavily to reduce the United States share of the payments.

The second factor is if the resolution deals directly with the United States. The UN occasionally passes resolutions regarding American actions, such as the recent bombing of Afghanistan and the Sudan. In its own defense the United States, and any other nation, will attempt to weaken the language in the resolution; or try to demonstrate that the entire UN is not against the action taken by creating a large bloc of nations against the resolution. An example of this comes from GA resolutions condemning the mining of Nicaraguan harbors by the United States in the 1980s.<sup>24</sup> The same premise would apply to any reports about domestic policy negative towards the United States.

Further, any resolution that deals with a close ally is important. The United States will not allow the GA to denounce an ally, because it can amount to attacking US policies. The United States demonstrates this by its continued attempts to shield Israel from negative resolutions debated by the GA. The United States has consistently fought

in support of Israel and other close allies. In the case of Israel the United States normally loses, but does attempt to weaken the voting coalition against Israel.<sup>25</sup> In 1995, the GA passed two such resolutions dealing with Israel, A/Res/50/73 and A/Res/50/129.<sup>26</sup> Although the United States agreed substantively with the resolutions, the United States believed that both resolutions attacked Israel unwarrantedly and attempted to defeat both of them. This shows that the United States provides protection to its allies, especially in the case of Israel.

Any resolution concerning an enemy state is important, especially if the resolution condemns the state or is an attempt to end punishment against a state. The United States has repeatedly ensured that Saddam Hussein could not gain a political victory by having the GA condemn the embargo against Iraq. The United States has also vigorously fought criticism of its Cuba policy.

Finally, issues of UN reform will take on great importance to most nations and certainly the United States. The United States has historically viewed the UN as a tool for American world leadership, designed to help maintain the current world order.<sup>27</sup> Any attempt to alter the balance of power, in the UN or any organ such as the GA, is important. The United States favors only change within the current system, not changes to the system itself.<sup>28</sup> Any attempt to alter the current balance of power, as currently debated in regards to the Security Council, must have the approval of the GA and would be significant to the United States as the global hegemonic power.

In this study, official United States government statements regarding votes will be used to determine which votes are considered as important. These statements will be drawn from the annual State Department report to Congress entitled *Voting Practices in*

*the United Nations* for the years of this study, 1995-97, as long as they meet the general criteria outlined above. Appendix 1 provides a complete list and brief review of these important votes.

### Abstentions and Absent

The final issue dealing with votes is how to confront nations that do not vote on a particular resolution. Currently there are four options for nations' vote: yes, no, abstain, and absent.<sup>29</sup> Since nations do not have to choose to support a resolution directly, it is difficult to determine if a vote is supportive or not, a fact that past studies have not taken into account. Instead, they have tested whether or not a nation voted identically to the United States. Only when a nation voted the same way is it supporting the United States, if not they were in opposition. Abstention and absence are not necessarily opposition.

The first issue to deal with is absence. If a nation is not present at the time of voting then they can neither support nor oppose an issue. However, they may be absent to protest the vote taking place, it is something that does not happen often in the GA of the 1990s. Usually, when a nation is not present to vote it is due to a collapse of government at home and not due to protest.<sup>30</sup> Further, when nations are absent they tend to miss the entire session. Any nation absent for a majority of the votes will not be a part of the sample of nations. Absent votes will not count when figuring vote support for the United States if a nation misses only few votes, unless there exists substantial evidence to support the claim that the nation is absent to protest the entire proceeding.

In the case of abstentions, the issue is much less clear. Lijphart first began to experiment with the multiple meanings of abstentions.<sup>31</sup> He determined that an

abstention is neutral, neither helping nor hurting any nation. Lijphart decided that abstentions should count as half a point when calculating voting agreement, an identical vote being one and opposite vote being zero. While this is a vast improvement over past conceptualizations of abstentions, it does not fully explain how a nation may employ an abstention.

The GA, as with most legislative bodies, makes the majority of decisions in private meetings, not on the floor of the assembly.<sup>32</sup> Nations are able to 'count votes' in advance of the public vote which is taken more for outside appearance than to resolve the issue. When taking a vote nations know how their vote will affect other nations, including those that provide them foreign aid. Thus, they can calculate if their donor nation is going to win an important vote or not. This allows them to abstain tactically when they are sure the donor nation will achieve their desired outcome. Therefore, whether an abstention is supportive or not, depends upon the outcome of the vote. If the donor nation wins the vote, however that may be defined, then an abstention is supportive of the donor nation. If the donor loses the vote then an abstention becomes a non-supportive vote. While the recipient nation did not openly defy the donor nation, it did not come forward and support it either. As a result, studies comparing support and foreign aid must examine abstentions on an individual basis, not as a whole as past studies have done.

Even the design above is not perfect. It is not hard to envision a scenario where a recipient must not oppose a resolution for domestic political reasons, but at the same time does not wish to conflict with a donor nation. Therefore, the nation chooses the middle ground of abstention. Yet, the abstention could be supportive, since the recipient altered

their behavior to protect their aid. This is the quintessential definition of influence.

However, attempting to determine why nations take the middle ground in specific cases would be a massive undertaking and would most likely not alter the final results in a dramatic fashion due to the lower number of occurrences. Therefore, even though the method for dealing with abstentions outlined in the paragraph above is not perfect, it is the best option for research of this nature.

### Conclusion

There are three conclusions drawn from this chapter. First, the United States, and most nations of the world, are concerned with the actions of the United Nations General Assembly. However, the issue that is under consideration in the GA shapes this concern. The United States is not concerned with every issue the GA covers. Instead, it reserves its influence for a select sub-set of issues that are important to US policies. Any test of aid and UN voting must concentrate on these matters and not the entire array of the GA's agenda. Finally, voting in the GA is not as clear as past studies have attempted to make it appear. Absences and abstentions make the issue of comparing votes much more difficult. However, it is possible to understand and employ these votes in this form of research with the application of a few simple rules. In the end, it is possible to rework the formula of influence to include these ideas as in Formula 5-1.

### Formula 5-1

$$\text{Influence} = f(\text{total aid, important votes, nation})$$

## Endnotes

1. Sydney D. Bailey, *The Procedure of the UN Security Council*, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 3-5.
2. Richard Hiscocks, *The Security Council: A Study in Adolescence* (New York: The Free Press, 1973), 56.
3. Sydney D. Bailey and Sam Daws, *The United Nations: A Concise Political Guide*, 3rd ed. (London: Barnes and Noble Books, 1995), 4.
4. Heliodoro Gonzalez, "Can Foreign Aid Continue as a Growth Industry for the Bureaucracy? Latin American Cooperation at the United Nations," *Inter American Economic Affairs* 37 (1983/84): 53.
5. Gonzalez, 53
6. *Foreign Aid Reform Act of 1997*, 105th Cong., 1st sess., S.R. 141.
7. Bailey and Daws 1995, 13.
8. Peter R. Baehr and Leon Gordenker, *The United Nations in the 1990s*, 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 56-57.
9. Bailey and Daws, 10.
10. Baehr and Gordenker, 52.
11. Hiscocks, 290.
12. Baehr and Gordenker, 74.
13. Baehr and Gordenker, 75-76.
14. Bailey 1988, 254.
15. Sydney D. Bailey, *Voting in the Security Council* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1969), 74.
16. Bailey and Daws, 16.
17. Bailey and Daws, 19.



