A comparative analysis of church and state issue attitudes in the United States and Norway

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A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CHURCH
AND STATE ISSUE ATTITUDES IN THE
UNITED STATES AND NORWAY

by

Bryan Arlon Smith Rasmussen

Bachelor of Science
University of Oregon, Eugene, OR
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ABSTRACT

A Comparative Analysis of Church and State
Issue Attitudes In The United States and Norway

by

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This study looks at the effect that the relationship between church and state has on the people of Norway and the United States. It is a study of political culture and socialization that compares the role of the established state church in Norway to the "Wall of Separation" that exists in the United States.

Public opinion data is obtained from the World Values Survey and presented in terms of the current Accommodationist/Separationist debate. The most important variable in determining issue attitudes turns out to be whether or not a person attends church regularly, and not their denominational identity. The study also shows that while the established church is an effective as a direct agent of socialization, it seems to quell religiosity. On the contrary, the religious marketplace promotes religiosity, while limiting Christianity's ability to socialize.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The United States of America, once considered a "Great Experiment", has enjoyed a great deal of success over its 225 year history. This title refers to the bold new direction that its founding fathers charted in the late 1700s. These men formed a democratic system by putting the power in the hands of the people and separating church and state. The system they created remains one of the most stable and secure governments in world history.

Norwegians constructed a similar document in 1814. Their Constitution created a similar democratic system, but did not separate church and state. Instead, they maintained their traditional state church. What effect has this difference had on the relative success of these two political systems? Should religion be a factor in politics? If so, what role can it play in a democratic system that derives its power from the people?

In today's world, we continue to redefine the role of religion in a democratic government of people over people. In the past, governments gained their legitimacy from different sources. Among these were social class, military might and wealth, just to name a few. The most common source of legitimacy was the concept of a divine right given to a monarchy. Many governments in the past, and some today, claim their authority derived from a higher power. This authority gives credence to their leadership and power. The
American and Norwegian governments, on the other hand, get their authority from the Constitution and, ultimately, from the people.

The goal of religion is to bring people to God. Therefore, how does religion logistically operate within a society to accomplish this goal? Traditionally, the primary roles of religion in a society are to maintain order and promote positive, communal values within the culture. Religion tries to accomplish this in two ways. The first step is to get the attention of the public. The best way to do this is to motivate people to attend church and believe in “God.” In doing so, religion creates an audience for its message. This is defined as promoting Religiosity in this study. The next step is to effectively communicate with, or socialize, the people in that audience. The people need to hear a clear message from the church and behave accordingly in order for religion to be an effective agent of socialization.

British philosopher Francis Bacon wrote that the four pillars on which government stands are religion, justice, counsel and treasure.¹ Religion is a core pillar of a civilization because it explains the unexplainable. It gives a people a common set of beliefs concerning the meaning of life. In the words of Samuel P. Huntington, “Of all the objective elements which define civilizations… the most important usually is religion…”² Because many people consider religion very important in their lives, inferring God’s will can be an incredible motivator. For obvious reasons, this could also be a dangerous weapon in the wrong hands. God’s word must be inferred with a great deal of integrity.

Both countries in this study are predominately Christian. At the same time, Christianity operates very differently in Norway than it does in the United States. How
does Christianity operate in the United States and Norway? Is it an important part of
either political landscape? Should it be?

Many observers, like Alexis de Tocqueville, have attributed the success the
United States has enjoyed to political and non-political factors alike. Tocqueville
mentioned a number of cultural factors that made America exceptional in its early years,
including religion. One of the first things we learn in school is that the United States is
"one nation, under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all." In the beginning,
government support aided the universal acceptance of Christianity in this country that
Tocqueville would observe. Accommodationists argue that government should still
promote religion in America. As American culture has expanded, however, the issue has
become more complicated.

Of course, government accommodating Christianity while respecting
denominational differences is not the only view of the First Amendment. Many believe
the goal of the establishment clause should be to eliminate government support of
religion in the name of tolerance. This view holds that since the two are completely
incompatible, they should remain separate. In the current debate, these people are called
Separationists. Those who favor a "positive neutrality" position concerning church-state
relations are Accommodationists. I will go into more detail on this debate in Chapter 2.

In recent decades, the law of the land has gone the way of the Separationists.
Legislators on local and national fronts have responded to concerns about prayer time in
public schools and the displaying of Christian symbols on public lands during the
Christmas season. The Supreme Court, the official interpreter of our Constitution, has
leaned towards a Separationist approach to the establishment clause of the First
Amendment. This trend began with *Everson v Board of Education of the Township of Ewing* in 1947. (This was the case where the Supreme Court officially sanctioned the term "Wall of Separation" coined by Thomas Jefferson for the first time)⁶ While not every decision has gone the way of the Separationists, the trend has built momentum through decisions like *Lemon v Kurtzman* in 1971 and *Lee v Weisman* in 1992.⁷ It has come to the point where Separationists look to the court to counter any Accommodationist legislation that might make it through Congress.⁸ Over the past decade, the court, led by its conservative majority, has moderated its stand, but remains relatively separationist.

Norway will provide an excellent contrast for us to study. A Catholic state church helped pull together much of Scandinavia around 1000 AD. The state church became Protestant in 1537. The Lutheran state church in Norway remains dominant nearly 500 years after its establishment.

At this time, 85% of Norwegians belong to the Lutheran church. The church plays a very active role in Norwegian politics. A majority of the representatives in government belongs to the church. In addition, the government works hand in hand with church leaders in forming policy. The church leadership is made up of three groups: The Bishops’ Conference, a National Council, led by a lay person and the Council of State, headed by the King.

These church groups play a large role in determining public policy. In particular, policies concerning social issues, like gay rights and abortion, rely heavily on church support. The result is the enlarging of the gray area between religion and politics as church leaders and government representatives strive to speak with one voice. This is a
very different situation than is found in the United States. Studying attitudes toward religious issues in the two countries will provide us insight into the opposing ideas concerning the role of religion in politics.

The United States remains a religious country when compared superficially to other democracies despite, or perhaps due to, the separationist trend. Statistics show church attendance high and religious issues create a great deal of debate in the political arena. The 1980’s saw a resurgence of religious conservatives in American politics. However, instead of mobilizing support and reversing this trend toward separation, these groups found most Americans unreceptive to their orthodox message. In many cases, they were forced to redefine themselves just to survive. Religious conservative groups took on a more secular appearance and resorted to pleading for the same free exercise protections given to Atheists in *Malnak v Yogi* in 1977.

Discussing religious issues in this country seems to be encouraged, as long as they are not discussed in religious terms. As the Supreme Courts “Lemon Test” says, public religious activity is Constitutional if it first has a secular purpose. This case set a powerful precedent that took us one step closer to being a secular nation.

Norway, on the other hand, does not seem to be a country of highly religious people. While most people profess church membership, only 3 percent of the population report weekly church attendance. Religious issues are debated openly in the public sector and in religious terms. The following example shows the role of the church in the public debate over a social issue.

Over the past decade, the issue of gay rights has been hotly debated in Norway. The people have been looking to the church for direction on the issue. In 1995, the church
Synod, the highest-ranking representative body in the church of Norway (led by the aforementioned National Council), voted to uphold the tradition of not employing openly gay individuals. In 1999, they voted to reconsider the issue. Since that time, the government has appointed a Church Affairs Minister who favors equal rights and opportunities for gays, and the King has ceremoniously honored Norway's first champion of gay rights, Karen-Christine Friele. In addition, the first openly cohabiting gay priest, Jens Olsen, was appointed to return to the altar. While the Bishops continue to debate the issue, the softening of their stance has led to a tidal wave of changes in church and government policy. As we will see later, these changes also reflect in public opinion.

The United States is a unique situation because it is a nation built on diversity and promoting the rights of minorities. While Norway is a small nation with a very homogeneous culture, people from all over the world have come to the U.S. seeking freedom and liberty. What may have originally been religious competition between minority Christian sects has expanded, primarily since World War II, to include Muslims, Hindus and other faiths from around the world. Our government evoking even the most general Christian principle can now be seen as infringing upon the rights of these minorities.

One potential benefit of this diversity is religious competition. Many argue that the separationist tendency has promoted competition between faiths for membership, resulting in a heightened religiosity among the public. While this may be true, does it aid religion in its attempt to influence people ethically? If the debate is between Lutherans and Catholics, in that case Christianity wins either way and gains a great deal of exposure. If the debate is between Christians and Atheists, as we have seen more of in
recent decades, Christianity stands a chance of losing. As government is allowing these debates, what role, if any, should it play in moderating them?

The question concerning the role of Christianity in American and Norwegian politics is a difficult and complex one. I have only touched on a few of the issues involved. In the interest of full disclosure, I now tell the reader I begin my research with a somewhat Accommodationist view. I have concern for the future of our “Great Experiment” given the current trend toward Separationism. If we shy away from the values our system was founded on, specifically those Christian values, I believe our system will lose some of its order and legitimacy and our nation will fade into history. I believe the establishment clause was just that, a promise that the U.S. would never establish a state-church. I do not believe the free exercise clause was designed to stifle the voice of Christians and give special protection to Atheists. In my opinion, we have gone too far by reading the Amendment as the court currently does.

Many of our founding fathers ambitions were secular in nature: capitalism and democracy, among others. There is a heated, ongoing debate as to the religious views of our “founding fathers” that will likely never be resolved. George Washington said that “reason and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle.” Some of them, like James Madison, seemed to change their views significantly over the course of their lives. Thomas Jefferson may not have been Christian at all, but he and John Adams definitely agreed on the importance of religion in maintaining a society in their letters. Jefferson, himself, occasionally accommodated Christianity into government policy to maintain order while he was President.
In the 1840s, Tocqueville observed that in America "Christianity itself is an established and irresistible fact which no one seeks to attack or defend." While I do not agree with every observation Tocqueville made of the American people, I believe this one was accurate at the time. While I realize it is a controversial stand, I am among those who believe the founding fathers recognized Christianity, in general, as a pillar on which our nation was built. It was not until the mid 20th century until non-Christian religions became significant a factor in the American culture.

I do recognize the value of "giving unto Caesar what is Caesar's, and giving unto God what is God's." I believe there is a place for science and technology in our culture, as they have played an invaluable role in our development as a nation. I also do not want God or the church corrupted by politics, or politicians evoking God's will for less than honorable ambitions. Obviously, God's word is open to any number of interpretations, which can create confusion and tension. However, I believe there is a way to keep Christian values guiding the system without infusing too much of the church.

In the end, I see American democracy requiring two essential elements for its continued prosperity: A respect for the strong Christian foundation we have and eternal vigilance by the citizenry will keep the leadership moving forward and keep America strong. Not only do we seem to be turning away from Christianity as a foundation of our system, but all signs indicate diminishing political participation in recent decades as well. I intend to address the problem of participation by teaching my students a sense of civic duty, and I intend to try to find the proper role of religion in government though my research.
The question about the proper role of religion in politics is not limited to certain religions or civilizations. Each religious tradition has a different defined role in society, and each country interprets that role differently. A complete answer to the overarching question concerning religion in politics would address the proper role of Islam in Pakistan, Shinto in Japan and Catholicism in Poland. For countless reasons, a macro solution like this seems unachievable. Instead, I begin my research in this field with a micro study of the U.S. and Norway that have different interpretations of the role of the same religious tradition in government. While I acknowledge that my current, unsubstantiated opinions got me interested in this topic. I am hopeful that this research can provide me some true insight into the current separationist/accommodationist debate within this narrow context.

