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Does Nation-Building Promote Liberty?

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DOES NATION-BUILDING PROMOTE LIBERTY?

by

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Bachelor of Arts in Political Science
University of California, Santa Barbara
2005

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the

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ABSTRACT

Does Nation-Building Promote Liberty?

by

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Nation-building has historically and contemporaneously been a significant part of the foreign policy of the United States, and has been embraced by Republicans and Democrats alike at one point or another. It is therefore worth delving into this matter with a new frame of reference--i.e., that of liberty promotion--to determine whether this fundamental value has been furthered by the process of nation-building. Does nation-building promote liberty in the local nation, the intervening nation, both, or neither? This question, though seemingly fundamental, has not attracted the consideration it deserves, and warrants further investigation on both theoretical and empirical grounds. It is important to address whether nation-building may possibly promote liberty as well as whether it has yet done so. This is where the connection between theory and case studies comes into play. If indeed liberty is found to be promoted, or potentially promoted, in either or both nations, our very understanding of nation-building may undergo a fundamental change. A typical protestor who opposes the US’s interventions abroad is likely to wield a sign or display a bumper sticker declaring “No blood for oil,” yet how many Americans would wave a banner that proclaimed “No blood for liberty?”

Montesquieu and John Stuart Mill both exalted liberty as the highest form of human achievement, yet both also approved of colonization and suggested that so-called
“good despotism” may offer the best means for ultimately attaining this liberty where it does not already exist. While Montesquieu proposed that commerce, with an appeal to human nature, provides the proper path to liberal colonization, Mill advocated for a foreign government comprised of experts who had the true interests of the colony and its people in mind. The case of US nation-building in Japan demonstrates that the promotion of liberty within the “mother country” as well as within the “dependent country” through the process of nation-building, when conducted properly, is possible. The case of Iraq, conversely, demonstrates that success and liberty are far from guaranteed when nation-building is attempted. While a victory, such as the Japanese case, may offer a shining example of hope for future nation-building endeavors, the case of Iraq ought to emphasize the weightiness of such a decision. The promotion of liberty, for both nations involved, should come more into play as leaders contemplate such drastic foreign policy measures as nation-building. Approaching nation-building from the standpoint of dual liberty-promotion will eliminate unnecessary recourse to doomed strategies and disingenuous or unrealistic goals.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Does nation-building promote liberty in the local nation, the intervening nation, both, or neither? Nation-building, along with its predecessor, colonization, is controversial by its nature. Republicans as well as Democrats in the United States have, at one time or another, both rejected and embraced nation-building as appropriate foreign policy. Eminent philosophers of the Enlightenment era, who exalted liberty as the highest form of human achievement, have also resided on both sides of the fence regarding colonization. Such critics of colonization included Denis Diderot, Adam Smith, Immanuel Kant, Edmund Burke, Condorcet, and Jeremy Bentham (Pitts 2005, 1). Yet colonization was also approved of by many liberal theorists--so long as it was conducted properly--who not only viewed it as legitimate and compatible with liberty, but even considered it conducive to the advancement of liberty. The doctrines of Montesquieu and John Stuart Mill best reflected this simultaneous reverence for liberty and encouragement of colonization. While both of these thinkers recognized the advantages as well as the disadvantages of colonization, they each proposed a set of guidelines which were intended to maximize the positives and minimize the negatives associated with colonization.

Today, colonialism has given way to nation-building. The foundations, however, have remained; for today, as much as ever, the most prominent champions of liberty--i.e., the United States, many of its allies, and the United Nations--have endorsed nation-building and have proclaimed it to be not only consistent with the principles of freedom and democracy, but indeed facilitative of these. United States presidents have been promoting this notion since the turn of the twentieth century, and more recently United
Nations chiefs Kofi Annan and Boutros Boutros-Ghali have promoted democratization as a legitimate method for establishing peace (Smith 1995, 37; Paris 2006, 433-4). Thus, as the basic aspects of European colonization have transferred to modern Western notions of nation-building, it would seem that the same doctrines which justified colonization by liberal mother countries would also apply to nation-building endeavors conducted by contemporary liberal states. I will therefore attempt to determine whether the philosophies of Montesquieu and Mill have been vindicated by recent examples of nation-building. I will employ the case studies of US nation-building efforts in Japan and in Iraq in order to examine whether liberty has been promoted in any (or all) of these countries as a result of the nation-building process. From this, I hope to shed light on whether such liberal colonization theories have been justified and continue to be relevant, and whether liberty can in fact be successfully promoted via nation-building.

As concerns regarding nation-building and liberty are exceedingly relevant, it is important to address whether nation-building may possibly promote liberty as well as whether it has yet done so. This is where the connection between theory and case studies comes into play. If indeed liberty is found to be promoted, or potentially promoted, in either or both nations, our very understanding of nation-building may undergo a fundamental change. A typical protestors who opposes the US’s interventions abroad is likely to wield a sign or display a bumper sticker declaring “No blood for oil,” yet how many Americans would wave a banner that proclaimed “No blood for liberty?”

Liberty

Nation-building has historically and contemporaneously been a significant part of the foreign policy of the United States. It is therefore worth delving into this matter with
a new frame of reference--i.e., that of liberty promotion--to determine whether this fundamental value has been furthered by the process of nation-building. This question, though seemingly fundamental, has not attracted the consideration it deserves, and warrants further investigation on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Before, proceeding, however, a conception of liberty must be defined.

“Liberty” is somewhat of a nebulous term and has been thought to mean many different things by many different people, places, and times. As Montesquieu described:

No word has received more different significations and has struck minds in so many ways as has liberty. Some have taken it for the ease of removing the one to whom they had given tyrannical power; some, for the faculty of electing the one whom they were to obey; others, for the right to be armed and to be able to use violence; yet others, for the privilege of being governed only by a man of their own nation, or by their own laws. For a certain people liberty has long been the usage of wearing a long beard. Men have given this name to one form of government and have excluded the others. Those who had tasted republican government put it in this government; those who had enjoyed monarchical government placed it in monarchy. In short, each has given the name of liberty to the government that was consistent with his customs or his inclinations; and as, in a republic, one does not always have visible and so present the instrument of the ills of which one complains and as the very laws seem to speak more and the executors of the law to speak less, one ordinarily places liberty in republics and excludes it from monarchies. Finally, as in democracies the people seem very nearly to do what they want, liberty has been placed in this sort of government and
the power of the people has been confused with the liberty of the people.

(Montesquieu 2009, 154-5)

Montesquieu’s own definition was that “liberty is the right to do everything the laws permit,” yet for him true political liberty also depended on a government’s preservation of the citizens’ security or sense of security (Montesquieu 2009, 155). “Philosophic liberty,” he wrote, “consists in the exercise of one’s will,” while “political liberty consists in security or, at least, in the opinion one has of one’s security” (ibid, 188). Thus for Montesquieu liberty consisted in living under laws (and criminal laws in particular) which secured citizens against harm from each other, but which also permitted the freedom and “power to do what one should want to do” (ibid, 155, emphasis added). In other words, while liberty did not consist of doing whatever one wanted, it involved allowing citizens to do whatever they liked, so long as their actions did not violate the laws which served to protect every citizen’s security. For Montesquieu, commerce was a universal vehicle for liberty; while Montesquieu requested that conquered lands be allowed to retain certain customs and particularities, he emphatically insisted that commerce would spread positive effects wherever it flowed.

Mill proposed a similar though distinct version of liberty. Mill’s idea of liberty—that is, “the nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised over the individual”—similarly drew the connection between liberty and security (Mill 2002, 3). He explained that liberty involves allowing everyone to pursue “our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs,” and that the only time when such liberty may be obstructed is to prevent harm to others (ibid, 11-15). Interfering in one’s liberty, therefore, was not legitimate if it was done for the person’s “own good,
either physical or moral” (ibid, 11). Rather, a person must be committing, or about to commit, harm to another before force may be used against him. However, Mill added almost as an afterthought: “it is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties,” and therefore precluded application to children and “backward states of society” (ibid., 12). Mill’s conception of liberty also distinguished between political tyranny and what he called “social tyranny,” which referred primarily to the domination of custom and opinion over individuality. Mill considered the freedom to form, express, and share original and dissenting ideas as a vital component of liberty.

Both Montesquieu and Mill recognized certain characteristics of societies that posed obstacles to the formation of liberty. Montesquieu believed that the physical features of a region, such as climate and terrain, could shape the people’s character so deeply that they would affect the type of government its inhabitants were most suited for. Montesquieu stated that “all men are born equal,” yet quite early on in The Spirit of the Laws he explained that a nation’s laws “should be related to the physical aspect of the country” (Montesquieu 2009, 252, 9). Mill, on the other hand, stressed that his idea of liberty could be applied only to civilized nations and not to the backward societies of the world, which “are still in a state to require being taken care of by others” (Mill 2002, 12). Mill categorized different nations by their relative “stage of development,” and it was this level of civilizational advancement that determined which form of government was most appropriate (Jahn 2005, 601). Only those nations which had learned certain lessons and had acquired certain habits were deemed suited for representative self-government. Liberty, Mill insisted, had no application until a society had reached the stage where it
could properly use and sustain self-governance, and until that time compulsion was justifiable (Mill 2002, 12).

In consideration of the monumental tasks associated with overcoming such hurdles and properly facilitating liberty in a primitive and illiberal state, both Montesquieu and Mill concluded that in many cases a despotism—though a uniquely good type of despotism—would provide the best form of government. If a society proved incapable of overcoming such obstacles and establishing liberty for itself, then despotism likely offered a more desirable alternative. “A conquest,” Montesquieu suggested, “can destroy harmful prejudices, and, if I dare speak in this way, can put a nation under a better presiding genius” (Montesquieu 2009, 142). Mill similarly maintained that “despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the means justified by effecting that end” (Mill 2002, 12).

As both of these theorists were firmly committed to the idea of liberty, they recognized the inherent difficulty involved with simultaneously promoting colonization. Montesquieu, for instance, described conquest as “a necessary, legitimate, and unfortunate right” (Montesquieu 2009, 142). Mill also justified colonization by free states, in that he considered it to be the mode of government which “most facilitates [the dependent country’s] transition to a higher stage of improvement” (Mill 1991, 345).

In this study, the term “liberty” will refer to both negative and positive freedom; that is, it will encompass both freedom from coercion and the people’s ability to participate in government. It is thus important to distinguish liberty from democracy, for democracy alone merely involves freedom in the positive sense. Democracy is rule by the people and does not, by its nature, guarantee private rights (i.e., freedom in the negative
sense). Liberty, rather, necessitates additional requisites, and these are: security (a prerequisite); economic prosperity; and the political rights most commonly associated with democracy. The term “democratization” is commonly used today and is meant to imply the establishment of such qualities as individual rights and representative government, rather than pure democratic majority-rule; Montesquieu and Mill spoke in terms of political advancement to describe this. Thus, in this way, democratization, as it is conceived of today, can be more or less equated with the notion of political progress as described by Montesquieu and Mill. As security, prosperity, and progress were the requisites for liberty in Montesquieu and Mill’s views, today we can accurately follow their theories if we look for security, economic prosperity, and democratization as indicators of liberty in nation-building.

**Colonialism and Nation-Building**

Nation-building finds its historical roots in colonization, for both processes were initiated under similar circumstances and were conducted with similar goals in mind. Western conceptions of nation-building today reflect European colonialism; the mindsets and proposed goals of modern nation-building states echo those of colonizing mother countries. Eighteenth and nineteenth century colonialism was conducted by nations, such as Great Britain and France, that deemed themselves to be the most liberal and advanced in the world; the societies they colonized, however, were considered to be uncivilized and backward. Mother countries colonized to expand not only their own security, prosperity, and political progress, but also those of the colony itself; they also often embraced the lofty belief that mankind generally would additionally benefit as a result of such colonization. Twentieth and twenty-first century nation-building has been embarked upon
primarily by the United States, and has been described as “liberating” operations conducted within oppressed or collapsed states; the goals of modern-day nation-building consist of promoting international security, fostering economic prosperity, and spreading democracy—all objectives intended to benefit the building nation, the nation being built, and the greater world order.

Additionally, colonialism and nation-building alike have been accompanied by what Pitts termed “civilizational confidence” (Pitts 2005, 14). Eighteenth century colonialism was accompanied by the Enlightenment, and nineteenth century colonialism by the industrial revolution; the US approached nation-building in Japan just as it was coming to be recognized as one of the two superpowers of the world, and its twenty-first century nation-building operations have occurred at a time when America has been called by many the world’s only superpower (Dobbins et al. 2003, xv, 22). “Europeans in the late eighteenth century,” Pitts wrote, “undoubtedly were becoming increasingly secure in their sense of superiority—intellectual, moral, political, economic, and technological—over the rest of the world” (Pitts 2005, 14). This was reflected by Montesquieu, who proclaimed in *The Spirit of the Laws*, first published in 1748, that “homage must be paid to our modern times, to contemporary reasoning, to the religion of the present day, to our philosophy, and to our mores” (Montesquieu 2005, 139).

Then, “in the nineteenth century,” Pitts expounded, “a number of factors, from the end of the ancien regime in France and the extension of suffrage in Britain, to the abolition of the slave trade and eventually of slavery in European colonies, to the economic and technological breakthroughs of the industrial revolution, lent a conviction to” the belief that “European (or at least British and French) political culture was
unimpeachably superior to those of the rest of the world’s societies” (Pitts 2005, 15). This sentiment is represented by Mill, who declared that British colonization, in particular, “has the advantage, specially valuable at the present time, of adding to the moral influence and weight in the councils of the world of the power which, of all in existence, best understands liberty” (Mill 1991, 342).

In a radio address to the American public in August 1945--at the time when two atomic bombs were dropped on Japan, which effectively ended the Second World War, and when the United States stood on the precipice of its subsequent nation-building efforts in Japan--President Harry S. Truman praised the prowess and righteousness of strong, liberal societies over those of any other:

We tell ourselves that we have emerged from this war the most powerful nation in the world--the most powerful nation, perhaps, in all history. That is true, but not in the sense some of us believe it to be true. The war has shown us that we have tremendous resources to make all the materials for war. It has shown us that we have skillful workers and managers and able generals, and a brave people capable of bearing arms. All these things we knew before. The new thing--the thing which we had not known--the thing we have learned now and should never forget, is this: that a society of self-governing men is more powerful, more enduring, more creative than any other kind of society, however disciplined, however centralized. We know now that the basic proposition of the worth and dignity of man is not a sentimental aspiration or a vain hope or a piece of rhetoric. It is the strongest, most creative force now present in this world. Now let us use that force and all
our resources and all our skills in the great cause of a just and lasting peace!

(Truman 1961, 213-4)

In 2002, just prior to initiating war with Iraq, President George W. Bush announced to the American public that “like other generations of Americans, we will meet the responsibility of defending human liberty against violence and aggression. By our resolve, we will give strength to others. By our courage, we will give hope to others. And by our actions, we will secure the peace and lead the world to a better day” (Peters and Woolley 2002). “We refuse to live in fear,” he added, for “this Nation, in World War and in cold war, has never permitted the brutal and lawless to set history’s course. Now as before, we will secure our Nation, protect our freedom, and help others to find freedom of their own” (ibid.). Thus we see how such “civilizational confidence” has, over the centuries, encouraged powerful nations--ones which espoused a strict sense of liberty--to attempt to spread their ideology by force to other nations as a way to rescue, in a sense, the entire human race (Pitts 2005, 14).

Europe’s eighteenth and nineteenth century liberal colonizing nations therefore supplied the philosophical justifications for twentieth and twenty-first century nation-building by the United States. Additionally, however, these colonizing predecessors also provided a specific set of overarching goals to be achieved both within the colony and for the mother country; these goals became adopted by later generations of US leaders as they embarked upon nation-building efforts abroad. As will be explored further in the following pages, these goals included: security, economic prosperity, and political advancement (or democratization). These fundamental connections between colonization and nation-building not only demonstrate the historical link and philosophical heritage,
they also serve to legitimize an analysis of modern nation-building in light of classical liberal theories of colonization.

**Overview of Paper**

The first half of this paper will consist of a theoretical analysis of the doctrines proposed by Montesquieu and John Stuart Mill. I will begin by examining their respective theories of colonization and its relation to liberty. This section of my thesis will focus on primary sources, most notably Montesquieu’s *The Spirit of the Laws* as well as Mill’s *Considerations on Representative Government* and *On Liberty*. In the second chapter, following this introduction, I will determine whether, according to Montesquieu and Mill, liberty can be promoted in the mother country as a result of colonization. I will first trace the legitimacy of colonization as established by their notions of the “right of conquest,” which consists of a just form of offensive force. I will then explore their prescriptions for how best to rule colonies, and expound on their conceptions of “good despotism.” The following section will address liberty in the mother country specifically, and close attention will be given to international peace and security, the disadvantages associated with colonialism for the metropole, and whether despotism abroad corrupts liberal principles of government at home. In the third chapter, I will determine whether liberty can be promoted in the dependent country through colonization, according to Montesquieu and Mill. Here I will further address the various obstacles to liberty, as well as the (sometimes surprising) ways in which they might be overcome. I will conclude this chapter by looking at whether the requisites of liberty—security, prosperity, and progress—were attainable within a colony, and whether these culminated in the ultimate achievement of liberty.
I will then shift focus to the case studies. In chapter four, I will examine whether liberty has been promoted in Japan and Iraq as a result of the nation-building efforts of the United States. First, I will investigate whether liberty has been promoted in Japan since its occupation by the US following the end of the Second World War. I will look at the indicators of security, democratization, and economic prosperity, and determine whether Montesquieu and Mill would agree that Japan represents a “success story” of nation-building. I will also pay special attention to the role General Douglas MacArthur played in the nation-building of Japan, and whether he could accurately be described as a modern-day “good despot.” Next, I will assess whether liberty has been (as of yet) promoted in Iraq following its occupation by the US after the Iraq war of 2003. I will address various explanations for why nation-building in Iraq has been largely deemed a failure. Such explanations include the lack of security established; the lack of economic development; and the lack of cultural understanding. I will then look at some contemporary thoughts on whether or not a version of good despotism ought to have been formed in Iraq, as well as raise some additional questions regarding the nature of imposed democracy, its legitimacy, and its likelihood of success. Chapter five will then delve into analysis of liberty in the US, by first examining the US’s international security standing--specifically, Americans’ opinion of their security and how it has been affected by nation-building in Japan and Iraq. I will then look at the less tangible effects of the US’s nation-building efforts, and explore how the realm of ideas has been affected (for better or for worse). Here I will give special focus to two examples: Japanese corporations’ household name-brands and the USA PATRIOT Act. In the sixth chapter, I will conclude with some final thoughts on the relationship between nation-building and liberty-promotion.
CHAPTER 2: CAN LIBERTY BE PROMOTED IN THE MOTHER COUNTRY?

Part 1: The Right of Conquest

Montesquieu and Mill both recognized a form of legitimate colonization, and both distinguished this legitimacy as based on specific goals and strategies. To understand their justifications of colonization, it is first necessary to understand their conceptions of a nation’s right of conquest. For both Montesquieu and Mill, the right of conquest was derived from what each considered a legitimate form of offensive force among nations. Montesquieu argued that offensive right “is regulated by the right of nations, which is the political law of the nations considered in their relation with each other” (Montesquieu 2009, 138). He suggested that “the right of nations...can be considered as the civil right of the universe in the sense that each people is a citizen of it” (ibid., 494). He explained that “the right of nations is by nature founded on the principle that the various nations should do to one another in times of peace the most good possible, and in times of war the least ill possible, without harming their true interests” (ibid., 7) Montesquieu argued that the rights of war and conquest follow from this conception of the right of nations. “The object of war,” he explained, “is victory; of victory, conquest; of conquest, preservation. All these laws that form the right of nations should derive from this principle and the preceding one” (ibid., 8). Ultimately, Montesquieu argued that men are governed by various laws, and this included “the right of conquest [which is] founded on the fact that one people wanted, was able, or had to do violence to another people” (ibid., 494). It was therefore lawful under what Montesquieu called the “right of nations” for one nation to attack another, but this did not give a free hand to rapacious conquerors. Rather, specific
guidelines were prescribed for just conquests, with emphasis on the restraints of necessity and preservation.

Montesquieu made it clear that conquest was not a legitimate route unless it was an absolutely necessary action for the offensive nation. “Among societies,” he wrote, “the right of natural defense sometimes carries with it a necessity to attack, when one people sees that a longer peace would put another people in a position to destroy it and that an attack at this moment is the only way to prevent such destruction” (ibid., 138). He distinguished this right of nations from that of citizens, whose “right to natural defense does not carry with it a necessity to attack,” for “instead of attacking they have the recourse of tribunals” (ibid.). As there is no overarching, objective judiciary for states to turn to in times of contention, nations remain in a sort of Hobbesian state of nature with each other and are therefore guided by a different set of rights from citizens. In linking the “necessity to attack” to nations’ “right of natural defense,” Montesquieu emphasized the right-based foundations of this action; offensive force, like defensive force, is justified only when it is required for a nation’s survival. In Montesquieu’s view, “the right of war derives from necessity and from a strict justice,” and this excludes frivolous rationalizations for war such as a prince’s glory or comfort (ibid., 139). “If those who direct the conscience or the councils of princes do not hold to these,” Montesquieu asserted, “all is lost; and, when that right is based on arbitrary principles of glory, of propriety, of utility, tides of blood will inundate the earth” (ibid.). Rosow underscored this point by insisting that “it is crucial to recognize the combination of right and necessity in Montesquieu’s theory of war and conquest” (Rosow 1984, 362).
Montesquieu’s “strict justice” drew the line at excessive harm done to the nation under attack. Killing and enslavement were justified so long as the offensive nation was striving to achieve the goal of its own preservation. However, once this nation established its security, neither killing nor enslavement could be considered legitimate. “It is clear,” Montesquieu stressed, “that, once the conquest is made, the conqueror no longer has the right to kill, because it is no longer for him a case of natural defense and of his own preservation” (Montesquieu 2009, 140). Servitude too, he continued, was legitimate “only when it is necessary for the preservation of a conquest” (ibid.). He added that servitude must never be the purpose of conquest and that when it was necessary it should always be temporary. Montesquieu based these requirements on fundamental rights as well. “When a people is conquered,” he stated, “the right of the conqueror follows...the law of nature, which makes everything tend toward the preservation of species” as well as follows “the law of enlightenment, which wants us to do to others what we would want to have done to us” (ibid., 139). Montesquieu thus combined natural right with a sort of golden rule to form a morality-based “law of enlightenment” with regard to conquest.

The spirit of preservation which pervaded Montesquieu’s theory of conquest went beyond the mere preservation of the offensive nation. The right of conquest, according to Montesquieu, also required an adherence to the notion of preservation within the colonized country. As Rosow noted, “the rule of conservation must apply to both the conqueror and the conquered” (Rosow 1984, 362). In Montesquieu’s words, “conquest is an acquisition,” and “the spirit of acquisition carries with it the spirit of preservation and use, and not that of destruction” (Montesquieu 2009, 139). This was hardly an altruistic credo for Montesquieu, however, for he saw mutual benefits involved with such a
principle. “Who can doubt,” he asked, “that there would be gain for such a [conquering] state and that it would draw other advantages from the conquest itself, if the conquest were not destructive?” (ibid., 141).

The idea of preservation of the conquered nation referred to sustaining the lives and well-being of the local inhabitants as much as possible, but it also referred to the retention of native customs and laws. This last idea was meant most strictly to apply to conquered nations that already possessed European mores; those nations that did not should be persuaded to alter their mores, but must never be forced to change them. When a monarchy conquered a neighboring land, Montesquieu described, “things must be left as they were found,” and this included leaving in place “the same tribunals, the same laws, the same customs, the same privileges”; “nothing should be changed,” he stressed, “but the army and the sovereign’s name” (ibid., 145). When a monarchy conquered another monarchy, Montesquieu added, “it is not enough to leave the vanquished nation its laws; it is perhaps more necessary to leave it its mores, because a people always knows, loves, and defends its mores better than its laws” (ibid., 146). Montesquieu praised Alexander the Great, who, after his conquests, “left to the vanquished peoples not only their mores but also their civil laws and often even the kings and governors he had found there” (ibid., 150).

If neighboring countries and other monarchies shared a similar climate and terrain with the nation doing the conquering, it was unlikely that a radical change in their mores would be necessary, as they already possessed the basic, physical requisites for liberal government. As Lowenthal explained, “opportunities for moderate government are much greater in Europe” due to the region’s natural characteristics (Lowenthal 1987, 529).
Similarly, as Pangle pointed out, “the situation of a country, above all its climate and proximity to Europe, makes free government conceivable” (Pangle 1973, 196). Under such circumstances, an attempt to completely overturn mores, Pangle continued, was, according to Montesquieu, “a form of tyranny” and a type of “violence [which] can be justified only in lands like China where climate makes fear and compulsion the only means to order; it cannot be justified in Europe” (ibid.). Hence, Montesquieu described how Peter I “found it easier than he had expected to give the mores and manners of Europe to a European nation,” for “the empire of climate is the first of all empires” (Montesquieu 2009, 316). “Therefore,” Montesquieu went on, Peter I “did not need laws to change the mores and manners of his nation; it would have been sufficient for him to inspire other mores and other manners” (ibid.).

These rules of preservation were meant to apply less rigorously to nations of non-European locations and climates, because these nations could learn and acquire better mores from their beneficent conquerors. It was to be primarily through the commerce which conquest would bring that native peoples would be persuaded and taught to have their mores “softened”—that is, transformed into becoming more European. This happened “because the spirit of commerce brings with it the spirit of frugality, economy, moderation, wisodom, tranquility, order, and rule,” and, so long as excess wealth does not destroy the spirit of commerce, “the wealth it produces has no bad effect” (ibid., 48).

John Stuart Mill, for his part, promoted a principle of non-intervention as proper foreign policy to be practiced among civilized nations, though with the seemingly unattainable caveat that “the doctrine of non-intervention, to be a legitimate principle of morality, must be accepted by all governments” (Mill 2006, 259). This meant that despot
and free states alike would have to consent to the policy in order for it to work. Mill based this doctrine of non-intervention on his theory of the rights of nations, a conception of rights which applied only to advanced, civilized states (despotisms included). As Jahn explained, “the principle which governs non-intervention and intervention--or the selective application of the right to sovereignty/liberty--is the stage of civilisational development set out in [Mill’s] philosophy of history” (Jahn 2005, 607). “Barbarians have no rights as a nation,” Mill asserted, and therefore “to suppose that the same international customs, and the same rules of international morality, can obtain between one civilized nation and another, and between civilized nations and barbarians, is a grave error” (Mill 2006, 257).

Mill considered it blatantly obvious that one civilized nation should not attempt to conquer another. Mill even suggested that “it would be an affront to the reader to discuss the immorality of wars of conquest, or of conquest even as the consequence of lawful war, the annexation of any civilized peoples to the dominion of another, unless by their own spontaneous election” (ibid., 258). Yet a civilized nation conquering a so-called uncivilized nation was another story. Mill conceded that neither an isolationist approach nor a strategy of mere defensive force was rational, for “a civilized government cannot help but having barbarous neighbors,” and “when it has, it cannot always content itself with a defensive position, one of mere resistance to aggression” (ibid., 257). Mill insisted that the civilized nation would eventually find itself “obliged to conquer” these surrounding barbarous states, and its doing so could be considered legitimate (ibid.). This legitimacy depended on the civilized foreign nation’s promoting the local nation’s advancement along the stages of progress, and thus the current civilizational stage of the
conquered nation was of utmost importance. Civilized states therefore had the right to conquer non-civilized nations, but not the other way around, and neither could civilized states rightly conquer each other.

Mill clarified the relevance these stages of civilization had for determining appropriate international relations. “Among many reasons why the same rules cannot be applicable to situations so different,” he wrote, “the two following are among the most important”: the idea of reciprocity and the benefit these so-called uncivilized nations may receive from such intervention (Mill 2006, 257). Regarding the first, Mill insisted that “the rules of ordinary international morality imply reciprocity,” and he maintained that “barbarians will not reciprocate” (ibid.). “They cannot be depended on for observing any [of these] rules,” he added, for “their minds are not capable of so great an effort” (ibid.). “In the next place,” Mill continued, “nations which are still barbarous have not got beyond the period during which it is likely to be for their benefit that they should be conquered and held in subjection by foreigners” (ibid.). These “lower” nations, according to Mill, were still at the stage of advancement whereby they could benefit from intervention by foreign, civilized states. Thus “independence and nationality...are generally impediments” to their further advancement, and with the absence of independence and nationality of course came the exclusion from the rights of nations (ibid.).

Since the “barbarous” nations of the world did not possess the same rights of nations as civilized states--that is, the right of non-intervention so long as all states were in agreement--intervention in these nations by civilized states remained a legitimate right. Mill wrote that “free states, like all others, may possess dependencies, acquired either by
conquest or by colonization” (Mill 1991, 336). “This mode of government is as legitimate as any other,” he argued, “if it is the one which in the existing state of civilization of the subject people most facilitates their transition to a higher stage of improvement” (ibid., 345). Thus conquest could be considered legitimate as long as the intervention helped to further the conquered nation along the path of progress.

This is what led Mill to consider despotism as typically the best form of government for a civilized nation to construct for a conquered nation currently residing in a lower stage of development, for he believed a despot was better able to lead the invaded nation toward civilization. Mill even went so far as to suggest that these lower states’ “almost only hope of making any steps in advance [depended] on the chances of a good despot” (Mill, 1991, 346). Mill therefore argued that “a vigorous despotism is in itself the best mode of government for training the people in what is specifically wanting to render them capable of higher civilization” (ibid.). A benevolent, despotic government imposed upon a conquered state was therefore completely justifiable for Mill. “Despotism,” he urged, “is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the means justified by actually effecting that end” (Mill 2002, 12). And while this type of “good despot” could potentially spring from the native population, Mill insisted that such an occurrence was but a “happy accident” and seldom happened. “In a country not under the dominion of foreigners,” Mill warned, “the only cause adequate to producing similar benefits is the rare accident of a monarch of extraordinary genius” (Mill 1991, 92). Charlemagne and Peter the Great, he said, were among the few examples of such a rarity (ibid.). A beneficent, foreign despot was therefore a much more reliable and efficient route for advancing an uncivilized state.
Part 2: How Best to Rule?

Since Montesquieu and Mill both justified forms of conquest, it is important to understand their views of how such colonies ought to be ruled. The growing number of colonies around the world made the issue of how to govern them urgent. Mill demonstrated this by urging that, “as it is already a common, and is rapidly tending to become the universal condition of the more backward populations to be either held in direct subjugation by the more advanced, or to be under their complete political ascendency, there are in this age of the world few more important problems than how to organize this rule” (Mill 1991, 346-7).

Types of State

For Montesquieu, what mattered most was the type of state that was doing the conquering and subsequent ruling; for Mill, it mattered more what the nation was like that had been conquered. Montesquieu distinguished between democratic republics, monarchies, and despotisms, and suggested that each type of state approached conquest and the subsequent rule of its colonies differently. A democratic republic that conquers, for example, faces the unique challenge of preserving not only its own liberty, but also that of the new dependencies. “If a democracy conquers a people in order to govern it as a subject,” Montesquieu wrote, “it will expose its own liberty, because it will entrust too much power to the magistrates whom it sends out to the conquered state” (Montesquieu 2009, 143). Another drawback, according to Montesquieu, “of conquests made by democracies” was that “their kind of government is always odious to subject states,” who enjoyed “the advantages neither of the republic nor of the monarchy” (ibid., 144). The subjects were thus left with neither true sovereignty nor robust security.
A monarchy that conquers, Montesquieu insisted, must have prudence and “should conquer only up to the limits natural to its government” (ibid., 145). Montesquieu used the folly of Charles XII to demonstrate this point. “This prince,” he wrote, “who used only his own forces, brought on his fall by forming designs that could be executed only by a long war, one which his kingdom could not support” (ibid., 147). The largest acts of conquest belonged to despotic states, Montesquieu explained, for “an immense conquest presupposes despotism” (ibid., 152). Such extensive ventures required extra safeguards; this included an army spread throughout the provinces, a “specially trustworthy body around the prince,” and colonies kept in a feudatory state (ibid., 152).

For Mill, the classification of what type of rule was best depended not on the government doing the conquering, but rather on state of the nation being colonized. In his thorough discussion of how to rule colonized nations, he first insisted that such dependencies must “be divided into two classes” (Mill 1991, 336). These two classes were those colonies that were “composed of people of similar civilization to the ruling country” and those that were dissimilar (ibid., 336-7). This first class possessed a population “capable of, and ripe for representative government,” such as the British possessions in America and Australia, whereas the “others, like India, [were] still at a great distance from that state” (ibid., 337). As mentioned, Mill believed that some conquered lands were best ruled by good despots. These “other” dependencies “must be governed by the dominant country, or by persons delegated for that purpose by it,” Mill explained, simply because they are not yet fit to govern themselves (ibid., 345). He was convinced that colonial rule of this sort could be organized “so as to make it a good instead of an evil to the subject people, providing them with the best attainable present
government, and with the conditions most favorable to future permanent improvement” (ibid., 347).

**Local Customs**

As noted, Montesquieu’s conception of the right of conquest incorporated a strong sense of preservation, and this included the conservation of a conquered nation’s so-called “general spirit.” Montesquieu paid special attention to the idea of the “general spirit” of a nation, and climate was only a part of what created it. In order to define it, he wrote that “many things govern men: climate, religion, laws, the maxims of the government, examples of past things, mores, and manners; a general spirit is formed as a result” (ibid., 310). Montesquieu argued for the primacy of a proper general spirit, insisting that good laws must necessarily follow the instillment of such a spirit in a population, and cannot successfully come before it. As Pangle described, “in order to bring about the ‘best laws’ it is necessary that the spirit, the ‘manner of thinking’ of a people, be prepared to received them” (Pangle 1973, 194-5). “In order to bring freedom,” Pangle continued, “the general spirit has to be changed, but it is usually dangerous to do so: in most despotisms (for example, China) no other form of order or tranquility is possible because of the climate and the established habits of the people” (ibid., 195). This was among the primary lessons a wise foreign legislator had to learn. Montesquieu forewarned legislators going to rule in colonies abroad that “it is a maxim of capital importance that the mores and manners of a despotic state must never be changed; nothing would be more promptly followed by a revolution” (Montesquieu 2009, 314). This was so, he explained, “for, in these states, there are no laws, so to speak; there are only mores and manners, and if you overturn them, you overturn everything” (ibid.).
A wise legislator would therefore have to work not only with the obstacle of climate, but also with the all-encompassing general spirit of a colony. Attempting to dramatically alter the spirit, or to enact laws incompatible with it, would benefit neither the mother country nor the dependency. Montesquieu even went so far as to suggest that attempting to govern against the general spirit was tyrannical. “There are two sorts of tyranny,” he explained, “a real one, which consists in the violence of the government, and one of opinion, which is felt when those who govern establish things that run counter to a nation’s way of thinking” (ibid., 308). It was thus very important for Montesquieu that this general spirit be molded by persuasion and not by force.

While this outlining of the dangers involved with uprooting mores and enacting laws against the national spirit was meant to serve as a warning to foreign legislators, it was also meant to instruct. Pangle pointed out that “Montesquieu advocates respecting and preserving the established order even as he teaches how to transform it” (Pangle 1973, 198). “If I could make it so that those who command increased their knowledge of what they should prescribe,” Montesquieu professed, “I would consider myself the happiest of mortals” (Montesquieu 2009, xlv). As previously stated, preservation constituted a vital requirement for legitimate conquest, and this applied to a conquered people’s mores above all else. “In general,” Montesquieu wrote, “peoples are very attached to their customs; taking their customs from them violently makes them unhappy: therefore, one must not change their customs, but engage the peoples to change themselves”; otherwise the conquering nation “would appear to be too tyrannical” (ibid., 315).
For Mill, an accurate knowledge of the local population and its customs was essential for a mother country to exercise good rule. This was extremely challenging, according to Mill, due to the vast gulf between societies with different histories and cultures, in addition to the dissimilarity caused by their different stages of civilization. “It is always under great difficulties, and very imperfectly,” Mill wrote, “that a country can be governed by foreigners, even when there is no extreme disparity in habits and ideas between the rulers and the ruled” (Mill 1991, 348). Obtaining such knowledge of one’s own customs naturally occurred as one grew up and absorbed the culture around him. For foreigners coming in later in life, however, acquiring such a unique understanding required especially skilled and attentive focus, and even then this learning remained spotty at best. “The laws, the customs, the social relations for which they have to legislate,” Mill explained, “instead of being familiar to them from childhood, are all strange to them” (ibid.). Thus, “what a native of the country, of average political ability, knows as it were by instinct,” Mill stressed, foreign governors “have to learn slowly, and, after all, imperfectly, by study and experience” (ibid.). To drive this point home, Mill added, “let any one consider how the English themselves would be governed if they knew and cared no more about their own affairs than they know and care about the affairs of the Hindoos” (ibid., 350). Put simply, Mill believed that “foreigners do not feel with the people” (ibid., 348).

While it was legitimate for an advanced nation to rule a more “backward” country in a despotic fashion, this type of rule was improved with familiarity and commiseration with the local populace. As Mill wrote, “it is quite certain that the despotism of those who neither hear, nor see, nor know any thing about their subjects has many chances of being
worse than that of those who do” (ibid.). The trickiest challenge involved gathering knowledge about the nation and its people. As Mill advised, “for most of their detailed knowledge [the foreign governors] must depend on the information of natives, and it is difficult for them to know whom to trust. [The foreigners] are feared, suspected, probably disliked by the population...and they are prone to think that the servilely submissive are the trustworthy” (ibid., 348-9). Such challenges came from both sides, for, as Mill warned, the foreign governor’s “danger is of despising the natives; that of the natives is, of disbelieving that any thing the strangers do can be intended for their good” (ibid., 349). And, of course, “these are but a part of the difficulties that any rulers have to struggle with, who honestly attempt to govern well a country in which they are foreigners” (ibid.). As we will see, Mill concluded that wise and educated administrators would offer the solution to these various challenges--a conclusion reminiscent of Montesquieu’s.

Wise Rulers, Good Government

In his study of Montesquieu, Pangle reminded us that “we should never forget that the explicit purpose of The Spirit of the Laws is the education of the ‘legislator’” (Pangle 1973, 192-3). In Montesquieu’s chapter titled “On the spirit of the legislator,” he wrote that “the formalities of justice are necessary to liberty,” and that “the spirit of moderation should be that of the legislator” (Montesquieu 2009, 602). Thus liberty depended on a legislator’s knowledge of and execution of good laws and justice. But what if such aspects as climate and terrain precluded a country from ever enjoying full liberty, as Montesquieu had suggested? For, as he continuously reminded us, “the character of the spirit and the passions of the heart are extremely different in the various climates,” and
therefore “laws should be relative to the differences in these passions and to the differences in these characters” (ibid., 231).

For Montesquieu, however, this only pointed to the heightened importance of a good legislator for hot climates. The good governance of a dependency in tropical regions was just as much, if not more, a result of the sagacity of its legislators as was that of a free state. This was so, Montesquieu contended, because only a wise ruler could effectively overcome the hindrances imposed by such climates. “As a good education is more necessary to children than to those of mature spirit,” he wrote, “so the peoples of these climates have greater need of a wise legislator than the peoples of our own” (ibid., 235). Yet, similar to Mill’s, Montesquieu’s wise legislator was by no means synonymous with the ruler of a free state: often the mark of a wise legislator and of good laws pointed more toward despotism than toward liberty, particularly when the climate necessitated a strong ruler to combat the “inactivity” of sweltering lands. Montesquieu praised the despotism in China, for instance, for combating “the idleness of the climate” with sensible and practical “religion, philosophy, and laws”; for, as Montesquieu insisted, “the more the physical causes incline men to rest, the more the moral causes should divert them from it” (ibid., 236). Thus, in such cases, despotism was in fact the more desirable alternative to liberal, representative government. “Even liberty,” he explained, “has appeared intolerable to peoples who were not accustomed to enjoying it. Thus is pure air sometimes harmful to those who have lived in swampy countries” (ibid., 308-9).

Like Montesquieu, Mill believed that despotism was often more suited to nations not yet prepared for liberty and representative government. While his ideal form of government was a representative one, if a nation was not yet at the stage of progress
which could properly employ and maintain it, then such a government could end up doing much more harm than good. History has provided examples, said Mill, of “unlimited monarchy [overcoming] obstacles to the progress of civilization which representative government would have had a decided tendency to aggravate” (ibid., 88).

For Mill, good and appropriate government consisted of having the “distinctive characteristics of government best suited to promote the interests of any given society” (Mill 1991, 26). Proper rule of a colony therefore required the promotion of the interests of the local society, and these interests were directly related to the stage of progress the society had thus far achieved. “The ideally best form of government, it is scarcely necessary to say,” Mill stated, “does not mean one which is practicable or eligible in all states of civilization, but the one which, in the circumstances in which it is practicable and eligible, is attended with the greatest amount of beneficial consequences, immediate and prospective” (ibid., 64). Mill maintained that while “we have recognized in representative government the ideal type of the most perfect polity for which, in consequence, any portion of mankind are better adapted in proportion to their degree of general improvement,” as societies “range lower and lower in development, that form of government will be, generally speaking, less suitable to them” (ibid., 81).

According to Mill, the “ideal rule of a free people over a barbarous or semi-barbarous one” consisted of the ruling country guaranteeing their formidable strength for the protection of the subjugated population, as well as imparting their experience and “genius” of ruling upon it (ibid., 346). Such a government would thus best be able to promote the true interests of the native population. However, Mill immediately added the caveat: “we need not expect to see that ideal realized; but unless some approach to it is,
the rulers are guilty of a dereliction of the highest moral trust which can devolve upon a
country; and if they do not even aim at it, they are selfish usurpers, on a par in criminality
with any of those whose ambition and rapacity have sported from age to age with the
destiny of masses of mankind” (ibid.).

In order to meet the various challenges posed by gathering information from the
locals, Mill, in a similar vein to Montesquieu, suggested that wise and educated rulers
offered the most viable solution. “To overcome these difficulties in any degree,” Mill
contended, “will always be a work of much labor, requiring a very superior degree of
capacity in the chief administrators, and a high average among the subordinates; and the
best organization of such a government is that which will best insure the labor, develop
the capacity, and place the highest specimens of it in the situations of greatest trust”
(ibid., 349). Again in agreement with Montesquieu, Mill asserted that good governors
were of utmost importance in the class of colonies that, in Mill’s view, were precluded
from governing themselves. In “a dependency where the people are not fit to have the
control in their own hands,” Mill insisted, “the character of the government entirely
depends on the qualifications, moral and intellectual, of the individual functionaries” in
the administration (ibid., 358).

