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Presidential transitions during capital campaigns: Perspectives of chief development officers

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PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITIONS DURING CAPITAL CAMPAIGNS:
PERSPECTIVES OF CHIEF DEVELOPMENT OFFICERS

by

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ABSTRACT

Presidential Transitions During Capital Campaigns:
Perspectives of Chief Development Officers

by

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In the past few decades, capital campaigns at institutions of higher education have increased in duration, while collegiate presidential tenures have been doing just the opposite. Turnover in the top post was frequent, even during major fundraising campaigns. Prior to this study, presidential transitions during campaigns had not been previously analyzed. Therefore, the objective of this exploratory study was to better understand presidential transitions during capital campaigns from the perspective of the chief development officer (CDO) who maintained continuity. Nine CDOs who experienced presidential transitions during campaigns were interviewed to better understand their experience. The institutions represented were Florida State University, Millikin University, Muhlenberg College, University of Indianapolis, University of North Florida, University of Redlands, University of Wisconsin – Whitewater, Villanova University, and Wake Forest University.

Schlossberg’s theory of transition served as the theoretical framework for the study and formed the four research questions which reflected Schlossberg’s S’s: situation,
self, supports, and strategies. The situation was defined differently at each institution, although they did have some similarities, such as lengthy campaigns of seven years or more, successful goal completions, and transitions that occurred after the campaign went public. Most presidential transitions were negative and restricting to campaign work, even when the transitions went smoothly.

The nine CDOs that participated in this study had an average of 24 years work in fundraising, and 15 years at their specific institution. The participants relied on the following traits to help them navigate the change in leadership: patience, perseverance, work drive, flexibility, teamwork, confidence, altruism, resiliency, and focus. Four groups or individuals were cited as most often providing support during the presidential transition: the Board of Trustees, the development staff, the incoming president, and senior staff colleagues. Lastly, the strategies for dealing with a presidential transition during a campaign included a) providing input in the selection of the new president, b) communication with constituency, c) education of the incoming president, d) involving the new president in the campaign right away, and e) creating new funding priorities. Recommendations for a CDO dealing with a change in leadership during a campaign have been outlined in the final chapter.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Dear Simmons Students, Colleagues, and Friends:

After much thought and conversation with the Board of Trustees, I have submitted my resignation as president as of June 30, 2006. Sue and I reached our decision after weighing carefully what would be best both for us and for Simmons. We take great satisfaction from our work at Simmons, but we have concluded that the College should welcome its new president well before launching the next major capital campaign. That campaign will be vital for Simmons’s future, and we cannot commit to the several years the next campaign’s timetable will require.

And the campaign’s likelihood of success will be greater if there is not a leadership change while it is underway (Cheever, 2006, p. 1).

Daniel S. Cheever, Jr., the former president of Simmons College in Boston, wrote the above letter to the college’s community with the purpose of disclosing his resignation from the executive position. The letter was mailed to faculty, staff, students, and 50,000 alumni, and it was posted on the Simmons’ website. The letter in its entirety reviews President Cheever’s accomplishments and praise for the college. However, it is the first section that cites the main reason for his departure: an upcoming capital campaign. He did not want to disrupt the campaign with a presidential transition.
Leadership is a critical element of a successful fundraising program for an institution of higher education. Although “fundraising requires team effort, an institution’s president is typically the central player on the fundraising team” (Cook, 1997a, p. 73). Allen Lee, a higher education consultant with First Counsel, a national fundraising firm in North Carolina said, “I used to think that a college could raise money without having a highly visible, dynamic president. But the longer I do this, I’m believing that less and less” (as reported in Crawford, 2003, p. 32).

Capital campaigns are embarked upon only after considering the fundraising performance of the chief executive at the institution. An institution cannot initiate a campaign without adequate leadership to champion its cause (Quigg, 1986). Bennett and Hays (1986) reported that the presidents’ “capability of performing effectively in this role and the time they make available for it will be an important element in the size and nature of the campaign” (p. 14).

Definition of Terms and Context

Comprehensive capital campaigns are the principal fundraising endeavors for institutions of higher education, beyond annual funds and various special events. Capital campaigns are intense efforts to significantly build a non-profit organization’s assets in a specified amount of time (Dovè, 2000; Kihlstedt, 2004; Newman, 2005; Quigg, 1986). The dollar amount raised during a college’s capital campaign varies from a few million to more than one billion. The Council for Advancement and Support of Education (CASE) reported that the average campaign goal for all institutions was nearly $250 million in 2002-03, a sharp increase from the mean goal of $174 million in 2001 and only $88
million in 1997 (Cross, 2004). In order to raise these kinds of dollars, the same CASE report indicated that institutions of higher education engage in campaigns of six years or more in length. Additional research supports the idea of lengthy campaigns (e.g., Cook, 1997a; Quigg, 1986; Dove 2000; Symonds, 2004; Newman, 2005; Worth, 1993).

Kihlstedt (2004) reported, “Organizations undertake capital campaigns when they are ready to take a major step forward – erecting a new building, renovating current facilities, adding equipment, or developing a major new program” (p. 1). Frequently all of the aforementioned expansions are part of an institution’s capital campaign goals (Newman, 2005). Most capital campaigns are tools to enhance endowment funds as well. Comprehensive campaigns demand utmost time and energy of development staff, volunteers, and leaders.

The terms “institutional advancement” and “institutional development” are used interchangeably throughout this study. Both terms refer to the department or separate entity on a college campus that oversees the fundraising – among other tasks – for the institution. Development offices are usually centralized in smaller colleges, whereas advancement offices are decentralized programs at larger institutions (Hilenski, 2002; Quigg, 1982). Worth (2002) explained the difference: “In a centralized program, all development officers and programs are organized under a central development office. In a decentralized program, development efforts are divided by units – schools, colleges, or other programs within the university – with development officers reporting to the deans or programs directors of the units they serve” (p. 280). Both advancement and development deal with educational fundraising, no matter how their affairs are organized. A more accurate description of institutional advancement would include all the activities
and programs that a college undertakes to acquire resources for that institution (Worth, 2002).

Advancement and development programs can include public relations, alumni relations, communications, and even enrollment management, among its duties of acquiring funds. As an example, the University of Missouri-Rolla’s organizational chart for its advancement office features the following departments: Alumni Relations, Public Radio KUMR, Communications and Publications, Development Communications, Major Gift Program, Relationship Management, Annual Fund, and Prospect Research (http://www.umr.edu/univadv/files/uaorgchart506.pdf). Contrastingly, Clemson University in South Carolina has a different structure to its advancement office: Finance Corporation, Conference and Guest Services, University Foundation, University Real Estate Foundation, Development and Alumni Affairs, Visitors Program, Historic Properties, Marketing and Communications, and Public Affairs (http://www.clemson.edu/oir/CUOrgChartAug2006.pdf).

Many large advancement offices have separate unit development officers for each college/school at the university, as well as development officers for student affairs, libraries, and research centers (Hilenski, 2002). In any case, the development or advancement office at an institution of higher education encompasses many different areas. The person who oversees that office, the chief development officer (CDO), organizes all the fundraising endeavors for the university, but the position requires a high degree of managerial skills as well. Worth (2002) suggested that the CDO has both internal (administrative) and external (fundraising) responsibilities. The CDO will be discussed at greater length in the next chapter.
Another term commonly used in this study is “private support.” Colleges and universities in the United States generally get their funding from three sources: public funds, private funds, and student tuition and fees. Public funds are state and federal monies that are generally designated for specific areas and are closely regulated (Leslie and Ramey, 1988). Federal and state grants, financial aid, and state appropriations fall into this category. Public universities used to receive the majority of their funding from public sources; however most public universities today receive less than 50 percent of their budget from public sources. Many college administrators now refer to their schools as “state-assisted” rather than “state-supported.” Elliott (2006) indicated, “Public support became public assistance and is now, in many states, little more than public land upon which higher education takes place” (p. 13). Higher education appropriations are among the first to get cut out of state budgets because, “Unlike other social institutions, higher education has potential for generating its own income and for coping with lost revenue” (Elliott, 2006, p. 9).

In rationalizing a $3 billion capital campaign at University of Virginia, UVA President John Casteen indicated,

State budget cuts had given the university no choice but to turn to private donations to remain competitive. During the last two years, the university has experienced a 31-percent cut in state funds. Virginia’s endowment, worth almost $2-billion, is making up the difference. This academic year, 8.3 percent of the operating budget came from the endowment and gifts, while 8.1 percent came from the state (quoted in Strout, 2004, p. A33).
By relying so heavily on private support, the chief development officer at UVA suggested that the school was becoming the first privately-funded public university.

State funding is no longer sufficient to cover a university’s expenditures. Therefore, universities must supplement their funds with student tuition as well as private dollars. Private support comes in the form of donations, and “frequently provides the margin of excellence, the element of vitality that separates one institution from another” (Leslie & Ramey, 1988, p. 115). The same authors denote that institutions of higher education obtain charitable contributions from six principle sources: alumni, non-alumni individuals, foundations, business corporations, religious denominations, and other areas. Leslie and Ramey (1988) indicated, “Private individuals, both alumni and non-alumni, have traditionally been the main source of voluntary support, representing between 48 and 49 percent of contributions” (p. 116).

Donations can take the form of outright gifts, such as cash, stock, real estate, or property, or donations can be deferred gifts that come in the form of bequests and annuities. Colleges and universities are frequently in competition with one another and other non-profit organizations to acquire these resources (Elliott, 2006). Worth (2002) wrote, “It is this element of competition among institutions that most distinguishes American higher education from the systems of other nations and that largely accounts for its quality and diversity” (p. 4). Stanford University alone has 275 staffers dedicated to institutional advancement (Elliott, 2006). Institutions have had extraordinary success in securing philanthropic dollars, which have created and enhanced programs, constructed buildings, fostered projects, and enhanced student aid. Cascione (2003) says
that a college’s ability to garner private funds is “now a defining criterion of institutional prestige” (p. 3). Fundraising is no longer a question of if or when, but how much?

Significance of the Study

Fundraising used to be reserved for presidents of private colleges and universities that did not receive state support, but today, the distinctions between public and private institutions “have become so blurred that one can scarcely distinguish between the two. This is especially true in institutional advancement. … Virtually every college and university, public or private, now considers external educational fundraising as an important vehicle for obtaining essential resources” (Shay, 1993, p. 17). Efforts to secure philanthropic dollars pervade every type of post-secondary institution (Cascione, 2003).

An effective CDO is essential to fundraising success, but a college president also has incredible fundraising responsibilities, especially during a capital campaign. And, due to the frequency at which campaigns are conducted, “every president has to do a capital campaign now” (Cook, 1997a, p. 74). Some of a president’s campaign tasks include serving as chief spokesperson for the fundraising goal, cultivating major gifts, working with staff, trustees and volunteers, and donating money themselves (Quigg, 1986; McLaughlin, 1990; Gearhart, 1995; Essex & Ansbach, 1993; Dove, 2000). Clearly, the president of a college or university has numerous responsibilities during a campaign, many of which are visible to the public.

One of the main expectations of presidents is to solicit top donors for substantial gifts. A “substantial” gift ranges from $10,000 at smaller schools to several million-dollar gifts at larger institutions. Former Massachusetts Institute of Technology President
Charles Vest personally met with the top prospects for his institution’s campaign that launched in 1999, and these individual meetings proved worthwhile: “Big donors will make or break a campaign. At MIT, the top 200 gifts ultimately totaled $1 billion” (Symonds, 2004, p. 90). Rooney (1999) indicated, “Frequently, it is the personal relationships of, and time devoted by, the key leaders in the university that actualize potential gifts, especially in the case of large gifts. The modern dean and president spend a great deal of time (some would say an inordinate amount) engaged in fundraising activities” (p. 43). The exceeding importance of the president to a capital campaign cannot be overemphasized (Foote, 1986).

In October 2005, Brown University launched a $1.4 billion fundraising campaign, and their 75,000 alumni were contacted for contributions. In particular, Brown President Ruth Simmons traveled to meet with the key donors all over the globe, from New York to London to Beijing. Johnson (2005) reported, “School officials say their research has shown that 800 alumni in Manhattan alone are capable of giving $1 million each” (p.1). When the vice president for university advancement at Brown was asked how they planned to raise over a billion dollars, his reply was, “We ask people to have faith in the institution, faith in the plan, faith in the president” (Johnson, 2005). Two years after the public launch, Brown has raised more than $1 billion thus far.

New college presidents, especially those who rise through the ranks of academics, may not be prepared for the extreme amount of time and effort needed for a successful fundraising program. The academic track is poor training grounds for an institutional leader (Carter, 2001). The individualized nature of research endeavors and sheer lack of fundraising expected of academicians, other than obtaining grants, lends itself for few
opportunities to raise funds on behalf of the institution. Therefore, fundraising becomes one of the most demanding and sometimes unfamiliar roles for a president. Ability to raise funds was cited as the key reason “why a good college chief is hard to find” according to Marcus (2001, p. 46). Marcus delineated, “It’s fundraising prowess that makes presidents famous, and while the job may pay well, it’s never been harder to find the right person to fill it” (p. 46).

Pressure to raise funds may be a reason why most presidents do not remain in office. The average term of a college president is now five to six years (Corrigan, 2002; Korschgen, Fuller & Gardner, 2001; Martin & Samels, 2004; Fincher, 1997; Rhodes, 2005). Padilla and Ghosh (2000) “estimate that a public university president has a one in three chance – or a 33 percent probability – of serving more than five years” (p. 34). The same authors calculated that the current length of presidential tenure, on average, is 5.7 years at both public and private institutions, but “average tenure for public university presidents appears likely to fall below the 5.7 years” (p. 34).

Martin and Samels (2004) offer many reasons for shortened terms, but their lengthy report claims the main force driving otherwise worthy presidents out of office is the pressure to raise extraordinary amounts of money: “Presidents told us that by a factor of four or five, fundraising challenges formed the greatest pressure in their professional lives” (p. 8). The current and former presidents interviewed throughout Martin and Samels’s book echo this sentiment. Vartan Gregorian, former president of Brown University, indicated, “All universities must be in the fund-raising business all the time” (p. 26). This theory is especially true during fundraising campaigns of any magnitude.
Cook (1997a) reported, “Capital campaigns often require huge commitments of time and energy from presidents and contribute to the growing stress level and rapid turnover rate associated with the position” (p. 75). In fact, former Harvard University President Neil Rudenstine took a leave of absence from his post in 1994 citing “severe fatigue and exhaustion” due to his commitment to Harvard’s $2.6 billion drive (Bulkeley & Stecklow, 1994). President Rudenstine did return to the presidency, but he eventually resigned in 2001 as the university began deliberating another capital campaign.

Five years later, Harvard President Lawrence Summers resigned during the quiet phase of a capital campaign expected to raise more than $4 billion. Harvard postponed the launch of its soon-to-be multi-billion dollar capital campaign until 2008 when a permanent president would be in office: “Quite naturally, we think that any university campaign will be most successful with a president in place, so any decisions about [the campaign] will likely wait,” the vice president for alumni affairs and development, Donella M. Rapier, said in an interview last week” (quoted in Ciarelli, 2006, p.1). Ms. Rapier continued, “Certainly, at all not-for-profits, the very largest gifts are typically made when there’s a senior leader in place. During periods of transition donors typically don’t think it’s the right moment to announce a very large commitment” (p. 2). In fact, three major donations to Harvard that would have totaled $275 million stalled following President Summers departure in 2006 (Bombardieri, 2006). Bombardieri attributed the donation lull to, “No one makes a mega-gift when there’s no president” (p. 1).

Presidents play a crucial, strategic role in institutional advancement, as seen in aforementioned details. When a president leaves office, institutions of higher education may lose momentum with fundraising, planning, productivity, staff morale, and
institutional reputation (Basinger, 2001; Richter, 1995; Gaylor, 2004). This introduction started with a letter from the Simmons College President that stated, “The campaign’s likelihood of success will be greater if there is not a leadership change while it is underway.” While this statement appears to make sense, presidential transitions during campaigns have not been previously analyzed. Because the average presidential tenure is shorter than the average capital campaign, this is a topic that demands further inquiry.

Purpose Statement

Specifically, this study analyzed the impact of a presidential transition during a capital campaign from the perspective of the chief development officer (CDO). Richter (1995) indicated that it is generally the “senior staff who must maintain the institution’s momentum in developing programs and resources” when a president departs (p. 1). How a CDO responds to such a critical career transition is an area that, prior to this dissertation, had not been studied and called for an in-depth investigation. This research is exploratory in nature since no existing studies formed the basis of this research and no previous studies had been conducted on the topic. Higher education scholars and administrators must contemplate the effect of capital campaigns that are increasing in duration, while presidential tenures are doing just the opposite.

Theoretical Framework

Stress and change are part of typical day for a chief development officer. How the CDO chooses to cope and manage those changes is unique to each situation. A change with such enormity, like a presidential transition, demands great time and energy from a
CDO. CDOs need to be equipped with the resources to deal with this change, and one way of assessing the situation is with a specific framework designed for transitions.

At various points in life, individuals are confronted with transitions, both positive and negative. Schlossberg, Waters, and Goodman (1995) defined a transition as “any event, or non-event, that results in changed relationships, routines, assumptions, and roles” (p. 27). An example of an event is a retirement or a student leaving for college; the individual anticipated and planned for that transition. A non-event would be not receiving a promotion or a rejection from medical school; both were a desired outcome, but they did not occur (Sargent & Schlossberg, 1988; Evans, Forney, & Guido-Brito, 1998).

Nancy Schlossberg developed an adult transition theory in 1981 with modifications thereafter, to create, according to Evans et al. (1998), “a framework that would facilitate an understanding of adults in transition and lead them to the help they needed to cope” (p. 108). In order to understand the meaning of a transition for a particular person, one needs to examine the type of transition, its context, and impact. Schlossberg’s theory provides the structure needed to examine a transition from these different angles.

Schlossberg (2004) proposed, “This transition model can be used as a framework for conducting research on any group or person in transition” (p. 7). Schlossberg’s theory was originally created for highly complex working adults (Tover & Simon, 2006); therefore, it is appropriate for use while studying the chief development officer at a college or university to better understand how he or she dealt with the presidential transition during a major fundraising effort.
Sargent and Schlossberg (1988) suggested that “people in transition are often preoccupied and a little confused, even if the transition is a desired one” (p. 59). An individual’s effectiveness in coping with transition depends on a series of four S’s that Schlossberg introduced in her theory: Situation, Self, Support, and Strategies. These S’s are the potential resources that individuals use in order to effectively navigate a transition (Tovar & Simon, 2006). Figure 1 is an illustration of this framework.

Figure 1. Schlossberg’s Four S’s: Situation, Self, Support, Strategies

Within the Situation category, the individual determines the type of transition that is occurring. Important factors include the “trigger” or event that advanced the transition, the personal “timing” of one’s social clock in relation to the transition, the aspect of “control” for the transition, how a “role change” might be involved, the “duration” of the transition, the individual’s “previous experience” with a similar transition, other sources

Adapted from Sargent & Schlossberg (1988) and Evans, Forney, & Guido-Brito (1998)
of "concurrent stress" and the "assessment" of whom is responsible (Evans, Forney, & Guido-Brito, 1998).

Two factors are important for the Self classification: (1) personal and demographic characteristics, such as age, gender, health and socioeconomic status, and (2) psychological characteristics, in particular optimism, values, and commitments. Within the Support category, Evans et al. (1998) cited four types of social support important to Schlossberg’s theory: intimate relationships, family units, networks of friends, and institutions and communities. The functions and measurements of these social supports also make varying impacts on a transition.

Lastly, Strategies influence the ways that people modify the situation, control its meaning, and manage the stress surrounding the situation (Schlossberg, Waters, & Goodman, 1995). Individuals use various coping strategies to deal with the transition at hand. Schlossberg (2004) wrote, “Transitions alter our lives – our roles, relationships, routines, and assumptions… It is not the transition per se that is critical, but how much it changes one’s roles, relationships, routines, and assumptions. The bigger the change, the greater the potential impact and the longer it may take to incorporate the transition and move on” (p. 3-4).

Schlossberg’s four S’s are a systematic process of assessing change. Evans, Forney and Guido-Brito (1998) laud the theory as being “comprehensive in scope… conceptually and operationally sound. For the future, an expansion of the research base related to theory would be helpful” (p.122). Schlossberg’s theory has already been used to examine community college students on academic probation (Tovar & Simon, 2006), the retirement of professional athletes (Swain, 1991), and newly employed social workers
(Koerin, Harrigan, & Reeves, 1990). This study should add to the compilation of research related to Schlossberg’s theory of transition.

Research Questions

The chief development officer’s ability to cope with a presidential transition while conducting a capital campaign can be examined through the lens of Schlossberg’s transition model. Institutions of higher education may enhance the transition and adjustment by offering support and strategies to cope with the situation. The theoretical framework and Schlossberg’s four S’s guided this study:

- Research Question 1: Situation: What events of the presidential transition impacted the capital campaign?
- Research Question 2: Self: How did the chief development officer react to the presidential transition during the campaign?
- Research Question 3: Support: What supports helped to ensure continuity during a capital campaign?
- Research Question 4: Strategies: What strategies did the CDO employ to navigate the presidential transition during a capital campaign?

Overview of Methodology

This study employed a qualitative, multiple-site, descriptive case study method for analyzing presidential transitions during capital campaigns. This approach is fitting for this study because the goal was to address the contextual nature of presidential transitions during capital campaigns and the effect of the transition on the chief
development officer. Merriam (1998), Patton (1990), and Yin (2003) regard the case study approach as particularly useful to understand a complex, social phenomenon, especially one that has not been previously studied. Presidential transitions during fundraising campaigns fit this description.

Data was collected through document analysis, including newspaper and magazine articles, speeches, press releases, and by searching website archives. However, the primary data source for this study was electronic mail (email) interviews. Online asynchronous interviews were employed to conduct the study. In-depth interviews conducted this way are typically semi-structured in nature and are conducted over multiple email messages (Persichitte, Young & Tharp, 1997; Meho, 2006). They have the convenience factor of garnering responses at any time of day or night, without regard to time zones or geography separating the researcher and the participant.

The institutional review board at University of Nevada, Las Vegas (UNLV) approved the study in December 2006. Data collection via the email interviews began the same month and continued through June 2007. Before an exchange was made via email, the participants were contacted by means of personal letter from the Vice President for Development at UNLV, who personally knew the researcher and who had experienced his own presidential transition during a campaign.

Most email interviews occurred over three or four exchanges, some extending more than two months in duration. Several opportunities existed to clarify questions and concepts within the email interviews. Detailed information on the methodology and how the participants were selected is described in Chapter Three. The final participant list included Millikin University, Muhlenberg College, University of Redlands, Florida State
University, University of Indianapolis, University of North Florida, University of Wisconsin – Whitewater, Villanova University, and Wake Forest University.

Limitations

Several limitations to the study are based on the qualitative nature of the methodology, which assumes that the results contribute to a general theory of the phenomenon rather making them generalizable to all colleges and universities (Yin, 2003). A diverse group of institutions – public and private, small and large, religious and non-denominational, from various regions of the U.S. – were included, but each situation of a president leaving during a capital campaign was unique. What occurred at one college may not have transpired at another.

An example of this idea from prior research is Cronbach’s (1982) comparison study of public and private schools. The findings are consistent, but they do not help a parent decide whether to send a child to public or private school since the parent must decide between two particular schools (Firestone, 1993). The same was true for presidential transitions during capital campaigns. Each situation was particular to the institution, the community, and the individuals involved. Some presidents leave office under positive circumstances, others leave under negative ones. As evidenced in the case studies used here, outside influences also shaped the nature of the presidential transitions. In this dissertation, all of the schools that experienced presidential transitions during campaigns successfully met their dollar goal within the designated timeframe; this does not, however, suggest that all colleges and universities will meet campaign goals, even without a presidential transition.
The voluntary nature of the participants limits the study as well. Nine out of 27 potential CDOs who were contacted for participation in this project completed the entire interview process and were included in the analysis. It was assumed that all participants answered the questions explicitly and truthfully, so that the material presented here accurately reflects the circumstances. The data were derived from personal experiences with presidential transitions during capital campaigns and should be noted as such.

Lastly, all participants were from four-year institutions of higher education in the United States, which limits the utility of results to community colleges or programs outside of the U.S. This study incorporated the best techniques for increasing the broad applicability of the findings: “Some of these – like providing rich, ‘thick’ description – contribute to case-to-case reasoning. Others – like intentionally sampling for relevant...diversity and replicating cases through multisite designs – are particularly useful” (Firestone, 1993, p. 22). Therefore, even though the situations were unique, higher education administrators may find utility in the techniques and suggestions illustrated in the case studies. The recommendations in the final chapter should also be perused.

Outline of Dissertation

Chapter one provided the context for the rest of the dissertation by defining the rationale for the research, the theoretical framework, and research questions. The next chapter highlights a review of the literature in four areas: presidential transitions, presidents as fundraisers, how a fundraising president differs from a chief development officer, and capital campaigns. Gaps in the literature will be revealed, and the purpose of
this study is reaffirmed based upon the existent scholarship. Chapter three details the qualitative research methodology for the study. In that chapter, the research design, interview protocol, data collection and analysis, and pilot study are disclosed. The fourth chapter incorporates the nine case studies of presidential transitions during capital campaigns, while the fifth chapter compares and contrasts those case studies by answering the research questions. The final chapter states conclusions and offers research-based recommendations for institutions dealing with presidential transitions during capital campaigns. Suggestions for future research are also delineated in the final chapter.
CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

Within the past two decades, fundraising on college campuses has started to be perceived as a true profession, and along with that notion came considerable research on the topic (Levy, 2004; Cook & Lasher, 1996; Lindahl & Conley, 2002; Cook, 1997b). The majority of information shared among fundraising professionals is still through newsletter or magazine format, with a limited number of scholarly articles available. Lindahl and Conley (2002) reported, “The field is in need of a greater base of substantive, objective research rather than a casual acceptance of anecdotal evidence” (p. 91). However, new journals, such as “Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly,” “New Directions for Philanthropic Fundraising,” and “International Journal of Educational Advancement” have emerged as the field has expanded and started to be taken seriously. Numerous books have also been written on the subject of collegiate philanthropy and nonprofit giving (e.g., Dove 2000 and 2001; Gearhart, 1995; Hilenski, 2002; Worth, 1993 and 2002; Weinstein, 2002; Cascione, 2003; Elliott, 2006).

Charitable donations in the United States are on the rise, especially for the education sector (Bragga, 2005). According to “Giving USA,” an annual study by the American Association of Fund Raising Counsel (AAFRC) based at Indiana University,

Educational institutions were the second most prevalent beneficiary of this giving, at 13.9 percent of the total, or $40.98 billion. Based on this overwhelming dollar amount, it stands to reason that research on fundraising for institutions of higher education deserves more attention. In particular, the topic of the academic president’s role in fundraising remains fertile ground for inquiry (Cook & Lasher, 1996). This study sought to learn more about presidential transitions during fundraising campaigns. Therefore, the ensuing literature review focuses on four areas of research: presidential transitions, presidents as fundraisers, how a fundraising president differs from a CDO, and capital campaigns. Gaps in literature and the purpose of the study will also be identified.

Presidential Transitions

CEO transition has frequently been studied in the nonacademic setting. Within the past decade, business executive turnover has been occurring at an unprecedented rate because organizations hope that “a fresh face with new ideas will restore the bottom line and return the business to profitability” (Auchterlonie, 2003, p. 52). Contrary to that belief, however, research has shown that executive turnover can negatively impact public perception of the company, shareholder confidence, staff management, and overall performance (Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2001; Collins, 2001; Allgood & Farrell, 2003).

Wiersema’s 2002 study suggested, “most companies perform no better – in terms of earnings or stock-price performance – after they dismiss their CEOs than they did in the years leading up to the dismissals. Worse, the organizational disruption created by
rushed firings…can leave companies with deep and lasting scars” (p.70). Rather than the panacea desired, an executive transition is more likely to be a traumatic experience for the individuals involved and the corporation.

While the above studies lend insight to executive transition, the research does not necessarily apply to the higher education setting. One reason for the difference between business and academe leadership results from the typical business CEO being an internal hire; he or she has acquired more than two decades of experience with the firm which he or she will lead (Allgood & Farrell, 2003). In corporate America, future leaders are internally groomed for that position through coaching, mentoring, and business development (Birnbaum, 1988; Hammons & Murphree, 1999). In fact, CEOs hired from outside the corporation can have a negative impact on the company. According Jim Collins’ (2001) best selling book, Good to Great, which was based on a five-year research effort of high-performing companies, “Leaders who ride in from the outside are negatively correlated with going from good to great. Ten of eleven good-to-great CEOs came from inside the company, whereas the comparison companies tried outside CEOs six times more often” (p. 40).

Conversely, most colleges and universities conduct national searches and hire an external leader who is generally unfamiliar with that specific environment. Rarely are individuals with institutional tenure hired to lead their college (Birnbaum, 1988; Bensimon, 1991; Martin & Samels, 2004). Blumenstyk (2005) reported that “fewer than one out of five current presidents – about 19 percent – were selected for their presidency from a post at their own institution” (p. 1). Richard T. Ingram, President of the Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges acknowledged that
“higher education’s greatest failing is the failure to grow the potential leadership within the institution” (quoted in Blumenstyk, p. 1).

The presidential search process for institutions of higher education usually takes longer than the corporate CEO search, more candidates are considered, and a greater number of constituent groups are involved in the selection process (Birnbaum, 1988; Basinger, 2001). Institutions of higher education also regularly use executive search firms to find their leader. This contrasts with the business model that generally does not need a search firm since the top post is filled by an insider.

Surprisingly, like fundraising research, literature on executive transition within institutions of higher education has been lacking until recently (Hammons & Murphree, 1999). However, as the tenure of college presidents is shrinking, the topic is more important than ever before. A successful transition is vital to the organization, but, “all too often, the transition is a bumpy road that can disrupt staff members, trustees, donors, volunteers” (Dickey, 2002). The consequences of a presidential turnover can be monumental for colleges, and it is happening on a frequent basis. Glick (1992) reported, “During any two-year period, about one-fourth to one-third of presidents were in some phase of leaving or thinking of leaving” (p. 625).

