Caught in an undertow of corruption: Stalled democratization in Bosnia-Hercegovina

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CAUGHT IN AN UNDERTOW OF CORRUPTION:

STALLED DEMOCRATIZATION IN

BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

by

William Joseph Murray

Bachelor of Arts
University of North Texas
2003

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
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ABSTRACT

Caught in an Undertow of Corruption:
Stalled Democratization in
Bosnia-Herzegovina

by

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Ethno-nationalism continues to be perceived by the international community as the primary source of Bosnia's political instability, and is seen as the leading cause of its stalled democratic consolidation. This thesis explores this premise, and questions whether international policy debates regarding Bosnia's future should continue to be framed in these terms.

In-depth exploratory interviews were employed to examine political attitudes within a sample of thirty-one middle class Bosnian citizens. Findings suggest that middle class Bosnians are forming new political attitudes. Perceptions of corruption among Bosnia's middle class may be emerging as a barrier to democratic consolidation. Since a politically engaged middle class has been a vital underpinning of previous democratic transitions, this potential trend of political alienation may be a warning sign for Bosnia's nascent democracy.
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Bosnia-Herzegovina's thirteen-year political morass is a widely recognized problem. At a recent speaking engagement in May 2008, at the Johns Hopkins Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, the current High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Miroslav Lajčák, described Bosnia's unchanging political situation as "near paralysis" (OHR, 2008). The United States Institute of Peace recently described Bosnia as a "dysfunctional state" (USIP, 2008), and in a 2008 interview with the Observer, Paddy Ashdown, Bosnia's fourth High Representative, stated that "after 10 years of progress which made Bosnia the world's most successful exercise in post-conflict reconstruction, there is a real threat of Bosnia breaking up again" (Observer, 2008). Giuliano Amato, Chairman of the International Commission on the Balkans, has described the western Balkans as an "isolated ghetto" (International Commission on the Balkans, 2005).

The policy discourse of politicians like Lajčák and Ashdown, and a premise shared by many academics that study Bosnia (for example see Tuathail (2006), Hayden (2005), and Touquet and Vermeersch (2008)) holds that ethno-nationalism remains Bosnia's primary (and perhaps only) source of political instability. The ethno-nationalism theme is also commonly found in various European Union documents such as the annual *Bosnia and
Herzegovina Progress Reports\textsuperscript{1} prepared and published by the European Commission.

This thesis questions this fundamental proposition. It does not argue that nationalism has become unimportant. Rather, it asks whether problems other than ethno-nationalism may be emerging as additional sources of political instability. Findings tentatively support this hypothesis.

The empirical research for this thesis involves a qualitative assessment of political attitudes among a small sample of Bosnia's middle class. In February 2008, thirty-one middle class Bosnian citizens participated in confidential, in-depth interviews. Participants were provided an opportunity to anonymously express deeply held attitudes toward their government. Participant responses reveal disillusionment with Bosnian and EU governance, and democracy. Symptoms include political apathy, a declining confidence in democracy, a desire to leave the country, and a viewpoint that some non-democratic methods of governance may be an acceptable solution to the country's severe corruption problem. Importantly, many participants do not now view democracy as what Schmitter and Guilhot (2000) term the "only game in town". All participants vigorously described endemic political corruption as the primary source of this disaffection. The qualitative conclusions drawn by this thesis are not statistically generalizable to a larger population. However, the interview transcriptions are so striking that they raise legitimate concerns that a larger percentage of the country's middle class, may be withdrawing from civic society.

\textsuperscript{1} The Bosnia and Herzegovina Progress Reports are an annual report from the European Commission to the European Council and Parliament addressing progress made toward European Union membership.
The likelihood of such a trend is worrisome. A democracy that does not vigorously engage its middle class effectively amounts to a form of despotism that Tocqueville (1840, Volume II, Section 4) concluded "conditions, softens, bends, and guides men's wills". A democracy in this condition "compresses, enervates, extinguishes, and stupefies its people" (ibid.), and poses one of its greatest dangers (ibid.). If future academic research satisfactorily links Bosnia's endemic corruption to widespread political alienation, it would signify the emergence of a new risk to Bosnia's nascent democracy and EU membership plans.

A country's middle class includes business people, professionals, shopkeepers, teachers, civil-servants, managers, technicians, clerical, and sales workers (Huntington, 1991, p. 66). This social group contributes to the democratic decision making process through the influence of its own distinct self-serving attitudes and agendas. An articulated and coalesced middle class has both a witting and unwitting influence on a less sophisticated, malleable, and manipulable general public. Through this influence, it shapes social choice and public opinion formation. A non-partisan middle class provides rhetorical ammunition for the less-informed, and helps the public distinguish sound policy from ideological obfuscation. This elite sector can play an especially important role during political transition. In virtually every country the most active supporters of democratization have come from the urban middle class (Huntington, 1991, p. 67).

During the “transition years” in Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic, for example, middle class elites opposing earlier socialist regimes emerged to unify and make a constructive contribution to democratization (Higley and Pakulski, 2000, p. 125). In contrast, Slovakian, Bulgarian, and Russian, legacy “parties of power” have remained
dominant and continue to “ride roughshod” over their opponents (ibid.). In Bosnia-Hercegovina, where opposition elites still remain weak, nationalist elites that emerged during the civil war have effectively done the same.

In a worst-case scenario, political alienation could drive Bosnia’s middle class to endorse, and perhaps influence others to endorse, a political party that convincingly promises more effective governance through non-democratic means. Its democratization could thus come to a standstill or slide backwards. At best, there is a distinct possibility that a decline in the public engagement of Bosnia’s middle class, over the long-term, will allow the continued stranglehold of ethno-nationalism in the political arena, further weakening the country's already lethargic democratic and economic reform process. Bosnia could continue to lose legitimacy in the eyes of European Union member states and ultimately may suffer economic and political sanctions due to its poor performance. Recent examples of this scenario are found in Bulgaria, which gained EU membership in 2007, but may already see billions in EU funding frozen amid fears of fraud (Economist, 2008); and Turkey, where a prolonged EU membership process has caused a decline in local public support for membership (Civilitas Research, 2005).

Today, the political trajectory for Bosnia is aimed at European Union membership. Bosnia is currently categorized as a “potential candidate”, participating in what is termed the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) to guide it down its long road to accession. The overarching goal of the SAP is to compel Bosnia to enact institutional reform, on its own initiative, that will facilitate coordination with the heavily institutionalized European Union. The prospect of EU membership is anticipated to serve as a stimulus for nationalist elites to redirect their attention to economic reform,
ethnic tolerance, and regional security. Compliance with the many prerequisites for membership, commonly referred to as the “conditionality criteria”, also assures existing EU member states of the validity of additional enlargement. Although the SAP process is succeeding in building local democratic institutions, the “conditionality criteria” offer few direct incentives for Bosnia to escalate its fight against corruption, which has seen little success since the civil war ended in late 1995. If further research finds political alienation widespread, this thesis recommends that the EU should consider “raising the bar” for membership by including measurable reductions in corruption as part of its “conditionality criteria”.

Although this study is not historical in scope, it begins by providing an account of Bosnia’s recent political evolution in order to correctly frame what follows. Consequently, Chapter 2 provides a description of Bosnia’s current sociopolitical problems and then defines Bosnia’s trajectory to European Union membership within the context of Dayton and the Security Pact for South-Eastern Europe. Chapter 3 and 4 provide a theoretical basis for this paper. Chapter 3 explains the dependency of democracy on legitimacy. Chapter 4 explores the nature of public opinion and its parallel relationship to legitimacy. Chapter 5 evaluates corruption’s corrosive effect on legitimacy and democracy. Building on the work of theorists such as Rose-Ackerman, Diamond, and Morlino, Chapter 5 further explores corruption’s influence on civic attitudes, political behavior and expressions at the political level. Chapter 5 also documents and analyzes the endemic corruption that currently exists in Bosnia. Chapter 6 describes the field research, interview process, and findings. It attempts to identify where political loyalties and priorities truly lie and if the EU’s reform policies are aligned accordingly. Finally,
Chapter 7 provides a summary of this thesis and makes recommendations for further research.
CHAPTER 2

THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF BOSNIA

The Paradox of Dayton

Thirteen years have passed since the signing of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina\(^2\) marked an end to the Bosnian war of secession. It has also been nine years since the EU’s affirmation of the Security Pact for South Eastern Europe\(^3\) in the wake of the Kosovo conflict. Both of these protocols led to billions of dollars worth of reconstruction funds, material, democratization efforts, humanitarian aid, and commitment to a revitalization of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s future. Since 1995, almost every aspect of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s economic and political development has been designed, supervised and monitored by a vast array of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and American and European experts. Tens of thousands of foreign diplomats, consultants, specialists, and missionaries have at one time or another descended on this small country of 4.5 million (CIA World Factbook, 2008).

In 1998 a *Wall Street Journal* article estimated that there were more than 50,000 civilian workers in the country (*Wall Street Journal*, 1998). Hospitals, schools, electric transmission networks, power plants, transportation infrastructure, and a major airport have been reconstructed, not to mention the removal of thousands of anti-personnel

\(^2\) Commonly referred to as the “Dayton Peace Accords”.

\(^3\) The Stability Pact of 1999 promised eventual candidate status to the states of the western Balkans.
mines and unexploded ordinance left from the war. Today, Bosnia's government continues to be overseen by the highly structured process of European Union assimilation and democratization known as the Stabilization and Association Process. Yet, despite this immense economic\(^4\) and human achievement, widespread physical reconstruction, and the creation of democratic institutions, Bosnia's moribund consociational political system calls the country's viability into question. That such extensive investment in time and money has resulted in such little substantive political progress is a widely acknowledged paradox.

In a May 2008 speech to the Sarajevo based Circle 99 association,\(^5\) the US Ambassador to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Charles English, characterized Bosnia as being "trapped in stagnation" (Embassy of the United States, 2008). On September 2008, the current High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Miroslav Lajčák, stated "I have seen the same atmosphere that I see today in Sarajevo–Banja Luka relations twice in my life. I saw it first in the Bratislava–Prague relations, and then in those between Podgorica and Belgrade, and we all know how that turned out"\(^6\) (Bosnian Insight, 2008). In his 2008 report to the United Nations Security Council, Lajčák describes the domestic parties' conceptions of necessary reform as "antithetical and non-negotiable" (UNSC, 2008).

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\(^4\) Between 1995 and 2000, Europe had contributed over 2 billion euros toward assistance (European Assistance, 2000).

\(^5\) The Circle 99 group was founded in 1992, during the siege of Sarajevo, and originally comprised a small group of Sarajevo intellectuals, whose intention it was to elaborate on their intellectual resistance to aggression and nationalism. (Refer to http://www.krug99.ba/eng/99/krug/Onama.htm)

\(^6\) In this statement, Lajčák is referring to the secession of Montenegro from Serbia.
Widely recognized indices of government performance further reveal the extent of the paradox. Bosnia ranks 54 out of 60 in the Foreign Policy Failed State Index (2007). In the Index of Economic Freedom (2008), Bosnia is categorized as ‘Mostly Unfree’ and ranked 38 of 41 countries in the European region, with an overall score well below the regional average. Freedom House rankings improved after the war, but have only improved from 5 to 4 since 1996. Bosnia as only ‘Partly Free’ in its Freedom in the World survey (2008). Transparency International ranks Bosnia 84th in its Corruption Perceptions Index (2007), with a rating of 2.9, which places it generally above only undeveloped African states. Furthermore, the High Representative continues to need his extensive executive and legislative authority to leverage reform. According to the European Commission, Bosnia and Herzegovina Progress Report (2007), between January 1, 2007 and September 30, 2007, the High Representative used his executive powers on 31 occasions, which included the forced imposition of legislation and the removal of officials. Organized crime and corruption are thriving (Anastasijevic, 2003). Citizens are dissatisfied with elected officials (Survey by the Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe, 2004). Bosnia’s unemployment approaches 29 percent (Emerging Europe Monitor, 2008). Its public sector accounts for nearly 50 percent of GDP (International Monetary Fund, 2008) and approximately 20 percent of the population lives in poverty (USAID, 2005). Analysts understand that, left to their own devices, many Bosnians would still “work to make the current internal lines of division permanent” (Soberg, 2006, p. 46). Moreover, Bosnia now finds itself last in line for European Union membership: behind Croatia, Turkey, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania, that is a failure made sharply ironic by the fact that, before the war, Yugoslavia was in many
ways “better poised than any other socialist country to make a successful transition to a market economy and to the West” (Woodward, 1995, p. 1).

The most widely accepted explanation for this remains ethnic nationalism, or one of its variants. Invariably, politicians and scholars point to the ethnic cleavages between Serbs, Croats and Muslims that caused the war. Three variants of this theme include, first, the depth of democracy that Dayton provides. Hayden (2005, p. 241), for example, views Bosnia’s constitution as flawed because it was instituted from above with no ratification by its constituent peoples, and that such a democracy is meaningless since the ethnic groups do not agree on its fundamental composition. A second variant blames Dayton’s consociational democracy because ethnic political elites have no common loyalty (Belloni, 2004, p. 173). Third, Woodward suggests that since it is a system based on ethnic rights, “it fails to resolve the core issues around which the war was fought” (1997, p. 30).

