Biology, culture, and environment: The struggle for hegemony in Arizona

Sondra Kae Cosgrove

University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/rtds

Repository Citation
Cosgrove, Sondra Kae, "Biology, culture, and environment: The struggle for hegemony in Arizona" (2003). UNLV Retrospective Theses & Dissertations. 2565.
https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/rtds/2565

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Scholarship@UNLV. It has been accepted for inclusion in UNLV Retrospective Theses & Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital Scholarship@UNLV. For more information, please contact digitalscholarship@unlv.edu.
BIOLOGY, CULTURE, AND ENVIRONMENT: THE
STRUGGLE FOR HEGEMONY IN ARIZONA

by

Sondra Kae Cosgrove

Bachelor of Arts
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
1996

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the

Doctor of Philosophy Degree in History
Department of History
College of Liberal Arts

Graduate College
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
May 2004
Dissertation Approval
The Graduate College
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

April 30, 2004

The Dissertation prepared by
Sondra Cosgrove

Entitled
BIOLOGY, CULTURE, AND ENVIRONMENT: THE STRUGGLE FOR HEGEMONY IN ARIZONA

is approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
PH.D HISTORY

DR. ROLLINGS
Examination Committee Chair

Dean of the Graduate College

DR. COUGHLTRY
Examination Committee Member

DR. WRIGHT
Examination Committee Member

DR. MIRANDA
Graduate College Faculty Representative
ABSTRACT

Biology, Culture, and Environment: The Struggle
For Hegemony in Arizona

by

Sondra Kae Cosgrove

Dr. Willard Rollings, Examination Committee Chair
Associate Professor of History
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

This is an examination of the various cultural groups who have attempted to extend
hegemonic control over what is now the state of Arizona. Each chapter focuses on the
ways different societies adapted to the region's challenging environment; paying particular
attention to those that sought to integrate their neighbors into their own socioeconomic
systems, whether by force or through negotiation. The rise and fall of the indigenous
Hohokam civilization marks the first phase in this struggle for hegemony, while conflicts
between Spaniards and Indians characterize the second. The third, and so far, final cycle
concludes with Euro-Americans seizing the region from Arizona's Hispanic and Native
Americans residents.

A brief preface introduces this work's underlying, interdisciplinary methodology, while
the body of the text proceeds chronologically from prehistory to 1886. The first chapter
examines the various prehistoric people who took up residence in Arizona. It describes
how the Hohokam Indians were able to adopt a sedentary lifestyle and then translate their
subsistence success into political power. The chapter concludes with the collapse of Arizona’s prehistoric political economy due to climatic change. Chapter two then provides an overview of the conflicts, beginning in the seventeenth century and continuing into the early nineteenth century, between Athapascan Indians and Spanish colonists. Throughout this period, both groups endeavored to exert control over the Southwest’s trade economy, yet each blocked the other’s efforts.

Chapter three analyzes the American ideology of Manifest Destiny and its role in westward migration; while the arrival of Americans in the Southwest and their successful quest to capture Arizona’s resources is the focus of the remaining chapters. A brief summation then concludes this work.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT............................................................................................................................ iii

PREFACE ............................................................................................................................... vi

CHAPTER 1  INDIGENOUS ARIZONA AND THE FIRST COMPLEX CIVILIZATION................................................................. 1

CHAPTER 2  ATHAPASCANS AND IBERIANS .......................................................31

CHAPTER 3  SPANISH BOURBONS AND THE MEXIAN INTERIM...................60

CHAPTER 4  MANIFEST DESTINY AND THE AMERICAN WEST .....................78

CHAPTER 5  THE AMERICANS OFFICALLY ARRIVE.............................................93

CHAPTER 6  AMERICAN VICTORY: HEGEMONY ACHIEVED ......................116

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...............................................................................................................146

VITA.................................................................................................................................164
Human occupation of what is today the state of Arizona stretches back for thousands of years. For most of this time, however, the region’s inhabitants were nonliterate and therefore left no written records detailing their thoughts, beliefs, or important life events. While this lack of documentation does pose a formidable challenge to writing even a partial state history, it fortunately does not create an impenetrable barrier. Instead, it merely necessitates utilizing an interdisciplinary approach, conversant in alternative forms of evidence, to integrate this community into the larger, historical fabric. As such, this examination of Arizona, from prehistory to 1886, will rely heavily on a range of non-historical sources. These include the archaeological record as well as theoretical models from disciplines such as paleoanthropology, psychology, and cultural anthropology.¹

The field of paleoanthropology, in particular, offers tremendous investigative

¹ This synthetic approach is particularly popular in the field of psychology where proponents seek not only universal cognitive processes but also the means for determining how fixed biological traits interact with known ecological domains to produce varied, yet reliable behavior. Research psychologist Mike Knight writes, "An egregious error we have made in doing science in psychology is to think of prediction as synonymous with predicting the future. It is possible to formulate hypothesis that make specific testable predictions about the past... In the speculative approach, one first discovers a psychological mechanism, and then one speculates about what adaptive problem it evolved to solve. The approach advocated here is the reverse: first, one uses existing and validated theories from evolutionary biology to define an adaptive problem that the human mind must be able to solve, and then deduce what properties a psychological mechanism capable of solving the problem must have. It is a constrained and predictive approach, rather than a compilation of post hoc explanations for known phenomena." See Mike Knight, "Functional Darwinism: A Cognitive Science Paradigm," *Psychological Record* 44, no. 2 (Spring 1994): 44. See also Luigi Luca Cavalli-Sforza, *Genes, People, and Language* (New York: North Points Press, 2000), 32, who concurs, “Multidisciplinary research provides, in a way, a sort of replication of an event, which is generally possible only in experimental science.”
assistance in interpreting the prehistoric and protohistoric periods. Because paleoanthropology is an integrated discipline, it brings together under one conceptual umbrella theories from physical anthropology, archaeology, paleontology, and geology. Paleoanthropological models of human behavior, therefore, consist of a range of independently verifiable variables, which makes them more reliable than nonintegrated hypothesis. Such variables include primary biological traits that are common to all *Homo sapien sapiens*, secondary learned behaviors that are known to exist in both past and present human cultures, and ecological data gathered through scientifically rigorous, environmental surveys.\(^2\)

Among the primary biological traits found in paleoanthropological models are bipedalism, non-specific, omnivorous digestion, opposable thumbs and dexterous fingers, and the capacity to think symbolically. Such attributes have predictive value as they produced the behaviors that set humans apart from other species and linked individuals into symbiotic groups. These capabilities allowed humans to travel long distances while carrying objects and infants; they produced the ability to process and consume many types of food from a wide range of ecosystems; and they imparted the acumen humans needed to create tools with which to compensate for absent appendages and diminished physical

---

\(^2\) David F. Bjorklund and Anthony D. Pellengrini explain, “Biologically primary abilities are those that have undergone selection pressure and evolved to deal with problems faced by our ancestors. Language and simple quantitative ability . . . would be examples. In contrast, biologically secondary abilities do not have an evolutionary history but are abilities that are instilled in children by their cultures to deal with new ‘ecological’ problems unknown to forebears . . . Their novelty reflects a new application of biologically primary abilities for purposes other than the original evolutionary-based function.” See David F. Bjorklund and Anthony D. Pellengrini, *The Origins of Human Nature: Evolutionary Developmental Psychology* (Washington D. C.: American Psychology Association, 2002), 125. See also Milford H. Wolpoff, *Paleoanthropology*, 2d ed. (Boston: McGraw Hill, 1999), 146, 159, 163.
attributes—such as claws, fangs, and great strength.\(^3\)

More advanced biological features include complex cognition, which allowed for behavioral plasticity, and vocal communication, which facilitated prolonged childrearing as well as integrated social living among adults. When combined, these two traits made it possible for humans to reason about the past and future, to pass accumulated knowledge on to offspring, to mediate conflicts, and to migrate beyond their natal African environment without having to wait for natural selection to alter their collective physiology.\(^4\)

In examining these more advanced human features, the field of psychology provides great insight as it offers analytical tools for deconstructing human thought processes and clues as to how different social and physical environments have shaped human intellectual development. Because of this, psychological models are useful for generating plausible ranges of behavior within known settings. For instance, psychological theories reveal likely human reactions to events such as habitat degradation and territorial encroachment by aggressive outsiders. In addition to this, the field also provides the means for understanding behavior that may appear to be irrational, yet in fact it makes rational, evolutionary sense.\(^5\)

---

\(^3\) The evolution of an organism is constrained by the amount of energy it can reasonably extract from its environment. Every organ and appendage requires a certain amount of calories to function; the larger and more complex, the more calories required. Thus, if an organism selects for a large brain or heart, there must be reduction in other areas to offset the greater amount of energy consumed by the specialized feature. Human evolution selected for a large brain and in the process gave up defensive appendages such as claws and strength from overly large muscles. In the end, the larger brain was the better choice as it created technological appendages to compensate for what was not selected. See John C. Cartwright, *Evolutionary Explanations of Human Behavior* (New York: Routledge Press, 2001).


\(^5\) Bjorklund and Pellengrini, like many others, argue that whatever, in a broad sense, increases reproductive success is rational behavior for a species. See Bjorklund and Pellengrini, 262.
Psychological studies show that human behavior is rational when it ensures the short-term survival of the individual. Examples of this would include the theft of a relative’s food to avoid starvation or the killing of an ally who momentarily threatens a person’s wellbeing. As both actions address immediate problems, each would be rational, regardless of the fact that they could ultimately lead to lethal retaliation by an offended party.6

Psychologists also identify behavior as rational if in the long-term it achieves some sort of reproductive benefit. An example of this would be a hunter who divides his kill amongst his kinsmen with full knowledge that his behavior will reduce the amount of meat immediately available for his own family. In the present his dependents will have less sustenance, but in the future, he assumes, they will have more as those who received meat will feel obligated to reciprocate equally when the roles are reversed. This outcome may not always occur, yet a sufficiently high success rate will ensure that the behavior continues.7

Human behavior can even be rational when it leads to immediate, individual death. In these instances, humans sacrifice themselves for first-order kin, such as siblings and offspring, by denying their own biological drive to survive. This trait, known as altruism, baffled Charles Darwin as it flew in the face of his theory of species reproduction. Why,

6 Ibid, 193.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
he pondered, would a fit individual sacrifice him or herself for a companion? The answer, Darwin found, lay in the fact that humans will seek not only to perpetuate their own genetic code, but will also seek to save others who share their biological inheritance. Over time, humans have even come to view the perpetuation of cultural inheritance as a sufficient reason for sacrificing one's own life for that of a compatriot.  

Beyond the organic components of human behavior lay secondary traits that, when understood, also aid in reconstructing human history. The field of anthropology lends assistance in interpreting these behaviors; the sum of which anthropologists call culture. In general, cultural behaviors include all those that humans create to live in specific physical and social environments, such as religious rituals, courtship practices, and a wide variety of actions that fall under the heading of manners. While not as predictive as other paradigms, cultural theories are still useful as they clarify behavior not readily elucidated by biological or cognitive models.  

Through their study of cultural behavior, anthropologists have also discovered the most enduring forms of human social organization, with the first and foremost being the familial band. This grouping of thirty to fifty relatives appears to have developed naturally, early in human social evolution and remained the preferred combination for thousands of years. It was not until the agricultural revolution began in approximately 10,000 B.C.E. that population density increased sufficiently to necessitate new social  

---


configurations. Once this happened, anthropologists argue, new sociopolitical entities such as tribes, chiefdoms, and eventually states began to appear with a concomitant redistribution of decision-making power and access to resources. While these scholars disagree over the finer details of how each familial band negotiated the transition from one social grouping to the next, in their broad interpretations, there is enough agreement to generally predict how particular human societies managed social change.  

As with any historical undertaking, even one that draws assistance from a variety of disciplines, a certain amount of speculation invariably plays a role in developing conclusions. This is true for this study, yet even here, conjecture will be grounded in three sound, interconnected premises; a brief review of which will reveal their veracity. The first is that regardless of time or place all humans will devote a portion of their time and energy to acquiring nutrition, shelter, and reproductive security. Therefore, any examination of human life will uncover evidence of these biologically derived activities. This evidence, which can range from artifacts such as flint scrapers to various types of food debris, will then offer insight into a society's daily activities.

The next assertion is that not only do we know that all humans will seek to meet their

---


11 Robert Hinde, 17-8, states, “We all have similar sets of goals such as food, security, sex, [and] a need to make sense of the world . . . These and other basic human propensities can reasonably be assumed to be present, to varying degrees, in all individuals . . .” Jonathan Haas also states, 13-5, “People of different culture respond to their unique environments in similar ways with a relatively tightly defined range of variability.” See also Bjorklund and Pellegrini, 262-3.
basic biological needs, but we also know how physiology restricts the ways humans fulfill those need. For instance, while humans can eat many types of food and adapt to many different environmental settings, there are limits to what they can digest and ecosystems in which they can survive, (e.g., humans cannot extract nutrients from many forms of non-organic matter, and they cannot endure without sufficient supplies of water). These restrictions are all the more rigid for groups that possess only simple forms of technology, as they have more difficulty manipulating their surroundings. Thus, if ecological setting and level of technology are known variables—which they can be with a fair degree of certainty through dendrochronology and the archaeological record—it is possible to generate plausible narratives that describe how particular humans fed, sheltered, and reproduced themselves.\(^\text{12}\)

And lastly, due to the evolutionary selection in \textit{Homo sapien sapiens} for a large brain over other traits that facilitate solitary living—such as appendages that serve as defensive weapons—humans must live in groups to ensure proper juvenile maturation and to decrease the likelihood of premature death among all members. Consequently, any historical study of normal humans will find evidence of some form of bonded living. While humans may express this trait in a variety of ways, in every society there will be a basic distribution of power and resources as well as mechanisms for suppressing

egocentric tendencies in favor of community cohesion.\textsuperscript{13}

In summation, to integrate all of Arizona's inhabitants into a larger historical framework, this study will employ an interdisciplinary approach suited for uncovering and interpreting a wide spectrum of human behavior. To this end, it will purposefully emphasize Arizona's prehistoric and protohistoric periods, and will seek to integrate within the storyline the perspectives of later-arriving immigrants who also lacked written communication skills. It will utilize a wide variety of methodologies, theories, and models to create a three dimensional narrative that does not categorize subjects as "advanced", "simplistic," or "barbaric." Nor will it pander in suppositions that imply that biology or culture predestined some groups to triumph over others. Instead, it will proceed under the assumption that each historical figure is equal to all others and that history is a composite of thousands of minute, highly contingent variables, which could have produced hundreds of alternative endings.

As I finish, I would like to thank all those people who assisted me in this process. My family deserves much of my gratitude. They never wavered in their support, even when I

\textsuperscript{13} Studies from a variety of fields substantiate this assertion; the most current comes from the field of developmental psychology. This research demonstrates that human phenotype and cognitive capabilities derive from a combination of specialized biological features and generalized mechanisms created through childhood interaction with social and physical environments. It shows that to accommodate our specie's large brain and cranium, evolution selected for human infants who arrived premature and helpless and then spent an extended and intensive childhood learning from adults which biological behaviors to express and in what form that expression should take. Evolutionary biologists and geneticists also show the even after childhood, humans require group living to survive. Through statistical analysis Cavalli-Sforza, 30, documents that individuals in a society require access to approximately 500 other individuals to avoid interbreeding. See also Bjorklund, 21, 100; and Richard B. Lee, "Primitive Communism and the Origin of Social Inequality," in The Evolution of Political Systems: Sociopolitics in Small Scale Societies (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 245. Lee states, "Despite our seeming adaptation to life in hierarchical societies, there are signs that humankind retains a deep rooted desire for a sense of community. All theories of justice revolve around these principles, and our sense of outrage at the violation of these norms indicates the depth of its gut-level appeal."
was certain that I would never complete this project. While writing is often a lonely endeavor, this study is as much the product of the careful editing of my colleagues, as it is my own. To my fellow graduate students, I say thank you. Lastly, I would like to thank my committee members for standing by me and seeing me through to the end of my journey. My life certainly would have been much more trying without the guidance of these fine scholars.
CHAPTER 1

INDIGENOUS ARIZONA AND THE FIRST COMPLEX CIVILIZATION

At some point between 40,000 and 20,000 B.C.E. the earth entered into a new glacial cycle causing a worldwide drop in ocean levels. As a result, a land bridge appeared connecting Eurasia with the Americas. This event allowed humans to migrate from what is now Siberia into what is currently Alaska. Once in North America these migrants encountered the massive Laurentide glacier covering all of present-day Canada and the Cordillian ice sheet spread across the landscape west of the Rocky Mountains.

After squeezing between these two giant mountains of ice, some families eventually arrived in the region that is today the Great Plains of the United States. There they

---

1 I will use the date markers B.C.E. and C.E. to the historic periods; I will then only state the date.

2 Conclusive data links Amerindians with Siberians in Cavalli-Sforza, 82-3, 140. A new theory, backed by osteological evidence, has begun to challenge the exclusivity of the land-bridge interpretation and posits that humans from southern Asia or possibly Australia arrived in the Americas earlier than the Siberian migrants. As human morphological features are the product of both genetics and environment, it will take more than variations in bone structure to displace the accepted hypothesis. Studies of DNA sequencing show little connection between south Asia and the Americas. According to Cavalli-Sforza, "Genetic tests put the first migration into the Americas at about 32,000 years ago. External characteristics are unreliable as they are influenced by both genes and by the environmental conditions of the individual's development; they change rapidly in response to factors such as nutrition and external temperature." See also Stuart J. Fiedel, Prehistory of the Americas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 44-51; Steve Connor, "Does Skull Prove That First Americans Came From Europe," Independent on the Web, 3 December 2002, <http://news.independent.co.uk/world/science_medical/story.jsp?story=358001>(20 September 2003); "Human Skulls Are 'oldest Americans," British Broadcast Network on the Web, 3 December 2002, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/2538323.stm.>(20 September 2003).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
discovered a lush biome with abundant vegetation and herds of large herbivores. After months of trekking over bleak snow-covered terrain, they were probably much relieved to find such an oasis. In the process of adapting to their new home, these first Americans created an innovative cultural complex that paleoanthropologists identify as the Clovis tradition. In general, Clovis society consisted of small familial bands, governed by rules of reciprocal exchange, which foraged widely and hunted large animals when the opportunity arose.3

For years researchers explained the Clovis aptitude for big-game predation by emphasizing cultural traits that supposedly imparted extraordinary skill to their hunters. Recent studies, however, have abandoned this approach and now explain Clovis prowess in light of evidence that humans will shun energy-expensive behavior unless assured of achieving some sort of benefit.4 Thus, with only simple forms of technology, current investigators argue, pointing to subsistence practices alone as being key to Clovis hunting skill is mistaken, as the Clovis clearly lacked the tools needed to substantially improve their predation success. As such, it is necessary to also examine the American

---


environment to accurately determine what enhanced the Clovis’ ability to kill large game.⁵

According to the most plausible environmental hypothesis, the Clovis excelled at hunting due to American herbivores evolving for thousands of years apart from humans. Because of this, they were slow to recognize hunters as predators and for at least a few generations did not react to humans by fleeing. Any time and energy hunters expended in pursuit of these large animals, then, would have likely resulted in a successful kill. Hence, each felled animal would have reinforced the notion that hunting was a reasonably efficient means for acquiring nutrition as well as other animal by-products.⁶

With secured access to a high quality food source, the Clovis thrived and spread beyond the Plains. The conditions sustaining their economic bonanza could not last forever, though, and finally came to an end when the Pleistocene gave way to the Holocene epoch at approximately 10,000 B.C.E. This climatic transition shifted global weather patterns and brought increasing aridity to many parts of the Americas. The result

---

⁵ Until recently, many paleoanthropologists argued that hunting was the basis of human social and physical evolution. Their bias resulted from an over reliance on the fossil record, which tends to only preserve durable artifacts such as bones and flint. As it is much harder to find preserved remains indicative of gathering activities, current paleoanthropologists now also take into consideration ethnographies that demonstrate that up to 70 percent of a band’s food comes from vegetation and small prey. For more on this, see Donald C. Johanson and Maitland A. Edes, "Why did Lucy Walk Erect?," in The Biological Basis of Human Behavior: A Critical Reader, 2d ed., Advances in Human Evolution Series, ed. Robert W. Sussman (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1999), 86-101.

⁶ In low technology societies every activity expends physical energy that must be replenished. Humans in such groups must think ahead to ensure that they do not spend more energy than there is food available to erase their calorie deficit. The riskiest type of nutrient acquisition for humans is big game hunting as it expends large numbers of calories without a guarantee of recouping calories. Therefore, only when the risks are lower and the benefits more assured, will humans focus more intently on this form of procurement. See Wayne D. Carroll et al., Background Paper: Historical Overview Of The Southern Forest Landscape And Associated Resources, <http://www.fs.fed.us/sustain/report/historyf.htm> (13 November 2003), Clemson University Forest Resource Department; Martha Tappen, "Deconstructing the Serengeti," in Meat Eating & Human Evolution, ed. Craig B. Stanford and Henry T. Bunn (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 15-26; Blaire Van Valkenburgh, "The Dog Eat Dog World Of Carnivory: A Review of Past and Present Carnivore Community Dynamics," in Meat Eating & Human Evolution, ed. Craig B. Stanford and Henry T. Bunn (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 101-121.

---

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
was leaner habitats. No species felt the consequences of this change more than the large herbivores. By selecting for large bodies, evolution had enabled them to withstand attacks by deadly Pleistocene carnivores, yet this also made them vulnerable to extinction should the calories available from the environment drastically shrink. When this happened at the onset of the Holocene, the large, hulking bodies that had served them well for thousands of years became a fatal liability.⁷

As their domain contracted, many large animals began to starve to death. With gestation among these species often lasting for more than twelve months and adolescent sexual maturation taking ten to fifteen years, remaining members were physically unable to replace their departed companions before they too succumbed. Ultimately, numerous giant species went extinct worldwide, with an almost complete disappearance in the Americas. In response to losing this prime food source, the Clovis created a new lifeway known as the Folsom Culture, which placed a greater emphasis on plant foraging, scavenging, and the hunting of small animals.⁸

Similar to the rest of North America, the transition to the Holocene substantially altered the climate of what is today the Southwest of the United States. During the Pleistocene the local climate had been mild, with little fluctuation between summer and winter. Such conditions encouraged a proliferation of both food and nonfood resources. Resident Clovis bands took advantage of this richness by traversing the area in large,

---


mobile bands that foraged for an array of plants and hunted a variety of large and small animals. When the giant herbivores began to die out in the early years of the Holocene, these families adopted the new Folsom tradition. Folsom cultural strategies then predominated in the Southwest until approximately 5000 B.C.E. when the increasingly arid climate once again forced the emergence of new desert cultures that focused even more on extensive foraging and small animal predation. These traditions included the archaic Amargosa, San Dieguito, Chiricahua, and Cochise.  

Throughout the Southwest, summers became hotter, winters cooler, and rainfall more varied. Archaic families survived by maximizing returns from their topographically diverse homeland, which included arid flatlands, riverine basins, jagged plateaus, and chains of alpine mountains. Now, instead of ranging widely over the horizontal landscape, they traveled over shorter, more vertical distances in a seasonal round that coordinated staggered lowland to upland harvests. As families moved from one ecological zone to the next, they foraged for drought-tolerant grasses, seeds, and fruits, while hunting both desert and mountain adapted animals.  

In addition to reorganizing their economic behavior, Southwestern peoples also altered
their social structures to fit the new environmental constraints. With food more dispersed, they replaced aggregating in extended, familial groups that exploited big game with smaller, nuclear bands that judiciously partook of resources from more limited territories. To hedge against drought-induced famine, they still maintained widespread trading contacts, yet now they only rendezvoused with distant family members when abundant food sources would allow. Ultimately, the result of this increasing social atomization was a higher degree of isolation that promoted cultural differentiation. 

Between 9000 and 2000 B.C.E., these small archaic bands drifted away from one another with some traveling into what is today Arizona. These first inhabitants scattered across the region until almost every human-friendly niche had a resident population. Those who made their way into the eastern Mogollon Mountains lived mainly in the upland environs, which, unlike the valleys, had numerous small springs and streams. Over time, they conformed to the limits of their habitat by relying more heavily on mountain resources during the summer and maintaining extensive trading contacts with groups outside their climatic zone during the winter.

Farther north, above the Mogollon Rim on the Colorado Plateau, streams and rivers were even more unreliable as they could disappear one year and then overflow the next

---


with devastating floods. Likewise, rain often neglected the region for months on end and then would suddenly reappear in the form of thunderbursts that selectively drenched small areas while leaving vast spaces bone dry. Such conditions made life tenuous and unpredictable yet did not deter settlement. Once migrating bands discovered the region’s sandstone aquifers, which drained watersheds from farther to the north, they began congregating near relatively stable and productive alluvial fans.13

Residents of the south-central basins were very fortunate as their lowlands valleys offered generous supplies of water from the Santa Cruz and San Pedro Rivers as well as an above average ten to twelve inches of rainfall per year. This moisture supported plant species ranging from the desert agave to the mountain piñon pine, which supplied residents with ample amounts of carbohydrates, while scores of rabbits, deer, and various small rodents provided fat and protein. The territory’s topography also contributed to a secure way of life, as the basins were narrow enough to allow for the gathering of a variety of upland foods within a day’s walk of lowland water sources.14

In the central valleys, along the perennial Salt and Gila Rivers, it was not a lack of water that restricted human habitation, but instead the relatively wide expanses that separated lowland water supplies from more plentiful upland foods. This distance made it more time consuming, and thus costly, to move between riverine and alpine resources. Resident families therefore either had to travel extensively or establish stable villages

13 Jeffery S. Dean, Chronological Analysis of Tsegi Phase Sites In Northeastern Arizona, Papers of the Laboratory of Tree-Ring Research, no. 3 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1969), 15, 87.

close to the rivers and then periodically dispatch band members to live and gather food in
the adjacent mountains. Over time, riverine bands also entered into trade alliances with
families living in the east who were looking to exchange upland commodities for lowland
products.\textsuperscript{15}

Inhabitants in the far west faced the greatest challenge as they lived in one of the
Southwest's harshest ecological zones. Their territory encompassed the lowest, and
therefore, hottest part of the Sonoran desert, where fresh water, apart from rivers such as
the Colorado and Gila, was so scarce that in many places it was nonexistent. To
overcome this obstacle, archaic bands had to carefully establish residences in a variety of
locations to ensure maximum access to seasonal resources, while concurrently shielding
themselves from extreme high and low temperatures as well as recurrent floods. In the
northwest, bands also had to contend with numerous steep-walled canyons, which made

\textsuperscript{15} Connie L. Stone and Todd W. Bostwick, "Environmental Contexts and Archaeological Correlates:
The Transition to Farming in Three Regions of the Arizona Desert," in \textit{Early Formative Adaptations in
the Southern Southwest}, ed. Barbara J. Roth (Madison: Prehistory Press, 1996), 19; Rein Vanderpot, Eric
E. Klucas, and Richard Ciolek-Torrello, eds., \textit{From the Desert to the Mountains: Archaeology of the
Transition Zone The State Route 87-Sycamore Creek Project} (Tucson: Statistical Research, 1999), 95-6;
Eric Eugene Klucas, "Round Valley," in \textit{From the Desert to the Mountain: Archaeological Transition
Zone The State Route 87-Sycamore Creek Project}, ed. Rein Vanderpot, Eric Eugene Klucas, and Richard
Ciolek-Torrello, Technical Series, no. 73, vol. 1: Prehistoric Sites (Tucson: Statistical Research, 1999),
85.
travel and therefore the search for food and water that much more difficult.\textsuperscript{16}

Despite these and other challenges, archaic groups throughout Arizona persevered and eventually began to thrive. They were so successful that by approximately 3500 B.C.E. their varying subsistence strategies had raised population levels to the limits of the region’s carrying capacity. When this happened, the largest groups began to routinely find it impossible to escape localized drought or poor harvests without encroaching on their neighbors. This dilemma led some southern families to search for and eventually discover a low-cost means for increasing their food supply without having to expand their territory: plant cultivation.\textsuperscript{17}

Living as they were on the periphery of the Mesoamerican periphery, these southern bands maintained trading contacts with people in modern-day Chihuahua and Sonora, who had acquired and adapted corn and squash to make them amenable to desert, floodwater

\textsuperscript{16} William Price wrote, “These Indians seem very destitute, and it is miraculous how they are enabled to secure an existence in this barren waste of a country. They say they rely on grass seeds and mescal; we did not see even a rabbit in several hundred miles of the country they occupied.” See William R. Price, “A Scout Among the Havasupai and Hualapais Indians,” in Eyewitness to the Indian Wars, 1865-1890, ed. Peter Cozzens (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001), 227. While stationed in northern Arizona, American Charles King also wrote of the plateau region, “From northwest to southeast run great parallel ranges of sterile mountains, like waves of the stormiest sea—only that the farther you get into the northeast and northern sections of the territory the more abrupt, jagged, and precipitous they become; the more tumultuous is the upheaval, and from broad valleys lying deep and sheltered between, you come upon narrow, tortuous canyons, so deep, so narrow that while it seems possible to hurl your hat across the widest of the lot, you look down into depths unfathomable, and by winding ‘goat trails’ and hours of dizzying climbing and sliding, sometimes on all fours, you manage to cross.” See “On Campaigning in Arizona,” in Eyewitness to the Indian Wars, 1865-1890, ed. Peter Cozzens (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001), 162; Joan S. Schneider, “Project Background,” in Of Stone and Spirits: Pursuing the Past of Antelope Hill, Technical Series, ed. Joan S. Schneider and Jeffery H. Altusch, no. 76 (Tucson: Statistical Research Publishers, 2000), 14; Landis, 40.

farming. With reliable rivers, adequate rainfall, and nearby mountains that allowed groups to tend gardens without abandoning upland foraging, these southern families had the conditions necessary to adopt domesticated crops without having to drastically alter their subsistence methods. If adopting such plants had required more than modest changes, it is very likely that they would have seen this option as too risky and rejected it, but this was not the case.

