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A Survey on Potential Privacy Leaks of GPS Information in Android Applications

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A SURVEY ON POTENTIAL PRIVACY LEAKS OF GPS INFORMATION IN ANDROID APPLICATIONS

By
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Bachelor of Technology, Information Technology
Jawaharlal Nehru Technological University, India
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May 2015
ABSTRACT

A Survey on Potential Privacy Leaks of GPS Information in Android Applications

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Android-based smart phones are extremely common today. However, it is believed that nearly half of the Android devices are vulnerable to an attack that alters the functionality of an app with malicious software. The malware can collect users sensitive data from the phone. In particular, there are hundreds of location-based applications available nowadays in the Google Play store or other app stores. The very famous services called “Location Based Services” are used by many apps on mobile phones to track the geographical coordinates of the device. Such location information can be leaked to an attacker via malware.

In this thesis, we discuss different ways in which privacy can be breached in android applications and their countermeasures. The vulnerabilities, the method of detecting the information leakage, and the measures to control the security breach are discussed. The experimental results show how effectively those different countermeasures can help us in preventing the security breaches and information leakage of GPS data in android applications.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

It is very common today that everyone is using smartphones. There are many location-based applications available now days in the play store or App store. The very famous services called “Location Based Services” are used by many applications to track the geographical coordinates of the device. The usage of this service is growing fast in the android applications.

1.1 Android History

In current mobile market, android is the most widely used operating system on smartphones. The android version history of the android operating system has begun with the release of the Android beta in November 2007 and then the first commercial version, Android 1.0, was released in September 2008[1]. Android is taken up by Google and currently is under ongoing development by Google and the Open Handset Alliance (OHA).

The most recent major Android release in operating system was Android 5.0 "Lollipop", which was released on November 3, 2014 by Google. Since April 2009, the nomenclature of Android versions have been developed under a confectionery-themed and released in an alphabetical order, beginning with
Android 1.5 "Cupcake"; the earlier versions 1.0 and 1.1 were not released under specific code names:

- Alpha (1.0)
- Beta (1.1)
- Cupcake (1.5)
- Donut (1.6)
- Eclair (2.0–2.1)
- Froyo (2.2–2.2.3)
- Gingerbread (2.3–2.3.7)
- Honeycomb (3.0–3.2.6)
- Ice Cream Sandwich (4.0–4.0.4)
- Jelly Bean (4.1–4.3.1)
- KitKat (4.4–4.4.4, 4.4W–4.4W.2)
- Lollipop (5.0–5.1)

Google announced that more than one billion activated Android devices were in use worldwide[2] on September 03, 2013 by the users. Recently in January 2015, Android devices accounted for approximately 62% of the US smartphone and tablet market.
1.2 Pre-Commercial Release Versions

The actual development of Android was started in 2003 by Android, Inc., and later was purchased by Google in 2005[3].

1.2.1 Alpha version

There were at least two internal releases of the software inside Google and the OHA before the beta version was released in November 2007 as per sources. For the milestones in internal releases, names of fictional robots were chosen, with various releases code-named Astro Boy, Bender and R2-D2 [4][5][6].

Dan Morrill created some of the first mascot logos, but the current green Android logo was designed by Irina Blok[7]. The project manager, Ryan Gibson, conceived the confectionary-themed naming scheme that has been used for the majority of the public releases, starting with Android 1.5 "Cupcake".

1.2.2 Beta version

The beta version was released on November 5, 2007[8][9], while the software development kit (SDK) was released on November 12, 2007[10]. The November 5 date is popularly celebrated as Android's "birthday"[11]. Public beta versions of the SDK were released in the following order[12]:

3
• November 12, 2007: m3-rc20a (milestone 3, release code 20a)\textsuperscript{[13]}
• November 16, 2007: m3-rc22a (milestone 3, release code 22a)\textsuperscript{[14]}
• December 14, 2007: m3-rc37a (milestone 3, release code 37a)\textsuperscript{[15]}
• February 13, 2008: m5-rc14 (milestone 5, release code 14)\textsuperscript{[16]}
• March 3, 2008: m5-rc15 (milestone 5, release code 15)\textsuperscript{[12]}
• August 18, 2008: 0.9\textsuperscript{[17],[18]}
• September 23, 2008: 1.0-r1\textsuperscript{[19],[20]}

1.3 Outline

In this survey, we discuss the different ways in which privacy can be breached in android applications. The few issues are:

1. Detection of GPS information leakage
2. Vulnerabilities
3. Privacy issues
4. Measures to control the leakage and security breach

The survey covers everything right from creation of an android application in an effective manner in order to prevent the security issues among the applications and then architecture of a typical android application then discusses the privacy issues in modern android applications followed by solutions to prevent the security breach.
This survey includes extensive experiments results that how effective different measures help us in preventing the detection of security breaches and leakage of GPS data in android applications with a high accuracy rate.

At last, we categorize the detection results in our survey and provide the best solution that provides the minimal leakage of GPS data in an android application.

1.4 Motivation

Almost nearly half of the Android devices are vulnerable to an attack that could replace app functionality with malicious software that can steal and gather sensitive personal data from a phone.

Major android developer giants like Google, Samsung and Amazon have released patches for their own devices, but 49.5 percent of Android users are still vulnerable according to Palo Alto Networks[21], which suffered the problem. Google said it has not detected attempts to exploit the flaw.

An infected application can be installed using the vulnerability, called "Android Installer Hijacking". This will have full access to a device, including personal sensitive data such as usernames and passwords, wrote Zhi Xu, a senior staff engineer with Palo Alto.
The vulnerability only affects apps that are installed from a third-party play store or websites. It is highly recommended to be more cautious while downloading such apps from third party websites.