Dayton's Origin

The Dayton Peace Accords were initialed on November 21, 1995, and signed later that year in Paris on December 14. This peace protocol was the culmination of American-led negotiations in Dayton, Ohio, that ended a complex and costly four-year civil war in Bosnia, a republic of the former Yugoslavia. The struggle had killed 250,000 (Robinson and Pobrić, 2005, p. 237), displaced more than two million (Robinson and Pobrić, 2005, p.237), and caused 20 billion dollars in damage (World Bank, 1996). The framework stopped the killing and established a crude plan to transform Bosnia into a liberal democracy, essentially from scratch.
According to Dayton’s terms, a sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina would henceforth comprise three constituent peoples in two entities: the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Croatians and Muslims would govern the Federation while Serbs would govern the Republic. Governance at all levels would employ an elaborate power-sharing scheme to ensure a balance of ethnic power.

The US State Department authors began with a theoretical model conceived by political scientist Arend Lijphart, known as consociational democracy. The theory’s premise is that the mitigation of divisive ethnic rivalries is possible when political elites share power within a government that recognizes these rivalries and incorporates this recognition into the political decision making processes. Over time, this ongoing cooperation, although initially disingenuous, will prevent violence and ultimately bring stability to divided societies. Consociational democracy relies on four principles of power sharing: a so called grand coalition (instead of a majority), veto power for each group, proportionality in the election system and civil service, and ethnic autonomy (Lijphart, 1979). Consociational concepts were not new and had been used previously in the European Community system. Veto power, for example, is seen in the Luxembourg Compromise which provides that "Where, in the case of decisions which may be taken by majority vote on a proposal of the Commission, very important interests of one or more partners are at stake, the Members of the Council will endeavor, within a reasonable time, to reach solutions which can be adopted by all the Members of the Council while

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7 Bosnian Serbs, Croats and Muslims.
respecting their mutual interests and those of the Community. Taylor theorizes that the consociational approach works because elites will acquiesce to the expansion of supranational capacities in the hope of securing overflow gains for their own constituency (Taylor, 1994). In the case of Bosnia, to meet the power sharing principle, two semi-autonomous entities were created; the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose majority is Muslim-Croatian and occupies 51 percent of the country’s territory, and the Republika Srpska, whose majority is Serbian, and occupies the remaining 49 percent. This division closely matched the population breakdown. A census taken in 1991 showed Bosnia’s population to be 44 percent Muslim, 33 percent Serb and 17 percent Croat (Hayden, 2005). An elaborate set of checks and balances were established to guarantee equal political representation, and institutions were structured according to the principle of ethnic proportionality and parity (Kasapović, 2005). The final product provided a government with five tiers: State, Entity, Canton, Municipality, and City. A separate constitution is provided at each level. The government is intentionally weak at the top level, with power distributed downward in order to facilitate as much ethnic self-rule as possible.

None of the antagonists were satisfied with this final protocol. The Bosnian Serbs held that their representatives at Dayton had very little input into the treaty's content, so

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8 Text of the Luxembourg Accords, from the Europa Glossary. URL: http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/luxembourg_compromise_en.htm

9 The Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina actually emerged from the 1994 Washington Agreement; it was primarily a military collaboration against the Serbs. It was here also that the 10 Cantons were first identified.

10 In 2001, the Bosnian Constitutional Court clarified that Serbs were a constituent ethnic group within the Federation, and that Muslims and Croats were a constituent ethnic group within the Republika Srpska.
they remained utterly opposed to the entire process. The Bosnian-Croat representative felt betrayed and resigned from office during the Dayton negotiations, and was not replaced. Bosnian Muslims argued that allowing the creation of the Republika Srpska entity rewarded Serb excesses. In general, at Dayton no effort had been made to resolve the issues that started the war. It was as Alija Izetbegovic described, “an unjust peace” (*New York Times*, 1993). Ethnic nationalism was clearly the primary source of political instability and stalemate for the first decade, or so, following Dayton. A multinational NATO force\(^{11}\) was necessary for the continued cessation of hostilities. Responsibility for civilian implementation of Dayton was assigned to a new office that would be called the High Representative, under the authority of a Peace Implementation Council of 55 member countries. A variety of international institutions were also deeply involved. These included the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).

At the time, Dayton was hailed by its authors as a great accomplishment. A long-term goal of its contributors was democratization. As U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher remarked during the first initialing of Dayton, “The agreement is a victory for all of those who believe in a multi-ethnic democracy in Bosnia-Herzegovina” (*New York Times*, 1995). Annex III of Dayton directs the OSCE to promote free, fair, and democratic elections and to lay the foundation for representative government and ensure the progressive achievement of democratic goals throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.

\(^{11}\) Named IFOR – short for "Implementation Force".
Article I of Bosnia's State constitution reads, "Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be a democratic state, which shall operate under the rule of law and with free and democratic elections." The G-7 Summit Chairman's Statement reads, "We confirm our support for the Peace Agreement and the establishment of a democratic and pluralistic State of Bosnia and Herzegovina, composed of two Entities" (Lyons Summit Documents, 1996).

There was cautious optimism that external intervention would be needed for only a short period of time. In September 1996, Secretary of State Warren Christopher was confident enough to comment that "the United States would now be able to withdraw its peacekeeping troops from Bosnia by the end of the year as President Clinton promised" (New York Times, 1996). In principle, its democratically elected leaders were to pursue the objectives prescribed by Dayton with minimal external intervention. However, it was immediately clear that this would not prove to be the case. In a classic example of what Schmitter and Karl (1991) term the "fallacy of electoralism", it was obvious that the newly elected government would be unable to function when ultra-nationalists Muslim Alija Izetbegovic, Serb Momcilo Krajisnik, and Croat Kresimir Zubak were voted into power. These were the same individuals that only months beforehand were orchestrating the war. The Peace Implementation Council responded by exercising new expanded powers through its High Representative and unilaterally enacting reform. By early 1997, the Dayton "voluntary" democratization and stabilization plan had mutated into a system that would be "force-fed" to Bosnians from the outside.
Kosovo

In 1998, two years after Dayton, the disintegration of Yugoslavia restarted. Ethnic fighting broke out in the Kosovo region of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Hostilities arose between Serbian military and police forces, and secessionist ethnic Albanians. The international community became alarmed when panic drove nearly one million ethnic Albanian refugees into neighboring countries (International Monetary Fund, 1999). There was fear that hostilities would spread into neighboring countries with large ethnic Albanian minority populations, such as Macedonia and Montenegro.

Although both sides were to blame for the conflict, Serbian forces were found to be using excessively brutal tactics against civilians (King and Mason, 2006, pp. 43-45). When attempted negotiations with Belgrade failed, it was decided that the most expedient solution was to use military force against Serbia. After a seventy-seven day NATO air campaign, Serbian forces departed from the Kosovo region. The UN Security Council subsequently deployed a long-term civil and security presence in Kosovo, under United Nations oversight. As with the war in Bosnia, regional economic, humanitarian and social costs of this war were staggering. Economic damage to Serbia alone was estimated at roughly $30 billion (Group-17 Report, 1999).

A New Security Paradigm in the Balkans

When the Bosnian war began in 1992, there was little Western interest in committing military assistance beyond providing humanitarian support. Warren Christopher, commented that the United States “had no vital interests in Bosnia” (New York Times,

12 The negotiations are known as the Rambouillet Accords.
This hesitation by the US to intervene occurred for several reasons. Soviet domination of Eastern Europe had only recently ended, so there was no revised policy to confront the new types of emerging regional security issues. For forty years the West had followed a policy of non-intervention in the Balkans. Also, there was significant in-fighting between America, France and Germany over which force should manage an intervention, if there was to be one (i.e. the United Nations, NATO or a regional security force led by the European Community, the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe or the Western European Union). Russia was also exerting pressure on the US to not take action against Serbia. Broadly speaking, these factors resulted in an overall lack of commitment by the United States and Europe that undermined effective peace-keeping and unnecessarily prolonged the Bosnian war until Dayton in 1995 (Gow, 1997, p. 299).

A similar critical observation can be made regarding the war in Kosovo. American and European policies were not designed for the events that unfolded after the fall of communism. Once again, Western response to the growing crisis in Serbia did not prevent a second war. It took this second humanitarian and security crisis to finally “bring international attention back to this part of Europe” (Biermann, 1999, p.5). The Euro-Atlantic community finally realized it had to accept that Europe, as a whole, had a stake in the Balkans. Policies developed to manage the traditional interstate rivalries between major military powers no longer functioned because these were no longer the primary threats to regional peace. The international security paradigm had changed. The threat in this region had shifted to the dangers of fragmentation in states that were more peripheral (Chandler, 2000, p. 22). Moreover, the concept of “security threat” now began to encompass not only violence, but advanced technological systems, hard drugs,
HIV/AIDS, the permeability of state borders, transnational refugee flows, economic migrations, and the role of diasporas (Del Sarto, 2006, p. 508).

The Stabilization Pact for Southeastern Europe

Following Dayton, US and European policy toward Bosnia was based on the assumption that the benefits of closer trade ties with the EU would prove a more enticing goal than continued nationalism. There was only an indeterminate prospect of EU membership for Bosnia. Incentives during this early period were vague, and failed to motivate elites to follow a path of democratization and reform on their own. By 1999, political reforms vis-à-vis Dayton had lost traction. It was only after the war in Kosovo, that both the EU and the United States fully realized their earlier policy weaknesses. One result of this revelation was a fundamental policy shift in Europe's approach to security in the Balkan region. Brussels realized that the American "policy of emergency reconstruction, containment and stabilization was not, in itself, enough to bring lasting peace and stability to the area: only the real prospect of integration into democratic European structures would achieve that" (European Commission Report, 2002, p. 4). Against the backdrop of a second bloody entanglement in the region, a new strategy took form in the Stabilization Pact for South Eastern Europe\textsuperscript{13} and the EU's Stabilization and Association Process. From this point forward, Dayton took a back seat to the EU, which then took the lead in administering Bosnia and preparing it for integration into EU structures.

\textsuperscript{13} The Security Pact is now managed by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
A new focus was placed on addressing “Europe’s strategic shortfalls” (Stability Pact, Section 1) of the past. In the Stability Pact, the EU reaffirmed its resolve to assume responsibility for western Balkan stability, this time by offering to direct the countries toward what Chandler (2006, p. 35) terms “the pot of gold that was held to come with EU membership”. Europe would accomplish this by making a commitment to the western Balkan countries\textsuperscript{14} for an unambiguous and potentially accelerated path to European Union membership. Within one year, the countries were recognized as “potential candidates” for EU membership. In return for this commitment, the western Balkan countries agreed to cooperate with the terms of the Pact. Henceforth, integration with the European Union was considered a non-negotiable prerequisite for regional security. The hub of the Pact was the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), and a new category of Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) that would be adapted to the needs of each country. The SAA resembles the Europe Agreements concluded with the countries of central and eastern Europe.

Bosnia’s SAP involves multiple steps that include fulfillment of the requirements of the EU Roadmap,\textsuperscript{15} completion of the action items of the European Commission Feasibility Study,\textsuperscript{16} and completion of subsequent SAA negotiations. Once the SAA is signed, its terms must then be implemented in order for Bosnia to be deemed a

\textsuperscript{14} The Western Balkan countries were Albania, Bosnia-Hercegovina, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

\textsuperscript{15} In 2000, an EU "Road Map" identified eighteen steps to be taken by Bosnia prior to preparation of the Feasibility Study for SAA negotiations.

\textsuperscript{16} In November 2003, the Commission presented the Feasibility Study on the preparedness of Bosnia to negotiate a SAA.
"candidate" for EU membership. After candidate status is acquired, the European Council begins accession negotiations. These negotiations result in an Accession Agreement, which requires European Parliament consent and unanimous European Council agreement for final membership ratification. The EU policy mechanism linking this wide range of political and economic reform with progressively closer bilateral EU relations is commonly termed "conditionality". "Conditionality" relies on rewards and penalties which are contingent upon the fulfillment of certain political reforms such as those found in the "Copenhagen Criteria"\(^{17}\) and the Acquis Communitaire.\(^{18}\) Individual steps through the process are administered through what is termed a European Partnership. The most recent progress milestone for Bosnia was completed when the European Council authorized the European Commission to open official SAA negotiations on November 25, 2005. In December 2007, the last remaining prerequisite for SAA initiation, namely the replacement of independent entity police forces with a single state force, was tentatively met. It is anticipated that the SAA will be formally concluded in 2008.

Europe’s "conditionality" approach has been to compel Bosnia, through financial assistance programs, trade privileges, peer pressure, and the authority of the High Representative, to implement constitutional and legislative reforms that shift political power from the entity to the state level and to create state level institutions that facilitate an EU interface (Chandler, 2006, p. 36). As noted, these reforms have been primarily

\(^{17}\) The Copenhagen European Council, held in 1993, delineated the conditions for European Union membership, which are now commonly known as the "Copenhagen Criteria".