Due to the individualism found in Protestant Christianity, it does not lend itself to a church-state system in the way that Catholicism and Islam do. Despite this, a number of European countries, including England and Norway, do have a Protestant state church. As our system has provided, this will not happen in the United States. The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the Constitution would never allow it. Besides, which church would it be? While Christians make up a significant majority, no single denomination represents anything close to a majority of the population. The debates in the United States instead center on how much Christianity should be accommodated by government.

As I have noted, current jurisprudence in the United States favors increased separation of church and state. If our leadership were to change direction toward greater accommodation, the question would be how to begin. Although the first 100 years of our
nation featured a great deal of accommodation of Christianity by our government, changing times would require a fresh approach.\textsuperscript{18}

President George W. Bush is promoting a plan to allow churches to help distribute social welfare. This plan makes sense to Accommodationists, as churches often do whatever they can to help those in their communities anyway. Religious Separationists oppose the connection this policy would forge between public programs and faith-based institutions. They believe churches might become dependant on government funds, and, therefore, subject to government intervention. Irreligious Separationists have a more fundamental objection to the policy. In any case, this program proposal is a reversal of the recent trend and faces sharp criticism on many fronts. Only time will tell if this program will be successful and a turning point for this debate.

If we were to take a more Accommodationist approach, how would it work? Which values should be promoted? Different sects clearly have different priorities. Would a church be better off by having a partnership with government to easier implement its values and policies on the people? Alternatively, do politics corrupt the church? Is government better off using the church to cement its legitimacy? On the other hand, does a church-state alienate the religious minority to the point of resistance?

Other non-Christian religious minorities must be considered, as well. To assume Hinduism or Islam do not have any values that would strengthen our culture is flawed. Many of the core principles in Christianity can be found in other faiths and philosophies. Sometimes we also teach these principles as secular. Although "Thou Shall Not Kill" is one of the Ten Commandments, murder is also condemned in other religious and secular
circles. Does it have more impact as a religious tenet versus a secular teaching? Does it matter which religion teaches it, and in what political context?

I have decided to see if I could research the impact of religion on political culture. I will compare the U.S. and its strong separationist culture with Norway, a nation with a state church. My goal is to analyze the impact of these two systems of government on their citizen’s attitudes concerning ethical issues. I hope to find out whether an established church does a better job socializing the citizens, or if non-establishment improves socialization by creating religious competition. In the end, hopefully I will be able to draw some conclusions about how some level of separation might benefit the Norwegians, or how some level of accommodation might benefit Americans.

The data set in use here. The World Values Survey, gives a strong and accurate view of public opinion in Norway as well as the United States. Norway’s Constitution was written just after that of the United States, and it reflects many of the same principles. Norway is a Western industrialized nation with a high standard of living, and the most popular religion is a version of Protestant Christianity: specifically, Evangelical Lutheranism. In many ways, the United States and Norway are very similar. This will help me draw conclusions about the independent variable that I am using: The state church versus the Wall of Separation.

There are, however, significant differences between the nations. I will need to remain mindful of these as I analyze the data. The United States is a heterogeneous society of nearly 300 million people, while Norway is a very homogeneous society of less than 5 million. In Norway, most people are ethnic Norwegian and nearly 90% belong to the state church. Norway maintains their monarchy and its rich history. Their
Parliament uses proportional representation and coalitions to govern the nation. The current government is a minority coalition of three parties from the middle of the political spectrum.\footnote{19}

While the United States is able to project leadership, Norway's small population and strategic location have forced it to ally itself with others. Norway's traditional friends include its Scandinavian brothers (primarily Sweden and Denmark), England, the United States and NATO. Recent oil discoveries have given Norway some financial freedom, but as the rest of Europe moves toward integration, Norway must decide how long it can avoid EU membership.

It is obvious that not all differences found in the political cultures of these two countries can be tied to the independent variable I am studying. These countries have different histories and traditions, as well as different issues currently shaping their attitudes. I was very careful to select questions from the survey that could be easily linked to my independent variable. However, I am willing to recognize the possibility of other forces being at work. In any case, I am hopeful Norway will work well along side the United States for this project.

Chapter 2 will review history and establish the parameters for this research. I will give an overview of the evolution of religion in politics and political culture theories, and a review of current literature in the field. In Chapter 3, I will analyze the data. I will legitimate the World Values Survey as my data source, and review the process of selecting data to use.
Chapters 4 and 5 will be an analysis of the data from Norway and the United States after a brief historical analysis puts these numbers in context. In the end, Chapter 6 will allow me to draw some conclusions from this research.
Notes on Chapter 1 (pages 1-13):


9 Finke and Stark. Chs. 5-7. Discussion of the current religious landscape in America.


14 Barton. Pages 124-46 on the religious nature of the founding fathers.

16 Tocqueville. Page 291.


18 Barton. Pages 49-74.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Political Culture and Socialization

In the broadest sense, this is a study in political culture and socialization. While research into the role of religion in politics can overlap into other social sciences, like sociology, psychology and anthropology, this study will focus on political issues surrounding church and state relations.

The concept of political culture developed from general theories outlined by Max Weber and Karl Marx. While Marx focused on the economic infrastructure of the society and its ability to guide culture, Weber looked at the role culture plays in legitimizing authority. Many authors would build on these theories and apply them to other fields of research.1

Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba would build on Weber’s work and be the first to specifically define and apply political culture in The Civic Culture, in 1963.2 They defined political culture as “the political system as internalized in the cognitions, feelings, and evaluations of its population.” Each country has its own set of mores that define it. For example, Americans tend to agree on concepts like capitalism, democracy and freedom. The importance we place on these concepts, and the way we define events in

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terms of them, help define us as a culture. We truly believe America is “the land of opportunity.”

I can not overstate the importance of political culture in a democracy. According to Almond, a country’s political system has a symbiotic relationship with its culture. In such a large Republic, there needs to be some agreement on basic principles to avoid chaos. The United States government is very stable because it enjoys a great deal of deferential support from its citizens. Another way to describe this concept is that American culture is very consensual in its support of the governmental system and the current regime. An American’s idea of a revolutionary change in government (a policy shift like a 1.6 billion dollar tax cut) is very different than an Afghani’s (complete overthrow of the current regime and/or form of government). There is a respect for our government instilled into Americans at a very early age.

This culture is perpetuated by political socialization. To continue quoting Almond and Verba: “People are introduced to (political culture) just as they are socialized into nonpolitical roles and social systems.”\(^3\) Political socialization is the way we, as members of a society, develop our views toward the society and our roles in the society. The people and institutions that help us with this development are agents of socialization. These agents can include (but are not limited to) family, friends, government itself and the media. One way we are socialized to give so much deferential support to the government is by saying the Pledge of Allegiance before school when we are young. In this example, the school is an agent of socialization because of its role in our development.
Political socialization is not an exact science. There are many agents at work, sometimes pulling a person in opposite directions. While many agents can play a role in development, some agents are certainly more effective than others are.

Two factors can explain an agent’s effectiveness. First would be the agent’s ability to tap deep emotion. If a father loses his job because of government cutbacks, the disappointment is going to influence his son’s views about the size of government more than a story on the news about someone else losing a job. Due to the intimacy exemplified here, many people consider family to be among the most important agents of socialization.

The other factor has to do with whether the socialization was direct or latent. Manifest, or direct, socialization would be a person thinking or doing something because they were told to do it by a person with authority over them. Latent, or indirect, socialization results in a person doing something because people and events over the course of their life have convinced them that this is the right thing to do. The distinction is in the method of delivery. Debates continue as to which one of these is the more effective method.

The political culture in the United States is very different than in Norway. Norway maintains a Monarchy, and the United States does not. The multiparty parliamentary system in Norway creates a much different dynamic than the two party presidential system in the United States. Voting rates are higher in Norway, and our data will show considerable differences in political issue attitudes between the cultures.

As I detailed in Chapter 1, there are many possible explanations for these differences. The one I am going to explore is the different role that Protestant Christianity
plays in the political systems. The central role of religion as an agent of socialization is key to understanding the importance of this study.

**Religion In Politics**

Religion is undoubtedly able to access the emotional core of an individual. In *The Clash of Civilizations*, Samuel Huntington makes the argument that religion is, and always has been, a defining element of a civilization. Our religion goes a long way toward defining who we are and what we believe as individuals and as a society. There is little debate that religion has the intimacy necessary to be an effective agent of socialization. There has been a great deal of debate, however, as to whether it should have a more direct or latent role in the public sector.

Religion is of great importance, not only due to the depths of its influence, but also because of the different ways it can affect a person’s development. Certainly, religion can be a direct agent through the church and the different religious documents available to read. However, it can also be an indirect agent, acting through parents or friends. The religious views of one’s parents have a great impact on development, whether the individual is aware of it or not.

In the United States, church and state are separate. While there is Christianity present in government symbols and proceedings, the state does not act as one with the church. In this way, religion does play a socializing role through our government system, but it is more of a latent role.

On the other hand, Norway maintains a state church. In this system, government and religion are supposed to speak with one voice. Here, religion has another institutional
agent of direct socialization besides the church. This difference is the independent
variable for this study. Is religion a more effective agent of socialization acting directly
through the state church or indirectly as one of many influences on the separatist system
in the United States?

**Historical Review**

There is very little in the Bible to help us determine the proper role for
Christianity in politics. Jesus spoke very little about politics or political issues. He was
more interested in individuals and their relationship to God than he was in the order and
structure of society. It was not until 330 AD that Roman Emperor Constantine the Great
recognized Christianity as a legitimate religion in the Empire. Soon after that, the
writings of St. Augustine established the superiority of the Christian Church over any
government of men, and Christianity became the official religion of the Empire. From
that time on, for a government to be effective, it would have to consider using the church
to maintain its authority. This idea would gain momentum going into the Middle Ages,
when state church governments were common in Western Europe. St. Thomas Aquinas’
concept of natural laws, the fact that laws get their legitimacy from God and not from
men, furthered this tie between church and state in the 13\(^\text{th}\) century.

With the invention of the printing press in 1454, many people had access to their
own copy of the Bible for the first time. The Gutenberg Bible would naturally reduce the
role of the church in religion and bring God closer to the people. The Protestant
Reformation of the 16\(^\text{th}\) century presented religion as a more individual concept. Martin
Luther led the charge to end corruption in the church by reducing its authority. While he
downplayed the role of the organized church, he could not dismiss it, as he needed an organizational structure in order to disperse his message. Protestant doctrine would still make use of a church organization, but the focus would be more on the individual's relationship with God.

