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Safe Village Initiative: A quasi-experiment, evaluating the impact in West Las Vegas

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SAFE VILLAGE INITIATIVE: A QUASI-EXPERIMENT,
EVALUATING THE IMPACT IN
WEST LAS VEGAS

by

Timothy Radtke

Bachelor of Science
Winona State University
2005

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the

**Master of Art Degree in Criminal Justice
Department of Criminal Justice
Greenspun College of Urban Affairs**

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
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
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

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Safe Villiage Initiative: A Quasi-experiment, Evaluating the Impact in
West Las Vegas

is approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts in Criminal Justice


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ABSTRACT

Safe Village Initiative: A Quasi-Experiment, Evaluating The Impact In West Las Vegas

By

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University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Beginning in January of 2007, the “Safe Village Initiative” (SVI) was implemented in West Las Vegas in response to firearm violence. SVI represents an effort of combined resources from criminal justice agencies, social service organizations, local clergy, and citizens to disrupt the cycle of violence that characterizes fatal and non-fatal shootings. The SVI is essentially a deterrence based model aimed to reduce firearm offenses.

The current study will analyze SVI from two research questions. The research questions are designed to: 1) assess the qualities of SVI that make it unique from previously implemented “pulling levers” models, and 2) assess the impact it has had on West Las Vegas. Secondary data were received from Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department and University Medical Center Trauma Unit as a means for assessment. Secondary data were supplemented with qualitative interviews with founders and core team leaders of SVI.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Murder, assault, stabbings, and drive-by shootings are all components of violence that disrupt the social cohesiveness of society. Many of these components can be found in communities that are host to gun/gang involved youth. Gangs, and the aspects of the violence they attract, draw young people from all walks of life, socio-economic backgrounds, races and ethnic groups. Gang involved youth violence is a problem not only for police but also for the community. Gang violence can destroy lives and rip apart the fabric of communities.

Without police to enforce laws and regulations, these components that make up the dreaded side of society would run rampant throughout the streets, creating a state of anarchy, causing social isolations of the desirable citizens. Police agencies have undergone numerous renovations to improve their resources in achieving an environment that is crime free. Police departments have continuously reengineered their tactics and strategies to improve community comfort, perception of “quality of life,” and the overall reduction in the fear of crime and crime rates. Police agencies have continued to be the leading force in crime fighting and maintaining order at the city, county, state, and federal level.

A core component of the criminal justice system is the implementation of a deterrence approach. The Thames River Police were the first acting police force, instilled

to protect the London wharves from thieves for the West India Trading Companies. In 1829, Sir Robert Peel of the London Metropolitan Police Department established the force with the intent to promote a preventive role in deterring urban disorder and criminal intent. Peel designed the police force to instill awareness in the community that police are there to maintain order and keep the peace (Gash 1961). At its essence the Peel model of policing has deterrence as its core element.

Models of deterrence have been implemented and practiced at all levels to reduce the amount of criminal activities. In the deterrent model, if a potential offender believes that the pleasure from committing a criminal offense is greater than the perceived punishment given for the offense, the offender will proceed with the criminal act. Assuming that the criminal is acting on a rational frame of mind, the police are trying to create an environment in which the criminal becomes acutely aware that the criminal sanctions for the crime outweighs the pleasure of committing a criminal offense (Akers 1994). Police agencies are continually revamping their strategies to offset the potential criminal's frame of mind.

Deterrence can either be specific or general. Specific deterrence is aimed at punishing criminals to discourage them from committing future criminal acts by instilling an understanding of the consequences (i.e. jail). General deterrence is the exploitation of specific deviants to arouse the public's knowledge of consequence for the deviant behaviors (Akers 1994). General deterrence does not focus on individuals but rather projects the received punishment for criminal offenses in the public view in order to deter other individuals from deviant types of behavior in the future.

Experiments and evaluations of tactics used within police departments have aided in the advancement of the police field. The revamping of police strategies have come in response to fundamental social and technological changes in U.S. society. Officers first relied on foot patrol as a means to deter crime. However, proven to be expensive, highly corrupt, and the advancement of technology; foot patrol eventually became an uncommon tactic. Vehicle patrol became the symbol of American policing in the mid 1900's. The uses of automobiles lead to a greater police presence in the community and a more rapid response. The Kansas City Police Department Preventive Patrol experiment resulted in contradictory findings to the concept that greater police presence produces greater reduction in crime (Kansas City Missouri Police Department 1977).

On February 2007, one such deterrent model has been implemented in southern Nevada's Clark County. With the given name "Safe Village," the initiative is designed in response to the firearm violence in West Las Vegas. The Safe Village Initiative is a result of both experimental and empirical evidence that supports the findings that gun violence is clustered among high-risk individuals, in high-risk places, at high-risk times. The initiative is a collaboration of agencies designed to disrupt the cycle of violence that characterizes both fatal and non-fatal shootings.

The collaborating agencies are composed from different sources of the community including: criminal justice agencies, social service, clergy partnerships, and the community. The main objective is to mobilize the community in an effort to rid the environment of gun/gang youth violence that has stricken the historical West Las Vegas community. Safe Village Initiative relies on information developed through community interaction and the implementation of operations designed for a specific purpose.

The “Safe Village Initiative” is concentrated in a small primarily residential community of minority, working class families located in “West Las Vegas” (Bolden Area Command). “West Las Vegas” accounts for a high majority of violent crimes that occur in the Las Vegas valley.

Safe Village is designed around the more notable Operation Ceasefires models implemented in Boston (MA), Richmond (VA), Los Angeles (CA), and Chicago (IL). The Operation Ceasefires previously implemented has received public notoriety for their reduction in gun/gang involved youth and violent acts.

The purpose of this study is to analyze and assess the “Safe Village” initiative of “West Las Vegas.” An analysis will be conducted on the rates of calls-for-service provided by the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department and hospital patients admitted to the University Medical Center’s Trauma Unit for gunshot and stabbing wounds one year prior (January 1, 2006 through January 31, 2007) to the implementation of “Safe Village,” through a period of one year following the implementation (February 1, 2007 through January 31, 2007). Along with the analysis of the crime and hospital data, qualitative interviews will compare the objective and design of the “Safe Village” to other Operation Ceasefire designs.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

In the late 1700s, thieves scoured the London ports for profitable gains through theft of cargo. The West India Trading Company established the Thames River Police force in 1798 with the sole objectives to prevent and detect thefts along the London wharves (Critchley 1967). Under control of magistrate John Harriot and Patrick Colquhoun, the Thames River Police force, even though met with hostile resistance, was considered a success (Critchley 1967). The successes lead to the conversion from a private to a public police force. The Thames River Police became known as the first police force to be established and lead to the establishment of police forces around the world.

Encompassing the Thames River Police model, in 1829 Sir Robert Peel, established the London Metropolitan Police Department as a means to promote a preventive role in deterring urban disorder and criminal intent in the greater London area. Peel designed the police force to instill awareness in the community that police are there to maintain order and keep the peace (Gash 1961). In its true essence, deterrence is a core element of the Peel model.

Deterrence models continue to be practiced in policing agencies as a means to reduce criminal activities. Agencies revamp their strategies to offset potential criminal's frame of mind. According to deterrence theory, if a potential offender believes that the

pleasure from committing a criminal offense is greater than the perceived punishment given for the offense, the offender will proceed with the criminal act. Assuming the criminal is acting in a rational frame of mind, the police try to create an environment in which the criminal becomes acutely aware that the criminal sanctions for the crime outweighs the pleasure of committing the offense (Sherman et al.1997).

Deterrence was defined in the mid 1700s by ancient philosopher Beccaria (Bellamy 1995).

“It is necessary to protect repository from private usurpations of each individual, who is always seeking to extract from the repository not only his own due but also the portions which are owing to others. What were wanted were sufficiently tangible motives to prevent the despotic spirit of every man from resubmerging society’s laws into the ancient chaos. Not even the most sublime truths have been enough to hold back for long the passions aroused by the immediate impact made by objects which are close at hand. The foundation of the sovereign’s right to punish crime: the necessity of defending the repository of the public well being from the usurpation of individuals” (Bellamy 1995, 9).

Beccaria believe that it was the right of the sovereign’s to punisht those that commit criminal offenses. “In order that punishment should not be an act of violence perpetrated by one or may upon a private citizen, it is essential that it should be public, speedy, and necessary, the minimum possible in the given circumstance, proportionate to the crime, and determined by the law” (Bellamy 1995, 113). Deterrence should pose enough of a threat to stop the most vindictive of criminals; “A lightning strike is needed to stop a fierce lion that is provoked by a gunshot” (Ballemy 1995, 113).

Deterrence can be understood in two separate aspects: specific or general (Sherman 1993). Specific deterrence is explained by the fact that pain generated by punishment will serve to discourage future criminality in an individual (MacKenzie 1997). “It assumes a rational choice model of decision making, where the offender

perceives that the cost and benefits of punishment are not outweighed by the crime” (MacKenzie 1997, 13). Specific deterrence denotes the preventive effects of punishment on people who have been caught. Individual offenders arrested for an offense are less likely to repeat that offense in the future than offenders who are not arrested. Furthermore, individuals who spend time in prison may be deterred from continuing their criminal activities when they are released (a specific deterrence effect).

General deterrence refers to the impact of threatened punishment on other potential offenders, thus reducing the chance that the public will commit crimes (MacKenzie 1997). General deterrence can be defined as the imposition of sanctions on one person in order to demonstrate to the rest of the public the expected costs of a criminal act, and thereby discouraging criminal behavior (Nagin 1978). General deterrence is an indirect experience with punishment that deters either through observation or otherwise having knowledge of the punishment of others. General deterrence refers to prevention of crimes by people in the community generally regardless of whether they have been caught and punished for a crime.

