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A World of Warning: Exploring U.S. Department of State Travel Warnings and Alerts

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A WORLD OF WARNING: EXPLORING U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE TRAVEL

WARNINGS AND ALERTS

By

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Abstract

Travel Warnings and Travel Alerts are documents issued by the United States Department of State to inform U.S. citizens traveling to other countries about the safety conditions of the desired destination. Travel Warnings are created for protracted conditions while Travel Alerts are meant for temporary circumstances. Scant research exists about official State Department travel advice, and there is an absence of knowledge about its components. This qualitative study seeks to answer the questions, what is the nature of State Department Travel Warnings and Alerts and what is their function? This study explores and seeks to describe the nature of Travel Warnings and Alerts and analyzes their function. The qualitative research design employs content analysis of archived Travel Warnings and Alerts and is anchored in Social Construction Theory, which provides a framework for understanding the social construction of target populations. This study then asks, is there a relationship between how a foreign country is socially constructed from the perspective of the United States and the issuance of State Department Travel Warnings and Alerts? Social Construction Theory is extended here to countries of the world and shows that there is indeed a relationship between the issuance of Travel Warnings and Alerts and the foreign countries for which they are issued based on their social construction.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Travel Warnings and Alerts

On December 20, 1988, the U.S. Department of State made a new telephone hotline available. Using a touch-tone menu, U.S. citizen travelers could listen to a recording to learn whether or not there was an advisory about travel to a given country. Unbeknownst to most citizens, these advisories were routinely available to the public for the previous ten years, but only if passport applicants happened to look at a passport center bulletin board or a discerning travel agent volunteered to mention it (Wade, 1989). The day after the new voice recording went live, the State Department was overwhelmed with calls about travel safety, but not because word had traveled fast about the new user-friendly system. Rather, a detonated Semtex bomb had caused Pan Am flight 103 to explode over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing 270 people; 179 of them were American (Wade, 1989; Stottlemire, 2011).

Foreign ministries or foreign offices, as State Department equivalents are termed throughout the world, have been generating and providing travel advisories of some kind to their citizens for decades. The United States may be one of the first governments on record to do so at the outset of World War I, having released a warning "...to the general public, advising in 1914 against travel to the European belligerents" (Lowenheim, 2007, p. 210). A first notice was issued for Americans already in Europe, ordering them to register with the nearest U.S. consular outpost, a practice that is still advised today through a registration system on the State Department website. Following that first notice in 1914 was another publication that advised all Americans to avoid non-essential travel to such countries "and warned them against unneutral conduct if they should go" (Riesman, 1940, p. 822). Advisories such as these continued to be

published over the years, but not for regular, public consumption. Instead, they were sporadic and meant only for government personnel (Lowenheim, 2007).

Definitions

Today's advisories are now easily accessible on the State Department's website. They are divided into two categories: Travel Warnings and Travel Alerts. A Travel Warning is the more serious and enduring type among the two and is meant for protracted, negative conditions. The Office of American Citizen Services and Crisis Management produces the content of these communications and writes:

We issue a Travel Warning when we want you to consider very carefully whether you should go to a country at all. Examples of reasons for issuing a Travel Warning might include unstable government, civil war, ongoing intense crime or violence, or frequent terrorist attacks. We want you to know the risks of traveling to these places and to strongly consider not going to them at all. Travel Warnings remain in place until the situation changes; some have been in effect for years (travel.state.gov, 2015).

The Travel Alert is designed for recent changes in conditions that State anticipates will be temporary. The State Department tells citizens:

We issue a Travel Alert for short-term events we think you should know about when planning travel to a country. Examples of reasons for issuing a Travel Alert might include an election season that is bound to have many strikes, demonstrations, or disturbances; a health alert like an outbreak of H1N1; or evidence of an elevated risk of terrorist attacks. When these short-term events are over, we cancel the Travel Alert (travel.state.gov, 2015).

Official Travel Advice Today

At any given time, there may be dozens of Travel Warnings on the State Department website and a smaller amount of alerts. Using mid 2015 as a snapshot, there were Travel Warnings for 38 countries and Travel Alerts for only six listed on <http://travel.state.gov>. Visiting

the State Department website, a reader would notice common components across Travel Warnings that the State Department deems important enough for the citizen traveler to know. Every Travel Warning and Alert include contact information and the location of U.S. embassies and consulates in the given country. Most advise that travelers continue to monitor current events in the country to which they wish to travel.

Alerts cover a wide range of situational and short-term circumstances and include an expiration date. For instance, a 2015 Travel Alert for Burundi concerned its legislative and presidential election season during the early summer. It emphasized the likelihood of protests and violence during that period and was scheduled to expire in September 2015, asking Americans to “avoid political rallies, demonstrations, polling stations, and crowds of any kind in the weeks before and after the elections” (travel.state.gov, 2015). Another document was for three countries in West Africa and “alert[ed] U.S. citizens to screening procedures, travel restrictions, and reduced aviation transportation options in response to the outbreak of Ebola” (travel.state.gov, 2015). It was scheduled to expire in early June 2015. An Alert for Burkina Faso describes the resignation of its president during fall 2014 and the unknown nature of the transitional government. Finally, an Alert about the South Pacific tropical cyclone season asked Americans to monitor weather reports and went into detail about travel insurance and evacuation (travel.state.gov, 2015).

Travel Warnings begin with a description of circumstances that justify warning U.S. citizens to defer non-essential travel. In fact, the phrase and recommendation to *defer non-essential travel* is a regular component across the Warnings and Alerts for 2015, and it seems that State does not appear to expressly forbid Americans from traveling to foreign countries. Sometimes State will express that embassy and consular services are limited and that U.S.

personnel may not be able to assist a U.S. traveler in his or her time of need. A Warning may be generated for a clear and present danger, which could include war or terrorism. A 2015 Travel Warning for Syria provides details about the all-consuming civil war there. The document for Nigeria brings attention to the reign of terror upon the people by the paramilitary group, Boko Haram (travel.state.gov, 2015). Other circumstances described in the Warnings may include petty crime, violent crime, sexual assault, homicide, gun battles, drug violence, highway robbery, carjacking, and kidnapping (travel.state.gov, 2015). Categories of crime can become very specific, such as the types of kidnapping. The Travel Warning for Mexico classifies kidnapping as traditional, express, or virtual. Traditional kidnapping refers to an abduction that continues until ransom is paid. An express kidnapping is a temporary abduction in which, for example, a perpetrator may hijack a victim's car and hold that person captive until he or she drives to an ATM to withdraw funds and hand them over to the captor. A virtual kidnapping occurs when money is extorted for the release of a victim who was never kidnapped in the first place (travel.state.gov, 2015). The casual American traveler may not have known that kidnapping was a problem in Mexico prior to reading the Warning, let alone know that three types of kidnapping existed in the first place.

The criteria for Warnings are not limited to crime. The Travel Warning for Nepal is expressly in response to the 7.8 earthquake it experienced in April 2015. The fact that it is a Warning and not an Alert indicates that State anticipates that conditions, services, infrastructure, disease, access to healthcare, access to clean food and water, and safety are severe to the extent that a protracted call for deferring non-essential travel to that country is warranted (travel.state.gov, 2015). In other cases, it may be that the U.S. does not have "diplomatic or consular relations" in a certain country and that elements in said country may be "hostile to the

United States”, such as the Warnings for Iran and North Korea (travel.state.gov, 2015). Note that it is not against U.S law to travel to those countries as an American; the danger is that the American traveler may not be able to return home to the U.S.

Prolonged Travel Warnings are not just reserved for countries hostile to the U.S.; conversely, a Warning could be issued and stay active for years in a country that is a close U.S. ally, such as Israel. While Israel is actually a generally safe place (outside the West Bank and Gaza Strip), the Travel Warning focuses on Israel’s hostile neighbors and the potential for sporadic, sudden, and severe violence, such as missiles being launched into the country from Gaza, Lebanon, or Syria, among other countries. It also includes a language about U.S. citizens of Arab or Muslim heritage being singled out by security personnel at Israel’s airports, causing those travelers “significant difficulties in entering or exiting” the country (travel.state.gov, 2015).

Travel Warnings often include the geography of concern. The document may be a blanket warning for the entire country, such as the one for Afghanistan, where “no province...should be considered immune from violence or crime...” (travel.state.gov, 2015). The State Department knows where Americans like to travel, and it appears that in a country like Mexico where Americans visit regularly, the Travel Warning is designed to describe the security and safety situation state by state, even neighborhood by neighborhood. One line of the Warning states, for example, “In Acapulco, defer non-essential travel to areas further than two blocks inland of the Costera Miguel Aleman Boulevard, which parallels the popular beach areas” (travel.state.gov, 2015).

There are miscellaneous circumstances, as well. A Travel Warning may include information about a safety or legal curfew in a given destination. The potable condition of the

water supply might be described. The mode of transportation one should use to travel to a country may be specified. Using the Acapulco example again, the State Department explains that even its own personnel are allowed to travel there only by plane or cruise ship because the highways into that city are not secure from highway robbery, violence, and high jacking (travel.state.gov, 2015). There are country facts—a traveler, for example, may not have known that “Honduras has had one of the highest murder rates in the world for the last five years” (travel.state.gov, 2015). Americans may not realize that Ebola still rages through Sierra Leone, or that Haiti has a “weak emergency response infrastructure” (travel.state.gov, 2015). To be sure, there is a lot that U.S. citizen travelers do not know about the countries of the world, and they may not even know the State Department has a resource to guide them.

Travelers

It is difficult to know how many U.S. citizens are reading Travel Warnings and Alerts and even more difficult to know if they are heeding the State Department’s advice. In 2011, a State Department spokesman named John Echard “acknowledged that the State Department does not have the technology to track or gauge how many people are reading their travel warnings” (msnbc.com, 2015). Even if it did, tracking who reads its travel advice is not the same as knowing who follows the advice. It begs the question, who is consuming State Department Travel Warnings and Alerts, and how are they using them? Some citizen travelers and vacationers may be using them, and aid and development workers may use them, too (Briggs, 2002). Entities that have a moral, legal, and financial interest in protecting individuals they send abroad, such as travel operators and agencies, corporations, and educational institutions make use of them (Friend, 2011; Lowenheim, 2007). The descriptions of Travel Warnings and Alerts

above are from one snapshot in time in 2015, and it provides a glimpse of the type of content during one contemporaneous moment.

Statement of the Problem

Much less is known about historical Travel Warning content and if and how it may have changed over time. There is no compilation and analysis of historical U.S. Department of State Travel Warnings. They are not archived in the State Department library or, for that matter, in the National Archives (J. Sherer, personal communication, January 20, 2015; D. Langbart, personal communication, January 28, 2015). There is no study that reports on the composition and content of historical Travel Warnings. There is not a published index of Travel Warnings revealing to an inquirer any details about the collective body of travel advice.

The dearth of information about Travel Warnings and Alerts generates questions. Some researchers ask if all travel advice is created equally. Sharpley, Sharpley, and Adams (1996, p. 6) suggest that by leveraging the economic power of tourism, governments can use foreign office travel advice as a sanctioning effect “for political ends”. Travel Warnings and Alerts could therefore be used as an “international disciplinary mechanism” (Lowenheim, 2007, p. 207). Bias and prejudice may also play a role, such as the otherness of non-Western countries and cultures, with or without intent. Conversely, allied countries may be treated differently in times of crisis, whether brief or protracted (Lowenheim, 2007). Close allies may not be issued a Travel Warning when another country would be issued one under similar circumstances. That is not the case with U.S. ally and partner, Israel, which has been under a U.S. Travel Warning for many years. While it is more likely that most travel advice issued by the State Department is meant to protect its

citizen travelers, no one has taken the time to show it methodically. The research is limited, parceled, and mixed, and there has not been a comprehensive study of these documents.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this theoretically guided, qualitative analysis (Yin, 2014) is to explore official Travel Warning and Alert documents created and disseminated by the United States Department of State. At this stage of the research, a Travel Warning and Travel Alert are defined as official travel advice issued by the Department of State for U.S. travelers visiting countries that may, respectively, have protracted or temporary conditions, which may be unsafe to the extent that a deferral of non-essential travel or travel of any kind is warranted. The context of this study on the macro level is international in scope, but on the micro level is the U.S. Department of State and the presidential administration under which it served. The data studied is archived Travel Warnings and Alerts issued from 1994 through 2014, focusing on six years each of the Clinton, Bush, and Obama Administrations, respectively. This 18-year span will cover the administrations of three U.S. presidents, and this timeframe is chosen simply to capture the census of official travel advice that is available. The study is meant to describe the nature of Travel Warning and Alerts—their components, content, frequency, quantity, duration active, and subject countries. This study is anchored in Social Construction Theory, a framework that helps understand the social construction of target populations in democratic policy design. The target population for this study is the country for which a Travel Warning or Alert is issued. This study shows that there is a relationship between the social construction of foreign countries and the issuance of Travel Warnings and Alerts.

There is little research about official State Department travel advice, calling for the need for the exploration this study undertakes. Further, there is no official archive of State Department travel advice in the State Department Library or the National Archives (J. Sherer, personal communication, January 20, 2015; D. Langbart, personal communication, January 28, 2015). Travel Warnings and Alerts are available on the State Department website, but only those that are currently active. A non-profit organization called the Internet Archive, however, exists to catalog websites over time. The Internet Archive calls its search engine The Way Back Machine, seeming to borrow from the Rocky and Bullwinkle cartoons. To use this search engine, the inquirer types in the URL of a given website of interest. The results show the frequency the Internet Archive crawled that website during a given year and what years the site was archived. When entering the URL <http://travel.state.gov>, it is revealed that that website is archived back to 1996, but shows Travel Warnings in 1996 from as far back as 1994. In this way, clicking on archived web pages of travel.state.gov since 1996 can one find Travel Warnings and Alerts issued by the U.S. Department of State. This is the only known public source of archived Travel Warnings and Alerts.

Methods

The research methodology for this study consists of a qualitative content analysis of the text of Travel Warnings and Alerts. Because this research is informed by Social Construction Theory, the research design employs principles from Yin's *Case Study Research: Design and Methods* (2014) to enhance reliability and validity. The data will be managed using ATLAS.ti software, which is a text management program that aids the researcher in coding, organizing, and mapping content.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

The State Department and Policy

Social Construction Theory is a theory of public policy. Applying it here is to assume that the State Department is a policy-making entity, which it is. In the early years of the United States' new government and up through the World Wars, though, the role of the Secretary of State and the Department of State were in line with the country's isolationist priorities. Simpson (1967, p. 3) writes:

Our relations with the rest of the world came more and more to be those of an aloof spectator. Observation, not action; reportage, not maneuver; the following of day-to-day events, not the mapping of large strategy and tactics, came to typify our stance overseas. Our diplomatic representatives were generally expected to remain on the sidelines, keeping Washington informed but avoiding a tricky business at which others were considered more adept and which others seemed to need more than we. It was thus that our diplomats came to be officially described as "the eyes and ears of our Government abroad." Their tools were little more than a pair of eyes, a pair of ears and a quill.

Isolationism became less tenable or sustainable with the advent of World War I. The United States was thrust into international affairs and geopolitics in a violent way. Still, it was not until after World War II that U.S. diplomacy moved far beyond a spectator sport. When Congress passed the Marshall Plan to rebuild devastated Europe, it "implied active involvement in the affairs of recipient countries" (Warwick, 1975, p. 17). The subsequent Cold War brought domestic and foreign policy together in a new way as the United States assumed its role as one of the great powers. Warwick (1975, p. 17) explains:

These developments and the U.S. position of dominance in the world affairs placed a heavy burden on the State Department and the Foreign Service. The new demands also clashed with some of the most venerable traditions in diplomacy. One of the strictest rules in the diplomatic code, for instance, is that the diplomat is a guest who is not to interfere in the political life of his host.

This contrast from observational diplomacy to an integrative one changed the role of the State Department. As the United States assumed a larger presence and advanced its interests on the global stage, the State Department was well placed to create and exercise policy. Indeed, shortly after President Truman installed General Marshall as Secretary of State, Marshall created in 1947 the Policy Planning Staff (Acheson, 1969). His Undersecretary at the time and later Secretary of State, Dean Acheson (1969, p. 214), wrote in his memoir, *Present at the Creation*, that General Marshall...

...conceived this group as being able to look ahead, not into the distant future, but beyond the vision of the operating officers caught in the smoke and crises of current battle; far enough ahead to see the emerging form of things to come and outline what should be done to meet or anticipate them.

This group is still in place today, and its current mission “is to take a longer term, strategic view of global trends and frame recommendations for the Secretary of State to advance U.S. interests and American values” (state.gov, 2015). Indeed, the Policy Planning Staff may be one of the most enduring and important policy offices in the federal government (Pugliaresi & Berliner, 1989). It has influenced foreign policy over decades. Its founding director and career foreign officer, George F. Kennan, had accurately and singly reported his prediction of Stalin’s true intentions after World War II when he was Deputy Chief of Mission serving in Moscow (Pugliaresi & Berliner, 1989). This propelled him into his founding policy position at State, and he and his staff became important contributors to post-war foreign policy. Over time, the Policy Planning Staff became even more involved in policy execution. In the early years of the Cold War, the staff was involved in “policy development on the implications of the Korean War, German rearmament, the Iranian oil dispute, the impact of thermonuclear weapons, and the periodic foreign exchange crises” (Pugliaresi & Berliner, 1989, p. 385). Its power waxed and

waned over the years, being reconstituted during the Nixon Administration and renamed during the Reagan Administration. Some Secretaries of State elevated Policy Planning Staff into prominence, such as under Kissinger, while others did not. Overall, it remained influential and relevant from its inception (Pugliaresi & Berliner, 1989). Today, its original name is restored, and its daily work is divided into seven areas: Analysis, Special Projects, Policy Coordination, Policy Articulation, Liaison, Planning Talks, and Dissent (state.gov, 2015).

In 2015, the stated mission of the U.S. Department of State was to “Create a more secure, democratic, and prosperous world for the benefit of the American people and the international community” (state.gov, 2015). Warwick (1975, p. 85), provided a more nuanced assessment:

Measured by its formal goals, the State Department’s most significant product is an elusive compound called “foreign policy.” State is also responsible for a variety of additional outputs, including support services for other agencies, passports, visas, educational exchange programs, and miscellaneous services to U.S. travelers. But in the local ethos, policy towers above all else. The problem is that it is not clear just what policy is, or who makes it. It may consist in formal decision and explicit plans of action or it may be a vaguely formulated set of attitudes toward another country or even an implicit decision to ignore a certain issue. Moreover, in State as elsewhere, policy is made at all levels of the organization, not only at the top. A consular official’s decision to refuse a visa to a student activist in Latin America is as much an expression of U.S. foreign policy as formal proclamations opposing student radicalism.

Establishing the State Department’s policy influence is important. It is easy to assume that the State Department or a foreign ministry of a given country is defined solely by its service to citizens and immigrants. After all, they create and issue passports for their citizens and provide consular support to them while traveling abroad. They staff consulates and embassies, where foreign nationals go to apply for visas to travel to the issuing country. Such descriptions, however, are superficial compared to the actual role of agencies such as the State Department. The State Department has true policy influence at all levels of its organization. If policy

decisions are made at all levels at State, as Warwick (1975) writes, then even the Travel Warning is a policy tool. It is in this context that this paper proceeds in its exploration of official State Department travel advice.

Travel Warning Research

Scholarly research on State Department or other foreign ministry travel advice is limited and considerably so when focusing on the U.S. State Department, specifically. Still, some work has been done, and it is reviewed here. While it was mentioned before that the United States may have been one of the first countries to issue a Travel Warning in 1914 as a prelude to World War I (Lowenheim, 2007; Riesman, 1940), that Warning was not made as part of a formal program of routinely disseminated risk communication to the traveling public. Rather, the State Department did not implement a structured Travel Warning program for dissemination to the general public until 1978 (Friend, 2011). “At that time, bulletins in the form of Notices, Cautions, Public Announcements, and warnings were issued to airlines, travel agencies, and passport processing centers for dissemination to their clients (Friend, 2011, p. 3).” Guidelines for what content would be disseminated to whom, however, was not sophisticated. For example, the Federal Aviation Authority disseminated intelligence in December 1988 “regarding an anonymous but credible threat to a Pan Am flight out of Frankfurt, Germany” (Friend, 2011, p. 3). State alerted several embassies, but not the public; the consequences were severe.

Years of discussion about what type of security threats would be unclassified and released to the public ensued (Friend, 2011). Finally, in 1990, “Congress passed the Aviation Security Improvement Act that in Section 109, added a requirement to the Federal Aviation Act that the President ‘develop guidelines for ensuring notification to the public of threats to civil

aviation in appropriate cases” (Friend, 2011, p. 3). As a result of this Act, State created the “No Double Standard Policy” (Friend, 2011, p. 3). This meant that what State would do for the public in the context of aviation, they would also do for all other non-aviation contexts. Its mechanism for dissemination of that information was a more robust travel advice system, including Travel Warnings and Alerts as well as country profiles (Friend, 2011).

The need for travel advice from government remains relevant. From 2009 through 2011, approximately “2,773 U.S. citizens died from non-natural causes, such as injuries and violence, while in foreign countries (excluding deaths occurring in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan)” (cdc.gov, 2015). Causes of death during that time included motor vehicle accidents (27 percent), homicides (22 percent), suicides (14 percent), and drowning (12 percent); disaster, aviation, drug-related instances, and other miscellaneous instances are the remaining causes of death (cdc.gov, 2015). As for severe injuries, those included “natural disasters, aviation accidents, drugs, terrorism, falls, burns, and poisoning” (cdc.gov, 2015). While men die in higher frequency than women abroad, women are more likely to be victims of acquaintance rape and sexual assault (cdc.gov, 2015). Keeping American travelers safe is clearly a problem. Despite evolving sophistication in providing detailed Travel Warnings to the public, the issue remains that potential travelers are either not reading or not heeding Travel Warnings and Alerts prior to departure.

Briggs (2002) studied travel advice issued by the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), which is the State Department equivalent for the United Kingdom. She draws attention to British travelers falling into a more frequent incidence of trouble abroad, including imprisonment, death, hospitalization, or the much less severe loss of passport (Briggs, 2002). She finds that the less developed a country is, the more likely a British traveler will experience

trouble of some kind. At the time of her study, British travelers were not making use of FCO travel advice, and advice was not getting to those who needed it. “Checking Foreign Office travel advice should become as natural as checking that you have your passport, tickets and foreign currency before travelling abroad (Briggs, 2002, p. 5).” Briggs (2002, p. 5) posed an interesting question: “When travelers have ignored official advice and ended up in trouble, should diplomatic resources be spent trying to get them out?” After all, if one’s government has recommended a traveler not visit a given country, it may be frustrating for consular support to exert financial and human resources sorting out a traveler’s avoidable misfortune. She also addressed that British travelers have many misconceptions about travel and safety abroad. First, one-fifth of surveyed British travelers were uninsured, while half believed that consular personnel could secure their release from custody if arrested. As for misconceptions, one-third believed consulates and embassies could issue temporary loans, and one-fifth believed they would have access to better healthcare treatment than locals (Briggs, 2002).

Better informed travelers make for safer travels—of course, not all unsafe conditions can be avoided, like natural disasters or unexpected political strife or terrorist activity. However, safety information about most countries is readily available and accessible and making informed choices can easily help travelers avoid harm. Briggs (2002, p. 12) writes:

Tom Hargrove was an agricultural scientist working in Colombia when he was kidnapped by the guerilla group the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Driving to work he was met by a crossroads and a choice: he could either drive through the busy, congested streets of Cali in the rush-hour or take the scenic route and, as he says, “This was the last decision I made for the next 12 months.” His car was stopped shortly down the road at a roadblock and he was taken away by the guerrillas at gunpoint. The risk of kidnapping in Colombia is clear in travel advice about the country, especially the fact that kidnappings usually take place, not in Colombia’s violent cities, but in the countryside around them. If Tom had known this, his decision that morning might have been different.

Travel risk will vary depending on the type of travel, whether travel is for vacation with a tour operator, independent, for business, or as an aid or development worker (Briggs, 2002). Formal tours tend to be the safest. Independent and business travel increases in risk commensurate with the level of development in the country visited. Aid and development workers are usually at the most risk (Briggs, 2002). Still, official travel advice exists specifically to protect citizen travelers, and they and sponsoring institutions can make use of them.

Friend (2011) writes that Travel Warnings can be used to develop effective response procedures for educational institutions and other organizations that send individuals or groups abroad. She lays out a ten step program for institutions to use Travel Warnings for risk assessment and response. They include an institution's appetite for risk, assessment of the sophistication of travelers, how to balance Travel Warnings with media reports and reports from the ground, and working with partner institutions abroad, among other steps (Friend, 2011).

Freedman (2005) writes about the politics of warning and the balance between combatting terrorism and communicating risk to the public. Indeed, Travel Warnings and Alerts serve an important purpose in creating an informed citizen traveler. The U.S. government has resources and personnel on the ground in almost all countries around the world, and they assume an appropriate role as risk communicator when informing the public about international travel conditions. Risk communication is "intended to supply laypeople with information they need to make informed, independent judgments about risks to health, safety, and the environment"...from ... "authoritative and trustworthy sources" (Morgan, 2002, p. 4).

Freedman (2005) articulates that communicating risk to the public through Travel Warning mechanisms can be delicate. In some instances, one government may not desire

creating hysteria or offending another government. Also, governments have dual interests in protecting their citizens from terrorism and also stopping it. Tipping off would-be terrorists that a government knows of their intentions could result in losing the opportunity to bring those terrorists to justice while catching them in the act. Conversely, perpetrators may react by scuttling their plans for mayhem if they see their intentions are known, resulting in no incident, and consequently weakening the power and credibility of future Travel Warnings (Freedman, 2005).

In a case study of the bombing of the tourist resort in Bali, Indonesia in 2002, Freedman (2005) found that the State Department had travel advisories to the effect that Americans should avoid all non-essential travel to Indonesia, citing potential for civil and ethnic violence, kidnapping, and terrorist activity in areas outside of Bali. The U.S. was particularly sensitive to terrorist activity and how it communicated risk level to Americans in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York. While the U.S. had shared intelligence with the Australian and British foreign ministries about Indonesia, neither of these countries issued similar Travel Warnings of their own. Consequently, when the bomb was detonated at the Indonesian resort, 88 Australians and 26 Britons of the total 200 victims were killed (Freedman, 2005). While a small amount of Americans also lost their lives, surviving family members of Australian and British victims expressed anger at being let down by their governments' failure to provide warnings about the danger of traveling to Bali (Freedman, 2005). Travelers felt that their countries had a responsibility to keep them informed.

Lowenheim (2007, p. 1) wrote of Travel Warnings from the perspective of a government's duty to "responsibilize" its citizenry. Responsibilization, a concept that emerged in social science literature in the mid-1990s, "is the process whereby the state encourages or even

impels people and communities to acknowledge—and assume—a responsibility to govern their own risks” (Lowenheim, 2007, p. 204). He identifies three modes of responsabilization:

1. A government divests itself from the role of welfare state through privatization of services and public-private partnerships to manage risk. For example, privatizing security services or healthcare may cause citizens to take a more active role in their security and health;
2. A government links citizen conduct to access of government services. For example, a citizen may need to be drug free in order to receive welfare benefits;
3. A government produces and disseminates knowledge about risk to its people, so they may be able to make informed choices about the consequences of their conduct (Lowenheim, 2007).

It is primarily in this third area that the author focuses his research on foreign office travel advice. He interprets “the practice of travel warning as a state effort to regulate transborder travel by responsabilizing the traveling citizen” (Lowenheim, 2007, p. 204). The author explains that the state has numerous reasons for responsabilizing its citizens in this way. First, there is the moral and ethical interest of keeping its citizens alive and well for their own sake and the sake of their loved ones. There is, also, a material interest for the state and citizen. It is simpler and requires fewer material and human resources to encourage a citizen to make responsible choices about travel safety before they embark than it would to assist a citizen while traveling abroad. When it comes to citizen travel, in other words, “prevention is better than cure” (Briggs, 2002, p. 6). If a citizen traveler is arrested, consular personnel are sent from the embassy of that person’s home country to meet them at their place of incarceration and to work with local authorities to assure that his or her rights according to the host country’s laws are being met. Legal cases can

be a drain on embassy personnel and may result in the extra cost of employee overtime compensation. In some cases of natural disaster, war, or other violence, an embassy may be ordered to evacuate its expatriates out of the country. For instance, the State Department was responsible for evacuating approximately 15,000 Americans from Lebanon during the summer of 2006 when war broke out there between Israel and Hezbollah (gao.gov, 2007). In that case, the evacuation was so massive that State had to cede control of operations to the Department of Defense and stopped having evacuees sign promissory notes for eventual repayment of evacuation costs (gao.gov, 2007). Other reasons for responsabilizing the citizen through providing Travel Warnings include the warning about the potential cost to the traveler—through injury, illness, ransom, or medical evacuation. Finally, the government issues Travel Warnings also out of fear of being sued for negligence for not warning citizens about the risk of travel to certain parts of the world (Lowenheim, 2007).

Lowenheim (2007, p. 212) establishes that the government assumes “a role of guiding people in making the right choices”, but it also faces a challenge of effectiveness. Many people do not read Travel Warnings—out of ignorance or indifference. Some travelers will read the Warning but disregard it out of a sense of adventure or a need to reconnect with a place of heritage and family (Lowenheim, 2007). The author also asserts controversy. He explains that Travel Warnings are not believed to be wholly pure in their protection of citizens. Some official travel advice is believed to serve as a means for “soft sanctions”, in which one country will punish or coerce another by using Travel Warnings to impede the flow of tourism dollars until that country acquiesces (Lowenheim, 2007, p. 206). Other travel advice, he asserts, may have its roots in prejudice, while, as a beneficiary of favoritism, another country may experience no Travel Warnings when one is warranted (Lowenheim, 2007).

Official travel advice issued as punishment has received some attention from scholars. In *Travel advice or trade embargo?*, Sharpley et al (1996) conducted a case study of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office's (FCO) treatment of The Gambia, a country in West Africa. Its thesis is that tourism is an aspect of international political economy that can be used or manipulated to achieve economic and political ends. Sharpley et al (1996, p. 2) explain, "...the potential exists for the governments of tourism-generating countries to influence, through travel advice, the flow of tourists, thereby exerting economic and political pressure on destination countries."

The Gambia is among the smallest countries in all of Africa. It is poor, relies heavily on international aid, and, since the 1960s, was an ideal tourist destination for Northern Europeans desperate for sunshine and warmth during their winter months (Sharpley et al, 1996). Most tourism to The Gambia was managed by British and Scandinavian tour operators. The revenue from tourism was quite significant for The Gambia. The authors explained that because of the extended family structure of Gambian families, up to ten people were supported by one salary. Consequently, one job in the tourism industry had a powerful, rippling impact there.

A former British colony, The Gambia became independent in 1965. Its first president remained in power from 1970 until 1994. Citing widespread corruption, the Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC) assumed power in July 1994 in a bloodless coup (Sharpley et al, 1996). AFPRC immediately "stated its commitment to human rights, freedom of the press, and the safety of foreign visitors and expatriates" (Sharpley et al, 1996, p. 3). Even though no tourists were harmed, the FCO issued three subsequent travel advisories warning Brits from traveling there on vacation. In case the FCO travel advice was insufficient, FCO sent an unprecedented letter to each British agency operating tours in The Gambia alerting each to the

advisories and writing that it would be irresponsible not to heed them (Sharpley et al, 1996). All British tour operators save one cancelled its trips to The Gambia; many Scandinavian operators followed the British lead. In just a few short months, consequently, Sharpley et al (1996, p. 3) describe:

Over 1000 jobs in hotels disappeared, at least eight hotels closed, and people indirectly dependent on tourism, such as taxi drivers and souvenir vendors, immediately lost their primary source of income. Another 1000 jobs were lost at the country's largest horticulture business; in the absence of scheduled flights between London and Banjul, charter flights had been fulfilling an important function as freight carriers, but following withdrawal of the major operators, fresh produce could no longer be shipped out of the country. Employment in many other sectors of the economy, including agriculture and brewing, was also threatened whilst the government itself faced a serious shortfall in revenue from tourism-related sources such as sales tax, airport departure tax and import duties.

The one British tour operator and other Dutch and German operators that continued trips to The Gambia did so without incident to the travelers. Nonetheless, the FCO insisted that its advisories were for the safety of British travelers. Inconsistently, the British government did not evacuate the 700 British expatriates living in The Gambia or encourage that they leave (Sharpley et al, 1996), which begs the question, did the FCO believe The Gambia safe or not? The authors could only speculate as to the British government's motivation for an "unofficial trade embargo", but they believe it was political. The British government maintained a friendly, political relationship with the president of The Gambia, which was "an important and geographically strategic ally in West Africa" (Sharpley et al, 1996, p. 4). The AFPRC had originally released a four-year plan to return The Gambia to democratically elected government. Under pressure, it shortened the transition to two years, and the FCO revised its travel advisory (Sharpley et al, 1996).

Withholding tourism and trade is an acceptable method of sanction and coercion, but it is usually done through an official trade embargo, such as the United States' decades-long relationship with Cuba. A surreptitious embargo under the guise of a Travel Warning meant to keep travelers safe is not an openly common practice, which does not preclude its existence. The question of sanctions through Travel Warnings was one of which Combs (2009) set out to address in a master's thesis titled, *A multivariate analysis of State Department travel warnings*. In her study, she used a binary logistic regression to explore the determinants of Travel Warnings, with particular emphasis on answering if Warnings were a sanctioning tool or mechanism to protect would-be travelers. Her sample included all Travel Warnings active at one moment in time, September of 2009, by the U.S. Department of State and the foreign offices of Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom. She hypothesized that decreased political stability, high crime and violence, and non-democratic state status would determine the issuance of Travel Warnings (Combs, 2009). Her dependent variable was Travel Warning/risk, and her independent variables were level of democracy, percent of Muslim population, crime, terrorism, civil unrest, diplomatic relations, G20 membership, and foreign direct investment. She used information from the CIA World Factbook, U.S. Department of State, G20, U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis, United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, and Freedom House Organization to determine each variable.

Combs (2009, p. 24) found that the State Department issued "travel warnings based mainly on the declining political stability of a given country". She also found a significant sanctioning effect present for non-democratic states, but not a significant effect for predominantly Muslim countries. She found that crime played no role as a determinant for a Travel Warnings. GDP, foreign direct investment, diplomatic relations, and G20 membership

also did not play a significant role. The models for the foreign ministries of Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom produced results similar to the U.S., with slight variations (Combs, 2009). Combs' work is revealing, and her small sample in time encourages more research. Her findings indicate a significant sanctioning effect, but also that the majority of Travel Warnings are meant to keep American travelers safe.

Theoretical Framework

Combs (2009) designed her dependent variables using criteria that classified countries by their economic, social, political, and religious statuses. Classifying target groups based on their circumstances brings this paper to its theoretical anchor. Schneider and Ingram (1993) introduced their theory of social construction of target populations and its implications for politics and policy. "...Social construction of target populations refers to the cultural characterizations or popular images of the person or groups whose behavior and well-being are affected by public policy (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 334)." In later publications, Schneider, Ingram, and deLeon (2014, p. 105) further defined social construction as "important political attributes" or "powerful images or stereotypes". Schneider and Ingram (1994, p. 334) explain:

Our theory contends that the social construction of target populations has a powerful influence on public officials and shapes both the policy agenda and the actual design of policy. There are strong pressures for public officials to provide beneficial policy to powerful, positively constructed target populations and to devise punitive, punishment-oriented policy for negatively constructed groups.

The authors use the terms target population or target groups to identify who will receive benefits or burdens as a result of democratic policy design. This policy design is meant to "achieve some public purpose that may include approbation and punishment" (Schneider et al,

2014, p. 107). This concept represents the first proposition of their framework, which divides target populations into four categories.

1. Advantaged
2. Contenders
3. Dependents
4. Deviants

For the purposes of this paper, target groups in Social Construction Theory will be extended to foreign countries.

“The advantaged have high levels of political power resources and enjoy positive social construction as deserving people important in the political and social hierarchy in general and, more specifically, in social welfare as broadly construed (Schneider et al, 2014, p. 110).” In a study of the theoretical application of Schneider and Ingram’s social construction framework in scholarly research over twenty years, Pierce et al (2014) found the following groups categorized as Advantaged by researchers: veterans, elderly, farm lobby, government workers, home owners, middle class, mortgage banks, Native American casino owners, prison administrators, scientists, and environmental organizations, among others. Schneider et al (2014) would add small business owners, soldiers, job creators, primary care physicians, and more. In the context of foreign countries from the U.S. perspective, Advantaged countries are likely Western democracies (with special exceptions like Japan) and well developed.

“Contenders have substantial political resources but are negatively regarded by many in the population as relatively selfish, untrustworthy, and morally suspect (Schneider et al, 2014, p. 111).” Researchers from 1993 to 2013 categorized the following groups as Contenders:

pharmaceutical companies, property developers, gaming industry, affluent people, political activists, and more (Pierce et al, 2014). Schneider et al (2014) add major labor unions, insurance companies, firearm industries, big banks and lenders, and Wall Street brokers. They explain that these groups are likely to benefit from their political power, but policy makers do so clandestinely, so as not to be openly associated with supporting them. In the context of foreign countries, Contenders are likely resource wealthy and maybe non-democratic countries like powerful China and Russia.

“Dependents are positively constructed as deserving, at least in terms of sympathy and pity (Schneider et al, 2014, p. 112).” Researchers have studied Dependents that include different classes of the elderly, immigrants, AIDS patients who are women or children, the impoverished, students, public housing tenants, and the working class, among others (Pierce et al, 2014). Schneider et al (2014) add mothers, children, the hungry, homeless, handicapped, disaster victims, and others of misfortune. While Dependents lack political power, they have sympathy. The sympathy accounts for some benefits, but they are limited and inadequate. “Because they do not have a strong role in the creation of national wealth, dependents are viewed as ‘good’ people but considerably less deserving of actual investments than advantaged groups (Schneider et al, 2014, p. 112).” Programs created for these groups are the first to be cut during periods of recession. In the context of foreign countries, Dependents are countries that cause no one trouble, are poor, are victimized, and have underdeveloped infrastructure, like various African, Asian, Eastern European, Latin American, and Pacific Island countries.

“Deviant lacks both political power and positive social constructions and tend to receive a disproportionate share of burdens and sanctions (Schneider et al, 2014, p. 112).” Historically, researchers have found the following groups to be socially constructed as Deviant: gay people or

minorities living with AIDS, criminals, illegal immigrants, the obese, impoverished minorities, public landlords, smokers, and others (Pierce et al, 2014). Schneider et al (2014, p. 112) add “...terrorists, sex offenders, welfare cheats, deadbeat dads, young male minority dropouts, ... and drug dealers”. These groups are targeted as the ills of society and are meted out punishments, whether deserved or not, through policy action or policy indifference. Policymakers benefit from being tough on such groups. In the context of foreign countries, Deviants could be non-democratic states hostile to the U.S., such as North Korea and Iran.

Across these four categories, there will be overlap, as is typical in Social Construction Theory. Russia is pulled toward Contender because of its military resources, but its aggressive behavior in neighboring countries like Ukraine likewise pulls it toward Deviant territory. Conversely, while Iran’s behavior can be classified as Deviant, its financial and arms support of paramilitary groups throughout the Middle East, like Hezbollah (Smith, 2013), pulls it toward Contender status. Does North Korea really have a nuclear weapon? If so, maybe it moves itself across a Deviant/Contender spectrum. India is the largest democracy in the world, is resource rich, is a nuclear power, has poor infrastructure, and many of its people are desperately poor—its construction may cross Advantaged, Contender, and Dependent. Most countries, though, will be more precisely constructed into one category, which leads to this paper’s first guiding hypothesis: Countries that are constructed as Advantaged are less likely to have a Travel Warning or Alert while countries that are constructed as Contender, Dependent, and Deviant are more likely to have one. This does not suppose causation, but rather a relationship.

Most groups do not and cannot change their status, and this concept represents the second proposition in social construction theory. Schneider et al (2014) propose that social construction is accompanied over time with a feedback and feed forward effect. In other words, socially

constructed groups begin to perpetuate their status in a self-fulfilling way. Their typology as Advantaged, Contender, Dependent, or Deviant is embraced as an identity, and it affects their political participation and attitudes. Future groups of immigrants, the obese, or minorities may inherit their typology after years of subtle and overt policy action against them. Further, policymakers may continue to treat target groups a particular way simply because that is how they have always been treated. Bias and prejudice are reinforced over time. In the context of foreign countries, many African countries seem to remain trapped in a vicious cycle of entrenched poverty and corruption despite being resource rich. Mistrust and suspicion of communist China remain despite China being one of the United States' most significant trade partners.

The third proposition is that “social constructions emerge from emotional and intuitive reactions and then are justified with selective attention to evidence” (Schneider et al, 2014, p. 121). Kahneman (2011) referred to this as fast thinking. Individuals rely on impulse, intuition, impressions, feelings, and heuristics to make an inordinate amount of judgments and decisions throughout every moment of the day. When policymakers have to make decisions about target groups, they make use of these heuristics and even exploit them.

Proposition four allows for the possibility of groups changing their social constructions. It is important to observe that some groups may be able to change their status over time. Gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender individuals, for example, represent a group that has had a drastic change in public opinion over the past decade. Schneider et al (2014) suggest that the higher education and income held by people in this group and their likelihood of not being ghettoized play a role. In the context of foreign countries, some foreign countries have clearly experienced a change in social construction. For example, Russia would likely have been

classified as deviant in construction during the Cold War. After the Iron Curtain fell, Russia became an emerging democracy with a capitalist economy, with residual, mutual distrust that continues to exist today. Iran was a U.S. ally until its revolution in 1979 (Halliday, 2012), and henceforth has been known for its anti-U.S. orientation. Presently, Cuba may be moving in the reverse direction from Deviant to something else as the Obama Administration opens diplomatic relations with it for the first time in over fifty years, having removed the country from its list of State Sponsors of Terror (state.gov, 2015).