The average term of a college president is now five to six years (Corrigan, 2002; Korschgen, Fuller & Gardner, 2001; Martin & Samels, 2004; Fincher, 1997; Rhodes, 2005; Padilla & Ghosh, 2000; Glick, 1992). A 2001 American Association for Higher Education (AAHE) Bulletin posited the question, “Is the fact that many presidents serve less time at a single institution than the probationary periods for most of our untenured
assistant professors a good thing?” (Korschgen, et.al, 2001, p. 3). Turnover in college presidencies is common:

Presidencies change hands each year. In this group are new chief executives who last a year or so and the much larger number who leave office within five years. It’s a disturbingly high turnover rate. Some of it, of course, is due to death or other unforeseen circumstances, but the vast majority of these men and women who … leave too soon depart of their own volition – or are asked to leave – because the ‘fit’ was wrong” (Perry, 2003, p. 29).

Martin and Samels (2004) published a comprehensive volume of essays long anticipated by college presidents, university board members, and scholars of higher education. The book, Presidential Transition in Higher Education: Managing Leadership Change, was the first of its kind to thoroughly address the concept of preparing for and dealing with presidential change. Martin and Samels indicated, “As many as one-fourth of all 3900 U.S. colleges and universities in any year are preparing for a presidential change, are in the midst of one, or have just selected a new president” (preface, x).

With presidential turnover occurring at an alarming rate, Martin and Samels provide a wealth of guidance for institutions to survive – and possibly thrive – during the process. Presidential change is both inevitable yet challenging, so the book discusses several strategies for transition management. Key chapters include the role of trustees, executive search firms, interim presidents, public relations, presidential spouses, and maintaining institutional advancement. Nearly all chapters are written in first person by contributing presidents and others who have dealt with such situations.
Martin and Samels (2004) argued, “Many of those now leading colleges and universities are coming to recognize that an effective transition process is far more difficult to manage than most higher education guidebooks and resource manuals ever acknowledge, because, while presidents ultimately come and go, how they come and go has a profound effect on the institution and largely determines the difference between extended periods of failure and success” (p. 22). Individuals concerned for the welfare of their institution should have an awareness of change in leadership and its consequences for the university because many presidential transitions are untimely and poorly managed (Basinger, 2001).

Even “under the best circumstances, a presidential leadership transition is an intense experience, both for the institution and its new leader” (Brown, 2004, p. 189). The entire campus community may feel apprehensive about the presidential transition (Richter, 1995; Solis, 1995; Pierce, 2003). A 1995 study of 296 faculty members during a presidential transition indicated, “Faculty are more sensitive to the need for stable leadership and less willing to take risks when that leadership is missing. They also feel that community and student needs are best met when the institution has a permanent president. ... In all cases, the score shifted toward the favorable end of the scale when a permanent condition existed” (Solis, p. 30). Solis proposed that no other change in an institution has as dramatic an impact on faculty members as a presidential transition (p. 23).

Faculty members look to a new president for guidance and responsiveness. In addition to firing and hiring, initiating programs and eliminating others, raising funds for these programs and establishing networks during the first year on the job, academics want
the campus president to be “one of them” according to Bensimon (1991). Bensimon’s research revealed that acceptance or rejection of a new president is contingent upon how the faculty members view that president: “A president who is believed to have had a positive effect on the feelings and morale of the faculty is more likely to be associated with institutional success than a president whose actions are thought to have had a negative impact” (p. 638). Presidents who continue sufficient contact with their faculty and staff are seen as strong presidents throughout their terms (Bimbaum, 1992).

Pierce (2003) suggested that nearly all campus personnel, not just faculty, will be on-edge about a new president: “Once a new president has been selected... people across campus will be looking for signs of things to come. Those who generally approved of the outgoing president’s performance may be anxious about the impending leadership change; those who are celebrating the incumbent’s departure obviously feel differently” (p. 14). Apprehension about relationships with the leader may come to the forefront.

A president’s potential desire to “clean house” and bring aboard his or her own associates can also be reason for concern (Pierce, 2003). One example of high turnover was during the four-year leadership of President John Lilley at University of Nevada, Reno. At least five top executives departed campus – either by their own desire or by being asked to leave – during Dr. Lilley’s presidency. This included the provost and the vice president for advancement (http://www.unr.edu/nevadanews/detail.aspx?id=36). Presidential transitions can start a snowball effect of other administrator departures which leads to additional stress and distraction for faculty and staff (Padilla & Ghosh, 2000). Similar to Collins’ (2001) study in corporate America, Padilla and Ghosh delineated,
"Ironically, frequent turnover at the top ultimately results in slower change and less responsiveness throughout the institution" (p. 37).

An AAHE study reiterated this point. In that report, Korschgen, Fuller, and Gardner (2001) noted, "Institutions that had been identified as 'innovative' had an average presidential tenure of about 13 years, approximately double that of the current average presidential term of service." The AAHE study concluded that long-term presidents are best equipped to change a campus culture, they are more adept at handling institutional difficulties, and they develop stronger relationships on and off campus. Presidential longevity does matter: "Effective presidencies surely require more than five or six years to manifest themselves" (Padilla & Ghosh, 2000, p. 37).

The Chronicle of Higher Education surveyed 764 executives from four-year colleges in 2005, and found marked differences between the most experienced and least experienced leaders. The most experienced presidents were defined by the survey as having served more than ten years as president at one institution. The least experienced presidents had served two years or less (http://chronicle.com/stats/presidentialsurvey/index.htm). The table below showcases some of the differences between the most experienced and least experienced academic executives. Of note, the majority of the most experienced presidents are highly satisfied with their jobs, whereas only 37.8 percent of the least experienced presidents feel similarly about their position.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job Item</th>
<th>Most experienced</th>
<th>Least experienced</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Job satisfaction</strong></td>
<td>57.1 percent are &quot;highly satisfied.&quot;</td>
<td>37.8 percent are &quot;highly satisfied.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rising tuition costs</strong></td>
<td>37.8 percent agree that colleges can do little about college costs.</td>
<td>20.1 percent agree that colleges can do little about college costs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Previous employer</strong></td>
<td>26.6 percent previously worked at their institution.</td>
<td>19.5 percent previously worked at their institution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Corporate boards</strong></td>
<td>42.3 percent do not serve on corporate boards.</td>
<td>72 percent do not serve on corporate boards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Enrollment</strong></td>
<td>24.9 percent say they have a &quot;very great concern&quot; about meeting enrollment targets.</td>
<td>39.9 percent say they have a &quot;very great concern&quot; about meeting enrollment targets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sacrifices</strong></td>
<td>On a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 being &quot;have sacrificed a lot&quot; to be president, rated having sacrificed teaching an average of 3.99.</td>
<td>On the same scale, rated having sacrificed teaching an average of 4.26.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Who is in their office</strong></td>
<td>15 percent met with faculty-senate chairman once or twice a week.</td>
<td>27.5 percent met with faculty-senate chairman once or twice a week.</td>
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Gaylor (2004) reported that transitional leadership can affect the organization in numerous ways: “The costs are not only tangible (the hiring costs, compensation, missed opportunity costs, and so on), but intangible (effects on organizational morale, confidence of consumers, cultural shifts, and so on)” (p. 82). Glick (1992) indicated that “turnover in managerial positions is very costly, ranging from five to twenty-five times an employee’s monthly salary” (p. 627). In 2007, the Ohio State University hired a new president. The search took 10 months and cost nearly $200,000 (Welsh-Huggins, 2007, p. 1). About $175,000 was spent on a headhunting company/executive search firm, and $19,000 was in miscellaneous costs for travel, lodging, and food.
The reasons why presidents do not endure have been the topic of a few studies (e.g., Fincher, 1997; McLaughlin, 1996; Birnbaum, 1989; Martin & Samels, 2004; Padilla & Ghosh, 2000). Fincher (1997) presented several leader transition case studies in a paper entitled “Presidential Leadership and Institutional Mission” that attempted to explain why the college presidency is increasingly a revolving door. First, the institutions he studied were more concerned with administrative competence in a new hire than strong leadership. Second, inadequate attention was given to institutional mission and the particular needs of each college. Third, the governing boards, faculty, and search committees had little or no experience in selecting a college president. Lastly, the institutions were hasty in making their recommendations for a new leader (pp. 11-13). All of these reasons compounded to make poor “fits” for the new presidents and the three institutions studied.

When the groundwork has been laid correctly for a decent fit between president and institution, McLaughlin (1996) suggested that the four following practices are in place: (1) an explicit entry plan; (2) a reasonable pace of change; (3) few priorities for presidential action for the first year, and (4) the development of key relationships (p. 11). McLaughlin’s synthesis is based on the perspectives of seven new college presidents and the transition issues they faced. McLaughlin served as the education chair for Harvard’s Seminar for New Presidents. This seminar is offered annually to provide “first-time [college] presidents with a practical and conceptual orientation to the presidency. It familiarizes new presidents with the opportunities and hazards they will likely face, and prepares them to respond to the multiple responsibilities and constituencies of their new office” (http://www.gse.harvard.edu/~ppe/highered/). Only 40 college leaders are
selected for this prestigious five-day seminar, which aims to prepare presidents for their new roles.

Birnbaum (1989) offered the following reasons why "many presidents serve only a brief period and then either voluntarily or involuntarily leave. It may in part be due to incomplete information exchange during the search process, to the scapegoating of the president for outcomes due to uncontrollable environmental events, or to changes in the interests or goals of either side. It may also be due to disappointment in the performance of the president" (p. 505). Other reasons cited for high turnover are increased government controls, greater legal issues, more influence by students and parents, more frequent board involvement in day-to-day activities, bureaucratization of the campus, commercialization of college athletics, and ambiguity in the mission of the college (Padilla & Ghosh, 2000).

As noted earlier, many presidents also leave office due to the extraordinary pressure to raise funds for programs, endowments, faculty, capital projects, and a sundry of other necessities to maintain and grow their colleges (Martin & Samels, 2004). In a national study of nonprofit organizations, Knauft, Berger, and Gray (1991) found that "by a wide margin, the chief staff officers we surveyed considered fundraising the most pressing challenge facing their organizations. ...Interestingly, these executives reported that building fundraising skills was the area where they perceived the greatest need for personal development" (pp. 25-26). Never before has such importance been placed on private dollars. Having an effective fundraiser at the top of the organization is becoming a key strategy for institutions of higher education. The next section discusses the history and current importance of this phenomenon.
Presidents as Fundraisers

When the American Council on Education (ACE) asked college presidents to list the areas that most significantly occupied their time, fundraising ranked second just after planning. ACE's *The American College President* (Corrigan, 2002), a demographic data report of 2,594 college and university presidents, discerned that fundraising was the top priority for presidents when analyzed by institutional type. Public doctorate-granting, private doctorate-granting, public master's, private master's, private baccalaureate, private two-year, and private specialized institutions all had presidents that listed fundraising as their primary task, above all other responsibilities (Corrigan, 2002). The author specified, "Public college presidents' attention to fundraising may be explained by the fact that state subsidies constitute a declining proportion of institutional funding in many states. Presidents of public institutions are increasingly expected to generate private donations to secure funds for institutional improvement and innovation" (Corrigan, p. 34).

The conclusions presented in the ACE report are not unique: A 2005 *Chronicle of Higher Education* survey of nearly 1,400 four-year college presidents found, "53 percent of presidents worked on fundraising every day, more than any other activity" (Pope, A11). Conclusively, the ACE report and Chronicle survey indicate that fundraising is an inescapable and demanding part of life for all college presidents. Cook (1997b) suggested, "Fundraising is one area where leadership can have a significant, and at times transforming, effect on an organization" (p. 343).

Bear in mind that college presidents have tremendous responsibilities to their internal constituencies that include working with faculty members, staff, students, and boards of trustees. While presidents have demanding schedules overseeing their colleges
and universities, fundraising is increasingly becoming a primary task. In 1996, University of Virginia President John Casteen recounted that 75 percent of his time was devoted to fundraising: “Shrinking budgets mean we spend more time fundraising” (within Terry, 1996, p. 14). The president’s responsibility toward raising funds is not necessarily a new occurrence. Sixty years ago, The Journal of Higher Education published an article by Edmund Day (1946), who served as President of Cornell University from 1937 – 1949. President Day served during the tumultuous years of World War II and the tremendous growth that followed the war. Despite these challenges, Dr. Day considered his first responsibility as a university president to be fundraising:

The most obvious and best-recognized obligation of administration is to add to the institution’s resources. The task of obtaining additional funds is, in fact, so characteristic of the role of the college and university president that he is frequently described as more of a cultured mendicant than anything else. It is safe to say that the reputation of many presidents has derived largely from their success or failure as fundraisers. The explanation of this is relatively simple. Here is one type of accomplishment which is almost certain to provoke general acclaim. With new funds, the president can implement new undertakings and gain fresh support for his overall program (p. 340).

Edmund Day’s statement epitomizes the importance of a president’s role in fundraising, and it is even more accurate by today’s standards. Generating new revenues through private support is something that contemporary presidents are asked about during interviews and held accountable for by boards of trustees throughout their terms (Michael,
Schwartz, & Bairaj, 2001). Dollars raised is a measuring stick for success as a university president.

The college president’s role in fundraising is a dynamic progression that begins even before he or she takes office. Cook and Lasher (1996) created the following figure (p. 43) to exemplify the developmental process of presidential fundraising. The process includes CEO selection, CEO participation in fundraising, and CEO effectiveness in fundraising. During each stage in the process, four variables or forces have an impact: (1) Personal forces; (2) Institutional forces; (3) Role forces; and, (4) Environmental forces.

Figure 2. Cook and Lasher’s Developmental Process of Presidential Fundraising
Personal forces include the president's established values, beliefs, interpersonal skills, leadership style, and experiences that the individual possesses. Components of institutional forces include the history and culture of the college, as well as other aspects of organizational life that impact the president and his or her fundraising ability. The president also has certain role expectations, both self-imposed and those created by others. Lastly, the president inherits environmental conditions such as the donor base, wealth and philanthropic tradition of the area, the state of the economy, and competition from other nonprofit organizations. According to Cook and Lasher (1996), who created this model, these four forces interact to produce the CEOs level of participation in fundraising. … Typically one of the four forces will dominate the others, although the exact configuration will vary from institution to institution. For example, institutional forces may be dominant or uppermost at elite, prestigious institutions, while institutions of lesser quality and prestige may be more reliant upon personal forces to stimulate fundraising” (p. 44).

The four forces impact a president's selection, participation, and effectiveness in fundraising and aid in understanding the overall motivation of the president to raise funds.

The process of identifying and acquiring donations is referred to as cultivation and solicitation. In higher education, it is typically the president’s responsibility to ask individuals, corporations, and foundations with significant resources to donate to the institution. In general, people give money to other people, and they do not give unless asked (Glass & Jackson, 1998; Worth, 1993; Murray, 1995). One example of a community college president who solicited funds was outlined in McGee’s (2003) article:
“The classic event was the personal meeting with the CEO of Blockbuster International. The meeting took five months to schedule by a board member who was a personal friend of Blockbuster’s CEO. But it was the appeal by the college CEO that guaranteed the ‘ask’ would be successful” (p. 43). The appeal for a major gift is generally a process, not a one-time event: “Securing each gift of $100,000 or more for a campaign required an average of seven to nine visits with a donor over a two-year period” (Cook, 1997b). Worth (2002) wrote that relationships between presidents and donors are “built over quiet dinners, at frenetic football finishes, in somber lecture halls, or amid the excitement of a laboratory discovery. Whatever the case, virtually every major gift donor has a long-standing, carefully nurtured relationship with the institution or cause – and, by extension, the people who represent it” (p. 135).

Prospective donors who can make a major gift expect and demand personal contact with the institution’s leader: “Major donors want to meet and converse with the people who will be spending their money. They do not want to talk to a department manager or professional fundraiser; they want to discuss their gift with the CEO” (Hall, 2005, p.45). The reason is simple: The president is viewed as one whose status is akin to the potential contributor’s (Fisher, 1984; Coll, 2000). Additionally, the president functions as the “embodiment” of the institution, not just as a representative of the institution (Bornstein, 2000; Quigg, 1986). Foote (1986) recounted, “There is only one president. There is only one office where all of those institutional roads cross. The president symbolizes the university to the alumni, the corporate community, the world at large” (p. 76).
Major donors are analogous to prestige. When they are considering a mega-gift to a university,

Donors feel that the project with which they are associated is a personal reflection on them and their concept of quality. In other words, major donors must have a high level of respect for and trust in an organization and its leadership because such donors invest a portion of their identities and values in the organization along with actual gifts of money and property. … Donor confidence in leadership is, of course, a prerequisite for major gifts and is based on personality, style, ethics, vision, personal and fiscal integrity, communication skills, and managerial ability, among other things (Cook, 1997b, pp. 339, 343).

Presidents make the significant asks, but their institutional advancement duties do not stop there. Additionally, they must motivate, educate, and support fundraising staff, volunteers, and the public (Patton, 1993; Worth, 2002; Cook, 1997b). According to Glass and Jackson (1998), “Leadership in private fundraising involves four primary tasks: (a) Articulating the vision and mission for the institution; (b) creating a climate of support from the governing board, faculty, and staff; (c) setting an example by devoting time and making significant personal gifts; and (d) planning and implementing strategies for soliciting funds” (p. 578). Donors want to believe that their money is going toward a worthy cause, and it is the president’s responsibility to implement those ideas. Foote (1986) explains, “The president must translate the vision to the many constituencies of the university” (p. 74).

Garning big gifts demonstrates that the institution has vitality and imparts positive public relations. The more adept a president is at raising funds, the more
accolades she or he is bound to receive. Fisher and Koch (2004) studied more than 700 college presidents to determine leadership effectiveness. Out of the 700 presidents studied, the final chapter of the book offers examples of 17 leaders considered to be highly effective. In all but two cases, fundraising prowess was mentioned as an important trait of these exceptional leaders. The authors highlighted Steven Sample, president of University of Southern California, as the most successful higher education fundraiser of all time. He has been the only college president to secure four $100 million gifts for an institution.

Overall, as one of the key findings of their study, Fisher and Koch determined, "Effective presidents preside at institutions with endowments that are more than twice as large as those enjoyed by [comparative] presidents. The effective presidents’ institutions also raise more than twice as much money on an annual basis" (p. 61). Results like these showcase the critical importance of a president’s involvement in raising funds and the impact an effective leader can have on the process. To achieve success as a fundraiser, campus CEOs must have an authentic belief in that role (Patton, 1993; Kaufman, 2004; Worth, 2002). Presidents need to be enthusiastic about fundraising since they set the example for the rest of the campus and its constituencies. Leaders help set the tone and focus of the fundraising program through their attitudes, values and decisions, as well as their personal involvement (Cook, 1997b).

McLaughlin (2004) referred to fundraising as “seductive” for college presidents: “Not only are the trappings that accompany these conversations with alumni and donors appealing – lovely settings, good meals, interesting company – many presidents discover that talking about the institution’s successes and future possibilities is more enjoyable
than responding to the seemingly endless and repetitive petty grievances and mundane matters at the campus” (p. 11). The positive attention that accompanies the donation can feed the president’s ego as well as bolster the campus’s image.

University of Washington (UW) President Mark Emmert was the subject of a recent Seattle Times article entitled “UW President’s Job: Wine, Dine, and Reel in Big Bucks” (Perry, 2006). The article described how President Emmert spent the majority of his time away from campus meeting with donors and politicians about fiscal support for the institution. During his first 16 months in office, Emmert took 23 trips, hosted 21 social events at the president’s mansion, joined at least three country clubs, and was reimbursed nearly $100,000 in personal expenses for “friendraising.” (Perry, 2006). UW Regents Chairwoman retold an old gag about the president’s job, “A university president is someone who lives in a mansion and begs for money” (as cited in Perry, 2006, p.1).

In order to aid presidents when they are meeting with prospective donors, it is likely that development staff will prepare a brief biographical sketch of the donor, including details of career, family, hobbies, their giving history, and relationship with the university (Coll, 2000; Quigg, 1986; Worth, 2002). Accurate records are essential, especially if there have been recent births, deaths, marriages or divorces in the donor’s family. The president also needs to be aware of any negative associations the donor has with the university. The more prepared a president is, the more comfortable he or she will be in meeting with the donor, and this stronger relationship could translate to an easier time soliciting the gift. The solicitor must understand the prospect’s giving capacity as well as their giving orientation. Worth (2002) indicated, “The same person who will
support an endowed chair or a scholarship will not necessarily support a campaign for a
ew president’s home or a weight-lifting room for the football team” (p. 134).

Despite the glamorous and interesting side of cultivating and soliciting gifts,
asking for funds is not easy; nor is it a skill at which many people are exceptionally able.
According to Glass and Jackson (1998), “The idea of asking people for money makes
many individuals uncomfortable. Presidents, trustees and foundation directors fear being
turned down, are reluctant to become involved in an activity they know little about, and
are afraid that the initiative will not be successful” (p. 582). Some executives are
uncomfortable meeting with donors, especially soliciting gifts (Gaylor, 2004).

Such fears could be founded in the lack of philanthropic experience of many
presidents (Cook, 1997a; McGee, 2003; Kaufman, 2004, Carter, 2001). Paradoxically,
many college chiefs rise through the ranks of academics and are not afforded much
familiarity with acquiring private support. A search consultant with A.T. Kearney
Executive Search stated, “Colleges used to want someone with very strong academic
credentials who could hopefully do some fundraising, but the priorities have flip-flopped”
(within Marcus, 2001, p. 46). A recent article in the “Washington Post” reinforced this
idea noting the change in presidents’ scholarly credentials (Pope, 2005). Schools are
becoming more open-minded to hiring leaders with proven fundraising records instead of
extensive publishing and teaching experience. Pope (2005) wrote, “The reason is clear:
The job of college president is increasingly a financial one” (p. A11). Universities now
demand fundraising skills in their leadership; it is no longer an optional activity.

To conclude this section on the president’s part in fundraising at an institution of
higher education,
I hope you can see the pivotal role that belongs to the president alone. It has been said that the president is the living logo for the institution. Nothing could be truer when it comes to fundraising. People with money, power and influence want to have ready access to the president of the college before, during, and after their contribution. They want to know that they have placed their trust and their funds into the hands of someone whom they respect, who will use their donations to further an institution in which they believe. The rewards are great for those who are willing to ask for support. It is our challenge and our duty (McGee, 2003, p.46).

The college president is critical to any fundraising endeavor. Few college development programs can be effective without a strong CEO.

How a Fundraising President Differs from the Chief Development Officer

A successful development program is also dependent upon a strong departmental leader. The Chief Development Officer (CDO) for a college or university plans, coordinates, and manages all the fundraising activities. He or she generally works at the rank of executive vice president and reports directly to the campus president (Worth, 2002; Dove, 2001). Lindahl and Conley (2002) reported, “Lead institutional fundraisers [are] recognized as one of the new ‘power brokers’ on university campuses” (p. 99).

CDOs have internal and external job functions. Their primary internal function is overseeing the day-to-day activities of the advancement office(s) and staff. As delineated in chapter one, the tasks of any college development program are numerous: annual fund, planned giving, corporate and foundation giving, stewardship, prospect research,
communications, among others. Worth (2002) suggested, "The CDO, with other members of the professional development staff, must create specific strategies and action plans to meet fundraising objectives. He or she must also create a climate of confidence for the staff's integrity and performance by making sure that all players understand and share the institution's short- and long-run goals" (p. 68). The CDO offers structure, direction, guidance, and support to all fundraising endeavors at his or her university and ensures that they are cohesive with the educational mission.

The CDO's primary external job functions involve cultivating and soliciting donors and volunteers. He or she must personally solicit donors and also work closely with the president, board of trustees, and key fundraising volunteers to facilitate their participation in the fundraising process (Worth, 2002; Carter, 2001). Externally as well, the CDO attends most, if not all, of the university's functions where prospects and donors will be present. The CDO constantly works on "friend-raising" to nurture relationships and encourage positive relations for the college (Weinstein, 2002). Gaylor (2004) contrasts the CEO from CDO in a nonprofit by "The CEO shoulders the burden of leading the organization to the achievement of its mission. The CDO bears the responsibility of procuring the funds necessary to make the vision possible" (p. 102).

The CDO's job should not be minimalized to just fund procurement, however. Dove (2001) listed seven main duties of a CDO: (a) Recognize the needs of staff and volunteers; (b) Delegate authority or responsibility (or both); (c) Solicit and cultivate donor prospects; (d) Involve staff and volunteers, as appropriate, in decision making at every level; (e) Provide meaningful support, direction, and leadership; (f) Recognize the challenge of changing times and human motivations; and (g) Provide adequate feedback.
and recognition of achievement (p. 70). Overall, the CDO sets forth the strategy for fundraising at his or her college and coordinates volunteers, associates, and the president to work toward those established goals. He or she must be a leader, colleague, and follower. Because of these many roles, Lindahl and Conley (2002) indicated, "It is not uncommon for skilled fundraisers and nonprofit leaders today to have advanced college degrees, specialized training (for example, in planned gifts), and exceptional communication skills" (p. 98).

Whereas the CDO establishes and guides the vision for fundraising endeavors, the president embodies those principles and "makes [them] comprehensible to a diverse constituency" (Worth, 2002, p. 69). These two players must work together for a strong fundraising program to exist. Worth (1993) enumerated, "The president’s relationship with professional development staff, and particularly the chief development officer, is pivotal" (p. 54). Gaylor (2004) reiterated this concept: "In the world of nonprofits, there is no single staff relationship more important than that between the CEO and the CDO. … This relationship… is critical, not merely so that the two can ‘get along’ but because the CEO and CDO are so critically interdependent that a strong relationship between the two is essential for both them and for the organization" (pp. 102-103). The CEO and CDO must work together to achieve institutional goals.

Because of the increased emphasis on fundraising today, Lindahl and Conley (2002) noted, "development personnel have become among the highest paid administrative staff on college campuses" (p. 98). The College and University Professional Association for Human Resources reported that the annual CDO salary outpaces that of the Chief Student Affairs Officer, Chief Financial Officer, and other
campus leaders, based on their study of 1,387 public and private institutions of higher education in the United States (CUPA-HR, 2005). The higher salaries for the CDO indicate a growing importance for institutional advancement.

One of the main vehicles for fundraising today is the comprehensive capital campaign. Campaigns will be described in the next section.

### Capital Campaigns

Dove (2000) defined a capital campaign as "an organized, intensive fundraising effort on the part of a third-sector institution or organization to secure extraordinary gifts and pledges for a specific purpose or purposes (such as building construction, renovation, equipment acquisition, or endowment funds) during a specific period" (p. 5). The term "capital" campaign may be a misnomer; rarely are capital campaigns just for capital improvements. Today, capital campaigns are multi-purpose efforts. They are the biggest fundraising projects a college can assume, whether in a large, research institution or a small private college.

The YMCA and American Red Cross were the first two organizations to raise funds in a campaign format with fixed goals in a specific timeframe (McGoldrick, 1993; Hilenski, 2002). Those campaigns occurred in the early part of the 20th century. Some of the techniques of capital campaigns today grew out of those early nonprofit campaigns. Grand kick-off dinners, announcements of lead gifts, screened lists of prospects, full-time publicity agents, and dramatic achievements were noticeable achievements of the YMCA’s campaign (Hilenski, 2002). A common visual effect of campaigns was also created; the successful YMCA campaign director, Charles Ward, “invented the campaign
clock or thermometer to display at a glance the time elapsed and amounts raised. This device became a hallmark of his later campaigns and, indeed, of all campaigns even today” (Hilenski, 2002, p. 14). For current examples, see New Mexico State University’s “chili pepper” thermometer for its campaign (http://giving.nmsu.edu/campaign.php) or Sam Houston State University’s “reach for the stars” campaign thermometer (http://www.shsu.edu/~ua_www/campaign/).

The year 1914 marked the first capital campaign for an institution of higher education when the University of Pittsburgh sought to raise an extraordinary $3 million for a new campus. Five years later, Harvard held an endowment campaign, whereby the school “presented its alumni with a bill for services rendered and asked for payment in the form of an investment to support even more and better service to future alumni and so the nation” (Hilenski, 2002, p. 17).

Capital campaigns at institutions of higher education began in earnest in the 1950’s and 60’s. By the 1970’s, Stanford University launched an impressive $300 million campaign, and ten years later the same university aimed for $1 billion, an unprecedented amount in the 1980’s. In 2003, University of Southern California concluded a capital campaign that raised $2.85 billion over nine years – the largest amount raised in a single nonprofit drive to that point in time. Not more than a year later, the State University of New York announced plans to raise $3 billion by 2012 (Lewis, 2004), and Stanford announced a $4.3 billion campaign to be raised in the same timeframe (http://www.stanfordreview.org/Archive/Volume_XXXVII/Issue_4/News/news1.shtml). It is the most ambitious capital campaign to date, although no longer unique: At least 42
universities have announced or completed billion-dollar campaigns (Bartlett, 2005; Johnson, 2005).

The billion-dollar campaigns exist at a variety of institutions, ranging from large, state institutions in rural locations (e.g., Michigan State) and urban cities (e.g., University of California at San Diego) to independent, private schools (e.g., Vanderbilt) and smaller, private, Ivy League institutions (e.g., Dartmouth College). Johnson (2005) reported, “Every new campaign raises the bar for all colleges and universities. It does spark trustees, presidents, or a vice president for development to say, ‘Gee, if they are capable of raising $1 billion, then maybe we should be thinking in those terms’” (p.1).

The increase and prominence of capital campaigns at colleges and universities are due to several factors, most notably because state and federal contributions have been limited, tapering institutional budgets (Dove, 2000; Yates, 2001; Crawford, 2003; Elliott, 2006; Cascione, 2003; Lawrence, 2006). Other reasons for campaigns include the repair and replacement of aging facilities, to temper skyrocketing tuition prices, and to add and expand programs (McGoldrick, 1993). Increased philanthropy can make a noticeable difference on an institution’s bottom line. Capital campaigns are a measurable achievement in higher education with specific goals, which is difficult to articulate about other areas of campus life. Lindahl and Conley (2002) noted, “Higher education recognized in the 1990’s that fundraising would become a visible symbol of institutional quality and viability” (p. 96). McLaughlin (1990) furthered this idea, “The success or failure of both a college and an administration is—in the short term—often judged on financial solvency... Campaigns have special, tangible significance” (p. 44b).
Comprehensive capital campaigns last from five to ten years; the average campaign is a seven-year cumulative effort on behalf of the campus (Quigg, 1986; Dove 2000; Symonds, 2004; Newman, 2005; Worth, 1993). Contrary to public impression, “successful capital campaigns don’t just burst out of development offices come Monday morning. They are painstakingly organized by way of feasibility studies – a basic assessment of where colleges and universities are financially, and to what projects alumni, friends and corporations are most receptive to contributing” (Yates, 2001, p. 22).

