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The growth of regionalism in Sub-Saharan Africa

Deogratius Stephen Mshigeni

University of Nevada, Las Vegas

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THE GROWTH OF REGIONALISM IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

by

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Bachelor of Arts
University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
1998

Master of Arts
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
2002

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MASTER OF ARTS

Examination Committee Chair

Dean of the Graduate College

Examination Committee Member

Examination Committee Member

Graduate College Faculty Representative
ABSTRACT

The Growth of Regionalism in Sub-Saharan Africa

by

Deogratius Stephen Mshigeni

Dr. Mehran Tamadonfar, Examination Committee Chair
Professor of Political Science
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

The emerging world is very different from the world of the mid-twentieth century. The East-West conflict and North-South dualism no longer provide an adequate framework for understanding global political trends. The fall of communism has forced countries to reposition themselves in light of increasing transnational interdependence, both in terms of benefiting from the opportunities offered and of containing the risks involved. Hence, Sub-Saharan African countries have been moving in the same direction for a number of years now.

In this thesis I will explain how Sub-Saharan Africa has struggled through globalization and interdependence. I will discuss the major theories, which have evolved in the integration literature since the 1960's after the independence of these former colonies. In addition, I will show how scholars in the field of international relations and cooperation have attempted to define and redefine "Integration" and resolved conceptual confusion facing students and scholars in this field. Furthermore, I will show why the applicability of "traditional" integration theories, which have worked well in such regions as Europe, and applied in Sub-Saharan Africa, failed to produce the same satisfactory results. Also, I will
discuss the ideas of some integration theorists from Sub-Saharan Africa, who came with their own frameworks for the integration to work in the region. I will explain the applicability of other frameworks such as dependency theories and developmentalism, which have been used to explain Third world conditions, Sub-Saharan Africa in particular. Further, I will explain why integration among developing countries depends on the effects of successful creation of regional markets (whether they are bilateral or multilateral) and the prospective gains from trade liberalization. However, while these goals are important, the structural features of typical developing countries, such as immobilized resources, capital formation for domestic investment and poor infrastructures and communications often present enormous obstacles toward their realization, and Sub-Saharan Africa is no exception.

I will look at various Integration schemes in the region and show how far they have succeeded in building an environment to enhance cooperation within the sub-regions. In conclusion, I will make a general evaluation of these schemes and various aspects of regional cooperation such as trade creation and trade divergence, if they help to increase or decrease cooperation. Also, I will evaluate issues such as successful creation of free trade areas, usage of single tariff rate, continental parliament and creation of continental court of justice can help in establishing a successful African unity (The United States of Africa), while the continental leadership remains the same. Further, I will look at Neo-functionalist theory vis a vis integral federalism, as an alternative path for African union, than the traditional integration theories.
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AEC</td>
<td>African Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANRPC</td>
<td>Association of Natural Rubber Producing Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEAO</td>
<td>Communauté économique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(West African Economic Community)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEMAC</td>
<td>Communauté économique et monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEPGL</td>
<td>Communauté économique des pays des Grands Lacs</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFA</td>
<td>Communauté Financière Africaine</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFC</td>
<td>Common Fund for Commodities</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMA</td>
<td>Common Monetary Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>ECOWAS Monitoring Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDFI</td>
<td>Gross domestic fixed investment</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross national product</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGADD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>ITO</td>
<td>International Trade Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDC</td>
<td>Less developed country</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRU</td>
<td>Mano River Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>NTB</td>
<td>Non Tariff Barrier</td>
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<tr>
<td>NTM</td>
<td>Non Tariff Measure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTA</td>
<td>Preferential Trade Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACU</td>
<td>Southern African Customs Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADCC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Coordination Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSA</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDEAC</td>
<td>Union douanière et économique de l'Afrique Centrale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Central African Customs and Economic Union)</td>
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ASANTE SANA, MUNGU AWABARIKI WOTE (Thank you so much, may the good Lord bless you all)

Deo S. Mshigeni,
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Fall, 2002
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Regionalism is said to bring about economic development, however this is not true for the African continent, especially sub-Saharan Africa which is the most marginalized and in that, it could be said to have devised the concept of the ‘failed state’. In the era of regionalization, Sub-Saharan Africa has lost its share of world trade, with this counting for less than 2 per cent by 1997. Africa has been dependent on the importation of primary products, therefore always vulnerable to price fluctuations and declining revenues. Furthermore, in the midst of globalization in 1990 and 1993, Africa’s real commodity prices fell by more than a half in the world market and thus hurting the continent more. Within the whole regionalism advocacy the continent is still lagging behind and is home of the most underdeveloped, poorest nations in the world. Hence, regionalism is seen as a stepping-stone towards economic and political development.

This thesis will explore some important features and efforts towards regionalism seen in sub-Saharan Africa. Although sub-Saharan Africa shows some signs of regional integration, it still exceedingly emulates the European Union functionalism and a neo-functionalist theory towards integration, which does not fit Africa as well as it, does in Europe.
Conceptual Definition

One of the prominent features of the contemporary international system is the heightened tendency of some states to come together towards some degree of regional arrangements or cooperation. This can either be economic or political integration; the process toward integration was of relatively little importance before 1945, but it gained popularity after World War II. Although there were unsuccessful attempts in the inter-war period to establish some kind of custom union in Europe, the issue of integration did not come to the forefront until after WWII, when it became very clear that the relatively small states created in Western Europe during the past centuries no longer corresponded with the size requirements of a modern industrial economy. In addition, states cannot survive in isolation in today's contemporary world. States depend on each other for a continuous coordination of the economy, the need for production and consumption naturally leads to the necessity of access to markets outside their particular boundaries, which in turn motivates various countries to interact. Therefore, interdependence can be defined simply as an environment where states mutually cooperate with each other.

Many scholars have attempted to define "Integration". However, the main problem, facing students and scholars of political science and international relations, is conceptual confusion. There is no consensus among scholars about the meanings of various "terms" and their usage in political science in general. Furthermore, the common usage of the term "Integration" is often confusing, and different integration theorists have referred to the term differently, though they almost arrived at the same conclusions. Even the dictionary definition of integration: "Forming parts into whole..." leaves a wide range of ambiguity. There is still no single definition of integration that has gained widespread acceptance among

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regional integration scholars. The integration concept, therefore, has provoked considerable discussion and debate in economic and political literature. However, in a simple form, integration refers to the process by which supranational institutions come to replace national ones, the gradual shifting upward of sovereignty from the state to regional or global structures. The ultimate expression of integration would be the merger of several (or many) countries into a single country or ultimately a single government. Such a shift of sovereignty to the supranational level would likely entail some version of federalism, in which states (or other political units) would recognize the sovereignty of a central government while retaining certain powers for themselves. Nevertheless, over a period of time integration came to be used more specifically as a term denoting a state of affairs or a process involving the combination of separate economies into larger economic regions.

When integration is defined as a process it includes all measures that aim at abolishing differences between economic units from different countries. It can also be considered as a state of affairs characterized by the absence of various forms of distinctions or differences between countries. This definition seems to be very closely related to what John Pinder referred to as a European Economic Community (EEC), a twin process involving both negative and positive aspects of integration. The negative integration is that aspect of economic integration that includes the elimination of distinctions against participating members. Positive integration symbolizes the formation and application of coordinated and common

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Also, see. Viotti, P.R and Kauppi, M.V, "International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism" 1987, pg. 364
policies in order to fulfill economic and welfare objectives other than the mere removal of discrimination.4

Furthermore, the literature has been full of two competing terms, "Regional integration" and "Regional cooperation", which have been used interchangeably. It may be useful to differentiate between the two. While, as noted above, the term regional integration has acquired several quite technical definitions, regional cooperation is a vague concept, applicable to any interstate activity with less than universal participation designed to meet some commonly experienced needs. However, various scholars have worked hard to differentiate between the two competing terms. A scholar such as Ernst Haas, who was a central figure in neo-functionalism, has attempted to limit the semantic confusion arising from the terms "Integration" and "Cooperation". Basing his early work on an analysis of Europe, Haas has argued that the study of regional integration is not the same as the study of regional cooperation.5 According to Haas, regional integration is concerned with explanations of "how and why states cease to be wholly sovereign, how and why they voluntarily mingle, merge and mix with their neighbors so as to lose the factual attributes of sovereignty while acquiring new techniques for resolving conflict between themselves. "Regional cooperation," on the other hand, is concerned with the process of "getting there". In other words, it means regional cooperation may help or lead to steps towards regional integration. Therefore, in this respect, the term integration may be treated as a terminal or resulting condition, the End State, or outcome or consequence of regional cooperation activities. Hence, the study of regional cooperation may be considered as a part of the study of regional integration or as a separate interest. However, the main point to emphasize here

4 For a detailed discussion on this see Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff. Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey 4th ed. 1997, pg. 422
5 ibid. Pg.423

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is that, states will eventually come to share individual authority with a collective mechanism or entity. For example, today one hears calls for a “United States of Europe” or “United States of Africa” or even of the World, but in practice the process of integration has never gone beyond a partial and uneasy sharing of power between the state and supranational levels. States have been unwilling to give up their exclusive claim to sovereignty and have severely limited the power and authority of supranational institutions. Therefore, States tend to share and delegate few powers to the supranational institutions which have been formed. Although many scholars have treated regional integration as a “process” or as a “condition” for the purpose of this discourse, I have regarded regional integration both ways as a “process” and also as a “condition”. In other words, all the actors (nation-states or international organizations) who joined forces with the intention to pursue the same goal in various fields whether economically or politically may lead to a partial or complete integration of the region. Most of the scholars and theorists on integration have treated the field as a multidimensional phenomenon that encompasses the political, societal, cultural and economic spheres, leading to a sense of common identity and integrated community, which is a right way to put it for the sake of this thesis.

Finally, as a theory of cooperation, “integration” seems to lack both a commonly accepted basic definition and a series of agreed indicators as a basis for measurement. Integration theorists have disagreed on a number of important aspects such as supranational elites, international structures, intergovernmental actions and domestic political factors, which happens to be important aspects to the process of integration. James Dougherty agrees that in the absence of a basic definition and conceptual consensus, it is hardly surprising to find discord about the indicators that could measure integration. Dougherty

\[\text{ibid. pg. 422}\]
and Pfaltzgraff Jr. in *Contending Theories of International Relations* (1997) gave an example from the European Union. They asked such questions as; is the European Union within the integration processes leading to community? At what point, and in what sequence, do the various phenomena associated with integration assert themselves to produce acceleration, or slowing of the integrative momentum? How important is the supranational institutionalism, contrasted with intergovernmental institutionalism in the promotion of integration? These questions are very important in the study of contemporary regional integration and will be answered in this thesis. Therefore, the lack of a commonly accepted definition and a series of indicators as a basis for a measurement in integration theories has led scholars to reach different conclusions about the status of, and prospects for, integration in different areas of their studies.

Integration Theories

There have been a number of theoretical explanations regarding regional integration. Various scholars have tried to give analytical explanations about the tendency of nations or other international actors to merge. The integration theories formulated during the 1950's and 1960's did not provide complete answers to the theorists' main questions: within what environment, under what conditions, and by what processes does a new transnational political unit peacefully emerge from two or more initially separate and different ones? I think the theories had to be incomplete because the cases available at that time; the Western European Common Market, Latin American and African customs unions and various other regional ventures were, in their infancy. Therefore, little could be learned about the processes leading to an end state because no end states had been attained.
It was supposed that integration would ultimately produce something like a nation-state or multinational federation, but empirically there was no way to tell. History could be checked for more cases, and it was to a certain extent, but this left other unanswerable questions about the comparability of conditions across eras. Scholars such as Hans Morgenthau (realism/realpolitik), David Mitrany (functionalism) and Ernst Haas and Karl Deutsch (Neo-functionalism) established most of the major intellectual theoretical work on international relations and integration.

Realism/Realpolitik

As a distinct approach to international relations Modern Realism grew out of a reaction to idealism in the interwar period. It has contributed extensively to the answers of why nations have a tendency to merge or cooperate in various spheres. Its roots however go back to Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes and Rousseau. However, the father of the realist school and one of the most influential analysts in international relations, Hans Morgenthau, best explained the Realist tradition. Morgenthau's *Politics among Nations* (1978) was an immensely important study that influenced successive generations of scholars and analysts. The realpolitik by Morgenthau is founded on the assumption that individuals are a bunch of selfish, power minded sinners. Therefore, the solution is to build a strong, powerful state, which you create a condition of stability, where you will not be attacked. Many times his ideas on how to conduct foreign policy have had an impact on decision-makers. Morgenthau's proposition in international politics was that politics is a struggle for power;

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3See a detailed analysis of this in Donald J. Puchala, "The Integration Theorists and the study of International relations," in the Classic readings of International relations 1994, pg. 261
For further discussion see also, Viotti and Kauppi, "International relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism" 1987, pg. 32-43.
hence, states define their national interest in terms of power.\textsuperscript{9} Morgenthau's book, \textit{Politics among Nations} (1978) suffered criticisms. The critics argue that Morgenthau relied too heavily for his starting argument on a concept of human nature that was very elusive. His core concepts such as power and interest are vague and ill defined, and that it was not clear whether he had developed a prescriptive or a descriptive theory.\textsuperscript{10} Although many subsequent analysts, such as Robert Keohane and Kenneth Waltz, rejected many parts of Morgenthau's analysis, his idea of international politics being a struggle for power later became a basis for much theorizing.\textsuperscript{11} Robert Keohane, one of the first analysts to write about the growing trend toward interdependence and cooperation among states and criticize Hans Morgenthau, has pointed out that even many of those who followed in the tradition of power politics did not share all of Morgenthau's assumptions. Perhaps the most important difference was that subsequent theorists focused less on the anarchical nature of the international system as one of the basic determinants of international political behavior. Another important Realist theorist is Kenneth Waltz (a neo-realist), who placed unprecedented emphasis on the structure of the system, a term he used to explain both anarchy (in the sense that central overriding authority was absent) and the distribution of power or capabilities within the system. The crucial difference between Waltz and Morgenthau here is that, the latter sees states as lustng for power, while the former sees states as searching for security. States, in Morgenthau's world, are driven by ambition, while those in Waltz's environment are motivated by fear about the possible ambitions of others.\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{9} Viotti and Kauppi, "International relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism" 1987, pg. 60-66
\textsuperscript{10} Keohane, R., ed. "Neo realism and its critics" 1986, pg. 20-40
\textsuperscript{11} ibid. pg.20-40 also see Waltz, K.N., ed. "Theory of International Politics" 1979.
\textsuperscript{12} Editors-William, P., Goldstein, D.M and Shafritz, J.M., "Classic Readings of International Relations" 1994, pg. 11
Therefore, Waltz sees force and threat as the only things, which drive nations to seek cooperation or merge with others for the sake of security.