After being adopted in the south, domesticated corn and squash spread through kinship trading networks to other areas possessing conditions amenable to cultivation. In the mountainous regions just to the north of the San Pedro River, families living in suitable basins imitated their southern kin by augmenting their available lowland resources with small gardens. Due to their greater likelihood of experiencing drought, however, they continued to rely mostly on wild, upland foods. Similarly, bands residing in higher elevations had to contend with a short frost-free growing season. Thus, like their lowland kin, they adopted horticulture, but protected themselves from crop failure by continuing to devote a lion’s share of their energy to foraging and trading with lowland partners.

Paleoanthropologists identify this new mixture of subsistence strategies characteristic of

---


eastern Arizona as the Mogollon tradition.20

Over time some of these Mogollon farmers migrated northward onto the Colorado Plateau, carrying with them their domesticated plants and horticultural know-how. The Plateau’s arid and unpredictable environment, however, necessitated modifications. The end result was the emergence of dry farming techniques that maximized the region’s high water table and hedged against localized crop failure through multi-zone plantings. At the time it seemed that this new, sparse society would be ephemeral and destined to fade away; yet, in looking back, it is plain to see that this was not a trivial settlement. On the contrary, these hardy migrants’ descendents would one day become the Western Branch of the fabled Anasazi culture.21

Unlike the southern and eastern valleys, which were suited to floodwater farming, the central basins offered an ideal setting for irrigation horticulture as they hosted two large, perennial rivers filled with ample supplies of water and soil-replenishing silt. Bands living along the Gila River were the first to adopt this more intensive and thus dependent form of


cultivation by minimizing risks associated with crop failure. They did this by reinforcing upland trade contacts and by actively nurturing wild plants in the surrounding deserts. Due to this ingenuity, these riverine bands were the first to produce a consistent surplus of food, which eventually allowed them to settle in permanent villages. Once established, these sedentary farmers then started down the path to become Arizona’s first complex civilization: the Hohokam.^[22]

As would be expected, bands living in the far west had the most difficulty adopting crops as low rainfall, ephemeral streams, and long distances separating fertile lowlands from upland resources frustrated their efforts. Even along the Colorado River farming was precarious due to its regular and often violent floods. Groups who managed to cultivate domesticated plants protected themselves by maintaining extensive trading contacts and by continuing to rely on desert-adapted gathering and hunting techniques. Families who decided to forsake crops persisted in a mobile existence and reaped peripheral benefits by trading with riverine settlements along the Colorado River and in the Hohokam basins. Paleoanthropologists identify this last cultural tradition as the Patayan.^[23]

---


^[23] Later accounts of life on the river illustrate the difficulties the Indians faced. According to the commander of Fort Mojave, established in 1859, “The surrounding country is a desert except in the river bottoms and sloughs [,] chiefly below the post where the Indians are able to raise some Corn, Beans, [sic] melons, and pumpkins after the overflow in May and June. The Chief [sic] reliance of the Indians however is the mesquite bean. The mountains on either side of the river are barren and destitute of timber, springs of water are seldom found, and the sterility of the country is apparent in every direction as far are the eye can reach.” See Irene J. Brenan, ed., *Fort Mojave, 1839-1890: Letters of the Commanding Officers* (Manhattan, KS: MA/AH Publishing, 1980), 95; Landis, 39-40; Joan S. Schneider, "Project Setting and History," in *Of Stone and Spirits: Pursuing The Past of Antelope Hill*, ed. Joan S. Schneider and Jeffery H. Altschul (Tucson: Statistical Research, 2000), 14.

12

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Regardless of the level at which different groups practiced horticulture, unprocessed corn was not sufficiently nutritious to allow even part-time farmers to rely on it as a dietary staple. Those who tried would have experienced the ravages of malnutrition due to a lack of protein and essential amino acids such as lysine and tryptophan, as well as deficiencies in niacin, calcium, and iron. Consequently, Arizona’s prehistoric inhabitants did not reduce their reliance on wild plants until they acquired domesticated legumes and advanced food processing techniques. This occurred around 1 C.E. when Mesoamerican beans and ceramic boiling pots traveled up the same southern trade routes that corn and squash had arrived along years earlier.24

Legumes provided protein and the amino acids tryptophan and lysine, while ceramic cooking vessels allowed for boiling, which released corn’s nutritious inner core and leached minerals into the resulting gruel. Once these additions to domesticated food production took hold, southern families living where water supplies minimized the risk of crop failure and nearby mountains allowed for quick trips to upland zones, slowly began expanding their gardens. Then, as before, once these peoples adopted this more dependent form of subsistence, related bands living in adjacent territories slowly copied their innovations.25

As domesticated foods became prominent in the Southwestern diet, farming families discovered that they would need to save an adequate supply of seeds from one year to the next to allow for future crops. While storage pits and basketry were already established as


25 Ibid.
means for caching foods, neither method proved reliable for the type of moisture-free and vermin resistant storage that seed-corn required. Some innovators eventually realized that the same ceramic pots that were capable of withstanding boiling water could be altered to make them almost airtight. Once this happened, these bands then began storing not only seeds but also surplus food.26

From approximately 200 to 600 C.E., bean cultivation, pottery technology, and other accoutrements of sedentary living spread throughout Arizona. As each group adopted these innovations, new cultural forms began to appear that ranged from minor modifications of older traditions to dramatic new lifeways. In the Eastern Mountains, on the Colorado Plateau, and in the western deserts, where rain was unpredictable and either frost or scorching heat plagued the growing season, change was minimal as families added beans and ceramics, but continued to rely mainly on foraging and hunting for meeting day-to-day needs.27

In the southern basins alterations were more pronounced as floodwater gardens expanded, yet even here families did not become overly dependent on crops, as they still feared drought-induced shortages. As a result, they buffered against possible crop failure by continuing to devote some of their time and energy to older foraging and trading practices. The most dramatic and sweeping transformation appeared along the Gila and Salt Rivers where bands expanded and elaborated their irrigation networks and in the

26 Huckell, 14-5; Whittlesey, 138, 161, 163; Gilman, 8-9.
process reorganized their sociopolitical system to form Arizona’s first complex society.28

These myriad variations in regional subsistence practices derived mainly from environmental constraints, yet they also emanated from choices groups made as they evaluated the feasibility of adopting a more sedentary lifestyle. In the short-term these decisions were perfectly rational, however, as with most human actions, no matter how well planned, such choices can result in long-term, unforeseen consequences. This was certainly the case with the storage of surplus food.

While full-time farming assured families access to sufficient amounts of essential nutrients when growing conditions were optimal, the erratic climate could easily force a hasty return to foraging when drought or floods decimated crops. Storing surplus food in flush years became a way to lessen the likelihood of this occurring. Although, the practice of dividing harvests into discrete units created new difficulties as it redirected food allocation away from communal sharing and toward private household ownership and use. This then resulted in new and unsettling confrontations as communities attempted to adjust to this redefinition of property and potential unequal distribution of resources.29

Evidence of bands devising new rituals to manage these conflicts first appears in the archaeological record in approximately 700 C.E. with construction of “great houses” in the south. These were larger than normal pithouses that lacked residential hearths and storage features. Later, large kivas, which were dug deeper into the ground, appeared in

---

28 Mark R. Hackbarth, Archaeological and Archival Investigation of the Las Canopas: The Esteban Park Project, Pueblo Grande Museum Anthropological Papers, Forward by Todd W. Bostwick, no. 6 (Phoenix: City of Phoenix Parks, Recreation, and Library Department, 1997), 7-9; Chester W. Shaw and Richard Ciolek-Torrello, 18; Klucas, 135.

29 Plog, 184-5; Gilman, 6-9; Chester W. Shaw and Richard Ciolek-Torrello, 423; Richard Ciolek-Torrello, “Summary,” 271.
the east, while platform mounds and ballcourts reminiscent of Mesoamerica sprang up in the central basins. In each instance these new, more public venues, signified that groups now found it necessary to perform community rituals to formalize obligations of reciprocity.30

Of all the emerging sedentary groups, the Hohokam displayed the most elaboration in developing these new ceremonial structures. The probable reason for this is that by the 700s C.E. the number of families living along the Gila and Salt Rivers was beginning to reach the river's carrying capacity, which created three significant, interrelated problems. First, canal residents had to find ways to equitably distribute finite supplies of land and water amongst themselves. Second, families had to develop a system for deflecting challenges from outsiders seeking access to irrigation sites. And third, these now dependent farmers had to strengthen trading ties with people living in areas unaffected by local weather fluctuations as insurance against starvation in years with low-river flows.31

To effectively respond to all three dilemmas, the Hohokam chose to subdivide their ritual system so as to address matters related to trade, conflict resolution, and alliance building in distinct settings. Most likely they built platform mounds for mediating conflicts among canal families, and Mesoamerican-like ballcourts for soothing tensions with outsiders and greasing the wheels of trade. From a pragmatic perspective, this duality gave the Hohokam more flexibility in managing their increasingly complex reality without

---

30 Plog, 186-7, 192-3; Fried, 144-5; Upman, "Decoupling," 12; Gilman, 70-1.

having to create a centralized, hierarchical political system to dictate resolutions.\textsuperscript{32}

In general, platform mounds were located in residential areas, and served as arenas for conducting rituals to ensure adequate rainfall, to communicate with supernatural forces for other purposes, and to stress the necessity of abiding by the rules of reciprocity.

Ballcourts, on the other hand, were located toward the edge of settlements and appear to have hosted games that involved both spectators and players. Ballgames would have allowed people lacking kinship ties to come together in a controlled setting to bond and dissipate the potential for violence through rigorous physical activity.\textsuperscript{33}

New ceremonial structures such as kivas and ballcourts would have also facilitated the advent of new administrative positions. This is not to say that communities would have abandoned older forms of leadership, circumscribed as they were by context and consensus, but instead that these public venues would have broadened their conception of authority. To clarify, there is a distinction between authority and power. Positions of authority are most prevalent in societies just beginning to develop beyond egalitarian, familial bands. In this context, authority is the ability to influence behavior without the clout to mete out punishment for refusal to cooperate. Power, on the other hand, usually appears in later stages of socioeconomic development and includes the unchallenged right to reward or punish other community members. As Hohokam society was comprised of

\begin{footnotes}

\item[33]Richard Eflfland and Barbara MacNider, \textit{Egalitarian Hierarchies?}, <http://www.mc.maricopa.edu/dept/d10/ash/lost_tribes/leadership.html> (2 September 2003); Odenkirk, Internet; Plog, 192-4.
\end{footnotes}
leaders with authority, but not power, anyone seeking a higher ceremonial status would have had to still rely mainly on persuasion to gain and keep public support.\textsuperscript{34}

Traditionally, a person could attract followers by excelling in areas such as warfare, craft production, hunting, or medicine. To address additional complications that came with sedentary living, Arizona's central communities most likely expanded this list to include the ability to fairly redistribute resources and the knack for circumventing crop failure by appeasing supernatural forces. Thus, ambitious individuals could now achieve a differentiation in status if they could keep family members and trading partners sufficiently supplied with resources. Or, a person could attain a position of prominence if they exhibited a penchant for combining the cycles of the sun and the moon with patterns of floods and droughts into a predictive system that reliably produced healthy harvests. Obviously, anyone who exhibited skill in both areas stood the best chance of winning and maintaining community fidelity.\textsuperscript{35}

Of these two forms of leadership, the more difficult, and thus tenuous, was that of weather prognosticator. To untangle the mysteries of nature, they would have had to engage in analytical processes to allow them to explain the unknown in terms of the known. Those who succeeded probably did so by working inductively, that is, reasoning that if events with clear cause and effect relationships occurred due to the actions of physical beings, then events lacking clear causes must be the result of supernatural intervention. Likewise, if humans could understand and influence the behavior of visible


\textsuperscript{35} Effland and MacNider, Egalitarian Hierarchies, Internet.
organism, then there ought to be mechanisms for doing the same with entities beyond
human sight.\textsuperscript{36}

Just explaining these relationships would not have been enough, however, as they also
would have had to demonstrate a personal affinity for communicating with and placating
these mystical forces. Unfortunately, the naturally unpredictable Southwestern climate
probably turned many of their well-crafted predictions into lies, making it difficult for such
men and women to maintain community allegiance. In the best case scenario, a
discredited forecaster would have merely lost status, while in the worst case such a person
could have been accused of witchcraft and ostracized from the group. Ultimately, this
linking of Hohokam social authority to the Southwest's mercurial climate, most likely
introduced an element of instability into their political structures that eventually
undermined their ability to maintain cohesion during times of crisis.\textsuperscript{37}

Evidence of leadership positions associated with socioeconomic authority also appears
in Arizona's archaeological record in the 700s C.E. The first signs emerged at a Hohokam
village archaeologists call Snaketown. Located at the confluence of the Gila and Santa
Cruz Rivers, the site's founding families apparently began at this time to leverage their
prime location into increased wealth and political authority.

Two complimentary advantages afforded them this opportunity. First, living between

\textsuperscript{36} Winifred Creamer, "The Origins of Centralization: Changing Features of Local and Regional
Haas (New York: Kluwer Academic/Penum Publisher, 2001), 56; Stephen Plog, \textit{Ancient People of the
American Southwest} (New York: Thames and Hudson, 1997), 54-5; Hinde, 53-5, 72.

\textsuperscript{37} Plog, \textit{Ancient Peoples}, 178-9.
perennial rivers, they had access to sufficient supplies of irrigation water to produce not
only enough food for subsistence, but also handsome surpluses for trade. And second,
due to the fact that all draft animals capable of hauling large loads had gone extinct in the
Americas, people from across the Southwest used the rivers as highways for moving bulky
items. Thus, the junction of the Gila and Santa Cruz Rivers had the potential to become a
trading hub for goods from as far away as the Pacific Ocean, the Great Plains, and
Mesoamerica. Once they realized this, Snaketown’s elite apparently seized the chance to
expand their influence. They did so by building two platform mounds for consolidating
their lineage’s ability to produce surpluses, and two ballcourts for translating those
surpluses into control over trade in foodstuffs and luxury items—such as macaw feathers,
copper bells, and sea shells.38

From approximately 800 to 1000 C.E. the roots of complex civilization slowly dug
deeper in the central basins, while peoples in the surrounding areas lived in a manner that
was less complicated, yet still reasonably comfortable. During this time the Medieval
Warming Anomaly brought warmer and wetter weather to the Southwest, with increased
rainfall in the lowlands and a longer frost-free growing season in the mountains. Such
salubrious conditions apparently encouraged many families still subsisting by gathering and
hunting to settle down. Evidence shows that some planted gardens near high altitude
water sources, while others sowed crops on floodplains once considered too dry to farm.

38 Lynn Thompson, "Hohokam Luxury Trade," in Center and Periphery: Comparative Studies in
Archaeology, ed. Timothy C. Chapman (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 47–50; Ciolek-Torrello,
"Summary," 273; Joan S. Schneider and Jeffery H. Altshul, 7; Sharon F. Urban, "Shell Artifacts: Beads by
the Hundreds," in El Macayo: A Prehistoric Settlement in the Upper Santa Cruz River Valley, ed.
William L. Deaver and Carla R. Van West (Tucson: Statistical Research, 2001), 113; Jefferson Reid and
Stephanie Whittlesey, The Archaeology of Ancient Arizona (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1997),
88–9.
As this trend accelerated, the density of settlements surrounding the Hohokam villages increased, creating a large pool of new clients for their central exchange network. In response, Snaketown’s leading families extended ballcourts out to these new desert settlements.

On the Colorado Plateau Anasazi families were among those who optimistically moved out onto previously marginal floodplains. A willingness to take such a risk was apparently widespread as many new villages soon appeared. Their success is evident in the substantial masonry storehouses that sprang up during this period on the edges of larger settlements. A similar chain of events also unfolded to the south as Mogollon farmers began growing crops in basins that once had been too arid for cultivation, and at higher elevations where a longer frost-free growing season could now accommodate corn.

While neither the Mogollon nor the Anasazi appear to have been directly connected to the Hohokam trading network, the two peoples did forge closer economic ties through rituals conducted in newly built great kivas. As usual, life changed the least in the far

---

39 During the Medieval Climatic Anomaly, worldwide climates were generally warmer from 850 to 1200. In the Southwest, the climate was also wetter. See Emi Ito Hu et al., Warmer Periods in Alaska Area Not Conflned To Modern Times,<http://www.eurekalert.org/press releas/2001-08/wpi082001.php>(2 September 2003); Steven A. LeBlanc, "Warfare and Aggression in the El Morro Valley, New Mexico," in Deadly Landscapes: Case Studies in Prehistoric Southwestern Warfare, ed. Glen E. Rice and Steven A. LeBlanc (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2001), 45.

40 Fried, 69-79, 112-3, 117, sees such ritual structures as venues for creating affinal ties, and therefore establishing familial rules of reciprocity as the guide for trade between unrelated groups. See also Charles W. Shaw and Richard Ciolek-Torrello, 46; Landis, 41; Carla R. Van West and William L. Deaver, 21; Gilman, 76-7; Hackbarth, Archival, 8-9.

west, yet even there people sowed more crops and some northwestern bands moved into the Hohokam sphere of influence to share in the central basins' good fortune.\textsuperscript{42}

As rivers swelled and watertables bubbled higher, more families settled into a farming lifestyle across the region. Over time, successive good harvests and less rigorous, sedentary living combined to enhance female fertility. As this increased the number of successful pregnancies, the size of the average family grew and the enlarged population accelerated the trend of bringing more land into cultivation. With more muscle power available, extended families now settled in areas that could only be inhabited through intense physical management, (i.e. building irrigation canals, terracing, constructing catchbasins). Ultimately, what this also meant was that Arizona's families were subsidizing their increased population by destroying the wild buffer zones part-time farmers had relied on for generations. This was especially true when drought or floods had destroyed whole harvests.\textsuperscript{43}

The favorable climatic regime not only encouraged bands living along the Santa Cruz and San Pedro Rivers to expand crop production, but also may have given them a sense of economic independence that led these families to withdraw from the larger Hohokam

\textsuperscript{42} Of this, military scout, William R. Price, 230, wrote, "Remnants of cliff dwellings and pottery are observed fifteen or twenty miles above the villages, which would indicate that at some previous date the water had come to the surface much higher up the canyon and that much more land was susceptible to cultivation."

\textsuperscript{43} A human female's reproductive system shuts down in times of nutritional stress; whether due to a lack of food in general, or to a lack of nutrients in particular. When a female has access to a balanced diet and is not expending more calories than she is ingesting, pregnancy hormones reach levels conducive to conception. See Amenorrhea: When Menstruation Goes Away, April 19, 2004, <http://www.mayoclinic.com/Invoke.cfm?objectid=55FAC47F-288C-4F89-83B1701B4B34CAE3>(20 April 2003), Mayo Clinic. Improvement in nutrition and less need to travel also reduces pressure to keep family size small through infanticide. According to Robert McC. Netting, 22-3, once population levels reach a certain upper threshold, humans must abandon extensive subsistence strategies for more intensive methods, or face starvation. See also Paul R. Fish, 37; Susan K. Fish and Paul R. Fish, 133-8; Gilman, 70-1, 76-7; Cavalli-Sforza, 98-9.
ballcourt system. With starvation risks reduced, benefits gained by remaining connected to the central basins apparently were no longer worth the cost of continued subordination.  

At about the same time, the Hohokam began altering their ceremonial complex, most likely in response to these southern villages leaving their trading network, but also due to nomadic bands crowding closer to their canals. Those responsible for these changes began to shift community focus away from ballcourts and toward platform mounds and as such, to the rituals that placated the forces of nature and bound neighbors into peaceful alliances. It is possible that individuals connected to weather prediction spearheaded this sociopolitical transformation, as they saw an opportunity to leverage their supposed connection to the improved climate into real power. By encouraging the building of fewer ballcourts and more platform mounds they could drain influence away from the trading elite and bolster their own clout. Migration away from Snaketown and other Gila River settlements to Salt River sites may be evidence of this.

The end of the Medieval Warming Anomaly in the Southwest began in roughly 1040 C.E. when many parts of Arizona received only 25 percent of the average annual rainfall. In these places inhabitants now faced a future that would once again include the ever-present specters of drought, floods, and famine. Having never lived when climatic variability was the rule instead of the exception, farmers now lacked experience in

---


45 Reid, 103-4; Rice, "Warfare and Massing," 319; Andrews and Bostwick, Desert Farmers; Hackbarth, Archaeological, 8-9.

23
dealing with these once again constant threats. The best response was to either diversify their subsistence base by cultivating drought-resistant wild plants, or to revert back completely to a gathering and hunting way of life. Those who lived where one or the other of these options was possible eventually did so; while the rest found themselves faced with a crisis.  

As circumstances offered this last group little time to contemplate their predicament, many adopted a variety of short-term solutions. Some bands migrated toward remaining lowland rivers. Once arrived, however, they often found established residents on the best sites who were more than willing to defend their positions. Others migrated vertically, hoping to take advantage of smaller, yet numerous mid-elevation springs and streams, yet they soon discovered that the climatic change had appreciably shortened the frost-free growing season. A few even exercised the option of last resort and began raiding existing riverine communities.  

Had the Hohokam ballcourt system still been functioning it may have served as a macroregional institution for ameliorating the growing disparity between the haves and the have-nots. By this time, however, most ballcourts had fallen into disuse. As overpopulation and an inability to improve environmental conditions through greater labor outlays spread through the central basins, Hohokam families began to abandon the most intensely used ritual sites. With their departure the human bonds needed to maintain what  


46 Center For Climate Assessment For The Southwest, "Reconstructing Past Climate In The Southwest," 2002, <http://www.ispe.arizona.edu/climas/research/paleoclimate/overview.html> (25 September 2003); Dean, 13; Lange, 139-143; Kaldahl, 21-4; Rice, 328; Gilman, 79.  

was left of the once elaborate Hohokam ceremonial complex simply faded away.\textsuperscript{48}

As this sequence of events played out in the central basins, people in the Anasazi and Mogollon territories responded to the reappearance of environmental uncertainty with a flurry of innovative, cooperative measures. Discarding their tradition of low intensity, extensive, dry farming, families joined together to augment the region's carrying capacity with muscle power. They built stone walls to catch floodwater and abate erosion; they dug ditches to channel runoff; and they fashioned reservoirs out of natural sinks. Despite only achieving short-term success, their willingness to work cooperatively did buy them a little more time.\textsuperscript{49}

By 1180 C.E., families throughout Arizona were coming to accept that life would once again be lived at the mercy of unpredictable weather cycles. The Hohokam were the last to rebel against this reality with one final burst of activity. They extended existing irrigation networks on the Salt and Gila Rivers and added new channels to remaining secondary streams. Founding families quickly seized control of headgates on both old and new canals, however, leaving lower status bands and newcomers to vie for less desirable positions. Battles erupted when farmers living at the end of each canal discovered that water flow would often be insufficient to reach their fields. With no viable alternative to remaining, terminus groups apparently solicited allies to help them fight for greater shares of water. Most likely, they sought assistance from desert dwelling kin, yet it is also possible that they simply opened their doors to anyone willing to join the struggle. Over


\textsuperscript{49} According to Landis, 20, during periods of drought on the Colorado Plateau, plant life dies out allowing flood waters to wash away topsoil, which then begins a cycle of arroyo cutting. Grahame and Sisk, Internet; Dean, 15, 138; Ciolek-Torrello, "Sites," 230; Netting, 26; Lange, 8-9, 164.
time this strategy proved so successful, that these settlements were able to translate their numerical strength into greater political and ritual power. Large platform mounds appearing at each terminus site is evidence of this phenomenon.\(^5\)

At the same time that Hohokam families were battling each other for water shares, desperate desert raiders began threatening their communities from the outside. Exhibiting an extraordinary gift for compartmentalization, canal residents reacted by suspending internal animosities whenever group survival was at stake.\(^5\) This contextual-based, community cohesion allowed the Hohokam to field fighting forces large enough to drive hostile bands out of surrounding buffer zones and into distant, hilltop settlements. Cooperation also permitted the Hohokam to build defensive fortresses around terminus platform mounds. These sanctuaries had thick adobe walls that allowed club-wielding warriors and archers to strike invaders from above as well as provide protection for whole canal populations below.\(^5\)

Once warfare became an accepted strategy for coping with community problems, vulnerable Hohokam leaders appear to have expanded its use. Spanish explorers observed

\(^5\) Kaldahl, 20-9; Weaver, 95-6; Plog, *Ancient*, 140-3; Klucas and Woodson, 85.

\(^5\) A description of the Yavapai homeland in 1877 offers clues as to the source of their desperation, “We found Mr. Al Blackburn keeping a station at Soda Lake. A spring near the house furnished brackish water, but Mr. Blackburn hauled water in barrels from a much better spring of fresh, sweet water about three miles to the northwest. Around the station lay many dead cattle, each of them dried-up mummies. Near the house were three of them that looked as though they were but lying down to rest; but they had been dead for three years. So dry is the climate that the dead animals, if not eaten by coyotes or foxes, will soon desiccate and remain entire for years.” See Don Maguire, *Gila Monsters and Red-Eyed Rattlesnakes: Don Maguire’s Arizona Trading Expeditions, 1876-1879*, ed. Gary Topping (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 1997), 40.

\(^5\) K.J. Schroeder, *Archaeological Survey of Phoenix’s Papago Park, Maricopa County, Arizona*, Pueblo Grande Museum Technical Report, no. 96 (Phoenix: Parks, Recreation and Library Department, 1996), 17, 33; Camillio C.C. Carr, “The Days of Empire—Arizona, 1886-1869,” in *Eyewitness to the Indian Wars, 1865-1890*, ed. Peter Cozzens (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Book, 2001), 3-22; In 1877, merchant Don Maguire, 79, observed a terminus mound and noted that “Judging from the foundation and for some feet above the foundation, the walls were six feet thick.”
the results of this when they arrived in Arizona in the late seventeenth century and found the Pima Indians, who are the likely Hohokam descendents, battling with Yuman groups on the Colorado River. The Spaniards explained that the Pimans were attacking their neighbors due to a belief that the Yumans had conjured a drought to torment them. The main beneficiaries of such warfare clearly would have been Piman weather prognosticators who would have been able to deflect blame for the arid conditions away from themselves.\(^53\)

This change in war rationale highlights the problems a variety of sedentary leaders faced once the favorable weather cycle came to an end. The return of climatic variability would have made it almost impossible for economic elites to maintain authority as much of their power derived from their ability to create and distribute food surpluses. The situation was doubly hard for individuals who gained deference through their apparent knack for predicting and controlling the elements, as it would now appear that their powers had dissipated.\(^54\)

Even in the less developed regions of the territory, this weakening of centralized authority would have had profound repercussions. In the short term it would have meant that life felt more uncertain and chaotic, while in the long term it would have meant that instead of a stable core society, complete with all the accouterments of complex civilization, setting the pace of regional life, Arizona would revert back to a state of decentralized, insular villages in which people worried more about their next meal than dabbling in the arts, politics, or science.

\(^53\) Van West and Deaver, 23; Carr, 23.
\(^54\) Rice, 319; Netting, 57; Bruan, 66-7.
As conditions worsened, people living on the Colorado Plateau finally reached the point where problems related to environmental degradation—such as arroyo cutting and a dramatic drop in the watertable—forced them to view out migration as the only real solution. The first families to leave seem to have gone into the Mogollon Mountains to settle with extended kin, where they appear to have integrated into existing communities with little or no conflict. Those who departed later apparently gained entrance into non-related Mogollon villages by establishing themselves as craft specialists. Evidence of this comes from areas where Anasazi influences over material culture attained predominance, leading to the submergence of Mogollon forms.\(^5\)

In addition to these short migrations, some Plateau and Mogollon families also traveled into the southern basins. Their reception there, however, was less than welcoming as southern population levels were already high. There was, therefore, little room to accommodate these newcomers. Archaeological evidence indicates that the Mogollon migrants first joined with upland groups and then possibly began raiding riverine settlements. Fear, of these raiders then apparently caused lowland bands to huddle closer together and fortify their perimeters. Real or threatened retaliation by these aggregate villages, they appear to have caused upland residents to move to better-defended, upland sites.\(^6\)

---


\(^6\) Ibid.
This pattern of migration and aggregation repeated itself across Arizona as desperate families joined to either maintain access to scarce resources or to repel invaders. While aggregating was a rational short-term solution, as it offered more muscle power for extensive foraging and defending territory, in the long run it was, to say the least, counterproductive. Within only a few years, residents stripped the land surrounding their settlements of vegetation, and once the forage was gone, so too went the animals that the plants sustained. The result was a depletion of food and fuel that set the stage for a serious macroregional, economic collapse.57

Considering the state of region, it should come as no surprise that by the end of the 1100s C.E., warfare or its threat was ubiquitous throughout Arizona. Mutual suspicion, hoarding, and club-wielding warriors decimated the last ties of camaraderie. Where there was access to stable supplies of water and food, groups fought amongst themselves for fair shares, while simultaneously banding together to repel outsiders. While on the dry peripheries, the less fortunate woke every morning wondering where their next meal would come from and whom they would have to fight to get it.58

With almost no other options remaining, an exodus from aggregate sites began in approximately 1330 C.E. Families living in the Mogollon Mountains either moved to Black Mesa to eventually become the Hopi and Zuni cultures, or broke into small, familial

57 Netting, 26, 57; Dean, 147-8. Of the Anasazi, Dean writes, "Thus, in a span of about 40 years the activities of man produced a profound change in the vegetational pattern of Kiet Siel Canyon. It is possible that the denudation of the bottom lands hastened the destruction of the farmland by the Tsefi-Naha arroyo. In this regard the clearing of the land for agriculture may be compared to the present overgrazing by Navajo stock. While neither may be considered the sole cause of a cycle of erosion, both affect the rate at which the cutting proceeds by destroying the natural plant cover that would inhibit the destructive capabilities of runoff." See also, Landis, 50; Newcomb, 50-1.