The apps that are downloaded from third party websites place their APK installation files in a device's unprotected or unmonitored local storage, such as an SD card.

From these places, a system application called PackageInstaller finishes the installation. The flaw allows an APK file to be modified or replaced which may be malicious, during installation without anyone knowing.

1.5 Attacking Procedure

Install and attack flow would be like this: User downloads an app what appears to be a legitimate application from the third party website or app store. The application after downloading and before installation asks for certain permissions on the device.

During that process, it was possible to swap or alter the APK file in the background because the PackageInstaller fails to verify it. After the user clicks the install button, the PackageInstaller can actually install a different malicious app with an entirely different set of permissions.
The main problem with the Android devices does not need to be rooted for the attack to work or to inject a malware, although rooting also make devices more vulnerable.

When the major flaw was detected, in January 2014, approximately 90 percent of all Android devices were affected. That has since dropped to 49.5 percent, but still many devices have not been patched.

The recent Palo Alto's exploit was a huge success against Android versions 2.3, 4.0.3 to 4.0.4, 4.1.x, and 4.2.x. The 4.4 version of Android devices fixes the issue and some Android 4.3 devices may still be affected and since some manufacturers have not patched yet.

In order to overcome these Malwares, Google has published a patch, and Amazon recommends its users to download the latest version of the Amazon AppStore, so that they update their Fire devices.
CHAPTER 2

ANDROID ARCHITECTURE

2.1 Android Security Architecture

Android is the most modern mobile platform designed and is open in the market. All the android applications use the most advanced hardware and software to offer variety of innovative features that value to customers. In order to protect that value, the coding platform must provide an application environment that provides the security for users, data and applications on device.

In order to secure the open platform, it requires a strong security and rigorous security programs. This can be achieved by android by adopting the multi-layered security and also provides protection for all the users using the platform. Android security system is designed with device users in mind.

This design includes the expectation that malicious app attackers would try to perform attacks such as social engineering attacks\[1\] to make users to install malware. The android security system is designed to reduce the both chances of these attacks and to limit the impact of attack on any app.
2.2 System and Kernel Security

At the operating system level, android comprises Linux kernel and secure inter-process communication (IPC). Android provides security to these two major components to achieve secure and safe communication between apps running in different processes. These security features at the Operating System level make sure that even the code is severely restricted by the Application Sandbox.

The fig.1 below shows the Android Software Stack with bottom up approach depicting various levels of Android development.

![Fig 1. Android Software Stack](image-url)
2.3 Application Security in Android

Android core operating system is completely based on the Linux kernel. The most android applications are programmed in Java programming language and run in the Dalvik Virtual Machine (DVM). All the android applications are installed from a single file with the .apk extension.

The android application building blocks are:

- **AndroidManifest.xml**: The AndroidManifest.xml file is the metadata file that is considered as control file that tells the system, what to do with all top-level components in an application. This file specifies what all permissions are granted to the app.

- **Activities**: An Activity is usually includes displaying a UI to the user and typically application’s Activities is the entry point to an application.

- **Services**: Services are the body or execution part of code that runs in the background. The other components “bind” to a Service and trigger methods on it via remote procedure calls.

- **Broadcast Receiver**: A BroadcastReceiver is an object that is instantiated when intent is issued by the operating system. An app may register a receiver for the low battery message and change its behavior based on that specific-information.
Security features are to be considered while developing Android applications to lessen the security breach. This can be achieved by encrypting the file system so that it keeps device safe during any theft or loss. This can be achieved by a concept called “SandBox”.

2.4 Sandbox

This Sandbox technique[26] helps users to isolate the app data and codes from the other applications on the device. So that developers can define their own permissions that are specific to their own applications.

Due to this isolation of application data and codes with the other applications, the scope of influencing malicious applications is very less. This Sandbox isolates apps data and code accessing from other apps on the device so that it can prevent any vulnerabilities of malicious attempts by other apps.

But in real scenario, there is a necessity of accessing Phone book or Photo Gallery from the messenger applications on the device by which there is a large scope for malicious apps to attack the applications data or code.
The above figure 2 depicts the overall architecture of the Android Sandbox Manager. To overcome this, an API called ContentProvider is responsible for authenticating and managing accesses to the databases of other apps. Permissions and ContentProvider are described in further detail in the following section.

For any unusual or malicious activity detection; knowledge of application’s characteristics is essential. There are two most common and best practices that exists in mobile software for analyzing the application’s activity. They are “Static and Dynamic analysis of software”.

These two techniques have many advantages and disadvantages in terms of their evaluation. Static analysis involves various binary forensic techniques, including decompilation, decryption, pattern-matching and static system call analysis.
**Functionality**

The main functionality of these techniques is to prevent running the potentially malicious software on the devices. The Static Analysis usually filters the binaries with malicious patterns, known as Signatures.

![Static and Dynamic Analysis](image)

**Fig.3 AASandbox Architecture[26]**

The above fig.3 shows the architecture of Sandbox with both the Static and Dynamic Analysis. Due to the direct comparison with the predefined signatures, the static analysis is very fast and simple.

Almost all the anti-virus software are based on this approach. Difficulty with the Static Analysis is that each and every signature/malicious pattern must be known in advance during the analysis. By which it is impossible to detect new malware or malicious code entry from any external malicious application.
2.5 Droidbox


The tool is based on TaintDroid[74] for detecting information leaks but has been extended, by modifying the Android framework, to monitor API calls of interest invoked by an application.

Applications are executed within the Android SDK emulator and logs are issued for each monitored behavior and collected in the host operating system. A text-based report is generated after analysis has ended and provides a summary of the execution.

On mobile phones, malware has been discovered that listens for incoming SMS and forwards this information to the attacker. In, TaintDroid was used to track sensitive data originating from the phone’s database.

