The dynamics of nonviolence in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict

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THE DYNAMICS OF NONVIOLENCE IN THE
PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT

by

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A thesis draft submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the

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The Dynamics of Nonviolence in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict

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ABSTRACT

The Dynamics of Nonviolence in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict

by

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The Palestinian/Israeli conflict is one of the most challenging political puzzles of the modern era. Although this is a bold assertion, the influence of this one conflict on the politics of the Middle Eastern region and on the politics of the new millennium is overwhelming. Hence, figuring out how to solve the puzzle, or more realistically, contributing to movements towards a resolution is paramount. This thesis seeks to assist in the scholarship dedicated to achieving this end. It does so from a unique perspective.

The thesis contends through a normative argument that a shift in Palestinian strategy, from violence to nonviolence, will facilitate necessary steps towards a resolution of the conflict. To establish this, it argues that the Palestinian and Israeli strategies of the conflict have been mostly violent since before 1948. The results of this type of strategy are manifested by the state of the conflict today. However, a shift to nonviolent action will likely bring more positive results.

Importantly, the thesis discusses what solutions and obstacles exist that enable a shift to nonviolent resistance. The principles of nonviolent discipline and human suffering
that are integral to theories of nonviolent action may be the key factors in a successful campaign. However, the culture of violence between the two sides, the historical experience of the Palestinians, and certain cultural values may hinder a shift in strategy. As well, several recent factors, including the Iraq War, the War on Terror, and the death of Yassir Arafat, may provide unforeseen opportunities for an effective nonviolent campaign. Importantly, this thesis does not spell out the specifics of how this strategy should take shape. It highlights important factors that can facilitate a Palestinian shift towards a nonviolent strategy.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Almost 12 years ago the world seemed poised to welcome a new era of peace in the Middle East. The sight of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin and Palestinian leader Yassir Arafat shaking hands sparked hopes of genuine lasting peace between the two peoples. Unfortunately, the intervening decade has not fulfilled those hopes. Currently, the conflict has moved from the continual unrest of the second Intifada into a ceasefire stage. Yet despite Israel’s pull out from Gaza and Abbas’s more moderate stance, a solution will probably not come as soon as many expect. Some mistakenly think the change of Palestinian leadership will accelerate the peace process. But Sharon’s position is well known, and Abbas is untried. A closer look at strategy may be more effective in determining progress towards peace. In many ways, it seems that the two sides are much further from peace than when Rabin and Arafat shook hands over a decade ago. If a solution is to be obtained, then something must change.

The option for change that this thesis proposes is a shift in strategy, from violence to nonviolence. Nonviolent action, based on historical experiences, is particularly suited to the Palestinian position in this conflict. For the past 30 years or more, Israelis and Palestinians have engaged in violent and nonviolent action against each other. Although nonviolent tactics have been ever-present, they have always taken a backseat to violence.
While violent action has achieved some success, it has also led to greater feelings of mistrust, ill-will, and intransigence on both sides. Importantly, several goals of either side have not been obtained. This inability to lead to an acceptable solution for either side supports the call for strategy modification.

The question that must be answered is, “What is required for the Palestinians to introduce more nonviolence into their strategy?” The thesis will examine this question through a normative process by focusing on some important principles of nonviolence and particularly how they can be applied in the context of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. As well, it is important to analyze what challenges and obstacles exist for shifting to a nonviolent strategy. The discussion will generate general theoretical suggestions more than specific methods or practices that will lead to an effective nonviolent movement. Also, some recently introduced variables strengthen the possibility of successful nonviolent action. Specifically, the death of Yasir Arafat, the aftermath of the War in Iraq, and the continuing War on Terror provide thought-provoking possibilities.

But for many international relations scholars, this suggestion of nonviolent action in the Palestinian/Israeli conflict may seem naïve or shortsighted. Particularly the principle of maintaining nonviolent discipline throughout the campaign may be unrealistic, especially when looking at historical experience. Most nonviolent movements had some group that engaged in violent struggle. Besides, some scholars argue that the first Intifada was the Palestinian attempt at a nonviolent strategy and it was not successful. But, despite the fact that the overall Palestinian strategy of the first Intifada was systematically committed to unarmed resistance, it does not conform to all the principles
of nonviolent action. Hence the thesis will suggest some possibilities for engaging in more effective nonviolent struggle.

The Lack of Goal Attainment

The strongest evidence that a change in strategy is required is the fact that the ultimate goals for either side are unfulfilled. Israel does not enjoy acceptable national security or widespread recognition within the Middle East. The Palestinians do not fully function as a viable nation-state. These are somewhat oversimplified aims of notably diverse parties within each society; nevertheless these do appear to be the overall goals. And without the attainment of ultimate goals the conflict between the Palestinians and Israelis could continue indefinitely. Therefore, any strategy that has not achieved these critical goals is faulty.

It follows that the inability of a predominately violent strategy to secure these aims demands a change. Besides countless plans have been proposed, including those from every president of the United States since Harry Truman, and a solution to the conflict has not been reached. It is unknown what results would have come if nonviolent action would have been the dominant strategy of the conflict. Nonviolence, while used at various times as a method of political action, has not been the main strategy. If adopted, it could move the conflict towards a lasting solution.

The general consensus of academics that study the region and particularly the Israeli/Palestinian conflict is that a lasting solution will be one that is viewed as equitable by both sides. Most in academia recognize that a viable solution requires concessions from each side. Thus any real solution to this conflict will contain conditions that are not
fully within the expectations of either side, but close enough to prevent further holding out for a “better deal.” But capturing the essence of this idea in a concrete negotiated settlement has proven elusive. However, nonviolent action has the potential to supply the necessary conditions for a more equitable solution.

The Oslo accords were seen by most to aim at this end. Israel and the PLO agreed to put the most contentious issues aside, and through negotiation, work through stages of self-determination. Each side had a different perception as to how this process was going to progress and what the ultimate end was, but both camps knew this was the case from the very beginning. Yet Oslo did not bring about an acceptable solution to the conflict. It could be argued the second Intifada is in large measure a result of the failure of Oslo’s negotiation strategy (i.e., putting off the final status issues until the end). Israel and the Palestinians returned to a more dominantly violent strategy which has not yielded the desired results either. Hence, this thesis contends that a more dominantly nonviolent strategy is not only advantageous, but one of the few options left.

Each camp would point the finger at the other when asked who should initiate such change. This attitude has plagued the conflict from its inception. While this thesis contends that a decrease in violent action on the part of both sides will contribute to a peaceful solution, it focuses mainly on the challenges and possible solutions for the Palestinians to engage in nonviolent action. Historically, those groups that engage in nonviolent campaigns have been among the oppressed or suppressed participants of their society. Well known examples include India, South Africa, and the United States Civil Rights movement. But the need for action does not depend entirely on the Palestinians.
In order to facilitate success, elements within Israel that are supportive of nonviolence and the Palestinian cause must be mobilized. But the expectation that Israel (or its government) should engage in nonviolence has no precedent. That is not to say that Israel has no responsibility to instigate nonviolent methods. Both sides are as much to blame for the cycle of violence and both should examine how to adopt more nonviolence. Yet nonviolent struggle is most often a political tool of the underrepresented, the oppressed, and the repressed, so the main burden lies with the Palestinians to adopt a nonviolent strategy.

Yet some think that violent action is the only way to reach a truly equitable solution. But a resumption of violence through guerilla warfare, suicide bombings, and the like will bring more of the same—lack of success (obtaining ultimate goals). Currently, the Palestinians are tremendously outnumbered militarily, not to mention the Palestinian Authority’s security forces have been severely weakened in the recent Intifada. Besides, a resumption of armed struggle would strain or break some important international relationships to the Palestinians and further entrench Israel and the United States in their positions. The potential for loss of life on both sides is tremendous. For Israel, the resumption of violence has and will continue to bring greater resentment from the Arab world, and assuredly a decrease in their security.

Some skeptics might argue that a different strategy is irrelevant because the two sides are currently engaged in a ceasefire and negotiations. But this return to negotiations is reminiscent of previous attempts and is problematic for the Palestinians. First, Israel holds the dominant position as a negotiating partner. Without an equal relationship, it is almost certain that an unacceptable agreement will result. Despite any agreement by their
leaders, the Palestinians generally have shown that an inequitable solution will eventually be resisted. As well, Abbas does not have nearly the broad support that Arafat had going into the Oslo Accords. Second, the process has been susceptible to quick derailment. The unrealistic expectations of both sides lead to quick defaults on promises which justify intransigence on either side. Third, not much has changed in the policies or positions of the two parties. Only one side has experienced a major change in leaders. Fourth, the current form of negotiation has proven its ability to extend (not resolve) the process of finding an acceptable solution.

But for many in Israel, the above points appear to be desirable. Elongating the process of negotiation (and in effect maintaining control of the Palestinian territories) has benefited many in Israel who are connected with the Palestinian economy and those who support retaining the territories. And it or any nation in a similar position, would not voluntarily give up negotiation advantages. Realistically, there would have to be some benefit or incentive to induce the Israeli government to do so.

Nonviolent action is one method with the potential to persuade Israel to change its practices. Chapter 3 will go into greater detail on how that can be accomplished theoretically. Chapter 4 will propose how it can be accomplished in practice. Thus a shift to a more nonviolent strategy could be the logical choice of where to proceed when the current negotiations break down. As mentioned previously, some important recent events may provide a unique opportunity for the success of a Palestinian nonviolent campaign.
Justification of the Research

While some scholars, including Dajani and Awad, have previously discussed the possibilities of nonviolent resistance, they did not go far enough in examining the theory behind nonviolence and its application in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. Also, the first Intifada has been widely supported as the Palestinian experiment with nonviolence. Although it is apparent that the Palestinians were committed to not use lethal weapons, a more extensive dedication to nonviolence (e.g. not throwing stones) may facilitate progress towards the Palestinian’s desired goals. As well, the current state of violent exchanges and the lack of goal attainment compel one to examine possibilities for strategy changes. Finally, some recent factors may introduce potentially catalytic possibilities into the dynamics of the Middle East. Specifically, the United States’ desire to overcome the difficulty they are currently experiencing in establishing a stable Iraq could motivate the administration to make concessions (in the form of pressure on Israel) in resolving the Palestinian/Israeli conflict. As well, the death of Yassir Arafat and the election of new leadership open the door for new ideas and new strategies.

Road Map of the Thesis

Chapter two covers the literature surrounding the general theories of nonviolence. As well, the literature on the Israeli/Palestinian conflict and the possibilities of nonviolence in the region are discussed. Chapter three lays out the conceptualization and theory of the thesis. It touches on the realist/idealist debate within the field of international relations, and examines certain theories of violence and nonviolence. In particular, it argues that violence is a socially learned expression more than a biologically inherited characteristic.
Also, the chapter discusses the underlying assumptions of the theories of nonviolence and specific principles that correlate with those assumptions.

Chapter four explains the history of the conflict and the viewpoints unique to both sides. It then analyzes the Palestinian and Israeli strategies just prior to 1948 through the present, and their results. It becomes apparent that violence as the main strategy has secured some successes but has not accomplished the ultimate goals of either side. The discussion turns to how nonviolent action has been employed and what lessons can be learned in formulating a renewed nonviolent strategy.

Chapter five examines what solutions and obstacles may exist to an adoption of more nonviolent action by the Palestinians. This chapter explains how certain principles of nonviolence can be effectively used to alter the status of the conflict. A particularly important obstacle is the PLO’s early emphasis on armed struggle and the idea is attached to Palestinian national identity. As well, years of constant conflict and growing up within an environment of contention will be hard to overcome. Also, the presence of certain variables including the new Palestinian leadership, the situation in Iraq, and the continuing War on Terror have the possibility of enhancing the effectiveness of a nonviolent campaign by the Palestinians.
CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Over 15 years ago Gene Sharp stated in the *Journal of Palestine Studies* that a new strategy was needed in the Palestinian/Israeli conflict. From his perspective, the potential for escalating violence in the first *Intifada* was increasing and required quick action from Palestinian leaders if they wanted to harness the success of the resistance. He suggested channeling the energy of the movement towards a complete nonviolent campaign (1989, 9-10). It is interesting that Sharp, for whatever reason, felt that the *Intifada* was not fully nonviolent. This is especially notable when so many scholars of the region refer to it as the Palestinian experiment with nonviolent resistance. Still, Sharp perceived that the level of Palestinian frustration and international attention needed to be harnessed and projected through nonviolent action.

The same argument can be advanced today. Despite intervening agreements and public recognition on both the Israeli and Palestinian sides that each other exists, an equitable settlement has not been reached. The Oslo Accords did not accomplish the aims that each side expected. Most agreements do not accomplish this. But what is remarkable is that the Palestinians and Israelis are further from a solution than when the first *Intifada* began. Many Middle Eastern scholars, regardless of bias, agree that something needs to change. In fact, many specifically take issue with the strategies currently employed by
both sides. It is in this context that Sharp’s assessment seems even more applicable, and a sampling of the literature on the above points while help to strengthen the argument.

Nonviolence in the Israeli/Palestinian Conflict

Mubarak Awad was one of the first authors to examine the possibility of nonviolent methods taking hold in the Palestinian territories. He advocated a shift in strategy from violence to nonviolence in order to resist the Israeli Occupation. Awad briefly outlines why violent struggle will not work in combating the occupation, but emphasizes that this applies to Palestinians on the “inside” and does not preclude the “outside” (i.e. the PLO in Tunis) from using violence to resist Israel. Awad highlights specific “points of contact,” or issues that would be most advantageous in a nonviolent campaign, and the methods available for such a campaign (1984, 26-27). For example, Awad specifies 15 different ways of refusing to cooperate with the Israeli Occupation including not carrying identification cards, communicating in Hebrew, and paying taxes or fines (1984, 30). He also suggests obstructing various manifestations of Israeli control by setting up roadblocks and interrupting settlement communications (1984, 28). As well, Awad emphasizes the need to be creative in organizing demonstrations and establishing a clear purpose and audience for which they are carried out (1984, 27-28). Throughout his recommendations, Awad implies that the use of nonviolence does not require a lifestyle commitment. He also asserts that Palestinians can successfully conduct nonviolent resistance.

R. Scott Kennedy (1984) examines the Druze of the Golan Heights and their refusal to take Israeli ID cards. His in-depth study revealed a sustained campaign by the Druze
to maintain their autonomy and their right to interact with Syria. Essentially, Israel increased pressure through new directives making it illegal not to have an ID card. As Israel attempted to offer ID cards to the Druze, most likely to facilitate the annexation of the Golan Heights, the Druze engaged in nonviolent action. In one instance, when some community leaders were arrested for not having the ID cards, thousands of Golani Druze presented themselves for confinement the next day. The Israelis decided to release their leaders because they were unable to arrest the number of protestors. Kennedy concludes that Israel is susceptible to nonviolent struggle.

During and shortly after the first Intifada, multiple articles and books were published on the success of the Palestinian campaign and its nonviolent characteristics. Crow, Grant, and Ibrahim published a collection of articles from a conference on the use of nonviolence in the Middle East, and particularly in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. In the book, Ibrahim, Kishtainy, and Bennett focus on historical examples and the acceptance of nonviolence within the region. Ibrahim in particular concentrates on independence movements and negotiations that transpired in a nonviolent manner. Satha-Anand analyzes Quranic references to discuss the connection between Islam and nonviolent action. Phillip Grant seeks to uncover nonviolent tendencies within the Palestinian resistance movement, particularly the first Intifada. Crow’s and Grant’s articles focus on the obstacles to adopting more nonviolent methods and possible solutions. Grant sees major challenges from the perception that nonviolence does not lead to success, the negative effect of historical experience, and the lack of unified leadership (1990, 69-71). Crow also identifies the perceived success of violence as an obstacle (1990, 77). Many
of Crow’s and Grant’s solutions hinge on the understanding and education of nonviolent struggle.

Yet many of these authors seemed hampered in their ability to demonstrate strong evidence for a nonviolent movement taking hold in the region, and the Israeli/Palestinian conflict in particular. The authors analyzed multi-faceted incidents in which they emphasized the nonviolent components and seemed to downplay or avoid mentioning the violent aspects of the movements. Brad Bennett examined eight different examples of groups who used nonviolent methods in their resistance to the government. The common thread amongst these groups seemed to be that each had conducted violent campaigns of one kind or another at some point in their history. However, his examples included the beginning of the 1936-39 Palestinian Revolt and the Iranian Revolution, two incidents that are generally accepted as violent and aggressive in nature. Further, Saad Ibrahim stated that the widespread use of nonviolent struggle was still in the seed-planting stage (1990, 8). Grant admitted that methods, more than a movement, were at work in the first Intifada, and that “[a]lmost all Palestinians, if asked, would have repeated the PLO party line that only through armed struggle could all of Palestine be liberated” (61-62).

Some scholars have continued to identify the first Intifada as an example of nonviolence. Ibrahim notes that the first Intifada functioned “to a considerable degree on nonviolent means” (1990, 7). Stephen Zunes stated that the Palestinian strategy shifted “towards largely nonviolent methods during the intifada” (1999, 47). He also emphasizes the Palestinians’ extensive use of nonviolent methods and minimizes the rock throwing and collaborator killings. He also mentions the declared intention of the PLO to renounce violence and conduct a nonviolent struggle against Israel (1999, 47). Yet,
Zunes does not address the reality of the time period in which Israel and the Palestinians were engaged in a game of political word play. The Israelis refused to call their military presence “occupation,” and the PLO continued to praise the “freedom fighters” who were terrorizing Israeli society. Israelis would not acknowledge a “Palestinian” people, and for Palestinians Israel was still the “Zionist entity.” In hindsight, the leaderships of both sides were well on their way to overcoming these public barriers, but the general population was not. Zunes overlooks this important dynamic in the 1988 PLO declaration of nonviolence.

Souad J. Dajani (1994, 1999) also views the first Intifada as a Palestinian nonviolent experiment. She asserts that it brought positive and negative pressures to bear on the Palestinian movement’s goal towards statehood. Specifically, the Palestinian situation was internationally recognized, the people strengthened alternative institutions, and the population became acquainted with nonviolent methods (1999, 56 and 59). Negatively, as the Intifada persisted Palestinian society became more fractionalized. Also, an increasing number of resisters were resorting to violent methods (1999, 56). Dajani believes that the lack of education or understanding of nonviolent struggle was a major factor in the breakdown of the Palestinian movement. As well, the Palestinians allowed the Israeli army to dictate the issues and terms of the struggle instead of defining them through action. A combination of these factors led to the breakdown of Palestinian solidarity and the resistance fractionalized (1999, 63-64).

In some ways, Dajani seems to undermine her position that the movement was nonviolent. She says: “the Intifada was consciously and deliberately envisioned as an organized and universal unarmed civilian struggle against the Israeli occupation” (1999,
58). But what something is envisioned to be and what it actually is are often different. As well, Dajani seems to imply that ‘unarmed’ is synonymous with ‘nonviolent,’ which is not necessarily the case. As with most scholars who assert that the first Intifada was nonviolent, Dajani briefly mentions some stone throwing and occasional killings, but does not address the perception of violence that accompanied the resistance.

Dajani noted some nonviolent shortcomings of the first Intifada. She criticizes the Palestinian leadership for not coordinating and communicating more effectively with sympathetic groups inside Israel that could have increased disunity in Israeli society and lessened support for the Occupation (1999, 61). As well, she contends that the increased violence by some Palestinians undermined international and Israeli public perception of an unarmed people against a sophisticated army. Violence also strengthened the military’s resolve and unity to control the uprising (1999, 62-63).

It seems that the first Intifada generated excitement among scholars for the increased use of nonviolence and possibly a focused nonviolent campaign. And in fact, the use of nonviolent methods was more widespread in the Palestinian territories than ever before. However, most academics fail to adequately address how the Intifada was portrayed in the media and perceived in the United States. There is a tendency to underestimate the amount of violent action that occurred in order to emphasize the nonviolent nature of the uprising. Several authors including Stephen Zunes and Souad Dajani maintain that the Intifada was nonviolent. Some scholars were able to identify important obstacles to accepting a more nonviolent strategy, and these will be addressed in greater detail in chapter 4.
The Status of Oslo

Arguably, the potential power reservoir of the first Intifada was momentarily funneled away with the signing of the Declaration of Principles between Israel and the PLO. The Oslo process seemed to satisfy both Palestinian frustration and international outcry. Yet a resolution of the conflict, which the Oslo process was thought to lead to, has not happened. This is due in part to the renewed violence on both sides. The failure of Oslo has precipitated a large amount of writing and research on where and how it went awry.

Rothstein, Ma’oz, and Shikaki bring together authors from various backgrounds that seem to agree on one thing, the Oslo Accords did not succeed. Another repeated idea is the need to shift to a new strategy. Shikaki and Zayyad conclude that continued violence has not secured a lasting resolution, but what is required is a political solution (2000, 46; 2000, 154 respectively). Rothstein and Miller argue through different methods that a strategy shift is necessary to change the current conditions (2000,14; 2000, 36 respectively). Zayyad and Rothstein both assert that many Israeli and Palestinian groups realize their current strategies are not working (2000, 14; 2000, 154 respectively). Yezid Sayigh has expressed considerable doubt about Oslo’s ability to obtain what Palestinians thought were their goals. Edward Said continually advocated a different road than Oslo. Hence, it is plausible to conclude that scholars are looking for a new strategy in the Palestinian/Israeli conflict.

Specifically, Rothstein focuses on the negotiation process, and what may be required to move towards positive gains again. A significant portion of his analysis focuses on the importance of leadership and the challenges that the Israeli/Palestinian conflict poses to
the leaders of each side. He also identifies inherent instabilities under the current interim agreement. Although Rothstein concludes that Oslo has failed, he mentions the positive point that at least the two sides now recognize they can sit down and negotiate (2000, 20).

Rothstein proposes several guides to future negotiations including: seven rules of conduct, and six precepts to facilitate success. His rules reflect pluralist principles: both sides agree to solve the problems through negotiations, the stronger side must be willing to give in the short term to gain in the long run, and leaders seek to support each other rather than forcing the other’s hand (2002, 17-18). Rothstein’s precepts deal with attitudes and priorities that are necessary for both sides. First, not everyone is in the extremist camp. Second, be sincere in seeking for peace. Third, leaders must be upfront with their supporters. Fourth, any agreement must be viewed by both sides as equitable. Fifth, recognize that making peace is much more valuable than the alternative. Sixth, have the long term consequences in mind (2002, 20-22).

Abraham Diskin focuses on Israeli voting behavior. He uses various surveys to illustrate the depth of the security issues and their influence on how citizens vote. Essentially, a considerable percentage of respondents ranked security issues as more important than the Jewish nature of the state or the establishment of peace. This could be due in part to the interconnection of security with the other issues. Pundak, besides articulating the shortcomings of both sides, focuses on the influence of leadership. Ma’oz levels similar criticisms of both the Palestinian and Israeli camps.

What surfaces in these criticisms of the Oslo process is the desire for a new strategy and a return to the peace process. Most of the authors declare their desire to see an end to the cycle of violence. If both sides have come to realize what Zayyad points out—
namely “that this conflict would not be solved by war and it [is] not going to be solved by terrorism and violence”—then a new strategy is the logical next step (Rothstein 2002, 154). It is apparent that some groups from the Palestinian and Israeli side do not agree with this view. But nonviolent action can break the cycle of violence (at least on one side), and conceivably move the parties back to the negotiating table.

Strategy

In terms of strategy, various authors have attempted to articulate the main focus of each sides’ method of reaching their ultimate goals. More seems to have been written on the Palestinian perspective. Barry Rubin and Yezid Sayigh are two authors that surface most often. Sayigh asserts that the Palestinian strategy of violence, that took its most independent shape after the war in 1967, was initially attached to Palestinian assertion of national identity. Specifically, he writes that at first, the guerilla raids and insurgent attacks against Israel were not so much aimed at toppling the Jewish state, but demonstrating to the Palestinian population (both local and in diaspora), as well as the Israelis and the international community, that Palestinian nationalist aspirations were concrete (1997, 27). Sayigh also contends that violent struggle united different factions and facilitated the formation of the Palestinian nation. This in turn opened the way for the state building institutions of the PLO. Interestingly, Sayigh notes that the emphasis on violent action within national identity allowed the PLO, as an entity in exile, to effectively control the leadership on the “inside” (1997, 33-34).

Sayigh also notes how the Palestinian goal began to change from the assertion of national identity to the establishment of a Palestinian state. Essentially, the movement
shifted its actions towards an audience that included the Israelis, the international community, and the United States, as opposed to mostly Palestinians and Arab nations. In order to enable this transformation, the PLO had to expand its strategy to include reaching out to international actors and influencing Palestinian inclusion in negotiations (1997, 30-31). The methods that the PLO used to induce this attention encompassed both violent and nonviolent action. For example, Yassir Arafat addressed the United Nations General Assembly in 1974, while guerilla groups conducted raids to disrupt Israeli negotiations with other Arab nations.

Importantly, Sayigh asserts that the first Intifada was more an evolution of Palestinian strategy because those who led the uprising were themselves the products of the previous years of armed struggle (1997, 32). The first Intifada seemed to be part of the audience shift discussed earlier. The Palestinians engaged in mass action to communicate to Israelis and the world that they would not be content with Israeli governance. The uprising also reflected one strategy of those on the “inside” that Sayigh terms sumoud, or steadfastness. Instead of easily detectible military exercises, those on the inside demonstrated their resistance to the Israeli occupation by their ability to remain on their land and conduct demonstrations (1997, 32).

In his investigation of violence in the context of the Palestinian/Israeli conflict, Ian Lustick confirms Sayigh’s analysis of the Palestinian strategy. Specifically, Lustick differentiates between violent action that is meant to affect the opponent population (other-directed) and violence that is intended to influence one’s own population (solipsistic). Like Sayigh, he contends that the main audience of Palestinian armed struggle leading up to and just after the 1967 war was the Palestinians. He also
demonstrates how that strategy changed, not from violence to nonviolence, but from focusing on their own populace to the Israeli and international audience.

Generally, Lustick explains that the Palestinian and Israeli use of violence was fairly similar. Both deliberately targeted their own population (solipsistic) in order to induce increased support. Also, the Israeli and Palestinian intent of violent action shifted from solipsistic to other-directed over the course of the conflict. Lustick also asserts that this process was necessary in order for the two sides to be in a position to negotiate a settlement in 1995.

According to Lustick, violence had the same effect on Israeli society. Lustick examines Zionist and Israeli literature, including dialogue from leaders, poetry, and songs to support his argument that Jewish violence against Arabs and the British was partly aimed at securing Jewish support (1995, 526-27, 530-31).

**Israeli Literature**

A voluminous collection of Israeli opinion and perspective about the conflict exists. Opinions span the Israeli ideological spectrum: from the religious to the secular; the staunch status quo supporters to the Palestinian sympathizers; the Israeli or die camp to the “die Israel!” sector.

Alan Dershowitz represents one sector of Israeli thought. He supports Israel’s continued administration of the Palestinian territories and its rejection of international criticism. In his recent book *The Case for Israel*, Dershowitz attempts to use the practice of law to defend major criticisms leveled against Israel’s practices in the Palestinian/Israeli conflict. But in his rebuttals Dershowitz seems to focus more on the actions of other nations (particularly the United States) and unsubstantiated accusations
rather than directly addressing the questions he poses. References to Israel’s conduct are
couched in positive terms and frequently tied to words like “always” and “never.” As
well, he often refers to Islam in a negative context. This unfortunate pattern undermines
his argument.