18. The GA deemed this issue to be an 'important matter' and thus required a two-thirds majority instead of a normal majority.

19. Baehr and Gordenker, 28.

20. Baehr and Gordenker, 54

21. Baehr and Gordenker, 54

22. Robert W. Gregg, *About Faces? The United States and the United Nations* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), 53.

23. Baehr and Gordenker, 23.

24. Baehr and Gordenker, 27

25. James A. Bill *Politics of the Middle East* (New York: Harper Collins College Publishers, 1994), 369.

26. United States Department of State, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, *Voting Practices in the United Nations 1995* (Washington, D.C., 1996), 39-40.

27. Gregg, 2 and 8.

28. Gregg, 9.

29. Baehr and Gordenker, 54.

30. See Gambia in 1997 for example.

31. Arend Lijphart, "The Analysis of Bloc Voting in the General Assembly: A Critiques and a Proposal," *American Political Science Review* 57, no. 4 (1963).

32. David A. Kay, ed., *The United Nations Political System* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, INC., 1967), 104-105.

## CHAPTER 6

### CLASSIFYING NATIONS

The final variable in the formula of influence is nations. In order to understand how aid influences nations it is necessary to compare among similar nations. Early studies, such as Wittkopf's, treated all nations the same, then researchers began to classify nations to help eliminate intermediate variables interfering with the correlations. Sexton and Decker attempted the most complex classification scheme; however, as demonstrated in chapter three it contained only four different types of nations, which is clearly an oversimplification. This chapter will layout a new classification scheme for the test of aid and UN voting.

#### What is Important?

What are the central factors influencing individual relations between nations? Specifically, what variables would lead nations to agree or disagree on issues? The obvious response to such a question is that it depends on the issue. However, this returns researchers to an overly narrow scope. What need to be established are variables that account for a nation's stance on an array of issues. Then it will be possible to classify nations in similar blocs to test the influence of an outside variable, such as foreign aid.

In this search for national indicators there are abundant possibilities. Geography, history, economic conditions, internal political structure, internal economic structure,

level of development, existence of opposition groups<sup>1</sup>, and cultural traditions are all variables that impact a nation's external relations. However, if all of these variables were used to create a classification scheme every nation would comprise a group of one because every nation has trademarks that no other nation shares. To avoid dividing nations into groups of one requires the use of a few significant variables to create groups that are large enough for internal comparisons; but narrow enough to have real meaning.

There has been little work done in this regard, perhaps because this type of research falls between the sub-disciplines of international relations and comparative politics. Since such work would comprise a far-reaching research project of its own, this study will outline what the most probable variables are and how to employ them in research.

This chapter will discuss only the three most prominent variables. These are type of government, geographic location, and level of economic development. The three chosen variables have a great impact on the external relations of all nations, which is the primary concern here. These three variables interact with most global issues and predispose a nation towards certain policy alternatives. By ignoring the natural dispositions of nations, past studies assumed all nations approached votes in the UN as a blank slate with foreign aid deciding their vote. However, research must account for preset preferences and designs that every nation has when entering votes. Foreign aid must overcome national preferences if it is to influence voting in the United Nations. Only by placing similar nations together will it become clear whether aid influenced votes.

### Type of Government

Though realist theory dictates that type of government has no effect on a state's international relations, other perspectives suggest the type of government a nation has may determine its views on certain international issues.<sup>2</sup> This dispute requires some elaboration provided in a brief overview of the central issues follows.

On the international level, one of the most discussed topics is human rights. With the recent expansion of this topic, it now encompasses a wide range of issues. One of which is the political rights of individuals, particularly the right to vote and have political representation. This issue will naturally meet with resistance from certain types of governments while viewed as natural by others.

A totalitarian regime, either monarchical or dictatorial in nature, will not accept the idea of popular sovereignty. Allowing the nation's citizens to vote could jeopardize the government's power, or even its claim to power. Thus, when any voting rights issue arises in the General Assembly, totalitarian governments would likely be negatively predisposed towards the resolution. On the other hand, a more liberal democratic regime, which could include constitutional monarchs, would believe the right to vote is fundamental for citizens. In this case, the government would be positively predisposed towards the issue and would have a natural position on the topic. This does not take into account the view of second world nations that believe voting is permissible as long as the communist party is the only entity on the ballot.

From one brief example it is clear the type of government a nation has is a very important variable in international relations; granted, this importance shifts depending on the issues. However, not controlling for this variable can distort the results of a study of

this nature. If a nation such as Saudi Arabia, an absolute monarchy, votes against a representation resolution while Chile, a democracy, votes for it, can these two votes be taken as equal in supportive value. In short, did Chile support the United States, assuming a positive vote, while Saudi Arabia did not? In the direct sense, Saudi Arabia did not support the United States but Chile did, but was the United States the critical factor? In this case, it is unclear due to differences in government and the philosophies that provide their legitimacy.

Creating an accurate classification scheme of governments will counteract these differences. By classifying government types, it would be possible to test the impact of an outside variable, such as aid, without the intermediate interference of government types. In short, it would be possible to test the realist theory of aid on more homogenous sets of nations.

However, an appropriate classification scheme is not obvious. The first attempt in aid studies at this type of classification had only two types of governments, totalitarian and non-totalitarian.<sup>3</sup> This is clearly an over-simplification and fails to achieve anything. For example, it classifies nations such as Saudi Arabia and the People's Republic of China as totalitarian. Clearly, these nations do not share the same natural governmental dispositions, especially since the latter governments political philosophy calls for overthrowing of the former. The non-totalitarian category in turn overlooks such differences as presidential versus parliamentary systems and direct vs. indirect elections, all of which could have an impact depending on the issue. In addition, it becomes very difficult to determine what is non-totalitarian. No government claims to be a totalitarian regime and the difference is not always easy to qualify.

Past works on voting blocs support these logical arguments. Although they do not perfectly match the topic at hand, they do follow the basic idea. These studies attempt to determine the reasons behind the existence of voting blocs by determining the characteristic that defines blocs. For example, Hovet does not discuss the existence of any blocs based on type of government. The closest type discussed by Hovet is “Common Interest Groups”, which are economic and colonial based groups, not political.<sup>4</sup> Lijphart’s voting bloc study does not identify a connection between types of government and voting. Despite the fact that his study did not set out to test this proposition directly, it is clear from the data that government type was not a significant factor.