Capital campaigns typically pass through six successive phases (McGoldrick 1993): (a) Pre-campaign planning; (b) Campaign planning; (c) Nucleus Fund; (d) Kickoff; (e) Plateau; and, (f) Home Stretch. Phase one is the pre-campaign planning stage, where institutions conduct feasibility studies and donor research, prepare strategic plans, and develop a potential campaign starting date. One of the main goals of a feasibility study is to determine how much money could potentially be raised during a capital campaign. Establishing the campaign amount usually involves a combination of surveys, interviews, and assessments of current fundraising activity. Institutional leaders, previous and potential donors, and other community leaders are generally invited to participate in the process. A consultant will ask these individuals about the priorities of the campaign; they also discuss specifics: “Let’s say this is a $36 million campaign to be conducted… Would you, under the right circumstances, be willing to make a substantial gift to the campaign? Would that be a four-, five-, six-, seven-figure gift?” (Brereton, 2006, p. 19). Setting the dollar goal is a key facet of the first phase.

The second phase is when the crux of campaign planning takes place, and a detailed campaign and communications strategy is written. An increase in development
staff is usually necessary at this point. Dalessandro (1989) recommends a 20-30 percent increase in advancement office staff because campaigns are so labor intensive. New staff members may include a campaign director, additional prospect researchers, and more special events personnel. Funds need to be budgeted for these new employees. Beyond new staff, funds should also be reserved for new campaign costs, such as outside counsel, videos and new media relations tools, special events, press gatherings, and establishing or enhancing regional offices. Additionally, the campaign communications pieces can be costly. They can encompass “everything from print materials, presentation folders, letters, e-mail, print newsletters, e-newsletters, phone calls, new websites, and most importantly, personal communication” (Sevier, 2003, p.45). These items are not a one-time cost; communications must be constantly modernized throughout a campaign to update constituents on the campaign’s progress and successes. Quigg (1986) simply notes, “Major campaigns are expensive” (p. 2).

Phase three is when the nucleus fund (also called “seed money”) is privately collected before the campaign becomes public knowledge. Several key donors and volunteers are enlisted during the third stage, usually referred to as the silent phase of the campaign. Yates (2001) recommends, “30 to 50 percent of the goal should … be raised during a ‘silent period’ before the campaign goes public” (p. 22). Other campaign executives suggest as much as 70 percent be raised during the nonpublic stage (Dove, 2000; List & Rondeau, 2003; Brereton, 2006).

List and Lucking-Reiley (2002) conducted field experiments at universities and determined that seed money has substantial benefits on a campaign: “Increased seed money sharply increases both the participation rate of donors and the average gift size
received from participating donors” (p. 218). Based on their research, List and Lucking-Reiley surmised that the optimal amount of seed money is greater than 33 percent of the overall campaign goal. With percentages like these, fundraising staff and volunteers will be busy soliciting gifts long before the campaign becomes public knowledge. A strong leadership gift phase is crucial to a successful campaign (Hasseltine, 2002; Weinstein, 2002). The first three stages of a campaign are some of the most demanding for those involved.

The next stage of a capital campaign is the campaign kick-off. Celebrations and special events accompany the announcements of a capital campaign, its leadership and goals. For example, State University of New York at Oswego launched its first-ever capital campaign with much fanfare in 2005. The development office printed 1,000 yellow Oswego t-shirts and distributed them to students, faculty, staff, and alumni. While wearing the shirts, the group gathered to spell out “OSWEGO” on the campus lawn. Pictures of the namesake have been used in campaign brochures. Additional campaign events included an on-campus dinner with notable alumni such as NBC “Today” show weatherman Al Roker, ESPN’s Steve Levy, and Heraldo Munoz, Chile’s U.N. ambassador. Upcoming campaign kickoff events for SUNY Oswego were also planned in Atlanta and Washington D.C. for later in the year (Mohr, 2005).

Colleges try to prolong the enthusiasm of the kick-off celebration with follow-up publications, speeches, sports and alumni events. But, colleges will soon enter the fifth phase, which McGoldrick (1993) referred to as the “plateau of fatigue” because the enthusiasm has dwindled; yet cultivation, solicitation, and stewardship must continue by
overcoming volunteer and staff burnout. Because campaigns last, on average, seven years,

Inevitably, there will be slow periods when there is nothing much to report. It is then that the president has an additional responsibility: to keep the momentum going. … The president must encourage the dean who has just been turned down to try another donor on another day. The trustees’ attention may drift away; the president must invite it back. The professor whose new library wing is still only a dream must be encouraged to keep the faith. Students wondering why tuition is rising despite all the money being raised, must be patiently educated about the complex realities of university financing (Foote, 1986, p. 76).

The momentum needs to continue for the campaign to end on a high note, despite the decline in enthusiasm. At this point, making an announcement of a big gift can create an upsurge for the campaign. In 2007, the University of Nevada, Las Vegas president publicized a $30 million gift from Harrah’s Corporation – the school’s largest corporate gift – during the plateau stage to reinvigorate their campaign.

The final 12 to 18 months of the campaign are the home stretch, when goal completion is the focus. When the goal is achieved, recognition and thanks are due to all donors, volunteers, and staff. Kenworthy (1994) recommends designing “a recognition plan that [gives] donors the kind of exposure and recognition they want” (p. 60). In June 2007, Purdue University ended a successful, seven-year, $1.7 billion capital campaign with an upscale gala for contributors. The bill for the event was $576,778.00, which was mostly spent on an event planning company that took care of food, entertainment, decorations, and technical equipment (Wallheimer, 2007). Although the expenditure of
the event seems extremely costly, it represented less than .03 percent of the $1.7 billion raised. University administrators defended the cost saying that it was a necessary expenditure to properly thank the top donors.

Stewardship will vary on the type of donor and type of institution. Beyond galas and parties, many donors are thanked through naming opportunities. For example, in 2005, Ball State University renamed its football field after a $4 million donor and alumnus. The donation was received as part of Ball State’s “Drive to Distinction” athletic fundraising campaign that raised more than $13 million in its entirety (Koch, 2005). Donors are not the only ones deserving of appreciation: “Postcampaign receptions charities should consider thanking not just the donors but also the fundraising staff” (Sommerfeld, 2002, p. 1).

During the final phase, post-campaign development activities are also discussed. One consideration is the potential physical and mental exhaustion of staff and volunteers following a substantial campaign. Newman (2005) noted, “Frequently, staff members leave after a capital campaign, if not because of burnout or boredom, then because they have been recruited by another organization, or desire to apply their new knowledge in another setting. Capital campaigns can also take a toll on CEOs, who are expected to continue running the organization effectively, efficiently, and creatively while also spending a large portion of their time meeting with groups of constituents and individual donors” (p. B22).

Top development staff members need to focus on the future: “They must find new ways to keep staff members motivated and excited about their work – or risk losing them. They also must figure out when and how to go back to the big donors who gave
generously to the campaign. And perhaps most challenging, they need to make sure that
lessons learned about what worked and what didn’t will influence planning for future
campaigns” (Sommerfeld, 2002, p. 1). From phase one to the finish, it is obvious that
capital campaigns are lengthy, multi-stage events that need significant resources and
efforts to meet established fundraising goals.

O’Brien (2005) idealizes that campaigns are more than just dollars to an
institution. Capital campaigns can revitalize organizations and force universities to plan
for the future. Campaigns “help an organization find its collective voice; they provide the
opportunity to examine and reshape the institution’s programs; they provide mechanisms
by which organizations can share and communicate their vision, objectives and outcomes;
and they involve constituents in meaningful initiatives and create reasons and occasions
for celebration” (O’Brien, p. 41). Compelling and energizing strategic plans are shaped
through capital campaigns. A unified vision for the campus can also be a result of a
successful campaign (Brereton, 2006). Clearly, a capital campaign is more than just a
simple event or undertaking.

The future will hold more campaigns with greater amounts of money raised.
Franz (1986) noted, “The number of capital campaigns has increased in recent years, and
goals have reached proportions that only 10 years ago would have seemed astronomical if
not preposterous” (p. 187). Headlines like “UCLA Sets Campaign Record at $3.05
Billion Raised” and “A Fund-Raising Bonanza: 4 Universities Get Gifts of at Least $100-
Million” – both recent articles in the Chronicle of Higher Education – are becoming
commonplace. Higher education campaigns are not going to slow down any time soon.
The propensity of and amount of money raised during capital campaigns have increased
dramatically. Most schools end one campaign, only to begin another. Franz (1986) wrote, "Many institutions consider it proper strategy to undertake a capital campaign program every eight to 10 years because that’s just about how long it takes to finish one campaign and plan the next" (p. 187). The future for campaigns is infinite.

Gap in Literature and Purpose of Study

Author of “The Successful Capital Campaign,” Quigg (1986) suggests that the president has at least seven specific roles in a successful capital campaign.

1. The president is fully aware of the central role of trustees in fundraising. He or she understands the board, knows its strengths and weaknesses, and has the support of his or her chief aides in creating assertive board leadership in fundraising.

2. The president works hard to enunciate the master plan of the institution and to obtain a consensus on mission and goals.

3. The president uses his or her time and appearances wisely; if he or she were to be involved in every fundraising operation and appeared before every group that requested a speaker, there would be no time for the truly important events.

4. The president should meet regularly with senior development staff to assess campaign strategy and analyze strengths and weaknesses.

5. The president must be willing to spend considerable time cultivating prospects for major gifts.

6. The president should insist on continuity in development strategy rather than zigzagging from one approach to another. Successful capital campaigning is
continuous, not episodic; Patient, steady effort is more productive than pushing for the “fast buck.”

7. The president must personify the character and the mission of the institution that he or she leads. Remember: people give to people. Confidence in the chief executive is often the deciding factor in the big gift. . . . People give to institutions whose representatives articulate goals clearly and project solidarity and confidence. How successfully your institution’s president does this can determine the success or failure of your capital campaign (p. 16).

In addition to the aforementioned seven strategies of a president during a capital campaign, Gearhart (1995) suggested a few more: recruiting the volunteer committee for the campaign, attending meetings of the volunteer group, acting as principal spokesperson for the campaign, and participating as a donor (p. 51). Gearhart indicated that the “president has a dramatic impact on the campaign. . . . It is not out of the realm of possibility for a president to devote as much as 60 to 70 percent of his or her time to campaign priorities” (pp. 50-51).

At times, presidents must devote even more time than that to fundraising endeavors. The Chronicle of Higher Education reported that University of Southern California President Steven Sample turned over the reigns of day-to-day operations and academic management to his provost while USC conducted the then-largest-ever capital campaign raising $2.85 billion (Basinger, 2003). President Sample committed his entire waking hours to the campaign. George Washington University’s president, Stephen Trachtenberg, followed suite because he also wanted to focus on the institution’s seven-year capital campaign (Basinger, 2003). Foote (1986) explained, “Being chief executive
officer of a major university fills the day well even without a capital campaign. ... But if the president does not devote sufficient time to the campaign, the likelihood of its success will be slight” (p. 76). Campaigns force everyone to work harder and smarter for high-performance goals (Lawrence, 2006).

Greensboro College in North Carolina raised $48 million during an eight-year capital campaign from 1994 to 2002. Greensboro President Craven Williams reported spending “100 percent of his time on fundraising. ... He differentiates his role from that of a Development VP, explaining that the president’s job is ‘establishing the enthusiasm, the momentum, and the confidence in the program’” (Crawford, 2003, pp. 34-35).

The preceding examples showcase the pressure and effort a college president must expend on a capital campaign. Recently, one southwestern university offered its CEO a supplemental salary to encourage her to stay in office until the conclusion of a capital campaign. As part of the salary proposal, the president of University of Nevada, Las Vegas (UNLV) was awarded a supplemental annual salary from the UNLV Foundation of $90,000 for work on the campaign and an additional incentive payment conditioned upon the successful completion of UNLV’s capital campaign. When asked about the reasoning behind the compensation increase, “Ted Quirk, treasurer of the UNLV Foundation, reported that the university is in a quiet phase of a major capital campaign that will be under the leadership of President Harter. The foundation’s goal is to raise $400-$500 million. Quirk stated that Dr. Harter is the face of the university, and she has been a proven fundraiser at UNLV over the past nine years. One of the keys in a successful capital campaign is to not change presidents mid-stream” (UCCSN Board of
Regents, 2004, p. 1). Quirk was suggesting that a president who leaves office during a campaign might impact an institution's fundraising ability during a campaign.

Surprisingly, while presidential transitions and capital campaigns have been the focus of research, the two areas have never been investigated in sync. Specifically, no studies have been conducted that examine a presidential transition during a capital fundraising campaign. When the president of Johns Hopkins University announced his resignation four months after the university launched a $900 million campaign, the Chronicle of Higher Education reported, "Because of the importance of steady leadership during a capital campaign, no one can say for sure what effect [President] Richardson's leaving will have on the university's attempt to raise nearly $1 billion by the turn of the century" (Mercer, 1995, italics added for emphasis). By August of 2000, Johns Hopkins University did raise more than $1.5 billion to conclude their campaign, so the dollar goal was more than met at 150 percent. But, dollar amounts are just one facet of a campaign. The effect of a presidential departure during a campaign is unknown, especially from the perspective of the chief development officer. How did the Johns Hopkins CDO keep the campaign moving ahead successfully? What strategies, supports, situations and self characteristics impacted this triumphant achievement? Researchers from the Association of Governing Boards (AGB) and the Council for Advancement and Support of Education (CASE) both confirmed that no studies have been conducted that measure the impact of presidential transitions on institutional advancement (P. Wood & A.D. Williams, personal communications, April 26, 2006).
Summary

This literature review examined presidential transitions, presidents as fundraisers, how fundraising presidents differ from chief development officers, and capital campaigns. As shown in the existent research, college presidents devote significant amounts of time and energy to their school’s fundraising activities, especially during capital campaigns. Because institutions of higher education are heavily relying on private dollars, capital campaigns are becoming commonplace. Presidential transitions are also becoming commonplace for colleges and universities.

The overall implications of a “changing of the guard” during a campaign are important to study so colleges and their chief development officers are equipped to deal with such an event. Thus, this study broadly determined the impact of a presidential transition on the institution’s CDO during a capital campaign. It also sought to define the strategies and supports that were in place to ensure successful campaigns notwithstanding the transitions.

Bimbaum (1989) wrote, “Scholars and observers have studied situations in which the acts of an individual president appear to have had a profound effect upon levels of institutional functioning” (p. 132). This study wanted to determine if administration changes in presidential leadership caused “profound effects” upon capital campaigns and those individuals who manage them.

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CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

Research Design

This section of the dissertation explains the qualitative research method used in the study and the rationale for its application. Qualitative methods were employed because they are the best strategy to (1) focus on naturally occurring, complex events; (2) understand the processes that go on in a situation and the perceptions of those in it; and (3) to explore a new area (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Firestone, 1993). For that multitude of reasons, a qualitative, descriptive methodology was appropriate for this study where the goal of the research was to address the contextual nature of presidential transitions during capital campaigns from the perspective of the chief development officer.

The ideal way to approach this topic was through a multiple-site qualitative case study. Multi-site case studies are used to understand a complex issue, its conditions and relationships (Yin, 2003). Yin defines the case study research method as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context. Case studies are in-depth, non-experimental investigations. The next chapter will present the case studies – nine in total, each one representing a college campus where a presidential transition took place during a capital campaign – and the fifth chapter will compare and contrast those studies.
Creswell (1998) suggested that the rationale for a case study "follows from a documented need in the literature for increased understanding and dialogue about an issue" (p. 94). As shown in the literature review, a gap exists in the research on presidential transitions and the impact of those transitions on capital campaigns. Because of this disconnect, this study analyzed how individuals leading development offices recently dealt with a change in leadership on their campus during a campaign. In this sense, the study met the rationale depicted by Creswell (1998): "For a case study, the researcher should focus on an event, process or program for which we have no in-depth perspective on this 'case.' Conducting the case study provides a picture to help inform our practice" (p. 95). The issue of transitions during campaigns will continue to occur with greater frequency in the future, so the need for a timely investigation was present.

In this study, a multi-case study strategy focused on the chief development officer at nine colleges where presidents left office during major fundraising campaigns. The logic for the multiple-case study strategy, versus a single site, was due to the comparative nature of this research. Each situation was unique, and by providing several descriptive cases, a broad perspective was ascertained. A cross-case analysis was employed to identify best practices and provide a gateway for discussion and future scholarship on the issue.

Merriam (1998) stated, "A case study might be selected for its very uniqueness, for what it can reveal about a phenomenon, knowledge we would not otherwise have access to" (p. 33). Merriam (1998), Patton (1990), and Yin (2003) regarded the case study approach as particularly useful to understand a complex, social phenomenon. Presidential transitions during fundraising campaigns fit this description.
Data Collection

Stake (2006) observed, “The details of life that the researcher is unable to see for him or herself are found by interviewing people who did see it or by finding documents recording it” (p.29). Both of these methods of data collection, interviews and document analysis, were employed in this study. These two forms of data collection helped describe the setting where the presidential transition took place and sought to understand the setting held by the development officer who worked to maintain continuity during the transition.

Documents were obtained by request from the CDO’s who were interviewed and by utilizing institutional website archives. An examination of foundation annual reports, meeting minutes, correspondence, speeches, media clips, press releases, campaign materials, newspaper and magazine articles, and the like were necessary to explain the background of the campaigns, the transitions, and to determine timelines and records of activities. Therefore, document review and analysis were used. However, the primary data source for this study was electronic mail (email) interviews: “Interviews...are used as key methods for recording people’s experiences, perceptions, and attitudes in qualitative inquiry” (Bianco & Carr-Chellman, 2002, p. 254). Interviews are used in almost all forms of qualitative research (Merriam, 2002). This is true regardless of the interview format: face-to-face, phone, or internet. Details about email interviews follow.

The three main types of computer-mediated qualitative research methods are online synchronous interviews (e.g., online chat rooms or instant messaging), online asynchronous interviews (e.g. email interviews), and virtual focus groups. The researcher employed the second method, online asynchronous interviews, to conduct this study. In-
depth interviews conducted this way are typically semi-structured in nature and are conducted over multiple email messages (Persichitte, Young & Tharp, 1997; Meho, 2006). Email interviews differ from email surveys, which are typically quantitative and elicit only one interaction between the researcher and respondent. Quantitative surveys via email are typically used in market research. Face-to-face (FTF) interviewing typically also occurs over one interaction, whereas email interviewing is extended over a period of time through numerous messages (Murray & Sixsmith, 1998).

Ducheneaut and Bellotti (2001) proposed that email is now more a habit than an application. Their studies indicated that many people use email throughout the day; email inboxes are “on” the entire time while people are at their work stations, and it is readily accessible. Additionally, email is now the major means of non-FTF communication and the main means of document exchange, outpacing the fax machine (Ducheneaut & Bellotti, 2001). In a recent study of email usage at an office equipment company conducted by Jackson, Dawson, & Wilson (2003), employees attended to 70 percent of their email messages within six seconds of the arrival of the messages. Another study observed that roughly 80 percent of all email users typically acted on a message within the first 24 to 48 hours of its reception (Santicola, 2006). In particular, managers and executives found email to be the communication medium of choice (Markus, 1994; Lehu, 2004).

Markus (1994) interviewed 375 managers within a risk-management company, and determined that email was the preferred communication method for top-level employees. Markus wrote, “By contrast, the telephone was widely described as a great ‘waste of time’ and, where work-related communication was concerned, managers
generally preferred email” (p. 520). The author listed the following reasons for managers’
email preference: desire for convenience, desire for closure of an issue, and accessibility
of a recipient. Whereas email messages can be sent and received 24 hours a day, intended
recipients of management communications were rarely available for phone or face-to-
face conversations. In one interview with a company executive, Markus elicited the
following comment, “People are attached to email and their terminals. It’s as much a part
of our lives here as eating and our families” (p. 522).

Among development professionals, email is rapidly becoming a popular way to
raise funds. The Council for Advancement and Support of Education (CASE) conducted
a survey of college development professionals about email solicitation in 2005. Fifty
percent of respondents used email for fundraising appeals. Of those not using email for
that purpose, 45 percent said they planned to start doing so, the majority within the next
year (Weiner, 2006). Many non-profit organizations are taking advantage of internet
fundraising: “Oxfam America collected $13 million for tsunami victims…[which
amounted to] more than 65 percent of their total fundraising efforts. Save the Children
raised nearly $10 million the same way…. The internet revolution has finally reached the
non-profits” (Metz, 2005, p. 1).

The prevalence of email usage, especially among executives and fundraisers – the
subjects of this study –made it a clear choice for data collection in a study of presidential
transitions during capital campaigns. Further advantages of using email interviews, such
as cost, rapid responses, opportunities for clarification, and accessibility, are delineated
below.
Internet-based surveys and interviews offer efficiencies not afforded by face-to-face or phone interviews. For example, questions sent via email cost nothing, other than the cost of establishing and maintaining internet service, whereas mail, fax, and face-to-face questioning take considerable labor and financial resources (Weible & Wallace, 1998; Cobanoglu, Warde & Moreo, 2001; Schaefer & Dillman, 1998; Taylor, 2000; Dillman, 2000; Bianco & Carr-Chellman, 2002; Bandilla, 2002; Persichitte, Young, & Tharp, 1997).

Web-based surveys and interviews also have a fast response/turn-around time (Schaefer & Dillman, 1998; Weible & Wallace, 1998; Selwyn & Robson, 1998; Dommeyer & Moriarty, 2000; Tuten, Urban & Bosnjak, 2002). Cobanoglu, Warde & Moreo (2001) found an average of 5.97 days for college educators to respond to a web survey versus 16.46 days for the same group to respond to a mailed survey. The majority of email surveys are returned within 24 hours of initial contact (Taylor, 2000; Dillman, 2000), and the response rate is generally higher than mailed surveys, too (Cobanoglu, Warde & Moreo, 2001).

Of key importance, online communication overcomes the barriers of time zones and geography (Crichton & Kinash, 2003; Dillman, 2000; Selwyn & Robson, 1998; Beck, 2005; Persichitte, Young & Tharp, 1997; Bampton & Cowton, 2002). In general, Bowker & Tuffin (2004) report, “the online medium facilitates a user-friendly research setting. Participants are afforded much flexibility because they can engage in the research at their own pace, time and location. This contrasts with the intrusiveness of face-to-face methods” (p. 230). Another advantage is the accessibility to difficult-to-reach, specific populations. Access may increase for socially marginalized groups, those abroad,
disabled, or housebound (Taylor, 2000; Mann & Stewart, 2002; Bianco & Carr-Chellman, 2002; Beck, 2005; Murray & Sixsmith, 1998).

Furthermore, interviewer barriers and biases that can surface in face-to-face interviews, such as race, gender, age, and sexuality, do not appear in email (Selwyn & Robson, 1998; Meho, 2006; Young, Persichitte & Tharp, 1998). Boshier (1990) argued, “Email appears to provide a context for the kind of non-coercive and anti-hierarchical dialogue… constituting an ‘ideal speech situation,’ free of internal or external coercion, characterized by equality of opportunity and reciprocity in roles assumed by participants” (p. 51). Additionally, the researcher can interview more than one participant at a time because a list of questions can be sent to multiple participants simultaneously (Meho, 2006).

Research also indicated that open-ended questions in quantitative online surveys resulted in richer, more detailed replies than in mailed surveys (Dommeyer & Moriarty, 2000; Taylor, 2000; Schaefer & Dillman, 1998; Shields, 2003). One reason for increased disclosure may be due to the informality and anonymity afforded by online communication (Bowker & Tuffin, 2004; Shields, 2003). Beck (2005) interviewed 40 women via electronic mail on their traumatic birthing experiences. The longest response to one question was 38 typed pages.

Another example stems from Shields (2003) study of high school students’ educational experiences in a diverse school district. More than 650 students were interviewed via face-to-face and online methods. An online response to one question (N=444) about the students’ best teacher had an average of 35 words per respondent; the longest online response was 198 words. In contrast, 217 students replied to the same question.
question via face-to-face interviews with an average of 12 words each, 65 percent fewer words than the online response. The greatest response in FTF interviews for that question was 42 words, 79 percent fewer words than the longest online answer. Shields’s (2003) explanation for the lengthier online responses was due to the internet being a “safe forum in which to express themselves” (p. 406). She also credited high school students’ savvy use of the technology for the increase in online responses.

Lengthy answers may also be due to a lack of time pressure in online responses. Young, Persichitte & Tharp (1998) stated, “Both the researchers and interviewees were able to take the time to be thoughtful and careful in their responses to each other, increasing the depth of understanding for both parties” (p. 295). Multiple opportunities exist to clarify questions and concepts with email interviews, so even if the response is not thorough the first time, prodding can elicit the necessary information. Bampton and Cowton (2002) suggest that “Asynchronicity enables interviewees to reflect and then supply a considered reply. The time to consider their response might reduce the pressure felt by nervous interviewees. … Moreover, an ethical case can be made in some situations for allowing research subjects the opportunity to protect themselves from making injudicious comments” (p. 3).

Lastly, and perhaps most important from a researcher’s perspective, email interviews transcribe the asynchronous conversation automatically, which saves time and resources while increasing accuracy (Selwyn & Robson, 1998; Taylor, 2000; Bowker & Tuffin, 2004; Murray & Sixsmith, 1998). The ability to produce a verbatim account denotes data accountability (Mann & Stewart, 2001; Young, Persichitte, & Tharp, 1998).
The advantages of email interviews are evident: low cost, quick response, no barriers to geography, greater accessibility, lack of interviewer bias, and detailed, descriptive results with automatic transcription. Meho (2006) made 13 recommendations for conducting effective email interviews (p. 16), which are summarized here, and were adhered to in this research project:

1. Invitations: People should be individually solicited to participate in the research, as opposed to a mass email soliciting multiple participants at once.
   - For this project, all participants were contacted via personal letter from a colleague prior to receiving email contact from the researcher.

2. Subject line: An effective subject line, such as “research interview,” should reduce the likelihood of the email being deleted.
   - The subject line for this study was “Dissertation Research Request” for the first contact; subsequent emails had subject lines such as “Research Study Follow-up Questions.”

3. Self-disclosure: Establish trust with the respondents by introducing yourself.
   - The researcher always explained her field of study, dissertation topic, and reason for interest in the project.

4. Interview request: Make your request succinct and professional.
   - The email request was concise and considerate.

5. Be open about the research: Outline details of the project and the amount of time requested for participation.
   - The message contained the following notification: “Participation in my research consists of two email questionnaires that you may complete at...
your convenience. The first one is a brief timeline/demographic form, and
the second one is a longer questionnaire about the supports and strategies
that were successful or unsuccessful. The time commitment will be
approximately two hours, and again, it will be completely through email.”

6. Incentives: Consider providing an incentive for participation, such as a copy of
the results. Also communicate the benefits of participating in the study.

- The participants were given the opportunity to partake in “cutting edge”
  research, as well as the opportunity to review (member check) the section
  on their institution. Copies of the study in its entirety will also be provided
to all participants.

7. Ethics and consent forms: Offer anonymity if requested. Follow standard
procedures for the protection of human subjects.

- The researcher was certified in human subjects research and received
  institutional review board (IRB) approval through the UNLV Office for
  the Protection of Research Subjects.

8. Interview questions: Be clear in the interview questions to avoid
misinterpretations.

- The interview questions were easily understandable, open-ended inquiries.
  None of the questions went unanswered due to the participant not
  understanding the question.

9. Instructions: Include instructions or suggestions for interview completion along
with the initial interview questions.
• The message that included the attachment of interview questions also included the following note: “Please use as much space as needed to elaborate on the answers to my questions. Additionally, if you want to use ALL CAPS or highlighting to emphasize a point, I encourage you to do that as well.”

• When the participant completed the interview, he or she was asked to send it back to the researcher via an email attachment. In one case, the participant sent his completed interview to the researcher via post because he did not save a copy on his computer after completing the interview and printing it.

10. Deadlines and reminders: Indicate the due dates for interview completion, making them reasonable enough that participants have ample time to respond. If sending a reminder, email all important materials again.

• All participants were asked to respond within one month of receiving the emailed interview. The majority of participants completed both the timeline/demographic form and lengthier questionnaire within four weeks of receiving the materials. After a month had elapsed, participants who had not responded then received a second query for the completed interview, along with a second attachment. Four participants were prompted for the completed interview on three occasions.

• In three cases, participants returned the short, timeline/demographic form within a week, but never (after three appeals) completed the lengthier questionnaire.
11. Follow-up questions: Be timely with probes, especially when clarifications are needed.
   - Participants received probing questions within a month after the researcher received their materials; most received probes within days of the response.

12. Participants: Be discriminating when selecting the sample to be interviewed.
   - Page 71 delineates the way participants were selected for inclusion.

13. Survey methodology: Acquainting oneself with email and internet survey literature can be useful in designing email interviews.
   - The researcher spent an excessive amount of time analyzing the literature about conducting online qualitative and quantitative studies. She also presented her findings on qualitative email interviews to the UNLV Graduate and Professional Research forum on March 31, 2007, and to a graduate-level advanced qualitative research methods class on April 26, 2007. Both forums provided the opportunity for feedback and discussion on the topic.

Although it appears progressive, online interviewing is becoming more common. Many researchers are now supplementing traditional research methods with electronic mail interviews and more recently, researchers are identifying email interviews as a primary data source (e.g., Beck's 2005 study) without justifying it as a legitimate methodology. Tierney and Dilley (2002) indicate the two ways to conduct individual interviews are face-to-face and over the telephone. However, the last paragraph of their chapter read:
Educational interviews are undergoing a dramatic transformation today; virtually every aspect of the interview process is now under reformulation. Such rapidly changing times afford researchers unique opportunities for experimentation and risk taking, even while there are forces that might work against them. From experiments such as these, great advances often occur, changing the ways individuals think about particular practices, theories, and designs. Rather than relying upon or superficially reforming past practices that have perhaps become more routine than insightful, interviewers are now facing the challenge of inventing new styles and methods for the new century (p. 466).

Email interviews have been a great opportunity to learn about presidential transitions during capital campaigns. Nine different institutions of higher education from all over the United States were included in this study because the researcher was able to facilitate the interviews via email.