For example, Dershowitz discusses the accusation of Israelis torturing Palestinians,
noting that the Israeli Supreme Court already outlawed torture in 1999. He first suggests
that the United States engages in sizably harsher practices in gathering information from
al-Qaeda prisoners, then he admits that some Israelis employed “similar” measures before
the 1999 decision, and finally suggests that Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, “and other
Muslim countries” condone torture—suggesting that somehow Muslim countries
condone torture almost to the exclusion of other nation-states (Dershowitz 2003, 134-35).
Most importantly, Dershowitz ignores the reality that Israeli law does not apply in the
Palestinian territories; therefore his point about the Israeli Supreme Court has no
relevance to the question he seeks to answer.

Other Israeli authors level harsh criticism against the government’s actions in the
territories. Stanley Cohen articulates several similarities between Israel and the apartheid
regime in South Africa. He also contends that the United States is really the only force
that can move Israel to change its policies in the Palestinian territories. In this assertion
he extracts an important dysfunction in the Israeli peace movement. Specifically, if
advocates believe that United States pressure is the key, then why is there no voice of
encouragement within the peace camp for the United States to apply it (1992, 193)?
Perhaps the greatest strength of his argument is that over twelve years have passed since
his comments and still no one inside Israel is calling for increased pressure from the United States.

Simha Landau provides an analysis of violence in Israeli society. Particularly, he focuses on crime trends and their correlation to periods of military conflict. His conclusion is that these conflicts cause a significant amount of stress which translates into an increased crime rate (Medding 2002, 129, 134). While he does not assert that all Israeli violence is a result of their series of conflicts, and that other factors influence the crime rate, his findings do infer that a link exists between these conflicts and the level of violence in Israeli society.

Chronological Development of Nonviolence

After examining the literature on the situation in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, it is important to understand how nonviolence has evolved since Mohandes K. Gandhi first developed his principles of nonviolence. He is primarily responsible for its initial theoretical construction. Gandhi described in his writings how he was concerned with the search for truth, and how the practice of nonviolence (ahimsa) facilitated its acquisition. To him, the use of nonviolent action was a reflection of an individual’s commitment to live a higher, or more esthetic life. According to Gandhi nonviolence was more effective than violence, and in actuality the most effective and the most correct method to combat untruth (Iyer, 1978, 182). Importantly, Gandhi believed nonviolence assumed that the individual had the power to strike or use violence, but instead of exacting vengeance, they choose to more effectively defeat the injustice. Nonviolent action converts the wrongdoer to the correct view of his actions, rather than coercing or forcing him to
capitulate. Another key element to Gandhi's view is that nonviolence requires self-suffering. Essentially, the individual is willing (and sometimes seeks) to suffer in order to expose a practice as untrue or unjust (Iyer 1978, 183).

Some refer to Gandhi's train of thought as "principled nonviolence" (Burgess 1994, 15). This is in large part due to his emphasis that nonviolence is a lifestyle not an expedient method to bring about social or political change. Currently this perception (the traditional paradigm) is fading among nonviolence scholars. Wehr, Burgess, and Burgess are a few of the many academics that place Gandhi, Tolstoy, and Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. under the 'principled' heading.

Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. adapted Gandhi's ideas to nonviolence resistance against segregation in the United States. He was encouraged by the apparent success of the Indian independence campaign with its widespread use of nonviolent action. Specifically King helped organize groups that deliberately sought to confront the blatant segregationist laws of the South. Concerning the bus boycott in Montgomery, Alabama, Dr. King wrote: "Nonviolent resistance had emerged as the technique of the movement, while love stood as the regulating ideal" (Carson 1998, 67). He, like Gandhi, saw love as the overarching regulator of widespread nonviolence. He also emphasized the necessity of unity. He admitted that various leaders he associated with often expressed doubts about nonviolence or were desirous to incorporate different methods, but he added "in spite of these honest disagreements, the vast majority were willing to try the experiment" (Carson 1998, 68). The bus boycott was a sweeping success, despite intense pressure, threats, and even violence from opponents. King declared the nonviolent movement was so effective because "it had a way of disarming the opponent [and exposing] his moral
defenses. It weakened his morale, and at the same time it worked on his conscience. [In sum], it provided a creative force through which men could channel their discontent” (Carson 1998, 99). Dr. King based much of the remainder of his campaign for black civil rights on the success of the Montgomery bus boycott.

Still, Dr. King and Gandhi differed slightly in their perceptions of nonviolence, specifically on the ideas of coercion, and no ill will. For Gandhi, coercion was a form of violence. If an individual was forced to comply with a change, then they would most likely continue to perceive the untruth they supported as correct. Nonviolence in Gandhi’s eyes exposed untruth and corrected it. Yet Dr. King saw coercion differently. In describing his thought process he said, “I had to recognize that the boycott method could be used to unethical and unchristian ends....But certainly...our purposes were altogether different....Our concern would not be to put the bus company out of business, but to put justice in business....I came to see that what we were really doing was withdrawing our cooperation from an evil system” (Carson 1998, 53). He later stated, “Standing beside love is always justice and we are only using the tools of justice. Not only are we using the tools of persuasion but we’ve come to see that we’ve got to use the tools of coercion” (Carson 1998, 61). Dr. King seemed to say of coercion that it was not the ideal method, but the situation required something to be done, and essentially the importance of combating the injustice at hand outweighed the possible harm that might come from the boycott.

On the issue of no ill will, Gandhi maintained a broader definition than King. Coming from a Hindu background, Gandhi believed that nonviolence applied to interaction with all living things. He saw the taking of life, even plants and animals as
violent. Dr. King, while maintaining the Christian respect for all forms of life, focused more on the human interaction and the use of love between mankind. Of course he focused mainly on the black community, but his guiding principles related to man’s dealings with man. In this sense, King’s teachings of nonviolence may appear to be more applicable or adoptable than Gandhi’s to the general population.

But King’s and Gandhi’s perception of nonviolence is very different than most scholars of nonviolence in the last thirty years. Many authors, while taking their initial bearings from Gandhi, emphasized nonviolence as a tool of political action rather than a lifestyle. These perspectives have been labeled “practical nonviolence.” Most recent scholars seem to be settling in to this notion of nonviolence championed by Gene Sharp (Wehr 1994, 15).

Sharp (1973, 1990) constructed a noticeably different school of thought. He differs from Gandhi in that he bases his arguments on power instead of truth, and coercion instead of conversion. He questions the willingness of those in power to “convert” to a social change that would reduce or threaten their power. They would have to be coerced to make such changes. Unlike Dr. King, Sharp separates the idea of love and coercion into a separate category for change. Specifically, his four mechanisms of change are nonviolent coercion, conversion, accommodation, and disintegration.

In essence, conversion entails the government (or other authority entity) agreeing with the reasons that nonviolent action was undertaken. Accommodation does not imply that the governing body agrees with the premise behind nonviolent action, but sees cooperation as the most beneficial course of action. The next level of change, coercion, comes when nonviolent resistance is effective enough that the government must
accommodate in order to avoid its own destruction. Disintegration occurs when the
governing entity is not able to maintain itself even with concessions to the nonviolent
group (Sharp 1990, 103; See also Burgess 1994, 21).

Sharp argues that all governments are founded on the consent of the people (1990,
18-19). This seems to be in line with Gandhi’s and King’s thinking, i.e. in order to
change the system the people must not cooperate with it. Thus if the people are the basic
source of power, the removal of their consent because of an injustice, specifically through
nonviolent action, forces the government to change. Hence, Sharp argued, nonviolence
can be a powerful and effective tool of social and political change. He also emphasized
that this tool could be (and had been) used by those who do not subscribe to a nonviolent
lifestyle.

Perhaps Sharp is widely recognized because of how he outlines the process of the
nonviolent group using the power of their opponent against them. This is the idea of
‘political jujitsu,’ which in the case of nonviolence, describes a process where the power
of the regime is transferred to the nonviolent group. In other words, when the general
population discerns a massive disparity between the regime’s violent tactics and the
nonviolent actions of the campaign, the population then ascribes legitimacy, once placed
on the regime, to the nonviolent resisters.

Some of Sharp’s conclusions have been criticized. Specifically, Brian Martin notes
how Sharp simplifies power systems to a ruler-subject relationship that cannot account
for the complex power structures that exist in many nations (Martin 1989, 217-18). As
well, is there a threshold of repression after which nonviolence should be suspended?
Sharp indicated that care and forethought should proceed a declared nonviolent campaign
especially in assessing possible loss of life, but he does not specify what signs to look for and how to gauge that process. As well, despite the move away from Gandhi’s moral emphasis, Sharp readily uses injustice and conscience as pertinent to his analysis. Lastly, how effective is nonviolence against invasion or armed forces aggression against a nation? Sharp tries to answer this through his ideas on Civilian-based Defense. In sum, Gene Sharp attempted to formulate a theory of nonviolence that was significantly less normatively based and more analyzable because of its emphasis on power relationships.

Boserup and Mack restated the Gandhian and Sharpian views as positive or negative depending on the level of mutual or unilateral development of a solution (Burgess 1994, 18). Steihm differed from Sharp in focusing more on the individual rather than strictly group level of analysis (1994, 16). Ronald McCarthy expanded on Sharp’s ideas by distinguishing between groups within the struggle and levels of goal attainment. Particularly, he criticized the assumption that choices of conflict resolution were either exclusively violent or nonviolent (1990, 107).

In the realm of strategy, Ackerman and Kruegle developed a comprehensive study of its role and importance in successful nonviolent campaigns. They articulated twelve principles of successful nonviolent strategies. Included in their list of influential principles were the necessity of maintaining nonviolent discipline and cultivating unity—which they infer from the first two principles: formulating objectives and developing organizational strength (1994, 42, 24, 26). Their analysis coincides with the practical school of nonviolence. Then they examined six different incidents of nonviolent struggle since the beginning of the twentieth century and analyzed how they conformed to these principles. The authors attempted to quantify some of their results by cross examining
how well their principles predicted success. According to their methodology, they were fairly successful. However, they readily admitted that more principles may be added to the list.

Wehr, Burgess, and Burgess in *Justice Without Violence* provide a summary of the field of nonviolence. Particularly, they base their analysis on Kenneth Boulding’s three faces of power: threat, exchange, and love. They also focus on conflicts that are based on (1) a fundamental injustice (political, social, and economical), (2) the disempowerment of the group, and (3) that these groups engaged in action that was primarily nonviolent (1994, 9-10). However, despite their extensive coverage and analysis, they chose to briefly define justice, violence, and nonviolence. This hearkens to the well-known phrase of Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart’s phrase of “I know it when I see it”. The authors’ choice to maintain ambiguous concepts hinders their ability to adequately explain the complexity of nonviolence. Specifically, they define nonviolence as the willful application of intentionally injurious force, but they are unclear on the inclusion or exclusion of the psychological aspect (Burgess 1994, 8-9). As well, they do not include rebuttals to possible criticisms on their definitions.

Another important aspect of Wehr, Burgess, and Burgess’s book is the emphasis on effectiveness and obstacles of nonviolent action. In their own words, the book is designed to help activists “know whether nonviolence will work as they hope, how to make it work better, and when its costs are likely to exceed the benefits to be gained” (1994, 23). They admit that establishing effectiveness is difficult. Achieving goals has most often been the measurable indicator of success. Still they refrain from an in-depth analysis of Gandhi’s and Sharp’s perspective on success.
Burgess and Burgess extract four main obstacles among scholars of nonviolence to determining its effectiveness as a method of conflict resolution. First, most adherents to nonviolent action focus on persuading their audience, rather than analyzing the results of the campaign. Second, nonviolence advocates support its use based on philosophical or moral commitments. Third, experiments are difficult to conduct—mainly because maintaining a controlled environment is impossible. Lastly, effectiveness, as a term, is practically undeterminable (1994, 23-25).

Zunes, Kurtz, and Beth Asher also base their study of nonviolent social movements on Kenneth Boulding’s theory of power. They attempt to systematically compare incidents of nonviolent insurrection to show the effectiveness of nonviolent struggle. The authors make it clear that they see an evolution in the theories of nonviolence from Gandhi’s religiously based ideas to Sharp’s practical application. They also assert that nonviolence as a political tool is increasingly being used across the globe.

Gay W. Seidman may be the first scholar to suggest that a nonviolent movement may not actually require a strict commitment to nonviolent methods. Specifically, his analysis of the South African nonviolent movement concluded that the multi-faceted campaign of international sanctions, nonviolent protest, violent acts (guerilla), and negotiations. His contention is that while many supported the nonviolent tactics, most also supported the ANC and its violent campaign.

Conclusion

The literature of nonviolence in the Palestinian/Israeli conflict reveals some common ground assumptions. First, most scholars attempt to explain the first Intifada in terms of
nonviolent struggle. Some still find their way back into the political rhetoric of whatever side they support. Still, in some ways, the Intifada does not appear to conform to some overriding principles of nonviolence—specifically maintaining nonviolent discipline. But many authors still agree that its overriding character reflected nonviolent aims.

The assessment of the Oslo agreements is that they did not succeed. While authors have a wide variety of reasons for why, many seem to agree that the previous strategy did not succeed in obtaining either sides desired goals. Therefore, a new strategy should be formulated that can secure these aims.

In looking at the literature on nonviolence, most scholars adhere to practical principles rather than moral principles and are seeking to analyze more and persuade less in their discussions about nonviolent conflicts. Many follow Sharp’s lead in couching nonviolent action in terms of power, more specifically the consent of the governed. Much of the emphasis on power could be a reflection of the attempt to satisfy realist and neo-realist paradigms. Obviously, Gandhi’s ideas have been expanded upon. While many academics like to separate Sharp and Gandhi into moral and practical spheres, most fail to see the dependence of theories of nonviolence on normative values. The demand for ‘value-free’ scholarship has intimidated some scholars into fleeing all normative appearances.
CHAPTER 3

CONCEPTUALIZATION AND THEORETICAL OBSERVATIONS

If a more nonviolent strategy is important to the resolution of the Palestinian/Israeli conflict, as this thesis argues, then the theories of nonviolence that assist in this effort must be examined. Specifically, this chapter will discuss Mohandes K. Gandhi's foundational assumptions of nonviolent resistance and then look at more recent theoretical developments. As well, some overriding principles of nonviolent struggle will be extracted from the various theories.

Obviously, nonviolence falls within the idealist perspective. Realists have not found satisfaction in these theories, particularly the rejection of violence as necessary and desirable method of conflict resolution. However, recent scholarly emphasis on power relationships within nonviolent struggle more closely satisfies the realist view of power.

This chapter also includes a discussion of several theories of violence and its biological and/or social origins. Basically, if violent behavior is strictly hereditary, then any nonviolent solution to the Palestinian/Israeli conflict would require identifying and recruiting only those persons who were genetically inclined to such a strategy. This sounds absurd, and indeed most scholars reject the notion that violence is strictly a product of biology. However, it cannot be denied that some groups and individuals display violent tendencies. Hence the theories of violence examined in this chapter will
demonstrate that the tendency towards violence stems from biological and societal influences. In fact, as most research suggests, socialization seems to be the dominating factor in determining violent behavior. Thus if a person can be socialized to violence, then they can be socialized to nonviolence.

Conceptualization

Violence

All societies seem to exhibit some form of violence. Violence is inflicting physical or psychological harm on other groups (Steger 1999, 13). Some scholars argue that concepts like force, strength, and authority must be defined in order to understand violence (Steger 1999, 6). Harm is an ambiguous term, but could be developed as the total negative effect on a group's physical or mental state. To inflict implies that force is used in a specific direction. In the case of violence, inflicting implies offensive rather than defensive action. In other words, it reflects the projection of a negative result on the individual or group. Thus armed action in defense of oneself or one's nation could be considered more self-defensive than violent. Another aspect of the definition of violence, which existing studies and everyday examples support, is the inclusion of psychological violence (Steger 1999, 35-36; Burgess 1994, 9). Recently, some scholars have contended that economic violence should be a part of the debate surrounding violent action.

Justice

Justice is a challenging concept to explain. Undoubtedly, some cultures would accept certain actions as just that others would perceive as unjust. Justice can refer to outcomes of interaction (distributive justice), procedures of allocation (what is fair), and motives of
behavior (Burgess 1994, 8). Equity theory, which attempted to explain justice, developed from the idea of distributive justice. However, equity theory and its critics often fail to account for procedural justice, or what is considered fair.

In terms of international relations, some might argue that a definition could be determined by what the majority of nation-states agree upon. Currently, the closest thing to this is the United Nations charter. A vast majority of the nation-states in the world have ‘signed-on’ to this organization and the declarations of its charter, thus making a case for its charter as a possible source for an international definition of justice. However, others can effectively argue that culture influences the concept of justice for each individual thus preventing a broad definition. As well, if the rule of law designates what justice is, those who make the laws determine what defines injustice. Thus justice is manmade, and if it is manmade, how can it be universal? Many scholars have had similar challenges in attempting to define justice. For the purposes of this paper, justice will more closely reflect the shared beliefs of the global community that each group (and individual) has basic rights and to systematically violate those rights is unjust.

Nonviolence

Nonviolence is action that does not inflict physical or psychological harm on other groups. However, action implies that a type of force is involved. That force is manifest through nonviolent methods that are active rather than passive. In other words, individuals engage in constructive action that by its nonviolent nature induces the opponent to respond. Whether the response is repressive or conciliatory, the movement is strengthened. Nonviolence is not passively allowing a situation to occur, but directly choosing how to act upon it. For example, Gandhi’s harvesting of salt during his famous
Salt March, did no harm to anyone, but it forced the British to either arrest him for breaking the law (thus emphasizing Britain’s unjust and exploiting practices) or risk further challenges to British rule.

Further, nonviolence has been portrayed as pacifism or total renunciation of violence in any form. While some scholars do adhere to principles of absolute non-aggression, most recent scholars fall into the practical nonviolent camp which allows for nonviolent or violent action when necessary. While many still mistake nonviolent action for pacifism today, most scholars acknowledge the difference and see nonviolent methods as active political struggle (Burgess 1994, 15). In fact, some have compared nonviolence to tactics in a conflict that can be planned and calculated like a military campaign (Ackerman 1994, 45-48).

Nonviolence is also connected to the existence of some type of injustice, whether social or political. Because those groups who feel injustice is occurring are most often lacking in power, they must resort to some action to induce the authority actor (the one with more of the power) to change. Hence nonviolence has been referred to as a method of the weak, but more accurately could be termed a strategy for those with less power who are suffering injustice.

Nonviolence as a term has taken on various types within the social sciences. McCarthy notes a few examples including: nonviolent crime, nonviolent revolution, and nonviolent action (1990, 107). The terms nonviolence, nonviolent action, nonviolent struggle, and civil resistance are often used interchangeably. Such will be the case for this thesis.
The essence and main goal of nonviolent action has been defined by some in the context of truth and others in relation to power. While Gandhi's conception of nonviolence included power relationships, he believed it was based on truth and its end was the acquisition of truth. Many academics are uncomfortable with this normative assertion. Hence Gene Sharp contends that nonviolent action is based on power and the securing of it. Specifically, a government may possess power and use it to repress or stifle certain groups. In order for a group to secure itself from repression it must reduce the power of the government entity and increase its own power. He argues that because political power flows from the consent of the governed, authority groups (usually governments) are vulnerable when faced with nonviolent resistance (1990, 92-93). For example, a group that is suffering injustice can appeal to the general public (a power source) and effectively use them (e.g. through a massive refusal to cooperate) to influence or coerce the authority group into changing the unjust policy. Sharp also identifies other important sources of power that nonviolent action accesses.

Yet even though he attempts to distance himself from the normative discussion of earlier scholars, his conceptualization of nonviolence still encompasses a flavor of normative language. This can be seen in his references to injustice and how it facilitates the transfer of power between the resisters, the opposition, third parties, and the remainder of those who experience the oppression (1990, 102). The power of nonviolent action seems to depend, in part, on its appeal to a form or sense of justice within the opponent, observers, and the like. It seems that nonviolence is inseparable from normative assumptions.
Power

As a concept, power has been debated since the inception of political science. Power has been defined in terms of ability to influence (to affect others' choices and actions), and potential (GDP, military size, location, population, etc. See Goldstein 2003, 73). Morgenthau sees it as the aim or ultimate goal of politics as well as the means to carry out one's desires (Holsti 1964, 179). Dahl explains power saying, "A has power over B to the extent that A can get B to do something B would not otherwise do" (Dahl 1957, 202-03). Darehndorf, like others, regards power as a possession, and contends that politics involves studying power that is attached to authority (Martin 1971, 242).

Gene Sharp states that power is "the totality of all influences and pressures, including sanctions, available to a group or society for use in maintaining itself, implementing its policies, and conducting internal and external conflicts" (Sharp 1990, 92). Although his definition is 'state-centric,' it seems valid for non-state actors (groups) as well. Sharp's definition is bulky, but he simplifies the power relationship between actors to the form of ruler and subject. Importantly, Sharp's definition encompasses the idea of power being based on the obedience of those who are governed. Whether the people are part of a democratic, socialist, or totalitarian regime, they all consent, by their obedience, to be governed by that system. Sometimes that consent is motivated by fear, economic gain, or security. Sharp's simplified theory is well suited for political activists (Martin 1989, 219). However, the definition's ability to account for different cultural norms is questionable.

A further clarification of power and its sources may be helpful. An examination of the word 'politics' reveals a major source of political power. Politics is related to 'polis' (city-state) and 'polity' (organizational form of government). These Greek terms come
from a root that means citizen, city, and state which imply that a group of individuals consents to be governed. It also infers that a government exists which retains the authority to dictate policy and provide services for the community (www.kent.k12.wa.us/KSD/MA/resources/greek_and_latin_roots/transition.html).

Speaking to this point, Sharp noted that the power of those who govern “must come from outside themselves. The political power they wield as rulers comes from the society they govern” (1990, 93). Souad Dajani speaks to this when she states, “A strategy of resistance by civilians in the Occupied Territories, therefore, has to rely on the power of the civilians themselves to effect change” (Dajani 1994, 111). Hence, the rulers’ ability to encourage that power placement is crucial. The consent of the people and societal structures form the foundation of political power. The very concept of politics shows that the people or citizenry should be included in any definition of power.

Certainly wealth and strength are components of power. Not surprisingly most of those chosen to govern have an abundance of these resources. While military might is definitely a component of power, it is not the main source. Gene Sharp concluded,

“Political power disintegrates when the people withdraw their obedience and support. Yet, the ruler’s military equipment may remain intact, his soldiers uninjured, the exiles unscathed, the factories and transport systems in full operational capacity, and the government buildings undamaged. But everything is changed. The human assistance which created and supported the regime’s political power has been withdrawn. Therefore, its power has disintegrated” (quoted in Satha-Anand 1990, 33).

His assertions may seem idealistic, and in fact power is really a complex conglomerate of elements. But some examples have occurred that support Sharp’s point. One instance is the failed Soviet coup of 1991. Many military personal refused to comply with their
orders and therefore greatly reduced the level of power (and legitimacy) and therefore the ability of the Communist party to take over the government.

The amount of power is then measured by an actor's ability to control resources (such as people or institutions of society). Power measurement is also manifested in the level of legitimacy bestowed by the general population (Sharp 1990, 93-94). This is difficult to quantify, unless events occur in which the population responds (positive or negative) to actions by the authority group. For example, the level of Ferdinand Marcos's power appeared to be diminishing when a popular election declared Mrs. Corazon Aquino the new president-elect of the Philippines. His refusal to concede was answered with sizable numbers of military personnel refusing to cooperate with his directives and massive groups of Philippino people effectively thwarting the efforts of the pro-Marcos groups of the military to bring the defectors back (Ackerman 1994, 339). Thus the amount of power an entity possesses depends on its ability to control numbers of individuals as well as other resources like military equipment, money, and raw materials. This coincides with the above argument about people's consent as a source of power and Sharp's definition of power.

While Sharp's conceptualization of power is relevant for social change, it neglects important structural qualities that are prevalent in everyday politics. Specifically, Sharp does not account for the influence of the economic system (e.g. capitalism) on power relationships. As well, Sharp disregards patrimonial and neo-patrimonial structures which greatly influence the power relationships within certain societies. Essentially, Sharp does not address the historical realities of multiple societies which reflect these structural aspects (Martin1989, 216-19).
Also, Sharp does not explain the complexity of power relationships within a political system. He reduces the power relationship to a ruler-subject form which is too simplistic for explanatory power. Along the same lines, Sharp does not provide important explanation for how a group overcomes an especially oppressive regime. For example, Sadaam Hussein committed atrocities against both the Kurdish and Shiite populations within Iraq, even resorting to testing chemical weapons on some of the population. Sharp does not provide direction on how a nonviolent campaign would be more effective than a violent military conflict in removing similar regimes. Critics can argue that it was not until the United States and other coalition forces removed the Sadaam government by force that those groups have been able to exercise more proportional power. By focusing on people power, Sharp seems to ignore the frequent violent and forceful transitions of power that occur within most regions of the world.

To sum up, this thesis uses concepts whose definitions are widely contested. Nonviolence is action that does not inflict harm. Because nonviolent action is practically inseparable with the concept of injustice, an attempt has been made to clarify what constitutes injustice on a global scale. A consensus on the idea of basic human rights seems to be growing among the nation-states of the world. However, the differing perception within various cultures of what determines just and unjust action hinders a completely generalizable definition. As well, the consent of the people, military and economic resources, and individual capabilities have been identified as important sources of power. Gene Sharp provides a theory that is adaptable for political action, but lacks structural explanation for political systems. Nonviolent action emphasizes the mobilization of the masses as a means of displaying and securing power. One indication
of this is the response of the population to their government’s actions—directed internally or externally—as was seen in Aquino’s election and the Russian people’s rejection of a Communist coup. With some important terms and their definitions clarified, the theoretical discussion turns to international relations theory and the debate between realism and idealism.

Realist vs. Idealist

Realist thought is grounded in the notion that violence or the tools of violence are integral to international survival. C. Wright Mills stated: “All politics is a struggle for power; the ultimate kind of power is violence” (Arendt 1999, 3). In this view, violence or the threat thereof, allows states to jockey against each other to ensure their existence—in other words, retain and gain power. Self-interest is the primary motivation. The nation-states that can force others to do what they want have much of the power. This ability can be measured in the potential a nation has for such action. One example is the decision for small Qatar to work with the US and Coalition leaders in allowing them to set up their command center during the recent Iraq War. They are a small country and relatively low on the scale of influential Gulf States. Yet they were more concerned (as evidenced in their acceptance) about securing the support of the US and other Coalition nations, than any possible sanctions from opponents in the Persian Gulf region (and the greater Arab world). It is doubtful that Qatar would have negotiated with the US to have a military base had there not been a war.

Violence has occurred in all ages of recorded history. Realists see this as proof that violence is an acceptable and necessary response of self-interest. History has shown that
nations and peoples have often resolved their differences through violent conflict. Realists also contend that cooperation between actors is self-motivated, and could turn violent if the interest of one actor is at stake. Thus as self-interested people interact, undoubtedly some use violence to motivate others to do what they (the threatening actor) want. Also, if the national security of an actor is threatened, that actor will use whatever means are available to defend itself.

But the use of military force to defend oneself is not juxtaposed to nonviolence theory. Gandhi readily admitted that cowardice was far worse than inflicting harm when he said, "It is any day better to use brute force than to betray cowardice (Gandhi 1996, 70-71). From this it seems that Gandhi would acknowledge the need for some security forces to preserve the peace. Again, some theories of nonviolence do not require an exclusive commitment against violence in any form. It still stipulates that those involved in the nonviolent campaign must refrain from violence. A more recent development among scholars of nonviolence, which fits into realist thought, is the emphasis on the power. Essentially, scholars argue that nonviolent action has the ability to influence other actors by changing the distribution of power. Nonviolent struggle is a technique used to manipulate and secure power.