58 Ibid., 57.
bands and resumed, as best they could, a mobile hunting and gathering lifestyle. In the Hohokam core, canal residents abandoned large sites, and they or later raiders even burned some villages, such as Casa Grande. Just to the south in the Santa Cruz and San Pedro basins, families resumed an older two-village strategy that divided labor and time among farming, gathering and hunting. Ironically, the people in the far west fared the best in terms of alterations to their lives as they had not destroyed their wild food reserves nor completely given up a mobile existence.  

Eventually, a sense of equilibrium returned to Arizona and for approximately one hundred and fifty years residents survived by once again judiciously partaking of available resources and maximizing their subsistence options through a variety of strategies. With each passing year, the lessons of sedentary living faded, making it likely that if a new wet cycle returned, Arizona’s people would remember too little to quickly return to settled life. In the end, no one will know exactly how they would have reacted, as they never got the opportunity. Before the climate could turn once again in their favor, strangers began arriving and set the region on a new historical course.

The Hohokam constructed homes of adobe, yet they also used timber for roofs and architectural support. See Newcomb, 50-2; Lange, 160-1; Landis, 50. Coronado’s men found the Mesa Pueblos easily defended; they had “a wall of large and small stones at the top, which they could roll down . . . so that no army could possibly be strong enough to capture the village.” They also noted the Pueblos had “room to sow and store a large amount of corn and cisterns to collect snow and water.” See Pedro de Casteñeda, “Account of the Expedition to Cibola which took place in the year 1540, in which all settlements, their ceremonies an customs are described,” in Spanish Explorers in the Southern United States, 1528-1843, ed. Frederick W. Hodge (New York: Barnes & Nobel, 1959), 321.
CHAPTER 2

ATHAPASCANS AND IBERIANS

For approximately one hundred and fifty years after climatic instability and resulting environmental degradation collapsed their sedentary economy, Arizona’s inhabitants practiced older forms of mobile subsistence strategies. If another wet cycle had appeared within two or even three generations, these peoples’ oral traditions would have retained enough memory of sedentism to recreate a new interconnected and complex community. This, however, did not happen and after the fourth and then fifth generations came and went, coping with aridity by judiciously partaking of a mix of wild and cultivated resources once again became the accepted way of life.¹

The next phase in Arizona’s history began almost imperceptibly, and for approximately two hundred years brought subtle, albeit important, changes to local life. While not as dramatic as steady increases in rainfall or the emergence of economic elites, who conduct network-building rituals in ballcourts, in cumulative form, the incremental alterations of this period set the stage for future, more dramatic events.

The forces that influenced Arizona from approximately 1400 to 1600 C. E., were not native to the Southwest, but instead appeared in the form of newcomers who arrived in

the region from distant lands. The first of these groups were Athapascans who emerged from the north after traveling along the Rocky Mountain corridors that connected what is today Alaska with the Northern Plains, the Great Basin, and the Colorado Plateau.²

Compared to other indigenous groups, the Athapascans arrived in the Americas late, in fact almost at the end of the Pleistocene in 10,000 B.C.E. At first they settled along the arctic coast, but they did not stay long as the Inuits, the last Asian group to journey across the Bering land bridge, established camps nearby and eventually pushed the Athapascans inland. With other bands monopolizing alternate sites, the Athapascans continue to move eastward until they reached the interior mountains. These families soon found, however, that their new home lacked abundant sources of food. To sustain themselves, they had to develop new subsistence strategies that placed a greater emphasis on mobility and opportunism. This meant that for most of the year they lived in small, loosely organized bands that could respond quickly whenever an opportunity to exploit a resource arose.³

Throughout North America, many other aboriginal groups also stressed economic flexibility over specialization and social fluidity over strict hierarchical organization, but the Athapascans stood out due to the degree with which they made these two attributes the focal points of their culture. For instance, instead of tracing descent matrilineally to


be assured of familial lineage, the Athapascans appear to have been tracing descent bilaterally to enlarge ties of reciprocity and assure multiple venues of assistance in times of crisis. Athapaskan families also invested individual members with a unique sense of autonomy that encouraged them to follow their instincts; even if such behavior produced long absences or the permanent fracturing a group. And lastly, the archaeological record and ethnographies show that the Athapascans freely adopted technological innovations from allies and strangers alike, regardless of the transforming effect this had on their beliefs and practices.4

In about 1500 B.C.E., this lifeway encouraged some Athapaskan families to move southward when cold and wet weather returned after a long warming cycle. Under this climatic regime, the arctic zone expanded to cover over one thousand miles, which allowed a number of Athapaskan bands to follow the caribou herds into the Arctic Taiga, on the edge of the Northern Plains. A few continued on and crossed the ecological boundary to exploit plains foods such as wild plums and grapes, prickly pears and sunflowers, pronghorn antelope and elk, and even big wooly bison.5

Beginning in 100 C.E., when a new warming trend began, many arctic-adapted species and Plains animals seeking cool summer habitats began moving to the north. Given a choice between retreating with their cold weather resources or maintaining their southern position, a fair number of Athapascans chose to permanently leave their homeland behind. By 200 C.E. some had migrated into the Wyoming Basin where they

---

4 Haskell, 44-49.

encountered Caddoans, and possibly, Algonquian speakers. Over time, through intermarriage and trade alliances, these peoples coalesced into new cultural entity paleoanthropologists call the Avonlea Complex.\(^6\)

Despite their socioeconomic success, a combination of environmental continuity and a sense of individual autonomy compelled many Avonlea Athapascans to keep moving southward. Some of these bands settled for a time along the front range of the Rocky Mountains, where they mingled and merged with Plains Kiowa-Taonans and desert-dwelling Uto-Aztecans. This new mixing created the Fremont Culture, which blended the three subsistence systems into economic strategies that allowed practitioners to move easily between ecological zones. As such, Fremont families spread into Rocky Mountain valleys and the Great Basin, while others migrated into the northern reaches of present-day Arizona and New Mexico.\(^7\)

In the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, these Fremont families faced the same drought-induced subsistence crisis that had forced Arizona’s inhabitants to revert back to simpler economic strategies. In response, they also adopted less intense subsistence practices and began to abandon depleted sites. Searching for greener pastures, some traveled onto the high plains of Wyoming and Colorado, while others migrated onto the Colorado Plateau. The first group became the founders of the Jicarilla Apaches, while the

---


second eventually splintered to become the Navajo and the Mescalero and Gila Apaches.\(^8\)

On the Colorado Plateau, low precipitation made it very difficult for even small bands to survive. Wide-ranging animals capable of digesting tough scrub offered access to protein, but the plant life consisted mostly of vegetation that humans cannot digest. These Athapascans possessed horticultural skills, yet the Plateau lacked sufficient water for full-time farming, and the frost-free season in the wetter uplands was too short for corn. It soon became evident that newly arrived bands would either have to keep moving or devise strategies to overcome these ecological obstacles. Those who stayed created a system in which they procured a surplus of reliable animal-based commodities and then forged trading alliances with neighbors possessing complimentary carbohydrates.\(^9\)

The closest and most attractive trading partners for these Fremont Athapascans were the Puebloan farmers in northern New Mexico. Luckily for them, the Puebloans were willing to exchange their surpluses of carbohydrate-rich crops and sundry manufactured wares (e.g. blankets and pottery) for the Athapascans’ hunted goods (e.g. protein, fat, and furs). As the relationship developed, the Athapascans became the more dependent partner, as they had more difficulty finding alternative sources of carbohydrates than the Puebloans did finding other sources of meat. Consequently, it is likely that the Athapascans engaged in some level of intimidation to ensure that the Puebloans would continue to trade. In fact, had this process continued without disruption, the Athapascans

---


\(^9\) Spielman, 13.
would have, in their own self-interest, asserted a certain level of control over the larger regional system of trade. Before this could happen, however, a second group of outsiders appeared in the form of a black explorer and a Spanish padre.10

Once the Spanish established a colonial base in the Caribbean late in the fifteenth century, eager Spaniards gazed out from the islands, impatient to seize gold and win glory. These would-be conquistadores were well-versed in the arts of conquest as they were the product of a culture that had just recently emerged from centuries of repeated conquests. Moving westward across the Mediterranean, Phoenicians, Greeks, Romans, Visigoths, and Moorish Berbers had all in various degrees and at various times laid claim to Iberia and her people.11 After some invasions, lengthy occupations had even followed, with each leaving an indelible mark on the Hispanic psyche. As such, by the time Iberians set out on their own colonizing adventures, they carried with them a well-tested blueprint for achieving hegemony in distant lands.12

10 Coronado's chronicler, Casteñeda, 333, 363, wrote that the Plains Apaches "do not have any crockery [ceramic vessels] in this region. They do not make gourds, nor sow corn, nor eat bread, but instead [eat] raw meat—or only half cooked—or fruit." This is slightly misleading as these Indians were not surviving on meat alone. As Casteñeda unknowingly corrects himself when he writes, "When they open the belly of a cow [sic], they squeeze out the chewed grass and drink the juice that remains behind . . ." As humans cannot digest cellulous grasses due to a lack of stomach enzymes, the Apaches were taking advantage of pre-digested plant material. See also Katherine Spielman, "Coercion or Cooperation? Plains-Pueblo Interaction in the Protohistoric Period," in Hunters, Farmers, and Colonists: Interaction Between the Southwest and the Southern Plains, ed. Katherine Spielman (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1991), 36-7.


One of the main benefits Iberians gained from their long contact with more complex societies was an accelerated acquisition of technology. Once innovations born of sedentary living emerged in the Fertile Crescent, they spread westward along the Mediterranean through both conquest and trade. The Iberians, therefore, gained access to new ideas and tools without having to undergo the slow, organic processes of innovation. Instead, revolutionary breakthroughs in areas such as transportation and communication simply arrived on their shores.¹³

Iberians also benefited from their prolonged contact with people who looked and behaved differently, in that it taught them to view the world as a place inhabited by people with differing phenotypes, customs, languages, and religious beliefs. Because of this, Iberians could imagine a reality that was far more diverse than anything the Amerindians could envision, as New World topography tended to isolate social groups. Ultimately, this made Iberians more resistant to the element of surprise and therefore to uncertainty during instances of first contact with strangers.¹⁴

Proof that this more expansive worldview assisted the Iberians during encounters with new societies comes from Hernan Cortés’ conquest of the Aztecs. After arriving in the Caribbean, the Spanish spent twenty-seven years gathering information about the New

---


¹⁴ Columbus discovered the Caribbean in October of 1492. For the next twenty years, the Spanish and later the Portuguese conducted reconnaissance along the eastern coast of Mesoamerica. Trips inland were brief and often resulted in the death of some explorers, yet enough data was collected, that when Cortés and his men landed at what is now Vera Cruz, they were not shocked to discover people who looked and behaved differently. For a soldier’s perspective on the events that led to the fall of the Aztecs, see Bernal Diaz, *The Conquest of New Spain*, trans. J.M. Cohen (New York: The Penguin Group, 1963). For Cortés’ views, see Hernan Cortés, *Letters From Mexico*, trans. ed. Anthony Pegden, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986).
World. They expected to find unfamiliar societies and understood that reliable information would assist in maintaining the upper hand at the moment of contact. This meant that Cortés already had an abundance of reconnaissance data even before he set sail in 1519. Once on the mainland, he then took another two years to study Mesoamerican society before finally attacking the Mexican capital of Tenochtitlán in November of 1521.

Already being familiar with other foreign polities, Cortés, therefore, knew that there had to be head of state somewhere along with a political apparatus for wielding power. His challenge was to learn as much about them as need be to plot an appropriate course of action.\(^{15}\)

It was Montezuma who faced the larger dilemma as he had no frame of reference from within which to evaluate these bearded, light-skinned men from across the sea. Thus, his response to the Spaniards was fatally inappropriate, as he hesitated, then assumed the strangers were gods. This assessment was unfortunate, as it gave Montezuma few options for saving himself and his people. Thus, Cortés' challenge was not the actual takeover of Tenochtitlán, as he had leeway with which to plot each of his moves. Instead, his utmost problem was the illegitimacy of his actions, as he lacked a royal contract authorizing him to lead the conquest.\(^{16}\)

\(^{15}\) Ibid.

\(^{16}\) The Spanish discovery and occupation of the New World was done under the aegis of the Kingdom of Castile; not Spain as a nation, as that did not exist yet. Neither Isabella nor Ferdinand wanted to expend their own money to finance wars or exploration, so they relied on the medieval practice of “hiring” men to undertake such adventures at their own expense. This made better economic sense; successful conquerors received confirmation of legitimacy and a share of the treasure. See Henry Kamen, Empire: How Spain Became a World Power, 1492-1763 (New York, HarperCollins, 2003), 27, 36, 98, 100.
This is why, once Cortés had Tenochtitlán under his command, he quickly appealed to the Crown for post hoc authorization. After the King recognized the conqueror’s fait accompli, Cortés then began dividing the spoils of war among his men. Those who participated garnered what they believed would be permanent shares of the Mexican empire, while those who arrived on the heels of conquest were left to watch with envy and dream of setting out on their own grand adventures.\(^{17}\)

In Spain, the young Castilian King Carlos I, also known as Holy Roman Emperor Charles V, was plotting to increase his control over various European and Mediterranean principalities when news of Cortés’ triumph arrived. Imbued with a millennialistic spirit and suffering from a chronically empty war chest, Charles and his advisors choose to view the New World and its vast wealth as a holy subsidy for spreading the Catholic faith.\(^{18}\)

While pleased with his new colony, Charles, as were his grandparents, was jealous of power and understood the threat Cortés posed if not sufficiently hobbled. As a result, there was no doubt in the King’s mind that Cortés’ wings needed to be clipped, what was not clear was how to do so without discouraging other warriors from expending their own wealth and health to expand Spain’s empire. This quandary, more than almost anything else, explains the many contradictions in Spain’s colonial policies. On the one hand, the Crown wanted to encourage bold and often brutal action in the name of conquest; while on the other hand, it wanted to circumscribe individual initiative and discourage conquistadors from siphoning off tribute and wielding undue power over new vassals.\(^{19}\)

---

\(^{17}\) Kamen, *Empire* 105, 117.


\(^{19}\) Kamen, *Empire*, 79-80.
The first expedition to the north of Tenochtitlán occurred as a result of one of the Crown’s plans to weaken Cortés’ power. In 1528, the King sought to undermine Cortés by making one of his chief political rivals, Nuño de Guzmán, the lead judge of New Spain’s Audiencia. Charles authorized Guzmán to use his office to expose any malfeasance on the conquistador’s part. In the end, however, it was Guzmán who soon found himself in trouble with the Crown. Charged with corruption and abuse of power, in 1529, Guzmán made a hasty exit from Mexico City to escape from the authorities. To divert attention from his misdeeds, Guzmán announced a plan to seek new Indian civilizations, quickly gathered eager recruits, and headed north along Mesoamerica’s western coast. Employing slash and burn tactics, the Guzmán’s expedition found little real wealth to seize; this, however, did not stop them from confiscating caches of Indian food and exploiting Indian labor under slave-like conditions.

At the same time Guzmán was wrecking havoc on the west coast, on the east coast, the survivors of Pánfilo de Narváez’s expedition to Florida—Alvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca, Alonzo del Castillo Maldonado, André Dorantes de Carraça, and Dorantes’ slave Estévan—were making their way back inland across the southern plains. The four men spent almost eight years wandering westward, including a brief pass through southeastern Arizona, before eventually making their way to Spanish-held territory. Chronicles of the journey described native groups suffering from drought and living in a state of nutritional privation, as well as the Spaniards’ acts of slaving, rape, and other forms of terrorism.

20 A Spanish court with judicial and legislative powers.

21 John L. Kessel, Spain in the Southwest: A Narrative History of Colonial New Mexico, Arizona, Texas, and California (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 2002), 22-6; Casteñeda, 285-7; Kamen, Empire, 118.
Upon their return, however, it was not vivid stories of Indian life that intrigued captivated audiences, but instead Vaca’s tale of seven distant cities filled with thousands of vassals and buildings constructed of shimmering gold.\textsuperscript{22}

Upon hearing this tale, impatient men wasted no time lobbying representatives of the Crown for the honor of bringing these cities into the Spanish domain. In the end, it fell to Viceroy Antonio de Mendoza to decide who would go. As he was under orders to keep greedy and reckless behavior in check, Mendoza selected Fray Marcos de Niza to accompany the slave Estévan on a reconnaissance mission to the north. In his directive to Marcos, the Viceroy instructed him to:

Take much care to observe the people who are there, if they be many or few, and if they are scattered or live in communities; [note] the quality and fertility [of the soil], the temperature of the country, the trees and plants and domestic and feral animals which may be there, the nature of the ground whether rough or level; the rivers, if they are large or small, and the minerals and metals which are there; and of the things of which you may be able to send or bring specimens, bring them or send them, in order that his majesty may be advised of everything.\textsuperscript{23}

And then, in almost the last paragraph, the Viceroy remembered his duty to the Pope and his Christian God, “And if God, Our Lord, is so served that you find some large settlement, where it appears to you there is a good situation to establish a monastery and to send friars to undertake the conversion, you shall send information by Indians or return yourself to Culiacan.”\textsuperscript{24}


\textsuperscript{23} Cleve Hallenbeck, \textit{The Journey of Fray Marcos de Niza} (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1987), 10-11; Casteñeda, 288.

\textsuperscript{24} Hallenbeck, 12.
On his journey, Fray Marcos dutifully made note of land suited for farming and ranching, native material culture, and any details pertaining to the northern cities. In fact, his report is filled with so much enthusiasm that it reads more like a fable than a truthful account. The padre did experience some difficulty along the way, yet it was not with the Indians. Instead, it was his companion Estévan, who apparently never declined an offer of female companionship, which raised Marcos’ ire. Eventually, the missionary decided to be rid of him and sent Estévan ahead to prepare the Indians of Cibola for his arrival. In the end, Estévan’s arrogance was his undoing; for when he arrived at the Zuni Pueblo, his antics offended the Zuni to such an extent that they killed him. Unaware of this, Marcos continued moving slowly northward until he reached the Sobaipuri Indians living along the San Pedro River in southeastern Arizona.

After resting, he traveled for four more days and encountered the Sobaipuri’s trading partners, the Southeastern Yavapai. As Marcos found no people living in-between, neither the Chiricahua nor Western bands of the Athapascan Apaches must have yet arrived in the region that would later become their home. As he traveled toward Zuni Pueblo, Marcos encountered one of the Indian guides that had gone ahead with Estévan; the frantic man told him of Estévan’ fate. Once Marcos heard this, he was too frightened to make contact with the Zuni, so, instead, he observed their mesa-top pueblo from a safe distance and

---

25 Winship, 102; Castañeda, 288-9.
26 These people were most likely the descendants of the Anasazi and Mogollon peoples.
27 This shows that the Yavapai were far to the southeast of the northwestern boundary of the Colorado Plateau; offering compelling evidence that it very well could have been the Yavapai, and not the Apaches, who latter attacked Euro-American settlers in the central valleys.
then retreated back to Mexico City.  

For some unknown reason, upon his return, Fray Marcos exaggerated the details of what he had seen. Not only did he relate his true discoveries of prime sites for future Spanish settlements and missions, but he also fabricated a story in which he made contact with residents of one of the seven cities of gold. His glowing report set Mexico City abuzz and Viceroy Mendoza wasted no time selecting his friend Francisco Vázquez de Coronado to bring Cibola and the other northern cities into the Spanish realm. As was typical, Coronado agreed to self-finance his expedition and to abide by restrictions to limit abusive behavior among his men.  

Before the Coronado expedition departed, Viceroy Mendoza ordered Hernando de Alarcon to take the baggage Coronado’s men could not carry and to sail as far as possible up the west coast. He was to then wait to rendezvous with the explorers. Once these logistical matters were settled, and after much pomp and circumstance, Coronado and his band of over one thousand men headed north. The Spaniards, however, were not adequately prepared to deal with the desert’s dearth of wild food and water. As such, it was not long before many men became desperate for fresh provisions. Consequently, the expedition paid little notice to the resource-poor Indian settlements in Arizona and instead marched directly to the comparatively well-off Pueblo villages. Coronado’s chronicler even called the barren region between the San Pedro River and the Zuni Pueblo “the

---


29 Casteñeda, 291.
Following an initial confrontation, the Puebloans willingly offered the newcomers gifts of corn and blankets as well as access to their wells. When the Spaniards continued to demand more, however, conflict erupted. From the Spanish point of view, the relationship fell under the purview of conquest, so there was no need to take Indian concerns into consideration. Thus, when one village finally refused to continue “trading,” it reaped a whirlwind as outraged Spaniards set it ablaze. Once the Indians learned the consequences of resisting, the Spaniards then declared the territory sufficiently “pacified.” At this point, Captain Juan Gallego left with Fray Marcos to report their findings to the Viceroy as “he did not think it was safe for him [Marcos] to stay in Cibola, seeing that his report had turned out to be entirely false . . .”

After establishing themselves at the Zuni Pueblo, Coronado ordered his men to reconnoiter the region. Some marched westward until they met the Yuman-speaking Maricopa Indians at the junction of the Gila and Colorado Rivers. They were much impressed by the natives’ size and physical strength. As the Spaniards traveled further down the Colorado, they found a tree marked “Alarcon reached this place.” Curious, they dug at the bottom of the tree and found letters explaining that Alarcon had traveled as far up the Colorado as possible, waited, ran low on provisions, and turned back. At the same time, these men were reading Alarcon’s letter, other explorers, under the command of Don

---

30 Casteñeda, 294-6, 299.

Garcia Lopez de Cárdenas, were staring awestruck over the edge of the Grand Canyon. They marveled at its sheer beauty and were baffled as to how the Indians navigated down the canyon's jagged walls to reach the bottom. What impressed both parties the most, however, was the Colorado Plateau's utter lack of water for miles on end. One Indian guide told the Spaniards, "there was no water within three or four days, [and] when they travell[ed] across this region themselves they [took] with them women loaded with water in gourds . . ."\(^{32}\)

Hoping to rid themselves of the Spanish parasites, the Puebloans directed Coronado farther to the north. They assured him that if he and his men would only leave, they would discover immeasurable wealth just beyond the horizon. Coronado eventually took the bait, but only left with a small party of men to search for the rich city the Indians called Grand Quivara. Along the way, Coronado's chronicler noted their first meeting with a group of Athapascans. He described them as expert buffalo hunters who "lived like Arabs" and utilized every part of their giant prey.\(^{33}\) Had Coronado arrived later he would have discovered these plains hunters moving south to trade meat for corn at the Pueblos, but as this was their prime-hunting season, the Athapascans were miles away. When Quivara turned out to be nothing more than a diversion, Coronado garroted his native guide and returned to the Pueblos.\(^{34}\)

\(^{32}\) Coronado and his men had similar difficulty finding water near the Pueblos in New Mexico, "they left the camping place and mid-day of the third day, when they saw some snow-covered mountains, toward which they went in search of water, neither the Spanish nor the horses nor the servants [had] drank anything." As cited in Casteñeda, 303, 309-10, 14.

\(^{33}\) This demonstrates the Iberians much broader frame of reference when it came to categorizing unknown ethnic groups.

\(^{34}\) Casteñeda, 330, 337; Jaramillo, 100; Ives, 47.
Disillusioned, Coronado left New Mexico in 1542, marching again across the “wilderness” of eastern Arizona. His exposure of Fray Marco’s ruse dampened further interest in the far north for about forty years. In New Mexico, however, the chaos wrought by the Spaniards surely lingered. With some of their villages burned and their stores of corn and blankets depleted, the Puebloans would have had little to exchange when the Athapascans arrived. This may have sparked a conflict and created a more adversarial relationship between the two peoples. If this were the case, it would explain why the next Spanish explorers found the Athapascans attacking the Pueblos to force them to relinquish their caches food.\textsuperscript{35}

The next Spanish exploring party of consequence for Arizona reached the Southwest in 1598. Under the direction of Don Juan de Oñate, this second group of conquerors also arrived weary and short of food. At first Oñate sought to replenish their supplies by soliciting Indian hospitality, yet as soon as he met resistance, the Conquistador resorted to a level of violence reminiscent of Coronado’s abuse.\textsuperscript{36}

Unbeknownst to Oñate, at the time, the Puebloans were under increasing subsistence pressure due to an extended period of aridity, which had begun in the 1560s. Since about 1400 the region had been in a less-than-average precipitation cycle, but the years 1579 to 1585 were extremely dry. This overall drought phase lasted until 1790, which meant that for approximately one hundred years, there was not enough rain to adequately sustain

\textsuperscript{35} Casteñeda, 375; Spielman, "Coercion," 36-7.

agriculture or livestock. The proximate effect of this climatic regime was repeated failed harvests and resulting famine, while the remote effect was the desertification of the Colorado Plateau and the migration of some of the Athapascans southward into west-central New Mexico.

The first Athapasean families to arrive, whom the Spanish called the Gila Apaches, initially congregated in New Mexico's Distal Mountains. They then slowly moved closer to the Pueblos and eventually settled in the foothills flanking the Rio Grande River. At the same time, a second Athapascan group, whom the Spanish called the Navajo, emerged from the northwest and settled in the upper San Juan River drainage. These two Athapascan populations shared linguistic and cultural traits, yet they had been separated for so long that neither now viewed other as a familial ally.

The Athapascan newcomers found ample space to settle, as they had migrated into the territory previous Anasazi and Mogollon residents had abandoned in the 1330s. Ecological conditions had not demonstrably improved since that time, so there was no resident

---


38 These bands had moved into northwest New Mexico during the last dry cycle, then remained and did not migrate onto the Plains. It is most likely that they were living on the Colorado Plateau in small horticultural communities when the Spanish arrived. When they began to feel the effects of the drought, they migrated toward the Pueblos, attracted by their surplus agricultural, as well as by Spanish livestock. See Ives, 47; Haskell, 82-3.

39 Haskell, 82-3; Ives, 48-9.
population to resist them. The Athapascans' biggest concern, then, was not trespassing on claimed territory, but instead how to find enough food and water to survive. Fortunately, as ingenuity was a hallmark of their culture, this was not an overwhelming obstacle. Over time, they adapted through various combinations of horticulture, extensive exploitation of wild foods, and maintaining trade connections with the Puebloans through both negotiation and intimidation.\(^{40}\)

The one long-term variable that the Athapascans had not encountered before was the effects Europeans had on the native economy. The Spaniards regularly consumed more than their share of food, water, and fuel, and their free-roaming cattle and sheep scoured unfenced Indian fields and decimated desert-adapted plants. Faced with such overwhelming competition for resources, the Athapascans eventually had to look for new sources of subsistence to augment the Puebloans crops and Mother Nature's bounty.\(^ {41}\)

Considering the circumstances, it did not take long for them to shift their focus to Spanish livestock and advanced trade goods. Initial contacts indicate that the Athapascans would have willingly entered into peaceful trading relations had the opportunity been offered. But with Spanish soldiers and administrative officials seeking wealth through Indian slaving, early close encounters with Spaniards often cost Athapascans their freedom and sometimes even their lives. Consequently, instead of a nonviolent, reciprocating relationship developing, one based instead on kidnapping, raiding, and retaliatory warfare


Disappointed by the prospects of his quasi-feudal estate, in 1604 Oñate decided to venture out and explore beyond New Mexico’s boundaries. In doing so, he also fulfilled his pledge to the Crown to seek a passage from New Mexico to California. Such a route was important to the Spanish government for three reasons. First, little was actually known about California and the King wanted an efficient and safe route for reconnaissance teams to travel. Second, the Monarch wanted access to the region’s natural ports to better establish trade with China. And third, officials still hoped that a clear passage would be found connecting the Atlantic to the Pacific so as to eliminate the need to explore on horseback.

To reach California, Oñate’s party decided to travel across Arizona’s northern plateau. On their way, they vigilantly scouted for signs of mineral deposits. As such, upon meeting a group of Indians, most likely Yavapais, in what is now the San Francisco Mountains, Oñate inquired about the colored ores the Indians had painted on their bodies. When an older man explained how they extracted the ores from a spot in the mountains, Oñate asked to be taken to the place. He later wrote that the mine “had a very large dump, where there were many and apparently very good ores...”