\(^{18}\) The Acquis Communitaire is the complete body of common rights and obligations that is binding on all the Member States of the European Union. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/glossary/terms/acquis_en.htm
institutional in nature. They address refugee and displaced person returns, police re-
organization at the state level, creation of an impartial public media broadcasting sector,
administrative capacity building in the area of customs and taxation, cooperation with the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), creating a single
economic space, and the labor market. The EU has chosen to address corruption only
indirectly. The development and implementation of reform addressing the control of
corruption has, for the most part, been left in the hands of the Bosnians themselves.
Though some action has been taken, it has been mostly superficial. For example, the UN
Convention on Fighting Corruption was recently ratified, and a National Anti-Corruption
Strategy and action plan was established in 2006. As discussed in Chapter 5,
implementation of these programs has been unsatisfactory. The 2007 and 2008 Bosnia-
Herzegovina Progress Reports, published by the European Commission, also identify this
shortcoming.
Pervasive corruption, as found in Bosnia, undermines public faith in elected government and the democratic system itself. For this reason, an understanding of the prerequisites for legitimacy and democracy are essential. Scholars view these two concepts from many perspectives. They are neither absolute nor unchanging. They continue to be influenced by contemporary and historical events, social conditions, and research methodologies. Viewpoints developed in different eras often differ. Contradictions emerge as time proves earlier assumptions wrong. The rights of citizens as conceived by Jeremy Bentham, for instance, are not considered democratic by today’s standards. Moreover, controversies between authors often arise since the quality of any democracy is a value-laden subject (Diamond and Morlino, 2005, p. ix). Consequently, a very large body of work is available for study.

This chapter presents a small selection of this literature relevant to concepts presented herein. Lipset’s (1959, pp. 71-72) definition of democracy serves as a suitable starting point. Lipset wrote: “Democracy is a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing governing officials. It is a social mechanism for the resolution of the problem of societal decision making among conflicting interest groups which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence these decisions through their ability to choose among alternative contenders for political
office.” At the core of Lipset’s definition are three simple dimensions: competition, participation, and liberty. Yet, as plainspoken as this definition may appear, its true meaning raises a number of complex issues.

Democracy

This complexity, the idea of “rule by the people”, has been a source of heated debate for centuries. In his Republic, Plato criticized democracy, arguing that states should be ruled by philosopher-kings. Less than one hundred years later, Aristotle, in The Politics, suggested that the rule of the many was the best governance system (Morgenthau, 2004, p.67). In his Discourses on Livy, Machiavelli hinted at democratic principles when he discussed the value of dissension between plebeian and noble factions. The period from the Renaissance to the eighteenth century saw the emergence of classical republicanism that rebelled against institutions claiming divine justification. The sovereignty of the monarch was replaced with the sovereignty of the people. Such liberal reasoning brought new democratic parliaments to England and Scotland. English political culture at this juncture, however, did not encourage public input. There were no opposition parties or public space in which political factions could openly compete and exchange ideas (Zaret, 2000, p. 7). Secrecy, censorship, and privilege remained the norm (Zaret, 2000, p. 8). The democracy debate expanded with philosophers such as Locke, Mill, Rousseau and Kant who re-introduced the concept of socioeconomic inequality. In the nineteenth century a Marxist school of thought emerged arguing that to achieve full freedom capitalism should be replaced with communism. More recent contributions
include theses by Lipset and Dahl, who argue that modernization and economic strength are correlatives to democracy.

Many academics today frame their study of democracy chronologically and theoretically in relation to what Samuel Huntington (1991) termed, three “waves” of democratization. Huntington observed that the spread of democracy was advancing and receding cyclically over time. The first wave, spanning the years from 1828 to 1926, comprised the United States since the presidency of Andrew Jackson, the democratization of Western Europe and colonies in Australia, Chile and Canada, and the democratization of Eastern and Central Europe post-1918. This was followed by a reverse wave that lasted from 1922 to 1942 and brought National Socialism to Germany, Fascism to Italy and the spread of the Third Reich. The second wave occurred between 1943 and 1962 and accounts for the democratization of West Germany, Italy, Austria, South Korea and Japan under occupation during and after World War Two. It also incorporates democratization following decolonization of India, Nigeria, Israel, Philippines and Jamaica. This second wave is overlapped by another reverse wave that lasted from 1958 to 1975 and brought military regimes to much of the third world of that period. The third wave began in 1974 and brought the fall of communism in Europe, and the democratization of Spain, Greece and Portugal, and much of Latin America, Asia and Africa.

As more countries embraced and rejected democracy, researchers encountered an increasing number of complexities and contradictions. Collier and Levitsky (1997, p. 430), for example, identified references to hundreds of democracy subtypes that differed “profoundly both from each other and from the democracies in advanced industrial
countries”. Authors shifted their attention from the sources of transition to democracy and looked toward the factors that sustained it (Diamond and Morlino, 2005, p. ix). The early theory of “modernization” was first seen as responsible for the success or failure of a democracy (Evans and Whitefield, 1995, p. 485). Additional theories began to encompass structural, economic, social, and cultural dimensions in addition to the narrow institutional views of scholars such as Joseph Schumpeter (Sørensen, 1998, p. 9). Concepts such as “democratic consolidation” and what Saxonberg and Linde (2003) term “transitology” emerged to capture the broad process of sustaining and solidifying democratic regimes.

The theory of the "democratic peace" gained significant attention in the second half of the nineteenth century. Empirical research has demonstrated that democratic states are generally as conflict and war prone as non-democracies; and yet over the last two centuries, they have rarely gone to war with one another (Moaz and Russett, 1993, p.1).

**Legitimacy**

The heart of democracy is “legitimation” according to Larry Diamond (1999, p. 65). “Legitimation” refers to the process of reaching the end product that democracy is expected to produce. It is the degree of fulfillment of this expectation. Legitimacy is a measure of the effectiveness of a government system in terms of meeting public expectation. Effectiveness in this context means: public endorsement of the political mechanism and its ability to sustain balanced public decision making. In its ideal form, a legitimate political regime exists when its citizens unconditionally submit to its rules and procedures. This procedural order becomes the only horizon within which political actors
A characteristic of democracy is that its existence depends on legitimacy. The general consensus among academics is that there is no universal formula for legitimacy. Each country must be evaluated within the bounds of its own circumstances (Sørensen, 1998, p. 16).

Among the many legitimacy variables proposed are economic and social conditions, beliefs and psychological attitudes, a capacity for empathy, the idea of civic culture, social structures, and political structures (Rustow, 1970, pp. 351-352). Research of Asian countries performed by Chu, Bratton, Lagos, Shastri and Tessler (2008) suggests that political indicators such as trust in institutions and a fair electoral system have the most influence on legitimacy, although economic factors should not be completely dismissed. Citizens of new democracies are able to discern political from economic elements of regime performance. Here, legitimacy hinges on whether political institutions command public trust. Rose, Mishler and Haef (1998) encountered similar results in their study of former East Block countries when they found that political factors mattered more than economic factors in determining support for democracy. David Becker (1999) points out that for new democracies, in the short term, legitimacy also includes fulfilling the expectations of those societal strata and interest groups that supported the previous regime and still wield sufficient influence to hinder democratization. As an example, he refers specifically to small but influential military, business sector and political elite elements in Chile, Brazil, and Peru. Along these lines, Chang, Chu and Park (2007, p. 68) add that robust legitimacy ultimately requires citizens to profess “authoritarian detachment”, that is they must eventually reject non-democratic alternatives if for no other reason than there are no preferable alternatives.
In his study of failing democracies in Latin America, O'Donnell (2004, p. 10) attributed a lack of legitimacy to high levels of social inequality, which he believed undermined the basic premise of democracy, namely individual agency. Human agency he reasoned is the grounding factor of democracy. According to O’Donnell, human agency is not a privilege or a goal – it is a right of all human beings. It is the highest moral right, and is the foundation of political life. He defines a human agent as “someone normally endowed with sufficient autonomy for deciding what kind of life is to be led, has the cognitive ability to reasonably detect options available, and is responsible for the courses of action ultimately taken”. Within the context of democracy, human agency can be conceptualized as the potential of group decision making through fair and institutionalized elections that are bound within the laws of the state. From this aggregate perspective, agency is both a participatory right and a responsibility imposed on citizens by the state. The state is thus presupposed to be both a territorial delimitation and a legal system (O’Donnell, 2004, p. 16).

O’Donnell’s concept of human agency logically leads to questions of what are the capabilities and range of options available to the human agent and which conditions enable or hinder an individual to function as an agent. In other words, what are the reasonable bounds of legitimacy? The answer lies in the origins of civil law, for example in the area of contract and social welfare, both of which rest on a basic criterion of fairness; fairness being a corollary of agency. O’Donnell’s line of reasoning is that the state, as a legal system, ensures fairness by guaranteeing that humans are able to interact with one another as equivalent agents without coercive influences on their agency, or their range of choices. It accomplishes this by providing necessary freedoms such as
expression, association, and access to information. Human agency thus equates to political citizenship legally enacted and backed. Moreover, to ensure fairness, there can be no individual or institution that is *legibus solutus*, that is, above the law (O'Donnell, 2004, p. 33). O'Donnell summarizes by arguing that citizens exercise their human agency through voting in fair elections. In doing so, they express their support for democracy's rules and procedures. Consequently, "it is these voting citizens who are the very source and justification of the authority needed to rule states and governments". Democracy thus logically precludes citizens from being treated as "subjects" or "supplicants of the goodwill of the state" (O'Donnell, 2004, p. 34).

Schmitter and Guilhot (2000, pp. 132-133) explain that for a democratic regime to persist, rules and procedures must be put in place that facilitate the eligibility of citizens to participate in political decision making processes. These rules and procedures must also channel the conduct of relevant actors. They must be seen as appropriate and employed on a normal basis either because they are normative or because non-compliance involves higher costs than compliance. A democratic transition comprises more than procedural attributes. It is an "actor-centered" process. In a similar line of reasoning, Darren Hicks (2002, p. 225) suggests that the legitimacy of a democratic system rests on its commitment to public justification. That is, social and political policies should be justified by reasons that can be accepted by all those affected. He places the locus of justification on stakeholders themselves through the mechanisms of representation and participation in civil society. Hicks (2002, p. 225) cites empirical evidence that stakeholders who are able to participate in "collaborative processes" will endorse decisions even at the cost of their own interests. The term "collaborative
processes", in this context, refers to collective reasoning by citizens as moral and political equals.

The concept of legitimacy can be said to be embodied in the principle of "accountability". By "accountability" Cullell (2005, p. 143) refers to the obligation of elected officials to justify their decisions to citizens and the consequences of this justification. When working properly, accountability is a strong incentive for politicians to be responsive to citizens. Accountability has two aspects: vertical and horizontal. Vertical accountability refers to the tension that develops between electoral actors (primarily citizens) and elected officials as a result of political performance. It is most frequently operationalized at election time when citizens either reward pleasing performance with reelection or punish displeasing performance by voting for alternate candidates. Vertical accountability is also employed between elections when institutions such as non-government organizations, social movements, and the media publicly hold officials accountable for their decisions (Schmitter, 2005, p. 23). For the mechanics of vertical accountability to function, bona fide elections offering reasonable alternatives to voters must be held (Diamond and Morlino, 2005 p. xix). Horizontal accountability refers to the relationship that exists between elected officials and bodies such as counter-corruption agencies, the court system, and enforcement agencies that have authority to independently scrutinize and circumscribe the power of these officials. Diamond and Morlino (2005, p. xxi) note that counter-corruption commissions are crucial for contemporary democracies and emphasize that they must possess sufficient power, breadth and resources to execute credible and interlocking investigations, deter temptation and try suspected offenders free from government interference.
Based on the theories presented, for a democratic regime to be legitimate the mechanics of vertical and horizontal accountability must be operational. This leads to the next discussion of this chapter, namely the rule of law. Legitimacy in the form of vertical and horizontal accountability must be enforced, hence the need for laws. For example, voters and institutions demanding vertical punishment of officials must be legally protected from intimidation and retribution. Agencies need the authority and functional legislation to aggressively prosecute law-breaking officials. But the rule of law is more than a collection of legally enforceable rules to protect voters. The rule of law in a democracy is typically established in a document, such as a constitution, that represents the highest law of the land. Constitutions also establish the unit of the polity, the citizen (Becker, 1999, p. 141). Laws emanating from a democratic constitution apply universally to all citizens. Thus, in addition to legislation, within a democracy the rule of law implies democratic behavior within an institutionalized system of impartial rights both coveted by citizens and respected in others. Moreover, this interplay of rights motivates rational individuals to circumscribe the rule-breaking of other individuals. In this way, each citizen has a stake in formulating and enforcing societal norms. In Europe this concept is commonly termed “rechtsstaat” or “constitutional state” (Donnelly, 2003, p. 64). As noted above, it is from this principle of universal and impartial rights that we derive the concept that there can be no individual or institution that is legibus solutus, that is, above the law.

Legitimacy works much like a quality assurance standard that allows us to measure the effectiveness of a democratic system. It establishes the bounds of acceptable political behavior by those in power and also behavior of the governed. The following paraphrase of Lipset summarizes the concept of political legitimacy: for a government to be
legitimized those out of power must adhere to decisions made by those in power, while those in power must respect the rights of those out of power (Lipset, S. M. 1959). By this he meant that democracy relies on a reciprocal balance of power and responsibility between the governed and the governors. It is thus reasonable to state that democracy and legitimacy are mutually correlative.