Where nonviolence and realism diverge is the emphasis realists put on violence (usually through military force) as the problem solver. Realists see violence (and the threat of using it) as a major manifestation of power and as the main vehicle of securing an international actor’s aims. Nonviolence seeks to harness the power that exists with those who are governed and mobilizing their power through large scale mass action. More to the point, nonviolence maintains that the participants could choose violence if
desired, but instead choose to express themselves through nonviolent methods. In support of this idea (which opposes realist thought), Hannah Arendt argues that it is a mistake to equate violence and power. Violence comes into play when power is threatened (1999, 7, 10-11). For Arendt and various other scholars, violence is the last available means of influencing another actor (internal or external), and the resort to it indicates that other vehicles of power have become obsolete. In other words, the level of power in the authority actor has decreased to a point where previously effective methods to influence others no longer work, so they engage in violent action.

Another departure is the placement of mankind and his motives. Realists argue that man is a creature of extreme self-interest and if left to himself (i.e. without government to control him), would live in violent chaos. Nonviolence, while it addresses the importance of power, is still based on the idealist premise that mankind seeks to cooperate to achieve its highest goals and greatest benefits. What is probably closer to reality is what Martin Luther King Jr. described as “a strange dichotomy of disturbing dualism within human nature” where man has the potential for both self-interest, to the exclusion of other people, and cooperation, to the exclusion of self (Steger and Lind 1999, 304). Other core idealist assumptions deserve discussion.

From ancient to modern times, various scholars and philosophers have contemplated and written about the better society—the one without violence, poverty, etc. Plato, Aristotle, and St. Augustine looked to such a state. Even Marx’s socialist theory leads to a utopian-like society where everyone lives in peaceful co-existence. Idealist thought looks to do just that—build the ideal society.
For the Idealists, violence is man made and a manifestation of limited self-control. They believe that at the core, individuals desire to treat others with love and respect. Hence violent behavior is contradictory to the nature of man. Idealists see man's natural inclination to cooperate as proof that violence is not a fundamental component of political interaction. With this as a base, they argue that international actors can work together to overcome each other's problems.

Nonviolence is properly categorized under this paradigm of academic thought. Gandhi believed that nonviolence was a natural expression of the soul, and that violence was counterproductive. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. also reflected these same ideas in regards to mankind's interaction. Still, some recent scholars have made attempts at distancing the theories of nonviolence from normative and religious themes.

Gene Sharp, among others, has constructed theories that emphasize power more than being on the "right" side of justice. His theory of nonviolence is more realist in that it relies on power, and more specifically, the balance of power between groups. McCarthy, Steim, and Wehr all reflect a similar shift towards realism. Still, Sharp like others that subscribe to a practical viewpoint ignore that the emphasis on injustice normatively links their theories to Gandhi, King, and Tolstoy. It may be more correct to refer to this group as neo-idealist. This brings us to the discussion of the origins of violent behavior, and the question of whether violence is biological or social.

Nature or Nurture

The discussion surrounding the social and biological aspects of violence is significant for the debate of nonviolence. If violence is mostly learned, then it can be unlearned.
More importantly, a different behavior or practice can be learned in place of violence. Besides, if socialization is more dominant than heredity than those who may have violent tendencies can learn to suppress them and employ nonviolent methods if desired.

Theories of violence are linked to the debate of nature verses nurture. Are violent tendencies a part of one's heredity, or one's society? From a biological stand point, the fact that violent action has accompanied mankind’s march through time attests that violence is somehow part of human nature (Freedman 1994, 85). No doubt some groups (and individuals) can get violent quickly, while other groups may behave totally opposite. Is this a natural affinity towards violence or the result of group socialization?

Some biologists and psychologists have asserted that biological factors are important in aggressive behavior (Dougherty 2001, 232-33). Konrad Lorenz used his study of animal behavior to conclude that animals are aggressive towards members of their own species, or that aggression is intraspecific (Dougherty 2001, 237). But many of these scientists have been criticized for too much reliance on projecting animal behavior on human behavior. Another criticism of those who adhere to the biological explanation is that they remove responsibility for actions (Dougherty 2001, 237-38). Scholars like Ashley Montagu and B.F. Skinner agree that instinct exists, but that socialization has a much stronger influence (Dougherty 2001, 237-38). Albert Bandera’s aggression theory also emphasizes the importance of socialization (Dougherty 2001, 238, 242). An ancient example of the human tendency towards aggression is in Homer’s The Odyssey. The solution for Odysseus to re-enter society was to violently dispatch of those wanting his estate. Barring the intervention of a goddess, the whole town would have erupted into violence (1950, 338-353, 383). Clearly group violence is a common occurrence in most
societies, yet no definitive research exists to support the biological argument (Freedman 1994, 85-86). A person's genes have something to do with it, but most scholars agree that socialization has greater influence on the use of violence.

Humans are mostly the products of their social environment. For example, Hitler's ability to persuade the German people to look the other way while millions of innocent humans lost their lives reveals the power of socialization. Germans probably have as many biologically violent people as any other county, and yet it would be absurd to conclude that many were born with hate towards one group. In essence, people can be influenced to do things they would not choose to do if they are socialized to act or behave in a specific manner. This feeds into group theory and even hints at some causes for group violence.

**Frustration-Aggression Theory**

An important aspect of socialization is expressed in frustration-aggression theory. Essentially, this theory argues that groups will become frustrated after a certain amount of repeated action against them. Most often this action in some way prevents an individual from obtaining their goals. If the goals are connected to an individual's way of life and the frustration is perceived, then excess energy builds. Essentially, an individual turns to aggression as an outlet for their frustration (Dougherty 2001, 238; See also Brown 1987, 13). The response is directly linked to their environment. Ted Gurr argues that frustration-aggression is "the primary source of the human capacity for violence" (1970, 36).

This theory helps to explain the causes of political violence. Seyom Brown addresses this theory in the context of groups who have been the subjects of unjust treatment by the
government. Brown notes that the group must perceive that they have been treated unfairly. The group responds to the frustration of the unjust treatment by revolting in some manner (Brown 1987, 29-30).

Hence frustration-aggression theory is applicable to group actions. While many individuals may perceive a source of frustration differently, possess various levels of tolerance for repression, or exist in a range of economic prosperity; those individuals who are repressed by the same authority find commonality in struggling against that authority. Besides, if a similar goal is being withheld or blocked, many individuals can and do form into larger groups that express their frustration in ways that impel recognition and response.

But Gurr admits that not all expressions of this frustration are violent. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff agree that frustration can be funneled towards action different than aggression (239). Perhaps a more encompassing theory could be formulated to include actions where frustration is transferred into transition (as in finding a new job), nonviolent, or violent action. In the Palestinian case, the brewing frustration could be funneled into another strategy. If, as this thesis argues, those whose outlet has been aggression can understand that past and current strategies against Israel are not achieving the success they desire (i.e. a Palestinian state), they might be willing to try a different strategy.

Still, Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff feel that frustration-aggression theory should be used at the individual level of analysis not as “an explanation of more complex modes of human action, at the much broader level of social behavior” (2001, 239). But they argue this from the perspective of groups that possess considerable power. Nazi aggression against the Jewish people might have been linked to previous economic frustration, but
because of the Nazi’s possession of immense power and increasing economic wealth the source for building frustration would be effectively gone. Therefore, it seems a stretch to categorize the Nazi persecution of the Jews as a form of frustration-aggression and compare it with the African National Congress’s (ANC) bombings against South Africa’s apartheid regime. A better theory could be frustration-displacement which will be discussed later.

Groups that have been historically and situationally repressed (or oppressed) do seem to respond to their frustration in aggressive ways. Various examples would be the early Pathans in colonial India, the Islamist organizations and guerilla groups in the Occupied Territories, and the Black Panthers of the American Civil Rights movement. Hence, frustration-aggression theory may account well for actions of many of these groups.

Also, Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff assume that individuals react to frustration quicker than large groups (Dougherty 2001, 241). This is not the case in all instances. Does the shooting of an abusive husband after years of mistreatment occur at a faster rate than a riot responding to decades of repressive laws? Or does the repressed group perceive the frustration at a slower rate than the abused wife as the authors seem to argue? These reasons do not adequately support their conclusion. From a practical perspective, the response of an individual to continuous repression may not be noticeably faster than a group’s response to continual mistreatment. In fact, Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff admit that frustration is a feasible pre-requisite to aggression, but contend that a “trigger mechanism” must exist (Dougherty 2001, 240-41). But the need for such a mechanism does not imply that frustration-aggression is exclusive to individuals. For example, the
event that started the first *Intifada* was a traffic accident involving an Israeli army convoy
and a Palestinian taxi.

Frustration-aggression theory relates to the Israeli/Palestinian situation. For
Palestinians, they feel Israel has suppressed and oppressed them. The acts of demolition,
annexation, deportation, assassination, expropriation, and humiliation contribute to the
people’s frustration. The first and second *Intifada* were a direct expression of that
frustration. Frustration-aggression theory says that as these oppressive actions continue
the possibility of violent response increases. This sheds light on why some extreme
groups—those that resist Israel through violent action—may have so much growing
support within Palestinian society. The people are frustrated with the situation and find
an outlet through violent confrontation.

On the other side of the conflict Israelis also experience a type of frustration-
aggression. After so many suicide attacks, a considerable number of citizens may think
that increased force must be undertaken to curb the bombings. The continual danger of
one’s bus blowing up or a social event turning deadly has to be psychologically
damaging. Some scholars, though, would argue that Palestinian violence is a response to
Israeli aggression, and any Israeli frustration may simply be the consequences of their
own actions. In either case, frustration-aggression theory seems effective in explaining
group response.

**Other Theories of Violence**

Scholars have developed other alternatives for explaining violence besides
frustration-aggression. Displacement theory is one extension of frustration-aggression in
which the individual suppresses their feelings and then releases them upon another object or individual that was not the original source of frustration.

Projection theory is slightly different in that it “involves attributing to, and exaggerating in, others the unfavorable qualities and malicious motives that one is reluctant to recognize in oneself.” Whether actual or perceived, the other person’s continuing actions are seen as reinforcing the classification assigned to them (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 2001, 241). They can become objects of violent behavior because of these inflated perceptions.

Another important alternative is learned aggression. This theory focuses on events of “organized conflict” (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 2001, 242). In other words, some societies are involved in conflict for a protracted amount of time so the society automatically emphasizes the need for violence—at least in protecting itself from threats. A related theory asserts that internal peace is a function of external threat. The theory holds that subgroups will unite more readily and completely to respond to an external threat (Brown 1973, 14). In sum, these theories rest on the assumption that a particular culture, religion, and family structure teaches the individual the appropriate use of violence.

With the position that violence, and conversely nonviolence, are more nearly products of socialization, one can conceive that individuals and societies in any region can be taught to display either action. If this is the case, those groups that use violence as a tool could be redirected to another ‘toolbox’ and taught to use different instruments. Those so directed may find that nonviolence is actually more advantageous than violent action.
Theories of Nonviolence

Nonviolence is the active pursuit of goals through methods that do not cause harm to others. Most scholars of nonviolence agree that it is not pacifism. Perhaps no other individual personifies nonviolent struggle better (or is more associated with it) than Mohandes K. Gandhi. He developed the first theoretical assumptions for a theory of nonviolence. However, various alterations of Gandhi’s theory exist, most notably Gene Sharp’s construction of nonviolence and power. Although many recent scholars view Gandhi and Sharp as the two major spokespeople of nonviolent thought, this thesis supports the perspective that Gandhi has been the major influence in practically all of the scholarship surrounding nonviolence.

Then why include Sharp’s theory? Although this thesis asserts a moral position, it must also appeal to those who may not agree with its normative aspects. For practical application, a call for nonviolent action must reach those who are seeking political change more than a lifestyle adjustment. Sharp recognized this and tried to conform his theory to encompass those who will not adopt the nonviolent way of life. Importantly, the overriding principles that this thesis discovers provide a common base from which “principled” and “practical” adherents can work.

And so, the following section will begin by outlining the basic theoretical assumptions and criticisms of Gandhi’s theory. Then several important differences between Gandhi’s and Sharp’s assumptions will be highlighted, as well as similarities. Lastly, this section will bring to light several overriding principles that seem to connect Gandhi’s and Sharp’s assumptions along with many of the currently accepted theories of nonviolence.
Gandhi’s Assumptions

Gandhi’s philosophical ‘discovery’ of satyagraha, or truth force (Haksar 2001, 111), is an important aspect of nonviolence. It is struggling with tenacious determination against a foe, while harboring no ill will towards him. Gandhi’s nonviolence means that a person’s whole character reflects an affinity to the family of man, and a desire to help it progress. The individual is ‘refined’ to the point where justice and peace are sought for more than tangible comforts (Gandhi 1996, 34, 40-41). Any introduction of violence or ill will compromises the effectiveness of nonviolence. As each individual gains this heightened awareness a unity develops among them, and the group can begin to change society. All these aspects are manifestations that a lifestyle is being adopted. His belief in ultimate truth and the duty to seek after it translates politically into resisting laws and policies that are based on untruth.

Satya means truth, and the method for finding truth is ahimsa, or nonviolence. Gandhi felt that ultimate or universal truth exists and should be sought after and followed. Truth dictates how to conduct one’s life. The securing of truth and living by it is an individual matter. Yet the emphasis on the individual does not mean that nonviolence cannot influence society. Gandhi said of nonviolence, “Its use is not restricted to individuals merely, but it can be practiced on a mass scale” (Gandhi 1962, 142; see also Gandhi 1962, 121). Gandhi believed that as more individuals commit to pursue truth through love, a group forms that can eventually transform a society. Essentially, Gandhi proposed that one had to participate in a search for truth, and only when one did so motivated by love could one come to that truth. Thus the first assumption in Gandhi’s theory is that an individual is seeking to acquire universal truth.
Gandhi felt that all humans were consciously or unconsciously on this path. An example of this could be the often stated goals and various methods of many international organizations to minimize injustice in the global sphere. The attempt to do so not only reflects a belief in an ultimate truth, but that there are methods for finding how to do it best. More concretely, the apparent commitment of mankind (as seen in the amount of money designated for research) to the furthering of scientific discovery demonstrates the search for ultimate truth.

Gandhi believed that the search for truth requires that the individual possess love towards living things. This love, or absence of ill will, is an active force that motivates the individual to work for the betterment of life outside himself. Gandhi’s insistence on no ill will towards all living things sets a high standard that even Gandhi did not reach at times. But for Gandhi, the process of developing these feelings was part of the strength of nonviolence. And in order for an individual to come to a correct understanding of truth, he had to possess some amount of love. Thus Gandhi’s nonviolence assumes that a person possesses these feelings.

Gandhi’s broad definition of no ill will towards all living things appears to be universal, but his admittance of the need to eat (i.e. to inflict violence on a living entity) creates an exception. Thus there remains a sort of layering or hierarchical justice in his conception of nonviolence. In other words, because one has to subsist on nutrients, one has to eat other living things. This type of violence was somehow acceptable, but not when it came to humans or other specific animals (e.g. cows). Even Gandhi who developed universal modes of living had to deal with exceptions.
Importantly, Gandhi believed nonviolence assumed that the individual had the power to strike or use violence, but chose instead to confront the injustice through nonviolent means. This assumption is often overlooked. The choice to engage in nonviolent action, when one has the ability to be destructively violent, enhances the power that is possessed by that individual or group. This assumption also emphasizes the contradiction of violently repressing a nonviolent resister. In Gandhi's theoretical formulation, the voluntary suffering of an individual who could inflict great harm causes the oppressor to reconsider the correctness of his position. It also engenders support from others who are sympathetic to the individual's cause. After repeated contradictions (i.e. the voluntary suffering of an individual who could be violent if he chooses), the oppressive authority is persuaded that the nonviolent resister's position is correct.

Thus, another assumption is that nonviolent action persuades the wrongdoer to adjust his actions. Gandhi maintained that nonviolence required this process to come about through the individual or the organization recognizing that the untruth existed and that it should be corrected. Gandhi maintained that this could happen regardless of a government's level of moral inhibitions. He even proposed that Europe could stop Hitler using nonviolence (Iyer 1973, 198).

Another assumption in Gandhi's theory is that nonviolence requires self-suffering. Essentially, the individual is willing (and sometimes seeks) to suffer in order to expose a practice as untrue or unjust (Iyer 1973, 183). Suffering is the work required to refine the person's character. Some overriding principles of nonviolence can be extracted from these assumptions.
Transposed on the political scene, laws or policies that contained untruth had to be recognized for what they did— injure others. These laws had to be re-aligned with truth. Gandhi believed the best and most effective way to address these untruths is to engage the law-making authority with action that reveals the untruth and persuades them to abandon it for the truth. The most effective means to expose untruth is the use of nonviolent action. Of course this does assume a positive view of mankind—that man is generally seeking truth and is desirous to live by it. The authority group usually resists the nonviolent action through violence, but in doing so actually accentuates the deficiency in their position. In other words, the violent repression validates the resisters' claim that untruth exists. If the policy or law were truth, it would not require violence to enforce.

Obviously critics will charge that this statement then implies that all governmental laws are untrue because every nation or government has a security apparatus that has had to punish an offender of most if not all of its laws. Yet the statement is focused on the nonviolent resisters. If the law were truth, the government would not have to resort to violence against the resisters, but could engage in nonviolent action to help the resisters see that the law or policy is in fact truth. The need for nonviolence ends when the truth is recognized and a correction occurs.

Inducing the government authority to change those laws is difficult. As is usually the case, laws that are perceived to be unjust to some groups are often beneficial to other groups. Hence this group (which would include the strong authority) will resist any change to those laws. As well, many critics would charge that no government or authority would give up an advantage (i.e. maintain the status quo) unless there was greater
incentive to change. Hence the process of enacting change through nonviolent persuasion seems difficult to accomplish.

**Gandhi and Sharp: Differences**

Several important differences surfaced as scholars sought to reconcile Gandhi’s theoretical assumptions with cries for value-free scholarship. The thoughts of how to effectively induce policy change no doubt crossed the mind of Gene Sharp as he contemplated Gandhi’s insistence on conversion. Part of Sharp’s difficulty may have been the increasing rejection of normative theory and the contrasting evidence that practical experience revealed. Sharp’s attempt to show the vast amount of nonviolent methods (or weapons as he calls them) and to explain the process in terms of power and legitimacy are clearly aimed at answering the query of how to induce a government to change without using normative assumptions.

Sharp distances himself from Gandhi’s emphasis on truth, but Gandhi does not depart from his assertion that the search for truth, i.e. the use of nonviolence by the resisters, will motivate the governing entity, or at least parts of it, to change. He explains this by the effect of seeing others suffer. For instance, the 1930-31 civil resistance campaign against the salt tax was especially vivid. The untruth was the tax on salt which was seen by Gandhi and others as the ultimate symbol of British exploitation. At a salt factory in Dharasana, nonviolent resisters carried out a twenty-six day operation trying to nonviolently confiscate salt. During an aggressive portion of the campaign resisters walked towards the factory’s gates, disregarding police calls to stop, and were systematically beaten to the ground. After the first wave was removed for medical attention, another wave of resisters took their place—both in marching on the factory and
subsequently being carried away on stretchers. One reporter recorded the reaction of the
crowd of observers: “From where I stood I heard the sickening whacks of the clubs on
unprotected skulls. The waiting crowd of watchers groaned and sucked in their breaths in
sympathetic pain at every blow....The injured men writhed and squealed in agony, which
seemed to inflame the fury of the police, and the crowd again almost broke away from its
leaders” (Ackerman 1994, 182).

Another important difference between Gandhi and Sharp is whether nonviolence must
be a lifestyle commitment or simply a method of political action. In other words, one can
use nonviolent techniques when it is beneficial to their cause, but use violence when it
suits the cause as well. Obviously, Gandhi disagrees with this assertion, but Sharp
concludes that nonviolence is most often a political tool. Both have support for their
positions.

Gandhi states: “[Nonviolence] is not like a garment to be put on and off at will. Its
seat is in the heart, and it must be an inseparable part of our very being” (Gandhi 1962,
66). Gandhi would argue that important characteristics and nonviolent actions cannot be
sustained unless one truly accepts the lifelong dedication to truth seeking through
nonviolence.

He would admit that some can appear to practice it without actually internalizing it.
But the untruth of hiding it would eventually manifest itself, and from Gandhi’s
perspective, that individual would likely engage in other untruths. He noted, “True
democracy or the Swaraj [total freedom] of the masses can never come through
untruthful and violent means[.] Individual freedom can have the fullest play only under a
regime of unadulterated ahimsa” (Iyer 1978, 185). An example will help illustrate his
point. During Gandhi’s campaign of nonviolent action in 1922 a tragedy occurred in a small Indian village. In what became known as the “Crime of Chauri Chaura,” some police officers were brutally murdered after they mistreated participants of a nonviolent demonstration. The ‘nonviolent’ crowd overwhelmed the ammunition of the officers, and subsequently hacked and burned them. Gandhi immediately called off his national nonviolent movement. He explains why: “If we are not to evolve violence out of nonviolence, it is quite clear that we must hastily retrace our steps...until we are sure of peace being retained...in spite of Government provocation” (Gandhi 1996, 33). From this perspective, a strong commitment to the nonviolent method seems vital to maintain the nonviolent nature of a campaign. Gandhi upheld this ideal to the end—that nonviolence is a complete way of life, otherwise it is not nonviolence.

Scholars have several criticisms of Gandhi’s expectation of a nonviolent lifestyle. Some scholars argue this is unrealistic because it would cause the nonviolent movement to be susceptible to any violent incident. The more violent factions that may not agree to a strategy of nonviolence could hold sway over the entire movement by instigating one violent episode. Others assert that it is highly unlikely that individuals within a group that is suffering injustice will agree on the use of nonviolent action—especially when most participants likely come from backgrounds where nonviolence was not emphasized.

But those who insist that nonviolence is only a tactic miss an important contradiction. Almost without exception, scholars of nonviolence support the need to refrain from violent action during the nonviolent campaign. However, if those who support the campaign are equally supportive of violent means to accomplish their ends, then the probability of the nonviolent campaign remaining nonviolent is decreased. That is, if
nonviolent action is not part of a total commitment, what is to hinder a group from turning to violence after enough provocation? Those who are committed holistically to nonviolent struggle have already accepted the possibility of violence against their person and the need to persevere through persecution.

Gandhi recognized the existence of the perspective that the means did not matter so much as accomplishing the end (whether violently or nonviolently), during his lifetime. He expresses his desire that those with this lack of commitment to a nonviolent lifestyle refrain from violence while the nonviolent actors bring about change (1996, 32). Later Gandhi concludes that these groups should be taken from society or changed (1996, 85). He also argues that if the society is not totally committed to nonviolence, that society will deal with the ills of violence long after the establishment of its own state. He notes: “Violent disobedience deals with men who can be replaced. It leaves the evil itself untouched and often accentuates it. Non-violent...disobedience is the only and the most successful remedy” (1996, 80).

Another important argument within this debate is self-defense. Is violence the only viable way of defending one’s nation-state from violent attack? Nation-states must be able to defend themselves and protect their interests from foreign aggressors. Interestingly, there is nothing to the contrary in Gandhi’s writings. In fact, self-protection, though possibly violent, should not be considered in the same category (Iyer 1973, 197). And, if given the choice between cowardice and violence, Gandhi would choose violence (Iyer 1973, 200). He also said, “People must learn to defend themselves against misbehaving individuals, no matter who they are.... No doubt the non-violent way is always best, but where that does not come naturally the violent way is both
necessary and honourable [sic].” Gandhi went on to describe the inaction of an individual in these cases as “rank cowardice and unmanly” (Iyer 1973, 201). For Gandhi, nonviolence was not an excuse in order to avoid the responsibility of defending one’s self, or family, or honor.

Gandhi’s insistence of no ill-will can be upheld even while using violence to defend ones’ country. In his eyes, the soldiers who were on the front lines and were willing to die in the line of duty were not guilty of violence. They demonstrated bravery and courage while their leaders were the ones guilty of cowardice and violence (Iyer 1973, 200). An example could be the actions of certain Allies after World War II. Specifically Great Britain and the United States demonstrated that they did not seek to overrun the German countryside and subjugate its people. They defeated the Nazi regime, helped rebuild the country’s political and social institutions, and turned the country back over to its people. Self-preservation would not be considered aggressive violence (if it met certain conditions), and therefore not necessarily antithetical to nonviolence.

From Sharp’s perspective resisters need only be committed to the method of nonviolence for the duration of the struggle. One does not have to look far to find examples of resistance leaders who were not committed to the nonviolent lifestyle. Jawaharlal Nehru was a major player in the Indian independence campaign, and he followed Gandhi’s lead in supporting nonviolence. Yet his actions after the campaign of 1930-31 demonstrate that for him it was Gandhi’s success with the method, not a lifestyle commitment, which kept him supporting it. Ackerman’s estimate that nonviolent resisters in 85 percent of all nonviolent campaigns were not committed to nonviolence as a lifestyle supports Sharp’s assertion (Ackerman 1994, 17 note 5).
A number of civil rights activists saw the efficacy of participating in Martin Luther King’s march on Washington and supporting his calls for nonviolence, but did not adopt the nonviolent lifestyle. He noted, “It is probably true that most of them did not believe in nonviolence as a philosophy of life, but because of their confidence in their leaders and because nonviolence was presented to them as a simple expression of Christianity in action, they were willing to use it as a technique” (Carson 1998, 68).

But not all authors are critical of Gandhi’s insistence on a nonviolent lifestyle. Martin Luther King Jr. can be classified within this realm of nonviolent advocates. He espoused and referred to Gandhi’s writings often (1999, 302, 304). Despite being a self-declared pacifist, King admitted the need for protective forces. His actions on occasions when others used violence against him reveal his commitment to nonviolence as a lifestyle. For example King refused to prosecute let alone get angry at a white man who struck him (See Carson 2001, 90). Still most recent scholars of nonviolence have moved away from Gandhi’s holistic commitment.

**Sharp’s Assumptions**

In response to some scholarly uneasiness with Gandhi’s normative assumptions of morality and conscience within political interaction, Gene Sharp developed a perspective of nonviolence that emphasized power distribution. Importantly, his theory accounts for the use of nonviolent action against actors who do not possess similar morals or a commitment to the nonviolent lifestyle. Sharp bases the effectiveness of nonviolence on power acquisition. Particularly, Sharp emphasizes the importance of people power, or the power that comes from the consent of the governed. However, Sharp’s core
explanation of power relationships still hinges on the moral contradiction felt by those wielding power and perpetrating violence.

Sharp assumes that nonviolence uses power to exact change in an unjust policy or norm (1990, 91). Successful nonviolent action requires an exchange of power between the oppressed and the oppressor. It depends ultimately on the willingness of a large portion of the population to refuse cooperation with the controlling authority (1990, 96). As the power of the resisters grows they can persuade or coerce the government into changing. This implies a framework of unity on the part of the protestors.

Also, nonviolent action entails a willingness to suffer unjust treatment. When the authority feels its power threatened, it reacts using sanctions, usually in line with the unjust treatment already received (1990, 100). However, those sanctions may not be effective if the population is not motivated to resume cooperation (1990, 95). The main idea behind the importance of suffering is what Sharp refers to as “political jujitsu.” In other words, the visible suffering of individuals (who do not return violence for violence) facilitates a power transfer from the perpetrator of the violence (the government) to the nonviolent resister.

The effective use of this noncooperation brings about change. According to Sharp this change comes about in four forms: conversion, accommodation, nonviolent coercion, and disintegration (Sharp 1990, 103). Conversion implies that the opponent has recognized the incorrect policy and agrees a change is necessary. Accommodation is a reflection of a rational decision to meet the demands of the resisters because it is less costly than continuing to oppose the changes they desire. Coercion implies the opposition or authority does not agree or want to change, but must in order to remain functional.
Disintegration infers that the governing entity is inoperable (Ibid.; See also Burgess 1994, 21). It is important to recall that these changes are functions of power distribution.