Finally, a review of current blocs in the United Nations supports the findings from Hovet and Lijphart. There are no current blocs in the United Nations associated by type of government. In fact, when reporting voting practices in the United Nations the US Department of State does not separate voting by government type. They employ a variety of other separating techniques such as geography and cultural factors, but without any attempt to explore governmental differences.<sup>5</sup>

Due to these immense difficulties, there will be no classification by government type. While it is true that government type does affect a nation’s voting in the United Nations on select issues, these topics will not arise under this study because the types of issues that government classification would impact will not rise to the level of important resolutions for the United States as outlined in chapter five. It is clear from the history of American foreign policy that ensuring everyone the right to vote is not of major concern; in fact, the United States has long supported and defended undemocratic regimes.<sup>6</sup>

## Geography

Geography in a strict sense can provide the researcher with a great deal of knowledge about a particular nation. Due to the overlap of many important factors, such as common history, culture, and linguistic traits, the geographic location of a nation is a strong indicator of a nation's characteristics. However, the definition of geography is broader for this research. The purpose of the geographic indicator is to signify major political subdivisions in the world.<sup>7</sup>

This is not an over-extension of the term geography. In his groundbreaking research on UN bloc politics, Thomas Hovet discovered that geographic groupings are very similar to caucus groups inside the GA. He further determined that most subgroups in the UN closely resembled geographic groupings.<sup>8</sup> Based on this research, it is possible to place nations into homogenous geographic groups, without performing in-depth studies of each individual nation.

There are two important points of clarification before dividing the nations into these sub-groups. First, Hovet found that the issue under consideration was very important to the creation of these subdivisions.<sup>9</sup> Although this is a serious research issue, it appears that apart from a microanalysis of single votes there is little to do to correct it. However, the second criteria for classifying nations, economic development, will provide a control for issues related to breakdowns of group cohesiveness, especially since the major issues in the GA of the 1990s concern economic issues. Second, Hovet's classification scheme is very old, designed in the middle of the Cold War. In fact, one of his groupings no longer exists, the Eastern Bloc. Due to changes that have occurred over time making adaptations to Hovet's scheme will update it for the modern UN. The

placement of nations in these political subdivisions occupies the rest of this section.

Provided in this chapter is a brief overview and a full listing of all categories is available in Appendix 2.

It is important to remember in this process that the purpose of this division is to place nations into homogenous sub-fields. While these sub-fields will follow traditional geographic lines there are special cases placed in different geographic categories or separated into categories of their own. The reasons for these changes are different with every case but share one common theme. The geographic designation is more than location, it groups nations having the same regional outlook, strategic concerns, and broadly speaking, cultural backgrounds. Nations singled out for special treatment, or placed in different sub-categories, have important idiosyncrasies deserving individual attention.

The first geographic category is Latin America. This category consists of all nations from Mexico to Argentina and the Caribbean states. It may seem prudent to place Cuba outside this grouping given its adversarial relationship with the United States, a relationship that is not currently shared by other Latin American nations, at least not to the same degree. However, the conflict with the United States is the only major difference between Cuba and the rest of the Latin American nations. Although important to keep in mind when examining the results of this study, the Cuba-American rivalry is not sufficient to place Cuba in a separate category.

The second geographic category is Western Europe. This category includes Canada, Greenland, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Greece, and all other European nations that were not under Soviet domination during the Cold War. While the Cold War status



of each nation is not an important factor, it is the point of demarcation between two drastically different groups. Despite the fact that Eastern European nations desire to join the ranks of the Western European nations they have not reached that point yet and that represents a clear division between East and West Europe. This division is important enough to warrant the creation separate groups. If the United States were not the donor under study in this research, it would be located within the Western Europe category.

The third grouping is Eastern Europe. This group includes the former Soviet Bloc countries, including the new nations that have formed out of Yugoslavia, the Baltic States, Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia. While Russia does extend into the Asian region its historical background is European and not Asian making it fit better with the Eastern European grouping.

The fourth geographic group is the Middle East and North Africa. While this region includes many nations, running from Morocco in the west to Kazakhstan in the East, these nations have similar background, especially religion. Clarify this region requires an in-depth explanation of its confines. It starts with Morocco in the west and continuing across the top of Africa to Egypt. It also includes the traditional Middle East, which extends from the Arabian Peninsula north to Turkey and then across to Iran. For this research, the region will also include the *stans* (or homelands) created by the collapse of the Soviet Union as well as Afghanistan. Despite the fact that these nations are not traditionally associated with the Middle East, share strong similarities.

There are two nations in the Middle East/North Africa grouping to separate for individual treatment. The first is Israel, which does not share many common features with its surrounding neighbors. In fact, one of the common features of countries in this

region is support of the Palestinians against Israel. Including Israel in comparisons of this region would skew any results; instead, the correct placement for Israel is with the Western European category. The other nation that requires special consideration is Turkey. Although Muslim and Arabic, Turkey has strong connections with Europe, even joining NATO. This would alter its voting in the General Assembly compared to other nations in this region. Similar to the solution for Israel, the correct placement for Turkey is with the Western European category.

The fifth geographic group of nations is South Africa. This group consists of nations on the African continent that do not fall into the Middle East and North African group with the addition of Madagascar. Sub-Saharan nations, traditionally grouped together in classification schemes, possess shared histories and concerns make them a natural category for broad ranging comparisons. In this region, the only nation requiring special attention is South Africa. While it has changed rapidly over the past ten years, it still does not belong with other African nations. Its strong European background and minority population gives South Africa a very distinctive outlook and unusual connections to other nations that alters their voting in the General Assembly. Further, the fact South Africa is the only African nation possessing nuclear weapons makes it even more unsuited for the sub-Saharan African category.<sup>10</sup> Following other studies, therefore, South Africa will be in the Western European category. Although not a perfect match, the Western European group is the best choice for South Africa.<sup>11</sup>

The sixth geographic grouping of nations is the Indian Subcontinent. This region will consist of the nations of Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh. This is a rather small grouping of nations, but a necessary one. These nations share unique

characteristics and historical experiences that would make them peculiar in either the Middle East category or the Asian Pacific category. The past British dominance, religious diversity, and intense conflicts gives these nations a singular outlooks that would have an impact on their support levels for different policies.