Functionalism

Writers on integration have several features in common. Most of them are concerned with the process by which loyalty or attention is shifted from one center to another. They share an interest in patterns of communications and transactions within units to be integrated. In general, integration theorists hold that persons adopt integrative behavior because of expectations of joint rewards for doing so or penalties for failing to do so. Functionalism can be defined as a theory about the growth of specialized technical organizations that cross national boarders. According to Functionalists, technological and economic development lead to more supranational structures as states seek practical means to fulfill necessary functions such as delivering mail, phone calls from one country to another or coordinating the use of rivers that cross borders. Some international relations scholars tried to measure the extent of functional connections in Europe, for instance, by counting the flow of mail and other communications among various countries. As these connections became denser and flowed faster, functionalism predicted that states would be drawn together into stronger international economic superstructures. In this respect, functionalism provides the essential basis for an understanding of much of the twentieth-century integration and cooperation theory. The work of scholars such as David Mitrany in this field has greatly influenced subsequent efforts to develop integration theory.  

In his main theoretical contribution, A Working Peace System published in 1943, Mitrany's main assumption was that the world of the twentieth-century was characterized by

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growing numbers of technical issues, which could be resolved only by cooperation across boundaries. Whether within or among states, cooperation could be well addressed by highly specialized trained personnel or technicians rather than politicians. The emergence of technical issues would lead first to the need for collaborative action, without political considerations. According to Mitrany, such pressing problems could be best addressed outside the politicized context of ideology or nationalism. The main suggestion, which Mitrany gave, was the creation of a thickening web of structures and procedures in the formation of institutions that would help emphasize cooperation in order to find solutions to a specific need or function. Furthermore, David Mitrany laid a foundation for what he came to call ramification theory. Successful cooperation in one functional setting would enhance the incentive for cooperation or collaboration in another field. In this sense, the process by which such cooperation came about as a result of calculated need in one functional task would in itself contribute to a change in a range of issues. Basically, ramification theory assumes that when two or more countries decide to integrate in technical areas, sooner or later they slowly find other common areas to integrate. A very good example here is the European Union, which started as the European Coal and Steel Community. This kind of a process will also reduce the prospects for, and eventually eliminate, conflicts by a transformation in behavioral patterns from conflictual to cooperative. Functional cooperation would prompt necessary international institutions in the form of organizations and regimes based on multilateralism according to the terminology many of Mitrany's intellectual successors.

\[14\] ibid.
\[15\] For a detailed discussion see, Mitrany, D., article "The Functionalist Alternative" in the "Classic readings of International Relations" 1994, pg. 257-59
\[16\] Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff Jr., "Contending Theories of International Relations" 4th ed. 1997, pg. 422
Neo-Functionalism

Neo-functionalism is a modification of the functionalist theory by international relations scholars to explain the development of more general, more political supranational bodies. Neo-functionalists argue that economic integration (functionalism) generates a political dynamic that drives integration further. Closer economic ties need more political coordination between the states to operate effectively and eventually lead to political integration as well as a process called 'spillover', whereby States find other spheres to cooperate after a successful cooperation in one sphere. Neo-functionalist writing includes works by Karl Deutsch, Ernst Haas, Philipe Schmitter, Leon Lindberg, Joseph Nye, Robert Keohane and Lawrence Scheineman, all of whom tried in one way or another to modify the work done by Mitrany on functionalism. The basic argument of all of the above theorists is that actors usually integrate because of the sense of commonality. The common values, norms, cultural background, economy and other environmental issues can lead to strong integration or cooperation between two or more countries. Among the neo-functionalist theorists who have done remarkable work in the analysis of the neo-functionalist theory to integration, selected works by Ernst Haas, Karl Deutsch and Joseph Nye have been chosen for the purpose of this discussion. These three scholars have been selected because of their contribution to contemporary regionalism literature.

As contemporaries, Ernst Haas, Karl Deutsch and Joseph Nye exchanged relatively few insights concerning international integration because their focus of analytical attention and conceptual vocabularies were very different. Karl Deutsch paid little attention to the role of international institutions during political unification, while Haas emphasized political unification and Joseph Nye the modification of neo-functionalism as a theory. Moreover,

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17 Puchala, D.J "The Integration Theorists and The Study of International Relations" article 37 in the book "Classic readings of International relations" 1994, pg. 265

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Deutsch's concepts and analytical vocabulary came largely from communication theory and his earlier work on nationalism. Haas and Nye drew some of their concepts from Mitrany's functionalism and created their own, using a kind of vocabulary tailored to their specific purposes. Deutsch and Haas differed rather fundamentally on a principal of causal relationship in the political unification process. As noted, Deutsch saw the mutual identification of peoples or "community" preceding and creating favorable conditions for institutional amalgamation. But Haas' work by contrast suggested that institutional amalgamation precedes and leads to community because effective institutionalization at the international level invites a refocusing of people's political attentions and a shifting of their loyalties. According to Haas, community among people follows sometime after political and cultural shift have occurred.

In his work, The Uniting of Europe (1958), Haas examined the European Coal and Steel Community after World War II. He argued that, the decision to proceed with integration, or to oppose it, depended on the expectations of gain or loss held by major groups within the unit to be 'integrated,' rather than relying upon a scheme of integration which brings some 'altruistic' motives as the conditions of conduct. In this way, it seems to be more reasonable to focus on the interests and values defended by major groups within the unit to be 'integrated' rather than such a complex and confusing notion, as "the desire for Franco-German peace" or the "will to a united Europe". In this case, Haas' assumption was that integration proceeds as a result of the work of relevant elites in the government and private sectors who support integration for essentially pragmatic reasons such as the expectation that the removal of trade barriers will increase markets and profits. Later on, he

18 ibid.
19 For in depth analysis see, Haas, E "The Challenge of Regionalism, In Contemporary Theory of International relations" 1960, pg. 223-240
introduced the concept of 'spillover', which closely followed Mitrany's "Ramification theory". In his studies of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), he found that there was a tendency for persons who experienced gains from supranational institutions in one sector to also favor integration in other sectors. Therefore, spillover is a process whereby nations upgrade their national interests in a larger integrative setting. Through spillover effects members approach integration with the experiences they had with former arrangements, present problems or future threats. For example, it can be economic threat, cultural threat or even security issues.

Karl Deutsch approached integration from a different perspective. Deutsch developed the theory of cybernetics, whereby integration is supposed to be distinguished from amalgamation. According to Deutsch, integration has to do with the formation of communities, and amalgamation deals with the establishment of organizations, associations, or political institutions. Communities are groups of people who have attributes with common goals, who display mutual responsiveness, confidence, and esteem and who consciously self identify. However, a minimum condition of community according Deutsch is a shared expectation among members that their conflicts will be peacefully resolved in a new security community. Nevertheless, Deutsch's assumption of international communities may be either amalgamated or pluralistic. If amalgamated, the community would look very much like a federation or nation-state, with institutions of central government regulating the internal and external relations of an integrated population. In his book, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience (1957), he noted that a fully amalgamated community would in fact be

\[\text{ibid.}\]

\[\text{Puchala, D.J "The Integration Theorists and the study of International relations" article 37 in the book "Classic readings of International Relations" 1997, pg. 261}\]
indistinguishable from a federation or nation-state. As an integration theory, in the sense the term is being used here, Deutsch's formulation is valuable in that it focuses on the international community formation during unification. Other theorists have largely ignored this dimension. Karl Deutsch's formulations allow for a number of possible end products, as noted, but to the extent that international political unification is under exploration, the assumed end product looks like a nation-state, and attaining this implies that both integration and amalgamation have occurred, most likely in sequence.

Finally, Joseph Nye a neo-functionalist closely followed the footsteps of other great functionalists including Haas and Mitrany. Nye developed his model based mainly on the aspects of 'process of mechanism' and what he called 'integrative potential'. He set forth a theoretical framework for analyzing the conditions for integration, drawn specifically from European examples as well as other non-western experiences that greatly changed the notions of politicization and spillover found in the writings of his predecessors.-looking According to Nye, the neo-functionalist literature has seven distinguishable “process mechanisms”. The seven "process mechanisms" concepts are very important in the integration literature even though they had some weakness from the previous theorists.

However, what he did was to redefine and reformulate neo-functionalist theory from the “process mechanism” concepts. The seven "process mechanism" are:

1. Functionalist linkage of task, or the concept of spillover
2. Rising transactions
3. Deliberate linkages and coalition formation
4. Elite socialization
5. Regional group formation
6. Ideological-Identitive appeal and
7. Involvement of external actors in the process.

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23 Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff Jr., "Contending Theories of International Relations" 4th ed. 1997 pg. 426-30
Central to his neo-functionalist model is what Nye termed 'integrative potential', that is the integrative conditions stimulated by the process mechanism. Here he presented four basic conditions that are said to influence both the nature of the original commitment and the subsequent evolution of an integrative scheme. Nye's four conditions are:

1. Symmetry or economic equality of units
2. Elite value complementarity
3. Existence of pluralism and
4. Capacity of member states to adopt and respond

According to Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff Jr., the neo-functionalist model, such as that developed by Nye, provides a framework for comparing integrative processes in more developed and less developed regions of the world and assessing the extent to which micro-regional or functionally specific economic organizations hold potential for further development toward federations.

Applicability of Integration Theories to Sub-Saharan Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa and the Third World in general, have the most cases of regional integration arrangements. Central to the literature on integration is the problem relating to the theoretical foundations on which the recent drive towards regional integration has been based. The problem facing scholars on integration is that research in the field is dominated by theory based on European experience. This makes its applicability to the Third World countries difficult, because of the difference in nature of social and economical conditions between Europe and the Third world.

In The Political Economy of Regionalism in Africa (1986), Asante stated the European Economic Community (EEC/EU) is a living laboratory for integration theories.
He was not surprised that the literature on integration and development pointed out that
developing nations do not satisfy the criteria of a neo-classical customs union theory nor will
they reap the traditional welfare gains from integration. He gave examples of economists
such as Jacob Viner and R.G. Lipsey who denied that integration schemes would benefit
developing countries. Their general argument has been based upon the concepts of trade
creation and trade diversion.24

By definition, trade creation means a shift in trade from high cost to low cost sources
of supply within the integration area, and trade diversion means a shift from low cost source
of supply outside the integration area to a high cost producer within it. In Asante's view, if
there is more trade diversion than trade creation within a customs union the net effect on the
world welfare and the welfare of the members will be negative. Since trade diversion (at least
in the short run) will obviously prevail over trade creation in the Third World customs union
as the members shift from low cost producers in the developed World to high cost
producers among themselves in the integration, it won't benefit the member states. Thus
Jacob Viner and R.G Lipsey concluded that there is no benefit from creation of customs
union among developing countries. In this regard Sub-Saharan Africa is not an exception.25
However, recently there have been a growing number of criticisms on the application of
Viner's criteria and Lipsey's general conclusions about the possible effects of customs union
among developing countries.26 Many scholars dealing with integration among developing
countries have rejected the neo-classical custom union theory and have argued that the
problems of integration among peripheral countries should be analyzed within the context of
development economies rather than as a branch of tariff theory. The Neo-classical customs

24 Asante, S.K.B "The Political Economy of Regionalism in Africa: A Decade of the Economic
Community Of West African States (ECOWAS)" 1986, pg. 10-15
25 ibid.
26 Melo, J.D and Panagariya, A., "New Dimensions in Regional Integration" 1993, pg. 234
union allows the establishment of a common tariff policy towards non-member countries, which is not very beneficial to the economies of Third World countries and it is difficult for these countries to reap the traditional welfare gains from integration.

The argument above is mainly based on the fact that conditions in the developing countries are strikingly different from those that exist in the developed world upon which the established theoretical framework for integration has been based. The critical factors on which Viner's criteria and Lipsey's conclusions were based are among the ones developing nations such as those in Sub-Saharan Africa are struggling to change through the application of integration. Recently, the Sub-Saharan African countries have been involved in an effort to alter the structures of their economies and integrate their foreign trade more closely than before. In other words, these countries aim at changing the structure of production and trade, and then at evolving new trade mechanisms based on regional specialization. The actual results will not be felt over a short period. This is because the creation of a custom union or a free trade area usually involves a relatively long period of time for results to appear. In as much, the initial influence, and perhaps the most important aspect, is the expectation of future market opportunities rather than existing trade patterns. Thus, attention is supposed to be focused on the long run effects integration is likely to have. Thus, many scholars who have written on the Sub-Saharan Africa integration experience have suggested that in evaluating the desirability of integration in the region, the emphasis should be placed on the dynamics rather than static effects. More specifically, we should be concerned with the creation of regional markets according to the developmental pace of member countries. Briefly then, integration in the case of developing countries should be treated as an approach to economic/political development rather than only a tariff issue. Accordingly, it combines various aspects that could improve the international trade position.
as well as raise the level of economic development of Sub-Saharan Africa.

Regional integration in most developing areas such as Sub-Saharan Africa is in many respects a very different phenomenon than in an economically advanced area such as Western Europe or North America. However, there are some features which are more or less the same and others that are totally different. First, for instance, one may point out important differences in infrastructure, market mechanisms and external dependence on administrative resources, political group structure and interdependence of social sectors, national consciousness and ideology. Amitai Etzioni, (a famous integration scholar), has argued that limited horizons, lack of administrative and political skills, and preoccupation with problems of domestic modernization all present a major barrier to successful integration efforts in the developing world, and in this case Sub-Saharan Africa in particular.27

Second, Western European countries could afford to treat integration as a 'matter of welfare politics' without foreclosing their 'high politics option' because each started from a relatively industrialized base. The base is quite different in developing Sub-Saharan Africa. As Joseph Nye has pointed out, integration involving developing countries seems to produce not 'gradual politicization' but 'over politicization', a premature politicization of integration may be because some economic issues greatly reduce the scope for bureaucratic initiatives and quietly arrange the packaged deals. Thus, conditions that may be deemed necessary for successful integration in the developed areas cannot reasonably be applied to the developing areas. The same criteria for judging the success or failure of an integrative process cannot be applied to efforts in both the developed and developing areas. Furthermore, to some extent the integrative process itself is different in developed and developing countries. More

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27 Etzioni, A., "Political Unification: A Comparative Studies" 1964, pg. 318-21
significantly, the objectives of integration in developing areas are different than those in developed areas. In developed countries the overall or general objective of integration is to maintain and enhance an already existing growth, whether it is economic or political. Hence the principal economic goal is to assist the development of already established industries and other institutions through trade expansion, increased competition, and creation of a peaceful political environment for further growth of the region involved.

In the case of Third World countries, Sub-Saharan Africa in particular, the goal of integration needs to be redefined. Here, the ultimate purpose of integration is to achieve an acceleration of economic growth within the partner countries. However, given the limited amount of scarce resources and technical know how within these countries, they search to benefit their economies by complementing one another within their arrangements. Not only do they try to accelerate the growth of their economies, but they also try to maintain the same rate of growth and lower the cost associated with the use of scarce resources. In other words, integration in the Third world countries is seen as a primary means of contributing to economic growth and development. Therefore, the results or impact of integration in developing areas should be evaluated in terms of its contribution to development and not necessarily to greater efficiency.