Policing

The course of policing in the United States has shown many diverse tactics implemented as a means to deter criminals. The reformation of police strategies have come in response to fundamental social and technological changes in U.S. society. The police culture has advanced through generations of different styles of policing to achieve their maximum potential. There have been eight major hypotheses about how the police can prevent crime: increasing the number of police officers on the street, rapid response

to 911 calls, random patrols, directed patrols, reactive arrests, proactive arrests, community policing, and problem oriented policing (Sherman 1997).

Increase Number of Police Officers

The idea of putting more police on the streets is very popular with the public (Walker 2006). The idea that police patrol deters crime has been the bedrock principle of policing since Robert Peel in 1829 (Walker 2006). The central notion is that the more police patrolling, the less crime there will be. Officers more readily available and placed in constant view should deter “would be criminals.” As the level of violence throughout the 19th century declined, the number of police increased, and many observers concluded more police equals less crime (Gurr et al. 1977).

One of the largest and most expensive crime-fighting programs in recent history has been the federal Community-Oriented Policing Service (COPS) program, which spent over 7 billion since 1994 to put more officers on the street. A total of 83,024 additional police officers were placed on the street as a result of the COPS program (Walker 2006)

Rapid Response to 911

Theorists believed that the shorter police response time from dispatch to arrival at a crime scene, the more likely police can arrest offenders before they flee. Rapid response would be able to produce three crime prevention effects (Sherman 1997). First, it could reduce the harm from crimes by quicker police intervention. Secondly, rapid response time is a greater deterrent effect from the threat of punishment reinforced by response-related arrests. Thirdly, is the preservation of evidence used to prosecute the offender (Sherman 1997).

An assumption of the times was that rapid response to calls would produce more arrests, more witnesses, fewer injured citizens, and a higher degree of citizen satisfaction. In an effort to attain quicker response times, police officials increased the number of sworn personnel, purchased faster cars, and expended large amounts of money to sophisticated communications systems and other technological innovations (Kansas City Missouri Police Department 1977).

The Kansas City Rapid Response Time Analysis concluded that achieving crime prevention merely by adding more police or shortening response time across the board was a failure. Of the collected 949 eligible calls analyzed, the researchers discovered; reporting the crime took up 48.1 percent of the total time, dispatch represented 21 percent, and travel was 30.9 percent (Kansas City Missouri Police Department 1977). Rapid response relies strongly on the time taken to report the event.

Random Patrol

During the reform era many scholars, especially O. W. Wilson theorized that if police drove conspicuously marked cars randomly through city streets and gave special attention to certain "hazards," a feeling of police "omnipresence" would be developed (Kelling and Moore 1988, 7). The increasing emphasis on rapid 911 responses in automobiles gradually allowed officers to patrol at random far beyond their assigned beats. This policy was justified by the theory that unpredictability in patrol patterns would create a perceived "omnipresence" of the police that deters crime in public places (Sherman 1997).

The Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department conducted an experiment designed to measure the impact routine patrol had on incidences of crime and the public's fear of

crime. The Kansas City Police Department divided up 15 districts of the South Patrol Division into three separate beats: proactive, reactive, and control. "The essential finding of the preventive patrol experiment is that decreasing or increasing routine preventive patrol within the range tested had no effect on crime, citizen fear of crime, community attitudes toward the police on the delivery of police service, police response time, or traffic accidents" (Kelling et al. 1974, 14).

Directed Patrol

With the introduction of computers into the policing function, computerized crime analysis created a precision in identifying crime patterns. Police have used that precision to focus patrol resources on the times and places with the highest risks of serious crime. The National Institute of Justice funded research has shown that the risk of crime is extremely localized, even within high crime neighborhoods, and varying widely from one address to another (Pierce, Spaar, and Briggs 1988; Sherman, Gartin, and Buerger 1989). Goldstein once pointed to Boston where sixty percent of calls for service orientated from ten percent of the households (Goldstein 1979).

"Hot spot" analysis suggests that a small number of locations in any particular city account for an abundance of crime and disorder problems. The hypothesis is that greater patrol presence concentrated at "hot spots" and "hot times" of criminal activity will reduce crime in those places and times (Sherman 1997).

Reactive Patrol

Reactive arrests (in response to specific citizen complaints) are similar to random patrol in that they cast a wide net by warning all citizens that they can be arrested for all

law violations at all times. The more arrests police make in response to reported or observed offenses of any kind, the less crime there will be (Sherman 1997).

Citizens are now authorized to make "citizen arrests." When a non-sworn citizen views a felony and/or an offense deemed arrest-able is able, he or she to place the individual in custody till the police authority is present. This creates an environment in which communities and individuals a like can aid the police in crimes reduction.

Advocates argue that more arrests will produce less crime. Proponents of reactive arrest theorize that arrest, especially for minor offenses, provokes a response by offenders making them more likely to commit future crime than if they had not been arrested (Sherman 1997).

Proactive Patrol

Proactive (police-initiated) arrests concentrate police resources on a narrow set of high-risk targets. The hypothesis is that a high certainty of arrest for a narrowly defined set of offenses or offenders will accomplish more than low arrest certainty for a broad range of targets (Sherman 1997).

A version of proactive arrest is "zero tolerance policing," based on the "broken windows" theory (Wilson and Kelling 1982). Implemented in New York Police Department during the Bratton administration, administrators theorized that areas appearing disorderly and out-of-control provide an attractive climate for violent crime just as a window with one broken pane attracts more stones than a completely unbroken window (Wilson and Kelling 1982). The crime prevention hypothesis is that the more arrests police make for even petty disorder, the less serious crime there will be (Skogan 1990).

Community Policing

In the late 1980s Community Policing hypothesized that increasing the quantity and quality of police-citizen contact reduces crime (Kelling and Moore 1988). Police departments would be able to obtain vital information about crimes and criminals from officer's direct communication with the public. With information obtained by patrol officers, investigative units and others would be able to significantly increase their effort in solving crimes (Kelling and Moore 1988).

The police have combined with the community to implement new and effective ways to reduce crime and protect neighborhoods. An example of a community policing program is "block watch," which increases surveillance of residential neighborhoods by residents themselves, which should deter crime because offenders know the neighborhoods are under constant watch. Many community meetings and informal contacts with police through storefront offices, foot patrol and other methods increases the flow of intelligence from citizens to police about offenses and offenders, which then increases the probability of arrest for crime and the deterrent effects of arrest (Sherman et al. 1993; Trojanowicz 1986).

Problem Oriented Policing

In 1979 Herman Goldstein's originally formulated problem-oriented policing. Goldstein argued that: "police job requires that they deal with a wide range of behavioral problems that arise in the community" (Goldstein 1979, 242). The concept of this style of policing is that police can make a greater difference by addressing core components of problems, rather than just responding to each individual incident. Problem-oriented policing, when appropriately focused on specific crime problems, has been found to be

effective in preventing crime (Sherman and Eck 2002; Weisburd and Eck 2004; Skogan and Frydl 2004).

In order for the police to be more efficient and effective, they must gather information about incidents and design an appropriate response based on the nature of the underlying conditions that cause the problem(s) (Goldstein 1990). “The central thrust of problem-oriented policing is to make the police more thoughtful about the problems they address and their methods of intervention. Problem-oriented policing seeks to formalize a methodology for the police to address persistent community crime, disorder, and fear of problems” (Greene 2000, 315).

A frequently used model of problem-orientated policing is “SARA” (Scan, Analyze, Respond, and Assess). “Using SARA, departments are to *scan* communities for problems, *analyze* the dynamics of these problems in a thorough and systematic way, design a *response* to address the defined and analyzed problem, then *assess* the impact of the response on the identified problem” (Greene 2000, 315). The more accurately police can identify and minimize proximate causes of specific patterns of crime, the less crime there will be (Sherman 1997). A major problem-solving theory of crime prevention is to keep the more basic elements of criminal events from combining: the more police can reduce the intersection of motivated offenders in time and space with suitable targets of crime, the less opportunity there will be to commit crime (Sherman 1995).

Pulling Levers

“Pulling levers” model combines community policing with problem orientated police. The “pulling levers” model provides a broader, more comprehensive combination

of strategies than most traditional problem-oriented policing programs (Weisburd and Braga 2006). “Pulling levers” strategies seem to be promising in controlling the violent behavior of groups of chronic offenders (Braga et al. 2001; Wellford et al. 2005; Kennedy 2006).

“Pulling levers” is a two-part intervention. One part is a direct law enforcement attack on a specific target. The other part is an inter-agency working group deterring violent behavior by reaching out directly to the target audience, setting clear standards for behavior, and backing up that message by “pulling every lever” legally available when those standards are violated. “The deceptively simple operation that resulted, made use of a wide variety of traditional criminal justice tools but assembled them in fundamentally new and different ways” (Kennedy 1998, 3).

The “pulling levers” model first requires that a target behavior be identified. To address that targeted behavior several agencies collaborate and with their resources capability, work as a group to address the behavior. There is a delivery of a “retail message” designed to deter possible violators. This message is communicated directly to the target audience and the audience is warned of possible consequences that will be brought down on them if they carry out the target behavior. This process is continued and the strategy is continuously being evaluated to achieve full potential.