The seventh, and final, category consists of mainland Asia and the Pacific Region. This group consists of the nations occupying the rest of the Eur-Asian landmass and the island nations of the Pacific. This group stretches from Australia in the South to Mongolia in the North and runs from Western China to the western coast of the North and South American continents. These nations share a long history of interaction and cultural similarities. They also share distinctive security concerns making them a natural grouping. Inside the Asia Pacific category, the Anzus nations, Australia and New Zealand, do not share the common background of the other nations in the group. Their historical and cultural backgrounds are Western European in origin.<sup>12</sup> Even though they share the security concerns of nations in the region, they are too different to classify with the Asia Pacific group. Instead, the Anzus nations belong in the category of Western European.

Despite not following traditional geographic breakdowns, this geographic classification scheme does provide a better typology for studying nations. With this classification, it is possible to study the impact of aid upon nations possessing similar political attitudes and agendas. These groupings divide the nations of the world into homogenous groups making a true comparison between UN votes and aid possible. The final intermediate variable research can control for is different levels of economic development inside each category.

## Economic Differences

The division of nations into regional categories creates broad homogeneous groups for comparing aid and UN voting. However, it is not perfect. There are other intermediate variables that interfere with the study. The variable of greatest importance is level of economic development among nations. In each of the regional categories exist diverse economic development levels. This diversity affects issues a nation will support in the United Nations. Developing nations favor redistributive programs while developed counterparts support these programs less. Further, this research theorized that less developed nations experience a stronger need to ensure continuation of their foreign aid donations. Since developing nations command fewer resources they must rely upon outside assistance to develop economically. To protect their foreign aid donations, developing nations should perceive greater pressure than developed nations to vote with donor. To control for effects from economic development, the level of economic development of each nation will further divide them inside of each geographic category.

The economic categorization uses the individual nation's gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. This provides a true estimate of economic development for each nation. Using pure GDP does not work because it only provides total amount of production of a nation without controlling for demands placed upon production by citizens of the nation. Dividing the GDP by total population of a nation controls for these demands on production, while at the same time controlling for size variations among nations. GDP per capita provides the average amount of production each citizen can consume, a statistic comparable between nations and between points in time. It is important to note that not all experts believe GDP per capita is an appropriate measure of

a nation's economic development. Dogan and Kazancigil state that national averages are not good statistics to employ because there is too much variance among nations and their reporting methodology.<sup>13</sup> Dogan and Kazancigil further state that GDP is imperfect because it does not include the "Black Economy", unreported work and sales, that exists in every nation.<sup>14</sup> However, they do not offer an alternative method for determining economic development levels of a nation. They propose a complex index of multiple variables, but never create one. Although GDP per capita is not perfect, it is the best alternative for comparing economic development among nations.

For this study, there are three classifications of economic development. These represent modifications of the classification scheme currently employed by the World Bank. The World Bank has four categories of nations divided as follows. The first category is low income and comprises nations with per capita Gross National Product (GNP) of 725 dollars or less. The second category is lower-middle income and consists of nations between 726 and 2,895 dollars per person. The third category is upper-middle income and covers the range between 2,896 and 8,955 dollars. The final category is high income and covers nations with per capita GNP greater than 8,956 dollars.<sup>15</sup>

This study combines the first two categories, low and lower middle, to form one low-income category. There are two essential reasons for doing this. First, the difference between the two categories is minimal; each represents the least developed nations of the world. Neither of the categories signifies an economy that is meeting the needs of the nation's population. While it is useful for the purposes of the World Bank to divide nations in this manner, it will not aid this study to divide these nations. Second, using four categories would reduce the number of nations in each category, which will not

allow for adequate comparisons. Sub-dividing each regional category into three fields will allow for a large enough number of nations in each field for comparative purposes. In addition, this study uses GDP instead of GNP. The use of GDP is necessary because it measures only production occurring inside a particular nation's boundaries, while excluding the production of citizens located in other nations.<sup>16</sup> This provides an accurate picture of resources available to a nation, which makes it the better indicator.

### Conclusion

This chapter provided a brief review of the important characteristics of nations, as it pertains to voting in the UN. The list of potential important characteristics has been narrowed to two, geographic region and economic development, that provide for homogeneous groupings of nations without creating overly restrictive criteria. While there are many more potential variables for the classification scheme they would not clarify the results, but rather would make comparisons impossible by forming too narrow of categories. In the end, this chapter creates a concise classification scheme, using as few variables possible, capturing the essential characteristics of each nation to allow for a test of a nation's response to foreign aid. Formula 6-1 shows the formula of influence rewritten to incorporate these findings.

### Formula 6-1

**Votes =  $f$  (total aid, important votes, economic/geographic category of a nation)**

## Endnotes

1. Kenneth A. Schultz, "Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises," *American Political Science Review* 92, no. 4 (December 1998): 829-844.
2. See Realist-Structuralist specifically Morton Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1957) 54-55.
3. Edwin A. Sexton and Terence N. Decker, "U.S. Foreign Aid: Is It for Friends, Development or Politics," *The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies* 17, no. 3 & 4 (Fall/Winter 1992): 304.
4. Thomas Hovet Jr., *Bloc Politics in the United Nations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960) 44-45.
5. Department of State, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, *Voting Practices in the United Nations 1996* (Washington, D.C., 1997), 7-8.
6. Judith Miller and Laure Mylroie, *Saddam Hussein and the Crisis in the Gulf* (New York: Random House, 1990), 217-221.
7. Hovet, 35.
8. Hovet, 35 and 39.
9. Hovet, 106.
10. J.D.L. Moore, *South Africa and Nuclear Proliferation*. St. Martin Press, New York 1987 p. 126-127.
11. Moore, 33.
12. See Richard W. Baker, ed., *The Anzus States and Their Region: Regional Policies of Australia, New Zealand, and the United States* (Westport, CN: Praeger, 1994).
13. Mattei Dogan and Ali Kazancigil, eds., *Comparing Nations: Concepts Strategies Substance*. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994) 41.
14. Dogan and Kazancigil, 43.
15. World Bank, *From Plan to Market: World Development Report 1996* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1996), 239.

16. World Bank, *The World Bank Atlas* 25<sup>th</sup> ed., (The World Bank: Washington, D.C., 1992), 33.



## CHAPTER 7

### CONCLUSION

Before presenting the results of this study there is a brief review of the issues covered, with emphasis placed on how this research differs from other voting and aid studies. Following the presentation of the results is a discussion of the policy implications along with possible alterations for future research on aid and United Nations voting.

#### Review

Chapter one previews this work outlining the general question and methods of research. Chapter two reviews the theories concerning why nations provide foreign aid in order for the reader to fully understand the different aspects of the foreign aid issue and to place this work among the volumes of research performed in the past. This study places heavy emphasis on international relations theories of aid, which serve as the theoretical tool of this study, as elaborated by Hans Morgenthau. Chapter three reviews relevant studies performed on aid and United Nations voting with specific attention on the weakness of these studies and how to improve the older designs.