Many of the recent academics who support nonviolent action as a viable form of conflict resolution follow Sharp’s basic premises. Steim, McCarthy, Burgess, and Burgess are just a few of the many that see nonviolence as a method of political action without having to be a lifestyle. This has precipitated a categorization of writers under a “principled” (Gandhi) or “practical” (Sharp) heading.

Sharp concludes that love is not only difficult to define, but impossible to measure and therefore an expendable aspect of nonviolence. While this assumption is related to the rejection of an adherence to a nonviolent lifestyle, it should be addressed separately. Essentially, Sharp and other closely related scholars have seen little or no evidence that support Gandhi’s insistence on no ill will. What history seems to show is a long list of self-interested actions of individuals attempting to secure power. Hence, Sharp focuses his efforts in explaining his theory of nonviolence in terms of power and dismisses Gandhi’s inclusion of love.

Another theoretical assumption is that the individual or nonviolent group is not required to adopt a nonviolent lifestyle in order to effectively protract nonviolent struggle. This assumption actually enables the previous assumptions of seeking for power and using coercion as a method of persuasion. As was previously addressed, evidence suggests that most participants in the nonviolent incidents of the past have not been committed to the nonviolent way of life. Thus it seems likely that a total allegiance to nonviolence is not required for conducting successful nonviolent resistance.
However, Sharp’s theoretical assumptions should not be characterized as incongruent with Gandhi’s. For instance, Sharp and Gandhi assume that suffering is a necessary part of the nonviolent experience. Both assume that the opposing group needs to be persuaded to change their position. Sharp is willing to include coercion as one viable method of persuasion while Gandhi relies strictly on conversion. Another area of agreement is the necessity of self-discipline among resisters—whether in seeking truth or facilitating power transfer. As well, both theories denote that those who engage in nonviolent resistance make a choice to do so.

In fact, Sharp’s and Gandhi’s assumptions seem to coincide more often than they diverge. For instance, although Sharp emphasizes obtaining power rather than truth, Gandhi assumes that moral power is accumulated through the process of nonviolent action. As well, the process by which power is transferred is almost identical to Gandhi’s explanation for persuading the authority entity to agree with the nonviolent position. Gandhi sees the use of nonviolence as an end in itself, as well as what Sharp promotes as the means to an end. And Sharp’s acceptance of coercion reveals more of an acceptance for political realities than a tolerance for violence. Essentially, Sharp builds upon areas of Gandhi’s teachings rather than breaking new ground.

Still, theories of nonviolence continue to evolve. Some advocates believe in the total cessation of violence—that any violent action, including military and police action, is unacceptable. Many pacifists would fit into this perspective. Those under the “practical” heading assert that nonviolence is a powerful tool to be used when it serves a purpose. This group is willing to use violent or nonviolent action to accomplish their goals. Finally, a group exists that advocates a lifestyle of nonviolence to resolve challenges,
while recognizing the necessity of a few forms of violence (through police and military forces to keep order and protect).

Principles of Nonviolence

Theories of nonviolence also contain important elements that are seen as key to nonviolent struggle. Gandhi developed his 6 maxims of nonviolence. Sharp also explained some universal principles of nonviolent action. In fact, it seems that most authors of nonviolence have developed in one form or another, key elements or principles of nonviolence. These include restricting actions to nonviolent expression throughout the campaign, maintaining unity, inducing power transfer, having strong leaders from within the society, securing support from their general populace, the opposition group, and third parties, and strategy formulation.

Gandhi’s Maxims (1962, 119)

Gandhi outlined his maxims in an article printed in Harijan on October 12, 1935.

“(a) Non-violence implies as complete self-purification as is humanly possible.
(b) Man for man the strength of non-violence is in exact proportion to the ability, not the will, of the non-violent person to inflict violence.
(c) Non-violence is without exception superior to violence, i.e. the power at the disposal of a non-violent person is always greater than he would have if he were violent.
(d) There is no such thing as defeat in non-violence. The end of violence is surest defeat.
(e) The ultimate end of non-violence is surest victory—if such a term may be used of non-violence. In reality, where there is no sense of defeat, there is no sense of victory” (Gandhi 1962, 119).

Most of these principles have been elaborated on extensively by other scholars and political activists, including Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. on nonviolence as a means and an end, and Gene Sharp contending that nonviolence is superior to violence. But Gandhi’s
insistence that the ability to influence through nonviolence is actually linked to the ability to inflict violence, has rarely been highlighted, if at all.

In essence, Gandhi is saying that those who have the greatest ability to enact violence but choose instead to be nonviolent, have the greatest strength. This makes intuitive sense. For example, the character in *Gulliver’s Travels* finds himself in a land where he is considered a giant. His refusal to exercise his overpowering strength against the people actually strengthens his position in their eyes. Thus, the important principle that should be taken from Gandhi’s maxim is that those who can be violent, but choose to be nonviolent, are stronger.

Gandhi also commented that the choice to be nonviolent for those who do not have the capacity to wage violent conflict most likely comes out of necessity rather than a lifestyle commitment. He said, “the weak and helpless are non-violent in action because they must be. But in reality they harbour (sic) violence in their breasts and simply await opportunity for its display” (1962, 143). However, he did note that those who are “weak” are strengthened by their use of nonviolence (Iyer 1973, 199).

**Suffering**

Perhaps Gandhi meant to include one other important maxim, that is, true nonviolence requires self-suffering. This appears to be implied in the first maxim, but the prevalence of suffering in Gandhi’s writings and practice emphasize the need for a separate statement (See also Burgess 1994, 15). As Gandhi asserted, “Things of fundamental importance to the people are not secured by reason alone, but have to be purchased with their suffering… Suffering is infinitely more powerful than the law of the jungle for converting the opponent and opening his ears…to the voice of reason”
At another time Gandhi noted that “nonviolence in its dynamic condition means conscious suffering” (Steger and Lind 1999, 294). Suffering seems to be the price an individual and a group must pay to engage in and reap the benefits of a successful nonviolent campaign.

As well, suffering can provide a powerful impetus for inducing change in the opposing group. This can occur through the opposition’s discomfort in observing the suffering, or from an outside actor observing the suffering and pressuring the opposition group to change. An example of this would be the scenes during the American Civil Rights Movement of police dogs attacking black protestors who readily exposed their bodies to harm. These images affected the public enough to put pressure on the United States Government to change and enforce civil rights laws.

**Culture of Leadership**

As with any successful military exercise, sports team, business venture, or social movement, effective leadership is vital in campaigns of nonviolence. Both King and Gandhi were leaders of nonviolent efforts in their respective countries. What are less apparent, but no less important, are the other leaders close to these men who took up the campaign while they were unable to do so (either from being in jail or in other geographical locations). Nonviolent struggle inherently increases the probability of arrest or killing of the leaders of the movement. Because of this, the need for multiple leaders with a broad understanding of nonviolent methods is great.

Hence it is important to foster a ‘culture of leadership’ to maintain the momentum of a nonviolent struggle. Ackerman and Kruegle note that leadership is vital for two reasons: making decisions and motivating resisters. They refer to the importance of
cultivating leadership in this way: “Depth of leadership must be developed. Lines of succession should be clear. Knowledge of the basic strategy should extend well down through the organization. Above all, the success of the struggle should never be tied to the personal fortunes of the leadership” (1994, 27).

Maintaining Nonviolent Discipline

Probably the most repeated principle among scholars of nonviolence is the necessity of maintaining nonviolent discipline during the nonviolent campaign. Ackerman and Kruegle designate it as one of their key principles for developing nonviolent strategy (Ackerman 1994, 42). Boserup and Mack designate it as the catalyst for inducing moral contradictions in the opposition (1975, 171). Sharp notes that nonviolent discipline allows for the transfer of power from the oppressive authority actor to the nonviolent resisters. Steim contends that an individual’s ability to carry out nonviolent struggle is inhibited without adhering to this principle (Ackerman 1994, 44). Thus it seems that most nonviolence advocates, whether Gandhian or Sharpian, assert that the forsaking of violence must occur by the group that is conducting the nonviolent struggle.

A corollary advantage to not using violence in response to violence is the ability to define the conflict. Dajani states, “The essence of nonviolent civilian resistance is to enable the defense itself to select the terms of struggle” (1994, 111). It also provides the nonviolent resister with a sense of control which undermines the oppressive authority’s aims to maintain control. Those who set the terms of the struggle sit in the driver’s seat and direct where the conflict proceeds.

Again, some critics charge that this principle opens a nonviolent struggle to derailment from other groups committed to violence. But as Ackerman noted, “In this
case, one should follow Liddell Hart’s advice to guarantee that the violent acts occur separately in time and space from the nonviolent campaign and that the two are clearly distinguishable to the opponents.” And if this does not work, “the only recourse would be to distance aggressively the nonviolent movement from those groups” (1994, 45).

Unity

Unity is another vital aspect of nonviolent struggle. In order to be effective, nonviolence requires a committed group working for the same goal. Dajani submits that unity is the first aim of the nonviolent campaign, and must be achieved before moving into other phases of struggle (1994, 112). Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. also emphasized the necessity of unity. He said, “In all our actions, we must stick together. Unity is the great need of the hour, and if we are united we can get many of the things that we not only desire but which we justly deserve” (Carson 2001, 10). His experiences are proof of the value of unity. Dr. King led marches in Detroit and Washington D.C. that rallied 150,000 and 250,000 people respectively (Carson 2001, 58 and 76). Their unified push for equal rights compelled lawmakers to take notice.

Power Transfer

Another aspect of nonviolent action is the power transfer that takes place when the oppressed engage in nonviolence against the oppressor. This is what Sharp refers to as “political jujitsu” (1990, 102). Nonviolent action usually elicits a severe response from any oppressive authority. At first, the use of violence to suppress the protest appears to work. When the abused do not return violence a process of power transfer begins. (Sharp 1990, 100). As Arendt states: “Violence appears when power is in jeopardy” (Steger 1999, 10). In other words, when an authoritative entity is threatened by nonviolence and
retaliates with violent suppression, it is really an expression of their fear of losing power. In fact, the use of violence actually transfers greater legitimacy (and power) to the nonviolent resisters.

Another facet of power transfer is the absence of any violence when engaging in resistance (Gandhi 1996, 40). The power in this concept is how it acts upon the oppressor. This method exposes an oppressor's brutality and pricks the consciences of those directly involved. It reveals any demoralizing or humiliating practices (Crow and Grant 1990, 85-86). Anders Boserup and Andrew Mack sum up the point:

"The specific utility of nonviolence as compared with other means of defense lies in its double feature of at once giving rise to a wide range of 'contradictions' in the ideological fabric of the enemy camp, and at the same time denying the enemy the justification, the ideological license for violence, which a violent response would have provided. These are of course only the two sides of the same coin. The more the enemy resorts to violent repression, the more he widens the contradictions in his own camp" (1975, 171).

Some have argued that this presupposes the ruling authority has some 'conscience' within their ideology that can be pricked. Outside this normative discussion is the position of law, particularly national law. And if the action does not conform to national law, then a similar disjunction occurs that may cause a questioning of the tactic being used. To this point, critics may argue that this applies to polities where representative or democratic-like structures exist. If the national law is a reflection of the desires of one person (in a totalitarian state), then he can change the rules to suit his actions. As well, with only one 'conscience' to stir up, the movement may find it difficult to ensure this will happen. Also, the adeptness of the authoritarian ruler at anticipating what tactics are planned will influence the effectiveness of such a method (see Ackerman 1994, 337).
Yet the target audience includes fellow citizens and the international community. The absence of violence from the suppressed, along with the results of oppressive actions, further weakens the authority's power in the eyes of the general public. As well, this authority may find their power de-valued in the international community. Their legitimacy is then transferred to the nonviolent movement. If it can be siphoned away through repeated events that resonate with the public, those resisters can secure more power with which to obtain their demands. Thus the nonviolent resisters increase their power through more support from the general populace and the other nation-states of the world. (This cycle continues until one side gives up.)

This power transfer is vital to the success of nonviolence. The transfer is assisted when the group is well known, or at least is highly visible to the international community. For instance, many throughout the world were familiar with the nonviolent campaign of Gandhi in India (the crown jewel of British colonialism) and Great Britain drew sharp criticism when certain brutalities were revealed. On the other hand, the campaign within Beit Shahur against Israeli taxation received some publicity, but did not maintain the public spotlight. The citizens eventually capitulated. Part of this can be explained by the lack of support from the PLO to push the movement into the international spotlight.

**General Populace and Third Party Support**

Another important principle within most theories of nonviolence is the securing of general public and third party support. While third parties are important, it is more vital that the domestic society recognize the nonviolent campaign occurring within its borders. This is the key to the transfer of legitimacy from the authority group to the nonviolent group. Despite the international pressure, Britain may have held on to India were it not
for the popularity of Gandhi's and other's efforts within India. This popularity undermined British control and increased the clout of the Indian National Congress. As well, the experience in Beit Shahur may have been vastly different had Palestinian villages and towns recognized its early success and followed suit.

The recognition of a nonviolent struggle by sympathetic elements within the authority group is also important to its success. Johan Galtung asserted this in his book, *Nonviolence in Israel/Palestine* (1979). He surmised that each side had its staunch supporters and those who were supportive but had contact to the other side in the conflict. He concluded that these mid-level contacts were the key to a successful nonviolent strategy. India's nonviolent movement demonstrated the effectiveness of this principle. Many debates occurred within British Parliament about Gandhi's 1930-31 civil disobedience campaign and Britain's response to it. Debates occurred among British authorities in India with some assisting Gandhi in his efforts (Dalton 1996, 79).

Israel also contains some of these 'friendly' elements, including various political parties, Knesset members, and public organizations including Peace Now. Shimon Peres, who is currently the Foreign Minister, has been more outwardly sympathetic to Palestinian aspirations than most in Sharon's government. Peace Now has been a voice of nagging criticism about most Israeli government policy in the Palestinian territories. A successful nonviolent strategy for the Palestinians must include tactics for maximizing these groups within Israeli society. The natural result of disagreement between factions is competing goals and tactics to reach them. By encouraging some schism, the Palestinians open opportunities to gain concessions.
How did this principle play out in the tax resistance campaign in Beit Sahur? A debate over the Beit Sahur experience never occurred among the Israeli public. It was most likely lost in the sea of civil resistance events occurring throughout the Palestinian territories reported through the Israeli media. While many discussions ensued over the army’s tactics and practices of enforcing order during the first Intifada, these took place long after the citizens of Beit Sahur gave in. It seems that the lack of correct information surrounding the events of the uprising inhibited prompt protest from sympathetic elements in Israeli society. More to the point, the perception of widespread threat to Israelis most likely dampened the ability of supportive groups to encourage sympathy for the Palestinian campaign.

**International Pressure**

The role of international sanctions and withdrawing of support cannot be overlooked. It was a key component of Ferdinand Marcos’ stepping down and the end of South Africa’s apartheid policy (Ackerman 1994, 339-40, 344-45). It may be the determining factor in any Palestinian nonviolent campaign.

Yet, Israel has been able to deflect much of the international criticism leveled in the form of UN resolutions and International Criminal Court rulings. Israel’s relationship with the United States seems to be the key to this immunity. Historical experience leads one to conclude that this relationship is difficult to breach. However, some possibilities can be found in the use of nonviolent action.

For example, nonviolence is a strategy of action that maximizes moral contradictions within governments that oppress groups. India and the American Civil Rights movement effectively employed this principle. Gandhi successfully gained concessions from Britain.
(although they were mostly disregarded) in part because his 1930-31 nonviolent movement appealed to British sensibilities. Notably, the British did not severely repress many civilians in the struggle. While some measures were obviously brutal (using clubs with metal tips), Britain still seemed apprehensive to engage in greater violence (e.g. killing).

In the American South, nonviolent protestors sometimes welcomed police brutality in order to influence public opinion and put pressure on government leaders. Pictures of police dogs attacking exposed demonstrators had the desired effect. The moral inhibitions of the general populace in the United States prevented these authorities from conducting more extensive violent repression.

In contrast, the apartheid regime in South Africa demonstrated little if any hesitancy to enact severe repressive actions against anti-apartheid protestors. For example, in 1960, 69 people died and 178 people were wounded when police broke up a demonstration that later became known as the “Sharpsville massacre” (Seidman 2000, 162). This lack of moral inhibition may have resulted from the government being founded on dehumanizing/racist practices.

But eventually the presence of international pressure, mixed with violent struggle and nonviolent mass action influenced the South African government to pursue reform. Seidman argues that international economic sanctions, mainly through refused bank loans, were the variable that turned the tide in the campaign against apartheid. He also notes that previous nonviolent campaigns (before the sanctions) seemed to have no effect because of the government’s ruthless response (2000, 162). Hence a theoretical
conclusion would be that international pressure increases in importance when an oppressive authority is less inhibited in using severely repressive methods.

This conclusion is important for the examination of nonviolent action in the Palestinian territories. Various scholars have already equated Israel with the apartheid government and thus infer that they will be less influenced by the moral appeal of nonviolent action (Cohen 1992, 186). While Israel is not South Africa, there are some similarities. In regards to the level of tolerance for extreme repression (e.g. killing) Israel has shown a propensity to act harshly in the name of security (Sharp 1989, 9). In fact, the policy of acting with stronger responses to terrorist activities (e.g. destroying the homes of the bomber’s families), directed at the Palestinians, may contribute to this propensity. Some evidences of this tendency are the number of Israeli casualties compared to Palestinian casualties in the first (and second) Intifada (Sharp 1989, 8). Regardless of who is more sensitive to the deaths, the fact remains that more Palestinians are dying.

That is not to infer that Israel’s defense force (the IDF) is composed of trigger-happy soldiers or that the government is founded upon a principle of oppression of another race, as the South African regime was. The comparison is made to demonstrate what action will be vital in transacting a successful nonviolent campaign against an entity that possesses less moral inhibition to severe violence. Essentially, if Israel has a greater propensity to resort to more repressive measures (i.e. their level of moral sensitivity is lower than in the United States and British cases), then the importance of international sanctions (or pressures) increases, as the South African example demonstrates.

Besides the power of moral contradiction, nonviolence facilitates the undermining of third party support. Historically, Israel has seemed immune from international pressure,
especially in regards to UN resolutions. Yet if the relationship of the United States is taken into account, especially in how many resolutions were stopped, vetoed, or abstained from, it is clear that Israel's apparent immunity is directly related to its relationship with the United States (Cohen 1992, 193-94). Thus in order to maximize international pressure, a major focus for Palestinian nonviolent action must be the United States-Israeli relationship.

The situation in Iraq and the War on Terror are possible catalysts for straining this relationship. As stated earlier, securing success in Iraq and changing the American image in the Middle East appear to be top priorities for the current Administration. If the Palestinians engage in nonviolent methods for an extended period of time, despite repression from Israel, it could put a wedge between the US and Israel. President Bush would have to decide whether to maintain the historic relationship with Israel and ignore the repression or apply enough pressure on Israel to stop and thereby work for greater national security through improved perception of the United States. The continuing situation in Iraq could influence his decision more favorably for the Palestinians.

The evidence that the President would choose the latter is apparent in his decision to go to war with Iraq. His stated justification for confronting Iraq was national security, even though proceeding created rifts in historic relationships with France and Germany. The continual use of rhetoric about Israel, its relationship to the United States, and the Israeli/Palestinian conflict by terrorist outlets is evidence of how connected this idea is with national security. The justification for terrorist recruitment, which is partially based on the United States' backing of Israel or the continuing irresolution of the Palestinian situation, would be undermined.
Even more importantly, as the War on Terror’s stated objective is the national security of the United States, then it is logical to expect the President to make decisions in harmony with that objective. To contradict this objective would not only undermine the War in Iraq, but any further military operations. Politically, President Bush has remained consistent in using national security as his justification for his actions. It seems almost certain that he would have to break with Israel in order to maintain his credibility and the momentum in the War on Terror. The gains for his defense of national security would most likely offset any backlash from Israeli supporters come election time.

Yet it is unlikely that the President will undertake these actions on his own volition. Something must occur to effectively coax him into such a position. Obviously a Palestinian organization should engage President Bush in discussion. Yet it seems that concrete actions that prompt international media coverage (not just American) are necessary to encourage such maneuvering. Nonviolent struggle, in a conflict saturated with violent occurrences, could provide the needed catalyst.

Strategy

Choosing the most effective strategy will contribute to the success of the nonviolent campaign. Ackerman and Kruegler creatively demonstrate how crucial strategy is by subjecting multiple nonviolent examples to a set of nonviolent principles. They contend that like a military war, a nonviolent campaign requires tactics, strategy, etc. Hence knowledge of an opponent’s vehicle of oppression, as well as one’s own capabilities is vital (1994, 34, 36). Nonviolence seems to be more effective when using diverse methods, which hints to the importance of a good understanding of theories and tactics. Ackerman and Kruegler conclude that the greatest hindrance to nonviolent success was
clear conceptualization of the principles (1994, 329-30). Thus strategy, to be effective, must include a sound understanding of nonviolent principles.

Specific Strategies

Gene Sharp collected and designated 198 various methods of nonviolent action. He organized these "weapons" of nonviolence under several headings namely: methods of nonviolent protest and persuasion, social noncooperation, economic noncooperation, political noncooperation, and nonviolent intervention. Importantly, Sharp provides multiple examples of these methods (1973, 113-14). Some of those examples will be used to illustrate some possibilities for the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. In line with Gandhi's thinking, the methods of Palestinian resistance should focus on the structures of Israeli repression and extreme injustice. For instance, anything having to do with Israeli settlements should be a prime target.

One method that could be effective for the Palestinians is the refusal to pay taxes. Specifically, those Palestinians under Israeli administration could coordinate the moment of beginning the no tax campaign. This method might also be effective in East Jerusalem.

The reasoning for this method is because most if not all Palestinians are paying taxes—either to the PA or to Israeli administrators. Those taxes represent in some ways an acceptance of the occupation. Because this acceptance would be contrary to the goals of a nonviolent struggle in the territories, any practice supporting the occupation would be singled out and eventually stopped.

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Another possible method of resistance could be protests directed at anything dividing or subverting the contiguity of the West Bank or Gaza Strip. The object of course would be to protest the continuation of settlement construction on land not legally belonging to Israel. Some protests could take the form of large numbers of women and children walking as a group down a highway forbidden to Palestinians. The resisters could simply sit down in the middle of the road. Another idea could be deliberately driving slow along important streets or highways in the territories to disrupt the way of life for Israelis living in settlements. If possible, Palestinians could be hindering traffic 24 hours a day.

Connecting Remarks

The persistence of violence in the international and domestic arena is evident. Realists see the re-occurrence of violence as an indicator of its primacy in international relations. While idealists have been largely out-shouted, they still contend that this method of conflict does not have to be dominant and that other explanations are valid. Nonviolence, not harming other individuals or groups, seems to be a desirable alternative. Yet the sense of justice sometimes moves nation-states, groups, and individuals to conclude that violent action is required. However, theories of nonviolence are connected with justice, whether in normative truth searching or practical power struggles.

The discussion of violence and its biological and social nature are important for the conceptual understanding of the thesis. Essentially, if socialization can teach violence then it can also teach nonviolence. Using frustration-aggression theory, this thesis contends that aggressive tendencies are more socially bound, and against some opposition, that the theory can be transposed on group behavior. Because of the
influence of socialization, group frustration can be channeled into violent, nonviolent, or other types of action.

Theories of nonviolence contain some important assumptions and divisions. Gandhi believed that nonviolence had to be a way of life in order to truly succeed. Gene Sharp sees the practical nature of power relationships, and the ability to engage in nonviolent action without commitment to it as a way of life. Certain key principles of nonviolent struggle surface from these assumptions.

Specifically, engendering a culture of leadership not only accounts for the duties of decision making and motivation, but allows for a nonviolent movement to persevere even when key leaders are immobilized. The ability to maintain nonviolent action while violence is being conducted removes any elements of justification the oppressive authority may use to continue repression and maximizes the moral contradictions in a society. A commitment to nonviolent discipline throughout the campaign also facilitates the effectiveness of other important principles including unity and appealing to other groups. Suffering acts as an agent that induces either power transfer or persuades an authority group that its position is incorrect. The key groups to co-opt are the general populace (of the oppressed society), sympathetic elements within the authority group, and international actors—especially ones that can exert pressure on the oppressive authority.

Also, recently introduced factors have the potential to assist a Palestinian nonviolent campaign. The United States' challenges in Iraq have provided an opportunity where the they and the Israeli government have less room to maneuver for fear of worsening the situation in Iraq. Hence a Palestinian nonviolent movement could facilitate concessions and pressure from the United States towards Israel.
CHAPTER 4

THE CASE OF THE PALESTINIANS

The Palestinian/Israeli conflict has reflected several strategies. Currently, both sides have the appearance of suspending violent confrontation. While a change in Palestinian leadership is significant, the majority of conditions before Arafat’s death still remain. Most scholars of the region have not taken on the optimism of the media and many others that a resolution to the conflict is now within grasp (NYT Feb. 13, 2005, p.5). The reality is that both sides must feel that an equitable solution can be reached. If not, the conflict will most likely flare up. While Abbas’s election is important, the lack of major change in policy and power relationships leads one to believe that equity is not forthcoming anytime soon. If the conflict does reignite, nonviolence could (and this thesis argues it should) play an important role in the strategy for continued action.

In proposing a change to the current strategy, several questions must be answered. What has the strategy been for the bulk of the conflict since 1948 and why does it need to change? This section will show that violence has been the dominant strategy for Israel and the Palestinians. More importantly, this section will discuss how that strategy has failed to secure ultimate success (defined as goal attainment) for Palestinians and Israelis.

Another question is how have Israelis and Palestinians incorporated nonviolent methods into their strategy? As well, what possibilities and obstacles exist for the
Palestinians to realistically adopt more nonviolent action? The discussion will show that some methods of nonviolence have been employed, but that the main example of Palestinian nonviolence (the first Intifada) does not conform to the universally accepted principle of maintaining nonviolent discipline during a nonviolent campaign. Hence more possibilities are available for renewed, if not more effective, nonviolent resistance. But some important obstacles may prevent the resumption of such a campaign. These will be examined in detail. But first, a brief history of the conflict will be given.

History of the Conflict

During World War I, the British brought 'liberation' from the Ottoman Empire to Palestine when General Allenby marched virtually unimpeded into Jerusalem. Great Britain had already agreed with Amir Husayn that if he lead a revolt against the Ottoman Empire (by encouraging insurrection), the British would award him his own independent nation. This became known as the Husayn-McMahon Correspondence and seemed to aim at the establishment of an Arab state in areas of the Middle East including Palestine (Goldschmidt 1999, 181).

The Sykes-Picot Agreement, in which Great Britain and France carved up the Middle East into areas of influence, contradicted the British assurances to Husayn. After World War I, an agreement was formed in which France and Britain would mentor specific territories towards self-government. New borders were drawn up which correlate to the modern boundaries of Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Egypt and Lebanon. The territory where these nations converged was called Palestine. Great Britain was given the responsibility from the League of Nations to administer this area for a certain time period with the eventual
goal of fully implementing the Balfour declaration. Yet British assurances to Arab leaders and the creation of Transjordan fostered thoughts of self-government for Arabs living in what was left of Palestine (Goldschmidt 1999, 240-41).

Lord Balfour, the British Foreign Secretary, in a letter to Zionist friends in England, stated that the British government would "view with favor" the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine (Goldschmidt 1999, 238). Many Jews who subscribed to Zionism saw this as the opportunity to establish a permanent Jewish state. However, many Jews did not grab hold of the idea. A large portion of the Jewish community in Europe was very comfortable and desired to become more apart of their respective societies. As well, the letter indicated concern for the rights of the non-Jewish residents of Palestine. Still Jewish nationalist sentiment was increasing, and after World War II, it was transformed into a majority support for a Jewish state.