44 Ibid., 244.
Similar to Fray Marcos, Oñate apparently did not encounter Apache bands living along the Mogollon Rim. Exactly when the Athapascans, known as the Western Apaches, arrived in eastern Arizona is uncertain, as scholars are still not sure of their location prior to migrating into the Southwest. While there is no doubt that the Athapascans who moved into Arizona's southeastern Chiricahua Mountains originated with the Gila Apaches in New Mexico, researchers disagree over whether the Western Apaches were also an extension of the Gila bands, or if they were subgroup of Fremont Athapascans from somewhere on the Colorado Plateau. The first theory rests mainly on the proximate location of the Gila Apaches to the Western bands, while confidence in the second hypothesis derives from the fact that the Gila and Western Apaches maintained a buffer zone between them and rarely worked in concerted effort.\footnote{Perry, 148-50. Most information on the Apaches comes from ethnographies compiled since the end of the nineteenth century and from linguistic analysis. This is the case due to the Apaches being a mobile group who left behind little material that remained in the archaeological record.}

In 1606, King Philip III received incriminating reports regarding Oñate's behavior and by 1609 he decided to recall the errant administrator and disband the colony. The Franciscans, who had accompanied Oñate, made no effort to hide their disdain for him. They did not, however, want the entire New Mexican settlement dissolved, especially their missions. To avoid such an event, in reports to the Viceroy the missionaries devoted as much ink to inflating the number of Indians they had supposedly baptized as they did to vilifying Oñate. Repeatedly, they stressed the Viceroy's duty to protect their newly saved Christian souls. Such tactics ultimately paid off when the King changed course and ordered that New Mexico become a royal colony, maintained at the Crown's expense. He then removed Oñate and appointed a new governor; he also dispatched fifteen friars and
fifty married soldiers to populate the colony. In 1610, Oñate rode out of New Mexico in
disgrace, leaving behind a settlement that would now be a permanent burden to both the
royal treasury and the Southwestern economy.46

Between 1623 and 1650 two closely spaced, severe droughts cast a pall across the
Southwest. Apache raiders reacted by looking for ways to improve their subsistence
success; they found that assistance in the skill of horse riding. This new mode of
transportation made them much more efficient at capturing Puebloan corn as well as
Spanish cattle and sheep. In addition, a string of incompetent governors disrupted New
Mexican life even further through their despicable acts of slaving; which in many cases
resulted in a firestorm of Indian retaliatory attacks. With deteriorating climatic conditions,
increasing Apache raids, and abusive government officials, by 1640 the Southwest was in
dire straights. Starving men and women lined the roads begging for food, while Spanish
and Pueblo men indiscriminately killed Apache raiders, who responded by striking back
just as ruthlessly.47

For about twenty years after 1640 circumstances normalized somewhat, but drought
returned again in 1666 and once more threw the region into turmoil until 1671. This latest

46 "To The Viceroy Concerning the Current State of Affairs in New Mexico Report of the Province,"
in Historical Documents Relating to New Mexico, Nueva Vizcaya, and Approaches Thereto, to 1773, ed.

47 In 1661, Captain Andres Hurtado wrote, "... very great, Sir, has been the covetousness of the
governors of this kingdom, wherein they have, under color of chastising the neighboring enemy, made
opportunity to send, apparently in the service of his Majesty, squadrons of men to capture the heathen
Indian to send them to the camp and mines in El Parral to sell (as governor Don Bernardo Lopez de
Mendizabal is doing at present, he having sent there more than seventy Indian men and women to be
sold)." See "Declaration of Captain Andres Hurtado, Santa Fe, September, 1661," in Historical
Documents Relating to New Mexico, Nueva Vizcaya, and Approaches Thereto, to 1773, ed. Charles
Wilson Hackett (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Institution Washington, 1923), 186-7; Elinore M. Barrett,
166-68.
drying cycle was especially devastating as it culminated in a great famine, a deadly epidemic, and a barrage of Apache raiding. In 1669 Fray Juan Bernal wrote that:

For three years no crops have been harvested. In the past year, 1668, a great many Indians perished of hunger, lying dead along the roads, in the ravines, and in their huts. There were pueblos (as instance Humanas) where more than four hundred and fifty died of hunger. The same calamity still prevails, for, because of lack of money, there is not a fanega of corn or of wheat in the whole kingdom, so that for two years the food of Spaniards, men and women alike, has been the hides of cattle, which they had in their houses.48

In 1679 Fray Francisco de Ayte wrote of the worsening conditions:

In the year 1670 there was a very great famine in those provinces, which compelled the Spanish inhabitants and the Indians alike to eat the hides that they had and the straps of the carts, preparing them for food by soaking and washing them and toasting them in the fire with maize, and boiling them with herbs and roots. By this means almost half the people in the said provinces escaped [starvation]. There followed the next year of 1671 a great pestilence, which also carried off many people and cattle; and shortly thereafter, in the year 1672, the hostile Apaches who were then at peace rebelled and rose up, and the said province was totally sacked and robbed by their attacks and outrages, especially all the cattle and sheep, of which it had previously been very productive. They killed, stole, and carried off all except a few small flocks of sheep which were saved by the vigilance and care of some of the inhabitants, who guarded them by day at great risk of losing their lives, as some did, and locked them up at night in the patios and corrals of their own houses.49

This last quote also highlights the breakdown in understanding that occurred between the Apaches and the Spanish. In the same breath that Spanish officials bemoaned their own drought-induced suffering, they also castigated the Apaches for saving themselves from a similar fate. Apparently, the Spaniards were unable to see beyond their own self-


interest to grasp that the Apaches were also resorting to extreme, short-term solutions to stave off starvation. Unfortunately, this lack of empathy was not a limited phenomenon. On the contrary, it became the official Spanish response to Apache survival strategies throughout the colonial era.

By 1680, members of the Pueblo communities had also reached a breaking point and lashed out at the Spaniards with a nativist movement that resulted in the 1680 Pueblo Revolt. Guided by the spiritual leader Popé, the Puebloans drove the Spaniards south into Chihuahua to cleanse their land of their corrupting influence. Not all Puebloans participated, though, as some families rejected the violence and sought refuge among the Navajo. For their part, the Navajo willingly absorbed these refugees along with their useful agricultural and technological know-how.

As they watched the Spaniards fleeing, some Gila Apaches followed to maintain access to Spanish material goods as well as to seize any opportunity to strike at their enemy. When they arrived in northern Chihuahua, these Apache bands mixed with local Uto-Aztecan and Coahulican Indians who practiced similar subsistence strategies. Since they

---


52 It is likely that these were the descendents of the Casas Grandes society; the larger complex civilization from which the Hohokam traded for luxury goods. Apparently the Casas Grandes people met a fate similar to that of the Hohokam, as they too burned many of their buildings.
shared much in common, it did not take long for a new hybrid, Apachean subgroup to appear. The Spanish identified this and all future-blended Athapascan entities as Apachean due to familiar linguistic markers. The reason for this was that the Athapascans were willing to radically change almost any part of their culture except their language. By 1686, this mixed tribe had begun raiding not only New Mexico’s exiled settlers, but also Spanish and Indian communities throughout what is now northern Sonora and Chihuahua.53

Northern towns lived at the mercy of Apache raiders for ten years before Spanish officials established presidios at Janos and Fronteras. Located in northeastern Sonora, these forts were strategically placed to obstruct Apache travel routes through the Sierra Madre Occidental. For a time this strategy worked, but it was not long before the raiders discovered new passages. Effectively blocking the Apaches was not the only difficulty Spanish soldiers faced. Once found and engaged in battle, the soldiers then had to deal with the Apache’s guerilla tactics that turned many of the Spaniard’s military strengths into weaknesses.54 Frustrated by this, in a letter written sometime in the 1720s, leading citizens of Sonora petitioned the King to save them from the cunning Apache villains:

The Apache enemies visit us boldly and repeatedly, to our confusion and damage, All for lack of a commanding officer [at Fronteras] with determination, interest, and valor. Every retaliation against them, made by [the current] lieutenant, is brief and without speed, range, or organization. In all of this, Sir, we petition Your Lordship, who is endowed with royal civility and compassion for our

53 Haskell, 78-9, 83-4, 104-5.

Miseries, to deign provide, with appropriate foresight, that which calamites require. 55

One way the Indians were able to negate the Spaniard’s military advantages was by living in mountainous areas almost too rugged for horses to reach. Because of this, the Spaniards often had to stop their pursuit at the mountains and in doing so lost their offensive advantage. Even when they caught the Indians in the open, the Apaches outwitted their Spanish adversaries through the art of strategic retreat. If not assured an offensive edge or if the Apaches were woefully outnumbered, they would disperse in as many directions as men running. This strategy was so simple, yet effective, that it tormented generations of Spanish and then later American soldiers. 56

Almost in admiration, Captain of the Fronteras Presidio, Juan Bautista de Anza wrote of his Apache adversaries, “They live in small, dispersed rancherias, both in their own lands and when they seek the protection of the impregnable mountain ranges along the frontier. Hence, if they are found, only a small number are seized. . . . And even though they always inhabit regions of great strategic advantage they attain even greater advantage by taking positions where they cannot be attacked, in land as vast as the ocean, with their backs secure.” 57

Frontier conditions eventually deteriorated to the point that Brigadier General Pedro de Rivera in 1720 reported that:


57 Garate, 117.
Because of the carelessness of the army of this presidio [Fronteras] and because of the cleverness of the enemy of these frontiers, they [the Apaches] have committed continuous thefts of horses, cattle, and other things, penetrating right to the presidio itself. It is ordered that the armies be continually on the move, with one squadron inspecting and visiting the passes and areas where the enemy comes, for this presidio was built for that reason.\(^58\)

By the time the General completed his assessment of Fronteras, however, many of the southern Apache bands had already shifted their focus to the north and west. Pushed by Spanish soldiers and their Opata Indian auxiliaries, and pulled by a herd of Spanish cattle that had recently arrived at the outpost of San Xavier del Bac, some Apaches had reoriented toward southern Arizona. The man responsible for the cattle’s appearance was a Jesuit priest whose life’s goal was to prove that one could reach the missions of California through the dangerous territory of the Apaches. His name was Padre Eusebio Kino.\(^59\)

When Kino first arrived in Mexico City in 1681, his superiors assigned him as cosmographer for what was believed to be the island of California. It was his duty to improve the viability of the province by seeking a less costly, overland travel route for delivering supplies to its residents. Sailing cargo ships north against the current from Mexico proper was time consuming, and thus expensive. Officials, therefore, hoped that Kino would discover an easily accessible, land route running parallel to the east coast of the supposed island. With single-minded determination, then, Kino made it his life’s work to bring California into the Christian fold. His zeal alone was insufficient, however, as


politics in Spain had stagnated at the end of the seventeenth century. Suffering from a lack of administrative attention, Kino received little financial support.  

In 1686, news arrived advising Kino to abandon his assignment and turn his attention instead to establishing missions in the Pimeria Alta—central and southern Arizona. No one had yet attempted this feat and many argued that it was impossible as the upper Pimans were as belligerent as their Apache allies. Kino paid no heed to these naysayers as he viewed his new assignment as a vehicle for completing his unfinished route to California. With this in mind, he first made contact with the Yuman Indians along the lower Colorado River. He then worked his way up the Gila River and briefly visited the Maricopas, before traveling to the junction of the Santa Cruz River, where he met with the Pimans. In each village, residents welcomed Kino, along with his enticing trade goods. By leaving more than he took, Kino consistently received parting invitations to soon return.  

Not only was the Padre a master of persuasion among the Indians, he was even more convincing with his superiors. To revive support for his Arizona-as-route-to-California plans, he filled his reports with bucolic images of fertile Piman farms that would be the “support of the scantier and more sterile lands of California.” With each letter, his words wooed important men along the chain of command until they reached the King’s council. It was there that Kino finally received authorization and financing for a series of exploratory ventures to California. Sure that a route existed, Kino never doubted his

---

62 Kessell, 135.
ability to prove it. Before he could demonstrate this, however, the one variable in life he
could not control put an end to his quest: just after midnight on March 15, 1711, Father
Eusebio Kino passed from this world into the next.  

During Kino’s tenure, fear of Apache raiders had kept Spanish slavers and land-
hungry hacendados at bay. As a result, Arizona’s Indians had had little direct contact
with these more brutal colonial figures. What they knew of the Spanish had arrived in the
form of a kindly Padre on horseback who brought them wonderful new plants and
amazing new trade goods. When Kino died, the Indians of the Pimaria-Alta were openly
solicitous for more Spaniards to come to live among them. When this did not happen, the
Indians worried that they would be forgotten.  

Kino’s death not only halted plans for integrating Arizona into a larger transportation
and communication network, but it also marked a larger transition in Spanish colonial
administration. In 1700, the last heir in the Spanish Hapsburg line, sickly Charles II,
mercifully died and a new French Bourbon monarch, Philip V, assumed the throne. With
Philip V’s coronation came not only a change in royal lineage, but more importantly, a
change in administrative philosophy. The Hapsburgs had created a herarchical
administrative structure in which power was shared with the nobility and subdivided into
overlapping governing units. The purpose of this had been to bind Spain’s aristocracy to
the Castilian Crown as well as create political friction to discourage collusion between

---

63 Burrus, Kino and Manje, 142-3; Kessell, 135.
64 Edward Spicer, Cycles of Conquest: The Impact of Spain, Mexico and the United States on The
65 Crumely, 26-7.
administrators in differing parts of the bureaucracy.66

When Philip V arrived in Spain, he found the old Hapsburg system in a state of disarray. Not from abuses from below, but from corruption at the top. Despite the vast wealth pouring out of its New World colonies, Spain had become a debtor nation to pursue an aggressive imperial strategy. Consequently, by the end of the sixteenth century, receipts from its empire did not even cover half of the country's expenditures. Unwilling to modernize the country's tax system, Philip II had begun to raise revenue by selling bureaucratic offices to the highest bidder. Eventually, even American-born Spaniards could purchase a government position. Because of this, by the seventeenth century, money, not loyalty, had become the requisite for serving in the colonial administration. Yet, even with this new source of income, Philip II still could not cover Spain's expenses. In fact, before he died, Spain had to declare bankruptcy four times.67 Philip V, therefore had much to accomplish if Spain was to continue as a world power.


CHAPTER 3

SPANISH BOURBONS AND THE MEXICAN INTERIM

In 1700, the Spanish government entered an era of transition when the last of the Hapsburgs, Charles II, died without an heir. Before dying, he selected Philip of Anjou, the grandson of the French monarch Louis XIV and of Bourbon lineage, to succeed him to the throne. Upon ascension, Philip discovered he had inherited a treasury in arrears and a bureaucracy plagued by inefficiency and corruption. The new King and his counselors had little time to address these matters, however, as they quickly faced a war of succession with the Austrian branch of the Hapsburgs. To raise sufficient funds for Spain's defense, Philip V initiated a process of administrative centralization, which included streamlining or abandoning imperial programs in Europe and the colonies. For Spanish citizens, soldiers, bureaucrats, and missionaries, the Crown's new emphasis on frugality often translated into reassignments, transfers, or rejections of new settlements, presidios, and missions.¹

Due to this more austere state of affairs, after Padre Kino died in 1711, it was almost another thirty years before ecclesiastical officials had enough funding to dispatch Padres

Keller, Grashoff, and Segesser to the Pimaria-Alta. When these missionaries arrived in 1732, they began where Kino had left off in bringing salvation to the Piman and Yuman Indians. Compared to Kino, however, these new men of God were not as successful at drawing favorable attention to southern Arizona. Parsimonious royal policies and a lack of diplomatic acumen hindered their efforts. Even local officials, paid little heed to the padres’ pleas, as they were focused instead on Apache attacks against missions, mines, and ranches.

In addition to these “depredations,” officials were also concerned over reports of a new Apache group, living north of the Chiricahua Mountains, who were blocking travel routes between the Sobaipuris on the San Pedro River and Zuni Pueblo in New Mexico. Officials labeled this new group the Western Apaches, yet administrators usually referred to them as individual bands with names that matched their geographic location, such as the White Mountain or Warm Springs Apaches. These Apaches apparently migrated south into the Mogollon Mountains from near Black Mesa sometime after 1695.

In 1736, Padre Keller was shocked when he visited the Maricopas, who were a branch of the Yuman Indians that had migrated up the Gila River toward the Hohokam villages during the dry years in the fourteenth century. Upon his arrival, he discovered their homes destroyed and blamed the Western Apaches for the dastardly deed. His conclusion was

---

2 Garate, 122.
3 Kessell, Spain, 229-30.
4 Spanish officials labeled anything Indians did that they found unpleasant, inconvenient, or criminal as a depredation. This would include killing feral cattle and sheep, or retaliating for the killing of a relative.
incorrect; however, as Western Apache territory never extended that far west. Instead, it is more likely that the Maricopas' long-time adversaries the Yavapais, who lived just to the north on the Gila River, were responsible party. Once done, though, such misassignment of guilt to the Western Apaches for conflict in western Arizona became common and continued throughout the colonial period and into the Mexican and American eras.  

In 1752, to protect northern mines and settlements from Apache raiders, Spanish officials established a number of new, strategically located presidios, including one at the community of San Xavier Tubac, in south-central Arizona. The plan was to place soldiers closer to Apache base camps to block raids at their point of origin, as well as more effectively mete out punishment.

With Tubac now an important frontier buffer, the post needed a commander of above-average competence. It would require a leader who understood the larger forces that influenced human behavior and was honest enough to see the flaws in his own society. This man was Juan Bautista de Anza, Jr., the son of the Fronteras Presidio commander of the same name. As his father, the younger Anza had a reputation as both a ruthless Indian fighter and as an evenhanded pragmatist.

Once in command of San Xavier del Tubac, it did not take Anza long to determine that Spanish policing policies were ineffective at achieving and maintaining peace. He first  

---


realized this in February of 1766, after he had led his men in pursuit of Apache raiders and captured 40 warriors. Anza divided the Apaches among his men to sell as slaves in payment for their service; they then set out to return to Tubac. Upon the soldiers’ arrival, however, they were shocked to discover that in their absence other Apaches had driven off the cattle from a nearby settlement. Anza’s anger over being duped eventually turned into reflection and he slowly began to view his role as more than just a soldier. In fact, he became determined to create a more rational plan for maintaining peace on the frontier.⁹

During Anza’s tenure, some of the Jesuit missionaries ministering to Arizona’s Indians also came to see the Apaches differently. In other parts of northern Mexico, the Jesuits were despised for protecting the Indians from abuse by a sundry list of Spanish predators—mine owners, hacendados, administrative officials. Up until the late eighteenth century, however, the Jesuits, as other frontier residents, looked upon the Apaches as little more than animals, undeserving of sanctuary. As with Anza, though, once they began living in close contact with the Apaches the padres began to change their minds.¹⁰

Initially sure that the Indians’ behavior derived from sin, men such as Fray Pfefferkom came to realize that their actions actually were driven by their inability to find enough to eat. Pfefferkorn wrote, “They [the Apaches] Plant [sic] maize, beans, gourds, and other things in different places, especially in valleys, but in such small quantities that they would starve if they were not able to supplement their meager harvest with the products of

---


¹⁰ Henry F. Dobyns, LANCE, HO!: Containment of the Western Apaches by the Royal Spanish Garrison At Tucson (Lima, Peru: Editorial Estudios Andinos, 1964), 3-5.
robbery and theft."¹¹ Living himself in southern Arizona, he now understood just how
difficult it was to survive in the desert. Had King Carlos III not expelled the Society of
Jesus from the Americas in 1767, a combination of Anza’s military pragmatism and
missionary compassion may have produced system that better balanced Spanish and Indian
interests, and thus reduced conflict.¹²

Following the Jesuit expulsion, colonial bureaucrats asked for and received royal
consent to secularize the missions of northern Mexico. This meant that Catholic Indians
would receive individual ownership of mission lands, which made it easier for
unscrupulous speculators to take native property and then force the Indians to work as
low-paid laborers. Just as the Crown authorized this, Franciscan missionaries, who had
taken over the Jesuit’s territory, were beginning to realize the true magnitude of their
undertaking.¹³

By 1797, Friar Bringas submitted a report that asked not only for a suspension of the
decision to secularize Sonora’s northern missions, but also permission to open new
missions in the many areas that had never been adequately proselytized. The request never
received royal approval, but it highlighted the region’s continued unsettled, frontier
nature, which was due in large part to continued Apache agitation for access to
resources.¹⁴

¹¹ Aschmann, 4-5.
¹² John L. Kessell, Friars, Soldiers, and Reformers: Hispanic Arizona and the Sonoran Mission
¹³ Ibid, 182-190.
¹⁴ Diego Miguel Bringas, Friar Bringas Reports to the King, ed. David S. Matson and Bernard
Spanish administrators had not turned a deaf ear to men such as Friar Bringas; they had simply come to view reports from Arizona not as policy suggestions but instead as tools for uncovering and exploiting Apache weaknesses. In fact, it was this use of intelligence that underlay a major shift in frontier policy at this time. A shift that moved away from an offensive posture and toward one seeking to create among the Apaches a state of chronic economic dependence and cultural demoralization. The man who initiated this pragmatic, yet morally dubious Indian policy, was a minor nobleman named Jose de Gálvez.\textsuperscript{15}

Gálvez arrived in New Spain in 1765 under orders to reform and centralize Spain's civil and military bureaucracy. Exuding the Bourbon affinity for fastidiousness, Gálvez tightened lax tax collection, extended royal monopolies, and implemented a new plan for eliminating waste in colonial expenditures. He was especially determined to bring order to the turbulent north. To achieve this, he called for a thorough inspection that would include recommendations for administrative restructuring. Not one to delegate lightly, Gálvez sent the trusted Marquis de Rubí with instructions to visit key northern settlements, to note any irregularities, and to finally synthesize the sum of his observations into a coherent plan for improved efficiency.\textsuperscript{16}

Rubí arrived in Tubac in December of 1766. He was pleased with the settlement and praised Captain Anza for creating such an efficient state of affairs. He must not, however, have truly understood just how much Tubac's success was the result of Anza's

\textsuperscript{15} Kessell, Friars, 259-60.

management, because in his final report, Rubí recommended that the town’s civilian residents be left to care for themselves, while the presidio moved north to the more vulnerable settlement of San Augustine de Tucsons. This decision made good economic sense as it deployed resources more efficiently, yet it was bad policy as it ultimately removed a necessary, mediating institution from a highly contested region.17

Upon completion of his two-year, fact-finding mission, Rubí concluded that the Apache threat was surmountable if the Crown would authorize a systematic redeployment of presidios along a corridor stretching from the Gulf of Mexico to the Gulf of California. Combined with a policy of waging relentless war against the Apaches, Rubí believed that his plan would not only boost the northern economy, but in the end would save the Crown money through reduced expenditures. In 1772, the Monarchy acted by issuing the Reglamento de 1772, which in many respects was a codified version of Rubí’s recommendations with modifications by Jose de Gálvez.18

Unaware of what was about to happen, Juan de Anza, with the assistance of Franciscan Padre Francisco Tomas Hermenegildo Garces Maestro, began to revive Kino’s idea of establishing an overland route connecting Sonora and New Mexico with California. When royal officials first reviewed the plan they found no compelling reason to finance their efforts. In 1772, however, the Russians began moving down the coast of California, causing Viceroy Bucareli to throw his support behind the idea of strengthening the colony’s military position with an efficient overland supply route. He decided, therefore,

18 Moorhead, 116-117, 133.
to reverse course and authorized Anza and Garces to take an exploratory journey. Leading a group of settlers, the Captain and the Padre crossed the lower Colorado River headed for California, on May 2, 1772.\(^{19}\)

Anza returned triumphant in May of 1774, yet his celebratory mood soon turned to distress when he found Tubac in disarray and under siege by Apache raiders. A drought begun in 1770 had by this time severely contracted available wild plant and animal life and was beginning to affect domesticated crops and livestock as well. The need to feed their families was therefore driving the Apaches to raid for whatever supplies they could capture. Likewise, settlers were fiercely defending their scarce supplies. Afraid that renewed conflict would dampen official support for his plan to transform Arizona into a commercial hub, Anza wrote to the Viceroy to assure him that there would be few problems for travelers in Arizona if they would merely follow a few simple rules.\(^{20}\)

The Captain first advised that settlers bound for California strictly follow the Santa Cruz River to the junction with the Gila. Then, from there they should hug the Gila River until it joined with the Colorado. These stipulations had less to do with the aridity of the region than with the protection Anza believed the Piman Indians would provide against Apache attacks. What he actually meant was that the river Indians would serve as a buffer from Yavapai attacks as the Gila River was the lower boundary of the eastern Yavapai bands, not the Apaches. Secondly, to ensure Piman cooperation and to establish friendly relations with the Yumans, who were willing to ferry travelers across the swift moving

\(^{19}\) Kessell, Friars. 93-100.
\(^{20}\) Garate, 87-93.
Colorado, Anza warned that Spanish travelers must take pains not to alienate either group. Among his list of transgressions was taking food without permission or just compensation, allowing livestock to destroy native fields, and any other arrogant behavior that would provoke indignation.\(^{21}\)

Anza fed his rules into the slow turning gears of the Spanish government where they passed from one bureaucrat to the next until they finally reached the Viceroy. At this point, however, Anza’s message lost its urgency as it became tossed in a sea of pressing communiqués. Unable to advance further, Anza’s pragmatic plan for ameliorating conflict on the Apache frontier stalled. Unaware, in 1776, the Captain followed orders and moved his men to Tucson under the stipulations established in the *Reglamento de 1772*. To assist, the Crown promised to excuse settlers who were willing to relocate from all taxes and tithes, as well as provide them supplies if they provided their own weaponry and horses and served in the ranks of the citizen militia.\(^{22}\)

Anza apparently seized this opportunity to implement parts of his plan for dealing with the Apaches. He offered the Apaches a clear choice between food and peace or continued raiding and relentless warfare. As the Crown’s offer to compensate those who went to Tucson had attracted more than one thousand soldiers, settlers, and Piman Indians, Anza had gained, as presidio commander, the power to requisition generous amounts of supplies. Thus, he could order enough food to support not only the citizen’s of Tucson, but also all peace-seeking Indians. Throughout his tenure at Tucson, 300 beef cattle

\(^{21}\) Ibid., 101-155.

\(^{22}\) Moorhead, 90-1; McCarty, 16-18, 88-92.
arrived annually, providing plenty for all.\textsuperscript{23}

In 1776, Jose de Gálvez became Minister of the Indies and began implementing his own plan for transforming New Spain's northern frontier into an independent administrative unit. Calling his creation the General Command of the Interior Provinces, Gálvez selected Viceroy Croix's nephew Teodoro as the first Commandant General. Teodoro's primary job was to defend the frontier against hostile Indians and foreign encroachment. He began by first addressing the deficiencies he saw in Rubí's presidio corridor plan and evaluating other options for containing the Apaches. After settling on solutions, Croix informed Captain Anza in 1777 that his talents were to be put to better use in the more volatile region of northern New Mexico.\textsuperscript{24}

Apparently unaware of Anza's previous warnings that Spaniards not trespass on the Pima and Yuma Indians, Croix authorized Padre Garces to establish two missions on the west bank of the Colorado River. These new settlements were to be different as they were to be streamlined, meaning soldiers would live with the missionaries, instead of in a nearby presidio. Garces was reluctant, as he understood the sagacity of Anza's rules; he worried that this plan would create just the type of conflict between Spaniards and Indians that the Crown was attempting to eliminate.\textsuperscript{25}

It did not take long for Garces' misgivings to be proven correct. Once arrived, mission soldiers began allotting themselves farm plots from Indian fields, and they allowed their cattle to graze on Indian crops. To add insult to injury, when the soldiers ran low on

\textsuperscript{23} Kessell, \textit{Friar}, 334-6.
\textsuperscript{24} Dobyns, 33-35.
\textsuperscript{25} McCarty, 35-40.
provisions, they took supplies from the Indians without offering just compensation. The final straw came in the summer of 1781 when a group of Yumans ferried a Spanish party across the river and the settlers only paid them with a few cheap gifts. The Spaniards then allowed their livestock to strip nearby mesquite trees bare—an essential Indian food source. In mid-July the Indians had had enough and rebelled. They killed most of the Spanish men, including the two friars, and captured the women and children. Once Croix heard of this disaster, he dismissed any future possibility of establishing missions in southern Arizona. He then attempted to shift the blame for the debacle onto Anza by accusing the Captain of misleading him into thinking that Arizona’s river tribes were peaceful.26

In 1785, Jose de Gálvez’s nephew Bernardo became Viceroy and decided to use his position to experiment with a new Indian policy. While serving in Spanish Louisiana, Bernardo Gálvez had admired French methods for winning Indian cooperation through gift giving and diplomacy. Not only did he believe that the French policy was more successful at minimizing conflict, but that it was also much cheaper than relying solely on military force. Consequently, in 1786 Viceroy Gálvez ordered Commandant General Ugarte27 to adopt a similar peace policy on the northern frontier. Once in operation, presidio commanders were under orders to negotiate with individual Apache bands and to ensure that Spaniards strictly adhered to all treaty stipulations. Commanders were also to assume a priori that the Indians would not uphold their end of the agreements. Instead,

---
26 Ibid.
27 Teodoro Croix had been poisoned and gone insane by this time.
they were to be ready to coax compliance by rewarding pliant Indians and viciously punishing those who remained intractable.28

Indians willing to settle near a presidio received adequate rations, poor quality guns for hunting, and protection from molestation from settlers. But, most importantly, they gained access to an endless supply of liquor. This was the case as Bernardo de Gálvez hoped to control the Indians through their appetites. On the one hand this was a pragmatic way to address the roots of Apache unrest, food scarcity and mistreatment by settlers and soldiers, while on the other hand it was a reprehensible attempt to destroy Apache society through addiction and internal conflict.29

Regardless of the motives, by 1790 the Apache threat to frontier settlers had diminished greatly, as more and more Indian families settled near presidios. In Arizona, the Western Aravapai Apaches permanently relocated near Tucson to gain access to rations and other goods. By the time Americans began traversing the region in the 1830s, the Spanish had begun calling these bands Mansos Apaches, which translated to Tame Apaches.30 The effects of this peace program only lasted for about twenty-five years, however. It came to an end when Mexican Creoles broke from Spain and royal funding disappeared, leaving presidio commanders with no provisions for their Apache charges. As soon as it became evident that the Spaniards were no longer able to fulfill their obligations, Apache families deserted the peace camps and resumed other subsistence

29Dobyns, 97-108.
30McCarty, 61-3.
strategies, which included raiding.\textsuperscript{31}

By enforcing existing taxes and implementing new government monopolies on key commodities Spain’s Bourbon monarchs had succeeded in diverting money from colonial hands into royal coffers. The Bourbons had also managed to curtail local prerogatives, making it more difficult for colonial-born bureaucrats to improve their standard of living through patronage and graft. While causing disquiet, such policy changes did not, however, automatically lead to rebellion. Instead, for over one hundred years, American-born Spaniards continued to believe that the benefits derived from belonging to a powerful empire outweighed the costs of what the Bourbons were deducting from their bank accounts and egos.\textsuperscript{32}

The breaking point finally came when Creole resentment combined with the uncertainty that emerged following Napoleon’s seizure of Castile’s throne in 1808. Many in the colonial elite at first recoiled from advocates for independence as these rebels were also clamoring for a social revolution. As events in Spain became even less stable, however, many Creoles began to believe that the only way to protect their way of life was to start their own limited movement for independence.\textsuperscript{33} Although, before they could take charge, a populous rebellion broke out under the guidance of a parish priest named Father Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla.

