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## The Turkish foreign aid program: A helping hand or a snake infested olive branch

Aisha T Bigbee

*University of Nevada, Las Vegas*

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THE TURKISH FOREIGN AID PROGRAM:

A HELPING HAND OR A SNAKE

INFESTED OLIVE BRANCH

By

Aisha T. Bigbee

Bachelor of Arts  
University of Nevada, Las Vegas  
1999

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the

Master of Arts Degree in Political Science  
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## Thesis Approval

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Dean of the Graduate College

John McIntyre (CDE)

Examination Committee Member

Examination Committee Member

Graduate College Faculty Representative

ABSTRACT

**The Turkish Foreign A Program:  
A Helping Hand or A Snake  
Infested Olive Branch**

By

Aisha T. Bigbee

Dr. John P. Tuman, Examination Committee Chair  
Associate Professor of Political Science  
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Turkey's long-standing struggle to fulfill the ideas of Kemalism has led to a long-standing dedication to help "heal" an ailing region and its often acting as an intermediate between Western powers and the Middle East. Turkey is at the strategic meeting point of Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. Turkey has a unique blend of secular democracy and Islamic society that makes it a vital asset to both the West and Islamist radicalism. As a result, Turkey's foreign aid program was developed in the last decade to primarily focus on the objectives of fostering a stable platform in Central Asia, sustaining a strong

presence in the Middle East, and all the while maintaining and cultivating its relationship with Russia.

Turkey pursues foreign policy endeavors with its regional partners through various means. Turkey's relationship with Russia has evolved to include several trade agreements and pacts. Their foreign policy goals toward the Caucus and Central Asian States remain optimistic and steadily rising. All the while, the Turks attempt to forge strong bonds with its Islamic neighbors by solidifying its role as a regional leader

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## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

*"Mankind is a single body and each nation is a part of that body. We must never say, 'What does it matter to me if some part of the world is ailing? If there is such illness, we must concern ourselves with it as though we were having that illness' "*

*-Ataturk Mustafa Kemal*

Turkey is a vital state as it is positioned in between Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East. Turkey's position gives it the capacity to affect regional and international stability. Turkey has become an emerging regional actor as it wields substantial military and diplomatic weight. Turkey's size gives it great strategic importance, as its population is nearly 67.8 million, which is the second largest in Europe after to Germany. Another factor that increases Turkey's position is its membership in western

organizations, such as NATO, and its evolving relationship with the European Union. It is believed that any threat to Turkey's foreign policy or democratic order would have serious consequences for the United States and Europe. <sup>1</sup>

Since the end of the cold war, Turkey has transformed its foreign policy and self-image more thoroughly than any other non-communist country. Turkey plays a distinctive part in world and regional politics virtually no other state other than the United States plays a part in so many different geographical regions. In addition, all of these areas are on Turkey's borders, and each has its own set of political issues. In short, Turkey has one of the most complex foreign policy situations in the world. <sup>2</sup>

It is in light of Turkey's foreign policy interests this study examines how Turkey's foreign policy interests are shaped by a number of trans-regional issues.

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<sup>1</sup> Larrabee, F., and Lesser, I; Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty, Center for Middle East Public Policy. Pg. 2-5

<sup>2</sup> Rubin, B. Turkey in Wold Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power; Lynne Reinner Publishers, London; Pg. 1

## Purpose of Study

This study examines Turkey's foreign aid program in an attempt to explain why Turkey has allocated aid to certain recipients in surrounding regions. Realist and idealist theories of international relations are used to evaluate the relationship between Turkey and recipient nations. Geographically Turkey is situated between Europe and Asia, and it shares a history of trade and turmoil with European and Asian societies. The study will focus primarily on the relationship between the Turkish Republic and its Asian and ethnic neighbors, as well as its relationship with religiously similar countries to the south and east.

As the Iron Curtain fell the Turks set out on a massive plan to build relations with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and many of the Turkic people internal to Russia e.g. the Tartars. Turkey focused on improving relations with Central Asia through various joint-ventures such as the formation and foundation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, Black Sea Trade and Development Bank, and the Central Asian Common Market.

These Central Asian states have historical, ethnic, and religious ties to Turkey as well as geographic strategic importance, and it is possible Turkey uses aid to promote these ties. Another aspect of Turkey's aims to extend foreign aid concerns Russia and the Middle East. Turkey and Russia have had diplomatic relations for over 500 years.

By examining these factors we may be able to gauge why Turkey gives aid to these countries, and also whether or not this line of thinking is conducive to their goal of maintaining regional stability and development.

## Significance of Study

This study adds to the research on Turkey because it examines a phenomenon not widely researched: why do countries such as Turkey give aid, when they themselves receive a fair amount of aid? It is not a common occurrence when researching foreign aid that you find another developing country in the same strategic position as Turkey. Therefore, it is tricky at best to compare the same political circumstances to other developing countries, as it is not a one-size fits all model. Realists assert that all countries use foreign aid agendas as a means of promoting their national interests. Alternatively, in a world that is increasingly more interdependent, liberals argue power and control are not the sole motivators of states' foreign aid programs.

The following chapters describe and then apply theories of international relations relating to the motivations of foreign aid donors. Using these theories this study will test four hypotheses. The first hypothesis is, Turkey is more likely to provide foreign aid to countries, which are most in need of aid. The second

hypothesis is Turkey is more likely to provide aid to countries where there may be potential security interests. The third hypothesis is Turkey is more likely to provide foreign aid to countries that have similar cultural characteristics. The final hypothesis is, Turkey is more likely to provide aid to countries to promote Turkey's economic development. Analyzing these hypotheses will reveal the determinants of Turkey's aid program.

## CHAPTER TWO

### LITERATURE REVIEW

There are several theories used to explain world politics. There are two philosophical world orders when approaching international relations theory: realism and idealism. Realism is more state centered, however does not dismiss the need for international or global relations entirely. Idealism focuses on international relationships as a necessary means for national survival.

#### Realism

Political realism typically claims to be the natural view of international relations, one that arises from ordinary, pre-philosophical and intuitive reflections on interstate relations. The term political realism encompasses a wide range of themes from classical, medieval, and modern formulations. Classical theorist like Aristotle, Augustine, and Machiavelli remind us that political realism is deeply rooted in conceptions of time, change, and history. On the other

hand neorealist like Waltz and Gilpin focus on concepts centering on the international system that engage in alternative courses of action.

Realism asserts the primacy of the state in world politics, and though realism recognizes other international actors such as international organizations and multi-national corporations, it still insists that states are the primary actors in international relations. Realists stress the significance of military power in shaping relations among states. Realism emphasizes the significance of competition and struggle for power between all states as being a crucial factor for creating a more interdependent world.

There are four major assumptions that formulate the realist theory; one, states are the principal or most important actors; two, the state is viewed as a unitary actor; three, given the emphasis on the unitary state-as-actor, realists believe that the state is essentially a rational actor; fourth, realists assume national security is at the top of the list of a nation's international issues.

Also amongst realists there are two basic traditional principles that are the cornerstone of analysis, power and system. Power is understood to be

the summation of military, economic, technological, diplomatic, and other capabilities at the disposal of the state. Another definition of power focuses on the interaction of states. In other words a states influence is not determined by its capabilities but also by its willingness to use these capabilities as a means to control or influence other states. Realism thus asserts that power can be inferred by observing the behavior of states as they interact.

The term system is defined by the various distributions of power and capabilities among states, unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar. Thus traditional realists accentuate distribution of capabilities between specific or alliances and the shifts in the capability to influence state behavior. <sup>3</sup>

Whereas the new approach to realism, known as Neorealism ascribes a specific importance to the role of hegemonic powers in creating and maintaining order in the global system, it recognizes that there is an uneven distribution of power within the system of states. In the neorealist diacotomy power is means to an end, not end itself to ensure security and survival, neorealist see a more stable reality. This includes the belief that

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<sup>3</sup> Kauppi, M.; International Relations Theory, Pg. 55, 64, 65, 66, 67

states engage in cost-benefit calculations about alternative course of action available to them. (Gilpin 2002)

For realism and neorealism, the nature of the global economy reflects the lack of an over reaching authority. The common need to promote national interest, maintain order, and uphold a semblance of governed behavior is recognized by most states. From realism and neorealism we find the logic that politics determines the specific character of globalization, not only with the goal of maintaining territorial integrity but also achieving economic, social and cultural security.

Globalization and/ or interdependence to realist is not necessarily a good thing. Rather realist see interdependence as being an act of co-equals, they argue that dominance and dependence with the dependant party being particularly vulnerable to the choices of the dominate party.<sup>4</sup>

However, interdependence suggests some degree of vulnerability. To reduce this vulnerability realist argue that it is better for the state to be independent or at least minimize its dependency.

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid. 76

## Realism and Foreign Aid

The Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor study asserts that the realist thought seems to conduct international relations from a "Hobbesian state" of nature in which national security and self-preservation become primary, if not exclusive, in its objectives. As a result, Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor continues on to say, foreign aid is perceived as only minimally related to recipient economic development and the humanitarian needs of the recipient country are downplayed.<sup>5</sup>

## Idealism

Idealists differ from realists in many important ways. First they do not believe that acquiring, preserving, and applying power must be the essence of international relations. Idealists assert that instead of being power based, foreign policy should be formulated according to cooperative and ethical standards. Second, idealists dismiss is the charge that pursuing ethical policy works against the national interest. The third way, in which idealists differ from

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<sup>5</sup> Schraeder, P., et.al. Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle: A comparison of American, Japanese, French, and Swedish Aid Flows., World Politics 50.2 (1998) p. 298

realists, is that they believe the world must seek a new system of order. In other words the current world system that is based on sovereign countries that define and promote their own interest must change in order to find new organizational course to cooperation. Finally the Idealist school of thought believes that countries are capable of achieving more cooperative, less conflictive relations<sup>6</sup>

The concept for cooperative relations is further defined by looking at the spread of democracy, foreign aid, and the growth of interdependency. Idealist and neo-realist are unlike realist in the way that they are optimistic about the potential advantage of foreign aid for ameliorating third world poverty and promoting broadly shared economic development.<sup>7</sup>

The work of Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye assert that countries have become more intertwined economically; the explosive growth in the size and number of transnational corporations has blurred state boundaries, rendering traditional realist assumptions about the centrality of the state questionable. Since

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<sup>6</sup> Roueke, J.; International Politics on the World Stage, 4<sup>th</sup> ed.; Dushkin Publishing Group, (1993), p. 144-145

<sup>7</sup> Schraeder, P., et.al. Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle: A comparison of American, Japanese, French, and Swedish Aid Flows., World Politics 50.2 (1998) p. 298.

realist assert that the state is the dominant actor in world politics and that military force is the primary means by which a state achieves its goals, it is here we look at more in-depth the theory of complex interdependence.

According to Koehane and Nye, complex interdependence has three major characteristics: First, multiple channels connect societies, including informal ties between government elites as well as formal foreign office arrangements; informal ties among nongovernmental elites; and transnational organizations. These channels can be summarized as interstate, trans-governmental, and transnational relations. Interstate relations are the normal channels assumed by realist.