Britain's administration of the Mandate saw increasing friction between Arabs and Jews, as well as between the two groups and the British. The Arabs were continually promised self-government, while concerned Jews were reassured that the Balfour declaration was still part of British policy. Societal competition immerged. An increasing amount of Jews were allowed to immigrate. Arab concerns about Jewish land purchases were countered by Jewish assertions that their communities were reviving the land's productive capabilities. Commercial competition increased. Many Jewish merchants began to hire only Jewish workers. Many Arabs boycotted Jewish goods. Probably most contentious was the interaction of religious worshipers from both sides at the Temple Mount, or Haram es-Sharif. Weekly confrontations seemed to erupt, usually on Friday just after Muslim prayers and just before the Jewish Sabbath.
One poignant event occurred in 1936 when both groups clashed near the Western Wall—resulting in many casualties. The British sought to reprimand both sides, but many Arabs felt the British were still ignoring the major issues—immigration and land purchasing. An armed guerrilla movement, called the 1936-39 Revolt, ensued. The British reacted quickly by deploying 20,000 more troops to Palestine. The soldiers carried out a concerted and effective campaign that overwhelmed the rebellion.

World War II diverted Britain’s attention and resources. Zionist supporters decided to back the Allies while many Arab countries remained neutral. The Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin Husseini, sided with Hitler. The reality of the Holocaust strengthened the Jewish position. Following the war, Britain again dragged its feet in responding to both sides. Zionist and Palestinian extremists began terror campaigns that saw 254 people killed in the village of Deir Yassin and 75 people killed in the Mount Scopus massacre. The acceleration of this friction, along with the dynamics of World War II, caused Britain to turn the Mandate back over to the United Nations (UN).

Various inquiries had been conducted on the Palestine question. Some, including the Peel Commission, proposed partition. Others recommended a bi-national state in Palestine. The majority of nations in the UN were in favor of partition. Both the Zionists and Palestinians did not like the idea of partition, but the Jewish Agency (as spokesperson for Jewish interests) was more open to the plan than the Palestinians and other Arab states.

The Palestinians seemed to have a strong argument against partition. They were the primary residents of the territory for over a thousand years. Throughout the Mandate period the British had promised the Palestinians through word and action that they would
help them secure self-government. As well, Palestinian Arabs comprised two-thirds of
the population in Mandate Palestine (Goldschmidt 1999, 245). However, World War II
had produced two important influences on the Palestine question: (1) the murder of over
6 million Jews, and (2) the neutrality of most Arab nations and some prominent
Palestinians aligning with Hitler. The effects of Holocaust seemed to have more bearing
on the UN’s decision than the Palestinian argument, and in August 1947 they voted to
create two separate states in the territory known as Palestine.

The reaction to the UN’s decision to partition Palestine brought more violent struggle
to the region. The Palestinians and Arab nations rejected the UN plan. Still, the state of
Israel was declared on May 14, 1948. Five nations invaded or attempted to invade the
next day. What became known as the War for Independence for Israelis or Al Naqba for
Palestinians and Arabs, solidified Israel’s existence as a nation-state in the region. The
disaster (al naqba in Arabic) for the Arab states was that their unpreparedness caused
humiliation for the Arab states and in process of their defeat they had actually lost
territory. After the last UN brokered armistice with each bordering nation, Israel had
enlarged its territory to encompass 78% of Mandate Palestine.

Following the armistice, Israel refortified and rearmed, prompting the Arab states to
postpone their designs of continuing the battle at that time over the former Mandate area.
Jordan and Egypt controlled the West Bank and Gaza Strip respectively. Jerusalem was
split between the Old city and the New city and the border separating Israel and the West
Bank and Gaza became known as the Green Line.

Israel took an opportunity to assert its regional presence in 1956. It occupied the
Sinai Peninsula as the British and the French took over parts of the Suez Canal. The
publicly stated reason for these actions was to protect international shipping after Gamal
Abd al-Nasser nationalized the canal. The prompt intervention of the United States and
Soviet Union returned the canal and the Sinai to Egypt. Nasser continued to stir up
support for his Pan-Arabist ideas through constant opposition and rhetoric against Israel.

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was formed with the support of Nasser.
While it was intended to be a representative organization of Palestinian interests,
Nasser’s designs for it (like most Arab leaders at the time) were for building his greater
Arab state. In conjunction with Syria, Egypt continued to harass Israel and engage in
rhetoric about re-establishing the Palestinians in their entire homeland. Small incidents of
violence between Palestinian guerillas and the IDF were common. While these groups
made no sizable impact on Israel’s control of their territory, they provided the
Palestinians with a mechanism to assert national identity. Many diverse groups formed
and attempted to represent Palestinian aspirations including the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(DFLP), along with the PLO.

Tensions continued to build until the first part of June 1967 when the appearance of
an Egyptian/Syrian attack prompted Israel to strike. The Egyptian and Syrian armed
forces were out maneuvered and overpowered. Jordanian forces opted to join the
struggle, but were quickly routed. The IDF pushed deep into Egypt, the West Bank, and
the Golan Heights. When another armistice was secured, Israel’s borders extended far
beyond the Green Line to the Suez Canal, the Jordan River, and nearly to Damascus.

The Six-Day War changed the face of the struggle for both Israelis and Palestinians.
Israel controlled the territory of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The idea of Pan-Arabism
was discredited. Palestinians began to realize that they needed to assert their ownership over their struggle (Tessler 1994, 423). Israel took on an aura of invincibility. Importantly, Israel now had responsibility for a few million Arab Palestinians.

Large Palestinian populations also resided within some Arab countries, especially Jordan and Lebanon, providing an interesting dynamic in local and national politics. Neighboring Arab nations continued verbal threats of harm to Israel and channeled financial support to Palestinian groups that conducted armed resistance. The more militant groups gained strength, and in 1969, Fatah effectively took over the PLO with Yasser Arafat as its leader. Despite differences in ideology, Arafat was able to unite many guerilla groups under the strategy of armed struggle (Sayigh 1997, 27).

Palestinian military activities, based from Jordanian soil, continued to foment discord between Jordan and the PLO. Israel routinely encroached on Jordan’s territory to attack guerilla groups. The PLO wanted more assistance from Jordan and attempted to secure more power within the government. The PLO was gaining more power than was comfortable for King Hussein. A Palestinian extremist had already killed his grandfather, the previous king. Finally, an assassination attempt on the king’s life prompted the monarch to order the removal of the PLO. The Jordanian army quickly defeated and drove the PLO and other militant groups out of Jordan. Many more refugees, along with the main PLO structure, moved into Lebanon.

At this time, it seemed that Arab hostility towards Israel had been diverted to internal concerns. Egypt transitioned from Nasser to Sadat, Jordan removed the Palestinian power base, and Syria underwent a military coup. Yet Palestinian groups continued to engage in violence to secure international attention for their cause. The 1972 Summer
Olympic Games in Munich were interrupted by an extremist Palestinian group called Black September taking Israeli athletes hostage. The incident ended with multiple deaths, including all of the hostages.

Unexpectedly, Egypt attacked Israel in 1973—securing a victory and suffering defeat at the same time. The Egyptian army surprised Israeli forces on Yom Kippur and pushed them back from the Suez Canal. After regrouping, the IDF drove the Egyptians back and pushed closer to Cairo. But Egypt had demonstrated Israel’s susceptibility. Israel suffered more casualties in the Yom Kippur War than in any other conflict to that point. While Israel eventually regained its positions and inflicted large Egyptian losses, Egypt’s prestige in the Arab community soared. Many Arab nations saw the conflict as a victory against Israel.

Other watershed events of the Yom Kippur War included the ascendency of Menachem Begin to the Prime Ministership and the Likud taking control of the Israeli government. For the Palestinians, this resulted in a more focused settlement efforts and greater suppression of Palestinian identity. What eventually followed was the Israel-Egypt treaty at Camp David in 1979 in which Israel traded the Sinai Peninsula for recognition as a state and a commitment of security through a buffer zone. Both nations received large packages of foreign aid from the United States.

As a result of their peace agreement, Egypt was isolated by the Arab world. Palestinians felt especially betrayed because Egypt had been a long-time source of support through funding and rhetoric. Sadat was assassinated by members of his own military, and the new leader, Hosni Mubarak allowed relations with Israel to cool. Eventually, Egypt was reintegrated into the Arab league.
During its time in Lebanon, the PLO expanded into a security force, diplomatic organization, and government prototype. The PLO provided protection to many of the Palestinian refugee camps from the Lebanese government and other opposition groups (Tessler 1994, 450). Amidst its continuing guerilla activities against Israel, the PLO engaged in diplomacy at the UN (observer status was granted in 1974), the Arab League, and with other countries (Tessler 1994, 464). The PLO also functioned in an administrative capacity, supplying goods and services as well as organized leadership. It soon became the dominant force in southern Lebanon and attempted to influence the volatile power structure in Beirut.

Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982 and dismantled the PLO. The bulk of PLO structure was crushed and its leaders relocated first to Algiers and then to Tunis. Without protection from the PLO and through the neglect of the Israeli army, many refugees were killed in the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatilla. From exile, the PLO leadership engaged in further diplomatic endeavors, even attempting unofficial contact with the United States and Israel.

For Israel, the results of the Lebanon War were mixed. The PLO was driven out which greatly reduced the continual security threat. Israel also attempted to assist the installment of a pro-Israeli Maronite faction in the Lebanese government, but when the link was discovered the leader was assassinated. A large number of Israelis began to question the continuation and even the instigation of the war. The Sabra and Shatila massacre evoked one of the largest Israeli protest demonstrations ever conducted (Zunes 1999, 49). Eventually, the Israeli government decided the protraction of the conflict in Lebanon was depleting their resources and morale to the point of needing to withdraw.
This was seen as a victory for Hezbolah (the party of God), a Lebanese Muslim organization that continually confronted the Israeli army.

Another conflict altering event occurred in December 1987. A popular uprising began which became known as the first Intifada (throwing off). Partly in response to Palestinian frustration with the continuing Israeli occupation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and partly in response to a demonstrated lack of concern by many Arab nations about the Palestinian problem, the first Intifada was an expression of national awareness and identity. It began as a popular, even spontaneous, rebellion that later submitted its aims and sovereignty to the direction of an organized leadership in the territories and ultimately the PLO in Tunis.

The tactics of the Intifada were in large measure different than any previous direct campaign against Israel. Some scholars have referred to it as the Palestinian example of nonviolent struggle. The uprising consisted mainly of stone throwing, mass protests, boycotts, and general civil resistance. The use of fire-bombs or Molotov cocktails was greatly emphasized in the media, but these and other more violent weapons were mostly discouraged by the United National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU)—the Palestinian governing body of the rebellion. The Palestinians within the territories eventually became larger players in the Israeli/Palestinian relationship, and gained more clout with the PLO because of the Intifada.

The duration and intensity of the Intifada has been downplayed, but its influence on the Israeli/Palestinian conflict is important. The assertion of national identity prevented Israel from dismissing or ignoring the Palestinians as a people. It jettisoned the Palestinian issue onto the international stage, and influenced the United States shift
towards negotiating with them. The first *Intifada* also solidified the separation of the West Bank from Jordan. King Hussein recanted his claim to the territory and the PLO declared independence over the area. While debate continues on its influence on negotiations with Israel, the first *Intifada* laid the groundwork for, if not directly resulting in, the organization of the Madrid conference and the Oslo Accords.

Another major factor in these break-through negotiations resulted from the Gulf War over Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. For one, the war saw unprecedented cooperation between Arab countries and the West. Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Egypt aligned with the United States and other European powers in decrying Sadaam Hussein’s occupation. However, neither Jordan nor the PLO joined the criticism of Iraq. Pictures of Arafat and Sadaam exchanging pleasantries, and Palestinians rallying in support of Iraq were spread throughout the world media. But not all Palestinians agreed with Arafat’s move to align with Hussein (Ashrawi 1999, 70-71). The political ramifications were tremendous. The Palestinian position with the United States and most other powerful nations was tarnished. Obviously, Sadaam was trying to lure Israel into the fight by firing Scud missiles, but the United States was able to persuade Israel not to respond. The coalition forces soundly defeated the Iraqis and restored Kuwait to its former position.

The cooperation between the West and most Arab countries precipitated a chain of events that saw Israel and other Arab states attending the Madrid conference. Unknown to most observers, the PLO and Israel were engaged in secret negotiations in Oslo, Norway that resulted in a joint declaration of a commitment to negotiations. Arafat and Prime Minister Rabin signed the Declaration of Principles on the White House lawn in September 1993.
The Oslo Accords, as they came to be called, put off final status issues (Jerusalem, settlements, Right of Return, etc.) until later, but outlined a plan for the establishment of a Palestinian prototype government called the Palestinian Authority (PA). While each side interpreted the intent of this maneuver differently, the Palestinian Authority seemed like a step toward more self-government. Some autonomy was granted and the process seemed poised to move forward. However, Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated by a Jewish extremist at an Israeli peace rally in 1995.

The Oslo process sputtered through two different Israeli administrations. Netanyahu openly stated his intent to narrowly interpret the Oslo promises. But some progress was made in Palestinian control of certain areas in the territories. Barak came to power with great expectations and many figured a resolution was on the horizon. Still, he attempted to make peace with Syria while simultaneously trying to forge agreements with the Palestinians. President Clinton called for a summit as Barak's support seemed to be slipping and Arafat was under fire for perceived concessions.

The meeting at Camp David between the two leaders was positive and negative. Various scholars have debated what these gains and losses were. Importantly, Camp David II was the first time that particulars of final status issues were discussed at the highest levels. As well, it seemed that the Israelis shifted their positions more drastically than before. The Palestinians also seemed willing to compromise on some volatile issues. Yet the inability of the two parties to agree on key issues prevented Camp David II from succeeding. Although Arafat was painted as the destroyer of the talks, it seems obvious that much more was occurring than his personal intransigence to derail the
negotiations. Many accounts peg Jerusalem as the main stumbling block. Regardless of what issues and personalities clashed, the talks ended without an agreement.

Shortly after the Camp David affair, a catalytic event occurred. Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount in late September 2000. Although he maintained that he was only exercising a right to visit Israeli controlled areas, Sharon most likely sought to further discredit Barak’s leadership and create a more conducive situation for Likud to take power. Continued inflammatory actions and violent protests on both sides ignited a four year protest (the second Intifada) that resulted in a weakened Palestinian Authority, an entrenched right-wing government in Israel, and more human casualties.

Recently, the Israeli/Palestinian conflict has experienced a period of calm, due in part to the death of Yassir Arafat. Violence on both sides abated while the Palestinians elected a new president, Mahmoud Abbas. Since his election, Abbas has met with Sharon and negotiations seem to be inching forward. However, the security wall continues to be built and the implementation of the Israeli pullout from Gaza is being threatened by Knesset and settler concerns.

Differing Viewpoints

In order to facilitate a deeper understanding of how nonviolent action might be advantageous for the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, the following section will highlight a few important issues from both the Palestinian and Israeli perspectives. The Palestinians have felt ignored as a people by all major actors in the conflict, and their connection to the physical land has been deemphasized. For the Israelis, they feel they have acted as any other state would have in protecting their national security.
The Palestinian View

An important Palestinian concern is that they feel they have been ignored since the days of Mandate Palestine. First of all, the British government ignored the fact that hundreds of thousands of “non-Jewish” people were living in the territory Lord Balfour was designating as future Jewish national home. Even though the language of the Balfour declaration states “that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine,” Palestinians argue that not only were these rights ignored in practice, but nothing was mentioned of their political rights.

The international community has been viewed as ignoring the Palestinians. The United Nations’ partition plan proposed the creation of an Arab state along with an Israeli state. But the percentage of Jewish inhabitants compared to Arabs was noticeably in favor of the Arabs, while the land designated for each group under the plan did not reflect those proportions. It seemed that the needs or demands of the Jewish residents were taking precedence over the Palestinians’ concerns.

A later example that particularly reflects the Palestinian feelings of being ignored by the international community was the first Intifada. While much could be debated on which nations were actively supporting or undermining the Palestinian cause, the historical record reveals that little was done to address Palestinian concerns before the uprising began. Israel had continued to build settlements and perpetuate the government administration of the territories. Most powerful nations, including United States, were not involving themselves in the debate. Arab nations continued to use the Palestinians
issue for their own gains instead of bringing about significant change in the situation. A popular uprising forced the international community to take notice.

Importantly, the United Nations issued more resolutions, but to no effect. Israel had historically responded with disdain towards international criticism, except from the United States. Hence, the United States receives some burden of blame for the lack of involvement and inquiry into what was actually happening in the territories, as well as why the uprising was cast in a violent light. Some consideration can be granted because the United States’ focus on the changing Soviet bloc began around the same time period. Still, the nearly complete absence of involvement substantiates the assertion that the American government was deliberately ignoring the uprising and therefore holds some responsibility for the continuing conflict.

Arab states have really had their own interests in mind, while espousing concern for the Palestinians. This has occurred since before the War in 1948. Other Arab countries in the region united with the Palestinians in rhetoric against partition, but their actual readiness for war and political aims did not coincide with the Palestinians (Goldschmidt, 246; Sayigh, 28-29). After a declaration of Independence by Israel, Arab armies from Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon engaged the Israelis in an effort to prevent the continuation of their state. The Israelis frustrated Arab aspirations and created a more complex situation in which Palestinians attempted to gain Arab support.

Thereafter, Jordan maintained control over the West Bank and Egypt administered the Gaza Strip. At times, it seemed that both countries desired to assimilate the territory under their own national government. For the most part, the leaders of Arab nations worked to undermine Palestinian national aspirations. Indeed, at various times Arab
leaders, including Gamal Abd al-Nasser, pushed for a Palestinian representative body. But these attempts were most often the outgrowth of personal aspirations rather than concern for Palestinian needs (Sayigh, 23; Hassassain, 75). Arab threats to Israel increased and Palestinians wanted to believe that Nasser and others could get their territory back. Unfortunately for the Palestinians, Israel resoundingly defeated the Arab armies and took over the West Bank and Gaza in June 1967.

The blow to the Arab psyche was tremendous. However, strong Palestinian resistance to assimilation in other countries and the occupation by Israel resulted from the greater Arab failure. Various liberation organizations formed, the main one being the PLO. However, most of these resistance groups engaged in armed struggle, which became more of an assertion of national identity than an effective means of taking back territory. In short, Palestinians took on their own struggle in part because other Arab nations could not and did not want to do anything to form a Palestinian-Arab state.

For Israel’s part, they tried to ignore the Palestinians as a people. Israel demonstrated this by seeking to have Jordan take over the West Bank instead of negotiating with Palestinians. As well, Israel flatly refused to negotiate or have public contact with the PLO. Although their publicly stated reasons for this were valid (i.e. that they did not want to negotiate with a terrorist organization), their intention was to strike at the heart of the Palestinian national movement. In fact, the Knesset framed a law that made it illegal to meet with anyone connected to the PLO. Not until 1993, when the secret negotiations at Oslo were discovered, was it acceptable to publicly refer to the PLO. These actions demonstrate Israel’s attempt to marginalize Palestinian aspirations. And even more to this point are the continuous construction of settlements in the Palestinian territories, and

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the reference to these areas by many in Israel as Judea and Samaria. Finally, the public
declarations throughout the conflict that Israel has no responsibility for the Palestinian
refugee problem are a symbolic slap in the face. While the refugee problem is most likely
a result of several factors— including voluntary withdrawal (whether out of fear or
thinking the fight would be over quickly), Israeli intimidation, and a lack of assistance
from other Arab nations— the insistence of Israel to ignore their part has been
disrespectful to Palestinians. Thus the Palestinians feel that their rights and aspirations
have been deliberately ignored by all the main actors involved in the conflict.

Current conditions in the Middle East may not allow these actors to overlook the
Palestinian situation any longer. The Iraq War of 2003 has brought renewed attention to
the region, particularly from the United States. This increased attention has precipitated
more discussion of the role of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict in Middle Eastern politics,
and has also opened a new opportunity for Palestinians to voice their concerns. As well,
the United States would likely serve their interests best in Iraq (i.e. to legitimize the Iraqi
government and minimize the insurgency), by more rapidly helping to resolve the
Palestinian/Israeli conflict. In the very least, the United States must pressure Israel into
concessions that will prevent the Palestinian issue from becoming a hindrance to the
efforts in Iraq. With an effective shift in strategy, Palestinians could take advantage of
this situation and secure more concessions.

Another important Palestinian concern that permeates their perception of the conflict
is the de-emphasis of their connection to the physical land of the former Mandate area.
The partition of the land is likely the most salient manifestation of this de-emphasis. On
the issue of partition Palestinians agree that the Holocaust was horrific and unjustifiable.
Yet why should they give up their traditional homeland when they had no part in prosecuting the atrocities. The continuous construction of Israeli settlements is also a direct expression of what Palestinians feel is a concerted effort to separate them from the land.

**The Israeli View**

The aspirations for a Jewish homeland surfaced mainly in the writings of Theodor Herzl. His writings became the basis for Zionism, the Jewish nationalist political movement to secure a self-sufficient Jewish entity that could effectively defend Jewish interests. As Zionism gained momentum, members looked for a territory to settle. Palestine held deep religious significance, and some pushed for it to become the gathering place. Lord Balfour’s declaration was seen as a green light for Jews to begin gathering to Palestine. The Jews secured land and began farming it. While they were heavily outnumbered, the Jews compensated with skilled lobbying and effective land acquisition. Despite some British attempts to limit immigration, the Jews continued to settle more people from an increasingly hostile Europe. Unlike the Arab Palestinians, the Jews threw their support behind the Allies and it paid off. After realizing what Hitler was attempting to accomplish, the Jews felt having their own state was even more necessary. No other nation had experienced a similar threat to its existence. World opinion coupled with British abdication of the Mandate provided an opportunity to give Palestinians and Jews their own state. Although not fully pleased with the specifications, the Jews accepted partition because it gave them something. Israel was established and immediately attacked. Israel defeated most of the Arab armies and secured more land.
than previously given. In their minds, they had not declared war and thus any gains were part of strengthening national security and also the consequences of losing the war.

Neighboring Arab countries continued to publicly threaten the security and ultimately the existence of the state of Israel. Many Israelis felt the need to establish greater security measures to ensure their safety. One solution was to create a buffer zone, which meant taking over the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Others thought normalization with the nations who controlled the territories would successfully obtain security. Needless to say, Israel maintained a combat ready force with reserves for the next 30 years.

The 1956 war was stated to be over trade, specifically shipping through the Suez Canal, but some feel that Israel wanted to expand their territory and demonstrate their dominating military strength. Israel colluded with France and Great Britain to invade and secure the canal. France's and Britain's involvement and instigation, as well as the two superpowers' immediate demands to leave provided a sufficient cover for Israel's withdrawal.

While hotly debated, the Six-Day War was simply an act of self-defense from Israel's perspective. They were certain that Egypt and Syria would attack and took measures to prevent the loss of Israeli lives. Israel felt justified in securing more land because it would help deter future attacks (Tessler 1994, 412). Israel also warned Jordan not to enter the conflict. When Jordan disregarded the advice, Israel took the opportunity to secure another buffer area. As well, reuniting Jerusalem had always been a hope and design of most Israelis (Tessler 1994, 411). But the main justification was national security and Israel stated it was acting in the same manner as any nation would act to establish security.
Israel maintained that it would not discuss territorial compromise until the neighboring Arab nations committed to recognize Israel's legitimacy and right to security. Despite private reassurances, Israel saw no tangible indication that any Arab nation was willing to do so. As Tessler indicates, moderate Arab leaders who may have supported such action were inhibited by the influence of rejectionist elements on their populations (1994, 410-411). Also, the Khartoum conference of Arab states (held in August of 1967) had issued a resolution rejecting any recognition, negotiation, and peace with Israel, thus reinforcing Israel's perception.

Israel was embarrassed and unnerved by Egypt's surprise attack in 1973. Although they regrouped and pushed deeper into Egyptian land, the Israeli's could not account for the intelligence failure. Israeli citizens experienced more hardship (in loss of life) and transposed the blame to the government in power. The shift to a more conservative government was facilitated by the emphasis of a continuing threat to the security of the nation. Also, the Yom Kippur War perpetuated the Israeli belief that its neighboring nations were simply biding their time to expose a weakness and attack.

The continuing refusal (until a few years ago) of the Palestinians and most Arab nations to recognize Israel and to publicly commit not to attack have provided justification for the Israeli government's foot-dragging in negotiations. The salient concern of Israel is security. Whether or not Israel's actions have contributed to the security problem is debatable, but the Israelis have been able to minimize outside intervention through the argument that their national security continues to be threatened. They have also been able to withstand intense international pressure partly by convincing the United States that their security remains in jeopardy.
It is this same emphasis on security that has helped to unify Israel’s diverse political camps. For example, the Lebanon War caused great debate among Israeli parties. The Sabra and Shatilla massacre precipitated widespread protest. A crowd of 150,000 gathered in Tel Aviv to demand the resignation of Ariel Sharon, the minister of Defense. The government lost support and Israeli society began to polarize. However, the onset of the first Intifada brought on the decades old agreement that when Israel was threatened, ideologies were set aside and political parties came together to defend the country. Because the first Intifada was perceived by Israelis as threatening, it had the same unifying effect as previous wars.

Strategies

With the events of the conflict clearly in mind, the discussion now resumes of what strategies have been employed in the conflict. The consequences of those strategies are particularly important. If the dominant strategy has been violent, then what are the results? If nonviolence has been conducted, what have been the outcomes? Also, have the strategies secured the major goals of both sides? These questions will be answered in this section.

For the purposes of this thesis, success will be determined by the achievement of ultimate goals. This conclusion is plausible, especially when looking at political success. For example, a candidate for President or Prime Minister may successfully achieve goals of rallying party support, constructing the perception of an opponent, or amount of campaigning in key areas. But in the end, if the candidate is not elected (the ultimate goal) then the campaign is not successful.
The Palestinian Strategy

The Palestinian struggle for statehood has been dominated by violent action for over 30 years. While methods of violence and nonviolence were implemented, numerous examples will show that violent struggle has had highest priority. Each time period will be examined and analyzed to discover what strategy is reflected. Also, the results of those strategies will demonstrate that the stated goals of the Palestinian resistance movement have not been achieved.

Pre-1948 through 1967: From the early days of the Mandate, Palestinians have used boycotts and strikes to express their concerns. In 1936 a general strike by Palestinian shop owners began in response to, among other things, Britain’s immigration policy, the stagnancy of plans for a Palestinian state, and purchases of Arab lands. The strike lasted for almost six months. It expanded into a larger revolt that lasted until 1939 (Bennett 1990, 45). The six-month strike caused plenty of discomfort and inconvenience, but it did not change Britain’s position on Jewish immigration. Guerilla warfare comprised the majority of the revolt strategy, and resulted in a ‘White Paper’ (a British policy) that limited the number of Jewish immigrants. The violence that accompanied this revolt, along with other armed resistance campaigns, contributed to the British admitting that they could no longer administer the Mandate in Palestine. Thus, it seems that violent armed struggle resulted in the successful ousting of British rule in Palestine.

But was this the ultimate goal of the armed struggle? Actually, the ultimate goal was the establishment of a Palestinian state on all of the Mandate territory. The British exit opened the door for the UN to decide what to do with Palestine. World opinion was supportive of (and voted for) establishing a Jewish national entity on part of the land of
Palestine. While the UN also designated an area for a Palestinian state, the main goal (stated above) was not met.