Chapter four covered the question of how to define and count foreign aid. It establishes why military and economic aid must be included in any study involving aid as

well as the need to count both loans and grants as part of a nation's aid package. In addition, this chapter reviews the weakness of the strength of aid indicators developed by Rai, establishing that raw aid amounts are the best tool for measuring the impact of aid upon recipient nations. Chapter five covers the issue of votes in the United Nations. An important part of this chapter is the establishment of the need to use important votes, as defined by the donor nation, when studying the connection between aid and voting. Further, this chapter explores the multiple meanings of abstentions, determining the need to explore individual votes before deciding whether an abstention is supportive or not. Finally, chapter six outlines a new method for classifying nations in order to test the impact of aid within similar groups of nations. The base of this classification scheme is a nation's geographic location and level of economic development.


### 1997 Results

After conducting the test of aid and voting as specified in the previous chapters, it is apparent that there is no clear answer to whether aid influences voting. The cases studied provide mixed results with certain classifications of nations showing no connection between aid and voting while others demonstrate a weak correlation. Despite the fact that some of the results that follow do present evidence to the contrary, it appears the hypothesis that American foreign aid wins votes in the United Nations General Assembly is incorrect.

To demonstrate the results of the test it is necessary to explore each geographic region separately, ordered by strength of results, with the nations' level of economic development denoted in each case. Since the results from each year studied, 1995-1997,

are almost identical this chapter will only present the graphs for 1997. The graphs for the other two years are available in Appendix 3 for comparison and the data for each category is available in Appendix 2.

The first region is the Asia Pacific. As is clear from Graph 7-1 voting patterns in comparison to aid levels is almost random. There is no strong pattern among the points together or divided by level of economic development. As is also clear, the line of best fit for the low developed nations in this region is nearly straight. This indicates nations vote with the United States at the same rate, regardless of the amount of aid received.<sup>1</sup>




Graph 7-1

While the economic development of the nations does not appear to play a strong role in voting for the lower and middle group, it does seem to have an impact on the

higher developed category. Two of the three high developed nations vote with the United States over eighty percent of the time. Although not compelling by itself, it does lend support to controlling for the level of economic development.


The second region of study is Eastern Europe. Again, the results are nearly random with a tendency towards a negative correlation between aid and voting. The line of best fit for the low economic group is slightly positive, demonstrating a weak connection between aid and voting. While the middle group's line of best fit is sharply negative, however there are too few points to be reliable.<sup>2</sup> Again, the tendency is against any correlation with level of economic development important but not decisive.



Graph 7-2

The third category is Western Europe. As is evident from Graph 7-3<sup>3</sup> there are not enough nations receiving aid in Western Europe to allow any firm conclusions to be


drawn.<sup>4</sup> This graph (along with 7-2) does present one important piece of information; geography does make a difference. In both of the graphs the lower bounds are at fifty percent support and above, meaning that all European nations support the United States over half the time. European nations vote with the United States at a much greater rate than most regions despite the fact most do not receive foreign aid. The regional variable is an important ingredient in United Nations voting; however, it is not dominant.



Graph 7-3

The fourth category is Latin America. In Latin America, the correlation between aid and voting is in the predicted direction. Both lines of best fit move in a positive direction. However, the line for the middle developed group has too few points of data to be accepted. The line for the lower income group, based on a wider number of cases,


does represent a valid measurement of aid and voting. As is clear however, it is flat; indicating a constant voting rate regardless of level of aid received.



Graph 7-4


The nations of the Indian Subcontinent comprise the fifth region in this study. However, there are only four nations in the sample, which is inadequate to draw firm conclusions. Despite being too small, this grouping should not merge with other groups; its uniqueness demands its continued separation. Combining this group with another would distort the impact of aid and voting for the new enlarged grouping, which is exactly what this research sought to avoid by dividing the nations.

Despite the small size of the Indian Subcontinent group, it is apparent that there is no connection between aid and voting. The line of best fit is negatively sloped. Further, the nation that receives the most aid tied for the lowest percentage of supportive votes, which is directly counter to expectations.



Graph 7-5

The Middle East/North Africa is the sixth group in the study. This group displays the strongest correlation between aid and voting so far. In the Middle East, both lines of best fit move in the predicted direction with the greatest strength.<sup>5</sup> However, as in the case of Latin America the line for the middle income group relies upon too few points. However, unlike the Latin American group the line of best fit for the poor nations is not flat, which shows there is some connection between aid and voting. While not strong, the connection is discernible. It is important to note that poor nations in this region are non-oil producing states, most of which have large populations. Thus, these governments have to provide for a large population without the benefit of a reliable source of income. This could account for an increased reliance on foreign aid that allows donor nations greater influence.




Graph 7-6

The final region is South Africa, and it possesses the strongest correlation between aid and voting. As is seen in Graph 7-7 the line of best fit for the middle group moves in the wrong direction. Again, the line for this group is not based on enough points to consider reliable. However, the line for the lower developed nations is reliable and moving in the correct direction. Further, the diagram as a whole demonstrates the general tendency to move from left to right and bottom to top, which is what should happen if a linkage between aid and voting exists. However, the connection is still weak.

While a complete explanation of the deviation of South Africa is not possible here, there is one fact that might explain the stronger findings in this region. The nations of South Africa are among the poorest on the face of the earth. The level of poverty in these nations may be so great as to force governments to secure aid at any cost, thus



making the pressure to vote with a donor, such as the United States, extreme. It may be the case that excessively poor nations perceive the need to vote with donor nations while more developed nations, that are still low in development status, do not. The findings in the lower developed nations of the Middle East/North Africa grouping support this explanation. Extreme poverty may be a strong factor in recipient support for donors.



Graph 7-7

In the end, there are six valid sets of data, with the Indian Sub-continent being too small for any conclusions. Of the six three show signs of aid and voting being linked, however the connection is minimal in one case, with only the African region showing any true correlation between aid and voting in the predicted direction. The remaining three cases all show the correlation between aid and voting to be negative or non-existent.

Thus, the only conclusion to draw from this study is that aid does not win support from nations in the United Nations General Assembly.

While there appears to be no connection between foreign aid received and support for the United States in the United Nations there is a connection between aid and a nations decision to abstain from voting. Chapter five hypothesized that nations would use abstentions tactically to avoid voting against an important resolution to the donor United States. The evidence supports this assumption and the need to reevaluate the meaning of abstentions. When national support percentages were adjusted based on their abstentions for issues the United States was successful in winning, 74% of the nations receiving aid in 1997 had their rates of support increase. Even more impressive is the fact that if European nations are not counted the rate rises to 87%. This evidence is not decisive but does indicate that recipient nations use abstention to avoid voting against the United States on issues they can not openly support or advocate.