DroidBox can extend this approach by adding and modifying output channels throughout the Android framework to detect leaks via outgoing SMS and to disclose full details of the network communication, not only in network leak scenarios.
The file AndroidManifest.xml, included in the Android package, contains permissions that are needed for the application to interact with the operating system, for example, connecting to the Internet, sending SMS, making calls and receiving incoming SMS.

Applications that need to interact with any resources must declare the appropriate permission in the manifest file. It has been demonstrated that malicious Android applications can circumvent the permission policies and [23], thus DroidBox compares each monitored operation that requires any permission with the package’s manifest file to check if any permission policy has been bypassed.

Some malicious Android applications can evade anti-virus software by performing obfuscation and changing themselves during run-time [27]. Obfuscation may include cryptographic functions applied to the data. DroidBox is designed to detect applications as they invoke cryptographic keys or perform encryption or decryption on the data.

Malicious Android applications can perform phone calls or send SMS to premium rate numbers that are declared by the attacker.
The above figure shows the behavior graph produced by Droidbox describes the temporal order of the operations. DroidBox can disclose these operations by listening to API calls when SMS and calling methods are invoked by a sample.

Figure 4 shows the output of the sample doodle.apk that was executed for 60 seconds. On the x-axis the time of the monitored operation is shown, while the y-axis describes what kind of operation type was monitored. This graph is generated by picking operations and timestamps for each operation from the sandbox log and plotting them.
Vulnerabilities of Data Leakage in Android Applications

Apps on android devices are highly vulnerable for data leakages because the android platform is open for developers and the android security allows users to download apps from third party websites or app stores. Therefore data leakage from android apps is very common and has high scope for stealing the personal sensitive data on phone.

Data leakage in android applications can be done in many ways. Few ways are listed below in detail[55].

3.1 Data leak through the Android App Structure

Personal sensitive data leakage in android application is done mainly through the app structure. An android app is undergoes many steps during the development [28]. Different ways in which data leakage occurs is discussed in following sections:

3.1.1 ContentProvider and Permission

There are many applications[29] installed on a device and each application knows the structure and file system of other applications and also knows how to interact
and access to the databases of other applications.

In order to grant access/permissions to the other applications databases, android interleaves ContentProviders[30], which is based on client-server model. So not all the applications cannot access the databases of other applications until permission is acquired from ContentProviders.

There are some applications that run on server. These applications also require databases to access the content. So with the help of ContentProviders, apps that run on server share their content to other applications on the device.

The server applications provide a unique URI to identify their database and specify these URI in AndroidManifest.xml or ContentProvider file. The applications that are so called client applications make use of these URI by making requests to send queries to a particular database of a server app.

So, the client apps in order to use the server-side databases it should know the names, table structures and URI of the database. Unlike ContentProviders at server-side there are ContentResolvers at client-side.
Fig 5: *Database Sharing between apps*[29]

The figure 5 explains how apps on android devices share resources like database. These ContentResolvers are used by client apps to communicate with the server-side ContentProvider. Queries and URIs are sent to server-side ContentProvider using these ContentResolvers.

These ContentProviders and ContentResolvers serve as intermediate for sharing databases between server and client apps. When these ContentResolver sends queries to the ContentProvider at server-side, the ContentProvider receives results from the database via DB Helper and send these results back to the ContentResolvers.
In order to access major resources or system functions, all the android applications see permission through the AndroidManifest.xml file[31] which is a unique file that holds all the permissions of Android System.

![Fig 6: Relationship between apps and permissions][29]

The figure 6 explains the relationship between apps on android devices and how the permissions are granted. Now the applications that run on client side send query requests to ContentProvider through the ContentResolver to access the database on server.

This Android System checks for the permissions required to access or to use the database by client apps. The service from a particular database may be denied or granted depending upon the permission levels for a particular client request.
3.1.2 Leakage of Data through Reverse Engineering

In order to access the databases of other applications, the assigned URIs to every database are used, queries that require data tables and information of fields attributes and finally permissions required by server apps are needed.

The address books database, it is provided as default to share within the apps. In this case not only URIs but also the access procedures or functions are also offered via System APIs. Data leakage in android apps through Reverse Engineering can be done in 3 different ways:

a) Using Dedexer Tool

The Java source files are converted into dex files while building an app in android. Dedexer is a tool that compiles dex files into Java source files. This is nothing but reverse compiling the files.

While developing an Android app, the Java source code is compiled (.java) to (.class) files, which are called as byte code based on JVM (Java Virtual Machine). These (.class) files are then converted into a dex type file using Dedexer tool.

The simulator that runs apps on Android devices is called Dalvik[32], which reads the byte codes of this dex file. All together the dex files, xml files and resources grouped together and compressed into Java archive (jar file) format and finally to generate an apk file (.apk).
There is one more important file named R.Java, which is a system generated resources file during the creation of app.

![Diagram](image)

**Fig 7: Conversion of Android app files[29]**

The figure 7 explains the conversion of android apps files in an android device. This Dedexer reconfigures not only user written Java source programs but also R.Java. Still Dedexer doesn’t completely restore all the files through reverse engineering process.

**b) Data Leakage through Apk Manager**

Dedexer may be accounted as one of the best tool for attackers to manipulate the Java source file through reverse engineering the dex files into Java Source files.
As mentioned earlier, the Dedexer does not support a complete restoration. And also, it restores Java programs only without supporting xml files and resources. That is the reason it is difficult to complete operable apps by analyzing the existing apps and turning them into malicious codes.

But this ApkManager reverses and compiles original Java programs into Smali-based[33] ones, which not only read just source programs but also AndroidManifest.xml.