Hidalgo was a revolutionary whose aim was to oversee a true social uprising in which

\textsuperscript{31} Moorehead, 37-42.

\textsuperscript{32} Leiby, 167.

the poor and dispossessed would rise and struggle for their liberation. The ranks of his army reflected this as they were filled with Indians and Mestizos. As would be expected, Padre Hidalgo’s goals and constituency frightened Mexico’s Creoles who correctly envisioned attacks on themselves as the ruling elite. They were unable to stop Padre Hidalgo, however, who had the advantage of numbers and momentum, until he provided them an opening at the edge of Mexico City. Hidalgo was low on provisions and afraid he would lose control of his organized mob once they entered the capital, so, in a fateful decision, Hidalgo chose not to attack and instead retreated to seek fresh supplies. In doing so, he lost forever his chance to upend the Mexican social structure.34

Given this break, Mexico’s leaders mounted an all-out effort to capture the priest and teach his followers a lesson. When news of the rebellion reached presidio commanders in Sonora and southern Arizona, they dispatched all available soldiers to capture the priest. Consequently, when Hidalgo’s retreating army arrived at Guadalajara, these northern soldiers were waiting for them. Dependent on Mexico City for funding of the Apache peace program, frontier citizens saw no benefit to be gained by joining Hidalgo’s populist movement.35

Only after conditions in Spain worsened appreciably, in their view, did Mexico’s Creoles finally decide that it was time to break the colonial bonds. Led by Colonel Agustín de Iturbide, these reluctant rebels won their independence and then set about codifying the socioeconomic system that had benefited their caste throughout the colonial

era. Once news of the rebellion reached the northern frontier, debate raged over the
correctness of opposing Spain. Ultimately, the regional leadership decided to throw their
support behind the conservative revolutionaries.\(^{36}\)

Life after Mexico's ruling class achieved independence was chaotic as political power
shifted rapidly between two ideological camps, neither of which represented the lower
castes. The effect of this in Arizona was multifaceted; with the most telling consequence
being a precipitous drop in the amount of money available to frontier posts. Surrounded,
as many were, by Apaches who had grown used to provisions provided through the peace
program, the loss of revenue threatened to cause a wave of rebellions. To add to this
problem, in the case of the Arizona settlements in particular, the government made matters
worse in 1828 when officials decided to expel all peninsulars,\(^{37}\) depriving the outposts of
not only all of their missionaries, but also the Friars' independent sources of money and
provisions.\(^{38}\)

Once the Mexican government reneged on Spain's treaty obligations to the Apaches,
the peace camps began to dissolve. With access to secured resources gone, it made little
sense for the Indians to stay and starve when they could leave and easily supply
themselves through raiding. This return to a state of Apache hostilities traumatized nearby
settlers not only due to years of relative quiet coming to an abrupt end, but also because
the scale of raiding was even worse than it had been before. The reason for this was that
ranchers, miners, and small farmers had all advanced northward during the peace-policy

---

\(^{36}\) Archer, 136-37.

\(^{37}\) Spaniards born in Spain.

years in the belief that the frontier had been permanently pacified. Some had even ventured into the heart the Apacheria and acquired large land grants, which they populated with cattle and sheep. These plump beasts then became the Indians’ main target after they returned to a nomadic way of life.

Many contemporary observers and historians have consistently blamed the Apaches for the theft of livestock in this period. Under the circumstances, however, it would be more correct to state that many Indian groups were raiding, yet Mexican citizens only consistently blamed the Apaches. One notable example of the continuing misidentification of guilty parties occurred when a number of southern Piman bands began attacking Mexican settlements after losing their prime sources of water. Their misfortune began when several well-connected, non-Indian families received land grants along the Santa Cruz River and began diverting water for irrigation. Without a resident missionary to plead their case, the Indians found themselves without protection and subsequently without water.

In addition to feeling aggrieved over their lost water, the Pimans also echoed complaints over Hispanic methods of ranching that dated back to Onate’s settlement in 1598. Still practicing extensive livestock management, the Mexican landowners allowed

---


40 Kessell, *Mission of Sorrow*, 119-123. James Officer also notes, 84-6, that Mexican officials in Tucson had seen the Papago, or more correctly the Tohono O’Odom, disguised as Apaches and raiding settlements.

41 McCarty, 6-7.
their cattle and sheep to roam freely and trespass on mission and Indian fields. It was this second grievance that pushed some southern Pimans to adopt Apache tactics; they began stealing livestock and destroying check dams that kept water from reaching their fields.42

By the late 1820s, much of Mexico’s northern frontier looked as it did before Bernardo de Gálvez implemented his peace policy. Soldiers struggled daily with hungry and angry Indians, while settlers lived in constant fear of Indian raids. Not everything was the same, though; there was one noticeable difference. Whereas, settlers had once kept watch for French and British interlopers, now, they were on the look out for Americans. Southern plantation owners were pushing into Texas and entrepreneurs from diverse parts of the United States were converging on the Santa Fe and Taos trade fairs. Many of these Norte Americanos also dabbled in the fur trade and had their interest piqued when they heard of good trapping along the Gila River. Technically, they could not go into Mexican territory without a license, but as long as they knew whose palm to grease or whose sister to marry, few were actually kept out.43

The Indian reaction to the American presence in Arizona was varied. Some Indians avoided the trappers fearing they were slavers, while others attempted to trade with the Americans hoping they had better goods than the Mexicans. A third group of Indians even preemptively attacked the trapper to protect their resources and families from American rapacity. Inter-ethnic relations in Arizona became increasingly tense when the governor of Chihuahua began offering bounties for Apache scalps. In his decree, the

42 Ibid., 5-7.
governor only asked for an intact forelock of black hair as proof for payment. Obviously, this led to indiscriminate killings of innocent Indians and even Mexicans citizens. With the going price at $100 for a male, $50 for a female, and even $25 for a child, murder on the frontier became rampant and produced the opposite effect that the policy was intended to produce. Instead of creating docile Indians, the lawlessness associated with the bounty hunters provoked attacks against anyone the Indians felt was suspicious in an eye for an eye style of revenge. Thus, right on the eve of official contact between the residents of Arizona and the U.S. government, a state of near pandemonium gripped the region.\textsuperscript{44}

\textsuperscript{44} Ralf Adam Smith, \textit{Boarderlander: The Life of James Kirker, 1793-1852} (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1999), 49.
CHAPTER 4

MANIFEST DESTINY AND THE AMERICAN WEST

The first Americans to venture into Arizona were fur trappers eager for access to the Gila and Salt Rivers. According to Mexican law, it was illegal for Americans to trap without authorization, but few bothered to apply. Thus, the vast majority of Americans in Arizona before the Mexican-American War were illegal aliens. In many ways, however, the American fur trappers who ventured into Mexican Arizona had much in common with the resident Hispanic population. Both viewed natural resources as commodities that could be translated into personal wealth; both belonged to societies that utilized similar technologies, such as guns and writing; and both adhered to millennialistic forms of Christian monotheism that promoted conquest over heathens.¹

On a deeper level, however, obvious distinctions existed between the two peoples. While both recognized the same supreme being, religious practices diverged as Hispanic Catholicism and American Protestantism were in many respects antithetical to one another.² And while both participated in hierarchically organized political systems, the Americans adhered to an aggressive form of republicanism that had no real counterpart in

¹ McCarty, 8-9; Kessell, Friars, 99; Eve Kornfeld, Creating an American Culture, 1775-1800 (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s Press, 2001), 120-7; Weber, 44-52.
² This is necessarily so as Protestantism was a reaction against Catholic ritual and liturgical conventions.

78
the still semi-feudal, northern Mexican polity.³

These and other socio-cultural differences stemmed in part from England's distinct history and the traits England passed on to her North American colonists. But the differences were even more the result of Anglo-American development apart from, and then in opposition to, their motherland. Over the millennia, England, as Spain, received successive waves of migrants and invaders who left their mark as they came and went. Yet, unlike Spain, in the years preceding American colonization, England experienced no uniting event such as the Reconquista,⁴ but instead witnessed divisive conflicts between Protestants and Catholics, as well as economic upheavals that pitted social classes against each other.⁵ This explains why, when the opportunity to migrate to North America arose, various groups within English society jumped at the chance to escape from hardship. When joined with lax immigration policies, this willingness to leave resulted in a hodgepodge of English colonies settled not by representatives of a unified ideology or monarchy, but instead by divergent factions possessed of differing agendas.⁶

The first English colonizing efforts, which took place in the 1580s, were not successful due to a combination of inadequate funding, deficient supplies, harsh coastal

---
³ In Spanish society a person's place was determined in large part by their genetic lineage. Because of this Spaniards went to great lengths to categorize people according to their parentage and set limits on rights and aspirations for each group. There were obvious exceptions to the rule, but for the most part a person's potential was predetermined at birth. For an in-depth examination of Spanish social structures, see Robert Howard Jackson's *Race, Caste, and Status: Indians in Colonial Spanish America* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1999).

⁴ This is what the Iberians called the war to drive the Moors from the Peninsula.

⁵ When Spanish gold and silver from the Americas flooded into Europe it caused spiraling inflation that hurt not only the poor but also aristocrats who lived on fixed feudal incomes.

⁶ For an in-depth examination of the differences between Spanish, Dutch, French, and English colonization policies and experiences, see Denys DeLange's *Bitter Feast: Amerindians And Europeans in Northeastern North America, 1600-64* (Van Cover: UBC Press, 1993).
conditions, and disease carrying insects. It was not until 1606, when investors in the Virginia Company tried their hand at colonizing, that England achieved it first success. To avoid the problems that plagued previous attempts, company officials legally bound all participants to place the good of the company ahead of personal enrichment. While this coercive policy correctly identified one of the main causes of colonizing failure, company officials failed to establish the means to enforce this rules once the ships arrived in the Americas. As a result, company captains were no better at controlling their “employees,” than were leaders of previous ventures. What allowed the Virginia Company to succeed, then, was not skilled planning or adept leadership, but the chance arrival and dictatorial assumption of power of soldier of fortune John Smith. Through his ruthless enforcement of common sense rules, Smith successfully kept the company’s settlement, Jamestown, from becoming just another failed enterprise.  

Despite their best efforts, no members of the Virginia Company ever found Indian gold. They did, however, stumble upon something almost as good as gold: tobacco. Spanish explorers had discovered the stinking weed in the Caribbean and had been exporting it into Europe before the English arrived in the Americas. Thus, a nicotine-addicted market already existed, ready to purchase whatever Jamestown planters could produce. The problem for planters, then, was not a shortage of customers, but a shortage of laborers to grow and process the time-intensive plant. At first, growers tapped into a domestic supply of workers by indenturing desperate English citizens who had been pushed off their land during the enclosure movement of the early 1600s. After exhausting

---

this pool, planters then turned to importing African slaves as their main source of labor.\(^8\)

As other Southern colonies came into existence, they also adopted economic systems that tended to replicate inequalities reminiscent of the English social system. At the top were men able to monopolize resources and keep others on the bottom rung of the social ladder; at the bottom, were the men and women living miserable lives with little hope for improvement. Hence, in England's southern American colonies, a political culture emerged that stressed themes of classical liberalism with an emphasis on the protection of private property and the notion that only the "best" men should directly wield economic and political power.\(^9\)

In the North, radical and moderate Puritans founded the New England colonies to create the Christian utopia they believed could not take root in their corrupted homeland. Once established, other religious migrants followed and settled nearby. The Quakers, a religious sect that actually practiced the Christian toleration they preached, made their home in William Penn's proprietary colony, Pennsylvania. Farther south, Lord Baltimore established Maryland for Catholics fleeing England's tumultuous political and religious climate. Neither of these later groups claimed the same sort of chosen status as the Puritans, yet both did view America as a refuge from persecution. Thus, in contrast to the secular Southern colonies, Northern culture adhered more to a pious worldview, which tended to emphasize themes of classical republicanism, such as service for others, charity,

---

\(^8\) For an explanation of the Chesapeake economy and its race and class relations, see T.H. Breen and Stephen Inness' "Myne Owne Ground: Race & Freedom on Virginia's Eastern Shore, 1640-1676" (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980).

\(^9\) Ibid.
and the suppression of individual desires in favor of the common good.\textsuperscript{10}

Over time Northern and Southern concepts of individual achievement, protection of property rights, and government promotion of the public good blended with various European currents of thought into a unique American worldview. This new ideology first appeared in coherent form in the discourse of colonists expressing their outrage over Parliament flexing its power to lay and collect taxes. It then became embedded in the common vernacular during the War for Independence, and afterward, it found its way into the new nation’s founding documents through the pens of men such as James Madison and Thomas Jefferson.\textsuperscript{11}

In the years following the war, Madison and Jefferson gave full expression to this new intellectual tradition as they struggled to construct the political system the Americans claimed was their birthright. Each man turned to the other as they ruminated over how best to maintain individual liberty, while at the same time guarding against the rise of a grasping aristocracy or an unruly mob. Further, they pondered over ways to expand political participation without initiating some grand scheme for artificially redistributing private property. In the end, after many vigorous debates, both men arrived at the same conclusion: the solution to their dilemma lay in the country’s ability to expand into its vast

\textsuperscript{10} Puritan minister John Winthrop expressed the northern ideal of community good succinctly when he wrote in his sermon “A Modell of Christian Charity,” “There are two rules whereby wee are to walke one towards another: Justice and Mercy.” For a broader examination of northern intellectual culture, please see Ernest Lee Tuverson’s \textit{Redeemer Nation: The Idea of America’s Millennial Role} (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).

\textsuperscript{11} In his book \textit{The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution} Bernard Bailyn traces the concurrent streams of intellectual discourse prevalent during the pre-war years and delineates how the colonists expressed Europeans themes through their own provincial lens. Jefferson’s most eloquent contribution to this ideology would have to be the \textit{Declaration of Independence}, while Madison’s gift to political thought, apart from the U.S. Constitution itself, was \textit{Federalist No. 10}.

82

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Being a consummate theorist, Madison scoured philosophical treatises ranging from ancient to contemporary scholars hoping to cobble together a comprehensive model from which to construct a new government. Yet the more he searched, the more disheartened he grew as one tome after another told the tale of a failed republic that crumbled due to human failings and errors. His despair turned to elation when he realized that it was unchecked factional power that had led to the downfall of many previous republics, and that remedying this defect would remove the greatest obstacle to creating a truly enlightened government. Consequently, Madison argued at the Constitutional Convention that the United States could succeed only if its national government was carefully regulated and balanced by equally powerful, countervailing forces. And amongst those forces would be a strong yeoman class.¹³

After sharing his insights, Madison then had to convince his critics who firmly believed that uncorrupted republican government could only exist in geographically and culturally limited polities. Citing conventional wisdom, they argued that a country as large and diverse as the Untied States could not sustain representative democracy, as its populace was too scattered and possessed of too many interests.¹⁴


Madison countered by turning their argument on its head. He asserted that in fact a large country possessed of a substantial population, with a good number of competing interests, was actually the best setting for republican government. Only in such a nation, he claimed, could representatives of the people truly serve as stewards of the public good. This he said was due to the fact that the ability of any one interest group to form a majority and infringe upon the rights of the minority would diminish in inverse proportion to the number of interest groups represented in the government. The caveat, he conceded, was that the country’s population could not expand beyond its resource base by any considerable degree. If this occurred, he admitted, a propertied majority would appear and reduce the landless minority to a state of utter dependence. And in doing so, they would shatter the republic’s cornerstone.\textsuperscript{15}

Due to this belief, Madison argued that the ability of the United States to increase its land base in tandem with its population was paramount. Fortunately, North America was much larger than the small portion occupied at the time of Independence. While it was true that Indians, Frenchmen, Spaniards, and Englishmen all inhabited much of the continent, this was only a minor complication, as political leaders could remedy the situation once the country’s constitutional government was functional.\textsuperscript{16}

Jefferson’s views tended to be more pragmatic than those of his theoretical friend. This was due in part to the fact that he was the ambassador to France during the years

\textsuperscript{15} James Madison to Thomas Jefferson June 19, 1786, in Republic of Letters, 424. In his correspondence with Jefferson, Madison developed the concepts that would later emerge as his most famous essay, Federalist No. 10, when he wrote: “Our limited population has probably a large share in producing this effect [comfort of the masses] as the political advantages which distinguish us. A certain degree of misery seems inseparable from a high degree of populousness.”

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
preceding the bloody French Revolution. As a result, he witnessed in stark relief the consequences of sacrificing the majority’s wellbeing to subsidize a life of leisure for the elite.\textsuperscript{17} Contrasts between starving families and opulent wealth worried him enormously as he feared the same would happen in his own country if government policy did not include the means for promoting an equality of circumstance. He even went so far as to propose a system of progressive taxation to lessen the possibility of property concentrating in the hands of the few.\textsuperscript{18}

In addition to his disdain for corrupt aristocrats, Jefferson also deplored the degeneracy he believed accompanied the rise of commercial manufacturing. As a result, he hoped America’s abundance of land would also postpone for many generations the need to resort to non-agrarian production. In his *Notes On The State of Virginia*, Jefferson addressed this topic when he wrote:

> In Europe the lands are either cultivated, or locked up against the cultivator. Manufacture must therefore be resorted to of necessity not of choice, to support the surplus of their people. But we have an immensity of land courting the industry of the husbandman. Is it best then that all our citizens should be employed in its improvement, or that one half should be called off from that to exercise manufactures and handicrafts for the other?

\textsuperscript{17} The first signs of Jefferson’s political pragmatism appeared in 1776 when he assisted in drafting Virginia’s Constitution. While he agreed with the majority in attendance that only propertied, white males should have the franchise, he also insisted on granting “every person of full age neither owning nor having owned [50] acres of land . . . an appropriation of [50] acres . . .” The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, *Draft Constitution for Virginia, June 1776*, 1996, \texttt{<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/jeffcons.htm>}(8 November 2003).

Those who labor in the earth are the chosen people of God, if ever he had a chosen people . . . 19

In light of such views, it should come as no surprise, then, that it was Thomas Jefferson, acting as President, who doubled the size of the United States by boldly seizing a fortuitous diplomatic opportunity. Upon inauguration, Jefferson had categorized himself as a constitutional constructionist. A man who would not engage in the type of loose interpretation his political rival Alexander Hamilton had employed to create the National Bank. Yet when Napoleon Bonaparte offered to sell the whole of the Louisiana territory for $15 million, Jefferson soon found that the only way he could acquire this land was to loosely interpret the Constitution’s treaty making clause. Ultimately, it was Jefferson’s vision of an “empire for liberty” teaming with yeomen farmers, sturdy in their habits and secure in their independence, that allowed him to violate his own principles and purchase the Louisiana Territory. 20

To hide lingering misgivings over his expansion of presidential authority, Jefferson exuded an infectious optimism. He repeatedly assured the American public that the country’s new dominion would guarantee the continuance of their blessed republic. 21 In

---


20 In a letter to James Madison dated April 27, 1809, Jefferson wrote: “we should have such an empire for liberty as she [history] has never surveyed since the creation; and I am persuaded, that no constitution was ever before so well calculated as ours for extensive empire and self-government.” Republic of Letters, 1586.

21 Jefferson was actually planning to propose a constitutional amendment specifically authorizing the president to acquire new territory, but French diplomats informed him that Bonaparte would withdraw the deal if Jefferson did not act quickly. Consequently, Jefferson informed Madison—who was his Secretary of State—that “Infer that the less we say about constitutional difficulties respecting Louisiana the better . . .” See letters from Jefferson to Madison dated July 1803 and August 18, 1803 in Republic of Letters, 1269, 1278.
his second inaugural address, and subsequent State of the Union speeches, he mixed lofty ideals with a call for every American to exercise their right to claim a portion of the enlarged public domain:

I know that the acquisition of Louisiana has been disapproved by some from a candid apprehension that the enlargement of our territory would endanger its union. But who can limit the extent to which the federative principle may operate effectively? The larger our association the less will it be shaken by local passions; & in any view is it not better that the opposite bank of the Mississippi should be settled by our own brethren & children than by strangers of another family? With which should we be most likely to live in harmony & friendly intercourse? 22

Consequently, unlike Europe, where the expectation to benefit from government power was limited to the aristocratic classes, under Thomas Jefferson, America became a country where average citizens could expect their government to promote the public good by also securing their access to private property. It was this sense of entitlement that energized many aggressive American settlers as they struck out onto the frontier. 23

To fulfill his promise of making land available to those who would work it, Jefferson had to devise a system for extinguishing Indian property rights. He was not starting from scratch, however, as previous government officials, including himself, had already begun to pave the way. In fact, one of the first acts of the Continental Congress in 1775 was to create three departments of Indian affairs, and then to appoint men such as Benjamin Franklin and Patrick Henry as Indian commissioners. Their job was to negotiate treaties

22 Thomas Jefferson's Second Inaugural Address; Internet.

23 Unfortunately, included within this lot were land speculators and silent congressional partners who took advantage of insider information to buy land cheap and sell it for a profit. Jefferson worried that such criminal activity would be detrimental to the country. He noted this in a letter to Madison dated April 23, 1787: "The inhabitants of those places [settlements on the Illinois and Wabash], claim protection against the savages, and some provision for both criminal and Civil justice. It appears also the land jobbers are among them who are likely to multiply litigations among individuals, and by collusive purchases of spurious titles, defraud the United States. The Republic of Letters, 475."
with Indian groups, so as to secure pledges of neutrality during the War for Independence. Jefferson revealed his own views on how to deal with Native Americans when he wrote to a Mr. Charles Carroll, "Our news from the westward [sic] is disagreeable. Constant murders committing [sic] by the Indians, and their combination threatens to be more and more extensive. I hope we shall give them a thorough drubbing this summer, and then change our tomahawks into a golden chain of friendship. The most economical as well as most humane conduct towards them is to bribe them into peace, and to retain them in peace by eternal bribes."

This did not mean that Jefferson believed Native Americans were biologically inferior. Unlike his views on Africans, whom he categorized as subhuman in his Notes On Virginia, Jefferson judged Native Americans to be equal to Euro-Americans, yet deficient in civilized manners. To view them otherwise would have confirmed European critics who argued that the American environment produced peoples with degraded intellects. After all, was Jefferson not now also a “native” American? Consequently, when it came time to devise an Indian policy, Jefferson focused not only on exacting submission, but also on extinguishing heathen manners through coercive assimilation.

---


Under Jefferson's administration Indian agents were to slowly allow American settlements to encroach upon hunting grounds until the Indians could no longer support themselves. Then, once under duress, officials were to offer the Indians assistance in becoming self-sufficient agriculturalists, while simultaneously convincing them to cede land in return for farming implements and know-how. For those tribes who refused to cooperate, Jefferson authorized government traders to sell them goods on credit until they could no longer service their debt. Once this happened, agents were then to offer to forgive the debt in return for land cessions. For any tribe that refused both approaches, or decided to "take up the hatchet," agents were authorized to drive them "across the Mississippi." In any case, Indians had to remove themselves from the path of advancing whites.  

Jefferson's coercive policies of assimilation and removal held sway up to the late 1820s. Until then, his successors continued to offer Indians the choice of living unmolested in their pursuit of sedentary life, or being forcibly relocated beyond the line of white settlement. Things changed somewhat during Andrew Jackson's administration when he set the precedent of removing even assimilated Indians beyond the Mississippi. Consequently, from the early 1830s to the 1850s, Indian agents placed more emphasis on restricting Indians to areas removed from white settlers, rather than negotiating terms for

---

assimilation.\textsuperscript{28}

New problems arose following the American victory over Mexico in 1848. With the country's acquisition of Mexico's Northern provinces, the United States now controlled the territory it had been using to exile recalcitrant Indians. As American citizens believed themselves entitled to take any land paid for in American tax revenue and blood, the Executive Branch had to abandon simple Indian removal and create some other form of exclusion. Had the Gold Rush not happened when it did, Washington officials may have reincarnated Jefferson's system of peace through bribes. This did not occur, however, as it was not long after California became American territory, that a worker at Sutter's Mill discovered gold and set off a mad rush of prospectors directly across "Indian Territory."

When Americans first began migrating westward, they crossed paths with not only previously removed tribes, but also Plains and Southwestern Indians. These native groups had spent many generations honing their skills of resistance against Spaniards and Frenchmen and were unwilling to simply bow to American pressure. Government officials and citizens alike were aware of these Indians from reports such as those of Lewis and Clark, but were unsure as how to treat them. Many early travelers erred on the side of

\textsuperscript{28} In his Fifth Annual Message to Congress on December 3, 1883, Andrew Jackson summarized his views of Indian affairs: "My original convictions upon this subject have been confirmed by the course of events for several years, and experience is every day adding to their strength. That those tribes cannot exist surrounded by our settlements and in continued contact with our citizens is certain. They have neither the intelligence, the industry, the moral habits, nor the desire of improvement which are essential to any favorable change in their condition. Established in the midst of another and a superior race, and without appreciating the causes of their inferiority or seeking to control them, they must necessarily yield to the force of circumstance and ere long disappear." President Jackson Speeches, <http://www.synaptic.be.ca.ejournal/Jackson.htm>(10 September 2003).
caution and did their best to avoid them.\(^9\)

Circumstances became volatile when the trickle of prospectors, merchants, and sundry other Americans heading for California turned into a river. Not only did the increased number of people consume more resources, but so too did their large number of cows, mules, and horses. Thus, while emigrants cut precious trees for fuel and helped themselves to game animals, their livestock destroyed the grasses Indian horses relied on and fouled scarce watering holes.\(^{30}\) Real inter-ethnic violence did not start in full, however, until the Americans crossed the line and repeated the Spanish mistake of punishing Indians who “took” supplies or drove emigrants away from resources.\(^{31}\)

For a time, migrating Americans defended themselves, but it was not long before they grew tired of providing for their own security and demanded that government troops protect them from aggrieved Indians. When government officials obliged, military leaders and Indian agents found themselves in a weakened position. Now they could not simply threaten to remove a tribe, as there was virtually no place left that was not already claimed. Many of the Plains and Southwestern Indians also possessed a sense of property rights and were determined to not turn over their land to the Americans without a fight.\(^{32}\)

\(^{9}\)For a thorough examination of American migration west please see John D. Unruh’s *The Plains Across: The Overland Emigrant and the Trans-Mississippi West, 1840-1860* (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1982).


\(^{32}\) See Robert M. Utley’s *The Indian Frontier of the American West, 1846-1890* (Albuquerque: University Of New Mexico Press, 1983), as it address this type of conflict.
Due to growing unrest, by the mid-1850s, the Interior Department took American Indian policy in a new direction with a reservation system. To quell potential conflicts and remove Indians from areas whites wanted, the government began consolidating native groups on restricted pieces of land where they could receive concentrated, assimilation training. The problem with this was that militarily strong Indian groups refused to stay on their reservations. Government officials responded by authorizing troops to force compliance, which led to a state of low-level warfare. Commissioners from the executive branch still went through the motions of negotiating treaties with Indians, yet by 1860 the only choices Indians had were to relinquish self-determination or wage an all out war against the white man.  

Representatives of the American government made official contact with Arizona's Indians in 1846 when the Army of the West traveled through on its way to California. This meeting of soldiers and residents ostensibly took place in the shadow of war, yet no fighting took place. In fact, early contact was so uneventful, that many American soldiers praised the various Indian groups for being well disposed to peaceful relations. Conditions would not stay this way for long, but at least for a time it seemed that Arizona would become a middle ground where different cultures could co-exist.  

---

33 Indian agents often expected one or the other of Indian groups. For example, here is a quote from an Indian agent assigned to the Apaches before even meeting his charges: "From all I have seen and know of the Apaches, they are treacherous, warlike and cruel, and need severe chastisement before they can be made to know the policy of observing good faith with white people." Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, 1824-1888, New Mexico Superintendency, 1849-1880, Roll 546 (Washington: The National Archives and Record Service, 1956).
CHAPTER 5

THE AMERICANS OFFICIALLY ARRIVE

The first officially sanctioned American exploration of Arizona began in 1846 when soldiers and scientists\(^1\) passed through during the Mexican-American War. American political and military leaders were not interested in Arizona per se, as they, like the Spaniards before them, viewed the region mostly as an extension of New Mexico as well as a dangerous barrier blocking access to California. But President Polk wanted to secure New Mexico’s trade economy, while Congressional members sought information about possible southern routes to the Pacific. These two motivations not only set the agenda for the Americans’ first visit to Arizona, but also shaped American relations with Arizona’s Hispanic settlers and Native Americans for the last half of the nineteenth century.\(^2\)

To secure New Mexico and survey a southern route to California, Secretary of War William L. Marcy ordered General Stephen Watts Kearney to organize at least fifteen hundred volunteers at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and to march them to Santa Fe as soon as possible. In the early summer of 1846, Kearny fulfilled his orders by taking command

---

\(^1\) As today with the Army Corp of Engineers, in the 1840s the military included a branch know as the Corp of Topographical Engineers. See letter from Secretary of War W. L. Marcy to the President of the Senate Geo M. Dallas in Emory, 19.

of seventeen hundred troops and heading southwest, toward New Mexico.\textsuperscript{3}

While Kearny did not have specific reconnaissance orders, the daily need to secure adequate water supplies caused the General and his subordinates to carefully note their surroundings. On July 4, 1846, Private George Rutledge Gibson wrote about their search for water in his journal: "The day was excessively hot, and all the company suffered extremely from thirst, to relieve which they pushed forward at a rapid gait, expecting any moment to find water. In this, however, they were disappointed and had to march twenty miles under a burning sun before they came to any."\textsuperscript{4} In fact, the closer they came to New Mexico the more likely it was that they would travel more than a full day between adequate watering sites.