The fifth and final proposition of social construction theory addresses policy change. “Types and patterns of policy change vary depending on the social construction and power of target groups (Schneider et al, 2014, p. 129).” Many public policy theories address the phenomenon of policy change over time, but they do not address “who benefits from change and whether change impacts the conditions of democracy” (Schneider et al, 2014, p. 129). Within this framework, policy change is predictably stable. Advantaged groups will receive benefits, and will be largely satisfied. Deviant groups will be the recipients of punitive policy, and the public will laud policymakers with approval. Research shows that the public is more approving when policy punishes such groups rather than providing treatment (Schneider et al, 2014). The formula is easily maintained and change occurs when policymakers deviate from making Advantaged groups happy or Deviant groups are given resources of which the public disapproves. When this takes place, change occurs, and policymaking returns to equilibrium (Schneider et al, 2014).

Since Schneider and Ingram developed this theory, scholarly work that featured the social construction framework was published in over 80 different journals. These include the *American Political Science Review*, *Policy Studies Journal*, *Journal of Public Administration Research and*

Theory, and *Social Science Quarterly* (Pierce et al, 2014). It has appeared in numerous books, and there is also international scholarly interest in this theory. Over time, scholars extended this theory into different groups of people, organizations, spaces, and even groups of animals. This paper intends to extend this theory to different countries and how they may be socially constructed from the U.S. point of view. After all, numerous studies have already applied the Social Construction Framework to cultural and immigrant populations. Some studies include pre-World War II Japanese immigrants and contemporary immigrants from Japan, China, Scandinavia, and other parts of Europe. Studies have also included immigrants who are elderly, children, farmers, students, women, and poor. They have included immigrants who came to the U.S. illegally (Pierce et al, 2014). An immigrant population is a representation of a larger culture, a reflection from some other place—in other words, a country. As such, if a population can be constructed based on its cultural identity, it is conceivable that countries of the world may also be classified into the typologies of Advantaged, Contender, Dependent, and Deviant and that the U.S. government would shape policy toward those countries accordingly. It has been established that the State Department is a policy influencing and implementing arm, and scholars have shown that official travel advice from various governments may be influenced by more than just safety of a given travel destination. That said, this paper's second guiding hypothesis is that while social construction plays a role in the creation of Travel Warnings, most official State Department travel advice is for the pure purpose of transmitting safety information to U.S. citizen travelers.

Chapter 3: Research Design

Archived Documents

This research employs a theoretically guided, qualitative methodology (Yin, 2014). The data is the body of State Department Travel Warnings and Travel Alerts from 1994 through 2014, taking 6 year intervals out of each of the three presidential administrations of that time period. Historic Travel Warnings and Alerts have not been archived at the State Department Library or at the National Archives, according to written exchanges with librarians at each institution (J. Sherer, personal communication, January 20, 2015; D. Langbart, personal communication, January 28, 2015). The author of this paper has submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the State Department, which has been confirmed as in process by the State Department but has not yet been fulfilled. The length of time and uncertainty of fulfillment called for an alternate source for Travel Warnings and Alerts.

The Internet Archive is a non-profit organization that is essentially a library of the Internet's websites. Its archive features a search tool called the Wayback Machine, which archives billions of historic webpages. If a researcher enters the URL, <http://travel.state.gov>, a page will appear with each year the Internet Archive has archived, or 'crawled' in Internet Archive parlance, that particular website. Within each year, a website will have been crawled numerous times. The Wayback Machine began crawling <http://travel.state.gov> in 1996 and has continued to do so through the present. The 1996 State Department website includes Travel Warnings and Public Announcements (as Travel Alerts were termed then) as far back as 1994. Those documents are included in the analysis because they were still officially active in 1996. Each Travel Warning and Alert was copied and electronically saved as well as printed. The

Internet Archives is the only place where historic Travel Warnings and Alerts exist that are readily available to the public.

ATLAS.ti Software

Data was collected by manually mining the Internet Archive, week by week, year by year since 1996. The data was analyzed using content analysis, which was aided by ATLAS.ti software. Berg and Lune (2012, p. 349) write, “Content analysis is a careful, detailed, systematic examination and interpretation of a particular body of material in an effort to identify patterns, themes, biases, and meanings.” ATLAS.ti is a text management program that assists in the organization, coding, and mapping of themes that emerge from the content analysis. It is not an automated, logarithmic coding software; rather, it requires the qualitative analysis by the researcher, just not in the traditional style with pencil and paper. The software manages the data, while the author analyzes it (Bernard & Ryan, 2010).

Through content analysis, the author produced an index of every Travel Warning and Alert that was issued over the period studied and includes descriptive data, such as: country name, organizational components of each document, duration, time, frequency, type (Warning or Alert), and document content. The reasons for Warnings is the bulk of what emerged from the content analysis. As themes emerged, the author used ATLAS.ti to produce a list of codes in the software. In addition to thematic coding by the author through content analysis, this study relied upon a peer, experienced coder to promote intercoder reliability (Creswell, 2013; Yin, 2014; Bernard & Ryan, 2010). With intercoder reliability, when coders produce similar themes derived from the content, that reliability should indicate that the themes are also valid (Bernard & Ryan, 2010). Pattern matching, also known as the congruence method in political science research,

adds to the internal validity of this study by determining if the findings match predictions made (Yin, 2014).

Intercoder Reliability

Reliability in content analysis is a reasonable concern. Content analysis is slow and solitary, and qualitative research is not meant to be generalizable in the way that quantitative research is. It has a different purpose. Still, there are methods to enhance the trustworthiness of qualitative research output, and one of those ways is intercoder reliability. The addition of at least one more coder for the sample content allows a researcher to “test whether people think that the same constructs apply to the same chunks of text” (Bernard & Ryan, p. 301, 2010). The process is to take a selection of documents from the sample and have a second coder code those documents. The two coders meet to compare how each coder coded the same documents, and they discuss where there is agreement and disagreement (Creswell, 2013).

The second coder for this study took a selection of 10 Travel Warning and Alerts from across the sample. Across the 10 documents, there was approximately 97 percent agreement and 3 percent disagreement between the two coders. What is considered enough with regard to agreement is subjective, but most qualitative researchers today agree that over 70 percent is considered adequate agreement while at least 80 percent is considered strong agreement or high reliability (Bernard & Ryan, 2010). One disagreement concerned a coding choice about corruption. For the Travel Warning for Chad in August 2011, the State Department noted that “law enforcement/military units have been implicated in violent crime” (DOS, Chad a, 2011). The primary research coded this Reason code as corruption, but the second coder disagreed, saying that coding it as corruption was a leap. Corruption to the second coder implies systemic

and intentional subversion of law and order, and those incidents may have been isolated and the offenders prosecuted. Other disagreements included the word “narcoterrorist” found in a Travel Warning for Colombia being captured as the Reason code, Narcotrafficking, by the primary coder (DOS, Colombia a, 2006). The secondary coder believed these two nouns to be distinct—that a narcotrafficker may not always be involved in terror. Generally, there was overwhelming agreement between the two coders, and this agreement lends to the reliability that the codes and the process for coding used across the sample were sound, sensible, and consistent.

Managing the Sample Size

From 1994 through 2014, 1,662 individual Travel Warnings and Public Announcements/Travel Alerts were available for extraction from archived State Department webpages using the Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine search tool. More travel advice documents had been issued over that time period and appeared on the <http://travel.state.gov> website; however, some of the documents were not live links. There were not many of these—approximately tens, not hundreds. When attempting to open those document links, the pursuer was led to a “not found” page. Each document ranged from being no longer than a paragraph to up to a dozen pages; most were just a few pages. The Internet Archives began capturing the <http://travel.state.gov> website as far back as 1996, and the 1996 year included active Travel Warnings and Public Announcements issued as far back as 1994. As such, the sample of available Warnings and Alerts extends from 1994 through present day, which makes for a rather large sample, which was limited in the ways described below. First, the documents studied were limited to the following six years of each of the three presidential administrations of the time period studied, generally for the purpose of convenience relating to sample availability:

- Clinton Administration: 1994 – 1999*
- Bush Administration: 2001 – 2006
- Obama Administration: 2009 – 2014

(*Note: The Bush and Obama Administration samples start with the first six years of both administrations, but the Clinton Administration sample starts 1994, his second year, because Travel Warning and Alert data were not available for 1993.)

The data set was limited further to Travel Warnings, Public Announcements, and Travel Alerts that were country-specific rather than region-specific. For example, there were multiple Worldwide Cautions that generally spoke of existential threats on a global scale, such as terrorism or disease that knew no country boundaries. Other examples included Al-Qaeda activity over many years or Ebola more recently. Some regional Warnings or Alerts were titled: ‘the Caribbean’, ‘East Africa’, ‘the Middle East and North Africa’, ‘West Africa’, ‘the French West Indies’, ‘Central Asia’, ‘the Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf’, ‘Europe’, and ‘the Pacific Rim’—again referring to widespread terrorism, violence, natural disasters, or disease. Other Travel Alerts were specific to destructive but temporary forces of nature typical to a certain region and season, including document titles such as the ‘Pacific Typhoon Season’, ‘South Pacific Cyclone Season’, ‘Hurricane Season’, and ‘Tsunami in Asia and East Africa’. One Alert was issued for a regional sporting event, the ‘ICC Cricket World Cup’ for Bangladesh, India, and Sri Lanka, which alerted traveling Americans to the potential for violence and petty theft despite not having actual credible threats to those ends; the State Department wanted Americans to be on guard given the potential for danger. Finally, other non-country specific Alerts were in relation to outbreaks of disease, such as a SARS-specific Alert in 2003. Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) was commonly associated with China during that outbreak, and it became an acronym with which Americans were generally familiar at the time. China, however, was not mentioned once in that particular Public Announcement. Instead,

advice was generally provided about SARS prevention with numerous citations of and referrals to the Centers for Disease Control and the World Health Organization. Later advisories of which disease outbreaks were the subject were issued for Ebola with association to the West African region. One Travel Alert marked the first anniversary of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City. These regional documents were all Public Announcements (later called Travel Alerts) because of their short-term nature; not one was a Travel Warning.

Filtering out two years from each of the three presidential administrations as well as the regional Alerts brought the document count to 1,303 Travel Warnings and Public Announcements/Travel Alerts. Those documents in aggregate still presented a large sample and required some further filtering. Occasionally, a Travel Warning or Alert would be duplicated (sometimes repeatedly) within the same year, perhaps even a week later, and would be identical to its predecessor excepting the inclusion of one new piece of information. For example, on January 31, 2011, the State Department issued a Travel Warning to describe violence taking place in Egypt during what the world would later refer to as the Arab Spring. In that Travel Warning, the following contextual information, emphasis added, was provided for the reader, which was that the “Department of State [had] *authorized the voluntary departure* of dependents and non-emergency employees.” It was followed by a Travel Warning for Egypt a little over two weeks later on February 18, 2011 that was mostly identical to its predecessor, but the language for that Warning had changed to: “On February 1, the Department of State *ordered the departure* of all non-emergency U.S. government personnel and family members from Egypt due to the ongoing political and social unrest.” Notice that the language changed from “authorized voluntary departure” to “ordered the departure”. Then, in the subsequent Travel Warning for

Egypt on March 29, 2011, it noted: “The U.S. Embassy in Cairo remains on ordered departure status for dependents, but most employees have returned, and the Embassy is resuming normal operations.” In other words, ordered departure had been lifted for most embassy and consular employees, but not for their children and/or spouses, whose presence in the country remained prohibited. In those three instances, the bulk of each successive document remained identical except for those three very specific updates. In those cases and cases similar to those, the first version of the Warning or Alert was read and coded in its entirety. For the subsequent duplications, the entire document was read, but only the updates were coded. In other Warnings or Alerts over the eighteen-year sample, the State Department would issue an identical document and provide the reader with the caveat that there had been no change. For example, the Travel Warning for Iran issued on November 22, 2004 noted: “This Warning is being reissued without change after periodic review and supersedes the Travel Warning for Iran issued May 14, 2004.” In most of those cases, the document was not coded a second time.

Application of Social Construction Theory

Each country of the world was categorized into Schneider and Ingram’s four target group categories: Advantaged, Contender, Dependent, and Deviant. The author created his own index using existing information about the countries of the world to classify them into the social construction categories, paying particular attention to each country’s economic development (high or low power) and political values (positive or negative deservingness or regard). This index is meant to reflect how countries are socially constructed from the U.S. point of view. After the content analysis, this study moves into the analysis of the frequency of Travel Warning and Alert issuance compared to each country’s social construction. The data derived from the content analysis is applied to see what type of content is associated with each social construction

country category. With regard to Social Construction Theory, the research proceeded with two guiding hypotheses:

- H₁ Countries that are constructed as Advantaged are less likely to have a Travel Warning or Alert while countries that are constructed as Contender, Dependent, and Deviant are more likely to have them.
- H₂ While Social Construction plays a role in the creation and issuance of Travel Warnings and Alerts, most official State Department travel advice is for the purpose of transmitting safety information to U.S. citizen travelers.

Purpose of Study and Research Questions

As this study is anchored by a theoretical framework, it is inspired by the following research questions:

1. What is the nature of State Department Travel Warnings and Alerts and what is their function?
2. Is there a relationship between how a foreign country is socially constructed and its issuance of State Department Travel Warnings and Alerts?

The purpose of this study is to explore the world of State Department Travel Warnings and Alerts and to collect them, analyze them, and understand them in the context of Social Construction Theory. Themes that emerge from the content analysis should contribute to the understanding of what exactly official travel advice is composed of and how the social construction of countries from the U.S. perspective relates to official State Department travel advice issuance. This exploratory study is significant because it makes a contribution to the

academic discipline of public affairs, it has professional relevance, and it extends Social Construction Theory. The U.S. Department of State is a policy generating and policy executing agency. Travel Warnings and Alerts are documents that the State Department produces and disseminates about countries across the globe, and those countries can see when the U.S. government warns its citizens not to travel there. They are significant policy documents because each document represents a decision State made about how it will represent a given country to a U.S. citizen traveler.

The contribution to the academic discipline starts at the most basic level of first collecting a body of Travel Warnings and Alerts, as they have not only not been archived in the State Department Library or the National Archives, but they also have not been studied. The content analysis is the deeper level of contribution, as it is not systematically known what constitutes the composition of these documents as a body of policy output. In the realm of professional interest, many organizations and institutions send people abroad for various purposes. Colleges and universities send students and faculty abroad. Government sends its personnel to travel or live abroad to carry out their work. Corporations have their employees conduct international business, and tour companies deliver their product by facilitating enjoyable experiences for vacationers. This study helps the practitioner with regard to using and interpreting State Department Travel Warnings and Alerts. Moreover, these organizations and institutions rely on State Department travel advice to make decisions about sending people abroad in order to promote traveler safety and in the interest of organizational liability (Friend, 2011; Lowenheim, 2007). As such, these entities need to know that the documents that they rely on so strictly reflect the safety situation on the ground for Americans traveling to various countries. Travel Warnings

created for any other reason besides U.S. citizen safety could have a compromising effect on the integrity of those documents.

Finally, extending Social Construction Theory to foreign countries could produce worrisome implications. If this exploration finds that positively socially constructed countries (i.e., the Advantaged) rarely have Travel Warnings, it may lead to the question, is the State Department favoring Advantaged countries by not always producing Travel Warnings and Alerts when they would be produced under the same circumstances in negatively socially constructed countries? As an exploratory, qualitative analysis, this study should produce potential for ample further research to answer such questions.

Chapter 4: Data Analyses and Findings

The purpose of this study is to first explore and describe the content of archived State Department Travel Warnings and Alerts. The qualitative research method used to achieve that goal is content analysis, aided by ATLAS.ti software. ATLAS.ti is a content analysis tool for the researcher to utilize; it is not a software that analyzes content in an automated way. Instead, it allows the researcher to highlight words and lines of text and assign a code to them. When the words ‘code’, ‘coded’, or ‘coding’ are used in the remainder of this paper, they refer to a word or length of text from the primary document that was highlighted, extracted, and assigned a descriptor (that is, a code) by the researcher as a result of the content analysis. A code list is stored in the software, and selecting any code in that list transports the researcher back to the primary document in which it was first coded. It is a vast organizational improvement on what would otherwise have to be done by hand since over 1,300 primary documents were used for this study. ATLAS.ti also provides tools for basic analyses and descriptive statistics. The second purpose of this study is to see if there is a relationship between which countries of the world are subjects of State Department issued Travel Warnings and Alerts and how they may be socially constructed, relying upon Social Construction Theory. Further, using the content described in the first stage of this research, this paper analyzes what type of content and language is used for which socially constructed country categories. For example, are the content and the language used to deliver it different for Advantaged constructed countries compared to Contender constructed countries (or Dependent and Deviant constructed countries)? This chapter ends with pattern matching (Yin, 2014) of comparing findings to the guiding hypotheses presented in chapter three.

Descriptive Statistics

Coding for only new information in documents that were otherwise identical made for a more manageable coding process. Despite these filtering efforts, the sample was still vast. Ultimately, 31,099 pieces of text (single words, phrases, sentences, or blocks of sentences) were coded across the 1,303 documents using the ATLAS.ti software, which was instrumental in coding and organizing that quantity of documents. This large sample, though, helped to fulfill the qualitative purpose of this research: to describe the components and content of State Department Travel Warnings and Alerts over time. Each document included the country that was the subject of the Warning or Alert, whether it was an actual Travel Warning, Public Announcement, or, later, a Travel Alert, which was the term that replaced Public Announcement. Each document also included the date it was issued and usually contact information for the nearest servicing U.S. Embassy or Consulate. If it was a Public Announcement/Travel Alert, it also included the previous document it superseded and when it would expire.

Lebanon was the most frequent subject country of Travel Warnings, with a total of 32 for the years studied. It was followed by Pakistan with 31, Algeria and Central African Republic with 30 each, Afghanistan with 29, Iraq and Israel with 28 each, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Yemen with 26 each, and Haiti with 25. Those are the top 10; the complete list can be seen in Appendix A. The top 10 countries with the most Travel Alerts were the Philippines with 22, Mexico with 21, Nepal with 20, India with 14, Malaysia and Russia with 12 each, Egypt, Kyrgyz Republic and Thailand with 11 each, and Uganda with 10. These countries are socially constructed in similar ways, which will be discussed at length.

Components

In most Travel Alerts, the State Department would regularly provide whether or not the document replaced or superseded a previous Alert as well as when it would expire. For Travel Warnings, expiration dates were not provided because the nature of a Warning is that it is a protracted state of danger with no immediate end in sight, but there usually was a note as to which previous Warning it was replacing or superseding. While that data are useful for descriptive statistics and are certainly noteworthy components, the content of each Warning and Alert was the focus of the research. To that end, very early in the coding process, it became clear that each document had three primary content components: 1) Background (contextual) information, 2) Reasons for the Warning or Alert, and 3) Advice in the form of verbs. As such, the three primary code structures were, “Background:_____”, “Reason:_____”, and “Verb:_____”. Take this text from the Travel Warning for Rwanda on September 12, 1995:

The Department of State warns U.S. citizens to defer travel to Rwanda. Sporadic fighting continues inside Rwanda; border areas in particular have been the sight of low-key insurgent outbreaks. Further, poor communication, transportation, and health services continue to make travel in Rwanda difficult and potentially hazardous. The U.S. Embassy in Kigali resumed consular services July 26, 1995 (DOS, Rwanda a, 1995).

Employing those three primary code components, first the State Department provides immediate advice, which is to defer travel to Rwanda. This advice was coded as “Verb: Travel:Defer...”. Then it provides a handful of reasons for issuing this Warning, including that there is insurgent activity, telecommunications are limited, and that travel in that country can be hazardous, to name a few. Those reasons were coded thusly: “Reason:Insurgence”, “Reason:PoorTelecommunications”, and “Reason:Hazardous”. There was also some contextual

information about consular services, which was coded as “Background:ConsularServicesResumed”. Accounting for just Background, Reason, and Verb codes, 25,424 pieces of text were coded over the 1,303 documents. Much of the following will focus on that particular content. Other pieces of text coded were dates, country names, document type, and salient words and phrases that did not neatly fit into the three primary code categories of Background, Reason, and Verb; altogether, 31,099 pieces of text were coded. There will be some discussion of those codes, as well. Using the discourse analysis qualitative method (see Appendix B), further insight was derived from the coding and is included throughout the following summary of the three code types (Putney, 1994). While the following sections are meant to fill the descriptive goals of this qualitative research, they include some analyses through deepening the content analysis and are then followed by analyses using the Social Construction theoretical framework.

Background Codes

Each travel advice document provided more than just the description of danger and actionable advice. They all consistently included some type of background information that helped the consumer of the information to understand the context in which the danger was set. There were 138 total codes for contextual information, coded as “Background:_____”; see Appendix C for the complete list of Background codes. Some of the least common codes are noteworthy, even if found across the 1,303 documents only once. For example, one piece of contextual information that appeared just once was particularly revealing in the June 10, 1997 Travel Warning for Afghanistan, in which it was indicated that “alcohol, video tapes, music, television and social activities between the sexes” were prohibited (DOS, Afghanistan a, 1997). Information tucked into a Travel Warning provides a glimpse of living under a severe regime.

Although less common codes will be mentioned when they aid discussion, the following three sections on Background, Reason, and Verb codes focus on the most salient of those codes. Table 1 shows the top 25 Background codes; that is, it shows the pieces of contextual information that were the most common across the Travel Warning and Alert documents sampled over the eighteen years.

Table 1

Top 25 Background Codes

Background Code	Frequency
Background:U.S.Govt:Personnel:TravelRestricted	390
Background:ConsularServicesLimited	335
Background:BorderAreas:Dangerous	273
Background:U.S.Govt:Personnel:Behavior:Modified/Restricted	165
Background:HostGovt:Cannot/WillNot/Incapable:AssureSafety	128
Background:U.S.Govt:Personnel:Dependents:Evacuated	106
Background:U.S.Govt:Personnel:Full/PartialEvacuation	105
Background:HostGovt:ImposedTravelRestrictions	95
Background:U.S.Govt:Personnel/Dependents:Evacuation:Lifted	83
Background:HostGovt/Police:TakingSecurityPrecautions	74
Background:NoU.S.Embassy/Services	58
Background:U.S.Govt:Personnel:Dependents:Prohibited	58
Background:DualCitizenshipHolders:Impeded	47
Background:PeaceAccords	47
Background:U.N.	47
Background:VisaRequired	47
Background:U.S.Govt:Personnel:Reduced	46
Background:U.S.Embassy:OperationsSuspended/Closed	41
Background:Cease-fire	38
Background:NoDistinctionInTargetingOfficialsOrCivilians	38
Background:U.S.Govt:RepresentedByThirdNation	36
Background:Sanctions	34
Background:NoDiplomaticRelations	32
Background:WarCriminal/Terrorists:Arrested/Sentenced/Killed	32
Background:U.S.Govt:Military:Action	29

The code Background:U.S.Govt:Personnel:TravelRestricted appeared the most frequently, coded 390 times. It is important to remember that travel advice issued by the State

Department is not just for American tourists. Rather, it is created and disseminated for all purposes of travel—business, visiting family, study, and work, including living or working abroad as an employee of the U.S. government. Perhaps a very impactful piece of information is consumed when the American traveler reads that not even U.S. Department of State personnel are allowed to move freely in a given country. On August 23, 1996, the Travel Warning for Burundi in East Africa reads:

The U.S. Embassy has reduced its staff over the last year and continues to restrict U.S. Government personnel from traveling outside the capital due to the unpredictable incidents of violence throughout Burundi. Furthermore, U.S. Government personnel may travel only to areas in Bujumbura deemed safe by the U.S. Regional Security Officer (DOS, Burundi a, 1996).

Not all travel restrictions imposed by the State Department on U.S. Government personnel pertain to geographical boundaries. That same year in Peru, the August 23 Public Announcement stated, “...all U.S. Mission personnel are hereby prohibited from flying Aero Continente until further notice” (DOS, Peru a, 1996). Aero Continente was an airline that had “been operating aircraft with unsafe engine conditions” (DOS, Peru a, 1996). Airline and airport restrictions were not uncommon. Not only did the State Department restrict personnel from traveling in ways or to places that were unsafe, but it also restricted travel in places that were unsafe and out of the jurisdiction of host government control. The August 10, 1999 Travel Warning for Pakistan stated:

...due to recent threats against U.S. citizens in Pakistan, on August 6, the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad decided to defer all official travel to the tribal areas of Pakistan’s northwest frontier province, areas which lie outside the normal jurisdiction of the Government of Pakistan (DOS, Pakistan a, 1999).

Some personnel restrictions were temporal, as seen in the Paraguay Public Announcement on August 6, 1999: “U.S. Embassy personnel have been advised to travel this route only if necessary, never alone, and strictly during daylight hours” (DOS, Paraguay a, 1999).

Restricting State Department personnel not only serves as behavior modeling for would-be American travelers, but it also implies something concrete to that potential traveler. Consular services regularly include physically sending embassy or consulate personnel to an American in distress, such as an American who has been arrested or jailed, whether under legitimate or illegitimate circumstances. That essential service can be impeded, as warned in the February 28, 2002 Travel Warning for Afghanistan: “Embassy officials in Kabul cannot travel outside the capital to provide assistance to Americans” (DOS, Afghanistan a, 2002). When possible, personnel are allowed to travel with security, as noted in the February 3, 2003 Travel Warning for Algeria: “They [personnel] travel off compound by armored car only with appropriate security, whether for official business or personal reasons” (DOS, Algeria a, 2003). Serving one’s country in the foreign service brings with it many potential consequences, and State Department personnel and other U.S. Government personnel working abroad may live under intense security regimes to account for their safety, including curfews (DOS, Togo a, 2005).

Related to personnel travel restrictions is the limitation of consular services and not just the service of leaving the embassy or consulate to physically go to an American traveler in distress. The second most common Background code was Background:ConsularServicesLimited. In some cases, a consular officer may not be able to make his or her way to a citizen in need. In the October 24, 2013 Travel Warning for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, it stated that “Very poor infrastructure (road and air) makes the provision of consular services difficult outside of Kinshasa” (DOS, Democratic Republic of the Congo a, 2013). In other cases, the nature of the

danger a U.S. citizen is experiencing may be the cause of limited consular services: "...the U.S. government's ability to assist kidnapping victims is limited" (DOS, Colombia, 2013). Sometimes the host government would inhibit the movement of consulate and embassy staff, which would have an effect on its ability to fulfill their consular role. Take the Travel Warning for Eritrea issued on April 18, 2012:

The Eritrean government continues to restrict the travel of all foreign nationals. The restrictions require all visitors and residents, including U.S. diplomats, to apply 10 days in advance for permission to travel outside of Asmara's city limits. Permission is rarely granted. As a result, the U.S. Embassy is extremely limited in its ability to provide emergency consular assistance outside of [the capital] Asmara (DOS, Eritrea a, 2012).

This calls to mind a Background code not in the top 25, Background:HostGovt:Prohibits/Delays/ImpedesConsularAccess. This related code appeared 19 times and was the occasional reason behind consular services being limited. In the February 12, 2009 Travel Warning for Syria, the State Department included this language: "Syrian officials do not notify the American Embassy when American citizens are arrested. Syrian officials do not inform detained American citizens that they have the right to request consular access" (DOS, Syria a, 2009). In the March 24, 2011 Travel Warning for the same country, it was added that "...in the past, security officials also have not responded to Embassy requests for consular access..." (DOS, Syria a, 2011).

Of course, safety of consular personnel is paramount and if going to an American traveler in need meant putting an embassy or consulate employee in danger, consular services would be limited. Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza were often the subjects of Travel Warnings during the sample studied, and in the one issued for March 19, 2012, it mentioned: "Security conditions in the West Bank can hinder the ability of consular staff to offer timely assistance to U.S. citizens"

(DOS, Israel a, 2012). Generally speaking, when travel advice is issued to discourage Americans from being present in a given country for a given danger, that danger often served as the same reason that inhibited consular staff from moving freely throughout that nation.

The code Background:BorderAreas:Dangerous appeared 273 times. This information could have been captured as a Reason code, as in a reason the State Department deems a location dangerous. However, given that it involved a border area, at least two or more countries could have been involved, so it was therefore coded as contextual information. In some cases, the border areas were dangerous because of rebel activity (DOS, Liberia a, 1998). Armed conflict over border disputes were not uncommon, as was the case between Eritrea and Ethiopia (DOS, Eritrea a, 1999). Violence of some kind, including criminal, was usually to blame. The Public Announcement issued for Mexico on January 26, 2005 alerted “U.S. citizens to the current security situations along the Mexican side of the U.S.-Mexico border in the wake of increased violence among drug traffickers” (DOS, Mexico a, 2005). Terrorist violence was also common: “Al-Qaida and Taliban elements continue to operate inside Pakistan, particularly along the porous Afghan border region” (DOS, Pakistan, 2005).

The next most frequent Background code at 165 times coded was Background:U.S.Govt:Personnel:Behavior:Modified/Restricted. It is similar to the earlier code of travel being restricted for U.S. Government personnel, but focused more on limitations placed on their behavior. It was not simply that personnel could not go somewhere; rather, it was a restriction on how they lived. Those restrictions were included in these documents, with the specific instruction that other American travelers in the region should follow suit. In many cases, personnel operated under an Embassy imposed curfew or restriction on mode or route of travel. Often there would be a reference across these documents across multiple countries to a daily

security regime, as in the Travel Warning for Algeria on April 2, 2010: “The U.S. Government considers the potential threat to U.S. Embassy personnel assigned to Algiers sufficiently serious to require them to live and work under significant security restrictions” (DOS, Algeria a, 2010). For example, personnel in Burundi were required to adjust their behavior for the security conditions in the following way:

Within 30 km of the city, employees may travel in single vehicles, but must check in and out with the Embassy. The Embassy’s Regional Security Officers (RSO) must pre-approve all Embassy personnel travel outside this approximately 30-km radius of Bujumbura, and employees must travel by an approved itinerary in two-vehicle convoys equipped with satellite phones and emergency equipment. All employee movement outside the city after dark is forbidden... (DOS, Burundi a, 2011).

The code Background:HostGovt:Cannot/WillNot/Incapable:AssureSafety can be summarized as informing American travelers that a country’s conditions are not only dangerous, but even the local authorities cannot or will not assure visitors’ safety. Appearing 128 times, it is an impactful piece of contextual information—the traveler has primarily him- or herself upon which to rely. The next two codes, Background:U.S.Govt:Personnel:Dependents:Evacuated and Background:U.S.Govt:Personnel:Full/PartialEvacuation were coded 106 and 105 times, respectively. These two codes are related to two others further down the top 25 list:

Background:U.S.Govt:Personnel/Dependents:Evacuation:Lifted and

Background:U.S.Govt:Personnel:Dependents:Prohibited, coded 83 and 58 times, respectively.

These four codes often appeared in the first paragraph of a Travel Warning or Alert. They reflected the severity of a security situation and served as an indication as to truly how dangerous circumstances in a particular country were. Indeed, it sends a strong message to the American traveler that a place is so unfit for safety that even embassy/consular staff and their dependents

are not staying. It should be noted that U.S. Embassies and related living compounds tend to be very fortified.

Among those previous four codes was Background:HostGovt:ImposedTravelRestrictions, which was coded 95 times. Travel advice and restrictions of course do not fall under the sole purview of the Department of State. The host government also restricts travel of foreigners within its boundaries. In some instances, as in the case of the Travel Warning for Indonesia on November 23, 2001, the justification for the restriction is for traveler safety:

Americans should avoid all travel to the regions of Aceh, Irian Jaya, Maluku, and North Maluku – places where the Indonesian government has restricted travel by U.S. and other foreign government officials – and West Timor, Central and West Kalimantan and Central and South Sulawesi, because of the risk of violence (DOS, Indonesia a, 2001).

In other instances, like the case of Pakistan mentioned earlier, the restriction is for locations where the government has less control: “The Government of Pakistan requires all citizens of countries other than Pakistan and Afghanistan to obtain permission from the Home and Tribal Affairs Department prior to visiting these tribal areas which lie outside the normal jurisdiction of the Government of Pakistan” (DOS, Pakistan a, 2001). In other instances, travel restrictions are put in place by the host government to keep foreigners from seeing something country officials do not want seen. In the Sri Lanka Travel Warning of June 26, 2009, it stated: “Travel in some parts of the country remains highly restricted by the Sri Lankan government, with particular sensitivity concerning the large number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in camps” (DOS, Sri Lanka a, 2009). This calls to mind reports of the North Korean government allowing visitors to only see fully stocked grocery stores and developed neighborhoods and plazas, while concealing the country’s endemic poverty and famine.

In numerous Travel Warnings and Alerts, the State Department would describe the predicament and add that host country authorities were taking precautions. Coded 74 times as Background:HostGovt/Police:TakingSecurityPrecautions, it is an encouraging piece of information. It is important to remember that the government hosting the U.S. diplomatic delegation is not always and perhaps often not an antagonist and is taking an active role in mitigating circumstances it would prefer not to be experiencing. The host government may even be partnering with the U.S. Government in such campaigns. In response to threats of terrorism against U.S. interests and citizens in Peru, a Public Announcement included that “Peruvian authorities continue increased security at the U.S. Embassy and U.S.-affiliated facilities” (DOS, Peru a, 2002). During an outbreak of Ebola in 2003, a Public Announcement for the Republic of Congo stated, “The Congolese Ministry of Health, with the support of the World Health Organization (WHO) and other non-governmental organizations, has sent medical teams to the region to help contain the disease and begin a public awareness campaign on how to limit the spread of the virus” (DOS, Congo a, 2003). During the 2010 Commonwealth Games in India, a time when petty theft against tourists and games observers spikes, a Travel Alert noted that “Indian police and security forces will increase their presence in Delhi during the Games, particularly around game venues”, providing a balance of assurance while alerting tourists to potential crime (DOS, India a, 2010).

The code Background:NoU.S.Embassy/Services, coded 58 times and related codes further down the top 25 list, Background:U.S.Govt:Personnel:Reduced, coded 46 times, and Background:U.S.Embassy:OperationsSuspended/Closed, coded 41 times, were usually reserved for severe conditions. Either the embassy was closed or staff was reduced because personnel were in mortal danger, or the embassy was not there in the first place, which implies no

diplomatic relations, which is severe in its own right. In countries during times in which their governments were hostile to the U.S. Government, Travel Warnings would indicate the absence of an operating U.S. Embassy, for countries including Libya in 1994, Somalia in 1996, and Iran throughout the entire sample, not to mention various others (DOS, Iran a, 1995; DOS, Libya a, 1994; DOS, Somalia a, 1996). In the Travel Warning for Afghanistan on July 8, 1999, years before the U.S. invasion of that country in 2001, it stated: “All U.S. personnel at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul were evacuated in 1989, and no other diplomatic mission represents U.S. interests or provides consular services in Afghanistan” (DOS, Afghanistan a, 1999). The end of that sentence hints at a caveat that sometimes appeared in documents, which were coded with Background:NoDiplomaticRelations, also in the top 25, coded 32 times. The accompanying code, coded 36 times, is Background:U.S.Govt:RepresentedByThirdNation. In that same year, for example, the Travel Warning for Iran, mentioned that the “Swiss government, acting through its embassy in Tehran, serves as [a] protecting power for U.S. interests in Iran” (DOS, Iran a, 1999). That piece of information was present in all the Iran Warning documents. Curiously, the Swiss government does not always represent the U.S. government in countries where there is no U.S. Embassy. Travel Warnings showed that Poland’s diplomatic mission represented the U.S. in Iraq for some time, Belgium’s in Libya, Sweden’s in North Korea, the Czech Republic’s in Syria, and France’s in Central African Republic (DOS, Iraq a, 1997; DOS, Libya a, TW 6/6/10; DOS, North Korea a, 2010; DOS, Syria a, 2012; DOS, Central African Republic a, 2013).

Another piece of contextual information was targeted at a very specific group of travelers. The code Background:DualCitizenshipHolders:Impeded (47 times) was meant for U.S. citizens visiting what was likely their or their parents’ birth country, in which the host government was not amenable to its citizens having dual citizenship with the U.S. In Israel, this

code was prevalent: “Dual Palestinian American citizens may encounter difficulties departing the West Bank and Gaza during times of Israeli closures in those areas” (DOS, Israel a, 2001). Iran was also particularly averse to this idea: “The Iranian government does not recognize dual citizenship and generally does not permit the Swiss to provide protective services for U.S. citizens who are also Iranian nationals. In addition, U.S. citizens of Iranian origin who are considered by Iran to be Iranian citizens have been detained and harassed by Iranian authorities” (DOS, Iran a, 2003).

A handful of remaining codes are self-explanatory. Background:PeaceAccords (47 times) and Background:CeaseFire (38 times) call attention to a conflict resolved or temporarily resolved. The code Background:UN (47 times) indicated United Nations involvement of some kind, whether as a peacekeeping force or relief presence, which were sub-coded as such. Sometimes the U.N., U.S., E.U., or another coalition body would level sanctions on a given country, and that context would be provided and consequently coded as Background:Sanctions (34 times). That code would warn American travelers of the limits to which they could spend money or conduct business in that country. The code Background:VisaRequired (38 times) stressed the importance of not traveling to a given country without the proper immigration document. When the U.S. government conducted military operations in a given country, whether a war or a more temporary intervention, it was coded as Background:U.S.Govt:MilitaryAction (29 times). Sometimes related, the code Background:WarCriminal/Terrorists:Arrested/Sentenced/Killed (32 times) was accompanied by information about reprisals, which sometimes could be the reason for the warning. Finally, Background:NoDistinctionInTargetingOfficialsOrCivilians (38 times) was a code that indicated indiscriminate cruelty. “Terrorist actions may include, but are not limited to, suicide operations,

assassinations, hijackings, bombings or kidnappings. Terrorists do not distinguish between official and civilian targets (DOS, Afghanistan a, 2005).” The second sentence of that quotation is reproduced verbatim across multiple Travel Warnings and Alerts for multiple countries, indicating some type of overarching editorial review of State Department issued travel advice; other verbatim sentences across the sample imply the same.

Background Codes Content Analysis

Taking the content analysis deeper for the top 25 Background codes, some patterns emerge. Table 2 shows the Background codes at three levels of analysis. The first level is often

Table 2

Background Codes Analyzed

Open Coding Level 1	Axial Coding Level 2	Thematic Coding Level 3
U.S.Govt:Personnel:TravelRestricted (390) BorderAreas:Dangerous (273) U.S.Govt:Personnel:Behavior:Modified/Restricted (165) HostGovt:Cannot/WillNot/Incapable:AssureSafety (128) U.S.Govt:Personnel:Dependents:Evacuated (106) U.S.Govt:Personnel:Full/PartialEvacuation (105) HostGovt/Police:TakingSecurityPrecautions (74) U.S.Govt:Personnel:Dependents:Prohibited (58) DualCitizenshipHolders:Impeded (47) U.S.Govt:Personnel:Reduced (46) NoDistinctionInTargetingOfficialsOrCivilians (38)	Safety (1,430)	Actionable (2,101)
ConsularServicesLimited (335) HostGovt:ImposedTravelRestrictions (95) NoU.S.Embassy/Services (58) VisaRequired (47) U.S.Embassy:OperationsSuspended/Closed (41)	Instructive (576)	
Sanctions (34) WarCriminal/Terrorists:Arrested/Sentenced/Killed (32) U.S.Govt:Military:Action (29)	Punitive (95)	
U.S.Govt:Personnel/Dependents:Evacuation:Lifted (83) PeaceAccords (47) U.N. (47) Cease-fire (38) U.S.Govt:RepresentedByThirdNation (36) NoDiplomaticRelations (32)	Circumstantial (283)	
		Informational (283)

taken verbatim from the data, while the next two levels are created by the researcher through insight and analysis. Level 1 is the most basic and descriptive, which is that these excerpts of Travel Warning and Alert text are pieces of contextual, background information. This is called open coding in content analysis (Marshall & Rossman, 2011). Level 2 moves toward grouping the Background codes into categories, analyzing for similarities; this is called axial coding (Marshall & Rossman, 2011). Those top 25 Background codes were categorized into four axial coding groups: Safety, Instructive, Punitive, and Circumstantial. The first axial category was composed of Background codes that transmitted safety information. It let the reader know that border areas are dangerous or what parts of the country were so dangerous that State Department personnel were restricted from traveling there. The second axial category was instructive, meaning that it provided instructions and parameters for travel in the host country, like informing a traveler that he or she needs to secure the appropriate visa before entering the country. The third category was punitive, which is rather different from the other categories. It provides information about punitive measures being taken by the U.S. government (in most cases) against the host country or host country inhabitants, like sanctions. Sanctions are a powerful tool to punish and coerce a country into compliance. Finally, the last category (Circumstantial) includes Background codes that describe the circumstances on the ground, such as the United Nations (U.N.) having a presence there or a cease-fire having taken place.

Looking deeper at patterns in this data, the most frequent Safety category codes were present in countries considered developing economies. Those countries were Mexico with the most, followed by Israel and Sudan. The countries with the most Instructive category codes were Serbia-Montenegro, Lebanon, Eritrea, Israel, and Iraq, most of which have experienced great conflict. It makes sense that those governments would impose travel restrictions on visitors,

which travelers need to know. The countries with the most Punitive category codes experience punishing actions in generally low frequency, with codes being assigned mostly once. The countries with the most punitive codes in this category were Iraq, Pakistan, Libya, Yemen, Afghanistan, and Syria. What is noteworthy about this group is that not only are they developing countries, but they are all autocratic. The countries specifically coded as having had sanctions are Libya, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Nepal, Eritrea, Cote d'Ivoire, and Mali. All of those countries were at some time during the sample studied or are still autocratic with the exception Mali (Geddes et al, 2014). The Circumstantial category Backgrounds codes were associated logically with country types. The code for no diplomatic relations appeared more frequently for countries like Iran and North Korea, while the peace accords code appeared in places where there had been conflict, like Congo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The content analysis of the Background codes were distilled into a third level of coding, called thematic coding in content analysis (Marshall & Rossman, 2011). The Background codes placed in the Safety, Instructive, and Punitive codes were themed as Actionable. The theme Actionable was used because although these Background codes are not explicit Verb codes, which will be discussed later, one can act on the information provided in them. If travelers are provided the context that a border area is dangerous, then they can travel elsewhere. If travelers see that a visa is required prior to entry, they can submit the appropriate application to that country's embassy or consulate in the U.S. prior to departure. If they see a country has been assigned sanctions, they may learn that they cannot legally conduct business there and may go elsewhere. The last group of codes in level two (axial) was categorized as Circumstantial, and those codes were then themed as Informational. Reading that the U.S. does not have diplomatic

relations with a certain country and is instead represented diplomatically by a third country provides the traveler with information about the United States' diplomatic limits in that country.