### Policy Implications

The implications for American foreign policy, especially foreign aid policy, are clear. If Congress expects aid should win votes in the United Nations, as shown in the fifth chapter, then they must explicitly state the connection between aid and voting. Even beyond the Congress, the American government as a whole must make the connection clear at every possible opportunity. Only unified action between the Congress and the executive will be able to make nations realize what the United States expects in exchange for foreign aid, assuming that votes are a true priority.

Congress has moved in this direction by printing the amount of total aid received by a nation next to its voting percentage in the State Department's annual report to Congress regarding voting in the United Nations. However, they have not accompanied this action with a straightforward statement such as the one proposed by Senator Faircloth. Only this form of blatant action will create the results presumably desired by Congress.

Further, the United States must realize that aid appears more suited to avoid opposition to policies than to winning support for them. Nations seem less willing to support American policies that are not in their best interest, but inclined to avoid openly opposing the United States on these same issues. Employed tactically, and with the aid of a large enough coalition in the General Assembly, the United States will be able to ensure the passage, or defeat, of its important resolutions.

#### Future Research

Adjustments in any research design can sharpen results; further, changing circumstances might alter the outcome of this research. While it is impossible to cover all the issues, a review of the significant topics for future research is important and provided here.

First, this type of study needs repeating in the future to determine if the passage of time will alter the outcomes. This research is not static, it is constantly changing and the conclusions of today will not be the same tomorrow. As Congress has moved, ever so slightly, to make the connection between aid and voting more concrete, nations around the world may begin to reconsider their voting practices in the United Nations. Since the

Congress has only recently begun making these changes, they have not had time to have an impact yet. Further, as the international system moves farther away from the Cold War, and into a new currently undefined system, the importance of foreign aid or United Nations decisions may increase causing a shift in national behavior. Either of these possibilities, or a combination, could lead to a new reality in global politics and cause the link between aid and United Nations voting to become clear. Ignoring this issue in the future because of the results of this and other studies would be unwarranted.

Second, this research does show that economic development levels of recipient nation affects its voting in the United Nations. Unfortunately, the current methods for categorizing development do not allow for a full exploration of this issue. There is still a need for better ways to classify development that will more clearly define a nation's status and allow nations to be broken into smaller groups for comparisons.

Third, efforts must continue to understand the various uses of a vote of abstention. In this study, the employment of a very simple model demonstrated that nations could use abstentions tactically. A more complex model needs to be developed that includes the possibility of the United States using aid to influence nations to abstain on votes it loses; which might cause the resolution to lose moral authority, assuming the abstaining block is large. It might also be helpful to limit the number of abstentions that are incorporated. This would entail adjusting national support figures for only those votes that the number of abstaining nations is large enough to alter the outcome of the vote.

Finally, there is a need for a research effort that takes a more macro approach instead of studies focusing on votes of individual nations. It is clear from data presented above that the majority of nations vote with the United States a majority of the time. This

ensures that the United States wins more important votes than it loses. This fact clouds the results because nations are clustered together very tightly making minor deviations statistically significant. Instead of focusing on individual nation's percentages it may be more instructive to explore how the United Nations as a whole votes and aggregate foreign aid increases or decreases. In other words, does more aid flowing to United Nations members secure the will of the United States overall, rather than among individuals? This of course would require a completely new methodology and data covering the entire history of the United Nations instead of just a few years. By changing the focus of the research, to the United States winning overall votes instead of individual nation's votes, the relationship between aid and voting may become clear.

#### Final Remarks

At the beginning of this research, there were two central questions to answer. Why do nations provide foreign aid and Does aid influence voting in the General Assembly? This design has provided the clearest answer yet to whether or not aid influences voting. Clearly, the answer is that aid and voting are not connected. While this upholds the work of past researchers, the conclusion of this work are based on a more detailed analysis than has been attempted in the past allowing for a firm dismissal, for now, of the idea that aid alters voting in the General Assembly.

Unfortunately, there is no answer for why nations provide foreign aid. This work does not disprove the international relations theory that aid is a tool of influence. It is possible the exercise of influence takes place in many other policy areas not covered

here. What is safe to conclude is that foreign aid does not secure votes in the United Nations or if designed for this purpose, it is not an effective instrument.

### Endnotes

- 1 There is no line of best fit for the middle or high economic groups due to the fact they do not receive any aid. Their lines are vertical.
- 2 The high category is constant and does not have a line of best fit.
- 3 Do to distortions caused to the graph, Graph 7-3 excludes Israel.
- 4 The data does not allow for a line of best fit for this graph.
- 5 Do to distortions caused to the graph, Graph 7-6 excludes Egypt.

## **APPENDIX 1**

### **1995 Important Votes**

- 1. A/Res/50/9 – Concerning International Atomic Energy Agency and its involvement with the establishment of safeguards agreements with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Also, calls of both the DPRK and Iraq to come into compliance with IAEA agreements.**
- 2. A/Res/50/10 – Calls on the United States to refrain from the embargo of Cuba.**
- 3. A/Res/50/21 – Welcomes recent attempts and designs of the Middle East Peace Process.**
- 4. A/Res/50/38 – Calls of colonial administrative powers to hold elections in their territories to determine the wishes of the people of their territories regarding their political future.**
- 5. A/Res/50/71 – Calls on Israel and all Middle East nations to renounce nuclear weapons and accept the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.**
- 6. A/Res/50/96 – Urges all nations to stop any coercive measures (political or economic) against developing nations.**
- 7. A/Res/50/129 – States that Israeli settlements in Palestinian territory are illegal.**
- 8. A/Res/50/140 – Reaffirms the right of Palestinian people to self-determination.**
- 9. A/Res/50/185 – Confirms the role of the United Nations in aiding nations in maintaining free and fair elections.**
- 10. A/Res/50/188 – Expresses concern regarding human rights in Iran.**
- 11. A/Res/50/191 – Condemns human rights abuses in Iraq.**
- 12. A/Res/50/193 – Condemns human rights abuses in the former Yugoslavia.**
- 13. A/Res/50/197 – Express concern regarding human rights in Sudan.**



14. **A/Res/50/198 – Calls on Cuba to permit United Nations officials to perform their duties in Cuba and to allow the people political rights such as assembly and expression.**
15. **A/Res/50/199 – Condemns human rights abuses in Nigeria, particularly the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa.**