![Fig 8: Reverse Engineering through Apk Manager[29]](image)

The above figure 8 explains how the data leakage is done through the Reverse Engineering using the Apk Manager.

c) Proguard

Android system provides a feature called Proguard. This Proguard is used to prevent the reverse-engineered result[34] from being used for malicious codes or malware susceptible codes that influence the app.
On including the proguard.cfg file in the Android project can use this feature. This Proguard deletes the less important codes to optimize and reduce program volume, changes class names, fields and classes into meaningless ones for vagueness.

Even though it takes some time to determine the meaning and context of changed names when vague sources are restored by reverse engineering, the analysis is definitely not impossible, as logics are not changed, which are the limitation of vagueness.

### 3.2 Vulnerabilities of Data Leakage in Android GPS applications

Many apps on the device use the GPS information for navigation. But before requesting and getting the information it needs to get the access permissions from the user. After too many studies, we discovered that vulnerable apps generally acquire the user’s private data at first and then sent them through network or SMS.

Malicious applications are classified into two types[35]:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Request only Location Information</th>
<th>Request extra Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Send information via Network</td>
<td>Low risk</td>
<td>High risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Send information via SMS</td>
<td>High risk</td>
<td>Low risk</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 1: Malicious applications classification[35]**
The above table 1 defines the classification of malicious applications. We define the data leaks that contain only GPS information as low-level risk behavior and the data leaks that contain more private information as high-level risk behavior.

Based on the triggering condition of the leaking behavior, we categorize the privacy leaking behavior into three types.

1. The behavior triggered by user interaction with the application.

2. The behavior triggered automatically by background services.

3. The behavior triggered automatically by background services and user Interaction.

The risk of leak triggered by background services on a device is only considered to be superior to other behaviors[35]. There are few papers that are manually analyzed on android malicious applications and noticed that most malicious applications are risky in behavior that mainly focus on collecting and sending the users private information.

For example, FakeFlash is an Android Malware in the disguise of an Abode flash player application that collects user’s phone number and phone’s IMEI information and then send this data by posting information to remote server[58]. So a complete path from getting privacy data to sending privacy data should be included in a complete attack model.
In the below figure, we define the following specific behaviors as the potential privacy leaks of Android application.

1. Collect user’s private information using android framework API.
2. Transform private information into another form.
3. Send the transformed information to remote phone or remote server.

**Fig 9: Potential Privacy Leaks of Android Application[35]**

The above figure 9 explains the potential privacy leaks of android applications. In the attack model, we define *Entry block* as the triggering action, which then leads to privacy data leak, *Sources block* as the action, which collects sensitive information, sinks block as *Privacy sending action.*
A path that is connecting a source and a sink is considered as a *Confirmed path*. There is a leakage detection called “Brox” which detects location leakage information.

This tool is based on Dalvik-opcode[36] specification and uses data flow analysis framework equipped with context-sensitive, flow-sensitive and inter-procedure techniques to detect potential location information leakage path in Android malicious apps.

This Brox is also a static privacy leak detection framework for Android apps. Got inspired by WALA[56], that provides static analysis capabilities for Java byte-code, JavaScript and related other languages; this Brox inherits its effectiveness and correctness by using inter-procedure analysis framework.
CHAPTER 4

Detecting Leakage Analysis in GPS Applications

Android is the most widely used Mobile operating system on many smartphones. There are many information flow tracking and information leakage detection techniques that are developed on Android operating system.

The most commonly used technique is Taint analysis. This Taint Analysis is a data flow analysis technique, which tracks the flow of private or sensitive GPS information and its leakage.

There are varieties of apps available for different platforms and device configurations. Apps are made for PC users and also available for Mobile users. These android apps manipulate personal data such as contact and SMS, GPS information and leakage of such sensitive information may cause great loss to the android users.

Therefore, detecting sensitive GPS information leakage on Android is in urgent need. However, till now, there is still no complete perfect solution available to get rid of this scenario to Android markets.

A famous approach called State-of-the-art is used for detecting Android GPS information leakage by applying dynamic analysis on user site, thus they introduce large runtime overhead to the Android GPS apps.
The main major difference between both the cases is, static analysis techniques look at the complete program source code and all possible paths of execution before its run, whereas dynamic analysis looks at the instructions executed in the program-run in the real time.

**Approaches**

There are many different approaches proposed to detect and determine the leakage of GPS data in an android device. This detection analysis can be done in two different ways. By static analysis and dynamic analysis. Few of the detections techniques are proposed below:

**4.1 LeakMiner - A Static Taint Analysis**

There are different approaches available to detect the leakage in android applications[37]. LeakMiner is one among them, which detects leakage of sensitive GPS information on Android with a static taint analysis. LeakMiner analyzes Android apps on market site unlike Dynamic analysis.

Therefore it does not introduce any runtime overhead to normal execution of target applications on a device. Besides, this LeakMiner technique can detect sensitive information leakage before apps are available to users, so vulnerable apps can be identified and removed from play store before users download them.
The above figure 10 explains the overall architecture[38] of LeakMiner technique, which is a static analysis for detecting the data leakage in android applications. Staring with android app and it traverses in a reverse manner and produces the Leak report.

**Functionality**

Unlike others programs, Android apps[46] doesn’t contain the main function, which is usually named the root or main function in C/C++ or Java. Instead of consisting single entry point, Android apps may have multiple entry points. These entry points are pre-defined by service interfaces and Android activity.

Our static taint analysis technique first build call graphs[59] which starts at these one of the entry points. Then a new root function node is used to link these call
graphs by constructing function call edges from the root node to each of the entry nodes. The entry points that were traced by static taint analysis are listed below:

### 4.1.1 Fundamental activity lifecycle callbacks

Android provides six basic lifecycle callbacks that are `onCreate`, `onStart`, `onResume`, `onPause`, `onStop`, and `onDestroy`. User can override any of this callback through any Android activity to do an appropriate work. These are the hooks that are invoked by Android activity manager when the state of activity changes. These callback functions are fundamental activity entry points for every android app.