Reason Codes

In addition to contextual information, Travel Warnings and Alerts always included a reason in justification of their issuance. There were a myriad of reasons why the State Department considered a certain country unsafe or less safe for American travelers. Across the 18 years of travel advice documents analyzed, there were 381 different reasons found and coded for why a particular country's environment may put the American traveler at risk. Each of these were coded as "Reason:_____". The following is a discussion of the top 25 Reason codes (see Table 3 on the next page and see Appendix D for a complete list).

The number one reason coded across the 1,303 documents was Reason:Murder, coded 564 times. "On August 5, 2010, a group of doctors, nurses, and medical practitioners, including six U.S. citizens, were shot and killed near their vehicles in Badakhshan province as they completed a medical aid visit to remote areas in nearby Nuristan province" (DOS, Afghanistan a, 2010). Perhaps the most difficult part of this exploratory exercise was coding these documents, line by line, and periodically succumbing to the despair of the human condition—in war, conflict, famine, and pestilence. These Travel Warnings and Alerts represent the worst that can happen to the people of a nation. The code, Reason:Murder, represented only one type of mortality. Not in the top 25, both Reason:Assassination and Reason:Death were also coded. The differences are nuanced, but important. Reason:Murder was used if one person's death was caused by another. Reason:Assassination was used if that person was of political importance. Reason:Death was used when an individual died not by the hand of another human, but instead

by natural disaster (flood, earthquake, storm, landslide, mudslide, tsunami, drought, etc.),
famine, or major disease outbreak.

Table 3

Top 25 Reason Codes

Reason Code	Frequency
Reason:Murder	564
Reason:Violence:U.S.Targeted*	511
Reason:Terrorism	485
Reason:Threat	406
Reason:Demonstrations	381
Reason:Kidnapping	380
Reason:Potential:Violence**	328
Reason:Crime/Criminal	258
Reason:ParamilitaryActivity	243
Reason:Risk***	243
Reason:Security:Concerns/Incidents	209
Reason:Anti-American/Western	204
Reason:Military	199
Reason:Elections	185
Reason:Violence:Foreign/Non-U.S.Victims:Targeted	184
Reason:Roads:Impeded	177
Reason:Al-Qaeda	161
Reason:Unpredictable	154
Reason:Danger***	153
Reason:Robbery	150
Reason:Tensions	127
Reason:Violence:Criminal	124
Reason:Unrest:Civil/Social/Political	117
Reason:Extremists	107
Reason:Landmines	103
Reason:Carjacking	101
Reason:Rebels/Rebellion	101
Reason:DiplomaticPersonnel:Attacked/Injured/Killed/Targeted	99
Reason:Detention	98

*Expanded to include different types of Violence codes

**Expanded to include different types of Potential codes

***Not included in top 25 discussion because all Reason codes reflect risk/danger, despite this specific word being used in documents coded

The next most salient code was Reason:Violence:U.S.Targeted, coded 511 times. This category broadly catches many types of violence exacted upon U.S. targets, be they American citizens and government personnel, diplomatic and military facilities, or business interests. The August 7, 2001 Travel Warning for Yemen read: “The Department of State continues to warn United States citizens to defer travel to Yemen in light of recent events, including the terrorist attack on a U.S. Navy vessel in port at Aden, Yemen, in October 2000” (DOS, Yemen a, 2001). Violence of some type, like Reason:Violence:Criminal, found further down on the top 25 Reason code list, was so ubiquitous throughout the sample that types of violence needed to be further categorized, and the top 25 violence codes are presented at the end of this section in Table 4.

Returning to the top 25 Reason code list, Reason:Terrorism was coded 485 times. Terrorism was exacted using many of the same codes that appear on the top 25 Reason code list. Reason:Threat was used 406 times and was referred to more existentially; for example, “The [Abu Sayyaf Group] ASG remains a security *threat* to areas of Malaysia near the Southern Philippines” (DOS, Malaysia a, 2001). Demonstrations proved to be a very common reason at 381 times coded, and they were often mentioned in tandem with an outburst of violence or potential violence. Demonstrations were often connected to elections or referenda, but also included protests and strikes. In Ecuador, the Public Announcement on February 7, 1997 noted, “There continue to be localized demonstrations sponsored by the political parties, and there have been sporadic incidents of violence” (DOS, Ecuador a, 1997). Advice to avoid crowds and demonstrations, even seemingly peaceful ones, almost always followed. Reason:Kidnapping was coded 380 times, and was an endemic form of terror, intimidation, and revenue (from ransom). Kidnapping appeared in numerous countries, but none so seriously as Colombia:

About 2,200 kidnapping incidents were reported throughout Colombia in 2003. Since the year 2000, 28 Americans were reported kidnapped in various parts of the country. American kidnap or murder victims have included journalists, missionaries, scientists, human rights workers, U.S. government employees and businesspeople, as well as persons on tourism or family visits, and even small children. No one can be considered immune on the basis of occupation, nationality or any other factor. Most kidnappings of U.S. citizens in Colombia have been committed by terrorist groups, including the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), which have been designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations by the Secretary of State. Since it is U.S. policy not to make concessions to, or strike deals with, terrorists, the U.S government's ability to assist kidnapped U.S. citizens is limited (DOS, Colombia a, 2004).

In some instances in certain countries, the State Department advised holding a kidnap insurance policy. The next code was Reason:Potential:Violence coded at 328 times, and it calls attention to a special category that emerged across the Travel Warning and Alert sample—potential danger. There were so many of these Reason:Potential codes that they are broken down with explanations into a longer list of their own at the end of this section in Table 5.

Next in the top 25 Reason codes, Reason:Criminal was coded 258 times. Crime was described in all the regular ways, ranging from criminal violence to non-violent theft. Some criminal activity warnings were extremely nuanced. In the Travel Warning for Burundi on January 8, 2009, the State Department explained: “Common crimes include muggings, burglaries, robberies, and carjackings” (DOS, Burundi a, 2009). Those crimes are decidedly all bad, but it is a wonder as to how one differs from the other. Perhaps a house gets burgled, a business gets robbed, and a person gets mugged; nonetheless, all possibilities are addressed.

Paramilitary activity was coded 243 times, and it was used when the word paramilitary was written explicitly, but also for operations by armed groups, insurgents, rebels, terrorist groups, and guerillas. Jumping further down the top 25 list, a related code,

Reason:Rebels/Rebellion was also used 101 times when such activity was limited to a group rebelling against the ruling party. The code Reason:Security:Concerns/Incidents was found in sentences that were often used vaguely in the opening paragraphs of Travel Warnings and Alerts and then followed by more specific information and advice. For example, the Travel Warning for Jordan that was issued on February 7, 2003 begins with this sentence: “This Travel Warning is being issued to alert Americans to increased security concerns in Jordan” (DOS, Jordan a, 2003). It was such a common phrase across the travel advice documents that it merited coding, despite not being overly specific.

Reason:Anti-American/Western was also a common code, and it was used 204 times. This type of information transmits to the would-be traveler that not only is a given location dangerous, but that it is specifically dangerous for the American traveler. “Rallies, demonstrations and processions occur from time to time throughout Pakistan on very short notice and have occasionally taken on an anti-American or anti-Western character (DOS, Pakistan b, 1999).” In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Travel Warning for April 13, 2001 stated: “There have been recent outbreaks of mob violence against American citizens and other members of the international community, particularly in the Herzegovina region” (DOS, Bosnia-Herzegovina a, 2001).

Coded 199 times, Reason:Military referred to military activity or operations that made a particular country or region within a country unsafe for visitors. Usually, military activity was representative of some type of conflict, and, generally speaking, a country in a state of military conflict exposes travelers to serious danger. This code was typically accompanied by sub-codes specific to the military, such as the military being attacked or military personnel being killed, soldiers being undisciplined and poorly trained, military corruption, and decommissioned

soldiers engaging in criminal activity. The July 27, 1999 Travel Warning for Angola warned Americans that “Travel within Angola remains unsafe due to high-intensity military actions, bandit attacks, undisciplined police and military personnel, and land mines in rural areas” (DOS, Angola a, 1999).

An election was another reason that the State Department used regularly to caution American travelers. Coded 185 times, Reason:Elections tended to appear more in Travel Alerts, since elections are usually fleeting. The necessity for alerting Americans to upcoming elections in given countries is because in many countries, elections are a time of conflict and strife. Transitions of power may not be peaceful, as Americans are accustomed to in the United States. Losing parties and their supporters may demonstrate, and demonstrations may suddenly turn from peaceful to violent. A typical example of language used regarding elections throughout the sample is found in this early Public Announcement:

Nicaragua will hold national elections on October 20, 1996, as well as a potential runoff round for the President in late November or early December. Substantial numbers of international observers and other travelers are expected in Nicaragua during that period of October 1 through December 15. To date, the political campaign has been peaceful, and no disturbances are expected on election day. However, visitors to Nicaragua should exercise particular caution during this period. It may be prudent to avoid large crowds (DOS, Nicaragua a, 1996).

In many instances, international observers for the assurance of fair elections were not present, and campaigns were not peaceful. In nearly all election warnings and alerts, the State Department advised Americans to avoid demonstrations and crowds of any form.

The State Department did not only report anti-American violence, but any kind of violence exacted upon the local population or other visitors. Reason:Violence:Foreign/Non-U.S.Victims:/Targeted was coded 184 times and was coded to capture any information provided

about local civilians and other non-U.S. citizen victims of violence or targeting in the host country. In Pakistan: “Kidnappings of foreigners are particularly common in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan. In 2008, one Iranian and two Afghan diplomats, two Chinese engineers, and a Polish engineer were kidnapped in NWFP” (DOS, Pakistan a, 2009).

The code Roads:Impeded was recorded 177 times. Official and unofficial road block checkpoints, road washouts, road damage, shakedowns by armed gunmen for extortion or worse, and even blockades were ubiquitous throughout the sample. This would leave American travelers confined to cities and off the open road for overland travel. Impeded roads of any kind is extremely limiting, and American travelers would need to think very carefully about how they would safely convey themselves from one city to another, especially if air travel was also unreliable or less available.

The only terrorist or paramilitary group to appear enough times to be included in the top 25 codes was Al-Qaeda. Reason:Al-Qaeda was coded 161 times. Other similar groups appeared, too, but less frequently, like the Taliban in Afghanistan, Hamas in Gaza, Boko Haram in Nigeria, Al-Shabaab in Somalia, Maoists in Nepal, and more recently ISIS across the Middle East, among others. An interesting code that appeared 154 times was Reason:Unpredictable. During the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014, the State Department reported that, “The situation along the border is unpredictable and could change quickly. Armed, pro-Russian groups are reportedly traveling illegally across the border into Ukraine and could increase the potential for clashes in Russia near the border” (DOS, Russia a, 2014). The unpredictable code reflects the difficult situation in which the State Department regularly finds itself—it has to warn Americans of danger that may or may not happen, but very well could and has come to be in the past. Crowds and demonstrations are unpredictable, autocrats are unpredictable, severe weather is

unpredictable, disease outbreaks are unpredictable, and paramilitary groups are unpredictable. While some American travelers may find solace in knowing that something that might happen has not yet happened and decide to go through with their travel plans, the State Department cannot be so carefree. Unpredictable is a dangerous state.

Reason:Robbery was coded 150 times and included types of theft that were mentioned before, such as muggings, petty theft, pick pocketing, and burglaries. Reason:Tensions and Reason:Unrest:Civil/Social/Political were coded 127 and 117 times, respectively, and were used vaguely in a way similar to that of Reason:SecurityConcerns/Incidents, which was explained earlier—typically in the first few sentences of a travel advice document. Helpfully, these more vague codes were consistently supported by more succinct pieces of information in the larger body of each document. Reason:Extremists appeared 107 times, and this code was only used when the word extremist was used explicitly, usually in the form of ‘extremist group’ or ‘extremist element’, which was then accompanied with their corresponding violent activity. Reason:Landmines, coded 103 times, was an unfortunately common code. This legacy of conflict was often accompanied with ‘unexploded ordnance’ or ‘unexploded ammunition’ and then followed by advice on how to attempt to avoid them. In a 1997 Travel Warning for Afghanistan, it noted that “Landmines are still prevalent throughout the countryside. Close to 10,000,000 landmines and tons of unexploded ammunition pose a danger to all visitors” (DOS, Afghanistan a, 1997). In the Lebanon Travel Warning of January 31, 2014, the State Department warned:

Landmines and unexploded ordnance pose significant dangers throughout southern Lebanon, particularly south of the Litani River, as well as in areas of the country where fighting was intense during the civil war. More than 40 civilians have been killed and more than 300 injured by unexploded ordnance remaining from the 2006 Israel-Hizballah war. Travelers should watch for posted landmine

warnings and strictly avoid all areas where landmines and unexploded ordnance may be present (DOS, Lebanon a, 2014).

Coded 101 times, Reason:Carjacking merited its own code outside of simply Reason:Robbery because it seemed pervasive and complicated beyond simple pickpocketing or purse-snatching. Carjacking is a commandeering action that can simultaneously include kidnapping and/or murder. Reason:DiplomaticPersonnel:Attacked/Injured/Killed/Targeted was coded 99 times, which was a revealing code and not always pertaining to just U.S. diplomatic personnel and facilities. In Turkey, a 2003 Travel Warning issued on the same day of the incident in question noted: “On November 20, the British Consulate General and the London-based HSBC bank in Istanbul were damaged by powerful explosions, killing dozens and wounding hundreds” (DOS, Turkey a, 2003). In Zimbabwe: “In November 2002, U.S. Embassy staff members were detained and one was beaten by war veterans on a farm near Harare” (DOS, Zimbabwe a, 2003). In Sudan: “On January 1, 2008, two American Embassy employees were assassinated while traveling in their vehicle in Khartoum” (DOS, Sudan a, 2009). In Ciudad Juarez, Mexico: “Three persons associated with the Consulate General were murdered in March, 2010” (DOS, Mexico a, 2011). Diplomats, by their very purpose, are not warriors, and violence against them is an especially meaningful piece of information for American travelers to contemplate prior to making their travel arrangements.

Reason:Detention, coded 98 times, is the final code on the top 25 Reason list. It comes with some associated sub-codes, including detention for unsubstantiated allegations and detention for dual citizenship (i.e., being a host country citizen as well as a citizen of the United States). In a Public Announcement for China in 2001, the State Department warned:

The Ministry of State Security (MSS) of the People's Republic of China has recently taken into custody several American citizens and U.S. permanent residents of Chinese origin. Of these, at least two Americans are now being detained by the Chinese authorities under suspicion of espionage or damaging China's national security, even though the Chinese Government has not offered any evidence to substantiate the allegations. Others have been questioned for up to four days and then released. ...It should be noted as well that the Americans recently detained by MSS had previously visited China without incident, but were nonetheless detained during their most recent visits (DOS, China a, 2001).

These codes were occasionally accompanied by Reason:HarshPrisonConditions. For example:

A number of Eritrean-U.S. dual citizens have been arrested without apparent cause. Once arrested, detainees may be held for extended periods without being told the purpose of their incarceration. Conditions are harsh—those incarcerated may be held in very small quarters without access to restrooms, bedding, food, or clean water. The Eritrean government does not inform the U.S. Embassy when U.S. citizens, including those who are not dual nationals, have been arrested or detained (DOS, Eritrea a, 2001).

The Reason codes were the most numerous, far more than the Background and Verb codes. A complete list of Reason codes can be viewed in Appendix D, and they are interesting. The rest of the codes include occurrences one can easily imagine to those that are less predictable. They include natural disasters such as volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, mudslides, floods, hurricanes, and tsunamis. Disease outbreaks like Ebola, SARS, cholera, dysentery, malaria, typhoid, gastroenteritis, and foot/hoof and mouth ravaged too many people in too many countries. There was 'hooliganism' in Japan and predatory scams from Nigeria, the emails with which many Americans are long familiar. Apostasy in Iran, that is, the abandonment of Islam and conversion to an alternate religion, was subject to arrest and possible execution. Cash shortages in Argentina and Madagascar and angry youth in France and Monaco were others, while corruption, martial law, poachers, curfews, and mutiny made appearances in various countries. Chadian authorities demanded the registration of satellite phones. It seems as if the list

is exhaustive, and it is difficult to imagine there could be any other reasons for danger that have not already happened and were not recorded in a State Department Travel Warning or Alert.

As mentioned earlier, there were multiple codes that emerged about violence—so many that it was important to explore them separately. On the next page in Table 4, there are the top 25 of 67 types of violence coded, the complete list of which can be viewed in the list of all Reason codes in Appendix D. Evidently, bombs and other explosives, coded 358 times, were presented as a preferred and common means to exercise violence, contributing to murder and injury (coded 286 times, with various causes) throughout the sample. Suicide bombings began appearing in the sample in 2003, also on the list and coded 93 times. Other forms of violence that appear on the top 25 Reason:Violence list are some the reader might expect—violence caused by drug trafficking, criminal, political, and sectarian violence, shootings, fighting, and, of course, war. Perhaps the most desperate form a violence coded was Reason:Violence:RockThrowing, which seems to be reserved for the most powerless and desperate. “There have been demonstrations in Khartoum against United States foreign policy. In some instances, demonstrators have thrown rocks at the U.S. Embassy and Westerners. Americans should avoid large crowds and demonstrations” (DOS, Sudan a, 2003). Another code is noteworthy specifically because it did not make the top 25. The code Reason:Violence:Rape did not appear as a reason in a Travel Warning or Alert until 2004, which likely is not because rape was absent as a form of violence in country subjects of Travel Warnings from 1994 to 2003, but rather was not included for reasons unknown.

Table 4

Top 25 Reason:Violence Codes

Reason:Violence Code	Frequency
Reason:Violence:U.S.Targeted	511
Reason:Violence	485
Reason:Violence:Bomb/Bombing/Explosives	358
Reason:Violence:Attacks	335
Reason:Violence:Injuries	286
Reason:Violence:Shooting	180
Reason:Violence:AgainstCivilians	167
Reason:Violence:ArmedConflict/Clashes	162
Reason:Violence:Criminal	124
Reason:Violence:SuicideBombing	93
Reason:Violence:Fighting	89
Reason:Violence:Rocket/MissileLaunches	69
Reason:Violence:Hostility	58
Reason:Violence:Political	54
Reason:Violence:Vehicles:Attacked	54
Reason:Violence:Assault	38
Reason:Violence:Riots	38
Reason:Violence:NarcoTrafficker	36
Reason:Violence:SoftTargets	32
Reason:Violence:Buses:Attacked	31
Reason:Violence:RockThrowing	27
Reason:Violence:Sectarian	27
Reason:Violence:Ambush	26
Reason:Violence:CivilWar	26
Reason:Violence:Arson	24

As seen on the next page in Table 5, there are numerous potential Reason codes that were also broken down into their own list. The State Department presented certain reasons that justified their Warning and Alert documents, and those reasons tended to have happened or were happening at the time. However, there was another category of reasons the State Department wanted travelers to consider, and they concerned not just what had happened, but what could happen. These were coded as Reason:Potential:_____. For example, there was kidnapping,

and then there was potential kidnapping. In other words, Americans were warned about both actualities and potentialities.

Table 5

Top 25 Reason:Potential Codes

Reason:Potential Code	Frequency
Reason:Potential:Violence	329
Reason:Potential:Terrorism	171
Reason:Potential:U.S.Govt:Personnel/Facilities/Citizens/BusinessesTargeted...	141
Reason:Potential:Kidnapping	90
Reason:Potential:Attacks	86
Reason:Potential:Demonstrations	79
Reason:Potential:Danger	59
Reason:Potential:Unrest:Civil/Political/Social	46
Reason:Potential:Bomb/Bombing/Explosives	43
Reason:Potential:Arrest/Detention	42
Reason:Potential:InterruptionInServices	37
Reason:Potential:U.S.Embassy:Closure/SuspensionofServices/Evacuation	33
Reason:Potential:Crime	21
Reason:Potential:SuicideOperations	20
Reason:Potential:Instability	17
Reason:Potential:TransportationINterrupted	16
Reason:Potential:Harassment	15
Reason:Potential:Assassination	12
Reason:Potential:Robbery	11
Reason:Potential:Deportation	9
Reason:Potential:Hostility	9
Reason:Potential:Injury	9
Reason:Potential:Murder	8
Reason:Potential:Retaliation	8
Reason:Potential:Roadblocks	8

Reason Code Content Analysis

Taking the content analysis deeper to better understand patterns in the Reason codes, the top 25 Reason codes were categorized into four categories. Level one of open coding in the

Table 6

Reason Codes Analyzed

Open Coding Level 1	Axial Coding Level 2	Thematic Coding Level 3
Murder (564) Violence:U.S.Targeted (511) Terrorism (485) Potential:Violence (328) Violence:Foreign/Non-U.S.Victims:Targeted (184) Violence:Criminal (124) Landmines (103)	Violence (2,299)	Harm (3,087)
Kidnapping (380) Crime/Criminal (258) Robbery (150)	Criminal (788)	
ParamilitaryActivity (243) Military (199) Al-Qaeda (161) Extremists (107)	Actors (710)	Actors (710)
Demonstrations (381) Anti-American/Western (204) Elections (185) Roads:Impeded (177)	Circumstantial (947)	Concern (2,356)
Threat (406) Risk (243) Security:Concerns/Incidents (209) Unpredictable (154) Danger (153) Tensions (127) Unrest:Civil/Social/Political (117)	Existential (1,409)	

content analysis is considered descriptive; in other words, each reason provided by the State Department for issuance of the Travel Warning or Alert was coded as Reason, as was just described at length. The researcher extrapolated the next two levels of coding based on observation of patterns. The second level of axial coding categorized these Reason codes into five groups: Violence, Criminal, Actors, Circumstantial, and Existential. This content analysis is seen in Table 6. In the top 25 Reason codes alone, the codes categorized as Violence appeared 2,299 times. They include murder, violence targeted at U.S. interests, terrorism, potential violence, violence that targeted foreign/non-U.S. interests, criminal violence, and landmines. The countries with the most Warnings and Alerts with these Violence category codes are Mexico,

Philippines, Israel, Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Mauritania, Kenya, Lebanon, Somalia, and El Salvador. It is perhaps not surprising to find that these countries tend to have the most violence category codes. Mexico's narcotrafficking violence has become an endemic problem there. Israel's neighbors are hostile on almost all sides. Somalia is a failed state.

The next group of top 25 Reason codes were distilled into a second level as Criminal. The included codes were kidnapping, crime/criminal, and robbery. Again, Mexico appeared at the top of the list with the most criminal category codes. It was followed by Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nigeria, Philippines, Colombia, and Afghanistan. The emergence of more Central American countries may be related to narcotrafficking that flows from Colombia through Mexico, where cartels compete violently over territory. Colombia is also notorious for its history of kidnapping. The next axial category among the top 25 Reason codes is Actors, which include paramilitary, military, extremists, and Al-Qaeda. Mauritania and Mali were at the top of the Actors list, particularly for Al-Qaeda activity. Lebanon was also the most coded for these Actors, and not for just one in particular, but all. Nigeria followed for extremist elements. This Actors category captures the perpetrators of major violence and conflict in countries that are the subjects of Warnings and Alerts. While these countries are all developing economies according to the U.N., they have different forms of government, both autocratic and not (un.org, 2016; Geddes et al, 2014).

The next two categories of Reason codes are Circumstantial and Existential. The content analysis proceeded into the third level of thematic coding, placing these two groups of axial Reason codes into a theme called Concern. They reflect non-specific concerns like: risk, tensions, demonstrations, etc. The categories of Violence and Criminal described for groups of Reason codes above were themed as Harm. Actors maintained that title for the third level theme.

The pattern here is that these documents are largely divided between reasons that are imminently dangerous, including life threatening, to not so dangerous. Most of the Reason codes reflect an imminent level of harm. The other portion of Reason codes are still nasty in and of themselves, but are more of concern rather than imminently life threatening. Next, along with each reason the State Department provided for Americans to give traveling to a particular destination a second thought, there was advice. If one intended to travel to a country ‘despite a warning’ or ‘despite an alert’—common phrases found and coded in hundreds of those documents—the State Department had advice for doing so to enhance one’s chances for a safer stay.

Verb Codes

The third main code group was Verb:_____, and this coding choice was made to not only explore what type of advice the State Department imparted to potential travelers, but how that advice was given. The top 25 Verb codes can be seen in Table 7 on the following page. In other words, these codes explored for the type of language used with regard to firmness. Did the State Department lightly suggest one avoid a certain country, or did it explicitly state not to take one action or another? The list of Verb codes is longer than the Background code list, but has fewer codes than the Reason code list. At 199 codes total (see Appendix E), the Verb codes reflect directives and suggestions provided by the State Department in relation to the nature of the danger described in a given Travel Document or Alert. For example, the Congo Travel Warning of June 17, 1997 states: “The Department of State *warns* U.S. citizens to *cancel* travel to the Congo-Brazzaville due to the deteriorated security situation and the suspension of the operations of the U.S. Embassy in Brazzaville” (DOS, Congo a, 1997). Two advice verbs were used in this sentence: ‘warns’ and ‘cancel’. They were coded Verb:Warns and

Verb:Cancel:Travel. While Verb:Warns was an extremely common verb, coded 274 times, Verb:Cancel:Travel was coded only once out of over 1,300 documents.

Table 7

Top 25 Verb Codes

Verb Code	Frequency
Verb:Urge*	633
Verb:Exercise:Caution/Prudence/Vigilance/GoodJudgement	590
Verb:Register/Enroll:WithU.S.Embassy/Consulate/STEP	556
Verb:Avoid/BeAlertTo:Crowds/Demonstrations	392
Verb:Avoid:TravelToSpecificAreas	318
Verb:Encourages*	305
Verb:Travel:Defer/CurtailPostpone/ReduceForgo/CarefullyConsider/Avoid	298
Verb:PersonalSecurity:Evaluation/BeAlertTo/BeAware	293
Verb:Warns*	274
Verb:Travel:Warns/Cautions/RecommendsAgainst	202
Verb:Advise*	197
Verb:BeAlertTo/AwareOf:Surroundings/Situation	176
Verb:Monitor:News	169
Verb:TakePrecautions:Security	156
Verb:Alerts*	145
Verb:Reminds*	143
Verb:Depart*	132
Verb:Consider*	131
Verb:Maintain/Keep:LowProfile	130
Verb:Monitor:Situation	87
Verb:Vary/Take:AlternateRoute	87
Verb:Travel:DuringDay/AvoidNightTravel	82
Verb:Avoid/BeAlertIn:AreasPopularWithWesterners/Foreigners	71
Verb:Maintain:Passport/VisaValidity	66
Verb:Report:ConcernsToU.S.Embassy	58
Verb:Avoid*	48
Verb:BeAware*	46
Verb:Follow:OfficialInstructions	46
Verb:Have:EmergencyEvacuationPlan	45
Verb:Avoid:PublicAreas	42
Verb:Avoid:PublicTransportation	34
Verb:Stay:Indoors	32
Verb:BeAlertTo:Unexpected:Visitors/Packages/Incidents	29
Verb:Carry:TravelDocuments/PhotoID	29
Verb:Avoid:OverlandTravel	28

*Not counted in Top 25 because verb without advice

Only once was the State Department so explicit as to write “cancel travel”. It is an interesting stance for the State Department to take—a suggestive stance (*warns*) more often than a directive stance (*cancel*). It seems that the State Department was and is much more comfortable with suggesting Americans ‘defer’ travel or ‘carefully consider’, ‘curtail’, ‘postpone’, ‘reduce’, ‘forgo’, or ‘avoid’ it. Over the course of the sample, the State Department ‘warned’ and ‘recommended against’ travel, but rarely used language as bold as ‘cancel’. “Verb:Depart” coded at 132 times was an example of a more explicitly directive code, but it was aimed at Americans already in a country when danger arose. The top 25 Verb codes are explored here (see Table 7 above), with some supporting tables for certain verb categories.

If the State Department does one thing the most in its travel advice documents, it ‘urges’. More than any other Verb code, Verb:Urge was coded 633 times. While it is the top code, the top 25 Verb code discussion will focus on verbs that come with specific advice. These stand-alone codes, like ‘urge’, will be mentioned, though. Verb:Urge rarely stood alone; it was regularly accompanied by some other type of supporting and suggestive verb. The State Department “urged [Americans] to exercise extreme caution” in Algeria (DOS, Algeria a, 1995), “urged [Americans] to avoid all travel in Iraq” (DOS, Iraq a, 1998), it frequently “urged [Americans] to register with the U.S. Embassy” (DOS, Fiji a, 2001), and it “urged [Americans] to be alert for unusual behavior” in Macedonia (DOS, Macedonia a, 2002).

The code Verb:Exercise:Caution/Prudence/Vigilance/GoodJudgement was used 590 times. The advice verb was ‘exercise’, and it appeared quite regularly and was accompanied by either ‘caution’, ‘prudence’, ‘vigilance’, or ‘good judgement’. This type of advice moves into a subjective space. While good judgement is exercised much less frequently than some people of the world may desire, the more pressing questions are, what exactly is ‘vigilance’ and does the

layman reader understand how to exercise it? After all, parents do not shout out to their children as they leave for school to remember their lunches and be vigilant; it is simply not used colloquially in the United States (and Americans are the target audience for these Warnings and Alerts) but appears in these documents quite regularly.

In the Travel Warning for Bosnia-Herzegovina on March 30, 2006, “Travelers are warned to exercise additional vigilance in urban areas to avoid being victimized during confrontational crime” (DOS, Bosnia-Herzegovina a, 2006). The words ‘avoid being victimized’ taken in isolation is advice frustrating enough, but the sentence as a whole leaves the layman traveler without actual concrete advice on what it means to exercise vigilance (or prudence or good judgment). This point would not be belabored to this extent if this particular code was not the second most frequent Verb code, meaning that many Travel Warnings and Alerts present this advice without the context needed. One standout example of a Travel Warning that did provide the context of what it means to be vigilant was issued for Syria on September 14, 2006:

Americans in Syria should exercise caution and take prudent measures to maintain their security. These measures include being aware of their surroundings, avoiding crowds and demonstrations, keeping a low profile, varying times and routes for all required travel, and ensuring travel documents are current (DOS, Syria a, 2006).

To be sure, all Travel Warnings and Alerts are full of advice, even when they use vague terminology as previously described. It is clear, though, that there is a diplomatic security vernacular that the State Department uses, and, as described above, it may not be language that is meaningful to the untrained traveler. Following the Syria Travel Warning’s explicit connection of what it means to be vigilant could be put to good use by the State Department if applied to more travel advice documents.

Coded 556 times, Verb:Register/Enroll:WithU.S.Embassy/Consulate/STEP mostly appeared at the conclusion of many documents. STEP refers to the Smart Traveler Enrollment Program (step.state.gov, 2016). In the early years studied, travelers were ‘urged’ to register their presence with the nearest U.S. Embassy or Consulate in the subject country of the Warning or Alert. This allowed the consular personnel to know how many Americans were in the host country in the event they needed to communicate emergency or evacuation information to the U.S. citizens present; occasionally, this was explained. Over time, the documents implied that the State Department automated this process with the Smart Traveler Enrollment Program.

Verb:Avoid/BeAlertTo:Crowds/Demonstrations was a very common code, coded 392 times. In Haiti: “Crowd behavior is unpredictable, and violence can flare up at any time, so American citizens are warned to avoid political gatherings and demonstrations” (DOS, Haiti a, 2001). ‘Avoid’ was a particularly popular verb that was coupled with various types advice. Table 8 shows all the “Verb:Avoid:_____” codes at the end of this section.

Returning to the top 25 Verb codes, the next one is Verb:Avoid:TravelToSpecificAreas, coded 318 times. Also on the Avoid code list, this particular code was useful. Essentially, all Travel Warnings and Alerts are suggesting one avoid travel to a particular country, but in many cases that advice is rather specific. This code accounts for that specificity. A Travel Warning and Alert for a given country does not imply that the entire country is unsafe. During 2014’s invasion of the Crimean Peninsula by Russia, the Ukraine Travel Warning stated: “The Department of State warns U.S. citizens to defer all non-essential travel to Ukraine and *to defer all travel to the Crimean Peninsula and eastern regions of Kharkiv, Donetsk and Lugansk* due to the presence of Russian military forces in the Crimean Peninsula, and in Russia near the Ukrainian border” (DOS, Ukraine a, 2014). The italicized portion of that sentence is what merited the

Verb:TravelToSpecificAreas code. Notice the difference between ‘defer all *non-essential* travel to Ukraine’ and ‘defer *all* travel to the Crimean Peninsula...’. The term ‘non-essential travel’ was a stand-alone code not categorized under Background, Reason, or Verb that was coded 176 times because it was prevalent across the Warning and Alert documents.

Verb:TravelToSpecificAreas is a useful code because it allows the American traveler to discern as to which parts of a given country he or she could travel with less risk. This is important information for official travel, allowing corporations or universities, for example, to have a better understanding of where their constituents may travel with less risk.

Next in the Verb list is Verb:Encourages at 305 times coded. Like Verb:Urge, this verb was always associated with follow-on verbal advice, such as American citizens are encouraged to register with the U.S. Embassy in such and such place. There are a number of verbs like these, which appear in Table 7’s Verb Code list because of their high frequency, but are not counted toward the 25 concrete verbal advice codes. The others are Verb:Warns, Verb:Advise, Verb:Alerts, Verb:Reminds, Verb:Depart, Verb:Consider, Verb:Avoid, and Verb:BeAware. Similar supporting verbs were regularly associated with the noun ‘travel’ and almost always appeared in the first sentence, coded as

Verb:Travel:Defer/Curtail/Postpone/Reduce/Forgo/CarefullyConsider/Avoid, which was coded 298 times. Often the term ‘non-essential’, as mentioned earlier, would precede the word ‘travel’. Coded further down the top 25 Verb list 202 times is stronger language:

Verb:Travel:Warns/Cautions/RecommendsAgainst.

A very common piece of advice was for the traveler to evaluate, be alert to, or be aware of his or her personal security. Coded 293 times,

Verb:PersonalSecurity:Evaluate/BeAlertTo/BeAware would often be presented thusly:

“American citizens who remain in Algeria *despite this warning* are urged to exercise maximum caution and to evaluate regularly their personal security practices” (DOS, Algeria a, 1997). This quote presents an opportunity to bring attention to another stand-alone code that did not fall under the Background, Reason, or Verb categories, which is the italicized ‘despite this warning’. This appeared quite regularly throughout the sample and appears to be the State Department’s way of telling Americans that they have been duly warned and that they proceed with travel at their own risk.

Verb:BeAlertTo/AwareOf:Surroundings/Situation was coded 176 times and perhaps is a better way to advise Americans to be vigilant. Verb:Monitor:News and Verb:Monitor:Situation were coded 169 and 87 times, respectively. For Senegal, the State Department wrote: “U.S. citizens planning to travel to Senegal during and immediately following the elections should monitor local news, assess local conditions and travel routes, and consult Embassy Dakar’s website for emergency messages to U.S. Citizens” (DOS, Senegal a, 2011).

Verb:TakePrecautions:Security was coded 156 times. Sometimes it appeared as advice imparted without context, and other times documents could be very specific. Those precautions tended to be many of the codes that appeared on the top 25 Verb list. One of them,

Verb:Maintain/Keep:LowProfile, coded 130 times, was quite common; not attracting attention to oneself, when possible, seemed to be staple advice. Verb:Vary/Take:AlternateRoute and Verb:Travel:DuringDay/AvoidNightTravel were coded 87 and 82 times, respectively, and are succinct. Verb:Avoid/BeAlertIn:AreasPopularWithWesterners/Foreigners, coded 71 times, appeared in places where Westerners and non-Western foreigners were targeted:

Historically, Americans have been the targets of numerous terrorist attacks in Lebanon. The perpetrators of many of these attacks are still present and retain the ability to act. American citizens should thus keep a low profile, varying times and

routes for all required travel. Americans should also pay close attention to their personal security at locations where Westerners are generally known to congregate, and should avoid demonstrations and large gatherings (DOS, Lebanon a, 2006).

The codes remaining in top 25 Verb codes are also very succinct. They called for Americans to maintain their passport and visa validity (coded 66 times) to avoid trouble with host country authorities and immigration officers and to report concerns to the U.S. Embassy (coded 58 times). Cooperation with local authorities meant for less trouble, so the code Verb:FollowOfficialInstructions was used 46 times and seemed to be associated with official roadblocks or check-in points. The State Department asked that travelers have emergency evacuation plans (coded 45 times) and that they avoid public areas and public transportation, coded 42 and 34 times, respectively. Verb:Stay:Indoors was coded 32 times and was often associated with nightfall. There was an instance of very specific advice about staying indoors, which contrasts very broad advice used in other instances. In a Travel Warning for Burundi: “U.S. citizens should stay indoors, in a ground floor interior room, if gunfire occurs nearby” (DOS, Burundi a, 2010). If an interior room means a room with no windows, then it makes sense that it would be a space that is safer from bullet fire, but why the ground floor? Perhaps it is easier to escape from the ground floor if absconding is merited, but without that context, it is perplexing advice. Verb:BeAlertTo:Unexpected:Visitors/Packages/Incidents, coded 29 times, was a specifically useful piece of advice and is a good example of what one could do to operationalize exercising vigilance. A 1996 Public Announcement for Paraguay asked private U.S. citizens to exercise caution: “General personal security guidelines include varying schedules and routes; being alert to surveillance, unusual events, unexpected visitors, and strange vehicles or packages” (DOS, Paraguay a, 1996). Also coded 29 times, American travelers were advised to carry their travel documents and photo identification and, 28 times coded, to avoid

overland travel. The term ‘overland travel’ was another example of State Department security vernacular. It is certainly easy to understand its meaning, so it is not vague vernacular. It does show, though, that there are specific terms used consistently across the sample of 18 years for a variety of countries, indicating that while these documents may be created at a U.S. Embassy in a certain country, there must be an overarching editorial review process at State Department headquarters. That very well may be the case, and it may be easily learned through interviews of State Department officials. However, this research was meant to derive understanding from archival documents, and these documents reflect much to the discerning reader.

As mentioned earlier, there were many Verb:Avoid codes, so they were broken out into a separate list, which can be seen on the next page in Table 8. The various advice given via the Verb:Avoid codes are specific and useful. It directs Americans away from present or potential danger. In some cases, this advice was overwhelming: “...American citizens should stay away from demonstrations and generally avoid crowded public places, such as restaurants and cafes, shopping and market areas and malls, pedestrian zones, public transportation of all kinds, including buses and trains and their respective stations/terminals, and the areas around them” (DOS, Israel a, 2004). That particular Israel Travel Warning left little else to avoid, which is essentially equivalent to the Verb:ShelterInPlace code, coded 12 times. If the State Department is reluctant to direct Americans to cancel travel outright, language such as this indicates that tourists should be circumspect about their plans for tourism in a place where quotidian activities are advised to be avoided.

Table 8

All Verb:Avoid Codes

Verb:Avoid Code	Frequency
Verb:Avoid/BeAlertTo:Crowds/Demonstrations	393
Verb:Avoid:TravelToSpecificAreas	318
Verb:Avoid/BeAlertIn:AreasPopularwithWesterners/Foreigners	71
Verb:Avoid:PublicAreas	42
Verb:Avoid:PublicTransportation	34
Verb:Avoid:OverlandTravel	28
Verb:Avoid:Restaurants/Bars	26
Verb:Avoid:Predictability	21
Verb:Avoid:Malls/ShoppingAreas	20
Verb:Avoid:Walking/TrekkingAlone	19
Verb:Avoid:ReligiousPlacseOfWorship	17
Verb:Avoid:CriminalActivity	12
Verb:Avoid:Military/MilitaryFacilities	12
Verb:Avoid:BusStops/Buses	11
Verb:Avoid:Public/GovernmentBuildings	10
Verb:Avoid:IsolatedAreas	9
Verb:Avoid:RoadBlocks	8
Verb:Avoid:Abandoned/DestroyedBuildings	7
Verb:Avoid:Attention	6
Verb:Avoid:Docking/SailingThroughHostCountryWaters	6
Verb:Avoid:Landmines/UnexplodedOrdnanceAreas	6
Verb:Avoid:PedestrianZones	6
Verb:Avoid:FuneralRites	3
Verb:Avoid:Red-light/ProstitutionDistricts	3
Verb:Avoid:BeingVictimized	2
Verb:Avoid:Boats	2
Verb:Avoid:Confrontation	2
Verb:Avoid:CongestedVehicleTraffic	2
Verb:Avoid:Contact	2
Verb:Avoid:Downtown	2
Verb:Avoid:DrugDealers	2
Verb:Avoid:CommericalFarms	1
Verb:Avoid:Hospitals/Clinics(Outbreak)	1
Verb:Avoid:Ice	1
Verb:Avoid:PoliticalPartyHQs	1
Verb:Avoid:PreviousSitesOfTerrorism	1
Verb:Avoid:Riots	1
Verb:Avoid:UnpopulatedAreas	1

One category of Verb codes that did not make the top 25 list was the ‘Do Not’ codes, and they are noteworthy for that same reason. Table 9 below shows the short list of ‘Do Not’ directives. It became clear during the content analysis that the State Department was reluctant to be overly direct about their advice, reluctant to outright forbid a given behavior, which makes these “do not” Verb choices interesting. To be clear, the “do not” codes were used for that express language or something similar, like “should not” or “under no circumstances should...”. For ease of coding organization, “Verb:DoNot” was used to capture these more strongly worded directives. The State Department finds itself in a precarious position. Americans are a free people and with the exception of Cuba, Americans are allowed to travel freely to any country in the

Table 9

All Verb:DoNot Codes

Verb:DoNot Code	Frequency
Verb:DoNot:DisplayWealth	25
Verb:DoNot:TakePhotos/Video	16
Verb:DoNot:AttemptToPassThroughRoadBlocks	15
Verb:DoNot:CarryLargeSumsOfCash	13
Verb:DoNot:ComeToVolunteerUnofficially	10
Verb:DoNot:SharePrivateFinancialInformation	6
Verb:DoNot:TravelAlone	6
Verb:DoNot:ParticipateInDemonstrations/Protests(Illegal)	3
Verb:DoNot:Sail/DockNearHostCountry	3
Verb:DoNot:ChallengeAuthorities	2
Verb:DoNot:Resist/AntagonizeCriminals	2
Verb:DoNot:StopCarAtAccidents/Gatherings	2
Verb:DoNot:ViolateCurfew	2
Verb:DoNot:AttemptToVisitU.S.Embassy	1

world, even North Korea, albeit at their own risk. The State Department’s role is clearly to warn and alert, not forbid, and they seem to take that role earnestly. Finding balance in warning a free people about travel to certain countries does not appear to be an easy task, especially given the

wide variety of human experience and intellect. There are those who may understand easily what it means to exercise vigilance, and then there are those who need to be told, as seen above in Table 9, not to “antagonize criminals”.