The “pulling levers” strategy has been implemented on the east coast to attack such problems as gang violence and firearm involved violent acts. The most notable “pulling levers” initiative was implemented in Boston’s as “Operation Ceasefire.” It has continued on to be implemented in Richmond, Virginia’s “Project Exile,” as well as

Chicago's and Los Angeles "Operation Ceasefire" and now Las Vegas, Nevada's "Safe Village Initiative."

Boston, MA

During the latter part of the 1980s into the early 1990s the United States was experiencing an epidemic of youth homicide. From 1987 to 1990, Boston's youth homicide increased from 22 to 73 a year and remained constant at 44 from 1991 to 1995 (Braga et al. 2000). Research of the Boston area showed that much of the violence was concentrated in a relatively small number of chronically offending gang involved youths (Braga et al. 2000). Gang members in Boston are composed of less than 1 percent of the youth aged 24 and under (Braga et al. 2000). These gangs however, are responsible for at least 60 percent of the youth homicide in the Boston city area (Braga et al. 2000).

Boston initiated a problem solving project aimed to stop the gang violence by eradicating all illegal firearms and violent crimes off the streets. The project assessed the nature and dynamics driving youth violence. From that research a larger working group was assembled of federal, state, and local agencies. "The hope was that a successful intervention to reduce gang violence in the short term would have a disproportionate, sustainable impact in the long term" (Braga et al. 2000, 7).

The agencies that carried forth the project were the Boston Police Department, Massachusetts Department of Probation and Parole, Office of the Suffolk County District Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, Massachusetts Department of Youth Services, Boston School Police, and gang outreach and prevention "street workers" attached to the Boston Community Centers program (Braga et al. 2001).

With all agencies directed at attacking the gang violence, “Operation Ceasefire” was created. “Operation Ceasefire includes two main components: a direct law enforcement attack on illicit firearms traffickers supplying youth with guns and an attempt to generate a strong deterrent to gang violence” (Braga et al. 2000, 4). The steps that were initiated are as followed (Braga et al. 2001):

- Expanding the focus of the local, state, and federal authorities to include intrastate trafficking in Massachusetts-sourced guns, in addition to interstate trafficking;
- Focusing enforcement attention on traffickers of those makes and calibers of guns most used by gang members;
- Focusing enforcement attention on traffickers of those guns showing short time-to-crime, and thus most likely to have been trafficked. The Boston Field Division of ATF set up an in-house tracking system that flagged guns whose traces showed an 18-month or shorter time-to-crime;
- Focusing enforcement attention on traffickers of guns used by the city’s most violent gangs;
- Attempting restoration of obliterated serial numbers, and subsequent trafficking investigations based on those restorations;
- Supporting these enforcement priorities through analysis of crime gun traces generated by the Boston Police Department’s comprehensive tracing of crime guns, and by developing leads through systematic debriefing of, especially, arrestees involved with gangs and/or involved in violent crime.

The second element of attempting to deter gang violence was initiated by delivering a message that violence would no longer be tolerated. Ceasefire operatives delivered the message to gang members through probation and police contacts, juvenile facilities, and outreach workers. Ceasefire agencies use other gangs to cite examples of the following sanctions that would occur if violence did ensue with gang activity (Braga et al. 2000).

The planning, researching, and meeting of Operation Ceasefire began in January of 1995, and street level operations began in 1996. The first official crack down and meeting with gang members of Operation Ceasefire was completed on May 15, 1996 (Braga et al. 2000). The height of the operation occurred through 1996 and 1997.

Results became apparent in 1996 when Boston's youth (24 and under) homicide rate had declined from 44 in 1995 to 26 in 1996 and decreased further to 15 in 1997 (Braga et al. 2000). The Boston Police Department kept monthly counts of youth homicides between the months of January 1, 1991 through May 31, 1998. Monthly counts of citywide "shots fired" and citywide gun assault incidents were also recorded (January 1, 1991, through December 31, 1997) to calculate the interventions effect on non-fatal shootings (Braga et al. 2000).

Boston's B-2 District is host to 29 of the 61 gangs in city limits. District B-2 was host to a third of the volume of homicides during the peak years of 1991 to 1995 (Braga et al 2000). Boston's B-2 District gun assault incidents were recorded from January 1, 1991, through December 31, 1997 to assess the effect of the intervention on the specific age group, 24 and under.

With May 15, 1996 declared as the first date of direct communication with gang members and Operation Ceasefire fully implemented, June 1, 1996 was selected as the start date for the "post" period. A time series showed a 63 percent reduction in the mean monthly number of youth homicide victims from pre-test mean of 3.5 per month to a post-test mean of 1.3 per month (Braga et al. 2000). There was a 32 percent decrease in the monthly number of citywide shots fired calls, a 25 percent decrease in the monthly

number of citywide gun assault incidents, and a 44 percent decrease in the monthly number of District B-2 youth (24 and under) gun assault incidents (Braga et al. 2000).

Richmond, VA

South of Boston, Richmond, Virginia was finding resolution for their homicide problem. During the 1990s Richmond, Virginia, was plagued with being one of the top five cities in the United States with the worst per capita murder rates. Guns had become an all too familiar weapon of choice for crimes committed. In 1997, 140 people were murdered, 122 with firearms. In the late 1990s, the U.S. Attorney's Office concluded the level of violence reached epic proportions and needed to be dealt with swiftly and severely (United States Attorney Office for the Eastern District of Virginia 1999).

The U.S. Attorney's Office in Richmond developed and carried out an aggressive, innovative, and creative approach called "Project Exile." Project Exile proposed all felons possessing guns or offenders carrying out offenses with firearms would be federally prosecuted (United States Attorney Office for the Eastern District of Virginia 1999). The U.S. Attorney's office worked in coordination with federal (FBI, BATF), state, and local police agencies and local prosecutors. All agencies were to work in coordination to promptly arrest, incarcerate, detain without bond, prosecute and sentence the armed criminal. The U.S. Attorney's Office has also carried out a training program for the Richmond Police Department officers on federal firearms statutes and search and seizure issues (United States Attorney Office for the Eastern District of Virginia 1999). The U.S. Attorney's Office also worked in coordination with "local government and business to launch a media campaign to communicate the message that illegal possession or illegal use of a gun would result in severe federal sanctions" (McGarrell 2005, 2). The

media campaign was able to energize the community and increase citizen reports of guns (McGarrell 2005).

Under the control of federal prosecution the cases preceded through the courts systems in days rather than months. “Through these efforts, 287 armed criminals have been removed from Richmond's streets, one violent gang responsible for many murders has been destroyed, and the rate of gun carrying by criminals has been cut nearly in half” (United States Attorney Office for the Eastern District of Virginia 1999).

Los Angeles, CA

For decades Los Angeles has attempted to hinder the gang problem that has stricken their communities but have repeatedly not produced favorable results. Los Angeles accepted Boston's Operation Ceasefire as a possible model. However, Los Angeles gangs are different from east coast gangs in that they tend to be bigger, more entrenched, and Latino (U.S. Department of Justice 2005).

Los Angeles implemented Boston's design. Like Boston, Los Angeles set a manageable and measurable objective, focusing on the specific problem of gun violence. Researchers served as conveners/ facilitators, analyzing crime data and other information. Criminal justice agencies, communities, and faith-based organizations identified the locale where an intervention would have a likely impact, and they decided what to do with the results of the researcher's analyses (U.S. Department of Justice 2005).

Los Angeles adopted a menu of “sticks” and “carrots.” Sticks were a range of sanctions or “levers” used to convince gang members to desist from violence by holding all of them accountable for violence committed by any one of them (U.S. Department of Justice 2005). The levers would be pulled or activated in response to a serious crime (a

trigger event). In advance of lever-pulling, a message would be retailed; communicating with gang members the consequences that would result from gun violence but also the social services and alternatives to violence available to them (U.S. Department of Justice 2005). Carrots are the prevention component of alternative services, a measure of the community's determination to intervene early in the lives of at-risk youths.

The Boyle Heights neighborhood of the Hollenbeck section of Los Angeles was selected, chiefly because of its high crime rate. Among the 18 policing areas in the city, Hollenbeck has consistently ranked near the top in violent crime (U.S. Department of Justice 2005). The most intense gang rivalries are played out in the Boyle Heights neighborhood of Hollenbeck (U.S. Department of Justice 2005).

Hollenbeck provided a solid infrastructure of community organizations, including faith-based institutions whose missions included reducing youth violence and gangs. A number of the community based organizations offer a variety of services to young people who want to break from their gang ties.

A trigger event occurred on October 8, 2000. Several members of the Cuatro Flats gang, armed with handguns and at least one high-powered semiautomatic assault weapon, climbed out of a van and opened fire on a group of rival TMC (The Mob Crew) gang members. One TMC member was killed, along with a 10-year-old girl who was riding her scooter nearby (U.S. Department of Justice 2005).

The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) quickly allocated additional resources, stepping up patrol in the five police reporting districts of Boyle Heights in and around the homicide site. Officers from several special units were deployed, and each weekend for 2 months after the shooting, mounted police patrolled the parks and adjacent

public housing developments in the targeted area. The County Housing Authority police stepped up patrol in a housing complex that was a hotbed of Cuatro Flats activity. Police and probation officers visited the homes of several well-known Cuatro Flats members, arresting three who had outstanding warrants or probation violations. At each visit, the officers made clear that their actions were a direct result of the violence committed by the gangs. Over the next 3 months, they arrested or revoked the parole of five more gang members, seized illegal guns, and referred several gun cases to the U.S. Attorney for prosecution (U.S. Department of Justice 2005).

The operation did not fully materialize, however, because a few days before the double homicide, community representatives urged the policing component of the intervention be put into effect immediately, even before any triggering event and before services were ready. Their reasoning was the neighborhood perceived violence to be escalating rapidly in the area (U.S. Department of Justice 2005).