In conclusion, it is difficult for Sub-Saharan Africa to follow the same path toward integration as developed countries have taken. The theories are more entailed to suit-developed countries' environment than developing ones, as argued above. The main obstacles that can be pinpointed in Sub-Saharan Africa are underdevelopment and dependency problems, which make it harder for smooth integration arrangement to take place. Therefore, underdevelopment and dependence provide the most useful concepts for critical understanding of the problems of the region. It seeks to address the most pressing
problems of the less developed world in terms of relations between developing countries themselves and with developed areas. In brief, dependence is viewed as a peripheral formation of relation in the world system through which former colonies and other underdeveloped countries are exploited economically and their backwardness is maintained over time. It thus involves a situation where effective control over the economy of a country lies outside that country. Ownership and control of the productive elements of the 'national' economy are held by Transnational Corporations/ Multinational Corporations that do not act in the primary interests of the local country or region, the situation, which is presently facing Sub-Saharan Africa at the present time.

The process above has shaped the political economies of most peripheral countries; Sub-Saharan Africa had its share, in such a way as to subject the development of the region to the needs of developed countries at the center. The result of this kind of arrangement/dependency for any country or region is continued uneven development, stagnation, unemployment, income inequality, regional disequilibria and low integration among various economic sectors. The marginalization and exploitation is effected through an apparatus of domination that in dependent countries takes the form of an alliance between domestic and privileged groups and external interests and forces, all of which benefit the status quo. In this situation, therefore, the applicability of regional integration theories to the developing countries, Sub-Saharan Africa in particular, is not a wise option. The region needs to find a way to eliminate all traits of dependence and underdevelopment for the theories to work. Therefore, the best framework to look at Sub-Saharan Africa is through the dependency approach. It is through the dependency approach that we can understand both the elusiveness of development and the complexity of neo-colonial structures in Sub-Saharan Africa. The approach brings into focus the interrelationship of external and internal factors.
that facilitate and enrich the understanding of the extent to which the dynamics of the international politico-economic system affect the continued underdevelopment of Sub-Saharan Africa. Most of the regional integration arrangements in Sub-Saharan Africa have the goal of collective self-reliance and disengagement of their peripheral economies from the international system. The objective of dependency reduction would necessitate, first, the alteration of traditional trade and investment relationships with a view to making it possible for Sub-Saharan African countries to secure fuller control of their economic and political destinies. Second, there is a need for deliberate restructuring of the present mode of production and adoption of regional policies to regulate external linkages in the interest of domestic development and also as well as some political restructuring to pave the way for the above developments. Thus, an important aspect of restructuring involves an increase in both the frequency and magnitude of economic exchanges among Sub-Saharan African countries, including increased trade, improved communication links, tariff reductions, industrial planning, technological acquisition, expansion of educational and technical exchanges, and the exploitation of natural resources on a sub-regional basis. Lastly, the regional arrangements should try to eliminate the most common problems of integration in Third World countries such as inter-regional rivalries, which make cooperation difficult. Further, restructuring of import substitution policies so that it would not get in the way of regional market integration. Also a restructuring of diversification of economy so that there would be complementarity to exploit and not economies, which are too similar. In this way, integration arrangements in Sub-Saharan Africa will help to boost development of the region and disengage from the international system, which does not favor the region.
CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF INTEGRATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

In Sub-Saharan Africa, integration has been in the forefront of discussion since the massive movement toward independence in the late 1950's and early 1960's. There was immediate recognition that, while independence had been the primary goal, African countries were largely artificial by-products of colonial scramble and its subsequent division in 1884-85 at the Berlin Conference. Hence many African countries were too small to be economically viable and the transformation of political into economic independence necessarily required concerted action. 28

In the past three decades, all countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have adopted a great number of broadly defined regional integration (RI) schemes. According to some accounts, there are currently over thirty Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs) in West Africa alone. The aims of RI schemes in SSA have ranged from limited cooperation between neighboring states in specific areas to the creation of an African common market. However, within all of SSA, there are at present no more than seven or eight IGOs that specifically aim at full-fledged economic integration. 29 Against this background, it is not surprising that integration has been seen as a means of helping to overcome the disadvantages of small size, low per capita incomes, small populations, and narrow resource bases, and of making

28 Asante, S.K.B. 1986 “The political Economy of Regionalism in Africa; A decade of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)”, pg. 26
29 Foroutan, F. “Regional Integration in Sub-Saharan Africa: past experience and Future prospects” pg. 234
possible a greater rate of economic growth and development. It has also been seen as a means of consolidating the political independence of African countries and thereby strengthening their overall position vis-à-vis that of developed countries, especially the former metropolitan powers. In brief, integration, whether economic or political, and cooperation in general, is not only desirable but it is necessary if Africa is to industrialize, develop intra-African trade, reduce her dependency on vulnerable and fluctuating overseas markets, mobilize and maximize scarce resources of capital and skills, and finally forge the way to effective African unity, both political and economic. This has been eloquently underscored by the *Lagos plan of Action*, which recognized the importance of regional integration and cooperation as necessary instruments for pursuing the objectives of national and collective self-reliance. Hence the discussions of regionalism in virtually every chapter of the *Lagos plan of action*, including an integral condition of implementation of the plan.

The appeal of some form of regional integration in SSA is almost intuitive. SSA countries are very small in economic terms. In 1989, the Gross National Product (GNP) of all SSA countries put together was approximately equal to that of Belgium. They are also among the poorest in the World, with per capita GNP of $340 in 1989, and are very poorly endowed with human and physical capital. Common sense thus dictates that for countries with such characteristics it is economically justified to integrate their markets. Imagine subdividing Belgium into forty something independent countries, each with its own isolated goods and factor markets, a different public administration, currency, language, fiscal and

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30 The Assembly of Heads of States and Governments of OAU at its second extra-ordinary session held in Lagos, Nigeria on April 28 and 29, 1990, which was devoted to the economic situation in Africa, adopted a Plan of Action for the Implementation of the Monrovia Strategy for the Economic Development of Africa (the Lagos Plan of Action). The Lagos Plan of Action, among other things, called for measures to overcome the lack of information relating to the selection, acquisition and use of technology options by “supporting and strengthening African Regional Organizations in the field of Patent Information and Documentation.”

monetary authorities, army, plus a very inefficient inter-country transportation network. Economist would contend that the welfare of individuals would surely be reduced.

Before independence and the departure of colonial powers in Africa (Sub-Saharan Africa in particular), African leaders had realized the significance of integration and cooperation. The historic All-Africans conference held in Accra in December 1958 called for removal of customs and other restrictions on trade among African countries and the conclusion of multilateral payment agreements, with a view to enhancing the African common market. Since independence, African countries have attempted various forms of collective self-reliance through regional economic cooperation as a means of accelerating their socio-economic development. However, until 1977 there were over 20 intergovernmental multi-sectoral economic cooperation organizations in Sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, about one hundred single sector multinational organizations were meant to promote technical and economic cooperation in Africa. Many of these were established in the 1960’s. Nevertheless, the decade was also characterized by the decline of several regional groupings. For example, the East African Community (EAC) experienced such acute tension in the 1960’s that by the end of the decade the level of integration declined, and by June 1977 the whole structure of EAC had disintegrated. The same happened to the Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa (UDEAC), which was set up in January 1966. Restrictions on the opening of markets and noncompliance with its rules denied it of motivation to integrate the system. So far, concrete achievements in Sub-Saharan Africa in the field of Regional Integration and Cooperation have been very modest or nonexistent. The question, which arises here is, why so little progress and such faltering steps? The problems and constraints of African integration and cooperation are many, and seemingly

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12 Mutharika, B 1972 "Toward multinational Economic Cooperation in Africa", Pg.12
13 Adedeji, A 1977 "The need for Concrete Action, In Regional Cooperation in Africa", Pg. 10

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very difficult to cure or even alleviate. In brief, the problems arise from the appeal of national sovereignty and the difficulty in reaching acceptable formulas and procedures in which the costs and benefits of integration and cooperation should be shared. In addition, the failure of political initiatives and declared collective goodwill to be matched by practical action causes concern. There are also mutual suspicions and differences of political outlook arising from heterogeneous cultures and varied colonial heritage. Fear of being dominated by others and an insular view being imposed by ultra-nationalism are all delicate problems, which require tact and patience. Political and ideological cleavages also seem to threaten existing and otherwise viable integration and cooperation arrangements such as the defunct East African Community.\(^4\)

Due to these key obstacles and constraints, the creation of regional integration arrangement in Sub-Saharan Africa is often no more than a declaration of intent and an indication of continental alignment. Despite this disillusioning record, the fervor with which regional integration has been proposed as a response to the problems of Africa has increased tremendously in recent years. Since the early 1970's, the world recession and its severe impact on economies around the world, particularly Africa, strengthened interest in the establishment of new regional groups and the geographical extension of existing ones. This trend was reinforced at the November 1984 OAU summit where the African leaders reaffirmed in an important resolution their solemn commitment to put together their collective effort to implement the \textit{Lagos plan of action} through the process of regional integration and cooperation.\(^5\) Hence, the past several years have witnessed the re-emergence of a rash of regional integration schemes in Sub-Saharan Africa as more or less explicit

\(^4\) Ibid, pg.32
\(^5\) OAU doc., "Resolution on Inter-African Economic Cooperation and Integration", Addis Ababa, AHG/Res. 131(20), Nov. 1984

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challenges to the external domination of the continent inherited from the colonial era. Among the most dynamic and ambitious regional arrangements are the ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African states), SADC (Southern Africa Development Community; formerly known as SADCC - Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference), PTA (Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States), which later gave way to COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern African States) and finally, the Libreville treaty of October 1983 which established the Economic Community of the States of Central Africa (CEEAC), comprising the present members of UDEAC and those of the Economic Community of Great Lakes. This was intended to be the Central African equivalent of the ECOWAS.

The basic objective of these new regional integration schemes is the same: to reduce dependence of their respective member states on the external forces that seek to influence the economic policies and directions of African states; to help improve the bargaining position of African countries, thus contributing to their development potential through the broader strategy for promoting a NIEO (New International Economic Order); and to coordinate the development programs in the different sectors and sub-sectors as a means of accelerating the rate of economic growth.

The underlying premise is the desire by African states and leaders to determine as much as possible their own economic policies based on their national aspirations, natural resources, and political ideologies outside the influence of developed countries. Yet, in 35 years of existence, what have the new regional integration schemes achieved so far? Because of the recent emphasis on the concept of collective self-reliance among developing countries, it is too often assumed that any form of economic integration or cooperation will have a positive impact on development. Schemes such as ECOWAS, PTA, SADC, or
CEEAC will not automatically lead to accelerated development. As Shaw and Grieve have warned, regional integration is not always an escape from Africa's inheritance of subordination, and it may not advance disintegration from the global economy. Indeed, without a well-considered and intensive effort in restructuring the economy and without adequate planning, regional schemes may lead to regional inequalities and continued dependence.

Viewed from this radical approach, with its focus on dependence and underdevelopment from a global perspective, just how far have the new regional initiatives attempted to fundamentally restructure both national and regional political economies as the prerequisite for integration and development? Or to what extent have they, for example, initiated efforts toward intra-regional trade or horizontal exchange in order to overcome an inheritance of vertical integration with former metropolises, leading toward greater self-reliance at both national and collective levels? How far have they effectively challenged the established pattern of trade and division of labor? Given such complex problems, although regional economic integration is certainly important as a means of loosening the developmental constraints confronting Sub-Saharan African states, it is unlikely to be an easy process. Then why, despite the strong appeal of common sense of this argument, has RI in SSA so far failed? Does this failure imply that RI as a model of development is harmful or, at best, ineffective for SSA and should be abandoned altogether, even as regionalism in the World appears to be gaining ground against multi-literalism? It is against this background that I attempt to examine the initiatives, experience, progress and prospects of regional integration schemes in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The objective of this thesis is to accurately address these issues. To do so, five types of integration are defined: goods market or trade integration; labor market integration; monetary integration; and integration of government activity and regulation, alternatively known as cooperation. With the first three types of integration, barriers to the free movement of goods, services and factors of production (labor and capital) are removed vis-à-vis partners so that the regional market is effectively unified. Monetary integration, at least in the context of SSA, has implied the adoption of a common central monetary authority and the surrender of national autonomy in the field of monetary and exchange policy. Regulation and government activity integration implies adoption of similar tax and investment codes, harmonization of administrative and bureaucratic rules, creation of joint administration such as a common customs administration, creation of a common infrastructure and the provision of common services, such as a common civil aviation, multinational universities and research centers and so forth.

In the specific context of SSA, this classification of integration is preferable to the classical taxonomy of regional arrangements (free trade area, customs unions, common markets, monetary union and political unification) because it allows each of these possible cases of integration to occur in conjunction with, or separately from, the others. For example, in SSA, monetary union in the CFA Franc zone exists without an effective integration of goods and factors markets. In the classical taxonomy, monetary integration would naturally come as the last step towards the creation of a full-fledged economic union.

One of the greatest weaknesses of integration schemes in SSA is that most of them have focused mainly on trade integration. The other forms of integration are seen as a distant goal in SSA. However, structural characteristics of SSA economies, the pursuit of

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Foroutan, F "Regional integration in Sub-Saharan Africa: Past experience and future prospects", in De Melo and Panagariya "New Dimensions In Regional Integration", pg.239

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import-substitution policies, and the very uneven distribution of costs and benefits of integration arising from economic differences among the partner countries, have so far prevented any meaningful trade integration in SSA. Moreover, as the experience of the former Eastern European bloc suggests, there is no theoretical or empirical reason to believe that an import-substituting trade integration strategy, even when successfully implemented, would have improved welfare.\textsuperscript{38} Other forms of integration, especially government activity and regulation integration, as well as trade integration when pursued as a complement rather than as substitute for global trade liberalization, may nevertheless help SSA economies to overcome the current economic difficulties by providing an enabling environment to those SSA producers that begin competing in the world markets. However, the extent of structural characteristics of SSA countries and their economic differences can only change gradually; complete trade and labor market integration remain at this point a medium to long term objectives.

Regional Integration Schemes in SSA

There are few (not more than eight) groupings in SSA that aim at fully-fledged integration. Some of these groupings date back to the colonial era. However, most integration schemes were adopted after independence during the period that runs from the late 1960's to the early 1980's. On many occasions the groupings comprised countries, which had shared colonial ties to the same foreign power because the colonial ties had created a host of common institutions, a common official language, and a common currency. In other instances, the regional groupings, notably the larger ones, were more in line with the geographical proximity of the member countries. A brief overview of the major groupings in

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid, pg.239
West, Central, East and Southern Africa will demonstrate what I have tried to explain above. The intent is to highlight the historic circumstances that gave rise to the various groupings, the economic characteristics of the participating countries, and the objectives and achievements of the various groupings.

West Africa

There are three important regional integration schemes in West Africa. The Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS), the Communauté Économique de l' Afrique de l'Ouest (CEAO) and the Mano-River Union (MRU). A fourth regional integration scheme, the Sene-Gambian Federation, between the republics of Senegal and the Gambia, ended in acrimony in 1989.