Verb Codes Content Analysis

To take the content analysis deeper into patterns across the Verb codes, the top 25 of these codes were categorized from mere descriptors in level one open coding to groups (see Table 10). The three group categories in level two axial coding are Avoid verbs, Alert verbs,

Table 10

Verb Codes Analyzed

Open Coding Level 1	Axial Coding Level 2	Thematic Coding Level 3
Avoid/BeAlertTo:Crowds/Demonstrations (392) Avoid:TravelToSpecificAreas (318) Travel:Defer/CurtailPostpone/ReduceForgo/ CarefullyConsider/Avoid (298) Travel:Warns/Cautions/RecommendsAgainst (202) Avoid/BeAlertIn:AreasPopularWithWesterners/Foreigners (71) Avoid:PublicAreas (42) Avoid:PublicTransportation (34) Avoid:OverlandTravel (28)	Avoid (1,385)	General (2,473)
Exercise:Caution/Prudence/Vigilance/GoodJudgement (590) PersonalSecurity:Evaluation/BeAlertTo/BeAware (293) BeAlertTo/AwareOf:Surroundings/Situation (176) BeAlertTo:Unexpected:Visitors/Packages/Incidents (29)	Alert (1,088)	
Register/Enroll:WithU.S.Embassy/Consulate/STEP (556) Monitor:News (169) TakePrecautions:Security (156) Maintain/Keep:LowProfile (130) Monitor:Situation (87) Vary/Take:Alternate:Route (87) Travel:DuringDay/AvoidNightTravel (82) Maintain:Passport/VisaValidity (66) Report:ConcernsToU.S.Embassy (58) Follow:OfficialInstructions (46) Have:EmergencyEvacuationPlan (45) Stay:Indoors (32) Carry:TravelDocuments/PhotoID (29)	Task (1,543)	Explicit (1,543)

and Task verbs. The Avoid verbs in the top 25 list appear most frequently in Mexico, Israel, Indonesia, Philippines, Nepal, and Thailand. The Alert codes appear most frequently in most of the same countries, with the addition of Pakistan. Finally, the category Task was used because these Verb codes provided the reader with an actionable task, such as being sure to carry one's passport or monitor the news. The country with the most actionable Task codes was Yemen, which was followed by Mexico, Lebanon, Pakistan, Syria, Liberia, Sudan, and Chad. The countries in these three top 25 Verb categories do not really reveal a meaningful pattern, except that countries with more Travel Warnings and Alerts will have a higher frequency of advice, or Verb codes. These three categories of Verbs were distilled into the level three thematic coding of content analysis, and those themes were titled General and Explicit. In other words, Avoid and Alert codes were less specific and provided something of a general guideline, like avoiding public areas. The Task codes were more explicit and more easily actionable.

Observations in Travel Warnings and Alerts

Distilling the content analysis from open coding to axial coding and finally thematic coding allowed for a deeper analysis that created an opportunity to draw conclusions about the general components of Travel Warnings and Alerts. With regard to Background code information provided in these documents, readers will find that, generally speaking, there is a theme of providing actionable contextual content and simply informational content. As regards Reasons coded across travel advice documents, the traveler will find that the State Department accounts for reasons that cause harm, create concern, and lists the actors who may be implicit in causing that harm or concern. Finally, with regard to Verb codes, the State Department overwhelmingly provides advice in a general way and less often provides advice in an explicit, direct way.

There were some curiosities across the 18 year sample of these documents. As mentioned earlier, rape as a reason for danger in a Travel Warning country did not appear until 2004. Likewise, noting that women in particular were a target for violence did not appear until a Travel Warning for Nepal in 2009: “Crime in the Kathmandu Valley, including violent crime and harassment of women, continues to rise” (DOS, Nepal a, 2009). It appeared nine times total after that date in various countries, but 2009 seems rather late for that. Does it mean anything that violence against women was accounted for with the start of the Obama Administration, or is it simply a coincidence? It is difficult to know without further research. Another curious phrase that appeared throughout the sample was, “Violent crime, *practiced by persons in police and military uniform*, as well as by ordinary criminals, is an acute problem” (DOS, Nigeria a, 1996). The phrasing in italics is perplexing. Has a criminal stolen a police or military uniform, or is a member of the police or military engaging in criminal activity? If the latter, does the State Department know this to be corruption and cannot put it in writing, diplomatically speaking, for fear of angering the host government? Deriving information strictly from archived material leaves the coding up to interpretation, and for the purposes of this study, those phrases were extrapolated to indicate corruption and were coded accordingly. It is not unlikely that the State Department has to be sensitive to its host government. In numerous Warnings, this type of phrasing was present for different countries: “Millions of U.S. citizens safely visit Mexico each year, including more than 150,000 who cross the border every day for study, tourism or business and at least one million U.S. citizens who live in Mexico” (DOS, Mexico a, 2011). Again, it appears as if the State Department is trying to strike a balance, letting Americans know that there is a way to travel safely to Mexico, as evidenced by the millions who do it annually, but it then follows this statement with pages of descriptive violence, murder, and kidnapping plaguing the

country. Not only is it a difficult balance to strike for the State Department, but it is also difficult information to process for the potential traveler.

Exploring these 1,303 documents and coding their main components—background/context, reasons/danger, and verbs/advice—revealed much about what the State Department deems dangerous and how they want to present it. Embassies issue Travel Warnings and Alerts with contextual information, with reasons for concern and advice to mitigate exposure to danger. There is clearly a style, which is careful, more suggestive than directive, and with a consistent diplomatic security vernacular used across time and a variety of countries. The second part of the analysis was to explore phenomenon beyond exploring the content, and it now turns to exploring which types of countries were subjects of Warnings and Alerts and how they may fit into a Social Construction theoretical framework.

Social Construction and Travel Warning and Alerts

Social Construction Theory in Democratic Policy Design constructs groups of people into four categories: Advantaged, Contender, Dependent, and Deviant (Schneider et al, 2014). This paper seeks to extend that theoretical application from groups in the United States, like immigrants, single mothers, banks, small business owners, and convicts, etc., to countries of the world. There are 193 member states of the United Nations (un.org, 2016). Schneider et al (2014) posited that groups were socially constructed based on their level of power and positive or negative regard (deservingness). Recall, for example, that small business owners are both well regarded and have economic agency; they are considered Advantaged. Children are well regarded, but have little power of their own. They are constructed as Dependent. Bankers and Wall Street have considerable power, but negative regard. They fall into the Contender category.

Criminals are constructed as Deviant because they are low on both power and regard. Each group is the beneficiary or target of policy decisions commensurate with their social construction.

Viewing countries of the world through the Social Construction lens of power and regard/deservingness, it was necessary to seek variables to help define that power and regard. Those variables were the state of a country's economy and a country's government type.

Power as described in the framework relates mostly to economic power. As such, for the purpose of this study, economic power is determined by the United Nation's Development Policy and Analysis Division's 2014 World Economic Situation and Prospects (W.E.S.P.) report (un.org, 2016). The U.N. classified the countries of the world into Developed Economies, Economies in Transition, and Developing Economies.

Table 11

Developed Economies

Countries		
Australia	Germany	New Zealand
Austria	Greece	Norway
Belgium	Hungary	Poland
Bulgaria	Iceland	Portugal
Canada	Ireland	Romania
Croatia	Italy	Slovakia
Cyprus	Japan	Slovenia
Czech Republic	Latvia	Spain
Denmark	Lithuania	Sweden
Estonia	Luxembourg	Switzerland
Finland	Malta	United Kingdom
France	Netherlands	

These three broad categories capture information about influence and power. The Developed Economies category also includes "major developed economies", which indicates membership in

the Group of Seven (un.org, 2016, p. 1). Of course, the United States is included in that category, but is removed for the purpose of this paper. It is removed because a United States government agency is writing Travel Warnings and Alerts about countries around the world and does not write Warnings and Alerts for its own country. Countries with developed economies can be seen above in Table 11. W.E.S.P.'s second category, Economies in Transition, captures nations at time when they are emerging from developing and moving toward developed economy status; they essentially cover both spaces. They are listed in Table 12. Among the Developing Economies (see Table 13), W.E.S.P. further classifies some countries as Least Developed, Heavily Indebted, Small Island Developing States, and Landlocked Developing Countries (un.org, 2016). Some of the countries classified as Developing may surprise the reader, like China, but China wields influence in other ways, which affects its place in the social construction power typology.

Table 12

Economies in Transition

Countries	
Albania	Moldova
Armenia	Montenegro
Azerbaijan	Russia
Belarus	Serbia
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Tajikistan
Georgia	Turkmenistan
Kazakhstan	Ukraine
Kyrgyzstan	Uzbekistan
Macedonia	

Table 13

Developing Economies

Countries			
Afghanistan	Dominican Republic	Malawi	Saudi Arabia
Algeria	Ecuador	Malaysia	Senegal
Angola	Egypt	Maldives	Seychelles
Antigua and Barbuda	El Salvador	Mali	Sierra Leone
Argentina	Equatorial Guinea	Marshall Islands	Singapore
Armenia	Eritrea	Mauritania	Solomon Islands
Azerbaijan	Ethiopia	Mauritius	Somalia
Bahamas	Fiji	Mexico	South Africa
Bahrain	Gabon	Micronesia	South Sudan
Bangladesh	Gambia	Moldova	Sri Lanka
Barbados	Ghana	Mongolia	Sudan
Belize	Grenada	Morocco	Suriname
Benin	Guatemala	Mozambique	Swaziland
Bhutan	Guinea	Myanmar	Syria
Bolivia	Guinea-Bissau	Namibia	Tajikistan
Botswana	Guyana	Nauru	Tanzania
Brazil	Haiti	Nepal	Thailand
Brunei	Honduras	Nicaragua	Timor Leste
Burkina Faso	Hong Kong	Niger	Togo
Burundi	India	Nigeria	Tonga
Cabo Verde	Indonesia	Oman	Trinidad and Tobago
Cambodia	Iran	Pakistan	Tunisia
Cameroon	Iraq	Palau	Turkey
Central African Republic	Israel	Panama	Turkmenistan
Chad	Jamaica	Papua New Guinea	Tuvalu
Chile	Jordan	Paraguay	Uganda
China	Kazakhstan	Peru	United Arab Emirates
Colombia	Kenya	Philippines	Uruguay
Comoros	Kiribati	Qatar	Uzbekistan
Congo	Kuwait	Republic of Korea	Vanuatu
Costa Rica	Laos	Rwanda	Venezuela
Cote D'Ivoire	Lebanon	Saint Kitts and Nevis	Vietnam
Cuba	Lesotho	Saint Lucia	Yemen
		Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	Zambia
D.R. of the Congo	Liberia	Samoa	Zimbabwe
Djibouti	Libya	Sao Tome and Principe	
Dominica	Madagascar		

To determine positive or negative regard, attention was directed toward type of government. The United States government and its people have an historical preference for countries that share its democratic principles and values; after all, one only need to look toward its wars in the 20th Century alone, both of the regular and Cold variety, to reinforce this impression. To broadly categorize countries as democratic or not, scholarship on the autocratic countries of the world was sought. In their *Autocratic Regimes Code Book* in “Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions”, Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz (2014) complete an historical analysis of nation states of the world and their autocracy status over time. Using their research, the following countries listed in Table 14 were shown to have an autocratic regime, even if for one year, during the sample studied from 1994 through 2014. Note that the countries on the list may not be autocratic now or may not have been autocratic during the 1990s but are now; they are listed because at some point they had an autocratic government during the sample years studied. It is taken into consideration if the tenure of an autocrat was fleeting, which affects construction of regard.

Accounting for a country’s economic classification as well as each country’s status as autocratic, countries in the following categories were assigned the following numbers:

- Developed and Not Autocratic = 1
- Economies in Transition and Not Autocratic = 2
- Economies in Transition and Autocratic = 3
- Developing and Not Autocratic = 4
- Developing and Autocratic = 5

There were no developed countries that were autocratic, so there is not a separate category as such. These five numbers classify countries across the spectrum of the social construction and power/regard typology (see Figure 1) of Advantaged, Contender, Dependent, and Deviant. To see each country's numerical classification as described above, see Tables 15 through 19.


Table 14

Autocratic or Temporarily Autocratic Countries, 1994 – 2014

Autocratic Countries		
Afghanistan	Guinea	Pakistan
Algeria	Guinea-Bissau	Peru
Angola	Haiti	Russia
Armenia	Indonesia	Rwanda
Azerbaijan	Iran	Saudi Arabia
Bangladesh	Iraq	Senegal
Belarus	Jordan	Serbia
Botswana	Kazakhstan	Sierra Leone
Burkina Faso	Kenya	Singapore
Burundi	Kuwait	Sudan
Cambodia	Kyrgyzstan	Swaziland
Cameroon	Laos	Syria
Central African Republic	Liberia	Tajikistan
Chad	Libya	Tanzania
China	Madagascar	Thailand
Congo	Malaysia	Togo
Cote d'Ivoire	Mauritania	Tunisia
Cuba	Mexico	Turkmenistan
D.R. of the Congo	Morocco	Uganda
Egypt	Mozambique	United Arab Emirates
Eritrea	Myanmar	Uzbekistan
Ethiopia	Namibia	Venezuela
Gabon	Nepal	Vietnam
Gambia	Niger	Yemen
Georgia	Nigeria	Zambia
Ghana	North Korea	Zimbabwe
Guatemala	Oman	

Countries classified as Category 1 (Developed and Not Autocratic) fall into the Advantaged quadrant of Figure 1. Those countries have both high power and positive regard. Countries classified as Category 2 (Economies in Transition and Not Autocratic) stay to the left of the Y axis as still having positive regard, but lower toward the X axis for having less power. Countries classified as Category 3 (Economies in Transition and Autocratic) move toward the

Figure 1 Social Construction and Power Typology: Foreign Countries



right of the Y axis with lower regard and stay at a similar level of power as the Category 2 countries, but in the Contender quadrant of Figure 1. Countries classified as Category 4 (Developing and Not Autocratic) remain well regarded and to the left of the Y axis, but move down in power below the X axis and into the Dependent quadrant of Figure 1. Countries classified as Category 5 (Developing and Autocratic) find themselves in the low power and low regard, or Deviant, quadrant, seen in the lower right corner of Figure 1.

Economic power and autocratic/not autocratic are two broad-brushed strokes used to paint a picture of how countries of the world may be socially constructed. These broad categories are not nuanced, and it is clear that other variables may move a country's position along the axes. The degree to which a form of government is free is on a spectrum, from truly communist to truly fascist. The degree to which a country's economy and its people can provide for themselves is also on a spectrum. For example, China is clearly autocratic and classified as a developing economy by the U.N.; however, it cannot be cast as not powerful. In the same U.N. W.E.S.P. report, it classifies China as having an upper middle per capita income, despite its developing economy status. In other words, its people are making decent earnings and although they live under an autocratic regime, it is not autocratic to the same extent as neighboring North Korea. The people of China can travel abroad, access much of the Internet, even with censorship, and are communist more in political ideology than economic ideology. That is a stark difference from North Korea. Another variable that could be considered is that China has nuclear weapons and the ability to use them, not to mention a robust military. North Korea is alleged to have nuclear weaponry with a questionable ability to deploy them. These variables would move China up the Y axis from the Deviant quadrant to the Contender quadrant while likely keeping North Korea firmly in Deviant quadrant territory. These examples show that there is room for some movement. This brings the research to where social construction meets Travel Warnings and Alerts. What follows is a discussion and analysis of content found in Warnings and Alerts corresponding to countries within the Category 1 through 5 classifications.

Category 1 Countries

Countries classified as Category 1 are Developed and Not Autocratic. Of the 193 countries of the world recognized by the U.N., 35 were categorized as Category 1 (excluding the

United States), and most of them are in Europe. They can be seen in Table 15. During the 18 years selected for this study between 1994 through 2014, only one country was issued a Travel Warning. It was Japan—one Travel Warning for one country. The Travel Warning for Japan of March 21, 2011 was not issued because of political turmoil, election violence, mass shootings, terrorism, or a coup d'état. Instead, it was issued because 10 days prior on March 11, a powerful earthquake put in motion a catastrophic tsunami, which overwhelmed a nuclear power plant and its reactors, thus creating widespread concern of radiological release.

...in response to the situation at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the Department of Energy, and other technical experts in the U.S. Government have reviewed the scientific and technical information they have collected from assets in country, as well as what the Government of Japan has disseminated. Consistent with the NRC guidelines that would apply to such a situation in the United States, we are recommending, as a precaution, that U.S. citizens within 50 miles (80 kilometers) of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant evacuate the area or to take shelter indoors if safe evacuation is not practical (DOS, Japan a, 2011).

The State Department proceeded to mention that its personnel were provided potassium iodide to be consumed only at State Department instruction, which is used to block radioactive iodine from coursing through the thyroid and throughout the body (cdc.gov, 2016). With regard to being present in Japan, the Travel Warning continued: “The State Department strongly urges U.S. citizens to defer travel to Japan at this time and those in Japan should consider departing” (DOS, Japan a, 2011).

Table 15

Category 1 Countries: Developed Economies and Not Autocratic

Category 1 Countries		
Australia	Germany	New Zealand
Austria	Greece	Norway
Belgium	Hungary	Poland
Bulgaria	Iceland	Portugal
Canada	Ireland	Romania
Croatia	Italy	Slovakia
Cyprus	Japan	Slovenia
Czech Republic	Latvia	Spain
Denmark	Lithuania	Sweden
Estonia	Luxembourg	Switzerland
Finland	Malta	United Kingdom
France	Netherlands	

For Category 1 classified countries, however, there were more Travel Alerts. There were 14 Category 1 countries which were the subject of 30 Travel Alerts, with Japan and the United Kingdom having the most with a tie at five each. One of the five Travel Alerts for Japan was for the 2002 World Cup, and it called attention to potential security risks, like “terrorism and hooliganism” (DOS, Japan-Korea a, 2002). The remaining four were released in succession in response to the same nuclear power plant breach caused by the earthquake and tsunami mentioned earlier. For the United Kingdom, the first three were released in close succession in early 2001 and with regard to “an outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD – known in the United States as Hoof and Mouth Disease)” (DOS, United Kingdom a, 2001). Another in 2001 was in reference to “controversial marches across the province” of Northern Ireland sparked by “sectarian clashes in Belfast that have featured sporadic street violence, attacks on police, property damage and road closures, especially at night” (DOS, United Kingdom b, 2001). The

fifth was released in January 2011 to call attention to the potential for terrorism in the U.K., but there was no mention of a realized attack (DOS, United Kingdom a, 2011).

As for the others, the reasons varied. Canada had one Travel Alert due to a SARS outbreak with the indication of three deaths and 50 cases of infection (DOS, Canada a, 2003). Three Travel Alerts were issued about Germany with one cautioning travelers about potential demonstration violence during a security conference (DOS, Germany a, 2003). The remaining two were about potential election period terrorist activity by Al-Qaeda after it released a video to that end, but with no mention of an actual attack (DOS, Germany a, 2009; DOS, Germany b, 2009). In March and April 2004, two Travel Alerts were issued for Spain in response to bombs “detonated on commuter trains in the Madrid area and at the Atocha station...resulting in numerous deaths and thousands of injuries” (DOS, Spain a, 2004; DOS, Spain b, 2004). Two of the three Travel Alerts for France (and related Monaco and Switzerland) were for potential demonstration violence, while one was in response to disenfranchised and “angry youths [having] set fire to many buildings and thousands of vehicles” (DOS, France-Switzerland a, 2003; DOS, France-Monaco a, 2005; DOS, France-Monaco a, 2006).

Analyzing the data collected from the content analysis about these 30 Travel Alerts issued for Category 1 countries, there are clear patterns. Coded 18 times, demonstrations were the primary reason presented as the cause for concern. This Reason code logically extends to the next top three Reason codes across that body of Alerts. They are Reason:Conferences/Forum/Summit, Reason:Potential:Violence, and Reason:Violence, coded eight, seven, and seven times, respectively. It is easy to tell the story here. Most Travel Alerts for Category 1 countries are issued in advance of a summit or conference, and the State Department wants American travelers to know that protests and demonstrations for that event carry a

potential for moving from peaceful to violent or have been known to turn violent in the past. Accordingly, the most common verb codes are to avoid or be alert to crowds and demonstrations and to exercise vigilance. There is not a single “do not” verb code; instead, the most common are codes that begin with “advise” and “alerts”. With regard to Background codes, the most common by far is that the host government or police are taking security precautions, which is sensible in preparation for a peaceful demonstration that may potentially turn violent. Like the single Travel Warning for Japan for the Category 1 countries, which was issued for a naturally caused disaster, the Travel Alerts are interesting for what they do not include. They are not about war, rebels, insurgency, or drug cartels, and they are not controversial. Instead, most of the Alerts are about what may happen, with the exceptions for angry youth or disease outbreaks, which were few. These Alerts, in sum, convey that there may be a demonstration at a conference that may turn violent, it is in a particular part of town, and it is easy to avoid.

Category 1 countries represent only 0.1 percent of the total Travel Warnings across the sample and six percent of the total Travel Alerts. Does this mean that Level 1 countries are intrinsically safer? Does this mean that over the 18 year sample, the most a traveler had to worry about was potential demonstration violence? It may indeed be that Category 1 countries that are both developed and not autocratic, mostly in Europe, are existentially safe most of the time. That question cannot readily be answered by this data set because the content presented in the sampled Travel Warnings and Alerts only includes what had been decided to be recorded. One would have to separately study the danger that occurred in a given Category 1 country over time and then review countries that were subjects of Travel Warnings and Alerts to see if they were issued those documents for the same type of danger. Currently, this data set does not provide evidence that Travel Warning and Alert issuance is directly proportional to country safety

because we do not know what is not being recorded for other countries. After all, one who follows the news over time might wonder why there was not even a single Travel Alert for Ireland, Northern Ireland, and the rest of the U.K. during the years sampled in the 1990s to inform travelers about consistent violence rendered by the Ireland Revolutionary Army (IRA) and similar actors in those regions before the peace process was engaged at the end of that decade. The same goes for Spain and the bombings by Basque Separatists throughout that country over decades. It could be that such violence did not meet some threshold that the State Department employs before it issues Travel Warnings and Alerts. It could, instead, be preferential treatment, whether intentional or not. It could be that as per the Social Construction power-deservingness typology, policy designers at the State Department issue Travel Warnings and Alerts accordingly. Countries like Ireland, the U.K, and Spain have people that are of predominantly Western origin, like the United States has, with similar cultural values, similar religions, their governments and people are generally wealthy, and they have similar political values of individual freedoms and institutional democracy.

Category 2 Countries

Category 2 countries are Economies in Transition and Not Autocratic, and they had five Travel Warnings and four travel Alerts among them. There are only six countries classified as Category 2, which can be seen in Table 16, and they are all in Europe, particularly Eastern Europe. Except Moldova, the remaining five each had Travel Warnings with a total of 26 among them. Bosnia and Herzegovina had the most at 10, and they concerned the legacies of war, which had ended with the Dayton Peace Accords of 1995. One early Warning in 1996 warned Americans not to travel there and called attention to landmines, unexploded ordnance, sniping, carjacking, and poor infrastructure (DOS, Bosnia-Herzegovina a, 1996). The remaining nine

Travel Warnings were related and lasted until 2006. Ukraine had the second most with five Warnings. They were all issued in 2014 in quick succession in response to the Russian invasion of the Crimean Peninsula (DOS, Ukraine a, 2014). Three Travel Warnings for Albania were released in 1997, 1998, and 1999, and they included a political assassination, a government issuance and subsequent lifting of a state of emergency and curfew, bombings, gunfire, nighttime criminal activity, and general instability (DOS, Albania a, 1997; DOS, Albania a, 1998; DOS, Albania a, 1999).

Only four of the Category 2 countries were issued Travel Alerts, with eight among them. Macedonia had the most, with reference to “armed clashes between Macedonian security forces and ethnic Albanian radicals” (DOS, Macedonia a, 2001). The 1997 Alert for Albania was released after “incidents of violence in some urban areas due to citizens’ frustration with the collapse of pyramid investment schemes” (DOS, Albania a, 1997). For Bosnia-Herzegovina, one Travel Alert concerned the arrest of a Bosnian-Serb war criminal and warned about the potential for retaliation by his supporters against Americans (DOS, Bosnia-Herzegovina-Croatia a, 1998).

Table 16

Category 2 Countries: Economies in Transition and Not Autocratic

Category 2 Countries	
Albania	Moldova
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Montenegro
Macedonia	Ukraine

Analyzing the Travel Warning data for patterns, the Background codes are what one might expect from countries in economic and political transition. The five most frequently coded pieces of contextual content, from highest to lowest, was that consular services were limited and

that the State Department restricted personnel travel and movements. This indicates general instability and violence. The next three of the five Background codes were that border areas were dangerous, N.A.T.O. was engaged, and that peace accords had been or were being negotiated.

The top Reason codes for concern in these countries were landmines, violence, and unexploded ordnance and ammunition—all legacies of war. The remaining top Reason codes for Category 2 country Travel Warnings were demonstrations, potential danger, political violence, and violence targeted at U.S. interests. The top advice corresponding with the reasons for concern were to avoid crowds and demonstrations, register with the U.S. Embassy, keep a low profile, and exercise vigilance.

The Travel Alert Background codes were the same regarding border violence, limited State Department personnel movement, and N.A.T.O. involvement. The top Reason codes for Category 2 countries were also similar in the Alerts, including demonstrations, but with extra focus on violence. Violence codes included general violence, armed conflict and clashes, radical elements, and fighting. The Reason:Ethnic code appeared with higher frequency than others, and that was a relic of the ethnic conflict in those regions over which a war was fought and tensions remained. The advice codes were to avoid travel to specific areas, which revealed over time across the sample that while some parts of a country were safe to visit, others needed to be avoided. That Verb code was followed with exercising vigilance, being alert to crowds and demonstrations, registering with the U.S. Embassy, and generally deferring travel to those countries until another time. Again, there were no “do not” directives.

These Eastern European and Balkan countries have experienced years of conflict, yet they represent only three percent of the total Travel Warnings and two percent of the total Travel

Alerts across this sample. Considerable violence was described in those Travel Warnings, and perhaps there should have been more of them. Their placement in the Advantaged social construction quadrant in Figure 1 may indicate why there are fewer Warnings and Alerts despite the instability in those countries.

Category 3 Countries

Category 3 countries are Economies in Transition and Autocratic. There are 11 of these countries, six of which had Travel Warnings and nine had Travel Alerts. They can be seen in Table 17. Of the six countries with Travel Warnings, there were 26 documents among them. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan had the most with eight each. Tajikistan's Warnings focused on anti-American and anti-Western incidents, including murder and kidnapping (DOS, Tajikistan a, 1998). The Tajikistan Travel Warnings in the late 1990s (1997 and 1998) were uncharacteristically vague, including mention of the suspension of embassy operations and a full evacuation of embassy personnel amid in-country instability (DOS, Tajikistan b, 1998). Such actions seem like last-resort actions, indicating severe violence, but the Travel Warning leaves the reader wondering exactly what was taking place on the ground in Tajikistan. In the 2001 Warnings, there is more context. It mentions a civil war that ended in 1997, terrorist incursions back in 1999 and 2000, and "fighting between government forces and former armed opposition leaders" (DOS, Tajikistan a, 2001). The Warnings for Uzbekistan focused on the country's history of terrorism, active terrorism, and potential terrorism. There was also mention of the fighting between government forces and militants, evacuation of the Peace Corps, and government imposed travel restrictions within the country (DOS, Uzbekistan a, 2006). The Kyrgyz Republic Warnings also referred to clashes between the government and opposition

forces, in addition to general instability, kidnapping, terrorism, and violence (DOS, Kyrgyz Republic a, 2005).

Table 17

Category 3 Countries: Economies in Transition and Autocratic

Category 3 Countries		
Armenia	Kazakhstan	Tajikistan
Azerbaijan	Kyrgyzstan	Turkmenistan
Belarus	Russia	Uzbekistan
Georgia	Serbia	

There were nine Category 3 countries with Travel Alerts, with 44 Alerts total among them. Russia had the most with 12. Four of those 12 were from the 2014 invasion of Ukraine, but the rest were spread from 1996 through 2006. They ranged from concern about demonstrations and strikes to skinhead violence to Chechen separatist violence and terrorism (DOS, Russia a, 1996; DOS, Russia a, 1998; DOS, Russia a, 2006). Uzbekistan had the second most with nine and were similar in content to its aforementioned Travel Warnings. The four for Turkmenistan concerned an attack on its president's motorcade, police checkpoints, home and vehicle searches, and its proximity to the dangers of Afghanistan (DOS, Turkmenistan a, 2002). Azerbaijan had only one Alert, and it was issued with regard to potential for election violence (DOS, Azerbaijan a, 2000).

Analyzing the coded Travel Warning data specifically for Category 3 countries, the most common Background codes were that border areas were dangerous and that State Department personnel had their travel restricted, their dependents were evacuated, or were evacuated themselves. Consequently, it was also coded that consular services were limited. The State

Department likely has a higher threshold for risk than the average traveler because diplomatic personnel and facilities have security and intelligence. As such, if the State Department is taking action to protect its personnel and their families from conditions it considers dangerous to the extent that it merits removal of personnel, it is a strong indication that host country conditions are unstable.

The top Reason codes for Category 3 countries were terrorism, potential terrorism, kidnapping and hostage-taking, and murder. There were also violence codes that appeared in high frequency, including potential violence, armed clashes/conflict, suicide bombing, and violence targeted at U.S. interests. Occasionally, one particular terrorist group would be prominent in certain regions, and Al-Qaeda was a Reason code that appeared in high frequency for Category 3 countries. Corresponding Verb codes for advice was to register one's presence with the U.S. Embassy, exercise vigilance, avoid travel to certain areas, and to defer travel. Travel Warnings for these countries also regularly advised American travelers to be alert to and evaluate their personal security.

The most common codes across the Travel Alerts were virtually the same for the three principal code types, with the following exceptions. In these Alerts, it was more common to add the Background code that there was no distinction in targeting officials or civilians for violence. In the Reason codes, demonstrations and bombings were included among the more frequent. Logically, the added Verb code was to avoid demonstrations and crowds. It is in the Category 3 country Travel Alerts that the first "do not" advice code is included. It was only coded once, for Georgia, and it was Verb:DoNot:TravelAlone. Direct or more forceful language has not been common in the previous categories, and it may be that as countries that are socially constructed as Contender or Deviant, they are associated with more explicit directives. The forthcoming

discussions of Category 4 and 5 countries will review that. Category 3 countries, like Category 2 countries, represent only three percent of all Travel Warnings; however, their Alerts spike to the highest thus far at ten percent out of all Alerts across the 18 year sample. These countries are autocratic and as they move to the right along the X axis, the positive-negative regard axis, the official travel advice issued about them increases.

Category 4 Countries

Countries classified as Category 4 are Developing Countries and Not Autocratic. There are 68 of these countries (see Table 18), and 23 have Travel Warnings issued about them. Among those 23 countries, there were 180 different Travel Warnings. Lebanon had the most with 32 and, in fact, had the most across the entire 18 year sample. Given the robust number of Warning documents for Lebanon from 1996 through 2014, the content covered a myriad of Background, Reason, and Verb codes. The State Department restricted travel for its personnel almost throughout the entire collection of Lebanon Warnings. Terrorism, Hezbollah, murder, bombing, anti-American activity, kidnapping, refugee camp danger, a high profile assassination, the canceling of the Fulbright program, sexual assault, landmines and unexploded ordnance from the long civil war, and most types of violence were present and coded (DOS, Lebanon a, 1996; DOS, Lebanon a, 2004; DOS, Lebanon a, 2005; DOS, Lebanon a, 2012; DOS, Lebanon a, 2014). After the month-long war with Israel in 2006, which included a major evacuation of Americans from Lebanon, the Travel Warnings for Lebanon began including information about how the U.S. Embassy will not evacuate travelers in an emergency, likely because it was very expensive and logistically overwhelming to the point that the State Department had to rely on the U.S. military to accommodate the vast amount of Americans needing evacuation (DOS, Lebanon a, 2009). Curiously, it only mentioned “hostilities” in the Travel Warning released in reference to

and in the middle of that war with no mention of Israel (DOS, Lebanon b, 2006). Israel is also a Category 4 country, and it had 28 Travel Warnings. The title of those Warnings always included the West Bank and Gaza. Each year, the Warnings became longer. They included an array of Background, Reason, and Verb codes. With hostile neighbors, Americans were warned about terrorism, potential terrorism, bombings, suicide bombings, kidnapping, rocket fire into Israeli cities, the death of Yasser Arafat and the potential for ensuing instability, Hamas, murder, State Department personnel travel restrictions and curfews, dangerous border areas, rock throwing, and entry and exit restrictions for Palestinian Americans (DOS, Israel b, 2001; DOS, Israel a, 2004; DOS, Israel b, 2004; DOS Israel a, 2005; DOS, Israel a, 2013). One piece of advice that appeared in some Israel Travel Warnings not seen in documents for other countries was:

...American citizens involved in pro-Palestinian partisan volunteer efforts were severely assaulted in the West Bank by Israeli settlers and harassed by the Israel Defense Forces. Those taking part in such efforts, including through demonstration, non-violent resistance, and 'direct action', are urged to cease such activity for their own personal safety (DOS, Israel a, 2004).

This advice disappeared in later Warnings and was instead placed into a linked page elsewhere on the State Department website. The United States and Israel have a deep and enduring relationship and alliance. One could point out that Israel having been among the countries with the most Travel Warnings issued by the State Department is proof that State issues Warnings and Alerts objectively and based solely on the security situation on the ground in each country. And that may be true, but that is not what is being argued with this study's extension of Social Construction theory to countries of the world and their incidence of State Department travel advice issuance. What is being argued is that there is a relationship between a country's social

Table 18

Category 4 Countries: Developing Economies and Not Autocratic

Category 4 Countries		
Andorra	Fiji	Philippines
Antigua & Barbuda	Grenada	Qatar
Argentina	Guyana	Saint Kitts & Nevis
Bahamas	Honduras	Saint Lucia
Bahrain	India	Saint Vincent & the Grenadines
Barbados	Israel	Samoa
Belize	Jamaica	Sao Tome & Principe
Benin	Kiribati	Seychelles
Bhutan	Lebanon	Solomon Islands
Bolivia	Lesotho	Somalia
Brazil	Malawi	South Africa
Brunei	Maldives	South Korea
Cabo Verde	Mali	South Sudan
Chile	Marshall Islands	Sri Lanka
Colombia	Mauritius	Suriname
Comoros	Micronesia	Timor Leste
Costa Rica	Mongolia	Tonga
Djibouti	Nauru	Trinidad & Tobago
Dominica	Nicaragua	Turkey
Dominican Republic	Palau	Tuvalu
Ecuador	Panama	Uruguay
El Salvador	Papua New Guinea	Vanuatu
Equatorial Guinea	Paraguay	

construction and its incidence of being the subject of State Department Travel Warnings and Alerts. It is not enough that a country be an ally to the United States. Israel is indeed an important and special ally and friend to the United States, but it is not socially constructed as Advantaged. Rather, it is socially constructed as Dependent because of its developing economy status. This paper submits that countries socially constructed as less powerful while being positively (Dependent) or negatively (Deviant) regarded will have more Travel Warnings than

more powerful and positively (Advantaged) or negatively (Contender) regarded countries, and Israel does.

Colombia had many Travel Warnings at 24, and those documents focused heavily on the presence of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), drug trafficking and related violence, and its long history of extraordinary incidence of kidnapping (DOS, Colombia b, 2014). The case of Somalia was particularly full of despair. As early as 1996, the Travel Warnings warned that there was no national government in Somalia and no U.S. diplomatic mission there (DOS, Somalia a, 1996). The Warning documents reveal a country that is rife with violence, piracy, conflict, and desperation, and, of course, warns Americans to avoid all travel to Somalia (DOS, Somalia a, 2010). There were other countries in this group that had Warnings unrelated to violence. For example, Guyana experienced severe flooding in 2005, and three successive Travel Warnings that focused on considerable health and sanitation issues that had even caused death (DOS, Guyana a, 2005).

As for Travel Alerts, this group of countries had 134 of them. The Philippines had the most at 22. Most of the Alerts for the Philippines concerned the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group, which was active in the Island of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago and which terrorized the region through kidnapping, bombings, and murder (DOS, Philippines a, 2001). Almost all of them concerned the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group, and they were so consistent and long term that one wonders why they were not issued as Travel Warnings (of which there were 14). It could be because much of the terrorist activity was concentrated in the far southwest of the country, although there was some activity noted in Manila. One other Alert for the Philippines included volcanic activity and earthquakes (DOS, Philippines b, 2001). India had the second most Travel Alerts within this group at 14 and, of note, had zero Travel Warnings throughout the sample.

They included the arrest of a Sikh separatist leader to warn for the potential for retaliatory violence against Americans after he and his wife were extradited to India for terrorism violence (DOS, India a, 1997). Another advised about potential terrorist activity for the Pushkar Camel Fair / Mela, while another alerted Americans about the risk for renewed tensions along the border areas of India and Pakistan as “India announced plans to withdraw troops from its border with Pakistan” (DOS, India a, 2002; DOS, India b, 2002). Other India Alerts indicated intercommunal violence, new visa regulations, potential terrorism, including during holidays, potential for petty crime during the Commonwealth Games, and an earthquake along the northeastern areas of India (DOS, India a, 2009; DOS, India b, 2009; DOS, India c, 2009; DOS, India a, 2010).

Analyzing the frequency of Background, Reason, and Verb codes for Category 4 countries, there are some similarities to the previous categories along with some additions. Similarly, the most coded Background codes were that travel and habits for U.S. diplomatic personnel were restricted, consular services limited, and that border areas were dangerous. An addition to contextual information was that the U.S. government would make no concessions to criminals and terrorists by paying ransom for kidnapped Americans. Also seen with more frequency were Background codes about the host government—primarily that it was incapable of assuring safety, it imposed travel restrictions on foreign visitors, and it may be taking security precautions. The Reason codes reflect more violence, with the top codes being murder, terrorism, general violence, violence toward American interests, kidnapping, bombings, injuries, attacks, rocket and missile firing, shootings, fighting, and violence against civilians. Ransom appeared as a top Reason code for Category 4 countries, which makes the inclusion of the Background code about the U.S. government making no ransom concessions logical. The corresponding Verb

codes were similar to the previous levels, with the addition of avoiding areas popular with other Westerners or Americans. There were more “do not” Verb codes for this this group of countries. They included not to display wealth, not to carry large sums of cash, not to attempt to pass through roadblocks, not to resist or antagonize criminals, and not to travel alone. As the country classifications change from Advantaged to Contender to Dependent, the advice is changing. The Verb codes are becoming more direct and “do not” codes are being added into the more common and gentle “advise” and “alert” codes.

The Travel Alert codes for Category 4 countries were virtually the same as the Warnings, with some exceptions added for the Verb codes. One frequently coded piece of advice was to avoid public areas, and attention is brought to this code because of what it implies. It was coded 25 times, which is not as much compared to other Verb codes, but it reveals a country where safety is so questionable that one can be outside only under the most controlled circumstances. The same “do not” codes as seen in the Warnings were also included. Reviewing the data, these 68 Category 4 countries represented 36 percent of all the countries in the world. The Travel Warnings issued about them represent 23 percent of the total Warnings across the 18 year sample and 29 percent of the Alerts. By far, Category 4 countries are issued Travel Warnings and Alerts with overwhelmingly higher incidence than Category 1 through 3 countries. As countries are socially constructed away from Advantaged and Contender, their Travel Warning and Alert issuance skyrockets.