In Boyle Heights, where retailing was carried out and some increased social services were offered, all three types of crimes: violent, gang, and gun—declined (U.S. Department of Justice 2005). Intensive law enforcement took place in the five police reporting districts of Boyle Heights where Cuatro Flats and TMC were most active. In these districts, violent crime fell 37 percent overall, compared with 24 percent in the rest of Boyle Heights. Gang crime also fell during the suppression phase, although it began to rise during the deterrence phase. Gun crime, however, did not decline more steeply in the five districts than in the rest of Boyle Heights; it fell at almost the same rate (by about one-third) as where there was no law enforcement intervention (U.S. Department of Justice 2005).

The policing (i.e., lever pulling) components of the intervention showed more promising effects than the retailing components, most notably in the measurable reductions in crime. Criminal justice system partners, especially LAPD and probation officers, were able to design a powerful policing element, in part because of the resources available to them and the flexibility they had in using them (U.S. Department of Justice 2005).

Chicago, IL

In 1995 the city of Chicago initiated its own form of “Operation Ceasefire” designed around violence prevention. The mission of the Chicago Project for Violence Prevention has to work with community and government partners to reduce violence in all forms and to help design interventions to be included in a community or city anti-violence program. The approach relied heavily on community outreach to work with youth at high risk of being involved in violence (University of Illinois at Chicago: School of Public Health 2007).

Chicago’s Ceasefire included community-based organizations to develop and implement strategies to reduce and prevent violence, particularly shootings and killings (University of Illinois at Chicago: School of Public Health 2007). Ceasefire relies on outreach workers, violence interrupters, faith leaders, and other community leaders to intervene in conflicts (or potential conflicts) and promote alternatives to violence. The resources to spread a strong public education campaign instilled the message that shootings and violence are not acceptable.

“Operation Ceasefire” was organized into five core components that address both the community and those individuals who are most at risk of involvement in a shooting or

killing. The five components include community mobilization, outreach, faith leader involvement, public education and police participation (University of Illinois at Chicago: School of Public Health 2007).

Community mobilization focuses on residents, local businesses, service organizations, and members of the faith community to build a safer and more viable community. The purpose of community mobilization is to build and energize a base of support for Ceasefire that involves a variety of efforts to both stop shootings and killings in the near term and to change the underlying conditions that give rise to shootings and killings in the long term (University of Illinois at Chicago: School of Public Health 2007).

Ceasefire outreach and high-risk conflict mediation are, together, perhaps the most vital of the five core components of Ceasefire. The outreach workers and violence interrupters are streetwise individuals who are familiar with gang life in the communities where Ceasefire is active. Many of them are former gang members and many have spent time in prison. These individuals identify with the street life mentality and engage with the most at-risk youth who are susceptible of becoming involved in violence in order to prevent shootings and killings from occurring. The outreach workers are to build sufficient trust with the at-risk youth and be able to influence the way they think, act, and redirect their motives into more positive pursuits (University of Illinois at Chicago: School of Public Health 2007).

Ceasefire engages members of the faith community to perform activities that complement those of the outreach workers. These faith leaders open safe havens, counsel high-risk individuals, participate and provide leadership in shooting responses, preach

nonviolence, and urge congregants to work to stop shootings and killings (University of Illinois at Chicago: School of Public Health 2007).

Ceasefire builds on the partnerships that many communities already have with police and fosters relationships with community residents in neighborhoods where those relationships may have been strained in the past.

The public education campaign is designed to facilitate behavior change and promote nonviolence. Neighborhoods are saturated with posters, leaflets, flyers, yard signs, bumper stickers, T-shirts, buttons and other materials that discourage violence and carry pointed messages about the consequences of shootings and killings (University of Illinois at Chicago: School of Public Health 2007).

Since the first implementation of a Ceasefire zone in Chicago (Beat 1115 in 2000), there has been a reduction in shootings of 68 percent in the first year, which has continued to an 82 percent reduction from 1999-2006. There was an average 63 percent decline in shootings across all sites from the time of implementation to the end of 2006. In 2004, killings in Chicago decreased by 25 percent, while killings in Ceasefire zones went down by 49 percent.

Las Vegas, NV

The purpose of this study is to analyze the “Safe Village Initiative (SVI)” implemented by the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department in conjunction with the community. The Safe Village area is concentrated in a small, primarily residential community of minority, working class residents. The area of “West Las Vegas” accounts for a high majority of violent crimes that occur in the Las Vegas valley. The initiative is a collaboration of agencies designed to disrupt the cycle of violence that characterizes

both fatal and non-fatal shootings. The collaborating agencies are composed from different sources of the community including: criminal justice agencies, social service, clergy partnerships, university (University of Nevada, Las Vegas), and the community.

Prior to the implementation of SVI, the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department along with social service agencies had a functioning model in tact to mobilize the community. There was a prevention team designed to address the community through knowledge and events. The prevention aspect implemented their own initiative called I.C.A.N. (Initiating Community Action in Neighborhoods). Through hosted events the members of the community could come out, socialize, and meet with clubs, while receiving literature on ways to “stop the violence.”

Along with the prevention aspect there was an intervention team which was composed of former gang members, with known reputations, going door to door speaking with children and families on reasons to avoid “gang life.” The intervention aspect was known as “Operation Lasting Peace.”

The model was not receiving beneficial results. In 2005 the community of “West Las Vegas” was home to a rash of shootings committed by both gang and non-gang individuals. The Gang Task Force Stakeholders decided to scrap much of the old model and revamp the initiative which later was converted to “Safe Village.” Stakeholders removed the initiative from addressing the entire valley and concentrated at a lower level, addressing locations that were in dire need of intervention (hot spots).

The Safe Village Initiative is composed of four core teams: Response, Outreach, Trauma, and Sustainment. Each team has a or is directed by a leader that has vast knowledge or close ties to the area.

Response is directed by a former gang member turned pastor. The goal of the response teams is to demonstrate the outrage regarding violent events that are occurring. The response team operates in reaction to a trigger event. When a violent act occurs (shooting, stabbing) they must initiate a response within 72 hours of the act. The goal is to show a bond between the action and reaction. Large groups of community members and the SVI operatives gather at the site of the violent event and disburse anti-violence literature (at least 300 pieces of literature). When not in a response event the goal is to change the norms through mass media and door-to-door contact with citizens of the community.

The outreach team is guided by a gang specialist of Clark County. The objective of the outreach team is to provide a positive adult (mentor) in a gang/gun involved youth's life. The mentor must be an individual from the community that has a gang reputation and has changed for the better. The core element of the outreach is the foundation of "trust," in which the mentor establishes a strong relationship based on consistent follow-up. A positive result for the outreach component would be that the youth has no more arrests or involvement with the police, increases school attendance, and improves their grades in school. A desired outcome from the outreach team would be that probation and justice agencies will save money because of less recidivism; therefore fewer services will be needed.

The trauma aspects act as a bridge for intervention. The mentor is introduced at this point. The mentor is allowed into the hospital and visits the home to counsel the victim and family to de-escalate the situation. Once a patient is discharged from the hospital, the trauma team refers services for the patient. The goal of the trauma team is to

make a positive change in the individual, stop any retaliation, and to train that individual in non-violent behavior.

Sustainment is the portion of the initiative that is designed to promote general program functioning. It is overviewed by a city employee in the Neighborhood Planning division. The sustainment goal is keep the funding available for longevity and create a point of entry for each individual initiative conducted, along with community mobilization.

The central hypothesis within the SVI is that by intervention at critical times in a victim's life and showing community intolerance for violence, efforts would serve as a firebreak and result in a long lasting reduction of future violence. By creating that bond between community outrage and violence acts, a deterrent message will be delivered and possibly halt violence from continuously occurring in West Las Vegas.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH QUESTION AND DATA ANALYSIS

The area of “West Las Vegas” is located on the border of Las Vegas and North Las Vegas in the central portion of the valley. Although it is geographically smaller than many other residential communities in Clark County, it accounts for a high amount of violent crimes. In the year prior to the start of SVI, there were 283 illegal shootings and 139 assault/batteries with a gun reported to LVMPD from West Las Vegas. These statistics prompted stakeholders within the community and LVMPD to direct an initiative to stop the violence, thus creating the SVI.

Due to the study’s concentration only on the SVI target area, secondary data were supplemented with qualitative interviews. A triangulation method of research was implemented as a means to uncover the full impact of SVI implementation. The analysis of the impact within West Las Vegas associated with SVI follows a basic one-group time series design. The analysis departs from a desirable, randomized controlled experimental approach.

Secondary data were received from University Medical Center Trauma Unit (UMC-Trauma Unit) and the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD). The data were derived from these two sources to encompass the full spectrum of violent acts occurring in the targeted area. Each source individually does not receive the full volume of violence occurring in the target area. This may be because participants that are injured

in the course of a violent act may refuse medical care but file a police report, or contrarily may receive medical treatment without notifying the police of the cause of injury. For example, victims receiving a wound(s) via a gun shot are more likely to receive medical care than a victim from a stabbing. Witnesses and/or participants are reluctant to report a crime to police for fear of involvement and/or retaliation.

A limitation to the use of secondary data as a primary source of data is that it is not recorded in a means for analysis. Many of the variables need to be recoded in a format that allows statistical analysis. By recoding variables, a researcher has the possibility of missing data; therefore caution must be used when deriving at a conclusion.