At times soldiers would discover water, only to be disappointed when a pecking order for access emerged. Sergeant Daniel Tyler expressed his frustration when he wrote, "...after about twelve miles' \textit{[sic]} travel [we] came to a hole or crevice in a rock... [with] water enough to give each man a half pint. As the Colonel and staff rode up to it, the former remarked 'The men can do without water better than the animals.'... His mule and his staff mules drained the spring."\textsuperscript{5}

A member of the Mormon Battalion, Tyler and his coreligionists had joined the fighting to prove their patriotism for a country that had rejected them.\textsuperscript{6} Little did they know that their unit would become famous for surviving a grueling trek down the Rio

\textsuperscript{3} \textit{Ibid.}, 17.
\textsuperscript{4} \textit{Ibid.}, 133-4.
\textsuperscript{5} Tyler, 208.
\textsuperscript{6} The Mormons had by this time been driven from two states by angry mobs and where in conflict with the government over their practice of polygamy. To smooth tensions Brigham Young encouraged some of his followers to participate in the war.
Grande River into Chihuahua, and a harrowing march westward across the harshest parts of southern Arizona. Captain James Allen was to be their commander, but died at Fort Leavenworth. As a result, on October 2, General Kearny selected Captain Philip St. George Cooke, who was in St. Louis at the time, as their new leader. As the battalion was already en route to New Mexico when Cooke assumed command, Kearny decided he would leave the Mormons in Santa Fe to wait for him.7

After facing no resistance from New Mexicans, who were torn between their cultural ties to Mexico and their resentment over being neglected by federal authorities, Kearny left the Mormons in Santa Fe and headed west.8 Among his troops was another young man whose life work was also about to become tied to Arizona. This was Lieutenant William H. Emory, a member the military’s Corp of Topographical Engineers. Lt. Emory was under orders from Washington to first assist in extinguishing all armed resistance in the Southwest, and then, as a scientist, to gather geographic data on New Mexico and California.9

When Kearny and his men reached the headwaters of the Gila River they found the terrain was too rugged for their heavily loaded wagons. The General finally decided to abandon the buckboards and transfer his supplies to the backs of the company’s mules. Before leaving, he hired local guides to wait for Cooke and to assist the Mormons in


9 Emory, 10-1.
refitting their mules. When all the repacking was complete, Kearny’s battalion moved into Arizona’s eastern mountains. It did not take Lt. Emory long to discover why the prehistoric Anasazi and Mogollon Indians had abandoned the region and why the Western Apaches could not give up raiding and adopt a sedentary life.¹⁰

On October 9, he wrote, “Game in [this part of] New Mexico is almost extinct, if it ever existed to any extent.” Then, on October 29, he noted, “The dust was knee deep in the rear of our trail; the soil appeared good, but, for whole acres, not a sign of vegetation was to be seen.” And lastly, on November 5, he observed, “Nature has done her utmost to favor a condition of things which has enabled a savage and uncivilized tribe, armed with the bow and lance, to hold as tributary powers three fertile and once flourishing states, Chihuahua, Sonora, and Durango . . .”¹¹

Cooke and his Mormon troops left Santa Fe on October 19, ten days behind Kearny. It was not until they came upon the discarded wagons and hired guides that they learned of the new mule-train plan. Unconvinced that this was the best course of action, Cooke decided not to follow General Kearny and to instead map-out a southern route that would circumnavigate around Arizona’s eastern mountains.¹²

As the days passed, conditions on Cooke’s route worsened. The land was rough and uneven, and water was dangerously scarce. It was not long before Cooke began to doubt the wisdom of his headstrong decision; yet he confided his misgivings to no one but his journal. The farther the battalion went, the more he worried about where he would

¹⁰ Emory, 113-4.
¹¹ Ibid., 90; 113; 123.
¹² Cooke, 95.
purchase meat on the hoof to feed his men; and where he would find healthy replacements for his exhausted draft animals. This last problem was to become particularly vexing for later Americans heading across Arizona, as horses and even mules had difficulty coping with the region's desert topography and arid climate.\textsuperscript{13}

To keep his fears from becoming reality, at each stop, Cooke ordered his quartermaster to search for anyone willing to trade healthy stock for their "broken down" mules and depleted cattle. Of this, on October 25, 1846, he wrote, "I sent the quartermaster and interpreter to the owner . . . [but] they [sic] treated his offer with contempt. It was great good luck to obtain those [mules] yesterday from a merchant . . . The bargain for exchange, two for one, was made before he saw mine"\textsuperscript{14}

Both Kearny and Cooke set a significant precedent when they began to strike deals with Indians who offered to trade or sell animals and other items. On October 20, General Kearny even sent a runner to the well-known Apache headman Mangas Coloradas to let his band know that the Americans would like to trade. Of this encounter Lt. Emory observed, "The whole camp was now busily engaged in attempting to trade. The Indians had mules, ropes, whips, and mezcal [sic]."\textsuperscript{15} Cooke met with the equally well-known Navajo chief Manuelito on November 29 and in a roundabout manner asked him to trade. Cooke wrote that he told Manuelito: "we [are] friends and . . . my great chief [Kearny] ha[s] gone on to California with a few men to meet a great many more who came by the

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 71-3.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 76-7.
\textsuperscript{15} Emory, 100.
sea; that [Kearny] would take the country from the Mexicans; that I would join him; that my mules were tired and I wished trade with his people for others.”

Neither Kearny nor Cooke ever bothered to ask where or how the Indians acquired their animals and other supplies even though both had to have known that such goods were stolen. Emory betrays his knowledge when he describes the trading event in great detail, even down to what each Indian was wearing: “One had a jacket made of a Henry Clay flag, which aroused unpleasant sensations, for the acquisition, no doubt, cost one of our countrymen his life.” In light of this, it is no wonder that during the early years of contact Plains and Southwestern Indians continued to view raiding as a more profitable economic practice than other more “legal” subsistence strategies.

Apart from powerful headmen such as Manuelito and Mangas Coloradas, most Indians kept their distance from the Americans. Soldiers from Private George Gibson all the way up to General Stephen Watts Kearny attributed this fear to bounty hunters such as James Johnson who had once lured a large group of Indians to his camp and then killed most of them with cannon blast so as to claim a reward for their scalps. The Americans did not, however, seem to know of the circumstances that prevailed during the years of Bernardo de Gálvez’s peace policy, as none correctly identified it as the cause of the Indians’ dependence on, and therefore insatiable desire for, liquor. In regard to this, boundary

16 Cooke, 122-3; Cooke refers to Manuelito as an Apache, but he was Navajo.
17 Ibid., 78. Just one month before meeting Manuelita, Cooke passed by a Mexican ranch that had lost over 6,000 head of sheep to Navajo raiders.
19 In every journal or report related to encounters with the Apaches there is somewhere a very similar accounting of Johnson’s actions; making it highly likely that the men all read the same story in local newspapers.
commissioner John Russell Bartlett wrote of a typical encounter, "They [the Indians] asked for whiskey, which I positively refused, denying that I had any. Although this was the simple truth, they did not believe it, not being able to imagine how a party of Americans could be without that indispensable article."^^20

Of the few lesser-known headmen who met with the Americans, all professed friendship and proposed that the two people join as allies in defeating their common Mexican enemy. At no time, however, did any of them state that they would submit to American authority, nor did they behave in a manner that would indicate that they expected to be treated as anything but equals. Unfortunately, most Americans ignored this; instead, they heard the Apaches' message without really listening to what was being said. Consequently, men such as Kearny and Cooke falsely led the Indians to believe that they agreed with their views, and they gave officials in Washington the wrong impression of the Indians' disposition.^^21 The men made it appear that Arizona's Indians as a whole where willing to quietly accept subordination to the Great White Father in Washington when this was not actually the case.

Of all the Indians the Americans met on their way to California, it was the "industrious" Pimans who they favored the most. While the soldiers looked down on the Pimans for their childlike fascination with dyed cloth and their preference for silver over gold coins, their vast, well-kept fields and settled villages so readily matched the

^^20 Bartlett, 302.

^^21 When addressing the Indians Kearny and Cooke affected a child-like speaking pattern and liberally infused their rhetoric with phrases such as "Great Father in Washington" and "Red Children."
Jeffersonian ideal, that the Americans could not help but embrace them. The fact that the Apaches did not intimidate the Pimans also impressed the Americans as the soldiers viewed the Mexicans as cowards, unnecessarily paralyzed with Apache fear. Of this Cooke wrote, "... the Apaches do not often trouble [the Pimans], being afraid." And, "They have a reputation of escaping molestation from Apache [sic], on [account] of [their] resistance." In almost every way, then, the Pimans were the model of what the Americans wanted in their Indians.

Kearny and then Cooke stayed briefly in the Piman villages to allow their men and animals to recuperate. It is a good thing that they did because upon leaving, each faced two more harrowing challenges before crossing into California. The first was the march to the junction of the Gila and Colorado Rivers. The bend in the Gila River forced the soldiers to either waste precious time and energy hugging its banks, or to march straight for over a day without access to potable fluids. A second obstacle appeared when the men reached the Colorado. The River's rapid and unpredictable nature made it a challenge for

---

22 Neither of these behaviors was irrational as bright dyes were hard to come by in the desert and the Mexican economy, especially in the north, was based on the silver standard.

23 They are probably also including the Southeastern Yavapai who lived just north of the Pima and had been their enemy since the time of the Hohokam; the most poetic description of Mexican prostration came in 1849 through the pen of John Woodhouse Audubon when he wrote of a Mexican town: "it has the apathetic lassitude of everything Mexican." See John Woodhouse Audubon, *Audubon's Western Journal, 1849-1850*, (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1984), 84. May 30, 1849, prospector A. B. Clark and his party stopped in Tucson and he wrote: "The soldiers made a contemptible appearance, lounging about their quarters. Their pay is the promise of three bushels of wheat; and a small sum of money per month... They however receive more than their services are worth." A.B. Clarke, *Travels in Mexico and California*, ed. Anne M. Perry (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1988), 68.

24 Cooke, 168-9; Emory, 133-6. In 1871 Peace Commissioner Vincent Colyer met with a group of "Tonto Apaches," which were either an intermixed band of Yavapai and Apaches or a band of Yavapai, who told him that they would not come to Fort McDowell unless the Americans would promise to keep the Pimans away from their camp sites. See Vincent Colyer, *Peace With the Apaches of New Mexico and Arizona, Report of Vincent Colyer* (New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1971), 23.
even the most physically fit to cross.\textsuperscript{25}

Both Kearny and Cooke made it to California with their ranks intact and the Mexican-American War ended in March of 1848 when the Senate ratified the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. At that moment, most of what had once been Spain's northern buffer against foreign encroachment became the property of Mexico's overbearing northern neighbor.\textsuperscript{26} Once the war was over, reconnaissance reports such as Lt. Emory's made their way back to military headquarters and inquisitive congressional committees. Such information would have taken possibly a year or more to filter through official channels and into newsprint had nothing of major importance happened to force the information into the public arena.

This important event occurred when President Polk confirmed the discovery of gold in California in his December 1848 State of the Union Address. Predictably, soon after, there was a sudden urge among thousands of men to go west; and each traveler was now very interested in knowing which was the shortest and safest route to the Pacific. Some forty-niners opted to travel over northern trails that passed through Wyoming, Utah, and Nevada, while others decided to try the southern course pioneered by Cooke. This lower route became especially attractive after the gruesome details of the Donner Party, who resorted to cannibalism after becoming stranded in the Sierra Nevada Mountains during

\textsuperscript{25}  \textit{Sgt. Tyler, 240-1; Emory, 157-63.} In 1849 John Audubon wrote of the journey to the Colorado: "Sixteen days of travel from the Pimos [sic] villages and \textit{such travel}, as please God, I trust we may none of us ever see again. . . . Lack of water and grass we have almost come to regard as inevitable; truly we look, and are, a forlorn spectacle, and we feel, I am sure, worse than we look."

the winter of 1846, reached the eastern newspapers.²⁷

At first there was just a trickle of emigrants passing through Arizona, but by the early 1850s the trickle had turned into a steady stream of prospectors, cattle herders, and merchants. As the number of migrants increased, so too did the potential for conflict. Violence during the early years of contact, however, was just as likely to be committed by non-Indians perpetrating murders, thefts, and bloody brawls as it was by Indians. Among the Indians, violence was more likely to occur between groups than with Americans as internal feuds and offenses often required a physical response. Regardless of who was committing the majority of the violence, Arizona soon became a place in need of a mediating authority.²⁸

That mediator arrived in 1851 when the War Department sent Major Samuel P. Heintzelman to establish Fort Yuma at the junction of the Gila and Colorado Rivers. The tiny outpost was not very impressive, consisting of little more than a few shabby tents and

²⁷ Louisiana Strentzel, “Letter of Louisiana Strentzel to her Family,” in Covered Wagon Women: Diaries and Letters from the Western Trail, 1840-1890, vol. 1, 1840-1849, ed. Kenneth L. Holmes (Glendale, Calif.: Arthur H. Clark, 1983), 250-67. In her letters home Louisiana Strentzel reports that she finds The Gila Trail much as Cooke had with the only exception being that there were many more people and animals. She writes, “...At his place we met a company of Mexicans returning from the gold mines. They gave awful accounts of the road before us, that they way was strewn with dead animals, and that wagons and property of every kind were left on the road all the way through the desert.” Yet even after all the hardships she writes, “We have just heard from the emigrants who came the other route [northern route] and from what we can learn they suffered a great deal more than those who came the Southern route.”

²⁸ Major Samuel P. Heintzelman, A Transcription of Major Samuel P. Heintzelman’s Journal, 1 January 1851-31 December 1854: Concerning the Establishment of a Post at the Junction of the Colorado and Gila Rivers, trans. Creola Blackwell (Yuma, AZ.: Yuma County Historical Society, 1989). Major Heintzelman’s journal serves as an excellent gauge for the increasing amount of violence in Arizona over time; the change in American attitude toward even the Pima Indinas is evident from the following quote taken from Hepah, California! The Journal of Cave Johnson Cuots: From Monterey, Nuevo Leon, Mexico to Los Angeles, California During the Years 1848-1849, ed. Henry F. Dobyens (Tucson: Arizona Pioneers’ Historical Society, 1961), 68. “The Unfortunate redman! Unsuspicious and unsuspecting of the cunning and politic white flatterer, little thought of their days being numbered! Of the day when the white man would see the last red warrior drowning in the Pacific, and rejoice as his rifle ball took the last breath of life from him!”
a holding pen for animals. Unimposing as it was, the fort did at least now provide
American officials with an institutional base from which to exert control over both people
and resources. Heintzelman was none too happy when he arrived at one of the country’s
hottest spots and often openly wished he could be assigned anywhere else. Throughout
his stay he consistently complained that he had been “exiled” from the civilized world.29
As a good career soldier, however, he fulfilled his orders and did his best to bring
American justice to the Arizona frontier.

The first order of business for Major Heintzelman and his men was to address the
violence that was keeping Americans from crossing peacefully into California.30 In his
assignment letter from the Adjunct General’s Office, the Major was directed to: “... 

. protect the emigrants [sic]; to punish the Indians for any outrages they have committed
upon persons passing through their country, [and] to establish and maintain friendly
relations with and to prevent any combination on the part of different tribes for hostile
purposes.”31

Heintzelman soon discovered, however, that while the military was correct in
recognizing that the situation on the Colorado River needed to be ameliorated, the
leadership was incorrect in assuming that the only parties in need of chastisement were the
Indians. In fact, he was surprised to find that many Indians felt just as threatened by
emigrants, who were expropriating their resources, as emigrants felt about Indians who

29 In his last journal entry Heintzelman wrote, “This ends the last year of my exilie I hope [sic]”, 174.
30 It is interesting to note that no one ever asks why the Indians were attacking travelers until people
on the ground started to report that the Indians had good reasons for why they oppose American
encroachment on their territory.
31 Ibid.
were lashing out at American abuses.\textsuperscript{32}

When Heintzelman realized this he jettisoned the idea that all Indians needed to be "controlled" and instead adopted a more evenhanded approach. An example of this occurred on January 31, 1853, when he refused to punish a group of Indians based solely on unsubstantiated accusations: "Those Mexicans accuse the Indians of stealing some of their animals. They have no evidence of it, only [that] they have lost the animals. I don't think the indians [sic] would venture to do this."\textsuperscript{33} At times the Major even found himself serving as a \textit{de facto} peace chief by mediating between warring bands of Maricopas, Cocopahs, and Yumans. On December 9, 1852, he wrote, "... I was explaining to the two Co-co-pas [sic] chiefs the relation in which they stood & that I would not permit them to war against the Yumans [n]or the latter to against them."\textsuperscript{34}

By 1853, many Mexican miners were coming back from California as discriminatory laws had kept them from mining. Among these men were some who planned to still strike it rich by driving Sonoran sheep, cattle, and mules back to sell in California's inflated markets. Slowly, as the amount of livestock crossing Arizona increased, so too did the reports of stolen animals. Not all cases involved Indians, but, as bands of Pai speaking natives living in western Arizona were in perpetual short supply of food and had few other

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{32} John Audubon, \textit{Audubon's Journal}, on October 5, 1849, Audubon comments that the Maricopas were on their way to "assist the Yumas against the Americans," yet conflict was apparently averted with the "prompt shooting of a party of Texans who had shot one or two Yumas [sic] Indians for not making the right landing." This is the same kind of mistake made by the Spaniards when they attempted to establish a mission among the Yumas in 1781; on Jan. 27, 1853, Major Heintzelman wrote of the problem Indians were having with emigrants beginning to settle on their land: "Lt. O'Connell is burning over the country between Cook's Wells, the Algodones & Fr. Defiance. Jose [probably a Yavapai man] appeared to think it was someone who intended to settle there. He is afraid our [sic] cattle will destroy their gardens when they plant, 125.

\textsuperscript{33} Heintzelman,125.

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., 113.
\end{flushleft}
methods for acquiring domesticated animals, it should have come to no surprise that some were pilfering fattened sheep and cattle. After adopting raiding as a means to meet their nutritional needs, some Indians then began to trade or sell a portion of their “surplus livestock” to emigrants whose animals had broken down. In doing this, these native entrepreneurs gained access to coveted American trade goods either directly or through purchase with money they received for stolen animals. Heintzelman did his best to curtail what he saw as an illicit practice, yet he was hindered by an inability to address the underlying environmental factors driving Arizona’s hungry Indians to take American animals.

Along with the animal herders, miners and men exiled from California for being habitual criminals also began arriving in Arizona in the 1850s. The miners were searching for the next bonanza where a man could strike it rich with just a pick and a pan, while the reprobates were eager to resume their illicit ways in any available town. For the prospectors Arizona seemed the perfect spot as the territory’s violent reputation had kept the area relatively clear of miners, while the criminals would go anywhere they could find

35 Complaints to Heintzelman over stolen herds increase throughout 1853. An interesting and wonderfully candid recounting of interaction between Americans with cattle and hungry Indians come from the memoirs of Hank Smith, “Mining and Indian Fighting in Arizona and New Mexico, 1858-1861,” Panhandle-Plains Historical Review, vol. 1, no. 1, ed. Hattie M. Anderson (Amarillo, TX: Russell & Cockrell, 1928) 81. Smith wrote, “We signaled them [the Indians] to come to camp, which they did. They said they were hungry and wanted a beef, that there were twenty more Indians with them on the mountains that they were on their way to Sonora on a raiding expedition and they would pay back the beef we would let them have . . . We finally concluded to give them the beef, provided they let the herd alone, which they promised.”

36 Hank Smith also provides insight into trading relations between Americans and Indians: “We found the White Mountains all right . . . about 150 White Mountain Apaches rode up to our camp and wanted us to come to their camp . . . for the purpose of trading some horses, mules, and calico, of which we always carried in good supply of the purpose [of trading with the Indians.] Smith, “Mining,” 106.
men laden with pockets of gold and silver.37

At first, the prospectors kept to the Colorado River and its peripheral streams. With the Colorado Ferry Company and Fort Yuma established nearby, staying close offered them assured access to both food and military protection.38 Eventually, from within this group grew a more organized effort to exploit Arizona’s mineral wealth. Some men had realized that real wealth was not to be found at the bottom of a rusted pan, but instead in the judicious cultivation of political connections. These speculators looked to merge the knowledge and power of military men with the money of eastern investors to create an industrial mining complex.

Despite his early protests against profiting from his position, Major Heintzelman became the first military commanders to profit from insider investments in mining and transportation concessions in Arizona.39 On February 20, 1851, he had fumed: “I have never hinted to him the least desire to own any part [of the proposed steamboat venture.]

---

37John Gregory Bourke, 119. For a detailed account of American discrimination against Hispanics in California please see Leonard Pitt’s The Decline of the Californios: A Social History of the Spanish-Speaking Californian, 1846-1890 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966). California’s territorial legislature passed the Foreign Miners’ Tax in 1850, which mandated that anyone not a U.S. citizen had to pay $20 per month to retain the right to prospect, “The people of Greenwood were about like those in any mining camp of the old days. They were largely mining men and adventurers from the old mining camps in California and Nevada, though some were from Texas and New Mexico. Some were Americans, Germans, Irish, French, and Mexicans. All in all, the men were more or less desperate in character.” Maguire, 54.

38 By 1863, this section of Arizona had many men who had “gone down to the new Diggins found on the tributaries of the Gila and others are leaving daily.” Letters of the Office of Indian Affairs, Extract from letter of Gov. F. Hooper to Major Heintzelman, San Francisco, September 24, 1863. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 1821-1880, New Mexico Superintendency, 1849-80, Roll 2 (Washington, National Archives and Records, 1956), Microform.

. . I have not sunk so low yet as to sell my character for a few paltry dollars. I can advocate the interests of the post without having at the same time a private interest.” Yet, the next year he was drawing dividends from his investment in that very steamboat operation. By November, 25, 1853 he had dropped all pretenses: “I gave Lt. McLean the gold Grinnel gave me, to send to Gen. Estel of S. Francisco, to try & have something done in the way of farther [sic] exploration & in making up a company. We want to profit some by it if we can.”

After leaving Fort Yuma, in 1856, Heintzelman joined with speculator Charles Poston to create the Sonora Mining and Exploring Company. Poston established the venture’s headquarters at the abandoned presidio of Tubac, while Heintzelman went back east to raise money. The main thrust of their business plan was to reopen abandoned mines previously worked by Spanish and Mexican miners.

At first there was only a few Americans, such as Heintzelman and Poston, who striving to monopolize Arizona’s resources. It did not take long, however, before the U.S. government joined in the quest. Congress did so when it authorized two railroad surveys through the region. Eager to connect California’s booming markets to east coast centers of finance and manufacturing, lawmakers were stuck in a debate as to where to put a trans-continental rail line. Each time a representative attempted to authorize an exploratory expedition that would favor his own state, opposition invariably formed. To move forward, compromisers finally passed a bill on March 3, 1853 to create multiple survey teams, so that the ultimate decision of where to locate the rail line would result

40 Heintzelman, 11, 168.

from scientific data and not due to majorities running roughshod over minority interests. With a Congressional mandate, Secretary of War Jefferson Davis authorized now Major William H. Emory to assemble surveying teams for possible southern routes along the 32\textsuperscript{nd} and 35\textsuperscript{th} parallels. And the Texas Western Railroad Company financed a third team. The task for each group was to “provide exact data on elevations and grades of mountain passes, meteorological and astronomical observations, and reports on the availability of water and timber as well as the nature of mineral resources, rocks, and soil.” For Americans in Arizona, this was just the type of information they needed to begin laying claim to the best pieces of land.

These survey reports, which literally directed men to promising mineral sites, began to publicly circulate in the late 1850s. The following excerpt comes from the Gray Report: “The mountains in the neighborhood are filled with minerals, and the precious metals are said to abound.” And “[w]e found the argentiferous galena ore and gold.”

Unfortunately, in addition to being conduits for information, the survey teams were also responsible for stirring up ill feelings among Arizona’s Indians. During the Whipple expedition a man came down with smallpox at about the same time that the disease was killing hundreds of Indians at the nearby Hopi and Zuni Pueblos. The Indians believed that man was to blame, as chronicler John P. Sherburne wrote, “Nothing could induce them [Indians] to come into Camp [sic]. They would take nothing to eat, drink, or smoke.

\footnotesize


43 Ibid., 1-2

so great was their fear of catching the smallpox.”

Members of survey teams also found amusement in harassing Indians. To assure themselves of keeping to the correct path, the men with Whipple captured an Indian man and forced him serve as their guide. When two Mexican runners arrived to take them to meet another team, they finally decided to let the humiliated man go: “We had a message from Lieut. W. this morning advising us to move and, hearing that he had met Indians [to serve as guides], we concluded to let our captive go, so after amusing ourselves for some time by making him show the road, we unlocked the chains, loaded him with old clothes, blankets, etc., and sent him off.” As a result, by the time miners and ranchers began pouring over Arizona’s landscape, many of the region’s Indians already held a very low opinion of Americans.

Despite high expectations, none of the mining ventures begun before the Civil War turned into a bonanza. Placer finds stopped producing either when miners had taken all the easily gathered minerals or when water supplies dried up, thereby eliminating panning and sluicing as extraction methods. Underground mining had its own problems related to access and ore refinement. Most underground claims required backbreaking work to expose buried veins as well as machinery for separating slag from ore. To meet their labor needs, mine owners often hired Mexican “peons” who would work cheaply without too

45 Sherburne, Indian Country, 136.
46 Ibid., 171-2.
47 “Tucson Correspondence,” Tucson, Feb. 11, 1860, St. Louis Missouri Republican, reprinted in Thompson Turner’s Latest from Arizona: The Hesperian Letters, ed. Constance Wynn Altshuler (Tucson: Arizona Pioneers’ Historical Society, 1969), 141: “All the placer mining hitherto attempted in Arizona, whether on the Gila, the Santa Cruz, or Bear Creek, has proved unprofitable to the miners on account of the scarcity of water.” See also Maguire, 64-5.
much complaint. After extracting the ore, owners could then either resort to the time-consuming, yet inexpensive patio refining process, or they could import expensive machinery to do the job. Technology was obviously the better choice if one had the money. Yet, as a cross-country railroad did not yet go through Arizona, bulky items had to come up the Colorado River on a steamboat and then move overland by mule train, or they had to come across country from the nearest eastern rail depot. Both options were time intensive and quite expensive.

A few miners and their investors were willing to risk the expense, but before any machines arrived in Arizona, the war between the Union and the Confederacy broke out. Southern sympathizers in Tucson and adjacent towns in New Mexico voted to support the Confederate cause, yet nothing of consequence came of this until Texans invaded New Mexico on July 24, 1861. Confederate Lieutenant-Colonel John R. Baylor was able to capture Mesilla, New Mexico, forcing Union commanders to order all loyal soldiers

---

48 Ibid., 20: Tubac, Nov. 24, 1859, “The Sonoran Exploring and Mining Company have an engine en route for the works, which will arrive early next year, and enable the company to reduce their rich ore in quantities to render it very profitable to shareholders;” Poston, State, 73, “As soon as it was known in Mexico that an American company had arrived in Tubac, Mexicans from Sonora and the adjacent states came in great numbers to work...A few straggling Americans came along now and then...[but] they were generally worthless, dissipated, dangerous, low white trash.”

49 In most cases, the patio process, which was developed in Mexico, consisted of a mule harnessed to a grinding wheel that crushed large chunks of rock into finer sand. The sand was then mixed with quicksilver and then dumped into vats of water. The quicksilver amalgamated with precious ores, which could then be separated from the slag.

50 The few men who succeeded in getting machinery into the region after the Civil War often abandoned mining themselves and went into the business of milling as they could charge exorbitant prices. “The prices charged by the cormorants running the mill were so exorbitant that one-half the ore was left on the dump because it would not pay to crush it.” See Maguire, 48.
west of the Rio Grande to abandon their posts and move to forts along the front line.  

This troop withdrawal upset loyal citizens in Southern Arizona, as they were now to be without a defensive buffer from Indian attacks. On June 15, 1861, Samuel Robinson, who was an accountant with the Santa Rita Mining Company, wrote in his journal, "Fort Breckenridge is literally surrounded by Apaches and many of the troops at the Fort talk of leaving, so that the immediate future of Arizona is not very bright." And on July 2, 1861, "The infantry expects to get off by the 15th inst. . .It is said the cause of the troops being removed to the Rio Grande is that they expect an attack from the Texans."  

Arizonans were particularly worried at this time as a recent incident between the military and some Indians had caused a sudden increase in Apache attacks. A rift had first opened between the Americans and the Apaches in 1848 when military leaders attempted to fulfill a pledge made in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo to keep Apache raiders out of Sonora and Chihuahua. Apache headmen could not understand why the Americans would want to protect an enemy that their military had just defeated. They also wanted to know why the Americans believed the U.S. government had a right to stop Apache warriors from avenging depredations perpetrated upon them by Mexican citizens.  

Having lived for generations with Spaniards who monopolized scarce resources and often indiscriminately punished Indians, the Apaches had learned to meet injustice with

---


52 Samuel Robinson, 1825-1907: Papers, 1861: MS 1088 (Arizona Historical Society: Tucson, AZ); On July 10, 1861 Indian Agent C. Lennan wrote, "The withdrawal of the U.S. troops has removed every check upon the Indians of Arizona and the larger portion of this part of the Territory of New Mexico is now entirely at the mercy of the most relentless of savages-the several tribes of Apaches."