The Enlightenment would follow with its liberal ideas about individual freedom and self-determination. John Locke adapted Aquinas' concept of Natural Laws to that of individual Natural Rights to "life, liberty and the pursuit of property." In addition, Locke, Thomas Hobbes and other liberal philosophers promoted the idea that government would no longer have to gain its legitimacy from a divine right; it could get it from the governed. These ideas opened the way to dividing church and state and the formation of democracy.

The trend toward individual freedom and liberty continues 300 years after the Enlightenment. The end of the Cold War reinforced these ideals throughout the world as many former communist nations try to establish a democratic system and fight to connect with their religious traditions. One might wonder, however, if individual freedom and liberty can be taken too far. Hobbes certainly feared a state of nature driven by individual self-interest. Without a common sense of cultural mores, would chaos not ensue? Adams and Jefferson certainly thought this would be the case, and placed religion in high regard for its value as an agent of socialization.

Only an individual can decide what role, if any, they want religion to play in their lives. Whether to believe in God and attend church is a decision each of us must make for ourselves. What has been shown here, however, is that common religious values are very important for a society. Religion helps maintain social order, one of the essential
responsibilities of government, and promote cultural values. The question is: What role should government take in promoting religious values?

**Accommodationists vs. Separationists**

The first amendment of the United States Constitution says that the “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...” The second Article of the Norwegian Constitution reads: “1. All inhabitants of the Realm shall have the right to free exercise of their religion. 2. The Evangelical Lutheran religion shall remain the official religion of the State...” Both Constitutions have a free exercise clause. The focus of this project is the difference in the two establishment clauses.

In today’s literature, scholars in the United States approach the establishment clause in one of two ways. Ted Jelen labels these two schools of thought accommodationist and separationist.

Accommodationists are those who believe religion has a place in government. They are not necessarily calling for a state church in the United States, but they believe religion is good for social order and cohesion. Therefore, they believe religion, in general, not any one specific sect, should be promoted by government. The term used to describe the accommodationist position is “positive neutrality.” Government should not promote one religion over another, but it can promote religion over irreligion.

In the case of the United States, Accommodationists believe Christianity ties us to our traditions and puts a foundation beneath our laws (the Natural Law concept), values and customs. They are concerned that current trends in the public sector and the courts...
indicate our government is moving away from the Natural Laws and Rights our founders promoted. In addition to the Everson and Lemon decisions I cited earlier, Accommodationists point to a series of court decisions in the mid-1960's as throwing out the concept of Natural Law in favor of a more relativist approach: legal positivism. ¹⁶

On the other hand, Separationists believe religion does not have a place in democratic government. Their basic argument goes back to my point about the depths of emotion religion can summon. Religion does not have a place in politics, because politics in a democracy is essentially about compromise and religion is about truth (at least perceived truth). James Madison wrote in Federalist 10 that religion could be a dangerous source of faction in a society due to the conviction of its adherents. ¹⁷

Separationists do not have to be anti-religion. There are some that are, but many of them are very religious and feel that any bond between church and state would corrupt the church with money and the politics of compromise. Religious Separationists also believe that religious liberty can only exist with complete separation, as government influence in religion is likely to result in government control of religion. In the introduction, the question was raised how government could accommodate and promote general religious principles without favoring one sect above all. Separationists do not believe this scenario can happen. They believe that government involvement with religion would surely lead to government control over religion.

While there is a tendency for an Accommodationist to be religious, a Separationist could be either religious or irreligious. Data shows that Americans have more confidence in churches than in government, and many Separationists want to keep it that way. ¹⁸
Religious Competition vs. The Canopy Model

Over the years, political scientists and sociologists have tried to develop models to explain the relationship between religion and politics. Each model tries to isolate the effect of the relationship between church and state on the individual citizen. The two major theories currently in play are the Religious Competition Model and the Canopy Model.

In 1967, Peter Berger, developed a theory of a “sacred canopy” provided by either an established church or one with a strong majority. The idea is that this church would effectively be able to set the mores for the culture. Even those citizens who are not a member of the established church would find themselves at least somewhat agreeable to its decrees. The church would create a commonality and unity among the citizens.

Catholic priest and political philosopher Richard Neuhaus built on Berger’s model in 1984: “…whether it is called the Judeo-Christian ethic, or Christianity… it is the dynamic of religion that holds the promise of binding together a nation in a way that may more nearly approximate civitas (the ideal state).”

For example, in Italy, where Catholicism is the established religion, the Catholic Church would have a strong influence on the attitudes of all Italians under this model. Even an Italian non-Catholic would likely be more conservative on an issue like abortion than he or she might be if (s)he lived in another country.

The Canopy Model can be used to support the Accommodationist view. While they are not pushing for a state church in the United States, Accommodationists believe added accommodation of Christianity by government would strengthen the ethics of all
citizens, Christians and non-Christians alike. Accommodationists also believe it is possible to do this without promoting one individual Christian sect over another.

The negative side to this model is called the Lazy Monopoly Theory. In this view, the established church, as a monopoly, loses its motivation to appeal to the citizenry. Professionalization of the clergy takes place and the church gets out of touch with the people. Should this occur, the church would lose its ability to effectively socialize, and would likely face resistance.

Ted Jelen and Clyde Wilcox tested the Canopy Model on countries in Europe with limited success. Their preliminary data did show an increased level of liberalism among Catholics in countries with vast Protestant majorities. While this study was not conclusive, it did provide an example of the Lazy Monopoly theory.

To provide another illustration, say the above mentioned Italian Catholic Church decides that since it does not have to compete for members and it can focus its energies on educating the clergy for intellectual debate. The lay person is left out as the Priest he/she feels closest to is always gone to seminary. This lay person is then likely to fade away from the church and, possibly, its teachings. This individual might also be recruited by a minority sect that shows more life and dedication to helping bring people to God. Suddenly, the established church is losing its grip on the population, and other churches begin to threaten its dominance.

This lazy monopoly approach is more likely to take place with an actual established church that has no significant competition. However, some would argue it has taken place during certain periods in United States history. For the Canopy Model to
work, the majority church must ignore the temptation to rise above and ignore the average member.

The other model is the Religious Competition Model. The most complete work on this model is *The Churching of America*, written in 1992 by Roger Finke and Rodney Stark. This work paints an image of a very religious America, driven by competition among sects. Finke and Stark show a high level of religiosity in America and attribute it to this free market. This book is a historical analysis of the gradual increase of religiosity in America from 1776-1990. At times when one church dominated, they show that religiosity decreased temporarily. Eventually that church would get lazy and the others would compete harder for membership. Religiosity would then increase as the different sects got closer in numbers. Stark has co-authored a number of journal articles in support of the Competition model.

The book presents a convincing argument concerning the history of religion in America. It acknowledges the dominance of Christianity that Tocqueville observed in the 1830’s, while documenting the battles between the denominations. Finke and Stark then review the introduction of other faiths into America in the early 1900’s and analyze their impact.

According to this model, competition is a key to promoting religious behavior, like attending church and professing a belief in God. The more open and competitive the market is, the more the individual churches focus on communicating with their members to keep them actively involved, and reach out to the people in hopes to recruit.

The Religious Competition model fits nicely into Jelen’s account of the Separationist view. The Separationists believe that bringing religion and politics together
would naturally result in one sect being favored over the others. If government stays completely separate, religions will be allowed to compete freely with each other for membership and ideas.

The goal of this project is to analyze two political systems and try to discover in which system religion can be a more effective agent of socialization. These models could help us a great deal. If the United States fits into the market analogy and Norway fits the Canopy model, they will provide an excellent structure to help analyze the data. Is religion a more effective agent on a nation’s political culture as a direct agent, in a church-state system following the canopy model? Alternatively, is it more effective in an indirect role, as voices competing in a pluralist system?
Notes on Chapter 2 (pages 16-27):


2 Ibid. Page 179.

3 Ibid.


8 Hart. Pages 123-8.


14 Ibid.

15 Barton. 319-30.

16 Ibid 241-51.


20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.


24 Ibid.
CHAPTER 3

THE DATA

The World Values Survey

The data source for this research project is the World Values Survey. The current version is a compilation of three waves of survey research. The European Values Survey group between 1981 and 1984 coordinated the first wave. The World Values Survey group and the European Values Survey group between 1990 and 1993 coordinated the second wave. The last wave of surveys was coordinated by Ronald Inglehart et al., for the ICPSR (Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research), from 1995 through 1997. Dr. Inglehart, of the University of Michigan, also assembled and documented ICPSR 2790 in February 2000. This compilation was used for this project.

The compilation data set worked well for my research. My goal was to get a general snapshot of attitudes in these two countries. Certainly, some attitudes have changed over the past twenty years, and these trends show up very well in a comparison of one wave to another. For example, the data shows attitudes toward homosexuality in the United States becoming more liberal between 1981 and 1995. (See Appendix 2) This is consistent with other data available of public opinion in the United States.¹
These trends, though interesting and represented well by the data set, are only mentioned as one verification of the reliability of the data. Some consistencies and trends will be mentioned later, but they are not the focus of this project. When I take an average of the three phases, however, I am able to find out what I really need to know: Attitudes toward homosexuals are more liberal in Norway than in the United States. (Table 3.2)

The biggest benefit to using the compilation is that it helps overcome possible aberrations in the data. The most glaring problem in the data is that Catholics in the United States are over-represented. The overall sample includes 39% Catholics and 32% Protestants (Table 3.2). In reality, Protestants outnumber Catholics in the United States by about two to one.\(^2\)

The big problem is with the 1981 wave that included 58% Catholics (Table A 2 in Appendix 2). This data set indicates that there is a religious sect that represents a majority of Americans. If this were true, it would change the whole purpose of this study. This research project is based on the fact that there is not a majority religious sect in the United States. For this reason, I could not have used the 1981 data set alone. Instead, the compilation allows me to use the data. Catholics are still over-represented, but there is no majority religious sect in the United States. While I must apologize for this error in the data, my concern is not the percentage of Catholics vs. Protestants, that information can be obtained from other places. My concern is their attitudes, and my sample size is big enough where I have some leeway on the representation, as long as they are all minority sects.\(^3\)

One option I considered was to leave out the 1981 sample. While this would have reduced the sample size and the value of the results, it would have been necessary had the
1981 data been aberrant due to the overrepresentation of Catholics. Table 3.1 shows the 1981 sample to be reliable. The table shows averages of coded responses for four variables. Respondents were asked specific questions concerning attitudes toward abortion and homosexuality. The other two variables are issue scales created for this project. I will detail those variables in the coming pages. For now, notice that the overall attitudes show consistent trends over time in American culture, and the Catholic data mirrors the overall data. In all data shown in this report, a lower number indicates a more conservative, or a more religious response, as defined by the potential answers to the questions. Defining what or who is "religious" could be a complex task. For purposes here, the answer comes from answers to the basic set of questions that will be in the Religiosity issue scale. The same logic applies to the conservative/liberal distinction. The Catholic data is generally slightly more conservative than the overall sample. This makes sense, since the overall sample includes all of those who claimed no religious affiliation. For this reason, and those mentioned previously, the data set proved reliable, despite the oversampling of American Catholics. 