Alexander and Good Despotism

For Montesquieu, Alexander the Great served as the best model for how to govern
conquered lands. Alexander’s wisdom and rationality, and the means by which he
preserved his conquests, set him apart from other conquerors. Alexander, Montesquieu
explained, “found the first ways for doing this in the greatness of his genius; the second,
in his own frugality and his own economy; the third, in his immense prodigality for great
things” (Montesquieu 2009, 151). Montesquieu described how “a great revolution in commerce” occurred under Alexander’s rule, and contrasted his expansion of commercial markets with the Romans’ approach to commerce (ibid., 364). While Alexander encouraged commerce through “the capture of Tyre, the conquest of Egypt, that of the Indies, and the discovery of the sea to the south of that country,” the Romans did not conquer with the goal of spreading commerce (ibid., 364). Addressing those who “believed that the Romans greatly encouraged and honored commerce,” Montesquieu issued the correction that “the truth is [the Romans] rarely thought about it” (ibid., 382). “Their genius, their glory, their military education, and the form of their government,” Montesquieu argued, “drew them away from commerce,” and “this proves that commerce was not a part of the Roman spirit” (ibid., 381, 383).

Montesquieu similarly praised the efforts of Alexander the Great over those of the Romans with regard to the preservation of their respective conquests. As “the Romans conquered all in order to destroy all,” Montesquieu noted, Alexander “wanted to conquer all in order to preserve all, and in every country he entered, his first ideas, his first designs, were always to do something to increase its prosperity and power” (ibid., 150-1). Montesquieu additionally applauded Alexander for not only respecting the conquered peoples’ customs, but also adopting many himself in order to further gain their confidence. “He respected the old traditions and everything that recorded the glory or the vanity of these [vanquished] peoples,” he always sacrificed at their altars, and he encouraged intermarrying (an act he participated in himself) (ibid., 149-50). All of this made Alexander a uniquely good despot. Montesquieu asked, what other conqueror “is
mourned by all the people he subjugated?”--none other than Alexander the Great (ibid., 149).

Mill’s version of “good despotism” was one that consisted not of preservation, but of change as a means for advancing a backward nation toward civilization. Mill argued that “a ruler full of the spirit of improvement is warranted in the use of any expedients that will attain an end, perhaps otherwise unattainable,” and this included despotism (Mill 2002, 12). Liberty, Mill insisted, had no application until a society had reached the stage where it could properly use it, and until that time compulsion was not only justifiable, it was advantageous (ibid.). As Jahn observed, “Mill argues that the government appropriate for a particular stage of development is the one which enables the people to move on to the next stage,” and this often meant despotism (Jahn 2005, 604).

Mill defined a “good despotism” as a government in which “there is no positive oppression by officers of state, but in which all the collective interests of the people are managed for them, [and] all the thinking that has relation to collective interests done for them” (Mill 1991, 59). Thus the role of a good despot was to have better knowledge of the interests of the subjugated people and to act to promote those interests. Since only colonized people of lower stages of civilization could legitimately be ruled despotically, promoting the interests of these people generally involved engendering their advancement. It was often the case, Mill professed, that “a central power, despotic in principle, was mainly instrumental in carrying the people through a necessary stage of improvement,” and he insisted that had a representative government been in its place it “would most likely have prevented them from entering upon” this advanced stage of civilization (ibid., 87-8). This demonstrated, Mill concluded, that “kingly government,
free from the control...of representative institutions, is the most suitable form of polity for the earliest stage of any community” (ibid., 90). Advancement thus almost always depended on a wise despot, and this type of ruler came much more reliably from foreign sources (ibid., 92, 346). “Under a native despotism,” he urged, “a good despot is a rare and transitory accident; but when the dominion they are under is that of a more civilized people, that people ought to be able to supply it constantly” (ibid., 346).

Although Mill certainly did not shy away from promoting the idea of despotism for such cases, he did make it clear that this guiding despotic ruler should cease to exercise its force on its dependencies as soon as the colonies attained that highest stage of civilization and became capable of properly governing themselves. Despotism was justified in directing progress, Mill contended, “but as soon as mankind have attained the capacity of being guided to their own improvement by conviction or persuasion...compulsion either in the direct form or in that of pains and penalties for non-compliance, is no longer admissible as a means to their own good, and justifiable only for the security of others” (Mill 2002, 12).

**Commerce**

Montesquieu believed that a good despotic legislator would usher in international commerce to the region, as Alexander the Great had done. The spread of commerce, Montesquieu maintained, would bring with it the spread of mores and knowledge most facilitative of liberty. It was the role of the wise legislature to carefully propagate commerce without resorting to a radical, enforced alteration of the local region’s mores. Until this transformation of habits and customs occurred, however, Montesquieu warned that aspects of a country’s “general spirit” must not be forced to change.
Yet despite all the naturally occurring impediments to liberty, Montesquieu remained optimistic about the power of the “spirit of commerce” and the prospects it held for paving the way for freedom. “Insofar as a national spirit constrains the possibility for the liberation” of a people, Pangle resumed, “it has the potential for commerce and hence for vastly increased security or liberty” (Pangle 1973, 198-9). The goal associated with a liberal, commercial nation’s foreign conquests involved, above all else, the expansion of markets. When a commercial nation would build colonies abroad, Montesquieu contended, “it would do so to extend its commerce more than its dominance” (Montesquieu 2009, 328). “As one likes to establish elsewhere what is established at home,” he continued, a liberal, commercial mother country “would give the form of its own government to the people of its colonies; and as the government would carry prosperity with it, one would see the formation of great peoples, even in the forests to which it had sent inhabitants” (ibid., 329). Pangle, again clarifying, remarked that “the constitution [of England, for example] is rarely transferable. But the commercial way of life is very transferable, and commerce brings freedom” (Pangle 1973, 199).

Colonization by modern, liberal states brought commerce to its dependencies. And as commerce became infused into a colony, it brought with it a “softening” of the mores, and thus an organic transformation of the general spirit--and this brought the local nation closer to freedom, in spite of the natural obstacles. The expansion of commerce not only brought prosperity, it also spread knowledge and cured “destructive prejudices,” and therefore benefited the local nation and conquering nation alike (Montesquieu 2009, 338). “It is an almost general rule,” Montesquieu noted, “that everywhere there are gentle mores, there is commerce and that everywhere there is commerce, there are gentle
mores” (ibid.). Montesquieu used the example of Marseilles, which, despite its barren territory, turned to economic commerce and thrived from the soft mores this decision produced. “They had to be hardworking,” Montesquieu explained, “in order to replace that which nature refused them; just, in order to live among the barbarian nations that were to make their prosperity; moderate, in order for their government always to be tranquil; finally, of frugal mores, in order to live always by a commerce that they would the more surely preserve the less it was advantageous to them” (ibid., 341).

While Mill was no opponent of commerce with dependencies, he disagreed with Montesquieu’s panacea-like view of it. For Mill, commerce best served both nations involved when it came via a so-called “intermediate body,” such as the East India Company, and co-rulled with the government of the mother country. A “great security for honest bestowal of patronage existed in rare perfection under the mixed government of the crown and the East India Company,” Mill insisted (Mill 1991, 362). Mill prophetically warned that “a free country which attempts to govern a distant dependency, inhabited by a dissimilar people, by means of a branch of its own executive, will almost inevitably fail” (ibid., 356). “The only mode which has any chance of tolerable success,” he continued, “is to govern through a delegated body of a comparatively permanent character, allowing only a right of inspection and a negative voice to the changeable administration of the state” (ibid.). Mill added that “such a body did exist in the case of India; and I fear that both India and England will pay a severe penalty for the shortsighted policy by which this intermediate instrument of government was done away with” (ibid., 356-7).
An intermediate body, such as the East India Company, would be so much a part of the local rule that Mill described its connection with the mother country as a “double government” within the dependency (ibid., 363). The benefits of such an intermediate body were that it could be objective with regard to policies, knowledgeable of the locale, and instilled with a permanent interest in the prosperity of the host nation. As Mill wrote, “the intermediate body is the certain advocate and champion of the dependency before the imperial tribunal”; it “can be kept entirely clear of bias from the individual or class interests of any one else”; and it “is, in the natural course of things, chiefly composed of persons who have acquired professional knowledge of this part of their country’s concerns; who have been trained to it in the place itself, and have made its administration the main occupation of their lives” (ibid., 357-8). The best form of government for such a dependency, Mill concluded, was therefore “best found in an intermediate body” (ibid., 357). It is worth noting that Montesquieu had a similarly favorable view of this type of double rule with trading companies such as the East India Company. “Many peoples acted so wisely,” wrote Montesquieu, “that they granted empire to trading companies who, governing these distant states only for trade, made a great secondary power without encumbering the principal state” (Montesquieu 2009, 391).

Compensation

Both Montesquieu and Mill acknowledged a certain duty that the intervening nation had to the local nation to “compensate” for its invasion. Montesquieu wrote that “when a republic holds a people dependent, it must seek to make amends for the drawbacks that arise from the nature of the thing by giving this people a good political right and good civil laws” (ibid., 144). The enhancement of commerce for the
dependency would bring with it all the advantages Montesquieu believed to be inseparable from the so-called commercial spirit. However, along with the increased commerce that colonization brought, often came strict commercial restrictions as opposed to international free markets. As Montesquieu wrote, “in Europe it remains a fundamental law that any commerce with a foreign colony is regulated as a pure monopoly enforceable by the laws of the country” (ibid., 391). But this monopoly did not come free. “The disadvantage to the colonies, which lose the liberty of commerce,” Montesquieu continued, “is visibly compensated by the protection of the mother country, which defends them by her arms or maintains them by her laws” (ibid.). Thus the mother country owed the dependency secure protection and good laws in exchange for the restrictions on trade. When a colony was ruled (at least in part) by a trading company, Montesquieu insisted that a primary concern be the improvement of the local nation’s commercial situation. “The purpose of these colonies,” he asserted, “is to engage in commerce under better conditions than one has with neighboring peoples with whom all advantages are reciprocal” (ibid.). As we shall see, spreading commerce, security, and good laws to dependencies in this way would, in Montesquieu’s view, benefit the mother country as well.

Mill, for his part, suggested that compensation to the dependent country come in the form of certain liberties and privileges allotted to the local nation; yet, as noted, he drew an important distinction between civilizations “similar” to the ruling country and other societies that were not fit for such representative government and which therefore “must be governed by the dominant country” (Mill 1991, 337; 345). Mill, in outlining the importance of determining how to rule such dissimilar countries, emphasized that good
must be done to the inhabitants, “providing them with the best attainable present
government, and with the conditions most favorable to future permanent improvement”
(ibid., 347). While Mill advised that the local people be omitted from ruling positions
concerning their own national government, he insisted that “they ought to be allowed all
liberties and privileges compatible with that restriction, including free management of
municipal affairs, and, as a compensation for being locally sacrificed to the convenience
of the governing state, should be admitted to equal rights with its native subjects in all
other parts of the empire” (ibid., 336). Since locals were therefore to be excluded from
ruling their own country, Mill contended that it became the duty of the mother country to
provide wise and educated rulers. “It is not by attempting to rule directly a country like
India,” but by giving it good rulers, that the English people can do their duty to that
country,” Mill wrote (ibid., 356). This, of course, came with an extensive knowledge of
and permanent interest in the colony itself.
Part 3: Can Liberty be Promoted in the Mother Country?

Peace and Security

The most obvious advantages the mother country obtained from the colonization of foreign lands were wealth and power, yet these were not necessarily indicative of liberty. Therefore, in order for liberty to be promoted in the mother country, other advantages had to have come from their colonizing efforts—and this would have to outweigh any drawbacks to the contrary. One theory, embraced by both Montesquieu and Mill, suggested that enhanced international security could arise from colonization, and, again for both theorists, this was directly related to the metropole’s liberty.

For Montesquieu, liberty could not be established without security, and therefore the two were deeply connected. Liberty, according to Montesquieu, of course consisted “in security or in one’s opinion of security” (Montesquieu 2009, 187). For Montesquieu, liberty and a perpetual state of fear were incompatible. A person, therefore, could not be considered free unless he deemed himself to be secure. Within a society, “political liberty in a citizen is that tranquility of spirit which comes from the opinion each one has of his security, and in order for him to have this liberty the government must be such that one citizen cannot fear another citizen” (ibid., 157). While this referred to the political liberty of a citizen under a national government, the sentiment could be transferred to the idea of liberty in general, and even to the international realm. For, Montesquieu might have asked, just as a citizen could not be considered free if he did not feel secure enough to exercise his freedom, how could a state be considered free if it remained terrified of acting on that freedom?
In Montesquieu’s view, international security was established through commerce, which brought with it a certain interdependence among nations. Each nation felt a sense of security at the fact other nations depended on it, just as it depended on them. Each state therefore had a vested interest in maintaining peace. “Two nations that trade with each other become reciprocally dependent,” Montesquieu contended (ibid., 338). “If one has an interest in buying,” he went on, “the other has an interest in selling, and all unions are founded on mutual needs”; in this way, “the spirit of commerce unites nations” (ibid.). Rosow noted that “the preeminence of exchange in the market implied that the individual European economies have become mutually dependent,” and this meant that “within the international commercial system amity and peace, not war, must reign” (Rosow 1984, 351-2, 355).

It may seem odd that Montesquieu saw liberty as emerging from this type of dependence. Early on in The Spirit of the Laws, however, he clarified the natural progression from mutual dependence to mutual security. Montesquieu countered Hobbes, who gave “men first the desire to subjugate one another” (Montesquieu 2009, 6). This assertion, according to Montesquieu, was unreasonable, for “the idea of empire and domination is so complex,” he wrote, “and depends on so many other ideas, that it would not be the one they would first have” (ibid.). While the immediate state of fear in the state of nature “would lead men to flee one another” initially, these “marks of mutual fear would soon persuade them to approach one another” (ibid., 6-7). This same natural effect was elicited through commerce in the international realm. Though the initial reaction may be distrust and fear of being dependent on another nation, commerce would inevitably draw merchant nations closer to each other and toward a mutually beneficial peace. At
first, Montesquieu explained, “each particular society comes to feel its strength, producing a state of war among nations,” yet “the natural effect of commerce is to lead to peace” (ibid., 7, 338). Thus, as colonialism expanded commerce among nations, more and more nations would be joined together and a stronger international peace would be formed; and with this peace would come security, and with such security would come the protection and fostering of liberty.

Mill, too, viewed colonialism, and the commerce that came with it, as a means for promoting international peace and security. “It is a step, as far as it goes,” Mill wrote, “toward universal peace and general friendly co-operation among nations,” as “it renders war impossible among a large number of otherwise independent communities” and “keeps the markets of the different countries open to one another” (Mill 1991, 342). Mill, also in the same vein as Montesquieu, suggested that liberty and security are profoundly connected. According to Mill, the only time a government could rightfully exert power over a citizen “is to prevent harm to others” (Mill 2002, 11). Application of this so-called “harm principle” was meant to sustain liberty in a society while simultaneously curbing the fear of harm from others. One was free to do as he pleased, so long as he did not cause harm to other people; thus liberty and a sense of security were deeply intertwined and dually promoted.

Thus Mill saw colonialism as an answer to “what international relations theorists refer to as the ‘security dilemma’” (Bell 2009, 51). As Bell explained, “the dilemma arises when two or more states coexisting in a condition of anarchy—lacking a global leviathan to regulate their interactions—are drawn into a conflictual posture despite their (potentially) nonaggressive intent,” and “Mill thought that the colonial empire helped to
mitigate this problem” (ibid.). Bell added further clarification by providing the context in which Mill promoted this solution. Bell pointed out that “in 1848, Britain avoided the revolutionary tumult that gripped the continent, in part because of the ‘safety valve’ provided by the empire” (ibid., 44). Early nineteenth century Britain had been characterized by “a constant sensation of fear—fear of revolution, of the masses, of crime, famine, and poverty, of disorder and instability, and for many people even fear of pleasure” (ibid., 38). Mill therefore would surely have considered these events when developing his advocacy of colonialism and the security it provided.

Mill also believed that colonial rule by an advanced nation would prevent its dependencies “from being absorbed into a foreign state, and becoming a source of additional aggressive strength to some rival power, either more despotic or closer at hand, which may not always be so unambitious or so pacific as Great Britain” (Mill 1991, 342). In this way, the more lands that were colonized by liberal, civilized nations, the fewer lands were available for despotic, aggressive nations to conquer and use for their own power. And an increase in such a state’s power could of course be considered a threat to a liberal nation’s security. Here, despotism abroad must not be confused with despotism at home. In Mill’s view, a metropole may rule despotically in her colonies and yet not be classified among these “aggressive, despotic” states, for a liberal nation will rule despotically only for the dependency’s own good, which is justified if the nation is not yet civilized, and this will, in the long run, advance liberalism, commerce, and thus peace and security generally. A nation, despotic at home and abroad, could hardly be counted on to do the same.
Additionally, once these “backward” states became connected to a civilized mother country, the colonies would no longer be able to determine for themselves when to wage wars. It was always the mother country that decided, “both for the colonies and for herself, on questions of peace and war” (ibid., 343). This, in Mill’s view, left militaristic concerns in the hands of the more advanced nations, which were considered to conduct matters of war in a more levelheaded and rational manner. In return for this substantial control, Mill assured, the mother country was obliged to “repel aggressions directed against” the dependencies, as well as take on “a considerable portion of the cost of their military defense even in times of peace” (ibid.). As the mother country gained more assurance of her own security in this way, she would also experience a burgeoning of her own liberty, for, according to Mill, security was a necessary basis for, and even a substantial part of, a nation’s liberty.

Disadvantages of Colonization

While international peace and security surely benefited the mother country and promoted her own liberty, there remained effects of colonization which were disadvantageous to the metropole and consequently potentially destructive to her own liberty. The primary aspects of colonization recognized by Montesquieu and Mill to be deleterious to the mother country were the increase of armed forces and the associated cost that came with such proliferation. I will examine this, as well as explore the possible hypocrisy of advocating and practicing despotism within the dependent nation, and whether such actions hindered the metropole’s liberty at home.

Montesquieu was adamant about the dangers associated with constantly increasing a nation’s military forces. As a nation began to colonize, it would necessarily have to
expand its army, for it would become primarily responsible for the defense of its new colonies. This increase in military force of one dominant country would spark a chain reaction across similar, neighboring nations, and would threaten the security established by the commercial side of colonization. “A new disease has spread across Europe,” Montesquieu warned, and “it has afflicted our princes and made them keep an inordinate number of troops” (Montesquieu 2009, 224). Such an affliction, he continued, “redoubles in strength and necessarily becomes contagious; for, as soon as one state increases what it calls its troops, the others suddenly increase theirs, so that nothing is gained thereby but the common ruin” (ibid.).

It is clear that Montesquieu would today be a staunch opponent of deterrence theory, which promoted the idea that a nation’s security depends, at least in part, “on how it compares to others in the quantity and quality of its weaponry” (Waltz 1988, 627). Waltz famously argued that the proliferation of nuclear arms will actually lead to peace. “In the anarchy of states,” he wrote, “improving the means of defense and deterrence relative to the means of offense increases the chances of peace,” and therefore “the probability of major war among states having nuclear weapons approaches zero” (ibid., 626). Montesquieu, almost with prophetic sarcasm, stated that in following this idea “each monarch keeps all the armies he would have if his peoples were in danger of being exterminated; and this state in which all strain against all is called peace” (Montesquieu 2009, 224). This again pointed to Montesquieu’s contention with Hobbes; Montesquieu took issue with the idea that both man in the state of nature as well as nations in the international realm would be in a situation of all against all.
For Montesquieu, inflated military force did not spread peace and security but rather fear, precariousness, and eventually poverty. The image Montesquieu painted of the expansion of troops as a “disease” is meant to call to mind the lethal dangers of proliferation along with the celerity with which it can spread. Yet, Montesquieu reminded us, there is also a financial burden that will necessarily accompany an ever-growing military—a burden which inevitably falls on the citizens. In addition to spending money on troops and weapons, Montesquieu noted, princes will also seek to “buy alliances” wherever they can, thus adding another hefty expenditure (ibid.).

“Thus Europe is so ruined,” Montesquieu concluded, for with the enactment of such policies “we are poor with the wealth and commerce of the whole universe, and soon, as a result of these soldiers, we shall have nothing but soldiers” (ibid.). “The consequence of such a situation,” he stressed, “is the permanent increase in taxes” (ibid., 225). Such a drain on a nation’s finances would therefore counteract most, if not all, of the benefits brought by commerce. Not only would the security that came with the interdependence of commerce be compromised, the wealth ushered in via commerce would also be diminished—all unnecessarily. In Montesquieu’s view, a “dominant nation,” such as Great Britain, “being in possession of great commerce” hardly needed such a large armed forces (ibid., 329). Indeed, “as the preservation of its liberty would require it to have neither strongholds, nor fortresses, nor land armies, it would need [only] an army on the sea to protect itself from invasions” (ibid.).

Mill was also concerned with the threat colonization potentially posed to the mother country’s security, and with the subsequent financial drain associated with expanded military force and colonization in general. He suggested that a mother country, such as
Great Britain, may in fact fare better minus her colonies. As far as security went, Mill argued that “England is sufficient for her own protection without the colonies,” and indeed “would be in a much stronger...position, if separated from them” (Mill 1991, 341). “The little she does derive” from her colonies, Mill went on, “is quite outweighed by the expense they cost her, and the dissemination they necessitate of her naval and military force, which, in case of war, or any real apprehension of it, requires to be double or treble what would be needed for the defense of this country alone” (ibid.).

Unlike Montesquieu, Mill believed that a mother country may actually be better off with regard to commerce without colonies as well. “Over and above the commerce which she might equally enjoy after separation,” Mill pointed out, “England derives little advantage, except in prestige, from her dependencies” (ibid.). Mill also insisted that England would in fact be put in a “more dignified position” sans her colonies (ibid.). This would be due to the fact that Great Britain would become completely independent and would return to being purely an advanced, civilized nation without the weight of dependent, backward nations. This would bring England, said Mill, more dignity “than when reduced to [being] a single member of an American, African, and Australian confederation” (ibid.). It is worth noting that Mill did not include Asia in the confederation here; this only points to the fact that he believed England would fare better without her similar colonies, and it can be assumed that her dissimilar dependencies caused even greater strain. Thus Mill surely would consider England better off without her colonies in Asia as well.

Nonetheless, Mill concluded that for the time being England, and presumably other metropoles, should hold on to their dependencies. “Though Great Britain could do
perfectly well without her colonies, and though, on every principle of morality and justice, she ought to consent to their separation,” Mill admitted, until such separation is mutually agreed upon there remain “strong reasons for maintaining the present slight bond of connection” (ibid., 342). For one reason, the dissimilar nations were under the sage guidance of an advanced nation, which could only benefit the colony in Mill’s view. Additionally, here agreeing with Montesquieu, Mill believed that the great moral influence of England would spread across the globe and benefit humanity as a result of its colonizing efforts. “Whatever may have been its errors in the past,” Mill contended, England “has attained to more of conscience and moral principle in its dealings with foreigners than any other great nation seems either to conceive as possible or recognize as desirable” (ibid.).

Despotism: Hypocrisy or Valuable for Liberty?

For Montesquieu, liberty consisted of having the right to do everything which good laws permit and in retaining the security to do so. Liberty meant that one was not subject to any other person’s will, and was sustained only so long as one believed himself and his liberty to be secure. It was primarily through commerce that both governments and citizens were directed toward the preservation of liberty. For Mill, liberty in an advanced nation meant being free and secure to pursue one’s own good so long as others were not harmed in the process. Mill, however, also insisted that citizens must be guarded against tyranny of the majority and the so-called tyranny of opinion or custom. “Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the magistrate,” said Mill, “is not enough; there needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own
ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them” (Mill 2002, 7). Thus liberty, for Mill, involved being protected from “social tyranny” in addition to political tyranny.

If, then, these are Montesquieu and Mill’s respective requirements for liberty, does colonization become a hypocritical practice, especially when despotism is exerted? Though both philosophers prized their own conceptions of liberty, both nonetheless justified despotism under certain circumstances of colonization. To find the answer, it is first necessary to determine each writer’s conception of despotism and its relation to liberty; the next step will be to ascertain, in their opinion, whether one nation can rule despotically abroad and still sustain a liberal government at home; and finally, we will be able to discover if, according to Montesquieu and Mill, liberty can be promoted in the mother country through colonization.

Montesquieu outlined what he believed to be the nature of despotic government, and in every way this portrayal seems, at first glance, to directly contradict his vision of liberty. In the first place, Montesquieu proclaimed that “despotic government has fear as its principle” (Montesquieu 2009, 59). Undoubtedly this was incompatible with the notion that liberty necessitated security. As the term fear, and not threat or danger, was used by Montesquieu, it is clear this principle of despotism cannot even be reconciled with a citizen’s perception of security. If one is perpetually fearful, he cannot feel secure, and thus liberty cannot be present. Similarly, peace is precluded from existing within a despotic government. Montesquieu wrote that, “while the principle of despotic government is fear, its end is tranquility; but this is not a peace, it is the silence of the towns that the enemy is ready to occupy” (ibid. 60).
As peace was the natural consequence of commerce in Montesquieu’s view, and as despotic government encouraged the opposites of peace and security, then it followed that commerce and despotism were incompatible as well. Montesquieu explained that despotisms typically reigned in environments unsuited for commerce, but he insisted that this was more than mere coincidence. The general spirit of people who lived under despotisms was one that made them reluctant to part with their goods, even for an exchange, and this obstructed commerce. This was due to the fact that “poverty and uncertainty of fortunes” were characteristic of despotic states, and therefore “the surrender of goods has no place there” (ibid. 64). This could be contrasted to the situation in a free society, for “this surrender enters by nature into moderate governments, and above all into republics, because there one should have greater trust in the citizens’ integrity and because of the gentleness that should be inspired by a form of government that each seems to have given to himself” (ibid.).

Not only the general spirit, but also the laws of a liberal government, would favor commerce whereas those of a despotic state would not. “Great commercial enterprises are not for monarchies,” Montesquieu stated, “but for the government by the many”; and “as for the despotic state, it is useless to talk about it” (ibid., 340-1). This was the case because, “in short, one’s belief that one’s prosperity is more certain in these states makes one undertake everything, and because one believes that what one has acquired is secure, one dares it in order to acquire more; only the means for acquisition are at risk” (ibid.). Under despotic governments, Montesquieu added, “the laws of commerce scarcely apply” for “these laws amount only to a simple police” (ibid. 65). In other words, when the fruits of one’s efforts are at a higher risk of being seized (by either bandit or
government), great commercial endeavors are abandoned; on the other hand, when profits are secure, one is encouraged to pursue more.

This pointed to another major conflict between despotism and liberty: the laws. In defining liberal laws, Montesquieu wrote that “in a state, that is, in a society where there are laws, liberty can consist only in having the power to do what one should want to do and in no way being constrained to do what one should not want to do” (ibid. 155). “But in despotism,” he asserted, “law is only the will of the prince” (ibid. 66). Thus, as “law is only what the prince wants” in a despotism, such a society had very few formal laws, for “not many laws are needed for timid, ignorant, beaten-down people” (ibid. 66, 59). This again contrasted to the genius of a moderate, liberal government, which would possess an intricate and complex array of checks and balances and a firm separation of powers. “In order to form a moderate government,” that is, the best form of government, Montesquieu stated, “one must combine powers, regulate them, temper them, make them act; one must give one power a ballast, so to speak, to put it in a position to resist another; this is a masterpiece of legislation that chance rarely produces and prudence is rarely allowed to produce” (ibid. 63). This, according to Montesquieu, explained why, “despite men’s love of liberty, [and] despite their hatred for violence, most people are subjected to” despotic governments instead of liberal ones (ibid.). Though “it seems that human nature would rise up incessantly against despotic government,” he continued, the solution of an alternative, liberal government was far from obvious (ibid.). “By contrast,” he explained, “a despotic government leaps to view,” for “only passions are needed to establish it,” as opposed to reason and genius for legislation (ibid.).
As previously stated, Montesquieu justified the conquest of other nations in certain circumstances, and he also suggested that despotism is often the most appropriate form of government, particularly in hot climates such as those found in Britain’s Asian colonies. But, as we have just seen, he has also indicated that despotism is incompatible with liberty. The question then becomes: can one government remain liberal at home while simultaneously practicing despotism abroad? Montesquieu was adamant about the liberty inherent in the British constitution, and he praised the English people for their general spirit. Yet the British, of course, had also established colonies around the globe, including areas which, according to Montesquieu, were best suited for despotism.

In praising England he wrote that it was the “one nation in the world whose constitution has political liberty for its direct purpose” (ibid., 156). Montesquieu described in length the separation of powers and the extensive checks and balances of the British system of government, and this points to the complexity and sophistication he mentioned previously with regard to the question of why such liberal governments are so prized yet so rare. He also applauded the English people for their esteem of commerce above all else. “Other nations have made commercial interests give way to political interests,” he explained, yet “England has always made its political interests give way to the interests of its commerce” (ibid., 343). “This is the people in the world,” he went on, “who have best known how to take advantage of these three great things at the same time: religion, commerce, and liberty” (ibid.). However, Montesquieu ended his chapter on the British constitution with a line that left the reader guessing as to what his true thoughts on Britain and its people currently were. “It is not for me to examine whether at present the
English enjoy this liberty or not,” he stated; “it suffices for me to say that it is established by their laws, and I seek no further” (ibid., 166).

Perhaps Montesquieu envisioned the liberal laws at home and the despotic laws abroad eventually coming to a head. While Montesquieu did not directly address whether one nation could successfully enjoy one type of government in its own country while exercising another type within a colony, we can glean from his writing what he thought on the subject. While he suggested that the principles of a liberal government (and thus its lifeblood) would become corrupted if any aspect of despotism were introduced into its system, one wonders whether a liberal nation could construct a separate despotic government abroad and not allow the poison to enter into its own veins. In other words, if a liberal nation set up a despotic government in a foreign colony, especially if it were only temporary, would Montesquieu consider it to be an introduction of despotism into the government at home?

In discussing how principles of government become corrupted, Montesquieu affirmed that “the force of the principle pulls everything along” with it: if the core “principles of the government are corrupted, [then] the best laws become bad and turn against the state” (ibid., 119). Liberty, he insisted, “is present only when power is not abused,” and “if one citizen could do what [the laws] forbid, he would no longer have liberty because the others would likewise have this same power” (ibid., 155). Montesquieu thus made it clear that a liberal nation could not allow despotic elements to enter its own government and remain liberal in doing so, for its very principles would be corrupted. But, would the same be necessarily true if the despotic aspects of the nation’s government were contained within the foreign country? Would the nation’s secondary,
colonial government necessarily bleed into its own system? Montesquieu’s conception of the evolution of liberty, and how it was cultivated through commerce and a forging of a people’s mores, offered an answer.

In his chapter titled “How commerce in Europe penetrated barbarism,” Montesquieu described the progression of the European perception of the merchant (ibid., 387). He offered England as the example. In its earliest period, ancient teaching, bolstered by the gospel, cultivated a view of commerce as “the profession of mean people,” and “soon it was no longer distinguished from the most horrible usuries” (ibid., 388). Eventually, however, “one saw commerce leave this seat of harassment and despair,” and both scholars and “theologians were obliged to curb their principles, and [thus] commerce, which had violently been linked to bad faith, returned, so to speak, to the bosom of integrity” (ibid., 389).

In addition, following this occurrence princes too changed their ways as they learned that they “had to govern themselves more wisely than they themselves would have thought, for it turned out that the great acts of authority were so clumsy that experience itself has made known that only goodness of government brings prosperity” (ibid.). Thus the greed of government actually encouraged a retrenchment of control and a freeing of the market. It was in fact “to the avarice of princes,” Montesquieu asserted, that “we owe the establishment of a device that puts it, in a way, out of their power” (ibid.). While it was the vice of avarice which motivated princes to allow commerce to flow more freely, newly commercial societies did not become permeated with vice. Instead, these societies saw their habits, customs, and laws become more gentle as commerce spread. For, as Montesquieu maintained, commerce “polishes and softens
barbarous mores, as we see everyday,” and, “therefore, one should not be surprised if our mores are less fierce than they were formerly” (ibid., 338).

Montesquieu thus presented an example of commerce transforming the mores of the English people, and he insisted that “what happened in England will give an idea of what was done in other countries,” and, presumably, what could continue to happen across the globe (ibid., 388). He explained that “one has begun to be cured of Machiavellianism, and one will continue to be cured of it” as it became more and more clear that good government brought greater prosperity (ibid., 389). He thus viewed liberal laws as springing from commercial mores, and, for him, commerce could be established through coercion. When a free, commercial “nation sent colonies abroad,” he maintained, “it would do so to extend its commerce more than its domination” (ibid., 328). He also affirmed that “we have seen how laws follow mores,” and while he immediately followed this with the seemingly baffling phrase “let us now see how mores follow laws,” he merely did this in order to demonstrate how laws and mores serve to reinforce and perpetuate each other once they have both been established (ibid., 325).

Montesquieu therefore envisioned a liberal, commercial nation conquering an illiberal, non-commercial nation and bringing with it international commerce and a subsequent “softening” of the colonial people’s mores. Montesquieu explained that as a liberal, commercial nation conquered, it “would carry prosperity with it, [and thus] one would see the formation of great peoples, even in the forests to which it has sent inhabitants” (ibid., 329). The progression to liberty which commerce brought, as seen in the example of England, would naturally occur in other barbarous nations, even if the commerce were forced upon it. As the mores of the colonial people began to soften and
adapt to commerce, the mother country would naturally back away from
“Machiavellianism” within the colony. This process could not be done in reverse, for
liberal laws could not be established in a land where the people’s mores were opposed to
such laws. The “customs of a slave people are a part of their servitude,” said
Montesquieu, while “those of a free people are a part of their liberty” (ibid., 325).

To return to the original point regarding despotism abroad and liberalism at home,
we see how Montesquieu justified a temporary establishment of despotism in a foreign
colony. If a mother country wanted to expand its own commerce to the non-commercial
nations of the world--and in doing so increase its own security (through interdependence)
and therefore its own liberty--it would have to begin by instilling, by force, commerce
into foreign nations. From there, commerce would transform the mores of the
dependency and eventually liberty would be able to reign. This demonstrated that
Montesquieu did not envision a liberal nation as permanently establishing a despotic
regime in another nation; rather, a mere temporary despotism would serve to increase
international trade, and thus international security. The consequence of these
arrangements, of course, would be increased liberty within the mother country as well as
the dependent country. Thus the liberal principles of the mother country would not
necessarily be contaminated by a temporary despotism, particularly when heightened
liberty for itself was the long-term ramification.

Additionally, the firmest guard against despotism creeping into the government at
home would have been the citizens themselves. Just as the colonial nation would be
developing its own commercial and liberal mores, the people of the mother country
would already have had these mores ingrained. The citizens of England, as Montesquieu
described, were restless and always wary of those in power. This characteristic was originally a result of the climate, yet, as noted, Montesquieu believed that mores and laws perpetuate each other. In outlining his hypothetical commercial, island nation, Montesquieu wrote that “the people would be uneasy about their situation and would believe themselves always in danger even at the safest moments” (ibid., 326). This temperament would keep them always on their guard against encroaching elements of despotism. “This nation,” he continued, “would love its liberty prodigiously because this liberty would be true,” and the people would be willing to go to great lengths to defend its liberty (ibid., 327).

Contrary to Montesquieu’s understanding of the relation between liberty and despotism, Mill did not view despotic rule as the opposite of liberal, representative government. Rather, Mill saw these two types of government as two ends of one fluid spectrum, and, depending on a particular society’s stage of development, the appropriate form of government was to be found somewhere in between. What ought to be sought after, according to Mill, was “the form of government which combines the greatest amount of good with the least amount of evil...for whom the institutions are intended” (Mill 1991, 10). For Mill, more advanced nations were capable of enjoying a greater degree of freedom, whereas less advanced nations could benefit more from heightened governmental control. “A people,” Mill stated, “may be unwilling or unable to fulfill the duties which a particular form of government requires of them,” even if they desired such a government (ibid., 15). “Thus a people may prefer a free government,” he explained, “but if, from indolence, or carelessness, or cowardice, or want of public spirit, they are unequal to the exertions necessary for preserving it...they are more or less unfit for
“In such a case,” he concluded, “a civilized government, to be really advantageous to them, will require to be in a considerable degree despotic” (ibid.). Unlike Montesquieu, Mill was not concerned with the principles of a government being contaminated. Mill, rather, saw the best form of government for a given society as typically falling somewhere in between the liberal-despotic spectrum. As a society progressed, however, (if it were in fact lucky enough to be guided toward civilization) it would advance toward more liberty as it moved farther away from despotism.

Mill repeatedly suggested that the most efficient way for a lower society to advance is to be under the guidance of a foreign, benevolent despot. Representative government, for a society not yet prepared to govern itself, would actually be a disservice to such a state’s progression. “Their improvement can not come from themselves,” Mill insisted, “but must be superinduced from without” (ibid., 49). In this way, the lower society would benefit from the wisdom and experience of the advanced nation that had reached the stage of representative government. Thus, unlike Montesquieu, who had more difficulty reconciling a liberal government at home with a despotic one abroad, Mill believed that this dual system was not only compatible, it was necessary. For a backward state to receive the full benefits of colonization, its colonizer had to be both liberal at home and despotic in the colony. “This, which may be termed the government of leading-strings,” said Mill, “seems to be the one required to carry such a people the most rapidly through the next necessary step in social progress” (ibid., 50). In lamenting the sad state of the Chinese people and its plateaued development, for example, Mill asserted that “if they are ever to be farther improved, it must be by foreigners” (Mill 2002, 74). Thus, as Magid succinctly wrote, “Mill believes in a government of experts” (Magid 1987, 793).
Mill therefore recognized rule at home and rule abroad as distinct and separate entities. “To govern a country under responsibility to the people of that country, and to govern one country under responsibility to the people of another country, are two very different things,” Mill maintained (Mill 1991, 347).

To ensure that these experts who came from the mother country were wise, insightful, and even creative, it was essential that their nation of origin was not corrupted by tyranny of custom. “Genius,” Mill insisted, “can only breathe freely in an atmosphere of freedom” (Mill 2002, 67). Mill was a firm advocate of preserving freedom of expression and opinion, and denied “the right of the people to exercise such coercion [over this freedom], either by themselves or by their government” (Mill 2002, 18). It was, Mill stressed, “imperative that human beings should be free to form opinions, and to express their opinions without reserve” (ibid., 57).

Initially, this may seem as though Mill would have objected to exercising control over the expression of people within dependencies. Indeed, when he brought up the hypothetical argument that governments should not “shrink from acting on their opinions” when they “are quite sure they of being right,” Mill offered his own response: “complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion, is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for purposes of action; and on no other terms can a being with human faculties have any rational assurance of being right” (ibid., 20-1). Thus it appeared as though Mill were promoting the idea of freedom of expression in all places and at all times. However, it must be remembered that Mill took it as a given that the same principles of freedom which were meant to apply to civilized nations were not applicable to nations at a lesser stage of development. “It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to
say,” Mill noted in the beginning of *On Liberty*, “that this doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties,” meaning that it was applicable neither to children nor to peoples of backward states (ibid., 12). With this broad disclaimer in place, Mill would not have felt it necessary to repeatedly allude to the civilizational requirements in his following discussions on liberty. Therefore, just as his harm principle was meant only to apply to advanced, civilized nations, we can confidently say that so too was his staunch advocation of freedom of expression.

This was made even more clear by his insistence that different times, and thus different stages, of now-advanced nations required different actions with regard to freedom of expression. Mill stressed the contemporary need to encourage people to act differently from the mass of society, because he believed individuality was currently at a great risk of being overcome by tyranny of opinion. “In other times,” however, he explained, “there was no advantage in...doing so, unless they acted not only differently, but better” (ibid., 69). “It was,” he added, “men of another stamp than this that made England what it has been; and men of another stamp will be needed to prevent its decline” (ibid., 72). Thus in previous ages, “acting differently from the mass” needed to be encouraged only when it offered the chance of improvement; yet “in this age,” Mill contended, “the mere example of non-conformity, the mere refusal to bend to the knee of custom, is itself a service” (ibid., 69). Since different times called for different requirements for freedom of expression, we can be sure that Mill intended his highest level of freedom of expression--much like his harm principle--to apply only to advanced nations.
Since it has been established that Mill did not find contradiction in a nation of liberty ruling despotically within a dependency, what remains to be determined is whether Mill believed the mother country’s own liberty could be promoted through colonization. While Mill believed that nations which engaged in colonization, such as England, were the most advanced nations of the world, he hardly thought that they should remain static in their current stage. Rather, not only was further advancement a possibility, such nations had to actively guard themselves against stagnation or, worse, regression. Mill offered the “warning example of China,” which, despite early periods of talent and wisdom, has since become “stationary,” according to Mill, and has “remained so for thousands of years” (ibid., 74). “They have succeeded,” Mill lamented, “beyond all hope in what English philanthropists are so industriously working at--in making a people all alike” (ibid.). Mill believed that encouraging individuality was the best combatant against this threat of enforced conformity, for individuality sparked new, progressive ideas whereas conformity fostered mediocrity. “Unless individuality shall be able to successfully assert itself against this yoke” of conformity, Mill warned, “Europe...will tend to become another China” (ibid.).

Yet how does colonization abroad promote such individuality and creativity of thought in the mother country, especially when freedom of expression is not even sanctioned within the foreign colonies? Mill was not suggesting that a marketplace of ideas was to instantly spring up between the colony and the metropole, whereby both nations might benefit from the exchange of ideas. Mill, of course, believed that the dependent country could benefit a tremendous amount--namely, through its advancement to higher stages of civilization--thanks to the wisdom imparted from the liberal mother
country. However, this relationship would not be reciprocal, as progress for the advanced nations would not come directly from the colonized lands. As Magid pointed out, “it is more difficult to determine what our society, a highly civilized one, requires to move on to its next stage of which we at present have no example and no clear conception” (Magid 1987, 787). Thus, progress for advanced nations would not be based on any pre-established pattern or precedent (as none existed), but rather would have to come from completely original ideas, and the only assurance that such ideas would be free to form was the sort of social freedom that consisted of protection from tyranny of custom--that is, freedom of expression.