Second, the agenda of interstate relationship consists of multiple issues that are not arranged in a clear or consistent hierarchy. The absence of hierarchy among issues means, among other things, that military security does not consistently dominate the agenda.

Third, Military force is not used by governments toward other governments within the region, or on the issues, when complex interdependence prevails. For instance military force could be irrelevant to resolving disagreements on economic issues among members of an

alliance, yet at the same time be very important for the alliance's political and military relations with a rival bloc.<sup>8</sup>

Keohane and Nye thus state, militarily and economically strong states will dominate a variety of organizations and a variety of issues by linking their own policies on some issues to other states' policies on other issues. By using their overall dominance to prevail on their weak issues, the strongest states will in the traditional model ensure congruence between the overall structure of military and economic power and the pattern of outcomes on any one issue. However, under complex interdependence military force is devalued; therefore, militarily strong states will find it more difficult to use their overall dominance to control the outcomes on issues in which they are weak.<sup>9</sup>

Dominant states may also use economic power to secure a strong hold over certain issues. If only economic objectives are at stake these states would succeed as economic objectives have political implications. Strong states using economic linkage are limited by domestic, transnational, and trans-

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<sup>8</sup> Goddard, C.; Cronin, P.; *International Political Economy: State-Market Relations in a Changing Global Order*; Lynne Rienner Press, (1999) pg. 50-51

<sup>9</sup> Ibid. p. 52

governmental actors who resist having their interest traded off.<sup>10</sup> Case in point, Turkey is a strong state that has major economic linkage issues with its regional counterparts. Turkey's primary goal like that of any nation is to increase its own wealth and stability in order to have prosperous society. By using their political connections i.e. ties with the U.S. and the E.U, Turkey wields a certain amount of strength over weaker states in the surrounding region by having a more economically viable market. It is the market place that takes precedence over the battlefield, and sometimes the reason why a country invokes its military power in the twenty-first century. Economics play a larger role in today's world politics more so than any other time through out history, as territorial issues have become less of an problem and the majority of geographical state borders and territories a generally accepted by roughly 85 percent of the world population economic dominance is key to understanding the new power politics of today. Bearing this in mind the importance of economics, transnational and trans-governmental organizations the potential of international institutions has increased greatly.

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<sup>10</sup> Ibid p. 53-54

International organizations act as catalysts for coalition formation and as political arenas for weaker states. International organizations have developed over the years to stress social and economic equality amongst partnerships.

Thus Idealism, which encompasses the notion of complex interdependence, therefore yields different political patterns than the realist principle of world politics.

#### Idealism and Foreign Aid

Using the idealist paradigm from the Schraeder-Hook research, foreign aid gives a nation a competitive advantage over another. Schraeder and Hook believe the idealist/neoidealist theories challenge realist assumptions. It advanced a vision that is more positive regarding the motivations of individual and state actors and more optimistic about potential cooperative relations. According to the Schraeder article, idealists believe the conception of interstate relations is based on relentless competition which both ignores the record of cooperation that emerged in the late twentieth century and serves as self-fulfilling prophecy of future conflict. Also, the idealist paradigm asserts the

overriding importance of humanitarian need as the cornerstone of many foreign aid programs.<sup>11</sup>

This study will examine the cultural/humanitarian ties Turkey has throughout the region. This will be examined by using intellectual origins of the idealist/humanitarian perspective, and its main assumptions. Then by examining idealist hypotheses about foreign aid i.e., why do states give foreign aid according to idealists. Also, what idealists might hypothesize about Turkey's foreign aid program, taking into consideration Turkey's cultural ties with certain neighbors in the region.

The bulk of the literature found to support my argument is qualitative. However, there are also studies to back up the qualitative material with statistical data showing where and why countries give aid. Few if any studies look at aid donations from other developing nations, such as Turkey. Studies on foreign aid are largely descriptive, and case study oriented works that explain the stimulus to these donor aid programs. As it is in an article Lobbying Ethnic Groups and Aid Allocation, by Sajal Lahiri and Pascal Raimondos, for the Department of Economics University of Essex, the

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<sup>11</sup> Ibid. p. 298

authors believe the factors that determine how a donor allocates aid are mainly political. However, at times donors use foreign aid to further self-interested agendas.<sup>12</sup> The study examines the relationship between aid allocation and ethnic ties. This thesis will examine similar relationships with Turkey and the "Ethnic Turic" people of Central Asia.

This study uses realist and idealist theories to extrapolate on the causal relationship between the independent variable of foreign aid, and to explain the dependent variables that deal with external relationships. There are many reasons why a state seeks a direct program of dominance, control, or systematic balance. The last of course is against the realist principle that nations just wish to rule and dominate. However, there are refuting concepts and examples that say states can cooperate to promote regional stability. This study will examine the following in theory as they are related to developing the independent and dependant variables that compose this study:

- Y - Foreign aid distributions
- X - Humanitarian need, strategic importance.  
Economic potential, cultural similarity,  
and regional identification

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<sup>12</sup>Lahiri, S.; Raimondos, P., "Lobbying Ethnic Groups and Aid Allocation", University of Essex Press, Jan 1998, p. 1

## Foreign Aid

Foreign aid, international aid or development assistance is when one country or state helps another country through some form of donation. Usually this refers to helping out a country that has a special need caused by poverty, underdevelopment, natural disasters, and armed conflicts. Foreign aid can also include both development aid and humanitarian aid. Some governments include military assistance foreign aid, however there is dissension amongst authors regarding how military assistance can be considered aid. Foreign aid can be characterized by emergency aid, developmental food aid, and development aid.

Emergency aid is money and or technical assistance used to help in times of emergencies that threaten humanity such as famine, floods, earthquakes, and any other natural or unnatural disaster that threatens human life.

Developmental food aid is given to most recipient countries as a means to increase farming, resource management, and health and welfare in developing countries. In a world where famine and hunger still exist developmental food aid programs are still necessary and useful in helping to alleviate some of the

problems that come from starvation, malnutrition, and disease.

Development aid is given by developed countries in order to support economic development in developing countries. It is distinguished from humanitarian aid as being aimed at alleviating poverty in the long term, rather than alleviating suffering in the short term. Development aid is composed of three separate areas: governmental (ODA), foreign investment (FDI), and private (NGO's and others). A fourth area that is remitted is foreign workers as it has an uncertain role, and since some studies have concluded it has a negative effect on economic growth many do not consider it aid.<sup>13</sup>

#### Humanitarian Need

For the definition of these terms I will use the Schraeder study, which states that humanitarian need is based on a widely adopted measures of average life expectancy of target country's population size and the average daily caloric intake of that population. In addition to these measurements, infant mortality rates and population growth. In accordance with the Schraeder

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<sup>13</sup> <http://www.oecd.org>

research, if humanitarian need serves as the corner stone of donor aid programs, one would expect to find aid earmarked to countries with low values on the above measures, everything else being equal.

### Strategic Importance

It is widely assumed that foreign aid is used to enhance the national security of the donor nation, thus the strategic importance of recipient countries to the donors is vital to explaining why foreign aid is used as a mechanism to foster and maintain relations between Turkey and its neighbors. Schraeder uses three measures to ascertain strategic importance: (1) maintenance of security alliance between donor and recipient, as witnessed by the signing of formal defense or military access agreements; (2) military spending as a percentage of the GNP of the recipient country; and (3) percentage of the recipient country's population that forms part of the military. In the case with Turkey I will add to the above referenced criteria civil societal agreements, such as education exchanges and business ventures and total investments. The latter two may fall more into the following category.

## Economic Integrity

Since donors are often self-motivated it stands to reason that the potential rewards from economic cooperative ventures are by far important in the donor-recipient relationship. Economic potential measured by: (1) the recipient country's GNP per capita; and (2) the level of trade with the donor country as measured by the recipient's imports from the donor country as a percentage of total imports. According to Schraeder if the economic potential of the recipient country is operative in the foreign aid equation, we should find aid directed disproportionately toward those countries with larger GNP per capita and importing significantly large amounts of goods from the donor country.

## Cultural Similarity

Turkey uses cultural similarities such as religion and ethnic ties, to further bond itself and beliefs to the Central Asian region. Turkey uses religious ties to strengthen its bond with that of the Middle East. Thus, re-enforcing the realist belief that states only seek to dominant; in this case, ideological domination, and domination of market are far more important than the traditional sense of divide and conquer. Turkey has

taken positive steps to develop its relations with Arab countries. Cultural similarities can be measured by the population of Turkic (ethnic similarities) people within the Central Asia Republics and through out the Middle East, linguistic similarities, religion, and historical commonality.<sup>14</sup>

### Regional Identification

Regional identification largely ties in with the historical component addressed in the cultural similarity section of this study. However, regionalism is also intricately linked with geographical location. Turkey is between Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Turkey is in both a geographical and political position that allows for it to be an innovative leader to those countries struggling in transition (i.e. economic/ idealistically), and to those who have yet to make the leap to completely secular governments. We can measure this by looking at (1) geographical location in congruence with state affiliation. We can define state affiliation by looking at the political rule of our selected countries, e.g. Islamic/ secular, democratic republics, and other government ideologies.

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<sup>14</sup> Landau, J., Pan-Turkism From Irredentism to Cooperation, Indiana University Press, Indianapolis, IN, 1995. pg. 1.

Since regional identification is so broad when examining the relationship Turkey has with its neighbors, we will narrow the focus to the following categories:

Category I- Works that examine the relationship between Turkey and Central Asia;

Category II- Works that examine the relationship between Turkey and the Middle East;

Category III- Works that examine the relation between Turkey and Russia;

Category IV- Works that examine the monetary functions/programs between Turkey and these regions.

Category I:

Turkey and Central Asia

The relationship between Turkey and Central Asia is documented by several articles that encompass the development of cultural, economic, and political ties. In the first years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey campaigned to expand its relations with the newly independent states of Central Asia and tried to become the unofficial leader of the Turkic-speaking states in the region. The Turkic republics of Central Asia have a growing interest in contacts with Turkey and seek economic and cultural ties as well.