Qualitative interviews were conducted with fundamental developers and core team leaders of SVI. As stated in chapter 2, SVI is composed of four core teams: trauma, response, outreach, and sustainment. Interviewees were questioned on their specific area of concentration, goal, and their role within SVI. Interviewers also questioned the core team leaders about their expectations of the initiative, satisfaction, and any problems that they encountered while implementing SVI. The use of in-depth interviews offers the opportunity to uncover the underlying structure and complexity of the program from first hand experience (Babbie 2007). A weakness of relying on qualitative interviews for constructive purposes is that it is based on an individual's perspective which may represent bias to their specific design and function of their core team.

The key outcomes in the assessment of SVI's impact are the monthly number of gun and knife offenses responded to by LVMPD and the number of patients receiving care at the UMC-Trauma Unity for gunshot and stab wounds. SVI mainly targets violence arising from gang dynamics which is the primary source of violence in the West

Las Vegas area. Therefore, the impact evaluation focuses on all gun and stabbing related offenses.

Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department

The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department provided calls-for-service data used in these analyses. Calls-for-service were compiled for the targeted area, which is concentrated in Bolden Area command; beat sectors William 5 (W5) and William 6 (W6) (see Appendix I and II). For evaluation purposes, data were collected containing the following four variables: year, month, beat (W5/W6), and call-for-service (413, 413a, 415a, 420, 420z, 434).

Calls-for-service were selected due to the nature of the offense. Calls-for-service are used as a measure of the known gun and knife offenses being committed and reported. The following calls-for-service are defined as: 413- person with a gun, 413a- person with a knife, 415a- assault with a gun, 420- homicide, 420z- attempted homicide, and 434- illegal shooting.

University Medical Center- Trauma Unit

Official data obtained from UMC-Trauma Unit contains the number of injured patients admitted to the trauma unit from the SVI target area (zip-code 89106), resulting from either a stabbing or a gun shot. UMC-Trauma Unit staff collected data on nine individual variables. The variables were collected from a patient's "face-sheet" that is routine for all inpatient care to the trauma unit. The "face-sheet" is started once first contact is made with the patient, by paramedics or UMC staff. Information that is unable

to be documented at initial contact is later provided by the family through further follow-up. The nine variables collected are as follows: type of wound, race, gender, day, month, year, length of stay in hospital, zip-code of patient's residence, and disposition of hospital stay.

Zip-code of residency is a primary variable in the analysis due to the intense concentration in the targeted area. The West Las Vegas area is encompassed in the 89106 zip-code. The zip-code is collected as a means to determine if the patient is a resident of the targeted area or traveled into the targeted area. Names and address of residency were not provided for confidentiality purposes. A weakness with the UMC data is that if the zip-code is unable to be provided by the patient, UMC staff provides the zip-code 89102 as the primary residency zip-code, which is the zip-code for UMC. A limitation also occurs in UMC's use of zip-codes and LVMPD's use of beat sectors as a means to record data. The problem that is encountered is that zip-code 89106 is larger than W5 and W6. By this issue, patients that are from the 89106 zip-code are accounted for, yet they may not be from the target area of W5 and W6.

A limitation to the use of UMC data is that it is being gathered by type of wound; however there is no distinguishing variable that states how the wound was received. This can result in wounds being counted, but not received from a violent act. Therefore, caution must be used when interpreting the results.

Research Question 1

How do the qualities of SVI make it unique from previously implemented “Pulling levers” models?

From the qualitative interviews a table was constructed of key variables needed to implement a problem-orientated policing “pulling levers” strategy. These variables assessed were: directed initiative, jurisdiction/working group, police enforcement, message, outreach, and community mobilization. These six variables were selected as key elements to the foundation of the strategy. Four cities: Boston (MA), Richmond (VA), Los Angeles (CA), and Chicago (IL), were selected because they previously implemented a “pulling levers” strategy. Their specific strategies were reviewed and compared to Las Vegas (NV) SVI.

Directed initiative was selected as the first variable because identifying a specific problem is a core element of problem-orientated policing that must be met prior to any further action. Each city identified a target behavior or offense to be addressed, such as gang violence.

Jurisdiction/working group was selected as a means to identify how resources were being dispersed through out the initiative and the array of agencies collaborated to address the “target behavior.” Jurisdiction was broken down into “city wide” or specific “sector beats.” “City wide” refers to addressing the problem wherever it occurred in the city. “Sector beats” refers the operation being conducted in a specific location, which primarily is police sector beats or community neighborhoods. The working group is an array of agencies collaborating from the area to address the directed initiative.

In this study “police enforcement” refers to the efforts of the police agencies. In problem-orientated policing, once a problem and core elements to that problem are

identified, an attack is strategized. That core elements of the problem that is addressed through enforcement efforts is categorized in the variable.

In a “pulling levers” strategy, message delivery is a key component. Through direct and explicit methods delivered to a small target audience, the audience becomes aware of the initiative and the possible sanctions they may receive if they continue committing the targeted behavior. Message delivery may be done through police contacts, media outlets, or outreach workers.

The outreach variable refers to the use of individuals going into the community and preaching the message of non-violence. These individuals communicate directly with the target audience about the resources available and provide some guidance. Along with outreach workers, faith based leaders and community supporters may assist in reaching out to the target audience.

Community mobilization refers to engaging the citizens to get involved in the revitalization of the community and aid in the initiative. This can be accomplished through distribution of anti-violence literature, hosting events for knowledge of the initiative, or a response implemented after a violent act occurred. By involving the community in the initiative a sense of cohesiveness can be restored to the community, which may result in benefits such as: aid in police investigation, less crime, and largely contributing to eradication of problem behaviors or groups.

Research Question 2

Were there significant reductions in violence after the implementation of SVI?

This question is addressed through the analysis of the secondary data. The secondary data was collected to provide empirical support on SVI's effectiveness in "West Las Vegas." A time-series design and mean comparisons were constructed for all calls-for-service. An "Independent Sample T-Test" was used to test the significance in the data from 'pre' to 'post' implementation.

For these analyses, February 1, 2007 is selected as the first official date of SVI implementation, since all elements were established and in place. LVMPD provided data from February 1, 2006 through January 31, 2008 on counts of the previously mentioned six calls-for-service from W5 and W6 beat sectors. Calls-for-service data received during February 1, 2006 to January 31, 2007 were collected as pre-implementation and data from February 1, 2007 to January 31, 2008 were collected as post-implementation.

Counts of patients receiving care for gun shot or stabbing wounds from the 89106 zip-code were provided by UMC- Trauma Unit from February 1, 2006 to January 31, 2008. The patients receiving treatment from January 1, 2006 to January 31, 2007 were compiled in pre-implementation and patients receiving treatment from February 1, 2007 to January 31, 2008 were collected as post-implementation.

Hypothesis

Stated formally the research question will address the following 10 hypotheses.

- H₁: The average number of calls-for-service in W5 and W6 during the 1 year period following SVI implementation will be less than the average number of calls-for-service during the 1 year period prior to SVI implementation.
- H₀: There is no difference between the average number of calls-for-service in W5 and W6 during the year 1 year period following SVI implementation

when compared to the average number of calls-for-service during the one year period prior to SVI implementation.

- H₂: The average number of 413 calls-for-service in W5 and W6 during the 1 year period following SVI implementation will be less than the average number of 413 calls-for-service during the 1 year period prior to SVI implementation.
- H₀: There is no difference between the average number of 413 calls-for-service in W5 and W6 during the year 1 year period following SVI implementation when compared to the average number of 413 calls-for-service during the one year period prior to SVI implementation.
- H₃: The average number of 413A calls-for-service in W5 and W6 during the 1 year period following SVI implementation will be less than the average number of 413A calls-for-service during the 1 year period prior to SVI implementation.
- H₀: There is no difference between the average number of 413A calls-for-service in W5 and W6 during the year 1 year period following SVI implementation when compared to the average number of 413A calls-for-service during the one year period prior to SVI implementation.
- H₄: The average number of 415A calls-for-service in W5 and W6 during the 1 year period following SVI implementation will be less than the average number of 415A calls-for-service during the 1 year period prior to SVI implementation.
- H₀: There is no difference between the average number of 415A calls-for-service in W5 and W6 during the year 1 year period following SVI implementation when compared to the average number of 415A calls-for-service during the one year period prior to SVI implementation.
- H₅: The average number of 420 calls-for-service in W5 and W6 during the 1 year period following SVI implementation will be less than the average number of 420 calls-for-service during the 1 year period prior to SVI implementation.
- H₀: There is no difference between the average number of 420 calls-for-service in W5 and W6 during the year 1 year period following SVI implementation when compared to the average number of 420 calls-for-service during the one year period prior to SVI implementation.
- H₆: The average number of 420Z calls-for-service in W5 and W6 during the 1 year period following SVI implementation will be less than the average

number of 420Z calls-for-service during the 1 year period prior to SVI implementation.