111
injustice. When the Americans began to act in what they perceived to be a manner reminiscent of the Spanish, Gila, Chiricahua, and Western Apache bands resisted by treating the Americans as they did their Hispanic enemies: an eye for an eye. Apache headmen believed to do otherwise would be tantamount to subordinating themselves to American power and eventually giving up their way of life.\(^{53}\)

Relations between Americans and Apaches worsened considerably on January 27, 1861, when a band of Apaches stole livestock from a ranch near the Chiricahua Mountains and kidnapped a Mexican boy. In response, on February 4, the commander of Fort Buchanan, Lt. Bascom, met with Apache headman Cochise to demand that he return the cattle and the captive. Cochise brought family members with him and claimed that a band of White Mountain Apaches had the boy and that he would try to retrieve him. Bascom was not convinced and seized the group as hostages to bargain for the boy's return. Cochise escaped and demanded his relatives' release. Bascom refused. In retaliation, Cochise attacked a Butterfield stage and captured an employee who he offered in exchange for his relatives. Bascom still refused. Two days later, Cochise burned a wagon train, which killed nine Mexicans, and he took three Americans prisoner.\(^{54}\)

\(^{53}\) With man-on-the-ground clarity, Dr. Michael Steck, Indian agent assigned to the Apaches during the 1850s, wrote in a report that “The Apaches living upon the headwaters of the Gila are in a most destitute condition, they have lived principally from time immemorial, upon cattle, mules, & horses stolen either from this territory, or from the northern states of Mexico, Sonora & Chihuahua... at certain seasons they are in a starving condition, but such is the fact that the natural resources of the country cannot supply them with food... They are then reduced to the absolute necessity of choosing between stealing and starving... Place a white man in the same position and I doubt whether he would consult the ownership or right to property more than these Indians.” National Archives Microfilm Publications, Records of the New Mexico Superintendency of Indian Affairs, 1849-80, No. T21, Roll 1 (Washington D.C.: National Archives and Records, 1956), Microfilm.

Finally Cochise made a direct attack, but Bascom repulsed the attempt. Fed up, Cochise killed all of his hostages. The Lieutenant then hung six of the Apache men he was holding, including Cochise's brother and two of his sister's sons. As the Chiricahua were a matrilineal people, hanging Cochise's nephews was tantamount to hanging his sons. Consequently, according to some reports, Cochise sought blood revenge by killing close to one hundred and fifty Americans in the ensuing weeks.\(^{55}\)

Less than two months later, in April of 1861, Congress moved the Overland mail route from its southern course to a central route so as to reduce travel time to San Francisco and to punish the south for seceding. When the Apaches watched the mail company remove its men and animals from their territory, they apparently assumed it was due to fear provoked by their efforts. After this, Apache raids increased even further.\(^{56}\) And finally, a few months later, U.S. soldiers stationed at Arizona forts, packed up, burned their remaining supplies, and marched east to turn back the Confederate invasion of New Mexico. Not surprisingly, it was not long before Apache headmen began boasting that they had defeated the Americans and driven their soldiers from the territory.\(^{57}\)

While fear of the Apaches was high among American and Mexican residents, it is misleading to assume that this was the only worry in Tucson and Tubac. With the soldiers gone, the kind of frontier violence that had plagued the region during the early years of the gold rush returned with non-Indians involved in as many "depredations" as the Indians.

\(^{55}\) Ibid.

\(^{56}\) Turner, 212-3.

\(^{57}\) Upon being appointed Superintendent of Indian Affairs of the territory of Arizona, Charles Poston wrote a detailed report of the Indian in his jurisdiction, of the Gila Apaches he wrote, "... when our unfortunate civil war caused the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from the country they proudly boasted of having chased the Americans from their domain never more to return."
Contemporary diaries and newspapers illustrate this, as they are filled not only with raiding Apaches, but also an assortment of American and Mexican thieves, murders, and assorted other criminals. In fact, local resident Samuel Robinson wrote to assure his family that he was not living in constant fear of Indian raids: "It is true that we are always prepared for them, but we do not really fear them."

Reality did not, however, stop Americans from blaming the Indians whenever something or someone came up missing. The following report from Fort Mojave demonstrates the generally irrational behavior of Americans toward Indians during this period: "Se-rum[.] head chief of the Hulapais who has been paying a friendly visit to this Post[,] was brutally Assaulted [sic] this evening by a drunken man in the Street of Mojave City. . . The probabilities are that this aggressive act will lead to another war with the Hulapais. . ." The next incident, also occurred near Fort Mojave, and demonstrates the tendency of settlers to see Indians culprits behind every crime, regardless of the evidence.

Some two weeks ago an Indian (Mojave) by name Toke-watha came to me and informed me that [Mr.] Goodrich was cutting his grass and refused to pay him for it, I sent for Goodrich and he and Toke-watha came up together about two days afterward when I ascertained that Toke-watha lived about four miles from where Goodrich was cutting, supposing that the Indian was simply trying to obtain some money I told him they would have to refer the matter to the Justice of the Peace at Hardyville as it was not on the Military Reserve. Toke-watha had threatened three or four times to shoot Goodrich previous to this occurrence. Owing to the above facts I suspect that Toke-watha murdered Goodrich, he was killed by an axe, or

---

58 In his memoirs, Charles Poston wrote of this period, "The Vigilance Committee of San Francisco sent a considerable number of unsavory immigrants to Arizona, who with the refugees from Mexico, Texas and Arkansas, render mule property rather insecure in the early days." Poston, 100. And in an editorial written from Tucson on October 17, 1859: "What with Indians, revengeful Mexicans and Border Ruffians, if I mistake not, the history of Arizona, for the next six months will be written in blood." Latest, 15.

59 Robinson, MS 1088.

other sharp instrument when asleep . . . A great many [citizens] are desirous of
gothing down the valley in a body and taking the Indian [Toke-watha] by force, which
would probably bring on a general skirmish . . . I would respectfully state that if I do
not receive the Indian today a mob will probably try to take him themselves . . . "61

This example also illustrates the fact that there were some parallels between the
behavior of frontier settlers in relation to Indians and southerners toward emancipated
blacks following the Civil War. 62 Other such similarities would also begin to emerge
between how the North defeated the South and then sought to reconstruct the region at
the end of the Civil War, and how the federal government defeated Arizona's Indians and
then attempted to forcibly acculturate them.63

61 Ibid., 81; Sept. 4, 1872.

62 Racially tinged comments such as that which follows were not uncommon in journals, newspaper
articles, and military reports, "We read everywhere of the stoicism and gravity of the Indian, but my
Apaches were merry as darkies, laughing, singing (but such singing) for hours at a time. The soldiers
delighted in them—gave them tobacco and extra sugar and coffee, made pets of them, as it were and had
nearly all of them rechristened." Charles King, "On Campaign in Arizona," Milwakuee Sentinel, March
28, 1880, in Eyewitness to the Indian Wars, 165; similarly, "Here the meals were prepared, and they were
brought hence by "our man" on a tray, into the "large house," where the board was spread . . . " Frank K.
Upham, "Incidents of Regular Army Life in Time of Peace," The Overland Monthly 5, 2nd ser. (April
1885): 426-29, in Eyewitness to the Indian Wars, 87.

63 The animal-like view some Americans had of Indians comes out clearly in U.S. Army surgeon L.
Y. Loring's report on the Coyotero Apaches, "When they are housed and have beds to sleep in in place of
groveling in the earth like dumb brutes, when they have been taught to wear clothes and to keep
themselves clean, when they have acquired industrious habits and the rudiments of civilized life, then will
they be in a better condition to comprehend and accept the mysteries of the Christian religion."
CHAPTER 6

AMERICAN VICTORY: HEGEMONY ACHIEVED

The events that led Arizona's regular troops to pack up, burn their supplies, and head east in the summer of 1861 also caused settlers to shift their focus from provincial concerns to national problems. As a result of this reorientation, citizens began to increasingly base their actions on factors not always evident to their Mexican and Indian neighbors. Without knowing this, it became much more difficult for these groups to respond to Americans in ways that did not jeopardize their own wellbeing. In fact, by 1886, miscalculations on the part of many Indians put them squarely at odds with the American settlers and ultimately cost them control over not only important resources, but also their lives.

In the years immediately following 1846, American emigrants and Arizona's Indians came into sustained contact. During this time, however, they were able to co-exist without too much bloodshed, as neither group was willing to fight for control over the region. This did not mean that Native Americans merely stood by as Americans trespassed on their land and usurped their resources, as many took umbrage with travelers who refused to respect their territorial claims. What it did mean was that neither side was yet ready to go to war. Evidence of this state of affairs comes from Indian agent John Greene in his 1852 report on the Gila Apaches: "The whole of this Country [sic] would soon be settled if the Indians would allow it but they are unwilling to part with their land..."
without fair compensation. Moreover, he wrote that settlers had repeatedly attempted to move into a verdant valley, but had "as often been driven away by the Indians who say they shall (emphasis in the original) not have them unless the Government pays for their country."

Indian agents such as John Greene also repeatedly warned federal officials that violence would erupt if the Indians, the Apaches in particular, were not given the same consideration as citizens. They bluntly informed American officials that if they did not live up to promises made to the Indians, American settlers would pay a heavy price. In a report dated January 19, 1855, Indian Agent Michael Steck wrote, "I hear complaints among them [the Apaches] of the bad faith of the Government towards them, they say they were promised assistance, but that they have waited two years and have not yet received it, and any one at all acquainted with the peculiar characteristic of Indian character, will at once see the evil that would result from another years' delay . . ." Unfortunately, federal officials were too busy or too little attuned to frontier life to take the agent's warning seriously.

On the level of the average American traveling through Arizona, most had some understanding of the Indian way of life as well as the historic nature of the ongoing battle between the southwestern Indians and Mexicans. This is evident in their journals and

---


2 United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, Letters Received By the Office Of Indian Affairs, 1821-88, New Mexico Superintendency, 1849-80, Roll 2 (Washington D.C.: National Archives and Record Service, 1956).

3 Ibid.
letters when they condemn the Indians for their un-Christian ways. Yet most Americans were very willing to overlook these supposed character flaws as long as the Indians facilitated their ability to reach California by providing fresh draft animals, potable water, and supplies wholesome food.

Underlying tensions first came to the surface in 1850 when Indian agents attempted to enforce a clause in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo obligating Americans to curtail Apache raids into Mexico. The agents quickly ran into determined resistance from Apache headmen such as Mangas Coloradas who demanded to know: "... are we to stand with our arms folded while our women & children are being murdered in cold blood? The Sonorans beat out the brains of fifteen of them with clubs. Are we to be the victims of such treachery—are we not to be revenged? Are we not to have the privilege of protecting ourselves?" As the War Department was unwilling to commit the resources needed to stop the raids, agents ended up turning a blind eye to most cross-border activity and only half-heartedly reprimanded the Indians when Mexican authorities complained.

Tempers again flared when the number of emigrants passing through Arizona increased in the mid-1850s. One factor in this was the strain emigrants put on the environment, as the desert could only sustain so many extra mouths. The bovine merchandise stripped the ecosystem of the plants most Indians relied on as famine food, raising the specter of starvation for more than just the nomadic groups. Boxed into a subsistence corner, some Indians decided to take matters in their own hands by helping

---

4 Ibid., August 13, 1851.
5 This is the main reason why the Gadsden Purchase Treaty, ratified in 1853, specifically released the United States from any further obligation to stop cross-border raiding by the Apaches.
themselves to the resource the Americans relied on: the cattle. It was this low-level poaching and retaliation along with other forms of "frontier" lawlessness that had caused Washington officials to establish Fort Yuma.

Despite Washington's intentions, military men, such as Major Heintzelman, only had enough power to keep local renegades on both sides from disrupting the flow of travel across the Colorado River. They did not, however, have the resources needed to secure the territory farther away from their posts. As long as American political leaders were unwilling to commit the money and manpower needed to undertake such an endeavor, military men could not effect a real redistribution of power or resources.

Conflicts between Americans and Indians escalated further with the arrival of prospectors who came to pan for gold in the Colorado and its tributaries. As the number of miners increased, so too did the burden of the soldiers to keep the Indians and Americans from abusing one another. The men stationed at Fort Yuma struggled to maintain peace on their own until 1859, when increasing American complaints pushed national authorities to establish Fort Mohave up the river. At first, relations between miners and resident Pai-speaking Indians was peaceful, but as Fort Mohave's commander understood, "Soon circumstances may cause the Indians to hesitate or object to making Treaties [sic]. Already the Indians are aware that the Mountains [sic] contain valuable ores, but when they learn more as to its value and mode of separating it from the earth, they will part with the mountain with more reluctance."

When the Indians did begin to resist, it was not because they wanted to keep minerals for themselves, instead, it was due to the same environmental deficiencies plaguing other areas of sustained contact. Under orders to suppress violent encounters, Fort Mohave's
various commanders adhered to the same sort of pragmatism that Major Heintzelman found so effective. The following report is indicative of officers at Fort Mojave:

This year however there has been no overflow [of the river], the Mesquite crop has been a failure, the wheat crop was light and the flour made from [it] is exhausted. It is evident that something must be done, and that speedily. They [Indians] will soon reach the starving Point [sic] and it is certain that depredations will then be Committed [sic] on the settlers, and others traveling in the valley. This would lead to war, many Indians would probably be killed. They would be forced to submit, or else driven off to the Mountains [sic] to join the hostile bands. If they submitted, as many would do, for this People [sic] is not warlike, the Government would have to feed them. Is it not better to assist them now?6

The first fort commissioned east of the Colorado, apart from Fort Defiance, in the far northeast, was Fort Buchanan. It opened in 1857 and was located twenty-five miles east of Tubac, which was then the headquarters of Charles Poston’s Sonoran Exploration and Mining Company. It was also just to southeast of Tucson, where a handful of American merchants were now established as local powerbrokers. With this new post, Washington continued a general pattern of stationing soldiers where miners and merchants needed security, yet at the same time not providing fort commanders with the manpower needed to seriously threaten Indian autonomy.7

For Mexican and Indian residents in Tubac and Tucson the arrival of American miners, merchants, and soldiers was not troubling as circumstances merely reverted to the way

---

6 Brennan, 53-4.

7 In a letter to his sister Private George H. Cranston wrote from Fort Grant in June of 1867 that “It is useless to follow them [the Indians] with a small party of men because nine times out of ten you will either fall into an ambuscade and [be] killed or taken prisoner.” And on September 23, 1868, he wrote to her from Camp Crittenden, south of Tucson, “We have been at this post now for nearly 7 months, and during [sic] that time there has been a great amount of scouting done. The Indians are more troublesome this summer than ever before. They have killed several of the settlers and drove off their stock, and driving [sic] the settlers into the fort, what were left of them. . .The Indians never do run from no troops in their own Country [sic]. They only laugh at our appearance.” Bruce J. Dines, ed., “A New York Private in Arizona Territory: The Letters of George H. Cranston, 1867-1870,” The Journal of Arizona History 75, no. 4, (Fall, 1994), 135.
they had been under Spanish and Mexican rule. For Mexican workers, American employers were not that much different from Mexican hacendados and mine owners. Both paid the same low wages for similarly harsh and degrading work. For the Pimans, the Americans offered protection from Apache and Yavapai raids and created a market for their surplus agricultural produce.

Relations between groups living in Arizona took a decided turn for the worst in 1861. In that year Lieutenant Bascom executed Cochise’s relatives; the Congress moved the overland mail route; and the regular troops retreat eastward. Taken together, these events caused the Chiricahua Apaches to reclassify Americans from periodic annoyance to committed enemy. Not only did these events cause the Apaches to view the Americans differently, but they also made the Indians believe they could dominate over the remaining settlers. When the Superintendent of Indian Affairs in Arizona, none other than Mr. Charles Poston, relayed this information to Washington he wrote, “These lordly mountaineers tauntingly say ‘The Americans are their husbandmen and the Mexicans are their herders, Why should they labor? When they want they will gather in abundance’.”

---

8 Charles Poston, Report to the Office of Indian Affairs, April 22, 1863, United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, 1824-1881, Arizona Superintendency, 1863-1880, Roll 3 (Washington D.C.: National Archives and Records Services, 1956); in a similar vein, in 1868 Overland Monthly reporter John Cremony spent time among the Apaches of Arizona and relates this exchange that followed Cremony showing an Apache headman pictures and models of American technology: “You desire our children to learn from books and say that, because you have done so, you are able to build all those big houses, and sail over the sea, and talk to each other at any distance and do many wonderful things; now, let me tell you what I think. You begin when you are little to work hard, and work until you are men in order to begin fresh work you say that you work hard in order to learn how to work well. After you get to be men, then you say, the labor of life commences; then, too, you build big houses, big ships, big towns, and everything in proportion. Then, after you have got them all, you die and leave everything behind. Now, we call that slavery. You are slaves from the time you begin to talk until you die; but we are as free as the air. We never work, but the Mexicans and others work for us.” In Eyewitness to the Indian Wars, 1865-1890, ed. Peter Cozzens (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001).
As the Chiricahua Apaches and Americans drew their battle lines, the Piman peoples decided to bind themselves closer to the Americans. In doing this they hoped to strengthen their protection from Apache and Yavapai raiders and gain the ability to appeal to white settlers as allies. While making perfect sense at the time, this decision, however, bode ill for the future as the Pimans did not foresee that the defeat of the Apaches and Yavapais would mean an increase in the number of settlers, many of whom would expropriate Piman land and water.

Americans such as Superintendent Poston also blundered when they supported arming the Pimans. He seems to have not taken into consideration possible long-term consequences of this action. It apparently never crossed his mind that armed Pimans could turn their weapons on Americans. Instead, he and others like him falsely assumed that the more “civilized” Pimans had always befriended intruders of European descent, so they therefore could always be implicitly trusted. This, however, was not historically accurate as various Piman groups had resorted to armed attacks against Spaniards, Mexicans, and American fur traders when circumstances led them to believe their resources were being threatened.

---

9 The O’Doom of the Gila and Santa Cruz both received reservations in the late 1860s; according to merchant Don Maguire, “[Amos] Carroll and the Pimans carried on a sort of contraband trade; that is he sold them wine and whiskey and playing cards and other means of gambling, contrary to the wishes of the nearby Indian agent. The agent told me that Carroll purchased horses, mules, and donkeys furnished to the Indians by the government, paying them not more than one-third their value and reselling them to travelers or Mexican traders at high prices.” In Maguire, 75.

10 Letter to Commissioner of Indian Affairs P. Dole from Indian Agent Charles Poston, August 19, 1864: These Indians have always been friendly to the whites, and have served as a bulwark against the Apaches, the great scourge of our Territory. . .it is considered as a matter of vital importance to conciliate them, and retain their good will.” Officer, 99; see also The personal Narrative of James O. Pattie, ed. William Goetzman (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1962) for a detailed account of Pima and Maricopa Indians attacking American fur traders.
When Confederate and Union forces began battling each other, Apache headmen appear to have surmised that American political power was fracturing, just as it had in northern Mexico following Mexican independence. They probably also assumed that they could pit opposing factions against one another just as they had done with Hispanic residents of Sonora and Chihuahua. This line of reasoning is probable as it most cogently explains Apache aggressiveness and bravado during the Civil War. Why else would they begin to behave as if they had nothing to fear?

While, this assessment of American politics certainly made sense from the Apache perspective, in a broader context, it was disastrous. The Apaches could not understand that the events shaping American behavior were occurring hundreds of miles away and that these events were in fact strengthening American resolve to crush any and all rebellions. What this meant for the Apaches was that they would pay dearly once the Americans decided to commit the resources necessary to defeat them.\textsuperscript{11}

American resolve to pacify the west arrived on the Great Plain almost a decade before it arrived in Arizona. Eager to apply the total war strategies that had defeated the South to the West, Generals Philip H. Sheridan and William T. Sherman swept the Plains with a vengeance. Their greatest problem was not that a scorched earth, no holds barred strategy was ineffective against the Indians, but that it was too successful. When news arrived in

\textsuperscript{11} Between 1866 and 1868 regular army forces again manned the posts in Arizona and many of these soldiers were veterans of the Civil War. They learned lessons of warfare from this experience, and then applied to the frontier context. First Lieutenant Camillo C. C. Carr related this in his diary, “When possible we carried salt pork and hard bread, which were made to last without reference to the number of days or rations. That trick we learned well in the Army of the Potomac.” See Cozzens, 32; “Letter of January 23, 1866 to Commissioner Cooley from Special Agent,” in Letters Received from the Office Of Indian Affairs: “when the troops were withdrawn in 1861, the whites settlers were all driven off by the wild Apaches. . .Since the return of the troops, during the last year the settlers have come back, unless a reservation is soon selected, the poor Indians [Aravapai Apaches] will have no chance.”
the East of military massacres of Indian women and children, reformers involved with uplifting freed slaves were aghast. Their protests resulted in a reconfiguration of the army back to its pre-Civil War strength and the removal of Civil War military commanders from the Plains. Consequently, in Arizona the voluntary California Column, which had occupied the territory after the Texans invaded New Mexico, mustered out in 1864. Some of the soldiers returned to California, while others stayed to prospect, and a few organized vigilante groups to bring “justice” to Indian raiders. Territorial governor John Goodman replaced the Californians with a volunteer regiment consisting mostly of Mexican and Piman men, yet they only served one year before the governor received orders from Washington to disband his militia.

Between 1862 and 1871, the army established nine military forts and camps in three strategic zones in Arizona: in the northeast near the Navajo, in the southeast near the Chiricahua Apaches, and in central Arizona in Yavapai country. As before the Civil War, these new posts were only minimally staffed with soldiers and supplies. Commanders

---

12 Some men stayed to return to promising mineral deposits they had previously located while on reconnaissance missions under Carlton; see Ted Cogut and Bill Conger, History of Arizona's Clifton-Morenci Mining District-A Personal Approach (Thatcher, AZ: Mining History, 1999).


14 In a letter to the editor of the New York Herald Sylvester Mowry bitterly complained that the lack of supply and foresight by military leaders in Washington was leading to the unnecessary deaths in Arizona: “This all-powerful and beneficent government sends a young man like my dear friend Cushing—poor, dear fellow, a man the army could not afford to lose—with twenty men to fight the bravest, wildest Indian chief on the continent, Cochise, with 150 warriors entrenched in a mountain range, every foot of which is as familiar to the Apache as your own doorstep is to you. It is not simply the killing of an officer. It is an officer’s duty and expectation every time he goes out to be killed, for in Arizona the troops always fight at a disadvantage in numbers and position.” Quoted in Eyewitness to the Indian Wars, 1865-1890, ed. Peter Cozzens (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001, 69: “in December of 1868, Indian Agent Post complained that “The military force now in Arizona is inadequate to the protection of the Mining Settlements [sic] and public highways So [sic] that the progress of the Country [sic] and development of the precious metals are very much retarded.”

124

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
did their best, but their men spent most of their time futilely chasing Indian warriors who stealthily raided and then disappeared into their mountain fortresses. Without training in guerilla tactics, or more recruits to lay siege to Indian hideouts, there was not much more the soldiers could do. In fact, there was such a lack of coordination among the outposts that in at least one instance, an Apache headman tried to lure soldiers from one fort into participating in a raid against soldiers at another fort. According to first lieutenant Camillio C. C. Carr,

Another result was that in a day or two after our return to Fort McDowell, Delshay, the chief of the Coyoteros, to which tribe the Indians we had killed belonged, came to the post to make peace, bringing with him several hundred of his people. He made the most liberal promises as to future good behavior, and as an unquestionable guarantee of his good faith offered to bring all his warriors, about three hundred, and join the troops of our garrison for the purpose of attacking and capturing Camp Grant. This offer was declined with thanks, but it showed that the Apaches had no idea that the troops of different posts belonged to the same army, but were regarded as independent bodies hostile to each other and simply holding places in the country for their own profit and advantage.

Unbeknownst to Arizona’s Indians, in Washington D.C., a battle between advocates of relentless war as a means for defeating recalcitrant Indians and proponents of a negotiated peace came to a head when Ulysses S. Grant, victorious Union general, became president in 1869. Upon his inauguration, a group of influential reformers requested that he create a peace commission for rooting out the corruption and brutality plaguing the military and

---

15 When possible, scouting parties did what Major John Green ordered his men to do when they came upon an Apache camp, “Whilst on the march, the captive squaw informed me that there was a cornfield about three miles from the trail, on one of the small tributaries of the San Carlos. I sent Corporal Miles and twelve men of the Thirty-second Infantry with the scouts to destroy it. On his return he reported he had found and destroyed about four acres of corn.” And, “Believing that many of these Indians, if not all, had been guilty of marauding, I instructed Captain Berry, if possible, to exterminate the whole village but gave no positive order…” John Green, “Interesting Scout among White Mountain Apaches Some of Whom Sue for Peace and a Reservation,” in Cozzens, 42-4.

16 Carr, 31.
Indian Bureau. They argued that fraud and a complete disregard for the Indians’ wellbeing were causing the ongoing Indian wars, and that the extirpation of these moral failings would bring peace to the West. And with peace would come the ability to bring the same benevolent policies that were uplifting freed slaves to the Indians. Grant agreed, yet in doing so did not completely abandon his commitment to proving the effectiveness of the total war strategy.\textsuperscript{17}

During the Grant administration, then, competing Indian policies of peace and war ran on parallel tracks until they collided in Arizona in 1871. On April 30 of that year, a vigilante mob from Tucson, consisting mostly of Mexican and Papago men, but led by a handful of Americans, arrived at Camp Grant in the early morning hours and bashed in the skulls of a group of sleeping Aravapai Apache women, children, and old men.\textsuperscript{18}

According to supportive newspaper editorials, these men carried out this heinous act because the camp’s commander, Lieutenant Royal Whitman, was allowing a duplicitous band of Apaches to live at the camp and receive rations while they were simultaneously conducting nocturnal raids against local citizens.\textsuperscript{19} In a deposition, Camp surgeon Dr. C.B. Biesly recounted in stark terms the result of this act of vengeance,

\begin{quote}
On my arrival I found that I should have but little use for wagon or medicines. The work had been too thoroughly done. The camp had been fired, and the dead
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{18} According to testimony taken by Peace Commissioner Vincent Colyer, the Papagos took 28 Apache children from Camp Grant and “that the majority of them have been carried ordered into Sonora by the Papagos [sic] and sold to the Mexicans.” Colyer, 15.

\textsuperscript{19} Of Arizona’s newspapers, Colyer, 19, wrote, “But I am told that these papers only reflect the opinions of the traders, army contractors, bar-rooms, and gambling-saloon proprietors of those two towns, who prosper during the war, but that the hardy frontiersmen, the miner, poor laboring men of the border, pray for peace and I believe it.”
bodies of some twenty-one women and children were lying scattered over the ground; those who had been wounded in the first instance had their brains beaten out with stones. Two of the best-looking of the squaws were lying in such a position, and from the appearance of the genital organs, and of their wounds, there can be no doubt that they were first ravished, and then shot dead. Nearly all of the dead were mutilated. One infant, of some ten months, was shot twice, and one leg nearly hacked off.20

By feeding the Indians, Lt. Whitman had not violated established policy; in fact, he was carrying out approved strategies of the peace plan, which included feeding Indians who promised to renounce raiding and settled down. This, however, did not sit too well with Tucson's leading men, and it was they who organized the citizen's militia that had marched on Camp Grant. After an investigation, the Grant administration demanded that the men involved be prosecuted, but as a leading Aravapai headman Eskiminzin said, "I do not expect ever to see any of them punished, for they will never punish a white man for killing an Indian . . ." He was right.21

In the middle of the Camp Grant scandal a man who represented the war policies of the Grant administration arrived in Arizona. His name was General George Crook. Crook had been temporarily stationed in San Francisco after successfully fighting Indians on the Plains and in the Northwest and was looking forward to a respite. It was not long, though, before his superiors began asking if he would consider going to Arizona. He refused until he felt he could no longer do so without jeopardizing his career.22

20 Ibid., 17.


After touring southern Arizona, Crook wasted no time in devising a pragmatic plan for defeating and relocating all hostile Indians. First, he would give his adversaries an ultimatum: they could choose either to remove to a reservation where they could live in peace or they could remain hostile and be hunted down and killed. To enforce this threat he decided to assemble a fighting force that could move swiftly and match the Indian’s guerilla tactics. He understood and respected Indian fighting strategies, remarking that the Indians were adept at launching “A number of simultaneous attacks . . . at points widely separated, thus confusing both troops and settlers, spreading a vague sense of fear over all the territory . . .”

To create his fighting force, Crook first followed in General Kearny’s 1846 footsteps by jettisoning his supply wagons and adopting the mule train. Then he hired Mexican and Indian scouts who understood Apache warfare and knew the location of Apache and Yavapai hideouts.23 Crook and many others called these scouts “Apaches,” but those with a better familiarity with the region’s cultural geography noted that these Indians were “Tonto Apaches,” meaning Yavapais, or “Apache-Mojaves” and “Apache-Yumas,”

---

23 From descriptions of the higher elevation Apache hideouts it is possible that they were using the same defensive sites that native groups used during the violent 14th century. The following quote is representatives, “We had then an opportunity to examine the locality, so much dreaded by the Pimans, used as one of the strongholds of the Apache-Mojaves [sic] and Tontos. Situated upon the crest of a very elevated range, it was difficult of access to large parties from all sides except that upon which we had come and even here the character of the soil was such that a footstep, unless made in the most cautious manner, would be heard for miles.” John G. Bourke, “The Salt River Cave Fight,” John G. Bourke Diary 1: 68-92, United States Military Academy Library, in Eyewitness to the Indian Wars, 1865-1890, ed. Peter Cozzens (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001, 149.