Category 5 Countries

Countries classified as Category 5 were Developing Countries and Autocratic. There were also 68 of these countries, like the previous category, and the complete list is presented in

Table 19. This category of countries had by far the most Travel Warnings and Alerts, with 559 and 246, respectively. Their Travel Warnings represent 71 percent of the total Travel Warnings across the entire 18 year sample. There would be even more if previously autocratic Afghanistan was included, but it was not because of insufficient data on Afghanistan's economy from the U.N. W.E.S.P. report. To provide some examples, the country with the most Travel Warnings in this group was Pakistan with 31. In Travel Warnings published about Pakistan from 1997 through 2014, the State Department relays the state of a country mired in what seems like perpetual violence. Violence and extremism is a theme throughout the 31 documents about Pakistan, not to mention the handful of Travel Alerts. They draw attention to general anti-American, anti-Western, and anti-foreign violence, referencing the "1997 ambush murders of four American businessmen and their Pakistani driver", then the kidnapping and brutal murder of American journalist Daniel Pearl in 2002, an attack on a Protestant church where two Americans were killed, and attacks on other Christian facilities (DOS, Pakistan a, 1997; DOS, Pakistan a, 2002; DOS, Pakistan b, 2002). There is repeated mention of public sympathy in Pakistan for Osama bin Laden and caution for retaliation toward Americans after his death by American Navy Seal Forces (DOS, Pakistan b, 1999; DOS, Pakistan a, 2012). There is the assassination of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, a government campaign against extremists in the tribal areas and North-West Frontier areas of Pakistan, attacks on the U.S. Consulate in Peshawar, and regular mention of State Department personnel and dependents being evacuated and U.S. diplomatic facilities being run on reduced staff (DOS, Pakistan a, 2004; DOS, Pakistan a, 2006; DOS, Pakistan a, 2009; DOS, Pakistan a, 2010).

Table 19

Category 5 Countries: Developing Economies and Autocratic

Category 5 Countries		
Algeria	Guinea Bissau	Oman
Angola	Haiti	Pakistan
Bangladesh	Indonesia	Peru
Botswana	Iran	Rwanda
Burkina Faso	Iraq	Saudi Arabia
Burundi	Jordan	Senegal
Cambodia	Kenya	Sierra Leone
Cameroon	Kuwait	Singapore
Central African Republic	Laos	Sudan
Chad	Liberia	Swaziland
China	Libya	Syria
Congo	Madagascar	Tanzania
Cote D'Ivoire	Malaysia	Thailand
Cuba	Mauritania	Togo
D.R. of the Congo	Mexico	Tunisia
Egypt	Morocco	Uganda
Eritrea	Mozambique	United Arab Emirates
Ethiopia	Myanmar	Venezuela
Gabon	Namibia	Vietnam
Gambia	Nepal	Yemen
Ghana	Niger	Zambia
Guatemala	Nigeria	Zimbabwe
Guinea	North Korea	

Algeria and Central African Republic were tied with 30 Travel Warnings each. Algeria's Warning documents portray a country with general insecurity. The State Department points to consistent terrorism violence against Westerners (including kidnapping and murder) and terrorism activity exacted upon airports, airlines, and oil company sites in northern Algeria (DOS, Algeria a, 1995; DOS, Algeria a, 1999; DOS, Algeria a, 2001). These themes repeat in Algeria in each Warning through 2014. Central African Republic reveals a country that seems to be systematically self-destructing over the 18 year period studied. Military and civil unrest is an

early theme and is enduring (DOS, Central African Republic a, 1996). At one point, violence is so endemic that the United States suspends its diplomatic presence for a time (DOS, Central African Republic a, 1997). Crime and highway banditry make the country very unsafe and require extremely limited movement by visitors (DOS, Central African Republic a, 1999). There is rebellion, a host government in transition, and a coup d'état that is successful in deposing the country's leader (DOS, Central African Republic a, 2003; DOS, Central African Republic b, 2003). Violence against civilians is commonplace, as is corruption and the necessity of paying bribes to move through one's day (DOS, Central African Republic a, 2012). Among many things, the body of Travel Warnings show the anatomy of dysfunction for many a country.

Transitioning to countries that American readers may expect to be included in this Category 5 list are Iran and North Korea with 11 and 7 Warnings respectively. One may wonder why there are not more Warnings for these two countries that are notorious in the collective American psyche and media. It is important to note that more Travel Warnings usually indicate constant and enduring danger but also unpredictable and diversified danger. As dangerous circumstances change, another Warning is issued with an update added to the pre-existing dangerous conditions. Countries like Iran and North Korea are rather stable in the sense that total control over the population is enforced. One does not hear about regular insurgent violence and activity in these countries; the people are ruled with an iron fist and circumstances are firmly fixed in place. As such, there is not much to update in these Warnings. In fact, many of them are almost exactly the same as they are periodically reissued, one document simply extending a Warning that had been quietly active and in place since issued a couple of years prior. Take these two sentences from Travel Warnings for Iran in 1995 and 2014, respectively: "Former Muslims who have converted to other religions, as well as persons who encourage Muslims to convert, are

subject to arrest and possible execution,” and “Former Muslims who have converted to other religions, religious activists, and persons who encourage Muslims to convert are subject to arrest and prosecution” (DOS, Iran a, 1995; DOS, Iran a, 2014). They are virtually the same. For reference, these sentences were coded as Reason:ApostasyPunished. While the Travel Warning for Iran in 2014 is longer than the one from 1995, many of the components are the same throughout the sample: hostility toward the United States, no U.S. diplomatic presence, U.S. diplomatic representation by Switzerland, arrest and detention on false charges, and general repression and oppression (DOS, Iran a, 2013). North Korea is similar, but for some reason, Travel Warnings are not issued for North Korea until 2010. Again, could this have had anything to do with the transition to a new U.S. presidential administration? There have been seven Warnings issued from 2010 through 2014 for North Korea, and they are all very similar. They reference the absence of U.S. diplomatic relations with North Korea, the U.S. being represented by Sweden, North Korea’s detention of American visitors for unsubstantiated reasons, harsh penalties and harsh prison conditions, and the likelihood of any electronic media being hacked if carried into the country (DOS, North Korea a, 2014).

The Travel Alerts for this group were numerous, too, at 246. Mexico had the most at 21, and it was included as autocratic because it was under the control of one powerful party regime from 1915 through 2000 (Geddes et al, 2014). Mexico is one of those countries whose ally status, proximity and tourism destination status, and a long mutual history would pull it along the negative regard axis toward the positive regard axis so that it may be closer to the axes’ center. In the 1990s, the Alerts focused on robberies involving taxis, serious cautions against taking firearms or ammunition into Mexico with the punishment of five years’ incarceration, and a volcano eruption advisory (DOS, Mexico a, 1997; DOS, Mexico a, 1998; DOS, Mexico a, 1999).

Starting in 2005, though, the Alerts shift consistently to Mexico's problem with narco-trafficking and related violence, including kidnapping, disappearances, murder, intimidation, and inter-cartel conflict. This lasted through 2010 when the Alerts about that violence shifted to Travel Warnings and remained as Warnings throughout the rest of the sample (DOS, Mexico a, 2005; DOS, Mexico b, 2005).

Nepal had quite a lot of Alerts at 20, and they often focused on Maoist rebel activity and intimidation; Maoists were also known as the United People's Front (DOS, Nepal a, 1996). They engaged in insurgency, murder, attacks, beatings, extortion, arson, and enforced general strikes known as *bandhs*, and the Maoists remained subjects of alerts through 2003 until the documents (still including Maoist activity) were switched to Travel Warnings (DOS, Nepal a, 1996; DOS, Nepal a, 1999; DOS, Nepal a, 2003). The more recent Travel Alerts about Nepal concerned the devastating 2011 earthquake and more recent concerns over elections (DOS, Nepal a, 2011; DOS, Nepal a, 2013). Another example in a different part of the world, Venezuela, with nine Alerts, tells a story of an increasingly anti-American regime under Hugo Chavez with repeated Alerts about strikes, various referenda to vote Chavez from power, and other election related conflict (DOS, Venezuela a, 2001; DOS, Venezuela a, 2004). Others refer to severe storm damage and poor infrastructure (DOS, Venezuela a, 2005; DOS, Venezuela a, 2006).

Looking at the most common Background codes for Category 5 countries, they are similar to the previous two categories, but now the code for State Department personnel being under travel restriction is at the very top. Consular services being limited is the second most coded. Instead of dependents of personnel just being evacuated, specific dependent prohibition is also coded among the most common Background codes. Violence against U.S. interests is in the top spot for the Reason codes for the first time across the five country levels. Perhaps it is not

surprising that in countries that would be socially constructed as Deviant are found to have violence against U.S. citizens, facilities, franchises, and other interests as the most common reason for Americans to avoid travel to those destinations. That Reason code is followed by murder and then terrorism, threat, and kidnapping. Then a variety of violence codes proceed.

The only phenomenon that is noteworthy about the Verb codes for Level 5 countries is the appearance of more “do not” directives, even if at low incidence. They include, do not: display wealth, take photos or video, attempt to pass through roadblocks, volunteer unofficially, carry large sums of cash, share private financial information, sail or dock near host country, stop at car accidents or gatherings, travel alone, violate curfew, attempt to visit the U.S. Embassy, challenge authorities, and resist or antagonize criminals. A curious change in language use has taken place. As the social construction of countries shifts from Advantaged to Contender to Dependent to Deviant, stronger advice language is used. Softer advice language like ‘avoid’ and ‘be alert’ or ‘be aware’ remain the most common, but more forceful directives like ‘do not’ begin to appear with the Dependent and Deviant social constructions where they had not for Advantaged and Contender countries.

The Travel Alert patterns for Category 5 countries are very similar to the Travel Warnings, with no notable exceptions. These Level 5 countries represent 36 percent of the countries of the world. Recall that Categories 1 through 4 represented, respectively, .1 percent, three percent, also three percent, and 23 percent of 1,303 Travel Warnings studied. Category 5 countries represent 71 percent of all the Travel Warnings. They also have the highest Travel Alerts at 53 percent. As shown, as countries are socially constructed as less powerful and poorly regarded, their incidence of Travel Warning and Alert issuance increases.

The above discussion included examples of Travel Warning and Alert content from country Categories 1 to 5. There was no economic data provided in the U.N. 2014 W.E.S.P. report for Afghanistan, Lichtenstein, Monaco, and San Marino, so they were not included in the Categories 1 through 5 country classification (un.org, 2016). Of course, the United States is not counted among the sample for the countries of the world because the State Department does not issue Travel Warnings or Alerts for its own country. That is left to the foreign ministries of other countries. Below, Table 20a and Table 20b show Alerts and Warnings, respectively, issued for countries by their social construction classification.

Table 20A

Travel Alerts by classification of countries using social construction

Travel Alerts	Category 1	Category 2	Category 3	Category 4	Category 5	Total
No	60 %	33 %	18 %	44 %	18 %	36 %
Yes	40 %	67 %	82 %	56 %	82 %	64 %
	100 %	100 %	101 % *	100 %	101 %	100 %
Total	n = 35	n = 6	n = 11	n = 68	n = 68	n = 188

*Does not add to 100 % because of rounding.

$$X^2 = 22.26 \quad df = 4 \quad p < .000$$

Table 20B

Travel Warnings by classification of countries using social construction

Travel Warnings	Category 1	Category 2	Category 3	Category 4	Category 5	Total
No	97 %	17 %	46 %	66 %	27 %	55 %
Yes	3 %	83 %	55 %	34 %	74 %	45 %
	100 %	100 %	101 % *	100 %	101 %	100 %
Total	n = 35	n = 6	n = 11	n = 68	n = 68	n = 188

*Does not add to 100 % because of rounding.

$$X^2 = 54.83 \quad df = 4 \quad p < .000$$

A chi-square test was performed and a relationship found between Category 1 through 5 countries and issuance of Travel Alerts, $X^2 (4, N = 188) = 22.3, p = .00$. A chi-square test was then performed and a relationship also found between Category 1 through 5 countries and issuance of Travel Warnings, $X^2 (4, N = 188) = 54.8, p = .00$. Both chi-square tests show significant results that as a country's social construction moves from Advantaged to Deviant, its issuance of Travel Alerts and Warnings increases, even more significantly in the case of Travel Warnings. To summarize, it is evident that Category 1 countries, the Advantaged countries in Social Construction Theory, are the least represented with regard to Travel Warnings and Alerts. They represent 19 percent of the countries sampled, 0.1 percent of the Travel Warnings, and six percent of the Travel Alerts. The Category 2 countries, set in between the Advantaged and Dependent within Social Construction, represent three percent of the countries sampled, three percent of the total Travel Warnings, and two percent of the Travel Alerts. Category 3 countries, the Contender countries, represent six percent of the countries sampled, three percent of the Travel Warnings, and 10 percent of the Travel Alerts. The Category 4 countries have the lowest power and are socially constructed as Dependent; they represent 36 percent of the countries sampled, 23 percent of the Travel Warnings, and 29 percent of the Travel Alerts. Finally, the Category 5 countries, or Deviant countries in Social Construction Theory parlance, also represent 36 percent of the sample, while representing the most Travel Warnings and Alerts at 71 percent and 53 percent, respectively.


While the descriptive statistics showing which countries based on their social construction were subjects of Travel Warnings and Alerts over the years sampled and how frequently such documents were written about them are revealing, it is also necessary to account for the share of those documents relative to social construction category size. In other words, if one social construction category made up a certain

percentage of the countries worldwide, then, with all things being equal, one might expect that its share of Travel Warnings and Alerts would be equal to that same percentage. Before engaging that analysis, though, the five social construction country categories required revisiting. Category 1 was a collection of countries with developed economies that were not autocratic—they represented the countries socially constructed as Advantaged. If variables were more ideal, one would expect the next group of countries socially constructed as Contender to be developed economies that were autocratic, but bringing together the data from the U.N. about country economies and the data on the autocratic status of countries from Geddes et al (2014) showed that that combination did not exist. There were no countries that were developed and autocratic. That left countries with economies in transition that were also autocratic as the next most powerful, and they were placed in the Contender category. However, the countries with economies in transition and not autocratic could not occupy the same space as the more powerful developed economies, but they were not as less powerful as the developing economies that were not autocratic. As such and as seen in Figure 1 earlier (see page 92), those countries were right on the X-axis in between the Advantaged and Dependent countries. There were only six of the economies in transition/not autocratic countries: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, and Ukraine. Some of these emerged as post-Soviet countries and the others emerged as post Yugoslav war countries. While they may be economies in transition now, there is a reason the statistics above show a spike in Travel Warnings and Alerts—most were mired in conflict in the 1990s. Their nature as transition countries make them difficult to classify within the social construction power typology for the period studied, and as such, they were removed from the next stage of the analysis

Below, Figure 2 shows an Index of Travel Warnings and Alerts to the relative size of social construction country categories. As noted previously, there were 188 countries studied prior to the removal of the six economies in transition/not autocratic countries. For this analysis, there are now 182 countries total. Over the 18-year sample studied, there were 792 total Travel Warnings found and 462 total Travel Alerts. This analysis created an index to determine if the proportion of countries per social

construction category to total countries studied was equal to their share of the proportion of Travel Warnings and Alerts to the total documents sampled. A ratio of 1 for Travel Warnings/Alerts relative to social construction country category size indicates an equal proportion of documents to countries. A ratio of less than 1 means fewer documents to relative size, and a ratio of more than 1 means a greater share of Travel Warnings /Alerts relative to the countries in the social constructed category size.

Figure 2 Index of Travel Warnings and Alerts to Relative Size of Country Categories



Take the Advantaged countries, for example. There were 35 of them compared to 182 countries studied, and $35 / 182 = .192$. They represent a proportion of about 19 percent of the total countries studied. Only one Travel Warning was issued for all of the Advantaged countries over the 18-year sample out of 792 Travel Warnings total, and $1 / 792 = .001$. Their Travel Warnings represent .1 percent of the total Travel Warnings studied over the 18 years. To determine the ratio, .001 was divided by .192, which gave this group an index score of .005. For its Travel Alerts, the advantaged countries share was 30 over the 18 years compared to 462 total Alerts found, and $30 / 462 = .064$, showing that its proportion of Alerts was 6.4 percent. For its ratio, .064 was divided by .192 for an index score .333. Both index scores of Travel Warnings and Alerts to the relative size of the group of 35 Advantaged countries are less than 1, showing that their share travel advice documents is less than proportional to its relative social

construction country category size. Moreover, the low ratio (index) demonstrates that these countries had far fewer warnings and alerts than one might have expected.

As seen in Figure 2 above, the Contender countries have less Travel Warnings relative to size, but more Travel Alerts. It may not be theoretically inconsistent that these countries socially constructed as more powerful are subject of the lighter Alerts as opposed to the more serious Warnings. Perhaps the State Department will go so far as alerting U.S. travelers to unsafe conditions in those countries while finding the full Travel Warning diplomatically insensitive. Dependent countries approach an equal share, but still fall short, having fewer travel advice documents of both types relative to size. Again, this may not be inconsistent with Social Construction Theory of target groups if Dependent populations, while less powerful, are still well regarded. Finally, the Deviant countries have more than their share of both documents relative to size. These findings are mixed. At both ends of the spectrum, there are extremes. The share of travel advice documents for Advantaged countries is far less compared to the size of their country group and to the extreme for Travel Warnings. At the other end of the spectrum is the Deviant category of countries, and they have far greater proportion of Travel Warnings and Alerts compared to their proportion of countries studied. In the middle, the Contender and Dependent countries tell a mixed story. Their share of documents compared to relative country group size is still more than the Advantaged countries, and that is revealing and rings true to what Social Construction Theory asks one to expect. The index scores for Contender and Deviant countries show mostly that they have less than their share of documents relative to size, with the exception of Travel Alerts for the Contender group. That score of 1.576 is in fact larger than the Deviant Travel Alert index score. Nonetheless, the data shown at the two ends of the spectrum show a relationship that as countries are constructed from Advantaged to Deviant, they are subject of increasing Travel Warning and Alert issuance.

This data begs certain questions. Is it simply that countries classified as Category 1 (i.e., Advantaged) are safer, and that explains the lack of Travel Warnings? Are the most Dependent and most Deviant countries simply more dangerous? Those are reasonable questions, but the answers to those questions were not sought for this study's exploration of Travel Warnings and Alerts. The purpose of this paper was to explore the components and content of historical Travel Warnings and Alerts and to learn if there is a relationship between the between social construction and issuance of Travel Warnings and Alerts, regardless of danger, real or supposed. This data shows that there is indeed a relationship.

Guiding Hypotheses Revisited

With regard to the second purpose of this study, to determine if there was a relationship between the social construction of foreign countries and the issuance of U.S. State Department Travel Warnings and Alerts, the research proceeded with two guiding hypotheses.

H₁ *Countries that are constructed as Advantaged are less likely to have a Travel Warning or Alert while countries that are constructed as Contender, Dependent, and Deviant are more likely to have one.*

Indeed, this relationship appears to be present. As described above, Advantaged and Contender countries represented a much smaller proportion of Travel Warnings and Alerts. Meanwhile, Dependent and Deviant countries compose the majority share of these documents.

H₂ *While Social Construction plays a role the creation and issuance of Travel Warnings and Alerts, most official State Department travel advice is for the purpose of transmitting safety information to U.S. citizen travelers.*

This guiding hypothesis needs elaboration. A side effect of potentially finding that countries that are socially constructed as Dependent or Deviant and by extension culturally different opens the door to possibly finding that the content of Travel Warnings and Alerts are not just for safety notification, but perhaps political in nature, too. Consequently, there was curiosity to know if overtly political content would emerge from the content analysis. It did not. Certainly, codes like Reason:Anti-American/Western were present, but it was not found to be political in nature, as it was consistently followed with codes like Reason:U.S.Targeted, indicating violence perpetrated against U.S. interests. Instead, the content that emerged through content analysis consistently identified types of danger. In sum, this guiding hypothesis is supported by the content analysis of Travel Warnings and Alerts studied; those documents reflect a purpose and output for transmitting travel safety information to U.S. citizens. Finding a relationship between the social construction of foreign countries and the issuance of Travel Warnings and Alerts is not meant to imply that those documents are invalid; indeed, the content shows that there is real and present danger in the countries that are subject of State Department Travel Warnings and Alerts.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

Purpose and Research Questions

The purpose of this study was to explore the world of State Department Travel Warnings and Alerts and describe what emerged from the archived pages. There were three research questions that guided this pursuit. First, what is the nature of State Department Travel Warnings and Alerts? Second, what is their function? Those two questions were meant to be answered through a qualitative content analysis of available Travel Warnings and Alerts. Combing the Internet Archives, Travel Warnings and Alerts were available as far back as 1994 through the present. A census of 21 years' worth of archived Warnings and Alerts were collected and then pared down to a more manageable 18 years for analysis. This study was also anchored by the Social Construction theoretical framework to drill deeper into the policy implications of this State Department output. This leads to the third and final research question: Is there a relationship between how a foreign country is socially constructed from the U.S. perspective and the issuance of Travel Warnings and Alerts about those countries by the U.S. Department of State? This study sought to answer these questions, and it did so.

The Nature and Function of Travel Warnings

Through a content analysis of 1,303 individual Travel Warnings and Alerts, the nature of Travel Warnings emerged. Each document identifies whether it is a Travel Alert, previously called a Public Announcement, or a Travel Warning. If it was an Alert, there was an indication as to whether or not that Alert replaced or superseded a previous Alert and when it would expire. If it was a Warning, it indicated if it replaced or superseded a previous Warning. Warnings did not provide an expiration date because they were created for enduring circumstances. Appendix F

shows a list of all Travel Warnings and Alerts with the date of issuance, the date of the document it superseded, and the expiration date, if applicable and provided. Of course, each document included the subject country, and usually concluded with the contact information for the nearest U.S. Embassy and Consulates. Aside from these descriptors, the nature of Travel Warnings and Alerts had three principal content components:

1. Background or contextual information.
2. Reason or justification for issuance.
3. Advice in the form of verbs.

The complete list of Background, Reason, and Verb codes can be reviewed in Appendices C, D, and E.

The Background codes added informative context that allowed the reader to extrapolate more about how he or she may fare if following through with the choice to travel in that country. Would an American proceed with travel plans if the State Department provided the contextual information that it had evacuated its own diplomatic personnel? Would an American with dual citizenship with Iran still travel there after reading that dual citizenship holders were stymied by the Iranian government, including harassment and incarceration? Would a university administrator still allow students to travel to a certain country after reading that both the Peace Corps and Fulbright programs withdrew their participants and canceled their presence in that country? Such background information provided insight that may influence one's decision. The context included in these documents ended up being rich and diverse. As the content analysis deepened, it was revealed that some contextual content was merely informational while some was actionable.

The Reason codes composed the bulk of Travel Warning and Alert content. They were as varied as one might expect and comprehensive to the extent that it would challenge a creative mind to think of one that had not already been mentioned. From hooliganism being coded once to murder being coded the most at 564 times, there were a myriad of reasons provided in justification of each Warning or Alert. They ranged from the mundane, like shops being closed, to the terrible, such as rape and suicide operations. Coding such despair line by line came to be an unanticipated challenge of endurance for the researcher, but certainly at a level infinitesimal compared to those who lived it. There is little light that emerges from the body of Travel Warnings and Alerts, as their subject is of the most serious nature. As the content analysis of Reason codes deepened, it was revealed that some described circumstances of concern, some of severe harm, and the actors who were the perpetrators of danger.

The Verb codes reflected the advice imparted by the State Department and style in which it offered it. If the State Department provided a given Reason for document issuance, such as violence against Americans, then it would follow it with advice, such as encouraging the traveler to be alert to his or her surroundings, avoiding certain areas at certain times, or advising to stay in certain types of accommodations. If there were landmines and unexploded ordnance offered as a reason for the Alert or Warning, it would proffer the advice to travel only on hard packed roads and be alert to signs that indicated the presence of landmines. Curiously, there was a nature to advice giving itself, which was much more implicit than explicit. As mentioned earlier, the State Department seemed more comfortable with suggesting a course of action rather than issuing directives. It was more common by far to find pieces of advice that began with ‘avoid’ or ‘be aware/alert to’ instead of directives like ‘do not’ do one thing or another. Perhaps this is the right way to present information and advice to a free people. The words and phrases used in these

documents also indicated a State Department security vernacular. Phrases like ‘overland travel’ and ‘exercise vigilance’ that spanned across the sample studied reflected a specific language style that may not be easily consumed by the traveling American layperson. Overall, the advice content was particularly useful, and it is important that it is included. Not all Americans travel for tourism and many travel by obligation. They may have sick family members abroad, they may be sent by their employer, or they may be called abroad by important research opportunities. The advice provided by the State Department gives travelers some idea of how they may approach mitigating potential danger. The deeper content analysis showed that most Verb codes were rather general (‘avoid’ this and ‘be alert’ to that), while some were rather explicit (task oriented).

That describes Travel Warnings and Alerts, but what about their function? That was the second research question. Generating an answer to this question strictly from the content analyzed, the function of these documents is to inform, to warn, and to advise. Their function seems to describe clear and present danger, whether fleeting or protracted, in a country outside the United States to where an American might be considering travel. The content analyzed confirms and reinforces the State Department’s explanation for the purpose of Travel Warnings:

We issue a Travel Warning when we want you to consider very carefully whether you should go to a country at all. Examples of reasons for issuing a Travel Warning might include unstable government, civil war, ongoing intense crime or violence, or frequent terrorist attacks. We want you to know the risks of traveling to these places and to strongly consider not going to them at all. Travel Warnings remain in place until the situation changes; some have been in effect for years (travel.state.gov, 2015).

And Travel Alerts:

We issue a Travel Alert for short-term events we think you should know about when planning travel to a country. Examples of reasons for issuing a Travel Alert might include an election season that is bound to have many strikes, demonstrations, or disturbances; a

health alert like an outbreak of H1N1; or evidence of an elevated risk of terrorist attacks. When these short-term events are over, we cancel the Travel Alert (travel.state.gov, 2015).

In terms of what can be found from the archival documents alone, the question of function was answered. Previous researchers have raised questions, though, about how and why governments issue official travel advice. Sharpley et al (1996) posited that travel advice from the United Kingdom's Foreign Office was used as an unofficial trade embargo against The Gambia for not complying with the U.K. government's wishes. Lowenheim (2007) suggested that travel warnings issued by any country could be used as an "international disciplinary mechanism" (p. 207). There are ways to address these questions. One could implement a multiple case study research design with variables that include multiple countries, their State Department Travel Warnings, U.S. foreign policy toward those countries, U.S. political, military, and business interest in those countries, U.S. allies' orientation toward those countries, and so forth. Another way could be a quantitative research approach, like Combs (2009) multivariate analysis of different variables related to Travel Warnings and Alerts. Yet another way is the approach this paper took, and that was to look deeper at Travel Warning and Alert function through the lens of Social Construction Theory.

Social Construction Theory and Travel Warnings

The third research question asked if there was a relationship between how a foreign country is socially constructed and Department of State issuance of Travel Warnings and Alerts for those countries. This research shows that there is indeed a relationship. Countries that are categorized as Advantaged (high power, high regard) and Contender (high power, low regard) and less likely to be issued Travel Warnings and Alerts than countries socially constructed as

Dependent (low power, high regard) and Deviant (low power, low regard). It was established early in this paper that the State Department has a long history as a policymaking agency of the U.S. government, particularly through its Policy Planning Staff (Pugliaresi & Berliner, 1989).

Social Construction Theory is a theory of public policy:

The social construction of target groups has become a central concept in the study of public policy. Policies typically carve out certain populations to receive benefits or burdens and often embed positive or negative social constructions of the targeted groups. These constructions serve to justify the allocation of rewards and penalties within the policy and are critical to an understanding of the way democracy functions. Social constructions are powerful images or stereotypes... (Schneider et al, 2014, p. 105).

In the case of this study, the policymaker is the State Department, the policy output is the Travel Warning or Alert, and the target group subject of the Warning or Alert is the foreign country.

The power of target groups provided as examples in the work of Schneider et al (2014) tends to focus on economic power, so the variable of the state of each country's economy was used (developed, in transition, and developing). If social constructions are powerful images or stereotypes, then countries that do not share the U.S. values of democracy and civil liberty, that is, countries that are autocratic, were chosen as likely having lower regard from the American perspective. Based on these variables, not only did Dependent and Deviant classified countries have more Travel Warnings and Alerts than Advantaged and Contender countries, but they did so overwhelmingly. The answer to this research question is, yes, there is a relationship between the social construction of a foreign country and the issuance of State Department Travel Warnings and Alerts. However, did the application of Social Construction Theory reveal a phenomenon beyond the presence of a relationship?

A Critique of Social Construction Theory Application to Travel Warnings and Alerts

Social Construction Theory implies that the biases of policymakers toward target groups shape how they will treat those groups in the policy arena. There are two ends of the spectrum: Positive biases mixed with the presence of high power of the target group produce positive policy decisions for that target group. Negative biases mixed with the lower power of the target group will engender negative and even punitive policy decisions. Those biases are generated based on behavior, identity, and power. This dynamic has been shown to be present in numerous examples over the decades since this theory was first presented (Pierce et al, 2014). In the case of Travel Warnings and Alerts, the application of Social Construction Theory is mixed. One is presented with the proverbial chicken or egg question: which came first? Are Dependent and Deviant countries issued Warnings and Alerts because of their social construction or because they are genuinely dangerous? In examples provided by Schneider et al (2014), criminals and sex offenders are meted out punishing policy decisions because of their deviant behavior. Deviance in this study was defined by political freedom—whether or not a country was autocratic—because autocracy is anathema to American values. Yet, an autocratic government does not have to imply danger. After all, Singapore is autocratic and developing, but did not have a single Travel Warning or Alert throughout the entire sample. When one reads all the reasons for which these documents were issued, it makes one think that these countries were issued Travel Warnings and Alerts not because of their difference compared to the United States and many Americans, but because of legitimate danger. In this way, Social Construction Theory does not explain the relationship neatly, simply because settings and circumstances in these countries really are quite dangerous. The application of Social Construction Theory was not to imply that

these Warnings and Alerts could not be trusted. In this study, however, Social Construction Theory turned out to be helpful in an unexpected way.

If the travel advice document is a policy tool, what is revealed to be more interesting in this study is not which country is subject of the most Warnings and Alerts, but which countries are not. When categories of Social Construction Theory are applied, it is shown that primarily Western, white, Christian, democratic, and economically powerful countries generally do not receive Travel Warnings, while Travel Alerts are also issued at a significantly lower incidence. Indeed, these countries are generally safer, but are they so safe to merit only one Travel Warning (for a tsunami and nuclear reactor breach in Japan—Japan itself being an exceptional country among the others) over an 18-year period? A Travel Warning is a policy tool that has implications beyond informing travelers about safety. Even if their issuance is sincerely meant only for safety, it still has policy side effects. If Americans heed a Travel Warning, they withhold not only their presence in a given country, but their money. Economies dependent on tourism can be very negatively impacted when official travel advice keeps tourists and their spending money away (Sharpley et al, 1996). Further, there is the matter of delicacy—foreign governments may find being a subject of a Travel Warning offensive and could hamper relationships among friends (allies). If the U.S. perspective includes a positive bias for Western countries, that preferential bias may keep the State Department from issuing Travel Warnings and Alerts for security incidences in those countries when it would it would issue them for similar circumstances in negatively socially constructed countries, even if it is just to protect them from the negative side effects of a Travel Warning. In the case of side effects for Dependent and Deviant countries, it may be that the danger is too much to overlook, or it may be the Dependent and Deviant bias

means that the State Department does not care overmuch about those negative side effects. In this way, the application of Social Construction Theory works well.

Recommendations for Further Research

The qualitative orientation of this study was meant to be exploratory and descriptive. It was meant to lay groundwork about the nature of State Department Travel Warnings and Alerts. It intended to also explore public policy implications with the extension of Social Construction Theory to foreign countries. What resulted was a treasure trove of interesting contextual, reason, and advice content and the manner in which it was presented as well as a clear relationship between social construction of foreign countries and Travel Warning and Alert issuance. The application of Social Construction was successful in some ways but not others. Of course, it did not imply causation and was not meant to, but the correlation was informative. It inspires the possibility of further research.

First, some case study research could be employed to learn more about the relationship the U.S. has with a certain country or countries with Travel Warnings to determine if there are any other variables that motivate the issuance of that official travel advice additional to safety. The descriptive statistics provided in the appendices of all the Warnings and Alerts found could be used to create a quantitative research design similar to Combs (2009), in which she used multivariate analysis to determine if bias was present in the issuance of Travel Warnings in a single month of time. It may be that the data from this study could be used to create a predictive study of which countries will receive Travel Warnings and why.

The descriptive statistics in the appendices also provide when Travel Alerts are issued, which Alert it replaced, and when it will expire. Then it includes Travel Warnings and which

Warnings they superseded. It would be interesting to know which countries under which circumstances move from Travel Alert status to Travel Warning status. That information may also be used for predictive purposes. Furthermore, there is potential to know what Reason codes (with regard to severity, perhaps) predict what type of advice is provided (implicit or explicit).

Finally, it would be interesting to know more about security incidents and circumstances in foreign countries without Travel Warnings constructed as Advantaged or Contender and explore if the same or similar circumstances in a Dependent or Deviant classified foreign country had generated a Travel Warning in those negatively, socially constructed countries. Again, was Irish National Army (IRA) activity throughout the U.K. not dangerous enough to at least merit consistent Travel Alerts during the 1990s before the peace process was engaged at the end of that decade? It seemed rather ubiquitous at the time, and that is just one salient example. Even now in summer 2016, after three successive and brutal mass killings in France starting with the Charlie Hebdo Paris headquarters mass shooting attack in January 2015, the Bataclan concert hall massacre and related mass shootings in Paris in November 2016, and the mass homicide of revelers as a driver deliberately targeted them with his truck on Bastille Day 2016 in Nice, there is not and has not been even a single Travel Alert for France, let alone a Travel Warning (travel.state.gov, 2016). Why is that and would similar incidences in non-Western countries have generated a Travel Alert or Warning by now? For that first question as to why, this study shows that Social Construction Theory points to a credible answer.

Concluding Remarks

The application of Social Construction Theory and its extension to foreign countries showed a relationship. It revealed more insight about countries that were not subjects of

Warnings and Alerts than it did subject countries. Based on the content of the documents studied, the countries that were subject of Warnings and Alerts were indeed dangerous, and those travel advice documents should be heeded. With the very high incidence of codes indicating that State Department personnel were reduced and evacuated, along with the prohibition of their dependents, one can conclude how unsafe some of these countries can be. If they are unsafe for employees with the might of U.S. government resources behind them, American travelers should certainly consume Travel Warning and Alert information seriously. Those examples about State Department employees are interesting in another way. The State Department regularly included information about its personnel's travel restrictions. It seems less likely that such information was included just for State Department personnel's sake. There is probably an internal method for State to communicate with its employees. Instead, it was likely included for the sake of American travelers. The State Department has to find a way to inform Americans, a free people, without directing them, and sharing State Department personnel travel restrictions may be a way to strike that balance.

The world of Travel Warnings provides thousands of snapshots in place and time. Much can be gleaned from a single travel advice document—a country's security circumstances, the U.S. government's orientation to that country, whether friend or foe, and how one might navigate visiting such a place, despite danger. Reviewing multiple Travel Warnings over time, one sees the changing stories of countries, as they struggle through natural disaster to rebellion to civil war to peace processes and elections. Travel Warnings and Alerts, as a collection, reveal much about how Americans may navigate the world more safely and much about the U.S. Government's relationship with other countries.

Appendix A

Frequency of Travel Warning and Alert Issuance by Country for 18 Year
Sample Studied (1994 – 2014)

Country	Travel Warnings	Travel Alerts
Afghanistan	29	1
Albania	3	1
Algeria	30	0
Angola	7	0
Argentina	0	4
Austria	0	2
Azerbaijan	0	1
Bahamas	1	1
Bahrain	4	8
Bangladesh	0	9
Belgium	0	2
Bhutan	0	1
Bolivia	1	7
Bosnia and Herzegovina	10	1
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia	0	1
Brazil	0	1
Burkina Faso	1	1
Burundi	22	0
Cambodia	3	1
Cameroon	2	2
Canada	0	1
Cayman Islands	1	0
Central African Republic	30	0
Chad	16	6
Chile	0	3
China	2	5
Colombia	24	2
Comoros	0	2
Congo	2	1
Costa Rica	0	1
Cote d'Ivoire	21	0
Cuba	2	1
Democratic Republic of the Congo	26	4
Djibouti	2	3
Ecuador	0	4

Egypt	5	11
El Salvador	4	2
Eritrea	16	0
Ethiopia	2	4
Fiji	0	4
France-Monaco	0	2
France-Switzerland	0	1
Gabon	0	5
Gabon-Congo	0	2
Gambia	0	1
Georgia	2	2
Germany	0	3
Ghana	0	3
Grenada	1	0
Guatemala	0	8
Guinea	6	4
Guinea-Bissau	1	2
Guyana	2	4
Haiti	25	2
Honduras	4	3
India	0	14
Indonesia	18	6
Iran	11	1
Iraq	28	4
Israel	28	2
Italy	0	2
Italy, Holy See, and San Marino	0	1
Jamaica	1	3
Japan	1	4
Japan-Korea	0	1
Jordan	2	2
Kenya	17	6
Kuwait	3	4
Kyrgyz Republic	5	11
Laos	0	7
Lebanon	32	1
Lesotho	2	1
Liberia	17	1
Libya	18	4
Luxembourg	0	1
Macedonia	6	3
Madagascar	1	4
Malaysia	0	12

Mali	15	2
Mauritania	10	1
Mexico	14	21
Mongolia	0	1
Montserrat	1	0
Mozambique	0	3
Myanmar (Burma)	0	4
Nepal	12	20
New Zealand	0	1
Nicaragua	0	4
Niger	8	4
Nigeria	24	3
North Korea	7	0
Oman	1	0
Pakistan	31	4
Panama	0	2
Papua New Guinea	0	4
Paraguay	0	2
Peru	0	9
Philippines	14	22
Portugal	0	1
Qatar	1	0
Russia	0	12
Rwanda	4	5
Saudi Arabia	22	6
Senegal	0	2
Serbia and Montenegro	2	2
Sierra Leone	6	0
Solomon Islands	3	4
Somalia	19	0
South Africa	0	2
South Korea	0	2
South Sudan	9	0
Spain	0	2
Sri Lanka	7	2
Sri Lanka-Maldives	0	1
St Lucia	0	1
Sudan	25	1
Swaziland	0	1
Syria	16	1
Taiwan	1	0
Tajikistan	8	3
Tanzania	0	6

Thailand	1	11
Timor-Leste	3	9
Togo	1	1
Tonga	0	1
Tunisia	6	7
Turkey	3	5
Turkmenistan	1	4
Turks and Caicos	2	0
Uganda	0	10
Ukraine	5	0
United Arab Emirates	1	0
United Kingdom	0	6
Uzbekistan	8	9
Venezuela	5	9
Vietnam	2	1
Yemen	26	0
Zambia	0	2
Zimbabwe	5	2

Appendix B

Discourse Analysis – Travel Warnings/Alerts, 18 Year Sample Studied (1994 – 2014)

ID	Text	Change	Analysis
TW-Dem. Rep. Congo-1/22/2004	“Nevertheless, unofficial armed groups and active duty troops operating in some parts of the country are responsible for pillaging, vehicle thefts, carjackings, extra-judicial killings, rapes, kidnappings, ethnic tensions, and continued military/paramilitary operations.”	Introduction of rape as a reason for a travel warning	Striking that rape did not appear as a code until 10 years within the sample
TW-Pakistan-3/25/2005	“These measures include maintaining good situational awareness, ...”		Vague advice; layperson may not know how to operationalize such advice. How does one maintain good situational awareness? Is it to be alert to surroundings? Such vocabulary appears to be more like security jargon than layperson advice.
TW-Bosnia-Herzegovina-3/30/2006	“...exercise additional vigilance in urban areas to avoid being victimized during confrontational crime...”		Exercising vigilance vague advice; layperson may not understand the meaning of vigilance, an uncommon word in Colloquial American English, let alone how to exercise vigilance;

			‘avoid being victimized’ is unhelpful advice
TW-Bosnia-Herzegovina-4/13/2001	“...Americans and other foreigners were brutally attacked, pelted with rocks, ...”		Rock throwing appears consistently over the years; this is first; rock throwing seems to reveal a most desperate form of powerlessness
TW-Israel, Gaza, West Bank-11/26/2004	“...American citizens involved in pro-Palestinian partisan volunteer efforts were severely assaulted in the West Bank by Israel settlers and harassed by the Israel Defense Forces. Those taking part in such efforts, including through demonstrations, non-violent resistance, and “direct action”, are urged to cease such activity for their own personal safety.”	First appearance of caution of this kind regarding advocacy for minority population within a country; repeats over next few years	Risk of direct involvement in Israeli-Palestinian peace process potentially dangerous, especially if pro-Palestinian; in later TWs, this advice is removed and relegated to a link to another document on the State Dept. website.
TW-Israel, Gaza, West Bank-2/27/2006	“... American citizens should stay away from demonstrations and generally avoid crowded public places, such as restaurants and cafes, shopping and market areas and malls, pedestrian zones, public transportation of all kinds, including buses and trains and their respective stations/terminals, and the areas around them.”		That includes almost every place; advice is equivalent to ‘shelter in place’. Not realistic advice for visitors/tourists.