The response of the Turkish government was initially cautious as Turkey sought to avoid any perception that it sought to undermine Russia. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia failed to develop a coherent policy toward Central Asia. This provided Turkey some leeway to maneuver and establish relations with Central Asia. However, there were several issues the Turks had to take into account. Turkey has faced several challenges in its dealings with Central Asia. First, many of the regimes in the region are weak, making them easily vulnerable to collapse or being overthrown by political groups or military groups that dissented against the ruling authority. Second, many of the countries, especially Kazakhstan, have large Russian minorities, which gives Russia an important political and psychological pressure point. Third, the existence of territorial disputes between a number of state in the region, particularly Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, has enabled Russia to act as a mediator and play one state against the other. Fourth, the economies of the region are closely linked to the Russian economy, especially with regards to energy, as a result the Central Asia States are highly dependant on trade with Russia. Fifth, Most of the key energy pipelines run through Russia and

therefore are controlled by Russia. Thus, many of the Central Asia states depended on Russia for transportation. And lastly, the elites of Central Asia remain highly "Russified"- a term used to describe the fact that many of the people in Central Asia remained in the same mind-set as the Russian way of life.<sup>15</sup>

Turkey has a strong historical, cultural and linguistic bond with the Central Asian Republics.<sup>16</sup> It is not uncommon that mutual interests as well as political interest are natural links for Turkey. In Jonathan Farley's work, *Turkey's Foreign Policy*, Turkish cooperation with these countries can be classified into five main categories: economic, transport and communication, cultural and education and humanitarian aid. That said, there are both qualitative and quantitative measures that can be employed to measure the amount of aid-based development between Turkey and Central Asia. Turkey enjoys a liaison status as it is shifting large amounts of aid to the Central Asian republics for western nations, such as the United States

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<sup>15</sup> Larrabee, F.; Lesser, I.; *Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty*; Rand Corporation (2002). P. 99-102

<sup>16</sup> Farley, J., "*Turkey's Foreign Policy*", Round Table, Jan 95 Issue 333, p. 81, 8p.

and the European Union (EU).<sup>17</sup> However, one would be hard pressed to find anyone who would admit to this in the government. The Turkish stance is and forever shall be that it pursues its own foreign aid policy at its own will, and not in response to pressure from the EU and U.S. Nevertheless, many case studies show differently.

### Category II:

#### Turkey and the Middle East

Turkey's relationship with the Middle East is as lengthy and interrelated as its ties with Central Asia.<sup>18</sup> Turkey's deep rooted historical, cultural and social relations with and geographical proximity to the Middle East results in Turkey being directly effected by all developments in the region, thus obligating Turkey to follow those developments in the Middle East closely. The aim for peace and stability in the region will serve the interests of Turkey as much as the interests of all regional countries.<sup>19</sup> Even an indication of easing of tensions and establishment of confidence will pave the way for developing possibilities of economic co-

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<sup>17</sup> Lahiri, S.; Raimondos, P., "Lobbying Ethnic Groups and Aid Allocation", University of Essex Press, Jan 1998 p. 2-3

<sup>18</sup> Olson, R., Turkey's Relations with Iran, Syria, Israel, and Russia, 1991-2000: The Kurdish Question and Islamist Question, Mazda Publishing 2001

<sup>19</sup> Sayari, S., "Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era", Journal of International Affairs, Fall 2000, Vol. 54 Issue 1, p169, 14p

operation. This is a common theme throughout most of the literature dedicated to exploring the advantages to the relationship between Turkey and the Middle East. A key example of this is illustrated in an article by Sabri Sayari, who presents Turkey' foreign policy as being significantly more activist and assertive in the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia.

However, this does not imply the rejection of moderation and caution that has traditionally characterized Turkey's approach to international and regional affairs.

Turkey uses aid for leverage in order to boost its position within the region especially with Middle Eastern countries. According to Stephen Larrabee and Ian Lesser, this relationship is key to the involvement of the western world in the Middle East. However, there is a fair amount of dissenting opinion that says Turkey is an over inflated middle-man.<sup>20</sup>

### Category III:

#### Turkey and Russia

The Turkish-Russian relationship has had a long and complex history, notably beginning in 1453 with the fall of Constantinople. There are multiple issue and

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<sup>20</sup> Larrabee, F.; Lesser, I.; Turkish Foreign Policy in and Age of Uncertainty; Rand Corporation (2002). p. 4.

contradictions of the Turkish-Russian relationship; some may not see this relationship as a positive one.

However, this relationship is as true in nature as any other mortal relationship that encompasses, bickering, dissent, contempt, partnership, then resolution.

According to Duygu Sezer, relations between neighboring countries are generally expected to alternate between conflict and cooperation. Turkish-Russian relations stem from the fact that they are both major regional powers, situated at the crossroads of two formerly adversarial continental systems, the transatlantic and Eurasia. As stated previous, Turkey's position as a strategic regional power is what makes it unique as it is directly tied Central Asia, the southern Caucasus, Balkans, Middle East, and Europe. Russia, although a former superpower is not as well connected politically with regions beyond Central Asia. Thus, Turkey remains the only direct and political link between the transatlantic system, which Russia does not completely trust, and the Eurasian system where it has been on strategic retreat.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> Rubin, B.; Kirisci, K.; Turkey in World Politics An Emerging Multi-Regional Power; Lynne& Rienner Publishing (2001) pg. 151-153.

Turkish-Russian relations have broaden as well as deepened in the 1990's, but the possibilities for friendship and cooperation have wavered because of residual fear and mistrust. External developments that influence the Turkish-Russian relationship range from terrorism to bilateral economic agreements. In the mid 1990's Russia in need of a serious economic revamping, sold weapons to the Greek-Cypriot government, which caused serious strain on its relationship with Turkey. However, the intensification of Turkey's aim to train the militaries many of the Central Asian states and also some of the Arab states caused Russia some anxiety as well.<sup>22</sup>

As for economic relations between Turkey and Russia, the 1990's had a promising outlook, as Russia's economy was in transition and sought investment capital and consumer goods. Moreover, Turkey sought to develop its market economy was more than willing to expand its business community to Russia. The collapse of the USSR in December 1991 changed everything and nothing in the Turkish-Russian equation. Economic relations between the former adversaries blossomed Trade between the two nations quickly reached \$3.5 billion in 1995 and topping

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid. 154-155

\$4 billion in 1996. One promising venture occurred in 1997 when the Russian government extended an agreement to close a natural gas deal that was called the Blue Stream. The arrangement included a twenty-five year project where Russia would supply 21 billion barrels years of natural gas to Turkey in exchange for transport the gas through underwater pipelines in the Black Sea to other markets where Russia did not poses any influence. The agreement never fully got off the ground due to the fact that the Black Sea is surrounded by ten other countries that Turkey could not sell the idea to, either due to the despondent relations it had with Armenia, or the pessimistic view the other countries such as the Ukraine, Georgia, and Azerbaijan had of Russia.<sup>23</sup>

Turkey believes it is important to continue developing its relationship with Russia on the basis of the principles of mutual trust, good neighborliness and friendship. It holds the view that furthering Turkish-Russian joint ventures will not only be to their mutual advantage but also to that of many other countries of the region with which they both have close ties. In fact, with their historic, ethnic and cultural ties,

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<sup>23</sup>Katik, M. (2003-2005) Turkish Daily News. Retrieved April 30, 2003, July 14, 2003, & Janaury13, 2005 from [www.turkishdailynews.com](http://www.turkishdailynews.com)

Turkey and Russia are occupying a special place by establishing and strengthening peace, stability and fruitful cooperation in the region. The amount of aid, and development that is exchanged between the two countries, is surprising. Russia receives a large amount aid from Turkey, from oil subsidies and communication aid programs.<sup>24</sup>

Some sources such as Graham Fullers' Book *Turkey's New Geopolitics* states that this relationship has maintained a of tug-o-war stance that philanders back and forth for the resources in Central Asia.<sup>25</sup> Thus, literature based on the relationship between Turkey and Russia, and aid related issues, deals primarily with bargains made both before and after the Cold War. Truer words were never said than that of Tartar publicist Ismail Bey Gasprinskii, who spoken on the relationship of Turkey and Russia. Gasprinskii wrote, " Russians and Turks are bound together in a huge common plain extending from the foothills of the Altai and Parmirs to the swamps of the Baltic Sea... Such it was in the past, and in the Future these peoples will understand that

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<sup>24</sup> Rubin, B.; Kirisci, K.; Turkey in World Politics An Emerging Multi-Regional Power; Lynne& Rienner Publishing (2001) P. 154, 163-165.

<sup>25</sup> Fuller, G.; Lesser, I.; Turkey's New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China; Westview press/ Rand Corporation (1993). P. 176-177.

understand that they must work hand in hand in order to find the way of life they both need"

The relationship between Turkey and Russia in the past has been conflictual at best; however, recent developments show that in recent years the past antagonistic relationship appears to be waning. This is primarily as a result of shared economic interests and Russia's inability to maintain a strong hold over the Central Asia states.

#### Category IV:

#### Turkey's Economic Partnerships and Initiatives

Literature written by Fuller, Larrabee, and Lesser, evaluates the relationship that centers on the growth of markets in each of the eleven member states of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, and the exchange of goods and aid. The economic maze that surrounds the region is also entrenched in political strife, one can readily pick a country from Central Asia to the Middle East in which Turkey has economic ties and there is certain to be some type of internal issue that effects the basis of trade. In order to alleviate some of the dissension in these countries, Turkey tends to use aid as a means to influence the local population into a

pliable source of return for access to their markets. This can be seen in the many attempts the Turkish government in the past has made with economic conventions and meetings through-out both Central Asia and the Middle East. More recently the Turks have begun to explore more lucrative relations with the European Union, and even this relationship has an impact on the amount and means in which Turkey produces aid to its neighbors to the east and south.

Beyond the desire to become a member of the EU Turkey is a member state in a number of economic cooperative ventures with several of the surrounding countries in Central Asia and in the Middle East. Three of these economic trade alliances are highly significant reasons as to why Turkey gives aid. The first, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), is comprised of eleven Central Asian and Baltic countries, with a potential market of 400 million people, and the second highest oil and natural gas reserves of the world. It also includes other rich natural resources and human resources. Of these eleven countries Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Russia, share a special relationship with Turkey.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> [http://www.bsec.gov.tr/discover\\_.htm](http://www.bsec.gov.tr/discover_.htm)

Relations with Azerbaijan are particularly of interest because strong historical, cultural, and linguistic ties. Azerbaijan has played an important role in the revival of Turkic national consciousness as well. Economic relations have intensified as Turkey and Azerbaijan have signed agreements for issues relating to education, energy, and military assistance.

Turkey and Azerbaijan have also signed several education relief and incentives, thus strengthen the bond between the two nations.

The two countries share one of the most important and much disputed pipelines in Central Asia. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline (BTC Pipeline) has been billed as the saving grace of not only the Central Asia region but perhaps that of the western world as well. The BTC pipeline transports crude oil 1,760 km (1,093 miles) from the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli oil field in the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean Sea. It passes through Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan, Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia, and Ceyhan, a port on the south-eastern Mediterranean coast of Turkey. It is the second longest

oil pipeline in the world (the longest being the Druzhba pipeline from Russia to central Europe).<sup>27</sup>

The project is governed by an Inter-Governmental Agreement (IGA) between the governments of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey and by an individual Host Government Agreement (HGA) between each of the three governments and the (British Petroleum) BP-led consortium.

Azerbaijan regards the projected oil and gas revenues as a source of great future prosperity. These riches are projected to come to the government in the form of taxes on the profits of the foreign oil companies, royalties on the resources they extract, and a direct share of the resources. In Azerbaijan, for example, oil-related revenues currently make up about 50% of the government's annual revenues. Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey all hope for substantial incomes from transit payments for pumping oil and gas in pipelines through their countries.