**Background Information**

The researcher visited the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign on April 21, 2006, to meet face-to-face with Dr. Patricia Justice, the Assistant Chancellor for Development. Dr. Justice has held this position for more than 15 years and she was able to provide valuable feedback relative to this study. In the 1990’s, she lead the university through a successful $1 billion capital campaign, and experienced a presidential transition during that campaign. Additionally, in 2007, the university publicly announced another major campaign for $2.25 billion, and a new chancellor – the chief executive of the Champaign campus – was hired in 2005 during the quiet phase of the current campaign.
Therefore, Dr. Justice was quite familiar with leadership transitions during capital campaigns. Her own experience provided constructive insight about how to shape this study:

Looking at President [Stanley O.] Ikenberry, for instance, was at our campus for seventeen years as president, one of the longest tenures in modern history, OK? He left toward the end of the last campaign, and we really didn’t feel it was much of an impact in our ability to hit our campaign goal. Now how much over our goal we might have achieved if he stayed in office, we’ll never know. And we won’t know really which gifts he had an impact on securing. I mean some of them we know, but others could’ve been somebody sitting in an audience of four hundred people listening to him and just saying, yes, I like what he’s saying, wasn’t personally solicited by the president, but the president’s message swayed the donor into making a gift. So those are the intangibles (personal communication, April 21, 2006).

Another fundraising professional proposed the intangible effects of measuring the impact of a presidential transition on a capital campaign. Tammy Hoebecke, the Director of Development Budgets at Michigan State University, wrote, “I think it will be difficult to determine the effects on leadership changes to campaigns because there are so many other variables that can affect philanthropic giving. During our current campaign [goal to raise $1.2 billion by 2007], we’ve had the attacks from September 11, the war in Iraq, a declining economy, and the tsunami which resulted in relief efforts. On the flip side, we had both our men’s and women’s basketball teams participate in the Final Four, so that

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generated free publicity for us. We had all that and we had a presidential transition” (personal communication, June 7, 2005).

Discussions with key development leaders confirmed the intangible, comprehensive effects of the presidential transition on a capital campaign. It would be nearly impossible to rule out extenuating circumstances. For this reason, this study narrowly focused on what effect the presidential transition had on just the chief development officer during the campaign. When I spoke with Vice Chancellor Justice about her personal experiences with the presidential transition, she was able to detail the effect the presidential transition had on her as CDO. For example, four months prior to the new president taking office, Dr. Justice met with each unit on campus for capital campaign planning. However, the campaign plans she facilitated were “put on ice” because of the transition and the new president’s call for a campus-wide strategic plan (personal communication, April 21, 2006).

After numerous discussions, it was determined that a focused approach solely using the lead fundraiser would narrow the study to be more manageable because of all the intangibles surrounding presidential transitions. How chief development officers maintained momentum and adapted to the change in leadership will be the focus of this study.

Identification of Sample

Miles and Huberman (1994) indicated that qualitative researchers thoroughly study small samples of people within their context (p. 27). For this study, purposive, nonrandom sampling was used to determine a group of chief development officers at colleges and universities that met predefined criteria. The criteria were as follows: (1)
The CDO worked at an institution of higher education located in the United States; (2) Institution had completed a capital campaign within the past three years, 2003-2006, or was planning on completing a campaign by the end of 2007; (3) Institution had a change in executive leadership during any stage of the campaign; and, (4) The CDO of the institution had been present during the leadership transition was willing to participate in the study.

Patton (1990) indicated that the benefits of maximum variation sampling were wide-reaching: “For small samples, a great deal of heterogeneity can be a problem because individual cases can be so different from each other. The maximum variation sampling turns that apparent weakness into strength by applying the following logic: Any common patterns that emerge from great variation are of particular interest and value in capturing the core experiences and central, shared aspects or impacts of a program” (p.172).

Based on the above criteria, a maximum variation sample of 27 institutions was identified. The colleges and universities are listed in Appendix A in alphabetical order. These institutions were found through a variety of search methods:

1. A message was posted to ADVANCE-L@hermes.case.org, which is the Council for Advancement in Support of Education’s (CASE) listserv for senior advancement professionals.

2. All consultants listed in the American Council on Education (ACE) “Roundtable of Executive Search Firms” were contacted. Search firms listed in the roundtable regularly seek and place leaders in higher education. Details of the roundtable are found at: http://www.acenet.edu/AM/Template.cfm?Section=ESR.
3. The *Chronicle of Philanthropy* regularly identifies all colleges and universities conducting capital campaigns in the U.S. in a feature called, "Capital Campaign Status." The institutions listed in the August 2005 and August 2006 status reports were cross-referenced against the *Chronicle of Higher Education*’s job postings for chief executives.

4. Each website of the 324 institutions listed in the August 2005 and August 2006 “Capital Campaign Status” directory was visited by the researcher to determine tenure of the president. Any institution that completed its campaign prior to 2003 was automatically dismissed from the search.

5. A Google.com search was performed with the following search terms: “president and capital campaign,” “president resigns capital campaign,” “president resignation capital campaign,” “president dies capital campaign,” “presidential succession capital campaign,” “capital campaign new president,” “president leaves capital campaign,” “president hired capital campaign,” “president departure capital campaign,” and “president departs capital campaign.”

6. Word of mouth, or snowball sampling, was also used to identify colleges and universities that experienced a presidential transition during a campaign. This is a popular technique to gain access to respondents (Goldstein, 2002).

From the original list of 27 institutions that were identified as having had a presidential transition during a capital campaign, nine CDO’s were able and willing to participate. The final sample consisted of a diverse range of institutional types from all over the United States with student populations that ranged in size from 1200 students to more than 44,000.
Interview Protocol

The former CDO at University of Nevada, Las Vegas, Dr. John Gallagher, experienced a presidential transition during a capital campaign in 2006. He is the researcher’s former professor, employment supervisor, and served as a member of this dissertation committee. Dr. Gallagher mailed a personal letter to all potential participants to provide an introduction, establish initial contact and ask for their participation in the study. The researcher followed up to these mailed letters with an email message reintroducing the study and the purpose for conducting the interviews. After establishing initial contact and rapport with the interviewees to gain their trust (Merriam, 1998; Miles & Huberman, 1994), the participants were emailed a timeline to determine the length of the campaign and in what stage the transition occurred during the capital campaign. The majority of the timeline forms were completed and returned to the researcher within one week of initial email contact.

Secondly, a list of open-ended questions was emailed to the participants. The interview questions were originally derived from “The Transition Guide,” a survey instrument developed by Schlossberg, the transition expert whose theory guides the research questions for the study. The instrument was acquired from Schlossberg’s consulting firm, Transition Works (Schlossberg & Kay, 2003). The Transition Guide consisted of 56 questions, which embodied the four S’s: situation, support, self and strategies, as discussed in chapter one. With input from the dissertation committee, 24 questions from the instrument deemed appropriate for this study were rephrased in a structured, open-ended format. Additional probing questions followed the initial interview to clarify or elaborate on issues described in the answers to these questions.
Initial interview questions are found in the Appendix. The questions sought to “better understand the experiences, opinions, and interpretations of characteristics of a phenomenon” (Curasi, 2001, p. 366).

Data Analysis

Yin (2003) recommends having an analytic strategy before collecting data. Yin wrote, “The strategy will help you to treat the evidence fairly, produce compelling analytic conclusions, and rule out alternative interpretations” (p. 111). To reach those ends, Ritchie and Spencer’s (1994) framework was applied to analyze the data. Ritchie and Spencer’s approach “involves a systematic process of sifting, charting and sorting material according to key issues and themes” (p. 177). The five parts to their framework are familiarization, identifying a thematic framework, indexing, charting, and mapping and interpretation. Each part will be subsequently described.

Familiarity is the first step, whereby the researcher immersed herself in the data and started listing themes and broad ideas. In the second step, an index was created of “conceptualizations which encapsulate and represent diversity of experience, attitude, circumstance, etc.” (p. 180). The research questions and theoretical framework guided in the index creation. In the third step, or “indexing,” the framework or index were systematically applied to all the collected data. Ritchie and Spencer (1994) explain this important third step: “Applying an index is not a routine exercise as it involves making numerous judgments as to the meaning and significance of the data. For each passage, the analyst must infer and decide on its meaning, both as it stands and in the context of the interview as a whole” (p. 182).
During the charting or fourth step of data analysis, the data was synthesized into charts to view and compare the data in its entirety. Ritchie and Spencer (1994) wrote, "Data are ‘lifted’ from their original context and rearranged according to the appropriate thematic reference" (p. 182). The topics for each chart were guided by the research questions. Lastly, the fifth step involved mapping and interpreting the data set as a whole. It is at this stage that "the analyst returns to the key objectives and features of qualitative analysis... namely, defining concepts, mapping range and nature of phenomena, creating typologies, finding associations, providing explanations, and developing strategies" (p. 186). These five steps, familiarization, identifying a thematic framework, indexing, charting, and mapping and interpretation, assisted the researcher in reaching analytic conclusions for this study.

Data Verification

Creswell (1998) indicates that there is no standard protocol for qualitative validity, unlike the reliability and validity terms depicted in quantitative research. However, Creswell provides eight verification procedures, and recommends that qualitative researchers engage at least two of them in any given study (p. 203). “Member checks” are cited as the most critical technique for establishing credibility in qualitative research. Member checks provide the participants with copies of the data and conclusions, and ask for feedback to determine the accuracy and credibility of the account (Creswell, 1998, Stake, 1995, Merriam, 2002). Member checks were used in this study. After each case study was written and peer-reviewed for grammatical errors, they were emailed to the
participants to review for accuracy. Feedback was received from the participants and aptly used.

Another popular method for verifying data is through triangulation. Triangulation is the convergence of information from various sources to verify its meaning (Creswell, 1998; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Merriam, 2002). Multiple participants and documents will confirm information. Another verification method is the use of rich, thick description to ensure credibility of the data (Firestone, 1993). Much of the data was presented as direct quotations, which are considered low-inference data. That is, no inferences are made without supporting data taken directly from the respondents. Corroborating documents and additional supporting information and evidence also aided in the rich description of this study.

Lastly, Creswell (1998) calls for an “external audit” of the study, which seeks an external consultant “to examine both the process and the product of the account, assessing their accuracy” (p.203). Miles and Huberman (1994) and Merriam (2001) support this peer-checking technique. The dissertation committee served as the external auditor for this study. These four verification techniques: member checking, triangulation, the use of rich description, and an external audit strengthened the findings.

Pilot Study

Van Teijlingen and Hundley (2001) enumerated more than a dozen reasons for conducting a pilot study, including the feasibility of a full-scale study, identifying logical problems, and training the researcher in many of the research elements. Sandi, the former CDO at Midwestern State University, offered valuable suggestions for all of these
aforementioned areas (names and college identifiers have been removed per the CDO's request). Additionally, she was extremely supportive of a study that identified the effects and strategies of dealing with transitions during campaigns.

Sandi oversaw her campus’s first-ever comprehensive capital campaign, a $96 million, seven-year project. A presidential transition occurred more than half way through the campaign. Sandi retired following the campaign’s completion. She was interviewed via email in July and August 2006. After a brief personal introduction and discussion of the goals of this study, Sandi answered 26 initial questions that were sent as an attachment to an email message. The questions are similar to the ones found in the Appendix, and Sandi’s answers comprised five single-spaced typed pages. Sandi also answered two questions that were emailed after receiving her interview to clarify points and to garner her feedback on the interview. The interview questions proved effective in answering the research questions; therefore, the questions were deemed appropriate and comprehensive in scope and were modified only slightly for the final group of participants.

Although the presidential transition at Sandi’s institution was, in her words, “undesirable because the previous president had been a huge supporter of the campaign and its staff,” the campus surpassed its fundraising goal (personal communication, Aug. 2, 2006). Sandi said that her campaign prospered, despite a presidential transition, because the capital campaign was “well thought out, endorsed by the campus and community of volunteers, and truly reflected the needs and visions of the university. … We were blessed to have strong leadership during the planning and initial phases which carried us through the transition” (personal communication Aug. 2, 2006). Additionally,
Sandi prepared a plethora of information for the new president, including the creation of an orientation manual about the campaign, she held bi-weekly meetings with the campaign chair and president, and she provided weekly briefing documents, individual donor preparations, and in-progress reports. Finally, Sandi had the new president immediately announce a gift to demonstrate to the public his ability to raise funds (personal communication, Aug. 2, 2006).

Overall, the pilot study offered an opportunity to refine interview questions and practice conducting an email interview. The pilot study also continued to emphasize the need for a study that determined the impact of a presidential transition during a capital campaign: “The topic is one that we face more often than we would like to admit” (personal communication from Sandi, August 2, 2006).

Summary and Conclusion

This study explored the nature of chief development/advancement officers when a presidential transition occurred during a capital campaign. It sought to answer how the lead fundraiser was affected by the transition, and what approaches were used to deal with the transition. The research questions sought to define the situation, self, supports, and strategies, per the described theoretical framework. Data were collected via the email interviews explained in this chapter and analyzed in a qualitative, multi-site case study format using Richie and Spencer’s (1994) framework. The case studies and cross-case analysis will follow.
CHAPTER FOUR

CASE STUDIES

This chapter presents the nine case studies, in alphabetical order, where presidential transitions occurred during capital campaigns. Each case study is divided into four parts: an introduction, the circumstances under which the president left office, a description of the chief development officer, and effective and ineffective strategies for handling a presidential transition.

Florida State University
Tallahassee, Florida

Former FSU Foundation President: J. Jeffrey Robison

Florida State University (FSU) is a distinguished public research institution with more than 32,000 undergraduate students pursuing degrees in 16 colleges. The main campus is located in Florida’s capital city of Tallahassee; FSU also offers degree programs in Panama City, Sarasota, and the Republic of Panama. Students can choose from 94 bachelor’s degree programs and nearly 200 graduate and professional degrees. Approximately 7500 students are pursuing advanced degrees. The law and medical schools are nationally-renowned.
Students who attend FSU come from every county in Florida, all 50 states, and over 137 countries. Twenty-five percent are minority and 57 percent are women (http://www.fsu.edu/students/). Most students live on campus in the 17 residence halls. The school is also celebrated for its prestigious athletic program. The FSU football team was the most successful team in college football during the 1990’s, with five attempts at the national championship and two championship wins in 1993 and 1999. Most recently, the men’s track and field team won a national championship in 2006.

Although Florida State has received some criticism for its use of Seminoles as its mascot, the Native American moniker is used with the official authorization of the Seminole Tribe of Florida and the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma. FSU’s “Marching Chiefs” band is the largest college marching band in the country and regularly performs the widely-recognizable FSU Fight Song that begins, “You've got to fight, fight, fight, for FSU. You've got to scalp ‘em Seminoles” (http://seminoles.cstv.com/trads/fsu-trads.html). Students and alumni are proud of their ‘Nole institution of higher education.

It was in this spirit that Florida State decided to embark on a massive $600 million fundraising campaign from 2000-2005. The campaign, called FSU Connect, topped its goal at $637 million when it concluded in December of 2005. The FSU Foundation managed the campaign and poured the funds into its endowment, professorships, undergraduate scholarships, graduate fellowships, and other program support. Although FSU is a public institution, only 65 percent of its budget comes from state appropriations and student tuition and fees. The remaining amount comes from grants and private gifts through the FSU Foundation.
More than 90,000 donors made gifts to the campaign in its five year duration (http://president.fsu.edu/pages/state_of_uni_03.html). One of the largest donations was a $7.5 million real estate bequest given by the FSU’s own President, T. K. Wetherell, who took office at the mid-point of the campaign in 2003. This gift represented the largest personal donation of a sitting college president to a public university in United States’ history.

Circumstances Under Which the FSU President Left Office

Talbot “Sandy” D’Alemberte served as President of Florida State during the first three years of the FSU Connect campaign. He was initially appointed president in 1993 and resigned almost ten years later. Today, he continues to teach in FSU’s law school, where he served as dean from 1984 to 1989. Known for adorning a bow tie and comfortable smile, Former President D’Alemberte was well liked and “after years of great service and some minor health issues, the president resigned – on top. Things were not going to get better, so it was a good time to leave” (Robison, personal communication, Dec. 19, 2006).

Following a national search, Florida State selected three-time alumnus and former football star, Thomas Kent “T. K.” Wetherell, Ph.D, as its leader in 2003. Dr. Wetherell earned his doctoral degree in education administration from FSU in 1974. He served more than 30 years in all four major divisions within higher education, having held positions in academic affairs, student services, business affairs, and college development at various institutions (http://president.fsu.edu/biography/). From 1995 to 2001, Dr. Wetherell was President of Tallahassee Community College.
Dr. Wetherell also served within the Florida legislature from 1980 to 1992, and was Florida State Speaker of the House in 1991 and 1992. His wife, FSU First Lady Virginia Wetherell, was also a state legislator and a former Florida government official. As a former politician, “What [Wetherell] finds today to be his greatest challenge as president of a large, public university is convincing his former colleagues to support the improvements he deems most important and to recognize that Florida’s university system is a vital cog in the state’s economic future. … ‘The money that state legislatures devote to higher education is little,’ Wetherell argues” (quoted in Crosby, 2006, p.1).

Soon after taking office as FSU President in 2003, Dr. Wetherell was diagnosed with prostate cancer, which prevented him from overseeing the day-to-day operations of the campus—and the progressing fundraising campaign—for the first six months of his term. He said, “It’ll knock you back when somebody says the ‘C’ word to you. They just say ‘you’ve got cancer’—it scares the pure livin’ heck out of you” (http://www.fsu.edu/pages/2004/02/02/wetherell_first_year.html). However, after treatment at the Mayo Clinic in Jacksonville, Florida, Wetherell’s cancer went into complete remission, and he enthusiastically began leading FSU.

An article on the FSU website that chronicled his first year as president said, “In his first year, Wetherell would arrive on campus as early as 5:30 on weekday mornings, and seldom return home before 10:30 at night. He admits the demands on his time were tremendous, a reality that won’t change. However, despite what might be considered a grueling schedule, he said his favorite part of the job is simply being on campus, taking part in its life” (http://www.fsu.edu/pages/2004/02/02/wetherell_first_year.html). He has come full circle from FSU student to its top administrator.
In four short years, President Wetherell has been determined to make an impact on the academic and physical landscape of FSU. According to the president’s website, Under Dr. Wetherell’s leadership, Florida State has undertaken the university’s most extensive construction program, adding three new residence halls, a general purpose classroom building, new food services facilities, parking garages, an alumni center, research facilities, massive renovation projects, a Heritage Walk system throughout campus, as well as the construction of a new medical school (http://president.fsu.edu/biography/).

Dr. Wetherell also established the “Pathways to Excellence” program, which strives to ascertain FSU’s place as one of the top graduate and research institutions in the U.S. These priorities, as well as some strife with the athletic department and the legislature, appeared to take precedent over the FSU Connect campaign.

Wetherell’s top fundraiser, J. Jeffrey Robison, said that the “campaign process was supported and calls were made [by Wetherell], but I never sensed his heart was in it – too many distractions: legislature, athletics, and other academic projects. ...I respect the office of the presidency and the never-ending demands on the person. Thus, I respected the person, his decision, and was grateful he got us through to where he did” (personal communication, Dec. 19, 2006).

The FSU Chief Development Officer

J. Jeffrey Robison served as FSU Foundation President, the chief development officer, at Florida State from 1994-2005. During that time, the university’s endowment increased eight-fold from $50 million to $443 million.
He also spearheaded two back-to-back capital campaigns at FSU: Investment in Learning, which ended in 1997 and FSU Connect, which ended in 2005. Robison left FSU in 2005 at the end of the campaign. After more than a decade as the FSU Foundation President, Robison currently works as the Vice President of Development at Case Western University in his hometown of Cleveland, Ohio. Robison had additional experience leading campaigns at Ohio University and University of Florida.

An article that highlighted his service to FSU concluded with, “Robison’s dedication to higher education has spanned 30 years of service to five different universities. He built comprehensive fundraising programs at three of those institutions and directed four campaigns that generated private funding totaling nearly $1.4 billion” (http://unicomm.fsu.edu/state/Issues/2005/09-12-2005.pdf). As Case Western’s chief fundraiser, Robison already experienced a presidential transition at that institution, and currently serves under an interim leader. He was no stranger to this occurrence.

Robison was the FSU Foundation President during the presidential transition between D’Alemberte and Wetherell. He said that the change in leadership “came at an appropriate time in the campaign… it was after the third year in and the leadership gifts were in. It would have been great not to change, and it would have helped the campaign, but there was no crisis” (personal communication, Dec. 19, 2006).

Although no immediate “crisis,” FSU Connect did suffer from two major stressors: “three of the five campaign years were in the worst time of recent U.S. economic history (2000-2003)” and “the new president came in, became ill, and for six months, we didn’t have a day-to-day president” (personal communication, Dec. 19, 2006). In 2004,
Robison was quoted in a campaign newsletter: “After the prolonged downturn in the stock market following the tragic events of September 11, 2001, we have seen a steady increase in charitable giving as the stock market bounces back and donors have gained confidence in their financial situation” (www.foundation.fsu.edu/Files/2004121310400.ConnectSept04.pdf).

Despite the poor economic conditions, the 9/11 tragedy which negatively affected collegiate fundraising, and the new president’s illness, Robison persevered through these difficulties to lead FSU to a successful end to the campaign. Robison said he counted on a “belief in the importance of what you are doing” and “being open to the brutal facts” (personal communication, Dec. 19, 2006). He also credited patience and perseverance to overcoming the hurdle of a presidential transition during a campaign, as well as faith in the development staff.

Strategies for Managing a Presidential Transition at FSU

Overall, Robison indicated that there was “nothing helpful” about the change in FSU’s leadership: “In fact, I’d judge that the change distracted the University and thus some momentum was lost, and some donors wanted to make their gifts to the successor” (personal communication, Dec. 19, 2006). The outgoing president had a big role in the initial campaign plan and in collecting early leadership gifts. D’Alemberte “pre-sold the idea of the campaign through feasibility study dinners and principal gift solicitation. All (100%) of feasibility study interviewees believed in the president and campaign” (personal communication, Dec. 19, 2006).
The outpouring of support for D’Alemberte made the campaign more attractive during difficult economic times. Robison and others on campus were “sad to see the incumbent leave, but supported his decision” (personal communication, Dec. 19, 2006). Interestingly, Robison played no part in the selection of the new FSU president. He suggested a few search committee names, but mostly relied on the Foundation Board to provide input. The board was instrumental in supporting the campaign process and the “foundation staff never wavered” (personal communication, Dec. 19, 2006). Robison also found that help came in the form of the deans on campus. During the leadership transition and the new president’s illness, the college deans were helpful in securing gifts and working as the “faces” of the university while the president was recuperating. No one served as an interim president during this time.

In order to acknowledge the presidential change to FSU’s constituents, Robison said, “We feted the outgoing president and greeted the new president with equal fanfare” (personal communication, Dec. 19, 2006). Robison also provided an explanation of the campaign plan and donor strategies for the new president. These items helped guide the president toward success. In President Wetherell’s first State of the University address in 2003, he recognized the ongoing FSU Connect campaign and asked for continued support of those in the audience: “Our fundraising success and our approach to philanthropy and corporate citizenship depends not only on those who have passed through these gates and then moved on. It also depends on those of us who are right here on campus—those of us on the inside. …I hope you will consider making a gift to the Connect Campaign to help us reach that goal of $600 million” (http://president.fsu.edu/pages/state_of_uni_03.html).
It was exactly two years later when President Wetherell announced the completion of the campaign, with FSU having raised $37 million more than the original goal. The support of a large group of constituents, perseverance on behalf of a veteran chief development officer, and the dedication of staff and volunteers made for a successful end to the campaign. The Seminole spirit resonated with the campus and community to overcome difficult economic times and a challenging presidential transition, consequently achieving campaign goals.

Millikin University
Decatur, Illinois

Vice President for University Development: Peg Smith Luy

Millikin University is a coed, independent four-year institution with approximately 2600 students. Founded more than 100 years ago, Millikin is situated on 75 acres in the central Illinois town of Decatur, a two hour drive north of St. Louis, south of Chicago, and west of Indianapolis. The school bears its founder’s namesake and houses three professional schools and one for liberal arts. Millikin’s mission is “to deliver on the promise of education,” and strives to be recognized as a distinctive midwestern university (www.millikin.edu/about/mission.asp). In order to advance these visions, the campus tackled an ambitious capital campaign during the last decade.

Commitments for the Millikin “Advancing the Vision” campaign totaled $125 million, which exceeded the goal by $5 million. It was the largest capital campaign ever conducted at the institution. On May 19, 2006, Millikin University President Douglas Zemke made the following declaration in the Millikin campaign commemorative booklet:
We’ve just completed the journey of a lifetime at Millikin University. A decade ago, we announced ‘Advancing the Vision: Millikin’s Second Century.’ It was the most ambitious capital campaign in university history. Originally planned as a $75 million campaign, the momentum was so strong that a new goal of $120 million was set five years ago. Today, I am delighted to announce that we have not only met that goal, we have exceeded it by more than $5 million. In 10 years, we have raised more than $125 million in commitments while physically transforming this campus with spectacular new and renovated facilities (Zemke, http://www.millikin.edu/alumni/completeETVbooklet.pdf)

Circumstances Under Which the Millikin Presidents Left Office

Reaching a $125 million goal was all that more impressive for Millikin considering it had four different presidents in office during the ten-year campaign. Curtis McCray held the executive office position when the campaign started in 1995. Three years later, McCray resigned; Thomas Flynn was inaugurated and served until 2002. John Reynolds was acting president from 2002 – 2003, until Doug Zemke took office. Zemke remained Millikin’s chief executive in 2007 at the time of the study.

The presidents each left office under different circumstances. The first one, Curtis McCray, left after a five-year tenure at Millikin to pursue another college presidency at National-Louis University. CDO Peg Luy wrote, “When the first president took a presidency at another institution, people felt surprised even though he had indicated from the beginning of his presidency that he would only be here 5-6 years. It took a while for
folks to get beyond that and realize that the campaign could still be successful” (personal communication, Jan. 10, 2007).

The second president, Thomas Flynn, earned his doctorate from University of Michigan in American Studies and served as a senior fellow in the president’s office at Georgetown before arriving at Millikin. President Flynn resigned from the Millikin presidency under pressure because of financial issues he created at the university and a lack of confidence in his leadership. The Decatur newspaper published a front-page article (Ingram, 2002) that indicated Millikin faculty members voted 102-1 to send a letter to the university’s board of trustees outlining their concerns about Flynn. The concerns included,

- a lack of fiscal planning and processes for creating and implementing realistic budgets;
- the absence of systems for shared, information-based decision making;
- poor judgment in the use and development of human capital;
- failure to communicate accurately and consistently with all members of the community including faculty members, administrators, staff members, students, trustees, and the public;

Certainly this was not desirable front page news for Millikin’s campaign. Luy noted,

The publicity over the resignation of the second president was not helpful and took some extraordinary work on the part of the development staff to overcome. … With the resignation of the second president, the University was left in a difficult financial situation. It took many months to work our way to recovery
from that. The campus community also lost confidence in the Board for not keeping a closer eye on fiduciary issues. However, out of all that came new governance policies for the Board and a renewed relationship with the campus (personal communication, Jan. 10, 2007).

Following the tumultuous presidency of Flynn, John Reynolds served a one-year, inconsequential role as the interim. He now serves as President of Salem International University in Salem, West Virginia. Luy indicated that the most challenging time during the campaign was between the time of Flynn's resignation and the term of the subsequent interim president. Luy noted, “The resignation of the second president in the campaign made a positive change in the climate on campus. Some tough times followed during the interim’s service, but the arrival of our fourth president in the campaign brought restored confidence to the University, which has only grown over the last three years” (personal communication, Jan. 10, 2007).

Doug Zemke, the current executive of Millikin, has long ties to the institution. He graduated in the class of 1966 and also was the parent of a student and a former member of its Board of Trustees. In 2001, he retired as Dean of Millikin’s Tabor School of Business, but was not off campus for long, since he was appointed as president in 2003. President Zemke has been highly regarded by the campus and the community. Luy wrote, “Our current president is a man of deep integrity and caring. He is committed to the University and our mission. He is a joy to work with” (personal communication, Jan. 10, 2007).

President Zemke said that he was “well aware of the $120+ million campaign” during the Millikin presidential interview process (personal communication, March 5, 2007).
2007). He served on the campaign’s steering committee as a volunteer prior to coming out of retirement to serve as president. Additionally, upon taking office, Zemke saw himself as the “leader of the campaign” and “someone who carries the message to the constituencies who can contribute” (personal communication, March 5, 2007).

The Millikin University Chief Development Officer

Amidst four university presidents, one person remained steadfast in the position of Vice President for University Development during the decade-long campaign: Peg Smith Luy. Luy is a 1975 graduate of the institution, and returned to Decatur in 1977 to teach at a local high school. Two years later, she started working at Millikin as the Director of Alumni Relations. Luy said, “I've worked for the University since then with the exception of two years in the early 90s when I was the Executive Director for the foundation at one of our local hospitals and helped them raise the funds to build an intergenerational daycare center. I became vice president in 1995. Millikin is one of my passions! Decatur is a great community” (personal communication, March 30, 2007).

Beyond her commitments to Millikin, Luy is quite active in the community; she is a founding board member of the Community Foundation of Decatur/Macon County and serves on the Macon County Mental Health Board.

Luy believes that Millikin’s capital campaign was ultimately successful because the development staff was constant throughout the ten years: “Donors’ relationships with the University were through that staff ... Their [presidents’] departures didn’t ultimately affect our success because the development staff remained in tact” (personal communication, Jan. 10, 2007).
In all of Luy’s answers to questions about the success of the campaign despite four presidential transitions, Luy always referred to the collective development staff, never singling out herself as the main cause of success. She wrote, “We had always worked hard but we worked even harder with each new transition (we had four, remember) because the ultimate success of the campaign depended on the development team” (personal communication, Jan. 10, 2007). An additional example of Luy’s selfless nature came when asked about what it takes to be resilient during immense change, Luy replied, “an extraordinary staff and volunteers, knowing that the work you are doing is providing an important legacy for generations to come, ... teamwork” (personal communication, Jan. 10, 2007). Luy persistently emphasized the importance of her entire development team as the cause for flourishing during a decade-long campaign despite multiple changes in leadership.