While Mill did not expect a mutually beneficial exchange of ideas between colony and metropole to occur instantaneously, he may have foreseen the long-run advantage of guiding colonies toward liberty. For although Mill affirmed that “the only unfailing and permanent source of improvement is liberty,” he was also convinced that liberty was unsuited for societies in lower stages of advancement (Mill 2002, 72). Thus, he concluded, “the spirit of improvement is not always a spirit of liberty, for it may aim at forcing improvements on an unwilling people” (ibid.). Yet once these lower societies were taught to sufficiently enjoy and protect liberty, and once they had successfully advanced to representative government and were thus deserving of freedom of expression, then (and only then) might a mutually beneficial marketplace of ideas be created between the now former mother country and now former dependency.

A contemporary example of this can be found in the gains Great Britain (and the rest of the world) has received from its former colony, India. As Leadbeater and Wilsdon described, India, now “an imperfect but vibrant democracy,” has in recent years become
the home of important innovation hubs, such as in the cities of Bangalore and Pune (Leadbeater and Wilsdon 2007, 9, 13). The legacy of British colonization has influenced India’s evolving approach to innovation development, and, as these authors argued, Great Britain now has much to gain from India’s emerging innovative class. “Modern Indian science,” Leadbeater and Wilsdon explained, “is a complex mix of institutions inherited from the British Raj, state-sponsored programmes started after Independence and companies created out of more recent connections with the US and Silicon Valley” (ibid., 17). “Political independence from Britain in 1947 ushered in a concerted attempt to build a self-reliant Indian science and innovation system”; “but,” they went on, “since India opened its economy to international investment and trade in 1991, it has positioned itself as an interdependent innovator, serving multinational companies and creating technologies for global markets” (ibid., 13).

These authors, writing for British think tank Demos, encouraged Britain to capitalize on the new ideas which India currently has to offer, for India’s particular brand of “cosmopolitan innovation” requires and depends on “international collaboration” (ibid., 39). This “cosmopolitan innovation” is the notion that “more brains, working on more ideas, in more places around the world, are good news for innovation” (ibid., 11). “Innovation in Asia may accelerate development and raise incomes, creating a larger market for British services,” and, as Leadbeater and Wilsdon argued, “innovators in Britain may also be more productive if they can collaborate with Asian partners [such as India] with complementary skills, for example in the application and development of technology” (ibid.). India, they suggested, has become an exporter not only of ideas, but also of people with knowledge, skills, and training. “India does not have an innovation
system,” they stressed, “but an innovation class: the global, non-resident Indians, who are embedded in social and business networks that connect India to Silicon Valley and beyond” (ibid., 13).

Thus India now has much to offer the world by way of innovation and knowledge, and it would be wise for nations around the world to make themselves the receptors of these new ideas and skilled individuals looking to emigrate. India as a free, electoral democracy therefore has more than just labor and markets to offer Great Britain; it now offers new ideas (Freedom House 2012). Such innovations offer British citizens (and indeed citizens of all receptive nations) countless opportunities, from consumer goods to increased economic prosperity via job creation, and even stretch to the defense industry. The Tata Group alone demonstrates this phenomenon. This incredibly successful Indian corporation “has grown to become the largest Indian employer in the UK, compromising 19 companies and a 45,000-strong workforce spread across the region,” and currently “Tata is the largest foreign investor in UK industry” (www.uk.tata.com). Additionally, as the UK Defense Minister of International Security Strategy, Gerald Howarth, commented, “both Britain and Indian companies have a huge amount to offer each other in terms of investment opportunities and long term partnerships,” and he made special reference to the Tata Group as “the largest manufacturing employer in Britain” (Howarth 2012). This statement came following Tata’s recent agreement “to produce a super steel armor in Britain using an invention developed by the U.K. Ministry of Defence’s research laboratory” (Chuter 2011).

In this way, Mill would argue, an advanced nation that colonized a less developed nation would find that it benefits a great deal more after the colony has been “made” into
advanced society with the liberty (and security) to develop and share innovation. Through colonization, a liberal mother country would thereby not only be working toward the improvement of that dependency by guiding it toward liberty, but it would also be potentially working toward the advancement of its own liberty. New ideas were the only route to progress, and new ideas only sprang from societies of liberty; thus cultivating liberal societies around the world would surely present at least the possibility of more new ideas, and this would in the process help all nations involved--mother country and colony alike. “We continually make new inventions in mechanical things, and keep them until they are again superseded by better”; thus “the progressive principle,” Mill contended, “in either shape, whether as love of liberty or of improvement, is antagonistic to the sway of Custom, involving at least emancipation from that yoke; and the contest between the two constitutes the chief interest of the history of mankind” (Mill 2002, 72-3).

Mill therefore saw no contention between one nation loving liberty and enjoying all its benefits at home, while simultaneously ruling despotically abroad. Although he suggested that England may in fact fare better without her colonies, due to cost and status, he found no obstacles to the mother country’s liberty in keeping her colonies. Rather, there remained the potential for more liberal societies to be developed through such colonization, and thus the possibility for more original ideas in the future. And, of course, new ideas were the only avenue that promised any chance of advancement of liberty for the mother country itself.
CHAPTER 3: CAN LIBERTY BE PROMOTED IN THE DEPENDENT COUNTRY?

Part 1: Is Liberty Possible?

Obstacles to Liberty

Montesquieu and Mill both attributed the lack of liberty in nations primarily to certain obstacles which inhibited the successful establishment of free government. Montesquieu believed that a nation’s physical features, such as climate and terrain, could shape the people’s character so deeply that they would affect the type of government its inhabitants were most suited for. Indeed, quite early on in *The Spirit of the Laws* Montesquieu insisted that a nation’s laws “should be related to the physical aspect of the country; to the climate, be it freezing, torrid, or temperate; to the properties of the terrain, its location and extent; to the way of life of the peoples...[T]hey should relate to the degree of liberty that the constitution can sustain, to the religion of the inhabitants, their inclinations, their wealth, their number, their commerce, their mores and their manners; finally, the laws are related to one another, to their origin, to the purpose of the legislator, and to the order of things on which they are established. They must be considered from all these points of view” (Montesquieu 2009, 9). As climate influenced mores to such a great extent, these mores determined whether liberal government could be properly maintained, exercised, and enjoyed. Montesquieu therefore argued that one could not assume that liberal self-government could be instantly adopted by certain populations, but rather a fundamental change in the population’s general spirit had to take place beforehand.

Physical characteristics of the land also provided the basis for mores that were conducive to liberty. The English people, for example, “received from the [cold] climate
a certain characteristic of impatience that did not permit it to tolerate the same things for long,” and this made them best suited for a certain type of government--specifically, “one in which they could not be allowed to blame any one person for causing their sorrows, and in which, as laws rather than men would govern, the laws themselves must be overturned in order to change the state” (ibid., 242). As “men are more vigorous in cold climates,” they therefore have the mores required for representative government (ibid., 231). In England there was, “for example, more confidence in oneself, that is, more courage; better knowledge of one’s superiority, that is, less desire for vengeance; a higher opinion of one’s security, that is, more frankness and fewer suspicions,” and this made for “very different characters” from what could be found elsewhere (ibid., 232).

This contrasted with the characters that developed in hot climates. “The peoples in hot countries are timid like old men,” Montesquieu wrote, while “those in cold countries are courageous like young men” (ibid, 232). While today the importance Montesquieu placed on climate may seem rather strange, it must be remembered that he based this theory on what he considered to be valid observations, including instances of history and experiments involving a sheep’s tongue, and he thus believed himself to be fully justified in making the conclusions that he did. For his experiments, he froze half the sheep’s tongue and observed the fiber contractions through a microscope. He remained confident that “this observation confirms what I have said, that, in cold countries, the tufts of nerves are less open,” and, “therefore, sensations are less vivid” (ibid., 233). From this he concluded that “in cold countries, one will have little sensitivity to pleasures; one will have more of it in temperate countries; [and] in hot climates, sensitivity will be extreme” (ibid.).
Thus hot climates induced people to be indolent, torpid, cowardly, and even immoral. “The heat of the climate can be so excessive,” Montesquieu asserted, “that the body there will be absolutely without strength” (ibid., 234). “So,” he elaborated, “prostration will pass even to the spirit; no curiosity, no noble enterprise, no generous sentiment; inclinations will all be passive there; laziness there will be happiness” (ibid.).

“Servitude,” Montesquieu expanded, “always begins with drowsiness” (ibid., 243). As Pangle pointed out, Montesquieu insisted that the “natural environment--climate, geography, terrain--and the conventional environment--history and tradition--mold and limit man,” and thus “the political alternatives must be understood in light of the fact that human nature is to a great extent not uniform” (Pangle 1973, 161). “One must not be surprised,” Montesquieu maintained, “that the cowardice of the peoples in hot climates has almost always made them slaves and that the courage of the peoples of cold climates has kept them free” (Montesquieu 2009, 278).

Thus climate largely affected man’s character and made him more or less suited to liberal government; yet it was not the absolute and final verdict. Because of the intense heat of the region, Montesquieu insisted, “Indians are by nature without courage”; yet he added that “even the children of Europeans born in the Indies lose the courage of the European climate” (ibid., 234). This demonstrated Montesquieu’s emphasis on the primacy of external influences, versus innate dissimilarities. In a counter to Aristotle’s assertion that some people are slaves by their nature, Montesquieu argued that “as all men are born equal, one must say that slavery is against nature, although in certain countries it may be founded on a natural reason, and these countries must be distinguished from those in which even natural reasons reject it, as in the countries of
Europe where it has so fortunately been abolished” (ibid., 252). This pointed to the potential, in Montesquieu’s view, for all men to overcome a natural inclination for slavery brought about by the physical conditions of the region. “Perhaps,” he contemplated, “there is no climate on earth where one could not engage freemen to work. Because the laws were badly made, lazy men appeared; because these men were lazy, they were enslaved” (ibid. 253).

Montesquieu therefore believed that the physical attributes and resultant mores of a region posed the biggest obstacles to establishing liberty, yet he was confident that these were surmountable. Lowenthal explained that, for Montesquieu, “climate sets natural limits to the extension of free, moderate, or non-despotic government” (Lowenthal 1987, 527). For Montesquieu, these limits had to be somehow overcome in order to successfully implement liberal government. Mill, on the other hand, devoted much more attention to distinguishing between the “civilized” and “backward” stages which states had attained, and the applicability of different types of government to these various stages of advancement. For Mill, it was a nation’s lower stage of civilization which posed the most formidable obstacle for establishing liberal government. Mill argued that the more “civilized portions of the species” are distinguished by “the stages of progress into which” they have entered, and only advanced, civilized nations were suited for representative government (Mill 2002, 3).

Mill stressed that his conception of liberty could be applied only to advanced, civilized societies and not to backward states. This was because stages of advancement were more or less synonymous with certain lessons that were necessary for the proper execution of representative government. If a liberal government was implemented prior
to the appropriate stage of advancement, the government would not only be exercised improperly, it would actually present a further obstacle to future progress. A people, said Mill, “in order to advance in civilization, have some lesson to learn, some habit not yet acquired, to the acquisition of which representative government is likely to be an impediment” (Mill 1991, 85). Until imperative lessons, such as obedience, were learned by a backward society, “a government under their own control would be entirely unmanageable by them” (ibid., 49).

There were three “social requisites” a society had to attain before representative government could be successfully established. Mill noted that these social requisites were distinct from a nation’s overall stage of advancement, but that they were so closely related they could be taken as more or less synonymous. “The adaptation of a people to representative government,” he explained, “does not depend so much upon the place they occupy in the general scale of humanity as upon the degree in which they possess certain social requisites” (ibid., 81). These “requisites, however,” Mill added, were “so closely connected with their degree of general advancement, that any variation between the two is rather the exception than the rule” (ibid.). These requisites consisted of: first, the desire for and willingness to receive representative government; second, a “sufficient value for, and attachment to, a representative constitution” so that they may sustain and preserve it; and, third, the will and “the capacity to fulfill the part which belongs to them in a representative constitution” (ibid., 81-84).

Instilling such requisites into a population was, according to Mill, an immense and highly complex task. It took knowledge of a society’s current capabilities, an understanding of the immediate steps that were necessary to take and the lessons which
had to be learned, and, finally, all this had to be considered in light of future steps which would have to be made down the line. As each society required its own unique prescription for advancement, Mill insisted that an extensive “knowledge of the particular people, and general practical judgement and sagacity, must be the guides” (ibid., 19) Whoever led the charge in advancing the nation therefore had to be able to determine the specific “defects and shortcomings which belong to that people,” and especially they had “to distinguish those that are the immediate impediment to progress--to discover what it is which (as it were) stops the way” (ibid., 50). “The best government for them,” then, would be “the one which tends most to give them that for want of which they can not advance, or advance only in a lame and lopsided manner” (ibid., 50-1).

As noted, the best form of government for those unable to advance themselves was, according to Mill, a foreign, despotic ruler. A backward nation was unable, or at least highly unlikely, to determine how best to advance itself. Foreign rulers from a civilized society would already have knowledge of how a society progresses, and therefore would be more inclined to determine how best to lead the backward dependency toward advancement. “Then, indeed,” Mill argued, “the rulers may be, to almost any extent, superior in civilization to those over whom they rule,” and thus “subjugation to a foreign government of this description, notwithstanding its inevitable evils, is often the greatest advantage to a people, carrying them rapidly through several stages of progress, and clearing away obstacles to improvement which might have lasted indefinitely if this subject population had been left unassisted to its native tendencies and chances” (ibid., 91-2). A benevolent despot could expertly guide a backward nation out of the fetters which previously bound it to barbarism, often for centuries. “From the
general weakness of the people or of the state of civilization,” Mill contended, “the One...or the Few, are not likely to be habitually exempt, except in the case of their being foreigners, belonging to a superior people or a more advanced state of society” (ibid., 91).

We see that Mill himself noted that there may be some evils associated with this type of foreign, despotic rule. He therefore emphasized that it was meant to be a temporary intervention that provided a sort of crash course in advancement for the colony; it was not an end in itself. “A good despotism,” he stressed, “is an altogether false ideal, which practically (except as a means to some temporary purpose) becomes the most senseless and dangerous chimeras” (ibid., 63). Mill also wanted to instruct the foreign actors in the dependency to do as little harm as possible in the process of furthering their progress. “We must not,” he insisted, “forget the reservation necessary in all things which have for their object improvement or Progress, namely, that in seeking the good which is needed, no damage, or as little as possible, be done to that already possessed” (ibid., 51). “The form of government which is most effectual for carrying a people through the next stage of progress,” he added, “will still be very improper for them if it does this in such a manner as to obstruct...the next step beyond” (ibid.). The teaching of obedience, for example, must not turn into the establishment or perpetuation of slavery; otherwise a step backward rather than forward would have been accomplished. As the complex nature of advancement was even a challenge to foreigners already immersed in civilization, so, for Mill, it remained nearly impossible for a backward nation to successfully recognize the steps necessary to advance itself.

Vice and Obedience: The Unexpected Sources for Overcoming Obstacles to Liberty
Since climate and terrain could obviously not be changed (at least not in Montesquieu’s time), Montesquieu searched for a way in which a society might overcome these challenges and advance toward liberty. Montesquieu was adamant that, despite these substantial hurdles, a proper shift in the general spirit would enable a people to overcome such obstacles. The most successful transformation of a general spirit would, in Montesquieu’s view, come from the vast influence brought through conquest by a liberal, commercial nation. Conquest of this nature would actually benefit the colonized nation to such a great extent—through the introduction of modern, international commerce—that the dependent nation would enjoy not only greater economic privileges through such commerce, but also heightened security, “softened” mores, and an overall increase in liberty. Montesquieu even suggested that, “instead of drawing such fatal consequences from the right of conquest,” like servitude and slavery, “political men would have done better to speak of the advantages this right can sometimes confer on a vanquished people,” thanks to the expanded commerce, security, and liberty it offered (Montesquieu 2009, 141).

For Montesquieu, commerce presented the brightest avenue for advancing liberty within a dependency. This “softening” effect which commerce had on a people’s mores, also managed to make governments more gentle. Commerce would, Montesquieu believed, serve to temper despotic tactics of the foreign colonizer as well. Montesquieu argued that as commerce advances, despotism naturally recedes. A nation, typically hot, having been stuck in the mire of local despotism for decades or even centuries, would have this replaced by the temporary despotism of a foreign, commercial conqueror; and, eventually, this new despotism would naturally retreat as commerce flourished. As
Pangle noted, “Montesquieu points to the fact that, within limits established by nature, commerce introduced from abroad will ameliorate despotism” (Pangle 1973, 211).

Montesquieu also described how commerce and despotism were naturally incompatible, as their spirits were at odds. Montesquieu used the example of Muscovy to highlight this argument. Muscovy, he explained, “has tried to leave its despotism” and establish a commercial system, yet it continually found that it could not (Montesquieu 2009, 416). “The establishment of commerce,” Montesquieu wrote, “requires the establishment of the exchange, and the operations of the exchange contradict all Muscovy’s laws” (ibid.). “The subjects of the empire,” he explained, “like slaves, were unable to leave or to send out their goods without permission,” and in this way “commerce itself is in contradiction to these laws” (ibid., 417). The laws of Muscovy therefore generated a slave-like general spirit in its people, and consequently, despite its efforts, it was unable to successfully establish commerce. The mores of Muscovy would have to change before commerce could successfully take root.

Montesquieu maintained that a general spirit could be altered, yet such an endeavor would be no small task. Montesquieu often spoke of the beneficial effects commerce would have on a people’s mores and spirit, but how would such a great transformation occur? It might seem as though such a beneficial outcome would be brought about by some grand and virtuous means, yet Montesquieu actually suggested that it was the releasing of certain vices of human nature, not virtues, that would facilitate the metamorphosis of a general spirit into a commercial one. As we shall see, commerce allowed such vices to be liberated in a sense, and to be channeled toward the production of positive results. In an ode to the Muses, which also served as the introduction to his
book on commerce, Montesquieu rhapsodized, “you are never as divine as when you lead to wisdom and truth through pleasure” (ibid., 337).

The primary vice that was most facilitative of productive goods was, according to Montesquieu, vanity. There were, he insisted, “innumerable goods resulting from vanity: luxury, industry, the arts, fashions, politeness, and taste” (ibid., 312). Montesquieu, however, stressed the distinction between vanity and arrogance. “Vanity,” he said, “is as good a spring for a government as arrogance is a dangerous one” (ibid.). He contrasted the goods produced by vanity with the “infinite evils born of the arrogance of certain nations,” which included “laziness, poverty, the abandonment of everything, and the destruction of the nations that chance has let fall into their hands as well as their own nation” (ibid.). “Laziness,” he summed up, “is the effect of arrogance,” whereas “work follows vanity” (ibid.). And thus we see, he argued, how “the arrogance of a Spaniard will incline him not to work; [while] the vanity of a Frenchman will incline him to try to work better than the others” (ibid.). As Pangle reiterated, “vanity and other vices are conducive to work, industry, and commerce” (Pangle 1973, 195).

Vanity, which occurred naturally in all humans, could therefore be used as a tool for fostering a commercial spirit. As an aspect of human nature, vanity, when encouraged properly through commerce, could help surmount the natural, physical limits climate set on the manners and mores of a people. Pangle further explained that, “insofar as a national spirit contains the possibility for the liberation of the selfish passions of avarice and vanity, it has the potential for commerce and hence for vastly increased security or liberty” (ibid., 198-9). Vanity and commerce would work together to encourage each other in a productive manner, and would thereby work to remold the people’s general
spirit into one which support not only commerce, but also the subsequent ramifications of security and liberty. Thus if a conquering nation brought with it an unobstructed flow of commerce, and if it fanned the flames of the local people’s vanity instead of attempting to suppress it, a general spirit propitious to liberty could emerge.

Montesquieu of course discouraged the forced change of mores through laws, especially from a foreign source, for this would be tyrannical; he instead suggested that “it would be better to change them by other mores and manners,” and this could be done most effectively through the introduction of commerce (Montesquieu 2009, 315). Pangle went on to expound that “the legislator need not act with violence and compulsion when he creates through law a way of life which follows the selfish bent of human nature,” and in fact the “correct method” for transforming the general spirit is through “the liberation and use of the natural but immoral passion of vanity” (Pangle 1973, 196-7). Montesquieu reminded us that even Alexander the Great understood this point, for when he conquered he “respected the old traditions and everything that recorded the glory and the vanity of [the vanquished] peoples,” while he also effectively spread commerce throughout his conquered lands; Alexander respected local customs as he simultaneously “formed the design for uniting the Indies with the west by a maritime commerce, as he had united them by the colonies he had established on the land” (Montesquieu 2009, 150, 366).

Commerce, therefore, allowed the natural instincts of vanity and self-interest to come to the forefront, and these subsequently served to develop a general spirit of productivity within the dependency. “The spirit of commerce,” Montesquieu insisted, was “opposed on the one hand to banditry and on the other to those moral virtues that make it so that one does not always discuss one’s own interests alone and that one can
neglect them for those of others” (Montesquieu 2009, 338). In advocating the encouragement of such vices as a means for overcoming physical obstacles such as climate, however, Montesquieu wanted to make it clear that he still considered vanity to be in fact a vice. That had not changed; what was new was how such a vice could be put to use. “I have not said this,” he stressed, “to diminish in any way the infinite distance there is between vices and virtues: God forbid!” (ibid., 314). He explained that “I have only wanted to make it understood that not all political vices are moral vices and that not all moral vices are political vices, and those who make laws that run counter to the general spirit should not be ignorant of this” (ibid.). So long as the laws favored commerce, therefore, people would happily be “in a situation such that, though their passions inspire in them the thought of being wicked, they nevertheless have an interest in not being so” (ibid., 389-40).

Montesquieu therefore saw great advantages as coming from what was essentially moral corruption. He argued that the ancient notion of a republic founded on virtue was not only outdated, it was unwise if the intended goal was the spread of commerce and prosperity. To highlight the difference, Montesquieu observed that while “the political men of Greece who lived under popular government recognized no other force to sustain it than virtue...[t]hose of today speak to us of manufacturing, commerce, finance, wealth, and even luxury” (ibid., 22-3). As Pangle noted, Montesquieu believed that “a virtuous republic is possible only among a simple, poor, primitive people,” and thus “pure and generous morals, the morals praised by the ancients, go together with barbarism” (Pangle 1973, 197, 210).
This was made clear by Montesquieu’s praising of England over the ancient republics. When pinpointing the principles associated with various governments across the centuries and around the world, he asserted that there has only been “one nation in the world whose constitution has political liberty for its direct purpose,” and this was of course England (Montesquieu 2009, 156). Similarly, when outlining the merits of the English constitution, he stressed the numerous benefits it had over those of ancient governments. The British system of checks and balances was a huge advantage over the ancient governments, for example (ibid., 162). Additionally, the English constitution gave the people the right “to choose their representatives,” which was “quite within their reach,” whereas “a great vice in most ancient republics was that the people had the right to make resolutions for action” (ibid., 160, emphasis added). Thus we see how Montesquieu referred to this expanded equality of the ancient republics--typically thought of as a virtue--as indeed a vice. “Even virtue has need of limits,” he urged (ibid., 155). The ancient republics based on moral virtues therefore possessed some political vices; Montesquieu advocated the interchanging of these in certain respects for modern republics.

Montesquieu believed that England was able to sustain liberty and commerce better than the ancients not in spite of the former’s vices, but rather because of these. “When virtue ceases,” Montesquieu wrote, “ambition enters those hearts that can admit it, and avarice enters them all” (ibid., 23). The advent of such vices, or at least the allowance for them to thrive, changed the character of a people. While “one was free under the laws” in ancient republics, Montesquieu stated, with the flourishing of vice in modern, commercial republics, now “one wants to be free against them” (ibid.). “Each
citizen” in a modern, liberal society, he noted, “is like a slave who has escaped from his master’s house” (ibid.). Pangle again clarified by pointing out that, for Montesquieu, “the English way of life is based on the liberation of the petty selfishness of man,” and this demonstrated “not only the necessity, but the beneficence, the charm, [and] the power, of vice” (Pangle 1973, 197, 199). Thus the expression of vice in this way was a sort of emancipation, an appropriate and productive mechanism for promoting commerce, industry, security, and, not least of all, liberty.

This was not to suggest that a modern, liberal nation should be founded entirely on vice. Rather, Montesquieu advised, a healthy combination of virtue and vice should be established--or, in other words, a government of moderation ought be formed. The general spirit of this nation could therefore release the vices which spur commerce and industry, while still retaining the virtues that keep society safe and stable. “The various characters of the nations,” Montesquieu asserted, “are mixtures of virtues and vices, of good and bad qualities” (Montesquieu 2009, 313). He contended that “the happy mixtures are those that result in great goods, and one often would not expect them,” and, similarly, “some result in evils, and one would not expect them either” (ibid.). Montesquieu employed the examples of Spain and China to illustrate this point. Spain, he said, was highly faithful and trustworthy, and this actually hampered it with regard to commerce; conversely, China enjoyed great commercial success, yet it was unfaithful and untrustworthy (ibid., 313-4). Nonetheless, an advantageous mix of virtue and vice was the ideal.

As Pangle summed up, for Montesquieu, “commerce requires security, and therefore some degree of moderate government,” and as “the commercial way of life
produces comfort and security,” the initial “commerce can be promoted by the power of vanity” (Pangle 1973, 210, 198). Thus we see how commerce, fostered by vanity, served to mold the general spirit into one favorable to security and liberty. While climate and other physical features of the land may have posed formidable obstacles to liberty, human nature offered the seeds of solution. A population’s general spirit was malleable enough to allow the vices inherent in its citizens to surge forward and be directed in appropriate ways via commerce. When a colony was provided this direction by a liberal, commercial nation, despite the subjugation involved, it could potentially achieve liberty through the process. Conquest, Montesquieu maintained, was “a necessary, legitimate, and unfortunate right, which always leaves an immense debt to be discharged if human nature if to be repaid”; yet, “a conquest can destroy harmful prejudices, and...can put a nation under a better presiding genius” (Montesquieu 2009, 142). Ultimately, therefore, Montesquieu envisioned a way in which liberty could be promoted through this change in the general spirit brought about by colonization; and such a positive change would prove to be the repayment of this debt to humanity.

For Mill, liberty also developed through an unexpected source. Liberty, he argued first, had no application until a society had reached the stage whereby it could properly use it, and until that time compulsion from an outside source was justifiable. Backward societies required much more guidance and therefore a stronger central authority--preferably one of a foreign origin who has already learned the lessons of civilization. Strong, central authority was in fact “the most suitable form of polity for the earliest stages of any community,” for it was most capable of eliciting the first lesson of civilization: obedience (Mill 1991, 90, 28). Mill argued that “a people in a state of savage
independence, in which every one lives for himself, exempt, unless by fits, from any external control, is practicably incapable of making any progress in civilization until he has learned to obey” (ibid., 47). “The indispensable virtue, therefore,” he went on, “in a government which establishes itself over a people of this sort is that it make itself obeyed,” and to effectively “enable it to do this, the constitution of the government must be nearly, or quite despotic” (ibid.).

Mill explained that a people who had not yet learned to obey would consequently not obey the laws it had established itself. For this reason, a popular government consisting of this type of people would inevitably fall into anarchy. “A constitution in any degree popular,” he asserted, “dependent on the voluntary surrender by the different members of the community of their individual freedom of action, would fail to enforce the first lessons which the pupils, in this stage of their progress, require” (ibid.). Obeying the laws that a society gave to itself was a characteristic of civilized states; it demonstrated that it was ready for and made proper use of its representative government. Until a society reached this level of “maturity,” however, discipline and rule-enforcement had to come from an outside source. “Accordingly,” Mill maintained, “the civilization of such tribes...is almost always the work of an absolute ruler, deriving his power from religion or military prowess--very often from foreign arms” (ibid.).

Obedience was therefore a lesson which had to be learned before representative government could be established. Yet because this was intended to be a step toward eventual representative government, not just any type of obedience would do. Mill insisted that “there are different degrees of obedience, and it is not every degree that is commendable” (ibid., 28). “Only an unmitigated despotism,” and thus not a benevolent
one with the dependent nation’s progress and eventual liberation as its aim, “demands that the individual citizen shall obey unconditionally every mandate of persons in authority” (ibid., 28-9). “We must at least,” he contended, “limit the definition to such mandates as are general, and issued in the deliberate form of laws,” for while “a people of savages should be taught obedience,” this should not be done “in such a manner as to convert them into a people of slaves” (ibid., 29, 51).

Thus for Mill obedience was a lesson of civilization, yet it was not intended to become the defining characteristic of a people, even as they remained living under a foreign despotism. Indeed, a corollary to this obedience was the willingness to relinquish old customs and accept new ideas. The notions of obedience and progress may initially seem at odds, yet, for Mill, they were not only compatible, they were symbiotic. Obedience was meant to establish order, which was the first step in progress, and from there a society would ideally continue to improve itself while retaining this established order. In other words, one would follow the laws, but he would simultaneously be free to form new ideas. Before a society could successfully promote both of these factors for itself, however, a benevolent (often foreign) despot would be able to efficiently guide the population toward order and away from old habits. For a society to progress, it necessarily had to change many of its old ways, yet, like obedience, mere change in and of itself was not enough. For Mill, a nation needed to learn how to change, and continue to change, in order to advance itself toward civilization and ultimately liberty—a lesson that would come most effectively from a foreign (and temporary) despot. Thus progress was an accompaniment to order, and we see how a despotism could guide a nation toward procuring both.
Montesquieu and Mill each supported despotic rule within a colony, yet they also maintained that such rule should be temporary. Both of these philosophers envisioned a helpless, backward dependent country as being elevated out from the dregs of barbarism and into light of liberty thanks to the colonization imposed on it by a foreign, liberal nation. Montesquieu wanted the shining example of the mother country and its commerce to persuade the colonial people to remodel their general spirit in a manner that stimulated liberty. Mill, on the other hand, wanted the mother country to make a conscious effort to advance the dependent nation along the stages of progress toward the ultimate goal of representative government. While each writer therefore promoted their own method, both envisioned heightened liberty for the dependent country as the end result of colonization through distinct though similar processes.

Though Montesquieu and Mill both promoted temporary despotism within the colony, neither provided any specific timeline for the despotic rule’s eventual termination. The end to this rule was instead meant to come with the accomplishment of specific goals. For Montesquieu, the goals intended for the benefit of the mother country would be mirrored by a benevolent process which occurred concomitantly in the dependent country, and these were an increase in security, prosperity, and liberty. While Montesquieu did not deny the harmful elements of colonization, such as restricted commerce and subjugation, he suggested that the colony would nonetheless develop in such a way that the positive ramifications would make the entire process overall advantageous for the dependent country. For Montesquieu, these advantages consisted of the security and prosperity brought by commerce, and, most significantly, the natural
emergence of liberty which accompanied the resultant shift in the colonial people’s
general spirit.

Mill, too, acknowledged the disadvantages that colonization inflicted on the
dependent nation, yet he also believed that the good done to the colony outweighed the
negative effects. For Mill, progress was the primary goal for the dependent country, yet
this type of progress brought with it an increase in security, prosperity, and, eventually,
liberty. Colonization would, according to Mill, guide the dependent nation toward the
highest stage of civilization: representative self-government. This necessarily meant that
colonization’s own goal was to ultimately end itself. Mill believed that the expertise of
the liberal, colonizing nation would accomplish this goal of advancement in a much more
reliable and efficient way than would the colonial nation itself—and often, the colonial
nation would never even be able to enable such progress at all. Thus, for Mill, the colony
would overwhelmingly benefit in the long-run.

Security for the Dependent Country

Montesquieu and Mill both believed that the metropole owed a debt of security to
its colonies. This security offered by the mother country consisted of protection in the
international realm, as well as greater security for the colony locally. Montesquieu
advocated that the mother country establish good civil laws within the colony as a form
of compensation (Montesquieu 2009, 144). For Montesquieu, it was essential that this
included good criminal laws, for, in his view, “the citizen’s liberty depends principally on
the goodness of criminal laws” (ibid., 188) This was so because “when the innocence of
the citizens is not secure, neither is liberty,” and these citizens’ very “security is never
more attacked than by public or private accusations” (ibid.). When the colonizing nation
sent wise rulers to the colony, as Montesquieu prescribed, they would ideally promote these good criminal laws in the colonial system. Thus, despite the despotic elements of government that presided, overall domestic security would be promoted within the colony. As Montesquieu maintained that the citizens’ *opinion* of security was of utmost importance for liberty, the mere presence of such good laws would alleviate their fear of one another and of the government. Hence, as fear receded, liberty advanced.

Commerce, for Montesquieu, was also the great promoter of security and liberty. Domestically, a colony would receive an increase in the citizenry’s perception of security as commerce was advanced. In a commercial nation, Montesquieu noted that “as no citizen would depend on another citizen, each would make more of his liberty than of the glory of a few citizens, or of a single one” (ibid., 328). In this way, commerce permitted each citizen to depend on himself for his own livelihood; he was no longer required to be a slave, a serf, or a sycophant. This independence brought to citizens by commerce contrasted with the *dependence* brought to nations by commerce. The difference resulted from the limitation associated with international markets; a free citizen could always find recourse in new buyers or sellers, whereas commercial nations only had so many options. International security via the interdependence of commerce also helped fill the security vacuum of international anarchy; conversely, citizens of liberal, commercial nations had “the recourse of tribunals” (ibid., 138).

Thus Montesquieu also saw enhanced international security as resulting from the interdependence facilitated by commerce. In this way colonization promoted international security for the mother country and the dependent country alike. Though Montesquieu frowned upon the augmentation of arms which typically accompanied the conquest of
foreign lands, he envisioned a peaceful method of strengthening security between nations: commercial interdependence secured by mutual needs and shared interests. Montesquieu made it abundantly clear that liberal nations would colonize for the primary purpose of spreading commerce, and this meant that the colonies of such nations would be led out from their crude state which lacked sophisticated trade, and into the modern system of international markets. As more and more nations became connected to this international web of commerce, their mutual dependence, and thus their mutual interest in peace, would continue to intensify.

Each new nation that was plugged into this connected system would be a recipient, and a perpetuator, of international peace. A formerly isolated and primitive state would instantly gain a new ally with each new market. Even though colonization often implemented strict regulations with regard to trade, the indirect markets the colony gained through the mother country would be equally its ally in fostering international peace. A colony could rest assured that no member of its mother country’s extensive network of trading partners would attack it, for such an act would jeopardize the aggressor’s own economy as well as incite retaliation from the mother country. Rather, it would be in everyone’s interest to remain peaceful.

Mill’s version of international security was arrived at in two distinct ways: protection and commerce. In the first place, Mill insisted that the mother country was obliged to pledge its steadfast commitment to the protection of the dependency. This meant that the metropole’s arms, soldiers, and the cost thereof, would all become dedicated to the defense of the colony. While the dependent nation would lose the right to declare war itself, the mother country would take on the immense role of guardian. The
mother country was required, in Mill’s view, to repel all aggressions directed against the colony (Mill 1991, 343). Additionally, however, the mother country had already done its dependency a service by colonizing it itself. This eliminated the chance that it would be conquered by a “bad” despot, one which certainly would not have the colony’s best interest in mind, as the liberal colonizer would. Any future attempts at invasion would be blocked by the strong, formidable metropole (so long as the dependency remained its colony, of course).

This protection in the international arena would also be bolstered by commerce in the Montesquieuan sense. International commerce encouraged “friendly co-operation among nations,” said Mill, and it was therefore a step “toward universal peace” because “it renders war impossible” (ibid., 342). In this way, commerce between nations served to ameliorate the “security dilemma” that resulted from international anarchy. “One of the acknowledged effects of that [commercial] progress,” said Mill, “is an increase in general security” (Mill 1894, 500). “Destruction by wars,” he added, “and spoliation by private and public violence are less and less to be apprehended” (ibid.). Though initially most of the colony’s trade would be done indirectly through either the mother country or a trading company, this, like the despotic government, would merely be temporary. Since the final goal was to establish the dependency as its own sovereign, liberal state, it would ideally also become a contributor to the international marketplace, and would thus be another perpetuator of universal peace. Until that time, however, the mother country’s arms and commerce would provide that security for it. Therefore, while Montesquieu viewed commerce as a complete solution to the security dilemma, in and of itself, Mill believed it to be rather a step toward international peace and cooperation. As a corollary
to this, and again contrary to Montesquieu who argued for preservation during colonization, Mill prescribed a method of enforced change. For, Mill believed, it was indeed the mother country’s duty to actively facilitate progressive changes within the dependency.

Yet Mill shared with Montesquieu the view that domestic security could also be promoted in the dependency through colonization. According to Mill, it was the job of the good despot to improve the lot of the colonial people, and a large part of this involved promoting social liberties, such as restraining harm done to others and subverting the tyranny of opinion. As Ambirajan noted, “Mill’s explicit views on the need to protect minorities from the tyranny of the majority naturally [were] welcome in India because of its heterogeneous character” (Ambirajan 1999, 245). While Mill believed that the more backward colonies were not yet ready to have their free speech encouraged, he still asserted that they must be protected from tyranny of their own majority. This was among the primary reasons he considered them not yet fit for self-government: they had to be taught the principles for maintaining liberty, not simply putting it in place, and this came most effectively from the expertise of foreign rulers.

**Prosperity for the Dependent Country**

Both Montesquieu and Mill believed that the dependent nation would be infused with an enhanced work ethic as a result of colonization. Similarly, both saw prosperity as linked to liberty. Montesquieu asserted that the commercial spirit was most favorable to liberty (and vice versa), while Mill associated industry with civilization. Montesquieu, of course, stressed that “only goodness of government brings prosperity”; and Mill insisted that “one of the changes which most infallibly attend the progress of modern society
is...an improvement in the business capacities of the general mass of mankind” 
(Montesquieu 2009, 389; Mill 1894, 476). Thus, for these philosophers, commerce and 
industriousness enabled prosperity, and prosperity went hand in hand with liberty.

  Montesquieu saw the commercial spirit of the liberal conquerors as being 
transfused into the hearts of the colonial people. These colonial people would be 
prompted to alter their own manners in a way that followed the example of the mother 
country and promoted commerce. While Montesquieu discouraged new laws being 
forced upon a conquered people, he argued that they were likely to adjust their own 
manners and mores themselves, and eventually their laws would follow. Vanity would be 
released to foster commerce, yet commerce would also “soften” the mores of the people. 
Industriousness would be the result. Montesquieu was confident that the same process, 
which had already taken place in most of Europe, could occur in the colonial nations as 
well. This was because the process of developing commercial mores could be universally 
adopted.

  As the process goes, vanity, an aspect of human nature, stimulates the desire for 
wealth and urges men to actively strive for economic success; this propensity, when 
released, grabs hold of commerce because it is the best means for achieving such 
satisfactions of vanity. Once established, however, commerce leads men toward peace, an 
inclination for justice, and an opposition to banditry; in this way, the “hard,” even 
heartless, mores which served to bring about commerce in the first place become 
naturally tempered by the commercial spirit which ultimately arises. As commerce 
encourages man to see his fellow beings as similar creatures--similar creatures who may 
have something to offer him, either by way of product, market, or insight--he becomes
more engaged with, more understanding and tolerant of, more trusting of, more connected with, and more mutually dependent on an increasing number of other individuals. One quickly learns that commerce is not a zero-sum game, but rather that hard work and personal gain go hand in hand with cooperation and reciprocation. His vanity is not lost, but he has become “softer”; a businesslike handshake has replaced the clashing of swords. As Pangle explained, Montesquieu believed that when people begin to “think of themselves” in this way, “they become hard-working, tolerant, and peace-loving” (Pangle 1973, 204).

Yet prior to this transformation, the laziness induced by warm climates had to be somehow overcome if the dependent nation was to ever prosper economically. Such laziness was a curse of hot climate, and a stubborn impediment to liberty. As hot climates fostered laziness, laziness in turn fostered a sort of pride in not working and not advancing. “Examine all the nations,” Montesquieu assured, “and you will see that in most of them gravity, arrogance, and laziness go hand in hand” (Montesquieu 2009, 312). “In many places on earth,” he observed, “people let their fingernails grow in order to indicate that they do not work” (ibid.). Similarly, he pointed out, “the people of Achim are proud and lazy: those who have no slaves rent one, if only to walk a hundred steps and carry two pints of rice; they would believe themselves dishonored if they carried it themselves” (ibid.). Additionally, he noted that “women in the Indies believe it is shameful for them to learn to read,” and that different castes were excluded from certain areas of work (ibid., 313). Thus he concluded that “every lazy nation is grave; for those who do not work regard themselves as sovereigns of those who work” (ibid., 312).
For Montesquieu, the best combatant to laziness was industriousness. “In order to conquer the laziness that comes from the climate,” Montesquieu asserted, “the laws must seek to take away every means of living without labor” (ibid., 237). This meant that, much like the people of Marseilles, who “had to be hardworking in order to replace that which nature refused them,” peoples of warm climates needed to somehow establish an ethos of work and industry in order to advance economically (ibid., 341). Once they had acquired an industrious spirit, they would then be inclined to form good laws. This was done, in Montesquieu’s view, through the freeing of vanity and introduction of international markets. Vanity encouraged personal success, and thus was a productive vice; yet vanity was moderated and kept from turning into arrogance by the gentle mores associated with commerce. The joint benefits of vanity and markets therefore adjusted the general spirit in a move away from laziness and stagnation, and toward industriousness and prosperity.

Economic success, however, was not the only achievement that sprang from such industriousness. What always followed economic success, Montesquieu observed, was a flourishing of the arts. “The effect of commerce is wealth,” he stated, “the consequence of wealth, luxury,” and “that of luxury, the perfection of the arts” (ibid., 357). To exemplify this, he noted that “the arts, carried to the point at which they were found in the time of the Semiramis, indicate to us that a great commerce was already established” (ibid.). Similarly, Montesquieu lamented that “most of the peoples on the coasts of Africa are savages or barbarians,” and, he added, “I believe that this comes largely from there being some uninhabitable countries that separate these small countries which can be inhabited”; the result of this isolation, said Montesquieu, was “they are without industry;
they have no arts” (ibid., 355). Colonization of these lands, and others plagued by lack of commerce, would offer the inhabitants not only the wealth that flowed from the introduction of commerce, but also the change in spirit which encouraged continued productivity in the future, both in economy and in the arts. The absence of this industrious quality was, on the other hand, indicative of poverty, arrogance, and barbarism. What followed was Montesquieu’s belief that the commercial spirit was the one most suited for liberty, whereas in perpetual, barbaric despotisms “slavery runs less counter to reason” (251). Industriousness in the general spirit was therefore conducive to economic prosperity, but as it was associated with commerce, this aspect of the general spirit was also indicative of art and liberty— that is, the tangible as well as the intangible luxuries of the world.