In the case of Bosnia, little democracy-oriented survey data is available for study. However, the insight gleaned from what is available corroborates the findings of this thesis: namely widespread corruption and a poor opinion toward government performance. According to the Early Warning System of the United Nations Development Program, public opinion surveys find that citizens still exhibit an obvious reserve toward state authorities, and public support for all levels of government is consistently below 60 percent among citizens of all three ethnic groups (United Nations Development Program, 2004). In a 2004 public opinion survey performed by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mission in Bosnia, 80 percent of respondents responded that they could have no influence on what political parties and politicians would talk about during the pre-election campaign and upcoming 2006 elections. A 2006 Open Society Fund Democracy Assessment in Bosnia found that 77 percent of respondents thought the rule of law operative at a very low or low level throughout the country, 63 percent thought that public officials did not perform their duties in accordance with transparency laws, 79 percent believed that confidence in the country’s legal system was low or very low, 69 percent thought that the business sector was insufficiently regulated in the public interest, 94 percent of respondents said public confidence in the effectiveness of government and leadership was low or very low, 57
percent believed there is significant influence of paramilitary units, private armies, warlordism and criminal mafias on the country, 90 percent said the effectiveness of the separation of public office from party advantage and the personal interests of office holders was low or very low, 86 percent believed that officials, companies and public services were involved in corruption, 84 percent thought the extent of citizen participation in voluntary and self-management organizations was low or very low, 71 percent thought the access of all social groups to public office and their representation in the public life were insufficient; and 81 percent thought the accessibility of elected representatives to their constituents was low or very low (Open Society Fund, 2006).
CHAPTER 4

POLITICAL ATTITUDE AND ALIENATION

This thesis posits that the influence of corruption and poor government performance are causing political attitude to be transformed in Bosnia. Political attitude studies are a subset of both public opinion studies and political psychology. The quantification and operationalization of political attitude are often referred to as “political efficacy”. The study of political attitude involves investigating factors that influence political choice. Political scientists, sociologists, and psychologists have each approached this research from different perspectives and have produced a large body of literature describing these influences. Accordingly, this chapter examines political attitude for multiple reasons. First, this thesis holds that if the political attitude of Bosnian middle class is being influenced by deeply entrenched corruption, there will be a negative impact on democratization. Second, an affirmative political attitude or a certain level of efficacy across a population generally, is necessary (though not sufficient) for political legitimacy. It is widely seen as a correlative to the stability and development of political systems (Chung-Li, 2003, p. 729). Third, political attitude, as expressed through opinions, is a reasonable standard by which government performance can be measured. Public attitude can also tell us what criteria citizens use to gauge government performance. Last, mass political attitude possesses a dynamic that can influence political systems. Acquiring and sustaining political power depends, in part, on the ability to influence public attitude and
thus provide votes. Political opinion thus has the potential to influence legitimacy and therefore democracy. Both Allport's definition of political attitude and Stewart's definition of political efficacy serve as appropriate guides for this chapter. Political attitude refers to "action or readiness for action with regard to a given issue on the part of members of a public who are reacting in the expectation that others in the public are similarly oriented toward the same issue" (Allport, 1936, p. 92). Political efficacy is the dichotomous perception that "one has the necessary resources and skills to affect the political process, and that this process responds to efforts to exert influence" (Stewart, 1992, p. 180).

Political Attitude

Political attitude is a transitory social phenomenon that aggregates individual preferences and choices (Davison, 1958, p. 92). It is a combination of emotional reactions to the media, and interactions between individuals, real or imagined. It is reciprocal in that it simultaneously reflects and influences the opinions of a population. Welzel observes that political attitude has a bonding effect on both individuals and members of society. It consolidates social capital and allows individuals to "translate democratic preferences into active support for democratic goals" (Welzel, 2007, p. 339). He suggests three normative types of public attitude necessary for democracy (Welzel, 2007, p. 400). First, there must be a widespread preference for democracy. Second, there must be wide-ranging communal attitudes. Third, broad emancipative attitudes are necessary because the idea of people power is an implicit concept of democracy. Muller and Seligson (1994, p. 647) contribute interpersonal trust as a product of democracy. Inglehart and Welzel,
(2005, p. 137) add self-expression values as one more mass attitude conducive to democracy. Linz and Stephan (1996, p. 8) frame democratic legitimacy as a political opinion.

Attitude Formation and Political Decision Making

Ideally, individuals would all make rational political decisions, in the sense that thought would be unaffected by emotions or desires. It means the type of political thinking that everyone would exercise if our best interests were really known (Baron, 2000, p. 5). Clearly, this condition is far from reality. Social psychologists examine the flaws in people’s reasoning when they make decisions, form beliefs and choose goals, in areas of life, such as politics. Kahneman and Tversky (1979), for example, proposed what they termed prospect theory to explain how the descriptive framing of risk causes people to draw different conclusions for the same problem. They discovered that many individuals, although they think they are acting in their own best interest, are in fact doing the opposite.

Political scientist Peter Marris (2001, pp. 280-281) views belief formation as the product of a contest between substantive and political rationality. Substantive arguments are those derived from rational enquiry, a notion sometimes referred to as deliberative democracy, while political rationality is based upon greed, prejudice and self-interest. Marris argues that political rationality dominates the political world because rational procedures of discovery are not adaptable to public debate. Still, substantive rationality can occasionally influence public opinion. As an example, he notes how public awareness of global warming has changed public perceptions of the environment (Marris, 2001, p.
Chung-Li (1994) hypothesizes that political attitude is dependent upon socio-economic status and subjective cognition of politics. In his study of a New Orleans, Louisiana mayoral election, social background conditions, notably race, were the key explanatory variables for political orientation. Harris (1991) posits that religion can act as a resource for political mobilization. In his study of political participation among church-going African Americans in Chicago, Illinois, he found that religious beliefs and practices facilitate psychological resources for individual and collective political action.

Building on Noelle-Neumann's (1993) spiral of silence theory, which holds that fear of social isolation is the compelling force behind aggregate changes in public opinion, Scheufele and Eveland (2001) posit that the distribution of public opinions in a population influences individual political participatory behavior. The spiral of silence theory holds that individuals continually scan public opinion on controversial issues and tend to remain silent about their own political opinions when they perceive themselves to be in the minority. In the long run, this creates the impression that the majority opinion is stronger than it really is. Scheufele and Eveland pursued this line of reasoning in their research, and found that public opinion perceptions, group membership, media use, and interpersonal discussion do influence political participation for some subgroups of society. In their investigation of Canadian federalism and political efficacy, Stewart, Kornberg, and Acock (1992) found that institutional contexts of its federal system affected Canadian political attitude, as reflected in different levels of external and internal efficacy structured along federal and provincial dimensions.

Sociologists Sutherland and Tanenbaum (1984) suggest that individual political preferences are strongly related to rational views about how society functions. They find
political preferences strongly linked with ideologies of what is possible to accomplish in society. Miller and Krosnick (2004) identified the level of political participation changes when individuals or groups are confronted with and seek to avert political threat that may affect material self-interest or well being. In a condition not unlike Olsen’s free-rider syndrome, Latane (1981) argues that individuals may decrease their political participation when they believe they belong to a group with a similar political agenda. In her attempt to validate claims that crowded ghetto living was instrumental in starting civil disorders, Susan Welch (1976) found that physical crowding of people showed effects on political aggression, especially under conditions where negative attitude toward government were preexisting.

Political Alienation

A consequence of poor political attitude, or low political efficacy, is that individuals become estranged from their government. Political alienation is a construct used by many sociologists and political scientists to describe this variant of political behavior. There is a long tradition in its study. Theorists in the Marxist tradition, for example, hold that political alienation is created when institutions and politicians extract power from citizens and subsequently reassert that power in the form of policies having a negative impact on those from whom power was derived in the first place (Seeman, 1959, p.783). Emile Durkheim’s (1912) *Elementary Forms of Religious Life* is another early essay on alienation (Gabel, 1984, p. 179). For the purposes of this study we define political alienation as a type of individual or group attitude that results from a perception of poor government performance combined with low levels of political efficacy.
From the term alienation, a broad meaning can be inferred. Alienation implies an ideal standard of attitude or level of efficacy, an individual ought to possess, and that this level does not exist in the alienated. Finifter (1970, p. 64) distinguishes four manifestations of political alienation. First, individuals may have a feeling of political powerlessness, in which the actions of the government are not subject to their influence. Second, there can be a perception of political meaninglessness. In this case, individuals detect no recognizable predictability in decisions and policies. Consequently government decisions are seen as irrational and unusable. Thirdly, citizens sense a departure from established political norms, for instance when politicians violate the law in the course of their duties. Fourth, there can be a feeling of "political isolation" where an individual believes existing political practices are unfair, illegitimate, or fraudulent. Seeman (1959, p. 789) provides a fifth variant - self estrangement. Here, an individual can become estranged from a normal human condition, for instance loss of pride in work.

Weatherford (1991, p. 150) suggests that the legitimacy-attitude nexus exists at two dimensions: individual and macro. At the macro level, legitimacy is said to exist if constitutional guarantees of representation and system stability exist. Popular support is not in the equation. At this level, legitimacy is not defined by popularity but by how well officials act in the polity's best interest. At the individual level, he posits personal feelings of alienation as a factor. Individuals manifest two types of alienation: input alienation, which is recognizable by symptoms of diminished political and citizen involvement, and output alienation, which results in suspicion and cynicism. Converse (1972) attributes group alienation to increased levels of education. Education increases people's political awareness. It is often accompanied by a shift toward more liberal
viewpoints and thus a demand for government to solve social problems. When this does not occur as expected, people become alienated.

Theorists generally propose one of three broad effects of political alienation: either reduction in political participation, participation in constructive radicalism, or anti-democratic radicalism. Certain voting behavior or massive protests may be employed to demonstrate disapproval with government policy or poor social conditions. Macke (1979, p. 77) contends that alienation at the individual level is not necessarily a determinant of matching group-level response. In his study of political alienation in the United States, Templeton (1966) found that political alienation was a predictable cause of withdrawal from political participation. Alienated citizens may become disinterested in political parties or refuse to vote. Macke (1979, p. 78) finds it a correlative of social discontent and perceived economic conditions. She also found that, during periods of high alienation, voters do not necessarily "redress their grievances by voting incumbents out of office", but rather are more likely to "use more indirect pressures" Macke (1979, p. 87).

Some theorists hold that alienation can result in anti-democratic modes of political behavior. Gusfeld (1962, p. 21) argues that groups that become disconnected from social structures and norms are capable of extremist political behavior. In an examination of American radical right ideology, Abcarian and Stanage (1967, p.788 and p.792) found alienation a source of political activism and charismatic identification. In a similar study, Powell (1986, p. 371) found the strength of extremist parties a barometer of political alienation. Similarly, Muller, Jukam, and Seligson (1982, p. 257) argue that an extreme form of alienation can be an incentive for various forms of politically aggressive
behavior. Sallach, Babchuk and Booth (1972, p. 891), in their study of alienation, found that the powerless are very likely to depart from normal participation, namely voting, and join in extremist behavior. There also is evidence that the alienated can be drawn to the polls by an extremist demagogue. Mason and Jaros (1969, pp. 495-496) present evidence demonstrating that, under certain circumstances, the alienated are more likely to support extreme, politically disruptive candidates.
CHAPTER 5

CORRUPTION AND LEGITIMACY

The previous chapter established a link between democracy, public opinion and legitimacy. In this next chapter, the linkage is examined in more detail. Because the corruption-legitimacy link in Bosnia forms the basis of this thesis, the specific impacts of corruption on political attitude and legitimacy are now explored. This chapter begins by describing how perceptions of corruption have evolved over time and provides a review of relevant literature and a discussion of how these effects are expressed through public attitude. It then follows with a detailed profile of Bosnia’s modern corruption record. The following simple definition of corruption by Robert Klitgaard (1998, p. xi) is provided as a point of departure: “Corruption exists when an individual illicitly puts personal interests above those of the people he or she is pledged to serve.”

Perceptions of Corruption

Corruption is a topic of contradictions. It is very difficult to define precisely, and can be viewed from both a moral and legal perspective. It is often agreed to be a conditional concept, yet it has rarely been viewed as ideal behavior. Historically, it has never been the policy of Western civilization to encourage corruption as an open and elemental part in its society or economy. In the history of Western thought, the wrongness of corruption is more widely agreed upon than any other tenet of good governance (Meyer, 1975, p.
62). As early as 1300 BC we find laws forbidding it. An edict of Pharaoh Horemheb proclaimed that any judge accepting a reward from a litigant while failing to hear the defendant was guilty of a crime against justice and subject to capital punishment (Martin, 1999). In the sixth century BC, Athenian law prohibited bribery. “If any Athenian accepts a bribe, or himself offers one to another or corrupts anyone with promises to the detriment of the people or of any of the citizens individually, by any means or device, himself and his children and his property will be confiscated” (Demosthenes XXI). Plato forbids corruption in The Laws. Under the Roman Twelve Tables, a judge convicted of bribery would suffer capital punishment (Peck, 2007). A later Roman law known as the Lex Julia de Repetundis required that a judge convicted of bribery suffer expulsion from the senatorial order or exile (Plescia, 2001).

Corruption is also viewed as destructive by the three great revealed religions. Islam teaches that bribes are not permissible. Mohammed “cursed the one who offers the bribe, the one who receives it, and the one who arranges it” (Islam Basics, 2008). The Old Testament frequently addresses the crime of bribery. “And you shall take no bribe, for a bribe blinds the clear-sighted and subverts the cause of those who are in the right” (Exodus 23:8) and “For I know how many are your transgressions and how great are your sins, you who afflict the righteous, who take a bribe, and turn aside the needy in the gate” (Amos 5:12). In the New Testament, Judas betrays Jesus for a bribe and the priests bribe the guards at Jesus’ tomb in order to persuade them to lie about the resurrection (Matthew 27). The Ottomans viewed bribery as a form of corrupt governance that necessitated the punishment of guilty official and unofficial power-holders (Ergene, 2001, p. 59). Under the Magna Carta of 1215 the English king’s officials were prohibited from taking
commodities without paying for them in an attempt to eradicate corruption. Corruption was an important concern of early American political philosophy. In his notes from the Constitutional Convention, James Madison recorded that 15 delegates employed the term corruption no less than 54 times in the context of presidential elections, impeachment, multiple office holding, and the dependency of one arm of government upon another (Savage, 1994, p. 177). In late Victorian England, the phenomenon of selling peerages was viewed as corrupt, especially in the Lloyd George era (Hannam, 1960, p. 277).