128
meaning Mojaves and Yumas.\textsuperscript{24}

Once on the trail, Crook admonished his men that none should wantonly destroy life and property, yet he also granted them leeway to use whatever means necessary to force the enemy to surrender. Just as he was beginning to implement his plan, however, officials from the Grant administration ordered the General to temporarily halt. By this time, news of the Camp Grant massacre and the perpetrators’ rigged trial had reached the Board of Indian Commissioners. Incensed, they recommended that peace advocate Vincent Colyer go to Arizona and undertake an investigation. President Grant finally agreed to send Colyer in September of 1871.\textsuperscript{25}

So, just as Arizona’s Indians were about to see a more determined and organized side of the American military, the President intervened, and in doing so confirmed their belief that the Americans were divided. Crook referred to Colyer as a member of the “Indian Ring,” meaning he was nothing more than a naïve and meddlesome outsiders.\textsuperscript{26} But as the General wrote in his autobiography, “I had no faith in his enterprise, but I was afraid if I...
continued my operations and he was to fail, I would be charged with interference.”

Consequently, Crook dutifully suppressed his incredulity long enough to serve as Commissioner Colyer’s escort.

Crook correctly predicted that Colyer’s visit would not significantly change circumstances in Arizona, yet he wrongly assumed that Colyer’s failure would be due to his naivety. The real cause was instead the unwillingness of Congress and the military leadership to follow through on his recommendations. In his detailed report, Colyer correctly explained why Arizona had “suffered” for so long from Indian depredations. According to Colyer, the Indians were starving because settlers had usurped their subsistence resources. On top of this, Americans often cheated and physically abused the Indians, which then created an endless cycle of retribution and revenge. He wrote, “I ask them, ‘Why are you so poor?’ and the answer invariably is, ‘How can we be otherwise? We had not much originally, and now we can get nothing; we do not steal; we cannot go to the mescal country, as we are liable to be met and killed by scouting parties.’ I know myself this to be the case, hence they have either to starve or steal, or we must feed them until they can raise enough for themselves.”27 Thus, his remedies included creating reservations with sufficient subsistence resources in each Indian group’s home territory; ensuring that peaceful Indians received adequate rations until they could support themselves; and restraining settlers from abusing the Indians. In the end, Colyer placed blame for the ongoing conflict squarely on the shoulders of the Americans. In his report

27 Vincent Colyer, 12.
he concluded that,

When the Americans first came among them bringing better traditions . . . and treating them as a people whose rights to the soil not having yet been extinguished by treaty . . . were entitled to some respect, and so treated them kindly, the Apaches received them as friends. But [when the Americans] began to treat the Apaches as incumbrances to be exterminated . . . They reaped the bloody fruits of that policy in a war which has cost us thousands of lives and millions of dollars.\footnote{Vincent Colyer even quotes agent Steck in his introduction to his official report: "In 1857 M. Steck, the Apache Indian agent for New Mexico, which then included Arizona, wrote, 'In my last annual report I urged the necessity of liberally supplying the Indians of my agency with food. Another year's experience and close observation has still more forcibly impressed me with the conviction that this is the only means of effectually controlling the Apache tribe." In Colyer, 4-5; see also Thomas Alexander, The Federal Frontier: Interior Department Policy in Idaho, Utah, and Arizona, 1863-1896 (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, 1974).}

Some military officials, such as Captain J. J. Van Horn, agreed with Colyer's assessment: "I am of the opinion that if the whites would deal fairly with the Indians and when they have any transaction with them and were as well disposed to keep peace as the Indians are, there would be but very little Cause for Complaint [sic]."\footnote{Brennan, 103.} Many other officials, however, dismissed the commissioner's interpretations as being overly sympathetic to the Indians. This view was especially prevalent among white settlers. On July 30, 1871, Judge B. Hudson of Grant County, New Mexico, sent the Superintendent of Indian Affairs in Arizona a series of resolutions signed by local citizens as well as a personal message that read in part: "What we want to know is, whether our stock can be recovered or not from Indians on your reservation . . . or are we forever at the mercy of these thieving murderous Apaches . . . if so, the sooner we know the better, because the citizens of this county are determined to put a stop to it, and if they carry out their program the Camp Grant massacre will be thrown entirely in the shade, and Alamosa will
stand next to Sand Creek. 30 (Emphasis in the original.)

Many members of Congress shared Judge Hudson’s sentiment, but most did not want
to look as if they were rejecting Colyer’s plan outright. Reformers still held enough
political power to make reelection troublesome, so a coalition formed to allow the
implementation of any of Colyer’s suggestions that did not interfere with Crooks’ plans.
Consequently, once Colyer left Arizona, Crook received the green light to resume his
efforts, but before he could get under way, he once again received orders to stop.
Refusing to be dallied with, influential reformers had convinced the Grant administration
that military interference underlay Congress’ refusal to accept Colyer’s whole plan. As
such, they demanded another investigation to be done by someone who could stop any
further military insubordination. Their man this time was peace advocate Major-General
Otis Oliver Howard.31

Howard was an ideal candidate not only because of his military credentials, but also
due to his exemplary record as a reformer. Before coming to Arizona, Howard had just
recently been Commissioner of the Bureau of Freedman and Refugees. For his part,
General Crook was not any more impressed by General Howard than he had been of
Commissioner Colyer. In his autobiography Crook wrote of Howard, “I was very much
amused at the General’s opinion of himself. He told me that he thought the Creator had
placed him on earth to be the Moses to the Negros [sic]. Having accomplished that

30 As quoted in Colyer, 74-5.
31 Major-General O. O. Howard, My Life and Experiences Among Our Hostile Indians: A Record of
Personal Observations, Adventures, and Campaigns Among the Indians of the Great West With Some
Account of their Life, Habits, Traits, Religion, Ceremonies, Dress, Savage Instincts, And Customs in
Peace and War (Hartford, Conn.: A.D. Worthington & Company, 1907)122-3.
mission, he felt satisfied his next mission was with the Indians." As credulous as Crook was, he nevertheless suspended his operations and stoically served as Howard’s guide.

As had Vincent Colyer, General Howard met with a number of aggrieved Indian bands, acknowledged their suffering, and promised that he would attempt to fairly reconcile Indian and American interests. His mission seemed doomed, however, as Cochise’s band of Chiricahua Apaches continued raiding throughout his stay. Try as he might, he could not find anyone willing to take him to the headman’s mountain fortress. Finally, while meeting with the Mimbres Apaches on the Rio Grande, fate intervened and brought him an Indian guide named Tom Jeffords.

As Jeffords was a confidant of Cochise, Howard believed “it a good providence which now threw him in my way.” Jeffords agreed to take Howard to Cochise and after an extended stay with the Chiricahuas, the General consented to establish a reservation in the southern Dragoon Mountains with Jeffords as the agent. Cochise then promised that his people would no longer be at war with the Americans. The Chiricahua’s kept that pledge until their beloved leader died.

After General Howard departed Arizona, General Crook resumed his grand plan for winning the peace through war. By this time, though, many Indian groups now doubted

---

32 Ibid., 187.
33 The Tucson Citizen (Tucson), October 12, 1872.
34 Cochise did not, however, promise to keep his men from raiding into Mexico as he believed that the Americans and Mexicans were two separate political entities. Of this Crook’s aide-de-camp John G. Bourke wrote, “In reference to the Mexicans, he [Cochise] said he considered them as being on one side in this matter, while the Americans were on another. The former had not asked him for peace as the latter had done. He did not deny that his boys were in the habit of raiding on Mexico, but this he could not prevent as it was no more than was done from all the reservations.” Cozzens, 152; Howard made the treaty with Cochise on October 13, 1872.

133
the Americans’ word. General Crook had threatened war if they did not submit; yet
Colyer and Howard had agreed to resolve the problems between the Indians and settlers in
the Indians’ favor. And, least they forget, there was also the very clear message sent to
the last group who had agreed to settle near Camp Grant and accept American
benevolence. Consequently, while some bands decided to take Colyer, Howard, or
Crook’s messages seriously and settled down on reservations, others chose to continue
raiding, believing that the Americans were too divided to be able to follow through on any
one plan.35

Once Crook swung into action, he ended up fulfilling not only his own promises, but
also many of those of Colyer and Howard. By the middle of 1874 he had successfully
forced the surrender of virtually all the renegade bands operating north of the Gila and Salt
Rivers, just as he said he would. Then, he placed each group on a reservation set aside
within their homeland, just as Colyer and Howard had promised.36 Had everything
continued on a natural course, Crook would have then swung through southern Arizona,
and at least for a time, Arizona’s “Indian problem” would have been resolved.37 This,
however, was not the case as Crook’s initial victories opened the way for the Indian
Bureau to try to reassert its authority. Of this Crook wrote, “As soon as the Indians
became settled on the different reservations, gave up the warpath, and became harmless,

35 An editorial dated October 26, 1872, the newspaper The Tucson Citizen complained that “there
must be unity and consistency in the course the Government toward the numerous and treacherous tribes
who are classed under the name in Arizona.” See Dan Thrapp for a detailed description of Crook’s battles
with different Indian groups.
36 Colyer, 11, 18; The Tucson Citizen, (Tucson), October 26, 1872.
37 The Tucson Citizen, (Tucson), September 6, 1871, Colyer reported that the Apaches at the White
Mountain Camp “furnished on hundred and ninety tons of hay... They [also] supplied the garrison with
al the wood they used. . .”
the Indian agents, who had sought cover before, now came out as brave as sheep, and took charge of the agencies, and commenced their game of plundering.\textsuperscript{38}

In fact, by the end of 1874, Indian policy in Arizona was once again in a state of disarray due to conflicts among warring American factions. The first faction consisted of General Crook and the military leaders and civilian reformers who now supported him. The second faction was the Indian Bureau and its San Carlos agent John P. Clum. Bureau officials resented any usurpation of their patronage powers and saw Crook as an obstacle to reestablishing a toehold in the Southwest. And the last faction was the Democratic Party, members of which had recently regained a majority in the House of Representatives, who planned to cut the monetary lifeblood to all Republican reform programs. This politically motivated stinginess was not a new weapon as Agent John Gregory Bourke attested to in 1872: “Just as soon as a few of the more progressive people begin to accumulate a trifle of private property, to raise sheep, to cultivate patches of soil and raise scantly [sic] crops, the agent sends in the usual glowing report of the occurrence, and to the mind of the average man and woman in the East it looks as if all the tribes were on the highway to prosperity, and the first thing that Congress does is to curtail the appropriations.”\textsuperscript{39} But this time the cuts in funding were so deep that it soon became virtually impossible to provide for even Indians’ basic needs.

In the impending battle, Agent Clum made the first move. To ingratiate himself with

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{38} Crook, 184. John Gregory Bourke told of how one agent was shorting the Hualapais supplies to sell the surplus to local miners: “Nearly the whole amount of the salt and flour supply had been sold to the miners in the Cerbat range, and the poor Hualpais, who had been such valiant and efficient allies, had been swindled out of everything but their breath, and but a small part of that was left,” 163.

\textsuperscript{39} Bourke, 223.
\end{flushright}
the local "best citizens," and cultivate a patronage base, Clum began consolidating the Yavapai and Apache bands onto the San Carlos reservation. This move benefited Tucson merchants, as they were now the closest suppliers for Indian provisions. Consolidation also made it easier for Clum to keep watch over the Indians as the reservation lay on the broad lowlands near the Gila River.\footnote{John Dibbern, "The Reputations of Indian Agents: A Reappraisal of John P. Clum and Joseph C. Tiffany," \textit{Journal of the Southwest}, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Summer, 1997), 204-5; Alexander, 29-30.}

For the Indians, this reorganization was not welcomed. With agent Clum and the Tucson merchant vested in supply contracts for San Carlos, more money went to pay for contractors' services than was devoted to purchasing farming implements. As a result, the Indians received little that would help them become self-sufficient farmers. The second problem lay in San Carlos' environmental setting. The flat lowlands, which covered most of the reservation, did not have a sufficient carrying capacity for the number of Indians confined within its boundaries. On top of this, it was horribly hot in the summer and desolate in the winters. Crowded conditions also only facilitated the spread of disease, and reservation living put lifelong adversaries into close contact, which resulted in numerous assaults and even some murders\footnote{Bourker, 224.}

General Howard had created San Carlos by moving the old Camp Grant north onto the Gila River so that it abutted the southern perimeter of the White Mountain Reservation. Clum saw the adjacent land as an opportunity to consolidate the Indians in his jurisdiction, saving him time and aggravation. He first marched the Yavapai from the Fort Verde Reservation to live at San Carlos with the Aravapai Apaches. In the next year
he then ordered the relocation of the White Mountain Apaches. By 1876, Cochise had
died and his band had split into factions, one of which decided to resume raiding into
northern Mexico. As Indian agent Tom Jeffords was unable to mend the fracture, Clum
obtained permission to also move the Chiricahuas north to his agency. He finished his
consolidation in 1877 by bringing Apache bands living along the Rio Grande to San
Carlos.\(^\text{42}\)

With each move, General Crook watched, impotent to stop the impending disaster.
He understood that the consolidation at San Carlos had placed various unrelated kin
groups together who now lacked the option of moving away when disagreements broke
out. He also knew that trouble was sure to erupt once the summer heat arrived as the
Indians would request, but be denied, permission to go into the cool mountains, as was
their custom.\(^\text{43}\) Crook's fears turned into reality when Indian men began to chaff under
Clum's regimented system of control, and families openly complained about starvation and
disease. With each passing month, "fiscal conservatism" and civil corruption pushed the
reservation dangerously close to catastrophe as supplies shortages and overcrowding
resulted in high levels of malnutrition and epidemic disease. According to an editorial
published in the Globe newspaper the \textit{Arizona Silver Belt} on February 7, 1879,

\textit{Flour is still not as abundant, by any means, at the San Carlos Indian Agency as it
ought to be. The contractor is derelict as usual and if the weather continues rainy he
will find it impossible to get supplies forward in time to prevent starvation from

\(^{42}\) Frederick G. Hughes, "The Military and Cochise," \textit{Arizona Star}, (Tucson,) January 27 and 31,
1886; Cozzens, 136; C.L. Sonnichsen, "Tom Jeffords and the Editors," \textit{The Journal of Arizona History},
vol. 29, no. 2, (Summer, 1998), 118.

\(^{43}\) Bourke, \textit{On the Border}, "The Apache-Mojave and the Apache-Yuma belonged to one sock, and the
Apache or Tinneh to another. They speak different languages, and although their habits of life are almost
identical there is sufficient divergence to admit of the entrance of the usual jealousies and bickerings
bound to arise when two strange, illiterate tribes are brought in enforced contact," 217.
ensuing amongst the wards of the Government. The consequences of mismanagement in this matter of Indian affairs are fearful to contemplate. If the Indians are starved they will ‘break out’ and hundreds of white men will be slaughtered.\textsuperscript{44}

In May of 1878 The Weekly Miner, a Prescott newspaper, reported that seventeen Indians fled the San Carlos Reservation due to the fact that “small pox was spreading at the Agency and they had left to escape its ravages.”\textsuperscript{45} All Crook could do was lament the shortsightedness of such a policy, “Their removal was one of those cruel things that greed has so often inflicted on the Indian. When the Indian appeals to arms, his only redress, the whole country [will cry] out against the Indian.”\textsuperscript{46}

Despite simmering tensions, for a short time, an uneasy peace settled over Arizona. This lull emboldened miners, farmers, and ranchers to swarm over the once dangerous eastern sections of the territory. Mormon settlers migrated down the Little Colorado River, encircled San Carlos, and began irrigating farms with water from the Salt and Gila Rivers. The result was water shortages on the reservation as well as downriver for the Pima and Maricopa.\textsuperscript{47} In fact, the Mormons drew off so much river water that the Pimans began raiding white settlements to acquire enough food to keep their families from starving. They were obviously dismayed to discover that they were no longer trusted

\textsuperscript{44} Arizona Silver Belt, (Globe), February 7, 1879; see also, Arizona Silver Belt, (Globe), February 28, 1878: “We hear very general complaints of Indians robbing miners’ cabins in the district. The truth is the poor wretches are starving, and a kind hearted victim does not like to punish them as they deserve. We learn that except lean beef they now get very little in the way of food at the San Carlos Indian Reservation, and are sent out to do the best they can in keeping bodies and souls together. We hope that some means will be adopted to give the Indians their rights.”

\textsuperscript{45} The Weekly Miner, (Prescott), May 31, 1878

\textsuperscript{46} Crook, 184; Dibbern, 203-5; Alexander, 124.

\textsuperscript{47} A Pima chief told General Howard that one the Mormon farmers began drawing water from the Gila and Salt Rivers “the poor Pimans and Maricopas lose their water and their crops.” Quoted in Cozzens, 117.
allies now that the Apaches were pacified, and had instead become mere impediments to progress. Settlers quickly forgot their praise for these industrious Indians and instead now routinely argued that their once loyal Piman allies should be removed to some other location. Some Americans even make the case for sending the Pimans to Indian Territory in Oklahoma.48

An editorial in the Prescott newspaper *The Daily Miner*, January 30, 1879, read in part: “The Pima Indians should be taken from their present location on the Salt River, and placed by themselves, where they will not come in contact with white people. The lands they are settled upon are owned by *bona fide* citizens, who located them, and are kept from peaceful occupation by old Chin-chi-a-cum, one of the meanest old wretches on the face of the earth.”49 By the end of the year, voices such as this, clamoring for displacing the Pimans, grew exponentially.

In response to such hostility, the Pimans did not immediately fights back, but instead revived an older form of defense. An editorial in December of 1879 made it clear that the Pimans were responding with a strategy similar to one pioneered by their Hohokam ancestors: increasing their fighting force through alliance building. “For several years a large number of citizens living at the Tempe Settlement, which by the way, is the best portion of the Salt River, had been annoyed, plundered and harassed by the Pima Indians, who live opposite on the north side of the River. From a small number, these Indians had increased by recruits from the Gila [River], until now they have 1,000 souls.”50

---

48 Pimans living along the Gila River told Commissioner Colyer that “They were always led to suppose that the white men wanted them to kill the Apaches . . .” Colyer, 75.

49 *The Daily Miner*, (Prescott), January 30, 1879.

50 *The Arizona Miner*, (Prescott), December 18, 1879.
In a letter to Commissioner Colyer, Special Indian Agent to the Pimans J. H. Stout reported that,

The time for preparing their land is now at hand, but having no water they can do nothing . . . On Sunday Morning last, Chin-kun . . . came to me and said that for many years he and his people had ‘lived from what they planted,’ but now they had no water; white men up the river had taken it from them, & etc. After spending a few moments in telling me of his wrongs, he made known the object of his visit, which was to obtain leave to take the warriors of his village . . . and by force of arms drive the whites from the river.\textsuperscript{51}

Military advisor General McDowell also noted the Piman’s destitution and petitioned the federal government to assist its former allies: “They are now suffering, and are likely to suffer, from no act of their own but by reason of settlements of whites on the Gila river above their farms, and the diversion of the water which they have heretofore been depending upon to irrigate their ground, for the land will produce no grain without irrigation.”\textsuperscript{52}

On the San Carlos Reservation, upriver, in addition to the serious lack of water, the Indian also faced encroaching prospectors who stirred up trouble as they searched for mineral wealth. The miners were especially eager to access reservation land, as soldiers serving under General Crook had included the hunt for minerals into their daily, scouting missions. According to soldier John Gregory Bourke, “We were among the very first to come upon the rich ledges of copper which have since furnished the mainstay to the prosperity of the town of Clifton, on the border of New Mexico, and we knocked off pieces of pure metal, and brought them back to Tucson to show to the people there . . .”\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{51}Colyer, 21.

\textsuperscript{52}The Arizona Miner, (Prescott), November 22, 1878.

\textsuperscript{53}Bourke, 98-9.
Lured by such reports, miners three times located ore deposits within the reservation's boundaries and three times were able to convince territorial officials and businessmen—including agent Clum—to lobby the President to contract the reservation's boundaries. Not only did this shrink the amount of land available to support the Indians, but it also put Americans on the doorsteps of bands who were already seething with anger over government duplicity.  

Due to building pressure, tension flared into conflict at San Carlos after 1875, causing both the Chiricahua and Gila Apaches to flee the reservation. It was especially galling to the Chiricahuas to be treated as defeated prisoners as they saw themselves as conquerors. Both groups of Apaches had apparently reasoned that the Americans were still internally divided, which Clum's actions seemed to confirm, and therefore would be unable to mount an effective effort to force them back to the reservation. They were incorrect in this general appraisal, however, as army soldiers did come to return them to San Carlos. At the same time, they were correct in assuming that division within the American ranks had weakened the military, because once they were back on the reservation, the soldiers were stretched too thin to keep the Apaches from fleeing again.

According to Captain Charles B. Gatewood, Apaches such as Victorio left the reservation due to "restlessness, caused by robbery and mismanagement by their agents (the same old story the West over) and innate desire to slay, pillage, steal, and create

---

54 Ibid., 434: "It was openly asserted that the Apaches were to be driven from the reservation marked out for them by Vincent Colyer and General O. O. Howard, upon which they had been living for more than eleven years. No one ever heard the Apache story, and no one seemed to care whether they had a story or not;" by 1878, an editorial celebrated the resulting pacification of the Indians in the Tucson newspaper The Citizen, August 30, 1878, called for a program under which Americans could now "utilize the labor of these Indians to our great benefit."

55 The Citizen, (Tucson), June 17, 1876.
havoc generally, summed up in the word ‘revenge.’ (Emphasis added.) By 1882 conditions on the reservation had gotten so bad that Cochise’s former band fled once more and declared war on the Americans.57

Fearful Arizonans called for General Crook to return and once again manage their Indian problem. Bolder citizens dismissed using the military and argued that if the troops could not settle the Indian problem permanently then “the so-called army be withdrawn from the Territory and settlers be permitted to defend themselves.”58 In a column that appeared in the Arizona Weekly Star, in Tucson, Charles Poston took an opposing view and placed blame not on the military, but instead on the Indian Bureau: “The only honest

56 Charles B. Gatewood, “Campaigning against Victorio in 1879,” in Eyewitness to the Indian Wars, 1865-1890, ed. Peter Cozzens (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001, 231; Victorio also told E.C. Kemble, an inspector for the Bureau of Indian Affairs, “A good many years ago, before my hair was gray, and when the Americans first began to come into this country, we were sitting in a room like this eating your bread and drinking coffee. We had had some trouble with your people, but we thought it was all ended when they asked us to come to a feast. We left our guns and bows and were ready to smoke with your people. In a moment, and while we were eating, the house was surrounded with soldiers, who put their guns through the windows and shot down all but five of our party. I was one who escaped... Since then I cannot lie down beside the road and not be afraid.” E. C. Kemble, “Victorio and His Young Men,” New York Times, November 28, 1880; Cozzens, 207.

57 According to relevant sources-newspapers, governor's reports, journals—the people of Arizona were having as much if not more difficulty with non-Indian robbers and outlaws as they were with the Apaches. Salesman Don Maguire wrote in his journal, “I was very anxious to reach Prescott, which was yet sixty miles away. I was doubly anxious, as we were in bandit-infested country and also in a region where there were yet straggling Apaches watching that they might waylay and murder solitary travelers.” Maguire, 58; also, according to the Tucson newspaper The Citizen, December 11, 1875, Arizona settlers had filed claims with the federal government for damages caused by “Indians” totaling over $5,000,000.

58 The tone of a Tucson editorial published on April 22, 1876, indicates an acceptance of Crooks tactics for “pacifying” the Apaches. Instead of resorting to a call for extermination, which was usually the case before the Camp Grant Massacre, this directive calls for the military to bring all its forces to bear on renegades, including the use of Apache scouts, but the avoidance of harming peaceful Indians; in a memorial, the Society of Arizona Pioneers appealed to President Grover Cleveland “for relief from the curse of the Apache Indian depredations that [had] been allowed to rest upon them so long by previous administrations.” Tucson, Arizona, June 25, 1885, Arizona Historical Society; an article even appeared in the San Francisco newspapers claiming that “troops are required in the neighborhood of San Carlos reservation to protect the Indians from a threatened attack by the lawless white element,” telegraph from Governor Zulick of Arizona to the Secretary of the Interior, December 30, 1885, Interior Department Territorial Papers Arizona, 1868-1913, roll 1, Executive Proceedings and Official Correspondence: July 1, 1887-December 31, 1903 (Washington D.C., National Archives, 1963).
remedy [to the problems caused by corrupt Indian agents] is to turn the Indian business over to the War Department. There is some honor in the military service—not much in the civil.”

General Crook did return to Arizona in 1882 to once again put the territory’s house in order. After arriving, Crook negotiated an agreement with Mexico to allow his men to cross the international border. Then, reviving his strategy of offering the Indians a clear choice between war and peace, he underscored his ultimatum with relentless pursuit. Understanding the importance of backing his threats with actions, he even pursued the Chiricahuas through the Sierra Madre Mountains twice, once in 1883 and again in 1886. After negotiating a peaceful return the second time with Chiricahua leader Geronimo, the deal fell apart before Crook could deliver his band back to San Carlos. Hoping that government officials would have patience and continue to support his efforts, Crook offered to resign, assuming they would decline. Instead, military leaders accepted and replaced him with his rival General Miles Nelson.

Nelson ultimately received credit for ending the Chiricahua standoff, yet he did so only by adopting Crook’s methods. First, he hired Apache scouts to locate the renegade band; then, Miles engaged Geronimo in negotiations just as Crook would have. Where he departed from Crook’s plan was in not offering the Chiricahuas a diplomatic avenue for resolving the standoff. Instead, Miles informed Geronimo that he had already arranged for the deportation of all Chiricahuas to Florida and that he would only accept Geronimo’s

59 Arizona Weekly Star. (Tucson), May 20, 1880.

surrender if he agreed to willingly follow his kin. Crook was heartbroken to learn of this as he had promised Geronimo that he would not be exiled. With his only other alternative being continued flight, Geronimo finally agreed to Mile’s terms and led his band back across the U.S. border. Then, on September 4, 1886, soldiers loaded the Chiricahua onto railroad boxcars, and with one motion of the conductor’s hand, the U.S. military shipped Arizona’s Indian problem away to a prison camp in Florida.

The departing railcars marked two important turning points in Arizona history. First, the territory moved from an era of negotiated compromise in which the worldviews of Americans and Indians co-existed, to a new era in which Americans alone set the standard for social relations and resource consumption. And second, the freedom minority groups, such as Mexican and Chinese settlers, derived from Indian violence, that limited Euro-American emigration to the territory, quickly disappeared. Consequently, no longer deterred by Indian raids, large numbers of Euro-American settlers began arriving who would now relegate minority groups to more typical, subordinate positions.

The North Americans becoming the hegemonic power in Arizona was clearly not the first time a cultural group had succeeded in seizing the region’s resources for their own desires. But this last cycle of conquest did mark the first time that a society had so completely taken control and the first time that the area has been almost completely integrated into a larger socio-political system. It seems clear from historical precedent,

---

61 Arizona settlers supported this plan as is evident in the June, 1886, memorial compiled by the Tucson Arizona Society of Pioneer in which they wrote: “The Society of Arizona Pioneers again propose to appeal to the National Government, to obtain the only effective remedy for all time to come, namely: the speedy and absolute removal of the Apache Indians from our Territory.” Memorial, 1886 (Tucson: Arizona Historical Society) MS.

though, that the Americans will mostly likely follow in the footsteps of their predecessors and will eventually fail in their efforts to tame the Southwest. Just as the Hohokam, the Spanish, and Apaches were unable to extend their power over both nature and other cultural groups for long, the Americans will also one day learn that technology and political power alone cannot save them from the next devastating drought or the arrival of newcomers from distant lands who have their own ideas about how Arizona and her resources should be managed.  

---

63 Shaw and Ciolek-Torrello, 7, write: “Historical land-use practices (e.g., rapid withdrawal of groundwater, grazing, wood cutting, and land clearing for urban expansion), possibly in combination with natural climatic change, have caused environments in southern Arizona to become seriously degraded. Prior to the 1850s, southern Arizona drainages were characterized by greater surface water, cienegas, and dense stands of riparian vegetation... Over the last century, dense riparian communities along most large drainages in the Tucson Basin have largely been eliminated.”
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Casteñeda, Pedro De. "Account of the Expedition to Cibola which took place in the year 1540, in which all settlements, their ceremonies and customs, are described." In Spanish Explorers in the Southern United States, 1528-1843. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1959.


Dean, Jeffery S. *Chronological Analysis of Tsegi Phase Sites In Northeastern Arizona.* Papers of the Laboratory of Tree-Ring Research, no. 3. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1969.


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.


Howard, O. O. *My Life and Experiences Among Our Hostile Indians: A Record of Personal Observations, Adventures, and Campaigns Among the Indians of the Great West With Some Account of Their Life, Habits, Traits, Religion*,


———. "Jefferson's Indian Policy."  


Matson, R.G. "The Spread of Maize to the Colorado River Plateau." *Archaeology Southwest,* no. 13 (Summer 1999): Online Journal,


"Memorial." 1886. MS. Arizona Historical Society, Tucson, AZ.


Odenkirk, James E. "An Interpretation Of The Hohokam Ballcourts In Arizona." .


_________. *Ancient People of the American Southwest*. New York: Thames and Hudson, 1997

Poston, Charles D. *Building a State in Apache Land*. Tempe, AZ: Aztec Press, 1894.


158


VITA

Graduate College
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Sondra Cosgrove

Home Address
4444 Ash Ave.
Las Vegas, Nevada 89110

Degrees
Bachelor of Arts, History, 1996
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Special Honors and Awards
2002  President's Graduate Fellowship
2001  Hules Scholarship for Meritorious Graduate Student
       UNLV Alumni Scholarship
       UNLV Summer Scholarship
       WHA Graduate Student Conference Scholarship
1997  Barrick Fellowship
1996  Phi Alpha Theta
       Golden Key National Honor Society
       Phi Kappa Phi

Dissertation Title: Biology, Culture, and Environment: The Struggle for Hegemony in Arizona

Dissertation Examination Committee:
Chairperson, Dr. Willard Rollings, Ph.D.
Committee Member, Dr. Jay Coughtry Ph.D.
Committee Member, Dr. Thomas Wright Ph.D.
Graduate Faculty Representative, Dr. Malvin Miranda Ph.D.