For Mill, prosperity came not as a result of a change in the general spirit, but rather in the form of benevolent strangers and the diffusion of their knowledge and expertise. Mill sang the praises of trading companies which, after having become immersed in the colonial culture, understood how to effectively jumpstart the local economy in addition to promoting their own interests. Likewise, Mill saw great benefit in working-class members of the metropole emigrating to the colony for work—and again, this profited all involved as well. Both of these types of foreign newcomers brought with them novel channels of commerce, but they also brought the mechanisms, expertise, and knowledge for transforming the colonies into modern centers of trade. Additionally, for Mill this spelled not only the advancement of the particular colonies involved, but a general progression of mankind overall.
Regarding the first instance, Mill continuously made the case for the advantages brought about by the East India Company, and similarly highlighted the folly of revoking its rule in India. Mill himself was “an important functionary in the East India Company’s London office, which oversaw Indian administration,” and “his association with it ceased only in 1858 [35 years later] when the British government took over the governance of India from the East India Company” (Ambirajan 1999, 222). Yet Mill’s justification for supporting this type of rule went beyond mere sentimental ties to the company; he believed that an agency such as the East India Company was fundamentally best-suited to rule a backward dependency.

If it was the mother country’s duty to provide excellent rulers for a colony--and Mill maintained that it was--then a metropole could “scarcely give it a worse one than an English cabinet minister, who is thinking of English, not Indian politics” (Mill 1991, 356). The East India Company was, on the other hand, much more qualified to govern because it had a vested interest in the prosperity of the colony itself. “When the home government and Parliament are swayed by such partial influences in the exercise of the power,” he argued, “the intermediate body is the certain advocate and champion of the dependency” (ibid., 357). This so-called intermediate governing body would “have a much more permanent interest in the success of their administration, and in the prosperity of the country which they administer” (ibid., 358). Thus, though Britain was currently managing India incorrectly, Mill believed that it was possible to establish a system of rule which had Indian prosperity as among its primary goals, and which could effectively produce such prosperity.
In an earlier work, *The Principles of Political Economy*, Mill wrote about the numerous benefits which came from the English working-class’ immigration into the colonies. “Much will,” he began, “depend on the increasing migration of labor and capital to unoccupied parts of the earth, of which the soil, climate, and situation are found, by ample means of exploration now possessed, to promise not only a large return to industry, but great facilities of producing commodities suited to the markets of old countries” (Mill 1894, 479). Yet it was not just the emigrants themselves and their mother country which profited from this migration; the colony that received them gained from their expertise in industry as well. “Much as the collective industry of the earth is likely to be increased in efficiency by the extension of science and of the industrial arts,” Mill argued, “a still more active source of increased cheapness of production will be found, probably, for some time to come, in the gradually unfolding consequences of Free Trade, and in the increasing scale on which Emigration and Colonization will be carried on” (ibid.). He also noted the vast improvements, in such areas as colonial infrastructure and agriculture, that came along with “the increase of the general riches of the world, when accompanied with freedom of commercial intercourse” (ibid., 107).

Mill was clearly concerned, not merely with improvement of the metropole and the colonies, but of mankind generally. In connecting prosperity to security, Mill insisted that “of this increased security, one of the most unfailing effects is a great increase both of production and of accumulation” (ibid., 476). “Industry and frugality,” he added, “can not exist where there is not a preponderant probability that those who labor and spare will be permitted to enjoy” (ibid.). As Jahn summed it up, for Mill, “the whole of the interests of
humanity lie in improvement, progress, [and] development along civilisational lines” (Jahn 2005, 605).

**Progress for the Dependent Country**

Montesquieu and Mill each envisioned a specific kind of progress that colonization would present for the dependent country, and this often involved remaking the colonial society and its government to resemble those of the mother country (as this was thought to be the ideal example to follow). However, both of these philosophers also warned against forced conformity in many cases, and even encouraged certain types of diversity. As we have seen, Montesquieu believed that the introduction of commerce and the simultaneous release of vanity would act to create a progressive change in the general spirit of the colonial population. However, as previously mentioned, Montesquieu also strongly pushed for preservation of the customs of the colonized areas. He explained that there was an element of tyranny involved with the sudden and enforced change of a society’s laws and customs. Montesquieu--who has been called a cosmopolitan by some scholars--thus desired a Westernization of the colonial population through its engagement in commerce and employment of vice, yet he also saw value in diversity. Lowenthal, for instance, recognized the connection Montesquieu made between commerce and cosmopolitanism in *The Spirit of the Laws*; and Robin pointed out how the character of Usbek in *The Persian Letters* “accepts the inherent plurality of disparate worlds” (Lowenthal 1987, 531; Robin 2000, 351).

Montesquieu valued diversity, first, in the ways it promoted commerce; and, second, in his acknowledgement that some laws and governments were more suited to some peoples than to others. In the first sense, a variety of materials, products, and
markets was essential for commerce, and even more so for the spread of commerce. “The difference in climates,” said Montesquieu, “makes people have a great need for each other’s commodities” (Montesquieu 2009, 356). “But, as peoples of the same climate have almost the same things, they do not need commerce with one another as much as do peoples of differing climates” (ibid.). Commerce also required people with diverse skills and tastes; and as commerce spread so too did people and know-how and ideas. Thus as commerce required diversity in commodities, people, markets, and knowledge, it also encouraged diversity by allowing all of these to cross borders more easily. As Lowenthal described, “philosophy is sustained by cosmopolitanism, and cosmopolitanism by commerce”; “philosophy [was] freest,” for instance, “in highly commercial England” (Lowenthal 1987, 531).

In the second sense, Montesquieu encouraged that diversity—here referring to peoples’ divergent characteristics and contexts—be recognized by those forming governments or enacting laws. Montesquieu, Kesler pointed out, “taught that governments have to be suited to a people’s character and conditions” (Kesler 2005b, 10). Montesquieu described the different characters of the Northern and Southern Europeans, for example, and how these related to their respective levels of liberty. “What has naturalized servitude among the southern peoples,” he wrote, “is that, as they can easily do without wealth, they can do even better without liberty. But the northern peoples need liberty, which produces for them more of the means of satisfying all the needs nature has given them” (Montesquieu 2009, 355).

Conversely, in discussing the idea of universality, Montesquieu noted that “there are certain ideas of uniformity that sometimes seize great spirits (for they touched
Charlemagne), but that infallibly strike small ones” (ibid., 617). “But,” be implored, “is this always and without exception appropriate?” (ibid.). “Does not the greatness of genius,” he continued, “consist in knowing which cases there must be conformity and in which differences?” (ibid.). It is therefore worth discovering where Montesquieu saw universality as appropriate and where he saw particularity. As we will see, commerce and vanity represented the universality of Montesquieu’s doctrine— that is, they were applicable and beneficial to human beings generally— whereas the plurality of his doctrine was represented by the recognition of differing characters, as well as by the retention of local customs and by the diversity of markets, goods, arts, and ideas that burgeoned following the use of these universal tools.

Since Montesquieu adopted a version of the state of nature to demonstrate how humans developed into civilized man, we know that he believed man to be a progressive being. In *The Spirit of the Laws* he provided numerous examples of societies advancing (and often declining) as a consequence of the mores of their people and the resultant laws. Of the many things that created the general spirit and that “govern men”— these being “climate, religion, laws, the maxims of the government, examples of the past, mores, and manners”— Montesquieu stressed that “in each nation, one of these causes acts more forcefully,” and to the extent which that occurs, “the others yield to it” (ibid., 310). He described how the more primitive states are governed most overwhelmingly by physical characteristics of the land: “nature and climate almost alone dominate savages,” he stated (ibid.). But, as Lowenthal pointed out, “Montesquieu does not ask which climate conditions produce the best humans,” and “he even stresses the connection between climate and human slavery, not human freedom” (Lowenthal 1987, 526-7). We
can therefore see that Montesquieu viewed freedom as occurring in societies which, having risen above subjection to the physical land, were influenced more heavily by the other aspects of the general spirit, such as laws, manners, and mores. These were, of course, the man-made aspects of the general spirit, and were thus changeable. A society could therefore adopt better mores and manners once it was no longer dominated by the land. In short, progress was possible.

For Montesquieu, commerce presented the ultimate universal endeavor. As noted, Montesquieu asserted that commerce properly channeled a vice common to all humanity: vanity. For Montesquieu, then, the role of the colonizer was to preserve local customs but also to introduce the basic tools that would allow the colonial people to change themselves. By introducing international markets and by developing commercial infrastructure locally the colonizers would give the colonial people the basic hardware for commerce; but, perhaps more importantly, by demonstrating the usefulness of vanity when appropriately unleashed and by offering the example of an industrious general spirit, the colonizing people could effectively persuade the colonial citizens, it would seem, to alter their general spirit into a sort of mirror image of their metropole’s.

This universality of commerce also united people through mutual interests and needs, as well as made people more tolerant of one another; thus we see the gentling effect commerce had on mores. Commerce, Montesquieu maintained, “cures destructive prejudices” because “the history of commerce is that of communication among peoples” (Montesquieu 2009, 338, 357). “The more communicative people are,” Montesquieu explained, “the more easily they change their manners, because each man is more of a spectacle for another; one sees the singularities in individuals better” (ibid., 311). Thus,
as Pangle described, “the communication commerce creates with foreign peoples brings knowledge of those people and their ways; this makes their differences seem less strange and forbidding,” and this, in turn, made people more tolerant (Pangle 1973, 205). As Montesquieu put it, “commerce has spread knowledge of the mores of all nations everywhere; they have been compared to each other, and good things have resulted from this” (Montesquieu 2009, 338). For instance “commerce brings into a country different sorts of peoples, a great number of agreements, kinds of good, and ways of acquisition” (ibid., 349).

As knowledge of other peoples was gained through commerce, this knowledge in turn reinforced commerce itself. Even in the earliest stages of commerce, Montesquieu suggested that “the little knowledge most people had about those who were far away from them favored the nations that engaged in economic commerce” (ibid., 359). Awareness of another’s needs and wants, and of their commodities and willingness to trade, obviously assisted the commercial flow, but a respectful understanding of their customs and traditions also greased the wheels of trade, as it still does today. Pangle added that “men in commercial societies see in foreigners not creatures of a different species but men with passions and needs like their own” (Pangle 1973, 205).

Thus learning about other cultures and tolerating those different from oneself, so long as their customs did not conflict with one’s commercial interests, was the advantageous route, according to Montesquieu. Yet certain aspects of other cultures were obstructive to commerce. Such examples included the Indian caste system, whereby people were inclined to have “a certain aversion for other men, an aversion quite different from the feeling that should arise from differences in rank and which among ourselves
include love for one’s inferiors” (Montesquieu 2009, 475). Montesquieu similarly offered the ancient example of Athens and the superfluous number of religious festivals it held, which interrupted the flow of commerce (ibid.). With regard to frequency of festivals, Montesquieu issued the useful mandate: “when a religion orders that work come to an end, it should have more regard for the needs of men than for the greatness of the being that it honors” (ibid.). The only hope for changing adherence to such obstructive customs was a change in the general spirit, for one can image what havoc a forced change of the caste system or of religious festivals would bring.

For such cases a colonizing commercial nation could do best by offering its soft and tolerant (and highly successful) mores as an example to its colonial citizens. In this way, said Montesquieu, “a conquest can destroy harmful prejudices” (ibid., 142). Commerce, knowledge, and gentle mores went hand in hand for Montesquieu, and the spread of one necessarily brought the others along with it; prejudices and barbarity, on the other hand, were the opposite characteristics. “Knowledge makes men gentle, and reason inclines toward humanity; only prejudices cause these to be renounced,” Montesquieu contended (ibid., 249). In modern colonialism, Montesquieu reminded us, “the state continues to govern its conquest according to its own laws and takes for itself only the exercise of the political and civil government,” but it can nonetheless serve as a shining example of the commercial spirit in the meantime (ibid., 139). “One must not change their customs, but engage them to change themselves,” Montesquieu urged (ibid., 316). With a proper example, however, they could be successfully persuaded to raise themselves to the acquisition of commercial manners and mores.
Thus we see the progress made in the general spirit of the colonial people. Commerce would establish communication with different peoples, and this would breed tolerance. This tolerance would consist, in part, of questioning one’s own habits and traditions, and would ideally result in a break from obstructive customs and “harmful prejudices.” This would concomitantly produce a curiosity for things new and different. For Montesquieu, a shift in the general spirit of a colonial people in this way was considered a great step in its progress. As Lowenthal pointed out, “in two ways this communication is connected with the civilizing of man, i.e., with the reduction of barbarism. The first is through wealth and the arts, the second through philosophy” (Lowenthal 1987, 530). Lowenthal continued to outline precisely how “commerce lays the basis for breaking out of this parochialism”: first, he explained, “it encourages the comparison of different ways of life”; second, “it makes possible the questioning of ancestral beliefs”; and third, “it enables men to discover more of nature”; thus, “in short,” he concluded, “it makes possible philosophy” (ibid.).

As previously mentioned, Montesquieu himself detailed how this exact process took place during the Middle Ages, and demonstrated how, in his view, commerce effectively put an end to barbarism in Europe. Montesquieu therefore saw a spread of reasoning and philosophy as the culmination of this adjoining of the universal (commerce and vanity) with the particular (disparate customs and commodities) as fostered through communication among peoples. This, Lowenthal noted, exemplified Montesquieu’s view that “there is a constant interplay between man’s needs and his knowledge” (ibid., 529).

The mere presence of reasoning--even bad or false reasoning--was, for Montesquieu, highly indicative of liberty. “In a free nation,” Montesquieu argued, “it
often does not matter whether individuals reason well or badly; it suffices that they reason; from that comes the liberty that protects them from the effects of these same reasonings” (Montesquieu 2009, 332). True liberty required that both good and bad ideas be allowed to form and be expressed; the opposite would be censorship. Montesquieu of course believed Europe to be the most advanced region in the world with regard to commerce, philosophy, and liberty. “Here homage must be paid,” he stated, “to our modern times, to contemporary reasoning, to the religion of the present day, to our philosophy, and to our mores” (ibid., 139). He therefore distinguished between “contemporary reasoning” and “our [modern] philosophy,” for not all contemporary reasoning would have been considered exalted philosophy. Montesquieu also connected liberty with the ability to share ideas. “In order to enjoy liberty,” Montesquieu wrote, “each must be able to say what he thinks and because, in order to preserve it, each must still be able to say what he thinks, a citizen in this state would say and write everything that the laws had not expressly prohibited him from saying or writing” (ibid., 327).

Reasoning, questioning, and expressing one’s ideas were therefore all elements of liberty. The freedom to form “bad ideas,” or to reason falsely, was necessarily a part of this liberty; but, for Montesquieu, the sensible mores of a liberal, commercial people would inhibit such bad ideas from catching on. Yet this freedom also allowed for good ideas to develop. Intelligent reasoning had produced the correct, modern philosophy of Montesquieu’s day; and commerce, with its inherent communication, had the potential to spread this philosophy across the entire earth. Thus, for Montesquieu, commerce with divergent peoples facilitated communication, and as this communication and sharing of ideas spread, so too did liberty, for the ability to exchange ideas was, in itself, an essential
part of liberty. There was little danger of bad ideas spreading, for commercial nations with liberal mores would thwart these; what remained, then, was the enormous potential for good ideas to propagate.

Montesquieu wrote that the “right of nations, among ourselves, has the result that victory leaves to the vanquished these great things: life, liberty, laws, goods, and always religion,” yet he also maintained that, with an appropriate example, “this nation, made comfortable by peace and liberty, freed from destructive prejudices, would be inclined to become commercial” (ibid., 328, 462). The nation would retain certain particulars, but it would gain the universally applicable and beneficial practice of commerce. The general spirit would thus transform into a commercial one, yet it would not become simply another England; rather, it would become a new source of commodities, markets, arts, and ideas.

Turning now to Mill, we will see how he focused on the notions of order and progress, as opposed to universality and particularity. Mill believed that one of the duties of government was to establish order, and that part of this included making itself obeyed. However, as explained, order went beyond mere obedience. “Though a necessary condition,” Mill wrote, “this is not the object of government” (Mill 1991, 29). Mill therefore defined order in the narrow sense as obedience to government, while “in a sense somewhat more enlarged,” he expounded, “Order means the preservation of peace by the cessation of private violence” (ibid.). In this way, order was associated with the security and stability of a society as well. Progress, on the other hand, he stated, “may be supposed to mean Improvement” (ibid., 28).
Yet Mill did not view order and progress as distinct operations, but suggested rather that they were merely different degrees of the same things. He countered the distinction made between order and progress as “unscientific and incorrect,” and argued instead that “we may define Order as the preservation of all kinds and amounts of good which already exist, and Progress as consisting in the increase of them” (ibid., 30). The same good qualities which maintained order, in both governments and individuals, were the same qualities which produced progress for both governments and individuals.

“Progress,” he affirmed, simply “is a greater degree of that which Order is a less” (ibid., 34). “The qualities in citizens individually,” he explained, “which conduce more to keep up the amount of good conduct, of good management, of success and prosperity, which already exist in society,” were “industry, justice, and prudence” (ibid., 30). “But are not these,” he asked, “of all qualities, the most conducive to improvement?” (ibid.) Similarly, he asserted that “whatever qualities in the government are promotive of industry, integrity, justice, and prudence, conduce alike to permanence and progress,” and that “any growth of these qualities in the community in itself [would be] the greatest of improvements” (ibid.). Good qualities in governments and individuals thus worked to sustain order and simultaneously promote progress, for “whatever tends to either promotes both” (ibid., 32).

Mill, like Montesquieu, believed man to be a creature capable of progress. Although he conceded that “people are more induced to do, and do more easily, what they are already used to,” he nonetheless maintained that “people also learn to do things new to them” (ibid., 19). “Familiarity,” he noted, “is a great help; but much dwelling on an idea will make it familiar, even when strange at first” (ibid.). Again pointing to the
interconnected qualities of order and progress, Mill insisted that “if there is any thing certain in human affairs, it is that valuable acquisitions are only to be retained by the continuation of the same energies which gained them” (ibid., 31). His reference here to human affairs generally indicated his belief that all mankind was capable of progress. While he did suggest that some people and some societies were more apt to change their ways and thus more likely to advance, he recognized that all human beings were in fact able to change and thus able to progress.

This was further demonstrated by his endeavor to determine whether there were qualities which promoted progress alone, as opposed to both progress and order. “What,” he asked, “are the particular attributes in *human beings* which seem to have a more especial reference to Progress, and do not so directly suggest the ideas of Order and Preservation?” (ibid., 31, emphasis added). His answer was that “they are chiefly in the qualities of mental activity, enterprise, and courage”; but, he added, “are not all these qualities fully as much required for preserving the good we have as for adding to it?” (ibid.). Thus his insistence that what furthers progress also sustains order was meant to be applied to all mankind, for every human possessed the ability to progress.

So, then, if all societies could progress, and if an aspect of good government was to facilitate this progress, how best could a mother country promote the advancement of her colonies? As previously explained, Mill believed that wise rulers with extensive knowledge of the local people and their customs offered the best way to usher in progress for a more backward society. Offering themselves as a better and more successful example, and demonstrating how modification in institutions, customs, and character could improve the colonial people’s situation, constituted one way for foreign rulers to
ignite change. While Mill contended that “a people may be unprepared for good institutions,” he stressed that they could in fact become prepared, and that “to kindle a desire for them is a necessary part of the preparation” (ibid., 19). “To recommend and advocate a particular institution or form of government, and set its advantages in the strongest light,” he claimed, “is one of the modes, often the only mode within reach, of educating the mind of the nation, not only for accepting or claiming, but also for working the institution” (ibid., 20).

There was another method for enacting change in a dependency, however, one which was most appropriately used for the more backward variety of dependencies; this was, of course, forced change initiated by the foreign rulers. As explained, Mill believed that such changes in traditional habits and customs by “good despots” were done in the best interest of the colonial inhabitants. As wise rulers had better knowledge of how to facilitate the progress of these colonial people than they did themselves, their advancement would be brought on much more quickly and effectively as a result of the enforced changes imposed on them by their new rulers. Yet Mill strongly urged that not every nation could follow the same prescription for advancement. “The capability of any given people for fulfilling the conditions of a given form of government can not be pronounced on by any sweeping rule,” he insisted; similarly, “the same things which are helps to one person toward cultivation of his higher nature, are hindrances to another” (ibid., 19; Mill 2002, 70). Thus each society required its own unique recipe for progress toward the ultimate goal of civilization and liberal government. Each plan was determined by the current stage of the society and by the corresponding character of its people.
Mill criticized the contemporary movement of his time which sought to “improve” different peoples by attempting to make them all alike. “There is a philanthropic spirit abroad,” he wrote, “for the exercise of which there is no more inviting field than the moral and prudential improvement of our fellow-creatures” (Mill 2002, 71).

While this spirit of advancement might have been on target, their method was far from correct. The problem was that the tendency of these philanthropes was to “prescribe general rules of conduct, and endeavor to make every one conform to the approved standard” (ibid., 71-2). “And that standard,” he stressed, “express or tacit, is to desire nothing strongly” (ibid., 72). “Its ideal of character,” he expanded, “is to be without any marked character; to maim by compression, like a Chinese lady’s foot, every part of human nature which stands out prominently, and tends to make the person markedly dissimilar in outline to commonplace humanity” (ibid.). Thus, while Mill pressed for the improvement of mankind, and in particular for the colonies least like the countries of Europe, he nonetheless did not desire “to force English ideas down the throats of the natives” (ibid., 350). This underscored the importance Mill put on foreign rulers’ having knowledge of local idiosyncrasies, and thus the importance of rulers who had not only experience with liberal government but also who had become immersed in the culture of the specific colony. For, while a mother country had the right to enforce change, this was best done in light of the uniqueness of each colony. Simply attempting to remake every dependent nation into another England, therefore, was unwise and unlikely to be successful. Improvement may have been directed toward the British model, but Mill urged that advancement did not necessary mean replication.
Although Mill recognized the distinctness of different cultures in this way, he far from advocated the retention of old customs when they proved to be an obstacle to advancement. Thus the interplay of order and progress came into effect: only the aspects of a society which maintained its goodness (however little or much of it there may have been), were to be encouraged to bring about its improvement. “When Order and Permanence are taken in their widest sense for the stability of existing advantages,” Mill contended, “the requisites of Progress are but the requisites of Order in a greater degree; those of Permanence merely those of Progress in a somewhat smaller measure” (ibid., 33). Like Montesquieu, Mill therefore believed that clinging irrationally to ancestral traditions was obstructive to development. Flexibility and openness to change, on the other hand, were characteristics which most facilitated progress.

Individuals as well as societies possessed different degrees of this willingness to change. Mill praised what he called the energetic character in individuals over what he referred to as the passive character. “All intellectual superiority,” he asserted, “is the fruit of active effort,” and all “enterprise” consisted of “the desire to keep moving, to be trying and accomplishing new things for our own benefit or that of others” (ibid., 70). Mill highlighted the beneficial link between individual characters of energy and the advancement of society. “The habits and conduct which promote the advantage of each individual member of the community,” he urged, “must be at least part of those which conduce most in the end to the advancement of the community as a whole” (ibid., 71). Thus “the amount of capacity which a people possess for doing new things, and adapting themselves to new circumstances,” he reasoned, determined their society’s relative potential for improvement (ibid., 19).
An initial step in advancement, therefore, was the questioning of inherited traditions and a receptiveness to new ideas, for the proper exercise of the ultimate goal of representative government precluded any type of tyranny of custom. “Strong prejudices of any kind; obstinate adherence to old habits; positive defects of national character, or mere ignorance, and deficiency of mental cultivation, if prevalent in a people,” Mill stressed, “will be in general faithfully reflected in their representative assemblies” (ibid., 91). For Mill, new ideas were what kept mankind not only progressing, but also from backtracking. “What is suggested by the term Progress,” he pointed out, “is the idea of moving forward, whereas the meaning of it here is quite as much the prevention of falling back” (ibid., 35). “The very same social causes--the same beliefs, feelings, institutions, and practices--are as much required,” he urged, “to prevent society from retrograding as to produce a farther advance” (ibid.).

In this way, civilized and non-civilized nations alike had a common interest in originality, and this was another quality which maintained order as it furthered progress. As Mill explained, “the mental attribute” most “dedicated to Progress, and [which] is the culmination of the tendencies to it, is Originality, or Invention” (ibid., 31). “Yet,” he added, “this is no less necessary for Permanence, since, in the inevitable changes of human affairs, new inconveniences and dangers continually grow up, which must be encountered by new resources and contrivances, in order to keep things going on even only as well as they did before” (ibid.). “Whatever qualities, therefore,” Mill maintained, “in a government tend to encourage activity, energy, courage, originality, are requisites of Permanence as well as Progress” (ibid.). This was as much the case for the advanced mother countries as it was for their uncivilized dependencies. “The progressive
principle,” Mill affirmed, “in either shape, whether as love of liberty or of improvement, is antagonistic to the sway of Custom” (Mill 2002, 72-3).

Returning to Mill’s original ideas of order and progress and how they relate to the dependent country, we find that Mill’s overall goal for so-called backward colonies was the same as it was for all individuals and all societies: first, if liberty was lacking, the goal was progress toward and the eventual achievement of representative government; and, following this, the goal became continual improvement via liberty. This process included establishing physical security as the prerequisite for liberty; instituting liberty from tyranny of custom and thus the liberty to form and express new ideas; and, finally, constructing the ultimate, though often gradual, ideal of liberal self-government. Liberty for the dependent country therefore encompassed order (through obedience and security, as well as through retention of diversity) and progress (through the encouragement of new ideas and guidance toward representative government). And, of course, these qualities associated with order and progress were interconnected and mutually perpetuating. Thus, for Mill, the attainment of liberty required progress, but it also required order; and, once established, liberty itself worked to perpetuate both. If a dependent country could obtain order and progress from colonization--if it could, for example, achieve order through security and protection, and progress through expert guidance and prosperity--it could therefore attain liberty; and from that point on, liberty, order, and progress would naturally sustain, and even advance, one another.

Liberty for the Dependent Country

Montesquieu and Mill both presented colonization as advantageous to the dependent country in four ways. The first was through security, in both the domestic and
international realms. While Montesquieu maintained that this was achieved through the citizens’ “opinion of security,” Mill insisted on a more tangible version, i.e., through the explicit prohibition of harming others. The second way was through the prosperity brought about by the mother country’s expansive network of commercial markets. The third was through progress, typically facilitated by wise rulers. Montesquieu believed that once commerce was introduced into a society, it had the ability to transform a people, its mores, and eventually its laws, to such a degree that the population would advance beyond the physical restraints of the environment and toward liberty; Mill, of course, envisioned a backward society as being swept through the stages of civilization by the guiding hand of the metropole. And, finally, the culminating result of the preceding three was in fact liberty.

While both philosophers saw formidable obstacles that blocked the way of liberty in the dependent nations, both were also firmly convinced that these obstacles were surmountable. This was because, according to both writers, man was inherently a progressive being--that is, man, and thus society, could change and therefore improve. This demonstrated their break from earlier theorists, such as Hobbes, who viewed human nature as static or fixed; for Montesquieu and Mill, conversely, it was the malleable quality of human nature which provided an immanent method for overcoming such impediments to liberty.

As Lowenthal explained, Montesquieu contrasted the “original” state of man with his conception of the “best” state achievable by man, and this demonstrated his confidence in the changeability inherent in human nature (Lowenthal 1987, 526). Montesquieu believed, Lowenthal noted, that “enlightenment to make human life less
barbaric or inhumane is possible, but even such enlightenment must be supported by an appeal to the passions” (ibid., 531). “Man, that flexible being,” Montesquieu declared, is “capable of knowing his own nature” and of using that knowledge to better his situation (Montesquieu 2009, xliv-xlv). History has provided instances of man successfully rising out from his original, barbarous state and into one filled with wealth, arts, philosophy, and liberty; these cases were successful, however, not when man denied or rejected the instinctual passions which dominated him in the state of nature, but rather when these were channelled properly--i.e., through commerce.

Lowenthal highlighted that “the full significance of England and commerce for Montesquieu’s thought can be appreciated [only] if one understands his conception of natural or primitive man and of the natural setting in which he first existed” (Lowenthal 1987, 526). Montesquieu contrasted “man’s deficient natural beginnings” with “the highest point he can attain”--i.e., “the regime of modern liberty”--and, as Lowenthal explained, “the two are connected by the development of commerce” (ibid., 529). Thus “commerce and knowledge together put an end to the Middle Ages”; or, as Montesquieu put it, “commerce in Europe penetrated barbarism” (Lowenthal 1987, 530; Montesquieu 2009, 387). Commerce provided the vehicle that allowed man to change not the existence of his original passions, but their application. So long as man remained in the state of nature, or even in more primitive societies, he continued to be ruled by instinctive passions and by the physical environment that surrounded him; his reason was not yet sufficiently cultivated, and therefore it continued to reside in the backseat as emotions and environment controlled the wheel that drove his thoughts and actions.
However, as agriculture developed and nonperishable money was invented, commerce began to form. As commerce brought peoples together, out of need, man was inspired to compare different ways of life, to begin “questioning ancestral beliefs,” and to discover new things about nature and about himself (Lowenthal 1987, 530). Vanity provided the fire that fueled man’s exploration for new and better things and conditions; commerce merely provided the most efficient and just means. And as commerce sprang from man’s quest for satisfaction and knowledge, commerce in turn encouraged further inquisitiveness. There have always been, and will continue to be, new inventions and discoveries waiting to be obtained--and bought and sold--if one is motivated enough to pursue them. Suppressing commerce is therefore suppressing the potential for progress which is inherent in human nature. Denying human nature, including (and especially) its vices, will stagnate commerce; such will lead not to the liberation or elevation of man, but rather to his imprisonment in a primitive state. Thus “the greatest benefits of commerce are the less obvious, unintended consequences of the merchant’s selfishness”; “remove commerce and travel, as in the Middle Ages, and you ruin philosophy” (ibid., 531).

Mill, for his part, often spoke in terms of “human progressiveness” and “the progress of human affairs” (Mill 2002, 74, 4). We as humans, he stated, “are progressive as well as changeable” (ibid., 73). The good utilitarian that he was, Mill argued that all ethical questions must be related to their utility, but, he insisted, this “must be utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interest of man as a progressive being” (ibid., 13). Like Montesquieu, Mill believed that the “raw materials of human nature,” by which he primarily meant impulses, had the potential to produce good effects in man,
such as an energetic nature, but in order for this to occur man had to first gain control over his own impulses (ibid., 62). Placing impulses under self-restraint required the use of rational faculties; and “the human faculties of perception, judgement, discriminative feeling, mental activity, and even moral preference, are exercised only in making a choice” (ibid., 60).

Making decisions for oneself, as opposed to blindly following orders or obeying customs, was therefore how man not only improved his mental faculties, but also how he managed to elevate himself to the highest attainable status as a human being. “He who chooses his plan for himself,” Mill wrote, “employs all his faculties”; on the contrary, “he who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life for him, has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation” (ibid., 60-1). It may be possible, Mill contended, to go through life in this manner, never employing the “human faculties” required to make choices, “but,” he beseeched, in such a state “what will be his comparative worth as a human being?” (ibid., 61).

Mill argued that if machines could replace humans in areas of work which did not require the use of these faculties, it would be to the great benefit of human advancement. “Supposing it were possible,” Mill proposed, “to get houses built, corn grown, battles fought, causes tried, and even churches erected and prayers said, by machinery—by automatons in human form—it would be a considerable loss to exchange for these automatons even the men and women who at present inhibit the more civilized parts of the world, and who assuredly are but starved specimens of what nature can and will produce” (ibid., emphasis added). Mill therefore believed that even the “backward”
peoples of the world had the potential to develop their faculties, but that engaging in activities which could be done by automatons was not the way to go about it.

Developing these faculties required decisions and creativity, not adherence to a fixed set of instructions. The ability to make decisions for oneself and to be creative, in turn, required liberty. “Human nature,” Mill asserted, “is not a machine to be built after a model, and set to do exactly the work prescribed for it, but a tree, which requires to grow and develop itself on all sides, according to the tendency of the inward forces which make it a living thing” (ibid.). Conformity, on the other hand, was antagonistic to creativity, to autonomy, and to the impulses inherent in human nature. “Among the works of man, which human life is rightly employed in perfecting and beautifying,” Mill declared, “the first of importance surely is man himself” (ibid.). Hence, “the secret of human progressiveness,” he stressed, was individuality free from the chains of conformity (ibid., 74).

For both Montesquieu and Mill, therefore, human nature made man intrinsically malleable; and positive change did not require the rejection of man’s basic passions and impulses, but rather the provision of an appropriate funnel. Thus societies, which are but collections of men, had the ability to change and to achieve liberty, even when and where it was obstructed. Hence, though a society may have harbored severe impediments to liberty, the progressive nature of human beings provided the basis for engaging the peoples of such illiberal societies to overcome these hurdles and advance toward liberty.

The first way a mother country could promote liberty in the dependent country was through security. And security, according to Montesquieu, was provided for the colony by the mother country in two ways. Domestically, a liberal and commercial colonizing
nation would provide its dependent country with good civil laws, and, in particular, good
criminal laws. Internationally, the commerce implemented by the metropole would
ensure that the colony was connected, even if indirectly at first, to the network of
interdependent, commercial nations. In this way, the colony would be protected by the
peace of international commerce, and would also be contributing to its perpetuation. Mill,
too, saw commerce as maintaining peace and cooperation among states. However, for
Mill, security for the dependent country also came through the guardianship of the
mother country in two additional ways. The stronger, more advanced mother country
would provide her colony with international protection by way of arms and military
forces. This metropole would also ensure domestic security for the dependent nation by
sending it good rulers with knowledge of both the locality and the necessary steps for
progress. These rulers were meant to enforce order and obedience, as well as to offer
further lessons for advancement toward civilization.

The second way the mother country could promote liberty in the dependent country
was through prosperity. Montesquieu envisioned a mutual surge in the economic
prosperity of both nations involved in colonization. A liberal mother country would
colonize for the primary goals of increasing her own commerce and prosperity;
consequently the commerce brought by the colonizing nation would penetrate the colony
very deeply and would spark the colony’s own commercial success. For Mill,
colonization brought two new sources of potential prosperity: trading companies, such as
the East India Company, which had not only a vested interest in promoting the
commercial success of the colony, but also the resources and wisdom necessary to bring
this about; and working-class immigrants from the mother country that would bring a
work ethic along with them which would serve as an immediate example to the colonial natives.

The third way was through progress. Once security and prosperity were established in the dependent country, Montesquieu and Mill believed that this nation had the capacity to progress much further. For Montesquieu, commerce necessitated communication between peoples. As people communicated in this way and discovered a mutual interest in trade, they would naturally become more tolerant of one another, but they would also share their thoughts and creations. This would seemingly inspire further contemplation and experiments, and these, in turn, would ignite a wildfire of reason and innovation around the world. Thus, in Montesquieu’s view, economic success would lead toward a flourishing of arts, innovation, reason, and philosophy.

Because of this, he did not encourage a form of colonization that attempted to fit every society and every individual into the same mold. The diversity that came with the different goods and commodities produced by different localities, as well as the divergent needs and desires of differing peoples, was essential for commerce. Similarly, as local customs were to be preserved so long as they did not inhibit commerce, this retention of cultural disparity would furnish unique and novel arts and ideas around the globe. Worldwide progress thus came about through commerce, and dependent nations benefitted and contributed to this as a result of colonization.

Montesquieu also applauded commerce for the way it promoted the questioning of old traditions, for being receptive to new ideas necessitated a reevaluation of inherited customs. Mill, too, championed questioning old ways, openness to change, and consideration of new ideas. For Mill, new ideas alone were what kept mankind
progressing (as well as what staved off retrogression). As new ideas were incompatible with forced conformity and the “tyranny of custom,” Mill urged that colonies should not be forced into becoming mirror images of their mother countries. Instead, he advised that dependent nations be guided through the necessary steps of advancement that led ultimately to representative government, but that they be allowed to retain any uniqueness which did not prohibit this advancement. Inherent in representative government was the freedom to be different from the masses, to question old ways, and to create new thoughts and to express them. Thus, according to Mill, colonies ought to be guided toward change, but they must not be forced to become virtual clones of their mother countries.

We can therefore see that Montesquieu and Mill believed that colonialism at least held the potential to usher in these significant advances in security, prosperity, and overall progress for the dependent country. Ideally, colonialism would bring all three to the colony, and the end result of these three qualities would be the final and highest achievement: liberty. Montesquieu and Mill agreed that security was a basic requirement if liberty was to be exercised and enjoyed properly; both were also convinced that colonization would provide this security domestically as well as internationally. These writers additionally shared the belief that the industriousness which accompanied prosperity would help to develop the character of a society, and its individuals, into one that was suited for liberal self-government; it would assist in overcoming the hurdles of climate and civilizational stages alike. Similarly, both men encouraged a form of progress for the dependent nation that cultivated its development of innovation and originality, yet which also necessarily embraced certain aspects of diversity; the questioning of old ways
and the concomitant receptiveness to new ideas, along with the freedom to create and share new thoughts and things, were essential for both Montesquieu and Mill’s conceptions of liberty. In sum, security, prosperity, and progress were all requisites for liberty, according to Montesquieu and Mill. Furthermore, these two writers each described the vast potential colonization had for precipitating the advancement in these three areas within the colonized nation. Thus, it can be concluded that both Montesquieu and Mill believed that colonization could in fact promote the liberty of the dependent country.
CHAPTER 4: HAS NATION-BUILDING PROMOTED LIBERTY IN JAPAN AND IRAQ?

Part 1: Currently, is there Liberty in Japan?

Since the end of World War II, Japan has made impressive improvements in its security, economic prosperity, and democratization. In most recent years, Freedom House has classified Japan as “Free,” with a political rights score of the highest possible “1,” and civil liberties at a respectable “2” (Freedom House 2012). This can be compared with the United States, which has also been consistently classified as “Free,” and has received a “1” for both political rights and civil liberties (ibid.). As stated in the introduction, our contemporary conception of “democracy” presumes the right to form and express new and dissenting ideas, as well as presumes minority rights and representative government as opposed to pure democratic majority-rule. Thus, our notion of “democratization” can be more or less equated with the idea of “progress” in the political sense as was promoted by Montesquieu and Mill. Therefore, as security, prosperity, and progress were the requisites for liberty in Montesquieu and Mill’s views, today we can accurately follow their theories if we look for security, economic prosperity, and democratization as indicators of liberty.

Some scholars, such as Mohamadian and Somit and Peterson, have suggested that Japan’s nation-building success story was at least in part a result of its historical foundations of democracy (Mohamadian 2012, 244; Somit and Peterson 2005, 53). While Japan’s pre-World World II government did contain certain rudimentary basics upon which democracy could be built, such as a constitution and a Diet (parliament), it could hardly be said to possess liberty at this time. “In principle,” Dobbins et al. wrote, “Japan
had a constitution, but not a fully parliamentary, form of government in 1945” (Dobbins et al. 2003, 27). “The Meiji Constitution,” Dobbins et al. explained, “adopted in 1890, vested sovereign power in the emperor but divided political power among a small set of competing elites” (ibid., 27-8). These competing elites consisted of the military, the bureaucracy, the leading industrialists (zaibatsu), and the emperor’s inner circle (ibid., 28). Under this constitution, only men could vote, and the Diet was easily overruled by the emperor’s orders; additionally, “the military was not legally subordinate to civilian control”; and “political freedoms necessary to sustain democracy, such as freedom of speech and assembly, to the extent they existed at all, were severely curtailed” (ibid.). Thus, the US-imposed democratization which took place in Japan did not have to start entirely from scratch, but it did face a long road toward establishing a complete liberal society.

For Dobbins et al., security, prosperity, and democratization were qualities inherently interconnected, and promoting each necessarily bolstered the other two. “There can be no economic or political prosperity without security,” they stated (ibid., 69). “Security,” they expounded, “proved to be a basic prerequisite for economic growth. Developmental assistance is futile if businesses and households are constantly at risk of seeing their goods appropriated by armed groups. In a lawless environment, neither production nor trade can proceed” (ibid., 70). With a similar philosophy in mind, the US’s strategy in Japan became one initially focused on demilitarization and democratization, with a subsequent “reverse course” in which fostering economic prosperity became the primary objective (ibid., 49). Demilitarization of Japan was most represented by the peace and security treaties formed between it and the US;
democratization was brought about primarily through the new Japanese constitution; and, finally, prosperity was most facilitated through several economic reforms. Let us now examine each part of this process to determine whether the US nation-building strategy in Japan actually achieved security, economic prosperity, democratization, and the ultimate goal of liberty as the combination of all three.

**Security**

In 1951, a year before “Japan regained its sovereignty,” the “peace treaty and a separate security treaty were signed” with the US (ibid., 35). The peace treaty signified the end of US occupation, and in exchange for this, Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida acquiesced to the US deployment of “a military force of 300,000 to 350,000 men” (ibid.). The security treaty had an even greater and lasting effect on US-Japanese relations. “The security treaty,” Dobbins et al. described, “ensured continued U.S. access to bases in Japan in return for U.S. protection should Japan be attacked” (ibid.). Packard emphasized the significance of the security treaty. “This agreement,” he explained, “has endured through half a century of dramatic changes in world politics—the Vietnam War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the spread of nuclear weapons to North Korea, the rise of China—and [has endured] in spite of fierce trade disputes, exchanges of insults, and deep cultural and historical differences between the United States and Japan” (Packard 2010, 92). “This treaty,” he added, “has lasted longer than any other alliance between two great powers since the 1648 Peace of Westphalia” (ibid.).

This security treaty managed to survive international strife, as well as tensions that arose between the US and Japan over the years. Such cause for tensions included Japanese protests of the US’s war in Vietnam in the 1960s and an unpopular import tax
on Japanese commodities in the 1970s, and, as Packard noted, “the 1980s were ever more fractious” (ibid., 94). In 1985, for instance, the US implemented further trade restrictions by limiting “the import of Japanese computer chips to the United States” (ibid.). US sentiment also began to decline as suspicions over communist activity in Japan began to spread; in fact, “in a 1989 Gallup poll, 57 percent of U.S. respondents said they considered Japan to be a greater threat to the United States than the Soviet Union” (ibid., 95). However, as the international field became more unstable, Japan and the US strengthened their ties of allegiance. As Packard pointed out, it took “Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 to keep tensions between the United States and Japan from getting any worse” (ibid.). Subsequently, in 1996 Washington issued a report which “reaffirmed the United States’ resolve to defend Japan” (ibid., 96). And “after North Korea test-fired a two-stage ballistic missile over Japan in 1998,” the Japanese and American governments agreed to share military technological developments (ibid.).