Palestinian strategy coincided with other Arab rhetoric in supporting an armed response to the Partition Plan. However, Arab forces were ineffective in pushing back Israeli forces, and lost more territory during Al Nakba. Despite the defeat, the Palestinians continued to align with the Arab countries in supporting armed resistance against Israel. The rhetoric and sporadic skirmishes increased until the Six Day War in which Israel took over the West Bank and Gaza.

Ian Lustick extrapolates an important influence on the Palestinian strategy against the British and later the Israelis. He argues that the strategy of Palestinian violence towards the British or the Jews was not intended to frighten them, but to encourage Palestinian support. Lustick supports this through the writings of several Palestinian authors which mock the Palestinian people for their lack of action before and after Israel's War of Independence. Several individuals, some of whom were the subject of these poems, whose actions sought to arouse Palestinian action were Shaikh Izz id-Din al-Qassam, Abd al-Rahim Mahumud, and Gassan Kanafani (Lustick 1995, 534-36). The point is that these men engaged in and encouraged a violent strategy in order to affirm Palestinian identity and inspire others to join the struggle. Lustick's insight can be proven by the later actions of the PLO and other militant organizations that conducted raids against Israel after the Six-Day War. As Yezid Sayigh noted, these operations were often physically ineffective against Israel, but for the Palestinians, they were a tool of recruitment and a means of asserting Palestinian national identity (Sayigh 1997, 26). He stated: "Military action confirmed that the Palestinians, to themselves above all, were
active participants in shaping their own destiny, rather than passive victims (Sayigh 1997, 27). Lustick’s and Sayigh’s analysis demonstrate that the Palestinian strategy during these periods was more dominantly violent.

**Post-1967 through the First Intifada:** The PLO was created based on the principle of armed struggle to gain back the territory lost to Israel in the Six-Day War and the War of Independence (Laquer 2001, 117). During the 1970s and 80s, the PLO and other movements carried out guerilla and terrorist warfare, while simultaneously engaging in institution building and diplomacy. Some notably violent events included the PFLP’s destruction of a jet airplane, the killing of Israeli athletes in Munich, and the series of clandestine attacks in Northern Israel that contributed to the Lebanon War.

Violent struggle found expression against targets besides Israel. In the early 1970s, Palestinians engaged the Jordanian army after attempts on King Hussein’s life and attempts to acquire more power in the Jordanian government. The rebellion was put down resoundingly, and Jordan expelled the PLO. After Jordan’s rejection, the PLO moved to Lebanon where PLO forces engaged various Lebanese factions, Syrian encroachments, and Israel in armed combat on numerous occasions. The PLO had evolved to the point of providing security and partial government functions to the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. Israel recognized this and launched the Lebanon offensive in part to dismantle that threat. The PLO leadership moved into exile following the Lebanon War, but still coordinated and condoned armed resistance against Israel. Numerous instances of sabotage and attempts to land on Israeli shores have been documented.
However, some nonviolent action also occurred. Yasser Arafat addressed the United Nations in 1974 and engaged in nonviolent diplomatic efforts through the UN and the Arab League. The PLO attempted to contact US state department officials as well as Israeli representatives to set up dialogue. A strategy shift seemed to be forming in the early 1980s leading up to the first 

Intifada.

Ian Lustick argues that the shift in strategy was not necessarily from violence to nonviolence. In fact, he contends that the Palestinians shifted audiences rather than methods. He states, “An important purpose of the uprising for most Palestinians and its central purpose for the elites who have emerged out of it was to hurt Israelis….The objectives, very clearly and explicitly, were to intimidate, scare, [and] ‘terrorize’ the Israelis into ending the occupation by raising the felt costs of continuing it” (Lustick 1995, 550). Lustick’s insights illustrate that some scholars of the region did not agree with the assertion that the first 

Intifada as a shift towards nonviolent action.

In 1987 the 

Intifada began with a mix of nonviolent and violent action. Young people battled Israeli troops with stones and street demonstrations. Small government committees sprang up to try and coordinate the activities. A group called the “Unified Command” or the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) distributed leaflets calling for specific types of action, both violent and nonviolent.

The 

Intifada contained a larger portion of nonviolent protest than previous Palestinian actions. This protest was expressed through nonpayment of taxes, mass demonstrations of support for the PLO, and the formation of parallel government. The town of Beit Shahur rallied behind a small number of pharmacists who refused to pay taxes. When the

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military responded with confiscation of materials and disbanding of schools, the
townspeople set up underground schools and hospitals.

However, not all action in the first Intifada reflected commitment to nonviolence.
Despite a fair amount of nonviolent action, some Palestinian groups by the end had
resorted to violent resistance including direct encounters with the IDF and Israeli settlers.
Israeli settlers and Palestinian informants were killed. The Unified Command issued
some leaflets calling for violent action.

While some nonviolent methods were prevalent they were not necessarily employed
because of a commitment to a new strategy. Philip Grant admits this in talking about the
first Intifada: “Although most of the methods employed by resisters were nonviolent, by
no means could these activities be labeled a ‘nonviolent movement.’...Almost all
Palestinians, if asked, would have repeated the PLO party line that only through armed
struggle could all of Palestine be liberated” (1990, 61-62). The PLO leadership outside
the territories tried to assume a nonviolent posture, but could not totally disassociate
themselves from earlier actions and popular rhetoric. Those in decision-making positions
seemed inconsistent in adopting nonviolence as their primary strategy.

Oslo through the Present: For Palestinians, violent struggle has been integrated into stated
policy and practical application. Only until 1988 was there a marked change in public
discourse of armed struggle. Still, violent components of Palestinian society, including
HAMAS and Arafat supported Fatah groups, have continued to carry out operations
against Israel. Even the Palestinian Authority (PA) has been repeatedly criticized for its
own repressive measures. Thus even during the Oslo period the Palestinian strategy has
reflected some deference to violence.
The Oslo agreements were seen by most as the beginning of the process towards a solution in the Palestinian/Israeli conflict. Importantly (and perhaps one of the successes of the Oslo Accords) the two opponents recognized each other's legitimate claim to exist. Despite heavy criticism from various factions with their societies, Israel and the PLO chose a strategy of negotiation.

Yet this strategy has not delivered the comprehensive win-win solution that so many expected. Many authors have conducted a critical analysis of the Oslo agreements and their results, and found them lacking. Numerous theories have been proposed about why Oslo has not succeeded. Some have focused on the individual decision makers, while others have criticized the structure of the agreements. While more of these criticisms will be addressed later, it seems the general conclusion is that the negotiation strategy failed. The eruption of the second Intifada is a clear manifestation of this.

The return to a more violent strategy (in the second Intifada) did not secure an equitable solution, let alone the particular goals of either side. Israeli forces were redeployed into previously designated autonomous Palestinian areas. The infrastructure and security forces of the Palestinian Authority were decimated. Israel's security bubble was intermittently popped by suicide bombings. Both sides engaged in actions that undermined each others public calls for peace. The progress of the Oslo era was unraveled as each side seemed intent to win what Rothstein calls the "race to the bottom" (2002, 1). Israeli security and Palestinian self-determination seemed further away than before the Declaration of Principles (DOP).

The second Intifada was not the first attempt at a strategy of violence. The familiarity with this type of strategy was not new to either side. Palestinians seemed determined to
show the Israelis that they would not continue to accept foot-dragging in the negotiation process. Again, their intent seemed to be to increase the costs of maintaining control of the territories (See Lustick 1995, 550).

The lack of any noticeable strategy shifts in the current conflict is apparent. The death of Arafat, more than a particular maneuver from either side, seems to be responsible for the current cease-fire and the ‘warm conditions’ between Abbas and Sharon. If one uses past experience as a guide, the chances of the ceasefire continuing, let alone steps toward a final settlement, are minimal.

Israeli Strategy

The largest component of Israel’s strategy has been violent as well. The response to Palestinian armed resistance and Arab aggression has been couched as defensive in nature, but several examples of offensive violence exist. Even with the understandable response to suicide bombings aside, the targeted killings, demolitions for land acquisition, and the Lebanon War combine to designate the Israeli strategy against the Palestinians as violent. As well, the treatment of Palestinians at border crossings and general border closures should be included in the violence category.

Pre-1948 through 1967: Following the Balfour Declaration, many Jewish Zionists sought to increase their influence in Mandate Palestine. The Jewish National Fund procured land from wealthy absentee land owners and even local farmers. Many Jews engaged in concerted efforts to lobby for British support of Jewish immigration and fulfilling Lord Balfour’s declaration. However, when Britain began to back off from its assurances of Jewish self-governance—most directly in various policies limiting Jewish immigration
and land purchases—and addressing Arab violence towards Jews with less than earnest response, some Jews believed they needed to begin their own plan to push the British out.

Jabotinsky founded the Irgun which focused efforts on terrorizing the British and further motivating them to leave Palestine. The bombing of the King David Hotel and the massacre of Deir Yassin are two prominent examples of Israeli terrorist violence. Probably more importantly, at least in the context of important issues in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, Deir Yassin became a source of fear that motivated many Palestinians to leave their homes (Tessler 1994, 292, 294).

Israel also continued aggressive actions against Palestinian commandos in Gaza and the West Bank. Specifically, David Ben-Gurion, now the Defense Minister, began the practice of retaliatory action in response to Palestinian operations within Israel. Ben-Gurion’s successor at the post, Pinhas Lavon, along with Moshe Dayan (Chief of Staff) continued the practice in sometimes uncoordinated and irresponsible ways (Tessler 1994, 340-41). These actions increasingly strained the relationships with Egypt and Jordan. When Ben-Gurion took over the Defense Ministry again in 1955, he increased the level of severity in an attempt to deter additional raids which further alienated Israel from Egypt (Tessler 1994, 342-43). A particularly destructive raid against Egyptian and Palestinian forces in February of 1955 broke the proverbial camel of the Israeli/Egyptian relationship (Tessler 1994, 345). Eventually, Israel addressed the commando problem by colluding with French and British forces in taking control of Egyptian territory in the 1956 Suez War. More importantly, these retaliatory practices were establishing a precedent for future response to Palestinian raids. Tessler concludes that “the pattern of infiltration and violence was intolerable to Israel, and the government in Jerusalem soon
adopted a deterrent strategy based on retaliatory strikes that were far more severe than the original provocations” (Tessler 1994, 344).

The tit-for-tat exchanges between Israeli and Palestinian forces came to symbolize the Palestinian (and Arab) relationship with Israel for the bulk of the conflict. Indeed the continual attacks and responses between Egypt (and later Syria) and Israel laid the groundwork for the Six-Day War in 1967. The preemptive strike and subsequent infiltration of Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian territory cast Israel as the aggressor. But it is likely that most nations would have acted similarly in context of the Arab rhetoric and military build-up on the Israeli borders. Israel maintained that it had acted to stop an imminent threat and reduce casualties, but the war still resulted in great destruction.

Post-1967 through the First Intifada:

With the occupation of the Palestinian territories, Israel seemed to be at a point where continued violence would decrease. But Palestinian guerilla movements increased in size and in frequency of attacks. An increase in guerilla raids brought increasing reprisals from the Israeli government. The whole 20 year period from the Six-Day War to the first Intifada reflected constant military exchanges between Israel and the Palestinians. As well, actions against Egypt continued, especially during the War of Attrition that saw constant skirmishes and artillery exchanges and several Israeli air strikes intended to deter further Egyptian attacks.

However, the fact that the Yom Kippur War in 1973 caught the Israelis off guard leads one to believe that Israel had become comfortable with the level of military action it was experiencing. The large number of resulting Israeli casualties not only ushered in a new era of conservative government, but contributed to the security argument so often
used by Israel to justify excessive responses to Palestinian attacks during this time period. A similar argument was adopted in justifying the Israeli invasion of Lebanon.

Few questioned the validity of rooting out the PLO in Lebanon, but many disagreed with the tactics used to accomplish this. The Sabra and Shatila massacre, although not perpetrated by the IDF, was a direct result of Israeli choice to invade Lebanon (Goldschmidt 1999, 338). This caused many groups to question the decision to go to war, and more generally the whole shift in Israeli society, from what they felt was a historically defensive stance to an offensive one.

Israel drove the PLO out of Lebanon, but the instability created by the war allowed Syria to obtain effective control of the Lebanese government. As well, the Israeli push to eliminate the PLO base solidified its place in the Palestinian psyche as their representative entity and further entrenched the Palestinian belief that Israel was committed to the use of force to resolve its political disputes. While still dealing with military operations in Lebanon, the first Intifada erupted.

The Israeli government’s strategy from the beginning was to end the uprising with overwhelming force before it spread. Prime Minister Shamir reflected this strategy in speaking about an Israeli tourist site in the West Bank: “Anybody who wants to damage this fortress and other fortresses we are establishing will have his head smashed against the boulders and walls” (NYT 4/01/1988, A3). The army moved quickly to quell demonstrations, but the Palestinians only came out in greater force for the next protest. When the first level of suppression did not work, Rabin instituted heavier deterrence methods including collective arrests, house demolitions, and using rubber bullets (NYT 9/28/1988, A1). For example, the military administration altered several laws to allow
the army to arrest and detain suspected protestors for six months without charges and the
detention could be renewed indefinitely. Israel had to create several detention facilities to
handle the large number of prisoners (NYT 6/03/1988, A1). Also, Israel carried out the
assassination of Palestinians suspected of orchestrating attacks on Israel. Although they
did not acknowledge it officially, during April of 1988 Israel was responsible for the
assassination of Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad) the PLO’s military leader. As well, the
Israelis were somewhat successful in portraying the Palestinian uprising as violent, but
the actions of the Israeli army were severe enough that most international actors
condemned Israel. Although the uprising continued for almost four years, it gradually lost
momentum, due in part to the heavy handed Israeli response. The strategy of violent
repression and deterrence of the first Intifada became routine for the Israeli Army, which
had ramifications for later actions after the Oslo Accords.

**Oslo through the Present:** While the reasons are debated as to why Israel and the PLO
finally came to an agreement, the events of the Oslo Accords seemed to reflect a change
in Israeli strategy. A majority of Israelis seemed united behind Rabin’s plan of trading
land for peace. The negotiating table became the main theatre of contact between
Palestinians and Israelis. The Israeli/Palestinian conflict may well have been resolved
through such methods had Rabin not been killed by an Israeli extremist in 1995.

Although Netanyahu’s government seemed to continue the negotiation strategy by
signing the Hebron Agreement, the shift in conciliatory limits was obvious. As well, his
government began to systematically link all Israeli movements towards a resolution with
whether or not the Palestinians met their agreed to obligations. The Palestinians expected
similar compliance. With such unrealistic expectations, the advances of Oslo seemed to
be slipping away. The Israeli army continued its retaliatory practices and even engaged in targeted killings of suspected HAMAS and Islamic Jihad terrorists.

Many thought the situation could be salvaged by Ehud Barak. But his attempts to secure a Syrian peace agreement diverted his efforts from working with the Palestinians. As well, Palestinian suicide bombings had soured the Israeli appetite for peace. By the time he came around to negotiate, Barak and Arafat were in politically precarious positions. President Clinton attempted to secure an agreement by inviting the two leaders to Camp David in July of 2000. The leaders were not prepared, nor did they have the support to make significant agreements (Quandt 2001, 364-68). In the end, neither side had anything to show for their efforts, and the lack of agreement only solidified Israeli and Palestinian frustration with each other.

Violence broke out in 2000 after Ariel Sharon's visit to the Dome of the Rock. Palestinians called for another Intifada, and Israel responded with heavy-handed violent actions. The second Intifada was underway. Since that time, the Likud coalition has retained power and continued the strategy of overwhelming force. HAMAS and Islamic Jihad resumed their violent bombings and the government has returned in kind with targeted killings and demolitions. As well, the IDF inserted itself into PA controlled territories, destroying infrastructure and crippling government effectiveness. A particularly violent episode occurred in Jenin when the IDF conducted a campaign of terrorist dismantlement.

Despite the current negotiations that have inched forward between Sharon and Abbas, the Israeli strategy does not seem to have changed. Although a military pull-out in Gaza is seemingly close, approval must be made by a Knesset that seems partially hostile to the
idea. As well, the powerful settler lobby has promised to fight any dismantling and forced relocation of settlers. As well, the retaliation for suicide bombings and Sharon’s security wall continue without major obstacles.

The Results of Palestinian and Israeli Strategies

Newton’s third law states that for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction. The same could be applied to human behavior, especially in political action. It is important to know the results one desires, so the appropriate action can be taken to achieve them. For the Palestinians, they desire (in general terms) a nation-state wherein they can secure their rights to self-determination (Laquer 2001, 413). What were the results of over 30 years of struggling? During this period the PLO lost allies in Egypt and Jordan. The Palestinians have been unable to disrupt Israel’s ability to annex and expropriate Palestinian land. Concurrently, Israel settled a constant flow of its citizens on lands within the West Bank and Gaza.

The dominantly violent strategy employed so far has not achieved the stated goals of the Palestinian national movement. The PLO charter, which reflects the goals of the most accepted representative of the Palestinian people, states that the PLO’s goal is to establish a Palestinian state. While the definition and dimensions of that state have changed over time (i.e. that the PLO now seeks for a separate nation-state alongside Israel not one established on the whole of Mandate Palestine), the fact remains that the main goal is state building. Obviously the Palestinians have not achieved their major goal through armed struggle. A new strategy could prove more beneficial in reaching their goal.

Several realities have resulted from the strategy of violence. For Israel, they have been able to establish themselves as the dominant military in the Middle East. As well,
those who support holding on to the Palestinian territories would argue that their violent strategy has helped them do just that. Currently, the continued violence empowers extreme elements in Israel and the Palestinian territories. And as the violence continues, it seems that both societies shift their support towards these extreme elements.

The two nations are caught in a cycle of violence. Some would argue that portions of their societies have employed nonviolent methods. Yet they have done so while at the same time, other parts of their society have prosecuted violence. The results of this mixed action—nonviolence and violence—are not conclusive. Advocates of nonviolence indicate that the presence of violence is not as undermining as the support for violence in a nonviolent campaign. Evidence indicates that a less than complete nonviolent strategy yields a less than complete solution. Israel has continued its settlements and land accumulation, and its security continues to be threatened. Palestinians are suffering in economic hardship and no closer to their own nation-state. It seems that their gains in autonomy are more like reminders that they have not yet gained the nation-state they desire. As Gandhi said, “Experience convinces me that permanent good can never be the outcome of untruth and violence.” (Gandhi 1996, 43).

However, one unstated goal of the Palestinian resistance movement has arguably been accomplished. As Lustick and Sayigh pointed out, one goal of the violent strategy was to reassert Palestinian identity and encourage greater support from the Palestinian people. This has been accomplished. As to whether it could have been accomplished another way is debatable. More importantly, the continuing connection between Palestinian self-sufficiency and violent actions against Israel may be incongruent with an equitable resolution of the conflict.
It seems that a recent goal of the Palestinian movement is to threaten the security of Israel in order to motivate them to negotiate a settlement. Israel's number one concern (security) is consistently threatened. The suicide bombings have disrupted this. The constant fear that the next bus could be their last is an encroachment on their feeling of security. For some Palestinians this might appear a step towards victory. Yet is this real success? Are Israelis proving to be more apt to give up land or settlement policies? Israel's actions of the last few years answer that question decisively. The results of these violent actions (the bombings) only increase the nation's reliance on the more oppressive factions of the government. These extreme elements are able to retain their power and continue implementing exactly what the Palestinians do not want—Israeli settlements and land accumulation.

A poignant example is Sharon's building of the wall of security in the West Bank. He is able to use the continued violence, along with a lack of tangible United States displeasure, to justify the erection of the barrier to his people. The most dangerous outcome of this is the possibility that the wall will define future boundaries for the Palestinian state. Even though the World Court has ruled it illegal and the United Nations has voted against it, Israel is not relenting. Their ability to deflect international criticism for their violent actions has been enabled for the most part by the United States. But Palestinian violence has prevented the full impact of these unjust Israeli actions on Israeli society. In sum, the dominance of violence in the Palestinian strategy has not accomplished ultimate Palestinian goals. As the examples above indicate, the strategy of violence may actually prevent the realization of those ultimate aims.
For Israel the consequences of 50 years of violence are measurable. Simha Landau provides some quantification of the effect of violence on Israeli society in his study of crime rates. Specifically, Landau tracks the increase of violent crime and petty crime from 1948 through 1999. He notes important correlations between increases in crime and periods of conflict like the first Intifada (2002, 134). Essentially, the level of societal stress is related to the crime rate. The continuous state of war within Israel increases social stress which in turn increases the crime rate. The constant stress from conflict has played a role in the “brutalization of Israeli society” (2002, 135). Landau predicts that the level of stress and crime will continue to increase, at least in the near future (2002, 144).

Jerome Slater suggests that the continual violence and intransigence of the Israeli government towards creating a Palestinian state has actually contributed to the worsening security problem. He contends that Israel’s blocking of Palestinian goals has contributed to the increased popularity of extreme groups in Palestinian society and the continuation of the security threat of suicide bombers. Essentially, the Israeli response to the Palestinians has strengthened the opposition to Israel and actually decreased the security of the state (Slater 1991, 417-18).

Conclusion

The region of the Middle East has been an area of constant fighting over the last 50 years. The Palestinian/Israeli conflict accounts for a large portion of the military exchanges and diplomatic efforts directed at the region. Although the political realities of the Cold War influenced the direction and protraction of the conflict, the fact that
hostilities continue despite the demise of Soviet Communism demonstrate that it is political reality that must be dealt with if political stability is to be obtained.

Each side has deep held and time hardened viewpoints that they feel are justifiable. But the lack of compromise and prevalence of blaming do not allow either side to see things from the other's point-of-view. In many ways these perspectives seem irreconcilable. Each side must make an effort to resolve those differences because they will be living alongside one another for a long time.

While perspectives of the conflict differ, both sides have engaged in similar strategies of violence to accomplish their respective goals. Some positive results have come from these actions. Most all Palestinians, regardless of ideology, have a strong sense of national identity which was solidified by armed struggle. The PLO benefited the most from this struggle in that their position of power increased and they became the major representative of Palestinian aspirations. They also secured greater international attention through violence, while at the same time engaging in diplomatic relations, most notably within the United Nations. From its own perspective, Hamas has also benefited from violent struggle. Their popularity continues to increase with each reprisal from Israel.

For Israel, they have established a self-perception of strength and military superiority through their strategy of violence. As well, for those who seek to hold onto the Palestinian territories, violence has secured Israel more territory. Like Hamas, various extreme groups within Israel continue to benefit from the violence. The settler movement finds justification for retaining the territories to ensure security for themselves and the nation. More importantly, the Likud party has been able to retain power and support for their hard-lined policies by emphasizing the continued security threat the Israel.
But these successes have not necessarily moved the parties towards an equitable resolution of the conflict or towards the overall goals and aspirations of the majority of either society. As mentioned above, many Israelis support the more extreme government because of the security threat. As well, regardless of which parties has been in power, security has consistently been the major issue or stated goal of Israel’s negotiations with the Palestinians. Slater argues that Israel’s hard line has actually decreased Israeli security because it produces political fodder for extreme Palestinian groups like Hamas to generate greater support (1991, 413-14; 1997, 679-81). The increasing popularity of Hamas is strong evidence that this is the case.

For most Palestinians, they look to an establishment of self-governing state as their goal. The PLO continues to work for its preservation within this process of state building. Various groups work for an establishment of a state that reflects their democratic or socialist beliefs, but the main goal is the same (Laqueur 2001, 436-439; 525-26). Even extremist groups have state-building as their goal, although their aim is to replace the state of Israel with a Palestinian or Islamic state (Laqueur 2001, 341-43). But a Palestinian state has not been established. Violent struggle has attempted to force that establishment, but the results are continuing Israeli control of most of the territories. Israel has retained its position of power within the realm of negotiations and continues to dictate several aspects of Palestinian life. The continual imbalance has increased the popularity and support of extreme groups like Hamas and their violent response to Israeli action. As both extreme elements of Israeli and Palestinian society become more entrenched, the conflict has the potential to deteriorate at an accelerated rate. Hence, a new strategy must be employed.
CHAPTER 5

THE CASE FOR NONVIOLENCE

How will a change in strategy to more nonviolence bring about a different result? As mentioned previously, the Palestinian campaign has emphasized violent struggle over nonviolent resistance. Israel's own strategy has been dominated by violence. Thus the full potential of nonviolent action has not been realized. This section will investigate each side's use of nonviolent methods and what the results of those efforts have been. This should demonstrate a few things: (1) Palestinians are familiar with nonviolent action, (2) nonviolent groups within Israel are sympathetic to the Palestinian position but their ability to mobilize may depend on Palestinian employment of nonviolent protest, (3) current political conditions have created possibilities for more effective nonviolent action. As well, this section will outline how certain variables, including Arafat's death, the War on Terror, and the War in Iraq, could be potentially catalytic in facilitating the success of a nonviolent campaign. Next, the solutions for the Palestinian acceptance of a more nonviolent action in their struggle will be discussed followed by an analysis of the obstacles to accepting it as a strategy.
Palestinian Use of Nonviolence

Some scholars have discussed the first *Intifada* as the Palestinian campaign of nonviolence. Generally, the Palestinian action appeared to be systematically nonviolent. Stone throwing was more a sign of disdain and disrespect than an attempt to harm Israelis. It is obvious that the Palestinians were outnumbered militarily. Road blockades, non payment of taxes, boycotts of working in Israel or buying Israeli goods, and constructing alternative governing institutions reflect a nonviolent campaign. As well, the demonstrations and group marches that took place were far from chaotic or destructive on a large scale. From the Palestinian perspective, they engaged in a concerted effort of refusing to use lethal weapons to fight the Israelis. It seems plausible to conclude that the Palestinian uprising was a manifestation of nonviolent resistance.

Still, some scholars have tried to dismiss the nonviolent label of the first *Intifada*. The killing of settlers and Palestinian collaborators are non-characteristic of nonviolent movements. Some might contend that the majority did not condone such action, but the absence of condemnation from the leadership and public in general does not support that argument. As well, the occasional call from the UNLU for violent action demonstrates a lack making the conscious choice to be nonviolent (Gandhi) or to choose it as the most effective political tactic (Sharp). And the action of throwing an object—whether a rock, an explosive, or a shoe—can easily be perceived, and indeed is usually intended, as violent in some manner.

When compared with Gandhi’s and Sharp’s assumptions, the first *Intifada* does not qualify as nonviolent. Gandhi’s assumptions of no ill will as well as the choice to use nonviolence instead of violence are violated. Some may assert that the Palestinians made
a conscious choice in what action they carried out. But there is a difference in choosing to be less violent rather than nonviolent. Sharp's key of exploiting moral contradictions to facilitate power transfer is made obsolete by any violence. And the main principle of nonviolent action that the first Intifada does not comply with—one that both Sharp and Gandhi maintain is vital—is preserving nonviolent discipline throughout the campaign.

Again, stone throwing to the Palestinians was most likely perceived as an unarmed tactic. And in comparison with machine guns and tanks, rocks are practically insignificant. Still, in the realm of nonviolence, placing oneself, unarmed, in front of tanks and heavily armed soldiers, is very different than taking up sticks and rocks to fight. The former gives the impression of a deliberate choice to be nonviolent (an assumption of nonviolence), while the latter signifies the willingness to be violent if only they had the means. The Palestinian campaign, despite its obvious nonviolent tactics (protest funerals, strikes, and parallel institutions), displayed an acceptance and use of violence which negates its use as a nonviolent example from certain perspectives.