In explaining the importance of her group, Luy said: “We've worked hard to help the entire team understand that the receptionist's reaction to a donor when they arrive at the Alumni and Development Center is as important as those of us who have the privilege of asking donors for their investment in our students” (personal communication, March 30, 2007). Luy said that the team approach is the heart of what they continue to do for Millikin.

Strategies for Managing a Presidential Transition at Millikin

In addition to a devoted and enthusiastic chief development officer and her fundraising team, Luy listed five key points that she detailed as the most effective strategies for dealing with the presidential transitions: “Belief in the mission of the
University. Determination to meet our goals. Belief that donors would support our cause. A vision for the legacy we were creating. Honesty with our constituents” (personal communication, Jan. 10, 2007).

The last point, honesty with constituents, was vital because of the close relationship the donors had with the development staff. Many of Millikin’s constituents had “lots and lots of questions” about the presidential transitions. Others “delayed their giving to see what was going to happen and who the next president would be. However, once again, we saw minimal impact because of the relationships of the development staff with donors” (personal communication from Luy, Jan. 10, 2007).

President Zemke also said that personal communication with donors was the key to the campaign’s success. He attributed overcoming his transition and having a successful campaign to delivering a personal message: “Getting ‘on the road’ with as much face-to-face contacts as could possibly be made and speaking to local groups … talking with key donors to ensure them that the priorities were unchanged and build confidence in the new president” (personal communication, March 5, 2007).

Zemke understood and embraced the importance of the president’s presence at development events and other school engagements and the impact this made on the campaign. In fact, when asked about ineffective strategies, he replied that “letters requesting support versus face-to-face contact” was the worst strategy employed.

In order to educate the new president about the capital campaign, Luy said that the following steps were particularly useful, “numerous meetings, background information, briefings” (personal communication, Jan. 10, 2007). Luy was the primary contact for President Zemke and brought him up to speed on the campaign. She said,
We met as often as necessary to help him feel comfortable and knowledgeable about the campaign, some of which I just did and some of which he requested. Other staff also provided briefings for him when he was going on calls with them. ... It’s our job to make him look good. We did and continue to do whatever’s necessary to make sure that happens. ... His commitment and passion for Millikin...absolutely shines through. His genuineness is absolutely apparent and he is willing to go anywhere and talk to anyone we ask (personal communication, March 30, 2007).

When the campaign wrapped in 2006, President Zemke wrote the following of the Millikin community, “They have given of their time, their talents and their treasures, and they have truly blessed this university” (Zemke, http://www.millikin.edu/alumni/completeETVbooklet.pdf). It was a remarkable feat for a small, Midwestern university to generate $125 million worth of success despite four presidential transitions in a ten year period. The success stemmed from the team-philosophy, Luy’s lengthy tenure with the college and President Zemke’s willingness to perform the development tasks required of him.

Muhlenberg College

Allentown, Pennsylvania

Vice President for Development & Alumni Relations: Tilghman Moyer IV

Muhlenberg College is a private, coeducational, liberal arts college located in the northeast United States. Affiliated with the Lutheran Church, Muhlenberg enrolls just over 2100 undergraduate students and employs 150 full-time faculty. Students pay more
than $40,000 in tuition, fees, room and board to attend Muhlenberg for degrees in humanities, sciences, and social sciences. It is the small setting and strong sense of community that have attracted students to the college since 1848. The admissions website includes the following quote from a student, “I think professors at Muhlenberg really respect their students. They respect our opinions and respect what we have to say in class. I can honestly say that many are much more like friends than ‘professors’” (http://www.muhlenberg.edu/admissions/). Thirty-five percent of applicants are admitted to Muhlenberg, making it a highly selective postsecondary option.

The college is situated in Allentown, Pennsylvania, which was the subject of a popular Billy Joel song from the 1980’s aptly named “Allentown.” Joel’s song describes the townspeople’s resolve in overcoming the manufacturing industry decline of that era. Today, Allentown houses the corporate headquarters of Air Products, Mack Trucks, and Olympus, to name a few. Allentown is conveniently located just 55 miles north of Philadelphia and 90 miles west of New York City. Only five percent of the students at Muhlenberg come from areas outside of the northeast.

The college strives to maintain a good relationship with the city. In 2006, a Muhlenberg communications class wrote and produced “Living Here in Allentown,” a guide to the city’s history, attractions, shopping, and restaurants. It was shared with all prospective freshman, current students, faculty, and staff, and with members of the community. The City of Allentown has already placed an advance order for 200 copies of the second edition (http://www.muhlenberg.edu/committees/stratplanning/update.html). The president also mails a full-color annual report to the college’s neighbors that outlines the impact Muhlenberg is having on the community.
In 1999, Muhlenberg College quietly began a multi-million fundraising campaign to raise funds for building projects, the endowment, and operations. The $70 million campaign called “Pride and Progress” ended in 2006 with more than $71.2 million raised. The Chief Development Officer, Tilghman Moyer, said, “The name of the campaign reflects our pride in what Muhlenberg represents, and the progress we have shown over the last few years and our progress towards the future. The campaign is not about any particular person. It is not about presidents and boards, it is about generations of students and faculty” (http://www.muhlenberg.edu/cultural/magazine/fa02/16.html). The Chairman of the Board of Trustees said, “At Muhlenberg, we compete for the best students and the best faculty. To attract both, we need competitive salaries, substantial student aid plans, outstanding programs, and modern facilities. To accomplish this, we need financial resources. The Pride and Progress capital campaign is our vehicle to attain these goals” (http://www.muhlenberg.edu/cultural/magazine/fa02/17.html)

Right before the campaign was publicly launched in the fall of 2002, the campus was abuzz in discussions over the president’s behavior. President Arthur R. Taylor served as president of Muhlenberg for a decade, from 1992-2002. The last year of his presidency was mired with accusations of sexual harassment and abrasive behavior toward staff (Farrell, 2002). On July 12, 2002, the Board of Trustees voted to end Taylor’s presidency. An interim president was named for the 2002-03 school year, and Peyton Randolph Helm permanently took the seat in July 2003. During this time, the Muhlenberg development office continued to raise funds for the campaign, already having committed nearly four years of time to “Pride and Progress,” as well as having received pledges and gifts totaling half of the $70 million goal.
Circumstances Under Which the Muhlenberg President Left Office

Arthur Taylor came to Muhlenberg as President in 1992 with years of experience in business and higher education. A Phi Beta Kappa graduate of Brown University, he became Dean of Fordham University’s Graduate School of Business in 1985. Prior to that, he served as chief financial officer at the International Paper Company and was president of CBS in the 1970’s. The CBS Chairman asked Taylor to abruptly resign from CBS in 1976, although profits rose considerably during his four-year tenure with the broadcasting company. A *Time Magazine* article from that year reported,

Taylor once remarked that ‘people either like me or they don’t.’ Many did not. Wielding a corporate ax as probably only an outsider could, he consolidated some unprofitable operations, sold off others (including the then-losing New York Yankees), and imposed rigid cost controls, all of which trimmed a case of middle-age corporate spread at CBS and led the company to 17 straight quarters of high profit. But some executives bridled at what they considered Taylor's arrogance, which apparently grew as quickly as the company’s earnings. It is said that Taylor once stormed up to a man using a telephone booth in Washington and shouted at him to get out, announcing, ‘I am president of CBS!’ (Behind the Purge, p. 2).

Many of the details surrounding Arthur Taylor’s termination at Muhlenberg are unknown due to confidentiality agreements, but some people close to the institution reported the cause to be similar to the aggressive behavior shown three decades before. Ludwig Schlecht, the leader of a Muhlenberg faculty committee that monitors personnel issues stated, “The president’s behavior for some time has been the source of great concern within the college and community” (quoted in Farrell, 2002). Additionally, “some faculty
members...said that immediately before Mr. Taylor resigned, the board reviewed a widely circulated anonymous document accusing Mr. Taylor of sexually harassing employees and engaging in other inappropriate behavior” (Farrell, 2002, p. 1).

Although these accusations were appalling, others praised Taylor’s leadership at Muhlenberg, citing his fundraising and expansion efforts as a tremendous asset for the school: “In the fiscal year ending June 30, 2001, the college’s endowment totaled $81 million, compared with $30 million in 1992, when he became president” (Farrell, 2002, p. 1). President Taylor was also credited with a strong focus on students and academic excellence. The Templeton Foundation recognized Taylor as one of 50 college presidents to have outstanding leadership that encouraged student character development. In 2003, Fordham University awarded him an honorary doctorate of humane letters for his accomplished career. However, even those individuals on campus who liked Taylor, and denied any wrongdoing took place, felt like his departure was the best option for Muhlenberg College, given the conditions and negative morale on campus.

Under any circumstances, a presidential transition can be difficult to navigate. A controversial change in leadership during a capital campaign is especially stressful. CDO Tilghman Moyer stated that the presidential transition took place at the “worst possible moment – the transition occurred during the summer proceeding the fall when the campaign was to go public. We were also involved in the first year of a $10,000,000 challenge grant” (personal communication, March 1, 2007). Moyer also said,

The spring prior to his “resignation,” the Board granted the President [Taylor] a five-year contract extension. The alumni magazine that announced his extension was received at about the same time as the termination. For many of the
constituencies (non trustees), the President was seen as the institution. When he
was terminated, it caused many to question the leadership of the institution. Under
the termination agreement, all employees of the College were obliged to follow a
confidentiality agreement. We could not talk about the reasoning behind the
termination. This was very awkward and caused people to be suspect of the
institution (Moyer, personal communication, March 1, 2007).

The interim president appointed after Taylor was James “Jim” Steffy, a retired
vice president of Muhlenberg. He had been affiliated with the college since the mid-
1980’s, and was specifically selected because of his ability to serve as an ally to the
faculty members and staff. The Muhlenberg alumni magazine reported, “Jim is a
professional of great integrity and is dedicated and loyal to Muhlenberg. Over the years,
he has built positive relationships with faculty, staff, students and alumni”
(http://www.muhlenberg.edu/cultural/magazine/fa02/2.html).

Although well-liked, Steffy’s impact on the ongoing capital campaign was minor;
he mostly served in a supportive role (Moyer, personal communication, Aug. 13, 2007).
Steffy was quoted in the Muhlenberg alumni magazine as saying, “The successful
completion of the Pride and Progress campaign will assure that Muhlenberg College
remains competitive with other prestigious liberal arts institutions with whom it vies for
students through student financial aid, facilities and endowment”
(http://www.muhlenberg.edu/cultural/magazine/fa02/17.html).

The campus and community were eager to find a permanent president. Even
Steffy himself seemed to be yearning for the new leader. In Spring 2003, he wrote to
alumni, “The current mood of the Muhlenberg faculty and staff is one of re-examination,
renewal and anticipation of the future. …Change leads to opportunity. We ask for your continued support, your ideas, and your goodwill as we look forward to the arrival of a new president and a bright future” (http://www.muhlenberg.edu/cultural/magazine/sp03/1.html).

A national search firm was charged with “finding the person that best fits the ideals of Muhlenberg College: a person with positive energy who can help us continue our extraordinary upward momentum and who will lead Muhlenberg College into the future” (http://www.muhlenberg.edu/cultural/magazine/sm02/2.html). Peyton Randolph Helm, Ph.D. was the person selected for the job. Dr. Helm earned a bachelor’s degree with honors in anthropology from Yale and a Ph.D. in ancient history from University of Pennsylvania. His experience in higher education spanned more than two decades, nearly all of it working within the field of development, fundraising and college relations. His experience in these areas was definitely an advantage for Muhlenberg in overcoming the Taylor controversy and moving the college and the capital campaign in a positive direction.

Dr. Helm said, “I enjoy campaigns. The president should be totally committed to the campaign’s success and a full partner with the development staff in making it succeed. He is the chief solicitor and closer, but in addition plays an important leadership role in ensuring that the campaign is an expression of a shared vision for the institution’s future and that the campaign objectives are clearly linked to the institution’s strategic priorities” (Helm, personal communication, February 23, 2007). The strategic priorities of the campaign and the campus were of utmost importance to President Helm. Immediately upon taking office, he began working on a new strategic direction for Muhlenberg with a
planning group comprised of administrators, faculty, and students. The name of the plan, "The Talents Entrusted to Our Care," has also become the name of the new capital campaign for the institution.

"Pride and Progress" officially ended in 2006 with more than $71 million accumulated; however this campaign was extended to 2010 with the hope of raising $105 million, an increase of $35 million from the original goal. It was renamed to reflect the vision and goals for the college under President Helm’s guidance. The chief development officer said, "The adapted campaign is planned with much more detail than the first part of the campaign. This increase in planning is a direct result in differences in presidents. Our current president places more emphasis on planning than our previous president" (Moyer, personal communication, March 1, 2007). In August 2006, President Helm released a 32-page report that depicted the progress that had been made to date under his leadership and strategic initiatives.

The Muhlenberg College Chief Development Officer

Amidst the chaos of a controversial presidential transition, the Vice President for Development and Alumni Affairs kept a firm focus on the future. Tilghman Moyer IV is the vice president who oversees fundraising at Muhlenberg College. He has served at the institution for 14 years. Moyer originally started working in fundraising as an undergraduate student for his alma mater, Penn State, in their Telefund Office. From there he climbed the ladder at institutions in the northeast, and centered his livelihood on Muhlenberg.
With his lengthy tenure as part of the president's senior staff, Moyer knew President Taylor well. When asked about his forced resignation, Moyer said, "For the good of the institution, the transition needed to happen. I was quite close to the president, and although it saddened me to see how it happened, I know that it was the right thing for the school" (personal communication, March 1, 2007).

Moyer felt that the following five principles were necessary in overcoming the transition hurdles: commitment to the organization, belief that the change was necessary, confidence in the "new" leadership, confidence in the program you are responsible for, and confidence in your senior staff colleagues. Moyer especially found refuge in his senior staff colleagues: "The senior staff really banded together and supported each other during this time. ... Members of the Board of Trustees also provided a great deal of moral and volunteer support to my operation. ... The Chairman of the Board was removed during the same negotiation [that removed Taylor from office]. ... The transition pulled the existing members of the board together. They realized that they would have to increase their own support, which they did, to demonstrate their own belief in the institution" (personal communication, March 1, 2007). Moyer also searched for colleagues at other colleges who had been through a similar situation to rely on for advice, but was unable to find any with the exact situation.

Instead, Moyer just focused his energy beyond the leadership transition to keep the campaign running smoothly and to encourage his staff to remain attentive to the donors and fundraising goals. Unfortunately, "my staff did not know all the details of the termination and I was unable to tell them. I needed additional energy to keep the staff focused on their jobs" (personal communication, March 1, 2007). Moyer said that,
overall, the inability to discuss the termination with the staff and constituencies was the biggest issue that he was forced to deal with. He continued to work hard and concentrated on meeting fundraising goals.

Strategies for Managing a Presidential Transition at Muhlenberg

The development office felt it necessary to educate Muhlenberg’s constituency about the transition even though specific details could not be revealed: “Once we knew the decision was being made, we were proactive to get our message out ASAP. Although we were not able to outline the details of the termination, we were able to announce an interim president, new board leadership, etc. We also communicated personally with our leadership donors. The biggest strategy was really just to keep moving forward, trying not to skip a beat. It helped to stay focused on the goals” (Moyer, personal communication, March 1, 2007). The development team focused on the positive aspects of the transition rather than the details surrounding Taylor’s resignation.

Moyer also expected President Helm to take an “active and immediate role” in the capital campaign upon taking office (personal communication, March 1, 2007). To educate Dr. Helm about Muhlenberg’s fundraising operations, Moyer took the initiative to meet with the incoming president: “Prior to his arrival on campus, I spent two days with him to begin bringing him up to speed about the development program, including the campaign. I also sent him regular reports and development updates prior to his official arrival” (personal communication, March 1, 2007).

When President Helm began focusing on the strategic vision for the college, he worked with Moyer and the development office to shift the old campaign, Pride and
Progress, into a new one that reflected the new momentum: “The goal and focus of the campaign has been expanded to encompass the new priorities of the strategic plan” (Moyer, personal communication, March 1, 2007).

President Helm recognized that more could be accomplished when the campaign reflected the strategic plan. He wanted to build upon the momentum of Pride and Progress, but also make it his own campaign: “In my case, the campaign I inherited had been successful, but very low profile – no feasibility study, no case statement, no kick-off. So we decided to treat it as the quiet phase of the campaign we are now engaged in” (Helm, personal communication, February 23, 2007). As previously stated, the Talents Entrusted to Our Care campaign seeks to raise $105 million by 2010. It, too, appears to be a low-profile campaign with little or no mention of it on the university’s website.

However, the commitment and confidence shown by Moyer, Helm, and the other senior staff at Muhlenberg College enabled them to overcome a presidential transition with unusual circumstances and roll out a new capital campaign. They are building on the $71 million success they have already had with Pride and Progress. The college is poised for a bright future with a dedicated team of leaders and an impressive strategic plan.

University of Indianapolis
Indianapolis, Indiana

Vice President for Institutional Advancement: Michael Ferin

University of Indianapolis is touted as one of the best-kept secrets of Midwestern post-secondary education. “Ulndy,” as it is commonly known to insiders, has 4300 students pursuing degrees ranging from associates to doctorates. The student to faculty ratio is...
ratio is 12:1, making this private, urban institution appealing to students looking for a smaller residential college within a big-city atmosphere. More than a million people call Indianapolis home. For UIndy students, tuition hovers about $20,000 a year, and 85% of students receive some form of financial assistance (http://www.uindy.edu/aboutuindy/facts.php).

The university has been growing in recent years. The Vice President of Enrollment Services stated, “We believe that our growth in undergraduate students is related to our stepped-up efforts to raise the public’s awareness about the university, as well as increased interest in our strong academic programs which are supported with tremendous applied learning opportunities. What sets us apart is our ability to offer our students a personalized education that emphasizes applied learning and service learning opportunities” (http://www.uindy.edu/news/?p=258&print=I). With growing enrollment, the university may no longer be a well-kept secret. Business and health care majors are featuring the largest enrollment gains.

The university has its roots with the United Methodist Church and was chartered in 1902. Upon establishment, it was known as Indiana Central University (ICU) until a name change in 1986 labeled it the University of Indianapolis. An “ICU” marking is still visible on the side of the campus’s brick library building. Despite the name change, the school has remained committed to its mission of “preparing its graduates for effective, responsible, and articulate membership in the complex societies in which they live and serve, and for excellence and leadership in their personal and professional lives” (http://www.uindy.edu/aboutuindy/mission.php).
A century after its founding, in the year 2002, the Campaign for UlIndy was launched with an original goal of $50 million. Campaign donations primarily benefited the endowment ($20 million), a gerontology center ($15 million), and strategic opportunities ($10 million). The campaign kicked off at a centennial celebration picnic following the 2002 Homecoming Game. The Campaign for UlIndy was the university’s first comprehensive capital campaign, and it was met with great success. After the original $50 million goal was met in 2003, way ahead of schedule, the goal was extended to $65 million. Before long, another goal of $75 million was announced, and the campaign concluded on June 30, 2006, having raised $76 million, more than 150% of its original target.

University of Indianapolis experienced a presidential transition upon completion of the extended $65 million goal. The new president completed the campaign, having raised an additional $11 million, and thanked the community for its support. In a letter posted on the campaign’s website (http://campaign.uindy.edu/), the new President and Campaign Chair said that The Campaign for UlIndy “exceeded all expectations in terms of funds raised and the number of individuals supporting it.” The letter also featured the following impressive figures due to the campaign’s success: more than 60 percent of faculty and staff donated to the campaign, the Board of Trustees gave more than $19 million, one endowed faculty chair was created, 64 new endowed scholarships were created, a building was renovated and expanded, and two centers of excellence were developed.

In the concluding campaign booklet, the new president wrote, “It has been my great privilege to preside over the final months of an extremely successful comprehensive
campaign. ... This ambitious undertaking was launched during the tenure of my predecessor in the president’s office, Dr. Jerry Israel, who retired in 2005. The University is greatly beholden to Jerry...” (Pitts, 2006, p. 3).

Circumstances Under Which the UIndy President Left Office

Dr. Jerry Israel served for seven years (1998-2005) as President of University of Indianapolis. Dr. Israel, a historian, was president of Morningside College in Iowa prior to taking the top post at UIndy. His tenure at UIndy was considered a successful one. He was perceived as a student-oriented leader, often seen helping new freshmen and their parents unload their cars on move-in day during the fall semester. He was credited with launching UIndy’s Center of Excellence for Leadership in Learning (CELL) and the Center for Aging and Community – both financially supported by the campaign. Additionally, Dr. Israel expanded the international focus of UIndy, by creating a “sister” campus in Athens, Greece. According to his Vice President for Institutional Advancement, “He retired at age 65 for personal and health reasons. ... On a scale of 1-100, he left at about 85, meaning that it was a very good time since the original campaign goal was reached ahead of schedule” (Ferin, personal communication, June 25, 2007). UIndy’s constituency understood Dr. Israel’s motivation for retiring. Fortunately, no controversies surrounded the transition period.

The person hired to fill the presidency at UIndy was the first female president in the institution’s history. Dr. Beverley Pitts came to UIndy from Ball State University in Muncie, Indiana, where she was Provost and served a one-year term as interim president. Her doctorate of education was earned at Ball State, though she had been a practicing
journalist and taught journalism classes at the university for many years before taking administrative roles. In March 2005, during her welcoming ceremony remarks at UlIndy, Dr. Pitts said that one of the reasons she accepted the presidency was because “I was impressed with the leadership of the board and administration and strategic planning and the most impressive capital campaign” (http://www.uindy.edu/pitts/speeches/speech_opening.php).

Upon President Pitts arrival on campus, the Campaign for UlIndy had met its original and extended goals, however the advancement team decided to announce the extension of the campaign goal again – this time to $75 million. The transition between Presidents Israel and Pitts was seen as the end of one outstanding era and the beginning of a new one for the campus. Because more than $10 million was committed after President Israel’s retirement, “the campaign was more about the university, not about the presidents or their persona” (Ferin, personal communication, June 25, 2007).

The University of Indianapolis Chief Development Officer

Michael J. “Mike” Ferin is one of the most experienced chief development officers in higher education, with a career spanning nearly four decades in institutional advancement. Thirty-eight of his 39 years in development have been within higher education, and 34 years have been as a vice president. His career has taken him to six different colleges, including his current position as Vice President for Institutional Advancement at University of Indianapolis. In 2005, Ferin was awarded the Independent College Advancement Associates’ Mentor Award, which recognizes an advancement professional with outstanding mentoring skills for younger colleagues.
When he started with UIndy in 1997, the fundraising program was not very efficient in reaching out to the community or its alumni. Ferin has changed that in recent years, especially through the Campaign for UIndy. He has been instrumental in securing large donors and grants for the institution over the past ten years. The largest gift during his tenure was a $15 million grant from the Lilly Endowment, which was received in 2001. This grant, although collected during the private phase of the campaign, was not counted toward the campaign goal, so as Ferin enthusiastically reported, “In essence, we actually raised a total of $91 million!” (personal communication, June 25, 2007). His passion for UIndy and fundraising is apparent.

Ferin said that he doesn’t “believe in long term presidencies” and offered the following advice for other advancement professionals attending to a presidential transition. “Since I have been involved with six presidential transitions during my 39-year career, I’ve learned a few lessons about change. They are:

- A new president needs you more than you need him/her
- Be accepting of new ideas, new ways of doing things (live with ambiguity)
- The president has many bosses (trustees)
- Never undercut the president
- If you disagree with them on an issue, cite your position.
- If you can’t reach a reasonable accommodation on an issue, leave.

The challenge of new leadership has always been sufficiently energizing to me!” (personal communication, June 25, 2007).

Ferin was actively engaged in the selection of UIndy’s new president. He said, “I nominated and recruited one of five cohort screening groups, namely the corporate/
friends group representing the Indianapolis ‘movers and shakers.’ I was heavily involved in the interview phases, too, and my counsel was sought by several trustees who served on the selection committee” (personal communication, June 25, 2007). Once President Pitts was hired, Ferin held several formal briefing sessions with the new leader and worked with her to enhance the campaign stewardship during the final months of the campaign. Ferin indicated, “The new president allowed the campaign to proceed as planned. …President Pitts performed admirably all the tasks requested of her” (personal communication, June 25, 2007).

Strategies for Managing a Presidential Transition at UIndy

One effective strategy for the presidential transition during the campaign was creating a tribute for the outgoing president. A campus press release stated, “Jerry Israel is retiring as president of the University of Indianapolis on July 8, 2005, but he and his wife, Carol, will not soon be forgotten. In recognition of their remarkable careers in education, lifelong commitment to learning and devoted partnership, the university has announced the creation of an annual lecture in their honor” (http://www.uindy.edu/news/?p=133&print=1).

Upon President Israel’s retirement, the Jerry and Carol Israel Endowed Lecture in Public Policy was established. The lectureship was designed to bring distinguished speakers to campus each year. According to Ferin, “It was funded via a $150,000 gift. The neat part of the tribute was that it was based on the wishes of Jerry and Carol. They wanted an opportunity to come back to campus once each year. Jerry was very concerned about his not being too involved after his retirement. We had the inaugural lecture this
past May. 200+ [sic] attended a private dinner and lecture given by Bill Raspberry (columnist); the affair was very successful. Future lectures will be open to the public, but we used the first lecture as part of our campaign stewardship strategy” (personal communication, June 27, 2007).

Involving the new president in the campaign stewardship was also an effective strategy since she was hired during the final year of the campaign. During that time, Dr. Pitts was mainly responsible for learning the constituency during the “celebratory” phase; she was not too involved in solicitation. Her previous fundraising experience was minimal. Therefore, it was found to be most effective to have President Pitts “personally acknowledge major donors and to begin the second cycle of cultivation of them… This was done through personal visits, small dinners, etc., all of which had a highly personal touch” (Ferin, personal communication, June 25, 2007).

In order to educate the constituency about President Pitts’s arrival on campus, Ferin said, “our whole arsenal of communication devices was used (press releases, notice in standard publications, press conferences, personal letters and phone calls, etc.). All were orchestrated via a ‘Role Out Beverley’ plan that was developed immediately after her appointment was determined” (personal communication, June 25, 2007). Since the retirement of Dr. Israel and subsequent appointment of Dr. Pitts were both positive developments for the campus, Ulndy had a lot of noteworthy accomplishments to highlight during the transition and the ensuing campaign. Overall, the presidential transition and the capital campaign were successful endeavors. Vice President Ferin’s highly motivating style and four decades of experience helped the campaign end on a positive note.
In a short time span of three decades, University of North Florida has grown into a comprehensive, urban institution of higher education in Jacksonville. The university (UNF) opened in 1972 with 2,000 students and now features an enrollment of 15,000. Because it offers a variety of majors, is considered quite affordable, and is located just seven miles from the beach, it is easy to see why UNF is attractive to students. In 2007, the Princeton Review named UNF a “Best Southeastern College” based on student surveys. Part of the campus includes a nature and wildlife area that fosters environmental and scientific research as well as scenic trails for hiking, fishing and exercise. With a great combination of education and recreation, UNF is also attractive to faculty, staff, the Jacksonville community, and philanthropists.

“Access to Excellence” was the institution’s first capital campaign, which occurred from 1996-2003. The public launch was held in 1999 with a goal of $65 million. More than $103 million was raised over seven years, which enabled UNF to create 21 endowed faculty positions, increase student scholarships, and build new facilities, including a 63,000 square-foot social science building and an expansion of the library. Specifically because of the campaign, the value of the endowment grew from $18 million to $40 million (http://www.unf.edu/development/news/insideunf/03%20oct/campaign.html).

During the campaign, the College of Business received a $5 million gift from a local automotive CEO; this amount was matched by the State of Florida, making it the
largest gift in UNF's history. Former College of Business Dean, Earle Traynham, stated, "The Access to Excellence campaign has been a tremendous success for the University of North Florida. Far beyond the funds raised, the campaign has created the opportunity for dramatic improvements in the educational opportunities for our students, both current and future students. UNF will be a much stronger educational resource for all of the citizens of northeast Florida because of this campaign" (quoted in O'Bryant, 2003).

Because the University of North Florida is such a young institution, the average age of the alumni is 31 years old. Therefore, UNF targeted wealthy, local businesses and individuals instead of alumni. Those deemed "friends of the university," rather than alumni, gave the majority of the gifts to the campaign. The *Jacksonville Business Journal* reported, "Of the 20 donors who gave $1 million or more during UNF's ...capital campaign, five are companies with no alumni involvement and 14 are individuals with no direct connection to the school. Only one is a UNF alum" (Stuart, 2003, p. 1). Engaging wealthy locals in the campaign proved beneficial since Access to Excellence raised more than 150% of its goal.

In a recent (2007) speech on campus, the Chief Development Officer said, "This community loves UNF. We have a tremendous number of people in Northeast Florida who believe in this institution and are very supportive of what we do" (http://www.unf.edu/development/news/insideunf/2007/Apr07iUNF.pdf).

Circumstances Under Which the UNF President Left Office

During the seven year Access to Excellence campaign, the University of North Florida employed two permanent and two interim presidents. Dr. Adam Herbert, a
political scientist with degrees from University of Southern California and University of Pittsburgh, served as President of UNF from 1989 – 1998. He resigned the post in 1998 to become the Chancellor of the Florida University System. UNF was in the quiet phase of the capital campaign at that point and delayed the campaign kick-off until a permanent replacement was found (Allaire, personal communication, Dec. 28, 2006).

The interim president following Dr. Herbert’s departure was no stranger to college leadership positions. Dr. E. K. Fretwell had more than 20 years experience as a university president, most recently at University of North Carolina at Charlotte, and wrote a monograph titled *The Interim Presidency: Guidelines for University and College Governing Boards* (Fretwell, 1995). This report was based on his interviews with 52 interim presidents. Dr. Fretwell served as UNF’s interim president until Dr. Anne Hopkins was appointed in January 1999.

Dr. Hopkins earned all her degrees in political science from Syracuse, and most recently served as Provost at Miami University in Ohio prior to coming to UNF. In a press release prepared by Miami’s news office, it cited Florida Chancellor Herbert, the former UNF president, as the main force in hiring Dr. Hopkins: “‘Hopkins was selected because of her outstanding qualities as a scholar, a teacher, a concerned citizen and a dynamic leader,’ said Florida Chancellor Adam Herbert, who visited each of the campuses of the four finalists” (http://newsinfo.muohio.edu/news_display.cfm?mu_un_id=252).