Today, international treaties forbidding bribery in business have been signed by all Western countries. Extensive anti-corruption legislation exists within most countries and the European Union has also enacted comprehensive anti-corruption policies.

Yet, despite this seemingly strong moral aversion to the idea of corruption, it has been and remains pervasive and deeply embedded in political systems in much of the world. Corruption by a few special interests is found in all societies no matter what their form of government (Huntington, 1991, p. 27). Corruption is a part of human society, found in countries large and small, rich and poor, developed or not (World Bank, 2007). In some developing countries illicit payments may equal a large fraction of GDP (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993, p. 599). Corrupt public officials constitute one of the most harmful problems facing governments in developing countries (Klitgaard, 1998, p. 6). Corruption has been widely associated with African ethnic violence in the past decade (Diamond, 2002). In the post-communist countries of Europe, corruption remains a serious problem even after EU membership (Reed, 2007). EU progress reports on would-be members, notably in the Western Balkans, continually identify corruption as rampant. The informal realities of norms fail to track formal written law. This contradiction raises interesting
issues which have attracted academics to develop theories of its causes and consequences.

Economists have consistently argued that corruption slows economic growth and retards foreign direct investment. It denies much-needed revenue to governments, increases transaction costs, reduces productivity, reduces incentives, and affects equitable distribution (Perkins, et al, 2001, p. 162). Political scientists, on the other hand, have not always held such a rigid viewpoint. Joseph Nye (1967, p.419), for example, suggested that corruption promotes economic development because it is an important source of capital when governments lack the capacity to tax a surplus, cuts red tape and overcomes the shortcomings of inadequate administrative resources, provided a means of overcoming racial discrimination by allowing minority groups “access to the political decisions necessary for him to provide his skills”, helps overcome divisions within ruling elite, and helps ease the transition from traditional to modern society. Neo-Marxists of the 1970s viewed corruption as a by-product of capitalist democracy and the international capitalist system in which lower-class groups are exploited (Montinola and Jackman, 2002, p. 149).

Samuel Huntington (1968, p. 113) wrote that “corruption provides immediate, specific, and concrete benefits to groups which might otherwise be thoroughly alienated from society. Corruption may thus be functional to the maintenance of a political system in the same way that reform is”. Other political scientists such as Waterbury (1973), Leys (1987), Werner (1989), and Becquart-Leclerq (1989) have, in the past, argued its positive aspects. Heidenheimer (2004) suggests that corruption is often framed in terms of the values of particular local and ethnic communities. As examples, he described how there
were cities and areas of the 20th century United States where mayors and congressmen continued to be reelected even though their local, regional and state peers had repeatedly labeled and condemned them as corrupt. Seligson (2002, p. 409) observed that during the cold war the United States and its allies tolerated corrupt regimes in the third world, so long as those regimes were joined in the struggle against communism. Today, however, most academics overwhelmingly do agree that, though it is often tolerated, corruption has a destructive effect on both society and government.

Corruption has been found to undermine accountability, openness, and equality. Corruption severs citizens from collective decision making, the very link that defines democracy (Warren, 2004, p. 328). Corruption reduces support for democracy in both mature and newly established democracies (Anderson and Tverdova, 2003, p. 91). It undermines governance, economic growth, and, ultimately, the stability of countries and regions (Spector, 2005, p. 7). Corruption introduces fundamental economic distortions that include impacting supply and demand, reducing foreign investment, reducing efficiencies, and excessive public infrastructure. Countries are poorer overall when corruption levels are high (Rose-Ackerman, 1999, p. 3). Social impacts of corruption include criminal activity, reduction of work ethic, environmental harm, and decreased political legitimacy. Corruption is inherently contradictory to and irreconcilable with democracy (Transparency International, 2006).

Anderson and Tverdova's (2003) analysis of 16 democracies connected levels of corruption with perceptions of government performance and trustworthiness. The authors consistently found that corruption leads people to believe that their political system performs worse than it could and was not trustworthy. Werner (1983, p. 149) theorizes
that the dysfunctionality due to corruption would be increased by spillover effects whereby corruption grows and affects increasing portions of society. Spillover effect is most evident when leaders become corrupt. Here, corruption affects the “trust, loyalty, and personal integrity of their followers”, in other words, corruption affects legitimacy. Patrick Dobel (1978) wrote that corruption was a source of decay of trust, loyalty and concern among citizens. Dobel theorized that corruption is an inverse function of moral loyalty, which is necessary for a stable political order. Loyalty is thus an important aspect of legitimacy. Dobel suggested that it is the extensive inequality resulting from wealth, power and status, originating in selfishness and pride that generates corruption. Members of the elite who exchange their own loyalty to society for self gain undermine the loyalty given to them by the general citizenry. Without civic loyalty individuals cannot employ self-discipline to suppress “self-interested desires”; thus legitimacy and democracy decline (Dobel, 1978, p. 960).

Seligson (2002) separates “legitimacy” into five dependent variables: the guarantee of a fair trial, respect for political institutions, pride for the political system, support for the political system, and trust in police. When controlling for demographic and socioeconomic factors of gender, age, education, income, and party affiliation, Seligson’s findings refute the functional view of corruption. According to Seligson, higher corruption is significantly associated with lower support for legitimacy in each country. Furthermore, legitimacy and interpersonal trust are also correlated in three of the four countries. Seligson concludes that individuals personally experiencing corruption may be less likely to be trusting, a contributor to legitimacy. Canache and Allison (2005) also examined the relationship between corruption and citizen support for incumbent
governments in Latin America. Their findings again demonstrate that when citizens perceive political corruption, there is a corresponding decline in opinion of both political officials and institutions. Mishler and Haerpfers (1998) found in their cross-national study of Central and East European states that higher levels of corruption correlated to lower levels of regime support. Mishler and Rose (2001) found that higher levels of corruption were related to lower levels of political trust in their study of East Central European States. Mungui-Pippidi (2003) observes that in Eastern and Central Europe, corruption linked to everyday life and the public services administered by the state are the most burdensome to citizens. In these post-communist countries the politicization of low-level state jobs "runs deep" since political parties support a "wide range of cronies" (Mungui-Pippidi 2003, p. 81). Moreover, corrupt favors may be used to acknowledge or establish superior social status amongst what Max Weber termed "status societies" (Mungui-Pippidi 2003, p. 82). In such instances, financial gain may not be the motivator; however, such situations undermine public trust and collective action and encourage cynicism (Mungui-Pippidi 2003, p. 82).

A fundamental premise of democracy is that, through human agency, citizens are able to influence the political decision making process (O'Donnell, 2004). In a democracy, corruption interferes with human agency because it causes the system to shift from being one of representation to one of dependence. Corruption breaks the link between the people's power to vote and collective decisions (Warren, 2004, p. 328). It reduces political competition and undermines popular political participation. Support for popular opposition parties can decline due to the fear of intimidating cronies. There is also a loss of confidence in civil society with less motivation to form independent political
organizations. Because it occurs in secret, corruption undermines fairness and trust. Trust facilitates human association and helps establish a union between political institutions and citizens. Trust encourages sociability and participation with others and enriches interpersonal ties (Sztompka, 1999, pp. 24-30). Corruption erodes the rule of law, and as the rule of law recedes, so do accountability, responsiveness, freedom and political equality (Merkel and Croissant, 2004, p. 201).

Perceptions of corruption can alienate voters and affect electoral outcomes. In his study of the effects of electoral fraud in Mexico, McCann and Dominguez (1998, p. 499) found that widespread suspicions of corruption affected electoral outcomes by making it less likely that potential opposition supporters would vote. This was because they thought voting under such circumstances was a waste of time. This weakening of the opposition impeded the democratic alternation of power. Unwittingly, opposition leaders may discourage their own voters if they overemphasize corruption in their reformist agendas.

In their study of democratic commitment in transition societies, Evans and Whitefield (1995) predicted that the consequences of individual experience with such factors as corruption would impact public attitude and behavior. They suggest that the performance of new political institutions produces perceptions of the workings of democracy. Results of their survey supported their hypothesis. They found a clear connection between political factors and commitment to democracy.

Johnson, in his study of political instability in Latin America, observes that public fiscal dishonesty encourages tax evasion and inefficient use of capital. According to Johnson, capital is typically hoarded and invested in prestige items or usury with proceeds hidden from taxation or concealed abroad. Also, local value systems sustain
these corrupt practices, inhibiting socioeconomic improvements. This, in turn, causes frustration, political alienation and instability (Johnson, 1964). In their study of post-Soviet Ukraine, Round, Williams and Rodgers (2008), demonstrate how corruption can creep into the workplace. They observe how bribes have to be paid by individuals to obtain employment. Salaries are paid informally to avoid taxation. This informal salary system facilitates the exploitation of workers and drives them to the surreptitious economic sector. Jong-Sung and Khagram (2005) find that corruption increases inequality, which in turn fosters a norm of corruption as acceptable behavior. The process manifests a vicious inequality-corruption-inequality circle.

A Decade of Corruption

There is a substantial body of evidence proving that endemic corruption has continued unabated in Bosnia since Dayton. Much of this corruption is a continuation of war profiteering and black-market activity that began during the war. In the first few years after the war, criminal elements on all sides gained control of what was left of the Bosnian economy. A wealthy and elite class of power brokers thus emerged, which now hinders reform efforts (Singer, 2000, p.32.). Richard Holbrooke, designer of Dayton, characterized these individuals as “crooks pretending to be nationalists” (Agence France Press, 2000). Mungiu-Pippidi (2003) concludes that corruption of a magnitude sufficient to plague an entire society may not be captured by the normal theoretical model. She writes that the concept of corruption itself “does not sufficiently describe the politicization of an entire state administration that functions only when palms are greased” (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2003, p. 80). Consequently, Bosnian institutions of
accountability simply do not seem to perform as they do in Western countries. She also concludes that “business-related corruption may involve the most money”, but it is “corruption linked to everyday life and the public services the state administration is supposed to deliver” that is the most burdensome to citizens (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2003, p. 81).

The international community’s attention was first drawn to corruption’s seriousness when a 1999 New York Times article alleged that one billion dollars in international construction aid had gone missing (New York Times, 1999). The missing funds were supposed to have funded the reconstruction of roads, buildings, and schools as well as provide municipal services throughout Bosnia. Since then, non government organizations and government agencies have regularly published reports documenting the extent of the problem, each warning that it threatens long-term political stability. The following paragraphs list relevant quotes from a small selection of these documents. They also include several high-profile corruption related prosecutions and news articles. All illustrate the seriousness and extensiveness of the corruption problem in Bosnia.

Bosnia’s 1998 through 2008 Corruption Profile

1998: A country assessment project sponsored by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) summarized the extent of corruption in BiH as follows: “For the economic and democratic development of Bosnia and Herzegovina to succeed, the large-scale fraud and corruption in the government must be reduced substantially. Bank fraud, customs fraud, tax fraud, procurement fraud, bribery, extortion
and an active organized crime network severely undermine economic and democratic reforms” (USAID, 1998).

1999: The Office of the High Representative Anti Crime and Corruption Unit Comprehensive Anti-Corruption Strategy for Bosnia states: “Three years after the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accord, the attention of the international community has focused with increasing intensity on the endemic fraud and corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (OHR, 1999). In his September 1999 address before the US House of Representatives International Relations Committee, David Dlouhy, Director of the US State Department’s Office of Bosnia, stated that “the problem of corruption is undeniably one of the prime obstacles to achieving the goals set forth at Dayton” (Dlouhy, 1999).

2000: Harold J. Johnson, of the Government Accounting Office (GAO), in testimony before the U.S. Congress, stated that “there is a near consensus opinion among officials that endemic crime and corruption in Bosnia is threatening the successful implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement” (Johnson, 2000). That same year, in an article published in the World Policy Journal, Peter Singer wrote “Many of the Bosnian Political Leaders derived their power from their positions at the helm of sophisticated war-profiteering operations that continue to dominate the black market — an underground economy that still makes up roughly 50 percent of the economy as a whole” (Springer, 2000, p. 32).

2001: A World Bank corruption study published this year concluded that “the corruption pattern in BiH is characterized by (a) high level of public concern with corruption, (b) low level of public trust in the governments, (c) state capture and conflict

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19 Harold Johnson was Associate Director, International Relations and Trade Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division.
of interest, (d) public administration inefficiencies reflected in widespread bribery in public offices, (e) distorted business environment, (f) a significant burden on poor households, exacerbating poverty and inequality" (World Bank, 2001). A report prepared by the European Stability Initiative determined that "The lack of governance capacity, the depth of the economic crisis, the level of corruption and the weakness of public institutions risk undermining the long-term stability of the country" (ESI, 2001, p. 22).

Also this year, a perceptions survey\(^{20}\) conducted by USAID on corruption among public officials in Bosnia and Herzegovina showed that 45 to 55 percent of respondents felt that corruption among doctors was widespread (USAID, 2002). Transparency International’s 2001 Global Corruption Report states that in the former Yugoslavia “corruption remains rampant and an integral part of doing business” (Transparency International, 2001, p. 124).