The peace and security treaties were supplemented by the legal demilitarization which took place in Japan. As early as 1945, “the Japanese armed forced had ceased to exist,” as “demilitarization was enshrined in the new Japanese constitution” (Dobbins et al. 2003, 34). “Article 9, the so-called ‘no war’ clause,” Dobbins et al. explained, “pledged that Japan renounced war and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes and, therefore, would never authorize the maintenance of land, seas, and air forces or other war potential” (ibid.). The US’s objective of this demilitarization was “to ensure [that] Japan would never again menace international security,” and in the face of the Cold War, the US insisted on retaining forces in the “increasingly strategic location” of Japan (ibid., 45, 35). As Packard described, “the
agreement gave the U.S. Navy a strategic advantage in observing the movements of Soviet warships and, in case of war, an easy way to bottle up the Soviet fleet in the Sea of Okhotsk” (Packard 2010, 97).

This demilitarization affected domestic security as well. Originally, in addition to eliminating the Japanese military, the Japanese police force also had its power reduced (Dobbins et al. 2003, 43). “This,” said Packard, “gave the United States the right to quell large-scale internal disturbances in Japan,” yet this often did not prove most effective or efficient (Packard 2010, 93). The “decentralization of the police,” Dobbins et al. wrote, “while successful in many ways, left Japan without a domestic force capable of responding to large-scale internal unrest,” and so in 1950 the National Police Reserve was formed, and “the police were recentralized at the end of the occupation” (Dobbins et al. 2003, 43). Internal order was therefore attained, although it experienced a rocky start.

While demilitarization may have been reasonable during this period and under these circumstances, many now believe it is time for Japan to rearm and take on responsibility for its own defense. “The U.S. government should respect Japan’s desire to reduce the U.S. military presence on its territory,” Packard suggested, “as it has respected the same desire on the part of Germany, South Korea, and the Philippines” (Packard 2010, 102). The US, he went on, “should be willing to renegotiate the agreement that governs the presence of U.S. troops in Japan, which to some is redolent of nineteenth-century assertions of extraterritoriality” (ibid.). “In return,” Packard proposed, “the Japanese government should make far larger contributions to mutual security and global peace” (ibid., 103).
However, Packard concluded, “despite some frictions, both the United States and Japan have found that the benefits of the treaty [and demilitarization] have generally outweighed its costs” (ibid., 96). “Certainly,” he affirmed, “the benefits for Japan always remained clear” (ibid.). For example, “falling under the U.S. nuclear umbrella freed up Tokyo to carry out the so-called Yoshida Doctrine [a plan for economic development] and focus on the country’s economic growth; without the need to acquire nuclear weapons, Japan could almost always hold its defense budget to less than one percent of GDP”; it “also preserved Japan’s access to the U.S. market, which served as a life vest in a sea of sometimes serious trade disputes”; and “all of this gave Japan a chance to nurture the fragile roots of parliamentary democracy, turning them into a robust and durable system” (ibid.). The US also benefitted greatly from the alliance, as it retained its strategic base locations and was able to have full control over the military actions of Japan. This arrangement “was especially advantageous,” Packard noted, “because Japan was committed to being a generous host” (ibid., 97).

It can be safely said that Japan and the United States are today firm allies. Not only has there not been any contention of force between these two states, Japan has also (in spite of remaining “disarmed”) supported and contributed forces to US engagements abroad. As Packard pointed out, since the early 1990s, “Japanese troops have engaged in such missions in Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, East Timor, Mozambique, the Palestinian territories, and Rwanda” (ibid.). “From 2001 until mid-January” 2010, he added, “Japan kept naval vessels in the Indian Ocean to supply fuel to coalition forces fighting in Afghanistan; it also committed 600 troops to Iraq (albeit in a relatively peaceful zone), and it has (if grudgingly) allowed U.S. nuclear-powered vessels
to dock at Japanese ports” (ibid.). And as the US assumed the role of protector and, at least initially, supplied Japan’s entire international defense force, Japan was free to develop its economy and foster its democracy. Thus, the security requisite was not merely obtained, it benefitted both nations to a great extent. As Dobbins et al. put it, the US occupation of Japan successfully “turned a former enemy into a reliable ally” (Dobbins et al. 2003, 32).
Part 2: Has Japan’s Liberty been Promoted through Nation-Building?

Democratization

While there is evidence that Japan possessed some basic elements of democracy prior to its occupation by the US, some scholars have argued that it was overwhelmingly authoritarian. As Beckmann wrote, even the Meiji Constitution, which did make some “important political concessions” to certain groups, was essentially a document intended to legitimize the ruling oligarchs’ power (Beckmann 1957, 84). “By the Meiji Constitution,” Beckmann went on, “the oligarchs established a body of authoritarian political principles in Western forms as the ultimate defense of their dominant position in government” (ibid.) “The basic premise of these principles,” he explained, “was the doctrine that supreme political power rested in the person of the Emperor; moreover, the Meiji Constitution emphasized that the Emperor was the center of political power not by divine right but by divine descent” (ibid.). Although Dobbins et al. acknowledged many of the democratic aspects of pre-World War II Japan, they nonetheless echoed Beckmann’s conclusion that it was more authoritarian than anything else. For Dobbins et al., however, this highlighted the more important fact, which was that democracy could be transplanted to places where it did not exist beforehand (Dobbins et al. 2003, 51). “Despite the absence of a long democratic history and the existence of an authoritarian culture,” they asserted, “nation-building in Japan was successful” (ibid., 52).

Regardless of historical familiarity with democratic institutions, or lack thereof, Dobbins et al. maintained that a crucial lesson of nation-building is that “democracy can be transferred, and societies can, in some situations, be encouraged to change” (ibid., 20). “The spread of democracy in Latin America, Asia, and parts of Africa,” they expounded,
“suggests that this form of government is not unique to Western culture or of advanced industrial economies,” and that “democracy can, indeed, take root when neither is present” (ibid., 161). In Montesquieu’s terms, a people’s general spirit can be molded into one that embraces liberty; or, as Mill might say, a backward society can progress toward liberal self-government.

Japan’s political reforms actually began two years prior to the implementation of its new constitution. “The SCAP Civil Liberties directive of October 4, 1945,” for instance, “led to the dissolution of the Special Higher Police, which had been responsible for enforcing restrictions on speech and thought” (ibid., 42). The police were additionally “banned from interfering in labor affairs,” and the “Home Ministry, which had directed an extensive network of repressive police forces, was abolished” (ibid.). It was under this directive that the Japanese police forces were decentralized, though, as stated, this decentralization was later adjusted in order to secure greater domestic stability (ibid.). Additionally, this Civil Liberties Directive “called for the release of political prisoners; the removal of limits on freedom of speech and assembly”; and it prompted the formation of a new cabinet (ibid., 43). As Dobbins et al. stated, “these freedoms set the stage for revision of the Meiji Constitution” of 1890 (ibid.).

In order to avoid Soviet input in the drafting the new constitution, General Douglas MacArthur and his team rushed to formulate this new constitution on their terms alone (Weintraub 2012, 48). MacArthur’s headquarters presented its “Three Basic Points” as a guide and foundation for the final constitution (ibid.). As Weintraub explained, the “first of the points allowed the emperor to remain head of state, though his powers would henceforth derive from the new constitution, which itself would reflect the
will of the people”; the “second point called for Japan's renunciation of the right to wage war or to maintain armed forces”; and the “third point abolished the feudal system and reformed the peerage” (ibid.). Dobbins et al. emphasized that this SCAP draft of the constitution “reduced the emperor from a sovereign to a mere symbol of the Japanese state and placed the Diet, as representatives of the will of the people, at the center of national sovereignty” (Dobbins et al. 2003, 43).

Another significant area of reform that became a part of the official 1947 Constitution concerned women’s rights. As Dobbins et al. explained, “equal rights were granted to women with regard to property, marriage, inheritance, and other aspects of family life” (ibid.). Additionally, before “the first election was held on April 10, 1946, [just] seven months after the beginning of the occupation,” the electoral law had been thoroughly revised; this law “was revised to give women the right to vote, a move MacArthur viewed as a sure break on the revival of militarism, and to lower the voting age from 25 to 20” (ibid., 44). The Japanese education system was also made over as the new constitution was ushered in. This educational reform included the “removal of all traces of emperor worship (State Shinto) and militarism from the classrooms and curriculum” (ibid.). Furthermore, “saluting the flag, singing the national anthem, and bowing to the emperor’s portrait were prohibited,” and the educational system was generally decentralized in order to weed out indoctrination (ibid.).

In these ways, Japan experienced a rather quick transformation into a democratic state, and is currently considered by many as one “of the world’s greatest democracies” (Packard 2010, 102). Although the case of nation-building in Japan is generally heralded as a success, Montesquieu and Mill would have each had some contention with the
process as it occurred. Montesquieu would not have approved of such an immediate overhaul of the nation’s laws and customs; he would likely have rejected the installment of a new constitution so quickly, and would have warned against altering the image of the emperor so abruptly. Additionally, while commerce was certainly not lacking in pre-World War II Japan, Montesquieu would have still insisted that a commercial general spirit needed to be more widespread (as a mere handful of industrialists ruled the economy and resources in Japan at this time) before liberty could successfully be embraced by the citizenry.

Mill, for his part, would have argued that holding elections so soon after the occupation was giving the people the power of self-government before they were ready to properly execute it. While Mill may have granted that the Japanese people had long-since learned the lesson of obedience (as they previously lived under a largely authoritarian government and submitted to a “semidivine emperor”), he might have worried that this obedience perhaps had become the object of the state (Weintraub 2012, 48). For Mill, obedience was meant to be “one step in advance of a savage,” but when it became the end of that state, a people of slaves was formed (Mill 1991, 49). Obedience, “though a necessary condition,” he wrote, “is not the object of government” (ibid., 29). For, according to Mill, a state based solely, or even mostly, on obedience is one based on fear; a representative government, on the other hand, requires the people to be free from fear and to have a vested interest in participating in their government (ibid., 49).

**Economic Prosperity**

Japan has experienced tremendous economic prosperity since US occupation, and currently “the Japanese seem to enjoy one of the world’s highest levels of economic
attainment” (Kusago 2006, 81). A report in 2011 stated that, “as the third largest economy in the world, Japan’s GDP at $5.5 trillion accounts for 8.7% of global GDP” (Nanto, Cooper, and Donnelly 2011, 1). However, “at the end of World War II, the Japanese empire lay in ruins”: “one-quarter of the country’s wealth was destroyed” and “the Japanese civilian economy was near collapse” (Dobbins et al. 2003, 28). Yet, Japan managed to bounce back to an impressive degree, and has continued to maintain its prominent economic standing more or less consistently since its recovery. “In Japan, per capita GDP was half its 1939 level in 1945, but by 1952, incomes had risen 80 percent of their level in 1939” (ibid., 160). And today, “if we look at Japan based on its economic performance (GDP)...we see that it achieved extraordinary high economic growth after World War II” (Kusago 2006, 82). According to Dobbins et al., Japan’s “experience suggests that rising economic prosperity is not so much a necessary precursor for political reform as a highly desirable follow-up and legitimizer” (Dobbins et al. 2003, 162). As we can see, Dobbins et al. thus followed Mill’s reasoning much more than Montesquieu’s.

What then explains “Japan’s extraordinary economic growth since” 1945? (Kugaso 2006, 81). Dobbins et al. suggested that part of this outcome can be traced to Japan’s pre-World War II economic success. “The easiest answer,” they offered, is that Japan was “already highly developed and economically advanced” (Dobbins et al. 2003, 160). “It is easier to reconstruct economies that have been modern,” they continued, “than to foster rapid economic growth in economies that have never been developed”; and “this may explain why it was easier to reconstruct” the Japanese economy “than it was to fundamentally reform the underdeveloped economies” of other nation-building operation, such a Somalia or Haiti (ibid.). “Note also,” Dobbins et al. added, “that past difficulties
fade with the passage of time,” for Japan actually had “one of the slowest rates of recovery” (ibid.) As Dobbins et al. reminded us, this successful economic recovery in Japan “did not happen until 1956, over a decade after the end of the war” (ibid.). Similarly, it should be recalled that, since Japan had been disarmed, it “received American military support and financial assistance long after” it became a self-sufficient democracy, because it was not capable of defending itself “unaided against the Soviet Union” (ibid., 164).

Japan’s economic success may have been bolstered by its historical record, but it can be argued that this success was partially linked to the reconstruction efforts (or at least furthered by them) which took place under US occupation. Initially, fostering the economy took a backseat to the US’s primary goals of democratization and demilitarization in Japan, and though it was considered a secondary goal in this sense, several rather substantial economic reforms were eventually enacted. As we will see, certain international events convinced US leadership to ultimately switch gears and place economic recovery at the forefront.

At the beginning of the occupation, “MacArthur and his staff focused their efforts on the democratization of economic opportunity”; the “goal was to provide the 80 percent of the population that had previously lacked an economic stake in the nation a reason to support the democratic status quo” (ibid., 45). Therefore, at first the “U.S. policy was [relatively] hands-off with regard to economic reconstruction”; “economic controls were to be left solely in the hands of the Japanese, and the SCAP’s role in economic stabilization was to direct the Japanese government to make ‘every feasible effort’ to curb rampant inflation that massive printing of money at war’s end had caused” (ibid).
Eventually, however, economics gained the spotlight. The Economic Scientific Section was created under the SCAP, for example, and its main tasks included “dissolving the large business combines (zaibatsu) that dominated the economy, expanding worker’s rights, and instituting a comprehensive land reform” (ibid., 46).

The breakup of the zaibatsu, which included such “financial cliques” as “Mitsubishi and Mitsui,” was essentially a mandated “purge of those in ‘positions of important responsibility or influence in industry, commerce, and agriculture’” (Kusago 2006, 81; Dobbins et al. 2003, 46-7). As Dobbins et al. explained, this “economic purge affected only 1,898 members of the business elite and had no discernible effect on industrial production,” yet symbolically it was meant to “lay the groundwork for the development of a Japanese middle class and democratic capitalism” (Dobbins et al. 2003, 47). “It was argued,” they expounded, “that the zaibatsu had suppressed democratic consumption with low wages, and in their search for cheap raw materials and foreign markets, had supported overseas aggression” (ibid.). Such “continued overconcentration of economic wealth and power in the hands of a few families was perceived as antidemocratic and dangerous,” for the zaibatsu not only enjoyed economic power but special political powers as well (ibid., 47, 28). While this reform “did not eliminate all anticompetitive practices,” the “breakup of family-owned zaibatsu helped share the wealth and spur the creation of many new companies, which in turn created greater wealth and led to a more competitive domestic economy” (ibid., 48).

Workers’ rights and the ability to form unions was another aspect of SCAP’s reforms. As Dobbins et al. pointed out, this was “another major focus of [SCAP’s] economic democratization efforts” and included “the enactment of laws that gave labor
the right to organize, as well as other protections” (ibid.). New “legislation to protect the rights of Japanese wage earners” came in the form of the “Trade Union Law of December 1945”; though it “had some serious limitations,” Dobbins et al. acknowledged, “it guaranteed workers the right to organize, to bargain collectively, and to strike” (ibid.). Workers were eager to take advantage of these new laws, and trade unions were quickly formed; subsequently, these “trade unions immediately used their new freedoms to organize and agitate for change through the political process” (ibid.). Although Japanese workers were delighted by their new rights, MacArthur still maintained an upper hand, as demonstrated by his demanding in 1947 that a major strike by government workers’ unions be called off (ibid., 49).

This order from MacArthur was seen as “a giant step in the American turn from agent of antifeudal revolution to supporter of capitalist recovery” (Gordon 2001, 9). This new approach culminated with SCAP’s implementation of “the Dodge plan (named for its architect, American industrialist Joseph Dodge)” in 1949, which aimed “to promote recovery through an extremely austere fiscal and monetary policy” (ibid., 10). These measures included reducing the public welfare budget, limiting the rights of unions to bargain and strike, and working to restore Japan as an industrial exporter (Schaller 1997, 17-18). As Schaller pointed out, “Dodge considered industrial recovery, export production, and containment of Communism as related goals” (ibid., 18). Thus, in “1950, Americans directed the Japanese government to fire over 12,000 union activists identified as Communist Party members or sympathizers, and Japan’s rulers happily complied” (Gordon 2001, 10).
However, as Gordon described, after 1950 “Japan’s unions gradually regrouped” and eventually evolved into a “new brand of corporate unionism” (ibid., 11). “This revised corporate position,” Gordon explained, “saw the interests of workers and [corporate] managers as fundamentally the same and assumed managers would normally act in the mutual interests of both employees and the company” (ibid.). With this new strategy, “corporations absorbed important elements of the union agenda” and found common ground with union leaders; for instance, “union leaders helped mobilize their members to produce efficiently, and managers who appreciated this help respected the union call for job security in particular” (ibid., 19).

What resulted, however, was that this “corporate-centered society came to permeate the thinking and daily lives of Japanese people, [and] began to limit what seemed possible, imaginable, or natural” to Japanese workers (ibid.). This was reflected by the grim, firsthand account of life as a Toyota factory worker in the 1970s presented by Kamata. “The Toyota method of production appears to the outside world as the systematization of ‘the relationship of a community bound together by a common fate,’” Kamata recounted, “but truthfully, it’s nothing more than the absolute determination to make all movement of goods and people in and out of these plants subordinate to Toyota’s will” (Kamata 1985, 200). Kamata also condemned the union’s policy, which was not to actively strive for the betterment of its workers, but rather to submit and “resolutely” comply with the company’s rather harsh demands (ibid., 204-5). As he stated, “gradually management has become more and more high-handed without being checked by the union,” and thus “the human cost of Toyota methods--suicides, injuries,
job fatalities, and occupational disease—[continues to] increase at a horrifying rate” (ibid., 211). Thus, Japanese unions have trodden a turbulent path since the years of occupation.

Conversely, it has been generally agreed upon that the land reform initiated under US occupation has proven to be “a very successful reform, which had a great impact on the political and social stability of postwar Japan” (Kawagoe 1999, 3). “One of the most dramatic and sweeping reforms of the economic democratization period,” Dobbins et al. wrote, “was the land reform instituted in 1946-7” (Dobbins et al. 2003, 49). While General MacArthur “praised himself for the success in his letter to Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida,” by proclaiming it to be “‘the most successful land reform program in history,’” even “incisive critics of MacArthur had to admit that the land reform was the most successful achievement in his occupation policy” (Kawagoe 1999, 2). Thus the final, and perhaps most significant, policy of US occupation came in the form of land reform. Enacted by the SCAP’s Economic Scientific Section, this program “was designed to undermine the political and economic power of landlords, who were viewed as the bulwark of feudalism and militarism” (Dobbins et al. 2003, 49). These landlords, much like the zaibatsu, possessed overly-concentrated economic and political power (ibid.).

It was MacArthur’s plan to “‘tear down the large feudalistic land holdings in order that those who till the soil will have the opportunity to reap the full benefit from their toil’” (Schaller 1997, 11). As Schaller explained, “advocates of [this] reform claimed that it would expand food production, democratize the rural economy, and prevent the type of peasant revolts sweeping China and Southeast Asia” (ibid.). Effects of the land reform were instantly felt. As Dobbins et al. described, “the percentage of owner-operated land rose from 54 percent in 1947 to 90 percent in 1950”; and thus by
1950, “land reform was completed” (Dobbins et al. 2003, 50). “Even today,” Dobbins et al. noted, “land reform is seen as the single most important factor for quelling rural discontent and promoting political stability in the early postwar period” (ibid.).

As previously stated, there was a so-called “reverse course” of the overall reconstruction strategy, whereby “economic stability took precedence over democratization and demilitarization” (ibid., 49-50). This change of course was brought about by a two-pronged fear of communism--fear of it penetrating into Japanese culture, and fear of fighting it off internationally. According to Dobbins et al., this is what led MacArthur to curb the 1947 government workers’ strike, as well as what led to the SCAP’s attention being focused on fostering a self-sustaining economy in Japan (ibid., 49, 53). “Eventually,” Dobbins et al. explained, “U.S. global interests trumped the desires of SCAP reformers” to continue concentration on democratization and demilitarization (ibid., 53). The Cold War and tensions with the Soviet Union had accelerated, and this “led to a shift in emphasis within the U.S. government toward policies that would promote Japanese self-sufficiency” (ibid.). In other words, the U.S. decided that a Japan with its own healthy economy would make for a stronger ally as the international scene grew increasingly unstable.

The questions remaining are: how has Japan fared economically since this “reverse course” took place, and can Japan’s subsequent economic success be attributed to these policies implemented by the US? As Kusago demonstrated, “Japan got on track to grow its economy rapidly in the 1950s and 1960s” following US occupation, and experienced an “economic boom with higher industrial production” in the late 1950s (Kusago 2006, 81). The 1970s continued to bring success, and in this period a profound
industriousness was fostered in the culture—a change in mores which would have been extolled by Montesquieu and Mill alike. Kusago painted the scene well: “in the 1970s,” he wrote, “Europeans described Japanese workers as ‘economic animals’ in the context of warning the world of Japanese economic power” (ibid.). “They worked long hours,” Kusago went on, “and perhaps, as a result of this hard work, their economic well-being improved with the sharp economic growth of the 1960s and 1970s” (ibid.). “Some academics and policymakers in the West,” he added, “described Japan’s high economic growth in the 1960s and 70s as a ‘miracle’” (ibid., 82). And, as previously stated, Japan today continues to enjoy a relatively impressive level of economic prosperity.

Some scholars, however, have argued that Japan’s so-called “economic miracle” was achieved more so thanks to strategic intervention by the Japanese bureaucracy (a result of the state’s enduring relationship with domestic businesses) as opposed to US-initiated reforms. Writers taking this historical-institutionalist approach, such as Johnson and Evans, have suggested that Japan’s bureaucracy was so culturally “embedded” and autonomous that Japan emerged as a “developmental state” following US occupation; thus Japan’s industrial success, they argued, was more a result of the state’s historical connection to Japanese corporations, formed in the 1920s (two decades prior to US occupation), rather than a result of US reforms (Johnson 1982; Evans 1995; Wright 1999). The Japanese state, “having experimented with direct and detailed intervention in the pre-World War II period,” Evans explained, “limited itself to strategically selected economic involvement after the war” (Evans 1995, 58).

Both Johnson and Evans applauded the “success of the Japanese developmental state,” and praised the actions taken by “Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI)” in particular (ibid., 48). Evans described the “startling economic growth” ushered in by MITI in the post-WWII period, and the subsequent transformation of Japan’s industry, as “rooted in coherent, competent bureaucratic organization” (ibid., 48, 51). Johnson described MITI as “a powerful, talented, and prestige-laden economic bureaucracy,” which focused on long-term national goals (Johnson 1982, 21). Thus “the Japanese state acted as a surrogate for a missing capital market while at the same time helping to ‘introduce’ transformative investment decisions” (Evans 1995, 48). In areas such as information technology, therefore, this “combination of protection from foreign competition, government support of demand, and fiscal subsidies transformed what would have otherwise been an extremely risky, if not impossible, industry into an attractive proposition” (ibid., 101).

MITI was originally created in 1949 to provide “‘administrative guidance’ to banks and corporations” by directing “the flow of domestic credit, foreign currency, imported raw materials, and foreign technology to favored companies” (Schaller 1997, 18). Though MITI has since been considered a model agency of Japan’s “developmental state,” and was designed after Japan’s Munitions Ministry, it was the brainchild of Joseph Dodge, the “so-called economic czar” who pushed for “a rigorous program of neo-classical economic policy” in Japan (ibid.). Schaller, therefore, in a challenge to Johnson and Evans, argued that “Japan’s government-guided, export-driven economy, later described as a ‘capitalist developmental state’ or, less charitably, ‘Japan, Inc.,’ was nurtured by American directives” (ibid.).

As Watanabe described, such a “capitalistic ‘developmental state’...has as its dominant feature state-led industrial policy--a strategic or goal-oriented approach to the
economy” (Watanabe 1998, 205). Yet others, such as Okimoto, have argued that “the level of coherence ascribed to Japanese industrial policy [enacted by MITI] tends to be overstated” (Okimoto 1990, 3). While “it is clear that MITI bureaucrats do not regard the market as sacrosanct,” Okimoto explained, “the Japanese state can be considered among the world’s smallest--a ‘minimalist’ state, as it were--in terms of the size of the ‘bite’ it takes out of the economy” (ibid., 2). For example, “state ownership of key industries like steel, shipbuilding, railways, automobiles, aircraft, electronics, telecommunications, and banking [was] far smaller in Japan than in France, Italy, or the United Kingdom” (ibid., 2). “Contrary to the conventional wisdom, therefore,” Okimoto concluded, Japanese industrial policy created by MITI lacked “the consistency and vision often attributed to it” (ibid., 3).

Schaller additionally argued that the US contributed to Japan’s economic boom via American “war orders” to Japan. “The outbreak of fighting in Korea breathed life into the dormant Japanese economy and stock market,” Schaller insisted, thanks to US requests to Japanese companies for various equipment and supplies (Schaller 1997, 48). Such “war orders benefited the textile, constructions, automotive, metal, communications, and chemical industries” in Japan (ibid.). As Schaller explained, “during the first year of the Korean War procurements totaled some $329 million, about 40 percent of the value of Japan’s total exports in 1950,” and “by 1954, Japan earned over $3 billion in defense expenditures, initiating a two-decade period of 10 percent annual growth in the GNP” (ibid.). And while “American military expenditures in Japan declined” in 1955, other areas of “trade between Japan and the United States surged after 1955” (ibid., 108). Schaller attributed this to “Japan’s entry into the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),” which reduced tariffs between the two nations and thus spurred an expansion of exports and imports (ibid.).

MITI, on the other hand, in later years directed what Theodore H. White of *The New York Times* called “the guided missiles of the trade offensive” (ibid., 255). This sentiment was reflected by a 2002 *Financial Times* report which stated that Japan’s Ministry of Finance has finally “broken ranks” with the view that MITI ushered in Japan’s economic miracle; the institute argued instead that MITI’s “participation in industries such as textiles, aircraft manufacturing and chemicals failed to turn them into global competitors and in fact retarded their growth” (Morita 2002, 10). This revelation, Morita of *Financial Times* stated, “exploded one of the myths surrounding Japan’s postwar economic growth by saying the protectionist policies implemented by the once-revered Ministry of Trade and Industry had hindered rather than aided economic growth” (ibid.).

Yet whatever the level, state involvement in the economy as such may seem like a direct reversal of Montesquieu’s agenda, which maintained confidence in the power of commerce and commerce alone to transform everything from commodity production to a nation’s general spirit. However, he was not opposed to laws and regulations which furthered commerce, particularly in a nation’s developmental stage. “Liberty of commerce is not a faculty granted to traders to do what they want,” he stated, for “this would instead be the servitude of commerce” (Montesquieu 2009, 345). Patent laws, for example, can be said to restrict the trader for the sake of furthering commerce; the American Patent laws, for instance, secure exclusive rights for inventors and authors, yet were founded on the Constitution’s intellectual property clause intended “to promote the
progress of science and useful arts” (Walterscheid 1998, 11). Nor were state-imposed restrictions necessarily incompatible with commerce or liberty for Montesquieu. For example, he pointed out that “England prohibits the export of wool”; thus, though England “hampers the trader” with some of its laws, “it does so in favor of commerce” (Montesquieu 2009, 345). If MITI and the other agencies of the so-called “Japanese developmental state” did in fact favor commerce, as Johnson and Evans have argued, then Montesquieu would most likely have approved of them--at least as a temporary measure.

Yet Montesquieu would also likely have agreed with Schaller that a reduction of tariffs would spur trade and thus foster the economy. “The farming of the customs,” Montesquieu insisted, “destroys commerce by its injustices and harassments and by the excess of what it imposes, but independently of that it also destroys it further by the difficulties to which it gives rise and the formalities it requires” (ibid., 346). Montesquieu again pointed to the example of England, “where customs are imposed directly” and where “the merchant does not have to waste an infinite time and have specified agents in order to conclude all the difficulties brought up by the tax-farmers or to submit to them” (ibid.).

Mill may also have approved of MITI in this case. It could be argued that Japan’s “developmental state” is a uniquely domestic version of Mill’s “government of leading-strings,” which was intended to be composed of experts who were entrusted with substantial power in both economic and political matters (Mill 1991, 50). Mill argued that a form of “double government” between trading companies and the crown (both of foreign origin) was the best mode for advancing a dependency toward civilization, and
this included the realm of economic prosperity; Japanese agencies, such as MITI, represented distinct “combination[s] of roles and strategies” that were fitted to Japan’s various industries (Mill 1991, 363; Evans 1995, 102). Where Mill and this type of state intervention would disagree, however, is less on the issue of foreign versus domestic sources of “leading strings,” and more so on the permanent nature of the bureaucracy. Mill’s government of guiding experts was inherently temporary, as its final goal was to retreat and leave behind a more classically liberal state-industrial relationship, whereas the developmental government in Japan was essentially created as a self-perpetuating rather than provisional arrangement. While MITI has since dissolved, it was replaced by (or more accurately “renamed,” some might argue) the Ministry of the Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) (Morita 2002, 10).

Regardless of the origins of its “economic miracle,” Japan has more recently suffered a rather lengthy period of economic stagnation. The “famous bubble” of the 1980s burst in the early 1990s, and while the Japanese economy has since gained a relatively better footing, it still faces serious challenges (Ueda 2011, 48). As Fletcher described, “the economic stagnation that Japan experienced between 1990-2003, what the Japanese have dubbed the lost decade, marked the end of four decades of impressive economic growth” (Fletcher 2012, 149). While MITI and similar agencies may have helped create the economic miracle, authors such as Ueda and Fletcher have suggested that “Japan’s poor macroeconomic performance” was primarily a result of “Japan’s mismanagement of its economy” (Ueda 2011, 60). Such “mismanagement,” Ueda proposed, came in the form of “the overly expansionary monetary policy of the 1980s that led to the formation of the bubble” (ibid.). Although Fletcher pointed the accusatory
finger at the “Keidenren (The Federation of Economic Organizations)”--a major Japanese business group--he suggested that it was their emphasis on neoliberal policies and deregulation which most contributed to the economic troubles of the so-called “lost decade” (Fletcher 2012, 150, 162).

Although Japan’s economy has fared better since 2003, it has hardly rediscovered its “miracle” phase (ibid.). However, despite the economic malaise Japan has experienced over the past couple of decades, despite the further woes it withstood in the face of the worldwide economic downturn, and despite the additional financial blow brought about by the 2011 tsunami, earthquake and subsequent nuclear crisis, Japan is still considered by most to be an economic powerhouse (Krugman 1998, 182; Nanto, Cooper, and Donnelly 2011, 1; Berger 1993, 119). As Schaller described, within forty years after the end of occupation, Japan’s “technology and industry set global standards,” and “although it remained a military midget, the lapsing of the cold war rendered its status as an economic superpower” complete (Schaller 1997, 258).

**Good Despotism**

If there is any modern-day example that genuinely reflects Montesquieu and Mill’s proposed idea of a “good despot,” it is Five-Star General Douglas MacArthur and his occupation of Japan. While the title “despot” may appear extreme at first, contemporary scholars have not shied away from comparable descriptions. As Weintraub proclaimed, “though his official title was supreme commander for the Allied powers (SCAP), he became in effect that defeated nation's American viceroy” (Weintraub 2012, 44). Parshall concurred by describing public reaction to rumors of a possible presidential campaign: “he struck many as a better candidate for emperor than president,” Parshall
noted, and “he proved them right when he became viceroy of postwar Japan” (Parshall 1998, 57). In reference to MacArthur, Dobbins et al. similarly asserted that Japan’s occupation “was presided over by an autocratic U.S. general” (Dobbins et al. 2003, 32). Even President Truman, in a message to MacArthur, acknowledged that “your authority is supreme” (ibid., 31). Manchester put it most eloquently, however, when he said, “most of all...MacArthur was like Julius Caesar: bold, aloof, austere, egotistical, willful” (Manchester 1978, 5). These “two generals,” Manchester continued, “surrounded themselves with servile aides-de-camp; remained long abroad, one as proconsul and the other as shogun, leading captive peoples in unparalleled growth; loved history; were fiercely grandiose and spectacularly fearless; and reigned as benevolent autocrats” (ibid.).

What, then, made MacArthur a good despot? In accordance with Montesquieu and Mill’s requirements, he provided security, democratization (progress), and economic prosperity. He implemented the complete demilitarization of Japan, whereby the US assumed responsibility for its protection; after a rough patch, domestic security was established, and for decades since the general’s departure, the US has provided Japan with its primary source of international defense. Japan’s new constitution was drafted under the supervision of MacArthur; and under his rule a new era of civil liberties was ushered in, which included women’s suffrage, freedom of speech, and freedom of assembly. The MacArthur camp also issued several economic programs, such as reorganization of the zaibatsu, workers’ rights, and land reform, which brought about “democratization of economic opportunity” (Dobbins et al. 2003, 45). Adding to these accomplishments, the US occupation, and MacArthur’s own time at the head, remained temporary. Though “he saw himself as a sovereign power,” MacArthur did not pursue
permanent rule over Japan (Weintraub 2012, 50). Rather, with Washingtonian grace, upon his departure “the general shook hands with his successor, Ridgeway,” and left his command to return to the US; a quick though ceremonious farewell accompanied this smooth and peaceful transition of power (albeit to another American); and then, as Weintraub put it, “another working day began in Japan” (ibid., 51). Thus, in these various ways, General MacArthur achieved the primary goals required of a good despot.

Aside from meeting these requisites, however, MacArthur also attained some of the less tangible qualities prescribed by Montesquieu and Mill. MacArthur seemed to have a rather profound understanding of the Japanese people and their culture. As Weintraub pointed out, MacArthur “understood the symbolic importance of the emperor” to the Japanese people (Weintraub 2012, 47). While the general actively suppressed divine worship of the former ruler and made it abundantly clear that a new leader was in charge (himself), MacArthur nevertheless ensured that the ex-emperor “escaped the scaffold” and would not be tried as a war criminal (ibid.). As Dobbins et al. explained, MacArthur’s reasoning for this sparing of emperor Hirohito was that he believed it “would facilitate a smooth and successful occupation” (Dobbins et al. 2003, 39). With this, “Japanese pride was massaged, and order was maintained”; yet in the process, “in his slowly imperial way MacArthur became a substitute emperor figure” (Weintraub 2012, 47).

In addition to recognizing the symbolic importance of the emperor, and thereby “going easy” on him, MacArthur “retained and adapted existing Japanese institutions” (Dobbins et al. 2003, 52). As stated, many Japanese governmental institutions harbored the rudimentary foundations for democracy, and thus they could successfully be built
upon in a democratizing fashion. MacArthur, therefore, “kept much of the local Japanese government intact and did not attempt to micromanage it, preferring to rule,” as Weintraub described, “much the way the British had run India for decades before the war” (Weintraub 2012, 47). In a Millian note, MacArthur was dismayed by the lack of Japanese experts at his disposal, so he decided to preserve many locals in their bureaucratic positions (ibid.). “The paucity of U.S. personnel with both language and technical capabilities,” Dobbins et al. affirmed, “led MacArthur and his SCAP staff to retain the existing Japanese government” and place themselves in a more supervisory role (Dobbins et al., 2003, 52). Echoing both Montesquieu and Mill, Weintraub commented that “this pattern of distant command and remote governance seemed to work, as MacArthur retained the country’s institutions and culture” (Weintraub 2012, 47).

Playing the full part of Mill’s good despot, MacArthur additionally demonstrated in many ways that he had the true interests of the Japanese people at heart. Not only did he assume “the task of demilitarization and democratization with what is often described as messianic zeal,” he showed a dedicated concern for the well-being of the Japanese citizens (Dobbins et al. 2003, 43). “MacArthur,” Dobbins et al. explained, “worried that his democratization program would be undermined by hunger,” so he “lobbied for more substantial assistance, arguing that the United States would have to supply either more food or more forces” (ibid., 37). As was typical, the general’s budget request was met (ibid.). “This food aid,” Dobbins et al. expounded, “saved Japan from acute malnutrition, if not starvation,” and “for many Japanese, particularly young children whose school lunches consisted largely of donated food, this assistance symbolized U.S. generosity and wealth” (ibid., 37-8).
Such acts as these enabled MacArthur to become in a real sense loved by the Japanese people. “For the Japanese people,” Weintraub noted, who were “long accustomed to a remote and nearly invisible emperor, MacArthur had filled the vacuum as a surrogate demigod” (Weintraub 2012, 51). The impression he left on the citizens of Japan prompted a “resolution of the Japanese Diet [that] cited MacArthur as the one ‘who helped our country out of the confusion and poverty prevailing at the time the war ended’” (ibid.). As mentioned, his departure was accompanied by a short but rather grandiose ceremony, and this elicited a very emotional response from the Japanese people. “Many Japanese,” Weintraub wrote, “displayed heartfelt banners in the language the general had never attempted to learn: WE LOVE YOU. WE ARE GRATEFUL TO THE GENERAL. WITH SINCERE REGRET. SAYONARA”; and, similarly, the “Asahi Shimbun newspaper published an editorial headlined LAMENT FOR GENERAL MACARTHUR” (ibid.). As Montesquieu asked, “who is the conqueror who is mourned by all the people he subjected? Who is the usurper whose death moved to tears the family he had removed from the throne? This aspect of his life, historians tell us, can be claimed by no other conqueror” than Alexander the Great--perhaps, that is, until MacArthur came onto the scene (Montesquieu 2009, 149). Thus vindicating Montesquieu over Manchester, MacArthur in many ways appears more to be an Alexander than a Caesar.
Part 3: Currently, is there Liberty in Iraq?

Freedom House and Other Statistics

The most recent rating by Freedom House in 2012 classified Iraq as “Not Free” with a political rights score of five and a civil liberties score of six (each out of seven) (Freedom House 2012). While a series of elections have been held since 2005, which have been described as “relatively free and fair,” Iraq is still “not an electoral democracy” (ibid.). “Although it has conducted meaningful elections,” Freedom House reported that “political participation and decision-making in the country remain seriously impaired by sectarian and insurgent violence, widespread corruption, and the influence of foreign powers” (ibid.). While Iraq’s freedom status has improved overall since the US-led invasion in 2003, it still suffers from serious limitations. Nonetheless, the various elections and the implementation of a constitution which guarantees many basic rights have enabled Iraq to advance from its categorization in 2003 as the “most oppressive state in the world,” whereby both political rights and civil liberties received the lowest-possible scores of seven, to where it stands today (ibid., 2011; ibid., 2003).

Iraq’s new constitution provided a foundation of basic rights, though many of these have yet to be fully realized. This is particularly a result of continued violence and threats caused by deep-seated ethnic and religious tensions in the society. “Freedom of religion,” for example, “is guaranteed by the constitution...However, all religious communities in Iraq have been threatened by sectarian violence” (ibid., 2011). Similarly, “judicial independence is guaranteed in the constitution”; “in practice, however, judges have come under immense political and sectarian pressure and have been largely unable to pursue cases involving organized crime, corruption, and militia activity, even when
presented with overwhelming evidence” (ibid.). The constitution also “promises women equal rights under the law, though in practice they face various forms of legal and societal discrimination”; despite some improvements, such as university attendance, women “still faced serious social pressure and restriction,” and furthermore “domestic abuse and so-called honor killings remain serious problems...across the country” (ibid.).

Nevertheless, there are some provisions of the constitution which have attained greater levels of success. With regard to workers’ rights, “the constitution provides for the right to form and join professional associations and unions,” and subsequently “union activity has flourished in nearly all industries since 2003”; yet in spite of this success, “Iraq’s 1987 labor law remains in effect, prohibiting unionization in the public sector” (ibid). The greatest success, however, came with the increase in participation in Iraq. As stated, elections have been successfully held, and, additionally, the “rights of freedom of assembly and association are recognized by the constitution and [are] generally respected in practice” (ibid.).

Iraq has also attained a certain degree of economic prosperity since 2003, which could potentially improve its likelihood of acquiring liberty. Iraq received an initial spike in its GDP real growth rate, jumping 52.3% in 2004; however, in the following years (between 2005 and 2010), it experienced an average real growth rate of only 3.07% (IndexMundi 2012). Enterline and Greig in 2008 placed Iraq in the “middle prosperity category,” as it had, for example, a GDP per capita much higher than that of Afghanistan at the time (Enterline and Greig 2008, 341). “This middle prosperity group,” they explained, “enjoys a much stronger level of democratic durability among imposed democracies” (ibid.). According to their study, this suggested that Iraq was likely to
sustain a democracy for at least a decade; yet, they noted, “after 20 years, the survival rate of imposed democratic regimes reduces even further” (ibid., 338). While this state has the potential to “provide economic opportunity for [its] citizenry,” Lowther acknowledged, the Iraqi economy remains “fragile” and “dependent on American aid and oil exports,” whereby “a serious decline in both may prove disastrous” (Lowther 2009, 202).

The level of attained liberty in Iraq therefore remains low. Though many argue for its ultimate potential for achieving more liberty in the future, it will clearly be a rocky road. While there have been considerable advancements since 2003, as Iraq now possesses the rudimentary foundations for liberty in its constitution, it nevertheless has so far lacked the surge in security and prosperity that would furnish the stable ground for furthering liberty—requisites both Montesquieu and Mill would insist must accompany any progress in the realm of political liberty.

Normative Assessment by Scholars

Most scholarly assessments of the liberty in Iraq, in addition to the overall success of the US’s nation-building efforts there, have been bleak. Diamond concluded that “the handover of power [from US forces to the Iraqis], and the subsequent elections, did not ease or at least initially ease the most pressing problems confronting that beleaguered country: endemic terrorist, political, and criminal violence, a shattered state, and a decimated society and economy” (Diamond 2005, 173). Additionally, Diamond recounted his own experience with Iraqi civilians: “I encountered numerous Iraqis with a genuine and deeply moving ambition to live in a decent, democratic, and free society and found them prepared to do the hard work that building a democracy will require” (ibid.,
Writing in 2005, Diamond thus presented the view of Iraq as a nation with the *potential* for liberty, but one which had not yet achieved it.

However, Diamond did acknowledge that “there were many other, more positive, aspects to the American-led effort, and these still offer some important foundations of hope for the future” (ibid., 192). These positive aspects included assistance to women’s and youth groups, training programs for political parties, and the establishment of offices and mechanisms that promote democracy and which have worked “to expand and stimulate democratic participation” (ibid.). Social and media reforms were also enacted, which “sought to encourage ‘pluralism and diverse political debate’ and to protect freedom of expression as defined by international standards”; one way of achieving this was through the creation of “a new Iraqi Media Network” intended “to serve as the public service broadcaster for the nation” (Fox 2005, 221-2).