In the case of Turkey, the country would be effectively divided into three: the area where Turkish law applies; the Kurdish areas under official or de facto military rule; and a strip running the entire

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<sup>27</sup> [www.alexanderoilandgas.com](http://www.alexanderoilandgas.com)

length of the country from North to South, where BP is the effective government.<sup>28</sup>

These agreements have largely exempted BP and its partners from any laws in the three countries - present or future - which conflict with the company's project plans. The agreements allow BP to demand compensation from the governments should any law, including environmental, social or human rights law, make the pipeline less profitable. The agreements have for these reasons been described by non-governmental organizations (NGOS) as "colonialist".<sup>29</sup>

The Turkish government can intervene only in the case of an "imminent" and "material" threat to the public, the environment or national security. The preservation of the stability of the project prevails over any other considerations. Thus the project has power over the state in the relevant area. It is unclear as to what would be allowed as constituting an "imminent and material threat" and who would decide if such a threat existed. The high threshold of damage required before action is taken is at odds with any recognized concept of *precaution* in matters of environmental

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<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

protection. Local populations would have no redress where the government has not acted or has failed to act to protect its interests.<sup>30</sup>

The HGA also paves the way for the consortium building the pipeline to demand unlimited protection from Turkish security forces, without safeguards against human rights abuses. Under the vague wording of the agreement, paramilitary units could be placed along the pipeline route to pre-empt "civil disturbance" or "terrorist" activities. Since the pipeline cuts repeatedly through villages and bisects established ownership patterns, people could find themselves cut off from their families or land and be forced to trespass regularly on oil company property in their daily lives. The Kurdish Human Rights Project points out that Turkey:

"has recently charged students signing a Kurdish education petition with membership of an illegal terrorist organization, and charged a father who named his daughter after a Kurdish character in a popular soap with sabotage of the state. These precedents do not instill confidence in the way such indefinable terms as 'civil disturbance' and 'terrorism' will be applied under this agreement."<sup>31</sup>

And last, in mid-October 2001, Turkey proposed a security accord to Georgia and Azerbaijan. Work on the

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid  
<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

trilateral security agreement began in the Caucasus and Central Asia in 2002. The security agreement was aimed at enhancing Turkey's strategic profile in the region. The security agreement included within its framework the set up military bases in Azerbaijan, and the modernization of existing air bases. Turkey has actively engaged in the training of Azerbaijan's military officers, helping Azerbaijan to modernize its military education and bring it up to NATO standards. Azerbaijan has a peacekeeping platoon that is part of the Turkish battalion of KFOR.<sup>32</sup>

The Georgian Turkish relationship at the collapse of the Soviet Union was stressed to say the least, however more recently, Turkey and Georgia have both realized the benefit of a cooperative relationship. In 1997 Turkey signed with Georgia a military assistance agreement just as it had with Azerbaijan. The agreement includes the construction of military training center, and reconstruction of preexisting military bases. In 2000, Turkey and Georgia launched a joint initiative to create a South Caucas Stability Pact, which was designed

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<sup>32</sup> Larrabee, F.; Lesser, I.; Turkish Foreign Policy in and Age of Uncertainty; Rand Corporation (2002). p. 104-105.

economic blocs to assist in the building of lucrative open markets and political ties. Amongst the economic partnerships formed after the cold war, there are three important regional economic organizations in which Turkey is a member to The Black Sea Economic Cooperation, The Economic Cooperation Organization, and ESCAP.

The BSEC was founded after the end of the Cold War period. At its inception the founding states proposed a question as to whether it would be possible to convert the area of the Black Sea into one cooperative economic alliance that would enable them to have a shared prosperity. Discussions were held between member countries on how to create an area where persons, capital and goods would move freely, where initiatives for cooperation would flow freely from one country to another. The Black Sea Cooperation is structured to cooperate on five different levels, which consists of governmental, parliamentary, private enterprise, banking and finance, academic-scientific.<sup>33</sup>

For the purpose of this study close attention was paid to the structure of the governmental and banking

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<sup>33</sup> The Work Program of Turkey During Its Chairmanship of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC) (November 2001)

cooperate on five different levels, which consists of governmental, parliamentary, private enterprise, banking and finance, academic-scientific.<sup>33</sup>

For the purpose of this study close attention was paid to the structure of the governmental and banking institutions of the BSEC. The BSEC governmental section consists of several working groups that manage various areas from economic trade and development, communication, environmental protection, agriculture and agricultural industry, energy, scientific and technological cooperation, health care and pharmaceuticals, transport, emergency assistance.

The Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (BSTDB) is the financial foundation of the BSEC. The initial capital for the bank was provided by specified shared-quotas purchased by participating states amounting to 300 million dollars according to the BSEC charter. Turkey, Greece and Russian Federation are the main shareholders with 16.5% shares respectively. The Bank has succeeded in providing a financial resource of 102 million dollars to different regional projects, particularly those relating to interregional trade.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> The Work Program of Turkey During Its Chairmanship of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC) (November 2001)

<sup>34</sup> Ibid

The BSEC represents a place for broad dialogue on issues of economic cooperation, for making recommendations and decisions aimed at improving the economic environment of the participating states, and encouraging investment projects including joint ventures and facilitating sustainable economic growth in the Black Sea area.

The second international/regional economic cooperative institution is the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). It is an intergovernmental regional organization established in 1985 by Iran, Pakistan and Turkey for the purpose of providing economic, technical and cultural cooperation among themselves.

In 1992, ECO admitted seven new members. Its present membership of ten includes Islamic State of Afghanistan, Republic of Azerbaijan, Islamic Republic of Iran, Republic of Kazakhstan, Republic of Kyrgyzstan, Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Republic of Tajikistan, Republic of Turkey, Turkmenistan and Republic of Uzbekistan. ECO consists of a Ministerial Council (the principal policy and decision-making organ comprising Foreign Ministers or equivalent), Regional Planning Council (which considers and evolves program of action for realizing the objectives of the Organization) and

Council of Deputies, consisting of the Ambassadors of the member countries in Tehran. <sup>35</sup>

Over the past 12 years the member states have been collaborating to accelerate the pace of regional development through their common endeavors. Besides shared cultural and historic similarities, they have been able to use the existing infrastructure and business links to further strengthen their resolve to transfer their hopes and aspirations into a tangible reality. ECO has embarked on several projects in priority sectors of its cooperation including energy, trade, transportation, agriculture and drug control.<sup>36</sup>

The ECO Trade and Development Bank is an important instrument for the promotion of intra-regional trade. It will also facilitate the financing of the projects in the region. Considering the experiences of the Turkish banking in the international area, Turkey believes that establishing the administrative center of the bank in Istanbul will contribute much to the Organization.

Lastly, there is the United Nations Secretariat for the Economic Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP). There are a total of 53 member states and 9

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<sup>35</sup> <http://www.ecosecretariat.org>

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

associate member states. All of the countries referenced in this study are active member states in ESCAP. The ESCAP serves as the main economic and social development forum within the United Nations system for the Asia Pacific region. It formulates and promotes development assistance activities and projects commensurate with the needs and priorities of the region while acting as an executing agency for relevant operation projects. It also develops and executes programs for technical cooperation.

The ESCAP incorporates all the same programs that smaller regional economic institutions have but add the additional dimension that all member states in this study are involved. With the BSEC and ECO only certain member states for this study are involved.

In his book, *The Competitive Advantages of Nations*, Michael Porter outlines the ways in which many industrializing nations have set out an agenda to reach their own competitive goals. If Turkey intends to become an industrialized first-world nation, it must realize that the first concern of every nation is the capacity of its economy. Realizing and reaching this goal will raise the standard of living. The role of government is to set policies that will provide the

foundation of human resources, science and technology, and an infrastructure that allows for an upgrade in economic and social stature in the world market.<sup>37</sup> Thus in the case of Turkey, ESCAP acts by promoting economic and social development through regional and sub-regional cooperation and integration by instituting projects that are comprised of programs of mutual benefit in the fields of economic and commercial cooperation, transport and communications, agriculture, energy, infrastructure, public works, narcotics and educational, scientific, and cultural matters.

Foreign aid and political ties play a large part in the formulation of a nation's economic venture. Historically we can see that colonial ties had a very large effect on the trade relationship between donor and recipient countries. For example, Great Britain and India's trade relationship has spanned the entire last century. The difference between Turkey and Great Britain is that Turkey was not the imperial power that colonized the Central Asian states. Instead, the ethnic background that is shared by Turkey and a majority of the people in Central Asia is a bond that helps forge

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<sup>37</sup> Porter, M., *The Competitive Advantage of Nations*, The Free Press, New York, NY 1998

economic ties. While colonies share a rare, special buying, trade, and political relationship. Traditional ties remain a persistent influence because of the large ethnic communities, historical influence, and social norms amongst regional nations.

Foreign aid and special buying relationships create an extension of the domestic market. Thus resulting in what Porter calls a captive market. The captive market can benefit a nation's industry. However, there are two important cautions: first, captive markets have the tendency to distract nations from adopting a more global market outlook; second, these market are rarely advanced, if a nation focuses on them, their capabilities may not be developed to meet the more stringent needs of other advanced countries.<sup>38</sup>

There have been many different sides of this paradigm explored in various ways, many researchers look purely at the economic ventures pursued by the Western governments and their trade partners, as apt analysis as to why Nation give and receive aid. Porter's book adds a dimension to the foreign aid puzzle by resurrecting and reviewing the relationship between colonial powers of

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<sup>38</sup> Ibid. Pg. 653-657

the past and those in which he deem colonial powers of the present.

One of Porter's examples is relationship between the United States and Latin America. In some cases it seems the U.S. has attempted to force these third world nations to develop more broadly and adapt to western standards, far more quickly than they were ready. This has led to the constant "bailing out" syndrome that plagues many third-world nations. In the case of Turkey Porter point of view helps to make the research question more puzzling by adding this dimension. Does Turkey want to set itself up as the constant dominant force that continues to "piggy back" the nations of Central Asia.

However, this may not be the case at all. By looking at one specific and very important part of the economic equation, we may be able to assess just how much control Turkey has over Central Asia with it power to weld aid.

## CHAPTER THREE

### METHDOLOGY

This thesis will examine the following hypotheses:

- Hypothesis 1:** Turkey is more likely to provide foreign aid to countries where there may be potential security interest.
- Hypothesis 2:** Turkey is more likely to provide aid to regional countries to promote economic development.
- Hypothesis 3:** Turkey is more likely to provide foreign aid to countries that have similar cultural characteristics.
- Hypothesis 4:** Turkey is more likely to provide foreign aid to countries in need of support for humanitarian purposes.

The above-referenced hypotheses shall be measured by creating a data set using the pooled-cross sectional time series regression methodology. By using this research design I will be able to account for the relationships among the variables. A multivariate regression model will be used to test each hypothesis. Techniques will be introduced to control common problems

associated with the pooled cross sectional times series data set. The effects of the independent variables will be estimated by using ordinary least squares (OLS) and with panel corrected standard errors.

By using data from the OCED, we are able to gain an accurate picture on the amounts and distributions in which Turkey disperses aid. There are also non-primary sources such as the websites Alexander's Oil and Gas, O'Brien Forecasting Country Instability, and Turizm.net, which features trade analysis, and humanitarian documentation for prior to present years. An additional source of information on Turkish trade and aid policy is the Turkish Businessmen's Association (TUSAID). There is a wealth of information from the business sector that deals with both the political and economical side of Turkish policies.