Table 3.1

American Attitudes Over Time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>*Attitudes on...</th>
<th>1981</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1995</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>1.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodoxy</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homosexuality</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td>1.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abortion</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>1.70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

American Catholics Attitudes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>*Attitudes on...</th>
<th>1981</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1995</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>1.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodoxy</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>1.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homosexuality</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>1.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abortion</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>1.57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Questions

The survey was made up of 235 questions (or variables), designed to get at everything from demographic information to attitudes about politics, religion, work, family, capitalism and democracy. Questions were selected out of the survey that fit into one or more of the following categories: Attitudes on religiosity, orthodoxy, political party, political interest, general ethics, sexual ethics, capitalism and denominational identification. A full review of the 34 questions used and how they were recoded is available in Appendix 1.

The first thing to do was establish the validity of the data set. The commonly held theory that Americans, on the whole, are more religious than many of their European counterparts was supported by the data (Table 3.2). While Catholics were over-represented in the American sample, the breakdown was relatively accurate in the Norwegian sample. The fact that Americans are more orthodox in their beliefs and Norwegians are more liberal about homosexuality and abortion is consistent with other data and scholarly observation.5

Table 3.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudes on...</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>Norway</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>2.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodoxy</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>1.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abortion</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>2.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homosexuality</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>1.82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of...</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholics</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainline Protestants</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nones</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Once the validity of the data and the compilation is established, the next step is to create subgroups for analysis. The independent variable is the religious landscape in Norway and the United States. The dependent variables are the attitudes that form the political cultures of the two countries.

The first groups to be isolated from the rest of the World Values Survey were the respondents from the United States and Norway (V2, or variable 2, equals 11 or 18). Within each sample, I then used question 179 to separate out Mainline Protestants, Catholics and "Nones" (Nones could be irreligious or non-denominational). In discussion on Norway, the "Mainline Protestants" are limited to the Evangelical Lutheran Church only, so we just call them Lutherans. For the purposes of this project, all other responses to question 179 were set aside. These groupings were to be used as dummy variables because there are only two possibilities. In other words, either a Norwegian individual is Lutheran, or they are not. I will compare all Lutheran to all non-Lutherans, all Catholics to all non-Catholics, and so forth.

The next step was to create issue scales concerning issue attitudes. The goal was to combine a number of questions in the survey into categories to represent attitudes. Once the categories were established, tests were run to see how reliable these categories were. In other words, do people respond in a consistent manner to the different questions in each category? There were six issue scales created, all with relatively strong reliability coefficients in both the United States and Norway (Table 3.3). The following is the name of each category, and the questions that were used to form it (For exact wording and coding, see Appendix 1).
• Religiosity
  o How important is religion to you?
  o Are you an active church member?
  o How often do you go to church?
  o Would you say you are a religious person?
  o How important is God in your life?
  o Do you get comfort and strength from religion?

• Orthodoxy
  o Do you believe in God?
  o Do you believe in life after death?
  o Do you believe people have a soul?
  o Do you believe the devil exists?
  o Do you believe in hell?
  o Do you believe in heaven?
  o Do you believe in sin?

• Capitalism
  o Should government take care of people?
  o Is competition good or harmful?
  o Is success due to hard work or luck and connections?

• Ethics
  o Is claiming a benefit you did not earn justifiable?
  o Is avoiding bus fare justifiable?
  o Is cheating on your taxes justifiable?
  o Is buying something you knew was stolen justifiable?
  o Is accepting a bribe justifiable?

• Sexual Ethics
  o Should you be able to enjoy complete sexual freedom?
  o Is homosexuality justifiable?
  o Is prostitution justifiable?
  o Is abortion justifiable?
  o Is divorce justifiable?

• Political Interest
  o How important is politics to you?
  o Do you discuss politics with your friends?
  o How interested are you in politics?
Table 3.3

Reliability Coefficients

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>Norway</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>.844</td>
<td>.827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodoxy</td>
<td>.896</td>
<td>.829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capitalism</td>
<td>.402</td>
<td>.582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethics</td>
<td>.515</td>
<td>.730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual Ethics</td>
<td>.672</td>
<td>.713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Interest</td>
<td>.470</td>
<td>.517</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The strength of the reliability coefficients was very pleasing. As expected, Norway showed more homogeneous on most issue attitudes than the United States as reflected by the higher reliability coefficients. This made the results in Religiosity and Orthodoxy, where the coefficients for the U.S. were higher, remarkable.

The relative strength of the Religiosity variable is especially important. That issue scale will be used in combination with the dummy variables created out of the religious denomination variable (V179) for extensive bivariate analysis with interaction. The fact that the issue scale is so reliable and consistent between the two countries will provide a strong foundation for the results.

The coefficients for Capitalism and Political Interest were relatively weak. While they are still usable, it is interesting to note the inconsistency in the responses to these issue scales, which only consisted of three questions each.

The data provided by the World Values Survey proved to be valid. The issue scales created to analyze the data have proven very reliable. The next step is analyze the attitude and try to determine the best role for religion in Norway and the United States.
At this point, I would hypothesize that the United States will continue to be more conservative on issues than Norway. Should this be the case, it would appear, at first glance, to show the Competition model to be more effective than the Canopy model at socializing attitudes. As with most Social Science research projects, however, it is unlikely the final analysis will be that simple.
Notes on Chapter 3 (pages 30-37):

1 Norrander, Barbara, and Wilcox, Clyde, Understanding Public Opinion, (CQ Press, Washington DC, 1997). Page 60. Citation from Chapter 4, Religion and Public Opinion In The 1990’s, by Ted G. Jelen.


4 Table 3.1, and all subsequent tables, consists of averages of coded responses. Lower numbers, on a scale of 1 to 3, represent the more conservative, or religious, attitudes. All statistics in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 are significant at .00.

CHAPTER 4

NORWAY

History of Norway

Certain Norwegian traditions go back for centuries, and are very entrenched in their culture. Both their Monarchy and the church-state system can be traced back to St. Olav, a Christian who united Scandinavia during the Viking Period, around 1000AD.¹

The Norwegian Constitution was written in 1814, when Norway began a 91-year union with Sweden. Since it was patterned after that of the United States many of the concepts and much of the language is similar.² Norway amended their Constitution after a liberal movement in 1884, and gained complete independence from Sweden in 1905. Their original Constitution, as with the American one, remains viable and stable to this day.

The Norwegian Constitution makes the Evangelical Lutheran church the official church of the land. It requires the King and over half of his Council of State, made up of the Prime Minister and top advisors, be Lutheran. The members who are not Lutheran can not attend a vote on church business. The King ordains all religious activity in the nation, and the citizens who are Lutheran are bound to raise their children in the same.³

Despite all of this, their Constitution does have a free exercise clause. Based on the United States Constitution and tradition, an American might find these two clauses in
conflict. How can freedom of religion be obtained without freedom from religion? In Norway, the people seem to be comfortable that they have done just that. The data will show members of minority religions to be relatively accepting of the situation.

One possible explanation for the success of this arrangement is the homogeneity of the Norwegian culture. Even so, there is currently a great deal of debate on the issue in Norway. The Lutheran church, which claimed close to 95% of the population just 25 years ago, is now down close to 85%. The Norwegian Parliament voted to maintain the state church in 1981, but make it slightly more autonomous. About three years ago, the church, concerned with the trend of lowering membership, created a commission to look into church-state relations. Their report is due early in 2002.

Norwegians are concerned with many of the same social issues that Americans are. Some of these issues include low political participation, ethics, gay rights and abortion rights, just to name a few. However, there is a big difference with how these problems are being perceived and dealt within the two cultures. In Norway, the Lutheran church takes a leadership role in developing public policy.

As an example, it is appropriate to revisit the gay rights issue in Norway. When the government wants to consider gay marriage issues, the Lutheran church is directly involved. The King is the symbolic Head of State and the head of the church. The Council of State, led by the King, the Bishops and the National Council are all very involved in making public policy directly, not just church policy.

Sometimes the church leadership influences public policy by creating internal church policy. When the church hires a gay priest, that sends a message to government that leads to a shift in public policy as outlined in Chapter 1.
Currently, Norwegians have very liberal attitudes toward gays by an American standard. Same sex unions, a legal marriage not recognized by the church, are allowed in Norway. Recent debates have centered on hiring gay priests and other behavior that implies church acceptance of homosexuality. The state church arrangement implies church acceptance of homosexuality if the government, representing society, accepts it.\(^6\)

This is only one example of the liberal issue stands taken by the Norwegian government and the Lutheran Church. On other fronts, abortion laws allow a woman under 16 to have an abortion without parental consent. Freedom of religion extends to giving Muslims the right to broadcast their call to worship, “azan”, throughout city streets. The Norwegian newspapers are full of social issue debates taking place far to the left of similar debates in the United States.

Is the government leading this charge toward liberal issue attitudes, or is it the church? It is hard to tell since they are supposed to be speaking with one voice. Is the state church leading the people in this direction, or is it driven by public opinion? In any democracy, this question is debatable. It usually works out to be a combination of the two. Seeing how these questions require extensive research beyond the frame of this project, I feel comfortable saying I do not know the answers. Still, even if I can not identify the driving force behind the attitudes, the does not reduce the value of studying these attitudes that define their political culture.

Here is the public opinion data from Norway. It is time to analyze how attitudes are effected by religion acting as a direct agent of socialization through the state.
Data on Norway

The Survey provides a strong sample of Norwegian opinions. The World Values Survey surveyed 5706 respondents in a country of a little over 4 million people. Due to the relative homogeneity of the country, most of the results were statistically significant. Sometimes the most interesting results were the exceptions.

The first thing that was tested is the correlation between the Norwegians confidence in government and confidence in the church. In other words, if someone has a high level of confidence in the government, how likely is this person to have a high confidence in the church. At .20 (n = 1127, p = .000), this correlation is high, but not as high as one might have thought given the state church.

The Religiosity scale is an important part of this study. It consists of one objective variable, church attendance, and several variables that are more subjective. Church attendance has traditionally been the most useful question in determining religiosity. Our issue scale combines this with a number of more subjective questions to give us a more complete picture.

The next fact to establish is that Norwegians, as a whole are considerably less religious than Americans. As mentioned in Chapter Three, Norwegians score considerably “less religious” on the Religiosity issue scale than Americans (2.19 for Norway vs. 1.53 for the United States). Of course, one of the questions in that scale pertains to church attendance, where only 3% of Norwegians attend church regularly compared to nearly 50% of Americans. This did not account for much of the difference, however. When this question was removed, and the more subjective measures of
Religiosity remained, the difference was still intact (2.12 for Norway vs. 1.47 for the United States).  

**Table 4.1**

**Religion to Religiosity Correlation (Norway)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Catholics</th>
<th>Lutherans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>.13***</td>
<td>.16***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Table 4.1, we used the complete Religiosity issue scale described in Chapter 3. This is the first usage, however of the dummy variables created out of V179, isolating Catholics and Lutherans. The table shows that Catholics are significantly more likely to give religious answers to questions in the issue scale than non-Catholics. The tendency is stronger when Lutherans are compared to non-Lutherans.