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

The Economic Community of West African States was established on the 28th of May 1975, in Lagos, Nigeria. The idea of a community embracing all Western Africa dates back to the mid-1960. Particularly Nigeria, out of conviction that a broader community would help her reduce dependence on oil and increase her influence in a French dominated region promoted the idea. Anticipating the prospect of expanded markets and the opportunity to compete on more favorable terms with multinational corporations, West African private business enterprises, especially the Nigerian ones, also provided strong support to the creation of ECOWAS39. The main objective was of ECOWAS to promote cooperation and integration, leading to the establishment of an economic union in West Africa in order to raise the living standards of its people, and to maintain and enhance

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39 Okolo, J.E and Wright, S (eds) 1990 "West African regional cooperation and Development", pg.14
economic stability, foster relations among member states and contribute to the progress and development of the African continent at large.

ECOWAS is composed of sixteen West African countries. These states have an estimated total GNP of $68 billion and a population of 198 million according to 1996 records. A wealth of mineral resources and a vast variety of agricultural products, allows ECOWAS to be among the largest and the most diversified economic community in SSA. Nevertheless, it is still poor and economically underdeveloped. The average GNP per capita in 1989 was only $326 and economic activity concentrated heavily on extractive industry and agriculture for exports. For example, fourteen out of the sixteen members of ECOWAS receive over 60% of their revenues from one or two commodities. Despite these common characteristics, the ECOWAS members are more different than similar. The most striking example is Nigeria whose population and GNP are roughly equal to that of the other fifteen members put together.

The economic differences among ECOWAS members are exacerbated by cultural, historical and political disparities. Historic ties to different colonial powers have given rise to three official languages, English, French and Portuguese, different currencies, fiscal codes and public administration structures and practices. Additionally, the relations between the countries are marked by long standing territorial disputes and political rivalries. Added to this is the extreme political instability in most of the member countries, which has caused frequent and violent changes in political leadership. The ECOWAS treaty of 1975 envisaged the creation of a common market among member states with a phased reduction of tariffs and non-tariff barriers on products of community origin until their complete

40 For instance, of the seventy-two successful coups d'etat in Africa during 1958-89, the majority took place in five of the sixteen ECOWAS states. For a detailed discussion on this, see. Welsh, C.E 1990 "The Military factor in West Africa: Leadership and Regional Development", in Okolo and Wright (eds) 1990.
elimination for all categories of goods and all countries by 1989; the establishment of
Common external tariff by 1994; fiscal and monetary harmonization; and close cooperation
in all areas of economic activity. Moreover, at the Dakar meeting in 1979, ECOWAS
members agreed to allow a "free movement of persons" and to establish a common defense
pact. Finally, the Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development (FCCD) was
supposed to alleviate the negative impact of integration and tariff preferences on the least
developed members.

However, today, twenty-five years since the establishment of ECOWAS the above
goals have yet to be met. Trade liberalization and the establishment of a common external
tariff are yet to be implemented; expulsion of foreign workers from Nigeria in 1983 and
1985 proved the political impossibility of removing restrictions on labor movements; and the
contributions to and outlays from the FCCD are subject to eternal controversy. The poverty
of ECOWAS members, the homogenous structure of their economies, the economic,
cultural, political and ideological differences among them as well as political instability of
many member states explain why the ECOWAS treaty has remained a dead letter.

Mano River Union (MRU)

Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone are linked in this all-but-defunct body called the
Mano River Union, which was set up for promotion of cooperation and integration in 1973.
The union's main objectives included the expansion of trade among member countries
through the elimination of existing barriers; the creation of a common protection policy vis-
à-vis the rest of the world; and the promotion of economic cooperation. Although in theory
intra-MRU trade is tariff free and a common external tariff was established, trade among
member states remains restricted by pervasive non-tariff and tariff equivalent barriers.
Moreover, despite the lack of marked differences among the members that is often a distinguishing feature of the larger organizations in the sub-region, progress towards integration and intra-regional trade is slowed by political unrest in Liberia and Sierra Leone and the lack of complimentarity among the partners’ production structures. After nearly a decade of "death" the Mano River Union started some initiatives for the revival of the scheme in April 2001. Hoping after the successful peace negotiation in Sierra Leone, the Union will lay some grounds for further development of the scheme.

Communauté économique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEAO)

CEAO represents the third attempt by the West African states that belonged to the former federation of French Western Africa to maintain arrangements for monetary and economic cooperation, which were established during the colonial era. Despite past failures in creating a custom union, the member states preserved their monetary union by adhering to the CFA Franc zone. The desire of France to preserve its influence in the sub-region and to counter the growing power of Nigeria played a crucial role in maintenance of monetary and economic ties. CEAO was established in 1973 by a treaty signed in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, and comprises seven member countries of Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Benin, which became member in 1984. All the member countries with the exception of Mauritania also belong to the West African monetary union (UMOA) and to ECOWAS.

The CEAO countries are characterized by varying degrees of economic development, with Ivory Coast and Senegal representing the relatively industrialized poles of

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41 For a detailed account of obstacles to economic integration in MRU see, Sesay, A 1990 "Obstacles to Intra-union Trade in the Mano River Union" chapter 4 in Okolo and Wright (eds) 1990.
the group. Because the economic imbalances among the CEAO members had been the major cause of the dissolution of earlier initiatives, the treaty of Abidjan embodied specific measures to attenuate such imbalances by directly assisting the economic development of the poorest countries within the group. The Community Development Fund was created to compensate member countries for the loss of tariff revenues arising from tariff preferences to partners, while the Solidarity fund largely financed by Ivory Coast and Senegal is to finance development projects in the most depressed regions. Moreover, the structure of tariff preferences to partners is tailored to accommodate the request for higher protection by the least developed member states. These measures do have some positive effects in promoting intra-trade and factor mobility, both of which are high by SSA standards. Nevertheless, they also contribute to the creation of an extraordinarily distorted structure of incentives. Moreover, intra-CEAO trade in goods and services is far from being free of restrictions and a common external protection policy is yet to be formulated.*^  

Central Africa  

The Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa (UDEAC), perpetuates the long-standing tradition of cooperation among the former French Central African countries. UDEAC was formally established in 1973 with the treaty of Brazzaville and the scheme comprised six member states of Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea, a former Spanish colony that acceded to the union in 1985. The original treaty of Brazzaville envisages a customs and monetary union with the complete removal of internal tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers and the establishment of common external tariffs and a common customs administration for trade

with the rest of the World. However, the treaty was extensively revised in 1974. This caused the de facto abolition of the common external tariff and the common customs union administration. While intra-union trade in manufactured goods was restricted to those produced by firms enjoying the privilege of Taxe Unique (TU) system. The direct result of TU system has been a structure of tariff preferences that varies with firm, product, country of origin and country of destination. As in CEEAO, this structure of tariff preferences has proven to be both highly distortionary and a major obstacle towards any meaningful integration of member countries' goods markets. In terms of per capita income, UDEAC is the second richest grouping in SSA. However, considerable differences exist among member countries. Cameroon is a semi-industrialized country where manufacturing contributes 14% of GDP, Congo-Brazzaville and Gabon heavily relies on petroleum extraction. By SSA standards, all the three countries have reasonable levels of per capita incomes. On the other hand, Central African Republic, Chad and Equatorial Guinea rely heavily on agriculture and are among the poorest nations in the group.

East and Southern Africa

There are four important regional groupings in East and Southern Africa, The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), The Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and The East African Cooperation (EAC), which revived after its collapse in 1977.

Southern African Development Community (SADC)

Originally known as the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), the organization was formed in Lusaka, Zambia, on April 1st, 1980, following the
adoption of the Lusaka Declaration by nine Southern African countries, it works towards economic liberation within the region. The Declaration and treaty establishing the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which has replaced the Coordination Conference, was signed on August 17, 1992 in Windhoek, Namibia. Member states are Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Each member state has a responsibility to coordinate a sector or sectors on behalf of the others.

However, before its transformation to SADC, SADC had one principal objective, which was to promote cooperation among its member states in order to lessen their economic dependence on the former South African government. Thus, from the beginning, the architects of SADC decided to reject the idea of a custom union and concentrate their efforts on the more modest goal of economic cooperation, which changed after the admission of a "non-racial" Republic of South Africa. Similarly, they avoided the establishment of a highly centralized and expensive bureaucracy by creating a small secretariat with limited coordination duties while leaving the responsibility for various sectors to the member-states.**

The entry of a democratic, non-racial South Africa into SADC gave a major boost to efforts already underway to promote regional integration and cooperation in Southern Africa. It greatly enlarged the overall size of the regional market and created new opportunities for cooperation in many ways. However, South Africa's admission into SADC by itself did not, automatically resolve the problems created by the acute imbalances, inequities and patterns of domination and dependency that characterized existing regional

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44 SADC handbook 1998, published by SADC secretariat
45 Ibid.
relations in Southern Africa. Since its inception, SADC saw these as barriers to balanced growth and development in the sub-continent. The current dominance of South African economy over the rest of the regional economy is both undesirable and unacceptable even with the new South Africa as a member of the organization. It was precisely to redress this economic imbalance, among other reasons, that SADC was established.

SADC conceives that a negotiation process aimed at reconstructing regional relations along new lines should involve full and frank exchanges both about existing interactions and possible new relations in various sectors. Moreover, the scheme has put out some important principles as guidelines for the group. For instance, the principle of mutual benefit, which means that all partners, including stronger ones, should legitimately expect to benefit materially from the new arrangement that emerged in the region. The principle of equity implies a willingness to recognize a number of existing relations and the need to act together to place these relations on a new footing. The principle of interdependence means recognition by all member states that the fate of the entire region is interlinked and that growth and development throughout the region is the interest of all. Despite its limitations, SADC has been considered by many inside and outside the region as a successful example of regional integration to emulate elsewhere in SSA.

Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)

The history of COMESA began in December 1994, when it was formed to replace the former Preferential Trade Area (PTA), which had existed from earlier days of 1981. Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) was established as an organization of free independent sovereign states which agreed to cooperate in developing their natural and human resources for the good of all their people and as such it has a wide
ranging series of objectives, which necessarily include in its priorities the promotion of peace and security in the region. However, due to COMESA's economic history and background its main focus has been on the formation of a large economic and trading unit that is capable of overcoming some of the major economic barriers facing individual member states. The formation of PTA and later COMESA was one of the main initiatives by the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). ECA has been actively promoting regionalism in Africa as the only viable strategy for the continent's development. According to ECA, regional groupings in Africa should comprise a large number of countries in order to provide sufficiently large markets for the creation of industries that would gradually substitute imports and promote Africa's self sufficiency. According to this view, no more than four such regional groupings should exist in Africa: North, west, Central, East and South. Thus COMESA, like its counterpart in western Africa, ECOWAS, received the active support of the ECA.

The COMESA treaty explicitly recognizes the establishment of an economic community as its ultimate goal. The creation of a preferential trade area is to be considered as only a first step towards that goal. Initially, common lists of 212 categories of goods were selected for preferential treatment within the sub-region. The original intention is to gradually expand the list to comprise all goods of COMESA origin. Yet since PTA the arrangement has experienced some problems. Members fail to negotiate on what goods to include in the list, how to define the rules of origin, and how to create compensatory mechanisms for those members that would suffer revenue losses. As a result, they failed to reach a target deadline for effective liberalization of trade, and shifted from 1992 to at least

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47 Ibid.

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the end of 2000, however, even this appeared to be real optimistic. The lack of quicker progress with intra-group trade liberalization in COMESA is due to the same factors that have been slowing down ECOWAS. Although in economic terms COMESA is the second largest grouping in SSA, all of its members are highly dependent on one or two commodities for their export revenues. The ensuing lack of complementarities and uneven distribution of benefits have so far stalled all efforts towards any meaningful and effective integration.

Southern Africa Custom Union (SACU)

Southern Africa Custom Union is the oldest and most functional custom union arrangement in SSA. Southern Africa Custom Union comprises South Africa and the BLS states of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. After its independence in 1990, Namibia also joined the union. The union was created in 1910, soon after the Republic of South Africa was formally created as an independent state, and the new union itself replaced an older one, which has been in existence since 1889. The main feature of SACU is the overwhelming dominance of South Africa over the other four members. Three countries (Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) are exceedingly small and economically poor while Namibia is still a young nation with economy depending on minerals for export revenues. Goods and factors markets are well integrated within SACU, and there is a common external tariff (CET) and a common excise tax, of which the proceeds are paid into a Consolidated Revenue Fund. The union members share revenues in proportion to their percentage of total trade. Under the 1969 revenue-sharing formulas as compensation for leaving trade, industry and fiscal decisions entirely to South Africa, the BLS states receive from the Fund more than their

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49 Ibid.
contributions to the Fund. All SACU members except Botswana are also members of Rand Monetary Area, with the central bank of South Africa acting as the central bank of the Area as a whole. The union does not have any institutional structure such as a secretariat; there is only a functional commission, which meets once a year to consider any issues. However, since 1989, with the Republic of South Africa experiencing dramatic changes internally and externally, many observers have strong feelings that SACU may not survive in its present form, either in terms of membership or in terms of trade and monetary arrangements. There is great change on the way.\(^5\)

East African Community (EAC)

In the past, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda have enjoyed a long history of cooperation under successive regional arrangements, including the customs union between Kenya and Uganda in 1917, which the then Tanganyika (now Tanzania after independence and union with Zanzibar) later joined in 1927; the East African High Commission 1948-1961; the East African Common Services Organization 1961-1967 and the East African Community 1967-1977. Before its revival last year, the East African Community collapsed in 1977 due to both internal and external factors, which were not supportive of regional integration at that time. However, following the signing of a mediation agreement for the Division of Assents and Liabilities in 1984, the three countries agreed to explore areas of future cooperation and work out concrete arrangements for such cooperation. Subsequent meetings of the three Heads of State led to the signing of the Agreement establishing the Permanent Tripartite Commission for East African Cooperation on November 30, 1993. Operations of the East African Cooperation (an inter-governmental organization with the mandate to promote

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regional integration and development among the three countries) started on March 14, 1996, following the launching of the secretariat at its headquarters in Arusha, Tanzania. In order to consolidate cooperation between the three states, the Agreement on cooperation was upgraded to a Treaty, which was signed August 1999 and officially launched the New East African Community. It is now just over three years since the official signing and launching of the new East African Community, but things seems to be going a little slow for the Community to have an impact on the development of the sub region. At the signing of the Treaty, the Community envisioned a better and expanded trading environment. The three governments promised to promote investment codes by protecting property rights and proper regulation of the private sector. Moreover, the agenda for cooperation also included; conservation efforts and sustainable utilization of wildlife within the community; tourism; and defense, security and peacekeeping matters. Other approved projects include the harmonization of military training syllabi as well as the integration of military schools, military research and production facilities. Nevertheless, as most of the regional integration schemes in SSA, EAC has the same problems to confront. The three member states have poor policy formulation, which hinders rather than encourages trade, which is the quickest route to wealth creation. The economies are too similar, hence no complementarities to exploit. Import substitution policies get in the way of regional market integration. In addition, inter-regional rivalries make cooperation difficult (taking into consideration the current Great Lakes crisis, which Uganda is involved, Tanzania and Kenya acts as mediators) and thus slowing down most of the cooperation efforts.