The sample data source is comprised of ten countries that were reflective of Central Asia, and the Middle East, along with Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The years examined were 1994 through 2002. However data for every year in some cases are missing, so in order to control for this

factor, I chose four particular years that seemed reflective of the general consensus.<sup>39</sup>

The indicators used to control for the dependant variables are as follows:

Humanitarian need was measured by observing, life expectancy, infant mortality, population growth rate, and caloric intake.<sup>40</sup>

The dependent variable for the study was observed over a period of time from 1990 through 2002. 1991 was the first official year that countries such as Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan become independent. Other countries may have missing data as a result of non-reporting to the various agencies used to gather information such as the OECD.<sup>41</sup> The measure for the dependant variable is:

Total ODA Net is inclusive of grants and loans with maturities of over one year are included in Development Assistance Committee (DAC) statistics. These are measured in millions of U.S. Dollars.

Independent Variables:

Time in years 1990-2002

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<sup>39</sup> See Table 2

<sup>40</sup> See Table 1

<sup>41</sup> Data for the years of 1990 and 1991 is missing.

GNI Per Capita, Gross National Income Per Capita in millions of U.S. Dollars.

Population, calculated by the million. (Source: OECD, and UN)

GDP per Capita, Gross Domestic Product per Capita in millions of U.S. Dollars. (Source OECD)

Donor Aid, Aid received from Turkey to the test group in the form of Emergency aid and developmental food aid. Calculated in millions of U.S. Dollars. (Source OECD)

Trade with recipients: Is derived by adding Imports and exports to Turkey, divided by population of each country. (Source World Bank)

BSEC, Black Sea Economic Cooperation that was formed in 1992. Member Countries of the BSEC that which are significant to the study, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Russia. Coded "1" for all BSEC members, "0" otherwise.

ECO, Economic Cooperation Organization formed in 1985. Member Countries of the ECO that which are significant to the study, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Turkey. Coded "1" for all ECO member, "0" otherwise.

Cultural Similarity, Each country was coded "1"

1. Azerbaijan

2. Kazhistan

3. Tajikstan

4. Kyrgyz Republic
5. Turkmenistan
6. Uzbekistan

Coded "0"

1. Georgia
2. Iran
3. Iraq
4. Russia
5. Syria

ESCAP, Economic Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific formed in 1992. Member Countries of the ESCAP that which are significant to this study, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan. ESCAP members are coded "1".

Oil Exports to Turkey; this variable is coded "1" for countries Turkey shares an oil pipeline connection with, "0" for all other countries. (Source Alexander Oil & Gas)

For the independent variable of economic potential I used the main data set that measures gross national income, gross domestic product, and gross national product, in congruence with total amount of trade exports and imports, and total amount of exports and imports to Turkey.<sup>42</sup>

One of the harder independent variables to control for was cultural similarity, as it in and of itself a

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<sup>42</sup> See Tables 2 and 4.1 through 5.5

separate research question. However, for the purpose of this study, I used ethnicity, religion, and language statistics to illustrate the commonality between the subset of countries and Turkey.

Having discussed in general terms the indicators used for the statistical analysis, I will now present specific measures used for dependant variables and all independent variables.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### FINDINGS

To test the hypotheses derived from the competing analytical approaches, I developed a multivariate model in order to analyze whether Turkey will use foreign aid as a means to advance its national interests it supplies aid to or solely as a means to promote humanitarianism.

By using multiple regression analysis we can test the effects over a series of time, showing what independent variables directly affect the way in which Turkey gives aid. After testing several combinations of the above variables the end results show the following combinations as being statistically significant.

By viewing the table below we can see that the coefficient for GNI per capita is negative and achieves statistical significance remaining the regression constant in most models. This suggests that Turkey's aid program is motivated by humanitarian considerations. Population is not significant in most trials. Of the

independent variables tested the trials that seem to be most related to Turkey's national economic interests and cultural ties, BSEC, ECO, and ESCAP are of interest. The coefficient for ESCAP is positive and significant in models 2, 3, and 5. Turkey's relationships pursued through this international economic organization are significant in the fact that Turkey provides a fair amount of aid to the countries it shares an economic affinity to. These economic organizations provide Humanitarian aid, but also safeguard Turkey's economic interest, which does not necessarily begin with monetary denominations. As previously discussed many of ESCAP spur development through various programs that will help govern and develop society as a whole. The money that is earned or attributed to these organizations goes toward implementing new technologies, business development, and healthcare. By contrast, the coefficients for ECO and BSEC fail to achieve significance and in some models display unexpected negative signs.

The coefficient for the variable for the oil pipeline is unexpectedly negative and statistically significant. This indicates that Turkey does not see the control of oil or the pipelines thereof as a sole reason to distribute aid to the countries in which it has the

agreements with. The relationship is probably negative due to concerns about humanitarianism oil exporting countries are wealthier.

The coefficient for trade per capita, which was derived from the independent variables of imports, exports, and population shows a negative sign through out the regression, but the coefficient is not significant in most trials. This shows that the amount of import and export goods provided to and from Turkey have no effect on average over whether or not Turkey gives aid to a particular country.

<i>Independent Variable</i>	<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>Standard Error</i>	<i>Z-Score</i>	
<b>Model 1</b>				
GNI per Capita	-.0012888	.000856	-1.51	
Population	.0000000825	.0000000296	0.28	
Aid	-.000000000580	.00000000353	-0.16	
GDP per Capita	-.00000000112	.00000000237	-0.47	
ECO	-.3598032	2.478309	-0.15	
ESCAP	2.191536	2.192174	1.00	
<b>+ Model 2</b>				
GNI per Capita	-.0012952	.00003234	-4.00	**
Population	.00000000891	.00000000775	1.15	
Tradecap	-000000000929	.000000000553	-1.74	*
ECO	-.3917603	.7217149	-0.54	

ESCAP	2.225292	.4532295	4.91	**
<i>Independent Variable</i>	<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>Standard Error</i>	<i>Z-Score</i>	
+ Model 3				
GNI per Capita	-.0011481	.000033	-3.45	**
Population	-.00000000531	.00000000510	-1.04	
Tradecap	-.0047743	.0098946	-0.48	
ESCAP	2.012918	.5639625	3.57	**
+ Model 4				
GNI per Capita	-.00154411	.0010312	-1.49	
Population	-000000000708	.0000000162	-0.44	
ESCAP	2.677508	1.527447	1.75	
+ Model 5				
GNI per Capita	-.0011	.0003332	-3.45	**
Population	-.00000000531	.00000000510	-1.04	
Tradcap	-.0047743	.0098946	-0.48	
ESCAP	2.012918	.5639625	3.57	**
+ Model 6				
GNI per Capita	-.0011612	.0003428	-3.39	**
Population	-0000000567	.00000000621	-0.91	
Tradcap	-0060194	.009713	-0.62	
ECO	1.315358	.7032724	1.87	
+ Model 7				
GNI per Capita	-.0016235	.0003535	-4.59	**
Population	000000005.82	000000004.44	1.31	
Tradcap	-.0068022	.0096004	0.71	

BSEC Independent Variable	-1.026946 Coefficient	.6940898 Standard Error	-1.48 Z-Score	
<b>+ Model 8</b>				
GNI per Capita	-.0014627	.0003727	-3.92	**
Population	.000000008.45	.000000004.24	2.00	*
Tradcap	-.0073451	.0094791	-0.77	
BSEC	-.00558912	.9391661	-0.06	
Oil Pipeline	-1.321223	.5677365	-2.33	*
<b>+ Model 9</b>				
GNI per Capita	-.0014551	.000	-4.22	**
Population	.000000008.32	.000000005.46	1.52	
Tradcap	-.0073754	.009413	-0.78	
Oil Pipeline	-1.351472	.5453362	-2.48	*
+ Model Significance		* $p \leq .05$		
		** $p \leq .01$		
Wald Chi-Squared		$p \leq .01$		

The results show that there are significant relationships between the dependent variable and several of the independent variables that relate to why Turkey gives aid to regional partners. However not all of the independent variables produced significant results. Therefore, other indicators may need to be examined in order to further investigate the relationship.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

Looking at the first hypothesis Turkey is more likely to provide foreign aid to countries in need of support for humanitarian purposes, the results of this study provide empirical support. Turkey alone is not the only nation that contributes humanitarian assistance to recipient countries such as Azerbaijan and Tajikistan. However, Turkey is one of countries that stands to gain in doing so. Azerbaijan and Tajikistan are two of the countries in Central Asia that struggle to meet the recommended World Health Organization predetermined nourishment allowances. For Azerbaijan, food is available in both urban and rural markets, the purchasing power of the bulk of the country's 7.6 million inhabitants remains low. Costing on average US\$ 68 per month for a family of five, food continues to account for around 70 percent of total expenditures among the most economically vulnerable. Humanitarian

assistance has been provided since the early 1990s. Nearly 500,000 people (half of whom have fled the areas affected by political conflict with Armenia) still need this help. A survey of internally displaced families conducted in 1998 found that 30 percent showed some signs of malnutrition.<sup>43</sup>

Turkey's traditional activities in expanding emergency humanitarian relief was mostly confined to natural disaster situations until the 1990's. By 1991, Turkey's relief efforts began to be geared toward near disaster and disaster situations caused by war, such as political and social upheaval and economic disruption. Starting in 1992 Turkey's expenditures for humanitarian assistance was 216 million (USD\$) it has now reached an unprecedented 8.76 billion (USD\$), increasing on average 30 to 60 million per year.

In short, Turkey gives aid to those in need, but sticking more closely to the realist principle, Turkey provides aid to countries such as Azerbaijan and Tajikistan in the way of humanitarian aid in order to forge a closer alliance, with these two nations, for the purpose of securing alternative resources for oil.

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<sup>43</sup> <http://www.fao.org/docrep/x8200e/x8200e03.htm>

Especially in the case of Azerbaijan, Turkey has desired to control the transit lines of the Caspian oil pipeline this by in large plays a greater role in establishing their motives for being communal.

Next, Turkey is more likely to provide foreign aid to countries where there may be potential security interest. Turkey's foreign policy has long since held that in order to foster a sense of national solidarity amongst the Turks/Turic peoples and Kurds alike that they need to maintain clear stance in which the government upheld a completely secular ideology, when dealing with regional entities. The Turkish government has time and again vowed to help western alliances in dealing with situation in the Middle East. More recently, the Turkish government has been made out to be the "bad guy" in the region, as many countries see their efforts as just an extension of the United States. The external factors of terrorism and war influence security interests where regional stability is concerned. Direct conflict with neighboring states and internal conflict within neighboring states is a large security threat and poses harm to Turkey's economy

It is ideal in the realist school, that a state be able to directly control or at the very least effect the

surrounding region in order to maintain its sovereign integrity. This aspect of the theory constitutes that Turkey gives aid as a means to promote its national interests as well as to maintain regional stability in order to protect and advance its goals for control of the region. It is then only true in a very small way, that Turkey can be seen by certain members of the international community as being just as domineering as the United States, Russia, and the European Union. Thus, these regional states have requested that Turkey maintain a somewhat neutral part to the more recent insurrection throughout the region.<sup>44</sup>

In order to assure its own political and geographical integrity, Turkey will pursue programs that align its neighboring states into a more stable position. By pursuing aggressive negotiations with these surrounding states, Turkey hopes to solidify its position through economic cooperation, instead of a show of force.