These data in Table 4.1 challenge the lazy monopoly theory. The theory would hold that Lutherans would be less religious and that Catholics, because they are the minority, would be more active in their faith. That is not represented here. Although Catholics are .13 more likely to be religious than non-Catholics, the Lutherans are up at .16. This indicates that the established church is doing a good job keeping its membership relatively active and involved.

The following Table 4.2 represents correlations between religion and issue attitudes in Norway. The table is divided into “Nones” (3% of the sample). Catholics (0.7% of the sample) and Lutherans (87% of the sample). In Norway, the “Nones” consist of primarily the irreligious. A negative correlation indicates a tendency toward
conservatism in ethics, laissez-faire in economics and high levels of political interest. The higher the absolute numbers, the stronger the relationship.

As I alluded to in Chapter 3, the dummy variables represent "None’s" vs. "non-None’s", Catholics vs. non-Catholics and Lutherans vs. non-Lutherans. The goal is to determine if, for example, Catholics have more consistent attitudes toward Capitalism than the entire collection of non-Catholics.

Table 4.2
Correlation Coefficients (Norway)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue category</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>Catholic</th>
<th>Lutheran</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capitalism</td>
<td>.05**</td>
<td>-.002</td>
<td>-.05**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethics</td>
<td>.04**</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.06***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual Ethics</td>
<td>.18***</td>
<td>-.08***</td>
<td>-.09***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Interest</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first thing that shown in this data is that there is no significant correlation between religious faith and level of political interest in Norway. This fact would, again, counter the lazy monopoly theory and support the canopy model. Catholics or None’s are not participating in politics in droves to change the system. Nor are they boycotting politics because they see themselves as the neglected minority. There is no correlation.

Actually, the numbers are mostly inconclusive about Catholics, except that they tend to be conservative on sexual ethics issues like homosexuality and abortion. This follows when one considers the Catholic Church’s stand on these issues combined with the afore mentioned liberal stand of the Norwegian church-state.
The primary difference this table represents is the conservative tendencies of the professed Lutherans versus the liberal tendencies of the Nones. Attitudes toward capitalism, general ethics and sexual ethics all provided significant data for this conclusion. The most powerful example is, again, sexual ethics. There is a tendency for both Catholics and Lutherans to be conservative on this issue, but the tendency for Nones to be liberal is at least twice as strong (.18 versus .08 or .09). This would indicate that the important distinction in determining issue attitudes at this level is not between sects of Christianity, but between religious and irreligious. The difference between .08 and .09 is hardly worth mentioning, but the difference between -.085 and .18 is distinctive in both size and direction.

It is not surprising that the correlations are weaker after you break it down by denominational affiliation when one considers what is being compared. In reality, it is remarkable that so strong a tendency can be found when Lutherans are being compared to everyone else (The None's and the Catholics, the religious and the irreligious, etc.). It does make sense that the Lutherans would be more conservative than the non-Lutherans, because the latter group includes the None's. However, on Sexual Ethics, the Lutherans actually had a slightly stronger conservative pattern than the Catholics (.09 to .08). This is true despite the Lutheran church's liberal public stand on these issues and the Catholic Church's conservative stand.

The next table takes this theory a step further. The first column of Table 4.3 represents a correlation between the Religiosity issue scale and the others. The goal is to look for tendencies in responses as subjects get more religious. The number in the first
column of the second row indicates that as Norwegians get more religious, they are .17 more like to give conservative responses to Ethics questions.

The next step proved to be a bit more complex. Using the religiosity variable, a bivariate correlation with interaction analysis was performed. Interaction was computed between religious affiliation and Religiosity, and then the correlations from Table 4.1 were recomputed. The Religiosity issue scale had to be changed into the dummy variable necessary to perform this interaction. To do this, I discovered the mean of the responses to the Religiosity issue scale as a whole (for example, it was 2.09 among Norwegian Lutherans). I then isolated those subjects whose responses averaged more religious than the mean. This interaction isolates religious members of one denomination from the rest of the sample. The goal was to recognize tendencies in attitudes among the more religious subjects among the Lutherans and the Catholics (Table 4.3).

To clarify, look at the number in the last column of the second row of Table 4.3. In this case, religious Lutherans, those who scored more religious than the average Lutheran on the Religiosity issue scale, are pitted against everyone else (Both non-Lutherans and less religious Lutherans alike). The goal is to see if this group (which is actually about 48% of the sample) shows any tendency in their responses when compared to the rest of everybody. The result shows that Religious Lutherans are more likely to respond in a conservative way to the questions in the Ethics issue scale by .03. This number is similar to the one representing the entire Lutheran sample on Table 4.2.
Table 4.3

Bivariate Analysis (Norway)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue category</th>
<th>Religiosity</th>
<th>Cath/Relig</th>
<th>Luth/Relig</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capitalism</td>
<td>-.06**</td>
<td>.0004</td>
<td>-.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethics</td>
<td>-.17***</td>
<td>-.07***</td>
<td>-.03**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual Ethics</td>
<td>-.39***</td>
<td>-.12**</td>
<td>-.07***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Interest</td>
<td>-.13***</td>
<td>-.05***</td>
<td>-.08***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This time, the data overwhelmingly showed the key factor in determining issue attitudes was religiosity in general. Someone who scored high on the religiosity variable was .39 more likely to have conservative attitudes on Sexual Ethics issues like abortion and homosexuality. The numbers down the column, while not nearly as strong, all tend toward conservative attitudes and are all significant and meaningful.

The Political Interest results were remarkable as well. Although no significant relationship was evident in this category on the earlier table, here adding religiosity in makes a big difference. A person, who scores high on religiosity, is .13 more likely to be interested in politics. This fact reinforces earlier data about the positive correlation between confidence in church and government (If we assume that those who are active in politics have more confidence in the institutions than those who are not).

Once it was broken down into denominational categories, the correlations became weaker across all issues. This shows that general Religiosity is a stronger predictor of issue attitudes than the religiosity/affiliation interaction. The Capitalism numbers are the most obvious example. On Table 4.2, None’s tended toward less free market by .05. Here, religious Norwegians were .06 toward laissez-faire. This is a clear distinction, but when it was broken down by affiliation, the correlations became insignificant.
However, as with table 4.2, it is important to remember what is being compared. It is actually very interesting to note that religious Lutherans (actually 48% of the sample) tend to be .07 more conservative on Sexual Ethics issues than less religious Lutherans and all non-Lutherans put together (Down from .09 for all Lutherans). This conservative tendency is even stronger (.12) when religious Catholics are isolated (Up from .08 for all Catholics). The Ethics results came out similar, just less pronounced. The liberal stand of the Lutheran Church on abortion and gay rights is a likely explanation for the increasing consistency among Catholics and the decreasing consistency among Lutherans.

In the Norwegians case, the Religiosity issue scale presents them as a slightly more religious people than the church attendance figure alone does. This is evident by the mean on the Religiosity issue scale getting more religious when the church attendance question is removed (2.19 down to 2.12). On the one hand, this could be seen as obscuring the objective data that can be obtained. However, if the Canopy Model is found to fit the Norwegian religious landscape, this subjective data could provide confirmation that Norwegians are content in their faith without being drawn to the institution regularly.

In the data, 5.1% of Norwegians indicated that they go to church once a week or more. Although this number is slightly higher than the ‘official’ data, it is satisfactory to work with. In research, the most widely used method to estimate church attendance is survey research. The option of asking the church is not a feasible one. Churches have been known to overestimate their numbers, particularly in competitive environments. The best way has always been to go out and count all the attendants individually. This eliminates a respondent’s temptation to overestimate due to social deniability. However,
this is clearly the least efficient method, and, as a result, is little used. As in this case, survey research usually provides sufficiently accurate results.

In any case, among Norwegian Lutherans in this sample, only 3% claim regular church attendance. Church attendance among Catholics was higher, at 4%, but not high enough to make a Lazy Monopoly argument. As before, when religiosity showed relatively similar between Catholics and Protestants, a one-percent difference in the church attendance figures does not present a significant difference. According to the Lazy Monopoly theory the Lutheran attendance figure would be much lower than the Catholic figure because the Lutheran church would be loosing touch with its membership and the Catholics would be rallying together as an oppressed minority. Instead, it appears the Canopy model idea of universal contentment is closer to the truth.

**Overview of Norwegian Results**

The Religious Competition model says the lazy monopoly theory should have taken hold by now and the Lutheran Church should be struggling. This does not hold up. While only 3% of Norwegians attend church, a fact that could be associated with this theory, the Lutheran Church does a better job of promoting religiosity than the Catholic Church, according to this research. While the Lutheran Church has been losing numbers in recent years, it still claims over 85% of the population almost 200 years after the writing of the Constitution.

The Canopy Model does fare better, but there are still some holes. The impact of certain controversial church positions, like gay rights and abortion issues, on churchgoers
seems to be limited. While the Lutheran Church seems to have pacified its members and its opposition, it is not effective at generating religiosity.

Two distinct conclusions can be drawn from these results. First, the variable that most affected the results was religiosity. There were clear relationships in issue attitudes when we contrasted the religious to the irreligious. These patterns were significantly reduced when we looked at the denominational breakdown. To paraphrase: It matters less which religion a person belongs to, instead it matters more whether or not they are religious.

The problem for the Norwegian Lutheran church is that Norwegians are not religious. The low church attendance and their responses to the Religiosity issue scale as a whole evidence this. Certainly, the most effective way for a church to socialize is by promoting religiosity. However, this is not the only way a church can socialize.

In Norway, religion acts directly through the church and directly through government. Acting through the church can be more efficient. When a minister speaks to his congregation, he has the right answers. Many people will not question the wisdom of the man in the black robe reading from the Bible.

When religion uses the government to socialize, the process is going to take more time. Even an established church, with a direct connection to the people, is going to have to move slowly. This is because liberal democratic governments are built to work slowly. Endless debate and compromise will slow an ethical movement. However, having majorities throughout government, the Lutheran Church should eventually prevail in most debates in Norway. The question is will they compromise their principles in the process.
The other conclusion that can be drawn is that religion can be effective at socializing issue attitudes with those individuals it reaches. Table 4.3 is a great example of this. All of the numbers reflected attitudes that are more conservative for religious members of both faiths. The problem is, with 3% regular church attendance, the Lutheran Church does not reach many people directly.

Separationists in the United States might argue that it is the lack of religious competition that results in the low church attendance and religiosity numbers in Norway. One goal of the current study being done concerning the state church is could be to determine how you can dramatically increase church attendance and religiosity without eliminating the state church. Still, while the church does not reach many people in this way, the state church system opens other possibilities for influencing public debate and socializing the masses.

Considering the church and the government work together to form public policy in Norway, the resulting policies and public opinion attitudes are a lot more liberal than one might expect. Statistics show things like abortion and euthanasia to be much more widely accepted in Norway than in years past.\textsuperscript{8} Norwegian responses, in general, were more liberal than American responses. Norwegian laws are also more liberal on these issues than laws in America. The church position on these issues seems to fit right in.