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51 EAC handbook published by Secretariat of the commission for East African Cooperation, Arusha, Tanzania
53 Ibid.
CHAPTER III

CHALLENGES FACING THE PURSUIT OF REGIONALISM IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Many sub-Saharan Africa leaders advocate regionalism as an effective strategy for stimulating development in the region. The process of forging regionalism in sub-Saharan Africa involves many interrelated challenges. Some of these, such as over-dependence on foreign funds and a lack of real political commitment, are generally found in sub-Saharan Africa and thus act as a blocking factor to the growth of regionalism in the region. The discussion here, however, focuses on the manifestation of these problems in regional integration and regionalism as a whole.

The Movement toward Regionalism in SSA

It is perhaps easier to argue that the readiness to accept regionalism as a strategy for development is an asset and not a problem for sub-Saharan Africa. However, given that this strategy is seemingly unquestioned and is accepted categorically, governments may neglect to conduct in-depth evaluations of the potential impact of joining a regional bloc. It seems that many countries in the region join any and all regional blocs to whom they have access, without carefully assessing the costs and benefits of getting involved in that particular regional bloc.\(^4\) As pointed out in the previous chapter, some countries belong to more than

\(^4\) R.E. Mshomba, 2000 ‘Africa in the Global Economy’ pg.175-181
three regional blocs, thus creating a multiplicity of intergovernmental organizations. For example, data shows that the membership of eastern and southern African countries can be traced in seven regional blocs, each country being involved in more than one bloc, while in western Africa, two regional blocs share overlapping membership and the trend is the same in central African states where there are three regional blocs.

Theoretical models and empirical studies confirm that moving toward free trade is beneficial to participating countries in these regional arrangements. Thus, one could conclude that decisions to form or to join a regional bloc, even if done without full consideration of the costs and benefits are still beneficial to these countries. The problem, however, is that such regional blocs may lack the commitment and clear direction usually borne out of careful evaluations. Such evaluation, often prompted by critical disagreement, can be preempted by nonchalant political unanimity.\textsuperscript{55} It appears that regionalism in sub-Saharan Africa is as popular in 1990's as import substitution was in the 1970's. In the 1970's, many sub-Saharan Africa countries did not have carefully designed programs for import substitution, in spite of the overwhelming support for the strategy all over the region. At that time frame, many policies were implemented in the name of import substitution even when they were effectively working against it.\textsuperscript{56} Although import substitution, as an economic strategy, is not on par with regionalism or economic integration in general, regionalism or economic integration also suffers from a lack of commitment and clear direction just as the import substitution did. However, politicians and government officials happen to like the idea of regionalism more, because they are personally benefiting from attending summits and

\textsuperscript{55} S.K.B. Asante, 1986 'The Political Economy of Regionalism in Africa: A decade of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) pg. 19-20
Also see Aparajita Biswas, 'Some Reflections on the classical Models of Regional Integration in Southern Africa' Africa Quarterly, Vol.39, #4, 1999
\textsuperscript{56} See Percy S. Mistry, 'Africa's Record of Regional Cooperation and Integration' African Affairs, 2000 pg.559
other regional activities. Nevertheless, many do not have a clear understanding of the political and financial commitment necessary to achieve any meaningful integration. However, not all politicians opt for regionalism because of the positive impact it might have on the region. Rather, some opt for it because they think the impact of regionalism or integration is far removed from their constituencies. Some opt for it because of the perceived relevance of integration or because they assume that regionalism will not have much impact. In other words, some have a very cavalier attitude and simply 'go with the crowd.' Worse, some policy makers may be in favor of integration only for their personal benefits, such as international travel and generous per diems that can be obtained even in an ailing regional bloc.\(^{57}\) The point here is not that the disagreement about regionalism is necessarily good for integration, rather an uninformed, quick, unanimous decision to join a regional bloc can be less effective than a delayed, challenged and carefully considered decision to do so. Since regionalism seems to be accepted at face value, many politicians and governments in sub-Saharan Africa do not engage in effective debate and analysis in these regional blocs.

Lack of Political Commitment

There are two important scenarios that appear in regionalism in sub-Saharan Africa, one the act of joining or deciding to establish a regional bloc and two, actual implementation of policies and allocation of resources that would bring about integration. However, there are two main issues which trouble integration in sub-Saharan Africa. One, agreements are reached, but some countries do not honor them, even though they are party to the agreements. Second, in many regional groupings in sub-Saharan Africa the functions of the

\(^{57}\) R.E. Mshomba, 2000 'Africa in the global economy' pg. 193
secretariats are severely constrained because member states do not pay their dues on time or honor their commitments. The main reason for the lack of political commitment goes beyond economic or political integration. Many sub-Saharan African countries lack political accountability. Political and government leaders are not held accountable for their statements or for the agreements they sign. At the launching of the Secretariat for the East African Cooperation on March 14, 1996, President Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya spoke not only of creating a customs union but also of forming a federation. Although such a vision is neither new nor totally unrealistic, it is unlikely that anyone took his statements seriously. A leader who has not manifested a genuine intention to listen to or bring together opposing parties in his own country can hardly be taken seriously in suggesting a politically unified East Africa.

Often government leaders commit their countries to agreements without having to justify such decisions to their public. Furthermore, they are not held internally accountable for failing to implement such decisions. In some cases, governments are held accountable externally by the institutions that administer the agreements. That is the situation, for example, with the WTO (World Trade Organization) agreements. Regional grouping in sub-Saharan Africa, however, take painstaking precautions not to offend any country, so punitive measures for those who fail or even refuse to honor agreements are minor and infrequent. Moreover, some groups take too much pride in the number of their members to worry about commitment of those members, as such, countries are neither held internally or externally accountable. For example, a country may agree to reduce tariffs on intra-regional trade, only to say a few months later, sometimes with the blessing of the secretariat, that it cannot do so because such action will reduce its revenues. Countries set group objectives

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58 See reports by UNCTAD, 1992:2, 1996:9
59 S.K.B. Asante, 1997 ‘Regionalism and Africa’s Development-Expectations, Reality and Challenges’ pg. 80

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without linking them to national policies. Countries join a multitude of regional blocs within the same region and with similar objectives, thus duplicating activities and increasing the financial burden to them. Hence, many sub-Saharan African countries fail to pay their budgetary contributions to these organizations, and still no one holds the governments in these countries accountable for such costly and unproductive decisions.

Over-dependence on Foreign Donors

One of the potential dynamic consequences of regionalism is the political and economic leverage it can accord countries in multilateral negotiations. This potential is compromised, however by too much dependence on foreign donors or, as they are often called, foreign partners. Over 85% of financial resources for SADC projects come from foreign sources. Part of the rivalry between regional groups such as COMESA and SADC or between ECOWAS and its subgroup, UEMOA, is over foreign donors. For instance, all UEMOA member states, except one, are francophone countries and, as such, are in a better position to secure more financial support from France. IGADD was restructured into IGAD in part to attract foreign partners. The restructuring itself was done with guidance from foreign partners. Some of IGAD’s technical meetings are held in the country that chairs IGAD’s foreign forum (Italy was the chair in 1998), and paid for by the foreign partners. This situation is not typical of other regional groups in sub-Saharan Africa, but such a setting is not conducive to providing leverage for Africans. It does not allow self-determination, which is often considered the ultimate objective of integration in sub-Saharan Africa. Projects are proposed not only by assessing the needs in the region but also by determining which ones have a higher probability of

\[\text{Ibid.}, \text{pg.} \, 74-75\]

\[\text{R.E. Mshomba, 2000 ‘Africa in the Global economy’ pg. 195}\]
being funded by foreign partners. The dependence on or the anticipation of foreign funds may explain, in part, why some countries join many regional blocs and why regional groups in sub-Saharan Africa are set on unrealistic schedules. Countries join many regional groups to be sure they get a piece of every ‘pie’ coming from foreign donors into the region. Groups set unrealistic schedules to impress donors and to qualify for the funds. Sub-Saharan Africa needs assistance and should get assistance from the rest of the world when it is truly for economic development. However, for a development strategy principally grounded in self-determination, African countries are supposed to have ownership responsibility both for the costs and direction of the programs in their regional blocs. Undoubtedly, this approach would significantly scale down the size of the secretariat units and the number of projects. Such an approach might not necessarily undermine the speed of genuine integration in sub-Saharan Africa. In fact, it might enhance regionalism by eliminating from regional blocs those opportunist countries that join only to tap foreign funds.

Foreign Countries’ Dominance

As indicated in the previous chapter, developed countries also often play a bigger role in the ongoing over-dependence of sub-Saharan African countries on foreign aid. The scramble for African resources by the developed world did not end with political independence for African countries. Some developed countries continue to devise strategies that would maintain the pattern of trade created by colonialism, whereby sub-Saharan African countries export unprocessed primary products and import manufactured products. Furthermore, the trade between sub-Saharan African countries and the rest of the world is still dictated by the market forces of supply and demand. The strategies of developed countries to sub-Saharan African countries are usually hard to resist because they are coated
with sweeteners such as ‘assistance funds’, which are needed in sub-Saharan Africa. However, African leaders who focus only on the short term of the donor’s assistance have a difficult time avoiding such engagement that later hurt the specific country.

Some African scholars argue that France has weakened ECOWAS with its controlling support of its former West African colonies. The member states of CEAO and its successor, UEMOA, find it more comfortable to rely on their former master, France, than to work on building economic cooperation with their Anglophone neighbors. In 1998, some members of U.S. congress proposed H.R. 1432, the African Growth and Opportunity Act. The bill was designed to encourage more trade between the United States and sub-Saharan African countries. It was quite interesting to note that the bill proposed the establishment of a U.S-sub-Saharan African free trade area. Sub-Saharan Africa obviously is not in a position to establish a free trade area with the United States, when neither sub-Saharan Africa as a region nor SSA sub-regional groups have yet succeeded in achieving that level of integration. Indeed, the schedule for integration in Africa as envisioned by the Abuja Treaty targets the achievement of a free trade area for the continent by the year 2016. Considering the trend of economic integration in sub-regional groups, this projection itself is very ambitious; let alone trying to integrate the whole sub-Saharan Africa region with the United States.

Nonetheless, the meager assistance stipulated in the bill made it irresistible to many countries. In addition, the bill appeared to represent an important departure from an ‘aid’ strategy to a ‘trade’ strategy arrangement. Many African diplomats in Washington, D.C., testified in favor of the bill. Offers of free trade partnership from developed countries, with many indirect efforts in sub-Saharan Africa from sub-regional and continental cooperation.

\[62\] ibid., pg. 197

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This happens especially as each country (or each sub-regional group, for that matter) attempts to draw most of the attention to itself for the most assistance. If sub-Saharan African countries were honest with themselves and the United States, they would have expressed their appreciation for the initiative and affirmed their belief in economic integration while explaining that it was too soon to discuss the free trade area with the United States. They would also have pursued the fact that the U.S. offer of 'partnership' did not include North Africa, whereas the goal of the Organization of African Unity is to integrate the entire continent. The European Union, which already has a strong trade link to Africa, prepared a summit with Africa in the year 2000. Assuredly, the focus of the summit was on the importance of trade and investment in the continent. However, African countries must be careful to avoid gazing at the EU and other such bodies, waiting for assistance, rather than working diligently to build cooperation among themselves.

Unrealistic Schedules

Making implementation projections is an important part of programming. However, such schedules must be realistic, and commitments to keep to the schedule must be binding. Some countries 'commit' to a schedule to reduce trade barriers either without any real intention of doing so or before they make adequate evaluations of the impact of the reductions. There are countries whose intra-group imports are less than 5% of their total imports that claim that reducing tariffs on intra-group trade would have a severe impact on their governmental revenue. This is one of the excuses given by COMESA and ECOWAS countries for failing to bring tariffs down to their scheduled levels. Even if these excuses were valid, it would still leave one wondering why the revenue problem could not have been anticipated before the agreement was reached. Perhaps, as already noted, it is because some
agreements are reached primarily as a strategy to draw financial support from donors.\textsuperscript{63}

Fear of Uneven Distribution of Benefits

Countries in sub-Saharan Africa and in each of the regional economic groups vary considerably in basic economic and social indicators. Foroutan (1992) described economic differences among sub-Saharan African countries as the major obstacle to realizing trade and integration in general. These economic differences cause concern that the benefits of integration will gravitate toward those countries whose manufacturing sectors are relatively more developed, such as Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Mauritius in COMESA; South Africa and Zimbabwe in SADC; Ivory Coast, Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal in ECOWAS; and Cameroon in ECCAS. These concerns have given rise to two major phenomena that have undermined the integration process itself: compensation schemes and selective liberalization schemes.\textsuperscript{64}

In regard to compensation schemes, ECOWAS stipulates that member countries will be compensated for their loss of import duties resulting from the reduction of tariffs on processed and industrial products.\textsuperscript{65} Although such compensation schemes may sound altruistic, they do not work (except to the extent that they restrain integration, thereby removing the need to have them). It is nearly impossible to formulate an effective remedy in which contributions are allocated into the compensation fund. More important, focus on the loss of import revenues neglects the positive impact of reduced tariffs to consumers and on the efficient allocation of resources. Even if losses of tariff revenues on intra-group trade cannot be sustained, then countries should reduce tariffs more gradually rather than setting ambitious tariff reduction schedules that are sure to be ignored or compensatory schemes

\textsuperscript{63} For further discussion see, A.S. Bhalla and P. Bhalla, 1997 ‘Regional Blocs’ pg. 40-67
\textsuperscript{64} F. Faezeh, 1992 ‘Regional Integration in Sub-Saharan Africa.’ In ‘New dimensions in Regional Integration,’ edited by Jaime de Melo and Arvind Panagariya, pg. 234-271
\textsuperscript{65} ECOWAS secretariat, 1993: Article 36 and 48
that are sure to fail.\textsuperscript{66}

There are those who believe that integration efforts need to include arrangements for equalizing the gains from regionalization.\textsuperscript{67} However, the gains from regionalization to each member country depend on many factors, one of which is the domestic investment environment and policies. Economic and political integration is a big incentive to domestic and foreign investors to invest in the region. Which countries investors commit their resources to, however, depends on such factors as the infrastructure, human labor skills, domestic policies, and political conditions in each country. A country with a corrupt civil service and judicial system, for example, may not be able to attract investment. In fact, it may lose its investors to other member states. It would be inappropriate to compensate such countries for losing investors even when such a loss is connected to integration. Such compensation, in this situation, would be subsidizing corruption. This does not mean that more developed countries in a regional group cannot or should not assist the least developed ones. They can assist through such means as proportionately higher contributions to regional development banks or to the secretariats’ costs. Such contributions can be determined in terms of GDP or GDP per capita, but they should not be tied directly to the volume or value of trade.\textsuperscript{68} Regional development banks can also give priority to responsible governments and/or nongovernmental organizations of relatively poor countries in issuing loans. Essentially, support programs should not be tied directly to trade nor should they be used to decide bureaucratically where firms should be located. Decisions on specialization and location of firms should be left to individual investors (stakeholders). Direct interference with the trade or production decisions limits the very benefits expected to be derived from

\textsuperscript{66} See Percy S. Mistry, ‘Africa’s record of Regional Cooperation and Integration,’ African Affairs (2000) pg. 565
\textsuperscript{67} Asante, 1997; pg. 67
\textsuperscript{68} For detailed discussion on this see, R.E. Mshomba (2000), pg. 199
regionalism, which are increased competition and efficiency.