This perception of violence is important because, as mentioned above, of one of the key principles of nonviolence is maintaining nonviolent discipline. In Gene Sharp's conception, the opposition is forced to comply by the moral contradictions of suppressing nonviolent resistance with violence. Of particular importance is the population that supports the opposition group. When they perceive that a nonviolent campaign is actually violent, then that avenue of support and the important possibility of disunity within the opposition are negated. Thus it is paramount to ensure that those involved in the nonviolent struggle are seen to be strictly nonviolent in their actions.
Within Israel, and for the most part the United States, the first Intifada was portrayed as a violent uprising. For example, the New York Times published articles that employed terms that likely biased the readers towards the conflict. For instance, an article described a Palestinian demonstration, as a “riot” and another referred to the Israeli army’s position as “stern” rather than brutal (NYT, 9/28/1988). To some this painted the Palestinian side as the violent instigator and the Israeli side as the restrained defender. In order to prevent a similar labeling Palestinians must commit to and demonstrate a more complete implementation of nonviolent action according to its theoretical principles.

The next argument against a renewed Palestinian nonviolent movement is that their attempts at nonviolent action were ineffective. The example for this argument is the campaign in Beit Sahur, a West Bank township near Nablus. During the first Intifada, pharmacists in Beit Sahur decided to band together and not pay taxes. They wanted to protest the value-added tax (VAT) as well as Israel’s military presence. The Israeli army responded immediately. In successive events they confiscated store items, ID cards, and various personal items and levied heavy fines to try and coerce the pharmacists to begin paying again. They did not. The army responded to the resistance by surrounding Beit Sahur and cutting off their resources. The citizens formed committees to coordinate the maintenance of necessary community services and resistance tactics. The citizens simply refused to pay their taxes. The situation received some media attention and the PLO expressed support for the movement, but the resistance eventually collapsed when some citizens began paying taxes again.

Scholars use Beit Sahur to argue that the Palestinians attempted nonviolent struggle and failed. But the failure to outlast Israeli pressure was not simply because of the tactic
the Palestinians used. Arguably the breakdown occurred because of a lack of continuing public support from the PLO leadership in Tunis and the leadership within the territories about the success of the tax campaign. Also, the lack of large numbers of town and cities following suit allowed the Israeli army to focus more effort and resources on Beit Sahur. This inability of other Palestinian towns to follow suit may have resulted from the lack of agreement in how best to demonstrate Palestinian resistance to Israeli occupation. The UNLU did not seem concerned about focusing on a few effective tactics, but rather the encouragement of a wide variety of unarmed practices.

The first Intifada, with its nonviolent activities, was not necessarily a failure either. Some scholars, including those who see it as a nonviolent campaign, contend that it was very successful. Some substantive examples of this include Jordan renouncing its protectorate of the West Bank, the PLO seeking diplomatic contact with Israel and the United States, the increased international support for a two-state solution, and the events leading to the Oslo Accords.

But the uprising did not obtain its main objective which was to make the Palestinian territories so ungovernable that Israel would have to give up control. The reasons most likely stem from Israel’s oppressive practices, the deportation of Palestinians, and the lack of United States public outcry. As noted above, the lack of focus by the UNLU may have also contributed to the problems. Some might also argue the uprising ended because the PLO signed an agreement with Israel effectively establishing plans for a Palestinian government entity a part from the Israeli administrative authority. Others may argue that unarmed struggle prevented the Palestinians from effectively inducing Israel to give up the West Bank and Gaza, because Israel had complete use of its military to
enforce control. Besides the Israeli military was not held accountable for its actions. However, the lack of achieving the main objective may have partially resulted from the decreasing unity in the Palestinian leadership and the lack of commitment to nonviolent discipline.

In sum, the Palestinian experience with nonviolence is far from complete. Although several scholars assert that the first Intifada was the Palestinian attempt at nonviolence, the underlying assumptions and principles of nonviolence do not support that categorization. The reduction of violent resistance, compared to the previous two decades, was enormous, and the campaign was effective to a certain degree. The Palestinian actions may also be preparatory for future encounters in nonviolent action. But the lack of commitment to maintaining nonviolent resistance throughout the uprising, and the inability to be completely nonviolent in the prosecution of the first Intifada, support the conclusion that the movement was not the ultimate Palestinian experiment with nonviolent struggle.

In fact, this thesis proposes that the ability of the Palestinians to preserve the nonviolent character of the struggle is the key to future employment of nonviolent action. As has already been emphasized, Gandhi and Sharp (and most scholars supportive of nonviolence) overlap in their assessment of the need for nonviolent discipline throughout the campaign. In other words, this is the one principle that practically all theories of nonviolence agree on, therefore it must be satisfied in order for a movement to be designated as nonviolent.

Using the basis of frustration-aggression theory and other socialization theories, it is plausible that the Palestinians can be taught to employ nonviolent methods just as easily.
as violent ones. The key is to convince the society that a strategy shift is required. As has
been demonstrated, the current Palestinian strategy has not achieved the desired goals of
an end to the occupation and the establishment of a Palestinian state. Hence a persuasive
argument exists for a change in strategy, and that new strategy must be nonviolent.

Israeli Use of Nonviolence

Proponents of nonviolence were present in Israel before the first Intifada, but many
new organizations formed in response to the Israeli government’s repressive actions. But
most Israeli citizens supported the government, in large part because they perceived that
the Intifada was a violent uprising. Some nonviolent movements have since expired
while others are still working within the Israeli system. These include Peace Now, the
Women in Black, and Yesh Gvul. The success of a Palestinian shift to nonviolent
resistance would be assisted by effective nonviolent organizations within Israeli society.

But these organizations do not seem to have a measurable effect on Israeli policy in
the Palestinian territories. Although the organizations worked to highlight nonviolent
methods and Israeli violence directed against the Palestinians, the Israeli government
often thwarted their actions. On example was highlighted by the New York Times. Peace
Now attempted to organize a rally in the West Bank to encourage Palestinian support of
compromise. But the Israeli army sealed of the area to any outsiders, and only allowed
the members of the organization to speak and listen. The participants were driven in a
long procession to their spot and were not allowed by the military to interact with any
Palestinians along the way. Posters and pamphlets were also banned. Essentially, the
group could only protest amongst itself (NYT 5/29/1988, 9). Importantly, one organizer
of the event noted that most Israelis supported the government’s response to the Palestinian uprising suggesting that the average citizen perceived the Palestinian strategy to be violent. This likely prevented greater support of Peace Now and other nonviolent organizations.

But an even more important point about the actions of these nonviolent organizations was made by Daphna Golan, an Israeli activist heavily involved at the time with B’Tselem, the human rights watch dog for the Occupied Territories. In a letter to a friend, she admits that spending time in jail caused her to adjust her protest activities. Essentially, her point was that Israelis know that a problem exists with how the government conducted the managing of the Palestinian territories, but most are not willing to give up their livelihood for the cause (Hurwitz 1992, 104-05).

But these organizations may be able to assist in a Palestinian movement by engaging in nonviolent resistance against the Israeli government. This could facilitate policy change. Specifically, they could work to bring about pressure from the United States. Stanley Cohen contends that this possibility has not been effectively tried. Interestingly, many opposition groups have suggested that American pressure is the only way Israel will reach a settlement, but none of these groups seem willing to call for that pressure. Cohen notes that the issue of calling for pressure from the United States seems more taboo than refusing certain military service (Cohen, 1992, 193). The effect of such actions, in that some pressure might come, could facilitate the Palestinian shift to more nonviolent resistance.
Catalytic Factors

Unexpected change came with the passing of Yassir Arafat in the latter part of 2004. While celebrated as a ‘Founding Father’ by many Palestinians, his death is also seen as an opportunity to inject new ideas into the Palestinian government and secure more hopeful gains towards an acceptable solution with Israel. For Israel, Arafat’s passing is a key to obtaining security and a peaceful resolution. But whether he was the main force behind the threat to Israeli security and peace is debatable.

Arafat’s death and the subsequent election of Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) as the new Palestinian leader hold some promising advantages. However, most outside viewers have incorrectly concluded that a new era of peace is on the horizon. Those who have studied the conflict seem less optimistic about this new variable.

It is understandable why many academics feel this way when discovering what has changed in the Israeli/Palestinian relationship. Only one side (the Palestinians) has encountered a major change in recent months. Israel has not shifted or modified any major policy or practice. Critics might counter that Israel is going forward with its pull-out from Gaza. But this action was already moving forward before Arafat’s death. This is not to say that change is not possible on the Israeli side. But clearly, the dual passing of the Gaza pullout and the continuation of the controversial security wall by the Israeli cabinet signifies no major shift in Israeli policy or practice. Critics might contend that the Cabinet chose to modify the course of the wall to coincide more closely with the pre-1967 borders. The counter is that the Cabinet’s vote allows the wall to encompass settlements around Jerusalem that are far from the Armistice borders (NYT, 2/21/2005, A1).
In order for important and positive steps to be made in the conflict, both sides must change. The idea that only one side needs to alter its position implies that only one side is at fault. While elements of either side may argue from this perspective, many understand that this is not the case. A conflict of this length and magnitude requires concessions from both sides in order to reach a solution.

Another important factor is the United States-led campaign in Iraq. Not only did this disrupt the regional power distribution, but it created a long-term commitment for United States' interests in the Middle East besides Israel. The Bush Administration's increased focus on foreign policy and relations in the region are evidence of that. This new factor may be of particular importance to the Palestinians. If conflict resumes between Israel and the Palestinians, and the lack of real change leads one to believe it will, the Palestinian use of nonviolent action could pose a serious challenge to Israeli power. Even if violence does not resume, the Palestinian leadership should consider initiating a nonviolent campaign, in light of the United States' difficulties in Iraq. Specifically, the administration will be more likely to make concessions, or better, pressure Israel to do so, in order to increase the legitimacy of the United States' operation in Iraq.

Essentially, if the Palestinians were to engage in a nonviolent demonstration, then Israel would respond violently. The United States government would then either have to criticize the Israeli action or risk further discrediting of their position and stability in Iraq. The United States has demonstrated its commitment to fulfill its purpose in Iraq, even at the risk of disrupting long-established relationships, so the possibility of pressure on Israel becomes more likely.
Some may argue this is absurd because the United States has never stepped in to stop Israel’s actions in the Palestinian territories before and what motivation exists to start now? Yet it is clear that President Bush’s declared desire is to improve the American image in the Muslim world. The United States’ role in the Palestinian/Israeli conflict (particularly the relationship with Israel) has likely prevented positive perceptions from taking hold and engendered negative ones. In an attempt to secure the administration’s stated goal of democracy in Iraq, the President may be willing to apply more pressure than ever before.

Although historical evidence suggests that the United States will not drastically modify its Israeli policy, the War on Terror has noticeably altered the dynamics of United States foreign policy. The Administration’s recent commitment to democracy in the Middle East (Bush’s State of the Union, 2005) and to the continuing War on Terror have set the United States on a course that intersects with Palestinian aspirations.

As well, President Bush took the American position on the Palestinian situation to a new level through his comments in May 2005 after meeting with Mahmoud Abbas, the new Palestinian president. He emphasized that no changes to the 1949 armistice line would be acceptable without Palestinian agreement and stated, “This is the position of the United States today, and it will be the position of the United States at the time of final status negotiations” (International Herald Tribune 6/21/2005, “Is Bush Getting Serious About the Peace Process?”).

In essence, President Bush has committed the United States to follow through on its promises to help freedom-seeking people, or risk further security problems from volatile nations and disenchanted individuals that could strengthen terrorist organizations. When
faced with the decision of maintaining national security or straining long-held relationships, President Bush has demonstrated he will choose security. The long standing closeness between Israel and the United States presents a challenge to this principle. Past experiences demonstrate that the United States government’s position towards the Palestinians has been words with very little action. Yet in the realm departing from precedent, the President has already shown his willingness to discuss a two-state solution, which no President before publicly endorsed. Thus the possibility exists that US-Israeli relations could be strained over the declared United States intention of supporting democracy in the Middle East.

Even a change in the Presidency will not likely alter the course of foreign policy. The war on Terror and the securing of Iraqi democracy are part of a lengthy process. Any new president will find it difficult to modify this direction. Also, the breaking of precedent, in that a two-state solution is now part of diplomatic discussion, leaves open the opportunity for the next president to expand. For instance, Jimmy Carter’s ability to bring Israel and Egypt (two nations who had consistently threatened and fought each other over the previous 30 years) together at Camp David set important precedent for Bill Clinton to offer the same option to Israel and the Palestinians in 2000.

In sum, these recent factors open important possibilities for Palestinian gains in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. Particularly, a nonviolent campaign could enhance the impact of these factors by forcing the United States to address their concerns by creating a political struggle that would greatly limit the United States’ choice between allying with Israel or securing legitimacy in Iraq.
Solutions

Along with these important factors, there are specific solutions as well as obstacles to adopting a more nonviolent strategy in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. The solutions will be taken from the principles of nonviolence already articulated in chapter 3, and examined in light of their connections to Gandhian or Sharpian assumptions of nonviolence. As well, the possible solutions will be measured against the obstacles mentioned later in the section to conclude whether or not they are viable.

Nonviolent Discipline

As has been repeatedly emphasized in this thesis and in the literature, that maintaining nonviolent discipline is vital to the success of a nonviolent campaign. Practically all scholars of nonviolence agree on this principle. As well, using this principle whether based in Gandhian practices of persuasion or Sharp’s coercion enables the functioning of other principles. It is one of the keys for a successful Palestinian nonviolent campaign.

The theoretical basis of maintaining nonviolent action throughout the campaign comes from Gandhi’s assumptions of no ill will and the deliberate choice to conduct nonviolent struggle. Essentially, an individual feels concern for all forms of life and when confronted with injustice, chooses to correct the untruth through nonviolent methods.

Many would argue that this attitude is idealistic and unrealistic. Others might emphasize that it is impractical and too normatively connected. Sharp, and those who support his “practical” view of nonviolence, maintains that sustaining nonviolent action is vital to the power transfer that occurs between the authority group and the nonviolent resisters. Hence, the motivation for nonviolence is not the absence of ill will, but the
desire to coerce the authority group. Still, Sharp's assumptions are still normatively connected in that the power transfer depends on moral contradictions in the oppressing entity and the general public.

Thus, it does not necessarily matter whether a Palestinian movement emphasizes nonviolent resistance from a Gandhian or Sharpian perspective. What matters is that the group maintains nonviolent discipline throughout the struggle. And, in practical terms, the continued suicide bombings do nothing to secure more support for the Palestinian cause—at least not from needed allies in Europe and the Americas. This support could be provided if Palestinians engaged in action that engendered sympathy from the international community. Nonviolent action—Palestinians willingly suffering without violent response—in the face of military might would evoke immense pressure on Israel. A sustained campaign of nonviolence could eventually bring pressure from the United States. The possibilities are not unlike what happened in the United States when black Americans suffered severe repression at the hands of southern police officers. The images ignited a storm of pressure that moved President Johnson and other leaders to help in the civil rights cause.

Suffering

One principle that facilitates the success of a nonviolent campaign is acceptance of suffering. Suffering can be a motivating force for the perpetrator of the suffering or for observers of the incident. Suffering can also impel others within the group that is being subjected to distress to increase their participation in and commitment to the movement.

The powerful effect of suffering can be illustrated not only by instances of conflict resolution (e.g. black protestors exposing themselves to police dogs) but in other spheres
of human relations like natural disasters. The frequent images of tsunami devastation flashing across American televisions no doubt elicited greater financial, temporal, and political support for victims. Humans respond to suffering.

According to Gandhi's assumptions, this would be accomplished in the Palestinian case through an appeal to the "conscience" or moral directors of Israelis, Palestinians, and third parties (such as the United States). The untruth, for Gandhi, is the occupation itself, regardless of how it came about (whether Jordan instigated the conflict or Israel attacked). Those Palestinians who engage in nonviolence would seek to expose this untruth through suffering (i.e. willingness to absorb the consequences of not abiding by the occupation status quo). From the Sharpian view, the willingness to suffer contributes more to a power transfer than to persuasion of the rightness of the position. But the support for a willingness to suffer is similar when looked at through either perspective. Hence the argument for suffering can be upheld regardless of the paradigm one subscribes to.

The Israelis: The Israeli target group would consist of the soldiers perpetrating the violence, the citizens who view it, or the government officials who are sympathetic to the Palestinian position (including the Arab parties in the Knesset). In essence, after repeated repression of civilians the soldiers would feel a deep sense of contradiction in violently abusing a person who is reacting nonviolently. Hence, some Israeli soldiers have joined a movement in which soldiers refuse to serve in the Palestinian territories called Yesh Gvul. In theory, some Israeli citizens would learn about the violent repression and the nonviolent response either on the television or over the radio and begin to pressure the government to cease its actions. Lastly, supportive Knesset members would challenge
the government’s response to the nonviolent campaign. All of these pressures could facilitate an Israeli government change in its occupation policy.

What actually occurs (or did occur) has differed somewhat from these ideals. During the first Intifada, some soldiers complained about having to work in the territories. Yesh Gvul published a petition in which 161 Israeli reservists refused to serve in the occupied areas (NYT 1/02/1988, 1). Some soldiers expressed alarm that the tolerance level for violence towards Palestinians was increasing (Peretz 1990, 122-123; 131). One indication of this is a New York Times article that reported Yitzhak Rabin admitting that tear gas and the beating of demonstrators had become ineffective, “so we use plastic bullets [which can] hit or injure stone-throwers outside the range of the stones” (9/28/1988, A1). The article later noted that two demonstrators had died from plastic bullet wounds that day. Did the suffering of Palestinians have an effect?

And what resulted from the apparent discord among some military personnel during the first Intifada? The lack of massive defections and large protests by soldiers indicates that the Palestinian suffering had a minimal effect. The reasons for this rest on two things: the soldiers’ (or antagonists’) reaction to the suffering and the conduct of the resister. In reality, a mix of both usually occurs. For example, if a soldier attempts to apprehend a protestor who is marching in support of a banned organization and that person throws a brick at the soldier to prevent his arrest, the soldier is more likely to feel justified in shooting the resistor. Setting the action of the soldier aside, the protestor’s action to avoid arrest violates Gandhi’s assumption of a willingness to suffer for the cause. And, as will be discussed shortly, the throwing of a brick (or any destructive object
for that matter) violates Gandhi's assumptions of no ill will and choosing nonviolence over violence.

The example above highlights one of this thesis’s criticisms of designation of the first Intifada as a nonviolent movement. The Palestinian campaign was effectively undermined because of the violent action of stone throwing or fire-bombing. This violates one of the most widely accepted and theoretically based principles of nonviolence. Obviously not all protestors threw rocks or Molotov cocktails. But in a nonviolent campaign, the movement must maintain nonviolent discipline in order to maximize the effect of suffering on the antagonist. The protestors provided part of the justification, at least in the eyes of the Israelis, for violent repression. Thus the contradiction was minimized in the minds of Israeli soldiers.

Also, this thesis proposed earlier that, according to the South African example put forth by Seidman (2000), when the government or antagonist seems to possess less moral sensitivity, suffering becomes less effective and economic influences from third parties become more effective. Hence, if the Israeli soldier has an increased tolerance for violence, the suffering may not induce the moral contradiction effectively.

In regards to how suffering can affect the Israeli citizen who views or hears about it, the first Intifada provides important insight. Some authors contend that most Israelis knew about and became quite accustomed to the daily confrontations between the military and the Palestinians. Some psychologists even felt that this adjustment or familiarity with violence caused conditions where “Israelis were indifferent not only to Palestinian suffering but also to economic problems, to people injured in road accidents
[and that] violence was becoming an acceptable way of settling disputes” (Peretz 1990, 158).

Actually, Don Peretz noted that many Israelis blamed the media for much of the negativity. But some of the sources he quotes engage in severe exaggeration and hyperbole, even charging that media was anti-Israel and anti-Jewish (Peretz 1994, 126). However, some practices cast doubt on claim against the media. For example, the IDF closed off some areas in the Palestinian territories to the media and some politicians even kicked around Kissinger’s famous idea of removing all the media so the army could quickly quell the uprising (NYT 3/5/1988, 5).

An argument could be made that the media actually affected the ability of Palestinian suffering to influence Israeli public opinion against its government. Specifically, the media often used “violence” or similar terms to describe Palestinian actions. As discussed earlier, stone throwing and yelling could be defined as violent. But as was also mentioned, the systematic nature of protest actions reveals that the Palestinian strategy was a deliberate attempt at a nonviolent strategy. Many media outlets missed this important pattern. Thus it was a misrepresentation to constantly couch the Palestinian actions during the first Intifada as violent. Of course there were exceptions, and in fact these exceptions were set forth as the norm and a sign of the “real” Palestinian strategy (Peretz 1990, 135). One example (of many) that supports this argument, as well as reveals Israel’s attempt to frame the Palestinian strategy, is in a New York Times article from September 28, 1988. The headline reads “Israel Reaffirms a Stern Response as Violence Grows.” The article also quotes Yitzhak Rabin as saying, “[The Palestinians] will have to learn that more violence will bring more suffering to them... My
responsibility as Defense Minister is to bring the level of violence down” (A1). In each instance, Palestinian actions are referred to as violent. By doing this, the media was arguably able to define many Israelis’ perceptions of the uprising, as well as the perceptions of those who support Israel abroad. In this way, the media undermined the ability of Palestinian suffering to influence the Israeli public to pressure their government.

This perception, along with a great distrust of the PLO, also affected the support of opposition groups within the Knesset. Some Knesset members, mostly from Labor, were still supportive of land for peace measures, but most felt the Palestinian “violence” needed to end before that took place. Other members called for immediate negotiations with the Palestinians (Peretz 1990, 138).

Some offer a different perspective—that for many Israeli’s life continued the same for the most part as before the Intifada broke out (Peretz 1990, 125). It is necessary to note that the Israeli government took great steps to give the appearance that life in Israel was proceeding as usual during the Intifada. Yitzhak Shamir took multiple opportunities to announce new plans, open tourist sites, or hold press conferences from sites in the West Bank. This provides some insight into new areas of focus for any future nonviolent campaigns.

As well, some authors assert that Israel’s opposition movement flourished during the Intifada. Specifically, one source notes that 24 new peace groups formed after the outbreak of the first Intifada. One of these, the Council for Peace and Security, was composed of 120 generals, over 100 colonels, and some Labor Knesset members. They stated that “Israel is strong enough to risk conceding territory. This is preferable to
holding onto it with the palpable continuing harm that it does to national security” (Peretz 1990, 139). As well, Peace Now’s membership increased dramatically, which may have contributed to its increased willingness to directly criticize the government’s actions during the Intifada (Peretz 1990, 140). Organizations such as these are crucial to the principle of suffering because they provide man power within the system to put pressure on the government to change.

The Palestinians: The Palestinian target for suffering would include citizens not yet involved in the movement, collaborators, and those who are content to maintain the status quo. For those citizens not yet willing to join the nonviolent struggle, observing the suffering of a fellow Palestinian for a cause that affects them can create some contradiction and motivation to join the movement. For example, a funeral for a protestor who was killed may provide the impetus for more family and community members to join. A challenge, as discussed in an earlier section, is being able to overcome the elements of cultural emotionalism that inhibit the ability to maintain nonviolent discipline. This is crucial in order to emphasize the injustice in the suffering inflicted by the occupation. Obviously, the increase in participants assists the nonviolent movement in momentum and increasing legitimacy.

The tax boycott in Beit Sahur is a good example of the recruiting power of suffering. At first, a handful of pharmacists were notified by the Israeli authorities that they would be required to pay back taxes. They protested the requirements, but were ignored. In response they decided not to pay any more taxes. The administration responded by confiscating goods from their stores and summoning them to appear at the headquarters—but never gaining an audience. The conduct of these pharmacists
prompted the bulk of the village to join the protest. After a heavy crackdown by the military, the citizens formed committees and provided services to outlast the siege. The movement was eventually broken, but most likely from the lack of support from other villages and cities joining in massive tax boycotts. The fact that these villages carried out these tactics alone, allowed for Israel to shuffle around its resources and concentrate its stranglehold.

In the realm of convincing collaborators, suffering has been somewhat successful. Several incidents have been recorded where Palestinian informants will to the death of a villager or family member by renouncing their activities. However, most of the violent incidents involving Palestinians were directed towards collaborators. If, on the other hand, a commitment to suffer was used as the primary weapon against a collaborating, he or she may be more motivated to disengage contact with Israelis.

Lastly, those Palestinians who support the status quo are vulnerable to the influence of fellow Palestinians who are willing to suffer. Mainly, the protestor would have to demonstrate a supporter’s connection to the unjust authority and therefore the source of his suffering.

Third Parties: As mentioned above, when the antagonist appears to be less affected by suffering, it is important to appeal to third parties who can bring other pressures to bear on the authority group so they will change the injustice. This was the case in South Africa as well as the American Civil Rights movement. United States pressure would be vital to a successful nonviolent campaign against Israel.

The means to induce such pressure have been allusive. Stanley Cohen criticizes the Israeli peace camp from avoiding any form of requesting political pressure from the
United States. It seems that introduction of violent acts, even at intermittent stages, has allowed the United States to justify its lack of condemnation of Israel. As well, the American government has consistently kept their language mildly critical when they have reacted to Israeli actions.

Nonviolent resistance could provide the least amount of wiggle room for an American administration to ignore. With a demonstration of human suffering through a campaign of nonviolent action, Palestinians could highlight Israeli violence and engender sympathy. And despite the inevitable violent actions of some extremist groups (e.g. suicide bombings), the Palestinian movement could distance themselves from those groups. The United States would not have the justification for their lack of pressure. Eventually, the United States would have to demonstrate measurable pressure on Israel. But the length of this process, determined by the Palestinian ability to maintain the campaign and the United States’ capacity to delay responding to it, is difficult to determine.

In sum, the ability of the Palestinians to demonstrate the suffering they are experiencing is crucial to the success of a re-invigorated campaign of nonviolence. The Palestinians are well acquainted with human suffering (over 30 years), so this assertion should not be taken as a proposal to find creative new ways to help Palestinians suffer more. However, a successful Palestinian campaign must effectively illustrate the afflictions they endure. In order to accomplish this, Palestinians must circumvent the national and international media and define their own conflict. Obviously any declarations of nonviolent commitment will be initially looked at with suspicion by Israelis and Americans. Yet if the Palestinian movement can adopt a strategy in keeping
with the principle of voluntary suffering and maintain nonviolent discipline, the potential for marked change towards their goals of a state will increase.

As well, Palestinians must demonstrate to their own people their willingness to suffer injustice and then effectively connect the causes of that suffering to those Palestinians who are enabling the maintenance of the status quo. A deliberate focus on collaborators may prove to be the most advantageous.

Finally, the appeal to third parties through the principle of suffering may be the most important focus. This is because the relationship between Israel and the United States has enabled the former to absorb international criticism and maintain its military superiority. The disruption of this relationship may prove to be the most important as well as the most challenging.

**Other Solutions**

One solution that will facilitate the adoption of a more nonviolent strategy is education on nonviolent methods and theory. Gene Sharp contends that the main reason nonviolence has not been used more generally in society, both past and present, is “the lack of knowledge of what to do” (95). Later, as he emphasizes one important solution, Sharp states that effective nonviolent strategy must be formulated from “their own knowledge of nonviolent struggle and the conflict situation” (100).

As well, an important avenue to overcoming the commitment to violence is for Palestinians to see what the results are of such actions. Violence has brought instability and less security to Israel and the Palestinians. In turn, these actions have contributed to instability within the entire region. David Fromkin proposed this in a general sense in
referring to internal conflicts and their increasing relevance in the 1990s and beyond (Dougherty 2001, 281).

Nonviolence would not necessarily bring greater stability at first. It is based on conducting action outside the system, thus creating instability in society, in order to force the authority actor to address the group’s concerns. However, nonviolence can help gain concessions that formulate an acceptable solution for both sides. This in turn can bring greater stability to the region.