In conclusion, it appears that the established church’s role as an agent of socialization for religion in Norway is complex. With church attendance so low, religious leaders in Norway must find another way to spread their message. Their other direct way is though the government. Using this medium limits their ability to define specific issue attitudes. The church position is modified with political compromise and socialization
can be a slower process. It does help religion play a role in guiding the overall direction of the society, but is this role defined by religious doctrine, or by compromise and public opinion.

While a liberalization of attitudes toward abortion and homosexuality does exist in other countries over the past 15 years, in Norway the state church legitimizes this evolution and allows for quicker institutionalization of the changes. The same sex unions, liberal abortion laws and a recent appointment of an openly gay priest are examples of these institutional changes.

As alluded to before in this Chapter, it is difficult to determine who the driving force is behind this liberal trend. When the church and the state speak with one voice, it is hard to know if they are in complete agreement or if one is driving the other. In addition, it is never easy to tell if the church state is leading the people, or vice-versa. The point here is that the Lutheran church is playing a significant role in this process, but not in a traditionally conservative way. Whether they are leading or following, the church support for this trend legitimizes it in many ways. It even works to lessen the conservatism of the most religious members of the church.

Religious Separationists in the United States would argue that these liberal trends in Norway are a result of government corruption of church principles. In essence, that if the church was left to its own devices, there is no way it would take such a liberal stand on these social issues. This is supported by the conservative attitudes of the religious Lutherans found in this research. One might wonder if the church's teachings on Sunday morning are in line with the liberal face it puts on to work with government on public policy. Once a church enters the political world of debate and compromise, how much of
“right vs. wrong” can remain? It appears that a religious Lutheran might be disappointed by the answer to this question.

In any case, time to shift the focus to the United States to see if the different church-state relationship provides different results.
Notes on Chapter 4 (Pages 39-53):

1 www.kirken.no/engelsk, the official web site of the Norwegian state church. This site contains a historical review plus reviews and documentation of current issues.


3 Ibid. Page 5.

4 www.kirken.no/engelsk.

5 The information concerning the report due next year was provided by Dr. Torleiv Austad. A professor of Theology at “det teologiske Menighetsfakultet” in Oslo, Norway.

6 Information on church policy came from www.kirken.no/engelsk. Information on public policy and debate came from personal sources and www.aftenposten.no/engelsk/local. Stories cited can be referenced under numbers d144331, d133975, d142368, d169175, d130238, d165673, d191804, d99664, d132888, and d157896.

7 On all subsequent tables, asterisks note the significance of the result. Three asterisks means the data is significant to .00, two indicates it is below .01, and one indicates it is below .05. If an asterisk does not follow a number, it is not significant to .05 and, therefore, is not a significant result.

CHAPTER 5

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Data on the United States

In previous chapters, much of the debate over religion in politics in American history was covered. In addition, some issues under current debate were analyzed. In general, American attitudes toward many of the issues being discussed here are more conservative than Norwegian attitudes. Americans will show up more religious and orthodox, as well. American laws also reflect these conservative attitudes when compared to Norwegian laws.

Is this pattern a result of the Wall of Separation we have built between church and state? Does the Religious Competition Model explain these attitudes and give Separatists cause to claim victory? Specific analysis of the data will answer these and other questions.

The Survey provides a sample of 3612 respondents in the United States. Since the U.S. is a more heterogeneous country, the results were not as tight as the results from the Norwegian data analysis. Fewer results were significant to .05, and in general, the correlations were not as strong. Still, the data provided some interesting insight.

The correlation between American's confidence in government and confidence in the church was lower than the Norwegian result. This is to be expected, because of the
lack of direct connection between the two in the United States. However, at .12 it is still high (n= 3297, p= .000).

Table 5.1

Religion to Religiosity Correlation (U.S.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Catholics</th>
<th>Mainline Protestants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>.04*</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Not much can be determined from Table 5.1. The dummy variables are the same as in Table 4.1, with the exception that the Mainline Protestant variable does not include only Lutherans. Catholics are slightly more religious than non-Catholics, but not much. The same cannot be said about Mainline Protestants because the result is not significant. This would indicate that a number of people who claim to be Protestants are not very religious, and/or that a number of people that claim another (or no) church affiliation are more religious (or spiritual). These numbers represent the difficulties in tying down patterns by studying the individualistic American culture. Interestingly, this is about the only time we receive significant results concerning Catholics in America.

In Table 5.2, like Table 4.2, the respondents are divided into “Nones” (12% of the sample), Catholics (39% of the sample) and, in this case, Mainline Protestants (32% of the sample). This final category includes Protestant sects like Lutherans, Presbyterians, Methodists, Episcopalians and others. An Evangelical Protestant category was actually clearer to define in the United States than in Norway with sects like Southern Baptists and others. However, the category was left out of the tables because it provided little useful information, and there was no comparable group in Norway.
The "Nones" are a lot more complex a group in the United States. In Norway, "Nones" were the few people who specifically rejected the canopy of religion that the Lutheran church provides, and, therefore, likely religion in general. This is exemplified by the fact that 0% of Norwegian "Nones" claimed weekly church attendance. They also scored very "low" on Religiosity (2.49) and Orthodoxy (1.73).

In the United States, it is more complicated than that. "Nones" could be irreligious people, but they could also be non-denominational Christians or belong to a variety of secular spiritual sects. As we will discuss later, the religious marketplace gives the individualistic American unlimited freedom to choose. Without government interference, an American can join any number of Christian denominations, or a non-denominational Christian church. He or she is free to practice Judaism, Islam, Hindu, or whatever religion they choose.

Still, we can conclude that the "Nones" represent the least conceptually religious section of society. While American weekly church attendance remains around 50%, this group was at 11% in the data. The "Nones" also scored considerably "lower" on Religiosity (2.03) and Orthodoxy (1.29) than the general sample. "Nones" do include the Atheists and other secular groups. They also include the growing numbers of non-denominational Christians, who have shied away from traditional denominational Christianity for one reason or another.

The following Table 5.2, like Table 4.2, represents correlations between religious denominations and issue attitudes in the United States. To review, the dummy variables represent "None's" vs. "non-None's" (primarily irreligious vs. religious), Catholics vs. non-Catholics (religious vs. a combination) and Mainline Protestants vs. non-Mainline...
Protestants. The goal is to determine if, for example, Catholics have more consistent attitudes toward Capitalism than the entire collection of non-Catholics.

Table 5.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue Category</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>Catholic</th>
<th>Mainline Protestant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capitalism</td>
<td>.08***</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>-.05**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethics</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual Ethics</td>
<td>.10***</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.05**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Interest</td>
<td>-.06***</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.08***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As we saw with Norway, the essential factor that defines these results is religion vs. irreligion. In three of the four categories, significant results could be obtained concerning the minority who claim no religious affiliation. They clearly tend towards less free market, liberal sexual ethics and they are more interested in politics. On the contrary, the same three significant results from the Mainline Protestants lean the other way (although not quite as strongly, which is to be expected). They have a slight tendency to want a free market economy, more conservative sexual ethics and a stronger tendency to want to stay out of political discussion.

What is very interesting is the fact that the Catholic sample provides no significant results on this table. Their tendencies on the table are very small and insignificant. This would indicate a great lack of cohesion among Catholics in America and between American Catholics and the Pope. An example of this might be Catholic support for the Democratic Party in the United States, despite the party’s pro-choice
platform. This is a complicated discussion for another time. For now, let us just conclude
that the data represents a discombobulated Catholic sample.

This creates an interesting dynamic pitting the Protestants versus the Nones. This
dynamic has been a major player in American politics over the past 20 years. The
Political Interest numbers might be of interest to Protestant religious leaders. Those
numbers would certainly help explain the Separatist trend in government and the failure
of the Religious Right movement to make a stronger impact in the 1988 presidential
election. Aside from the Political Interest results, however, the American results had a
striking similarity to the Norwegian results.

The first column of Table 5.3, like Table 4.3 in the previous chapter, represents a
correlation between the Religiosity issue scale and the others. The goal is to look for
tendencies in responses as subjects get more religious. The number in the first column of
the second row indicates that as Americans get more religious, they are .26 more like to
give conservative responses to Ethics questions.

Then the bivariate correlation with interaction analysis was performed, using
the religiosity variable. Interaction was computed between religious affiliation and
Religiosity by changing the issue scale into a dummy variable (the mean was 1.44 among
Mainline Protestant Americans). By isolating those subjects whose responses averaged
more religious than the mean, religious members of one denomination could be isolated
from the rest of the sample. The goal was to recognize tendencies in attitudes among the
more religious subjects among the Protestants and the Catholics (Table 5.3).

To clarify, look at the number in the last column of the second row of Table 5.3.
In this case, religious Protestants are pitted against everyone else. The goal is to see if this
group (which is actually about 16% of the sample) shows any tendency in their responses when compared to the rest of the sample.

Table 5.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue Category</th>
<th>Religiosity</th>
<th>Cath/Relig</th>
<th>Prot/Relig</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capitalism</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.0007</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethics</td>
<td>-.26***</td>
<td>-.08**</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual Ethics</td>
<td>-.37***</td>
<td>-.08***</td>
<td>-.05***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Interest</td>
<td>-.003</td>
<td>-.07***</td>
<td>-.10***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With a couple of notable exceptions, this table represents the same strong relationships for Americans that we observed with Norwegians. It matters less which religion one adheres to, the more distinctive variable is religion vs. irreligion. The tendency for religious Americans to have conservative attitudes on sexual issues is very strong. It is almost as strong as the correlation was in Norway. The correlation for the general ethics attitudes was even stronger than Norway. This is remarkable for such a large and diverse country to have more consistent attitudes than a small homogeneous one. This table reflects a high level of religiosity in America.

One explanation for this might be church attendance. Church attendance in the United States is very high in comparison to other western industrialized countries. Most sources put American attendance over 50%. According to the survey, 44% of Americans said that they go to church at least once a week. This broke down to 50% of Protestants and 49% of Catholics. The significant minority of Nones, who attend at 11%, brought down the total number.
When the results were broken down by denomination, the ethics correlations lessened, as with Norway. However, the correlations were still remarkable when it is considered what is being compared. The religious Catholics were .08 more conservative on Ethics and Sexual Ethics than the rest of the population, including groups like less religious Catholics and Evangelical Protestants. Part of this can be attributed to the presence of the “None’s” in the non-religious Catholic group, but not much.

This is obvious when you consider the same numbers for the religious Mainliners. The Ethics result is insignificant, and the Sexual Ethics result is lower, at .05. What this shows is that the Catholic Church is doing a better job of socializing issue attitudes among its religious adherents than the Mainline Protestant churches. One possible explanation is that there is one Catholic Church delivering one message to its followers. At the same time, there are many Protestant denominations competing for membership. It is possible that the effort to differentiate the product has taken the focus away from the basic message of the Christian church.

Most of the numbers on this table indicate, to varying degrees, that American Mainline Protestant churches usually send conservative messages to their followers. However, evidently this is not always the case. A look at the Capitalism data reflects no tendency among religious Mainline Protestants, Catholics, or the religious in general. The church is likely preaching the need to help the less fortunate, and some people seem to be reconsidering the concept of raw capitalism. What does this say about Max Weber’s “Protestant Ethic?”