Highlighting some of the economic changes enacted by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), Fox outlined some of the more positive aspects which took place under the US occupation of Iraq. “The CPA,” he argued, “remade virtually every aspect of Iraqi economic life,” and these drastic changes “were [all] intended to transform Iraq’s economy from a centrally planned to a free market model” (Fox 2005, 282). As he described, “the laws of banking, taxation, trade, foreign investment, corporations, bankruptcy, intellectual property, securities regulations, the media, state-owned enterprises, and even road traffic were extensively overhauled,” all with the economy in mind (ibid.). Therefore certain economic liberalization efforts were undertaken; of particular note were the creation of a new Iraqi Stock Exchange, whereby “all government oversight was removed,” and the complete reworking of Iraqi intellectual
property laws, a change which facilitated Iraq’s “entry into the World Trade Organization” (ibid., 220-1).

Yet Fox acknowledged that not all economic liberalization goals were achieved. He explained that while early on in the occupation “the CPA announced plans to begin privatizing Iraqi state-owned enterprises (SOEs),” these efforts were abandoned by the end of 2003 (ibid., 222). This was due to “a variety of circumstances,” Fox wrote, including “the difficulty of the task, the limited time available before the CPA ceased operations, opposition by Iraqi officials (including members of the Governing Council), and a fear of violence” (ibid.). “Instead,” therefore, “control over certain SOEs was transferred to Iraqi ministers, which, the CPA believed, would [at least] exercise more efficient control” (ibid.).

Another phenomenon which demonstrated the reversal of (and rather hypocritical approach to) proposed economic liberalization strategies involved what has been referred to as “contracting out.” In 2004, the Defense Department discovered that various US government agencies in Iraq had been awarding contracts on a “non-competitive basis,” often to major contractors that were “closely tied to former and current government officials” (Berrios 2006, 121, 126). As Berrios contended, “these government agencies did not allow for sufficient competition to award contracts, did not determine reasonable prices, and did not provide contractor oversight, [all of] which opened the door to abuses” (ibid., 128). “Awarding contracts mainly to prime contractors,” Berrios reasoned, “obviously does not entail or encourage competition and fairness” (ibid., 126). Thus, while “the government points to contracting as a more businesslike way of handling its needs,” in practice “its arrangements often erase the fundamental function of the
This, in Berrios’ view, pointed to the hypocrisy involved. The US government may have “embraced the idea of competitive bidding, but often proceeded to award no-bid contracts or to allow an oligopolistic structure in which contractors are able to obtain favorable circumstances at low risk to their firms” (ibid., 128).

Such agencies which engaged in this “contracting out” process included USAID (the United States Agency for International Development), the Army Corps of Engineers, and the Defense Department itself; and among the main firms receiving such no-bid contracts were Halliburton and its subsidiary Kellogg, Brown, and Root (ibid., 128). As a New York Times editorial pointed out, this practice also excluded Iraqi firms from fairly competing for such contracts (The New York Times 2004, A14). “Greater Iraqi involvement,” the editorial suggested, “would spread public awareness of these projects, provide new jobs for Iraqis and drastically reduce costs” (ibid.). Allegedly, “Iraqi construction labor costs about one-tenth of what is typically paid to foreign contractors” (ibid.). Awarding contracts based on competition and merit would have therefore promoted both US legitimacy and economic liberalization in Iraq. As Mill maintained, the metropole’s rulers stationed in foreign lands ought to offer themselves as industrious models in order to guide the local inhabitants toward advancement, and by doing so would demonstrate “a more permanent interest in the success of their administration, and in the prosperity of the country which they administer” (Mill 1991, 358). Similarly, Montesquieu would have condemned such an unfair practice as “contracting out” as anti-commerce and full of “destructive prejudices” (Montesquieu 2009, 328).

Beetham offered his own pessimistic evaluation of the US occupation, arguing that liberty in Iraq was doomed from the start, not because of any procedural mistakes,
but because the very idea of “democratization by force” is an inherent contradiction (Beetham 2009, 443). “While Iraq may display specific features that have intensified the problems of democratization,” he noted, “the basic problem lies in the contradictions of a democratizing project militarily imposed by an outside power, which Iraq has had the misfortune to demonstrate in an archetypical fashion” (ibid., 448). Beetham’s argument thus preemptively dismissed any objections that it remains too soon to make any final conclusions about Iraq, for, according to him, democracy-by-force precludes the establishment of meaningful liberty. Other commentators, however, have not been so quick to write Iraqi liberty off completely.

Most recently, Mohamadian, writing in 2012, did not consider nation-building in Iraq as a success with regard to liberty, yet he maintained that it was still too early to make final judgements (Mohamadian 2012, 245). He proclaimed nation-building in Iraq to presently be a “failure,” yet he insisted that “it is too early to assess the project’s [final] success in Iraq”; he reminded us that “if everybody agrees on the success of state nation building in [Japan and West Germany], it is because the statement was not made in [the] 1950s, but it is made currently after passing six decades” (ibid.). “So,” he confirmed, “to assess the success of Nation-State building [in Iraq] we need more time” (ibid.).
Part 4: Why has Widespread Liberty not been Established in Iraq?

Lack of Security

One common explanation for the failure to successfully implement stronger elements of democracy in Iraq is the fact that domestic security has not been established. Fukuyama, for instance, argued that “in postconflict reconstruction operations, adequate security is the absolute sine qua non of success” (Fukuyama 2005, 234). “The single biggest U.S. mistake after the invasion” of Iraq, he continued, “was the failure to anticipate the widespread looting and disorder that occurred and to deploy forces adequate in numbers and configuration to deter it” (ibid.). Mohamadian concurred, insisting that “the first step for the U.S to initiate a new era in Iraq” ought to have been for “a Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to be responsible for the Iraq security” (Mohamadian 2012, 240-1). This was particularly true, he added, because it was the US’s “belief that failed states and rogue states constitute the biggest threat to world peace in the foreseeable future” (ibid., 239). Or as Lowther put it, “the stated reasons [by the US] for regime change [in Iraq] were based on morality, security, and one of political science’s most enduring theories, democratic peace theory” (Lowther 2009, 196).

Diamond has been among the staunchest proponents of the idea that the so-called “security deficit” has been the cause of liberal failings in Iraq. The US occupational forces “never came to grips with the massive security deficit in Iraq,” he argued, “and furthermore, the Bush administration was never willing to commit anything near the force necessary to secure viable postwar order in Iraq” (Diamond 2005, 174). What was needed early on, he urged, included “more military police and other troops trained for urban patrols, crowd patrols, civil reconstruction, and peace maintenance and
enforcement” (ibid.). This “pervasive security deficit,” he maintained, “undermined everything else the [US-led] coalition sought to achieve” (ibid., 176). Diamond thus advocated a primacy of security, following Montesquieu and Mill’s belief that security was indeed a prerequisite for liberty. Diamond therefore insisted that, in a postconflict situation such as Iraq, “security trumps everything else,” but he acknowledged the way in which security is interconnected with political liberty (ibid.). “Just as decent governance was not possible without some minimal level of security,” he contended, “so it was that the security situation was not going to improve without significant progress on the political front” (ibid., 181).

Lack of Economic Prosperity

Another explanation for the lack of liberty in Iraq has been based on economic failures within the nation. This stance is best represented by the argument put forth by Lowther, who contended that “a focus on economic liberalization and the development of a free market economy would have led more quickly to an Iraq that is peaceful and prospering and a closer ally of the United States,” as opposed to the strategy adopted by the Bush administration, which instead “focused on rapid democratization” (Lowther 2009, 194). Lowther thus argued for a primacy of economic liberalization. And despite Fox’s insistence that “the most far-reaching reforms [in Iraq] were economic,” Lowther maintained that such reforms regrettably took a backseat during US occupation (Fox 2005, 215).

In Lowther’s view, “in a country like Iraq where the Baathist regime [of Saddam Hussein] dominated the national economy for more than three decades, the immediate need in a postinvasion environment is rapid economic liberalization in order to spur
economic growth” (Lowther 2009, 197). “Some needed economic reforms” in Iraq, he stressed, “include strengthening private property rights, simplifying investment law, reducing regulation, reducing corruption, and overhauling current labor laws, and other areas that constitute a hindrance to economic growth” (ibid., 201). He defended “the positive relationship that exists between economic liberty and economic growth” by referring to studies, such as the 2008 *Index of Economic Freedom*, which stated that “those countries with the highest levels of economic liberty are also among the wealthiest”; Lowther therefore proceeded from the assumption that “a positive correlation exists] between economic liberty and economic prosperity” (ibid., 197).

In Lowther’s view, in addition to this prosperity, security would also follow such promotion of economic liberalization. While President George W. Bush in 2004 declared, “the reason why I’m so strong on democracy is democracies don’t go to war with each other,” and thus emphasized democratization in Iraq over economic reform, Lowther argued that the US’s efforts in Iraq instead should have followed the agenda set forth by “*The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (2002), which placed strong emphasis on free markets as a method of bringing peace and prosperity to areas of the globe where neither exists” (ibid., 197, 204, 194). “What is often forgotten,” Lowther urged, “is that it is not democratic institutions that act as a deterrent to conflict but a liberal economy that precedes and undergirds democracy” (ibid., 195). Lowther therefore would have been applauded by Mill and especially Montesquieu for his insistence that establishing a market economy in Iraq would promote security through interdependence, and that such economic liberalization would have to occur prior to democratization. Mill would have agreed that fostering prosperity and security were necessary steps which had
to be taken before liberal government could successfully be exercised by the Iraqis. Montesquieu would further commend Lowther for his recognition of the panacea-like quality of commercial freedom. Montesquieu himself would likely have prescribed a fostering of commerce in Iraq, whereby a new Iraqi general spirit would emerge by the Iraqi people’s own accord, and from there prosperity, security, and liberty would naturally flourish.

Montesquieu and Mill would continue to approve of Lowther for his suggestion that economic liberalization would facilitate security both domestically and internationally. Domestically, said Lowther, economic prosperity would alleviate a great deal of the widespread violence as it would put Iraqi citizens to work. The already bad “economic conditions,” he urged, “have been made more difficult by the uncertain security situation, which itself has been made worse by Iraq’s continuing high unemployment rate” (ibid., 199). “Thus,” he maintained, “insecurity exacerbates poor economic performance, leading to current instability and violence” (ibid.). He offered the example of one frustrated Iraqi job-seeker who stated openly, “I haven’t been working at all the last two weeks. If I stay like this for another week my family will starve, and if someone comes along with $50 and asks me to toss a grenade at Americans, I’ll do it with pleasure” (ibid.).

Mohamadian confirmed this by similarly linking unemployment to domestic security issues. “Among the mistakes the U.S.-led coalition forces made in the first months after the end of major operations of war,” Mohamadian argued, was the dissolution of many major Iraqi security institutions, “thus, putting approximately 400,000 of Iraq’s young men out of work,” an outcome which “was exacerbated by
delays in engaging the labor force in the processes of state-building” (Mohamadian 2012, 243). “Further,” he noted, “60 per cent of the adult population was out of work in the aftermath of the invasion” (ibid.). Mohamadian explained how this unemployment led to increased “security threats in the form of terrorist acts,” and the resultant public atmosphere became one “in which citizens were more involved in disposal of security risks rather than being involved in their business activities” (ibid., 243-4).

As for international security, Lowther argued that, “from a strategic perspective, providing training and employment to unskilled Iraqi men is a positive step toward reducing the recruiting base for the insurgency” -- an insurgency which not only posed threats to US personnel in Iraq, but also reportedly furnished members for terrorist groups (Lowther 2009, 201). “It is worth noting,” he added, “that the rise of the modern jihadist movement is in part a response to the failure of many oil-rich states to provide economic opportunity for their citizenry” (ibid., 200). “Those regimes,” he explained, “have failed to provide the expected benefits and are now experiencing a backlash in the form of violent Islamic fundamentalism” (ibid.).

Lowther emphasized the “role that free markets play in promoting stability and in making democracy possible” (ibid., 195). Additionally, Lowther continued, “promoting free market reform of Iraq’s economy is the most viable long-term solution” to ending both Iraq’s poverty and its dependence on the US (ibid., 201). Thus for Lowther, as for Montesquieu, commerce was the harbinger of prosperity, security, and, finally, liberty. Lowther similarly reflected Montesquieu’s belief that commerce draws focus to the individual and allows his vanity to be channeled productively. “A prosperous free market
economy that links success to individual efforts rather than tribal, ethnic, or sectarian influence,” Lowther noted, “will prove to be the key to Iraqi success” (ibid., 202).

Lack of Cultural Understanding

Just as Mill encouraged foreign rulers to obtain a deep knowledge of the society and inhabitants of their colonies, and just as Montesquieu insisted that local customs be retained, many scholars today suggest that the US-led nation-building efforts in Iraq could have been salvaged with a better understanding of the Iraqi people and their culture. Allen, for example, offered a path dependence approach to analyzing how nation-building ought to be undertaken. “Path dependence,” Allen wrote, “leads to a reconsideration of the assumption that there is a set of best practices that can be employed in order to replicate the successes” of other nation-building endeavors, such as Germany and Japan (Allen 2010, 425). Rather, Allen continued, “there are distinct variables at play in cases of outside-imposed nation-building which go unheeded in the absence of solid historical grounding and an appreciation for the influences of both formal and informal institutional development” (ibid.). Instead of modeling efforts in Iraq after such examples, Allen urged that a closer examination of certain societal idiosyncrasies of Iraq would have led to a more successful process of US-imposed nation-building. “A look through the lens of path dependence,” he explained, “suggests that instead of a formula for replicating the successes of Japan and Germany, it is more likely that there is a continuum for the likelihood of approaching those levels of success based upon the extent to which the effects of conflict on infrastructure and society have left the polity amenable to wholesale change from outside, whether there are substantive,
democratically oriented political institutions upon which an occupier can draw to guide
the building nation, and the clarity of a unifying national identity” (ibid.).

Following Allen’s indicators, let us first examine whether conflict in Iraq left
Iraqis open to change from an outside source. While Diamond suggested that from the
start the Iraqi people were open to the ideals of democracy, they generally preferred to be
persuaded than dominated. “Both the Iraqis and the Americans agreed that the
[constitutional] document needed strong and explicit protections for individual rights, and
the extensive bill of rights that was drafted did not prove controversial”; however,
Diamond explained “that Iraqis wanted democracy” on their own terms, and increasingly
the US-established “CPA and the GC [Governing Council] were widely distrusted and
held in low esteem”; thus, the “Iraqis wanted more voice and participation in [their own]
governance” (ibid., 189, 192). In other words, “democracy cannot be imposed; it must be
homegrown” (Diamond and McFaul 2006, 58).

Additionally, as Mohamadian pointed out, the internal rebellion and insurgence
against US forces diminished legitimacy of the outside force (in this case the US); this
caused “the failure...after the invasion to win the ‘hearts and minds of Iraqis’”
(Mohamadian 2012, 243-4). Malik similarly noted that “the occupying Anglo-American
troops in Iraq were confronted with an increasingly coordinated guerilla resistance” as the
occupation continued (Malik 2005, 212). Enterline and Greig further supplemented this
by arguing that, “in sum, democratization via foreign imposition is a fragile process”
(Enterline and Greig 2008, 338). “This fragility,” they went on, “is likely to be all the
more the case among imposed democracies because of the low level of institutional
legitimacy that their foreign source engenders. To the degree to which the imposed
democratic regime is considered illegitimate or as a tool of an external power, said regime will be less likely to survive” (ibid., 338-9). “The more gradual development of democracy, as is occurring in Iraq and Afghanistan, appears less durable,” they suggested, “perhaps due to the lack of ‘buy-in’ into the regime by its political opponents that piecemeal steps toward democracy tend to engender” (ibid., 331).

It has thus far been generally agreed that while the Iraqi people may have been open to foreign ideas, such as democracy (or at least their conception of it), they have understandably resisted the continued presence of foreign occupation. Resuming Allen’s indicators for success, let us now examine whether there existed in Iraq any democratically oriented institutions which the occupiers could draw from or build on. Diamond argued that, despite their desire for democracy, the majority of Iraqis are still “lacking an understanding of federalism” (Diamond 2005, 191). Somit and Peterson devised a “checklist” of conditions which favored the successful emergence of democracy, and out of the ten points Iraq scored a mere two (Somit and Peterson 2005, 58). These measurements were compiled after the “military victory had been achieved” and “the process of transforming” the nation into a democracy had been “formally launched” (ibid., 58-9). Not only did Iraq lack the “extension of basic liberties” at this time, the nation also lacked, among other pro-democratic qualities, “functioning government institutions”; it previously had an authoritarian regime; it lacked a “pro-democratic ‘out elite’” (that is, “credible, potential democratic leaders” who “have been openly critical of the previous regime”); and it lacked “pro-democratic civic dispositions” (ibid., 52, 58)
Mohamadian, for his part, suggested that cultural and historical aspects of Iraq have in fact fought against the implementation of democracy. He, like Allen, underscored the dissimilarities between Iraq and other, more successful examples of nation-building. “With regard to [the] feature of prior historical experience, the contrast between West Germany and Japan in the late 1940’s and Iraq...today could not be greater,” Mohamadian stressed; for Iraq, unlike the others, has not even had “experience with some version of liberal democracy” (Mohamadian 2012, 244). And as Montesquieu warned, “a free nation can have a liberator; a subjugated nation can have only another oppressor” (Montesquieu 2009, 327).

Mohamadian also pointed to the possible regional influence by noting that “most Arab governments have non-democratic structure” (Mohamadian 2012, 239). Yet he also argued that another strong force has been at work against democracy: “terrorist groups like Al Qaeda, not only do not want democracy, but they bring added pressure on their government to fight the Islamic and Western democracy” (ibid., 240).

If terrorist groups are indeed fighting against the establishment of democracy in nations such as Iraq, Aslan argued that it is precisely because of this that Iraqis themselves should strive for liberal government. “A democratic Iraq,” he urged, “can become the best tool to fight the forces of Islamic extremism because it represents everything the jihadists disdain” (Aslan 2006, 30-1). Iraq thus lacked any substantial democratic institutions that the US nation-building forces could draw upon, but, Montesquieu and Mill would ask, did the Iraqi people possess the mores or the stage of civilization conducive to democracy?
Fareed Zakaria and Charles Kesler would agree with Montesquieu that the general spirit first needs to be altered in order for liberal government to be embraced, and they would also agree with Mill that the Iraqi citizens must be taught certain lessons before representative government can be established. “We do not seek democracy in the Middle East—at least not yet,” wrote Zakaria in *Newsweek*; rather, he went on, “we seek first what might be called the preconditions for democracy...the rule of law, individual rights, private property, independent courts, the separation of church and state...We should not assume that what took hundreds of years in the West can happen overnight in the Middle East” (Podhoreatz 2004, 46). Similarly echoing Montesquieu and Mill, Kesler posited that “the human right to be free, in other words, does not guarantee the human capacity to be free. That capacity must be elicited and demonstrated, and its noblest and most persuasive proof is by the establishment of ‘good government,’ along with the habits necessary to perpetuate it; the habits of heart and mind that, among other things, allow a people’s ‘choice’ to be guided by ‘reflection’” must be present (Kesler 2005a, 226).

Some scholars have therefore emphasized the lack of democratic institutional foundations in Iraq, while others have focused on the potential for democratic mores to emerge. Montesquieu and Mill would suggest that the former does not necessarily preclude the latter. However, despite their extensive exploration of all the potential obstacles for liberty in the non-Western, “backward” societies of the world, both Montesquieu and Mill seemed to have missed the hurdle of unified national identity. Ethnic and religious conflict has unfortunately plagued Iraq, and some have argued that this may inhibit democracy. Somit and Peterson’s checklist indicated that Iraq did not meet the final criterion for the successful emergence of democracy: that “ethnic, tribal,
and racial conflict is absent” (Somit and Peterson 2005, 58). Mohamadian highlighted the significance of this by asserting that “ethnic conflicts and religious disputes with religious and ethnic dimensions are the most powerful platforms for challenges in Iraq” (Mohamadian 2012, 243). This was the case, he argued, because “national solidarity” is among “the key factors for successful state nation building”; currently, however, “ethical issues and discrimination policies of previous rulers in Iraq not only deepened [the] racial gap in the country,” but also made it “difficult for Iraqis to achieve a strong common national identity” (ibid.)

Enterline and Greig also noted that Iraq’s “social characteristics push even more strongly against the persistence and deepening of democracy” than its historical legacies; “the sharp ethnic and religious differences that divide Iraqi...people,” they went on, “are key impediments to the success of the current efforts to develop and sustain fully democratic political institutions” (Enterline and Greig 2008, 344). Agreeing with Allen, these authors argued that “weighing heavily upon the success of democracy in Iraq...is not only the way in which democracy is cultivated, but also the environment in which democracy is being fostered” (ibid., 345). “West Germany and Japan,” Enterline and Greig expounded, “represent near ideal cases for the successful imposition of democracy, because of their high levels of prosperity and low levels of ethnic and religious differences. Yet, this is not the case in Iraq...[which is] sharply divided across ethnic and religious lines” (ibid.). While Somit and Peterson suggested that Iraq did possess “adequate levels of economic development,” it nonetheless, according to Enterline and Greig, had “lower levels of economic development relative to West Germany and Japan,
leaving fewer resources to divide amongst contending groups within both societies” (Somit and Peterson 2005, 58; Enterline and Greig 2008, 345).

The failure of the US-led occupation to “accurately assess the nature of Iraqi nationalism, [and] the true level of cultural differences,” has been considered among the top mistakes made in the nation-building efforts in Iraq (Mohamadian 2012, 244). A better understanding of this situation could have led to a more effective strategy, perhaps one which emphasized what Putnam called “‘bridging’ social capital”—that is, fostering “links that cut across various lines of social cleavages” (Putnam 2004, 14). While Montesquieu and Mill may not have predicted the obstacle of national unity as such, they each nevertheless offered the bases for overcoming such a challenge. Montesquieu’s notion of a general spirit assumed a certain unity of thinking among a people; he insisted that a people could mold their general spirit, and that it was thus changeable, yet he envisioned this change as occurring among the population more or less in unison. If Montesquieu had encountered a people that lacked a consensus on some of the very basics which formed their general spirit—i.e., “religion, laws, maxims of the government, examples of past things, mores, manners”—he might have recommended that fostering universals, such as vanity and commerce, would help to create the unity for which this people wanted (Montesquieu 2009, 310).

Mill’s solution would likely have been to cultivate experts on the region, to assess and deal with such problems, before any attempts at democratization were enacted. Mill continually stressed that knowledge and a deep understanding of the locale were essential for successful colonization. Mill’s emphasis on expertise is reflected by many scholars today, who have suggested that the lack of such experts is what has led to the failed
nation-building efforts in Iraq. Wallace, for instance, contended that once the military operation in Iraq was completed, control over reconstruction should have been handed over to American civilian leaders, for “civilian stabilization organizations have the option to hire experts,” while “the military is almost always forced to develop or ‘grow’ combat capable personnel through years of training” (Wallace 2010, 121). Military forces, he argued, are simply not prepared to handle the intricacies of state-formation; “these are the problems,” he stated, “which result from using ‘warriors’ in the role of nation-builders and diplomats” (ibid., 114). “Military personnel, as a whole,” he continued, “are no substitute for civilian experts in governance, economics, social issues, essential services, and all of the other requirements of rebuilding infrastructure within a society” (ibid., 118).

Diamond also pointed to this lack of regional experts as a major problem. “Throughout the occupation, the coalition lacked the linguistic and area expertise necessary to understand Iraqi politics and society,” he affirmed, “and the few long-time experts present were excluded from the inner circle of decisionmaking in the CPA” (Diamond 2005, 181-2). “Because of these structural flaws and knowledge deficits,” he added, “the coalition never realized that, although most Iraqis were deeply grateful to have been liberated from a brutal tyranny, this gratitude was mixed with deep suspicion of the real motives of the United States (and of Britain, the former colonial ruler)” (ibid., 182). Similarly, Diamond and McFaul urged that an improved strategy for promoting democracy in the region will require “a new generation of scholars and policymakers who speak Arabic, know the Koran, understand the geopolitics of the Middle East, and are also well versed in theories of democratization” (Diamond and McFaul 2006, 65).
Some have suggested that such experts on Iraq existed prior to the invasion, but that they were not properly engaged by US leaders who made the final decisions. A *New York Times* editorial reported that “before the invasion, the White House and Pentagon contemptuously ignored post-invasion planning memos drafted by State Department experts knowledgeable about Iraq, the Arab world and the broader problems of nation-building” (*The New York Times* 2004, A14). Thus, at least “part of the blame rests on the Pentagon’s planning failures and the occupation authority’s reluctance to consult qualified Iraqis”; for, “instead, the administration brought in American defense contractors who had little clue about what was most urgently needed or how to handle the unfamiliar and highly insecure climate” (ibid.). While some of these State Department experts were later “quietly...called back to try and repair the damage,” their reemergence was arguably too “late in the game” (ibid.). The editorial also encouraged the consultation of local Iraqi experts themselves. “Despite all it has gone through,” it stated, “Iraq remains one of the Arab world’s most advanced societies, with considerable professional expertise that should be put to better use”; such engagement with “Baghdad ministers and local council would [have] also add[ed] some plausibility to Washington’s claims that Iraqis now exercise sovereignty in their own country” (ibid.).

Additionally, Kaufmann claimed that “the administration’s authority advantage” in the realms of foreign policy and national security “allowed it to attack the credibility of independent experts,” permitted it to “control the agenda for debate,” and enabled it to successfully persuade the public to support its decision to invade Iraq (Kaufmann 2004, 41-3). While independent experts may have existed, therefore, they were overshadowed by the presumed credibility of US government agencies. “In a December 2002 poll,”
Kaufmann pointed out, “Americans said they would trust the administration over international inspectors by a margin of 52 percent to 36 percent” (ibid., 42). The fact that “government agencies usually have a large authority advantage in debate with anyone else,” Kaufmann concluded, contributed to “the failure of countervailing institutions--mainly the press, independent experts, and opposition parties--on which the marketplace of ideas theory relies” (ibid., 41, 32).

The broader issue here that is while experts may exist, their knowledge may not always be employed correctly by those in power. Mill’s prescription was for the experts to go abroad and rule the colony themselves--or, more accurately, for those going to rule to become experts on the locale by actively acquiring knowledge, by immersing themselves in the culture, and by eliciting information from locals. These emigrating experts were not to be a branch of the invading nation’s government, but rather were intended to be part of an “intermediate body” with their own set of motivations for gaining expertise and facilitating the prosperity and advancement of the colonial nation itself. Mill would therefore have agreed with Wallace that “military personnel...are no substitute for civilian experts” (Wallace 2010, 118). Mill insisted that “a free country which attempts to govern a distant dependency, inhabited by a dissimilar people, by means of a branch of its own executive, will almost inevitably fail,” and thus “the only mode which has any chance of tolerable success is to govern through a delegated body of a comparatively permanent character” (Mill 1991, 356). Mill’s answer to the “contracting out” controversy, therefore, would have been the same as his original proposal: “it is not by attempting to rule directly a country like India, but by giving it good rulers, that the English people can do their duty to that country; and they can scarcely give it a worse one
than an English cabinet minister, who is thinking of English, not Indian politics” (ibid.). Here “England” and “India” could just as accurately be replaced with “the US” and “Iraq.”

It is thus generally agreed that: first, while there is considerable openness to the foreign ideals of democracy among the Iraqis, they want this change to come from within rather than from without (“for better or for worse,” as Diamond put it); second, although the people themselves appear receptive to democratic principles, Iraq has historically lacked a foundation of democratic institutions and formal knowledge of the workings of liberal government; and, third, there remains a severe divide between ethnic and religious groups, which presents a formidable challenge to establishing national unity (Diamond 2005, 195). As Iraq ranked low on all of these indicators for the successful implementation of democracy offered by Allen, the path dependent approach would therefore argue that Iraq’s chances of flourishing under outside-imposed nation-building would be extremely unlikely; applying the “formula” of West Germany and Japan to nation-building in Iraq would thus be inappropriate considering the vastly differing circumstances (Allen 2010, 425).

Allen concluded that “the liberal peacebuilding thesis”--which assumes similar strategies for erecting liberal governments, and thereby promoting international peace, can be applied across regions, cultures, and eras--“may be overly optimistic, particularly under conditions of outside imposition” (ibid., 426). Montesquieu and Mill would likely contest the progression of this conclusion, though generally agree with the final assessment. While Allen argued that the liberal peacebuilding thesis was flawed because it did not take into account the uniqueness of particular cases, Montesquieu and Mill
would have maintained that a universal strategy was in fact possible, *so long* as certain particulars were taken into account.

For Montesquieu, this meant that commerce could be applied generally and could promote international peace universally, yet preservation of local customs and recognition of differing characters were essential aspects of successful colonization, and these considerations ought to affect the design of the rule; regions with hot climates, for instance, required laws which would help overcome laziness (Montesquieu praised China, for example, for achieving this). For Mill, good, foreign despotism (preferably with the aid of an intermediate body) was the common strategy, yet this involved a different set of actions based on the colony’s stage of development; a colony “similar” to the mother country required much different steps than did a “dissimilar” one (e.g., American colonies versus those in India). Thus Montesquieu and Mill would agree with Allen that a formula-based strategy of nation-building ignores crucial aspects of particularity, though the two earlier philosophers would maintain that not all universal elements of a nation-building strategy ought to be abandoned (e.g., vanity and commerce or intermediate bodies). Do not throw the baby out with the bathwater, they might have said.

With these considerations in mind, it appears that the path dependent approach offered by Allen is not completely incompatible with Montesquieu’s and Mill’s own versions of the liberal peacebuilding theory, as Allen himself had originally proposed. Allen merely argued that regional particularities should to be considered before developing a nation-building strategy, whereas Montesquieu and Mill maintained that universal recipes ought to be tweaked in accordance with each individual case. Allen,
however, added one more layer to the debate. “Does success,” he inquired, “have to mean liberal democracy in the Western image?” (ibid.). If so, he contended, a whole set of further questions arise. “To what extent,” for example, “is the legitimacy of this image [of success] held in the minds of imposed-upon societies?”; and to what extend should this local image of success be considered by the foreign nation-builders? (ibid.). “Also,” he continued, “are Western governments comfortable with alternatives to the current approach from a moral and strategic perspective?” (ibid., 426-7).

In the end, Allen suggested--here completely in line with Montesquieu and (especially) Mill, as well as many other contemporary scholars--that regional experts will offer the best answers to such questions. “Local and regional experts should be able to shine a light on the potential universality of the state-society relationship,” Allen advised, “and how that is conceptualized along with matters of social identity, not merely under terms of imposition, but in general” (ibid., 427). Such “expertise can prove valuable,” he added, “in framing the application of concepts in the light of different societies while undercutting flawed assumptions” (ibid.). This expertise can come in the form of just this type of debate among scholars, especially when supplemented by further knowledge obtained by “embedded reporters, freelance journalists, and civilian experts in cyberspace” (ibid.).

Ultimately, therefore, while there has been disagreement over what has most contributed to the failed nation-building efforts in Iraq--whether lack of security, lack of economic prosperity, or lack of cultural understanding--there has been general consensus, among contemporary scholars and Montesquieu and Mill alike, on the necessity for extensive knowledge and expertise to be developed in order to bring liberty to a foreign
nation. Ensuring that nation-building leaders heed this expertise is, of course, an additional challenge. Truly, however, the intelligent (though perhaps overly idealistic) strategy offered by Enterline and Greig would likely be most effective in any future nation-building attempt, which is that “each goal must be pursued simultaneously” (Enterline and Greig 2008, 344). These authors affirmed that security, prosperity, and democracy are so interconnected, that, not only do they reinforce each other once in motion, one can barely be promoted without the others. “Without security,” they explained, “neither democratization nor economic development is likely to be obtainable. At the same time, without a quick push toward economic development and political liberalization...even the achievement of domestic security...is unlikely to translate into a greater probability that imposed democracy will survive in the long term”; and, on top of this, all actions had to be considered in light of “the environment in which democracy is being fostered” (ibid., 344-5). How might a nation-builder accomplish such a seemingly monumental task? While experts are an essential aspect to the answer, Montesquieu and Mill would both insist that a good despot would additionally be required to lead the charge on such a difficult mission.

Good Despotism

Montesquieu and Mill both promoted the idea that a good despot, typically of foreign origin, could best rule colonies lacking modernization. Today, is this notion of a good despot completely antiquated, or can it be justified with regard to the contemporary process of nation-building? As we will see, this idea is rejected by some, while others do not dismiss it entirely. Diamond, for instance, would not condone a form of good despotism, despite his insistence on the necessity of security and his call for additional
forces in Iraq. Though “above all else,” Diamond wrote, “Iraqis want security,” they also “want to be free from the terror that disfigured their lives under Saddam and that has continued, in a different form, since the war” (Diamond 2005, 193). In clear opposition to Montesquieu and Mill, Diamond argued that most Iraqi citizens “favor achieving this security though democratic means, not under some ‘benevolent’ strongman” (ibid.). “Those who think from afar that a country can be stabilized by another dictator,” Diamond went on, “do not grasp the divisions and aspirations in Iraqi society that need democratic expression and negotiation” (ibid.). He concluded that “increasingly, Iraqis will want to shape their own political future, for better or for worse” (ibid., 195).

Montesquieu and Mill would likely have stressed the “worse” in Diamond’s conclusion. Mill would have fiercely challenged this by insisting that the Iraqi people need to be taught the lessons and requisites of liberty before being allowed to rule themselves (whether they desired self-government or not); and, for Mill, a foreign, benevolent strongman would be the best not only at teaching these lessons and guiding them eventually toward representative government in a successful and efficient manner, but also at preventing the fatal security deficit. Similarly, Montesquieu would agree with Mill that such a benevolent strongman would best establish the security that Diamond so longed for. On the other hand, Montesquieu might concede Diamond’s argument that the Iraqis “want full and complete ownership of the constitution-making process,” though Montesquieu would counter that they could not possibly be capable of managing this until they altered their general spirit in a way that embraced commerce--and this has not yet been the case in Iraq, as made evident by their poverty levels and reliance on foreign aid (ibid.). Montesquieu would also likely offer Diamond the argument that commerce
naturally facilitates security, and that the end result of both of these would be liberty; allowing the Iraqis to exercise self-government before commerce was successfully implemented, rather, would promote neither security nor liberty.

Thus Diamond may have had similar goals in mind for the Iraqi people to what Montesquieu and Mill had in mind for the colonial peoples of their time--i.e., security and liberty--yet Diamond did not approve of self-government being placed on hold indefinitely while other initiatives were being sought after. Diamond proclaimed that the lack of occupational forces and security-enforcement mechanisms was a vital mistake of the US-led operation in Iraq, but he nonetheless encouraged a transfer of power into the hands of the Iraqis. In other words, he did not want the US to attempt to remedy the security deficit with the implementation of a strongman, but rather justified immediate self-governance for Iraq. However, the mere fact that Diamond called for Iraqis to be given control of their own future “for better or for worse” suggests that he may share more in common with Montesquieu and Mill than might be expected (ibid., 195). The “worse” implied that Iraqi self-rule may not in fact be the best course for them, but simply that it is better than another dictator in Diamond’s view.

While Diamond did not approve of the idea of a good despot, Lowther actually offered his own version. As Lowther called for economic liberalization prior to political liberalization, he therefore approved of a benevolent strongman holding power long enough to enforce market reforms (à la Pinochet, one might say). “The almost six years that have passed since the invasion of Iraq,” said Lowther, “provided the ample time to implement and nurture free market reforms in Iraq while maintaining a benevolent authoritarianism” (Lowther 2009, 198). “Limited reform and an honest but large
bureaucracy constitute the appropriate course of actions,” he added, as has been
“suggested by some Arab analysts” (ibid., 200).

This followed in the line of thinking of both Montesquieu and Mill. Such a
“benevolent authoritarianism” that would enforce free market reforms, as was prescribed
by Lowther, particularly reflected Montesquieu’s conception of a good despot. For
Montesquieu, a good despot, like Alexander the Great, would spread commerce to his
colonies as the initial step. Mill, too, envisioned trading companies, such as the East India
Company, as being most beneficial for the colony because the economic prosperity of the
colony was among its top priorities; yet this “intermediate body” would co-rule with the
mother country in a beneficent though despotic fashion. For both Montesquieu and Mill,
therefore, political freedom was secondary to the instillation of commerce; similarly, for
Lowther, the most successful way to facilitate commerce was market liberalization, and a
benevolent autocrat could usher this in smoothly and effectively.

Lowther similarly followed in the footsteps of Montesquieu and Mill in the fact
that he considered his benevolent authoritarian government to be temporary. “Security
gains resulting from the surge and the goodwill of the Iraqi people,” Lowther contended,
“are providing a window of opportunity for the United States to press for further market
reforms” (ibid., 202). Thus he saw a very slim optimal occasion for such enforced market
reforms, and he blamed the US for not making these reforms when it had the chance.
“The blame for this failure,” Lowther asserted, “can be placed squarely on the shoulders
of the United States. By imposing democracy on Iraq prior to developing a liberal
economy, the United States violated what theory and experience have taught us” (ibid.,
195).
Thus we see how Lowther followed the visions of both Montesquieu and Mill, and what their theories “have taught us.” Lowther demonstrated this further by stating that “economic liberty must necessarily precede the satisfaction of higher-order needs like political liberty” (ibid.). Though this is more firmly in line with Montesquieu’s notion that liberal laws successfully emerge only after a society has embraced commercial mores, it also follows Mill’s idea that certain requisites must be established before self-government can be properly executed. In sum, Lowther offered a similar progression for a dependency--from free markets set forth by a benevolent despot, to economic prosperity, to security, and finally to political liberty--as those proffered by Montesquieu and Mill.
CHAPTER 5: HAS NATION-BUILDING IN JAPAN AND IRAQ PROMOTED LIBERTY IN THE UNITED STATES?

Part 1: Security in the US

We have thus far analyzed whether liberty can be promoted, and whether or not it has been by US nation-building efforts in Japan and Iraq. Let us now focus on the “metropole” side of the picture, and see if liberty has been promoted within the US itself thanks to these nation-building endeavors, and consider this in light of the theories proposed by Montesquieu and John Stuart Mill.

Let it be recalled that Montesquieu emphasized that “liberty consists in security or, at least, in the opinion one has of one’s security” (Montesquieu 2009, 187, emphasis added). It is thus important to analyze Americans’ perceptions of their own security in order to determine whether the US has become more safe or less as a result of its nation-building efforts in Japan and Iraq. As Montesquieu explained, “liberty in a citizen is that tranquility of spirit which comes from the opinion each one has of his security” (Montesquieu 2009, 157). And while Mill demanded a more tangible form of security--i.e., through preventing violence and procuring social order--he still urged that order and progress both require “every one to feel his person and property secure” (Mill 1991 32, emphasis added). I will therefore examine several opinion polls conducted among US residents over the years, and determine whether Americans perceive themselves and the United States as more secure as a result of nation-building in Japan and Iraq. There is one caveat, however: as the occupation of Japan occurred several decades ago, and as the US is still in the midst of finalizing its efforts in Iraq, it must be taken into account that
feelings likely have cooled with regard to Japanese security threats as opposed to those associated with Iraq.

Let us begin by first setting the stage with a look at some general feelings among US residents concerning their own position with regard to international security. A 2006 Public Agenda Foundation Poll offered a glimpse when it asked whether US respondents believed that the world was “becoming safer or more dangerous for the US and the American people” (WorldPublicOpinion.org/Knowledge Networks 2006, 10-11). An overwhelming majority, 79%, of respondents said “more dangerous”; this included the 36% who answered somewhat more dangers and the 43% who answered much more, as opposed to the 13% who answered somewhat safer and the 6% who answered much safer (ibid.). This feeling that the world has become a more dangerous place for the US and its citizenry was complemented by the impression that “instability and insecurity in other parts of the world impact US security”; in a 2006 WorldPublicOpinion.org/Knowledge Networks (WPO/KN) poll, 87% of Americans believed insecurity and instability affect US security (ibid., 11). This contrasted with the 13% who responded positively to the counterargument that “the US is so strong that such conditions in other parts of the world have little real impact on US security” (ibid.). Thus there has been a general feeling in the United States that the world is becoming a less safe place, and Americans believe they are directly affected by this.

However, this feeling has also led citizens to support the US maintaining a dominant presence in the world. A German Marshall Fund poll asked Americans how desirable they believed it was for the US to “exert strong leadership in world affairs” in the years 1998, 2002, 2005, and 2006 (ibid., 4). Consistently, the respondents who found
it “very desirable” and “somewhat desirable” were in the clear majority, hovering right around 84% for each year (ibid.). Similarly, in 1999 a Harris Interactive survey found that 70% of Americans agreed that “the United States should play a leading role in developing new and better ways to prevent and react to international problems like Bosnia, Kosovo, Rwanda, and East Timor” (ibid., 3). With the exception of Rwanda, these are all considered examples of nation-building operations conducted by either the US or the United Nations (Dobbins et al. 2003; Steele 2002). From these various responses, we can glean a conception of American perceptions of international security. The American people have felt themselves increasingly at risk as the world becomes more unstable; and they concurrently support the US’s playing a leading role in international affairs, including nation-building.

The United States also has a deeply-ingrained culture of imagining itself to be the bestower of freedom and democracy to the, in Mill’s terms, “uncivilized” nations of the world. US presidents in particular have been promoting this image for over a century. In 1902, for instance, William Howard Taft proclaimed that “it is in my judgement the duty of the United States to continue government [in the Philippines] which shall teach those people individual liberty, which shall lift them up to a point of civilization of which I believe they are capable, and which shall make them rise to call the name of the United States blessed” (Smith 1995, 37). Woodrow Wilson also famously stated that “the world must be made safe for democracy” in his 1917 speech to Congress that called for war with Germany; yet, in the same speech, he also asserted that “we are glad...to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and the liberation of the peoples...for the rights of nations great and small and the privileges of men everywhere to choose their way of life,”
for “peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty,” and “we are the champions of the rights of mankind” (ibid., 84). During the next World War, in 1941 a solemn Franklin Delano Roosevelt declared “that the United States will never survive as a happy and fertile oasis of liberty surrounded by a cruel desert of dictatorships” (ibid., 124)

More recently, George H. W. Bush in 1992 announced that “no society, no continent should be disqualified from sharing the ideals of human liberty,” and that “abandonment of the worldwide democratic revolution could be disastrous for America security” (ibid., 311). Bill Clinton followed in the sentiment of his predecessors when, in 1993, he orated: “in a new era of peril and opportunity, our overriding purpose must be to expand and strengthen the world’s community of market-based democracies...Now we seek to enlarge the circle of nations that live under those free institution, for our dream is that of a day when the opinions and energies of every person in the world will be given full expression in a world of thriving democracies that cooperate with each other and live in peace” (ibid., 311). And in 1996, he reaffirmed that “when I came into office, I was determined that our country would go into the 21st century still the world’s greatest force for peace and freedom, for democracy and security” (Blum 2002, vi).