In addition to compensatory schemes, the fear of uneven distribution of gains of integration has been an excuse for a second phenomenon that is selective and limited liberalization schemes. The fear is that member countries with more advanced manufacturing sectors will benefit at the expense of member countries with less advanced manufacturing sectors. As a result, the movement toward free trade for CEAO, CEPGL, ECCAS, and ECOWAS, for example, has mainly focused on unprocessed products.\(^{69}\) Tariff reductions on manufactured products and primary products that have undergone industrial processing have been held back, and they lag far behind. This selective approach, however, reduces the potential for regionalism. There is considerable homogeneity in primary products in the regional groups. Free trade limited to these products does not produce significant intraregional trade. Moreover, such a selective approach breeds suspicion among some countries that feel they are resented for their relative success. Some scholars believe that part of the solution to the wide differences in economic development between countries is to assign certain industries to certain countries so that no country is left too far behind.\(^{70}\) This recommendation often comes packaged as part of regional industrial development strategy. For example, ECCAS’s industrial policy calls for establishment of large industrial units and an industrial development center but does not allow industrial competition among its member nation.\(^{71}\) By limiting competition, these restrictions limit the potential benefits of integration.

\(^{69}\) See report by UNCTAD, 1996
\(^{70}\) See Rajen Harshe, ‘South Africa and trajectories of regional Cooperation in Southern Africa,’ Africa Quarterly, Vol. 39, #4, 1999
\(^{71}\) Report by UNCTAD, 1996: 42

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Political Instability

Even though there have been progressive political reforms in many countries in sub-Saharan Africa during the last decade, wars and political insecurity has been the order of the day in some parts of the region. Political unrest in the Great Lakes region, whereby the Democratic Republic of Congo still has conflicts with Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda, while Angola has her own troubles going on, the same is true in Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Sudan. In particular, CEPGL has been paralyzed by conflicts in the Great Lakes region. ECOWAS, through its peacekeeping force, the ECOMOG, has had to direct resources and attention to wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone. It is clear that the prerequisite for real progress in regionalism in sub-Saharan Africa is a real political commitment. Some countries are too overburdened with internal conflicts and other domestic challenges such as severe poverty, famine, and overwhelming debt to be diligent in their pursuit of regionalism. Some African leaders (not unlike some leaders in other parts of the World) are blinded by their own selfishness or corruption or are simply not able to think carefully about the future of their countries.

Perhaps it does not take the vision and commitment of every African president for the integration and cooperation on the continent to thrive. A few totally committed leaders, including Julius Nyerere, Kenneth Kaunda and Samora Michel, kept the liberation efforts alive for southern Africa in the 1970's and 1980's. For better or the worse, the initiative and operation of the ECOWAS peacekeeping monitoring group (ECOMOG) have primarily been the result of Nigeria's leadership and commitment. Integration and cooperation initiatives in sub-Saharan Africa lack such committed leadership. Whatever leadership

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72 Percy S. Mistry, 'Africa's record of Regional integration and cooperation,' pg. 569
73 R.E. Mshomba (2000), pg. 200
74 E. Nwokedi (1992), 'Regional integration and regional security: ECOMOG, Nigeria and the Liberia Crisis

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emerges, it is important to ensure that integration and cooperation is used as a strategy towards free trade and development of the region at large. The new leadership must be careful that import substitution policies, which generally work against free trade, do not find their way into regionalism efforts. The new leadership must be careful because it is very easy to argue that sub-Saharan Africa is too dependent on developed countries. In the 1960's and 1970's, sub-Saharan African countries tried to reduce this dependence by implementing an import substitution strategy. They did not succeed, though it was not until the 1980's and 1990's that outward-looking structural adjustment programs started to replace import substitution policies at the national level.

It would be ironic if the genuine efforts toward regionalism made in the spirit of outward orientation would allow import substitution policies to find new life. This would amount to transferring import substitution policies from the national to the regional level. It should be noted here that import substitution policies at the regional level are not as harmful as import substitution policies at national level. This is because the regional level at least allows for increased competition and a more efficient allocation of resources as intra-regional trade develops.

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<td>COMESA</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>12.1</td>
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<td>7.8</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
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<td>5.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
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Source: UNCTAD (1997a: 34-35)
a. Data unavailable for Namibia and Swaziland
b. Data unavailable for Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland

The above table shows the official intra-regional trade as a percentage of total exports of each of the four main regional blocs in sub-Saharan Africa. However, given the widespread unofficial regional trade in Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in the 1980's, the actual level of intra-regional trade is higher than what is shown in the above table.

The official intra-regional trade as a percentage of total exports for ECCAS has been relatively low and stable. The percentage for ECOWAS countries increased following the establishment of ECOWAS in 1975, from 3% in the 1970 to an average of 10% in the early 1990's. As for COMESA and SADC, it is a little difficult to discern the trend in their percentages since some of the changes are a factor of the changes in membership. Also hard to discern is the relationship between reducing absolute tariffs on intra-regional trade, on the one hand, and intra-regional trade as a percentage of total exports of the region, on the other hand. Many assume the relationship is necessarily positive. The percentage of intra-regional trade may not increase, however, if reductions of trade barriers are also extended to other countries outside the bloc. In addition, even tariff reductions on intra-regional trade alone may increase the region’s trade with the rest of the world. In either of these cases, the percentage of intra-regional trade as a percentage of total exports of the region is indeterminate a priori; that is, it may increase, stay the same or decrease. Suppose, for example, that Ghana exports its cotton textiles to countries outside ECOWAS. Reductions in trade barriers within ECOWAS that enable Ghana to import more cotton, say from Benin, will also increase Ghana’s exports of textiles to non-ECOWAS countries. Depending

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73 See R.E. Mshombu (2000), pg. 202-203

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on the value added to cotton, it is possible for intra-regional trade as a percentage of total exports of the region to fall. One objective of integration is to reduce trade costs. Since this is accomplished discriminately, it may lead to trade diversion from OECD markets to African markets as noted in the previous chapter. Many politicians and academics in sub-Saharan Africa consider such trade diversion to be good because it represents (or symbolizes) self-reliance. A lack of growth in intra-regional trade as a percentage of the region's total exports may suggest the absence of trade diversion; as such, it is often presented as disappointing. Considering the static impact of integration, however, trade diversion may cause a net welfare loss. In addition, the reduction of tariffs within a group may not only increase intra-regional trade; such a reduction may also increase trade between members of the group and the rest of the world, as already illustrated. Further, sub-Saharan African countries have limited potential for increased intra-regional trade in the short run owing to limited demand for each other's exports. This level of demand is largely due to the considerable homogeneity in primary products in the regional groups. The manufacturing sector, which has the potential of producing differentiated products and, thus allowing intra-industry trade, is still very small for most of the countries in the region.

Therefore, although the low growth in the percentages shown in the table above suggests a limited reduction in trade barriers, trade liberalization must be measured in its true sense, the reduction in policy-induced costs of trading. Assessing the level of integration in terms of intra-regional trade may place undue emphasis on the short-run impact of regionalism, which is likely to be minimal in sub-Saharan Africa. Economic integration is a step toward free trade. The objective is not to break ties with OECD countries but rather to take advantages of the economies of scale that may help sub-Saharan African countries

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77 For detailed discussions see, F. Faezeh (1992), 'Regional Integration in Sub-Saharan Africa', in 'New Dimensions in Regional Integration.'
develop their manufacturing sectors. Eventually this may indeed result in more intra-regional trade. There are those who point to the adoption of the classical model as the reason for the poor return on the economic cooperation in sub-Saharan Africa.\textsuperscript{74} Undoubtedly, the classical model has its limitation in developed countries, not to mention developing countries as indicated in the first chapter. In sub-Saharan Africa, markets are not competitive, and prices are not flexible as the classical model assumes. There is market failures associated with externalities. Moreover, income distribution considerations may call for government programs and regulations to adapt and complement the classical model. The classical model, however, is often simply a convenient villain. For example, Ally Ahmad in his book \textit{Economic Cooperation in Africa} (1994) argued that the classical integration process (outward looking integration) in developing countries is irrelevant because developing countries lack well developed manufacturing sectors. Further, Aly contended that classical integration is likely to do more harm than good to member countries because of the disparity in economic development between member countries. It is presently difficult to associate the poor return on integration in sub-Saharan Africa (assuming it has been adequately documented) with anything but the limited degree to which integration has actually taken place. The lack of a well-developed manufacturing sector does not make the classical model useless unless integration prevents the growth of the manufacturing sector where it should occur, considering relative costs of production.

Regarding economic development, whatever asymmetry exists between African countries, the asymmetry is even greater when African countries are compared to developed countries. Should African countries discourage trade with developed countries? Differences in economic development do not necessarily make trade a zero-sum game. Although it is

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\textsuperscript{74} A. Ahmad (1994), 'Economic Cooperation in Africa.'
\end{flushright}
important to be aware of the shortcomings of the classical model, it cannot be disqualified categorically. In the 1960's and 1970's, there were policymakers in Africa who ignored producer price incentives to subsistence farmers, naively thinking that the classical model (price incentives, in this case) was irrelevant to such farmers. That premise was subsequently well established to be wrong. What some scholars like Aly Ahmad called classical integration has not yet actually happened in most regional blocs in sub-Saharan Africa, and when it happens it will certainly not work like magic. Effective regionalism goes far beyond reducing tariffs and markets harmonization. It includes the development of human capital, infrastructure, financial systems, effective property and antitrust laws, political stability of the region and other areas that affects regionalism. All these require thoughtful involvement of the government in the economy.79 Perhaps a major problem facing sub-Saharan Africa regionalism as shown in this dissertation is that most of the government decisions are misguided. Consider, for example, the high propensity to join many regional blocs and an excess availability of intergovernmental organizations within and between overlapping regional blocs. This situation turns what would have been classical integration into a sphere of bureaucracy and duplication. There are no signs that the propensity for duplication will change soon, and this is not because countries do not know what ought to be done. Although there is a call from within to rationalize intergovernmental organizations, the political will and courage to do so are currently lacking right now.

However, this may change with an increase in political accountability. If democracy and the private sector continue to grow, it is likely that political system and economic institutions that unfold will generate serious and healthy political and economic environment that will lead to the growth of regionalism in sub-Saharan Africa and leaders will be held


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accountable for their actions, as they move towards a United States of Africa.

A United States of Africa?

In the face of mounting competition from global economic blocs and the threat of neo-colonialism, sub-Saharan African leaders joined other African leaders who met for the September 1999 extraordinary summit of the Organization of African Unity in Sirte, Libya. At the summit, the leaders decided that Africa would become the world's largest economic and political bloc, and perhaps the leader of the next millennium.

A record of 43 heads of state answered the call of Libyan leader Muammar Gadafi for the September 8-9/99 sessions to discuss the pace at which Africa is moving in the face of much global challenges. Col. Gadafi, following the example set by great revolutionary Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah, and others, specifically called for the establishment of a United States of Africa, with its own central bank, military and parliament. On their target date of 9-9-99, the OAU Secretary General Salim Ahmed Salim told more than 100 journalists and international observers that the leaders had agreed to quicken the pace of unity.

"As we prepare to enter the 21st century and cognizant of the challenges, we emphasize the imperative need and high sense of urgency to rekindle the aspirations of our peoples for stronger unity, solidarity and cohesion in a larger community of peoples transcending cultural, ideological, ethnic and national differences. It is our conviction that our continental organization needs to be revitalized in order to be able to play a more active role and continue to be relevant to the needs of our peoples and responsive to the demands of the prevailing circumstances". - Salim Ahmed Salim, former OAU Secretary General

After the summit, the OAU determined it would:

- Quicken the pace of implementing the 1991 Abuja Treaty which established an African Economic Community
- Speed up the process of establishing all of the institutions provided in the Treaty---an African Central Bank, an African Monetary Union, African Court of Justice and a Pan-African Parliament
• Strengthen and consolidate existing regional economic communities

• Mandate its council of Ministers to ensure implementation of those decisions, particularly to prepare the legal text necessary in light of the existing Charter and the Abuja Treaty

• Mandate OAU Chairman and Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika and South African President Thabo Mbeki to engage African creditors with the goal of securing the total cancellation of Africa’s debt.

Many experts and observers support the idea of a unified Africa. In fact, some feel that the OAU and African leaders are out of step with African masses that already embrace a sense of regionalism. Nevertheless, all agreed that Africa is still a continent in crisis and thus the mandate of the original OAU charter of fighting colonialism has not yet been achieved. The focus now is to bring internal stability to member states some of whom are involved in endless civil wars and rebel attacks against their governments so that the countries can gain control of their mineral and human resources to strengthen their economies. In debating his point at the inception of the OAU Charter, Mr. Nkrumah argued that an African ‘Continental Union government’ would have a two-house legislature: an upper house of two members from each state and a lower house based on the population of each state, with power to formulate a common foreign policy, common continental planning for economic and industrial development, a common currency, monetary zone and a central bank of issue and a common defense system with one high command military.\textsuperscript{ec}

On July 2000 in Lomé Togo, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit went ahead and approved the act establishing an African Union, which eventually replaced the

OAU, thus moving one step toward the long awaited dream of United States of Africa. However, the dream of the United States of Africa can only become a reality if a new model of multinational state is adopted, based on a social and democratic pact and rooted in Africa's own traditions. If Africa is to focus on the same issues and approaches as the European Union with its expansion such as heterogeneity of nations, languages, religions, standards, localities and so on, then the main question will be 'would a United States of Africa work?'
CHAPTER IV

VIABILITY OF REGIONALISM AND UNITY IN AFRICA

In the dawn of a new millennium Africa has come a long way from the post-colonial divisive days when the ideological rivalry between the so-called Monrovia and Casablanca groups held sway in much of the continent on regionalism and integration in general. The Casablanca group, which included Algeria, Egypt, Ghana and Morocco, represented radical perspectives by leaders who wanted rapid unification of the continent and the Monrovia group, of which Nigeria, Tanzania and Liberia were the key players of moderates, who wanted step by step stages towards regionalism in the region. These antagonistic groups were only dissolved by the 1963 formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) - the first attempt to make real the vision of a united Africa. It was a vision that had long been espoused by the adherents of Pan-africanism. The Casablanca group distrusted the Monrovia group, considering it to be composed of "lackeys of imperialism". As a result, the deliberations on the OAU Charter, at the OAU's first summit in Cairo in 1964, fell far short of pan-African hopes. The emphasis was neither on unity as seen by Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah nor on the formation of a United States of Africa. Nkrumah's idea of forming a continental army to liberate African territories still under colonialism or white minority rule was also debunked by the moderates. They feared that Nkrumah and his radical friends could use the proposed united army of Africa to oust them. The OAU settled instead for a liberation committee, which was based in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and which did much to assist the liberation movements in southern Africa. For much of its existence, though, the
OAU had, in effect, acted as the "trade union of the African heads-of-state," to quote Tanzania's first President, the late Julius Nyerere, one of the organization's founding fathers.