The other significant data on religious American Mainline Protestants and Catholics reflects a high level of Political Interest. This is interesting because the number
representing all the American Mainline Protestants revealed the opposite, a significant trend toward less interest. This represents a division between Americans who are active in social organizations and those who are not. It also supports the earlier positive correlation between confidence in church and confidence in government.

It is interesting that a higher percentage of Americans attend church every week than voted in the last presidential election. The data indicates a tendency for Nones and religious Mainline Protestants to be more interested in politics than other groups. This would indicate that a large percentage of the voters came from one of these two groups. This supports the None vs. Protestant dynamic that was discussed earlier.

One final table needs to be presented here to emphasize the point concerning denominational breakdown. Similar to the last table, this one represents a bivariate analysis. However, instead of using the entire Religiosity issue scale as a dummy variable, here we use church attendance only as the dummy variable to combine with the denominational variable.

Table 5.4

Bivariate Analysis w/ Church Attendance (U.S. and Norway)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue Attitudes...</th>
<th>Cath/Attendance</th>
<th>Prot/Attendance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capitalism</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethics</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>-.08***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual Ethics</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>-.17***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Interest</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>-.07***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since church attendance statistics are so different for the United States and Norway, an effort was made to isolate that variable from the other religiosity variables to
see how that would effect the results. The data for Norwegian Catholics is unusable, since an insufficient number of them reported weekly church attendance on the survey. Aside from that, this table helps solidify trends already recognized.

All of the significant information on this table supports previous conclusions, but it is remarkable how clearly it does so. The correlations under Ethics and Sexual Ethics for both American Catholics and American Protestants are exactly the same. Political Interest for American Mainline Protestants and Catholics remains high. This result is also consistent with previous discussion. This table shows the ability of church attendance to promote Christian values regardless of the national church and state system or political culture. The conservative correlations are equal. The key seems to be getting people to church.

It is true that most of the correlations were stronger when church attendance was used alone and not combined with the other variables in the Religiosity issue scale. On the other hand, Table 5.4 also clarifies the value of the more subjective measures included in the Religiosity variable. Table 5.4 shows no difference in issue attitudes among church-going Protestants in Norway and the United States. However, Tables 4.3 and 5.3 provided some valuable information distinguishing religious Lutherans in Norway from religious Protestants in the United States.

Since 3% of Norwegians attend church regularly, it is safe to assume that there are more “religious” people in Norway than churchgoers. In this case, the issue scale provided valuable information, represented on Table 4.3, that is not available on Table 5.4. This includes correlations on Lutheran Political Interest and Catholic views in general.
In contrast, the dynamic is different in the United States. Higher church attendance figures in the United States can provide a good indication of who is religious. Churchgoers commit to their faith and hear the message on a weekly basis. Consequently, the correlations using attendance were stronger than when the religiosity scale was used. The religiosity scale allows those who attend church less often, but still claim to be religious, to influence the results. As expected, this works to reduce the conservative tendencies.

While Table 5.4 was included for discussion, the religiosity variable was used over church attendance for this study. This was necessary due to the comparative nature of this work. Due to the differences in church and state relations, the institutionalized church has a much different role in the two cultures. Using the religiosity issue scale helped level this playing field a little bit.

Overview of American Results

The Religious Competition model says that religious competition should provide for a religiously charged atmosphere in the United States. The data certainly shows that to be the case. Church attendance is high, and the religiosity and orthodoxy variables scored much higher among Americans than among Norwegians. How is this effecting Christianity’s ability to socialize the political culture in the United States?

As with Norway, the conservative trends on attitudes of religious people lessen when you look at Catholics and Protestants separately. In this case, it cannot be explained by a liberal stand on these issues by one certain church. Here, the data indicates that the breakdown emanates from a lack of cohesion among Protestant Christian sects.
Competition creates the desire to distinguish one group from the other. In American politics, the two political parties try to convince people they are very different when, in reality, they are very close to each other on the political spectrum. The same thing is occurring among Protestant Christian sects in America. To find significant differences between what a Lutheran and a Methodist minister preaches would not be easy. However, somehow these two denominations need to distinguish themselves in order to compete for members. This dynamic creates a lack of cohesion among American Protestants that we see in the denominational breakdown correlation reductions.

As far the American Catholics were concerned, a look at the whole sample did not provide many significant results, while a look at religious Catholics provided remarkable consistencies. This indicates that the less religious Catholics tend to struggle justifying the traditional conservative views of the Pope in light of current liberal views on issues such as gay marriage and abortion. Those who attend church more often are able to maintain their conservative views, while many of them continue to actively support the Democratic Party.

Right now, the splintered Mainline Protestant groups are competing against a growing group of relatively cohesive and politically active “Nones.” While this total sample represented this group at 12% of the population, the reality is they are closer to 20%. The problem in the 1981 data set discussed in Chapter 3 accounts for this difference (see Table A 2). This group shows strong trends toward liberal issue attitudes and a strong interest in politics. This creates a competition dynamic that was not found in Norway, where only 3% of the sample were “Nones.”
The large group of “Nones” shows another side of the Religious Competition Model. If an individual is asked to select between religious sects, it is entirely possible he/she might select “None Of The Above.” This is especially true in a nation like the United States, where concepts like freedom and individualism are so important to the culture. Many Americans do not want to be “institutionalized,” and they avoid organized religion. In a highly charged religious atmosphere, it is harder to defer denominational selection. Product differentiation becomes an increasingly important factor, further heightening religious competition.

In short, the Religious Competition Model seems to accurately describe the American landscape. However, it also seems to be hindering religion in its ability to socialize. Religious Americans are .37 more likely than other people to have conservative views on sexual ethics issues. If we just look at church going Protestant, that number goes down to .17. Looking at religious Protestants, and Protestants in general, the correlation is a mere .05. The same pattern showed up in the analysis of the Ethics results. Whatever commonality of issue attitudes that might exist among religious Americans across the board is not reaching the religious or the casual Mainline Protestant, because the denominations are more interested in accentuating their differences rather than their similarities. The stronger tendencies among the religious Catholics reinforce this fact.

This is a very important observation about the state of religion in America today. Despite the high church attendance, in the end, there is little commonality among Mainline Protestants concerning ethical issue attitudes. This sample shows more commonality among “Nones” in attitudes concerning Capitalism and Sexual Ethics. It is
true that when “None’s” are compared to non-“None’s”, the primarily irreligious are being compared to the more religious. That should allow for some significant distinctions. It is also true that there are a number of Mainline Protestant sects in America. However, they all teach the basic Christian values found in the Bible. A “None” is, by definition, unlimited in the different attitudes or values he/she could possess.

The fact that the “None’s” appear to be more cohesive, on any issue attitude, than the Mainline Protestants, even the religious Mainliners, is remarkable even when it is considered what is being compared. In addition, the stronger consistencies among the religious Catholics reinforce the point. The Religious Competition in the United States results in religious particularism among Protestant denominations. This fact appears to have diminished the commonality of Christian values in the American political culture.
Notes on Chapter 5 (Pages 55-67):

1 There were many references to this forming dynamic in my research. One example was Jelen and Wilcox, 1995. Page 70-1.


4 Finke and Stark. Pages 17-21.

5 Bellah, Robert. Habits Of The Heart. (Univ. of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 1985). Reference to “Shilaism” concept outlined in this work.
CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

The first thing this study accomplished was to reinforce some established facts and theories in the context of a comparison between the United States and Norway. Church attendance rates in the United States are much higher than rates in Norway. In addition, Americans are more religious and orthodox than their Norwegian counterparts. Current theories placing a positive correlation between these two facts are not disputed by these results.

The next step was to see how religiosity proceeds to affect the socialization of issue attitudes. The established church in Norway seems to do a fairly good job socializing the few churchgoers quickly and affecting the rest of the population gradually by influencing public policy. The differing means have also resulted in very different ends. Churchgoers remain conservative, while public opinion and policy move to the left. To an extent, the Norwegians have established a successful religious canopy and managed to avoid most of the lazy monopoly pitfalls. However, the Norwegian system does a poor job promoting religiosity among the people, especially if the objective measure of church attendance is used. In addition, the church has compromised many traditional positions in order to compromise with government in a public setting.
In the United States, the “Wall of Separation” model seems to do a good job of promoting church attendance, religiosity and debate. Still, it is no better than the Norwegian State church in socializing, due to a lack of cohesion in the religious message. Is there a way to improve the socialization ability by taking the strengths of the two systems and reducing the weaknesses?

Accommodationists and Separationists in the United States would both find support by looking at the Norwegian data. Separationists would say that the data illustrates their concerns about the effects of politics on religion. The Norwegian Lutheran church has moved far to the left of traditional Christian values due to its bond with government. In addition, many religious Lutherans maintain conservative views on these issues. Considering the low attendance and religiosity, religious Separationists feel the data on the Norwegian system would support their position.

Meanwhile, in the United States, religiosity and orthodoxy are high. Church attendance is higher than any other western industrialized country. Religious issues are debated constantly. People have complete freedom of choice when it comes to religious preferences. The size of the “Nones”, and their obvious influence on the political system, is a great example of that freedom. If lawmakers try to stifle that freedom, the court is usually quick to act. The Religious Marketplace seems to have worked very well. A Separationist argument would be easy to make based on these results.

A deeper look at the data presented here reveals a more Accommodationist argument. The American Accommodationist does not want a state church for the very reason that we see in Norway. Politics should not require churches to compromise their teachings as seems to have happened in Norway. Instead, the accommodationist believes
government should promote religion without forging any official ties to any one specific sect.

Government can be a very good direct agent of socialization for religion. The Norwegian State church is playing a significant role in a liberal movement on ethical issues. How can this be modified to an accommodationist model in the United States without churches having to compromise their message? Can government promote Christianity, in general, without lifting one sect over another?

The data suggests that this is possible. In both countries, there was a strong tendency for religious people to agree on conservative ethical attitudes. This trend was reduced when we broke up the sample into Protestants and Catholics, but it was still significant. This "common ground" among religious people of all denominations would be the place to start reintroducing religious values into American society through government policy as well as promoting religion, in general, through rhetoric. The challenge would be doing survey research to define and test this "common ground."

The most important conclusion found in this study is that the essential variable is religiosity. We found all of the major distinctions in issue attitudes when we compared the religious to the non-religious, not the Catholics to the Protestants. This is true regardless of the standard used. In the United States, an individual had to score below 1.5 on the Religiosity scale to be in the "religious half," whereas, in Norway, the mean was 2.2. A person scoring at 1.9 would be "more religious" in Norway and "less religious" in the United States. Despite the significant difference in how religious one has to be to get in the "more religious" groups used for Tables 4.3 and 5.3, the issue attitudes reflected in
these groups are very similar. This speaks well of the sacred canopy of the Lutheran church in Norway.

If this holds to be true in other research, the Accommodationist would say that there is definitely a place for government here. It could take a leadership role in forming a more cohesive religious environment by accommodating some basic, "common ground" religious values into government policy. It could also promote religiosity, in general, through government rhetoric, as President Bush did in the weeks following the tragedies of September 11th, 2001. The United States government might also consider presenting these values in Christian terms, since vast majorities of Americans are Christian.