The year that Dr. Hopkins took office, UNF publicly announced the capital campaign, having already collected $40 million toward the $65 million goal. When asked about the expectations for Dr. Hopkins in regard to the campaign, UNF’s Chief
Development Officer said, “We expected that she would be committed to this campaign. She really did not have a choice since the campaign was part of the interview process and the expectation was that it would be launched soon after she arrived. ... The campaign brought out the need for all candidates to have fundraising experience and a commitment to getting out and raising private support” (Allaire, personal communication, Dec. 28, 2006).

Three years after President Hopkins assumed the presidency, the campaign was well on its way to reaching its goal, but still more than a year from completion. At the same time, Dr. Hopkins announced in January 2002 that she would be taking at least a two-month leave of absence to repair a congenital heart defect (Luce, 2002). After a successful surgery and recovery, President Hopkins returned to her post in April 2002 and stated, “I am enormously pleased to have returned to work last week as President of the University of North Florida. There is no place in the world that I would rather be” (Luce, p. 1).

However, she cited health concerns when less than two months later, she officially resigned the presidency. The Chief Development Officer said that Dr. Hopkins’s departure was beneficial for the campaign since “she was not in good health and could not devote the time needed” (Allaire, personal communication, Dec. 28, 2006). She took a year-long sabbatical and returned to UNF as a professor of political science in 2003.

In the meantime, UNF Provost A. David Kline became acting president from 2002-2003. Dr. Kline had been with the university as the chief academic officer since 1996. His Ph.D. was earned in philosophy from the University of Wisconsin, and he
previously held administrative positions at SUNY and Iowa State. Since Dr. Kline was already familiar with the campus and its constituency, he engaged his colleagues and the UNF community and worked hard to surpass campaign goals. Additionally, “he was eager to learn and knew how to meet with people and share his vision” (Allaire, personal communication, May 15, 2007).

On June 30, 2003, the Access to Excellence campaign officially concluded while Interim President Kline was in office. The campaign raised $38 million over the original $65 million goal. It was the institution’s first capital campaign and was considered a resounding success, despite having had multiple presidential leaders. The Chief Development Officer said, “My expectations were met and went beyond what I thought we could do. The strength of the campaign was in the volunteers and reputation of UNF. The president is certainly important, but not exclusively” (Allaire, personal communication, Dec. 28, 2006). After the campaign wrapped, the mayor of Jacksonville, John Delaney, was inaugurated as the permanent UNF president. He continued to serve as the university’s leader as this study was being conducted.

The UNF Chief Development Officer

The one person who remained steadfast at UNF was the Vice President for Institutional Advancement, Pierre Allaire, Ph.D. Dr. Allaire’s background is in biology, but he has held full-time positions in development for 22 years, another four years working part-time, and all roles have been within higher education. Access to Excellence was Dr. Allaire’s first campaign as the Chief Development Officer at a college, although he previously served as the Assistant Vice President and Campaign Director at University
of Florida. At Florida, he helped to raise nearly $400 million from 1986 to 1991 during that institution’s first comprehensive capital campaign. Interestingly, a presidential transition took place at the end of that campaign; an interim president served at Florida from 1989-1990, and a permanent president was appointed in 1990 during the final year of the campaign.

In 1995, Allaire joined the development staff at UNF as Vice President. The following year is when the Access to Excellence campaign started in its private/quiet stage. Former President Anne Hopkins praised Dr. Allaire’s commitment to UNF’s fundraising endeavors in a 2002 campus newspaper article: “The success we have made in the Access to Excellence capital campaign would not have been possible without his [Allaire’s] hard work and dedication” (http://www.unf.edu/groups/spinnaker/archives/2002/jun12/news.html).

As Vice President of Institutional Advancement, Dr. Allaire oversaw the departments of development, alumni relations, and public relations. On average, the office of institutional advancement processes about 7,000 gifts a year, about 100-150 weekly (http://www.unf.edu/development/news/insideunf/2007/Apr07iUNF.pdf). Allaire said, “I expend the same amount of energy whether in or out of a campaign” (personal communication, Dec. 28, 2006).

When Dr. Allaire was asked what it takes to be resilient during an immense leadership change, he replied, “You have to keep your focus. I’ve been through a few presidential changes in my career (three to be exact) and have found that a strong campaign plan, coupled with strong volunteers, will weather most transitions. You gotta be smart about how you convey the message of transition and show that you are not
scared of the change because once you do (as the VP), others will pick up on it and lose confidence in you and the campaign” (personal communication, Dec. 28, 2006).

He emphasized the ability to adapt to change, as well as teamwork, in dealing with two permanent presidents and two interims during the campaign. Allaire stated, “We never planned for a president leaving, let alone two leaving. We just adapted which is what you have to do. ... Many people had time and resources invested in this endeavor. We were not ready to give up” (personal communication, Dec. 28, 2006). The people he deemed most helpful in navigating the transitions during the campaign were the interim presidents, the Board of Trustees – who came into existence in 2001 at UNF – and the campaign consultant, who was hired for the campaign’s entirety. The UNF Board of Trustees serves as the governing body for the university and includes many donors, such as the previously mentioned auto executive. It is a separate entity from the Foundation Board, which began in 1971, a year before the university opened (Allaire, personal communication, July 18, 2007). Along with Dr. Allaire and his colleagues, the trustees and board members devoted a lot of time to ensure the success of the Access of Excellence campaign.

Strategies for Managing a Presidential Transition at UNF

Vice President Allaire took an active role in the selection of the new permanent president. He reported, “As a VP, my input was sought as to my impressions of whether the president was able to be effective as a fundraiser. Also, I was asked to set up a general interview session with the top alumni and volunteers to see how the candidates did with public speaking/interaction. Lastly, my role in the process included having dinner with
the candidates and our Foundation board members” (personal communication, Dec. 28, 2006). Several members of the UNF Foundation Board served on the search committee and had opportunities to meet the candidates during the group interview sessions. They also offered input on the candidates’ fundraising abilities (personal communication, July 18, 2007).

Although involved with the selection of UNF’s president, Dr. Allaire had some conflicting views with regards to the second leader: “The first president [Herbert] and I had the same values. The second president [Hopkins] looked at things 180 degrees from the norm. We worked out our differences but it did require adapting to a different style” (personal communication, Dec. 28, 2006).

As the campaign evolved, Dr. Allaire took many steps to educate the ever-changing leaders: “I gave the presidents and interims briefing booklets on the campaign plan, introduced them to the top volunteers and donors, and kept them constantly abreast of progress” (personal communication, Dec. 28, 2006). The Vice President and his advancement team also took the time to educate the campus and community of the transitions and campaign goals through press announcements, radio and TV interviews, alumni publications, and phone calls to key donors and volunteers. Allaire attributed the best strategy for handing the transitions to staying in constant communication with UNF’s constituency. Part of this communication included getting the “presidents and interim presidents to meet people and speak at public functions” as often as possible (personal communication, Dec. 28, 2006).

Allaire mentioned, “Some constituents were nay-sayers, but for the majority, they saw that we could still accomplish our goals set out in the original plan and maybe do
even better” (personal communication, Dec. 28, 2006). Dr. Allaire felt that the presidential transitions did not cost UNF many, if any, constituents and/or dollars: “I guess we might have raised a few more gifts from some prospects who wanted to give to a particular president, but this was minimal” (personal communication, Dec. 28, 2006).

At the time of this study, UNF was already in the quiet phase of another campaign that potentially seeks to raise $150 million from 2006 – 2012. The majority of these funds will go toward the school’s endowment to ensure financial stability for the future. President Delaney wants the endowment to at least equal the operating budget of the university – currently $120 million. According to the Florida Times-Union, “When UNF reaches $100 million endowment, it will be the youngest Florida state university without a medical school to achieve that distinction” (Patton, 2007, p.1).

Although President Delaney appears committed to the university, the question begged to be asked if the ensuing campaign plan included the possibility of a presidential transition. Dr. Allaire responded with a resounding no: “Because, if and when it happens, you just have to deal with the circumstances as we did in the last campaign. … Presidential transitions are not the end of the world if there is a strong case to be made and if the institution has a solid base of support” (personal communication, May 15, 2007). UNF can rely on what it learned during its first experience with presidential transitions during a capital campaign. Despite two presidents and two interims, their overarching recipe for success appeared to be staying focused on the goal, maintaining constant and broadly based communication, and a will to adapt to change.
The year 2006 marked two important milestones for University of Redlands, a private liberal arts and sciences college in Southern California. First, the institution turned 100 years old. It had humble beginnings led by the dynamic vision of Rev. Jasper Newton Field, a Baptist minister, and Baptist parishioner Karl Wells, a banker who donated land for the college’s location. Following a city subscription drive that raised $50,000, the American Baptist site committee chartered the University of Redlands on November 25, 1907. The first student was admitted in September 1909 and Rev. Field served as president (http://myredlandsapps.redlands.edu/Centennial/Past.aspx).

Now, a century later, approximately 4000 students attend Redlands. The majority of students are enrolled within their College of Arts and Sciences, where majors range from psychology to chemistry to studio art. Tuition nears $30,000, and 85% of students receive some form of financial aid. Students from 45 states and 10 different countries attend Redlands. The university is now independent, while maintaining an informal relationship with the American Baptist Church.

Another milestone met in 2006 was the attainment of a $100 million Centennial Campaign goal. A Redlands press release stated (2006), “As the University of Redlands officially kicked off its 100th anniversary, President Stuart Dorsey announced that the Centennial Campaign had reached its initial goal of $100 million. ... "The timing of reaching this goal could not be more perfect," he [Dorsey] said.” (http://www.redlands.edu/x30952.xml).
Privately started in 2001, the Redlands Centennial Campaign sought to raise nine figures for the university, the most significant fundraising event in the history of the school. The campaign was established to increase the university’s endowment, improve facilities, and offer program support. Twenty six donors gave $1 million or more.

The campaign’s public launch was held in October 2004, and just two months later, the president of Redlands resigned. However, he stayed on campus and assumed the new title of “Chancellor” in order to aid with the campaign’s completion. A new president was named in June 2005, and the university exceeded its $100 million goal under the guidance of two leaders the following year.

Circumstances Under Which the Redlands President Left Office

Dr. James “Jim” Appleton served as the president of the University of Redlands for 18 years, from 1987-2005. His years of leadership were considered extremely successful, especially in the area of fundraising. Before coming to Redlands, Dr. Appleton worked as the Vice President for Development at the fundraising powerhouse, University of Southern California. His experience at USC helped him build the development organization at Redlands and launch their ambitious Centennial Campaign.

Dr. Appleton published a journal article on the critical elements of a capital campaign for *New Directions of Higher Education*. In the article, he emphasized the importance of the president’s role in the campaign. Appleton (2002) wrote,

The president must be fully engaged in a project of this magnitude and importance to the campus. The faculty will expect it, and major donor prospects assume it. The professional personnel and faculty deserve this full attention and
leadership. Such a...capital project may be one of the most expensive fund
development project ever mounted on a campus. And because it will make a
significant impact on the educational landscape of the institution for years to
come, the time and attention will be well rewarded (p. 103).

Despite this rhetoric to be “fully engaged” in the campaign, Dr. Appleton resigned the
position of president just two months after the public announcement of the $100 million
campaign at Redlands. The Chief Development Officer, Neil Macready, stated,

We were at 62% of goal for the campaign and it was unclear how this would
affect the rest of the campaign. The outgoing president was widely viewed as the
person who had led all of the fundraising success the university had enjoyed
during his tenure, and we worried that his announcement might have a negative
impact on our alumni and friends’ faith in our ability to continue our success.
Once people heard that he was staying in the community and would be actively
involved in helping the new president succeed, this stressor was eliminated
(personal communication, March 12, 2007).

Although he stepped down from the position of president, Dr. Appleton was
committed to helping the university reach the goals of the Centennial Campaign. He
established the position of Chancellor to primarily serve in a fundraising capacity.
Although staff and the Redlands community were glad to have Appleton’s expertise,
uncertainty surrounded how the position would work with the newly-hired president.

Dr. Stuart Dorsey was hired as the new leader of Redlands in June 2005. Dr.
Dorsey had previously served in administrative roles at University of Evansville in
Indiana, Baker University in Kansas, and the University of West Virginia. An economist,
he also served as the chief economist for the United States Senate Committee on Finance from 1982-1984. Although well-versed in fiduciary issues, Dr. Dorsey did not have much fundraising experience. In this regard, he explained that he was “fortunate, in that the retiring president stayed on as ‘Chancellor,’ specifically to continue to work on the campaign and to mentor me in this role. He and I quickly developed a good working relationship that focused only on fundraising, not institutional policy” (Dorsey, personal communication, Feb. 26, 2007).

The Redlands community was elated to have two leaders dedicated to the success of the campaign, in addition to the advancement staff. In Dr. Dorsey, they found an eager administrator willing to work with the chancellor and development team to learn the advancement side of higher education. One of the president’s cabinet members said, “The new president welcomed the advice and counsel of his predecessor, as well as his lead administrators. He and his wife also embraced the entire community, not merely those who they viewed could be of immediate benefit to their success” (Macready, personal communication, March 12, 2007). He also said, “The new president was not experienced in the advancement arena and needed time to learn the skills necessary to be successful in fundraising. I am happy to report that he has been a quick study and appears to be well on his way towards becoming a very good ‘development’ president” (Macready, personal communication, March 12, 2007).

The development team at Redlands discovered that President Dorsey had to create his own style of fundraising. They found it ineffective to “guide the campaign work of the new president. He had to listen to his advisors and find his own path to becoming a ‘development president.’ When others tried to fit him into the mold of the outgoing
Dr. Jim Appleton served successfully for 18 years at Redlands. It appears that President Dorsey is on his way to creating another lengthy tenure. In his inauguration speech, Dr. Dorsey stated, “We pledge the rest of our working lives in service to the University and its students” ((http://redlandsapps.redlands.edu/inauguration/DorseyAddress.htm). He has already been engaged in long-term planning which will inform the planning for the next major campaign at Redlands.

The Redlands Chief Development Officer

Neil Macready serves as the Vice President of University Relations at Redlands and has been in the fundraising industry since 1985. Before coming to Redlands, he was the director of development for USC’s College of Letters, Arts and Sciences, where he raised gifts for 24 academic departments and 15 research centers. USC is Macready’s alma mater, and he worked with Dr. Appleton there in 1987 when Appleton was Vice President of Development. More than a decade later, “in 1999, Jim [Appleton] recruited me to come to Redlands” (personal communication, May 3, 2007). Prior to becoming Vice President, Macready served as Associate VP. In this role, he served as “lead administrator for the campaign” (personal communication, March 12, 2007). When Dr. Dorsey was hired as Redlands’ new president, Macready said, “I knew that a new president might be interested in bringing in his own chief development officer. I continued to work hard, adapt to change and remain positive” (personal communication,
March 12, 2007). These skills served him well, because instead of being replaced, he
was promoted July 1, 2006, to the vice presidency.

Beyond the campus, Macready serves as the immediate past president of the Boys
and Girls Club of Redlands where he was helping with their capital campaign as well.
When asked about his ability to handle many tasks and be resilient during changes,
Macready said that “flexibility and ability to keep the ego in check were two important
elements” (personal communication, March 12, 2007).

To deal with the presidential transition during the capital campaign, Macready
made the following statement:

Early on in the post-announcement period, and then again when the new president
came on board, I felt it was imperative to maintain a high level of energy. When
the outgoing president announced his upcoming departure, I had to deal with a
staff and constituency who basically knew only one very successful president of
18 years. This led to quite a bit of uncertainty and angst that had to be dealt with.
Similarly, when the new president arrived, there was new uncertainty about staff
roles, as well as questions about whether he would be as successful as his
predecessor. In both cases, my job was somewhat easier due to the position the
outgoing president took regarding his role and commitment to the success of the
new president. … The outgoing president took the time to assure all
constituencies that he was committed to the long term success of the new
president and the university (loyalty to the organization, not the individual)
(personal communication, March 12, 2007).
Macready kept a positive attitude, high level of energy, and keen sense of focus to lead his staff and constituents to a successful end to the Centennial Campaign despite the presidential transition. His keys to success were “open acknowledgement of the transition, staying the course, and not getting sidetracked during a time of potential uncertainty” (personal communication, March 12, 2007). Having focus gave the campaign the necessary forward momentum. The goal was clearly enunciated and everyone worked in sync to achieve it.

Strategies for Managing a Presidential Transition at Redlands

While the Redlands community was disappointed to see Dr. Appleton step down, it offered the opportunity for growth and new perspectives. Macready said,

It is never a good time to lose the leadership of a very successful ‘development’ president. … His statement that he was committed to staying in the city and assisting the university complete the campaign should the new president request him to do so was viewed quite positively by our constituency groups. If [Appleton] would have been leaving to assume another presidency, it would have certainly been the worst possible moment. In our case, while it would have been nice to have him remain in place for the duration of the campaign, institutionally it was the best possible moment for the long-term stability of the university. The new president was able to take office in advance of the centennial and begin the process of strategic planning for our second century (personal communication, March 12, 2007).
The campaign goals were not altered in any way after President Dorsey was hired because of the successful progress of the capital campaign up to the point of transition. Dr. Dorsey was educated about the university and the campaign through a series of meetings and reports. Additionally, “the president was provided with a transition notebook that covered the entire university. There was a section that thoroughly detailed the current status of the campaign, as well as an overview of remaining campaign objectives and the history of development at Redlands” (Macready, personal communication, March 12, 2007).

Macready and the development staff always openly acknowledged the transition with regular reporting to their constituency. Because of the ongoing written and verbal acknowledgments, Macready said, “I am not aware of the loss of any gifts due to the transition. The campaign continued to secure commitments at the same rate following the transition announcement, the presidential search period, and the current phase of the new presidency. In fact, we surpassed our campaign goal ahead of schedule at the 14-month mark of the new presidency” (Macready, personal communication, March 12, 2007). According to the campaign website, “Since the campaign’s inception, the market value of the university’s endowment has nearly doubled; nine endowed academic chairs have been created; and the university completed construction on the state-of-the-art Stauffer Complex for Science, Mathematics and Environmental Studies” (http://redlands.edu/x10883.xml). While the Centennial Campaign has officially concluded, Redlands continued to raise money for “mini-campaigns” at the time of this study, including a $14 million Campaign for the Arts to build a new theater on campus.
Overall, it was Macready’s high energy, coupled with former President Appleton’s desire to complete the campaign as “chancellor” and new President Dorsey’s open-mindedness, which helped secure the Redlands’ Centennial Campaign victory.

University of Wisconsin – Whitewater
Whitewater, Wisconsin

Assistant Chancellor for University Advancement: Jon Enslin

The University of Wisconsin system is one of the largest public systems of higher education in the United States, with 26 campuses that serve more than 160,000 students. One president oversees the Wisconsin system, and chancellors preside at each of the branch locations. The University of Wisconsin at Whitewater (UWW) is one of those satellite campuses. More than 10,000 students attend UWW for degrees in 46 undergraduate majors and 13 master’s degree programs. For 135 years, the campus has been located on 400 acres in rural Whitewater, with nearly as many townspeople as students. Whitewater is in the southern part of the state. The city of Madison is 40 miles away; it is 50 miles to Milwaukee.

UWW is extremely affordable for Wisconsin residents, at less than $6000 per school year for a full-time undergraduate (https://uwwcost.uww.edu/). Consequently the university mainly attracts in-state students. Only four percent of undergraduates come from outside Wisconsin. The average high school grade point average of incoming freshmen is 3.25 on a 4.0 scale (http://www.uww.edu/admissions/IR2.php). Business and education are the most popular majors. A variety of extracurricular activities are offered, such as band, dance, student government, fraternal organizations, and a student
newspaper. UWW is a NCAA Division III school for athletics and boasts the 2005 National Championships in volleyball, baseball, and wheelchair basketball.

In 2000, the campus hired a fundraising firm to study the feasibility of a capital campaign. The following year, UWW embarked on the quiet phase of a $5.5 million campaign to raise funds specifically earmarked for the College of Business and Economics’ new building. The campaign website stated, “Some of our innovative business services are housed in retrofitted dormitories that are in such disrepair they no longer qualify for state maintenance funds. The new building will insure [sic] that business programs continue to produce the most technologically competent graduates for the workforce” (http://www.uww.edu/marketingandmedia/special_reports/beyond_tradition/vision.php).

The public launch of the “Beyond Tradition” campaign took place in 2004. The same year, the Chancellor of UWW announced his resignation to become president of Central Connecticut State University. He stayed on board until June 2005, and in August 2005, a new chancellor took office. The campaign officially ended in October 2006, having collected $240,000 more than the goal of $5.5 million. The actual cost of the business building was $41 million, $35.5 million of which was covered by general purpose revenue. The additional $5.7 million in gift funds offset the remainder of the building’s costs. Construction began in the summer of 2007, and the hall was expected to open in the summer of 2009. It will include 38 high-tech classrooms, a 400-seat auditorium, five computer labs, and four centers of learning (http://www.uww.edu/construction/cobefaq.html).
The building was named after its largest donor, Timothy J. Hyland, who personally contributed $2 million to the project. Hyland is a 1982 UWW alumnus and currently owns Hyland Real Estate Investment Group in Arizona. Chancellor Martha Saunders said (2006), “Tim and Natalie Hyland have made an extremely generous gift to UW-Whitewater’s College of Business and Economics. Hyland Hall will be the signature building of our campus, and I am so pleased that it recognizes an alumnus who has accomplished so much and who remains connected to our campus” (http://www.uww.edu/spotlight/hyland_hall.html).

Circumstances Under Which the UW-Whitewater President Left Office

John W. “Jack” Miller served as Chancellor of UWW from 1999-2005. During his tenure, he oversaw a variety of initiatives, including a new fieldhouse on campus and secured many of the leadership gifts for “Beyond Tradition.” He earned his doctorate in education from Purdue in 1975 and served as the Dean of the College of Education at Florida State University prior to coming to Whitewater. His annual study of “America's Most Literate Cities” has been noted in 100 daily newspapers and on National Public Radio (http://www.ccsu.edu/President/JWMBio.htm).

While Dr. Miller did not leave on bad terms with the university, he was involved with a controversial speaker who visited campus right before his departure. Ward Churchill was invited to campus to speak on “Racism against the American Indian.” Chancellor Miller supported the speaker, while many students, faculty, and alumni did not. The chancellor received hundreds of emails expressing displeasure with the university’s decision to allow the speaker on campus. Churchill, a professor at the
University of Colorado-Boulder, came under fire for an essay he wrote that accused U.S. foreign policies for provoking the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In the essay, he also referred to those individuals working in the World Trade Center as “technocrats” and “little Eichmanns.” An expanded version of the essay is available in book form (Churchill, 2003). Chancellor Miller felt that Churchill deserved the opportunity to explain his stance: “I do not share the fear of words that is apparently becoming prevalent in our society, Miller said” (quoted in Debilzen, 2005, p.1). A Churchill appearance at Hamilton College in New York scheduled for 2005 was cancelled after public furor.

The night of the Churchill speaking engagement at Whitewater, more than 200 people protested the event, including local politicians and a Native American group. Churchill claimed to have Native American ancestry; this fact was disputed by the American Indian Movement (http://www.aimovement.org/moipr/churchill05.html). The event also attracted more than 100 media reporters, some from the national level. Republicans held a rally and prayer vigil to commemorate those lost on September 11, 2001. Others held a rally to promote free speech on public university campuses (Delcorps, 2005).

Ward Churchill’s speech had a negative effect on fundraising and the “Beyond Tradition” campaign. Some alumni said that they were not going to give to the Whitewater Foundation any longer (Stitt, 2005). Cherise Means, one of the phonathon managers at UWW said (2005), “It is very damaging to the university right now, but hopefully in the long run it will not have a great impact” (quoted in Stitt, p.1). The Assistant Chancellor for Development, Jon Enslin, said that the speaker “turned off a number of our donors – many of whom were considering proposals to support the
campaign. Since our former Chancellor supported the speaker, it turned a number of people off on him as an individual and a leader” (personal communication, Jan. 19, 2007).

Following the tumult, the campus was eager for a new leader to take the chancellor’s seat. A few months following the Churchill speech, Chancellor Jack Miller left for Central Connecticut State, and Dr. Martha Saunders became Whitewater’s leader. Dr. Saunders was the first-ever woman to hold the position. Chancellor Saunders earned her Ph.D. in communication theory from Florida State. She previously served as vice president for academic affairs at Columbus State University in Georgia, where she was on the leadership team of a successful $100 million capital campaign.

Her campaign experience was an asset to Whitewater. Enslin said, “She has a very high regard for the need for fundraising at a public institution of higher education. She understands the need for a constant, high quality message. She is of the highest integrity” (personal communication, Jan. 19, 2007). Enslin also praised her talent in getting along with others: “I think amongst some of our major donors, even those who had already made commitments [to Beyond Tradition], they felt more comfortable with our new Chancellor. She has an ‘easier’ personality to deal with. ... It was refreshing to work with a new Chancellor, especially one who did not want to ‘rock the boat’” (personal communication, Jan. 19, 2007).

Since taking office in 2005, Chancellor Saunders worked to bring the UWW campus together through a strategic planning process. She also completed the “Beyond Tradition” campaign, and oversaw the plans for new building projects on campus (http://www.ihl.state.ms.us/martha_saunders.html). In a shocking turn of events for the UWW campus, Dr. Saunders announced her resignation in 2007, only two years after
taking office. She was offered the opportunity to serve as president of the University of Southern Mississippi, her undergraduate alma mater, and started work at Southern Miss in the summer of 2007. A native Mississippian, Dr. Saunders jumped at the opportunity to return "home." Although the Whitewater campus was surprised with her departure, it was easy for people to see why she made the choice, given that it was her alma mater and hometown (Enslin, personal communication, June 11, 2007).

The UW-Whitewater Chief Development Officer

Jonathan Enslin oversees the Advancement Division at UWW, which includes Alumni Affairs, the Foundation, News and Publications, Photographics and Printing Services. As Assistant Chancellor for Development, he is the lead fundraiser for the university as well. According to a 2004 press release, "Enslin has been with UW-Whitewater since 1996, when he began as director of development and associate executive director of the Foundation. Prior to joining UW-Whitewater, Enslin was associate director of development and director of corporate and foundation relations for Indiana State University in Terre Haute. Enslin also held advancement posts at Mount Mary College and Cardinal Stritch College, both in Milwaukee" (http://www.uww.edu/marketingandmedia/news_releases/2004_12_john_enslin.html).

Enslin is a native of Wisconsin, and earned his bachelor’s degree from Marquette University in Milwaukee and an MBA from UWW. In order to tackle the campaign during the leadership transition and Churchill controversy, Enslin credited, "the conviction in your own abilities and that the institution is larger than any one person" (personal communication, Jan. 19, 2007). Enslin’s unassuming persona belies a fervor for
fundraising and UW-Whitewater. In 2004, then-Chancellor Miller said, “Jon [Enslin] has earned a broad base of support across the university. We have successes to build on but also challenges in taking advancement efforts to a new level, and I am confident Jon will rise to the occasion” (http://www.uww.edu/marketingandmedia/news_releases/2004_12_john_enslin.html).

In the search for the new chancellor, Enslin helped to recruit external members for the search committee, and he assisted in the interviews of all the candidates. As the Assistant Chancellor for University Advancement, he was looking for someone “to continue supporting the messages and themes of the campaign, to meet with the major donors who had already committed to ‘reassure’ them, and to help with additional solicitations” (personal communication, Jan. 19, 2007). Fortunately, he found a willing partner in the new chancellor: “Chancellor Saunders was willing to meet with everyone, and to almost every person, she had better relationships with them than the previous chancellor” (personal communication, Jan. 19, 2007). Constituents also received personal phone calls, emails, and letters about the presidential transition. Although many constituents initially met the change with skepticism, they felt it was a positive transformation for the campus.

Strategies for Managing a Presidential Transition at UWW

Because the leadership transition took place late in the campaign, about 18 months before its conclusion, it did not significantly impact the campaign. Enslin said, “The campaign planning and themes had already taken place. The major gifts had already been committed. The relationships that utilized [Miller] the most had already been
capitalized on. When the new chancellor came in, we were working on smaller gifts to wrap up the campaign” (personal communication, Jan. 19, 2007). Therefore, the transition took place at the best possible moment for the campaign.

After Chancellor Miller announced that he was leaving UWW, “I expected him to help wrap up some of the gifts that he had been working on. Unfortunately, due to the controversial speaker, he did not get much of a chance to do that” (personal communication, Jan. 19, 2007). However, when Enslin and the development team realized that Chancellor Saunders was going to be such an asset to the campaign and fundraising endeavors, they tried to get “as much ‘face time’ between the donors and the new chancellor as possible. Almost everyone who has met her has come away thinking positive about the change. Her assurance about the campaign’s importance and her continuous thanking for their support was reassuring to our donors” (personal communication, Jan. 19, 2007). Chancellor Saunders put donors at ease and made constituents feel like the change in leadership was a constructive development for UWW.

In order to bring the new chancellor up to speed on the campaign, Enslin provided campaign materials for her to review. He also “gave her a list of the major donors and those still considering proposals” (personal communication, Jan. 19, 2007). The two worked together to establish goals for a completion date and groundbreaking for the new business building. Construction began on Hyland Hall in the summer of 2007, the same time that Chancellor Saunders left UWW for Southern Mississippi. However, it was her charisma and influence that helped wrap up the campaign beyond the original goal.

Since most universities end one campaign, only to begin a new one, Chancellor Saunders’ departure may impact the next major fundraising effort in Whitewater. Enslin
reported, "We are already in the planning/silent phases of our next campaign. In fact, Chancellor Saunders announced she was leaving right in the middle of the feasibility study interviews. It will delay it a bit, but most of our alums didn't seem to skip a beat" (personal communication, June 12, 2007). Although Dr. Saunders will not be leading UWW in its next capital campaign, the university can build on its experiences from the Beyond Tradition campaign with Assistant Chancellor Enslin and a committed constituency.

Villanova University
Villanova, Pennsylvania
Associate Vice President for Development: Mary McRae

Founded in the mid-1800's by Augustine priests, Villanova is a private, Catholic school located 12 miles west of Philadelphia. The university consists of four colleges: Liberal Arts, Business, Engineering, and Nursing, as well as a School of Law. Approximately 10,000 students attend Villanova for degrees in these areas. All incoming students ranked in the top third of their graduating class, making Villanova a highly selective institution. Twenty-three percent of freshmen in 2006 had an alumni affiliation to the university. Additionally, students who start at Villanova are likely to continue at the school for their entire college career: "Our freshman-to-sophomore retention rate this year was 95%, a good indication that our students feel comfortable and supported here" (http://www.villanova.edu/homepage/president/speeches/stateofuniv.htm).