Thus, Turkey's foreign aid policy seems to be more inline with the idealist principles that deems it is necessary for a nation in modern times to be cooperative

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<sup>44</sup> Winrow, G., Turkey in Post Soviet Central Asia, Royal Institute of International Affairs Press, 1995, Pg. 25-53.

and respectful of its regional communities desires. In fact with recent developments in the Middle East and Central Asia after the war in Afghanistan (2001) and the war in Iraq (2003) suggest that Turkey has maintained a semi intermediary position. Turkey has been beneficial in sending and maintaining peacekeeping troops in Afghanistan and had hoped to do so with Iraq. However, due to Iraqi dissent they have ever so hesitantly and graciously bowed out. Regional security thus by case study alone seems to dictate who receives aid assistance and how much, by the simple implication that Turkey, will give aid as a means of appeasement and pacification in areas troubled by war, and at the very least civil unrest.

Continuing on to the next hypothesis, Turkey is more likely to provide foreign aid to those countries with similar cultural characteristics. Turkey gives the greatest importance to developing relations in all fields with Central Asia because of its long standing language, historical, and cultural bonds. Turkey believes it is both its moral and political duty to provide these new states with assistance and support in

hopes to assist with their establishing full democratic rule and market economies. <sup>45</sup>

Turkey's religious ties to its regional neighbors plays a large role in the relations it has with other regional nations, especially those in the Middle East. As a secular state Turkey tries not to become entrenched in religious issues in the middle east, but attempts to maintain a steady equilibrium between political agendas and religious agendas. One of the most notable relationships between Turkey and the Middle East is that of Turkey and Syria. There is a long-standing history between the two nations, but more importantly is the Kurdish issue, in which both nations have a small under-representative population of Kurds.

Another, yet all too important relationship Turkey shares with the Middle East is that with Iraq. There are half a million Turkomen and Kurds living in northern Iraq, and Turkey feels obligated to protect and defend these inhabitants. So far Turkey has been able to maintain semi-peaceable agreement with the Iraqi government even throughout the Saddam Hussein administration over the last 10 to 12 years. The amount

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<sup>45</sup> Winrow, G., Turkey in Post Soviet Central Asia, Royal Institute of International Affairs Press, 1995, Pg. 25-53.

of aid investments in Iraq totals around 34.8 billion over the last eight years.

Lastly, the results of the fourth hypothesis that Turkey is more likely to provide aid to regional countries to promote economic development has the most standing, as all roads leading to the giving and receiving of aid eventually arrive at one conclusion--- money. In this case it is the creation and maintenance of viable economic resources that propels Turkey to give in collaboration with other regional governments. The path Turkey has been on in the region was one that would have made it a "regional hegemonic leader", as they unbelievable had the most stable economy in the region, which in turn meant Turkey could have very well in the future played a larger role amongst its regional neighbors. Economic hegemony scholars such as Robert Gilpin (of the realist school of thought) have argued that the overwhelming dominance of one country was necessary for the existence of an open and stable world economy. Such hegemon served to coordinate and discipline other countries so that each could feel secure enough to open its markets and avoid the "beggery-neighbor" policies. Thus, the decline of a hegemon

tends to be associated with economic closure, instability, and competition amongst regional blocs.<sup>46</sup>

As I see it this principle both conforms to the realist and idealist theory as the global economy is maintained by joint entities and their desire to maintain and develop individual markets, yet at the same time remain collective.

Ultimately, Turkey does give aid to promote its own self-interest, as every state does in order to maintain its own integrity and status. Self-preservation is a large promoting factor for Turkey in its aims to generate donations of foreign aid, as it is still a developing nation in and of itself. However, since Turkey has once enjoyed the status of a ruling empire that spanned several centuries, there is a tendency for it to regress in its ideology by maintaining it should by enlarge serve as a regional leader. However, memories of both Ottoman and Russian imperial rule run deep in both Central Asia and the Middle East causing all the efforts made by the Turks to be less than fruitful as they would like.

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<sup>46</sup> Gilpin, R., *The Challenge of Global Capitalism: The World Economy in the 21st Century*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, c2000, pg. 325-330.

### Limitations of the Present Study

It has become apparent by review the two articles assess donor aid programs that it is necessary to have one other developing nation in the methodology when trying to account for aid programs. Having this other nation gives an added dimension to the scope of the donor countries position. In other words Turkey is used as a single model, because we have nothing to compare it to. In the Schraeder-Hook article, they use the United States, France, Sweden, and Japan; all of which are industrialized nations that give aid to developing African nations. However, for this study it would have made a difference if only to point out the facts that Turkey although considered a developing nation is far better off than those that really are developing nations. In order to clarify that you would have to show a dichotomy of one know industrial nation, to that of Turkey, and then that of a developing nation.

Another limitation is of course the study in and of itself is slightly unprecedented as most scholars do not look at developing nations as having the ability to supply monetary or commodity aid to any other nation, as in a sense they are themselves developing and usually in

need a foreign aid. Thus, this study requires more examination on a far more in depth level.

#### Conclusion

The findings of this thesis suggest that no one theory can account for why Turkey gives aid. Each theory has some support in explaining why aid is distributed to whom and for whatever reason. The results reported in Chapter 4 provide a mixed picture of whether Turkey uses aid as a means to further its humanitarian goals, or that of its foreign policy, and or security interests.

Regarding realism and neorealism, the results show a negative and statistically significant relationship in the models (Model 8 and 9) that relate to the oil pipeline and Turkey's use of it as a power mechanism for control and distribution of aid to those countries with a vested interest in oil production and transportation. This finding challenges the conventional wisdom offered by neorealist. Turkey, although having some influence with the oil exporting countries does not have sole controlling interest in the means by which oil is produced or to whom it is sold. Turkey's vested interest lies mostly with the transportation of the oil from its originating oil field, which is typically in a semi land-lock country like

Azerbaijan or Kazakhstan. Transportation of oil from the land-lock countries is a key priority and national interest, as it will assist in some key economic revitalization. Given these conditions, the negative association between Turkish ODA and oil pipelines is striking. It is significant to know that Turkey does not operate solely on national interest alone when creating its foreign policy.

Looking at the other variables would suggest that Turkey's aid program is more or less derived from Idealist principles of humanitarianism. Idealism asserts that foreign policy can be formulated according to cooperative and ethical standards. Countries that are capable of achieving this cooperation have less conflictive relations. Turkey appears to be able to serve its national interest by serving a common relationship pursued through its economic interest and cultural ties. The ESCAP, an economic organization in which Turkey belongs, showed the highest correlation and statistical significance in the data analysis in the models (Models 2,3, &5). This organization provides humanitarian aid and safeguard economic interest of member countries. Aid allocation to member countries an average was higher than to non-percipient countries.

This shows that perhaps the tenants of Idealism is prevalent in the aid program.

The idealist principal of interdependence in globalization also fits into the picture, because Turkey is unequivocally interdependent on being able to maintain its dominant position over its lesser developed regional partners, and to continue to align itself with those more powerful than itself in order to maintain continually economic growth and security in the region that surrounds it.

Geopolitical shifts combined with Turkey's new status in international events, have had and continue to impact the way Turkey sees itself, deals with other, and is perceived by others. As a result, this study does create a framework in which others can use to develop a clearer understanding of the goals of developing nations that paradoxically use their national interests to further their own goals, yet maintain international order, and promote humanitarian awareness, and contribute to the overall geopolitics of the world.

The other variables used in this study are perhaps too collinear as they produced on average statistically insignificant results. Perhaps that combinations of these variables should be studied in order to find

divergent ranges in an attempt to further develop the causal relationship of how and why Turkey distributes aid, and the effects realist and idealist theories of international relations have on the evaluation of the relationship between Turkey and recipient nations.

How does Turkey's aid program relate to other foreign policy challenges facing the country? Since Turkey is an emerging political, economic, and cultural magnet, it faces a struggle with its neighbors that can either bond or break future endeavors due to its imperial past, and current nepotistic relationship with the west. Turkey's geopolitical opportunities have changed the nature of Turkey. It has blossomed from the once isolationist stance during the years directly before the cold war to being able to profoundly affect change in the Middle East, Central Asia/Caucuses, Europe, and even in the United States.

Regionally, Turkey has many opportunities to influence its neighbors. Turkey and the Caucasus have seen major developments with Turkey and Azerbaijan and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation. Turkey's relationship with Azerbaijan over the last few months has centered on issues regarding the Azerbaijan/Turkish/Armenia conflicts, the opening of the

BTC pipeline, and creating more economic investment programs increasing communication and transportation.

Through a great many difficulties Turkey over the last 15 years has been able to make remarkable strides toward coexisting with the independent states of the old Soviet Union by creating several bilateral agreements. The future for this relationship looks strong and as long as it isn't undermined by greed and western powers that occasionally cause splinters to form in the region.

In the Middle East, Turkey met with Kuwait and Yemen on October 25, 2005 in order to increase bilateral trade. Trade between Kuwait and Turkey has risen over the last few years, reaching \$225 million in 2004. In Yemen similar agreements have been reached preventing double taxation, forging cooperation in the fields of oil and natural gas, and protecting the environment.

Water has also become a major source of tension between Turkey, Syria and Iraq. Turkey, located upstream of the Tigris and Euphrates river systems, began the Southeast Anatolia (GAP) Project in 1990, which give Turkey extensive control over the flow of Euphrates water and is expected to double Turkey's irrigated farmland. The project is expected to be completed by 2010. In an article, "The New Water Politics Of The

Middle East" ("Strategic Review," Summer 1999), the authors explain that: "Despite the signing of a protocol ensuring Syrian access to Euphrates water in 1987, Turkish development efforts have increasingly threatened to marginalize and even eliminate Syrian access to water."<sup>47</sup>

Turkey has been willing to implement reforms to gain entry into the EU. Achieving comprehensive public sector reform, maintaining a determined struggle against unregistered economy, committing to the implementation of democratic reforms, initiating those belated reforms in the spheres of agriculture, education and social security, developing a promising strategy to take a leading part within the global information society, and most important of all, keeping open the channels of social dialogue will undoubtedly strengthen Turkey's position in the negotiations. <sup>48</sup> Arguable, Turkey's Domestic and foreign policies regarding entry into the E.U. demonstrate the importance of neorealist factors.

In the end, by looking at the current developments, it can be concluded that Turkey takes a mixture of both

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<sup>47</sup> Berman, I.; Withbey, P.; The New Water Politics of the Middle East; Strategic Review, Summer 1999.