2003: Paddy Ashdown, Bosnia’s fourth High Representative, forced Mirko Sarovic, the president of Republika Srpska, to resign because of corruption allegations (Chandler, 2006, p. 86). Later that year, Mila Gadzic was also forced to resign as Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations in the state government for similar reasons (Chandler, 2006, p. 86). A World Bank survey this year, evaluating the perception of corruption among business managers, public officials, and the general public, observed that fifty percent of public officials admitted accepting bribes in exchange for altering the content of legislation; one-third noted that colleagues who refused bribes were marginalized and sometimes even forced to quit (United Nations, 2003).

2004: Transparency International’s second Corruption Perception Study for Bosnia found that political parties “calling for anti-corruption measures were doing so just for the sake of elections while their main goal was to assume control of corruption channels from previous governments” and that “90 percent of BiH citizens found themselves very much affected by corruption and perceive it in almost all spheres of their day-to-day life and work” (Transparency International, 2004). A separate opinion poll performed by Transparency International showed that 93.7 percent of the University of Banja Luka students believed that there was corruption at the faculties in Banja Luka, with nepotism at exams the most common form of corruption, followed by bribing professors at admission exams (One World Southeast Europe, 2004).

2005: A corruption study published by the Christian Michelsen Institute found that “corruption is rampant in all spheres of public and political life in Bosnia and Herzegovina” and that “corruption exists in all its facets – bribery, nepotism,

21 Banja Luka is the capitol of Republika Srpska.
embezzlement, diversion of public funds, tax fraud, illegal rent seeking, kick-back schemes etc.” (CMI, 2005). Corruption is cited as a problem for doing business by 45 percent of respondents, especially large companies, in the 2005 World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (World Bank, 2005). A survey sponsored by the International Finance Corporation found that 25 percent of firms in Bosnia identified corruption as a major constraint and 70 percent expected to give gifts in meetings with tax officials (International Finance Corporation, 2005). Also this year, Radojka Prastalo, a representative of the Bosnian Serb association of professors, stated publicly that "incompetent and immoral individuals have turned Bosnian universities into places where you can buy diplomas, titles and professions" (Mail and Guardian, 2005).

2006: The 2006 World Bank Worldwide Aggregate Governance Indicator for Control of Corruption shows no change for Bosnia between 1996 and 2006 (World Bank, 2007). A survey performed by the GfK Centre for Market Research found that 58 percent of Bosnians felt that bribes were an absolutely natural part of life, and that 93 percent believed they lived in a corrupt state (GfK Centre, 2006). A former member of the Bosnian presidency, Dragan Covic, was convicted this year and sentenced to five years in prison for his involvement in organized crime and tax evasion (Freedom House, 2007). The sixty-second Rose-Roth Seminar held in Tirana, Albania concluded that “the persistence of corruption at various levels of their societies, as well as the strength of organized crime networks throughout the region, was the most serious challenge in the Balkan region” (NATO, 2006). In Transparency International’s 2006 annual Corruption Perception Index, BiH shared 93rd to 98th place out of 163 countries with a score of 2.9 out of 10. This ranked the country among the most corrupt countries in the world
(Transparency International, 2006). Also this year, the 2006 South-East Europe Barometer found that over 85 percent of the population believed corruption was common in the medical profession, and among private officials, judges and public prosecutors, members of parliament, customs officials, and police (Europe Barometer, 2006). The World Bank reported that “persistent difficulties in political uncertainty and corruption are some of the key constraints to business development and investment” (World Bank, 2006).

2007: Transparency International’s 2007 National Integrity System Study of Bosnia-Herzegovina concluded that corruption thrives at higher political and administrative levels, and is pervasive at the local level (Transparency International, 2007). A 2007 Balkan-wide Gallup survey showed that in Bosnia and Herzegovina 86 percent think corruption is widespread in business and 81 percent think corruption is widespread in government (Gallup, 2007).

2008: In an interview, former High Representative Paddy Ashdown said: "We lovingly forget that item number one is always the rule of law. It is not elections, I'm afraid. If you have elections before you establish the rule of law then all you do is elect the criminals who ran the war. What you create is not a democracy but a criminally captured space. That is what we had in Bosnia. Corruption is now in the marrow and bone of Bosnian society" (Sydney Morning Herald, 2008). In what is touted to be the most comprehensive and thoroughgoing examination of the social and political health of BiH ever, the United Nations Development Programme concluded that Bosnians “are not interested in de-mining, prosecuting war-criminals, police reform and defense issues.
Instead they opt for improvements in their living standards, a unified country and anti-corruption measures” (United Nations, 2008).
CHAPTER 6

QUALITATIVE INTERVIEWS

Qualitative in-depth field interview techniques are applied in this study. Several factors led to this choice of research method. Initial research did not begin with an articulated hypothesis. The original intent of the researcher was to explore factors affecting personal political loyalties and then develop a hypothesis from the subsequent data. However, this approach changed during the interviews when a majority of participants commented that political loyalties were secondary to concerns about political ethics. Qualitative methods were deemed appropriate given the subjective nature of political attitude and the corruption-legitimacy link. Bosnian norms and culture are often far removed from Europe and the United States. It was felt that in-depth interviews might provide a hitherto unexploited opportunity for insight into Bosnian political psychology. Qualitative results might also complement preexisting quantitative data. It was hoped that this approach would deepen understandings of Bosnian political attitude and, at the same time, provide a testing ground for the qualitative perspective.\(^{22}\)

\(^{22}\) It is worth noting that the researcher lived and worked in Sarajevo from 1996 to 1998 and has stayed in close contact with several Bosnians since then. This long-term stay familiarized the researcher with Bosnian viewpoints and for the purposes of this paper "facilitated the differentiation of what is valid information from what is not" (Pelto and Pelto, 1978).
Interviews Versus Surveys

Schutt (2006, p. 268) identifies several advantages of in-person interviews. First, from a practical standpoint, personal perspectives generally foster a greater understanding than those acquired from structured survey interviews and questionnaires. Second, personalized interviews are known to result in higher question response rates. Third, the physical and social circumstances of an interview can be controlled by the researcher, and responses can be probed and clarified. Surveys also present a host of problematic phenomena such as response instability and the effects of question ordering (Zaller and Feldman, 1998, pp. 580).

Zaller and Feldman (1998, p. 579-584) also observe that in a typical survey, individuals do not express opinions with sufficient specificity, answers to survey questions have been found to be unstable and incoherent, and most individuals base their responses to survey questions on whatever thoughts are at hand at the moment of answering. Consequently, survey questions are answered randomly and often to only politely indulge interviewers (Converse, 1964). Anderson (1988, p. 230) suggests that the dominant survey-based methodology which employs statistical patterns in data to derive inferences about beliefs does not provide clear understanding of how people connect ideas presented as survey items. She argues that in-depth interviews provide a more fruitful way of understanding the process by which people think and reason about politics (ibid, p. 230).

Schuman and Scott (1987, p. 957) found that there is a significant difference between answers to closed questions and open questions constructed in a respondent’s own words and that closed questions sharply restrict frames of reference by focusing the
respondent's attention on limited alternatives. For example, a survey commissioned by Ó Tuathail and O'Loughlin (2005) asked respondents the following question: “Some people say that the current constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina does not work, to what degree do you agree with this opinion?” With 72.6 percent agreeing, the authors conclude that there is a consensus for change. This conclusion is not questioned by the researcher per se. However, when the researcher queried respondents with a university education about their level of knowledge regarding the state constitution, a majority admitted they knew little about it except that it was part of the Dayton Accords. Hence our belief that inferences gleaned from surveys can be validated with qualitative interviews.

Rationale for Participant Selection

For the purposes of this thesis, comprehensive in-depth interviews were also preferred because they bring to light subtle influences such as the “paradox of distance”. In the paradox of distance, the public holds negative views of government and public administrators in the abstract, but they have favorable views of governmental programs with which they interact and favorable views of the bureaucrats whom they encounter (Frederickson and Frederickson, 1995, p. 166). In addition, Converse (2004) observed that citizens of transitional democracies may answer polling questions with what he termed non-attitudes, namely ad hoc opinions that individuals have not considered or held before the question was asked. The researcher was also concerned when preliminary discussions with colleagues in Sarajevo suggested that, given both the ideological aspects of formal education and its dubious quality in many areas of Bosnia, it is unlikely that many respondents would fully understand politically oriented survey questions and could
The caution that elites are more politically competent than the general public is both empirically and theoretically sound. Robert Michels (1962, p. 105) observed that, by virtue of their formal training, educated leaders are superior to the led. The incompetence of the uneducated masses provides the educated leader both a practical and moral justification. According to the "elitist theory of democracy", elites are more strongly committed to democratic values such as political tolerance than ordinary citizens (Gibson and Duch, 1991, p. 191) and therefore should be more aware of democratic system deficiencies. Zaller’s reception axiom states that the greater a person’s level of cognitive engagement with an issue (the middle class can be classified as such), the more likely he or she is to be exposed to and comprehend political messages concerning that issue (Dobrzynska and Blais, 2007, p. 260). For these reasons it was decided that only university-educated informants would be chosen for the interviews.

Interview Setting

The interviews were held during a two-week visit to Sarajevo in February 2008. The population under study comprised thirty-five volunteer adult citizens of the Federation of BiH and Republika Srpska that either lived or commuted to work in the city of Sarajevo. Eleven of the participants were known personally to the researcher. Two participants subsequently declined to participate. Thus, the final sample consists of 31 subjects. Six Bosnian Serbs, four Bosnian Croats and twenty-three Bosnian Muslims were interviewed. Six females and twenty seven males were included. All subjects were employed. Three

See the Bertelsmann Transformation Index Country Report for confirmation of Bosnia’s education problems. URL: http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/177.0.html?&L=1
had previous experience working for a foreign company in Bosnia or abroad. Selection was largely opportunistic. Access was gained with the assistance of a gatekeeper who identified and approached individuals willing to participate in open and candid interviews about loyalty and problems in their respective entities.

Interviews were carried out in public settings such as restaurants and cafes. To ensure confidentiality, interviews were discrete and out of hearing range of non-participants. To establish rapport with each respondent, coffee was purchased and some brief anecdotal stories were shared. Relevant personal details were then confirmed. This introductory period lasted approximately fifteen minutes. Before each interview, the purpose of the project was explained. It was emphasized that painful or controversial subjects such as personal experiences during the war would not be raised, and if subjects became uncomfortable during the interview they would be allowed to stop. Each acknowledged their understanding and then gave verbal approval before participating. Each subject was asked separately if their respective interview could be recorded. It was explained that the recordings were for later analysis by me only and that the individuals would remain anonymous. At the completion of taped sessions, informants were given a second opportunity to destroy the recorded data. A commitment was also made to destroy the recordings after project completion. It also was made clear that the translator who was present would respect strict privacy concerns. This was a matter of special worry since the topic of corruption was to be addressed. Seven subjects gave permission to record.

Interviews were open in nature and subjects were allowed to digress from question topics. The interviews followed four broad themes: the respondent's perception of loyalty, attitude about government performance, views of the European Union, and
attitude toward corruption. The interview methodology followed the principals of qualitative interviewing as described by Kvale (1996). The trigger question was: "What does the word loyalty mean to you?" Consistent with the goal of the research, pre-prepared thematic questions addressing the topics of interest were posed periodically to sustain the interview. However, respondents were given considerable leeway and were encouraged to be verbose. An effort was made to lead informants to reveal their underlying rationales and personal attitudes. Identifying a logical link between knowledge of, or personal experience with, corruption and political alienation was of particular interest. Most were willing to talk at length and in great detail without prompting, although it was immediately found that the tape recorder had a negative effect on openness. In the cases where taping was allowed, informants provided additional information after taping was stopped. Actual discussion times lasted an average of forty-five minutes. After this duration, both subject and translator became fatigued. Another 15 minutes of general conversation typically followed the interviews.

Data Analysis Procedure

There is no intent to interpret the interview data to establish sample generalizability. This qualitative research is exploratory and descriptive only. The researcher's goal was to learn whether a source of political instability, other than ethno-nationalism, might exist, and to acquire a description of this source "in the terms and situational context" (Schutt, 2006, p.109) of Bosnians themselves. The "gatekeeper" was utilized to gain a sufficient degree of initial trust and rapport between participant and researcher, with the goal of

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24 Topics of open ended discussion are found in Appendix A.
eliciting deeply personal opinions that would not be provided through a quantitatively oriented survey questionnaire. This was necessary because one topic of conversation addressed corruption. The comments made in these interviews about corruption would not have been made without a great degree of trust.

Although the interviews were performed at one point in time, it should not be viewed as a single "snapshot". Attitudes are acknowledged by the participants as changing over time. To acquire a level of validity, the researcher followed the guidance of Wolcott (1990, pp. 127-135). Three of his nine points were important processes in this research. First, efforts were made to record conversations accurately and fully. This “minimizes the potential influence of some line of interpretation or analyses that might record selectively” (ibid.). Second, writing was started early in order to record first impressions. Otherwise, over time writings may become distorted due to discernment and reflection (ibid). Third, an effort has been made to “let readers see for themselves” by “capturing the expressed thoughts of others rather than relying too singularly on what was observed and interpreted” (ibid). All interviews, including taped sessions, were translated from Bosnian into English in real time. Translation was performed by the gatekeeper. The researcher synthesized the data and interpreted the subjects’ experiences by participating directly in the interviews, took extensive notes, transcribed the recorded interviews, and identified experiential themes in the respondent’s dialogues (Giorgi, 1985, p. 85). Dominant themes were subsequently identified and summarized. Transcriptions and supporting notes were made manually by the researcher in English during the interview. These documents serve as the data for this analysis.
The transcription of each interview session was read several times in order to identify pertinent phrases, words and themes. A coding scheme was developed to match (see Appendix B). The code library was entered into the Ethnograph Version 5.08e database. The handwritten transcripts were then typed into the software database. The electronic versions of the transcripts were then broken down into text segments which were assigned an appropriate code from the code library. The software sorting and grouping capabilities were then used to align transcript content to relevant topic categories and codes. For example, a table was generated that listed all transcripts with respective text coded as "corruption" and "alienated". These steps allowed the researcher to estimate the frequency and variety of themes.