PA-Mexico-9/15/2006	“...alerts U.S. citizens to the rising level of brutal violence...”	Introduction of the adjective brutal to type of violence	Violence categorized in many ways over 20 years, but usually linked to perpetrators, such as gang violence, sectarian violence, etc; however, adjectives denoting severity not as common.
TW-Nepal-4/24/2006	“...should factor the potential for violence into their plans”		Striking acknowledgment of likelihood of violence if traveler insists on visiting Nepal despite warning.
TW-Somalia-6/5/2006	“Merchant vessels, fishing boats and recreational craft all risk seizure by pirates and having their crews held for ransom, ...”	Introduction of word “pirates”.	I have been coding “piracy” for what has been described as seizure of boats for plundering and hostage taking from TWs back to 1999, but 2006 is first year I’ve seen actual word “pirates” or any of its derivatives (e.g., piracy) used. Why wasn’t State using the words ‘pirates’ or ‘piracy’ for all those years for what was clearly piracy?
TW-Syria-9/14/2006	“Americans in Syria should exercise caution and take prudent measures to maintain their security. These measures include being aware of their surroundings, avoiding crowds and demonstrations, keeping a low		Excellent example of starting with vague language (“take prudent measures”) and reinforcing with concrete examples on how to do so; seems

	profile, varying times and routes for all required travel, and ensuring travel documents are current.”		much more useful for the lay traveler
TW-Algeria-2/6/2014	“The Department of State recommends that U.S. citizens avoid overland travel...”		Phrase “overland travel” is consistently used in the documents coded as early as 1995 through the last year sampled; it appears in a variety of countries 47 times; “overland” is an example of speech Americans would not use colloquially and makes me think that there is State Department jargon; perhaps this is common language to the military or security profession.
TW-Burundi-1/8/2009	“Common crimes include muggings, burglaries, robberies, and carjackings.”		Redundant language that occurs in multiple warnings/alerts over the years, showing that the State Department distinguishes between robberies and muggings or burglaries and robberies; is it that only a house is burgled, but a person is mugged? Maybe all muggings are robberies but not all robberies are muggings?
TW-Central African Republic-4/1/2009	“Highway bandits (‘coupeurs de route’ in French, ‘saraguinas’ in	Introduction of terms in local language.	First encounter of translations offered in TW for elements to

	Sango) poste a serious threat to travelers throughout the country.”		avoid; perhaps provided for the unexperienced traveler
TW-Central African Republic-4/1/2009	“Central Africa security forces (and people posing as such) at those checkpoints frequently harass local and expatriate travelers for bribes or small amounts of money (described as ‘coffee’ in French).”	Introduction of slang terms.	Curious slang term—the use of the term coffee as slang for bribe. It is difficult to imagine what the etymology of this slang term is.
TW-Liberia-3/26/2003	“While fighting tends to increase during dry season, acts of organized violence can occur at any time.”	Introduction of seasonal schedule for fighting.	Interesting insight that weather/seasons are directly proportional to fighting intensity. Likely an ancient problem/practice in world history, but interesting to see contemporary examples.
TW-Chad-4/12/2006	“Americans traveling with Thurarya satellite phones should register the phones with Chadian authorities.”	First reference to satellite phones.	Only country to ever have this advice appear in its Travel Warnings and only for the 2006 year (but in multiple Chad TWs); Thurarya is a telecommunications company out of United Arab Emirates. Odd restriction. Why?
TW-Colombia-3/25/2009	“Extortion-related bombings have occurred recently in Bogota, Cali, and several smaller cities.”	Introduction of this type of bombing.	Appears to be threat to detonate a bomb if potential victim or perhaps authorities do not supply requested funds.

TW-Haiti-1/28/2009	“...kidnappers make no distinctions of nationality, race, gender or age.”	New phrasing re: kidnapping	Curious phrasing; reminiscent of language usually reserved for non-discrimination statements from an HR office, but certainly means to indicate that no one, regardless of identity, is safe from kidnapping.
TW-Nepal-5/22/2009	“Crime in the Kathmandu Valley, including violent crime and harassment of women, continues to rise.”	First appearance of women as specific target	Shocking that women listed as targets only appears now, 15 years into the sample. Women are consistent targets of crime and war and tend to be among most vulnerable; why only now?
TW-Syria-2/12/2009	“Those registering should give due consideration to Privacy Act provisions and waivers.”	Cautionary phrasing introduced regarding registering trip with State Department	In almost every TW/PA/TA, traveler is directed to register one’s presence with the State Department, which allows the nearest U.S. embassy or consulate to know that its citizen is in the host country. It had not appeared before, and it rarely appeared again. Sentence creates a “big brother” sentiment—volunteering one’s information for the government to track one’s movements/behavior.

TW-Afghanistan- 5/25/2010	“No part of Afghanistan should be considered immune from violence...”		Extremely intense and impactful statement reflecting the breadth of violence across the country.
TW-Burundi-11/4/2010	“...stay indoors in a ground floor, interior room.”	New phrasing.	Why? This is so curiously specific. Does it refer to gunfire? Perhaps an interior room is more protective from gunfire than a room with windows to the outside? Perhaps the ground floor is indicated because it is easier to escape from if attacked?
TW-Nigeria-11/19/1996	“Violent crime, practiced by persons in police and military uniform.”	Introduction of new criminal?	This is mysterious phrasing, and it appears many times across multiple countries throughout the long term sample; phrasing leaves reader not know if the criminal stole police/military uniforms or if the criminal is a member of the police/military; it’s possible State Dept. doesn’t know, and it’s possible State Dept. knows it’s corruption and out of diplomacy and deference to host government, phrases it this way; I chose to interpret it as corruption and coded it as such.
TW-North Korea- 8/27/2010	“Since the United States does not maintain diplomatic or consular	Introduction of consular limits	TWs as early as Iran-1995 mention that the U.S.

relations with North Korea, the U.S. Government cannot provide normal consular services to its citizens in North Korea. The Swedish Embassy in Pyongyang is the U.S. Protecting Power in North Korea. It provides limited consular services to U.S. citizens traveling in North Korea who are ill, injured, arrested, or who have died while there. As with other host nations, consular officials cannot obtain the release of U.S. citizens from the host government's judicial system, i.e., release citizens from foreign prisons, influence the outcome of trials or pay criminal fines."

TA-Bhutan-9/23/2011

"U.S. citizens with questions or concerns may contact the American Citizens Services Unit of the U.S. Embassy in Kathmandu, Nepal, the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi, India, or the Consulates General in India for further information. Please note that consular issues related to Bhutan, including assistance to U.S. citizens, are covered by the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi."

Omission.

government has no diplomatic relations with the host country and is instead represented by a third country's government and continue to reference this throughout the long term sample; this TW paragraph is very first that outlines what services that third government can and cannot provide to the American traveler.

Clearly no U.S. embassy/consulate in Bhutan, but zero mention of that explicitly. Why no explanation? It is explicitly explained in most TWs. And why no diplomatic presence? Does U.S. have at least diplomatic relations with Bhutan?

TW-Egypt-1/30/2011

"The U.S. Department of State recommends that U.S. citizens avoid

Unlabeled

Advantage of reading this TW with hindsight is that I know this

travel to Egypt due to ongoing political and social unrest.”

to be the start of Egypt’s infamous Arab Spring, but it was not labeled as such at that time. Label came later, but since the TW was written in present time back on that date of January 2011, the author of the TW doesn’t know what’s coming. Reading TWs historically reveals a trickling in of information/events/circumstances that regularly amount to a conflict of great significance, like bread crumbs to disaster.

TW-Libya-2/25/2011

“The Department is working closely with other governments and multinational corporations to ensure the safe departures of those U.S. citizens who still need assistance. Please direct inquiries regarding U.S. citizens in Libya to LibyaEmergencyUSC@state.gov.”

Introduction of an ad hoc email.

First ad hoc email address to appear in a TW/PA/TA for a specific, temporal emergency. Very 21st Century method to track correspondence for a crisis.

TW-Mali-2/9/2011

“This replaces the August 6, 2010 Travel Warning for Mali and provides additional examples of violent acts carried out by the Islamic extremist group Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in the region.”

Controversial term

The term “Islamic extremist” is verboten in the Obama Administration and in current Kerry State Department, but this TW was from Clinton State Department; when did Obama make it clear he wasn’t going to

pair “Islamic” and “extremism” or “radical” in order to indicate that such groups did not represent Islam? Was it before this time? Had it not trickled down to State employees?

TW-Mexico-4/22/2011

“Millions of U.S. citizens safely visit Mexico each year, including more than 150,000 who cross the border every day for study, tourism or business and at least one million U.S. citizens who live in Mexico.”

This sentence is followed by pages of descriptions of great violence endemic in Mexico, so why include it? First of all, it’s true, but it’s also a mixed message. Is this to give Americans perspective? Is it to pacify the Mexican government? Is it simply enough that it’s true? All of the above? This phrase also appears in other TWs over time. How should the lay traveler process this information—that you may succumb to a violent death or you may not?

TW-Honduras-11/21/12

“Honduras has the highest murder rate in the world. San Pedro Sula is considered to be the world’s most violent city, with 159 murders for every 100,000 residents in 2011.”

First stat of its kind across long term sample

Shocking statements for such a small country.

TW-Honduras-11/21/12

“Kidnappings and disappearances are a concern throughout the country.”

What distinguishes a kidnapping from a disappearance? Is a

			disappearance a kidnapping without a trace or without extortion/ransom?
TW-Iraq-1/19/12	“Methods of attack available to groups targeting U.S. interests have included roadside improvised explosive devices (IEDs), including Explosively Formed Penetrators (EFPs); magnetic IEDs placed on vehicles; human and vehicle-borne IEDs, mines placed on or concealed near roads; mortars and rockets, and shootings using various direct fire weapons.”	Introduction of very technical explosive device language	At times, TW language becomes very technical and reveals something about the writer and the audience; it’s as if the diplomat as become militarized and the audience is not the American tourist.
TW-Cambodia-10/31/1997	“Those American citizens who feel that they must travel to Phnom Pehn should defer non-essential travel to other parts of the country.”		Phrase “non-essential travel” appears and is coded consistently throughout the long term sample and is often preceded by ‘defer’, ‘avoid’, and ‘warns against’, among others; it is somewhat safe language and is a curious alternative to what the State Department seems to want to say: “Don’t go to this country.”
TW-Cote d’Ivoire-10/18/2002	“U.S. citizens who remain in Cote d’Ivoire despite this Travel Warning are urged to register with the U.S. Embassy...”		Admonishing language; transferring risk/decision to traveler; kind of like, ‘if you come here even though we told you not to...’

TW-Libya-8/27/2012	“...and provide their current contact information and next-of-kin or emergency contact information.”	New warning language	Severe language; asking for next of kin gives an impression that if you travel to Libya, you need to provide the State Department with the name of who State should contact upon your death; serves a healthy dose of reality.
TW-Somalia-6/15/12	“U.S. citizens contemplating travel to Somalia, including Somaliland and Puntland, are advised to obtain Kidnap and Recovery Insurance, as well as Medical Evacuation Insurance, prior to travel.”	Introduction of insurance type	I wonder if people know that kidnap insurance exists; useful knowledge to have
TW-Djibouti-6/8/2014	“Do not antagonize armed criminals.”		Advice that one shouldn’t have to give.

Appendix C

Travel Warnings and Alerts for 18 Years Sampled (1994-2014)

Background Codes	Frequency Coded
Background:Accommodations:Limited	16
Background:AirEvacuationDifficultInEmergency	1
Background:AlcoholProhibited	1
Background:BailUnavailable:ShortTermVisits	1
Background:BlasphemyPunished	2
Background:BorderAreas:Dangerous	273
Background:CabinetDissolved	1
Background:Cease-fire	38
Background:Cease-fire:Failed/Ended	6
Background:CoalitionMilitaryAction	24
Background:CollapseOfPyramidScheme	1
Background:ConsularServicesLimited	335
Background:ConsularServicesResumed	9
Background:DiplomaticRelationsEstablished	1
Background:Drugs:IllegalUse/PastUse/PosessionSeverelyPunished	1
Background:DrySeason:FightingIncreases	3
Background:DualCitizenshipHolders:Impeded	47
Background:ElectionMonitorsPresent	1
Background:Extraditions	1
Background:FulbrightProgramSuspended	3
Background:HistoryOfAnti-U.S.Violence	5
Background:HistoryOfKidnapping/HostageTaking	23
Background:HistoryOfTerrorism	22
Background:HistoryOfViolence	26
Background:HistoryOfWar	4
Background:HolidaysPotentiallyDangerous	12
Background:HostCountry:Divided	2
Background:HostGovt/Police:TakingSecurityPrecautions	74
Background:HostGovt/U.S.RelationsDeteriorating	2
Background:HostGovt:Anti-U.S./WesternRhetoric	9
Background:HostGovt:ArmingItsCitizens/CreatingCitizenMilitia	2
Background:HostGovt:Assurances/Assistance	16
Background:HostGovt:Cannot/WillNot/Incapable:AssureSafety	128
Background:HostGovt:ClosedU.S.RelatedEstablishments	1
Background:HostGovt:DisrespectTowardLeaderPunishable	5
Background:HostGovt:ImposedTravelRestrictions	95
Background:HostGovt:InTransition	28

Background:HostGovt:IronDomeMissileDefense	1
Background:HostGovt:NoEffectivePoliceForce	5
Background:HostGovt:None/Limited/Fledgling	5
Background:HostGovt:NotifyingFamiliesOfDeceased	1
Background:HostGovt:NotInControlOfMilitary/Police	2
Background:HostGovt:ParticipatingInPeacekeepingOperationsAbroad	4
Background:HostGovt:Prohibts/Delays/ImpedesConsularAccess	19
Background:HostGovt:Provocation/Defiance	12
Background:HostGovt:RestrictingDiplomats	2
Background:HostGovt:WithdrawingTroops	1
Background:HostGovt:WithholdsInformation	1
Background:HumanitarianAids:ForcedOutByHostGovt	1
Background:HumanitarianAids:Present	8
Background:HumanitarianOrganizations:Partial/FullEvacuation	19
Background:HumanitarianOrganizations:TakingSecurityPrecautions	2
Background:InternationalObservers	1
Background:MartialLawEnded	1
Background:NATO	22
Background:Negotiations	2
Background:NoConsularRelations	7
Background:NoDiplomaticRelations	32
Background:NoDistinctionInTargetingOfficialsOrCivilians	38
Background:NoFlyZone	2
Background:NoSafe/ConventionalTransportationOutOfCountry	1
Background:NoU.S.Consulates	4
Background:NoU.S.Embassy/Services	58
Background:NoVaccine/TreatmentExists	4
Background:ParliamentDissolved	4
Background:ParliamentRestored	1
Background:PeaceAccords	47
Background:PeaceCorps:Evacuated	14
Background:PeaceCorps:ReducedVolunteers	1
Background:PeaceCorps:TakingSecurityPrecautions	1
Background:Peacekeepers:Present	25
Background:Peacekeepers:Withdrawn	4
Background:Prohibited:Music	1
Background:Prohibited:SocialActivitiesBtwnSexes	1
Background:Prohibited:Television	1
Background:Prohibited:VideoTapes	1
Background:Questioning:ForHavingVisitedCertainCountries	5
Background:RebelsSupportingU.S.InTopplingRegime	2
Background:Sanctions	34
Background:SanctionsLifted	8

Background:SchoolsClosed	1
Background:StateOfEmergency:Lifted	1
Background:TouristAreasSafe	2
Background:U.N.	47
Background:U.S.Embassy:OperationsSuspended/Closed	41
Background:UN:Coalition	17
Background:UN:Controlled	4
Background:UN:Evacuation:Dependents	1
Background:UN:Evacuation:U.S.Employees	1
Background:UN:FacilitatedDisarmament	2
Background:UN:Inspectors:RefusedEntry	2
Background:UN:Observers	7
Background:UN:Partial/FullEvacuationOfPersonnel	8
Background:UN:Personnel:Attacked/Killed/Targeted	9
Background:UN:Personnel:TravelRestricted	3
Background:UN:SponsoredBallot	1
Background:US:BusinessInterests:Withdrawn/Affected	8
Background:US:Consulate:Closed	4
Background:US:Embassy:Attacked/Targeted	13
Background:US:Embassy:Cannot/WillNotEvacuateTravelers	21
Background:US:Embassy:CharteredEvacuation	2
Background:US:Embassy:DoesNotProvidePrivateSecurity	3
Background:US:Embassy:Established	1
Background:US:Embassy:EvacuatesCitizensAtCitizensCost	12
Background:US:Embassy:Moved	2
Background:US:Embassy:Re-opened	20
Background:US:Embassy:TakingPrecautions	9
Background:US:Embassy:TemporarilyRelocatingStaff	1
Background:US:Embassy:TemporaryLocation	1
Background:USGovt:Contractors/Grantees:Evacuated/AdviseEvacuation	5
Background:USGovt:InterestsSection	4
Background:USGovt:InterestsSectionClosed	5
Background:USGovt:LiaisonOfficeClosed	2
Background:USGovt:LiaisonOfficeOpened	4
Background:USGovt:Military:Action	29
Background:USGovt:Military:Withdrawal	4
Background:USGovt:NoRansomConcessionsToTerrorists	23
Background:USGovt:NotRepresentedByThirdNation	8
Background:USGovt:Personnel/Dependents:Evacuation:Lifted	83
Background:USGovt:Personnel/Dependents:ProvidedPotassiumIodide	1
Background:USGovt:Personnel:Behavior:Modified/Restricted	165
Background:USGovt:Personnel:CurfewImposedbyDOS	28
Background:USGovt:Personnel:Dependents:Evacuated	106

Background:USGovt:Personnel:Dependents:Prohibited	58
Background:USGovt:Personnel:Full/PartialEvacuation	105
Background:USGovt:Personnel:Reduced	46
Background:USGovt:Personnel:TravelRestricted	390
Background:USGovt:Personnel:TravelRestrictions:Lifted	1
Background:USGovt:RepresentedByThirdNation	36
Background:USGovt:RestrictsCitizensTravelToCountry	1
Background:USGovt:SeeksEqualTreatmentforItsCitizens	1
Background:USPassports:NotValid	13
Background:USPassports:RestrictionLifted	2
Background:VaccinationsRequired	3
Background:VisaRequired	47
Background:War:Ended	9
Background:WarCrimesTribunal	3
Background:WarCriminal/Terrorists:Arrested/Sentenced/Killed	32
TOTAL BACKGROUND CODES	3082

Appendix D

Travel Warnings and Alerts for 18 Years Sampled (1994-2014)

Reason Codes	Frequency Coded
Reason:AirPollution:Unhealthy/Hazardous	2
Reason:Airport/Planes:Attacked	20
Reason:Airport:Blocked	9
Reason:Airport:Closed	15
Reason:Airport:MajorCommercialCarriersResumeService	1
Reason:Airport:MajorCommercialCarriersSuspendedOperations	4
Reason:Airport:Reopened	7
Reason:Airport:U.S.CarriersProhibited	7
Reason:AirTravel/Airport:Unsafe	49
Reason:AirTravel:Disruption	25
Reason:Al-Qaida	161
Reason:Al-Shabaab	19
Reason:AngryYouth	2
Reason:Anti-American/Western	204
Reason:Anti-Christian	1
Reason:Anti-Foreign	28
Reason:Anti-Globalization	1
Reason:Anti-Government:Group/Activity	24
Reason:Anti-Peace	1
Reason:ApostasyPunished	15
Reason:Arrests	80
Reason:Assassination	60
Reason:AutomaticWeapons	1
Reason:Bandits	84
Reason:Bank/CashShortages	4
Reason:Boat:Accidents	4
Reason:BokoHaram	17
Reason:Bounties	1
Reason:BribesRequired	17
Reason:Burglaries	23
Reason:CallForExpulsionOfAmericans	1
Reason:Carjacking	101
Reason:CattleRustling	4
Reason:Censorship	1
Reason:Chaos/Lawlessness/Disorder	35
Reason:ChildrenAffected	3

Reason:CivilEmergency	1
Reason:CivilLiberties:Limited/Suspended	11
Reason:Commerce:Interrupted	2
Reason:ConditionsImproved	4
Reason:Conferences/Forum/Summit	18
Reason:Conflict	24
Reason:Corruption:Government	7
Reason:Corruption:Leader	1
Reason:Corruption:Military	33
Reason:Corruption:Police	51
Reason:CoupRelated	25
Reason:Crime/Criminal	258
Reason:Criminals:Murdered	8
Reason:Crisis	4
Reason:Curfew	81
Reason:Danger	153
Reason:Death	64
Reason:DeathPenalty	1
Reason:Demonstrations	381
Reason:Deportation	31
Reason:Detention	98
Reason:Detention:ForUnsubstantiatedAllegations/Reasons	40
Reason:Detention:HostCountryHeritage	9
Reason:Difficulties	3
Reason:DiplomaticPersonnel:Targeted	99
Reason:Dissident	3
Reason:Disturbances	26
Reason:DoctorsThreatened	5
Reason:Drought	3
Reason:Earthquake	32
Reason:EconomicHardship/Crisis	31
Reason:Elections	185
Reason:ElectronicMediaHacked	2
Reason:ElNino	3
Reason:EmergencyAssistanceLimited	3
Reason:EmergencyDepartureLimited	7
Reason:Entry/Exit:Restrictions/Harassment	57
Reason:Ethnic	38
Reason:Expatriates:Targeted	55
Reason:Extortion	34
Reason:ExtrajudicialProceedings/Killings	12
Reason:Extremists	107
Reason:Famine	1

Reason:Fatal/Lethal	5
Reason:Festival	7
Reason:Fines	6
Reason:Flood	6
Reason:FluidSituation	16
Reason:Food/Water:Limited	25
Reason:Foreign/Non-U.S.Victims:Targeted	184
Reason:ForeignCurrencyExchangeRestrictions	2
Reason:ForestFire	2
Reason:Fraud/Scam	10
Reason:FuelShortage	19
Reason:Gangs	39
Reason:Government:Targeted	59
Reason:Hamas	14
Reason:Harassment	50
Reason:HarshPenalties	15
Reason:HarshPrisonConditions	9
Reason:Hazardous	31
Reason:Heritage:Bias	10
Reason:Hezbollah	28
Reason:Hijacking	12
Reason:HiredSecurityCannotBeTrusted/Betrayal	4
Reason:HitList	3
Reason:HomeInvasions	24
Reason:Hooliganism	1
Reason:Hostage-taking	88
Reason:HumanitarianAids:Targeted	80
Reason:HumanitarianCrisis	9
Reason:HumanTrafficking	6
Reason:Inauguration	1
Reason:Incarceration	13
Reason:Incursion	2
Reason:Infrastructure:Attacked/Damaged	44
Reason:Insecurity	17
Reason:Instability	58
Reason:Insurgence	69
Reason:Interrogation	10
Reason:Intimidation	15
Reason:Invasion/Incursion	1
Reason:ISIS	3
Reason:IslamicShariaLaw	5
Reason:Kidnapping	380
Reason:LaborDispute	2

Reason:Landmines	103
Reason:LandSeizures	1
Reason:Landslides	12
Reason:LeaderAttacked	3
Reason:LeaderChange	23
Reason:LeaderDeposed	8
Reason:LeaderDetained	4
Reason:LeaderDied	4
Reason:LeaderKilled	2
Reason:LeaderResigned	4
Reason:LimitedResources/Services	28
Reason:Looting	23
Reason:MartialLaw	6
Reason:Military	199
Reason:Military/Police:/Targeted	94
Reason:Military/Police:HeavilyArmed	3
Reason:Military/Police:Undisciplined/Ill-trained	22
Reason:Military:DecommissionedSoldiers	3
Reason:Military:ForeignMilitaryPresence	4
Reason:MilitaryOperations	70
Reason:MissingPersons	3
Reason:Missionaries:Targeted	8
Reason:Muggings	18
Reason:Murder	564
Reason:Mutiny	8
Reason:Narcotraffickers	56
Reason:NationalDisaster	4
Reason:NightTravelDangerous	66
Reason:NuclearDanger	3
Reason:Occupation:ByForeignGovt	1
Reason:OppositionLeaders/Forces	19
Reason:Oppression	1
Reason:OsamaBinLadin	16
Reason:Outbreak:Disease	66
Reason:Overcrowded	1
Reason:ParamilitaryActivity	243
Reason:PeaceKeepers:Targeted	7
Reason:PettyTheft	9
Reason:Pickpockets	2
Reason:Pilgrimage	6
Reason:Pillaging	16
Reason:Piracy	38
Reason:Poachers	5

Reason:Police	49
Reason:Police:HeadquartersTakenOver	1
Reason:Police:NotSolvingCrimes	1
Reason:PoliticalUncertainty	14
Reason:Poor:CriminalJusticeSystem	15
Reason:Poor:HealthServices	47
Reason:Poor:Infrastructure	43
Reason:Poor:PublicTransportation	38
Reason:Poor:SanitaryConditions	8
Reason:Poor:Telecommunications	19
Reason:Poor:TransportationMaintenance	18
Reason:PortAccess:Impeded	1
Reason:Potential:Arrest/Detention	42
Reason:Potential:Assassination	12
Reason:Potential:Assault	3
Reason:Potential:Attacks	86
Reason:Potential:Banditry	1
Reason:Potential:Biological/ChemicalWarfare	6
Reason:Potential:Bomb/Bombing/Explosives	43
Reason:Potential:Conflict	3
Reason:Potential:Crime	21
Reason:Potential:Curfew	7
Reason:Potential:Danger	59
Reason:Potential:Demonstrations	79
Reason:Potential:Deportation	9
Reason:Potential:DestructionOfProperty	2
Reason:Potential:Earthquakes	3
Reason:Potential:Famine	2
Reason:Potential:Fighting	2
Reason:Potential:Harassment	15
Reason:Potential:Harzard	1
Reason:Potential:Health/SafetyProblems	1
Reason:Potential:Hijacking	7
Reason:Potential:Hooliganism	2
Reason:Potential:HostageTaking	5
Reason:Potential:Hostility	9
Reason:Potential:Inconvenience	1
Reason:Potential:Injury	9
Reason:Potential:Instability	17
Reason:Potential:Insurgency	1
Reason:Potential:InterruptionInServices	37
Reason:Potential:Kidnapping	90
Reason:Potential:Looting	1

Reason:Potential:MilitaryActivity	5
Reason:Potential:Murder	8
Reason:Potential:Prosecution	3
Reason:Potential:Retaliation	8
Reason:Potential:Riots	1
Reason:Potential:Roadblocks	8
Reason:Potential:Robbery	11
Reason:Potential:Shooting	2
Reason:Potential:Strike	5
Reason:Potential:SuicideOperations	20
Reason:Potential:TelecommunicationsInterrupted	1
Reason:Potential:Tensions	7
Reason:Potential:Terrorism	171
Reason:Potential:TransportationInterrupted	16
Reason:Potential:Tsunami	1
Reason:Potential:U.S.Embassy:Closure/ServicesSuspended	33
Reason:Potential:U.S.GovernmentRetaliation	1
Reason:Potential:U.S.Govt:InterestsTargeted	141
Reason:Potential:Unrest:Civil/Political/Social	46
Reason:Potential:Violence	328
Reason:Potential:VolcanicActivity	2
Reason:PowerVacuum	1
Reason:PreditoryScams	6
Reason:PrisonBreak	11
Reason:Property:Damaged/Destroyed	53
Reason:PropertyDisputes	7
Reason:ProphetMohammad	1
Reason:Prosecution	8
Reason:Protesters	12
Reason:PublicSympathyForTerrorists	4
Reason:PurseSnatching	1
Reason:Quarantine	13
Reason:RadicalElements	7
Reason:Raids	3
Reason:Rallies/Meetings:Political	2
Reason:Ransom	69
Reason:Rape	23
Reason:Rebels/Rebellion	101
Reason:RecallReferendum	2
Reason:Referendum	24
Reason:Refugees/RefugeeCamp	67
Reason:Religious	17
Reason:ReligiousObservances	2

Reason:ReligiousSite/Observers:Targeted	21
Reason:Repression	6
Reason:Resentment	2
Reason:Retaliation/Revenge	34
Reason:Revolution	3
Reason:Risk	243
Reason:Roads:Impeded	177
Reason:RoadTravel:Dangerous	71
Reason:Robbery	150
Reason:Scrutiny	11
Reason:Secessionists	1
Reason:Sectarian	11
Reason:Security:Concerns/Incidents	209
Reason:Security:Fluid/Uncertain	78
Reason:SecuritySituation:Deteriorating	33
Reason:Separatist	11
Reason:ServicesInterrupted	27
Reason:SexualAssault	9
Reason:Shakedown	4
Reason:Shelling	3
Reason:ShopsClosing	1
Reason:Skinheads	2
Reason:Smugglers	9
Reason:SportEvent	12
Reason:Squatters	3
Reason:StateOfAlert	1
Reason:StateOfCalamity	1
Reason:StateOfEmergency	45
Reason:StrandedTravelers	5
Reason:StreetChildrenThieves	9
Reason:Strikes	50
Reason:SuicideBomb	93
Reason:Taliban	29
Reason:TaxisUnsafe/Corrupt	26
Reason:TearGas	7
Reason:Telecommunications:Interrupted	22
Reason:Telecommunications:Interrupted/Blocked	1
Reason:Tensions	127
Reason:Terrorism	485
Reason:Threat	406
Reason:Thugs	4
Reason:Tourists:Affected	92
Reason:Train:Attacked	6

Reason:Transportation:Interrupted	25
Reason:Travelers:Searched	1
Reason:TravelWarning:Cancelled	1
Reason:Tsunami	13
Reason:U.S.Franchises:Attacked	12
Reason:UnexplodedAmmunition/Ordnance	40
Reason:Unpredictable	154
Reason:Unrest:Civil/Social/Political	117
Reason:Unsafe	49
Reason:UnsettledConditions/Situation	32
Reason:UnsolvedCrimes	1
Reason:Upheaval	1
Reason:Vandalism	7
Reason:VehicleTheft	28
Reason:Vigilante	1
Reason:Violence	485
Reason:Violence:Abuse	5
Reason:Violence:Against Civilians	167
Reason:Violence:Against:U.N.	15
Reason:Violence:Against:Women	8
Reason:Violence:Aggression	1
Reason:Violence:Ambush	26
Reason:Violence:ArmedConflict/Clashes	162
Reason:Violence:Arson	24
Reason:Violence:Assault	38
Reason:Violence:Attacks	335
Reason:Violence:Beatings	16
Reason:Violence:Boat:Attacked	7
Reason:Violence:Bomb/Bombing/Explosives	358
Reason:Violence:BulldozerAttack	1
Reason:Violence:Buses:Attacked	31
Reason:Violence:Businesses:Attacked	5
Reason:Violence:BusinessInvasion	1
Reason:Violence:CivilWar	26
Reason:Violence:Confrontations	12
Reason:Violence:Criminal	124
Reason:Violence:Demonstrations	9
Reason:Violence:Elections	8
Reason:Violence:Ethnic	17
Reason:Violence:Fighting	89
Reason:Violence:Gang	9
Reason:Violence:Government	1
Reason:Violence:Hospitals:Attacked	2

Reason:Violence:Hostility	58
Reason:Violence:Housing:Attacked	6
Reason:Violence:Injuries	286
Reason:Violence:Insurgent	5
Reason:Violence:Interclan/Tribal	24
Reason:Violence:Inter-factional	6
Reason:Violence:IntraCommunal	16
Reason:Violence:LegaciesOfWar	1
Reason:Violence:Massacre	1
Reason:Violence:Military	2
Reason:Violence:Minorities:Attacked/Targeted	4
Reason:Violence:Mob	7
Reason:Violence:NarcoTrafficker	36
Reason:Violence:NeedleStabbings	1
Reason:Violence:Organized	1
Reason:Violence:PledgeForFutureAttack	1
Reason:Violence:Political	54
Reason:Violence:Riots	37
Reason:Violence:Rocket/MissileLaunches	69
Reason:Violence:RockThrowing	27
Reason:Violence:RubberBullets	1
Reason:Violence:SchoolAttacked	9
Reason:Violence:SchoolDestroyed	1
Reason:Violence:SchoolInvasion	4
Reason:Violence:Sectarian	27
Reason:Violence:Separatist	4
Reason:Violence:Shooting	180
Reason:Violence:Skirmish	24
Reason:Violence:SoftTargets	32
Reason:Violence:Stabbing	1
Reason:Violence:Standoff	1
Reason:Violence:Terrorist	14
Reason:Violence:Torture	1
Reason:Violence:U.S.LocallyHiredEmployees:Targeted	7
Reason:Violence:U.S.Targeted	511
Reason:Violence:Vehicles:Attacked	54
Reason:Violence:War	1
Reason:Violence:WeaponsOfMassDestruction	2
Reason:Visa/ImmigrationChanges	1
Reason:Volatile	70
Reason:VolcanicActivity	30
Reason:WaterContaminated	3
Reason:WeaponsTrafficker	8

Reason:Weather:SevereConditions

61

TOTAL REASON CODES

14977

Appendix E

Travel Warnings and Alerts for 18 Years Sampled (1994-2014)

Verb Codes	Frequency Coded
Verb:Abide	1
Verb:Advise	197
Verb:Alerts	145
Verb:Apprise	1
Verb:Ask:ForConsularAccess/RightToContactEmbassy	3
Verb:Assemble:VitalDocuments	1
Verb:Assure:PassportValidity	3
Verb:Avoid	48
Verb:Avoid/BeAlertIn:AreasPopularWithWesterners/Foreigners	71
Verb:Avoid/BeAlertTo:Crowds/Demonstrations	392
Verb:Avoid:Abandoned/DestroyedBuildings	7
Verb:Avoid:Attention	6
Verb:Avoid:BeingVictimized	2
Verb:Avoid:Boats	2
Verb:Avoid:BusStops/Buses	11
Verb:Avoid:CommercialFarms	1
Verb:Avoid:Confrontation	2
Verb:Avoid:CongestedVehicleTraffic	2
Verb:Avoid:Contact	2
Verb:Avoid:CriminalActivity	12
Verb:Avoid:Docking/SailingThroughHostCountryWaters	6
Verb:Avoid:Downtown	2
Verb:Avoid:DrugDealers	2
Verb:Avoid:FuneralRites	3
Verb:Avoid:Hospitals/Clinics(Outbreak)	1
Verb:Avoid:Ice	1
Verb:Avoid:IsolatedAreas	9
Verb:Avoid:Landmines/UnexplodedOrdnanceAreas	6
Verb:Avoid:Malls/ShoppingAreas	20
Verb:Avoid:Military/MilitaryFacilities	12
Verb:Avoid:OverlandTravel	28
Verb:Avoid:PedestrianZones	6
Verb:Avoid:PoliticalPartyHQs	1
Verb:Avoid:Predictability	21
Verb:Avoid:PreviousSitesOfTerrorism	1
Verb:Avoid:Public/GovernmentBuildings	10

Verb:Avoid:PublicAreas	42
Verb:Avoid:PublicTransportation	34
Verb:Avoid:Red-light/ProstitutionDistricts	3
Verb:Avoid:ReligiousPlacesOfWorship	17
Verb:Avoid:Restaurants/Bars	26
Verb:Avoid:Riots	1
Verb:Avoid:RoadBlocks	8
Verb:Avoid:TravelToSpecificAreas	318
Verb:Avoid:UnpopulatedAreas	1
Verb:Avoid:Walking/TrekkingAlone	19
Verb:BeAlert	23
Verb:BeAlert:LandmineWarnings	3
Verb:BeAlert:WhenEntering/Exiting:Vehicles/Premises	15
Verb:BeAlertTo/AwareOf:Surroundings/Situation	176
Verb:BeAlertTo:ChangingSecurityDevelopments	16
Verb:BeAlertTo:Surveillance	4
Verb:BeAlertTo:SuspiciousVehicles	1
Verb:BeAlertTo:TheUnusual/Suspicious	8
Verb:BeAlertTo:Unexpected:Visitors/Packages/Incidents	29
Verb:BeAlertTo:UnusualPhoneCalls	1
Verb:BeAware	46
Verb:BeAware:OfSecuritySituation	1
Verb:BeCautious	4
Verb:BeSelfReliant(LimitedEmergencyServices)	1
Verb:Cancel:Travel	1
Verb:Carry:Cash	3
Verb:Carry:CellPhone/Two-WayRadio	6
Verb:Carry:HealthDocuments	4
Verb:Carry:MinimalBelongings	2
Verb:Carry:TravelDocuments/PhotoID	29
Verb:Carry:TravelItinerary	1
Verb:Cautions	24
Verb:Cease:ProPalestinianAdvocacy	5
Verb:CheckInAtPoliceCheckpoints	1
Verb:Confirm:Tourist/TravelServices	14
Verb:Consider	131
Verb:Consult:CDC	19
Verb:Consult:PersonalPhysicians	1
Verb:Contact:Doctor	1
Verb:Contact:Family/Friends	14
Verb:CooperateWithAuthorities	23
Verb:CrossBordersOnlyAtBorderPosts	7
Verb:Depart	132

Verb:Develop:ContingencyPlan	16
Verb:Discourages	10
Verb:DonateCash	2
Verb:DoNot:AttemptToPassThroughRoadBlocks	15
Verb:DoNot:AttemptToVisitU.S.Embassy	1
Verb:DoNot:CarryLargeSumsOfCash	13
Verb:DoNot:ChallengeAuthorities	2
Verb:DoNot:ComeToVolunteerUnofficially	10
Verb:DoNot:DisplayWealth	25
Verb:DoNot:ParticipateInDemonstrations/Protests(Illegal)	3
Verb:DoNot:Resist/AntagonizeCriminals	2
Verb:DoNot:Sail/DockNearHostCountry	3
Verb:DoNot:SharePrivateFinancialInformation	6
Verb:DoNot:StopCarAtAccidents/Gatherings	2
Verb:DoNot:TakePhotos/Video	16
Verb:DoNot:TravelAlone	6
Verb:DoNot:ViolateCurfew	2
Verb:Dress:Appropriately	2
Verb:Drink:BottledWater	3
Verb:Drink:PlentyOfWater	1
Verb:Drive:OnTollRoads	2
Verb:Encourages	305
Verb:EvacuateArea	7
Verb:Evaluate	5
Verb:Exercise:Caution/Prudence/Vigilance/GoodJudgement	590
Verb:Exercise:OnlyInGyms/FitnessCenters	3
Verb:Find/Locate:Shelter	13
Verb:Follow:OfficialInstructions	46
Verb:Have:EmergencyEvacuationPlan	45
Verb:Have:MultipleMeansOfCommunication	4
Verb:Have:SafeHavenPlan	6
Verb:Heed	17
Verb:InventoryHouseholdEffects	1
Verb:Keep:MucousMebranesMoist	1
Verb:Limit:Movements	10
Verb:Lock:Homes/Vehicles	25
Verb:Maintain/Keep:LowProfile	130
Verb:Maintain:AdequateFoodAndWater	24
Verb:Maintain:CarAndItsReadiness	9
Verb:Maintain:CommunicationsAbility	9
Verb:Maintain:MedicalSupplies	9
Verb:Maintain:Passport/VisaValidity	66
Verb:Maintain:Readiness	2

Verb:Maintain:StrongSecurityPosture	13
Verb:Maintain:VehicleSecurity	4
Verb:Make:AlternativeLodgingArrangements	1
Verb:Monitor:Children	3
Verb:Monitor:News	169
Verb:Monitor:Situation	96
Verb:Move:ToHigherGround/Inland	1
Verb:Obtain/Purchase:Traveler's/HealthInsurance	14
Verb:Park:InWellLit/GaurdedPaidLots	1
Verb:Patronize:LegitimateBusinesses	5
Verb:PersonalSecurity:Evaluate/BeAlertTo/BeAware	293
Verb:Proceed:ToPoliceStationIfFollowed	9
Verb:Protect:Belongings/Passport	7
Verb:Provide:NextOfKinInformation	10
Verb:Reaffirms	1
Verb:Recognize	1
Verb:Recommends	203
Verb:Recommends:ArmedProtection	9
Verb:ReduceVulnerability	10
Verb:Refrain	1
Verb:Register/Enroll:WithU.S.Embassy/Consulate/STEP	556
Verb:Register:SatellitePhonesWithAuthorities	5
Verb:Reiterates	1
Verb:Relocate	3
Verb:Remain:Calm	2
Verb:Remain:OnHard-SurfaceAreas	5
Verb:Reminds	143
Verb:Report:ConcernsToAuthorities	28
Verb:Report:ConcernsToU.S.Embassy	58
Verb:Respect:Customs	1
Verb:Restrict:Movements	1
Verb:Return:ToHomeEarly	2
Verb:Review:TravelPlans	4
Verb:Share:TravelPlansWithReliableContact	10
Verb:Shelter:InPlace	12
Verb:Stay:Indoors	32
Verb:Stay:Indoors:AfterDark	3
Verb:Stay:InHotelsByAirport	1
Verb:Stay:InPopular/SecureHotels	27
Verb:Stay:InTouristAreas	9
Verb:Stay:InWellPopulatedAreas	1
Verb:Stay:WithinCityCenters	6
Verb:TakeCover	1

Verb:TakePrecautions:Earthquake	5
Verb:TakePrecautions:Health	8
Verb:TakePrecautions:Security	156
Verb:Travel:ByAir	4
Verb:Travel:Defer/Curtail/Postpone/Reduce/Forgo/CarefullyConsider/Avoid	298
Verb:Travel:DuringDay/AvoidNightTravel	82
Verb:Travel:InConvoys	18
Verb:Travel:InGroups	9
Verb:Travel:OnTollRoads	6
Verb:Travel:ThroughParticularCity	1
Verb:Travel:ToLegitimateTouristAreas	2
Verb:Travel:Warns/Cautions/RecommendsAgainst	202
Verb:Travel:WarnsAgainstWithFirearms/Ammunition	2
Verb:Travel:WithKnownLocalCompanion	13
Verb:Travel:WithProvisions	5
Verb:Travel:WithReputableTourGuides/TravelAgents/Drivers	19
Verb:Travel:WithSecurity	12
Verb:Urge	633
Verb:Use:AlternateMeansOfTransportation	2
Verb:Use:EyeWash	1
Verb:Use:LegalTaxis/NegotiatePriceAhead	8
Verb:Use:Non-CashPayment	1
Verb:Use:PublicTransportation	1
Verb:Use:SafeTransport	6
Verb:Use:Well-TraffickedSurfacesRoadways	9
Verb:Vary/Take:Alternate:Route	87
Verb:Vehicle:Inspect:Security	4
Verb:Vehicle:KeepSecure	1
Verb:Verify:CellPhoneCoverage	2
Verb:Verify:Legitimacy	6
Verb:Walk:WithOthers	1
Verb:Warns	274
Verb:WarnsAgainst:CommercialTransports	2
Verb:Wear:SurgicalMask	1
TOTAL VERB CODES	7365

Appendix F

Countries for 18 Year Sample Studied (1994 – 2014)