While George W. Bush ran on a platform opposed to nation-building, he changed courses after the events of 9/11. In 2000 he stated that “I don’t think our troops ought to be used for what’s called nation-building. I think our troops ought to be used to fight and win war” (Fukuyama 2004a, 159). Yet in 2002 he addressed the nation with a different message. “Freed from the weight of oppression,” he declared, “Iraq’s people will be able to share in the progress and prosperity of our time. If military action is necessary, the
United States and our allies will help the Iraqi people rebuild their economy, and create the institutions of liberty in a unified Iraq at peace with its neighbors” (Peters and Woolley 2002). Additionally, channeling his predecessors, in 2002 he professed: “the great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom—and a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise” (Lowther 2009, 194). In 2007 he reaffirmed his new conviction with an invocation this time more redolent of Montesquieu and Mill; he announced to the UN that terrorists and extremists follow a “violent ideology” and are thus “a threat to civilized people everywhere,” and “the best way to defeat extremists is to defeat their dark ideology with a more hopeful vision--the vision of liberty” (UN General Assembly 2007, 2).

Many presidents of the United States, Democrats and Republicans alike, have therefore embraced a rhetoric which reflects variations of Montesquieu’s and Mill’s vision of a dominant, liberal nation promoting freedom, prosperity, peace, and security around the globe, and doing the same for itself in the meantime. It has been demonstrated that the American people generally approve of this approach (though they vary more widely on particular presidents and particular strategies). It can thus be said that the “general spirit” of the United States, to employ Montesquieu’s verbiage, is one that overall favors acting out this role as the universal promoter of liberty around the world, as it is believed that this fosters security at home in an international environment that is becoming evermore insecure; just how to properly go about this has been a matter of more contention, however. Let us now examine whether the US’s nation-building missions in two cases, Japan and Iraq, have vindicated this image of the US as the global
bestower of security and liberty; this will be done in light of the colonization theories proposed by Montesquieu and Mill.

Is the US Safer Because of Nation-Building in Japan?

Montesquieu’s strongest argument for colonization was that it spread and facilitated international commerce; and Montesquieu was adamant that as international commerce expanded, so too did interdependence among states, and this, in turn, promoted peace and security. As he explained, “two nations that trade with each other become reciprocally dependent,” for such “unions are founded on mutual needs”; and thus the “natural effect of commerce is to lead to peace” (Montesquieu 2009, 338). Mill believed that colonization ensured the mother country’s security, in particular, because the metropole assumed control over all militaristic decisions and actions. He asserted that the mother country decided all matters, “both for the colonies and for herself, on questions of peace and war” (Mill 1991, 343). Additionally, Mill maintained that the number of countries colonized by dominant, liberal nations, meant that fewer were open to invasion from despotic states. In this way, many countries are prevented “from being absorbed into a [different] foreign state, and becoming a source of additional aggressive strength to some rival power” (ibid., 342).

Commerce with Japan

There is no doubting that interdependence has resulted from the flow of commerce between the United States and Japan. According to the Japanese Ministry of Finances, the US Census Bureau, and JETRO (the Japanese External Trade Organization), “U.S. exports to Japan were valued at US$117 billion in 2009,” 35% of which “were service exports, much higher than the U.S. average of 23% to the world”
Reciprocally, “Japanese exports to the United States were valued at US$124 billion in 2009, of which 29% were service exports” (ibid.). Additionally, according to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis and JETRO, “over 160,000 [US] jobs were supported by exports to Japan in 2009, with nearly three quarters in the manufacturing sector, primarily in computers, transportation equipment, and food”; and Japanese investment in the US supports over 665,000 U.S. jobs” (ibid.). The US is also “the leading source of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Japan, with 38% of total stock in Japan in 2009, an increase of 71% since 2005”; and “Japan is the second largest source of FDI in America, with 11% of total stock in 2009, an increase of 39% since 2005” (ibid.).

While Japan and the United States are thus mutually dependent on each other’s trade and investment in this way, their relationship also affects the rest of the globe. Combined, the two nations make up “only about 7% of world population,” yet “together the U.S. and Japan account for 32% of the global economy” (ibid.). According to the IMF (International Monetary Fund), consistently “their economies have ranked first and second largest since 1968,” although China’s economy surpassed that of Japan’s in 2010 (ibid.). The US and Japan are also “the top two financial supporters of United Nations peacekeeping operations, accounting for 40% of total contributions” (ibid.). However, with the benefits of this interdependence also come the drawbacks. Repercussions of the “global financial crisis,” beginning in 2007, “caused a significant decline in trade” between the US and Japan, “particularly hurting Japanese exports to the United States” (ibid.). Thus the two nations, though independently strong financially, remain deeply interdependent commercially.
Demilitarization of Japan

As explained, Japan went through a thorough demilitarization process under General MacArthur. As Kaufman described, Japan, though “a global leader in many fields, has since World War II lagged in at least one: offensive military capabilities” (Kaufman 2008, 266). “Japan’s rearmament, perhaps inevitable,” Kaufman continued, “would violate the country’s pacifist postwar constitution”; “since the end of the U.S. occupation, however, Japan has gradually taken steps to strengthen--and flex--its military muscle” (ibid.). Constitutionally, therefore, the US is still the dominant military presence, both physically and conceptually, in Japan, and even when Japan has “flexed” its military muscle, it has generally been in support of US-led (or at least US-supported and UN-led) missions (ibid.). The US thus clearly thwarted Japan as a possible future threat militaristically. The US additionally obtained strategic base locations in Japan, which have still proven effective today (ibid.).

As far back as 1993, however, scholars such as Berger argued that “Japan should be encouraged to play a larger role in the post-Cold War security order, especially in the area of regional security” (Berger 1993, 121). “It is in the interest of the United States,” Berger noted, “to help Japan manage a slow and orderly evolution of this peculiar culture [of anti-militarism] toward a more realistic stance with regard to security affairs,” whereby it “could survive a reduction in America’s regional military presence” (Berger 1993, 121). If Japan does rearm itself fully in the near future, it is therefore likely that it will remain a close ally to the United States, especially with mutual concerns regarding other nations in the region, such as China and North Korea.
A 2009 Yomiuri Shimbun/Gallup project, which conducted a joint Japan-US public opinion poll, asked how much citizens in each country trusted China, and found that neither country had much trust in Japan’s controversial neighbor. In Japan, 73% said they did not trust China (with 47% answering “not very much,” and 26% answering “not at all”); and in the US, a total of 56% said they did not trust China (with “not very much” at 30%, and “not at all” at 26%) (Yomiuri Shimbun/Gallup, Inc. 2009). This same study found that Japanese as well as US citizens concur to an even greater extent that the two nations ought to work together regarding foreign relations with North Korea. An overwhelming majority--96% in Japan and 92% in the US--agreed that “the U.S. and Japanese governments, working in cooperation,” should make it a priority to get “North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons programs” (ibid.).

However, despite this sentiment of cooperation, the Japanese government has not always placed US security interests as its primary concern when making foreign policy decisions. While Japan has generally supported US-led endeavors in other countries, some scholars have been more skeptical over the actual influence the US has on Japanese foreign policy decisions more generally. As Tuman, Strand, and Emmert argued, the theory that gaiatsu--that is, foreign pressure exerted on Japan from the United States--has influenced Japan’s decisions regarding foreign aid rests on very little empirical evidence (Tuman, Stand, and Emmert 2009, 220-1). Overall, they found that “the influence of US pressure is shown to have only a limited influence on Japanese ODA” (official development assistance) (ibid.).

As these authors contended, “the statistical analysis suggests that US gaiatsu regarding security and economic interests had an effect only in the security domain, a
finding that is not completely consistent with the expectations generated by the case study literature on *gaiatsu*”; and even in that area the effect was less than expected (ibid., 234). “Although Japan may yield to US pressure in other areas of its foreign policy,” they concluded, their findings “suggest that aid policymakers responded to US pressure only in the area of security, and then only with regard to the containment of communist regimes”; this is a “pattern more limited than one would expect based on the theoretical literature of *gaiatsu*” (ibid., 236). While the *gaiatsu* theory would have predicted that Japan’s foreign aid would have been largely directed toward “political liberalization, democratization, or improvements in human rights,” there has in fact been a “shift toward humanitarianism” in Japan’s ODA, and this demonstrates the shortcomings of the *gaiatsu* framework (ibid., 224-5).

More broadly, this study demonstrated that the US-Japanese relationship should not be taken as granted, even with regard to security. Whether Japan will remain an ally—and how strong that connection will be—if and when it does rearm will remain to be seen. Japan is a sovereign nation, and must not be thought of as a colony whose “questions of peace and war” are decided entirely by the US (Mill 1991, 343). Nevertheless, remaining under the wing of the US’s military has thus far sustained both nations’ security, or at very least has not detracted from it. While there are disagreements over whether it is now time for Japan to reassume responsibility for its own offensive forces, and over how strong US influence has actually been over recent years, it can nonetheless be concluded that the original demilitarization of Japan has successfully promoted security for the United States.
Aside from the strategic base locations it gained, the US has effectively transformed “a former enemy into a reliable ally” (Dobbins et al. 2003, 32). At the time of demilitarization, however, there was also motivation to keep Japan from being absorbed and overtaken by communist states. As Dobbins et al. explained, “by 1947, U.S. policymakers were increasingly concerned about the Soviet Union and the spread of communism in Asia” (ibid., 34). Thus “they began to see Japan as a future ally rather than a former enemy, especially since communism was expanding into neighboring countries, such as China” (ibid.). Weintraub also noted that one of the motivating factors that led President Truman into the Korean War was that “he could not abandon South Korea to a Stalinist aggressor and leave Japan at risk” of following suit (Weintraub 2012, 50).

_A “Colonial” Bond?_

Yet, despite these numbers, how do Americans feel toward Japan? Do they feel safer as a result of previous nation-building efforts? Overall, American citizens have a favorable view of the Japanese people. A 2009 Gallup poll found that 51% of American respondents believed that current US relations with Japan were either good or very good, while 34% said “just fair,” and only 8% answered poor or very poor (Gallup 2009). The same survey found that 66% of Americans trust Japan either very much or some, while 31% trust it not very much or not at all (ibid.). A recent “2011 US Image of Japan” opinion poll, commissioned by Japan’s foreign ministry, “determined that “a record 84% of American respondents considered Japan to be a dependable ally and friend” (Ruch 2011). Similarly, a 2012 Gallup poll found an 83% approval rating of Japan by US
residents; this ranked Japan fifth among all nations, just behind Canada, Australia, Great Britain, and Germany, while just above France, India, and Israel (Saad 2012).

According to Ruch, this surge in approval occurred following the tsunami, earthquake, and subsequent nuclear crisis in March 2011, and the increase in favorability occurred on both sides (Ruch 2011). “Japan’s unprecedented March 11 disasters led to a strengthened US-Japan alliance due to the joint military and governmental response and the commitment of American citizens to Japan’s recovery” (ibid.). America’s readiness to assist Japan after the disasters in 2011 could be an effect of the bond between the two states which was fostered by the nation-building efforts that began decades earlier. As Dobbins et al. pointed out, “the record suggests that nation-building creates ties of affection and dependency that persist for a substantial amount of time” (Dobbins et al. 2003, xxv). This confirms Schaller’s assessment that “the relationship forged [between the US and Japan] in the post-Occupation years proved remarkably durable” (Schaller 1997, 63). Or, as Rosow said in referring to Montesquieu, “the bonds of economic necessity created by commerce had to extend to social and political bonds as well” (Rosow 1984, 351).

While Americans are generally favorable toward Japan and content with its relationship with the United States, the one area they believe can be improved is trade between the two nations. In 2010 a Pew study found that 60% of Americans believed an increase in trade with Japan would be good for the US, whereas only 30% believed such an increase would be bad (Pew Research Center 2006). This gave Japan second place among nations Americans favored increasing trade with; they gave the first place to Canada, with 76% saying that it would be good for the US to increase trade with its
northern neighbor (ibid.). In 2009, when asked which issue “connected with the U.S.-Japan relationship...is going the worst,” the first place, with 27% of responses, went to the “U.S. and Japan’s handling of trade and economic issues” (Gallup 2012).

Additionally, both Japanese and American respondents demonstrated that they each believed China would prove to be more important to their nation’s economy in the future, than would the US or Japan respectively (ibid.). The “2011 Image of Japan” poll similarly found “the majority of those surveyed felt that the best way” to strengthen US-Japanese relations “lies in improving economic and trade relations” (Ruch 2011).

These data can be taken in light of a 2006 poll by the Chicago Council, which determined that Americans perceive Japan as relatively influential in the world (WPO/KN 2006, 4). On a 1-10 scale (with 10 being “extremely influential”), US respondents gave Japan an average score of 6.4; this number was on par with that of China, and was just below a score of 6.7 given to Great Britain, and a (self-appointed) score of 8.5 to the US (ibid.). It thus appears that the American people want to improve trade relations with Japan, and generally believe that expanding such economic ties will benefit the US. Ruch maintained that “progress at the official level on issues like trade and security” has continued to improve (Ruch 2011). Nevertheless, while most Americans see Japan as a close ally, they would like to strengthen the bond between the two nations even more by streamlining and expanding trade--for, as Montesquieu would say, “the spirit of commerce unites nations” (Ruch 2011.; Montesquieu 2009, 338).

Americans consistently tend to consider the military actions taken in Japan following the Pearl Harbor attack as successfully promoting the security of the United States. In 2005, “six decades after the United States dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, which effectively ended World War II, a majority of Americans, 57%, say they approve of using the bombs, while 38% disapprove” (Moore 2005). Gallup polls over the years have indicated that this number has remained relatively steady, as approval was 59% a decade prior in 1995, and 53% in 1991; yet these are sharp declines, understandably, from 1945, when the approval rating was 85%, with a mere 10% disapproving (ibid.). This earlier support was similarly reflected by the 97% of Americans who in 1941 “approved of the Congressional declaration of war against Japan,” directly following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (Newport 2001).

As Moore explained, “a major factor in President Harry S. Truman’s decision to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki was that the bombs would hasten the end of the war and thus save American lives by shortening the war” (Moore 2005). US residents were therefore asked in 2005 whether they believed “the bombs did in fact save American lives by shortening the war,” and a strong majority of 80% responded that they did believe this to be the case (ibid.). This is similar to the 1995 findings, which indicated that 86% of respondents believed dropping the bombs saved American lives (ibid.). While people have been more “divided on whether it saved Japanese lives,” these results clearly demonstrate that Americans perceive the United States as safer and better off for having dropped the two atomic bombs on Japan in 1945 (ibid.).

While the America public remains confident in the decision to drop the bombs in retaliation and to end the war, it does not appear to hold any grudge against the Japanese people themselves. A Gallup poll in 1991 reported that at the time “only 19% of Americans said that they had not forgiven the Japanese for the attack” (Newport 2001). As the US populace still approves of the military course taken during and after World
War II, it also appears content with the subsequent nation-building in Japan. It is worth noting that General MacArthur is currently considered to be one of the greatest American generals of all time, according to a 2000 Gallup survey (Gallup 2012). “In a close third place, cited as the greatest general by 12% of the public, is Douglas MacArthur”; he trailed Patton at 17%, and Eisenhower at 14% (ibid.). This poll found a noticeable generational gap, with many younger respondents citing Colin Powell and George Washington as their choices for greatest US general (ibid.). The fact that many older respondents, who were there at the time of the events of the second World War, chose MacArthur, as well as Patton and Eisenhower, is telling of their general support for the actions of the US.

As for current military presence in Japan, a 2006 Chicago Council poll asked American respondents whether they believed the US should continue to keep long-term military bases in Japan; they found that 57% said yes, whereas 34% said no (WPO/KN 2006, 12). This corresponds to a 2002 question which asked Americans if they thought the 44,000 US troops stationed in Japan was an appropriate number: 43% answered that it was too many, 45% said it was about right, while only 5% said it was too few (ibid.). More recently, in 2009 Gallup asked Americans which countries they thought were likely to become a military threat to the US in the future; Japan received 20% of positive responses (indicating that they did perceive it as a future threat), which is in fact relatively low when compared with responses mentioning other countries and regions (Gallup 2012). This score of 20% was on par with that of Latin America, both of which ranked just above the European Union, which received 14% from respondents; and
Japan’s score was significantly lower than the Middle East, which got 81% of positive responses, North Korea with 75%, China with 56%, and Russia with 42% (ibid.).

This demonstrates that people in the US generally feel relatively comfortable with the militaristic actions taken in Japan, now and since Pearl Harbor. The current goodwill, favorability, and low threat perception toward the Japanese people, coupled with the positive reflections of the actions during and after WWII, show that Americans perceive the US as decidedly safe when it comes to Japan. While Americans would like improvement in the area of economic and trade relations between the two nations, such improvement would likely only make the bond between the US and Japan even more secure and friendly. As Mill said, “there are strong reasons for maintaining the present slight bond of connection” for “it renders war impossible” and “at least keeps the markets of different countries open to one another”; this “bond of connection,” therefore, provided “a step...toward universal peace and general friendly co-operation among nations” (Mill 1991, 342). Though Mill was referring to Great Britain and her colonies, it seems he may just as well have been speaking of American sentiment toward US-Japanese relations.

Is the US Safer Because of Nation-Building in Iraq?

As US troops are still withdrawing from Iraq, there has obviously been much more time to consider the effects of nation-building in Japan than nation-building in Iraq. Nonetheless, there are certain indicators which can be examined to determine whether US inhabitants feel safer in the years following the occupation of Iraq, particularly in light of Montesquieu and Mill’s theories. The first indicator is whether commercial relations between the US and Iraq have contributed to security; the second is whether the
occupation prevented Iraq from becoming “absorbed” into aggressor entities—in this case, terrorist groups; and third, whether the US was able to increase its own security by gaining control over Iraqi military decisions.

Commerce with Iraq

As for commercial interdependence, results have so far been ambiguous. As far as public opinion goes, scarcely any reports have been conducted on whether American people believe trade with Iraq has improved since the US occupation, or on whether this would, in their opinion, improve American security. However, a CNN/ORC survey did ask US residents: “Do you think the amount of money the U.S. has spent on the war in Iraq is one reason for the economic problems the country is facing today, or is the amount of money spent on the Iraq war not related to economic conditions in the country today?” (PolingReport.com 2012). This question was asked in 2008 and again in 2011; in both years, a large majority of 71% answered that it was at least one reason for the economic problems in the US, whereas in both years 28% said that it was not related (ibid.).

While this offers a glimpse of the American people’s opinion of the economic ramifications of the US occupation of Iraq, media and government sources have presented more ambiguous conclusions. The official US International Trade Administration (ITA) applauded the “U.S.-Iraq Business and Investment Conference (USIBIC)” held in Washington, D.C. in October of 2009 (ITA 2009). At the time, this conference was heralded as a “major international event” which “offered U.S. and international companies the opportunity to learn about business and trade opportunities in Iraq’s market of 28 million people” (ibid.). The ITA declared that “the USIBIC promoted current investment and business opportunities in Iraq; provided matchmaking
opportunities for U.S. and Iraqi firms; addressed the challenges to doing business in Iraq; and facilitated meetings between U.S. firms and Iraqi ministers and senior government officials” (ibid.).

This sentiment was echoed by a 2011 report issued from the Department of Commerce, the umbrella department of the ITA. Commerce Secretary John Bryson met with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in Washington, D.C. to discuss economic relations (Commerce.gov 2011). According to the report, both officials were in complete agreement that Iraq presented a shining opportunity for future commercial relations with the US. The meeting was intended to reinforce the “variety of resources available to U.S. businesses already in place [which serve] to encourage and create trade and investment in a new era of relations between the two countries” (ibid.). Such available resources included the USIBIC, as mentioned, as well as “Conference-led trade missions to Iraq, the Iraq Task Force and Commerce’s Advocacy Center” (ibid.). One of these so-called “trade missions” was led by the Under Secretary for International Trade, Francisco Sánchez, in 2010, and was described as “a historic business development mission to Baghdad”; it brought several U.S. companies together with “key Iraqi public and private sector decision-makers,” and procured numerous meetings, investments, and sales (ibid.).

The Department of Commerce’s 2011 meeting with the Iraqi Prime Minister also emphasized the importance that Iraq’s emerging markets will likely have in the near future. At this meeting, Secretary Bryson stated that “we will continue working through the U.S.-Iraqi Business Dialogue and with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the U.S.-Iraq Business Council, as Iraq continues to emerge as a promising market in the region” (ibid.). The Department of Commerce’s report on the meeting noted that Al-Maliki also
“called for the U.S. business community to seize the investment and trade opportunities available in Iraq” (ibid.). This report optimistically concluded that “Iraq is a promising and important emerging market--one that’s set to grow faster than China--and has needs that encompass everything from manufacture to small consumer goods,” and that “meeting those needs can help create jobs here in the U.S.” (ibid.). Al-Maliki also announced “Iraq’s five-year National Development Plan...[which is] aimed at diversifying Iraq’s economy away from oil,” and he “highlighted the growing commercial ties with the United States” (ibid.). Bryson, too, stated that, “working together we can continue to strengthen ties between our nations’ business communities” (ibid.). Mill and especially Montesquieu would likely have argued that strengthening such commercial ties would simultaneously work to strengthen the security bond between the two countries. Whether Al-Maliki or Bryson envisioned such a connection is left to be inferred by the reader of the report.

While such governmental reports painted a rosy picture of both current US-Iraq economic relations and possibilities for the future, some commentators, though somewhat ambiguous, have been a bit more pessimistic and perhaps more realistic; in particular, they have devoted more attention to potential security risks for US businesses operating in Iraq. In 2009, *The New York Times* reported that “America’s war in Iraq has been good for business in Iraq--but not necessarily for American business” (Nordland 2009). The “high security costs and fear of violence make Iraq a business no-go,” the article stated, as many businesses do not want to spend the average “25 percent of their budgets on security” (ibid.). More recently, in mid-2011, Kennard of *Financial Times* pointed to some successful US investment ventures, and noted that “with Iraq’s having 30m people,
some of them well educated, and holding the world’s third-largest oil reserves, there is plenty to go for”; yet he also acknowledged that “still, fears about legal and physical security, alongside political stability, have made many foreign businesses wary of directing more money into the country” (Kennard 2011).

At the very end of 2011 (December 30), USA Today reported that “U.S. investment and other business in Iraq has quadrupled this year despite concerns over violence and sectarian rivalry” (Michaels 2011). “U.S. companies reached deals worth $8.1 billion through Dec. 1” in 2011, the article affirmed, “up from $2 billion last year,” and this “surge follows a number of years in which U.S. companies were fearful of entering Iraq” (ibid.). This article concluded, however, by noting that “nevertheless, there are political risks, including rising tensions between Iraq's Shiite-dominated government and the Sunni minority, and terrorist attacks” (ibid.). Therefore, media commentators are increasingly trumpeting the commercial successes while pushing security risks to the backseat of the discussion. Though none suggest that such risks have vanished, this may indicate that commercial interests are overcoming (and perhaps one day may even “cure”) the “destructive prejudices” which have previously torn Iraq apart (Montesquieu 2009, 338). Only time will tell.

*Threat of Terrorism Reduced?*

Following Mill, one of the goals of nation-building is to keep weaker states from becoming “absorbed” by the building nation’s enemies. True liberty, in both Mill’s and Montesquieu’s views, would necessitate citizens’ being free from terror and threats of violence. In theory, therefore, transforming Iraq into a strong, stable democracy, allied to the US, would prevent it from harboring terrorist groups and contributing to terrorism in
general. Let us now examine whether the American people’s perception of terrorist threats has been lowered since military actions in Iraq, and whether or not they believe Iraq will likely become a haven for terrorists in the future.

In December of 2011, a CNN/ORC poll asked US respondents if they thought “Iraq will be able to prevent terrorists from using the country as a base of operations for planning attacks against the United States”; 63% answered that Iraq would be unlikely to prevent this, while 34% believed that this was likely (PollingReport.com 2012). Also in December of 2011, an NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll asked Americans whether they believed “there will be more attempted terrorist attacks against the United States on our own soil as a result of our troops having left Iraq” (ibid., emphasis added). Respondents were relatively divided on this; a total of 45% answered that this scenario was likely (with 12% saying “very likely,” and 33% saying “somewhat likely”), and a total of 52% answered that this was unlikely (with 30% saying “somewhat unlikely,” and 22% saying “very unlikely”) (ibid.).

Earlier in 2011 (May), a Gallup poll indicated that Americans felt safer as a result of the death of Osama bin Laden, but that they still believed a terrorist attack against the US was imminent. When asked if they thought “the death of Osama bin Laden will make the U.S. safer or less safe from terrorism,” 54% answered safer, 28% answered less safe, while 12% said it will not make a difference either way (Saad 2011). However, “despite the optimism about the broad impact of bin Laden’s death on U.S. national security,” Saad of Gallup wrote, “more Americans believe an act of terrorism is imminent than have said so at any time since the start of the Iraq war in 2003” (ibid.). “Overall,” she went on, “62% think an act of terrorism is either ‘very’ or ‘somewhat likely’ to occur in the U.S. in
the next several weeks, with 17% considering it very likely” (ibid.). Similarly, a 2011 CBS News poll found that 41% of Americans considered the removal of Saddam Hussein from power as “worth the loss of American life and other costs of attacking Iraq,” whereas 50% considered it “not worth it” (PollingReport.com 2012).

Previously, in 2010, Gallup reported that only 25% of Americans perceived the US as “safer from terrorism” as “a result of the Iraq war,” while 32% responded that it had become “less safe,” and the answer with the highest response, “no change,” was chosen by 40% of respondents (Jones 2010). Jones, the reporter of this Gallup poll, suggested that “Americans do not believe the war has met two of its stated objectives: making the U.S. safer from terrorism and stabilizing the political situation in the Middle East” (ibid.). In fact, he added, “Americans believe the situation is now worse rather than better” (ibid.). These result demonstrates that, overall, the US populace does not deem itself safer from terrorism as a result of the occupation of Iraq.

Decisions in Iraqi Hands

As was explained, the total demilitarization of Japan left all decisions involving war in the hands of the Americans. Yet demilitarization in Iraq did not occur to the same degree. The supposed threat of weapons of mass destructions turned out to be false, and Iraq still maintains its own armed forces. Nonetheless, in 2006 a WPO/KN poll showed that 68% of Americans were opposed to retaining permanent military bases in Iraq, while only 27% approved of the idea; these numbers have remained fairly steady since 2004 (Kull 2006, 11). This same poll asked if Americans believed that US military presence in Iraq was a “stabilizing force” or whether it “provoked more conflict than” it prevented (ibid.). In 2006, 60% thought that US military presence provoked more conflict (up from
51% in 2004), whereas 35% perceived it as a stabilizing force (down from 46% in 2004) (ibid.).

In spite of this general belief that US military presence merely added to the instability, the American people have also not been confident that Iraq will be able to keep itself stable and secure without active US involvement. The 2011 NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll asked US respondents: “looking ahead to a time after U.S. troops have left Iraq, how likely do you believe...Iraq will become more settled and less violent?” (PollingReport.com 2012). To this, 62% answered that this was either somewhat or very unlikely to happen, while 35% said that it was either somewhat or very likely to be the case (ibid.). When asked the likelihood of an all-out civil war, 60% answered that it was somewhat or very likely, and 35% answered somewhat or very unlikely (ibid.). Additionally, the CNN/ORC poll found that 60% of US respondents believed it was unlikely that “Iraqi military and police will be able to ensure safety and security in Iraq without assistance from the United States,” whereas 37% thought that this was likely (ibid.).

Regarding Iraqi democracy, this poll found that 54% of respondents thought it was unlikely that “Iraq will continue to have a democratic government that will not be overthrown by terrorists,” and 43% thought that it was likely (ibid.). The NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll similarly found that 60% believed it was somewhat or very unlikely that “the Iraqi government will achieve a stable democracy” in the future when all US troops have left, whereas 38% believed this to likely be the case (ibid.). This was reflected by the 2010 Gallup findings, where Jones reported that 60% of Americans deemed “the situation in Iraq [to be] not worth going to war over, while 34% believe[d] it
was” worth it (Jones 2010). “In recent years,” Jones added, “Gallup has also found a consistent majority of Americans saying the United States made a mistake in sending troops to Iraq” (ibid.). “Americans are eager,” he added, “to end their more than seven-year involvement in Iraq, even if that would leave Iraqis in charge of a situation they are not equipped to handle, and even if that means the United States has not met some of its stated objectives for going to war” (ibid.).

In sum, the fact is that Iraq has thus far not been overtaken by terrorist groups, and this is at least partly because of US presence there. Nevertheless, the American people generally do not feel safer from terrorism since the occupation of Iraq. A majority of Americans believe that US presence in Iraq has not only not facilitated security at home, it has also contributed to instability within Iraq itself. US citizens also have little confidence that Iraq will be able to maintain its democracy or stability once the US has left. The US people blame this seemingly no-win situation, at least in part, on the strategies employed by US officials and on its overall botched attempt at nation-building. While many successes have been achieved within Iraq—for example, as of yet, Iraq has not been “absorbed” by terrorist groups, and it has held elections and implemented more individual rights--this has not translated into American sentiment. People in the US do not generally perceive nation-building in Iraq as a success story, and they certainly do not deem themselves to be more secure or more free as a result of the efforts. What they do see, rather, is the loss of security, resources, and American lives. Thus, one cannot be surprised to discover that a majority of Americans do not view the war with Iraq, and the subsequent nation-building there, as “worth it.”
Part 2: New Ideas

Innovation

Montesquieu and Mill both emphasized the value of new ideas. For Montesquieu, commerce spread communication and knowledge, and therefore facilitated not only wealth and tolerance, but also art, philosophy, and innovation. Mill, for his part, championed the singular importance of new ideas, for they alone were the key to perpetuating human progress. As previously discussed, India is currently emerging as an oasis of innovation, and Britain is benefitting as a result of this. Both writers also stressed that freedom was required to express and develop these new ideas. Contemporary scholars, too, have highlighted the importance, and indeed the necessity, of new ideas for not only economic prosperity but for progress generally.

Traven, for example, insisted: “intellectual innovation will become even more important to the future of our nation’s economy as global economies shift their focus from the industrial to the creative,” and “in this evolving economy, the most important resource will be a person’s mind because the scarcest commodity will be good ideas” (Traven 2006, 694-5). Mill similarly acknowledged the rarity and preciousness of good new ideas, for, he said, “there are but a few persons, in comparison with the whole of mankind, whose experiments, if adopted by others, would be likely to be any improvement on established practice” (Mill 2002, 66). “But,” Mill insisted, “these few are the salt of the earth; without them, human life would become a stagnant pool” (ibid.). Thus, Mill concluded, “it will not be denied by anybody, that originality is a valuable element in human affairs,” for “it is only the cultivation of originality which produces, and can produce, well-developed human beings” (ibid., 65-6).
“This need for creativity,” Traven went on, “has established a new social class...dubbed the ‘creative class’” by Dr. Richard Florida (Traven 2006, 700). And “the heart of this new class is the ‘super-creative core,’--scientists, engineers, professors, novelists and poets, musicians, artists, entertainers, actors, architects, as well as non-fiction writers, editors, think-tank researchers, and other opinion makers”; thus “this group is primarily employed because of their ability to create new ideas, technology, and forms” (ibid.). This reflected Montesquieu’s view of innovation, for Montesquieu maintained that “cultivation assumes many arts and much knowledge, and one always sees arts, knowledge, and needs keeping pace together” (Montesquieu 2009, 292).

Bhidé similarly shared the view of both Montesquieu and Mill that such innovation and originality would benefit the entirety of mankind. As Bhidé asserted, “the development of scientific knowledge or cutting-edge technology is not a zero-sum competition,” for “the results of scientific research are available at no charge to anyone anywhere in the world” (Bhidé 2009, 16). He promoted the idea that growth and innovation abroad can produce the same effects at home, if properly taken advantage of. In this way, he stressed the beneficial link between globalization, innovation, and prosperity. “Almost everyone agrees,” he stated, “that technological innovation plays a crucial role in sustaining prosperity. Similarly, few deny the significance of globalization or doubt that technological innovation affects globalization and vice versa”--or, to paraphrase Montesquieu, everywhere there is commerce there are gentle mores, and vice versa (Bhidé 2009, 12; Montesquieu 2009, 338). As Bhidé explained, “the U.S. likely enjoys a higher standard of living because [nations such as] Taiwan and Korea have started contributing to the world’s supply of scientific and technological knowledge”
“An increase in the world’s supply of high-level know-how,” he added, therefore “provides more raw material for mid- and ground-level innovations that increase living standards in the United States” and elsewhere (ibid.).

Montesquieu would have declared that this was the glory of commerce at work. Such international commerce naturally spread prosperity and knowledge, according to Montesquieu, and this was “because the spirit of commerce brings with it the spirit of frugality, economy, moderation, wisdom, tranquility, order, and rule” (Montesquieu 2009, 48). “Commerce,” he mused, “sometimes destroyed by conquerors, sometimes hampered by monarchs, wanders across the earth, flees from where it is oppressed, and remains where it is left to breathe: it reigns today where one used to see only deserted places, seas, and rocks; there where it used to reign are now only deserted places” (ibid., 356). This highlighted the importance of allowing ideas (and commerce) to be freely exchanged between individuals and across borders. Mill also urged that “genius can only breathe freely in an atmosphere of freedom”; “I insist thus emphatically,” he added, “on the importance of genius, and the necessity of allowing it to unfold itself freely both in thought and in practice” (Mill 2002, 67).

Bhidé, in a similar vein, stressed the dual importance of fostering new ideas at home as well as being receptive to new ideas from other peoples. As he contended, “in a world where breakthrough ideas easily cross national borders, the origin of ideas is inconsequential” (Bhidé 2009, 16). “The Key to widespread prosperity,” he went on, therefore includes “not just the exceptional performance of a few inventors, scientists, or entrepreneurs,” but also “the widespread use (as opposed to just the development) of innovative technologies, and thus venturesome consumption of innovations as well as
their development” (ibid., 22). Worldwide prosperity thus results “because high-level ideas cross borders easily,” and only so long as they are free to do so (ibid., 16).

Mill would have agreed that such receptiveness to new ideas was as important to the progression of mankind as the ideas themselves. A society’s potential for continued improvement, Mill argued, could be determined by “the amount of capacity which [the] people possess for doing new things, and adapting themselves to new circumstances” (Mill 1991, 19). Conversely, Mill added, “strong prejudices of any kind” indicate “positive defects of national character, or mere ignorance” (ibid., 91). This followed Montesquieu, who asserted that commerce facilitates knowledge and prosperity, and “only prejudices cause these to be renounced”; and, conversely to this, a commercial “nation, made comfortable by peace and liberty,” would be “freed from destructive prejudices” (Montesquieu 2009, 249, 328). This has been considered no less true today, for, as Bhidé concluded, “now we may say that should the scientific and technological prowess of China and India ever come to equal that of the United States, so much the better for the U.S” (Bhidé 2009, 23).

Japan’s Household Name-Brands

The number of Japanese corporations which have become household names in the United States is seemingly endless. Considering the automobile industry, virtually all Americans know the names Toyota, Honda, Mazda, Mitsubishi, Nissan, Isuzu, and Suzuki; and within the electronics field, nearly every American is familiar with the names Sony, Nintendo, Sega, Nikon, Canon, Panasonic, and Seiko. The list of well-known Japanese corporations stretches much farther, from Ramen Noodles to Hitachi, and does even begin to touch on the vast number of lesser-known Japanese companies that have
consistently topped the Forbes 2000 list and which affect the day-to-day lives of most Americans, such as Mitsui & Co., Japan Tobacco, Nippon Steel, and Takeda Pharmaceutical (DeCarlo 2012).

This is confirmed by Sakai, who noted that “giant Japanese manufacturers have become household names worldwide” (Sakai 2003, 276). Companies like Toshiba, Hitachi, and Sony “have become strong because they produce what the world wants to buy,” he explained; “moreover, they seem to have an uncanny ability not just to invent remarkable new products but also to borrow ideas, rework them, tinker with them, and produce something totally ‘new’ from a product concept that originated elsewhere” (ibid., 276-7). This followed in line with Montesquieu, Mill, and Bhidé’s argument that economic prosperity comes not just from the cultivation of new ideas, but also from receptiveness to new ideas.

Sakai offered further explanation for the enormous success of many of Japan’s largest companies. He pointed out that “rather than design and manufacture their own goods, they actually coordinate a complex design and manufacturing process that involves thousands of smaller companies” often located in foreign localities (ibid., 277). In this way, he noted, “these huge businesses are more like ‘trading companies’”; that is, “the goods you buy with a famous maker’s name inscribed on the case are seldom the product of the company’s factory--and often not even the product of its own research” (ibid.). Mill, of course, would have overwhelmingly approved of this concept, as he was the ever-eager champion of trading companies. Though Sakai’s version was much more modern and was not meant to be a part of the so-called “dual government” advocated by Mill, many qualities can nonetheless be shared between the two models.
For instance, just as the East India Company had the knowledge and resources to jumpstart a successful flow of commerce to and from distant parts of the world, today’s multinational corporations (“trading companies,” in Sakai’s terms) are often best equipped to pepper the globe with subsidiaries and thus facilitate a network of international markets. According to Mill, as trading companies were “chiefly composed of persons who have acquired professional knowledge” of the regional and cultural aspects of the branch or subsidiary’s location, they would also “have a much more permanent interest in the success...and in the prosperity of the country” (Mill 1991, 357-8).

Bhidé also provided further explanation for what has contributed to widespread familiarity with Japanese products and name-brands. “Today Japan is a highly developed economy and makes important contributions to advancing the technological frontier,” he wrote, and this is at least in part thanks to “its overall capacity to develop and use innovations” (Bhidé 2009, 15). Bhidé emphasized the fact that homegrown innovation and development, when coupled with the free flow of ideas, expertise, and technology across borders, produce the best results and, in the process, will spread prosperity and knowledge around the globe. He offered some examples to demonstrate this phenomenon. “The then tiny Japanese company Sony,” he pointed out, “was one of the first licensors of Bell Labs’ transistor patent. Sony paid all of $50,000—and only after first obtaining special permission from the Japanese Ministry of Finance—for the license that started it on the road to becoming a household name in consumer electronics” (ibid., 16).
It is worth noting how unfortunate a “no” from the Japanese Ministry of Finance would have been in this case. While some regulations on commerce are beneficial, such as patent laws, too much can obstruct the flow of ideas and inhibit innovation. As Montesquieu pointed out, “it is better not to hamper the liberty of commerce by exclusive privileges,” and he insisted that a nation’s laws must be conducive to commerce in order for it to enjoy liberty and prosperity (Montesquieu 2009, 345). “A harsh and tyrannical government,” he insisted, is “incompatible with commerce,” whereas “the increase in commerce” has always brought with it “new communication to new lands and new seas, which [in turn always] gives us new produce and new commodities” (ibid., 381, 405).

Another great example of this phenomenon comes from Apple, Inc. Though formed in the US, this company similarly burgeoned as a result of ideas and technological developments collected from around the world. “Especially noteworthy,” said Bhidé, “are the high-level know-how and products used in the iPod mix that originated abroad” (Bhidé 2009, 19). While “the venturesome spirit of U.S. consumers has...played a crucial role in the success of the iPod—and several other Apple products”—various elements of the iPod had their genesis in nations such as Japan, Britain, Germany, Holland, France, Italy, and elsewhere (ibid.). Thus, as Greg, Kraemer, and Dedrick noted, “the iPod is a perfect example of a globally innovated product, combining technologies from the U.S., Japan and a number of [other] countries” from Europe and Asia (Greg, Kraemer, and Dedrick 2007, 2). In fact, “the 1.8-inch hard drives that put ‘1000 songs in your pocket’ and were used in the first five generations of the iPod came from the Japanese company Toshiba”; and “later, the iPod Mini used 1-inch ‘microdrives’ supplied by Hitachi (Japan) and Seagate (United States)” (Bhidé 2009, 19).
Thus this winning combination of original innovation with receptiveness to brilliant creations from around the world is what has led to such extraordinary inventions as those produced by Apple, Inc. Additionally, Bhidé asserted, this “is how the iPod’s success helps the U.S. economy,” via the numerous jobs it has generated and continues to generate (ibid.). In analyzing value distribution from shared innovation, specifically with regard to the iPod, Greg, Kraemer, and Dedrick determined that “the biggest winner is Apple, an American company, with predominantly American employees and stockholders who reap the benefits” (Greg, Kraemer, and Dedrick 2007, 10). A close second were “the producers of high value, critical components,” such as visual displays and hard drives, who also “capture a large share of the value” produced by innovation; “innovation is rapid in these components, and accounts for much of the rapid innovation in final products such as the iPod” (ibid., 10, 3). For the 30GB Video iPod, for example, “the highest value components are the hard drive and the display, both supplied by Japanese companies” (ibid., 10). It therefore remains true that “the creation of value through innovation is not a zero-sum game,” and that “today, no single country is the source of all innovation” (ibid., 2).

Greg, Kraemer, and Dedrick concluded that it is “simply a fact of the 21st century” that “U.S. companies need to work with international partners to bring new products to the market,” but added that “the good news is that many American companies are winning the game and [are] continuing to bring significant benefits to the U.S. economy” (ibid., 10). “As long as the U.S. market remains dynamic, with innovative firms and risk-taking entrepreneurs,” they maintained, “global innovation should
continue to create value for American investors and well-paid jobs for knowledgable workers” (ibid.).

US corporations have similarly benefitted from successful partnerships with Japanese businesses through the vehicle of joint ventures, a practice which burgeoned between companies of the two nations during the 1980s (Tyebjee 2002, 457). Joint ventures with Japanese companies have been an advantage to US corporations because they bring “access to technology, capital, factors of production, and market” (ibid., 466-7). “In linking with another firm,” Contractor and Lorange wrote, “one or both partners may enjoy options otherwise unavailable to them, such as better access to markets, pooling or swapping of technologies, enjoying larger economies of scale, and benefitting from economies of scope” (Contractor and Lorange 2002, 5). Joint ventures also increase “the interdependence between the partners,” an outcome Montesquieu would have surely applauded (ibid., 6).