<sup>48</sup> www. TUSIAD.com: "The EU Decision Reinforces Turkey's Transformation and Enhances EU's Global Role" October 2005.

<sup>49</sup> www.germany.info/relaunch/info/publications/week/2005/050701

realism and idealism as a means to allocate aid to certain recipients in surrounding regions and in other areas of its foreign policy. Turkey's goals are neither purely humanitarian based nor completely state based. I believe that Development Minister Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul of Germany said it best when referring to the German policy on developmental aid, "Development cooperation is the most cost-effective form of security policy."<sup>49</sup> It appears that this line of thought ties into that of either forms of international theory, meaning a state can not ignore or seek security or its own national interest without first realizing that in order to acquire the things basic to its survival, it must first maintain its surrounding areas.

		Total ODA Grant	Total ODA Net	Emergency Aid	Development Food Aid	GNI Per Capita in USD	Gross Domestic Product Per Capita in USD	Population	Total Exports from Turkey in USD	Oil Exports to Turkey in USD	BSEC 1992	ECO 1985	ESCAP 1992
Azerbaijan	1990	0	0	0	0	0	3061	7159000	0	0	0	0	0
Azerbaijan	1991	0.3	0.3	0	0	0	2088	7271000	0	0	0	0	0
Azerbaijan	1992	1.79	31.36	0.81	0	0	60	7382000	102221864	28,481	1	1	1
Azerbaijan	1993	1.98	61.1	0	0	0	208	7495000	68175120	870,430	1	1	1
Azerbaijan	1994	1.68	0.58	0.23	0	0	155	7590000	132061296	0	1	1	1
Azerbaijan	1995	9.84	0	2.83	0	0	310	7685000	160634000	0	1	1	1
Azerbaijan	1996	0	0	0	0	0	402	7763000	239139872	4,501,126	1	1	1
Azerbaijan	1997	0	0	0	0	0	497	7838000	319619808	6,917,091	1	1	1
Azerbaijan	1998	7.31	7.31	0.58	0	0	556	7913000	325239168	2,192,559	1	1	1
Azerbaijan	1999	2.28	2.28	0.27	0.01	0	566	7983000	272979712	4,187,582	1	1	1
Azerbaijan	2000	3.72	3.72	0.47	0	0	611	8049000	229668240	44,264,544	1	1	1
Azerbaijan	2001	3.33	3.33	0.47	0.12	0	653	8116110	225125424	42,983,728	1	1	1
Azerbaijan	2002	4.14	4.14	0.27	0.02	0	707	8172000	226797728	28,391,788	1	1	1
Georgia	1990	0	0	0	0	0	4115	5460000	0	0	0	0	0
Georgia	1991	0	0	0	0	0	2005	5456000	0	0	0	0	0
Georgia	1992	15.04	15.73	14.65	0	0	140	5437000	11610172	943497	1	1	1
Georgia	1993	3.63	15.74	2.59	0	0	409	5408000	34492912	1022994	1	1	1
Georgia	1994	0.91	0.57	0.33	0	0	303	5378000	67031272	0	1	1	1
Georgia	1995	0.45	0.45	0.1	0	0	520	5352000	67678160	2599	1	1	1
Georgia	1996	0	0	0	0	0	559	5334000	110153136	4988981	1	1	1
Georgia	1997	0	0	0	0	0	658	5320000	173434080	15226237	1	1	1
Georgia	1998	1.16	1.16	0.13	0	0	669	5307000	161257120	34124948	1	1	1
Georgia	1999	1	1	0.26	0	0	518	5289000	114134128	9605167	1	1	1
Georgia	2000	1.03	1.03	0.83	0	0	566	5262000	131200008	44820488	1	1	1
Georgia	2001	0.84	0.84	0.04	0	0	598	5224000	143982512	46318932	1	1	1
Georgia	2002	0.64	0.64	0.31	0	0	639	5177000	103315608	14768775	1	1	1
Iran	1990	0	0	0	0	0	1576	54400000	495479840	486553280	0	0	0
Iran	1991	0	0	0	0	0	1649	55300000	486898144	56591756	0	0	0
Iran	1992	0	0	0	0	0	1656	56200000	455278016	333790144	0	1	0
Iran	1993	0.14	0.14	0.13	0	0	1788	57100000	289679392	609692992	0	1	0
Iran	1994	0	0	0	0	0	1735	58000000	249806896	650713600	0	1	0
Iran	1995	0	0	0	0	0	1743	59000000	265562448	64486988	0	1	0
Iran	1996	0	0	0	0	0	1792	59900000	296384064	709528832	0	1	0
Iran	1997	0	0	0	0	0	1662	60900000	306985120	561860288	0	1	0
Iran	1998	0.02	0.02	0	0	0	1611	61900000	193588240	375792384	0	1	0
Iran	1999	0	0	0	0	0	1656	62800000	157793808	582635584	0	1	0
Iran	2000	0.06	0.06	0	0	0	1550	63700000	234286720	760344576	0	1	0
Iran	2001	0.08	0.08	0.07	0	0	1639	64500000	360494272	782819136	0	1	0
Iran	2002	0.02	0.02	0.01	0	0	2000	66623000	308047168	846244608	0	1	0
Iraq	1990	0	0	0	0	0	2138	18100000	214478208	0	0	0	0
Iraq	1991	0	0	0	0	0	704	18600000	122397728	56591756	0	0	0
Iraq	1992	0.13	15.04	0	0	0	900	19200000	212011104	0	0	0	0
Iraq	1993	0.03	3.63	0	0	0	474	19700000	160116848	0	0	0	0
Iraq	1994	0	0	0	0	0	511	20300000	140968928	0	0	0	0
Iraq	1995	12.08	0.91	12.06	0	0	630	20800000	119211632	0	0	0	0
Iraq	1996	0	0	0	0	0	571	21300000	187964016	31542872	0	0	0
Iraq	1997	0	0	0	0	0	778	21800000	53926920	76141776	0	0	0
Iraq	1998	0.11	0.45	0.09	0	0	759	22300000	10719403	10271617	0	0	0
Iraq	1999	0	0	0	0	0	611	22800000	0	0	0	0	0
Iraq	2000	0.03	1.16	0	0	0	723	23300000	0	0	0	0	0
Iraq	2001	0.13	1	0	0.06	0	810	23800000	0	0	0	0	0
Iraq	2002	0.08	1.03	0.01	0.01	0	737	24001816	0	0	0	0	0
Kazakhstan	1990	0	0	0	0	0	4276	16300000	0	0	0	0	0
Kazakhstan	1991	0	0	0	0	0	2911	16500000	0	0	0	0	0
Kazakhstan	1992	2.53	2.08	0	0	0	374	16500000	19357076	303394	0	1	1
Kazakhstan	1993	1.33	4.33	0	0	0	696	16500000	67803928	1297529	0	1	1
Kazakhstan	1994	4.81	4.79	0.01	0	0	710	16300000	131732216	428179	0	1	1
Kazakhstan	1995	6.86	6.86	0	0	0	996	16100000	149795344	0	0	1	1
Kazakhstan	1996	0	0	0	0	0	1272	15900000	163243200	86973	0	1	1
Kazakhstan	1997	0	0	0	0	0	1350	15800000	210495648	0	0	1	1
Kazakhstan	1998	4.66	4.66	0.01	0	0	1366	15500000	212882768	63584240	0	1	1
Kazakhstan	1999	3.29	3.29	0	0	0	1035	15300000	96523000	174380880	0	1	1
Kazakhstan	2000	1.65	1.65	0	0	0	1067	15100000	116080080	169205168	0	1	1
Kazakhstan	2001	1.34	1.34	0	0.04	0	1354	14900000	119720176	0	0	1	1
Kazakhstan	2002	1.51	1.51	0.01	0.01	0	1512	14900000	158588865	23368474	0	1	1
Kyrgyz Reb	1990	0	0	0	0	0	2925	4423000	0	0	0	0	0
Kyrgyz Reb	1991	0	0	0	0	0	2380	4495000	0	0	0	0	0
Kyrgyz Reb	1992	17.57	20.32	17.06	0	0	171	4546000	1830433	0	0	1	1