While academics rank high for all Villanova students, extracurricular activities are a big part of campus life at 'Nova, too. More than three-quarters of students
participate in community service activities as well as 150 student organizations. Sports are also central to campus life at Villanova. A state-of-the-art fitness center is expected to open in 2008. The NCAA Division I men’s basketball team won the national championship in 1985 and regularly competes in the March Madness tournaments. Furthermore, the women’s soccer team earned a bid to the NCAA tournament five times in the past six years.

The motto of Villanova University is “Veritas, Unitas, Caritas,” which translates as truth, unity, and charity. These virtues are evident in all of the university’s endeavors. One such endeavor was the launch of the $300 million “Transforming Minds and Hearts: The Campaign for Villanova.” The original goals of the campaign were to raise money for endowments to support faculty, athletics, students, facilities and programs. During the three-year quiet phase of the campaign, which started in 2001, more than $100 million was raised.

The public launch was held in 2004 at a lavish gala in New York City’s Metropolitan Museum of Art. That night, more than $25 million in new commitments were announced. It ignited the most successful year of fundraising in Villanova’s history. The campaign vice chairman, alumnus James Curvey, made the following comment in Villanova’s alumni magazine (2006), “The success of the campaign, not only this year but overall, can be attributed to a few factors. It has been well planned and our volunteers have put in a lot of hours… It is also because of the involvement of Father Dobbin [President of Villanova], who said from the start that the campaign was important and that he would do whatever it took to make it a success” (http://www.villanova.edu/advance/assets/documents/cpa/magazine/winter_2006.pdf).
However, about the same time that this alumni magazine was published, Father Dobbin announced his retirement from the presidency of Villanova with the intent on returning to the classroom in the Department of Theology and Religious Studies. He was on sabbatical in 2007 and did not continue work on the campaign. A new president was named in January 2006, and began working in June of the same year. At the end of the fiscal year on May 31, 2007, Villanova had secured $263.5 million in gifts toward its goal of $300 million. The final campaign gala was scheduled for December 7, 2007.

Circumstances Under Which the Villanova President Left Office

A 1958 alumnus of Villanova, Rev. Edmund J. Dobbin earned his Doctor of Sacred Theology from University of Louvain in Belgium and was selected for the top position at Villanova in 1988. At age 71, after leading Villanova for the longest presidential service in the university’s history, he resigned (http://www.villanova.edu/homepage/president/past_presidents.htm).

During Father Dobbin’s 18 years of leadership from 1988 to 2006, Villanova attained notable achievements, including new buildings and renovations, endowment growth, expanded international programs, and new degree programs. *U.S. News and World Report* ranked Villanova as the number one regional university in the North for 15 years of his presidency. “Transforming Minds and Hearts” also started when Fr. Dobbin was in office, and he had an extensive role in the capital campaign until his retirement. He headed an internal task force and oversaw the campaign planning committee.

In the Villanova alumni magazine, Father Dobbin said, “It is in light of how much has been accomplished at Villanova that I have chosen this opportunity to announce my
desire and intention to step down. We have successfully reached many of the goals outlined in our initial strategic plan. Now, as the University embarks upon an even more aggressive plan that will guide the institution over the next decade, it is time for the next era of leadership” (quoted in Kovolski, p. 2).

In June 2006, Rev. Peter Donohue, Ph.D., was chosen as that next era of leadership. Father Donohue was also a Villanova alumnus; he earned his bachelor’s degree in communication and theater from Villanova in 1975. Four years later, he was ordained as a Catholic priest. In 1992, he received his Ph.D. in theater from the University of Illinois. He then embarked on a professoriate career at Villanova, teaching theater classes, directing musicals and serving as chair of the Villanova theater department until he was tapped as the next president of the university in 2006 (http://www.villanova.edu/homepage/president/bio.htm).

The Associate Vice President for Development who oversees the management of the campaign at Villanova said, “The former president was very highly regarded – some wish he would have stayed until the campaign’s conclusion. At the same time, [there was a] very positive reception of the new president. ... The new president immediately embraced the community” (McRae, personal communication, Feb. 1, 2007). Fr. Donohue did not have previous fundraising experience, but his vivacity and theater background have made him appealing to many donors.

Fr. Donohue’s Assistant for Events, Christine Quisenberry, relayed the following information about the new president’s appeal: “Father Peter [Donohue] is a people person... everyone loves him. He has lived on campus for a long time now, so many students know him, from class, from Masses, from living in the residence hall with
him. He gets to know the students, is energized by the students, and loves interacting with people, and he has a great sense of humor to boot” (personal communication, June 15, 2007).

While the new Villanova president has been well-received, the campaign has undergone some adjustments as a result of the change in leadership. The Associate Vice President said, “We underestimated the impact a presidential transition would have on a campaign. Our new president has a very clear set of priorities that were not part of the current campaign’s case statement. Prospects were in a holding pattern waiting to participate in the campaign designed by the new president” (McRae, personal communication, Feb. 1, 2007). Not surprising for a thespian, Fr. Donohue’s number one priority was a Performing Arts Center on Villanova’s campus. This was not a high priority for the previous president. Shifting strategies has been a challenge for the development office at the mid-point of the capital campaign: “Financial support was impacted because many [constituents] wanted to invest in the new priorities/vision” (McRae, personal communication, Feb. 1, 2007). Donors are no longer interested in the “old” message of the campaign when the new president had a different vision for Villanova.

A major gala was planned for the campaign celebration on December 7, 2007, at the Waldorf Astoria in New York City. Another major change between the old and new administration was in event planning. Past events were always held in New York City. Fr. Donohue desires all future special events for Villanova to be held in Philadelphia. The university is located just outside of Philadelphia, and the new president seeks to solidify Villanova’s relationship with that city.
The Villanova Chief Development Officer

The Vice President for Development at Villanova, John Elizandro, declined to participate in this study. However, his associate, Mary McRae, was pleased to answer questions about the impact of the presidential transition on the campaign. McRae was another Villanova alumna working for the institution. She earned her bachelor’s degree in accountancy in 1982, and after working as assistant controller for Marriott Hotels, McRae began her career with Villanova 21 years ago as a senior staff accountant in their financial affairs department. Since 1996 she has served as the Associate Vice President for Development at the university. McRae personally managed the capital campaign and focused her energy on securing major gifts for the institution. Her office includes 60 employees and usually receives 21,000 gifts each year (http://www.rowan.edu/news/display_article.cfm?ArticleID=1787).

McRae said that the “conflicting agendas” between the old and new presidents were the most difficult aspect of the transition for her: “It is difficult to try and sell the agenda of the former leader when the new leader is out front relaying his own vision” (personal communication, Feb. 1, 2007). She credited a “focus on the institutional mission” as getting her through the presidential transition. Regardless of the face in office, the university and its mission of truth, unity, and charity, were the main components of the development team’s work. This purpose was discernible in all of their messages to constituents.

Villanova acknowledged the presidential transition to their constituency through the “magazine, newsletters, and a gala event that celebrated the former president and acknowledged the new president” (personal communication, Feb. 1, 2007). They also
engaged their campaign volunteers even more than before. The “Steering Committee of the campaign (all volunteers) is firmly invested and committed to help us successfully hit the $300 million goal” (personal communication, Feb. 1, 2007). McRae also said that the campaign chairman, Gerald Cassidy from the class of 1963, was especially helpful. He was quoted as saying, “The remarkable level of involvement indicates a strong belief in Villanova among its alumni, parents and friends and a willingness to help the University meet the challenges of the future” (http://www.villanova.edu/advance/develop/news/index.htm?page=steinway.htm).

Strategies for Managing a Presidential Transition at Villanova

Because the two presidents of Villanova during the “Transforming Minds and Hearts” campaign had very different agendas and personalities, the development staff had to approach donor negotiations in a new way. They started reaching out to students, their parents, and younger alumni, many of whom knew Fr. Donohue from the campus. Quisenberry said,

In the past, we haven’t reached out to alumni until they have lots of money. Well, Father [Donohue] wants to reach out to them as students and teach them why it is important to give back when they graduate. He has been on the road all year talking to alums (mostly Young Alums from the 80s and 90s) explaining why they need to give. These are people that haven’t been touched before. But the older alums are excited too. They see a lot of hope with Father Peter...he is young and energetic and tells it like it is. He allows people to disagree, but explains his point of view. He has said that he will get rid of the past issues here and focus on
the future... People are just excited about the change (personal communication, June 15, 2007).

President Donohue traveled a lot during the first year in office to reach out to Villanova alumni, old and new. Kathy McGinley, another Villanova development employee, said, “His presence at these receptions has caused new involvement from our alumni regarding donations to the University” (personal communication, June 14, 2007).

Fr. Donohue joked about his extreme number of road trips in his first State of the University address on December 1, 2006:

Inauguration ended on a Sunday and first thing Monday morning I was on a plane headed for Texas – and it seems like I haven’t stopped since! It really has been a wonderful experience for me... It’s great to match names with faces, to hear different Villanova stories, and to bring the University to people who, in some cases, haven’t been to campus in years. It is during these events that I really get a sense of the enthusiasm and excitement that exists for the University among our alumni. Their eyes light up when we talk about the basketball team, of course, but they also light up when we talk about the quality of the incoming freshman class, the number of nationally competitive scholarships and awards our students win, various faculty achievements, and the national rankings of our academic programs. The alumni, parents, and friends that come to these events are interested in Villanova and are gratified to have us visit. In just three months, more than 2,000 people have attended the 12 events that have been held to date...and, since I am no longer in the theatre department, I’m looking forward to more of what has
become the “traveling Villanova road show”

(http://www.villanova.edu/homepage/president/speeches/stateofuniv.htm).
The new president’s enthusiasm for the office and the university is palpable. Alumni and friends of Villanova are caught up in the excitement.

While the development team at Villanova was not prepared for the impact of a new president, they have adapted to his style, and fundraising has flourished because of it. They held the typical meetings to educate the president about the campaign – “met to review pyramids, rating information on top donors and prospects” but it was mostly the face-to-face receptions and “large amount of travel” that were found to be the most effective in dealing with the change (McRae, personal communication, Feb. 1, 2007). McRae accepted a new job as the Vice President for University Advancement at Rowan University in New Jersey, beginning in July 2007. Several senior development staff members shifted priorities to cover McRae’s duties until December 2007 when the campaign ended. At that time, Villanova restructured its office of institutional advancement and sought to fill several top positions.

Wake Forest University
Winston-Salem, North Carolina

Vice President for University Advancement: James Bullock

Founded in 1834 to train Baptist ministers, Wake Forest University (WFU) is now a top-tier, private institution of higher education in the southeast. WFU is internationally recognized for its graduate and undergraduate programs. It boasts “small in size, big in resources” with less than 7,000 students and degrees a variety of areas: law, medicine,
divinity, business, and liberal arts. Undergraduate tuition, room and board was in excess of $40,000, and more than three-quarters of students attended from out of state.

In 1999, Wake Forest privately launched an ambitious $600 million campaign called “Honoring the Promise.” The public launch took place in 2001, and three years later, the president announced his intent to retire. A new president was selected and took office in 2005. The following year, the “Honoring the Promise” campaign concluded at 115% of its goal with $689.4 million raised. The money was earmarked for endowed scholarships, endowed faculty and program support, facilities, and the medical school.

Circumstances Under Which the WFU President Left Office

Wake Forest enjoyed one of the longest presidential tenures in American history with Thomas K. Hearn, Jr. Preceding his retirement in 2005, President Hearn served 22 years as the leader of WFU. In his final speech, he said, “My two decades plus at Wake Forest have passed like a mere season or so” (http://www.wfu.edu/hearn/c2005.html). WFU gained national recognition, increasing selectivity among applicants, and ranked among the top 30 schools in U.S. News and World Report during President Hearn’s time in office. WFU also hosted two U.S. presidential debates during his tenure. Hearn was an early advocate of using technology in higher education and was instrumental in the development of a research park, where the university’s medical school was the anchor. In regard to fundraising at WFU, Hearn worked on two capital campaigns while in office. The first, a $150 million Heritage and Promise campaign, ended in 1995 with $173 million raised. The second campaign was Honoring the Promise, which ended in 2006.
One year prior to this capital campaign’s completion, President Hearn officially retired; however, during the last two years of his presidency, he had limited involvement in the campaign due to his failing health (Bullock, personal communication, Feb. 28, 2007). He took a four-month leave of absence in 2004 to recover from surgery and treatment of a brain tumor. In May of 2005, Hearn said, “My presence before you this morning is in large part due to the skill of the Wake Forest University Brain Tumor Center of Excellence and the compassionate care I received there” (http://www.wfu.edu/hearn/c2005.html). The same year, Dr. Hearn earned “president emeritus” status at Wake Forest, and “chairman emeritus” for his work with the Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics. He continued to live in Winston-Salem at the time of the study.

President Hearn’s announcement of his intent to retire was made in April 2004. Following a ten-month national search, WFU selected Nathan Hatch, then the provost at the University of Notre Dame, to take the reigns. Hatch earned his doctorate at Washington University in St. Louis, and until his inauguration at WFU, spent his entire academic career at Notre Dame as a historian and administrator. At Wake Forest, he spent his first year meeting faculty, students and alumni, and focused on building a comprehensive strategic plan for the university (http://www.wfu.edu/president/biography.php). His campaign involvement was limited, at best. The chief development officer said, “For the most part, he saw it as the previous administration’s priority” (Bullock, personal communication, July 14, 2007).

Instead, one of the new president’s main goals was to work closely with faculty, an area where former President Hearn received some criticism: “Therefore, Dr. Hatch has
made a concerted effort to advocate on behalf of faculty. With [Advancement Staff] help, he developed the Presidential Trust for Faculty Excellence to encourage donors to support faculty endowments. He has done a number of things to reengage with faculty” (Bullock, personal communication, April 17, 2007). The goal of the Presidential Trust is to attract $10 million by the end of 2008 to support endowed professorships, purchase library materials for faculty research, and strengthen WFU’s capacity to recruit and retain faculty members. The WFU library’s website is already displaying new reference books which were credited as gifts from the Presidential Trust.

A few of the early gifts for the Presidential Trust were included in the Honoring the Promise campaign’s total, but it was mostly designed as a post-campaign effort (Bullock, personal communication, July 14, 2007). In a 2006 speech to faculty, President Hatch stated, “We cannot build a great university without the ability to recruit, retain and appropriately compensate a stellar faculty. My most important priority in building next year’s budget will be faculty salaries” (http://www.wfu.edu/president/2006.11.01.php).

The WFU Chief Development Officer

Apparently Wake Forest breeds long tenures. For more than two decades, James Bullock has worked for WFU. He joined the WFU development staff in 1985 after receiving his BA at the university. Bullock also earned his MBA at Wake Forest in 1995. Today he serves as Vice President for University Advancement. In a university press release, President Hatch said, “He (Bullock) has established many important relationships that have benefited Wake Forest and will continue to help us in the future, and I am
confident that James and his colleagues will generate new and expanded support for our mission” (Cox, 2006, p.1).

Bullock remarked that his experience helped him be resilient during the leadership change, as well as focused on the ultimate needs of the institution (personal communication, Feb. 28, 2007). He also noted the “very experienced staff” that he worked with as helping to overcome any difficulties in the presidential transition during the campaign: “There are 4 senior members of my staff who have been at WF longer than me – all 28-35 years!” (personal communication, April 17, 2007). Additionally, the Board of Trustees chair and the Provost became somewhat active in the campaign due to the poor health of Dr. Hearn (Bullock, personal communication, Feb. 28, 2007).

Bullock did not have much contribution in the selection of the new president, other than offering “a little input to the trustees and others who were on the search committee” (personal communication, Feb. 28, 2007). Even before Dr. Hatch arrived on campus, Bullock and his staff took the initiative to educate the new president about the impending campaign. They provided a “full Advancement Office presentation and written plan” to bring the new president up to speed. They also acknowledged the leadership transition with university announcements to educate their constituency (personal communication, Feb. 28, 2007).

Strategies for Managing a Presidential Transition at WFU

Because of President Emeritus Hearn’s health, Bullock did not have high expectations for the outgoing president’s involvement in the campaign. Bullock said, “Dr. Hearn was able to speak about the campaign in group settings but did not have the energy
to make many one-on-one calls. I do think his health and lack of energy had some negative impact on the campaign. On the other hand, we had a great push leading up to his retirement when many wanted to help get us over goal by his retirement date. This was really a recognition of his 22 years of leadership” (personal communication, April 17, 2007). The advancement office established “tribute funds” in honor of the retiring president, which proved most successful in bringing in donations toward the end of the campaign.

Outgoing President Hearn mentioned the campaign several times in formal speeches, beginning with the public campaign kick-off in 2001. After cataloging the needs for such a massive campaign, he concludes with, “In writing the concluding chapter of my presidency, I believe ‘The Campaign for Wake Forest: Honoring the Promise’ will enable us to strengthen our place among America’s great universities” (http://www.wfu.edu/hearn/unfinished-cause.html).

Four years later, Dr. Heam also mentioned the campaign in his final speech as the leader of WFU: “I am delighted … that we have reached the $600 million goal in the Honoring the Promise campaign. This is a great milestone, one for which I am grateful. We still have another year to go, and that will help us focus all our energies on … surpassing the goal” (http://www.wfu.edu/hearn/c2005.html).

Although the push was on to surpass the original $600 million goal after Heam’s retirement, rarely did new President Hatch mention the capital campaign during his first year in office. In fact, out of the 19 speeches published on the current president’s website, http://www.wfu.edu/president/speeches.php, there was not one reference to the “Honoring the Promise” campaign. Hatch was hired with more than a year left in the
campaign’s timeline. Bullock said, “To a small degree, the new president did not see the
campaign as his priorities” (personal communication, Feb. 28, 2007). Bullock also
mentioned that his expectations for the incoming president were “fairly modest, but he
was willing to be helpful … was really just getting to know the constituency” (personal
communication, Feb. 28, 2007). Fortunately, the institution’s constituents were positive
toward the change in leadership.

Interestingly, however, President Hatch has already indicated that WFU will soon
undertake another campaign. In his annual State of the University address to faculty in
November 2006, he said, “Let me add a brief word about strategic planning and the next
capital campaign. This plan must lay the foundation for those development efforts and on
them it will depend. We must generate ideas of compelling excellence that our
benefactors will champion and support” (http://www.wfu.edu/president/2006.11.01.php).
While he did not take ownership of the campaign that was ongoing upon his arrival on
campus, President Hatch has already looked ahead to the next one. He has also worked
diligently to raise the funds for his previously-mentioned Presidential Trust for Faculty
Excellence.

Chief Development Officer Bullock indicated that, overall, the presidential
transition was “somewhat more positive than negative” because of the push to raise funds
for Hearn’s retirement and an increase in dollars raised while they introducing the new
president (personal communication, Feb. 28, 2007). Bullock’s lengthy experience at the
institution, and that of his senior staff, helped navigate the presidential transition despite
the outgoing president’s declining health and the new president’s change in priorities.
CHAPTER FIVE

DATA SYNTHESIS

This is an appropriate time to revisit the research questions, as they will shape the following chapter. The case studies were presented in chapter four, and this chapter will attempt to provide answers to each question using a cross-case analysis of the aforementioned case studies. Research question 1 dealt with the situation surrounding the transition: What events of the presidential transitions impacted the capital campaign? Research question 2 looked at the impact the chief development officer had: How did the chief development officers react to the presidential transition during the campaign? The third research question was interested in the support available: What supports helped to ensure continuity during a capital campaign? Lastly, the fourth question probed the strategies used: What strategies did the CDOs employ to navigate the presidential transition during a capital campaign?

Situation

The literature review suggested that campaigns are becoming lengthy endeavors, and this research supports that proposition. The average campaign studied here was seven years in duration. Florida State University had the shortest campaign (2000-2005) and Millikin University’s lasted the longest (1995-2006). Most campaigns held private/quiet
phases for more than two years before making a public launch. During the quiet phase, as much as 50% of the total dollar goal was raised; never less than 30% was raised or pledged before the campaigns went public.

In a few instances, the presidential transitions impacted the length of the campaigns. Muhlenberg College extended its campaign length and dollar goal under the new president. Muhlenberg’s “Pride and Progress” campaign originally concluded in 2006 having met its $70 million goal, but President Helm extended the campaign until 2010 with a new $105 million goal upon taking office. The campaign goal and timeline at University of Indianapolis was also extended under new leadership. In another case, University of North Florida delayed its campaign kick-off until a permanent president was named. When the leadership transition occurred toward the end of the campaign, as in the case of University of Wisconsin – Whitewater, the goal and timeline were not affected by the new president.

University of Wisconsin – Whitewater held the smallest fundraising campaign of $5.7 million, and Wake Forest and Florida State were the largest ones at $600 million a piece. There appeared to be no correlation between the length of the campaign and the amount raised. Florida State had the shortest campaign, but raised the most amount of money in this study. At the time of the interviews, all of the institutions had successfully reached their dollar goals, with the exception of Villanova. Villanova’s campaign was poised to end in December 2007, and final tallies were not known when this study was conducted. Most campaigns ended with totals significantly higher than the original goals. University of North Florida, for example, ended its $65 million “Access to Excellence” campaign having collected more than $100 million in cash and pledges.
The presidential transitions occurred at a variety of times during the capital campaigns. See Figure 3 for an illustration of when the transitions occurred. The majority of transitions happened after the university publicly announced the campaign and asked for support under a specific president.

Figure 3. Timeline for Presidential Transitions during Campaigns

In only three instances did the transition occur before the public launch, and two of those cases (UNF's second transition and Muhlenberg's first transition) took place immediately prior to the public launch. Muhlenberg's CDO suggested that the timing of this transition right before the campaign went public was the "worst possible moment." This negative sentiment of Muhlenberg's CDO was not necessarily the result of the campaign about to go public, but the circumstances under which the president was

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leaving office. Muhlenberg’s former president, Arthur Taylor, was forced out of office due to accusations of misconduct, and this would have been unfavorable for a college at any point in a campaign.

The nature of how the presidents left office varied between institutions. Three campuses cited illness as the cause of the presidential transition and/or causing an impact on the campaign. At Florida State University, President Wetherell was diagnosed with prostate cancer right after taking the executive post. The cancer diagnosis and treatments forced Wetherell to be out of office for the first six months of his term, and he was unable to participate in campaign activities during that time. The University of North Florida and Wake Forest University’s presidents were also out of office for several months due to health concerns. UNF’s President Hopkins had heart surgery and was unable to devote the requisite time to the campaign during her recovery. She cited health reasons when she resigned from the presidency soon after the surgery. Lastly, during the final two years of Dr. Hearn’s presidency at Wake Forest, he also had limited involvement in the campaign due to poor health. He had a brain tumor that required surgery and an extended leave of absence.

During all of these presidential health problems, the campaigns continued to function and raise money despite the lack of daily executive leadership. Generally the offices of institutional advancement would cover the executive duties of cultivation and solicitation during the presidents’ absences (e.g., UNF). At times, the provost and deans were also instrumental in carrying out the executive fundraising responsibilities (e.g., Florida State). When the campaigns were successfully able to continue sans presidential leadership, it reiterated the point of UNF’s CDO: The president is certainly important,
but not exclusively” (Allaire, personal communication, Dec. 28, 2006). This study emphasized how much campaigns are group efforts.

A few of the universities studied had controversial transitions between leaders. At Millikin University, Thomas Flynn served as president from 1998-2002 and resigned under pressure due to financial issues he created at the university and a lack of confidence in his leadership ability. Millkin’s CDO said that it “took some extraordinary work on the part of the development staff to overcome” the damaging publicity and negative sentiment. Millkin’s campaign was about at the mid-point when Flynn resigned, and the debate about his resignation received front-page headlines in the local newspaper.

National news coverage was the result of University of Wisconsin – Whitewater’s Chancellor Miller’s decision to bring a controversial speaker to campus right before his departure from the top post. Many UWW students, staff, and alumni protested the speaker and were relieved to see Chancellor Miller vacate office soon thereafter. New leadership helped to mend ties with constituency and end the UWW’s campaign on a high note.

The contentious departure of Muhlenberg’s President Taylor was another situation where most everyone was eager for change. Unfortunately, due to confidentiality agreements, the CDO at Muhlenberg was unable to release many details about Taylor’s resignation. Constituents were “suspicious” of the institution and its policies, and it took a new president and ongoing dialogue with development staff to restore confidence in the college.

Not all presidents left under duress, however. When University of Indianapolis’s president, Jerry Israel, retired in 2005 due to personal reasons, he was lauded as having
had a positive impact on the campus and its capital campaign. Constituents understood his desire for retirement after seven years in office. Ulndy’s original campaign goal was met during his tenure, and the new president was able to build upon successes after Israel retired. The University of Redlands also had a positive transition between presidents. When Dr. Appleton retired after 18 years in office, he created the new position of “chancellor” at Redlands specifically in order to continue his work on the campaign. Chancellor Appleton was a very successful fundraiser, and his ongoing work supported and mentored new President Dorsey in that capacity.

The Villanova President also retired under good circumstances after a lengthy tenure. Father Dobbin stepped down at age 71 after a significant impact on the campus. His replacement was another Villanova alumna, Father Donohue, who was also well respected. Although these two leaders had very different personalities and objectives for the campaign, the transition was seen as a positive one.

All of these presidential transitions impacted their ongoing capital campaigns. Some of the impacts were large, like delaying a kick-off date until a permanent president was found. Other transitions had smaller impacts on the campaign, like when UWW’s Chancellor Saunders took office; she simply worked on wrapping up gifts and helped with stewardship by confidently reassuring donors at the end of the campaign. Mainly the institutions had to deal with the exposure the university received – both positive and negative – due to the change in leadership. Additionally, the development teams were charged with maintaining continuity and stability in light of the transition (how they did this is explained in the strategy section). It is important to reiterate at this point that all of
the capital campaigns proceeded as planned despite the transitions, and all institutions met and exceeded their campaign goals – most ahead of schedule.

Self

The interviewees constituted an amazing repertoire of advancement officers from institutions of higher education. The nine CDOs that participated in this study\(^1\) had an average of 24 years work in fundraising, and 15 years at their specific institution. Four CDO’s were alumni of the institution where they worked. All had a true passion for fundraising and a desire to advance the missions of their colleges.

Table 2 is a comparison of the participants. Indicated in the table are the years they worked in the field of development, the years they worked at the institution, and the number of capital campaigns they have led, both at the institution studied and other institutions. The combined experience of these individuals cannot be overestimated.

Mike Ferin from the University of Indianapolis had the most experience of the nine chief development officers in the study. He clocked 39 years in development, with all but one year in higher education fundraising. He served as vice president at six different colleges, and built UIndy’s development program nearly from scratch when he arrived at the college 10 years ago.

Jeff Robison of Florida State (now CDO at Case Western University) also had more than three decades of experience in institutional advancement. He worked at FSU

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\(^1\) At the time of the study, all participants served as Chief Development Officers at institutions of higher education, with the exception of McRae from Villanova University. McRae served as the Associate Vice President (Associate CDO) at Villanova during the data collection stage. Following her participation in the interview, McRae accepted a CDO position at Rowan University in New Jersey and has served as Vice President for University Advancement at that institution since July 2007.
for 11 years, during which time he oversaw two capital campaigns and helped increase the FSU endowment from $50 million to $443 million. Robison also oversaw more campaigns than any of the other CDOs in this study—four campaigns during his lengthy career. Two campaigns was the average number that were led by the nine CDOs, although for Macready, Enslin, McRae, and Bullock, the campaign mentioned in the case study was their first and only (thus far) as a chief development officer. Enslin and Bullock are already in the planning stages of their second campaign as CDO.

Table 2. CDO Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>CDO @ time of transition</th>
<th>Years in Development</th>
<th>Years at Institution</th>
<th>Led # of CC at institution</th>
<th>Led # other CC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Florida State University</td>
<td>J. Jeffrey Robison</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millikin University</td>
<td>Peg Smith Luy</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhlenberg College</td>
<td>Tilghman Moyer</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Indianapolis</td>
<td>Mike Ferin</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of North Florida</td>
<td>Pierre Allaire</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Redlands</td>
<td>Neil Macready</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Univ. of Wisc., Whitewater</td>
<td>Jon Enslin</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villanova University</td>
<td>Mary McRae</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wake Forest University</td>
<td>James Bullock</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the nine participants, only two CDO’s were women: Peg Smith Luy of Millikin University and Mary McRae of Villanova University (now CDO at Rowan University). Both women had worked in the development arena more than 20 years, and almost their entire careers were spent at one institution. Unlike Ulndy’s Ferin and FSU’s Robison, Luy and McRae climbed the career ladder in institutional advancement without moving cross-country. Luy credited the longevity and continuity of the development staff at Millikin one of the main reasons why the four presidential transitions at that school
went as smoothly as they did. She mentioned, “Donors’ relationships with the University were through that staff … Their [presidents’] departures didn’t ultimately affect our success because the development staff remained in tact” (personal communication, Jan. 10, 2007)

Three other CDOs climbed the development career ladder primarily within one institution: Moyer at Muhlenberg (14 of 16 years at same institution); Enslin at UW-Whitewater (11 of 15 years at same institution); and Bullock at Wake Forest (all 22 years in development at one institution). Robison at Florida State, Ferin at UIndy, Allaire at UNF, and Macready at Redlands all found progressive careers through more mobility. Therefore, prospects for career advancement were available both by moving to new institutions and by seeking out opportunities within one’s own institution.

All the chief development officers relied on specific qualities to help them navigate a presidential transition during a capital campaign. Based on the data analysis by mapping and interpreting, the following list represents the nine personality characteristics deemed most important per the CDOs:

1. Patience (Robison, McRae)
2. Perseverance (Robison)
3. Work drive (Luy, Allaire, Macready)
4. Flexibility (Ferin, Allaire, Macready)
5. Teamwork / Cooperativeness (Robison, Luy, Allaire, Ferin)
6. Confidence (Moyer, Allaire, Enslin)
7. Altruism (Luy, Macready)
8. Resiliency / Hardiness (Bullock)

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9. Focus (Moyer, Bullock, McRae, Macready)

Also, while not explicitly cited as important traits, these CDO characteristics were evident in the interviews and bear mentioning here: enthusiasm, optimism, extraversion, passion for work, and overall job satisfaction. Having a passion for the work and the college were especially important to these CDOs. Robison said he counted on a “belief in the importance of what you are doing” to help him persevere through tough times at FSU. Luy specifically stated, “Millikin is one of my passions!” The participants appeared to truly enjoy their work and be dedicated to advancing the missions of their institutions.