Some examples of US-Japanese joint ventures included “the General Motors-Toyota venture,” and the Boeing 767 “corporate agreement” project between “Boeing and Japan Aircraft Development Corporation (itself a consortium of Mitsubishi, Kawasaki, and Fuji)” (ibid., 11, 7). “The risk-sharing functions of coalitions,” Contractor and Lorange went on, “may be especially important in research-intensive industries such as computers, where each successive generation of technology tends to cost much more to develop, while at the same time product life cycles might shrink, leaving less time to amortize the developmental costs” (ibid., 11).

Another significant benefit of joint ventures can be found in market access, particularly “faster access into a market” if, for instance, “the testing and certification
done by one partner are accepted by the authorities in the other partner’s territories” (ibid., 13). “Japan,” Contractor and Lorange pointed out, “is known for its more or less exclusionary policies, and this has been a major contributing factor to the hundreds of U.S. firms using the joint venture route as the most practical way to sell products in the Japanese market” (ibid., 14). An example is the Fuji-Xerox venture, whereby “Fuji provided Xerox an entry into the Japanese market as well as links with key buyers” (ibid., 19). Contractor and Lorange stressed that “the latter [of these] is an important consideration in Japan because of the strong business conglomeration within Japan’s commercial industry sector”; “personal contacts and referrals within the group are necessary for sales success” (ibid.).

In these ways, the US and Japan have become mutual consumers, competitors, and business partners, and, “in effect, normal nations in a multipolar world”; as Schaller affirmed, “by most measure, this should be counted as a spectacular achievement of U.S. foreign policy since 1945” (Schaller 1997, 260). Thus, although Japan’s economy was decimated by World War II, it has since become an oasis of prosperity and innovation, and has given rise to some of the most popular and successful brand-names in the world. The United States has benefited from such Japanese innovation in various ways; not only have American consumers been bestowed with a wider variety of, and often cheaper and more efficient, products, but US corporations have also profited by way of shared innovation and joint ventures.

The USA PATRIOT Act

We can therefore observe the flow of new ideas from Japan, and how the United States has benefitted as a result. Yet, just as Japan took nearly a decade before getting its
economy on track, it may be too soon to judge whether Iraq will one day become a significant purveyor of innovations and creative new ideas in the future. It is therefore difficult to determine whether the US will benefit in the realm of ideas thanks to its nation-building efforts in Iraq. Because this is the case, examining the current tensions within the US between liberty and security, as epitomized by the the Patriot Act, is perhaps more telling of how free the flow of ideas is in contemporary America. The USA PATRIOT Act is “a backronym for ‘Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism,’ [and] was submitted [to Congress] several days after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon” on September 11, 2001 (Vasi and Strang 2009, 1719). This legislation, passed in October of 2001, “was drafted by the Department of Justice to grant federal agencies broad powers to conduct searches, use electronic surveillance, and detail suspected terrorists” (ibid., 1720). While the Act was therefore passed prior to the invasion of Iraq, these two cases are nevertheless connected through the overarching strategies employed by the US to battle the so-called war on terror.

As Vasi and Strang noted, the passage of the Patriot Act sparked debates over legitimacy and “the trade-off between liberty and security” (ibid., 1724-5). “Conflict over the scope of individual rights,” they wrote, “is fundamental to democratic politics, most sharply when the nation is threatened” (ibid., 1716). “National crises,” they went on, “restructure the balance between individual rights and collective security, leading the state to withdraw freedoms that in other times appear inviolable”; yet, in the wake of the Patriot Act’s passage, many citizens have remonstrated against “what they see as the unneeded and unprincipled surrender of rights for security” (ibid., 1716-7).
Before discussing the possible ways in which the Patriot Act has suppressed individual freedoms, particularly with regard to the sharing of ideas, it is important to first examine ways in which the Act has been successful in procuring security. As Carrigan demonstrated, “there have been many specific incidents in which the Patriot Act has proved to be successful,” and these include: “the arrest and indictment of a father and son in Lodi, Calif., for lying to federal agents about the son’s attendance at an al Qaeda terrorist training camp”; the securing of “six guilty pleas from an al Qaeda ‘sleeper cell’ in Lackawanna, N.Y.”; “the surveillance of a reputed terror cell in Portland, Ore., resulting in convictions of six persons in a scheme to travel to Afghanistan to fight U.S. forces”; “the successful prosecution of a money launderer for Colombia's leftist rebel group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC”; “the conviction of a man who sent more than 200 threatening letters laced with white powder to government agencies, businesses and individuals in Louisiana; and the discovery, through communication intercepts, of an 88-year-old Wisconsin woman who had been kidnapped and held for ransom” (Carrigan 2008, 26). The Patriot Act was at least partially responsible for all of these aforementioned triumphs for US security.

Thus, in light of this heightened security brought about by the Patriot Act, let us look at two ways in which the Act has obstructed the cultivation of new ideas within the US: an increase in business regulations and stricter restrictions placed on student visas. First, as Carrigan continued to explain, “the Patriot Act has had a major impact on how business[es] operate, communicate with, and train their employees. The added regulations have caused many businesses to revisit their policies on background checks, records retention and regulatory compliance software and to some extent, how they
design their workspaces. The reality is that as long as The Patriot Act is on the books, it will impact businesses” (ibid., 27). This Act has therefore affected the ways businesses communicate within their own operations as well as with outside sources. “The Patriot Act,” Carrigan went on, has “impacted how, and by whom, communication within an organization can be monitored,” and it has “vastly expanded the authority of law enforcement to monitor private communication and personal information” (ibid., 23).

The ability to research has also been hampered by this act; not only are electronic vehicles for research, from websites to phone calls, more heavily monitored, library records are also now subject to strict surveillance. This, Carrigan argued, is an “issue of privacy,” and such “automated library records can affect everyone from patrons and library [personnel] to the library board of trustees and township or city officials” (ibid.). Additionally, most businesses have had to alter their hiring and screening processes, as “background checks have come under increased scrutiny” (ibid., 24). Businesses have also “had to change their recordkeeping practices in order to comply with the new standards”; cable companies and internet providers have been affected by this in particular (ibid., 22). “The records retention requirements that are now required under The Patriot Act,” Carrigan expounded, have “not only caused businesses to add more employees and to spend more money on training, but some businesses have had to develop entirely new departments to adhere to these changes” (ibid.).

Thus we see the enormous costs in time, money, efficiency, and privacy involved with adhering to the “many controls, procedures and requirements that businesses are required to implement” as stipulated by the Patriot Act (ibid., 20). Because of the Patriot Act, therefore, businesses have not only experienced the trade-offs between security and
liberty, but also between resources devoted to compliance with regulation as opposed to research and development. While there is no exact way to measure the resultant loss in the formation and spread of new ideas, we can safely say that the laws of the Patriot Act are not conducive to commerce, and that Montesquieu might even dare to call them tyrannical.

The second area in which the Patriot Act has suppressed the cultivation of new ideas is through the inflated restrictions it has placed on the student visa process. According to Traven, the “U.S. visa policies implemented since the September 11, 2001 tragedy are so restrictive and are primarily to blame for the decline in international student enrollment in U.S. academic institutions” (Traven 2006, 695). In 2003, he explained, “the number of foreign students in colleges and universities in the U.S. dropped for the first time in more than three decades” (ibid.). Traven argued that this “could be detrimental to our economic success in the future because we will lose valuable intellectual capital,” for, historically, “the most effective lure for the U.S. to attract such creative and bright people from around the world has been its world-class universities” (ibid.). “Because of the importance of attracting and retaining the world’s brightest people,” he went on, “the U.S. is destroying its chances of securing the world’s most valuable future commodity--intellectual innovation--by making it more difficult to obtain a visa to study here” (ibid.).

As Traven posited, “U.S. visa policies since the September 11th tragedy have made it increasingly difficult for foreign nationals to attend U.S. academic institutions” (ibid., 711). The Patriot Act specifically has obstructed the development of the so-called “creative class primarily though its reestablishment of the computerized tracking system
of foreign students, named the Student Exchange and Visitor Information System (SEVIS)” (ibid., 717-8). “The Patriot Act’s establishment of SEVIS,” Traven expounded, “has directly affected the creative class because the slow and ineffective implementation of the tracking program has led to unnecessary and costly visa delays” (ibid., 718). This in turn has deterred foreign students from even applying for US visas, and has instead prompted them to look elsewhere for education; other nations’ universities have also simultaneously increased their efforts “to attract the world’s most intelligent individuals” (ibid., 695). The end result has been the sharp decline in matriculation by foreign students in the US, and, as Traven stressed, this will inevitably prove detrimental to the cultivation of new ideas here in America.

There was, of course, a reason for implementing these heightened regulations and surveillance on student visas. As Traven explained, “one of the hijackers, Hani Hanjour, who was believed to have been flying one of the airplanes, was admitted into the U.S. on a nonimmigrant student visa” (ibid., 717). Additionally, “at least three of the hijackers had overstayed their visas and, although originally gaining entry legally, had an illegal immigration status at the time of the attacks” (ibid.). Traven acknowledged, therefore, that “in terms of immigration reform, the Patriot Act was designed to ensure homeland security by imposing regulations such as tightening the rules on student visas, implementing stricter penalties and enforcing them against those who overstay their visas, as well as tightening the Mexican and Canadian borders” (ibid.).

Thus, as Carrigan contended, “in the process of addressing vital national security issues,” it is clear that “the Patriot Act has changed the role of organizations to protect individual rights and meet the security needs of the government” (Carrigan 2008, 19). It
is difficult to conclude whether the security of the Patriot Act has been “worth it,” but it can nonetheless be confidently stated that this security has come at a heavy price. While businesses’ resources have to a great extent been redirected in order to comply with new regulations and requirements, the loss in innovation, though intangible, is likely profound. Similarly, as visa applications have become increasingly difficult to obtain, with stricter conditions and more intrusive monitoring systems, the number of foreign students attending US universities will continue to drop. This means, of course, that the world’s supply of ingenious minds, ripe and brimming with new ideas, is now met with, not the idyllic open arms and promise of the opportunity of the “American dream,” but rather with the impediments of paperwork and bureaucracy. The United States has thus had one of its greatest resources--ideas--diminished as a result of the security strategies employed in its efforts to combat terrorism.

While the Patriot Act, and, more broadly, the nation-building efforts in Iraq, have produced many successes, one is left wondering whether our own liberty here in the United States has been promoted, or rather atrophied, in the process. Perhaps time and future reflection will provide a more definitive answer. For now, however, to follow Montesquieu’s lead, I will merely conclude that “it is not for me to examine whether at present the...[American people] enjoy this liberty or not. It suffices for me to say...[what] is established by their laws, and I seek no further” (Montesquieu 2009, 166).
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

The Japanese case demonstrates that the promotion of liberty within the “metropole” as well as within the “dependent country” through the process of nation-building, when conducted properly, is possible. Regardless of what contributed most to this success--whether prior foundations of democracy, the unconditional surrender, the overall strategies of the US, the leadership of MacArthur, the character of the Japanese people, or a “perfect storm” of all these combined--it has shown that liberty can be the end result, on both sides, of nation-building.

The case of Iraq, conversely, demonstrates that success and liberty are far from guaranteed when nation-building is attempted. Because there is general consensus that the US’s nation-building in Iraq has been an outright failure, new questions have arisen regarding whether nation-building success is the exception rather than the rule. If this is the case, how many failed attempts are worth the rare successes? There are substantial costs for the intervening nation--in lives, resources, proliferation, the possible increase of security threats, the possibility that the project will be a failure and result in a loss of legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens and the world, and the potential decrease in liberty--as well as substantial costs for the nation being built--similarly in lives, but also in its sovereignty and its “right” as a nation. Idealistic goals of spreading peace, democracy, and economic prosperity around the globe and at home are not risk-free ventures. While a victory, such as the Japanese case, may offer a shining example of hope for future nation-building endeavors, the case of Iraq ought to emphasize the weightiness of such a decision.
The promotion of liberty, for both nations involved, should come more into play as leaders contemplate such drastic foreign policy measures as nation-building. While an altruistic strategy of promoting liberty in the dependent nation alone is unrealistic, the goal of promoting the liberty of the home country alone does not take into account that violating the natural rights, such as life and liberty, of other people inherently undermines one’s own natural rights. As Montesquieu stated, “if one citizen could do what they forbid, he would no longer have liberty because the others would likewise have the same power” (ibid., 155). Because of the immense risks and costs involved with nation-building, Mill would perhaps conclude that the US is “sufficient for her own protection without her colonies, and would be in a much stronger position, as well as more dignified position, if separated from them” (Mill 1991, 341).

And yet, a liberal nation must also be willing to defend its liberty, and this may in fact mean defense at all costs. It is a reality of today’s world that terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda are not simply passively anti-democratic, but are actively hostile to “Islamic and Western democracy” (Mohamadian 2012, 240). As Mill urged, liberal nations with “representative institutions necessarily depend for permanence upon the readiness of the people to fight for them in case of their being endangered” (Mill 1991, 83). If the people of a liberal nation have “too little value for this, they...are almost sure to be overthrown as soon as...[anyone] is willing to run some small risk for absolute power” (ibid.). Or, as Montesquieu affirmed, a liberal nation “would love its liberty prodigiously because this liberty would be true; and it could happen that, in order to defend that liberty, the nation might sacrifice its goods, its ease, and its interests, and might burden itself with harsher imposts than even the most absolute prince would dare make his subjects bear”
(Montesquieu 2009, 327). “But this nation,” he went on, “would know with certainty that it was necessary to submit to them, as it would pay them in the well-founded expectation of not having to pay more” (ibid.).

Reevaluating Our Understanding of Nation-Building

Before a correct approach to nation-building can be determined, our very conception of what it means, or what it ought to mean, needs to be refined. In light of the liberal colonization theories proposed by Montesquieu and Mill, and in considering the examples of Japan and Iraq, an examination of nation-building through the lens of liberty-promotion demonstrates, first, that it is true some nations’ environments are not adequately prepared for liberty, and that a fundamental change must occur in the nation being built before freedom and democracy can successfully take root; and, second, that it is possible for liberty to be promoted in both nations involved, as long as a proper approach is pursued by the nation doing the building. Approaching nation-building from the standpoint of dual liberty-promotion will eliminate unnecessary recourse to doomed strategies and disingenuous or unrealistic goals.

For liberty to be simultaneously promoted in both nations, neither side may play a passive role, and neither may act in a way which obstructs this parallel process. To successfully engage in the process, this means that the nation being built must, as a people, have (or must actively strive to obtain) what Kesler referred to as the “capacity to be free” (Kesler 2005a, 226). For the nation doing the building, this means that leaders must be cognizant of which characteristics are conducive to liberty and which are adverse, and adapt their foreign policy accordingly.
Kesler’s distinction between the capacity and the right to be free followed the idea proposed by both Montesquieu and Mill that the universality of natural rights does not guarantee their fruition, and that a society may possess certain obstacles which obstruct the full realization of liberty. “Every human being has, by nature, a right to be free,” Kesler wrote, “but it does not follow that every human being has the capacity or the moral equipment—the habits of the heart and mind—to do so” (Kesler 2005b, 10). Montesquieu spoke in terms of a “general spirit,” whereas Mill referred to certain “social requisites” which had to be learned and acquired before representative government could be properly established.

As Kesler argued, “no founding is completely de novo” (i.e., developed from an actual state of nature), for “every attempt at regime change,” whether enacted from without or from within, “begins from the existing habits and beliefs of the people for whom you are trying to found a new way of life” (Kesler 2005a, 226). And, as Montesquieu and Mill urged, certain existing mores are more facilitative to liberty than others. For Montesquieu, colder climates encouraged people to be more “vigorous” and therefore more on guard against anyone attempting to usurp their liberty; warmer climates, on the other hand, induced inactivity among the denizens, and this paved the way for servitude. Montesquieu maintained “that the cowardice of the peoples in hot climates has almost always made them slaves and that the courage of the peoples of cold climates has kept them free” (Montesquieu 2009, 278). Mill, for his part, spoke in terms of capacity as well. “Liberty, as a principle,” he stated, “has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion. Until then, there is nothing for them but implicit obedience to an
Akbar or a Charlemagne...But as soon as mankind have attained the capacity of being
guided to their own improvement by conviction or persuasion...[then] compulsion...is no
longer admissible” (Mill 2002, 12).

Again following Montesquieu and Mill, Kesler affirmed that “culture is not
destiny” and “regime change [is] possible” (Kesler 2005b, 10). This meant that man, as a
progressive being, could change and so too could the society in which he lived. Thus,
nation-building has its merits and its place in legitimate foreign policy, but must be
conducted properly and in light of existent obstacles to liberty, if liberty is indeed to be
promoted in both nations involved. The acknowledgement of cultural particularities,
however, does not exclude the fact that certain universals permeate mankind regardless of
one’s location or culture. Kesler pointed to the Founding Fathers of America in order to
reenforce this: “though fervent believers in universal moral principles,” he explained,
“They knew that these had to be approximated differently in different political situations”
(Kesler 2005a, 226). Such universals include characteristics of human nature—such as
vanity, Montesquieu would say—as well as the natural rights of life, liberty, and property
which the American Founders held dear. Lincoln, too, asserted that “human nature will
not change...Let us, therefore, study the incidents of this, as philosophy to learn wisdom
from, and none of them as wrongs to be revenged” (Lincoln 2001, 764). Kesler’s point
was that the existence of these common rights must not be conflated with the capacity or
ability to sustain them.

Thus a person, born in any country and at any time, will continue to possess his
right to life, for instance, so long as he remains alive; yet the context into which he is
born will affect his capacity to sustain his life. If he is born in the midst of a war, or
plague, or famine, for example, his ability to continue living has been greatly reduced—despite the fact that his inherent right to his own life has not been lessened to any degree. This applies to the cultural conditions of a society as well. And the same goes for liberty: as Kesler further explained, one must not confuse “the individual right to be free with the right to live in a fully democratic regime” (Kesler 2005b, 12). A liberal country that engages in nation-building must therefore weigh the two; its primary goal must be related to the universals of human nature, while its strategies must be tailored to the particulars of culture.

The correct approach to nation-building can be best illuminated by first outlining the flaws associated with the wrong approach; and the wrong approach most commonly adopted by liberal nation-builders (indeed, it was the approach taken by the US in Iraq) is to set democratization of the foreign state as the first and foremost goal. Such a goal affects the strategy of implementation, and thereby violates the universal and particular requirements of proper nation-building.

As Beetham contended, “democratization through invasion, or forcible democratization, is intrinsically flawed and self-contradictory, for reasons independent of any regional context” (Beetham 2009, 446). Therefore, he went on, “to say that the Iraq project failed through errors of implementation is to wish that different authors had been in charge; for example, those who would have listened to independent experts on Iraq and the region rather than marginalizing them” (ibid., 445). “But,” he concluded, “these [experts] would have been ones who would most probably never have embarked on the project in the first place” (ibid.). Thus Beetham countered the argument proposed by
Mill—and furthered by authors such as Diamond, McFaul, and Kaufmann—that regional experts can potentially make or break the success of a nation-building endeavor.

Mill believed that foreign experts, endowed with the power to enforce changes, would be best suited to guide the dependent country along the steps of advancement and eventually to the ultimate goal of representative government. Beetham, conversely, argued that the very concept “of ‘coercive democratization’ as a purposive project” is “deeply contradictory” by its nature (ibid., 450). Forcing liberty upon a society negates that very liberty from the outset. Beetham therefore followed Montesquieu, who suggested that people ought to be persuaded to alter their mores and laws in ways which facilitate commerce and liberty, but never forced.

In other words, liberal nation-builders may attempt to persuade a foreign people to cultivate its own capacity for freedom, but attempting to force this capacity is self-defeating; the people must have the habits and mores of liberty engrained in their society, by their own doing, and this cannot come by way of outside imposition. As we have observed from history, Beetham explained, “democracy may indeed result from invasion by a foreign power or powers, but it can only be shown to have successfully happened where the purpose of invasion was something else” (ibid.). He offered the example of Japan, where “the purpose of invasion and occupation was not primarily to bring democracy...but to defeat aggressors” (ibid.). “All important, therefore,” he summed up, “is the purpose of the military invasion, as this has a crucial bearing on the legitimacy of the action in the eyes of the population involved, and this in turn on the prospects for a subsequent democratic evolution” (ibid.).
Kesler expounded on this, explaining that adopting a strategy for implanting democracy above all else, where it does not already exist, assumes that democracy can be implanted anywhere, regardless of the cultural environment. This was the Bush Administration’s policy in Iraq. As Kesler noted, the so-called “Bush Doctrine” stressed “America’s supposed duty, as the result of our respect for human rights, to help the Iraqis and others realize their democratic entitlements and destiny” (Kesler 2005a, 224). Kesler countered this, arguing that “republicanism is extremely difficult to attain,” and requires not merely elections, but also secure individual rights and the various elements which constitute “good government”; thus, “republican government is an achievement, not an entitlement” (ibid., 226). This echoed Montesquieu, who sought to explain why, “despite men’s love of liberty, despite their hatred for violence, most people are subjected to” despotic governments instead of liberal ones (Montesquieu 2009, 63). The formation of representative government—what Montesquieu called the “masterpiece of legislation”—required a firm understanding of the complex system of checks and balances, and thus a high level of reason; “by contrast, a despotic government leaps to view,” for “only passions are needed to establish it, [and] everyone is good enough for that” (ibid.).

President Bush reinforced the faulty premises of his administration’s nation-building strategy in his 2004 State of the Union Address: it is, he declared, “mistaken, and condescending to assume that whole cultures and great religions are incompatible with liberty and self-government. I believe that God has planted in every human heart the desire to live in freedom” (Kesler 2005a, 230). As Kesler responded, “yes, but the question is whether some cultures and religions are less compatible with freedom and democracy than others, and if so, how...[we] ought to adjust our foreign policy”
accordingly (ibid.). Previously, in his 2002 State of the Union Address, Bush similarly stated that “no people on earth yearn to be oppressed,” and thereby equated this desire for liberty with the capacity for liberty (ibid., 228). He did not, as Kesler suggested, explain “that democracy depends on the mutual recognition of rights and duties,” that liberty requires not only a desire not to be oppressed, but also a consensus to not oppress others (ibid.). As Lincoln affirmed, “as I would not be a slave, so I would not be a master. This expresses my idea of democracy. Whatever differs from this, to the extent of the difference, is not democracy” (Lincoln 2001, 427).

Ultimately, as Zakaria pointed out, “the right lesson of Iraq...is not that nation-building must fail, but rather that President Bush’s approach to it” was what led to its failure (Zakaria 2005, 90). President Bush, much like his twentieth century presidential predecessors, embarked on nation-building with lofty ideals, and indeed one can assume his intentions were genuine (as were those of his predecessors); however, Iraq’s capacity for freedom—the array of obstacles to liberty it harbored—was not considered, and an inherently flawed strategy for implementing democracy was subsequently adopted. The result in Iraq was what Beetham referred to as “elections without democracy” (Beetham 2009, 448). And as Kesler affirmed, democracy “is not just a matter of elections,” but also “requires that majorities accept and protect individual rights, observe due process of law, respect free speech and free exercise of religion, protect private property, and observe the obligations of contracts” (Kesler 2005b, 12). Elections are only meaningful if they exist in a culture of liberty. As Tocqueville stated over a century and a half before this, in a liberal society “it is not elected magistrates who make democracy prosper; but it prospers because the magistrate is elective” (Tocqueville 2000, 488).
Soft vs. Hard Power

If democratization by force is the wrong strategy, then does a foreign policy based entirely on persuasion present a better option? Montesquieu insisted on persuasion over the enforced change of laws and customs by the outside power, and Mill, too, suggested that working-class immigrants from the metropole could serve as good, hardworking examples to the locals. Is it possible, therefore, that liberty could be promoted most successfully through a foreign policy strategy based primarily (if not entirely) on the use of “soft power?” Nye, who coined the term, described a country’s “soft power” as resting “primarily on three resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)” (Nye 2008a, 96). As Shuja explained, “in contrast to hard power that rests on coercion and is derived from military and economic might, soft power rests, not on coercion, but on the ability of a nation to co-opt others to follow its will through the attractiveness of its culture, values, ideas and institutions” (Shuja 2008, 52). “When a state can persuade and influence others to aspire to share such values,” Shuja added, “it can lead by example and foster cooperation” (ibid.).

Soft power is viewed by many as a more “humanitarian” form of intervention, one that is more facilitative to “enlightenment values” (Munslow and O’Dempsey 2009, 3). As Shuja argued, “soft power is much more useful and progressive than resorting directly to brute force” (Shuja 2003, 51). Repeta additionally maintained that the US can effectively spread democracy--or at least aspects of it--by simply setting a good example. Repeta argued, for example, that “the world has seen a remarkable development in
democracy promotion--by persuasion rather than force--through the spread of freedom of information laws” (Repeta 2008, 246). “This core democratic value,” he went on, “has set a good example emulated by dozens of countries around the world aspiring to create more open and democratic governments. This is soft power at work” (ibid.).

Some authors have pointed to the Marshall Plan, and other policies of the Cold War era, as examples of the successful use of soft power. “During the Cold War,” Crowell noted, “soft power in its broadest sense was considered a potent weapon against communism and the Soviet Empire” (Crowell 2008, 207). The idea was “that communism would be undermined by means of the gradual influence of Western ideas and culture--‘peaceful evolution’--rather than by violent invasion” (ibid.). “In a more positive incarnation during the Cold War,” Crowell went on, “soft power aimed at rebuilding the devastated societies of Western Europe and Japan”; the US’s “first great foreign aid program, the Marshall Plan, was aimed at rebuilding Western Europe after World War II, in part as a bulwark against soviet expansion” (Crowell 2008, 207; Radelet 2003, 105). Other vehicles of soft power included the Peace Corps, USAID, the Alliance for Progress, and such media outlets as Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, which broadcasted American culture into the Eastern bloc during the Cold War (Radelet 2003, 105; Nye 2008a, 98-9).

Yet the notions of “culture” and “values” are extremely vague. It therefore becomes difficult to delineate these concepts in practice, particularly when speaking in terms of “power.” Supporters of soft power have often cited the collapse of the Soviet Union, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the virtual eradication of the threat of communism as evidence that attests to the formidability of soft power. However, such soft power
tactics were not employed in a vacuum. It must be remembered that the Marshall Plan was enacted directly following a World War; similarly, the US’s Cold War policies did not exclude military actions (such as in the Bay of Pigs), they involved an intensive arms race with the Soviet Union, and they embraced secrecy for government agencies such as the CIA (which directly conflicts with the “core democratic value” of “freedom of information laws”) (Repeta 2008, 246, 258). Pinpointing specific examples of soft power in use thus becomes even more of a challenge. Instances such as these have led many scholars to promote a strategy of soft power combined with hard power, which in practice becomes much more reasonable.

Nye himself developed the term “smart power” in order “to counter the misperception that soft power alone can produce effective foreign policy”; “smart strategies,” he declared, “combine the tools of both hard and soft power” (Nye 2009, 160). In fact, Nye argued, “the United States’ Cold War strategy involved a smart combination of hard and soft power. The U.S. military deterred Soviet aggression, while American ideas undercut communism behind the Iron Curtain” (ibid., 163). This combination strategy has also been supported by such scholars as Fukuyama, who maintained that “both [hard and soft] components of power are ultimately necessary” and “you cannot do without either of them” (Fukuyama 2004b, 31). US Navy Secretary Donald C. Winter embraced this idea of smart power as well: “soft power elements can help avoid war,” he acknowledged, but “soft power missions do not obviate the need for hard power” (McGrath 2008, 3).

It has been argued that the US occupation of Japan indeed represents a combination of hard and soft power. Japan, of course, surrendered unconditionally to the
US in 1945 after the two atomic bombs were dropped, thereby ending the Second World War; subsequently the American occupation authorities enforced drastic changes in Japan, including democratization, demilitarization, and economic reforms. Yet these military actions and forced reforms were accompanied by “softer” methods which served to promote a positive image of the US in the minds of the Japanese. Guthrie-Shimizu offered the example of baseball, which was used by “key [US] officials in the general headquarters...as a tool of pacification and democratization” in Japan (Guthrie-Shimizu 2008, 163). It was thought that baseball would help “reeducate the local population in the ways of self-directed, rule-abiding democratic citizenry” (ibid.). Additionally, spectators of the games received “Coca-Cola, hot dogs, and Hershey’s chocolate bars,” and thus such games “came with the seductive appeal of consumer abundance and material comfort” (ibid.). “If this is not soft power in play,” she asked, “what is?” (ibid.).

Iraq, on the other hand, has been said to represent the US’s overreliance on hard power, with only scattered and lilliputian uses of soft power. “The efficiency of the initial American military invasion of Iraq in 2003 may have created admiration in the eyes of some Iraqis and others,” Nye conceded, “but that soft power was undercut by the subsequent inefficiency of the occupation and the scenes of mistreatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib” (Nye 2008b, xii). Munslow and O’Dempsey similarly criticized the US’s neglect of soft power in Iraq, suggesting that “a more humanitarian soft power approach which addressed the causes of people’s problems would have undercut support for extremists” (Munslow and O’Dempsey 2009, 7).

Both Montesquieu and Mill certainly advocated a combination of hard and soft power. Mill, of course, encouraged foreign rulers to enforce changes within the
dependent country, and even Montesquieu, who championed persuasion over force, contended that “the right of natural defense sometimes carries with it a necessity to attack” (Montesquieu 2009, 138). Mill maintained that “backward” societies did not possess the same rights of nations as did civilized states, and that inhabitants of these societies were not yet ready for liberty (Mill 2006, 257; Mill 2002, 12). According to Mill, foreign rulers could therefore go beyond serving as mere examples, and were in fact expected to actively work to alter the dependent nation in ways which advanced it more quickly toward the end goal of civilization and representative government.

Montesquieu’s emphasis on soft power only came into effect following the initial method of hard power. His insistence on the preservation of local customs and mores was the prescription for colonial rule post-conquest. Conquering liberal nations, such as England, or conquering “good despots,” such as Alexander the Great, were justified in invading a foreign nation with the goal of spreading commerce. Note that Montesquieu encouraged leaving “the vanquished nation its laws” and mores, not leaving the nation absolutely free of outside coercion (Montesquieu 2009, 146, emphasis added). Thus preservation and persuasion played key roles in Montesquieu’s theory of colonization, but force was far from excluded. Rather, the initial invasion by the mother country provided a “foot in the door” effect for the establishment of commerce; after that, it became the colonial people’s job to follow the model of the metropole and alter their general spirit in ways conducive to commerce and liberty. At this point, the mother country could offer guidance but generally had to refrain from enforcing changes within the dependent society.
Montesquieu discouraged forcing a people to change its mores not merely because this was tyrannical, but also because this strategy proved ineffective in most cases. One may ask a promoter of the soft power strategy why American culture and values have managed to successfully allure some societies and not others. Nye would answer that there are simply some “areas and groups that are repelled rather than attracted by American culture, values, and policies” (Nye 2008b, x). He offered extremist Muslim cultures as an example, whose resistance to American values has been reinforced by opposing systems that offer their own brand of soft power; Osama bin Laden, he pointed out, employed “impressive soft power among” his followers (ibid.). Additionally, Nye admitted, “there are some situations in which soft power provides very little leverage”; “it is difficult, for example, to see how soft power would solve the current dispute over North Korea’s nuclear weapons” (ibid., xiv).

As Crowell suggested, among “the dangers of the ‘soft power’ concept is that it is rather nebulous” and certain methods “are not always interchangeable” (Crowell 2008, 219). Thus, while baseball and Coca-Cola may have helped bridge the “cultural gap” between the Americans and the Japanese, these forms of soft power may have proven useless in occupied Iraq (ibid., 212). Montesquieu would therefore likely instruct liberal modern-day nation-builders to adjust their balance of hard and soft power tactics according to the local particularities of the invaded nation. He would approve of using hard power to usher in commerce abroad, and of the continued use of despotic methods of rule until the colonial population appeared ready to transform its general spirit; then (and only then) would he suggest that soft power techniques ought to take over as the
primary means for enticing the local inhabitants to embrace liberty and further their commerce.

Thus it seems that purely soft power measures will be ineffective at promoting liberty. This is so, Montesquieu would say, because although “it seems that human nature would rise up incessantly against despotic government” of its own accord, such occurrences are, in Millian terms, but “rare and transitory accident[s]” (Montesquieu 2009, 63; Mill 1991, 346). It is therefore instructive to examine nation-building cases where “smart power”—that is, an informed combination of hard and soft powers—was used, such as the US’s occupation of Japan. Just as democratization by force may contain lofty ideals that prove unfeasible in practice, a strategy of soft power alone—what Axe described as “resolving conflicts with good deeds”—is likely another good-intended though naive and unrealistic goal.

National Identity: The Overlooked Obstacle

As previously mentioned, though Montesquieu and Mill each recognized their own set of obstacles to liberty, both seemed to have missed the impediment posed by the lack of a national identity. Among the primary preconditions for democracy, Beetham stressed, “is a minimum level of agreement on nationhood, and on the relationship between the different communities that make it up” (Beetham 2009, 448). “There should be,” he went on, “agreement on who constitutes ‘the people’ whose will is to be realized through the electoral and legislative process” (ibid.). Popular elections necessitate a certain level of trust among fellow citizens in a nation; there must be present, therefore, some overarching connection which allows countrymen to trust their own interests to the democratic process. “As a political model,” Keitner noted, “the nation-state is assumed to
possess a high degree of internal homogeneity and coherence”—that is, “the kind of internal policies needed to forge a strong sense of national unity and identity” (Keitner 2007, 18). This requires that a person think of himself not only as a “Sunni” or “Shiite,” for example, but also as a “citizen”—i.e., as an “Iraqi.”

Tocqueville, recognizing this, praised the American system which combatted adverse individualism with free institutions. “The free institutions that the inhabitants of the United States possess and the political rights of which they make so much use recall to each citizen constantly and in a thousand ways that he lives in society”; “thus politics generalizes the taste and habit of association,” and this in turn fosters trust (Tocqueville 2000, 488, 496). This can be compared to the transformation commerce will have on mores, as was envisioned by Montesquieu. Commerce fosters communication, tolerance, mutual dependency, and peace; similarly, when citizens have a vested interest in their government, and in their local government in particular, they develop the habit of association. In this way, while Montesquieu may have assumed the presence of a “general spirit,” thereby overlooking the potential hurdles of distrust and dissociation for establishing liberty in a nation, we can imagine that his solution would have been akin to his solution to the problem of international insecurity.

Putnam termed this interpersonal trust “social capital” (Putnam 2004, 14). “Social capital,” he explained, “refers to social networks and the associated norms of reciprocity”; in short, “social networks have value” (ibid.). However, Putnam emphasized that, while “social networks can be a powerful asset, both for individuals and communities,” it must be remembered that “social capital is not a substitute for effective public policy, but rather a prerequisite for it and, in part, a consequence of it” (ibid., 15).
Thus, liberty requires not only the administrative aspects of democracy, such as elections and an independent judiciary, but also “a willingness to trust one’s fellow citizens”; it “requires that majorities restrain themselves and practice sometimes disagreeable tasks out of respect for law and for their fellow citizens” (Kesler 2005b, 12).

This kind of trust, Kesler warned, “comes very hard to tribal societies who are not used to trusting anyone who is not at least a cousin of some sort” (ibid.). “This is a hard thing to say,” Kesler admitted, “but it is true” (ibid.). “How,” he asked, “do you persuade people who are used to trusting only members of their extended families or clans to trust strangers who, in an electoral process in a democratic system, will be voting for laws that will affect their interests? How do you get them to trust people who are not related to them or not known to them in some intimate and familiar way? How do you introduce them to the idea of being fellow citizens?” (ibid.).

Mill, of course, would have insisted that expert foreign rulers must guide these people toward this understanding, and change their laws in the process. But if this is, in effect, “democratization by force,” which Beetham deemed inevitably doomed to fail, Mill’s solution becomes unsatisfactory. Therefore, if we accept Beetham’s estimation, the answer we can infer from Montesquieu seems more convincing. Persuasion via an appeal to human nature--“self-interest well understood,” in Tocquevillian terms--with the aid of social capital reinforcements, may provide the building blocks for a unified “general spirit” (Tocqueville 2000, 500). However, as “it has taken Turkey a century to achieve the parliamentary democracy it now has,” it is conceivable that Iraq will require a similar amount of time, or possibly more, to go from a heterogeneous and undemocratic state to a nation fully “capable” of enjoying and maintaining its natural right to liberty. We should
therefore “not expect that [the Iraqis] will transform themselves--much less that we shall transform them—all at once” into “a government of, by, and for the Iraqi people” (Kesler 2005a, 232).

It is thus important not to underestimate the significant determents to liberty which religious and ethnic divides can create. Nation-building leaders, who have the intention of dual liberty-promotion, would therefore likely have been more cautious of embarking on such a process in a state as disunited as Iraq. While Montesquieu and Mill did not include the lack of national identity among their listed obstacles to liberty, it remains a fundamental requirement for self-government to function. Yet the lack of national identity, as with all other obstacles, does not spell the final death toll for liberty in that society; it is a hurdle which can be surmounted. To invert Lincoln’s famous phrase, when a “government of the people, by the people, for the people” does come together, this produces “a new birth of freedom”; thus, with the formation of a national identity, the possibilities for liberal nation-building open anew (Lincoln 2001, 734).

Promoting Liberty

Promoting liberty in both nations through the process of nation-building therefore requires proper goals and strategies to be set by the nation doing the building, as well as a nation-to-be-built that either possesses the capacity for liberty, or, at very least, the willingness to cultivate their own capacity. When leaders from liberal nations embark on nation-building--with the knowledge that greater liberty for both nation can be the end result, but that enforced democratization cannot be the primary goal--more realistic goals will motivate their actions.
As Montesquieu would instruct, nation-building with the primary goal of spreading commerce can effectively unite men through mutual interests and mutual calls upon common aspects of human nature. This idea has been supported by other prominent liberal peace theorists as well. As Pangle and Ahrensdorf pointed out, “Kant’s thought here is strikingly reminiscent of Montesquieu” (Pangle and Ahrensdorf 1999, 205). “It is the spirit of trade,” Kant wrote, “which cannot coexist with war, which will, sooner or later, take hold of every people. Since, among all the powers (means) subordinate to state authority, the power of money is likely the most reliable, states find themselves forced (admittedly not by motivations of morality) to promote a noble peace” (Kant 2006, 92). “In this way,” Kant concluded, “nature guarantees perpetual peace through the mechanisms of human inclinations itself” (ibid.). However, as Montesquieu would forewarn, certain environments—that is, not merely physical environments, but even more so the mores which dominate—are less conducive to commerce, and therefore liberty, than others, despite the universal inclination for commerce and universal right to liberty.

With this knowledge, leaders of liberal nations will be more apt to appeal to their own public with the honest and real goal of liberty-promotion as reason for embarking on nation-building endeavors. Implanting democracy as a primary goal is not only a doomed strategy, but it also comes off as insincere and illegitimate. Similarly, threat inflation will not be necessary. I believe the American public would respond positively to a goal of dual liberty-promotion much more than they would to such vague, ephemeral concepts as “America’s supposed duty...to help the Iraqis and others realize their democratic entitlements and destiny,” or to false or exaggerated security threats (Kesler 2005a, 224). The citizens of the United States do not need to be “tricked” into supporting foreign
policy tactics if these endeavors do in fact have their own best interest--and simultaneously the interest of those oppressed abroad--as an attainable goal.

As Kesler predicted, “it may take many years, if ever, before Iraq is capable of a fully-functioning liberal democracy” (ibid., 232). “In the meantime,” however, what the Iraqi people, and other societies in need of conditions that support liberty, can do is work “to adopt what arrangements they can to create strong executive powers; security forces able to protect their countrymen’s life, liberty, and property; a free, prosperous economy; local experience in managing local affairs; and impartial courts” (ibid.). What liberal states, like the US, can do for them is approach them with a universally appealing goal--one, such as commerce, which has immediate interest to all involved--and thus persuade them to alter their mores in ways which work to topple the obstacles of liberty and erect, in their place, bastions of individual rights.

US nation-building in Japan provided an example of nation-building that was conducted in a society composed of people who had a foundation of and a capacity for liberty--and it proved successful. The Meiji period established some democratic elements in the Japanese society prior to occupation, such as the Constitution, the Diet, and limited voting rights. The Japanese were also a highly unified people and had a strong sense of national identity. Japan was a “highly developed [civilization] and had a high standard of living and widespread literacy beforehand” (Kesler 2005b, 10). In addition to this, Kesler pointed out, “the U.S. was reorganizing [Japan] at the very time the Cold War was beginning, so [the Japanese people] had to choose a destiny for themselves--whether to go with the West and democratic institutions or with the East and totalitarian communist regimes” (ibid.). Thus, the Japanese people played an active role in developing their
mores and in cultivating their capacity for liberty (before, during, and after US occupation). Of course, achieving all this is no small task; in fact, Kesler argued that these qualities are what made the case of Japan the exception “that prove[s] the rule that it is very difficult to pull off this kind of transformation” (ibid.).

Nation-building thus offers the promotion of liberty as its potential end result, yet the process itself demands that current levels of liberty be put at stake. It must not be forgotten that modern nation-building, even if pursued via commerce, involves military action; it relies on the legitimate use (in Montesquieu and Mill’s view) of offensive force, and this, of course, carries with it substantial risk. Is the reward worth the risk? Is the alternative, however, an even greater risk? As Montesquieu warned, “servitude always begins with drowsiness” (Montesquieu 2009, 243).

Many Americans today call for peace above all else, decry nation-building as imperialistic, and stridently demand “no blood for oil,” and most who do so consider themselves advocates of liberty. Yet how many Americans--how many sons and daughters of Patrick Henry, as it were--would renounce his famous declaration, “give me liberty, or give me death?” (Hample 1977, 298). As Lincoln proclaimed, we live in “a free Government, where every man has a right to be equal with every other man,” and “in this great struggle, this form of Government and every form of human right is endangered if our enemies succeed”; thus “the nation is worth fighting for, to secure such an inestimable jewel” as liberty (Lincoln 2001, 755, 757). “Our defense,” Lincoln maintained, “is in the preservation of the spirit which prizes liberty”; “destroy that spirit, and you have planted the seeds of despotism around your own doors” (ibid., 473). The American “general spirit” is one that has loved its liberty “prodigiously” since the
nation’s birth; when considering future nation-building missions, the US will therefore have to decide the amount of liberty it is willing to risk for the potential prize of greater liberty. Approaching nation-building with a sense of what constitute legitimate goals and proper strategies is merely a first, though necessary, step.
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