There are two groups that are left out of this equation: The non-Christian religious minorities and the "Nones." The "Nones" present the biggest hurdle to the Accommodationist. They have been growing in numbers and influence for decades. They are a product of the religious competition and individualism found in our culture, and they are hard to define. This group and the non-Christian religious minorities would have to believe that neither religion clause of the First Amendment was being threatened by accommodation. The Norway data proves that even an established church can exist without threatening the freedom of other religions under a free exercise clause. They would then have to accept the fact that the United States was founded on Christianity, not secularism, and remains a Christian nation to this day. All of this seems very unlikely based on the current political climate in the United States.

In the future, the debate between the Accommodationists and the Separationists will continue. It is my hope that this work will contribute to the ongoing debate. As with
many studies in Social Science, the results can be used to support either side of the issue. If this project did not solve the debated issue, at least it explored the dynamics of the relationship between church and state in a way that had not been previously done.

From my personal view, I believe I now have a deeper understanding of some of the issues involved. At the end of this project, I maintain my Accommodationist view. I agree with Samuel Huntington who believes that we should "keep America American." We should not try to turn the rest of the world into America, and, at the same time, we should not try to turn America into the rest of the world.¹

I believe the United States was founded on Christian values, and that we can maintain those values in our political culture while tolerating anyone among us who believes something else. I do not believe any secular nation has the foundation necessary to survive in this world, and the more we separate church and state, the more we become a secular nation.

As for the fear the government cooperation with the church would result in government control over the church, the Separationists seem to have a point. The Norwegian data would certainly indicate that it might have occurred there. The key to avoiding this is to maintain the religious marketplace we have built by not lifting one sect over another. The only way to see if this is possible is to respectfully try it.

I believe the sacred canopy benefits Norwegian political culture. There seems to be sufficient democratic debate on ethical and church issues, without creating any kind of rebellious minority. The canopy creates yet another cultural commonality for a small, homogeneous people, adding a sense of religious nationalism. Public opinion does have too big a role in determining church policy. However, the relationship does add quick
justification to liberal aspects of our social evolution that the church usually inhibits. The biggest problem they face is church attendance. More participation at that level would free up church from government and allow the church to communicate more directly with the people. It will be interesting to note if this is the conclusion of the Lutheran church report that will be available next year. If it is the conclusion, the important thing they have to determine is how to do it. If there is another way to promote religiosity, besides religious competition, they need to find it.

With limited accommodation in the United States, I believe our government can promote Christian ideals without dominating the religious landscape. Religious competition can still flourish while our leadership reminds us not to lose track of the core Christian values that are the foundation of our culture. Values like self-control, dedication, integrity, kindness to all, and the desire for peace can be reinforced by religion. I believe religion will always play a very important role in maintaining social order and motivating people, and these are its primary values to government.
Notes on Chapter 6 (Pages 69-74):

APPENDIX I

WORLD VALUES SURVEY QUESTIONS
Listed in this appendix are all of the questions from the World Values Survey Codebook that were used in the research. In some cases, the questions were modified from the way they read in the codebook for clarification. The answers are taken directly from the survey, except in cases where the responses were country specific. In those cases, I distinguished between Norway and the United States.

Also listed after each question is the code categories used for the purposes of this project. In general, the answers were coded with the most conservative or religious response as the lowest number (usually one), the moderate answer next (2), than the most liberal or irreligious answer (3). The miscellaneous answers and the “Don’t Knows” were combined into 9, in order to clean up the data. See Chapter 3 for further information on how the questions were used and the reliability of the dummy variables.

Question 1, or V (variable) 1, establishes which wave of the survey the subsequent data represents. The survey was collected three times, in 1981-82, 1990-91 and 1995-97. I did not use this variable, so my data represents a compilation of all three surveys. See Chapter 3 for discussion of this issue.

V2 is a two-digit country code. Nearly 100 countries participated in this survey. I used this variable to isolated data from Norway (The country code is 18) and the United States (coded 11).

V3 is a four-digit interview number that identifies each respondent in the given country. I did not use this variable for my project so to include all respondents without bias.
The following are the questions that were used in this research:

V7 Please say, how important is politics in your life?
1 Very important
2 Rather Important
3 Not Very Important
4 Not at all Important
9 Don’t Know
Coded: 1 or 2 = 1, 3 = 2, 4 = 3, else = 9 (Political Interest)

V9 Please say, how important is religion in your life?
1 Very Important
2 Rather Important
3 Not Very Important
4 Not at all Important
9 Don’t Know
Coded: 1 or 2 = 1, 3 = 2, 4 = 3, else = 9 (Religiosity)

V28 Are you an active member, and inactive member or not a member of a Church or Religious organization?
1 Active Member
2 Inactive Member
3 Don’t Belong
Coded: 1 = 1. 2 = 2, 3 = 3, else = 9 (Religiosity)

V37 When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political matters:
1 Frequently
2 Occasionally
3 Never
9 Don’t Know
Coded: 1 = 1. 2 = 2, 3 = 3, else = 9 (Political Interest)

V95 If someone said that individuals should have the chance to enjoy complete sexual freedom without being restricted would you:
1 Tend to agree
2 Neither/ It depends
3 Tend to disagree
9 Don’t know
Coded: 1 = 3, 2 = 2, 3 = 1, else = 9 (Sexual Ethics)
V117 How interested would you say you are in politics?
1 Very interested
2 Somewhat interested
3 Not very interested
4 Not at all Interested
9 Don't Know
Coded: 1 or 2 = 1, 3 = 2, 4 = 3, else = 9 (Political Interest)

V123 In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?

Left
DK = 99
Coded: 7-10 = 1, 4-6 = 2, 1-3 = 3, else = 9

V127

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
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<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
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<th>10</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Left</td>
<td>People should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for.</td>
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<tr>
<td>People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves.</td>
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<td>DK = 99</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coded: 1-3 = 3, 4-6 = 2, 7-10 = 1, else = 9 (Capitalism)</td>
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V128

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<tr>
<td>Competition is good.</td>
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<td>Competition is harmful.</td>
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<tr>
<td>DK = 99</td>
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<td>Coded: 1-3 = 1, 4-6 = 2, 7-10 = 3, else = 9 (Capitalism)</td>
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V129

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life. (Capitalism)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hard work doesn't generally bring success. It's more a matter of luck / connections.</td>
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V179 Which, if any, religious denomination do you belong to?
0 No, not a member/ NONE
1 Roman Catholic
2 Mainline Protestant

Here, I created dummy variables to isolate each of these three groups in each of the two countries. For example, to isolate Lutherans in Norway, 2 equals 1 and all else equals 0, given that V2 equals 18.
V181 Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days?

1. More than once a week
2. Once a week
3. Once a month
4. Only on special holidays
5. Once a year
6. Less often
7. Never, practically never

Coded: 1 or 2 = 1, 3 thru 5 = 2, 6 or 7 = 3, else = 9 (Religiosity)

V182 Independently of whether you go to church or not, would you say you are:

1. A religious person
2. Not a religious person
3. A convinced atheist
4. Don’t Know

Coded: 1 = 1, 2 = 2, 3 = 3, else = 9 (Religiosity)

For questions 183-189, the answers and the way I coded the answers are the same. Refer to V183. These made up the Orthodoxy group.

V183 Do you believe in God?

1. Yes
2. No
9. Don’t Know

Coded: 1 = 1, 2 = 2, else = 9

V184 Do you believe in life after death?

V185 Do you believe people have a soul?

V186 Do you believe the devil exists?

V187 Do you believe in hell?

V188 Do you believe in heaven?

V189 Do you believe in sin?

V190 How important is God in your life?

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<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Not at all

DK = 99

Coded: 8-10 = 1, 3-7 = 2, 1-2 = 3, else = 9 (Religiosity)

V191 Do you find that you get comfort and strength from religion?

1. Yes
2. No
9. DK

Coded: 1 = 1, 2 = 3, else = 9 (Religiosity)
For questions 192 though 202, the responses are recorded on the same Likert scale. I have coded the scale the same for all of the questions. Refer to 192 for the scale and code. 192-196 made up the Ethics group. 197-200 finished out the Sexual Ethics.

V192 Claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled...

<table>
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<tr>
<th>1</th>
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<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Is Never Justifiable</td>
<td>Is Always Justifiable</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DK = 99
Coded: 1-3 = 1, 4-6 = 2, 7-10 = 3, else =9

V193 Avoiding a fare on public transportation...
V194 Cheating on your taxes if you have a chance...
V195 Buying something you knew was stolen...
V196 Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties...
V197 Homosexuality...
V198 Prostitution...
V199 Abortion...
V200 Divorce...
V201 Euthanasia...
V202 Suicide...

V210 If there were a national election tomorrow, for which party on this list would you vote? Or, which one appeals to you the most?
If V2 equals 11, then...
1 Republican
2 Democrat
9 else
If V2 equals 18, then...
1 Labour
2 Progressive
3 Conservative
4 Christian Peoples
5 Communist
6 Marxist-Leninist
7 Center
8 Socialist
9 Liberal

Here, again, dummy variables were created to isolate constituents of each party. Here is how the seven Norwegian political parties currently represented in their parliament line up from right to left: Socialist Left, Labor (Norwegian Workers), Liberal, Center, Christian People's, Progressive, Conservative. The party that usually gets the most votes is Labor.
The World Values Survey and European Values Surveys, 1981-84, 1990-93, and 1995-1997 were produced by the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR). The principal investigators for the ICPSR were Ronald Inglehart, et al. from the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor. The codebook includes the questions and response codes, a summary of the project and details on the methodology. The first version of ICPSR 2790 was copyrighted February 2000. The codebook is 178 pages. I accessed the data set through SPSS.
APPENDIX 2

TRENDS SHOWN IN DATA 1981-1995
This appendix is a series of tables that show trends in Norway and the United States between 1981 and 1995. The aberrations in the 1981 data set also show up here. This data has been relegated to an appendix because it is not directly relevant to the study and/or the results. However, it is provided in the interest of covering all of the bases.

### Table A 1- Norway By Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>1981</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1995</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lutherans (percentage of)</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholics (percentage of)</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nones (percentage of)</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity (dummy variable average)</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>2.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodoxy (dummy variable average)</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>1.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homosexuality (attitudes toward average)</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>2.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abortion (attitudes toward average)</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>2.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table A 2- United States By Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>1981</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1995</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mainline Protestants (percentage of)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholics (percentage of)</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nones (percentage of)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>Religiosity (dummy variable average)</td>
<td>1.58</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1.15</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>1.15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Homosexuality (attitudes toward average)</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td>1.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abortion (attitudes toward average)</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>1.70</td>
</tr>
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</table>

All statistics in this appendix are significant to .001 or better. Although Americans are getting more religious, their attitudes toward homosexuality and abortion are becoming more liberal. The same is true in Norway. The difference is that Americans became as liberal toward gays in 1995 as Norwegians were in 1981.
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31. www.kirken.no/engelsk, the official web site of the Norwegian state church.


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