#### **1996 Important Votes**

1. **A/Res/51/17 – Calls on all states to end any measures regarding an embargo of Cuba.**
2. **A/Res/51/22 – Calls on all nations to end any coercive economic or political actions.**
3. **A/Res/51/29 – Welcomes the Middle East Peace process that has started.**
4. **A/Res/51/45M – Note the International Court of Justice's opinion regarding the legal use of nuclear weapons.**
5. **A/Res/51/45S – Calls on all states to negotiate an agreement to ban anti-personnel landmines.**
6. **A/Res/51/82 – Reaffirms the Palestinian peoples right to self-determination.**
7. **A/Res/51/106 – Condemns human rights abuses in Iraq.**
8. **A/Res/51/107 – Expresses concern regarding human rights abuses in Iran.**
9. **A/Res/51/112 – Expresses concern regarding human rights in Sudan.**
10. **A/Res/51/113 - Calls on Cuba to permit United Nations officials to perform their duties in Cuba and to allow the people political rights such as assembly and expression.**
11. **A/Res/51/116 - Condemns human rights abuses in the former Yugoslavia.**
12. **A/Res/50/245 – Adopts the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.**

#### **1997 Important Votes**

1. **A/Res/52/10 - Calls on all states to end any measures regarding an embargo of Cuba.**

2. **A/Res/52/11 - Concerning International Atomic Energy Agency and its involvement with the establishment of safeguards agreements with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.**
3. **A/Res/52/38H – Calls on all states to intensify efforts to eliminate anti-personnel landmines.**
4. **Motion – Procedural motion to have a separate vote for conferring on the Palestine Liberation Organization the same rights and privileges of member states, except voting and candidature.**
5. **A/Res/52/114 - Reaffirms the Palestinian peoples right to self-determination.**
6. **A/Res/52/129 - Confirms the role of the United Nations in aiding nations in maintaining free and fair elections.**
7. **A/Res/52/136 – Reaffirms the rights of all people to develop.**
8. **A/Res/52/140 – Express concern regarding human rights violations in Sudan.**
9. **A/Res/52/141 - Condemns human rights abuses in Iraq.**
10. **A/Res/52/142/ - Expresses concern regarding human rights violations in Iran.**
11. **A/Res/52/143 - - Calls on Cuba to permit United Nations officials to perform their duties in Cuba and to allow the people political rights such as assembly and expression.**
12. **A/Res/52/147 - Condemns human rights abuses in the former Yugoslavia.**
13. **A/Res/52/181 - Calls on all nations to end any coercive economic or political actions.**

## APPENDIX 2

Country	1995		1996		1997	
	Aid*	Votes %**	Aid*	Votes %**	Aid*	Votes %**
Latin America						
Antigua	0	57.1	0	66.6	0	66.7
Argentina	0.6	60	0.588	66.6	0.6	69.2
Bahamas	0.7	60	0.816	72.7	1.1	69.2
Barbados	0	60	0	66.6	0	66.7
Belize	3.9	60	1.239	66.6	1.248	66.7
Bolivia	69.2	60	80.474	66.6	97.69	69.2
Brazil	9.1	60	5.167	66.6	13.605	69.2
Chile	6.5	57.1	1.955	66.6	1.684	69.2
Colombia	27.9	60	16.213	66.6	30.6	61.5
Costa Rica	6.3	61.5	2.137	60	1.127	69.2
Cuba	0	35.7	0	41.6	0	38.5
Ecuador	14.5	60	13.185	66.6	15.533	69.2
El Salvador	63.6	60	27.757	72.7	30.738	72.7
Grenada	0	69.2	0	72.7	0	69.2
Guatemala	39.2	66.7	31.496	70	38.176	69.2
Guyana	5.8	60	3.205	66.6	3.672	69.2
Haiti	160.5	60	123.667	72.7	97.373	66.7
Honduras	30	60	27.871	72.7	28.789	66.7
Jamaica	24.1	60	14.407	66.6	14.371	69.2
Mexico	10.4	60	5.433	66.6	24.216	69.2
Nicaragua	31.3	57.1	22.076	70	23.258	72.7
Panama	5.3	60	4.982	66.6	4.259	75
Paraguay	4.8	57.1	4.301	66.6	8.232	69.2
Peru	131.9	60	92.507	66.6	99.844	69.2
Suriname	0.4	60	0.817	66.6	1.017	66.7
Trinidad and Tobago	0.2	67.1	0	66.6	0.1	69.2
Uruguay	2.4	60	1.58	72.7	1.096	69.2
Venezuela	1.1	60	0.928	66.6	0.95	69.2

Western Europe						
Australia	0	66.7	0	66.6	0	69.2
Austria	0	66.7	0	66.6	0	69.2
Belgium	0	66.7	0	81.8	0	69.2
Canada	0	66.7	0	75	0	76.9
Cyprus	0	53.3	15	66.6	15	69.2
Denmark	0	66.7	0	66.6	0	76.9
Finland	0	66.7	0	66.6	0	76.9
France	0	66.7	0	75	0	69.2
Germany	0	66.7	0	75	0	69.2
Greece	229.6	60	0.054	50	0.025	69.2
Iceland	0	66.7	0	63.6	0	76.9
Italy	0	66.7	0	75	0	69.2
Liechtenstein	0	66.7	0	66.6	0	69.2
Malta	0.1	60	0.3	66.6	0.1	69.2
Monaco	0	71.4	0	75	0	69.2
Netherlands	0	66.7	0	75	0	76.9
New Zealand	0	66.7	0	66.6	0	69.2
Norway	0	66.7	0	66.6	0	76.9
Portugal	0.5	60	0.769	75	0.8	69.2
Republic of Ireland	39.2	66.7	19.6	66.6	19.6	69.2
South Africa	100.4	53.3	118.51	63.6	79.457	53.8
Spain	0.1	60	0.049	75	0	69.2
Sweden	0	66.7	0	66.6	0	76.9
Turkey	495.3	57.1	34.995	66.6	28.3	54.5
United Kingdom	0	73.3	0	75	0	76.9

Eastern Europe						
Albania	31.4	60	21.577	75	28.978	70
Belarus	11.2	60	4.879	66.6	5.31	53.8
Bulgaria	38.9	60	29.728	66.6	33.452	69.2
Croatia	12.4	69.2	14.513	70	11.35	69.2
Czech Republic	20	66.7	5.542	75	1.281	76.9
Estonia	3.3	75	0.386	66.6	0.5	75
Hungary	26.8	66.7	17.349	75	16.428	69.2
Latvia	7.2	71.4	3.768	66.6	3.5	69.2
Lithuania	23.2	66.7	8.088	66.6	7.5	69.2
Macedonia	13.6	60	13.409	75	16.3	69.2
Poland	86.5	71.4	48.187	75	43.608	69.2
Romania	39.6	60	30.709	75	35.086	69.2
Russia	353.5	53.3	112.306	66.6	100.138	61.5
Slovak Republic	29.2	66.7	17.141	75	17.135	69.2