Interview Findings and Discussion

Three interrelated themes emerged from the interviews. First, it is found that, among all ethnic groups in the sample, loyalty to one's respective entity is now outweighed by the desire for more effective governance at all levels. The idea of unconditional loyalty to the Republika Srpska or the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was challenged by the participants. Secondly, corruption and poor governance, although widely tolerated in the past, have now reached such levels and permeated such a broad range of society, that they have become a huge human burden and are perceived as the greatest impediment to social, economic and political progress. Third, the majority of respondents exhibit symptoms of political alienation. Again, the primary source of this alienation is

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25 Ethnograph v5.08, developed by Qualis Research.

26 The phrase ‘all levels’ here means State, Cantonal, and Municipal government.
corruption and poor governance. It is important to note however, that the participant’s university education may have sensitized them to corrupt behavior.

These three dominant themes guide the discussions that follow. Actual interview quotes are entered to supplement the discussion. For clarity purposes, these quotations are bracketed. At times there was difficulty interpreting expressions, so in some instances, only partial sentences are included. Also, at times discussions digressed from the topic. This text is not included. The presence of an ellipsis indicates that the quotation was extracted from a longer sentence for brevity. Grammar is not always proper, since there is an attempt to capture the wording as it was translated, where possible. These summarizations should not be interpreted to imply precise quantification or generalizability across the Bosnian population. They are intended only to provide a rough characterization of how frequently similar attitudes were expressed and how they were formed.

Theme One - Political Loyalty

Serbs participants still identify with the Republika Srpska. This is reflected in the following statements: [“Republika Srpska is a country for Serbs”]. [“There is patriotism to Republika Srpska, loyalty to other Serbs and my village, family and friends…but, no loyalty to country Bosnia”]. Muslims continue to favor dissolution of the entities and express solidarity with the country of Bosnia. [“Loyalty means loyalty to the country, not the entity”]. [“I support Bosnia the country and think the entities should be removed…not to hurt Serbs but to make one country”]. [“Political loyalty is to Bosnia the country”]. [“My loyalty is to Bosnia. I am not interested in the Federation”].
Loyalty was the first topic to be raised by a majority of participants and comments were given in a firm tone. This can be attributed to the fact that the subjects were nervous at first. They may have anticipated a challenging response from the researcher, but when they found none their mood quickly became more relaxed and open. No Muslim or Croat participants expressed loyalty or allegiance to the Federation of Bosnia and Hercegovina. Two Muslim males who had traveled and worked in Europe expressed their loyalty to the European Union. [“I want to be a European and want Bosnia to be part of Europe”]. [“I have loyalty to the EU - no loyalty to the ethnic groups, as these are a cover for party power. I am a citizen of Europe”].

As the participants relaxed, it was observed that their ethno-political attitude was no longer being constructed in terms of nationalism and hatred. It appeared that lines of allegiance are now blurred and loyalty is becoming less dependent on ethnicity. Although most respondents were quick to express their respective preferences regarding entity configuration, it was not communicated to the researcher in a context of hatred or defiance, nor did it overshadow the interview as it undoubtedly would have a decade ago. One Muslim respondent characterized this change when he stated: [“...even the most radical Serbs are not looking for ethnically pure areas”]. In some cases, discussions about ethnic loyalty became almost nostalgic in nature. [“Well I used to be loyal to Bosnia. You know, this war was for Bosnia, not for the Federation...we were fighting for a country not for this or that entity”], [“Just imagine what it was like to have your country dissolve – it was fine to be a Yugoslav”] [“So these leaders are joined like strong brothers because they are fighting together and this is a powerful force...”]. In the view of several other respondents, ethnic political issues are no longer considered to be the primary factor in
political decision making. Many respondents stated that they were tired of discussing ethnicity and that the use of this to portray Bosnian politics is inaccurate. ["I do not care about Republika Loyalty anymore as long as a system is put in place"] ["There are no entity loyalties. All citizens want good is governance..."] ["Loyalty to entity is not realistic question. The war and what is happening now is about power and money"]. ["Ethnic questions are not applicable"].

All participants seemed resigned to accept that the reality of the de facto partition in Bosnia. Serbs have been compelled to sell their homes and move to the RS. Muslims have been pressured to do the same and move to the Federation. Yet, in several interviews, Serb respondents indirectly acknowledged that ultimately the Republika Srpska can never be an independent State. ["I don't know if we can be independent our economy is too small"] ["Loyalty is a difficult thing to describe. I am loyal to Serbs, but sometimes loyalty doesn't mean agreeing. Well, I am loyal to the idea of independent RS but this independence should be a modern independence. Not through an isolated RS but through some agreement with Bosnia and European Union. This is the best way for us"]. Similarly, some Muslim respondents, despite their Entity preference, were willing to agree to independence for the RS. ["I have loyalty to Bosnia. Entities should be dissolved - but never will be. So it seems we must live with this separation for a long time. I have no problem now letting Serbs have their own independence, but they should not get all 50 percent of land - say 30 percent. I don't care about it much let them have an independent country or join with Serbia"] ["I have no problem with an independent RS but prefer one country.."].
There was also awareness that ethnic loyalties were somewhat transient and that latent ethnic suspicions are used to manipulate vulnerable country residents during pre-election periods. One can detect a distrust of political parties due to this fear mongering. ["The parties have made us afraid of restarting war. People are afraid of killing. There has been some talk on television of a new war. This is party talk to scare people"]'). ["I don't care about entities. But country people, many are now in Sarajevo, are frightened at election time, frightened of killing, they are easy to manipulate. But for me, I just want a country that will allow me to make myself better. Make some more money and buy a country house. So I don't care if there are entities or not. The question is not meaningful"]'). ["Ethnic loyalties come up at election time only"]'). ["Political parties that have enough money can go into the countryside and agitate the poor, suspicious country people and make them afraid of a return to violence - make them feel as if someone could get killed again"]'). ["This remains an issue today because politicians have kept it in our ears – the parties keep us thinking about"]'). ["Mostly uneducated from the country areas are manipulated by the ethnic rhetoric"]').

The Dayton Accords and the State constitution were rarely discussed. The few comments made were either negative or neutral. Many appeared to have no knowledge of Dayton’s content. ["Dayton is not giving to us results. Every party is looking to the constitution for their own purposes only with no results"]'). ["Yes, Dayton stopped the war but now everything is different. Dayton doesn't mean anything today"]'). ["Dayton cannot help us, only EU membership can help Bosnia"]'). ["The constitutions mean nothing and are just for foreigners to practice intervention"]'). ["Our constitution does not work"]'). ["No, I have no knowledge of my constitution"]'). It was also noted that some the subjects
had little understanding of the concept of democracy. ["I cannot describe details about
democracy"]). It is concluded that a lack of knowledge of their constitution and a lack of
understanding about democracy have not prevented Bosnians from recognizing or
responding to bad governance. Moreover, a poor opinion of the Dayton Accords does not
necessarily indicate ill feelings toward the United States. More than one subject
suggested that America should come back and sort out their bad government. ["I just
want a return of good government. I am willing to let America come back and run the
government...anything would be an improvement"]). ["Well, do you think they can help
us stop politicians from stealing? Can you stop this? Can America come back and help us
do this?]. ["Why doesn't America do something about it? Why don't they arrest the
criminals?]. Looking outside their own government and country is an indication of
discouragement and alienation.

Theme Two - Corruption and Poor Governance

Almost all participants demonstrated outrage toward corrupt government officials,
public employees and elected politicians. ["Elected officials are corrupt"]). ["Most seek
office and high positions so they can put their family and friends into other jobs"]).
["...discouraged with politicians getting rich and ignoring their job"]). ["Now they just try
to become rich... corrupt. It is the only way they can acquire so much money. How else
can they do it?"]). ["Politicians are corrupt - more than acceptable"]). ["They are
politicians because they can become rich and they do this in many ways"]). ["Yes there is
a serious problem of politicians putting their friends into position"]). ["Some politicians
are caught already and are still running for office"]). ["There is no respect for the law and
there is no concern by corrupt politicians about getting caught”). [“There was a big problem with Electroprivreda some years ago, not so long”]. [“I am very disappointed with elected officials because they seek personal profit in their jobs”]. [“Politicians are not there to help people they are there for themselves”]. [“They are making deals and doing wrong things to get rich”].

Some participants linked corrupt officials to war profiteers. [“Well, nobody had coffee during the war but some were selling it at a very high price. These people are still doing these things. They are very rich and very dangerous”]. Other participants were not timid about associating politicians with organized crime. [“It is the politicians who can be blamed for this because they think they are special and they became criminals. Even they are continuing business they started during the war. Many are nothing more than gangsters and mafia”]. [“This is what the parties really are, mafia”]. [“They are connected to the politicians. They are never arrested and politicians are helping them not us”]. [“I hate politicians. They are thieves and mafia”]. [“All of these politicians are small mafia”].

The judiciary, public employees, and police were also accused of corruption. [“Getting license…pay bribe to get drivers license”]. [“Also there is corruption in the education system. You can pay for a test pass, or to be accepted to university”]. [“So there are many crimes, especially at the border area…stolen cars”]. [“Also some police stops”]. [“You pay to escape false speeding ticket or traffic violation”]. [“I have witnessed a corrupt judge”]. [“Yes there is corruption everywhere. But, the most dangerous is politicians and judges. They are not afraid of being caught”]. Corruption in Bosnia’s medical system also angered many subjects. [“We can accept low employment

Electroprivreda is the Bosnian Public Electric Utility.
but not corruption, especially medical services. Several hundreds of KM\textsuperscript{28} is required to get average medical service”). [“Health care requires cash payment to doctors, but supposed to be free”). [“...angry about having to pay bribes for medical care”). [“...some doctors have false credentials. And of course you must pay for medical service which should be free - or a small cost”). [“...can't get medical attention without a bribe”). [“The doctor service you get depends on the amount of the bribe”). [“Medical coverage for my son required a bribe”). [“...and medical care, all must pay”).

Participants expressed frustration that citizens could do nothing to end the corruption. It was commented that it would be physically dangerous for anyone trying to do so. Several subjects, while discussing the corrupt, stated: [“and there is no way to catch them and if you try you will be killed - yes you will be. It is dangerous. We know this, they are corrupt and do things they shouldn't. Even so we don't complain. Who will listen to us?]. [“People do not trust the politicians...they are very powerful and very dangerous”). [“...we can’t do anything to stop it. Nobody alone can stop them, it is too dangerous”). [“These people are still doing these things. They are very rich and very dangerous”). [“Corruption... I can’t tell you more than you have heard already. You know this is a very serious problem, and dangerous for anyone trying to stop it”).

It was also observed that complaints about corruption were often linked to comments regarding economic inequality. In the view of a number of subjects, it is considered wrong for politicians to be self-serving, especially when average citizens are poor. This is an important observation since it provides a reason how anti-corruption attitudes are formed. [“No, corruption does not bother me usually, but it is becoming unfair because

\textsuperscript{28} The main currency in Bosnia is the Konvertible Mark (KM).
they are becoming very rich while most are poor in Srpska”]. [“Elected officials are corrupt. All of them were poor before the war. They had nothing before being elected into office or getting their positions. Now they have big houses and cars…”]. [“Also politicians are getting rich – poor before election”]. [“Who will listen to us? We stay quiet and poor”]. [“This is a problem today. Politicians don't have respect for people”]. [“It is this hypocrisy, when people are suffering…”]. [“Patriotism, for what...politicians control everything and become rich and we are poor”].

Theme Three - Political Trust and Efficacy

The majority of subjects expressed a low degree of confidence in government. As pointed out earlier, this is a product of low political efficacy. It is one consequence of estrangement from one's government and a correlative of political alienation. [“Bosnia was worth fighting for in 1993... but not now”]. [“There is no response from government. Most Bosnians will say the same. There is no input to government. I am very discouraged. OHR is not accountable to citizens. Is this democracy?”]. [“…absolutely no help or responsiveness from government. I am highly dissatisfied; anyone will tell you the same thing. I am generally not optimistic about Bosnia”. [“We have had several elections and an opportunity for effective government but failed. I will not vote anymore. I don't have any faith in Bosnian politicians”]. [“I am generally frustrated about the bad situation in BiH. There has been no improvement since Dayton times”]. [“There is something wrong with the whole system. It is not just the politicians in power now, but because things remain the same even when politicians change. Something needs to change throughout the country. Citizens are apathetic and government takes advantage”].
[“No I am not represented by government, no way to express my views or opinions even on a municipal level”]. [“I am very frustrated due to the lack of progress in BiH. It is like time has stopped. There is absolutely no help from the politicians”]. [“We need to correct this problem before we move forward. Bosnia needs a new government”]. [“I really don't know what to do about this situation here. But anything would be better than what we have”]. [“Politicians do nothing. Something needs to be done but I don’t know how to fix it. No, there is no service from government. It is a joke. Politicians are not there to help people they are there for themselves. Politicians are isolated from us”].