		Total ODA Grant		Total ODA Net		Emergency Aid	Development Food Aid	GNI Per Capita in USD	Per Capita in Product Per Capita in USD	Gross Domestic Product Per Capita in USD	Population	Total Exports from Turkey in USD		Oil Exports to Turkey in USD		BSEC 1992	ECO 1985	ESCAP 1992
Kyrgyz Reb	1993	1.44	18.43	0.91	0	0	0	218	221	4543000	17041908	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Kyrgyz Reb	1994	1.53	1.88	0.16	0	0	0	241	245	4540000	16960060	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Kyrgyz Reb	1995	1.76	1.76	0	0	0	0	323	327	4590000	38061424	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Kyrgyz Reb	1996	0	0	0	0	0	0	387	296	4657000	47035408	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Kyrgyz Reb	1997	0	0	0	0	0	0	365	377	4725000	49376180	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Kyrgyz Reb	1998	7.25	7.25	0.04	0	0	0	327	344	4797000	41414488	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Kyrgyz Reb	1999	2.06	2.06	0	0	0	0	242	258	4864600	23149424	15319	0	0	0	1	1	1
Kyrgyz Reb	2000	2.08	2.08	0	0	0	0	262	278	4915000	20231858	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Kyrgyz Reb	2001	1.54	1.54	0	0	0.04	0	293	306	4955000	17293568	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Kyrgyz Reb	2002	2.48	2.48	0.01	0	0.01	0	301	317	5004000	23915324	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Russia	1990	0	0	0	0	0	0	6523	6523	148000000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Russia	1991	0	0	0	0	0	0	5375	5375	149000000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Russia	1992	0	1.07	0	0	0	0	564	575	149000000	444843976	431087040	1	1	1	1	1	1
Russia	1993	0	1.29	0	0	0	0	1145	1163	149000000	505277976	604652992	1	1	1	1	1	1
Russia	1994	0	0	0	0	0	0	1861	1878	148000000	820194944	457	1	1	1	1	1	1
Russia	1995	0.83	0.83	0	0	0	0	2258	2115	148000000	1232041984	803536869	1	1	1	1	1	1
Russia	1996	0	0	0	0	0	0	2798	2653	148000000	1494434048	891250432	1	1	1	1	1	1
Russia	1997	0	0	0	0	0	0	2850	2748	147000000	2056470272	901768256	1	1	1	1	1	1
Russia	1998	1.34	1.34	0.01	0	0	0	1842	1845	147000000	1347468928	775864512	1	1	1	1	1	1
Russia	1999	0.77	0.77	0	0	0	0	1271	1339	146000000	588603264	1140914432	1	1	1	1	1	1
Russia	2000	0.29	0.29	0	0	0	0	1737	1784	146000000	639025472	2190643712	1	1	1	1	1	1
Russia	2001	0.98	0.98	0	0	0.06	0	2112	2116	145000000	924042240	2528608768	1	1	1	1	1	1
Russia	2002	0.32	0.32	0	0	0.01	0	2377	2399	144070000	1168258176	2672816456	1	1	1	1	1	1
Syria	1990	0	0	0	0	0	0	1030	1100	12100000	194485296	66654984	0	0	0	0	0	0
Syria	1991	0	0	0	0	0	0	1084	1153	12500000	264199552	52275308	0	0	0	0	0	0
Syria	1992	0	0	0	0	0	0	1238	1272	12900000	216181280	19621164	0	0	0	0	0	0
Syria	1993	0	0	0	0	0	0	1270	1302	13400000	238875616	33448974	0	0	0	0	0	0
Syria	1994	0.01	0.01	0	0	0	0	1382	1359	13800000	253842176	8562265	0	0	0	0	0	0
Syria	1995	0	12.08	12.06	0	0	0	1437	1417	14200000	270649472	223083360	0	0	0	0	0	0
Syria	1996	0	0	0	0	0	0	1443	1516	1460000	308673216	278475520	0	0	0	0	0	0
Syria	1997	0	0	0	0	0	0	1461	1552	1500000	268737056	345392448	0	0	0	0	0	0
Syria	1998	0	0	0	0	0	0	1587	1616	15400000	308851168	190853512	0	0	0	0	0	0
Syria	1999	0	0	0	0	0	0	1642	1520	15800000	232192544	256989872	0	0	0	0	0	0
Syria	2000	0	0	0	0	0	0	1574	1492	16200000	182551584	451851744	0	0	0	0	0	0
Syria	2001	0.01	0.01	0	0	0	0	1606	1506	16600000	281114816	415233792	0	0	0	0	0	0
Syria	2002	0.06	0.06	0.05	0	0	0	1618	1517	16900000	262845056	456427776	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tajikistan	1990	0	0	0	0	0	0	22	21	5303000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tajikistan	1991	0	0	0	0	0	0	14	14	5464000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tajikistan	1992	0.19	0.21	0.05	0	0	0	48	47	5571000	705977	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Tajikistan	1993	0.38	0.4	0.35	0	0	0	123	122	5638000	4803519	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Tajikistan	1994	0	0	0	0	0	0	130	129	5745000	14578392	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Tajikistan	1995	0.64	0.64	0	0	0	0	100	99	5835000	6080931	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Tajikistan	1996	0	0	0	0	0	0	181	180	5927000	4432759	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Tajikistan	1997	0	0	0	0	0	0	158	157	6018000	7173437	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Tajikistan	1998	0.35	0.35	0	0	0	0	224	221	6127000	9795290	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Tajikistan	1999	0.16	0.16	0.01	0	0	0	182	180	6160000	5226350	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Tajikistan	2000	0.27	0.27	0	0	0	0	144	143	6193000	4347159	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Tajikistan	2001	0.32	0.32	0	0	0	0	174	174	6244730	15518611	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Tajikistan	2002	0.39	0.39	0.09	0	0	0	197	197	6265000	10851358	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Turkmenistan	1990	0	0	0	0	0	0	3111	3111	3668000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Turkmenistan	1991	0	0	0	0	0	0	2227	2227	3773000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Turkmenistan	1992	1.2	3.22	0.28	0	0	0	1067	1067	3883000	7477413	1181493	0	0	0	1	1	1
Turkmenistan	1993	6.56	5.91	5.52	0	0	0	1440	1433	3996000	83828528	5630064	0	0	0	1	1	1
Turkmenistan	1994	1.65	0.65	0	0	0	0	1127	1105	4106000	84073448	287231	0	0	0	1	1	1
Turkmenistan	1995	1.69	1.69	0	0	0	0	1401	1396	4210000	56187916	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Turkmenistan	1996	0	0	0	0	0	0	556	552	4307000	65195360	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Turkmenistan	1997	0	0	0	0	0	0	629	610	4398000	117445576	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Turkmenistan	1998	6.35	6.35	0.01	0	0	0	646	638	4483000	95509968	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Turkmenistan	1999	1.91	1.91	0	0	0	0	844	845	4564000	106541456	9009464	0	0	0	1	1	1
Turkmenistan	2000	2.64	2.64	0	0	0	0	945	1062	4643000	119373976	2324833	0	0	0	1	1	1
Turkmenistan	2001	1.44	1.44	0	0	0.01	0	1221	1180	4719000	105201392	6797569	0	0	0	1	1	1
Turkmenistan	2002	1.93	1.93	0.02	0	0.01	0	2265	2559	4793000	118423328	3795499	0	0	0	1	1	1
Uzbekistan	1990	0	0	0	0	0	0	2361	2374	20500000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Uzbekistan	1991	0	0	0	0	0	0	1668	1677	21000000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Uzbekistan	1992	0.14	60.36	0	0	0	0	197	197	21400000	54483120	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Uzbekistan	1993	0.49	55.13	0	0	0	0	250	251	21900000	213507936	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Uzbekistan	1994	0.15	0.06	0.01	0	0	0	290	292	22400000	64473040	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Uzbekistan	1995	2.79	2.79	0	0	0	0	445	446	22800000	138039808	0	0	0	0	1	1	1

		Total ODA	Grant	Total ODA Net	Emergency Aid	Development Food Aid	GNI Per Capita in USD	Gross Domestic Product Per Capita in USD	Population	Total Exports from Turkey in USD	Oil Exports to Turkey in USD	BSEC 1992	ECO 1985	ESCAP 1992
Uzbekistan	1996	0	0	0	0	0	597	649	601	23200000	229793568	0	0	1
Uzbekistan	1997	0	0	0	0	0	597	649	601	23200000	229793568	0	0	1
Uzbekistan	1998	3.29	0	3.29	0	0.05	620	620	622	23700000	210513744	0	0	1
Uzbekistan	1999	0.93	0	0.93	0	0	620	620	622	24000000	155863488	0	0	1
Uzbekistan	2000	0.39	0	0.39	0	0	684	684	697	24400000	99077312	0	0	1
Uzbekistan	2001	0.36	0	0.36	0	0	550	550	552	24700000	82062648	0	0	1
Uzbekistan	2002	0.6	0	0.6	0	0	227	227	278	25100000	89653184	67371	0	1
Uzbekistan	2002	0.6	0	0.6	0	0	384	384	385	25271000	93401264	5038615	0	1
Turkey	1990													
Turkey	1991						2644	2644	2616	56200000				
Turkey	1992						2590	2590	2573	57300000				
Turkey	1993						2684	2684	2660	58400000				
Turkey	1994						2985	2985	2962	59500000				
Turkey	1995						2118	2118	2107	60600000				
Turkey	1996						2717	2717	2685	61700000				
Turkey	1997						2869	2869	2830	62900000				
Turkey	1998						2969	2969	2913	64000000				
Turkey	1999						2100	2100	3025	65200000				
Turkey	2000						2779	2779	2749	66300000				
Turkey	2001						2942	2942	2918	67400000				
Turkey	2002						2078	2078	2101	68500000				
Turkey	2002						2580	2580	2604	69400000				

## APPENDIX

**Democratic Republic:** Are generally police states that never holds elections generally treat attempts to emigrate as state treason have little or no freedom of religion, freedom of speech or freedom of press.

**Developing Countries:** A developed country enjoys a relatively high standard of living through a strong high-technology diversified economy. Most countries with a high per capita gross domestic product (GDP) are considered developed countries. Some countries, however, have achieved a (usually temporarily) high GDP through natural resource exploitation without developing the diverse industrial and service-based economy necessary for "developed" status. Synonyms include industrialised countries, more economically developed countries (MEDC) and the First World. Other terms sometimes used to describe the developed/developing country dichotomy are first world/third world (the term second world referred to communist states during the Cold War); North/South; and industrialized countries/non-industrialized countries. The term Western countries has a similar meaning, but its connotations restrict its usage, especially in Asia.

**Foreign Aid:** Foreign aid, international aid or development assistance is when one country helps another country through some form of donation. Usually this refers to helping out a country that has a special need caused by poverty, underdevelopment, natural disasters, armed conflicts, etc. The main receivers of *foreign aid* are developing nations (third world countries), and the main contributors are the industrialized countries.

**Foreign Direct Investment:** Is the movement of capital across national frontiers in a manner that grants the investor control over the acquired asset. Thus it is distinct from portfolio investment which may cross borders, but does not offer such control. Firms which source FDI are known as 'multinational enterprises' (MNEs). In this case control is defined as owning 10% or greater of the ordinary shares of an incorporated firm, having 10% or more of the voting power for an unincorporated firm or development of a greenfield branch plant that is a permanent establishment of the originating firm.

**GDP Per Capita:** Gross Domestic Product

**GNI Per Capita:** Gross National Income per unit of population, per person

**GNP Per Capita:** Gross National Product

**Islamic Republic:** An Islamic republic is a state under a particular theocratic form of government advocated by some Muslim religious leaders in the Middle East and Africa. In an Islamic republic the laws of the state are theoretically required to be compatible with the laws of Islam, while the state remains a republic.

**Measures of Development:** The term "developing country" often refers mainly to countries with low levels of economic development, but this is usually closely associated with social development, in terms of education, healthcare, life expectancy, etc. The development of a country is measured with statistical indexes such as income per capita (GDP), the rate of illiteracy, and access to water. The UN puts forth a compound indicator using these lists of statistics, to create, a "human development index" which gives a sense of how developed countries are. Developing countries are in general countries which have not achieved a significant degree of industrialization relative to their populations, and which have a low standard of living. There is a strong correlation between low income and high population growth, both within and between countries.

**ODA/OA GNI:** Official Development Assistance/ Official Aid Disbursements

**ODA/OA Grants:** Official Development Assistance/ Official Aid Disbursements total amount of soft loans

**ODA/OA Per Capita:** Official Development Assistance/ Official Aid Disbursements per unit of population, per person.

**ODA/OA Total Net:** Official Development Assistance/ Official Aid Disbursements After deductions were made.

**Secular Government:** Is a state with no state religion and in which the state is neutral in matters of religion, neither supporting nor opposing any particular religious beliefs or practices.

**Turkic:** The term Turkic is used to refer to peoples who in spite of intermarriage with other ethnic groups, believe that they are still able to trace a common ethnic origin to the original Ottoman Empire which had been inclusive of the Central Asian republics of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan. And then those ethnic groups which resided with the Tartars, Karaim of the Crimea, and the Tofas of Siberia.

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Statistical Data on health issues

VITA

Graduate College  
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Aisha T. Bigbee

Local Address:

P.O. Box 571662  
Las Vegas, NV 89157

Home Address:

13601 S. 44<sup>th</sup> #1106  
Phoenix, AZ 85044

Degrees:

Bachelor of Arts, Political Science, 1999

Publications:

Caspian Sea Environmental Program, ISA-West, 2001

Thesis Title: Turkish Foreign Aid Program: A Helping Hand  
or Snake Infested Olive Branch

Dissertation/Thesis examining Committee:

Chairperson, Dr. John Tuman, Ph. D.  
Committee Member, Dr. Jonathan Strand, Ph. D.  
Committee Member, Dr. F. John Merhtens, Ph. D.  
Graduate Faculty Representative, Dr. Paul Werth, Ph. D.