Slovenia	3.6	60	1.016	75	0.4	69.2
Ukraine	179.5	60	144.255	63.6	228.411	69.2

#### Middle East/North Africa

Afghanistan	12.4	45.5	15.2	50	13.6	30
Algeria	0.1	60	0.075	66.6	0.075	61.5
Armenia	52.5	50	76.531	50	96.104	54.5
Azerbaijan	9.8	45.5	11	66.7	16.43	54.5
Bahrain	0.1	64.3	0.108	80	0.125	66.7
Iran	0	26.7	0	20	0	33.3
Jordan	21.8	64.3	110.002	58.3	47.138	61.5
Kazakhstan	40.2	60	21.365	66.6	37.796	69.2
Kuwait	0	61.5	0	72.7	0	58.3
Kyrgyz Republic	25.2	58.3	12.874	66.6	21.416	66.7
Lebanon	13.8	50	0.474	58.3	12.55	63.6
Libya	0	20	0	18.1	0	25
Morocco	15.8	57.1	17.651	63.6	18.244	58.3
Oman	0.1	46.2	0.119	54.5	0.15	50
Qatar	0	46.2	0	55.5	0	41.7
Saudi Arabia	0	50	0	63.6	0	46.2
Syria	0	28.6	0	33.3	0	33.3
Tajikistan	8.4	72.7	3.37	50	9.027	60
Tunisia	3	60	1.669	66.6	0.805	61.5
Turkmenistan	5.5	0	3.401	33.3	5.64	66.7
United Arab Emirate	0	61.5	0	72.7	0	66.7
Uzbekistan	11.7	77.8	10.293	80	22.88	80

#### South Africa

Angola	44.8	66.7	55.076	58.3	35.146	50
Benin	20.5	60	15.144	66.6	17.774	61.5
Botswana	32.3	60	2.23	66.6	1.551	61.5
Burkina Faso	15.9	60	13.394	66.6	14.689	66.7
Burundi	5.1	61.5	2.569	63.6	1.5	54.5
Cameroon	4.3	60	3.621	72.7	3.185	69.2
Cape Verde	8.4	66.7	7.28	72.7	3.649	58.3
Chad	5.3	57.1	5.896	70	1.009	60
Congo	5.4	70	1.061	70	1.278	62.5
Cote d'Ivoire	1.9	60	1.636	72.7	1.853	69.2
Djibouti	2	50	0.15	66.7	0.1	44.4
Equatorial Guinea	0.3	87.5	0	55.5	0	63.6
Eritrea	10.6	70	13.124	70	26.529	66.7
Ethiopia	119.8	57.1	105.373	72.7	73.874	69.2

Gabon	2.7	64.3	2.493	70	2.614	62.5
Ghana	39.4	46.7	48.276	50	50.836	58.3
Guinea-Bissau	6.7	66.7	7.323	66.6	5.304	70
Guinea	19.9	64.3	15.601	66.6	15.141	61.5
Kenya	26.7	60	15.718	66.6	22.919	69.2
Lesotho	10	53.3	2.077	42.9	2.744	54.5
Madagascar	30	57.1	20.589	50	20.851	57.1
Malawi	68	53.8	31.297	72.7	35.628	54.5
Mali	34.9	60	31.297	60	33.375	66.7
Mauritania	2.7	57.1	2.194	70	3.039	61.5
Mauritius	0.2	60	0	66.6	0.025	69.2
Mozambique	66.9	66.7	45.428	63.6	53.158	61.5
Namibia	17	57.1	6.881	58.3	9.906	53.8
Niger	19.1	53.3	6.315	50	5.776	46.2
Nigeria	2.9	23.1	1.67	41.6	7	30.8
Rwanda	166.1	80	118.362	50	71.521	60
Senegal	25	54.5	22.15	80	24.988	61.5
Sierra Leone	10.1	66.7	26.748	58.3	6.289	58.3
Sudan	30.1	26.7	23.521	33.3	9.689	30.8
Swaziland	13.5	60	0.832	63.6	0.252	69.2
Tanzania	31.5	53.8	9.239	58.3	20.644	61.5
Togo	4.2	53.3	1.861	66.6	1.892	69.2
Uganda	58	53.3	39.749	58.3	54.615	54.5
Zambia	29.7	50	13.157	54.5	18.474	60
Zimbabwe	21.8	57.1	16.092	58.3	18.543	41.7

#### Indian Subcontinent

Bangladesh	146.9	53.3	76.121	60	68.322	53.8
India	164.6	40	161.512	33.3	139.618	38.5
Pakistan	17.1	46.7	6.493	50	2.5	38.5
Sri Lanka	13.3	53.3	12.479	58.3	3.62	53.8

#### Asia-Pacific

Bhutan	0	64.3	0	58.3	0	66.7
Brunei	0	53.3	0	58.3	0	53.8
China, PRC	0.6	33.3	0.696	41.6	0.891	46.2
Fiji	0	66.7	1.457	66.6	0	72.7
Indonesia	61.6	40	37.467	41.6	42.1	38.5
Japan	0	66.7	0	66.6	0	76.9
Korea	0	60	0.009	66.6	0	69.2
Laos	2.2	45.5	4	50	2.5	50
Malaysia	0.5	53.3	0.613	58.3	0.6	53.8

<b>Maldives</b>	<b>0.1</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>0.08</b>	<b>63.6</b>	<b>0.1</b>	<b>53.8</b>
<b>Mongolia</b>	<b>12.3</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>5.063</b>	<b>66.6</b>	<b>11.381</b>	<b>66.7</b>
<b>Myanmar</b>	<b>0.1</b>	<b>33.3</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>41.6</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>62.5</b>
<b>N. Korea DPRK</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>30.8</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>27.3</b>
<b>Nepal</b>	<b>17.1</b>	<b>64.3</b>	<b>18.802</b>	<b>66.6</b>	<b>22.168</b>	<b>75</b>
<b>Papua New Guinea</b>	<b>1.6</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>1.653</b>	<b>66.6</b>	<b>2.137</b>	<b>53.8</b>
<b>Philippines</b>	<b>52.8</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>45.993</b>	<b>72.7</b>	<b>51.884</b>	<b>53.8</b>
<b>Singapore</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>0.02</b>	<b>66.6</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>61.5</b>
<b>Solomon Islands</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>1.395</b>	<b>66.6</b>	<b>1.395</b>	<b>69.2</b>
<b>Thailand</b>	<b>6.1</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>4.864</b>	<b>66.6</b>	<b>5.943</b>	<b>61.5</b>
<b>Vanuatu</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>77.8</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>72.7</b>	<b>0.912</b>	<b>69.2</b>
<b>Vietnam</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>30.8</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>27.3</b>
<b>Western Samoa</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>1.144</b>	<b>66.6</b>	<b>1.136</b>	<b>69.2</b>


**\* Total aid in millions of dollars (U.S.).**

**\*\* Important votes adjusted for abstentions.**



## APPENDIX 3



1996 Results



Ordered Alphabetically


















## 1995 Results









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**Thesis Examination Committee:**






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