Country	Date Issued	Travel Warning	Travel Alert	Expires	Supersedes
Afghanistan	9/5/2014	1	0		2/20/2014
Afghanistan	2/20/2014	1	0		8/23/2013
Afghanistan	8/23/2013	1	0		1/29/2013
Afghanistan	1/29/2013	1	0		6/27/2012
Afghanistan	6/27/2012	1	0		12/1/2011
Afghanistan	12/1/2011	1	0		3/8/2011
Afghanistan	6/27/2011	1	0		
Afghanistan	3/8/2011	1	0		8/13/2010
Afghanistan	8/13/2010	1	0		5/25/2010
Afghanistan	5/25/2010	1	0		7/23/2009
Afghanistan	7/23/2009	1	0		9/10/2008
Afghanistan	6/22/2006	1	0		1/9/2006
Afghanistan	1/9/2006	1	0		1/9/2005
Afghanistan	9/16/2005	0	1	10/14/2005	6/9/2005
Afghanistan	6/9/2005	1	0		11/11/2004
Afghanistan	11/15/2004	1	0		7/30/2004
Afghanistan	7/30/2004	1	0		2/4/2004
Afghanistan	2/4/2004	1	0		7/28/2003
Afghanistan	7/28/2003	1	0		4/2/2003
Afghanistan	4/2/2003	1	0		12/27/2002
Afghanistan	12/27/2002	1	0		11/18/2002
Afghanistan	11/18/2002	1	0		7/3/2002
Afghanistan	7/3/2002	1	0		2/28/2002
Afghanistan	2/28/2002	1	0		12/17/2001
Afghanistan	12/17/2001	1	0		11/23/2001
Afghanistan	11/23/2001	1	0		12/12/2000
Afghanistan	7/8/1999	1	0		5/4/1999
Afghanistan	8/21/1998	1	0		7/8/1998
Afghanistan	6/10/1997	1	0		7/2/1996
Afghanistan	7/2/1996	1	0		1/12/1994
Albania	4/14/1999	1	0		12/24/1998
Albania	12/24/1998	1	0		9/22/1998
Albania	8/14/1997	1	0		6/10/1997
Albania	2/20/1997	0	1	3/31/1997	1/24/1997
Algeria	8/13/2014	1	0		2/6/2014
Algeria	2/6/2014	1	0		8/23/2013
Algeria	8/23/2013	1	0		2/19/2013

Algeria	2/19/2013	1	0		1/19/2013
Algeria	1/19/2013	1	0		9/13/2012
Algeria	9/13/2012	1	0		5/4/2012
Algeria	5/4/2012	1	0		9/19/2011
Algeria	9/19/2011	1	0		3/16/2001
Algeria	3/16/2011	1	0		4/2/2010
Algeria	4/2/2010	1	0		11/16/2009
Algeria	11/16/2009	1	0		3/3/2009
Algeria	3/4/2009	1	0		8/22/2008
Algeria	12/20/2006	1	0		
Algeria	11/22/2006	1	0		
Algeria	8/31/2006	1	0		2/15/2006
Algeria	2/15/2006	1	0		7/21/2005
Algeria	7/21/2005	1	0		1/19/2005
Algeria	1/19/2005	1	0		7/15/2004
Algeria	7/15/2004	1	0		3/8/2004
Algeria	3/8/2004	1	0		9/5/2003
Algeria	9/5/2003	1	0		4/9/2003
Algeria	4/9/2003	1	0		2/3/2003
Algeria	2/3/2003	1	0		2/3/2003
Algeria	12/11/2001	1	0		5/31/2001
Algeria	5/31/2001	1	0		3/31/2000
Algeria	10/29/1999	1	0		6/8/1999
Algeria	5/1/1998	1	0		8/25/1997
Algeria	8/25/1997	1	0		1/31/1997
Algeria	1/31/1997	1	0		5/22/1995
Algeria	5/22/1995	1	0		2/1/1995
Angola	10/2/2003	1	0		3/24/2003
Angola	3/24/2003	1	0		8/23/2002
Angola	8/23/2002	1	0		9/8/2000
Angola	7/27/1999	1	0		1/14/1999
Angola	1/14/1999	1	0		7/15/1998
Angola	4/18/1997	1	0		11/19/1996
Angola	11/19/1996	1	0		9/20/1995
Argentina	7/14/2009	0	1	9/14/2009	
Argentina	6/27/2002	0	1	10/31/2002	5/29/2002
Argentina	2/28/2002	0	1	5/29/2002	1/3/2002
Argentina	1/3/2002	0	1	4/3/2002	12/27/2001
Austria	6/26/2001	0	1	8/1/2001	
Austria	12/18/1998	0	1	2/17/1999	11/20/1998
Bahamas	10/15/2004	0	1	11/28/2004	10/12/2004
Bahamas	9/17/2004	1	0	10/7/2004	9/7/2004
Bahrain	6/26/2012	0	1	9/17/2012	4/25/2012

Bahrain	4/25/2012	0	1	6/30/2012	1/23/2012
Bahrain	1/23/2012	0	1	4/19/2012	11/18/2011
Bahrain	11/18/2011	0	1	1/19/2012	8/19/2011
Bahrain	8/19/2011	0	1	11/19/2011	5/13/2011
Bahrain	5/13/2011	0	1		4/12/2011
Bahrain	4/12/2011	1	0		3/22/2011
Bahrain	3/22/2011	1	0		3/17/2011
Bahrain	2/18/2011	0	1	3/15/2011	
Bahrain	7/3/2004	1	0		7/1/2004
Bahrain	12/23/2003	0	1	2/24/2004	
Bahrain	2/12/2003	1	0		
Bangladesh	3/2/2009	0	1	4/1/2009	
Bangladesh	3/21/2006	0	1	9/21/2006	9/21/2005
Bangladesh	12/21/2005	0	1	3/21/2006	
Bangladesh	8/24/2004	0	1	11/22/2004	
Bangladesh	1/15/2004	0	1	4/15/2004	
Bangladesh	12/9/2003	0	1	3/9/2004	
Bangladesh	10/26/2001	0	1	1/9/2002	9/26/2001
Bangladesh	6/29/2001	0	1	11/30/2001	4/11/2001
Bangladesh	4/11/2001	0	1	7/11/2001	
Belgium	11/29/2001	0	1	12/28/2001	
Belgium	9/4/2001	0	1	9/30/2001	
Bhutan	9/23/2011	0	1	11/15/2011	
Bolivia	8/12/2010	0	1		11/12/2010
Bolivia	12/13/2005	0	1	2/20/2006	
Bolivia	6/7/2005	1	0		6/1/2005
Bolivia	7/2/2004	0	1	7/18/2004	
Bolivia	11/28/2003	0	1	2/21/2004	10/22/2003
Bolivia	7/31/2002	0	1	8/7/2002	
Bolivia	11/1/2001	0	1	2/2/2002	
Bolivia	4/27/2001	0	1	7/26/2001	
Bosnia and Herzegovina	3/30/2006	1	0		8/1/2005
Bosnia and Herzegovina	8/1/2005	1	0		12/27/2004
Bosnia and Herzegovina	6/2/2004	1	0		11/12/2003
Bosnia and Herzegovina	11/12/2003	1	0		6/4/2002
Bosnia and Herzegovina	6/4/2002	1	0		4/13/2001
Bosnia and Herzegovina	4/13/2001	1	0		11/29/2000

Bosnia and Herzegovina	4/6/2001	0	1	7/7/2001
Bosnia and Herzegovina	7/30/1999	1	0	3/26/1999
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1/12/1999	1	0	10/14/1998
Bosnia and Herzegovina	10/14/1998	1	0	10/12/1998
Bosnia and Herzegovina	6/5/1996	1	0	6/18/1996
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia	1/22/1998	0	1	2/28/1998
Brazil	5/18/2001	0	1	8/20/2001
Burkina Faso	10/31/2014	0	1	1/29/2015
Burkina Faso	4/19/2011	1	0	
Burundi	10/30/2014	1	0	4/3/2014
Burundi	4/3/2014	1	0	10/11/2013
Burundi	10/11/2013	1	0	4/22/2013
Burundi	4/22/2013	1	0	11/8/2012
Burundi	11/8/2012	1	0	4/18/2012
Burundi	4/18/2012	1	0	11/25/2011
Burundi	11/25/2011	1	0	6/1/2011
Burundi	6/1/2011	1	0	11/4/2010
Burundi	11/4/2010	1	0	5/16/2010
Burundi	5/19/2010	1	0	7/22/2009
Burundi	7/22/2009	1	0	1/8/2009
Burundi	1/8/2009	1	0	4/22/2008
Burundi	6/23/2006	1	0	10/19/2005
Burundi	10/19/2005	1	0	12/7/2004
Burundi	12/7/2004	1	0	5/11/2004
Burundi	5/11/2004	1	0	8/12/2003
Burundi	8/12/2003	1	0	7/13/2003
Burundi	4/23/2003	1	0	8/9/2002
Burundi	8/9/2002	1	0	12/21/2000
Burundi	3/18/1999	1	0	5/21/1998
Burundi	5/21/1998	1	0	8/23/1996
Burundi	8/23/1996	1	0	8/9/1996
Cambodia	9/18/1998	1	0	7/29/1998
Cambodia	4/29/1998	1	0	10/31/1997
Cambodia	1/15/1998	0	1	4/21/1998 10/31/1997
Cambodia	10/31/1997	1	0	8/8/1997
Cameroon	8/6/2014	1	0	5/6/2014
Cameroon	4/25/2014	1	0	

Cameroon	5/31/2013	0	1	8/26/2013
Cameroon	9/28/1999	0	1	12/28/1999
Canada	3/28/2003	0	1	6/26/2003
Cayman Islands	9/14/2004	1	0	9/9/2004
Central African Republic	11/5/2014	1	0	5/13/2014
Central African Republic	5/13/2014	1	0	11/14/2013
Central African Republic	11/14/2013	1	0	5/10/2013
Central African Republic	5/10/2013	1	0	12/28/2012
Central African Republic	12/28/2012	1	0	12/23/2012
Central African Republic	7/11/2012	1	0	1/4/2012
Central African Republic	1/4/2012	1	0	7/28/2011
Central African Republic	7/28/2011	1	0	1/14/2011
Central African Republic	1/14/2011	1	0	12/6/2010
Central African Republic	12/6/2010	1	0	2/26/2010
Central African Republic	2/26/2010	1	0	8/19/2009
Central African Republic	8/19/2009	1	0	8/19/2009
Central African Republic	4/1/2009	1	0	3/25/2008

Central African Republic	12/19/2006	1	0	10/20/2006
Central African Republic	11/17/2006	1	0	4/20/2006
Central African Republic	4/20/2006	1	0	4/19/2005
Central African Republic	4/19/2005	1	0	10/29/2004
Central African Republic	10/29/2004	1	0	4/15/2004
Central African Republic	4/15/2004	1	0	4/7/2003
Central African Republic	4/7/2003	1	0	2/13/2003
Central African Republic	2/13/2003	1	0	10/31/2002
Central African Republic	10/31/2002	1	0	10/31/2002
Central African Republic	10/25/2002	1	0	
Central African Republic	11/8/2001	1	0	5/30/2001
Central African Republic	5/30/2001	1	0	
Central African Republic	6/7/1999	1	0	12/11/1998
Central African Republic	12/11/1998	1	0	3/28/1997
Central African Republic	3/28/1997	1	0	3/28/1997

Central African Republic	12/6/1996	1	0		12/5/1996
Central African Republic	5/21/1996	1	0		5/20/1996
Chad	4/15/2014	1	0		4/15/2014
Chad	10/10/2013	1	0		6/11/2013
Chad	6/11/2013	1	0		11/21/2012
Chad	11/21/2012	1	0		3/29/2012
Chad	3/29/2012	1	0		8/16/2011
Chad	8/16/2011	1	0		12/8/2010
Chad	12/8/2010	1	0		7/9/2010
Chad	7/9/2010	1	0		11/23/2009
Chad	11/23/2009	1	0		6/2/2008
Chad	6/2/2009	1	0		11/14/2008
Chad	11/20/2006	1	0		10/27/2006
Chad	10/27/2006	1	0		9/6/2006
Chad	9/6/2006	1	0		7/6/2006
Chad	7/6/2006	1	0		6/2/2006
Chad	4/12/2006	1	0		
Chad	7/25/2005	0	1	1/20/2006	4/21/2005
Chad	4/21/2005	0	1	10/31/2005	
Chad	7/29/2004	0	1	10/27/2004	
Chad	12/17/1998	0	1		
Chad	2/12/1998	0	1	5/11/1998	2/9/1998
Chad	2/9/1998	0	1	5/9/1998	
Chad	6/30/2014	1	0		4/15/2014
Chile	12/30/2011	0	1	1/31/2012	
Chile	3/12/2010	0	1	4/11/2010	3/1/2010
Chile	12/17/1998	0	1	3/21/1999	10/21/1998
China	9/25/2009	0	1	12/30/2009	7/9/2009
China	9/9/2009	0	1	12/10/2009	
China	7/9/2009	0	1	9/30/2009	6/19/2009
China	7/9/2009	0	1	8/10/2009	
China	5/6/2003	1	0		4/16/2003
China	4/16/2003	1	0		4/10/2003
China	4/19/2001	0	1	12/27/2001	
Colombia	11/14/2014	1	0		4/14/2014
Colombia	4/14/2014	1	0		10/11/2013
Colombia	10/11/2013	1	0		4/11/2013
Colombia	4/11/2013	1	0		10/3/2012
Colombia	10/3/2012	1	0		2/21/2012

Colombia	2/21/2012	1	0		7/22/2011
Colombia	7/22/2011	1	0		11/10/2010
Colombia	11/10/2010	1	0		3/5/2010
Colombia	3/5/2010	1	0		11/10/2009
Colombia	11/10/2009	1	0		3/25/2009
Colombia	3/25/2009	1	0		8/7/2008
Colombia	1/18/2006	1	0		5/4/2005
Colombia	5/4/2005	1	0		3/3/2004
Colombia	3/3/2004	1	0		12/19/2003
Colombia	12/19/2003	1	0		6/16/2003
Colombia	2/24/2003	1	0		7/3/2002
Colombia	7/3/2002	1	0		
Colombia	2/22/2002	0	1	5/21/2002	4/17/2001
Colombia	9/7/2001	0	1	12/3/2001	
Colombia	4/17/2001	1	0		1/28/2000
Colombia	6/10/1999	1	0		4/23/1999
Colombia	11/20/1998	1	0		3/26/1998
Colombia	3/26/1998	1	0		11/12/1997
Colombia	11/12/1997	1	0		2/11/1997
Colombia	2/11/1997	1	0		5/23/1996
Colombia	5/23/1996	1	0		3/14/1996
Comoros	5/7/2009	0	1	6/30/2009	3/16/2009
Comoros	3/16/2009	0	1	6/30/2009	
Congo	2/28/2003	0	1	8/20/2003	
Congo	12/3/1998	1	0		6/17/1997
Congo	6/17/1997	1	0		6/8/1997
Costa Rica	1/22/1998	0	1	4/21/1998	11/26/1997
Cote d'Ivoire	5/16/2013	1	0		11/16/2012
Cote d'Ivoire	11/16/2012	1	0		4/23/2012
Cote d'Ivoire	4/23/2012	1	0		12/16/2011
Cote d'Ivoire	12/16/2011	1	0		6/16/2011
Cote d'Ivoire	6/16/2011	1	0		4/14/2011
Cote d'Ivoire	4/14/2011	1	0		4/19/2011
Cote d'Ivoire	3/2/2011	1	0		12/19/2010
Cote d'Ivoire	12/19/2010	1	0		12/16/2010
Cote d'Ivoire	10/20/2010	1	0		5/12/2010
Cote d'Ivoire	5/12/2010	1	0		9/22/2009
Cote d'Ivoire	9/22/2009	1	0		12/15/2008
Cote d'Ivoire	12/18/2006	1	0		3/3/2006
Cote d'Ivoire	3/3/2006	1	0		8/25/2005
Cote d'Ivoire	8/25/2005	1	0		
Cote d'Ivoire	2/8/2005	1	0		
Cote d'Ivoire	12/3/2004	1	0		11/10/2004

Cote d'Ivoire	6/18/2004	1	0		2/4/2004
Cote d'Ivoire	2/4/2004	1	0		8/13/2003
Cote d'Ivoire	8/13/2003	1	0		12/9/2002
Cote d'Ivoire	12/9/2002	1	0		10/18/2002
Cote d'Ivoire	10/18/2002	1	0		9/26/2002
Cuba	10/9/2009	0	1	1/7/2010	
Cuba	10/19/2005	1	0		
Cuba	9/9/2004	1	0		
DRC Congo	11/25/2014	1	0		4/23/2014
DRC Congo	4/23/2014	1	0		10/24/2013
DRC Congo	10/24/2013	1	0		10/24/2013
DRC Congo	11/21/2012	1	0		8/2/2012
DRC Congo	8/2/2012	1	0		7/25/2012
DRC Congo	7/25/2012	1	0		1/12/2012
DRC Congo	1/12/2012	1	0		7/19/2011
DRC Congo	11/3/2011	0	1	1/3/2012	
DRC Congo	7/19/2011	1	0		11/25/2010
DRC Congo	11/25/2010	1	0		4/21/2010
DRC Congo	4/21/2010	1	0		9/1/2009
DRC Congo	9/1/2009	1	0		2/5/2009
DRC Congo	2/5/2009	1	0		10/30/2008
DRC Congo	12/18/2006	1	0		10/20/2006
DRC Congo	10/20/2006	1	0		8/24/2006
DRC Congo	1/20/2006	1	0		6/24/2005
DRC Congo	6/24/2005	1	0		3/30/2005
DRC Congo	3/30/2005	1	0		8/19/2004
DRC Congo	8/19/2004	1	0		1/22/2004
DRC Congo	1/22/2004	1	0		4/7/2003
DRC Congo	4/7/2003	1	0		7/1/2002
DRC Congo	7/1/2002	1	0		4/11/2001
DRC Congo	1/18/2002	0	1	7/17/2002	
DRC Congo	4/11/2001	1	0		1/21/2001
DRC Congo	1/21/2001	1	0		1/18/2001
DRC Congo	4/23/1999	1	0		3/12/1999
DRC Congo	3/12/1999	1	0		12/2/1998
DRC Congo	12/2/1997	1	0		10/10/1997
DRC Congo	2/13/1997	0	1		1/17/1997
DRC Congo	10/28/1996	0	1		10/26/1996
Djibouti	11/25/2014	1	0		6/8/2014
Djibouti	6/8/2014	1	0		
Djibouti	1/16/2004	0	1	7/14/2004	10/14/2003
Djibouti	10/14/2003	0	1	1/17/2004	7/16/2003
Djibouti	3/18/2003	0	1	7/17/2003	

Ecuador	4/22/2005	0	1	5/31/2005	
Ecuador	9/28/1999	0	1	11/30/1999	
Ecuador	4/3/1998	0	1	6/30/1998	1/7/1997
Ecuador	2/7/1997	0	1	3/5/1997	
Egypt	3/18/2014	0	1	6/18/2014	2/21/2014
Egypt	11/6/2013	1	0		8/15/2013
Egypt	8/15/2013	1	0		7/3/2013
Egypt	5/15/2013	0	1	8/15/2013	3/29/2013
Egypt	3/29/2013	0	1	6/27/2013	2/6/2013
Egypt	2/6/2013	0	1	5/4/2013	
Egypt	3/29/2012	0	1	6/30/2012	11/7/2011
Egypt	11/7/2011	0	1	4/1/2012	4/28/2011
Egypt	4/28/2011	0	1		3/29/2011
Egypt	3/29/2011	1	0		2/18/2011
Egypt	2/18/2011	1	0		2/6/2011
Egypt	1/30/2011	1	0		
Egypt	8/18/2005	0	1	11/15/2005	7/23/2005
Egypt	7/23/2005	0	1	10/22/2005	5/3/2005
Egypt	10/8/2004	0	1	1/8/2005	
Egypt	4/3/1998	0	1	7/1/1998	
El Salvador	11/21/2014	1	0		4/25/2014
El Salvador	4/25/2014	1	0		8/9/2013
El Salvador	8/9/2013	1	0		1/24/2013
El Salvador	1/23/2013	1	0		
El Salvador	10/7/2005	0	1	10/31/2005	
El Salvador	2/14/2001	0	1	5/9/2001	1/16/2001
Eritrea	9/12/2014	1	0		11/18/2013
Eritrea	11/18/2013	1	0		5/10/2013
Eritrea	5/10/2013	1	0		11/29/2012
Eritrea	11/29/2012	1	0		4/18/2012
Eritrea	4/18/2012	1	0		11/4/2011
Eritrea	11/4/2011	1	0		2/27/2011
Eritrea	2/27/2011	1	0		9/24/2010
Eritrea	9/24/2010	1	0		3/2/2010
Eritrea	3/2/2010	1	0		8/28/2009
Eritrea	8/28/2009	1	0		2/18/2009
Eritrea	2/18/2009	1	0		11/15/2008
Eritrea	6/5/2006	1	0		12/9/2005
Eritrea	12/9/2005	1	0	6/7/2006	
Eritrea	6/15/1999	1	0		2/11/1999
Eritrea	1/20/1999	1	0		1/20/1999
Eritrea	12/1/1998	1	0		6/4/1998
Ethiopia	4/13/2010	0	1		7/1/2010

Ethiopia	11/4/2005	0	1	12/31/2005	
Ethiopia	12/23/2003	0	1	3/19/2004	
Ethiopia	4/21/1999	1	0		2/11/1999
Ethiopia	1/20/1999	1	0		1/20/1999
Ethiopia	7/18/1996	0	1		
Fiji	1/15/2009	0	1	1/30/2009	
Fiji	12/1/2006	0	1	12/22/2006	11/22/2006
Fiji	7/24/2001	0	1	12/12/2001	4/9/2001
Fiji	2/9/2001	0	1	5/9/2001	12/12/2000
France-					
Monaco	3/27/2006	0	1	4/30/2006	
France-					
Monaco	11/7/2005	0	1	12/7/2005	
France-					
Switzerland	5/28/2003	0	1	6/9/2003	
Gabon	7/21/2009	0	1	9/15/2009	
Gabon	6/15/2009	0	1	7/25/2009	
Gabon	12/12/2001	0	1	6/12/2002	
Gabon	12/4/2001	0	1	1/10/2002	
Gabon	1/9/1997	0	1	3/31/1997	
Gabon-Congo	1/10/2002	0	1	7/9/2002	12/12/2001
Gabon-Congo	7/16/2002	0	1	10/15/2002	2/15/2002
Gambia	11/12/1996	0	1	1/30/1997	
Georgia	5/3/2010	1	0		4/9/2009
Georgia	4/9/2009	1	0		12/12/2008
Georgia	9/26/2001	0	1	11/30/2001	
Georgia	4/15/1998	0	1	6/14/1998	
Germany	11/12/2009	0	1	2/10/2010	9/24/2009
Germany	9/23/2009	0	1	11/11/2009	
Germany	1/31/2003	0	1	2/15/2003	
Ghana	12/3/2004	0	1	12/15/2004	
Ghana	7/9/2002	0	1	10/9/2002	
Ghana	5/25/2001	0	1	6/15/2001	
Grenada	9/9/2004	1	0		
Guatemala	10/7/2005	0	1	10/31/2005	
Guatemala	5/3/2005	0	1	11/3/2005	
Guatemala	10/29/2004	0	1	5/1/2005	
Guatemala	5/3/2004	0	1		
Guatemala	8/26/2003	0	1	1/15/2004	4/2/2003
Guatemala	4/2/2003	0	1	12/1/2003	2/26/2003
Guatemala	7/3/2002	0	1	10/1/2002	
Guatemala	6/21/2001	0	1	8/18/2001	
Guinea	9/10/2013	0	1	10/24/2013	

Guinea	6/18/2013	0	1	7/15/2013	
Guinea	3/14/2013	1	0		9/7/2012
Guinea	9/7/2012	1	0		11/4/2011
Guinea	11/4/2011	1	0		12/3/2010
Guinea	12/3/2010	1	0		6/16/2010
Guinea	6/16/2010	1	0		
Guinea	10/17/2009	1	0		
Guinea	11/30/1998	0	1	1/18/1999	
Guinea	4/1/1998	0	1	5/31/1998	
Guinea-Bissau	4/13/2012	0	1	7/12/2012	
Guinea-Bissau	6/10/2009	0	1	8/1/2009	
Guinea-Bissau	6/14/1998	1	0		6/9/1998
Guyana	3/2/2005	1	0		2/4/2005
Guyana	2/4/2005	1	0		1/19/2005
Guyana	1/19/2005	1	0		
Guyana	2/4/2004	1	0		
Guyana	4/12/2001	0	1	7/11/2001	1/11/2001
Guyana	1/11/2001	0	1	3/19/2001	
Haiti	12/4/2014	1	0		3/12/2014
Haiti	3/12/2014	1	0		8/13/2013
Haiti	8/13/2013	1	0		12/28/2012
Haiti	12/28/2012	1	0		6/18/2012
Haiti	6/18/2012	1	0		8/8/2011
Haiti	8/8/2011	1	0		1/20/2011
Haiti	1/20/2011	1	0		12/9/2010
Haiti	12/9/2010	1	0		6/24/2010
Haiti	6/24/2010	1	0		3/15/2010
Haiti	3/15/2010	1	0		2/22/2010
Haiti	2/22/2010	1	0		1/14/2010
Haiti	1/14/2010	1	0		2/13/2010
Haiti	7/17/2009	1	0		1/28/2009
Haiti	1/28/2009	1	0		4/30/2008
Haiti	7/7/2006	1	0		11/22/2005
Haiti	11/22/2005	1	0		5/26/2005
Haiti	5/26/2005	1	0		3/11/2005
Haiti	3/11/2005	1	0		10/14/2004
Haiti	10/14/2004	1	0		10/9/2004
Haiti	7/8/2004	1	0		5/25/2004
Haiti	5/25/2004	1	0		3/11/2004
Haiti	3/11/2004	1	0		2/27/2004
Haiti	2/27/2004	1	0		2/21/2004
Haiti	1/29/2004	1	0		1/9/2004
Haiti	1/9/2004	0	1	5/5/2004	12/12/2003

Haiti	4/17/2001	0	1	10/17/2001	2/5/2001
Haiti	2/5/2001	1	0		11/17/2000
Honduras	6/24/2014	1	0		12/24/2013
Honduras	12/24/2013	1	0		
Honduras	6/17/2013	1	0		11/21/2012
Honduras	11/21/2012	1	0		
Honduras	11/6/2009	0	1	12/20/2009	
Honduras	10/20/2009	0	1	12/20/2009	
Honduras	7/24/2009	0	1	10/20/2009	
India	10/18/2011	0	1	1/20/2012	
India	9/23/2011	0	1	11/15/2011	
India	9/1/2010	0	1	11/15/2010	
India	4/16/2010	0	1	5/30/2010	1/29/2010
India	1/29/2010	0	1	4/30/2010	12/29/2009
India	12/29/2009	0	1	12/9/2009	10/29/2009
India	12/23/2009	0	1	1/21/2010	12/9/2009
India	10/29/2009	0	1	1/28/2010	9/12/2009
India	9/12/2009	0	1	10/30/2009	
India	11/20/2002	0	1	3/20/2003	7/22/2002
India	11/13/2002	0	1	11/25/2002	7/22/2002
India	7/22/2002	0	1	11/20/2002	6/26/2002
India	3/27/2002	0	1	6/26/2002	3/13/2002
India	1/17/1997	0	1		
Indonesia	11/10/2010	0	1	12/31/2010	
Indonesia	11/18/2005	1	0		5/10/2005
Indonesia	10/26/2005	1	0		5/10/2005
Indonesia	5/10/2005	1	0		3/24/2005
Indonesia	3/24/2005	1	0		1/13/2005
Indonesia	1/13/2005	1	0		12/27/2004
Indonesia	12/27/2004	0	1	1/28/2005	
Indonesia	12/17/2004	1	0		9/13/2004
Indonesia	9/13/2004	1	0		9/7/2004
Indonesia	6/16/2004	1	0		3/19/2004
Indonesia	3/19/2004	1	0		8/28/2003
Indonesia	8/28/2003	1	0		8/8/2003
Indonesia	4/25/2003	1	0		4/10/2003
Indonesia	3/22/2003	1	0		10/19/2002
Indonesia	10/19/2002	1	0		10/14/2002
Indonesia	11/23/2001	1	0		9/27/2001
Indonesia	9/27/2001	1	0		9/26/2001
Indonesia	8/10/2001	1	0		6/27/2001
Indonesia	2/27/2001	1	0		2/22/2001
Indonesia	10/4/1999	1	0		9/21/1999

Indonesia	1/22/1999	0	1	4/22/1999	12/11/1998
Indonesia	11/14/1998	0	1	12/14/1998	9/14/1998
Indonesia	5/6/1998	0	1	8/6/1998	3/20/1998
Indonesia	2/4/1998	0	1	3/4/1998	1/9/1998
Iran	5/22/2014	1	0		11/21/2013
Iran	11/21/2013	1	0		5/24/2013
Iran	5/29/2013	0	1	8/30/2013	
Iran	5/24/2013	1	0		12/7/2012
Iran	12/7/2012	1	0		4/27/2012
Iran	4/27/2012	1	0		10/21/2011
Iran	10/21/2011	1	0		10/8/2010
Iran	10/8/2010	1	0		3/23/2010
Iran	3/23/2010	1	0		7/1/2009
Iran	7/1/2009	1	0		9/15/2008
Iran	10/10/2006	1	0		12/29/2005
Iran	12/29/2005	1	0		11/22/2004
Iran	6/30/2005	1	0		11/22/2004
Iran	11/22/2004	1	0		5/14/2004
Iran	5/14/2004	1	0		5/12/2003
Iran	5/12/2003	1	0		1/30/2002
Iran	1/30/2002	1	0		8/24/2001
Iran	8/24/2001	1	0		9/14/1999
Iran	9/14/1999	1	0		9/14/1999
Iran	4/2/1998	1	0		7/8/1997
Iran	7/8/1997	1	0		10/4/1995
Iran	10/4/1995	1	0		8/31/1993
Iraq	8/10/2014	1	0		8/8/2014
Iraq	6/16/2014	1	0		6/11/2014
Iraq	3/6/2014	1	0		9/5/2013
Iraq	9/5/2013	1	0		2/25/2013
Iraq	2/25/2013	1	0		8/9/2012
Iraq	8/9/2012	1	0		8/9/2012
Iraq	1/19/2012	1	0		12/31/2011
Iraq	9/13/2011	1	0		4/12/2011
Iraq	4/12/2011	1	0		11/5/2010
Iraq	11/5/2010	1	0		2/25/2010
Iraq	2/25/2010	1	0		6/15/2009
Iraq	6/15/2009	1	0		6/13/2008
Iraq	8/28/2006	1	0		3/24/2006
Iraq	3/24/2006	0	1	6/28/2006	12/29/2005
Iraq	12/29/2005	1	0		
Iraq	12/13/2005	0	1	1/13/2006	6/28/2005
Iraq	10/13/2005	0	1	11/14/2005	6/28/2005

Iraq	6/28/2005	1	0	10/20/2004
Iraq	10/20/2004	1	0	9/17/2004
Iraq	9/17/2004	1	0	7/20/2004
Iraq	7/20/2004	1	0	6/25/2004
Iraq	10/31/2003	1	0	10/2/2003
Iraq	4/25/2003	1	0	2/19/2003
Iraq	2/19/2003	1	0	2/7/2003
Iraq	10/31/2002	1	0	7/20/2001
Iraq	7/20/2001	1	0	9/1/1999
Iraq	9/10/1999	1	0	12/14/1998
Iraq	12/17/1998	1	0	2/21/1998
Iraq	2/21/1998	1	0	6/25/1997
Iraq	6/25/1997	1	0	9/15/1994
Iraq	9/3/1996	0	1	
Iraq	9/2/1996	1	0	9/15/1994
Israel	9/10/2014	1	0	7/21/2014
Israel	7/21/2014	1	0	2/3/2014
Israel	2/3/2014	1	0	6/19/2013
Israel	6/19/2013	1	0	12/20/2012
Israel	12/20/2012	1	0	8/10/2012
Israel	8/10/2012	1	0	3/19/2012
Israel	3/19/2012	1	0	6/22/2011
Israel	6/22/2011	1	0	8/10/2010
Israel	8/10/2010	1	0	8/5/2010
Israel	6/20/2010	1	0	8/14/2009
Israel	8/14/2009	1	0	1/15/2009
Israel	1/15/2009	1	0	9/26/2008
Israel	1/6/2009	0	1	1/31/2009
Israel	8/29/2006	1	0	7/19/2006
Israel	7/19/2006	1	0	2/27/2006
Israel	2/27/2006	1	0	6/20/2005
Israel	6/20/2005	1	0	4/7/2005
Israel	4/7/2005	1	0	11/26/2004
Israel	11/26/2004	1	0	8/3/2004
Israel	8/3/2004	1	0	4/28/2004
Israel	4/28/2004	1	0	3/23/2004
Israel	10/20/2003	1	0	4/17/2003
Israel	4/17/2003	1	0	3/16/2003
Israel	3/16/2003	1	0	2/7/2003
Israel	1/10/2003	1	0	8/2/2002
Israel	8/2/2002	1	0	7/12/2002
Israel	12/7/2001	1	0	8/10/2001
Israel	8/10/2001	1	0	1/12/2001

Israel	1/12/2001	1	0		10/24/2000
Israel	11/1/1996	0	1	11/30/1996	
Italy	10/2/2001	0	1	1/6/2002	
Italy	9/7/2001	0	1	10/4/2001	
Italy, Holy See, and San Marino	3/21/2006	0	1	6/19/2006	
Jamaica	6/24/2010	0	1	7/23/2010	6/15/2010
Jamaica	5/24/2010	0	1	6/23/2010	5/21/2010
Jamaica	9/17/2004	1	0		9/14/2004
Jamaica	7/9/2001	0	1	10/9/2001	
Japan	7/19/2011	0	1	9/18/2011	6/9/2011
Japan	6/9/2011	0	1	8/15/2011	5/16/2011
Japan	5/16/2011	0	1	7/15/2011	4/14/2011
Japan	4/14/2011	0	1	6/15/2011	3/31/2011
Japan	3/21/2011	1	0		3/18/2011
Japan-Korea	5/23/2002	0	1	7/15/2002	
Jordan	11/10/2005	0	1	2/10/2006	
Jordan	4/13/2004	0	1	7/7/2004	
Jordan	2/7/2003	1	0		
Jordan	11/22/2002	1	0		
Kenya	6/19/2014	1	0		5/17/2014
Kenya	5/17/2014	1	0		5/15/2014
Kenya	9/27/2013	1	0		7/5/2013
Kenya	1/14/2013	1	0		7/3/2012
Kenya	7/5/2012	1	0		4/4/2012
Kenya	4/4/2012	1	0		11/4/2011
Kenya	11/4/2011	1	0		12/28/2010
Kenya	12/28/2010	1	0		7/24/2009
Kenya	7/22/2010	0	1	10/22/2010	3/16/2010
Kenya	3/16/2010	1	0		6/24/2009
Kenya	7/24/2009	1	0		11/14/2008
Kenya	8/10/2006	1	0		12/30/2005
Kenya	12/30/2005	1	0		7/1/2005
Kenya	10/25/2005	0	1	12/20/2005	7/1/2005
Kenya	7/1/2005	1	0		11/29/2004
Kenya	11/29/2004	1	0		5/21/2004
Kenya	5/21/2004	1	0		9/25/2003
Kenya	9/25/2003	1	0		5/16/2003
Kenya	5/16/2003	1	0		5/14/2003
Kenya	3/14/2003	0	1	7/17/2003	12/24/2002
Kenya	12/24/2002	0	1	4/24/2003	
Kenya	2/24/2002	0	1		

Kenya	12/18/1998	0	1	3/17/1999	
Kuwait	7/27/2005	0	1	1/26/2006	1/28/2005
Kuwait	1/28/2005	0	1	7/25/2005	12/23/2004
Kuwait	3/16/2003	1	0		1/30/2003
Kuwait	1/30/2003	1	0		
Kuwait	12/16/1998	1	0		11/11/1998
Kuwait	2/6/1998	0	1	5/6/1998	
Kuwait	10/27/1996	0	1	11/30/1996	
Kyrgyz Republic	4/20/2010	1	0		4/9/2010
Kyrgyz Republic	4/9/2010	0	1	5/9/2010	
Kyrgyz Republic	10/31/2005	0	1	4/27/2006	8/31/2005
Kyrgyz Republic	3/24/2005	1	0		10/22/2004
Kyrgyz Republic	10/22/2004	0	1	4/30/2005	4/27/2004
Kyrgyz Republic	4/27/2004	0	1		10/31/2003
Kyrgyz Republic	10/31/2003	0	1	4/30/2004	5/6/2003
Kyrgyz Republic	5/6/2003	0	1	10/31/2003	12/3/2002
Kyrgyz Republic	12/3/2002	0	1	6/6/2002	6/2/2003
Kyrgyz Republic	6/6/2002	0	1	12/2/2002	1/2/2002
Kyrgyz Republic	1/2/2002	0	1	6/1/2002	11/19/2001
Kyrgyz Republic	11/19/2001	1	0		
Kyrgyz Republic	9/21/2001	1	0		8/17/2001
Kyrgyz Republic	8/17/2001	0	1	12/15/2001	3/14/2001
Kyrgyz Republic	3/14/2001	0	1	9/15/2001	9/9/2000
Kyrgyz Republic	8/27/1999	1	0	10/15/1999	8/23/1999
Laos	12/6/2004	0	1	7/30/2005	10/21/2004
Laos	10/21/2004	0	1	11/30/2004	7/9/2004
Laos	7/9/2004	0	1	1/6/2005	1/5/2004
Laos	1/5/2004	0	1	7/8/2004	8/28/2003
Laos	2/26/2003	0	1	8/13/2003	

Laos	1/30/2001	0	1	4/1/2001	12/1/2000
Laos	4/6/1998	0	1	6/30/1998	
Lebanon	11/26/2014	1	0		8/15/2014
Lebanon	8/15/2014	1	0		1/31/2014
Lebanon	1/31/2014	1	0		10/9/2013
Lebanon	10/9/2013	1	0		10/3/2013
Lebanon	9/6/2013	1	0		4/1/2013
Lebanon	4/1/2013	1	0		9/17/2012
Lebanon	9/17/2012	1	0		5/8/2012
Lebanon	5/8/2012	1	0		10/12/2011
Lebanon	10/12/2011	1	0		4/4/2011
Lebanon	4/4/2011	1	0		10/8/2010
Lebanon	10/8/2010	1	0		3/29/2010
Lebanon	3/29/2010	1	0		9/29/2009
Lebanon	9/29/2009	1	0		5/13/2009
Lebanon	6/2/2009	0	1	6/30/2009	
Lebanon	5/13/2009	1	0		9/10/2008
Lebanon	12/22/2006	1	0		
Lebanon	9/28/2006	1	0		7/27/2006
Lebanon	7/27/2006	1	0		7/19/2006
Lebanon	5/2/2006	1	0		11/7/2005
Lebanon	11/7/2005	1	0		4/21/2005
Lebanon	4/21/2005	1	0		11/15/2004
Lebanon	11/18/2004	1	0		5/20/2004
Lebanon	5/20/2004	1	0		12/4/2003
Lebanon	12/4/2003	1	0		5/6/2003
Lebanon	5/6/2003	1	0		2/7/2003
Lebanon	2/7/2003	1	0		12/9/2002
Lebanon	12/9/2002	1	0		4/29/2002
Lebanon	4/29/2002	1	0		8/28/2000
Lebanon	7/9/1999	1	0		4/12/1999
Lebanon	4/12/1999	1	0		6/29/1998
Lebanon	5/11/1998	1	0		7/30/1997
Lebanon	7/30/1997	1	0		
Lebanon	7/15/1996	1	0		9/6/1994
Lesotho	9/30/2014	1	0		9/18/2014
Lesotho	9/18/2014	1	0		9/3/2014
Lesotho	2/11/1997	0	1	3/31/1997	
Liberia	8/7/2014	1	0		
Liberia	11/9/2011	0	1	11/21/2011	
Liberia	3/30/2006	1	0		11/4/2005
Liberia	11/4/2005	1	0		9/23/2005
Liberia	9/23/2005	1	0		3/3/2005

Liberia	7/23/2005	1	0	
Liberia	3/3/2005	1	0	7/30/2004
Liberia	7/29/2004	1	0	1/7/2004
Liberia	1/7/2004	1	0	9/30/2003
Liberia	9/30/2003	1	0	6/6/2003
Liberia	6/6/2003	1	0	6/6/2003
Liberia	3/26/2003	1	0	1/17/2003
Liberia	5/21/2002	1	0	2/26/2002
Liberia	5/31/2001	1	0	5/3/2001
Liberia	3/24/1999	1	0	11/2/1998
Liberia	11/2/1998	1	0	9/19/1998
Liberia	2/6/1998	1	0	9/13/1996
Liberia	9/13/1996	1	0	4/16/1996
Libya	7/26/2014	1	0	5/27/2014
Libya	5/27/2014	1	0	12/12/2013
Libya	12/12/2013	1	0	6/7/2013
Libya	6/7/2013	1	0	5/9/2013
Libya	1/2/2013	1	0	1/2/2013
Libya	9/12/2012	1	0	8/27/2012
Libya	8/27/2012	1	0	9/22/2011
Libya	9/22/2011	1	0	8/23/2011
Libya	2/25/2011	1	0	2/24/2011
Libya	12/23/2005	0	1	6/28/2006 11/1/2005
Libya	11/1/2005	0	1	1/5/2006 8/1/2005
Libya	8/1/2005	0	1	11/1/2005 5/6/2005
Libya	5/6/2005	0	1	8/5/2005 12/29/2004
Libya	12/29/2004	1	0	6/28/2004
Libya	6/28/2004	1	0	3/5/2004
Libya	3/5/2004	1	0	11/20/2003
Libya	11/20/2003	1	0	10/7/2002
Libya	10/7/2002	1	0	6/6/2001
Libya	6/6/2001	1	0	8/4/1999
Libya	8/4/1999	1	0	6/3/1997
Libya	6/3/1997	1	0	12/22/1994
Libya	12/22/1994	1	0	8/31/1993
Luxembourg	10/4/2001	0	1	11/3/2001
Macedonia	5/21/2002	1	0	11/29/2001
Macedonia	11/29/2001	1	0	10/22/2001
Macedonia	10/22/2001	1	0	9/5/2001
Macedonia	9/5/2001	1	0	8/30/2001
Macedonia	8/10/2001	1	0	7/26/2001
Macedonia	5/4/2001	0	1	8/6/2001 3/15/2001
Macedonia	3/15/2001	0	1	6/14/2001 3/9/2001