### 4.1.2 Activity supplementary callbacks

Fundamental activity[46] lifecycle callbacks are triggered each time when the state of activity is changed. Besides, Android provides supplementary hooks, which assist the function of Android system for efficient resource management.

For example, when the system destroys or kills an activity in order to restore memory, a function `onSaveInstanceState` is invoked to save the current state of activity. A corresponding `onRestoreInstanceState` hook is invoked to restore the state when user navigates to the activity.
4.1.3 Basic service lifecycle callbacks

Like activities, Android services also have life callbacks, which are automatically triggered by android service manager such as `onStartCommand`, `onBind`, `onCreate`, and `onDestroy[46]`. These callback services are the basic entry points for analyzing the service application behaviors.

4.1.4 Service supplementary callbacks

This Service supplementary callbacks are usually triggered when the configuration is altered (eg. `onConfigurationChanged`), or when the resources are exploited (eg. `onLowMemory`).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leakage Source</th>
<th>LeakMiner Report</th>
<th>True Leak age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Device ID</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phone Information</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacts</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Detected</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Information leakage reported by leakminer about half of the reported information leakage is true information leakage.[46]
These functions are infrequently triggered, and our analysis includes such interfaces for the sake of code coverage. The above table 2 explains the information leakage reported by LeakMiner in which about half of the reported information leakage is true information leakage.

### 4.2 TaintDroid – a Dynamic Taint approach

TaintDroid is a dynamic taint tracking[39] system for Android devices available system-wide. Simultaneously, this TaintDroid[65] approach can track multiple sources and sinks. When the sensitive information leaks through the system at the run time, the Android phone users are get notified.

![TaintDroid diagram](image)

**Fig 11**: TaintDroid within the Android Application[60]
The above figure 11 explains the TainDroid structure[40] in an android application. The main functionality of TaintDroid is achieved by altering the Dalvik virtual machine of Android. It introduces variable level taint tracking in android system using the shadow variables.

The size of each variable is doubled from 32 bits to 64 bits with modifying the stack format. These additional 32 bits are used to store the taint tag ID. These taint tag ID’s are the unique identifiers to identify the sensitive information such as Geographical Location coordinates and IMEI.

This TaintDroid offers various levels of tracking in android system. It does variable level tracking for the native code in the system. For the secondary storage files it does File level tracking.

It does the message level tracking for the Inter Process Communications and finally it does the method level tracking for the native code. The taint tags are added to the sources in the taint system and when it reaches the sinks in taint system, these tags are processed to recognize and find out which information is leaked through at the corresponding sink.

Each application in android environment has their own sandbox with its own User ID, Dalvik Virtual Machine instance and respective set of permissions assigned to it.
In a trusted application the Taint source is marked, which is mapped in virtual taint map by the new or modified Dalvik virtual machine. The Binder IPC is responsible for the inter-app communication and that carries the tainted data to binder hook of untrusted app.

This tainted data is then mapped and propagated in corresponding virtual taint map. This virtual map is of untrusted application according to data flow rules. When the untrusted application triggers a taint sink specified library, the particular tag from the tainted data is retrieved and the event is reported directly to user.

This TaintDroid technique tracks information flows at real-time for the privacy monitoring. TaintDroid has 14% performance overhead on a CPU bound microbenchmark.

The TaintDroid implementation requires constructing a ROM i.e., patched version of Android operating system in a customized android release. CyanogenMod ROM is an OS similar to Android available in market. This CyanogenMod ROM’s has been released in some of the Samsung Galaxy devices.

This TaintDroid has been integrated with this CyanogenMod ROM. There is a successful author who presented collection of attacks on TaintDroid exploring its effectiveness and limitations. The author applied generic classes of anti-taint methods to overcome TaintDroid.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Static/Dynamic Analysis</th>
<th>Sensitive information Sources defined</th>
<th>Implicit flows</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taint Droid</td>
<td>Dynamic Analysis</td>
<td>5 sources 32 possible</td>
<td>Method level tracking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AppFence[41]</td>
<td>Dynamic Analysis</td>
<td>12 sources predefined</td>
<td>Not analyzed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kynoid[42]</td>
<td>Dynamic Analysis</td>
<td>$2^{32}$ possible</td>
<td>Not analyzed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LeakMiner</td>
<td>Static Analysis</td>
<td>6 sources predefined</td>
<td>Not analyzed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TrustDroid[43]</td>
<td>Static Analysis</td>
<td>Not mentioned</td>
<td>Not analyzed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FlowDroid[44]</td>
<td>Static Analysis</td>
<td>Exhaustive list</td>
<td>Analyzed[45]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3:** comparison of various Taint Analysis Techniques for android[37]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Inter app Taint Propagation (IPC)</th>
<th>Deployment</th>
<th>Open Source availability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taint Droid</td>
<td>Message level taint tracking</td>
<td>Customized Android version</td>
<td>Available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AppFence</td>
<td>Not mentioned</td>
<td>Customized Android version</td>
<td>Available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kynoid</td>
<td>Inter Process Tracking</td>
<td>Customized Android version</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LeakMiner</td>
<td>Not analyzed</td>
<td>Deployed on computer</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TrustDroid</td>
<td>Not analyzed</td>
<td>Can be deployed on computer as well as phone</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FlowDroid</td>
<td>Not analyzed</td>
<td>Deployed on computer</td>
<td>Available</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4:** comparison of various Taint Analysis Techniques for android with other techniques[37]
The above tables 3 and 4 explain comparison of various Taint Analysis techniques for android with other techniques. Among all the approaches from table 3 only the TaintDroid approach follows the Method level tracking and all other approaches are not analyzed. From table 4 only the TaintDroid approach and AppFence approach has the open source availability.