The OAU, with its out-of-date charter, narrowly defined sovereignty by protecting dictators by its so-called principle of non-interference. It had also adopted a softly-softly diplomatic approach in dealing with Africa's dictators, whereby it let them operate and do whatever, even if jeopardizing their citizen's lives. Despite its many shortcomings the OAU has long made significant contributions to Africa, in addition to its pivotal role in the continent's de-colonization process. Two of the OAU's former secretaries-general, Dr Salim Ahmed Salim and Diallo Telli, will be remembered as the most energetic and creative movers, for nurturing the nascent organization at a very difficult political period in Africa. During the Cold War era, Africa was seen more as a playground for Cold War warriors than as a continent striving for recognition in its own right. Salim Ahmed Salim will be remembered for creating the Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution Mechanism and for taking stern measures against member-states with serious arrears. He will also be honored for canvassing ideas on reforming the continental body and by taking a strong line against military regimes in Africa. Salim has also done much of the groundwork in the transformation of the OAU into the Africa Union, as was proposed by Libya's Muammar Gaddafi, and whose ratification came into effect on 25 May 2000. The Africa Union is an ambitious project fraught with all sorts of difficulties. It is difficult, for example, to see how such unity will be achieved, given the current tensions. Ideas for the union include creating an African parliament and a court of justice. But it is difficult to see how the Union could be democratic if its constituent member-states are not. There is also the Herculean task of achieving economic unity with all that entails, including the creation of a common currency,
a unified central bank and "imaginative industrialization". The current regional economic blocs, including Ecowas, SADC, COMESA and the moribund Maghreb Union, would need to be rationalized and turned into instruments of inclusion rather than of exclusion. The road to the Africa Union will not be an easy one to tread. To advance, Africa has no choice but to take this road. Perhaps it is just as well that Africa has a maverick such as Gaddafi to push it to take such bold steps.

Is Regionalism In Africa Viable?

There are three main views concerning regionalism in Sub-Saharan Africa. The first is optimistic and suggests that most Sub-Saharan African countries are emerging from crisis and are going through a period of transformation in which regionalism has much to offer. However, economic and political instability have plagued sub-Saharan African countries for decades now. The economic difficulties are broadly manifested by the general decline or stagnation in their average GDP growth rates (both absolute and per capita) as well as by sharp declines in their export growth coupled with marked losses in the region’s share of world trade, particularly during the 1980’s and 1990’s. A second view suggests that, irrespective of the economic situation and whether or not the preconditions for effective regionalism are present, cooperation is essential for longer-term sustainable development. This conviction goes beyond SSA and is most clearly seen in the growth of trading blocs such as EU (European Union), NAFTA (North American Free Trade Area), and MERCOSUR (The Common Market of South America). In this scenario, the argument is that SSA must accelerate its cooperation and integration processes if it wants to compete

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81 Terminology used by head of States in their session describing the importance of creative and inventive industrialization
with other parts of the world.\textsuperscript{83} The third, and most skeptical view, is that regionalism in SSA, although desirable, is unlikely to have much effect in the near future until African economies are stronger. The argument is that period of economic weakness is not the best time to formulate plans to promote intra-regional trade, liberalize national markets, establish multinational sectoral linkages, and to harmonize macroeconomic policies on a regional or sub-regional basis.\textsuperscript{84} Governments in these situations are under pressure to sort out their domestic crises before addressing regional issues.

Why Progress in Sub Saharan Africa Has Been Slow

According to many scholars, who agree that despite continuing commitments to regionalism and cooperation in Sub-Saharan Africa, the outcome is very disappointing.\textsuperscript{85} The reasons depicted from various scholars for this poor record are historic, political, economic and institutional.

History: The colonial heritage that left many African countries dependent on their former metropolitan countries tends to work against viable regionalism or cooperation. Commercial and political links with Europe, for example, continue to be more important than links within Sub-Saharan Africa, and communication and transport networks oriented towards former colonial centers do not facilitate intra-regional trade.

Economics: Most of the Sub-Saharan African nations have been plagued by small or zero growth rates, difficulties of balance payments, lack of complementarities between economies, weak industrial structures, low productivity and heavy debt burdens. Further,\textsuperscript{86}

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poor infrastructures, lack of transport facilities and non-convertible currencies all work against regionalism and cooperation initiatives in the region. It is questionable how useful market integration in the region can be when the gross domestic product is roughly equal to Belgium or The Netherlands, and where almost half originates from five countries.

Politics: Regionalism is an intensely political process and, when most Sub-Saharan African nations are defining their national identities, it is difficult to agree on regionalism and cooperation that require sovereignty in certain areas to be handed to a regional organization. No matter what the rhetoric, political leaders jealously guard their sovereignty and are not willing to reduce the power and authority of the state.\textsuperscript{86} When governments and politicians do benefit from regionalism, they tend to pursue it seriously; otherwise they do not pursue it seriously. However, another problem for many African countries is the lack of participation by the general public in discussion on regional initiatives. Instead, regionalism and cooperation agreements are often considered to be the private domain of politicians and civil servants. The general population tends to see cooperation as bloated and expensive bureaucrats attending the meetings, rather than opportunities for growth and development.

Institutions: There is a long list of institutional weaknesses, which can be pinpointed here. Too many regional groupings exist in Sub-Saharan Africa; a tendency towards top down model with many political appointees; many failures by governments to meet their financial obligations towards regional organizations, which depend heavily on their annual fees. Also, reluctance by countries to hand over power and resources to regional executives; poor preparations before meetings, often participation by wrong people, and little internal consultation between officials and ministries on decisions taken at regional meetings; and lack of follow up by sectoral ministries on decisions taken at regional meetings by Heads of


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States. The consequences can be seen at the regional level whereby different regional groupings compete, and duplicate their activities often holding rounds of increasingly expensive meetings in terms of spending. Further at the national level, regional agreements are rarely integrated into either national or sectoral policy plan, which makes the meetings to be useless on development level.

Theoretical Questions

There are several theories that can be used to describe the recent surge towards regionalism and the drive to one Africa. Neo-functionalism by Haas (1958) suggests that problems of increasing interdependence would lead governments to more cooperation. Moreover, neo-Marxist, World system theory and neo-Gramscian theory show a class analysis of regionalism. Are the above theories applicable to the African context?

Neo-Functionalism

Neo-functionalism theory explains well what the European Union experienced from the coal and steel community, EEC to EU. Generally, the theory claims that, initial steps towards integration in smaller settings can trigger endogenous economic and political dynamics leading to further co-operation. The neo-functionalist approach is based on two principles: First, functional spillover occurs in the economic sphere; because of the interdependence between industrial sectors, the integration of one sector makes the integration of another necessary to reap the full welfare benefits of the first integration. Second, this is accompanied by political spillover. Interest groups of an integrated sector are expected to shift their focus to the new decision-making center in order to influence the decisions that are important for them, and to press for further integration of related sectors.

See Bax Nomvete, (1992), 'Economic Cooperation in Africa (south of the Sahara)'

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87 See Bax Nomvete, (1992), 'Economic Cooperation in Africa (south of the Sahara)'

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Is neo-functionalist theory applicable to African context? The answer is No, because the theory is based on an ahistorical understanding of human beings as rational, utility-maximizing individuals. The notion of spillover implies inevitable, teleological process of further integration along an objective economic rationality, although there are strong forces that may oppose this process. The theory explains the integration process through an emphasis of internal dynamics of European politics. There is a need to account for structural changes such as globalization and the end of the Cold War, which changed the picture of the world politics, at large.

Neo-Marxism, World System Theory and Neo-Gramscian Theory: a class analysis of Regionalism in Africa

There are a wide variety of neo-Marxist theories of regionalism, most of which deal with imperialism in one way or another. Most variants of the neo-Marxist theory of imperialism have focused on processes that are taking place in developed, capitalist countries, and ascribe the policies of these countries’ governments to developments inherently to the capitalist mode of production. International exploitation has been analyzed in terms of the siphoning off by external actors economic surplus produced in developing countries. Paul Baran (1957) stressed the appropriation of surplus by foreign investors, who repatriate the profits. Arghiri Emmanuel (1972) has analyzed the structurally disadvantageous effect of international trade on the developing countries as a process of unequal exchange. The central argument is that the value of commodities on the international market is formed in a different way from that on national markets, since labor, in contrast to capital is relatively immobile across borders. While John Galtung (1971) has described imperialism as a structural relationship between countries from the center and periphery, whereby the center benefits from resources from the periphery. The center's
policy is aimed at fragmenting the developing world; the center enters into separate trade agreements with different groups of developing countries. Further the developed countries try to penetrate the developing world by forcing its 'Euro-centric' formula of development onto the local elites and the MNCs try to block integration initiatives among medium-sized and large countries (Galtung, 1973:59, Vaitsos 1982).

Wallerstein, Chase-Dunn and Arrighi are the key representatives of world-systems theory. The theory is based on the understanding that over the last few centuries, a system has come into being that can be categorized as a capitalist world economy. The system contains a single division of labor, expanding since the 16th century and multiple cultural systems. It is capitalist because it is based on production for the world market. It is an economy since there has never been one power center that was successful in unifying the capitalist world economy into a single political system is the prime explanation of capitalism’s persistence; hence the regionalization of economic activities is necessary to the developing countries. The culmination of Marxist analysis of regionalism is what has become known as neo-Gramscian theory. The theory is based on the assumption that production and the social relations deriving from production are crucial to the building of political power, the formation of state structures, and world orders (Cox, 1987).

The modern age system has seen a restructuring of global society under the influence of economic globalization. The market appears to be bursting free from the bonds of national societies, to subject global society to its laws. The shift towards a neo-liberal, disciplinary world order, stressing economic deregulation, the combating of inflation, the reduction of state activities, and cuts of government expenditure are the key features of the decline of Keynesianism in the modern era. According to this approach, regionalism is a way in which the autonomy of even the most powerful states is subordinated to the interests of large capital and a rentier view of monetary policy. It provides a regional mechanism for
insertion into the global economy, and also serves as a mechanism for globalizing the neo-liberal ideology. Therefore, according to the approach, regionalism is a tool for achieving hegemony of neo-liberal economic principles, not a single state or organization.

Lessons from Europe

If the prospects for Sub-Saharan Africa and African continent in general do not seem very bright, what can be learned from experiences elsewhere in the world? In Europe, economic growth, good governance, political stability, and strong institutions have all been necessary for effective regional cooperation. However, when looking at the same factors in Sub-Saharan Africa, these preconditions are either not present, or are not well developed. Indeed, Sub-Saharan Africa has neither favorable international nor domestic environments, and much work is needed to reform domestic economic policies, which hinder regionalism, and to build confidence that will revitalize economic activities. To be more precise, local private sector entrepreneurs and businessmen could give an important stimulus to regionalism development through their demands for better market opportunities throughout the region. In regard to good governance, many Sub-Saharan African countries face unstable political environments as well as regional tensions and instability. For example, the eternal turmoil in the Democratic Republic of Congo, spilled-over to many countries in the Great Lakes regions including Burundi, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Angola. The same situation is seen in the horn of Africa whereby Ethiopia and Eritrea have a border conflict, while Somalia and Sudan have their own eternal turmoils. Effective implementation of regionalism and regional cooperation frameworks will only take root in healthy and democratic environments where economic management is both transparent and
accountable. To build this kind of political and social security requires these countries to have leaders with vision and the will to implement change. Furthermore, apart from political and economic prerequisites, the availability of indigenous institutional capacity is essential. A strong institutional set-up at the regional and national levels is fundamental, and links between national and regional institutions (the interface level) are required to integrate regional agreements into national policy. While all three levels are important, it is amazing that the literature on regionalism, integration and cooperation in general in Sub-Saharan Africa focuses more on the roles, functions and strengthening of regional groupings in the region. Far less attention has been paid to the frameworks for regionalism and cooperation at the national and interface levels.

Two lessons can be drawn from the European Union; first there can be no effective regionalism without national integration and participation. The European Union experience shows that at national level arrangements such as inter-ministerial coordination committees, or consultation mechanism with the chambers of commerce, trade unions, and other pressure groups are essential for effective participation in regional initiatives. Efforts at the regional level can only be sustained if Sub-Saharan African countries can first put their own states/countries in order. Second, there are no simple recipes or models, success or failure hinges on the specific context and environment in which the cooperation is to operate. Care must be taken not to transplant or copy models from different circumstances and context. They must be adapted to local needs and realities. Some of the approaches and mechanisms from Europe that may be useful in Sub-Saharan Africa are the principle of subsidiarity, targeted policies to reduce welfare disparities between regions; the role of small countries; and also sub-Saharan Africa needs a gradual implementation of regionalism at a different pace and speed.

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88 Ibid.
The Need for Action at the National Level

By the end of the 1980's, almost none of the targets set out by the Organization of African Unity's (OAU) and Lagos plan of Action for a gradual establishment of an African Common Market were achieved. The Treaty of Abuja, signed in June 1991, set 2025 as a new date for attaining a pan-African Economic Community comprising 53 nations and more than 600 million people.\footnote{See the East African Newspaper, 23 June 2000, 'Setting Agendas towards African Economic Community'} Furthermore, at the OAU summits held in August 1999-Libya and August 2000-Togo agreed to move towards the United States of Africa, following the path of the European Union, and 32 countries so far have signed a treaty to establish an African Parliament. The institutional implications are impressive. The politico-administrative machinery to be created is almost a copy of the institutional framework of the European Union with a Council of Ministers, Economic and Social Committee, Court of Justice and an all African Parliament.

However, the biggest challenge arose from the Abuja treaty is to move from talk and prescription to action, and to change the assumption that once goals for regional cooperation have been set, implementation will automatically follow. Conviction and recommendations must be matched by commitment to implementation. One of the most crucial and urgent questions now is how the new joint machinery will be gradually established. This machinery is needed to take the important decisions, and when taken, to implement them without delay or dilution.

The treaty provides little operational guidance on how the declarations of intent can be implemented, and what is required to make them effective. How can Africa bridge the implementation gap and move from words to deeds? Without neglecting important decisions

\footnote{See the East African Newspaper, 23 June 2000, 'Setting Agendas towards African Economic Community'}
to be taken regionally, policies and institutional requirements for cooperation must, first and foremost, be addressed at the national level.

A national agenda for action could include:

- Building strong and sustained political commitment for cooperation
- Building institutional capacities to manage cooperation
- Involving economic actors and civil society in discussion and decisions
- Opting for flexible types of cooperation arrangements
- Ensuring support for cooperation from the international donor community

Building Political Commitment

The real starting point for regionalism is a political will to support cooperation or integration, despite obstacles that are faced. The history of regionalism in Africa shows that political considerations have often slowed the implementation of regional decisions and this makes African political leaders key figures in the process, their commitment to regionalism and cooperation will be largely determined by the perceived personal and national advantages and disadvantages brought by regionalism to political leadership and their respective citizens. If it is not likely that these leaders will benefit from regionalism and cooperation, attempts will not be seriously pursued and mutually agreed policy decisions will not be implemented.