Obstacles to Adopting a Nonviolent Strategy

Culture and Religion

It is impossible to discuss Palestinian culture without discussing religion, particularly Islam. In describing the Middle East one author wrote, “Islam thus remains the single most important source for the ethos that distinguishes the area” (Bates 2001, 85). Christianity also plays a role in a sizeable percentage of Palestinian homes. Some families, Muslim and Christian, have ancestral connections to the area before the Crusades. Thus religious influence and Arab culture have been mixing for centuries to form a major portion of today’s Palestinian culture.

As one of the three major world religions, Islam has core doctrine and specific practices that are fundamental. Like Judaism and Christianity, these doctrines and practices are based on authoritative sources including canonized scripture and the recorded actions of initial leaders. Some of its basic reflections include a continual striving to submit to God’s will, service to fellowman in the form of kindness or monetary support, and the resistance to injustice.
Christianity is also based on specific doctrine and practices stemming from canonical sources. It is believed to have commenced in Jerusalem near the beginning of the first millennium AD. It reflects a similar emphasis on the positive treatment of mankind, accountability for one’s actions, and life after death. As with most religions, the actions of its followers have not reflected these beliefs at times.

Islam, Arab culture, and even Christianity have combined to foster a cultural emotionalism within many Middle Eastern societies. This emotional emphasis socializes the people to act and react through more spontaneous and perceived irrational behavior. Some have proposed that the closeness of religious faith and emotions within individuals partially explains this behavior. This is plausible if recalled that many religious experiences are described as a feeling more than an instrumentally measurable response. However, this does not assume that religions are more sympathetic to violent behavior. It does infer that religious followers tend to express themselves in an emotional manner. Decisions based on emotion are not always irrational, but often resemble that type of behavior. The actions that result from these decisions can exhibit violence.

Some might ask why a funeral in the Palestinian territories, unlike one in the United States, has demonstrated its potential to turn into violent protest (similar scenes have been played out in Iraq as well). While the potential for protest is naturally prevalent in an environment charged with outwardly expressed emotion, the political conditions seem to be more influential in the sparking of protest than the religious background. It is important to remember that many Christian and Muslim funerals have sparked protest in the Palestinian territories. The overwhelming majority of funerals—Muslim, Christian,
or whatever—in the United States end without similar reaction. Thus the political conditions more than religion may be the best determining factor in the protests.

Regardless, Islam should not be classified as a violent religion. Although it does not rule out its use in certain situations, Islam does not condone violence either—especially towards certain groups. Specifically, some hadith (sayings of the Prophet Muhammad) directly refer to refraining from injuring the elderly, women, children, and the devoutly religious during armed conflict (Satha-Anand 1990, 28). Still, Islam (along with Christianity and Judaism) accepts the use of violence in defense, “just war” or lesser jihad, and against injustice.

Yet the practice of jihad has been clarified by Muslim scholars to be primarily a struggle within the individual against worldly influences. This is an important distinction, especially in light of the connotation jihad has taken on in Western society. Jihad has been assigned two classifications: greater and lesser (Satha-Anand 1990, 29). The struggle for one’s soul is the greater, while the physical struggle is the lesser. Satha-Anand noted, “The perpetual inner and greater jihad will guide the conduct of lesser jihad in both its objectives and its conduct” (1990, 29).

Thus it can be concluded that nonviolent action is possible in the Middle East. The Quran, like other cannons of scripture, contains writings that are open to interpretation. Some scholars have made the effort to extract passages that preach a way of life more conducive to nonviolence. For instance, Satha-Anand quotes some Quranic references about the sanctity of life, and also some hadith (sayings about the Prophet Muhammad) regarding the rules against hurting those who are noncombatants (1990, 32 and 28). This is helpful for Muslims to see religious support for nonviolent principles.
Then why is Islam, or more specifically, Palestinian culture perceived as violent?

Part of the reason comes from media coverage. The more violent and amazing stories are covered. The short reporting time is given to spectacular events obviously to encourage increased viewer percentages. But this is not only the reason for a perception of Palestinian dedication to violence.

Because religion is faith based, there is a tendency to link decisions to emotion rather than reason. Whether or not this is the case, some observers equate emotional outpourings as reflections of religious belief. Hence, the actions of suicide bombers and funeral demonstrators are taken to be a reflection of Islam, when in fact they might be a reflection of political frustration, sadness at the loss of a loved one, or similar human outpourings. Thus the impression of such actions could be that the religion itself promotes violence.

But some components of Islam reflect an acceptance of nonviolent action. For instance, unity is a religious ideal of Islam. Unity is a consequence of practicing Islam. Part of the acceptance of Islam is the recognition that one is a part of the community of believers, or the *umma*. This community is necessary for full practice of Islam. Disunity inhibits the “survival and growth of the Islamic community” (Tamadonfar, 61). As discussed earlier, unity is one of the necessities for effective nonviolent struggle. While this value appears to be hard to achieve within the Muslim nations of the Middle East, it is no less a possible bridge to accepting a nonviolent stance.

**Justice**

Another important principle within Islam and the Palestinian culture is the sense of justice. Islam teaches that men are to be just towards each other and they are to resist all
types of injustice (Tamadonfar 1989, 55). As with American culture, it is sometimes acceptable to resist injustice through violent action within Islam. There exist many examples of this precedent. For one, Muhammad had to flee Mecca because of the unjust persecution he received for preaching his newly discovered religion. He returned later with an army to take the city and rid it of idolatry.

Justice is an embedded part of Palestinian culture. It would be impossible to convince Palestinians that they have not suffered injustice during the last 56 years. The Palestinians have seen the land they historically lived on for two thousand years divided up and given to someone else. The treatment they receive on a daily basis (e.g. border crossings and closures) adds fuel to the injustice fire. It will be hard to transcend the idea that using nonviolence is synonymous with letting go of all the oppression they have experienced in the past. This perception will hinder any attempt to shift to a nonviolent strategy.

Importantly, nonviolent theory emphasizes that past injustices are not forgotten but utilized to emphasize the magnitude of the injustice. A shift to nonviolence has the potential to illuminate the “long train of abuses” suffered by the oppressed actor. In the Palestinian case, some in the international community have looked past possible actions that would be considered ‘unjust’ by Israel. A campaign that minimizes violence and accentuates nonviolent action could remove most of the justification (usually surrounding terrorism) for nations to look the other way. Of course extreme groups will most likely not participate, but if the majority of the society agrees with the nonviolent strategy, an important distance between them and the ‘terrorist elements’ will widen (Ackerman 1994, 45). Thus, Israel would be left without cause to respond violently (and if they
participated in violence it would accentuate the claim of injustice), and the international community would be faced with a ‘dilemma’ of whether or not to conform their actions to their stated ideals (particularly those found in the UN charter). Hence, the obstacle of injustice could be overcome by the understanding of this process—particularly that nonviolence is an active struggle against injustice and is designed to expose the opposing authority’s cruelty.

**Israeli Placement of Violence**

Israel’s repeated use of violent tactics to respond to Palestinian actions has created a formidable barrier to Palestinian acceptance of a more nonviolent strategy. Israel has been demolishing homes, removing agricultural space for settlement needs (whether to build homes, construct roads, or enhance security), and limiting Palestinian movement for over 30 years. The construction of the security wall is a dual manifestation of the Israeli government confiscating Palestinian lands and controlling Palestinian life in the territories.

First, Israel’s use of collective punishment has not deterred Palestinians from joining extremist groups or from fighting against Israel. If actions like house demolitions were being effective, Hamas would not be increasing in political power and gaining more recruits. The practice also isolates those elements within Palestinian society that have sought negotiation with Israel. Without legitimate mediators, Israel will be left to itself to garner Palestinian support and history has shown that Israel’s success would be unlikely. Thus collective punishment not only strengthens opposition elements within Palestinian society, it weakens those forces that are possible partners for negotiating a settlement.
Also, the continued practice of assassinating extremist leaders has not only demonstrated Israel’s willingness for violence, but more importantly has increased Palestinian extremist popularity and Palestinian opposition to Israel. The British have not resorted to such practices with the IRA despite repeated terror attacks from the organization. Besides, the practice of assassination has been internationally illegal since the Geneva Convention. The continual disregard for international law to serve security purposes may hurt the Israelis in the long run because Palestinian groups may use similar tactics. As well, the killing of Palestinian leaders solidifies the Palestinian perception that the Israeli government and the people who support are not seeking for a negotiated settlement.

As well, Israel has cultivated Palestinian economic dependency and impotency since taking control of the Palestinian territories. The economic regulations are another manifestation of Israel’s attempt to control Palestinian life. As the economic conditions in Palestinian territories do not improve, more Palestinians experience frustration that can lead to greater amounts of aggression and on a more massive scale than a few suicide bombers. The Israeli commitment to violence represents one of the most difficult obstacles to overcome if a Palestinian nonviolent movement is to emerge.

**Palestinian Placement of Violence**

As discussed in the previous chapter, violence has been the dominant strategy in the Palestinian campaign for autonomy. The challenge that this presents to a more nonviolent strategy is two fold. First, violence has been tied to Palestinian national identity, in the form of armed struggle, since the 1960s (and some would argue even
earlier). Second, many Palestinians believe that violence has secured them important successes in the conflict with Israel.

**Violence and National Identity:** In fact, this dynamic of emphasizing armed struggle may actually be a core element of Palestinian national aspirations. Yezid Sayigh stated: “Military action confirmed that the Palestinians, to themselves above all, were active participants in shaping their own destiny, rather than passive victims” (1997, 27). Sayigh admits that armed struggle had minimal effect on Israel, and that these actions (and their results) were usually exaggerated. In fact, Sayigh points out that this over exaggeration proves the intent of armed struggle was not for military gains, but national unity and aspirations (1997, 27). The connection of armed struggle to national identity solidified its position as the main strategy of the conflict. To suggest any different would be to devalue Palestinian aspirations, and even be perceived as treasonous to the Palestinian cause. This may explain why even some Palestinian nonviolence advocates always mention the right of the Palestinian people to engage in armed resistance if desired (see Awad 1984, 24).

**Perceived Success of Violence:** Some experiences in the Palestinian struggle for a state can give the impression that armed struggle is a successful method. An early historical example of the apparent success of violence is the British relinquishing their rule of the Mandate. The Palestinian guerilla campaign against the British (and Jewish) presence after WWII helped initiate Britain’s reluctance admittance that they could not oversee Palestine any longer. Not only did this encourage more armed struggle (because of its perceived success), it also provided a connector for Palestinian organizations in the 1960s
to portray a continuous armed Palestinian movement from the colonial days of the Mandate through the Six-Day War (Sela and Ma’oz 1997, 27).

Was it the strikes and international pressure or the continual violence on both the Jewish and Arab side that caused them to give up? Scholars have differed greatly on what influenced their leaving Palestine, but it is widely accepted that the continual train of violent events between the Jews, Arabs, and British had the most influence (Sherman 1997, 208-09). Thus some may conclude that violent action resulted in success. However, Britain’s exit was not a successful result for Palestinians. The British departure precipitated in some ways the United Nations decision to partition Palestine. The two sides were essentially left to fight it out. The new state of Israel proved to be more successful in that fight. It seems that the British withdrawal was not a success for Palestinians. Yes the British left Palestine, but Palestinians still did not secure their state and they ‘lost’ more territory. Over 50 years of experience proves that this was no success for the Palestinians.

The fact that Palestinians can hurt Israelis—through suicide bombs and killing settlers—may be seen by some as a success. It is important to note that the frustration of millions of Palestinians with the peace process has simmered for a long time. They must be tired of being treated as unequal and required to jump through so many hoops to accomplish their daily tasks. It is logical to see that some may desire to strike back at the Israelis. The ability of extremist groups, like HAMAS, to give them an outlet to this frustration is attractive to some. Sadly, what these frustrated individuals do not realize is that their actions only strengthen the cause of their extreme counterparts in Israel. The Israeli government is able to take a harder line and implement creative solutions that
continue to oppress other Palestinians. A cycle has formed. Violence has engendered more violence. Successful resolution of the conflict seems far out of reach.

As well, the continued use of suicide bombers places Palestinian activities in the realm of terrorism. Even though some argue that these groups are acting in self-defense, recent events prevent acceptance of that line of thought. The increased awareness of these types of actions, resulting from 9/11 and the frequent incidents in Iraq, and their association with Palestinian suicide bombers will not help the Palestinian appeals for intervention on their behalf.

Leadership

The need for strong leadership is vital in any nonviolent campaign. For the Palestinians, the need is even more crucial. The current leadership structure in the territories has proven itself hostile to new ideas. A change in leadership is essential to the adoption of a comprehensive nonviolent strategy. As well, the leaders of nonviolence must be totally committed and versed in nonviolent principles. In addition, a change in strategy will threaten current funding to the Palestinians.

"Something more than education is required of the leaders of a nonviolent movement. They must be...specially trained in the ethical principles of a nonviolent way of life” (Crow and Grant 1990, 88). This is even more crucial in the Palestinian territories because nonviolent proponents are rare. Leaders must emerge who have necessary clout, but are not as concerned with maintaining power. Nonviolent resistance most often requires an abundance of trained leadership so when leaders are jailed or killed, others can continue the struggle. The abundance of educated Palestinians will likely facilitate a move in this direction.
For years, Arafat controlled the leadership structure in Gaza and the West Bank. He demonstrated his unwillingness to foster new ideas. Despite public espousal of a nonviolent strategy, Arafat continued to pursue rhetoric and relationships that were opposed to nonviolent action. By his unwavering commitment to consolidate power, Arafat indicated that his greatest concern was maintaining his power and position, which some believe did not always coincide with the good of the Palestinian people. Arafat’s death opens the possibility for consideration of a new strategy. Yet the transition to a nonviolent leader could take considerable time.

Possible leaders would most likely come from the educated ranks. As mentioned earlier, those who will lead the nonviolent movement must be “specially trained.” Whether or not that training comes from Palestinian institutions or universities abroad is irrelevant. Most importantly, the new leader must come from within the Palestinian community. He must have influence within the community. This is essential because of the patriarchal structure of power.

Funding is also a necessary concern for any new leadership committed to nonviolence. If a nonviolent strategy is adopted, participating Palestinian entities would risk losing funding from nation-states that support violent struggle against Israel. For the same reason, some nation-states might be more apt (and openly able) to give monetary support to the Palestinian cause. The losses might be quickly countered by the gains, both economically and politically. Any movement away from terrorism in the post-9/11 world is an invitation for aid.
Historical Experience

Another obstacle to acceptance of a nonviolent strategy is historical experience. Most Palestinians have grown up in the current occupied situation. Contention and conflict have surrounded them for so long that it would be difficult for many Palestinians to accept a nonviolent strategy. This would likely stem from a perception that to engage in more nonviolent methods means to ignore the pain and suffering already experienced.

For instance, asking an individual whose family member was killed by an Israeli soldier in a previous conflict or even a recent confrontation to protest the action by not using any weapon against the Israeli army would be difficult. As well, to expect the individual not to express ill will towards the perpetrators and, even more challenging, to go seeking an opportunity to suffer at their hands seems almost impossible. This illustrates why some see Gandhi’s requirements as unrealistic. It also illuminates why many scholars of nonviolence have adopted Sharp’s attempt to couch nonviolent action in terms of power and coercion, while leaving ill will out.

This is probably the most challenging obstacle because the conflict has continued for over 50 years. Frustration increases as the conflict remains unresolved. Because of the violent nature of the struggle (both on the Palestinian and Israeli sides) most interested parties have dealt with pain in various forms and distrust has increased. The inability (or unwillingness) to follow through with agreements has also undermined confidence in reaching a solution in the foreseeable future. But engaging in nonviolent action is a constructive method of dealing with the frustration created by historical experience, not a method that ignores injustice.
Islam and Palestinian culture provide some formidable barriers to accepting a more dominant strategy of nonviolence. The “supremacy of justice” (Tamadonfar, 55), cultural emotionalism, and historical experience contribute to the challenge of accepting a more dominant nonviolent strategy. However, Islam possesses some necessary solutions to understanding and adopting a more nonviolent strategy. Another hurdle for nonviolence is the place that violence holds within Palestinian society. This stems from its connection to Palestinian national identity and the perceived success it has gained as a strategy. As well, the imbedded Palestinian leadership has more often than not hindered strategy shifts and thus real progress towards a solution. Finally, and maybe most importantly, Palestinian historical experience may prevent effective acceptance of a more nonviolent strategy.

Yet some possible solutions are equally attainable. The education in nonviolent theories and practices is notably important. An understanding of nonviolence is fundamental to facilitating many other possible solutions. The recognition that nonviolent action is based on a commitment to justice correlates with the cultural emphasis on justice. A comprehension of the consequences of violent and nonviolent action could motivate a change in strategy. A realization that a commitment to nonviolent resistance does not equate to forgetting past injustices, but actually emphasizes those injustices in the strategy to secure Palestinian goals.

One final result of nonviolent action is the two sides meet together to negotiate a settlement. This would come after the process described above. Also the repressive regime would have to feel confident that no security threat existed. In the case of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict this would be a revolutionary concept. The Israelis have
maintained their military measures based on security concerns. If the threat is no longer present and security concerns are met, Israel has no other issue to base their actions on. They would be compelled, in a way, to change their approach. Although they might succeed in justifying repressive action for a short while, they could not do so indefinitely (Crow and Grant 1990, 86).

Specific Strategies

Nonviolent strategies are varied and some are more desirable depending on the situation. In the Palestinian/Israeli conflict demonstrations, obstructions, noncooperation, and boycotts are most often used. Demonstrations are popular with the people. A large number of people with a specific purpose can send a clear message to their audience. Obstructions have been attempted usually in the form of road blocks. The Druze of the Golan Heights are a good example of noncooperation. In their case, they did not want to have Israeli ID cards. Israelis set up laws to arrest those without ID cards. When group leaders were arrested, the village residents showed up at the station to turn themselves in for the same offense (Kennedy 1984, 57). The authorities relented.

In the past, Palestinians have been encouraged to boycott all Israeli goods, or conduct action that severs contact with Israel. But not having contact with Israel has had seemingly no effect. This method has not been as successful and historically has been more symbolic than tangible. Besides, this action has hurt the Palestinians more in some cases, or has not been adhered to by Palestinian business entities.

In order to employ these strategies a few overriding necessities exist: the movement must be unified in purpose and tactics. Those engaging in the event must be ready to
suffer for their actions (Awad 84, 27-31). The resistance group must maintain nonviolent discipline throughout the campaign. Taking these principles into account allows for flexibility and efficiency in choosing “targets” of protest. For example, Gandhi chose to focus on an injustice that affected all Indians alike, the tax on salt. His act of civil disobedience, gathering his own salt on the sea shore, effectively roused Indian resistance to the British. His actions also brought immense international pressure to bear on Great Britain.

For the Palestinians they might look to using the ID card or some other universal item that all Palestinians could relate to. The military authority in the territories uses the ID card as a major mode of control. It is required in order to obtain driver’s licenses, building permits, economic permits, and passes into Israel or across the border to Jordan. Therefore, a creative variety of methods could be formulated to expose the ID card practice as a means of suffocating control. Specifically, large numbers of Palestinians could “show up” at the Israeli border without ID cards and demand to be let in. The resisters could then calmly sit down and block the passage of other Palestinians. The Palestinian Authority could subsidize wages for those who miss work.

Another area of focus could be agricultural production. Israel’s economic regulations on Palestinian agricultural goods ensure that Israeli products are cheaper in Israel and surrounding countries. Palestinians could engage in actions that would highlight this exploitation. Specifically, Palestinians could refuse to sell produce to Israel and encourage Palestinians to buy Palestinian. As well, more effective methods of smuggling produce into Jordan and other countries could be devised. This campaign could highlight the Palestinian desire for self-sufficiency and how it correlates to the United States
“American Dream.” Israeli attempts to limit the free market could generate increased sympathy for the Palestinian situation from within the United States.

The emergence of a charismatic leader could also prove vital to the adoption of a Palestinian nonviolent movement. Although the idea is underdeveloped in this thesis, the basis for it has precedent. India had Gandhi, and the American Civil Rights movement had Martin Luther King, Jr. While some successful nonviolent struggles have not had a single charismatic leader, the aspects of Palestinian culture, specifically the neo-patrimonial structure, lend strength to the need for a strong leader to instigate a nonviolent campaign.

Conclusion

Both Palestinian and Israeli societies have demonstrated an awareness and use of nonviolent methods. But a comprehensive strategy has not been fully implemented by either side. Historical experience has shown that a Palestinian nonviolent campaign is more appropriate and likely more effective. Hence it is important to know what elements must be present in that campaign.

The assumptions of the various theories of nonviolence that were first explained in chapter three, seem to converge on a few principles that should be present in a campaign of nonviolence. Specifically, this thesis identifies that maintaining nonviolent discipline, and the willingness to suffer as two important points of theoretical convergence.

In the context of the Palestinian/Israeli conflict, the importance of sustaining nonviolent action is untried. The first Intifada, while reflecting a reduction of violent action, still contained enough violence which allowed Israel and the United States to
downplay the scope of the uprising. It cannot be known how a completely nonviolent campaign would have affected the outcome of the first Intifada. But that does not negate it as an important element of renewed Palestinian nonviolence. However, most nonviolent movements in recorded history contain some element of violence. And the expectation that all groups within a society will remain nonviolent during a campaign is unrealistic. Hence Ackerman and Kruegle suggest distancing the movement from those elements in that society (1994, 45).

Another vital principle for engaging in a Palestinian nonviolent campaign is the willingness to suffer. Palestinians have already demonstrated this. Suffering has a three-fold effect within the nonviolent struggle. It appeals to elements within the population of the nonviolent group, to elements within the opposition, and to third parties that can influence the outcome of the struggle. As has been examined, the current factors of the Iraq campaign, the War on Terror, and new Palestinian leadership provide a unique opportunity for a Palestinian nonviolent movement to effectively secure concessions from the United States and Israel.

Still, some important obstacles may prevent the adoption of a nonviolent strategy. Of particular importance is the historical experience of the Palestinian people. In essence they have suffered greatly and for an extended period of time while being relatively ignored by the international community. The actions of the Israeli government throughout the conflict have unfolded a pattern of behavior that has deepened Palestinian mistrust of Israeli intentions. The commitment of Israel to its violent strategy of deterrence has also facilitated mistrust and enmity. As well, the cultural value of justice
and the connected commitment to resist injustice violently have deepened Palestinian resolve to struggle against Israel.

Although nonviolence requires creativity and thought it has the potential to produce the results Palestinians are seeking. The Palestinians have experience in conducting several methods of nonviolent resistance. Despite the formidable obstacles, most notably—historical experience and the acceptance of violence as an effective strategy—nonviolence provides an avenue of emphasizing past and present injustices. As well, it allows the Palestinian strategy to reflect a more accommodating position to the Israelis and other important parties (e.g. the United States), while maintaining the struggle for their ultimate goal.
CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate and extrapolate the possibilities of conducting a Palestinian nonviolent campaign. More generally, the normative argument of this thesis is that shift to a nonviolent strategy will result in a more positive outcome for the Palestinian people. Part of the justification for this study is the lack of goal attainment. Specifically, the establishment of security for Israel, which its majority has constantly stated is its foremost concern, and the establishment of a self-governing state for the Palestinians, which the bulk of Palestinians look forward to, have not been fully realized. While it can be argued that some short-term successes have been obtained, the ultimate goals remain afloat. The resulting question is why?

This thesis asserts that the ultimate goals have not been obtained because the strategy to secure them is incorrect. In order to demonstrate this, the Palestinian and Israeli strategies throughout the conflict have been analyzed and shown to be dominantly violent. Notably, the evolution of each side’s strategy progress along similar tracks. Ian Lustick’s work is instructive on how the Israeli and Palestinian leadership decided on a violent strategy in part to solidify nationalist support from their societies. As well, Lustick provides extensive evidence that after these aspirations were established, the
strategy shifted audiences. Importantly, Yezid Sayigh substantiates Lustick's argument (in the Palestinian case) with evidence of his own.

The results of these violent strategies are important because they either reinforce the use of violence or suggest that a new strategy is necessary. Some may contend it is too early to determine if the violent strategy has not achieved ultimate success. But the length of the conflict and the preservation of the same strategy throughout its existence disperse that notion. This study concludes that while some short-term goals were achieved for different groups within Palestinian and Israeli society, the strategy of violence has not obtained the ultimate goals. Hence, the incorrect strategy must be replaced by a new one.

The assertion that a strategy of nonviolence is the most effective next-step for the Palestinians is fairly ambitious. The thesis attempts to extrapolate from the theories of nonviolence the overriding principles that must be present in an effective nonviolent movement. Once these principles are known, the feasibility of adopting a nonviolent strategy in Palestinian society can be examined. The principles that surfaced at the crossroads of the theories of nonviolence are the maintaining of nonviolent discipline and the willingness to suffer during the campaign. The importance of other parties also emerged as important in certain circumstances.

Essentially, these two principles operate upon the moral foundations of the parties involved. They are also interconnected to the point that you cannot have one without the other. Both are crucial to facilitating the policy change that the oppressed group is seeking to obtain from the authority entity (usually the government). However, if the moral foundations are not as susceptible to suffering and nonviolent discipline, than the importance of another party increases.
In the Palestinian case, the first Intifada demonstrated that large numbers of Palestinians can engage in a strategy of systematic refraining from violence. However, the full potential of sustaining a campaign without any violence has not been realized. Past examples of nonviolent action imply that it may be impossible to apply such a strict regulation.

However the moral capital produced from a Palestinian campaign that is almost completely nonviolent, coupled with recent factors in the greater Middle East could be used to secure concession from Israel and the United States. Of particular importance is the situation in Iraq. The Bush Administration has demonstrated its commitment to completing the construction of a new Iraqi government and a Palestinian flare could disrupt the achievement of that aim. Hence the United States is vulnerable, or more willing to put pressure on Israel, to make concessions. A nonviolent campaign would not only force an Israeli and American response, but it could isolate Israel from the United States’ stated goals in Iraq.

Yet some important obstacles exist that could hamper the adoption by Palestinians of a nonviolent strategy. First, Palestinian experience over the last 50 years has taught them that their rights are secondary to Israelis and that when injustices occur, they are essentially ignored in international circles (especially by the United States). Who is to say that the same response will happen this time? As well, the number of unfulfilled plans, proposals, and promises has conditioned the Palestinians to mistrust most “new” ideas. But as noted above, the important United States’ interests in Iraq may overpower the likelihood that the Palestinians will be ignored.
Another obstacle is the concept of justice and the willingness to violently resist injustice that exists in Palestinian culture. This value has found expression in violent struggle since 1948 and before. It seems that a Palestinian understanding of nonviolence, particularly that it focuses on injustice, may be crucial to overcoming this obstacle. Hence the importance of educating Palestinian society in nonviolent practices.

A final obstacle is the Israeli use of violence. Particularly damaging, at least for Palestinians in adopting nonviolence, are the targeted killings and heavy-handed responses from Israel. As well, the continued expropriation of land and mechanisms of control that the Israeli government uses to dominate much of the Palestinian way of life have further engrained their animosity towards the Israel. But nonviolence suggests that these mechanisms of control are the most effective targets. One specific practice this thesis suggests is Palestinians refraining from using ID cards at border crossings which would illicit attention from Israel as well as other Palestinians.

In sum, the theory behind nonviolent action suggests that the Palestinians, or any oppressed group can engage in effective nonviolent conflict. However, the context of the situation, including the culture, religion, ethnicity, geography, etc., may have more bearing on whether such a strategy is viable. As the Palestinian/Israeli conflict proceeds, it is unclear what strategies will be most effective in bringing about a resolution. This thesis suggests that nonviolence is one of the options that may bring about more positive results.
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