From table 4, all the approaches including the TaintDroid can be deployed in a customized android version whereas the FlowDroid approach is deployed on computer instead of mobile phone.

4.3 Detection Leakage through Hybrid Analysis

Hybrid analysis is the combination of both static and dynamic analysis to enhance the privacy leak detection. The overview of hybrid privacy detection tool known as SmartDroid is shown in the below figure. The leak detection of SmartDroid varies at different levels of the application.

At the higher levels it implements a static path selector that uses static analysis to extract the expected activity of switching paths by analyzing function CFGs and activity.
The above figure 12 explains the SmartDroid Architecture for an android application. Then the dynamic UI[67] is invoked and then traversed each UI element. This is done to reveal privacy sensitive trigger conditions according to the static analysis reports[68] i.e., activities and switching paths.

4.4 Detection Leakage through Cloud based analysis

All the mobile devices have limited memory and are severely restricted in resources. Due to this performing the privacy leak detection on these devices is an issue. So, the researchers came up with a solution and proposed a new cloud based analysis model[71].
The above figure 13 explains the structure of Paranoid Android Architecture\cite{49} in an android device. Architecture of one such technique and tool names Paranoid android was proposed.

Based on this model\cite{73}, performing privacy detection on mobile devices has been eliminated. The architecture is illustrated in the above figure. The working of this model is, the cloud\cite{69} includes running synchronized replica of the mobile device on a cloud-based server.

Since the server does not have any memory and mobile device like constraints, the privacy leak detection analysis that would be too complex to run on a mobile device can be performed successfully. In this model there is a Tracer available in
mobile device that collects all the necessary information required to perform all the mobile application executions.

This tracer transmits the information over the encrypted channel to the cloudbased Replayer[70]. It re-executes the application in the smart phone emulator. Then eventually the privacy checks within the emulator can be performed on the server.

4.5 Leak Detection through Kynoid

Recently Daniel Schreckling proposed Kynoid[42], which is real time enforcement of fine-grained, user defined and datacentric security policy proposed in android. It is based on user defined security policies defined for data items stored in shared resources. Core idea of Kynoid is to implement a middleware between application and the data as shown in Fig to provide policy enforcement functionality.

Fig 14: Core idea of Kynoid[61]

The above figure 14 explains the core idea of Kynoid in android architecture. Kynoid is based on TaintDroid to integrate a lightweight policy tracker in
sandboxing mechanism of Android[42]. It tries to make the TaintDroid approach fine grained to support practical permission system, which allows critical and non-critical data.

TaintDroid supports 32 different tags in 32 bits field introduced in shadow variable, which can refer to at most 32 different data sources. Whereas, Kynoid uses this 32 bits field for identifiers, each variable in Android can be assigned with different ID, which again mapped with policy.

It allows Kynoid finer grained tracking by having total $2^{32}$ mappings for security policies. But this creates tremendous amount of run time and memory overhead, which is addressed by using dependency graph in Kynoid.

Dependency graph is evaluated at sink to derive exact security policy. Kynoid blocks the connections that are leaking information at monitored sinks as per policies defined. Modifying this Dalvik VM for taint tracking and Kynoid system service for policy database and ID mapping does implementation.

For inter-process policy tracking, identifiers of source variables are mapped to the identifiers of destination variable of another app. Sinks are monitored in similar kind of architecture that of TaintDroid to detect information leak.

Kynoid claims to be giving competitive performance on benchmark tests against TaintDroid while providing finer granularity of taint tracking policy, but it exists
only as a prototype implementation. Also, Kynoid needs to analyze impact of indirect flows to the overall performance.

### 4.6 DroidVulMon

In android the security-related vulnerability for mobile terminal suggests ‘DroidVulMon’ system to detect and respond attacks in order to prevent information leakage caused by malicious app.

The proposed scheme is different from the traditional scheme in the sense that the proposed scheme enables to monitor and detect existence of malicious app for multiple terminals while the traditional scheme supports to detect malicious app for only one mobile terminal.

The proposed scheme, named as DroidVulMon, enables to collect information related to system, service, process and network from multiple terminals so that it can detect rooting attacks and security vulnerability.

#### 4.6.1 Security Architecture for malicious App detection

The Architecture about the proposed system, DroidVulMon[47] can be described as a follow Fig. One of main part is a server which consists of server application and vulnerability checking server. Vulnerability checking server is continuously cooperating with client.
Specifically, the security vulnerability-checking engine of vulnerability server sends or receives data from security vulnerability monitoring engine in client. They exchange data including engine update information and manage verification logic with each other.

Additionally, the server has security-checking DB, which is used for storing the entire data to/from server and the data maintained in DB will be utilized for criteria to estimate whether an app is malicious app or not. As mentioned above, client has vulnerability monitoring engine.

![Figure 15: System Architecture](image_url)

The above figure 15 explains the system architecture of DroidVulMon[47] for an android application. The main purpose of the engine is to verify and protect the app in conjunction with server's vulnerability check engine. If the malicious app is
DroidVulMon aims to detect malicious app and security related vulnerability for ‘n’ mobile terminals. To meet this goal, the DroidVulMon is designed effectively to share data collected from n mobile terminal by client and server.

The main purpose of the engine is to authenticate and protect the app in conjunction with server's vulnerability check engine. If the malicious app is detected, events will be collected.

Those events will be sent to a native library, which is an agent to detect rooting attack and the native library along with main program keep sharing events, rooting attack monitoring results and information about abnormal app.

4.7 Overall Comparison

The below table 5-I/II explains the comparison of different types of Detection analyses. All the techniques are applied on Android platform except the ProtectMyPrivacy technique, which is for iOS device. Static data flow technique is implemented by most of the approaches like LeakMiner, AndroidLeaks, AppIntent. Whereas Droidtest, IntentFuzzer and TISSA use dynamic data flow technique.