- H₀: There is no difference between the average number of 420Z calls-for-service in W5 and W6 during the year 1 year period following SVI implementation when compared to the average number of 420Z calls-for-service during the one year period prior to SVI implementation.
- H₇: The average number of 434 calls-for-service in W5 and W6 during the 1 year period following SVI implementation will be less then the average number of 434 calls-for-service during the 1 year period prior to SVI implementation.
- H₀: There is no difference between the average number of 434 calls-for-service in W5 and W6 during the year 1 year period following SVI implementation when compared to the average number of 434 calls-for-service during the one year period prior to SVI implementation.
- H₈: The average number of patients admitted for gunshot and stabbing wounds from zip-code 89106 during the 1 year period following SVI implementation will be less then the average number of patients admitted for gunshot and stabbing wounds during the 1 year period prior to SVI implementation.
- H₀: There is no difference between the average number of patients admitted for gunshot and stabbing wounds from zip-code 89106 during the year 1 year period following SVI implementation when compared to the average number of patients admitted for gunshot and stabbing wounds during the one year period prior to SVI implementation.
- H₉: The average number of patients admitted for gunshot wounds from zip-code 89106 during the 1 year period following SVI implementation will be less then the average number of patients admitted for gunshot wounds during the 1 year period prior to SVI implementation.
- H₀: There is no difference between the average number of patients admitted for gunshot wounds from zip-code 89106 during the year 1 year period following SVI implementation when compared to the average number of patients admitted for gunshot and stabbing wounds during the one year period prior to SVI implementation.
- H₁₀: The average number of patients admitted for stabbing wounds from zip-code 89106 during the 1 year period following SVI implementation will be less then the average number of patients admitted for stabbing wounds during the 1 year period prior to SVI implementation.

H₀: There is no difference between the average number of patients admitted for gunshot wounds from zip-code 89106 during the year 1 year period following SVI implementation when compared to the average number of patients admitted for stabbing wounds during the one year period prior to SVI implementation.

Data collected from both sources were entered into a database (SPSS) for analysis. Data were analyzed to determine significance in the reduction of the mean monthly counts of calls-for-service and admitted patients for a year prior to the implementation of SVI to a year following at the .05 significance level.

CHAPTER 4

KEY EVALUATIONS AND FINDINGS

Research Question 1

How do the qualities of SVI make it unique from previously implemented “pulling levers” models?

Problem-orientated policing holds great promise for creating strong responses to crime, fear, and public safety problems. The “pulling levers” strategy of problem-orientated police aspires to address problems and develop a strategic response by using a wide variety of resources. By creating a model for problem identification and response development, police agencies will be able to implement newer techniques for addressing problems rather than resorting to previous traditional models.

Many major police agencies have collaborated with the community they serve to address local problems. Since many other “pulling levers” models have been implemented, a comparison table was formulated to identify the framework of the strategy incorporated. Boston (MA), Richmond (VA), Los Angeles (CA), Chicago (IL), and Las Vegas (NV) were selected due to the departments “pulling levers” model.

In Table 1, the first element of the “pulling levers” strategy is the identification of a localized problem. Each of the five operations identified a “targeted behavior” toward which the city or a specific community directed the initiative. Boston (MA) addressed

Table 1. Result of Agencies "Pulling Levers" Strategy Comparison

	DIRECTED INITIATIVE	JURISDICTION/ WORKING GROUP	ENFORCEMENT	MESSAGE	OUTREACH	COMMUNITY MOBILIZATION
Boston, MA: "Operation Ceasefire"	Youth Homicides	City Wide/ Policing, Probation and Parole, Court Agencies	Illegal Firearm Trafficking	"Violence No Longer Tolerated" Police Contacts	"Street Workers" Probation and Parole officers	N/A
Richmond, VA: "Project Exile"	Firearm Violence	City Wide/ Policing and Court Agencies	Illegal Possession and Crimes Committed with a Firearm	"Illegal Possession and Use of a Firearm Would Result in Severe Federal Sanctions" Media	N/A	N/A
Los Angeles, CA: "Operation Ceasefire"	Gang Involved Firearm Violence	Specific Beat Sector (Boyle Heights)/ Policing, Community Agencies	N/A (Respond to a Trigger Event)	Communicated Directly of the Consequences of Gang Violence	Faith Leaders	Increased Social Services
Chicago, IL: "Operation Ceasefire"	Violence	Specific Beat Sector/ Community Agencies	N/A	"Shootings and Violence, Not Acceptable"	Outreach workers, Violence Interrupters,	Distribute Anti-violence literature, Host events, Response to Violent Events
Las Vegas, NV: "Safe Village Initiative"	Violence	Specific Beat Sector (W5 and W6)/ Policing, Probation and Parole, Community Agencies	SVI Team Created, Identified & Cracked Down on "Problem Houses"	"Stop the Violence" Fliers	Outreach workers, Faith Based Leaders	Distribute Anti-violence literature, Host events, Response to Violent Events

the youth homicide epidemic that reached epic proportions in the mid 1990s. Richmond (VA) and Los Angeles (CA) each identified firearm violence committed by gangs or felons possessing firearms. Chicago (IL) and Las Vegas (NV) purposed their initiatives in response to violence in general, although primarily focusing on firearms violence.

In Table 1, the jurisdiction/working group section addresses how resources are allocated towards the targeted behavior. Boston (MA) and Richmond (VA) directed its efforts to the entire city because the aim was to do something about the target offense wherever it presented itself (Braga et al. 2000). Where as Los Angeles (CA), Chicago (IL), and Las Vegas (NV) designed their initiative around a targeted area with a high concentration of the targeted behavior. The use of police beat sectors allowed the police and community to better allocate the resources, rather than disperse them entirely through the city. The design of specific target areas allowed for a tighter community response and greater knowledge of the central problem in the area. In Las Vegas much of the firearm violence that was occurring in West Las Vegas was the result of gang mentality, where as that may not be the case in other areas

The collaboration of diverse agencies allowed for a multitude of resources made available that previously were not. Boston (MA) and Richmond (VA) primarily relied on agencies from the criminal justice system, which hindered their efforts in mobilizing the community. Los Angeles (CA), Chicago (IL), and Las Vegas (NV) designed there initiative around the capacity of a police enforcement and community effort. The three operations used resources available to the community and the surrounding environment to address the targeted behavior.

The central idea of problem-oriented policing is gathering information about incidents and design an appropriate response based on the nature of the underlying conditions that cause the problem(s) (Goldstein, 1990). Boston (MA) aimed to stop the gang violence by eradicating all illegal firearms that were used in the course of homicides (Braga et al. 2000). Boston collaborated with multiple agencies and designed an initiative to disrupt intrastate trafficking of the makes and models most likely used in the commission of homicides. In Richmond (VA) the U.S. Attorney's Office performed a training program educating the officers of the Richmond Police Departments on federal firearms statutes and search and seizure issues (United States Attorney Office for the Eastern District of Virginia 1999). Los Angeles (CA) stepped up police and housing authority enforcement but only after a trigger event (gang shooting). Other than to response to a trigger event, enforcement efforts remained at constant patrol effort. Chicago (IL) did not implement a direct police enforcement effort. LVMPD established a "Safe Village Team," in which officers communicate with the citizens and business in the West Las Vegas community. At first initiation of SVI, LVMPD invited citizens to identify "problem" homes of the target area. Intelligence was gathered on homes, warrants were issued, and swat teams raided the premises for drugs and illegal firearms. LVMPD also established a "Safe Village Team," in which officers communicate with the citizens and business in the West Las Vegas community.

Delivering a message of "no tolerance" has become a key element of the "pulling levers" strategy. By implementing a message, the community becomes aware of the direct initiative on the offense and has the ability to aid in the efforts. Boston (MA) delivered the message that "violence is no longer tolerated" to gang members through

probation and police contacts, juvenile facilities, and outreach workers. In Richmond (VA) the U.S. Attorney's Office worked in coordination with "local government and business to launch a media campaign to communicate the message that illegal possession or illegal use of a gun would result in severe federal sanctions" (McGarrell 2005, 2). Los Angeles (CA) communicated their message as a means to let gang members know of the possible consequences that would result from gun violence, as well as the alternatives and social services resources (U.S. Department of Justice 2005). Chicago (IL) engage outreach workers, violence interrupters, faith leaders, and other community leaders to deliver the message; "shooting and violence is not acceptable" (University of Illinois at Chicago: School of Public Health 2007). Las Vegas (NV) produced fliers, banners, media outlets, outreach workers, faith based leaders, and hosted community events to spread the message; "stop the violence." In West Las Vegas, when an event is held or media is present, fliers are distributed along with banners being hung with the message.

Outreach workers are individuals willing to go out in the community and speak directly with the target audience. They provide the target audience with support and resources needed to promote a message of anti-violence. Chicago (IL) and Las Vegas (NV) involve individuals with previous criminal records that have redirected their lives to help those at-risk. Faith based leaders are deployed as a means to spread the word through their parish. Los Angeles (CA) relied primarily on faith based leaders and business as a means to deliver the message. Boston (MA) used outreach workers assist in spreading the message.

Community mobilization is a key element in aiding the cause. By involving the community, police will increase their ability to identify suspects and apprehend

criminals. Revitalizing the community will increase the community's net worth and increase the market value. Chicago and Las Vegas have implemented a response rally event around a violent act. Once a shooting or violent act occurs a response is initiated in which members of the initiative and the members of the community come to the site of the violent act and demonstrate their outrage. This response gives the community a voice to preach that they are not going to stand for further acts of violence. With this response, members of the initiative aid in the restoration of the community by restoring historic buildings or teaching the children that violence is not the answer.

Research Question 2

Were there significant reductions in violence with the implementation of SVI?

Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department

The Safe Village Initiative team was brought together for a meeting on January 21, 2007, as a means to establish goals and form an effective strategy for complete implementation. In these analyses, February 1, 2007, was selected as the date of first implementation, since all elements of the strategy: policing, response, trauma, outreach, and sustainment were in place.

Appendix III is a representation of the spatial analysis (GIS) for all gun related offense (excluding 413A) for all LVMPD's by beat sectors. Figure 1 of Appendix III is pre implementation SVI. As the shade of the sector beat increase in darkness the sector has a higher volume of firearms violence per square mile within that sector. Accordingly, W5 and W6 are among the two darkest shaded beat sectors within LVMPD's jurisdiction, thus revealing that W5 and W6 is host to a high concentration of firearm violence.