A decline in political participation, notably voting, is also symptomatic of political alienation. During the interviews, several participants stated that there is no point in voting because the government is ineffective and unresponsive. [“Many do not vote because they do not see BiH as a democracy”]. [“I probably will not vote. I don't see any need to participate. There are only bad choices”]. [“We have had several elections and an opportunity for effective government but failed. I will not vote anymore”]. [“Maybe I will not vote”]. [“A citizen votes but I have not voted because of the bad choices”]. [“I am not voting again”]. [“Politicians are isolated from us. I will not vote next time. I voted in 1996, but no more”]. [“Citizens are losing interest in voting and being citizens”]. [“Yes, I have voted in the past but I will not vote next time. Because nothing changes...”].

Anti-democratic radicalism is a third indicator of political alienation. It is the view of the majority of respondents that fighting corruption and establishing good governance are needed urgently. Bosnians state that they are not capable of fighting corruption within the present system. They fear corrupt officials linked with organized crime. Consequently, a
forceful and authoritarian non-democratic form of government was advocated since it would exercise the necessary force for a quick and decisive solution. ["We need an authoritarian system now"]. ["I would welcome an authoritarian leader. I just want a return of good government"]. ["I am willing to accept some forceful leadership - to make people obey the law and become good citizens"]. ["Citizens are apathetic and government takes advantage. But many are now angry to the point where they will act in rebellion - or support a strong leader"]. ["Yes I will support a stronger system that provides more discipline and law enforcement"]. ["I am tired of politics and wish someone would step in and do something about it. Anything is better than what we now have. We need a strong forceful leader, authoritarian, a government like Putin's. Russia's system is good"]. ["I wish someone would get power that was strong enough to do something about it. We need a strong leader. I don't care if it is a democracy or not. I don't care about politics or how it is done...just get things fixed. I don't care if it is a police state"]. ["We need a forceful ruler who will put this mafia away in jail"]. ["But this is what we need, a strong police. It has become so bad, forget human rights. Let police shoot them..."] ["I really don't know what to do about this situation here. But anything would be better than what we have. You know we want some forceful leaders. Replace the old style leaders with someone new who is not afraid and cannot be purchased. We need to be controlled. We cannot govern ourselves well at this time. We have so little experience"]. ["I would be willing to do anything to fix this, even return to Tito days"]

Many subjects also expressed that they would leave Bosnia if they were able. Support for EU membership was often due to the likelihood of acquiring a visa which would allow them to leave Bosnia and work in other European countries. ["I would leave BiH if
I could, especially to work in Europe. I cannot do this without a passport and Visa”].
[“…would leave if possible”]. [“When we get membership more educated people will
leave”]. [“Yes, I support EU membership - it will allow me to get work in Europe”]. [“I
hope we get EU membership soon so I can find a job”]. [“Yes, I favor EU membership
because I can work in Germany - I have family there”]. [“I would leave Bosnia if I
could”]. [“Most will leave for work - especially the young. They see the EU as an escape
from BiH”]. [“Few educated people left they continue to leave when they are able”].
[“Most Bosnians would leave now if they were able”]. [“Yes, I would leave if I could get
a visa”]. [“Yes, I would leave if I could get a visa to stay in Europe or Canada”]. [“I will
leave Bosnia if I can…”].

Discussion

Although these observations are limited and not generalizable to a larger population,
it is important to point out that for every one of the participants endemic corruption is the
source of at least one symptom typical of political alienation from Bosnian governance.
These symptoms include political apathy, a declining confidence in democracy, a desire
to leave the country, and a viewpoint that some non-democratic methods of governance
may be an acceptable solution to the country's severe corruption problem. Of particular
interest are the similarities between the comments regarding the nature of corruption; for
example bribery required to get service in the socialized health care system. The
interviews also garnered a number of interesting secondary observations not addressed
here in detail. For instance, the researcher was struck by the fact that there were no
derogatory comments made about any of the ethnic groups. Each respondent spoke
positively about their day-to-day encounters with individuals of different ethnicity. Comments were made about free and safe travel through once dangerous towns. More than once it was commented that the police behaved fairly to Muslims in the Republika Srpska. Serbs frequently spoke kindly of Muslims and Croats and visa versa. It was made clear to the researcher that questions about ethnic tension were no longer applicable to present day life in Bosnia. There was also a striking lack of awareness of the concept of civil society. For example, none of the respondents considered volunteering to participate in political activities. The concept of citizens having a responsibility to actively pursue holding elected officials accountable was foreign to the respondents. One of the most insightful comments from the interviews was from a Muslim male who stated: ["the biggest problem in Bosnia is that people and politicians are not changing"]. Many indicated that they have simply given up and were controlling their immediate environment by hiding from politics. ["...now most of us hide in our small villages ignoring politics, and not caring who is elected..."]. It was also observed that there were no themes unique to any given ethnic group. All subjects communicated essentially the same urgent message, namely that government performance, responsiveness of elected officials, and fighting corruption are their highest priorities.

It is important to bear in mind that many of the preceding interpretations are derived from brief snippets of conversation interpreted from Bosnian to English, and then written down in real time. Under such research conditions, there is a dual risk of misunderstanding. The interpreter may misrepresent what has been spoken, and the researcher may further incorrectly record what has been interpreted. Furthermore, in some instances, the term "corruption" may serve as a derogatory "catch-all" term that
doesn't mean corruption at all. Participants may be using this term too freely. More extensive research within a broader sample will be needed to detect this.
SUMMARY AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

What academics and politicians continue to say and write about Bosnia-Herzegovina is, more often than not, grounded in the assumption that it is an ethnicity paradigm that continues to cripple the country’s democratization. Because Bosnian politics have been framed in these terms for so long, this paradigm has become widely accepted as an ongoing political reality. This proposition is not unproblematic. The results of this research tentatively suggest that, within Bosnia’s middle class, ethnicity based nationalism is no longer the primary source of political attitude formation. This conclusion is based, in part, on the premise that the Bosnian middle class possess a coherent and accurate understanding of the current political and social undercurrents within their country. Their understanding includes an awareness of the behavior of political elites and its implications. These individuals however, are not immune to discouragement and disaffection. What these individuals have stated herein strongly suggests a political opinion shift away from support for the ethno-nationalist and entity based politics that was predominant several years ago. This attitudinal shift appears to have been caused primarily by the destructive effects of widespread corruption. Importantly, the direction of this change is not toward democracy as a solution. The interview data gathered during this research suggests a shift toward political alienation. Research participants have expressed marginal faith in elected officials who are now viewed as self-serving, with
little respect for democracy and the rule of law; especially the principle of legibus solutus. Their social and economic needs are not being responded to. Some expressed that they would be willing to leave the country if they were able. Others implied support for non-democratic means of governance.

This thesis concludes therefore, that although Bosnia has been inching ever closer to European Union membership from an institutional and administrative perspective, democratization is now at risk because it’s educated elite have become politically alienated. The absence of an active democratic consensus among a democracy’s middle class is cause for concern. In stable democracies, the middle class is one of several elite segments that possess resources, possess specialized talents, “hold authoritative positions in powerful public and private organizations and influential movements, and are therefore able to affect strategic decisions regularly” (Higley, Hoffman-Lange, Kadushin, and Moore, 1991, p. 36). They provide an important influence balancing and synthesizing function in their competition with other elite hubs (ibid.). The active participation of a country's middle class in the political arena helps prevent zero-sum, winner take all, majority decision making (Higley, Hoffman-Lange, Kadushin, & Moore, 1991, p. 37).

Despite the creation of democratic institutions and procedures, corrupt politicians are playing what Higley and Pakulski (2000) term “elite power games”. Bosnia's middle class recognizes that citizens are trapped in a circle of corruption, patronage and clientelism. The boundaries of horizontal and vertical accountability are damaged. Civil society cannot respond because it is essentially non-existent. Consequently Bosnia’s middle class may be changing their mind about democracy.
The EU’s SAA is providing short term regional security advantages, as intended. However, pervasive corruption is preventing democracy from securing a foothold in Bosnian society. Wolfgang Petritsch’s early vision of Bosnians accepting ownership has proved predictably ineffective. Bosnia’s democracy will be no more than a façade unless its leaders come to value democracy’s essential principles. It is not sufficient for the European Union to reprimand Bosnian politicians about corruption at arm’s length while leaving the Bosnians to solve this problem by themselves. Rational choice theory dictates that self-interested political actors are not altruistically motivated. Rationality should be constrained by the accession process. The present incentive for political elites to change their behavior is not strong enough, and since such change would involve a loss of personal and political benefits it will certainly not come voluntarily. Reforms requiring moral commitment should be receiving the highest priority and oversight from Brussels. Bosnia’s movement forward in the long accession process should be made conditional upon significant reductions in the levels of corruption. The European Union will have a difficult time continuing to justify to average Bosnian citizens the value of vague and distant membership in the face of severe social inequality. Moreover, Europe's Bosnia policy discourse needs to be realigned more with genuine public concerns, and away from the high-level political and economic issues. SAA policy initiatives need to address the implications of corruption.

Legitimacy grants patience, flexibility and tolerance toward new governments. It is the foundation of democratic consolidation. Bosnia’s lack of popular legitimacy is resulting in impatience. With EU membership realistically more than a decade away, Bosnia’s nascent democracy may ultimately be placed at risk. Bosnia could easily caught
in what Diamond terms an "authoritarian undertow" now affecting countries such as Nigeria, Russia, Thailand, Venezuela, and most recently Bangladesh and the Philippines (Diamond, 2008). Leaders such as Russia’s Vladimir Putin and Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez immediately come to mind. One danger of declining legitimacy is that a disillusioned public may embrace an alternative form of government, either permanently or temporarily. Democratic turn-arounds are not uncommon. As Diamond (ibid.) points out, this occurred spontaneously in Nigeria in 1983, in Thailand in 1991, and in Peru in 1992.

In addition, democratic institutions alone do not guarantee democracy and political legitimacy. More robust reform policies that develop democratic and ethical norms in governance need implementation, notably in the area of corruption. The Bosnian middle class need to be empowered because they are more apt to see through rationalizations of policies and ideologies. They are also more qualified to recognize what is good for the public interest. To affect the behavior of politicians, the European Commission must modify the accession process and demand that Bosnian leadership meet its expectations for the rule of law, justice, a better life, and a fairer society before allowing Bosnia to proceed further in the SAP.

It is not unreasonable to suggest that EU member countries and international donors will ultimately grow tired of funding Bosnia’s stagnant pre-accession process. The distant benefits of EU enlargement do not resonate well with today’s European voters. Domestic politics could potentially alter Bosnia’s accession. Italy is considering restricting Romanian migrants and the latest Eurobarometer poll on enlargement indicates support for only Croatia (The Economist, 2008). Also, Hazama (2007) has found that, on public
support for EU enlargement, expectations of democratization influence community attitudes, and were the most important determinant of support for enlargement in the case of Turkey.

Recommended objectives of further research include interviews among a wider and more representative sample of middle class citizens. Interview question topics could be added to examine the lack of confidence and influence middle class elites hold in Bosnian politics. The strong elite consensus described in this thesis should be manifesting itself as an active intervening influence in domestic and EU politics, but it is not.
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APPENDIX A

OPEN ENDED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Loyalty

- What does loyalty mean to you?
- Do you think there are different types of loyalty?
- How is your loyalty formed?
- Describe your loyalty to the Republika Srpska.
- Describe your loyalty to BiH.
- Describe your loyalty to the European Union.
- Describe your loyalty to the OHR.

Perceptions of the Bosnian State Constitution

- What does the Constitution mean to you?
- What does it mean to be a good citizen?
- What is your understanding of democracy?

Perceptions of Government

- When you think of government what comes to mind?
- What things should a government not do?
- What are the major problems in Bosnia
- Of these problems which do you think are the most important?
- In what ways does government affect your life?
- Do you feel that you have some say in how government acts?
- How much of the time do you think you can trust the government?
- Do you feel as if you are well represented in government?
- Who runs the government?
- In general what would you like to see different in Republika Srpska? Why?
- How do you feel about the European Union?
- Is EU membership a higher priority than RS autonomy?

Corruption

- Have you experienced corruption personally?
- Where does corruption occur?
- Does corruption affect your view of the government?
DATA CODE BOOK

ALIENATED: Subject demonstrated symptom of political alienation
ANTISYS: Subject advocated non-democratic government
CORRUPTION: Subject commented about corruption
DAYTON: Subject commented about Dayton Peace Accord
DISCOURAGE: Subject expressed discouragement with political or social situation
ENVIRON: Subject commented about environmental issues
EU: Subject commented about the European Union
FEAR: Subject expressed fear of revenge by corrupt individuals
FEDBIH: Subject commented about Federation Entity
FRUSTRATED: Subject expressed frustration with political or social situation
INEQUALITY: Subject commented about economic inequality
LEAVE: Subject commented about leaving Bosnia
LOYALTY: Subject commented about loyalty to Country or Entity
MEDICAL: Subject commented about corruption of medical field
OHR: Subject commented about OHR
PARTICIP: Subject commented about civic participation (see VOTE)
PARTY: Subject commented about political parties
PERFORM: Subject commented about government performance
POLICE: Subject commented about police corruption
POLITICIAN: Subject commented about politicians
RS: Subject commented about Republika Srpska
USA: Subject commented about USA
VOTE: Subject commented about voting (see PARTICIP)
VITA

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