Majority of android apps are tested on AndroidLeaks approach, which is around 25,976. Approximately 57,299 leaks are found in applications; 63.51% leaks are found in ad code. Moreover, 92% leaks are related to phone data, 5.94% leaks are of Location data.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tools/Frameworks</th>
<th>Platform</th>
<th>Technique</th>
<th>No. of Tested Apps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LeakMiner</td>
<td>Android</td>
<td>Static Flow Data</td>
<td>1,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCLeaks</td>
<td>Android</td>
<td>Static intra Component analysis</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DroidTest</td>
<td>Android</td>
<td>Dynamic Data Flow</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AndroidLeaks</td>
<td>Android</td>
<td>Static Data Flow</td>
<td>25,976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AppIntent</td>
<td>Android</td>
<td>Static data Flow</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IntentFuzzer</td>
<td>Android</td>
<td>Dynamic capability leak</td>
<td>2,183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IccTA</td>
<td>Android</td>
<td>Static intra component Analysis</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TISSA</td>
<td>Android</td>
<td>Dynamic data flow</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Forensics of Privacy Leaks</td>
<td>Android</td>
<td>Correlate User actions to leaks</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woodpecker</td>
<td>Android</td>
<td>Capability Leaks</td>
<td>953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ProtectMyPrivacy</td>
<td>iOS</td>
<td>Crowdsourcing</td>
<td>685</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 5: Privacy Leak Detection Framework-I[71]*
Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>App</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LeakMiner</td>
<td>It is found that 127 apps leaks device ID, 50 apps leaks phone info, 27 apps leaks Location and 12 apps leaks contacts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCLeaks</td>
<td>Nearly 986 component leaks are found. While 534-activity launch leaks are found. Moreover, broadcast injection leaks are 245 and activity-hijacking leaks are 110.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DroidTest</td>
<td>It is found that most app leaks model number, subscriber ID, Location, Mobile number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AndroidLeaks</td>
<td>Approximately 57,299 leaks are found in applications; 63.51% leaks are found in ad code. Moreover, 92% leaks are related to phone data, 5.94% leaks are of Location data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AppIntent</td>
<td>It is found that 140 apps have potential data leaks, 26 apps leaks data unintentionally, 24 apps leaks Location, 1 app leaks SMS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IntentFuzzer</td>
<td>It is found that more than 50% of applications leak capabilities or permissions related to network state, Location, internet connection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IccTA</td>
<td>It is found that 425 applications leak information directly. These leaks are related to Device and Location data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TISSA</td>
<td>It is found that 14 apps leak Location and 13 leaks device ID.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Forensics of Privacy Leaks</td>
<td>It is found that 9 different kinds of data is leaked by applications, 34 apps leaks data due to user actions on widgets 14 leak on Location.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woodpecker</td>
<td>Explicit capability leaks are found in trustworthy applications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ProtectMyPrivacy</td>
<td>It is found that 48.43% applications access identifier of device, 13.27%access locations, 1 app leaks contacts.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 6: Privacy Leak Detection Framework-II [71]**

The above table 5-I explains the statistics and comparison of different types of Detection analyses Least number of apps was tested on TISSA and DroidTest approaches, which are 24 and 50 apps respectively.
It is found that 14 apps leak Location and 13 leaks device ID through the TISSA approach whereas it is found that most app leaks model number, subscriber ID, Location, Mobile number through the DroidTest approach.

Dynamic capability leak technique is applied on IntentFuzzerer and number of apps tested was 2,183. It is found that more than 50% of applications leak capabilities or permissions related to network state, Location, internet connection.

Capability Leaks are applied on Woodpecker testing in total 953 apps. Explicit capability leaks are found in trustworthy applications. Crowdsourcing is applied on ProtectMyPrivacy is tested on 685 number of applications. It is found that 48.43% applications access identifier of device, 13.27% access locations, app leaks contacts.

Static intra component Analysis is applied on IccTA testing on 3000 apps. It is found that 425 applications leak information directly. These leaks are related to Device and Location data.

Static intra Component analysis is applied on P克莱克斯 with tested on 2000 apps. Nearly 986 component leaks are found. While 534-activity launch leaks are found. Moreover, broadcast injection leaks are 245 and activity-hijacking leaks are 110.
5.1 Location Tracking Applications

In this chapter, we discuss about apps that records the GPS coordinates and shares them to the dear ones. There are bunch of applications available in play store, which works on these GPS.

The below table 6 gives the comparison between the Location sharing apps available in the app store. The table compares the apps with the type of language developed, type of webserver used and databases. The table also talks about the pros and cons of the apps.

All the apps developed on Android uses either Java or C# as programming languages for development. Usually most of the apps are developed on Java because development on Java is more feasible. Java doesn’t less configuration system for development.

A common database used for app development in android is SQLite. By the nomenclature it conveys as a Lite database. It’s not like a usual database. Since mobile has very less memory when compared to the desktop applications.
### Table 7: Comparison of different Location sharing apps on app store

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Family Locator</th>
<th>Friend Location Finder</th>
<th>Friend Finder</th>
<th>Family Locator</th>
<th>Friends Finder</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Database</strong></td>
<td>SQLite[51]</td>
<td>SQLite</td>
<td>H2 DB</td>
<td>SQLite</td>
<td>SQLite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Language</strong></td>
<td>Java</td>
<td>Java</td>
<td>C#</td>
<td>Java</td>
<td>Java</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Webserver</strong></td>
<td>GCM Http[52]</td>
<td>GCM Http</td>
<td>GCM Http</td>
<td>GCM Http</td>
<td>GCM Http</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pros and cons</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cons:</strong></td>
<td>1.Needs Internet compulsory on phone to track. 2.Need Smartphone</td>
<td>1.Needs Internet compulsory to track. 2.Need Smartphone</td>
<td>1.App can only send updates to 2 contacts which is limited. 2.Not on iOS, need Internet to run this application. Need Smartphone</td>
<td>1.Need Internet to run this application. 2.Need smartphone. 3.Difficult to understand the Interface</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 5.2 Case Study

**Sygic GPS Application**

The Sygic GPS application[50] allows the users to take pictures using an Activity developed in house, instead of reusing the regular Android camera application.
To do this, the Activity called CameraActivity first registers a callback using the Camera.takePicture function. The system triggers the callback function when the picture is captured and attaches the actual byte array. It then calls setResult function and finish, sending the raw picture to the caller.