Supports

The Chief Development Officers reported that support came from ten key areas listed here in alphabetical order: the Board of Trustees for the college, the campaign chair(s), the campaign consultant, the campaign steering committee, the development staff, the Foundation board, the incoming president, the interim president, the outgoing president, and senior staff colleagues. Table 3 presents the areas of support and the colleges that used them. Some institutions are listed more than once due to the CDO relying on a few different individuals or boards.

From that list, four categories were cited as most often providing support during the presidential transition. These areas included the Board of Trustees, the development staff, the incoming president, and senior staff colleagues. The Board of Trustees is the only group comprised of volunteers. Many, if not all, of the board members at institutions of higher education are donors and solicitors for campaigns. Therefore, while trustees are
volunteers, they devote a significant amount of time and resources to a campaign and want to see it succeed.

Table 3. Support Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form of Support</th>
<th>Institution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Board of Trustees</td>
<td>Muhlenberg</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UIndy</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wake Forest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Chair(s) (volunteer)</td>
<td>Millikin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Villanova</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Consultant</td>
<td>UNF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Redlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Steering Committee (volunteers)</td>
<td>Millikin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Villanova</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development Staff</td>
<td>Florida State</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Millikin</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Whitewater</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wake Forest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundation Board</td>
<td>Florida State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Whitewater</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incoming President</td>
<td>Millikin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Muhlenberg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UIndy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Whitewater</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interim President</td>
<td>UNF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outgoing President</td>
<td>Redlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Staff Colleagues (Provost, deans, VPs)</td>
<td>Florida State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Muhlenberg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Whitewater</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Wake Forest</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Vice President Moyer from Muhlenberg indicated that “Members of the Board of Trustees provided a great deal of moral and volunteer support to my operation. …The transition pulled the existing members of the board together. They realized that they would have to increase their own support, which they did, to demonstrate their own belief
in the institution” (personal communication, March 1, 2007). Allaire at UNF also noted the Board’s involvement in the campaign: “The Board of Trustees was indispensable during the second transition” (personal communication, Dec. 28, 2006). Lastly, UIndy’s Ferin said that he “sought the advice of trustees I believed could be influential in making sure the campaign plan would be continued” regardless of who held the top post.

The development staff, the incoming president, and senior staff colleagues were also cited as particularly helpful. Bullock from Wake Forest noted that his very experienced staff helped overcome any difficulties in the campaign due to the presidential transition. Robison from FSU said that his “staff never waivered” and that made an impact during the transition. Millikin’s Luy continuously gave credit to her development team and credited the team philosophy for their campaign success in spite of four presidents.

Senior staff colleagues, including other VPs, Provosts, and Deans were also supportive and accommodating of campaign demands, especially when the president was out of office, like in Wake Forest’s instance, as well as Florida State’s. While Florida State’s president recovered from prostate cancer surgery, the FSU college deans were helpful in securing gifts and working as the “faces” the university. Senior staff colleagues also banded together because of their familiarity with the campus and the demands of the positions and the campaigns.

The new president was cited by several CDOs as a valuable resource during the transition. Because Muhlenberg’s new president had more than two decades of experience working in higher education fundraising and college relations, he helped push the campaign in a positive direction after a tumultuous transition. Muhlenberg’s new
president even increased the timeline and goal of the campaign upon taking office. Other new presidents were seen as effective for the campaign because they were obliging and let the campaign proceed as planned without rocking the boat, like at University of Indianapolis, University of Redlands, and University of Wisconsin-Whitewater.

President Zemke from Millikin had years of experience at the institution, both working as its dean of the business school and serving on the board of trustees. He was the fourth president during Millikin’s 10-year campaign, and Zemke’s intimate knowledge of the university and the campaign – as well as his integrity, work ethic and compassion, as cited by the CDO – made him extremely valuable during the “home stretch” of the capital campaign.

Interestingly, Muhlenberg’s CDO searched for colleagues at other institutions who had been in similar situations of a presidential transition during a campaign, but he was unable to find any. Perhaps this dissertation may fill that void. In a couple instances, the CDO relied on the experience of the campaign consultant who was hired to assist with the campaign. Macready from Redlands said, “I called on our campaign consultant who previously served as Senior VP at the same R-1 University both the outgoing president and I had worked for during a major campaign. He provided invaluable advice on maneuvering through the transition period and engaging both the outgoing and incoming presidents” (personal communication, March 12, 2007). All of the institutions represented in this study hired campaign consultants for part or all of their campaigns; however, only two CDOs mentioned that the consultants provided significant support during the transition. Luy at Millikin said that the campaign consultant was more important during the planning stages of the campaign: “A campaign consulting firm
conducted a feasibility study for the campaign and was retained to provide counsel for six years of the 10-year campaign... [consultant firm] was an important part of our planning...

Beyond support in the form of people, support also was found by relying on the campaign plan (e.g., UNF and Redlands) and the mission of the university (e.g., Villanova and Millikin). Allaire at UNF stated, “I’ve been through a few presidential changes in my career (three to be exact) and have found that a strong campaign plan, coupled with strong volunteers, will weather most transitions.” McRae at Villanova credited a “focus on the institutional mission” as getting her through the presidential transition. When the presidential transition caused a change in priorities for the Villanova campaign, the staff could rely on the overarching mission of the university to carry their campaign message to the constituency.

Strategies

Although the presidential transitions and capital campaigns profiled in this study were entirely different from one another, the CDOs used surprisingly similar techniques to traverse their situations. The most commonly cited strategies for dealing with a presidential transition during a campaign included a) providing input in the selection of the new president, b) communication with constituency, c) education of the incoming president, d) involving the new president in the campaign right away – especially through personal meetings and events, and e) creating new funding priorities. Each one of these areas will be examined.
The first strategy that many CDOs used during a presidential transition was providing input in the selection of the new president. Most of the CDOs in this study sat on selection committees, participated in the interview process, and/or provided feedback about the candidates’ ability to fundraise during a capital campaign and beyond. On this point, UNF Vice President Allaire said,

My input was sought as to my impressions of whether the president was able to be effective as a fundraiser. Also, I was asked to set up a general interview session with the top alumni and volunteers to see how the candidates did with public speaking/interaction. Lastly, my role in the process included having dinner with the candidates and our Foundation board members (personal communication, Dec. 28, 2006).

Other CDOs reported that they recruited external members for the search committee and assisted in interviews of all candidates (Enslin, UWW and Ferin, Ulndy) as well as personally met with the top candidates to discuss the campaign (Moyer, Muhlenberg). Vice President Ferin from University of Indianapolis did not serve on the selection committee, but he stated, “I was heavily involved in the interview phase and my counsel was sought by several trustees who served on the selection committee” (personal communication, June 25, 2007).

Gaylor (2004), an independent consultant who has written extensively on the CDO/CEO relationship in non-profit organizations, implied that the hiring process is crucial for both parties. If the hiring process “goes awry...the outcome significantly damaged the organization’s ability to raise money” (p. 79). Gaylor outlined eleven action steps that CDOs should take to be involved in the hiring process of the CEO (p. 80-81). A
number of the steps include the ones mentioned above by the CDOs in this study, such as participation in commissioning a search committee and contributing in the interview process. Some of Gaylor’s other suggestions included reviewing resumes, solidifying recruitment methods, and clarifying the hiring philosophy with the board of directors. The CDOs in this study would probably argue that, while their input is valuable, they simply cannot devote enormous amounts of time to the presidential selection process, especially during a capital campaign. Regardless, it is recommended that the CDO be involved at some level to find the best fit for the university and its fundraising goals.

The second strategy – communication with constituents – is another fundamental step in handling a presidential transition during a capital campaign. All of the CDOs interviewed in this study emphasized the importance of ongoing communication. Even in Muhlenberg’s situation, where they were unable to outline the details of the president’s termination due to confidentiality agreements, they were “able to announce an interim president, new board leadership, etc.” (Moyer, personal communication, March 1, 2007).

The common techniques used to communicate the message of a new president were press announcements and interviews, articles in alumni and development publications, email newsletters, website updates, and personal phone calls and letters to top donors. Ferin from ULndy said, “Our whole arsenal of communication devices was used (press releases, notices in standard publications, press conferences, personal letters and phone calls, etc.). All were orchestrated via a ‘Role Out Beverley’ plan that was developed immediately after her appointment was determined” (personal communication, June 25, 2007).
Additionally, celebrating the outgoing president’s accomplishments (when appropriate) and feting the incoming president through special events was another way to communicate the change in leadership to constituents and involve them in the process. Villanova’s presidential inauguration was a five-day event that included a faculty and staff reception, a student inaugural ball, a celebratory evening at the Philadelphia Museum of Art, a dinner celebration on their football field, and several liturgies (http://www.villanova.edu/homepage/president/inauguration/). Alumni, staff, students, and friends of the university were invited to participate in these events that recognized the outgoing president and honored the incoming one. Constituents who were unable to attend could participate via live web-broadcasts or view photos of the events on shutterfly.com, a popular internet photo-sharing site.

The third strategy mentioned in the interviews with CDOs was educating the new president about the campaign. CDOs regularly met with the new president to provide campaign background information, briefings, and donor information. In a couple instances, the meetings even took place prior to the president’s arrival on campus (e.g., Muhlenberg and Wake Forest). Bullock from Wake Forest accounted for some success of the campaign to providing the new president – even before he arrived on campus – a “full advancement office presentation and written plan” to bring Dr. Hatch up-to-speed on the capital campaign (personal communication, Feb. 28, 2007).

Allaire from UNF, who dealt with several transitions during his campaign, said, “I gave the presidents and interims briefing booklets on the campaign plan, introduced them to the top volunteers and donors, and kept them constantly abreast of progress” (personal communication, Dec. 28, 2006). Whitewater’s CDO, Enslin, discussed major donors with
incoming Chancellor Saunders. They also deliberated about potential contributors. McRae from Villanova noted the same disclosure of key donors; McRae met with incoming President Donohue to “review pyramids and rating information on top donors and prospects” (personal communication, Feb. 1, 2007). Educating the president about the institution and the campaign was an important aspect of the president being able to come into the position and “hit the ground running.”

University of Redlands provided the new president with a “transition notebook” that was created by the senior staff at the university. CDO Macready said, “It covered the entire university. There was a section that thoroughly detailed the current status of the campaign, as well as an overview of remaining campaign objectives and the history of development at Redlands” (personal communication, March 12, 2007).

One president who was interviewed in this study, but wished to remain anonymous, stated, “The president has to get to know the institution, the strategic plan, the mission of the university, the donor base, and the history to be successful” (personal communication, Feb. 26, 2007). This president also said, “The president must be the leader of the capital campaign whether he/she started it or inherited it. Under any circumstances, the capital campaign must be successful or the institution is negatively effected” (personal communication, Feb. 26, 2007).

When a leadership transition takes place during a campaign, it is the CDO’s responsibility to provide the incoming president with necessary information about the campaign so he or she can help in making it a successful effort. Luy from Millikin said, “We met as often as necessary to help him [President Zemke] feel comfortable and knowledgeable about the campaign. ... It is our job to make him look good. We did and
continue to do whatever’s necessary to make sure that happens” (personal
communication, March 30, 2007).

The fourth strategy piggybacks off the education of the incoming president, and it
is involving the new president in the campaign right away. Including the new president
could be through face-to-face meetings with donors and prospects, having the president
mention the campaign and ask for support in letters and speeches, or engaging the
president in campaign events right away. A new president can invigorate a campus and
constituency, like in Villanova’s case. President Donohue traveled a lot during his first
year in office to introduce himself and reach out to new Villanova prospects. One
employee said, “His presence at these receptions has caused new involvement from our
alumni regarding donations to the university” (McGinley, personal communication, June
14, 2007).

A personal visit from the new president also reassured donors of the priorities and
mission of the university and built confidence in the new leader (Luy, personal
communication, March 5, 2007). Enslin from Whitewater also reiterated this point; the
new Chancellor at UWW was cause for a positive outlook on campaign fundraising and
the state of the university. Enslin said, “Her assurance about the campaign’s importance
and her continuous thanking for their support was reassuring to our donors” (personal
communication, Jan. 19, 2007).

Florida State’s incoming president, T. K. Wetherell, recognized the ongoing FSU
Connect campaign from his very first State of the University address and asked for
support: “I hope you will consider making a gift to the Connect Campaign to help us
reach that goal of $600 million” (http://president.fsu.edu/pages/state_of_uni_03.html).

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Other presidents (e.g., pilot study) delivered a public announcement of a large donation soon after taking office, so that the constituency would immediately view the new president as a successful fundraiser.

The last strategy deemed important for thriving during a capital campaign when there is a change in leadership was to create a new fund for the outgoing or incoming president. This was really successful at Wake Forest, where the development team created tribute funds in honor of the retiring president. The donations for the tribute funds brought in numerous donations toward the end of the campaign. CDO Bullock said, “We had a great push leading up to his retirement when many [donors] wanted to help get us over goal by his retirement date. This was really a recognition of his 22 years of leadership” (personal communication, April 17, 2007).

University of Indianapolis also developed a tribute for the outgoing president. An annual lecture was created in honor of outgoing president, Jerry Israel, and his wife. CDO Ferin said that both the funds for the lecture, and the lecture itself, were part of their campaign strategy. While future lectures will be open to the public, the first lecture was used as a campaign stewardship tactic, and only major donors were invited to attend (personal communication, June 27, 2007).

The five strategies - a) providing input in the selection of the new president, b) communication with constituency, c) education of the incoming president, d) involving the new president in the campaign right away, and e) creating new funding priorities helped the CDOs approach the presidential transitions in a positive manner while forging ahead with their capital campaigns.
One strategy that was not mentioned, but could have been an asset, was planning for a change in leadership. In fact, at Millikin, where four transitions took place, Luy indicated, “None of our planning included what would happen if essential staff left before its conclusion” (personal communication, Jan. 10, 2007). The nine CDOs dealt with the change, even though it was not outlined in their campaign plans. However, any future campaign planning committee should consider the inclusion of a change in leadership and a stratagem for dealing with this situation. Many times, the CDO and the campus are surprised by a change and it can take time to overcome this challenge. Being prepared for this circumstance may prove extremely useful so the campaign can proceed smoothly.
CHAPTER SIX

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The objective of this study was to better understand presidential transitions during capital campaigns from the perspective of the chief development officer. Chapter one provided the context for the dissertation and outlined Schlossberg’s transition theory and research questions. The next chapter reviewed the literature in four areas: presidential transitions, presidents as fundraisers, how a fundraising president differs from a chief development officer, and capital campaigns. Gaps in the literature were revealed, and the purpose of this study was reaffirmed based upon the existent scholarship. Chapter three detailed the qualitative research methodology for the study. In that chapter, the research design, interview protocol, data collection and analysis, and pilot study were disclosed. The fourth chapter incorporated the nine case studies of presidential transitions during capital campaigns. The nine universities were Florida State University, Millikin University, Muhlenberg College, University of Indianapolis, University of North Florida, University of Redlands, University of Wisconsin – Whitewater, Villanova University, and Wake Forest University. The fifth chapter compared and contrasted those case studies through the lens of the theoretical framework and research questions. This final chapter stated conclusions and offered research-based recommendations for institutions
dealing with presidential transitions during capital campaigns. Suggestions for future research have also been delineated in the sixth chapter.

Conclusion

"We underestimated the impact a presidential transition would have on a campaign" (McRae, personal communication, Feb. 1, 2007). This statement from the Chief Development Officer at Villanova University sums up the importance of this study. Prior to this research being conducted, no formal studies had investigated what occurs when an institution of higher education experienced presidential turnover during a capital campaign. College presidents are rarely staying in office more than five years, yet capital campaigns are occurring with greater frequency and greater length. The need for capital campaigns mostly stems from reduced state support. Additional reasons for campaigns include reparation and construction of facilities, as well as expansion and creation of programs for the campus. The majority of institutions in this study were raising campaign funds to bolster endowments and expand programs, buildings, and financial aid. This dissertation attempted to determine what transpires from the perspective of the chief development officer during an immense fundraising period.

The four research questions, situation, self, supports, and strategies, mimicked Schlossberg’s transition theory as outlined in the first chapter. The situation was defined differently at each institution, although they did have some similarities, such as lengthy campaigns of seven years or more, successful goal completions, and transitions that occurred after the campaign went public. Most presidential transitions were negative and restricting to campaign work, even when the transitions went smoothly. None of the
transitions were considered an asset to the campaign in progress. Florida State University’s CDO alleged, “The change distracted the University and thus some momentum was lost” (Robison, personal communication, Dec. 19, 2006).

The “self” question was posited to learn about the chief development officer who maintained continuity during the transition period. The nine CDOs that participated in this study had an average of 24 years work in fundraising, and 15 years at their specific institution. Their lengthy experience in advancement positions provided them with necessary skills, knowledge, and competency for fundraising. The participants also relied on the following traits to help them navigate the change in leadership: patience, perseverance, work drive, flexibility, teamwork, confidence, altruism, resiliency, and focus. Some of the CDOs also had familiarity with presidential transitions during campaigns, including Ferin from UIIndy and Dr. Allaire from UNF. Allaire believed, “Presidential transitions are not the end of the world if there is a strong case to be made and if the institution has a solid base of support” (personal communication, May 15, 2007). Supports were essential to all the CDOs who participated.

Four groups or individuals were cited as most often providing support during the presidential transition: the Board of Trustees, the development staff, the incoming president, and senior staff colleagues. At times, support took the form of advice or counsel. Other times the CDO relied on these groups to take upon presidential duties when he or she could not or did not want to do so, such as meeting with prospective donors and championing for the cause. An increase in monetary support – notably from the Board of Trustees – was also used to send a message to the community that the
campaign still had backing and was continuing as planned. Some CDOs also relied on the mission of their university and the campaign plan to keep momentum going.

The final question looked at the strategies deemed most effective. The most commonly cited strategies for dealing with a presidential transition during a campaign included a) providing input in the selection of the new president, b) communication with constituency, c) education of the incoming president, d) involving the new president in the campaign right away – especially through personal meetings and events, and e) creating new funding priorities. While not specifically mentioned, it would also be beneficial to calculate a change in leadership into the campaign plan. These areas have been expanded in the next section, which will hopefully provide a template for CDOs in a similar situation in the future.

Recommendations for CDOs Dealing with a Change in President during a Capital Campaign

1. Communicate with the constituency as soon as possible following the announcement of a presidential departure. Reassure staff, students, alumni and friends of the university that the campaign will continue as planned. Remain steadfast to the mission of the university and the campaign plan in order to show continuity to constituency during a time of change. The most effective means of communication were found to be face-to-face meeting and interviews, articles in alumni and development publications, email newsletters, website updates, and personal phone calls and letters to donors. Sharing the message of the new
president and the ongoing campaign at special events, like inaugural weekends, was also a valuable technique.

2. Provide input in the selection of the new president, and outline the goals for the campaign. Determine what kind of fundraising experience is needed of the incoming president. When possible, sit on the selection committee and participate in the interview process to determine the best fit for the university and the ongoing capital campaign.

3. Educate the new president about the campaign right away, detailing his or her role in it, even before he or she arrives on campus, if possible. Provide campaign background information, briefings, and donor information. Keep the new president constantly abreast of progress or setbacks made in the campaign.

4. Involve the new president in the campaign right away. When feasible, have the president announce a big gift soon after taking office to show his or her commitment to the campaign and fundraising, like in the pilot study for this project. Also encourage the president to hold face-to-face meetings with donors and prospects, mention the campaign and ask for support in letters and speeches, and participate in campaign events and stewardship right away.

5. Create a new fund for the outgoing or incoming president – or both. Tribute funds established for successful outgoing presidents were profitable for Wake Forest University and University of Indianapolis. Wake Forest’s new president also created the Presidential Trust for Faculty Excellence to encourage donors to support faculty endowments. New funding priorities can reflect the change in leadership while also moving the campaign in a positive direction.

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6. Lastly, it would be beneficial to add to the campaign plan a thoughtful consideration of possible changes in leadership. Rather than improvise if it happens, an addendum to the campaign plan could help those individuals prepare for who will take over the key presidential campaign duties and who will follow up with donors and prospects. A communication strategy following the transition could be outlined. While there are no foolproof answers for handling a presidential transition during a campaign, being prepared for such an occurrence can make things go more smoothly.

The most senior of the CDOs interviewed, Mike Ferin of the University of Indianapolis, also offered the following pearls of wisdom:

Since I have been involved with six presidential transitions during my 39-year career, I’ve learned a few lessons about change. They are:

- A new president needs you more than you need him/her
- Be accepting of new ideas, new ways of doing things (live with ambiguity)
- The president has many bosses (trustees)
- Never undercut the president
- If you disagree with the president on an issue, cite your position.
- If you can’t reach a reasonable accommodation on an issue, leave (personal communication, June 15, 2007).

Overall, this research demonstrated that a successful campaign was possible despite a change in leadership, and that a strong campaign plan, coupled with an experienced CDO, made for an easier transition period. Communication and focus were key management tools for a presidential transition during a capital campaign.

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Recommendations for Future Research

The qualitative, multiple-case study design was appropriate for this exploratory study that conducted empirical research on a real-life experience. Qualitative research, "most significantly, has a key role to play in providing insights, explanations, and theories of social behavior" (Ritchie & Spencer, 1994, p. 174). The rich, thick description of the presidential transitions, through the voices of the participants, was particularly helpful in determining the context of situation and how and why certain strategies were employed. That being said, a quantitative study of presidential transitions during capital campaigns may garner a larger response rate. This study had a 33% response rate, perhaps due to the lengthy nature of the qualitative interviews. If a modified quantitative survey was used, a larger response rate may result with a broader perspective of CDOs.

Scholarly research in higher education philanthropy is needed. It is an area that has been neglected until recently and is ripe for study. Additional studies similar to this one could be conducted using the president as the research subject, rather than the chief development officer. Having the outgoing and incoming presidents participate may provide a different perspective on leadership transitions during capital campaigns. The presidents may be able to provide additional suggestions of ways to maintain continuity or to keep them abreast of campaign developments.

Another area that warrants further research is the transition of the chief development officer during a capital campaign. While CDO turnover does not occur as frequently as turnover in the president’s office, it does happen on a regular basis and should be explored in depth to determine who keeps continuity during a campaign when the chief development officer leaves. Worth (2002) noted the high turnover of
advancement personnel: “Successful development people are in such demand that the
capacity to leapfrog from one job to the next is virtually unlimited” (p. 135). For
example, Emory University experienced the departure of its CDO in 2007 during a $2
billion campaign. In the CDO’s absence, University President James Wagner convened
meetings with the development staff to continue campaign work
(http://www.emorywheel.com/detail.php?n=16089). Another interesting study may be
examining the departure of both the president and the chief development officer during a
campaign. Such an occurrence is not very common, but did take place at University of
Nevada, Las Vegas during the course of this study.

Finally, the researcher recommends transition studies from a variety of
institutions, including community colleges, In recent years, higher education has seen an
increase in fundraising campaigns at community colleges, and a study that looks at
presidential transitions during capital campaigns at two-year institutions might provide
unique results. Other interesting transition studies during campaigns could come out of
HBCU’s, single-sex institutions, and other colleges with specific missions not covered in
this research.

Overall, this study provided an empirical view of how chief development officers
dealt with a change in leadership while conducting a capital campaign. Jon Enslin, the
CDO at University of Wisconsin-Whitewater said, “The institution is larger than any one
person” (personal communication, Jan. 19, 2007). This was certainly true for the nine
institutions profiled in this study, since all had successful campaigns despite the changes
in leadership. While the president generally serves as the public personification of the
college or university, it is possible to maintain continuity during a capital campaign by following the guidelines suggested by the CDOs in this study.
APPENDIX

LIST OF POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS

1. Albright College / Reading, PA
2. Berry College / Mt. Berry, GA
3. California Institute of Technology / Pasadena, CA
4. College of William and Mary / Williamsburg, VA
5. Concordia University / Seward, NE
6. Cornell University / Ithaca, NY
7. Delta State University / Cleveland, MS
8. Drake University / Des Moines, IA
9. Emporia State University / Emporia, KS
10. Florida State University / Tallahassee, FL
11. Illinois State University / Bloomington-Normal, IL
12. Miami University / Oxford, OH
13. Michigan State University / East Lansing, MI
14. Millikin University / Decatur, IL
15. Muhlenberg College / Allentown, PA
16. New Mexico State University / Las Cruces, NM
17. Radford University / Radford, VA
18. University of Albany / Albany, NY
19. University of Indianapolis / Indianapolis, IN
20. University of Missouri – Kansas City / Kansas City, MO

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21. University of North Florida / Jacksonville, FL
22. University of Redlands / Redlands, CA
23. University of Wisconsin-Whitewater / Whitewater, WI
24. University of Wyoming / Laramie, WY
25. Villanova University / Villanova, PA
26. Wake Forest University / Winston-Salem, NC
27. Washington and Lee University / Lexington, VA
LETTER TO POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS

Dear (first name):

Those of us who have worked in our business for awhile fully understand how important a president is to a capital campaign. Yet most of what we know about the implications of a presidential change during a campaign is essentially folklore. We would all benefit a bit – our profession would benefit – if we could pin down the implications a little more carefully.

You have been through such a transition, so I would like to ask you to participate in a doctoral dissertation research study about this subject. The study will look at the impact of a presidential transition on a capital campaign from the point of view of the chief development officer.

The time requirement to participate in the study will be approximately two hours. You would need to answer questions via e-mail, but this can be done at your convenience. Anonymity is guaranteed, if requested. All e-mail interviews will begin by December, 2006.

A doctoral student in the Department of Educational Leadership at UNLV will conduct the study as her doctoral dissertation. She is particularly interested in the strategies you and others in the study group have used to maintain consistency and momentum during the transition.

Kim will be contacting you by way of e-mail within the next two weeks to talk with you about this. If you wish to contact her first, please find her information below:

Kim Nehls
200 N. Ring Dove Dr.
Las Vegas, NV 89144
Cellular phone: 702-326-1651
Email address: UNLVdissertation@aol.com

This should be an interesting study, one which will have utility for all of us in university development. Kim is an intelligent and very competent individual, and I have every confidence in her ability to carry out the work effectively. I would like to encourage you to participate.

Sincerely,

John Gallagher, Ph.D.
Vice President for Development
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Situation

1. Please explain the circumstances under which the president left office.
2. From a fundraising perspective, did you feel that the presidential transition took place during the best possible moment, worst possible moment, or somewhere else during the campaign? Elaborate.
3. In some circumstances, presidential transitions can be helpful to a campaign. Was there anything in this transition that was helpful?
4. In other circumstances, presidential transitions can be undesirable or unhelpful for a campaign. Was there anything in this transition that was undesirable or unhelpful?
5. What other major stressor(s) occurred at about the same time as the transition; in what ways did those impact the campaign?

Supports

1. Describe the campaign planning period and detail if any part of the plan included the impact of a change in president or other leader essential to the campaign.
2. What role did the outgoing president have in the campaign planning stages?
3. How did the institution’s constituents view the presidential transition?
4. Did constituency continue to support the campaign after the transition? Did the transition cost any constituents?
5. Who provided you with the most support during the transition, and what form did this support take?
6. Who did you ask for assistance or advice during the presidential transition?

Self

1. What does it take to be resilient during an immense change?
2. In what ways did you need additional energy to deal with this transition?
3. How did the presidential transition align (or not align) with your values?
4. What were your expectations for the outgoing president in regard to the capital campaign?
5. What were your expectations for the incoming president in regard to the capital campaign?
6. How were your expectations met or not met?

Strategies

1. What formal and informal roles did you have in the selection of a new president?
2. In what ways did the capital campaign impact the presidential search?
3. What steps did you take to educate the new president about the campaign?
4. What new campaign goals or priorities was the result of the leadership change?
5. How did you acknowledge the transition (both verbal and written word)?
6. What strategies were most effective in dealing with the transition during the campaign?

7. What strategies were least effective in dealing with the transition during the campaign?
IRB APPROVAL NOTICE

UNLV

Social/Behavioral IRB – Expedited Review
Approval Notice

NOTICE TO ALL RESEARCHERS:
Please be aware that a protocol violation (e.g., failure to submit a modification for any change) of an IRB approved protocol may result in mandatory remedial education, additional audits, re-consenting of subjects, researcher probation suspension of any research protocol at issue, suspension of additional existing research protocols, invalidation of all research conducted under the research protocol at issue, and further appropriate consequences as determined by the IRB and the Institutional Officer.

DATE: December 5, 2006
TO: Dr. Robert Ackerman, Educational Leadership
FROM: Office for the Protection of Research Subjects
RE: Notification of IRB Action by Dr. J. Michael Stitt, Chair
Protocol Title: Higher Education Presidential Transitions During Capital Campaigns: A Comparative Case Study from the Perspective of the Chief Development Officer
Protocol #: 0609-2095

This memorandum is notification that the project referenced above has been reviewed by the UNLV Social/Behavioral Institutional Review Board (IRB) as indicated in Federal regulatory statutes 45 CFR 46. The protocol has been reviewed and approved.

The protocol is approved for a period of one year from the date of IRB approval. The expiration date of this protocol is December 4, 2007. Work on the project may begin as soon as you receive written notification from the Office for the Protection of Research Subjects (OPRS).

PLEASE NOTE:
Attached to this approval notice is the official Informed Consent/Assent (IC/IA) Form for this study. The IC/IA contains an official approval stamp. Only copies of this official IC/IA form may be used when obtaining consent. Please keep the original for your records.

Should there be any change to the protocol, it will be necessary to submit a Modification Form through OPRS. No changes may be made to the existing protocol until modifications have been approved by the IRB.

Should the use of human subjects described in this protocol continue beyond December 4, 2007, it would be necessary to submit a Continuing Review Request Form 60 days before the expiration date.

If you have questions or require any assistance, please contact the Office for the Protection of Research Subjects at OPRSHumanSubjects@unlv.edu or call 895-2794.

Office for the Protection of Research Subjects
4505 Maryland Parkway, Room 5107, Las Vegas, Nevada 89154-4897
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BIBLIOGRAPHY


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Committee Member, Dr. John Gallagher, Ph. D.
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