Figure 2 of Appendix III is an illustration of the decrease experienced in the volume of firearm offense following a year after implementation of SVI. This illustration concludes that there was a decrease in the 5 firearm related calls-for-service per square mile within W5 and W6. Along with the decrease in shade of the target area, surrounding beat sectors decreased as well, indicating to a possible spreading effect.

Figure 3 presents a time-series analysis of the monthly counts for W5 and W6 six calls-for-service during the study time period. The time-series shows a 37.04 percent reduction in the mean monthly number of the six calls-for-service from a pre-test mean of 56.7 calls-for-service per month to a post-test mean of 35.7 calls-for-service per month. This simple analysis suggests that SVI was associated with a large reduction in gun and knife related calls-for-service in West Las Vegas, and supports the first hypothesis (H_1).




Figure 3. Time Series of All 6 Calls For Service

Figure 4 is a representation of W5 and W6 six calls-for-service for one year prior to implementation of SVI (February 1, 2006 to January 31, 2007) to one year after direct

implementation (February 1, 2007 to January 31, 2008). With the exception of November (pre = 44, post = 45), the post intervention remained consistently below the pre SVI monthly counts of gun and knife related calls-for-service.




Figure 4. Pre and Post SVI Comparison

Table 2 presents the results of the significance test when comparing means for pre and post SVI implementation for the six calls-for-service. Pre SVI is the mean counts of the six calls-for-service per month for one year prior to implementation. Post SVI is the mean counts for the six calls-for-service per month for one year following implementation. The *t*-test revealed a statistically significant difference between the pre SVI and post SVI calls-for-service ($t = 5.675, p = .000$). (Each individual call-for-service will be explained in further detail in the next section).

Table 2. Results from Time-Series Design *T*-test

	Pre.SVI Mean	Post.SVI Mean	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
All Calls-For-Service	56.67	35.67	5.675	.000
413- Person with a Gun	16.08	11.00	3.984	.001
413A- Person with a Knife	4.50	4.42	.103	.919
415A- Assault/battery with a Gun	11.58	6.67	4.287	.000
420- Homicide	1.80	1.17	.850	.417
420Z- Attempted Homicide	1.00	1.33	-.775	.495
434- Illegal Shooting	23.58	12.67	4.914	.000

Table 3. Six Calls-for-Service: Comparing pre-implementation to post-implementation

	Feb06 - Jan07	Feb07 - Jan08	<i>Percent Change</i>
Target Area (W5 and W6)	680	428	-37.06%
BAC (not including W5 and W6)	1,761	1,424	-19.14%
BAC (including W5 and W6)	2,441	1,852	-24.13%
LVMPD (not including W5 and W6)	12,095	10,950	-9.47%
LVMPD (including W5 and W6)	12,775	11,378	-10.94%

As previously stated West Las Vegas is primarily a small community with a high concentration of firearm violence. When accounting for the six calls-for-service analyzed in W5 and W6 there was a 37.06 percent reduction experienced from pre to post SVI (see Table 3). Bolden Area Command experienced a 19.14 percent reduction when not including W5 and W6. When not including W5 and W6, LVMPD as a department experienced a 9.47 percent reduction from pre to post SVI. Illustrated in Table 5 gun and knife related offense were down through all of LVMPD jurisdiction.

When including W5 and W6 into Bolden Area Command the reduction was reduced from 19.14 percent to 24.13 percent. When including W5 and W6 with all other LVMPD jurisdictions, the reduction in gun and knife related offenses decreased from 9.47 percent to 10.94 percent. Table 3 represents the effect the reduction in gun and

knife related calls-for-service experienced in West Las Vegas had on Bolden Area Command and LVMPD as a department. Prior to SVI, West Las Vegas experienced a high volume gun and knife related offense that with the reduction experienced during SVI, all of LVMPD's gun and knife related offense were affected.

413- Person with a Gun

LVMPD represents a "person with a gun" with the code 413. The 413 call-for-service was selected due to the nature of weapon identified. Figure 5 presents a time-series of the monthly counts of 413 calls-for-service from one year prior to SVI implementation to one year following SVI implementation. The time series shows a 31.6 percent decrease in the mean monthly counts of 413 calls-for-service from a pre-test mean of 16.08 per month to a post-test mean of 11 per month. Referencing Table 2, the *t*-test for 413 concluded that there is statistical significance ($t= 3.984$, $p=.001$), therefore rejecting the null hypothesis and finds support for H_2 .




Figure 5. Time-Series of 413 Call-for-Service

413A- Person with a Knife

According to LVMPD's codes, 413A is defined as a "person with a knife."

Figure 6 presents a time-series of the monthly counts for 413A calls-for-service received by LVMPD from pre to post implementation. Table 2 illustrates the reduction in the average means from a pre SVI mean of 4.50 to a 4.42 post SVI mean. Table 2 shows the reduction in the means was not statically significant ($t=.103, p=.919$), therefore failed to reject our third null hypothesis and providing no support for the third hypothesis (H_3).




Figure 6. Time-Series of 413A Call-for-Service

415A- Assault/Battery with a Gun

The nature of a 415A is a direct offense targeted by SVI. Figure 7 represents a time-series of the mean monthly number of 415A calls-for-service for W5 and W6 with a pre-test mean of 11.6 to the post-test mean of 6.7. Reference to Table 2, the t -test for

415A is statically significant ($t = 4.287, p = .000$) leading to rejecting the hull hypothesis and finds supports for the fourth hypothesis (H_4).




Figure 7. Time-Series of 415A Call-for-Service

420- Homicide

Homicide is an offense that triggers a community response. Figure 8 represents the time-series for homicides. Homicides in the target area experienced a decrease in the mean from a pre SVI of 1.8 per month and post SVI of 1.2 per month. Table 2 revealed that the reduction in means was not statistically significant ($t = .850, p = .417$), therefore failing to reject the fifth null hypothesis, that there is no support for H_5 .




Figure 8. Time-series of 420 Call-for Service

420Z- Attempt Homicide

LVMPD recognizes ‘420Z’ as an “attempted homicide.” The ‘Z’ is placed after the code to represent an “attempted offense.” The analysis produced a difference in the average number of “attempt homicides” occurring in W5 and W6 (pre mean = 1, post mean = 1.33). The *t*-test in Table 2 is representative of the change not being significant ($t = -.775, p = .495$). At the .495 level, the drop in the average failed to reject our sixth null hypothesis, that there is no support for H_6 .

However with 2 “attempt homicides” during the pre-test time period and 4 during the post-test time period. The increase may represent a positive. With an “attempt homicides” representing homicides not fully completed an interruption may have occurred resulting in fewer fatalities.




Figure 9. Time-series of 420Z Call-for Service

434- Illegal Shooting

Illegal shootings are a primary offense targeted in the initiative. A response is designed around a violent act which draws attention. With a response design strategy, the public can witness a link between an event like an “illegal shooting” and a community response to violence. “Illegal shootings” are a primary call-for-service in the analysis due to its frequency and possible outcomes of the offense.

The time-series (figure 10) represents the 46 percent reduction in the mean monthly number of 434 calls-for-service (pre mean = 23.6, post mean = 12.7). Table 2 illustrates the reduction was statically significant ($t = .914, p = .000$), leading to the rejection of the seventh null hypothesis and finding support for H₇.




Figure 10. Time-series of 434 Call-for Service

University Medical Center Data Analysis

Data received from UMC-Trauma Unit was analyzed to assist in measuring the impact of SVI. The variables used assisted in identifying demographics of the individuals admitted and the severity of the shootings and stabbings occurring in the 89106 zip-code. UMC-Trauma Unit provided data from February 1, 2006 to January 31, 2008 on all admitted patients from the 89106 zip-code, receiving care for either a “gun shot wound” or a “stabbing.” For analysis purposes patients receiving care from February 1, 2006 to January 31, 2007 were collected as pre implementation and patients from February 1, 2007 to January 31, 2008 were collected as post-implementation.

A total of 93 patients were admitted into UMC-Trauma Unit for wounds received from either a “gun shot” or “stabbing,” during both pre and post implementation years. Of these 93 patients, 60 (64 percent) were treated for “gun shot wounds” and 33 (35.5 percent) received care for “stabbing” wounds.” During pre SVI there were a total count of 54 patients admitted and 39 during post SVI. The monthly average of patients

admitted during pre SVI implementation were 4.50 and 3.25 during post SVI implementation. Figure 11 presents the time-series with a mean comparison when accounting for both “gun shot” and “stabbing” patients.




Figure 11. Time Series of Gun Shot and Stabbing Wounds Treated at UMC-Trauma Unit

Table 4 presents the results of the significance test when comparing means for pre and post SVI implementation of “gun shot” and “stabbing” patients. The *t*-test revealed that there was no statistically significant difference between the pre SVI and post SVI mean when accounting for both “gun shot” and “stabblings” wounds ($t = 1.68, p = .107$)¹. With the p-value being greater than .05, the analysis fails to reject the eight null hypothesis, that there is no support for H_8 .

¹ Although this result is not significant at the .05 level, there is support for H_8 at the .10 level, since the research hypothesis is directional.