Building institutional and managerial capabilities

As pinpointed earlier in this chapter, most analyses of regionalism and cooperation in Sub-Saharan Africa are based more on the functioning of institutions at the regional level.

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Proliferation, duplication of functions, conflicts over mandates, and errors in contributions have meant that the many regional institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa find it difficult to implement the tasks assigned to them. Strategies to reinforce and rationalize the existing regional institutional framework have been discussed in various forums and meetings. The most visible initiatives in Sub-Saharan Africa are those taken by pan-African organizations, such as the OAU (Organization of African Unity), ADB (African Development Bank) and ECA (Economic Community of Africa) whose evaluations of some regional organizations has resulted in recommendations for their restructuring, merging, or abolition.

Further, apart from the regional institutions, strong institutions at the national level are indispensable for implementing the large and increasing diverse number of conclusions and recommendations formulated in regionalism and cooperation schemes. Institutions for national development should be considered before looking into the strengthening of regional organizations. Very few Sub-Saharan African countries seem to have a well-structured national apparatus that is able to coordinate their involvement in different regional organizations. As stipulated in an ECA paper, “Establishing national integration structure in each country will make for a better coordination among member states and would facilitate implementation of decisions; it will, also, make for quicker decisions. Arguably this will lead to easier consultation and harmonization at the sub-regional level”.

Most of the EU member countries, for example, have very clear coordinating procedures that work out compromises at the country level. The Netherlands has inter-ministerial coordination on an almost permanent basis at both the Cabinet level (standing Cabinet Committee) and at the level of the civil servants who are involved in European affairs (Inter-departmental Coordinating Committee). In Sub-Saharan Africa, ministries for

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regional cooperation or integration might constitute a first step in the direction of more coordination; but in rare cases where they exist, these tend to have neither real coordinating power nor appropriate staffing. Regionalism also requires coordinated interactions between the national and regional levels to bring greater convergence between national development policies and the objectives of integration groupings. One important theme that underpins efforts to strengthen intra-African economic integration and cooperation is to strengthen the links between national and regional development policies.

Capacity building has been identified as one of the critical areas for economic development and regionalism processes in Sub-Saharan Africa. The World Bank puts it bluntly this way, “More access to information on other African countries, more exposure to them, and more education about them are vital parts of the process”. Nevertheless, human resource development and administrative, technical and research capabilities are indeed fundamental in any strategy to promote regionalism. Training of government officials and technocrats charged with implementing regional policies, and finding ways to motivate them are key elements that may help to achieve the objective of regionalism and cooperation in Sub-Saharan Africa. Exchange programs and increased contacts at the personal level also play a major role in building support for regionalism initiatives and creating a common factor between the actors and stakeholders both public and private in the countries concerned.

Further, among the capacities required there is also information management. Here, there is an acute lack of awareness of what other African countries can offer to substitute the products presently being imported from developed countries. Institutional access to and quick transmission of information on rules and regulations implemented in partner countries

and on bureaucratic procedures, publications of standardized statistical data and so on are needed to lay the groundwork for effective regionalism. Finally, institutional provisions are needed to ensure that where Heads of government make a decision for example, member countries provide the necessary legal effect to the decision.

Involving a broad range of economic actors and civil society

Important factor in the success of regionalism and cooperation is the emergence of a so-called integration culture. Beyond actions on policy, infrastructure, and institutions there is a fundamental need, to mobilize the media and educational and cultural institutions to promote the concept that cooperation within Sub-Saharan Africa is likely to enhance the progress of all African societies. Strong non-governmental participation is a key factor in achieving the goals of regionalism. Successful regionalism and cooperation schemes in Europe and elsewhere have not been the work of governments alone. They have all benefited from active participation by a wide range of groups such as trade unions, employers’ organizations, and private entrepreneurs and these groups ensured that regionalism issues remained at the top of political and economic agendas. The degree of participation by civil society can therefore be seen as a barometer to gauge the real effects of regionalism measures.

Flexible Cooperation arrangement

Full market integration (involving a surrender of national sovereignty) is one of several possible approaches to regionalism. However, this does not seem to be the right time

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93 Langhammer, R.J. & U. Hiemenz (1990), ‘Regional Integration among developing Countries: Opportunities, Obstacles and options, Kieler Studien No. 232
for this type of integration in Sub-Saharan Africa and it may be better to aim at arrangements that involve shared sovereignty. Thus, rather than striving for strong independent supra-national institutions with considerable powers and resources, African countries could be less ambitious, and aim to create more flexible institutions that can be linked more closely to national priorities and interests. This implies arrangements that are less binding, more project-oriented, and involve action on certain themes or in certain sectors that offer some immediate benefits. Therefore, with these types of pragmatic institutional arrangements based on realistic and well-defined objectives, the emphasis shifts towards policy coordination rather than integration and countries can keep their autonomy, while at the same time; cooperate in areas where they perceive a need to do so. Experience shows that the chances of success are higher where loss of sovereignty is low and potential benefits are high. Concentrating efforts on more modest activities in which the benefits to all participants are clear and appropriable was the kind of strategy followed by the European Union when it began as a series of cooperation agreements on iron and steel.

Ensuring Donor Support

The primary responsibility for effective regionalism and cooperation lies with the governments and populations of the countries concerned. However, given the magnitude of the problems and the very limited resources of the most African specifically Sub-Saharan African countries, substantial international support is needed to supplement national efforts. External financial and technical cooperation can play a catalytic role, but only if

they are derived from the priorities of the African countries and try not to formulate ‘solutions’ from outside. Care is needed to ensure that regionalism in the same way as governance does not become another donor-imposed condition, or that international donors display a greater enthusiasm for regionalism than African countries themselves.

Problems and Prospects for African Unity—United States of Africa

African countries finished a historic event of transforming the moribund Organization of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU) on July of 2001. This historic effort requires leadership, courage and willingness to depart from the ways of the past, if it is to do for Africa what the European Union has done for Europe. The African Union, inspired by the European Union and styled on other global continental bodies in Asia and America, is being touted as a continental body that will pave the way to a better life for all Africans. However, too much faith is being placed in a document that establishes the African Union, which looks good on paper but might be hard to implement. African leaders are rushing to create what should be a more effective political and economic union without enough thought, only for fear of being left trailing behind in the rapid race of globalization.

Further, the timetable put forward for trying to achieve the union goals is very unrealistic and could backfire. The African Union idea is good, but the continental economy is too similar to have an impact like that of Europe. Some of Africa’s renowned political analysts, such as Ali Mazrui and Mwesiga Baregu have warned that the AU runs the danger of creating structures without meaningful content if it emulates the European Union. The AU structured to have a pan-African parliament, continental court, central bank and monetary

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fund as basic institutions, which looks good on paper but practically very complicated taking into considerations Africa's disjointed cultures and colonial background.

Does the current Continental Leadership have what it takes? The answer to the above question is Yes and No. There are current serving African leaders with vision and integrity, who are competent and committed. On the other hand, there are those who have not lived up to high hopes and expectations of their election or self-selection through coup and have manifestly failed their people. There are hawks and doves, there are movers and shakers and there are those leaders who delight in obstructing and thwarting progress. In short, Africa has some leaders who are a credit to the continent and those who are a disgrace. The United Nations Secretary General, Mr. Koffi Annan, speaking at the African summit in Lusaka, Zambia stressed that the resolution of many conflicts in Africa was essential to making the continent framework. Additionally, he pointed out that the conflicts in the continent were in a great measure the result of misguided leadership, which is unwilling or unable to put the people's interests first. 98 The OAU, which was created in 1963 dismally failed to resolve conflicts on the war torn African continent 99. Africa has had an unfair share of dictators and military autocrats compared to other continents on earth. In 1966, only three years after the formation of the OAU, Kamuzu Banda declared himself the President for life and simultaneously made Malawi a one-party state. In 1972,Nguema, President of Equatorial Guinea after independence, also declared himself president for life. Recently Frederick Chiluba of Zambia tried to make himself an eternal president but the idea was shrugged off by members of his own party, while in Zimbabwe Robert Mugabe has vowed that the opposition movement for democratic change will "never, ever" rule his
country. Moreover, illegitimate governments have also 'graced' the continent through various coup dé tats and Nigeria has felt the greatest pinch of this military despotism under various military autocrats Ibrahim Babangida and Sani Abacha deserves a special mention here. In war torn Somalia, the military junta under the leadership of Siad Barre even went to the weird extreme of declaring war on his people by bombing them, all happening in an open view of OAU, which did absolutely nothing, just like it turned a blind eye to the Matebeleland massacres in Zimbabwe's present government in 1980's. Therefore, will the African Union succeed where the OAU monumentally failed?

The worst area of failure by the OAU has been in conflict resolution. Africa particularly south of Sahara has been literally torn apart by a barrage of civil wars and a myriad of border conflicts yet the OAU remained quiet on these unfortunate 'developments'. For example, from ongoing Angolan war, the war in Guinea Bissau, the Mozambican conflict, the Somali crisis and the Democratic Republic of Congo eternal struggles, are few conflicts, which can be mentioned as a failure of OAU. In short Africa has become a boiling pot of civil strife where governments raid state coffers to buy more ammunition and guns than medicine and books. Although, article three of the 1963 OAU charter advocates the respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity by its members, border conflicts have been rampant on the continent and Ethiopia, which hosted the headquarters of the OAU and is now the African Union head office, is entangled in abnormally long and yet unresolved border disputes and conflicts with its neighbors Somalia and Eritrea. The OAU conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution organ of 1993 proved, beyond any reasonable doubt that it was not an effective organ. Most of the continent's far-reaching conflicts actually occurred after 1993. A classic example of OAU

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100 For further discussion on this see Carol B. Thompson, 'Regional Challenges to globalization: Perspectives from Southern Africa', New Political Economy, Abingdon; March 2000

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failure in resolving conflicts afflicting Africa is the long internal conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo formerly Zaire, whereby some of its neighboring countries tried to get involve in one way or the other fruitlessly.

Concluding Remarks: Is African Unity a Wishful Thinking?

The treaty establishing the African Union was signed in July 2001 in Lusaka, Zambia cherishing the great dream from the earliest days of pan-Africanism. For many political leaders, the failure of the post-colonial state is the root cause of the marginalization and upsurge in violence that affects a big portion of African continent and set it into chaos. They also think the failure is the source of the dramatic rise in poverty that now threatens the survival of tens of thousands of people. It is destroying what remains of social cohesion, and leaving the way open to the terrifying pandemics of Aids and Malaria. Further, for Africa (Sub-Saharan Africa in particular), it is absolutely prerequisite to emerge from this crisis and it is the only chance of meeting the challenges of globalization. In doing so, Africa should come up with a new state model based on African traditions. Unless new life is ejected into it, the concept of African Union will remain an empty shell. Africa will not have genuine constitutional states or sustainable development let alone the intellectual revival and resolve it so desperately needs. The failure of the post-colonial state reflects a questioning of the will to co-exist, and loss of purpose and direction. The nations (or ethnic groups) are in fundamental disagreement about the community’s basic values. How are we to define a free society, authority that is properly conferred and shared, and law that seem to come naturally? State and society seem to have been in conflict ever since Africa’s multi-ethnic societies saw their own model destroyed to make way for an enforced western caricature or model.

101 Ibid.
102 Timothy M. Shaw, ‘New Regionalisms in Africa in the new millennium: Comparative perspectives on renaissance, realisms and/or regressions’, New Political Economy, Abington; November 2000
Although colonial domination disrupted the process of state building, African societies remain multi-ethnic by nature. The pre-colonial nations that marked out identities of these multinational states survived even though they were parcelled out and often dispersed among several states, it was not impossible to re-forge a societal link. An unexpected consequence of the crisis in the nation-state is that the concept of nation is no longer shackled by the law or by revolutionary mystique. The break-up of the Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia, the separation between Czech Republic and Slovakia and between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the Tutsi genocide and the chaos in Somalia are all proof of that. Reinstating these tribal nations will make it possible to bring to an end the crisis of national consciousness and identity that is ravaging Africa, and will prevent political manipulation of disputes over nationality. The kind of manipulation that led, for example, to the banishment of the Banyamulenge community to the east of Congo-Kinshasa, and the marginalization of the former President Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia or former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara in Ivory Coast. This renaissance of the state can be rooted in African-ness. Contrary to received wisdom, black Africa, like Europe, created its own model of multinational state and nation-ethnic groups such as the empires of Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Songhay, Noupe, Benin, the Congo, Mwanamutapa and Zimbabwe date back to the African Middle Ages. In those societies, the political element came before the state, although it is traditionally assumed to have developed with the advent of the nation-state. In contrast to the nation-state with its monopoly on legislation, the multi-ethnic character of African societies led them to establish two legislative areas within the constitution of the multinational state. The state is responsible for general legislation and the national or ethnic area for specific legislation on

1 Ibid,
1 Ibid,
1 Mwayila Tshiyembe, ‘Inventing the Multination: Would a United States of Africa Work?’

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land-ownership, inheritance, registration of births and deaths and so on. An individual bask in genuine pluralism of law, depending on the area of law that is relevant, as well as the kind of activity he pursues in it and the status he claims.

However, to achieve the benefits of African Union to all, African law must be rescued from the non-law or "customary" law to which it has been relegated because colonialism made it mimic to other systems, and pluralism of law must be restored. Therefore the African charter on Human rights tried to reflect this special feature by including in its title the concept of 'peoples' rights, but even failed to define the substance of those rights. The post-colonial state has thus retained absolute sovereignty, and peoples have been deprived of their own means of subsistence, for instance, the Ogoni people of the Niger Delta, Nigeria's oil producing region, or the Dioula people of Casamance who are rebelling against the Senegalese state. Furthermore, in this model of multinational state, the rights of minorities cannot be enforced against the rights of the majority. The state and the nations that make it up would have to respect the principles of equality and the right to be different, in order to achieve a common destiny.

Benefits of Integral Federalism

Nevertheless, I can say that, integral federalism should emerge and in it power is allocated based on a threefold federation of nations, citizens and localities. It operates on the premise that the state acts on behalf of several nations, scattered over a number of localities. In that sense, authority and political action can be exercised rationally and effectively only if power is accorded first by reference to nations and citizens, and only then by territory. In fact, the tribal districts, communes and autonomous provinces are politically significant only because they are the cradles of the nations and where citizens concerned the founders of the political system.
A major new feature of integral federalism is the transformation of these sub-ethnic groups into jointly managed political areas that channel a mix of people towards a shared destiny, so avoiding any form of ethnic cleansing. The territorial federalism of the nation-state relies on the fundamental principle that since the nation is a single, indivisible entity, effective exercise of political authority depends on it being applied to the whole of the territory over, which the population is dispersed. However, integral federalism requires that power be structured according to the political division of the territory: into counties, townships, regions, federate state and so forth. In this way, African Union can achieve the goals put forth by its founding fathers of the great pan-Africanism, and may be the long worked efforts on regionalism in Africa will be rewarding to the continent, which still lags behind in many human development factors and economically in general.
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