Macedonia	3/6/2001	0	1	5/30/2001	
Macedonia	2/13/2001	1	0		11/24/2000
Madagascar	10/16/2013	0	1		
Madagascar	3/17/2009	1	0		
Madagascar	1/28/2009	0	1	5/1/2009	
Madagascar	7/15/2002	0	1	11/15/2002	4/12/2002
Madagascar	2/8/2002	0	1	5/7/2002	1/9/2002
Malaysia	1/15/2010	0	1	4/15/2010	
Malaysia	6/24/2005	0	1	12/23/2005	5/17/2005
Malaysia	11/8/2004	0	1	5/12/2005	5/12/2004
Malaysia	5/12/2004	0	1	11/12/2004	11/7/2003
Malaysia	11/7/2003	0	1	6/6/2004	5/14/2003
Malaysia	5/14/2003	0	1	11/14/2003	11/20/2002
Malaysia	11/20/2002	0	1	5/14/2003	9/20/2002
Malaysia	9/20/2002	0	1	3/22/2003	
Malaysia	12/5/2001	0	1	6/22/2002	6/13/2001
Malaysia	6/13/2001	0	1	12/6/2001	4/9/2001
Malaysia	4/9/2001	0	1	8/6/2001	1/11/2001
Malaysia	3/24/1999	0	1	6/24/1999	
Mali	12/18/2014	1	0		12/18/2014
Mali	3/21/2014	1	0		7/18/2013
Mali	7/18/2013	1	0		3/22/2013
Mali	3/22/2013	1	0		1/18/2013
Mali	1/16/2013	1	0		1/10/2013
Mali	8/29/2012	1	0		4/9/2012
Mali	4/9/2012	1	0		4/3/2012
Mali	3/26/2012	1	0		3/23/2012
Mali	10/4/2011	1	0		3/9/2011
Mali	3/2/2011	1	0		2/9/2011
Mali	2/9/2011	1	0		8/6/2010
Mali	8/6/2010	1	0		7/29/2010
Mali	11/19/2009	1	0		8/31/2009
Mali	8/31/2009	1	0		6/2/2009
Mali	6/2/2009	1	0		
Mali	6/29/2001	0	1	9/29/2001	3/30/2001
Mali	3/30/2001	0	1	6/29/2001	1/5/2001
Mauritania	10/7/2014	1	0		3/12/2014
Mauritania	3/12/2014	1	0		5/21/2013
Mauritania	5/21/2013	1	0		11/30/2012
Mauritania	11/30/2012	1	0		5/24/2012
Mauritania	5/24/2012	1	0		10/10/2011
Mauritania	10/12/2011	1	0		3/11/2011
Mauritania	3/11/2011	1	0		12/8/2010

Mauritania	12/8/2010	1	0		8/2/2010
Mauritania	8/2/2010	1	0		12/2/2009
Mauritania	12/2/2009	1	0		9/1/2009
Mauritania	9/1/2009	0	1	11/30/2009	
Mexico	12/24/2014	1	0		10/10/2014
Mexico	10/10/2014	1	0		8/15/2014
Mexico	8/15/2014	1	0		1/9/2014
Mexico	1/9/2014	1	0		7/12/2013
Mexico	7/12/2013	1	0		11/20/2012
Mexico	11/20/2012	1	0		2/8/2012
Mexico	2/8/2012	1	0		4/22/2011
Mexico	4/22/2011	1	0		9/10/2010
Mexico	9/10/2010	1	0		
Mexico	8/28/2010	0	1	9/10/2010	
Mexico	8/27/2010	1	0		7/16/2010
Mexico	7/16/2010	1	0		5/6/2010
Mexico	5/6/2010	1	0		4/12/2010
Mexico	4/12/2010	1	0		3/14/2010
Mexico	3/14/2010	1	0		2/22/2010
Mexico	2/22/2010	0	1	8/20/2010	8/20/2009
Mexico	8/20/2009	0	1	2/20/2010	2/20/2009
Mexico	4/27/2009	0	1	7/27/2009	
Mexico	4/20/2009	0	1	8/20/2009	10/15/2008
Mexico	2/20/2009	0	1	8/20/2009	10/15/2008
Mexico	11/15/2006	0	1	1/18/2007	
Mexico	9/15/2006	0	1	3/15/2007	
Mexico	8/24/2006	0	1	9/24/2006	
Mexico	10/28/2005	0	1	11/27/2005	
Mexico	10/20/2005	0	1	11/14/2005	
Mexico	4/26/2005	0	1	7/29/2005	1/26/2005
Mexico	4/6/2005	0	1	5/31/2005	1/26/2005
Mexico	1/26/2005	0	1		4/25/2005
Mexico	1/31/2003	0	1	5/29/2003	
Mexico	2/19/1999	0	1	6/18/1999	
Mexico	12/4/1998	0	1	11/30/1999	8/3/1998
Mexico	8/3/1998	0	1	7/28/1999	
Mexico	3/26/1998	0	1	6/27/1998	
Mexico	12/18/1997	0	1	3/18/1998	
Mexico	1/21/1997	0	1		
Mongolia	12/16/1997	0	1	2/14/1998	
Montserrat	8/27/1997	1	0		
Mozambique	9/18/2014	0	1	10/31/2014	
Mozambique	4/30/2010	0	1	5/31/2010	

Mozambique	9/23/2009	0	1	11/10/2009	
Myanmar					
(Burma)	5/17/2005	0	1	8/31/2005	
Myanmar					
(Burma)	2/16/2001	0	1	4/15/2001	
Myanmar					
(Burma)	12/9/1996	0	1		5/23/1996
Myanmar					
(Burma)	5/23/1996	0	1		
Nepal	11/1/2013	0	1	12/19/2013	
Nepal	9/23/2011	0	1	11/15/2011	
Nepal	1/12/2011	1	0		6/15/2010
Nepal	6/15/2010	1	0		11/19/2009
Nepal	11/19/2009	1	0		5/22/2009
Nepal	5/22/2009	1	0		11/21/2008
Nepal	12/8/2006	1	0		5/11/2006
Nepal	5/11/2006	1	0		4/24/2006
Nepal	4/24/2006	1	0		4/12/2006
Nepal	12/15/2005	0	1		6/24/2005
Nepal	6/24/2005	0	1		10/26/2004
Nepal	2/2/2005	0	1	5/2/2005	10/26/2004
Nepal	10/26/2004	1	0		9/14/2004
Nepal	9/14/2004	1	0		7/21/2004
Nepal	7/21/2004	1	0		6/8/2004
Nepal	6/8/2004	1	0		4/7/2004
Nepal	12/22/2003	1	0		10/22/2003
Nepal	3/5/2003	0	1	6/5/2003	11/22/2002
Nepal	11/22/2002	0	1	5/20/2003	9/3/2002
Nepal	9/3/2002	0	1	5/16/2002	12/19/2002
Nepal	5/16/2002	0	1	9/15/2002	4/19/2002
Nepal	3/22/2002	0	1	6/20/2002	2/8/2002
Nepal	2/8/2002	0	1	4/8/2002	1/24/2002
Nepal	1/24/2002	0	1	4/22/2002	12/4/2001
Nepal	12/4/2001	0	1	3/2/2002	11/27/2001
Nepal	11/27/2001	0	1	11/27/2001	
Nepal	9/13/2001	0	1	10/21/2001	
Nepal	3/12/2001	0	1	6/15/2001	
Nepal	10/1/1999	0	1	11/6/1999	
Nepal	9/22/1999	0	1	11/21/1999	11/21/1999
Nepal	1/27/1997	0	1		3/1/1996
Nepal	3/1/1996	0	1		
New Zealand	2/25/2011	0	1	3/22/2011	2/22/2011
Nicaragua	4/21/2005	0	1	7/19/2005	

Nicaragua	10/30/2001	0	1	12/1/2001	
Nicaragua	11/4/1998	0	1	12/31/1998	10/26/1998
Nicaragua	10/1/1996	0	1	12/15/1996	
Niger	3/27/2014	1	0		7/15/2013
Niger	7/15/2013	1	0		6/13/2013
Niger	6/14/2013	1	0		5/28/2013
Niger	1/16/2013	1	0		11/16/2012
Niger	4/6/2012	1	0		8/5/2011
Niger	8/5/2011	1	0		1/12/2011
Niger	1/12/2011	1	0		
Niger	5/11/2010	1	0		
Niger	11/19/2009	0	1	2/28/2010	
Niger	7/24/2009	0	1	8/31/2009	
Niger	11/19/1996	0	1	12/8/1996	
Niger	9/28/2001	0	1	9/28/2001	
Nigeria	8/8/2014	1	0		1/8/2014
Nigeria	5/6/2014	1	0		1/8/2014
Nigeria	1/8/2014	1	0		6/3/2013
Nigeria	6/3/2013	1	0		12/21/2012
Nigeria	12/21/2012	1	0		6/21/2012
Nigeria	6/21/2012	1	0		2/29/2012
Nigeria	2/29/2012	1	0		1/12/2012
Nigeria	1/12/2012	1	0		10/13/2011
Nigeria	10/13/2011	1	0		10/19/2010
Nigeria	4/15/2011	1	0		10/19/2010
Nigeria	10/19/2010	1	0		6/15/2010
Nigeria	6/15/2010	1	0		5/24/2010
Nigeria	7/17/2009	1	0		12/2/2008
Nigeria	8/24/2006	1	0		2/17/2006
Nigeria	2/17/2006	1	0		1/20/2006
Nigeria	1/20/2006	1	0		12/1/2005
Nigeria	12/1/2005	1	0		5/20/2005
Nigeria	5/20/2005	1	0		7/19/2004
Nigeria	7/19/2004	1	0		12/29/2003
Nigeria	12/29/2003	1	0		6/26/2003
Nigeria	8/8/2002	1	0		4/7/2000
Nigeria	4/29/1999	1	0		5/27/1998
Nigeria	2/17/1999	0	1	3/10/1999	
Nigeria	5/27/1998	1	0		11/19/1996
Nigeria	4/24/1998	0	1	7/24/1998	
Nigeria	11/19/1996	1	0		6/5/1996
Nigeria	1/25/1996	0	1		
North Korea	5/20/2014	1	0		11/19/2013

North Korea	11/19/2013	1	0		10/1/2013
North Korea	10/1/2013	1	0		3/14/2013
North Korea	3/14/2013	1	0		9/11/2012
North Korea	9/11/2012	1	0		11/3/2011
North Korea	11/3/2011	1	0		
North Korea	8/27/2010	1	0		
Oman	3/10/2003	1	0		
Pakistan	8/8/2014	1	0		2/5/2014
Pakistan	2/5/2014	1	0		9/6/2013
Pakistan	9/6/2013	1	0		8/9/2013
Pakistan	4/9/2013	1	0		9/19/2012
Pakistan	9/19/2012	1	0		8/27/2012
Pakistan	8/27/2012	1	0		2/2/2012
Pakistan	2/2/2012	1	0		8/8/2011
Pakistan	8/8/2011	1	0		2/2/2011
Pakistan	2/2/2011	1	0		7/22/2010
Pakistan	7/22/2010	1	0		1/7/2010
Pakistan	1/7/2010	1	0		6/12/2009
Pakistan	6/12/2009	1	0		2/25/2009
Pakistan	2/25/2009	1	0		2/25/2009
Pakistan	12/5/2006	1	0		4/7/2006
Pakistan	4/7/2006	1	0		1/27/2006
Pakistan	1/27/2006	1	0		3/25/2005
Pakistan	3/25/2005	1	0		9/24/2004
Pakistan	9/24/2004	1	0		1/29/2004
Pakistan	1/29/2004	1	0		4/17/2003
Pakistan	4/17/2003	1	0		3/28/2003
Pakistan	3/28/2003	1	0		3/19/2003
Pakistan	8/12/2002	1	0		7/19/2002
Pakistan	3/22/2002	1	0		3/18/2002
Pakistan	1/30/2002	1	0		1/28/2002
Pakistan	12/13/2001	1	0		9/25/2001
Pakistan	9/25/2001	1	0		9/17/2001
Pakistan	5/14/2001	1	0		8/19/1999
Pakistan	8/10/1999	1	0		7/16/1999
Pakistan	2/3/1999	1	0		8/16/1998
Pakistan	8/16/1998	1	0		11/12/1997
Pakistan	5/1/1998	0	1	5/30/1998	3/3/1998
Pakistan	3/3/1998	0	1	6/2/1998	2/5/1998
Pakistan	11/12/1997	1	0		
Pakistan	2/24/1997	0	1		
Pakistan	10/18/1996	0	1	1/31/1997	8/15/1996
Panama	2/5/2012	0	1	2/20/2012	

Panama	5/10/2001	0	1	6/30/2001	
Papua New Guinea	5/22/2002	0	1	8/15/2002	
Papua New Guinea	7/13/2001	0	1	10/31/2001	6/29/2001
Papua New Guinea	6/29/2001	0	1	9/30/2001	
Papua New Guinea	11/6/1996	0	1		
Paraguay	8/6/1999	0	1	10/13/1999	
Paraguay	11/5/1996	0	1	2/1/1997	
Peru	10/17/2005	0	1	11/14/2005	
Peru	5/2/2003	0	1	7/24/2003	
Peru	4/19/2002	0	1	7/24/2002	3/21/2002
Peru	12/1/2001	0	1	1/31/2002	
Peru	6/1/2001	0	1	5/18/2001	7/31/2001
Peru	3/22/2001	0	1	5/31/2001	10/26/2000
Peru	2/25/1998	0	1	6/30/1998	9/12/1997
Peru	12/18/1996	0	1		
Peru	8/23/1996	0	1		
Philippines	11/20/2014	1	0		5/19/2014
Philippines	5/19/2014	1	0		1/10/2014
Philippines	1/10/2014	1	0		7/5/2013
Philippines	7/5/2013	1	0		1/30/2013
Philippines	1/30/2013	1	0		6/14/2012
Philippines	6/14/2012	1	0		1/5/2012
Philippines	1/5/2012	1	0		6/14/2011
Philippines	12/22/2011	0	1	2/5/2012	
Philippines	6/14/2011	1	0		11/2/2010
Philippines	11/2/2010	1	0		4/2/2010
Philippines	4/2/2010	1	0		9/17/2009
Philippines	1/20/2010	0	1	2/28/2010	9/17/2009
Philippines	11/4/2009	0	1	1/6/2010	9/17/2009
Philippines	9/17/2009	1	0		1/29/2009
Philippines	1/27/2009	1	0		2/13/2008
Philippines	6/16/2006	1	0		3/23/2005
Philippines	3/23/2005	1	0		
Philippines	2/18/2005	0	1	7/18/2005	1/1/2004
Philippines	11/1/2004	0	1	4/28/2004	4/30/2005
Philippines	4/28/2004	0	1	10/29/2004	1/16/2004
Philippines	1/16/2004	0	1	5/31/2004	7/16/2003
Philippines	7/16/2003	0	1	1/17/2004	3/7/2003
Philippines	3/7/2003	0	1	9/4/2003	1/10/2003

Philippines	1/10/2003	0	1	7/1/2003	11/2/2002
Philippines	11/3/2002	0	1	1/10/2003	10/23/2002
Philippines	10/23/2002	0	1	4/23/2003	8/20/2002
Philippines	8/20/2002	0	1	2/19/2003	4/18/2002
Philippines	10/5/2001	0	1	4/22/2002	10/4/2001
Philippines	6/26/2001	0	1	11/1/2001	5/1/2001
Philippines	6/14/2001	0	1	12/6/2001	6/6/2001
Philippines	5/27/2001	0	1	9/5/2001	4/5/2001
Philippines	5/1/2001	0	1	8/1/2001	2/1/2001
Philippines	4/5/2001	0	1	8/5/2001	1/5/2001
Philippines	2/1/2001	0	1	5/1/2001	
Philippines	1/5/2001	0	1	4/5/2001	12/30/2000
Philippines	11/22/1996	0	1	12/10/1996	
Portugal	5/12/2004	0	1	7/14/2004	
Qatar	2/12/2003	1	0		
South Sudan	6/12/2014	1	0		4/23/2014
South Sudan	4/23/2014	1	0		1/3/2014
South Sudan	1/3/2014	1	0		12/17/2013
South Sudan	12/17/2013	1	0		10/22/2013
South Sudan	10/22/2013	1	0		3/29/2013
South Sudan	3/29/2013	1	0		9/10/2012
South Sudan	9/10/2012	1	0		7/12/2011
South Sudan	12/22/2011	1	0		
South Sudan	7/12/2011	1	0		
Russia	10/23/2014	0	1	12/31/2014	7/22/2014
Russia	7/22/2014	0	1	10/21/2014	6/12/2014
Russia	6/12/2014	0	1	9/10/2014	3/14/2014
Russia	3/14/2014	0	1	6/13/2014	
Russia	10/2/2006	0	1	3/31/2007	4/4/2006
Russia	4/4/2006	0	1	9/30/2006	10/3/2005
Russia	10/3/2005	0	1	3/30/2006	3/30/2005
Russia	3/30/2005	0	1	9/30/2005	10/27/2004
Russia	10/27/2004	0	1	3/31/2005	9/3/2004
Russia	9/3/2004	0	1	3/3/2005	
Russia	4/22/1998	0	1	7/21/1998	
Russia	10/31/1996	0	1	11/30/1996	
Rwanda	1/19/2002	0	1	7/17/2002	
Rwanda	11/9/2001	0	1	3/18/2002	9/19/2001
Rwanda	9/19/2001	0	1	3/18/2002	6/20/2001
Rwanda	6/20/2001	0	1	9/18/2001	5/23/2001
Rwanda	5/23/2001	0	1	6/22/2001	
Rwanda	3/19/1999	1	0		5/1/1998
Rwanda	5/1/1998	1	0		2/14/1997

Rwanda	2/14/1997	1	0	9/12/1995
Rwanda	9/12/1995	1	0	8/4/1994
Saudi Arabia	8/8/2014	1	0	2/11/2014
Saudi Arabia	2/11/2014	1	0	7/25/2013
Saudi Arabia	7/25/2013	1	0	5/18/2012
Saudi Arabia	11/19/2012	1	0	5/18/2012
Saudi Arabia	5/18/2012	1	0	8/5/2011
Saudi Arabia	8/5/2011	1	0	12/23/2010
Saudi Arabia	12/23/2010	1	0	2/18/2010
Saudi Arabia	2/18/2010	1	0	6/26/2009
Saudi Arabia	11/5/2009	0	1	12/15/2009
Saudi Arabia	6/26/2009	1	0	3/4/2009
Saudi Arabia	3/4/2009	1	0	3/4/2009
Saudi Arabia	12/19/2006	1	0	6/23/2006
Saudi Arabia	6/23/2006	1	0	12/23/2005
Saudi Arabia	5/17/2005	1	0	12/7/2004
Saudi Arabia	12/7/2004	1	0	10/27/2004
Saudi Arabia	10/27/2004	1	0	8/12/2004
Saudi Arabia	8/12/2004	1	0	6/23/2004
Saudi Arabia	6/23/2004	1	0	6/17/2004
Saudi Arabia	2/20/2004	1	0	12/17/2003
Saudi Arabia	12/17/2003	1	0	
Saudi Arabia	5/13/2003	1	0	5/1/2003
Saudi Arabia	2/12/2003	1	0	1/30/2003
Saudi Arabia	1/30/2003	1	0	
Saudi Arabia	10/6/1998	0	1	1/6/1999
Saudi Arabia	2/25/1997	0	1	
Saudi Arabia	11/5/1996	0	1	11/30/1996
Saudi Arabia	7/22/1996	0	1	
Saudi Arabia	7/10/1996	0	1	6/26/1996
Senegal	12/12/2011	0	1	3/2/2012
Senegal	11/22/1996	0	1	12/9/1996
Serbia and Montenegro	9/29/1999	1	0	8/6/1999
Serbia and Montenegro	11/25/1998	1	0	10/27/1998
Serbia and Montenegro	3/3/1998	0	1	5/31/1998
Serbia and Montenegro	1/31/1997	0	1	2/28/1997
Sierra Leone	8/14/2014	1	0	
Sierra Leone	8/20/2001	1	0	8/4/2000
Sierra Leone	9/16/1999	1	0	12/24/1998

Sierra Leone	12/24/1998	1	0	7/14/1998
Sierra Leone	6/1/1997	1	0	2/1/1995
Sierra Leone	2/1/1995	1	0	
Solomon Islands	10/27/2003	0	1	4/9/2004 9/8/2003
Solomon Islands	3/17/2003	0	1	9/14/2003 12/20/2002
Solomon Islands	12/20/2002	0	1	3/19/2003
Solomon Islands	11/8/2001	1	0	5/1/2001
Solomon Islands	5/1/2001	1	0	2/27/2001
Solomon Islands	2/27/2001	1	0	11/3/2000
Solomon Islands	9/22/1999	0	1	12/22/1999
Somalia	10/24/2014	1	0	2/7/2014
Somalia	2/7/2014	1	0	6/21/2013
Somalia	6/21/2013	1	0	12/26/2012
Somalia	12/26/2012	1	0	6/15/2012
Somalia	6/15/2012	1	0	8/19/2011
Somalia	8/19/2011	1	0	12/27/2010
Somalia	12/27/2010	1	0	12/31/2009
Somalia	12/31/2009	1	0	11/15/2008
Somalia	6/5/2006	1	0	7/21/2005
Somalia	7/21/2005	1	0	12/14/2004
Somalia	12/7/2004	1	0	6/7/2004
Somalia	6/7/2004	1	0	6/2/2004
Somalia	10/31/2003	1	0	3/4/2003
Somalia	3/4/2003	1	0	8/23/2002
Somalia	8/23/2002	1	0	2/16/2001
Somalia	2/16/2001	1	0	2/16/2001
Somalia	12/21/1999	1	0	7/14/1998
Somalia	7/14/1998	1	0	6/28/1996
Somalia	6/28/1996	1	0	4/26/1995
South Africa	5/25/2010	0	1	7/31/2010
South Africa	8/27/2001	0	1	9/22/2001
Spain	4/5/2004	0	1	7/2/2004 3/12/2004
Spain	3/12/2004	0	1	6/11/2004
Sri Lanka	5/26/2010	1	0	11/19/2009
Sri Lanka	11/19/2009	1	0	6/26/2009
Sri Lanka	6/26/2009	1	0	12/22/2008
Sri Lanka	11/19/2006	1	0	

Sri Lanka	10/23/2006	1	0	4/19/2007
Sri Lanka	8/15/2006	1	0	11/15/2006
Sri Lanka	10/26/2001	0	1	1/22/2002
Sri Lanka	7/24/2001	1	0	7/13/2001
Sri Lanka	3/18/1999	0	1	9/30/1999
Sri Lanka-				
Maldives	12/26/2004	0	1	1/25/2005
St Lucia	11/3/2010	0	1	12/1/2010
Sudan	10/30/2014	1	0	4/10/2014
Sudan	4/10/2014	1	0	10/11/2013
Sudan	10/11/2013	1	0	4/16/2013
Sudan	4/16/2013	1	0	3/13/2013
Sudan	9/15/2012	1	0	9/7/2012
Sudan	1/11/2012	1	0	6/22/2011
Sudan	6/22/2011	1	0	1/7/2011
Sudan	1/7/2011	1	0	10/1/2010
Sudan	10/1/2010	1	0	12/31/2009
Sudan	12/31/2009	1	0	4/8/2009
Sudan	4/8/2009	1	0	3/9/2009
Sudan	3/9/2009	1	0	2/26/2009
Sudan	10/5/2006	1	0	8/31/2006
Sudan	8/31/2006	1	0	2/6/2006
Sudan	2/6/2006	1	0	8/5/2005
Sudan	8/5/2005	1	0	12/14/2004
Sudan	6/30/2004	1	0	11/14/2003
Sudan	11/14/2003	1	0	3/26/2003
Sudan	3/26/2003	1	0	7/9/2002
Sudan	7/9/2002	1	0	10/5/2001
Sudan	10/5/2001	1	0	12/12/2000
Sudan	8/22/2001	0	1	10/21/2001 12/12/2000
Sudan	12/14/1999	1	0	7/29/1999
Sudan	7/28/1999	1	0	7/28/1999
Sudan	8/21/1998	1	0	1/31/1996
Sudan	1/31/1996	1	0	1/30/1995
Swaziland	1/31/1997	0	1	2/28/1997
Syria	11/12/2014	1	0	5/5/2014
Syria	5/5/2014	1	0	10/7/2013
Syria	10/7/2013	1	0	3/1/2013
Syria	3/1/2013	1	0	8/28/2012
Syria	8/28/2012	1	0	8/1/2012
Syria	7/27/2012	1	0	3/6/2012
Syria	3/6/2012	1	0	3/6/2012
Syria	1/11/2012	1	0	12/21/2011

Syria	12/21/2011	1	0		9/30/2011
Syria	9/30/2011	1	0		9/30/2011
Syria	9/15/2011	1	0		8/5/2011
Syria	8/5/2011	1	0		4/25/2011
Syria	4/25/2011	1	0		4/4/2011
Syria	3/24/2011	0	1	6/24/2011	
Syria	2/12/2009	1	0		4/15/2008
Syria	9/14/2006	1	0		
Syria	3/16/2003	1	0		2/7/2003
Tajikistan	1/14/2005	0	1	8/12/2005	7/19/2004
Tajikistan	7/19/2004	0	1	1/18/2005	1/20/2004
Tajikistan	1/20/2004	0	1	7/19/2004	12/20/2002
Tajikistan	12/20/2002	1	0		9/25/2001
Tajikistan	12/2/2002	1	0		
Tajikistan	9/26/2001	1	0		6/29/2001
Tajikistan	6/29/2001	1	0		5/29/2001
Tajikistan	9/25/1998	1	0		3/13/1998
Tajikistan	3/13/1998	1	0		2/25/1998
Tajikistan	11/25/1997	1	0		10/21/1997
Tajikistan	2/21/1997	1	0		2/13/1997
Tanzania	10/15/2009	0	1	2/15/2010	8/28/2009
Tanzania	8/28/2009	0	1	12/20/2009	
Tanzania	10/5/2005	0	1	11/30/2005	
Tanzania	1/10/2003	0	1		5/12/2003
Tanzania	1/18/2001	0	1	4/18/2001	
Tanzania	2/18/1998	0	1	2/18/1998	
Thailand	6/20/2014	0	1	8/21/2014	5/28/2014
Thailand	5/28/2014	0	1	8/21/2014	5/23/2014
Thailand	2/14/2014	0	1	5/19/2014	1/19/2014
Thailand	11/16/2011	0	1	2/14/2012	10/27/2011
Thailand	10/27/2011	0	1	1/26/2012	
Thailand	5/27/2010	1	0		5/15/2010
Thailand	4/22/2010	0	1	7/22/2010	4/12/2010
Thailand	9/20/2006	0	1	12/19/2006	
Thailand	1/12/2005	0	1	2/6/2005	
Thailand	12/26/2004	0	1	1/25/2005	
Thailand	4/8/2004	0	1	7/6/2004	
Thailand	2/15/2001	0	1	4/15/2001	
Timor-Leste	11/1/2006	1	0		7/18/2006
Timor-Leste	7/18/2006	1	0		5/30/2006
Timor-Leste	5/30/2006	1	0		5/24/2006
Timor-Leste	9/12/2003	0	1		
Timor-Leste	5/14/2003	0	1		

Timor-Leste	12/9/2002	0	1	6/23/2003	10/23/2002
Timor-Leste	10/23/2002	0	1	4/17/2003	6/28/2002
Timor-Leste	6/28/2002	0	1	12/6/2002	3/29/2002
Timor-Leste	3/29/2002	0	1	6/30/2002	3/31/2002
Timor-Leste	10/22/2001	0	1	3/31/2002	8/8/2001
Timor-Leste	8/8/2001	0	1	12/5/2001	8/11/2001
Timor-Leste	3/7/2001	0	1	7/11/2001	11/3/2000
Togo	4/26/2005	1	0		4/22/2005
Togo	4/10/1998	0	1	7/10/1998	
Tonga	11/17/2006	0	1	3/17/2007	
Tunisia	10/4/2013	1	0		3/13/2013
Tunisia	3/13/2013	1	0		10/19/2012
Tunisia	10/19/2012	1	0		9/15/2012
Tunisia	9/15/2012	1	0		
Tunisia	4/17/2012	1	0	6/30/2012	1/13/2012
Tunisia	1/13/2012	1	0	4/12/2012	10/5/2011
Tunisia	7/8/2011	0	1	10/8/2011	4/11/2011
Tunisia	4/11/2011	0	1	7/9/2011	3/10/2011
Tunisia	3/10/2011	0	1	4/9/2011	2/18/2011
Tunisia	2/18/2011	0	1	3/10/2011	2/9/2011
Tunisia	1/28/2011	0	1	2/28/2011	1/16/2011
Tunisia	4/11/2010	0	1		
Tunisia	4/19/2005	0	1	7/19/2005	
Turkey	9/6/2013	1	0		
Turkey	6/4/2013	0	1	7/5/2013	
Turkey	3/19/2010	0	1	4/30/2010	3/19/2010
Turkey	8/29/2006	0	1	11/1/2006	
Turkey	4/17/2006	0	1	5/16/2006	3/31/2006
Turkey	5/27/2004	0	1	7/6/2004	
Turkey	11/20/2003	1	0		
Turkey	3/19/2003	1	0		3/17/2003
Turkmenistan	12/23/2002	0	1	3/28/2003	
Turkmenistan	9/12/2002	0	1	12/13/2002	3/15/2002
Turkmenistan	3/15/2002	0	1	9/14/2002	11/19/2001
Turkmenistan	11/16/2001	0	1	3/14/2002	11/7/2001
Turkmenistan	9/19/2001	1	0		
Turks and Caicos	8/23/2011	1	0		
Turks and Caicos	9/17/2004	1	0	10/7/2004	9/1/2004
Uganda	1/24/2011	0	1	4/18/2011	
Uganda	7/16/2010	0	1	8/15/2010	
Uganda	9/11/2009	0	1	11/10/2009	

Uganda	3/3/2006	0	1	5/16/2006	11/14/2005
Uganda	11/14/2005	0	1	2/10/2006	
Uganda	9/7/2001	0	1	12/6/2001	6/1/2001
Uganda	6/1/2001	0	1	9/4/2001	3/27/2001
Uganda	3/27/2001	0	1	6/27/2001	
Uganda	3/9/2001	0	1	4/10/2001	
Uganda	4/10/1998	0	1	7/9/1998	
Ukraine	8/29/2014	1	0		8/1/2014
Ukraine	6/5/2014	1	0		5/8/2014
Ukraine	5/8/2014	1	0		4/16/2014
Ukraine	4/16/2014	1	0		3/21/2014
Ukraine	3/21/2014	1	0		3/7/2014
United Arab Emirates	3/10/2003	1	0		
United Kingdom	6/28/2001	0	1	8/30/2001	
United Kingdom	4/27/2001	0	1	6/30/2001	3/15/2001
United Kingdom	3/15/2001	0	1	5/30/2001	3/7/2001
United Kingdom	3/7/2001	0	1	5/30/2001	
United Kingdom	1/31/2011	0	1	4/30/2011	
United Kingdom	8/3/2005	0	1	11/3/2005	
Uzbekistan	4/25/2011	1	0		7/22/2010
Uzbekistan	7/22/2010	1	0		7/16/2009
Uzbekistan	6/16/2009	1	0		7/3/2008
Uzbekistan	10/4/2006	1	0		4/7/2006
Uzbekistan	4/7/2006	1	0		7/1/2005
Uzbekistan	11/4/2005	0	1	5/4/2005	8/24/2004
Uzbekistan	7/1/2005	1	0		6/2/2005
Uzbekistan	6/2/2005	1	0		5/27/2005
Uzbekistan	11/4/2004	0	1	5/4/2005	8/24/2004
Uzbekistan	8/24/2004	0	1	2/23/2005	8/3/2004
Uzbekistan	3/30/2004	0	1	9/29/2004	12/17/2003
Uzbekistan	12/17/2003	0	1	6/17/2004	9/29/2003
Uzbekistan	4/5/2003	0	1	10/1/2003	7/23/2002
Uzbekistan	10/31/2002	0	1	4/28/2003	7/23/2002
Uzbekistan	7/23/2002	0	1	10/31/2002	1/8/2002
Uzbekistan	1/8/2002	0	1	7/8/2002	9/22/2001
Uzbekistan	9/22/2001	1	0	1/8/2002	
Venezuela	12/11/2014	1	0		6/4/2014

Venezuela	6/4/2014	1	0		11/22/2013
Venezuela	11/22/2013	1	0		
Venezuela	5/25/2006	0	1	12/5/2006	1/11/2006
Venezuela	1/11/2006	0	1	6/5/2006	
Venezuela	2/11/2005	0	1	3/10/2005	
Venezuela	8/11/2004	0	1	11/15/2004	6/4/2004
Venezuela	6/4/2004	0	1	8/24/2004	3/10/2004
Venezuela	2/27/2004	0	1	5/25/2004	2/11/2004
Venezuela	8/15/2003	0	1	2/28/2004	
Venezuela	2/19/2003	1	0		12/10/2002
Venezuela	12/20/2002	1	0		12/10/2002
Venezuela	6/10/2002	0	1	10/10/2002	5/16/2002
Venezuela	12/3/2001	0	1	1/10/2002	
Vietnam	4/24/2003	1	0		3/22/2003
Vietnam	3/22/2003	1	0		3/21/2003
Vietnam	2/12/2001	0	1	4/8/2001	
Yemen	9/25/2014	1	0		7/21/2014
Yemen	1/29/2014	1	0		8/6/2013
Yemen	8/6/2013	1	0		7/16/2013
Yemen	11/19/2012	1	0		3/27/2012
Yemen	3/27/2012	1	0		9/2/2011
Yemen	9/2/2011	1	0		5/25/2011
Yemen	5/25/2011	1	0		3/6/2011
Yemen	3/6/2011	1	0		10/15/2010
Yemen	10/15/2010	1	0		2/25/2010
Yemen	2/25/2010	1	0		6/26/2009
Yemen	6/26/2009	1	0		4/24/2009
Yemen	4/24/2009	1	0		3/24/2009
Yemen	10/13/2006	1	0		4/13/2006
Yemen	4/13/2006	1	0		10/28/2005
Yemen	10/28/2005	1	0		5/6/2005
Yemen	5/6/2005	1	0		4/8/2005
Yemen	11/16/2004	1	0		5/11/2004
Yemen	5/11/2004	1	0		8/20/2003
Yemen	8/20/2003	1	0		5/23/2003
Yemen	5/23/2003	1	0		3/28/2003
Yemen	3/28/2003	1	0		11/30/2002
Yemen	3/18/2002	1	0		3/18/2002
Yemen	12/3/2001	1	0		9/19/2001
Yemen	9/19/2001	1	0		8/7/2001
Yemen	8/7/2001	1	0		6/9/2001
Yemen	1/28/1999	1	0		12/30/1998
Zambia	8/11/2011	0	1	10/15/2011	

Zambia	11/1/1996	0	1	11/30/1996	
Zimbabwe	11/14/2005	1	0		3/16/2005
Zimbabwe	3/16/2005	1	0		7/2/2004
Zimbabwe	7/2/2004	1	0		1/22/2004
Zimbabwe	1/22/2004	1	0		1/27/2003
Zimbabwe	1/27/2003	1	0		
Zimbabwe	1/23/2002	0	1	3/31/2002	
Zimbabwe	4/30/2001	0	1	7/31/2001	

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Warwick, D.P. (1975). *A Theory of Public Bureaucracy: Politics, Personality, and Organization in the State Department*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Yin, R.K. (2014). *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*. Los Angeles, CA: SAGE Publications.

Curriculum Vitae

Ryan Larsen

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Education

- December 2016 (anticipated graduation): Ph.D. in Public Affairs, University of Nevada, Las Vegas
- May 2006: Master of Public Administration, University of Nevada, Las Vegas
- May 2001: Bachelor of Arts, International Affairs and Spanish Language and Literature, University of Nevada, Reno
- 1998-1999: Academic year abroad, Universidad Nacional de Costa Rica

Professional Experience

Associate Director, February 2015 – present

Assistant Director for Education Abroad, July 2008 – February 2015

Office of International Programs, University of Nevada, Las Vegas

- Manage study abroad advising
- Study and research abroad visa specialist
- Design and teach pre-departure orientation curriculum for traditional study abroad and faculty led programs
- Advise and coach for nationally competitive scholarships (Fulbright, Boren, Gilman, etc.)
- Faculty-led program administration and advising for faculty and students
- Campus marketing and recruitment for study abroad
- Website content social networking management
- Develop and maintain collaborative relationship with Academic Advising units across campus to assure curriculum integration for study abroad
- Develop and maintain collaborative relationship with UNLV Admissions and Recruitment to use UNLV's study abroad programs as a recruitment tool for prospective students to UNLV
- Event programming (International Education Week, guest lectures, re-entry programming, passport fair, President's Reception for International Community, UNLV recruitment events, etc.)
- Peace Corps liaison
- Act for director in her absence

Coordinator, Program for International Education and Training

July 2003 – June 2008

Office of International Programs, University of Nevada, Las Vegas

- Create, market, and teach programs in cross-cultural communication, cultural awareness, culture/reverse culture shock, and cultural sensitivity/diversity for public and private organizations in Las Vegas/Southern Nevada
- Study abroad advising
- International visa acquisition advising
- Design and lead pre-departure study abroad orientation curriculum
- Event programming (including International Education Week, guest lectures, Passport Day, & returned student programs)
- Advise/coach for nationally competitive scholarships (Boren, Gilman, Freeman, etc.)
- Peace Corps liaison
- National Student Exchange (NSE) advising

Resident Program Coordinator

May 2002 – May 2003

University Studies Abroad Consortium, University of Alicante, Spain

- Assistant to Resident Program Director at study abroad site for university-level students at the University of Alicante in Spain
- Student support liaison
- Coordinate cultural excursions
- Interpret for student medical visits
- Create and manage an organized office
- Work with University of Alicante's support staff to arrange student housing, process course registration, complete in-country visa process, and prepare for students' arrival

Assistant to Director and Office Manager

May 2001 – May 2002

University Studies Abroad Consortium, University of Nevada, Reno

- Coordinate cooperative agreement and contract processes between the Consortium and international member universities, working closely with international consulates in the U.S. to facilitate work visa and student visa processing for international visitors and to certify legal procedures
- Serve as liaison and host to visiting international dignitaries, university officials, and faculty
- Coordinate administrative reorganization of Consortium policies, procedures, and records
- Human Resources: process hiring contracts, personnel paperwork, serve as leave keeper for 30+ employees, etc.

- Draft correspondence for director

Translator/Interpreter

Fall 2000 – spring 2001

Northern Nevada International Center, University of Nevada, Reno

- Translated documents and interpreted between English and Spanish

Research Interests

- International education policy and practice, public policy, student immigration, public diplomacy and soft power, foreign policy, and qualitative methods.

Awards

- Fulbright Scholarship: International Education Administrator Program Award to Japan (short term), June 2015
- Outstanding Service to International Education Award, NAFSA: Region XII, 2014

Conference Participation

Conference Sessions Presented

- Study Abroad and Its Importance to Your Institution, NAFSA Region XII Conference, 2015, Chair and Presenter
- Federal Resources for Health and Safety in Study Abroad, NAFSA Biregional Region I and XII Conference, 2014, Chair and Presenter
- Strategies for Difficult Student Meetings for Education Abroad and International Student Advisors, NAFSA National Annual Conference, 2014, Chair and Presenter
- International Education as a Foreign Policy Tool, Southwest Social Science Association Annual Conference, 2014, Presented Academic Paper
- Process Management in Study Abroad, NAFSA Region XII Conference, 2013, Presenter
- Difficult Student Meetings, NAFSA Region XII Conference, 2012, Chair and Presenter
- Study Abroad Advising 101: “Do I need a visa if I have a MasterCard?”, NAFSA Regions I and XII Bi-regional Conference, 2011, Chair and Presenter
- Toolbox for Creating a Pre-Departure Orientation, NAFSA Region XII Conference, 2010, Chair and Presenter
- Opportunity Cost of Study Abroad, NAFSA National Annual Conference, 2009, Presenter

Service

Professional Service

NAFSA: Association of International Educators

- Chair, Regional Affairs Committee (RAC), NAFSA, 2015
- Chair Designate, Regional Affairs Committee (RAC), NAFSA, 2014
- Past Chair, Region XII and Member of Regional Affairs Committee (RAC), 2013
- Chair, Region XII, 2012
- Chair-elect, Region XII, 2011
- Treasurer, Region XII, 2008-2010
- Nevada Representative, Region XII, 2006-2007
- Conference Registrar, Region XII, 2006 Conference

University Service

UNLV

- Member, Advisory Committee to Vice President for Diversity, 2012 to 2014
- Member, Non-Traditional Student Scholarship Committee, 2006 to present
- Faculty Advisor, Spectrum, 2008 to 2013
- Trainer, Human Resources Staff Development Workshop: Cross Cultural Competency, 2004 to 2013 (taught each semester)
- Trainer, Human Resources Staff Development Workshop: No Fear Less Gear—How to Travel the World, 2008 to 2013 (taught annually)
- Women's Center Scholarship Committee, 2007-08, 2013
- Chair and member of multiple candidate search committees

Other Presentations

- NAFSA webinar presenter: Interpreting and Responding to Travel Warnings in Education Abroad, February 2016
- Gilman Scholarship: Tips for Advising and Outreach, webinar presenter, University Studies Abroad Consortium (USAC), summer 2015
- Gilman Scholarship: Tips for Advising and Outreach, lead webinar presenter for the Gilman Scholarship Program, Institute of International Education, January 2015

Languages

English: native language; Spanish: fluent