Table 4. Results from Time-Series Design *T*-test Gun Shot and Stabbing Wounds

	Pre.SVI Mean	Post.SVI Mean	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
Gun Shot and Stabbing Wounds	4.50	3.25	1.68	.107
Gun Shot	2.92	2.08	1.09	.283
Stabbing	1.58	1.17	.814	.424

To test the severity of the violence occurring in West Las Vegas an analysis was configured on “hospital disposition.” Figure 12 presents pre.SVI with post.SVI hospital disposition for both “gun shot” and “stabbing” patients. As the table presents majority of the patients admitted were released and returned home after treatment (pre.SVI = 44, 81.5%, post.SVI = 37, 94.9%). During pre.SVI, 6 victims were fatally wounded as a result of their injuries (DOA = 3, Death = 3). While post.SVI only experienced 1 deceased patient (DOA = 1, Death = 0).




Figure 12. Counts of Patients Hospital Disposition

From the UMC-Trauma Unit data, analyses were configured on further demographics of the patients. Table 5 illustrates the central tendency for age of admitted

patients. By conducting an analysis of the ages, one is able to acknowledge target audiences age. The average age of the patients admitted prior to SVI implementation was 30.6 years (pre median = 28.5, pre mode = 19) and pre implementation an average age of 29.8 (post median = 25, post mode = 19). Due to outliers in the age of patients admitted, Median and Mode are viewed as the more accurate measure of central tendency. A unique finding in the analysis is that younger individuals were admitted at a higher frequency for “gunshot” wounds, while elders were admitted more frequently for “stabbing” wounds.

Table 5. Central Tendency Test for Age of Admitted UMC-Trauma Unit Patients

	<i>n</i>	Mean	Median	Mode	<i>sd</i>	Range
Pre.SVI Gun Shot and Stabbing	54	30.6	28.5	19	12.57	59
Post. SVI Gun Shot and Stabbing	39	29.8	25	19	13.66	62
Pre.SVI Gun Shot	35	26.6	23	19	11.53	45
Post.SVI Gun Shot	25	24	21	16	12.55	62
Pre.SVI Stabbing	19	38	40	32	11.32	49
Post.SVI Stabbing	14	39.7	39.5	37	9.52	32

Males were the vast majority admitted (pre.svi = 85.2%, post.svi = 82.1%). When accounting for race African Americans were treated the most frequently (pre.svi = 62.9%, post.svi= 76.9%), followed by whites (pre.svi = 29.6%, post.svi = 15.4%), Hispanics (pre.svi = 5.6%, post.svi = 7.7%), and other races (post.svi = 1.9%, post.svi 0%).

Gun Shot Patients

From February 1, 2006 to January 31, 2008, there were an aggregate total of 60 patients admitted to UMC-Trauma Unit for “gun shot” wounds. Of those 60 patients, 35 (58.3 percent) were admitted patients during the pre-implementation time period (pre mean = 2.92 per month). In the year following implementation of SVI there were 25

(41.7 percent) patients admitted (post mean = 2.08 per month). Figure 13 is a presentation of the time series analysis conducted on “gun shot” patients admitted into the UMC- Trauma unit. Table 4 presents the *t*-test gunshot patients revealing that the change was not statistically significant ($t = 1.09, p = .283$) thus failing to reject the ninth hypothesis, that is, there is no support for H_9 .




Figure 13. Time Series of Gun Shot Wounds Treated at UMC-Trauma Unit

Stabbing

The pre SVI data collection presented a total count of 19 stab wounds treated, an average of 1.58 per month. The post.SVI data presented a total count of 14 patients, averaging 1.38 per month. Referring back to table 4, the *t*-test showed no statistical significance, thus failing to reject the tenth null hypothesis, that is, there is no support for H_{10} .

As discussed in chapter 3, one could reasonably agree that victims receiving a wound(s) via a gun shot are more likely to receive medical care than a victim of a stabbing. Therefore, the lower counts for stabbings are not surprising.




Figure 14. Time Series of Stab Wounds Treated at UMC-Trauma Unit

CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION

The research presented shows that the Safe Village Initiative was a meaningful problem-orientated policing effort that brought the community and the practitioners together in new ways that lead to a fresh assessment and new operational activities to the violence occurring in “West Las Vegas.” This new and innovative strategy departed from the previous traditional practices that were less effective. SVI has been hailed by the founders and core team leaders as success. Even though the study can not declare with precision that the violence reduction in “West Las Vegas” was due to SVI, based on the timing and the direct intervention, one can reasonably conclude that SVI likely had a causal effect on the violence.

Presented in Table 1, SVI is the only model that fully incorporated resources from both the police and the community. The police carried out the criminal justice services needs when a violent act occurred and placed officers in the community as means to establish Intelligence on the community’s acceptance to the initiative. The community and the services provided have excited the citizens. Events and community restoration projects are being conducted as means to place pride back into the once violent community.

Since February 1, 2007, a substantial reduction in violence occurred in West Las Vegas. LVMPD responded to fewer calls-for-service which were firearm and knife

related. There was an overall reduction of 37 percent in the six calls-for-service studied from one year prior to implementation to one year after. The year prior to SVI, LVMPD was responding to an average of 56.7 gun and knife related calls-for-service per month. One year following intervention, the average reduced to 35.7 gun and knife related calls-for-service per month.

Each of the calls-for-service study produced results that were favorable to the implementation of SVI. Persons with a gun (413), persons with a knife (413A), assault/battery with a gun (415A), homicide (420), and illegal shooting (434) all were reduced in the course of a year post SVI implementation. Even though “person with a knife” (413A) and homicide (420) reductions in the monthly means were not determined to be statically significant the counts were still reduced. 420Z was the only call-for-service to not produce lower counts; however this can be viewed as a positive outcome. An increase in “attempted homicide” may be beneficially received in the direction that a homicide was not fully carried out. In the course of the act, an interruption occurred, which one can conclude that a life may have been saved.

Along with the LVMPD data showing favorable reduction in violent calls-for-service, the UMC-Trauma Unit data showed 38.9 percent reduction in admitted patients for “gun shot” and “stabbing” wounds from zip-code 89106 (West Las Vegas). Patients receiving care for a “gun shot” wound decreased 28.6 percent from pre SVI (35 patients) to post SVI (25 patients). “Stabbing” patients were down from a pre SVI count of 19 to a post SVI count of 14, a reduction of 26.3 percent.

A unique finding from the UMC data was that patients receiving care for a “gun shot” wound were older than expected with a mean age of 30 (pre.SVI = 30.6, post.SVI

29.8). There was a distinguished difference between the ages of patient being treated for a “gun shot” wound, compared to those being treated for a “stabbing” wound. The mean age of the patients receiving care for a “gun shot” wound were 26.6 (pre.SVI) and 24 (post.SVI). Patients with a “stab” wound had a mean age of 38 (pre.SVI) and 39.7 (post.SVI). However, when assessing central tendency of age, the median and mode, appeared to be the greater measurements of accuracy. Outliers in the age skewed the means to produce a high average.

As with any study there are limitations. This study lacks in research from social service and community efforts. To fully incorporate the impact of SVI, research would need to include data from probation and parole, outreach programs, and demographics variables (school enrollment, clergy membership).

Conclusion


SVI was constructed largely of resources and capacities available in the community at the time and tailored to stopping the violence in “West Las Vegas.” SVI applies a basic principle of problem-oriented policing to a public safety problem in a specific location. Addressing this problem of violence required the involvement of multiple agencies and the community, as well as substantial investment in coordination and implementation. SVI has shown that deployment of services and community intervention can yield substantial benefits. The problem-orientated nature of the initiative involves the definitions of the problem, establishment of core participants, design of a particular strategy for intervention, and implementation through collaboration.

SVI was designed to be replicable for other cities and jurisdictions. SVI was customized to address the particular violence occurring in “West Las Vegas,” collaboration of agencies, and the capacities available in “West Las Vegas” for incorporation into a strategic intervention. Certain elements of SVI, such as a “working group,” and the use of qualitative and quantitative research to discover a chosen problem shall be applicable for other problem-solving efforts. By establishing a “working group,” criminal justice practitioners in other jurisdictions can develop a set of intervention strategies that are designed to fit their specific violence problem and their operational capacities. The initiative implemented in other communities may not closely resemble the tactics used in SVI; however the framework can be similar.

The “pulling levers” strategy at the heart of SVI was designed in to influence the behavior and the environment in West Las Vegas. SVI in it essences is a deterrence model gained through advertising the message and by designing a community response to a violent act. By initiating a community response a link is drawn between the violence and the community’s outrage. It is crucial that the target audience understand the new regime that the community is imposing.

APPENDIX I

LVMPD JURISDICTION MAP



**LVMPD Area Commands
and
Sector/Beats**


Map shows
Area Command and Sector/Beats
Effective July 1, 2005

Crime analysis maps are produced only to meet
the needs of the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police
Department. Please contact DOC at
828-2915 or 828-2929 regarding this or other products.

June 2005

APPENDIX II

LVMPD BOLDEN AREA COMMAND MAP



**LVMPD Area Commands
and
Sector/Beats**

Map shows
Area Command and Sector/Beats
Effective July 1, 2005

Crime Analysis Maps are produced solely to meet
the needs of the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police
Department. Please contact DOC at
828-2916 or 828-2929 regarding this or other products.


June 2005

LVMPD
Crime Analysis Unit
1000 W. Sahara Avenue, Suite 400
Las Vegas, NV 89106

APPENDIX III

GIS ANALYSIS MAPS

Safe Village: Pre Implementation Results February 1, 2006 - January 31, 2007




Figure 1. Pre Implementation GIS

Map Created on March 7, 2008
by Timothy D. Radtke

Safe Village: Post Implementation Results February 1, 2007 - January 31, 2008




Figure 2. Post Implementation GIS

Map Created on March 7, 2008
by Timothy D. Radtke

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