The Activity has no intent-filter because the exported attribute is not set, the default value is set to false. The Activity could only be exploited by another application signed by the same developer, so then we classify it as low risk.

As of now, none of the other applications of the same developer currently in the play store seem to invoke this Activity function, but this may change in the future. This type of vulnerability is difficult to detect statically because the source is not in the application code. The application passes a function to the camera API and the operating system calls that function with tainted parameters.

The Intent passes through a message queue, from where it is forwarded to the correct application handler. Identification of this vulnerability was possible because we analyze the application together with the Android libraries and manually added a rule to Permission Flow that marks the function that distributes the Intents to handlers as having a tainted Intent parameter.
5.3 Personalized Android app – Track Me

This section discuss about an android app that is developed and entitled “Track Me” records your Geographical Longitudinal and Latitudinal location coordinates from the app using the GPS[54].

Initially, the app has to set a mobile number to someone whom you want to share your location coordinates. And then once the app is triggered, it sends the GPS coordinates to that corresponding mobile number through the app[53].

Functionality

The app sends geographical coordinates along with the address and a Google Maps link[54]. So, the app users may need not to have a smart phone on both sides. It works perfectly even if only the sender has a smartphone and the receiver does not have one.

This app keeps on send the geographical coordinates to the receiver in the form of text message for every constant interval of time. Once the app is triggered, it keeps running in the background and sends the text message to the receiver until we hit the stop command in the app.
5.3.1 Home Screen

Initially, the app is supported for only android devices. The device requires minimum OS Android 2.2 running on android devices.

![Fig 16: Home Screen of app](image)

The above figure 16 is the welcome screen for the app. Whenever the user triggers the app from the device, this screen pops up asking to start newly or continue to send the text messages to the previous number that has been set on the device.
Either you can select “Go to Application” or “Yes”. If the user hits the “Go to Application” button then the app, it redirects to the new contact page to add a new contact number to which the geographical coordinates updates are to be sent.

5.3.2 Go to Application

The above figure 17 shows a screen that pops up when the user hits the “Go to Application” button during the welcome screen. If the user wants to set a new number to which the coordinates has to be sent then hits the contacts button.
5.3.3 Contacts

Fig 18: Adding a Contact

The above figure 18 shows a screen to add a new contact to whom the user wants to send the updates of his/her location. A new contact can be added or an existing contact can be chosen.
5.3.4 Choosing a Contact

The above figure shows a screen to pick a contact from the phone directory to whom the user has to share the location coordinates and after choosing the contact, the user hits back button to return to Main menu.

Fig 19: Choosing a Contact
5.3.5 Start Updating

The above figure 20 shows a screen saying the location updating has been started and it keeps sends the text messages to the number, which we have set in the app. The app keeps on send text messages to the receiver for every two minutes of interval.
5.3.6 Text Message Notification

The above figure 21 shows a format of the text notification[53] sent to the receiver when the app is triggered from the sender mobile. The message contains a link which when pressed redirects to the exact location on the Google Maps.
5.3.7 Google Map View

**Fig 22: Google Map View**

The above figure 22 shows a screen, which is redirected, to the Google Maps[54] when the link in the text message [53] is pressed. By default the app navigates to the Google Maps and pins your exact location.
CHAPTER-6

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SECURE APPLICATIONS

The best and efficient advice for security-aware Android developers is to pay close attention to the configuration of their application (particularly, any combination of parameters listed without additional checks, vulnerable). If such a parameter combination is needed for functionality reuse or other constraints, here are some ways of maintaining security:

A better approach is to always request an explicit user confirmation for the invocation of any Activity that may be part of an inter-application flow and the user should be informed to which caller the information will be sent.

This method has the disadvantage that it decreases the ease-of-use of the application and to enforce that callers of your Activities own certain permissions, developers can use either declarative permission requirements in the application manifest and dynamic permission checks using checkPermission calls.

All the developers should consider using work-around for sending sensitive information over inter-component boundaries. For example, several of the applications analyzed leak information from an ordered set of items such as GPS data, contact names/phone number or zip code.
For these kind of applications there is no need for complex mechanisms to avoid the vulnerability. It may be sufficient to return an integer index to the information database, instead of the actual information and the caller would need to query the database to obtain the actual information.

Passing sensitive information over the inter-component boundaries of the same application in an encrypted form is recommended to protect against unintended callers, but it does not help if an attacker has compromised another application with which the current application shares the user id.
CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

Many android applications have access to other types of sensitive information that are not protected by standard Android permissions. In order to protect this kind of information, developers should define custom permissions to the apps, but because of the coarse-grained nature of the custom permissions (assigned to applications as opposed to APIs) it is not possible to automatically identify the taint sources for such information. The method is completely automated and it is based on coupling rule-based static taint analysis with automatic generation[63] of rules that specify how permissions can leak to unauthorized applications. Most mobile operating systems are included in this category and can benefit from the proposed new application of taint analysis[64].
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