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## The institutional control of NCAA Division One collegiate athletics

Burton Larry Easley  
*University of Nevada, Las Vegas*

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THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTROL OF NCAA  
DIVISION ONE COLLEGIATE ATHLETICS

by

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**A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment  
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
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
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## ABSTRACT

### The Institutional Control of NCAA Division One Collegiate Athletics

by

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Dr. Anthony Saville, Examination Committee Chair  
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The control of collegiate athletics has been a matter of concern since the earliest days of college sports competition. In 1952, the National Collegiate Athletic Association instituted policies that included the ability to impose sanctions on colleges that violated recruiting guidelines, eligibility requirements, and other rules. Its lack of investigative and policing resources, however, left the NCAA with limited ability to enforce these policies. As a result, the organization placed the responsibility for control of institutional athletics on the school itself and its chief executive officer based on the reasoning that many problems involving violations of regulations would be solved without intervention by the NCAA if a school's administration is in control of athletics.

Scandals surrounding intercollegiate athletics and the issuance of a number of citations by the NCAA against Division I institutions for lack of institutional control are raising serious questions about the present status and effectiveness of self-governance and control of collegiate athletics. The purpose of this study was to determine the status

of institutional control of athletics programs at NCAA Division I colleges and universities by identifying the levels and ways in which control was exercised and to determine where problems with control lay. This was done by surveying the athletics directors and chief executive officers of the 275 NCAA Division I colleges and universities.

The results of the survey and the implications of them are presented in this document; also presented are recommendations for changes in policy, procedures, and attitudes in order to improve the degree of institutional control of athletics at NCAA Division I intercollegiate athletic institutions and suggestions for further study of the topic.

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

#### The Problem

On June 12, 1995, the cover of Sports Illustrated carried the headline, "Why the University of Miami Should Drop Football." The accompanying article, "Broken Beyond Repair," by Alexander Wolff, took the form of an open letter to the school's president, Edward Foote II, urging him to eliminate the university's famous football program in order to salvage the school's reputation as a place of higher learning. Wolff cited offenses on the part of individual athletes that included disorderly conduct, shoplifting, drunken driving, burglary, arson, assault, and sexual battery.

An earlier article which had appeared in the Miami Herald of May 18 had reported that, "No fewer than one of every seven scholarship players on last season's team has been arrested. . . ." According to Wolff, abuses were not limited to the athletes. Problems involving employees included fraud with the Pell Grant Program, drug abuse, drunken driving, and reckless driving.

With the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) tagging the University of Miami with the charge of lack of institutional control, Wolff called on the school's president to summon the courage to defy the board of trustees, the alumni, and the



boosters and shut down the football program. As precedent, Wolff cited examples of presidents of other schools such as the University of Chicago, University of San Francisco, and Tulane University who had already dropped major athletics programs.

The issue of control of collegiate athletics is not a new one. It has been an ongoing, persistent concern of college and university presidents at NCAA member institutions since the earliest days of college sports competition (ACE Report, 1952; Cohen & March, 1974; Frey, 1982; Guttman, 1988; Hanford, 1976; Hardy & Berryman, 1982; Hart-Nibbrig, 1989; Knight Commission, 1991; Rooney, 1980; Sack, 1982; Savage, 1929; Smith, 1988; Thelin, 1989, 1994). From the time when Yale and Harvard first competed in the sport of rowing in 1864, university presidents have struggled with the issue of the control of athletics (Guttman, 1978).

Criticism has also been ever present: it has pervaded college and university sports since before the turn of the century and continues today (Andre & James, 1991; Farrell, 1989; Fleisher, 1992; Guttman, 1982; Hardy & Berryman, 1982; Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1989; Lawrence, 1987; Lucas & Smith, 1978; Wheeler, 1996).

Administrators from around the country continue to question the relationship between athletics and academics: some believe that the abuses created by the entertainment value of a successful athletics program have turned academic institutions into nothing less than professional amusement centers (Frey, 1982; Funk, 1991; Lucas & Smith, 1978; Mallett & Howard, 1992; Nelson, 1982; Smith, 1988; Thelin, 1989, 1994). Despite the problems, however, many still feel that the benefits of intercollegiate athletics programs outweigh the drawbacks as long as cheating, gambling, and recruitment irregularities do

not sacrifice the integrity of the university (Andre & James, 1991; Guttman, 1988; Lucas & Smith, 1978; Simon, 1985, 1991; Thelin, 1989).

In the early 1950's, the American Council on Education (ACE), a large association of colleges and universities, considered the possibility of de-emphasizing athletics. The discussion was generated by the numerous scandals that tainted many of the athletic programs at that time (Farrell, 1989; Robert & Olson, 1989; Stern, 1979; Thelin, 1994). Consequently, in 1952, the NCAA, as the rule-making body of intercollegiate sport, instituted policies that included the ability to impose sanctions upon colleges that violated recruiting guidelines, eligibility requirements, and other rules.

Unfortunately, NCAA attempts at controlling intercollegiate athletics have had results that are mixed, at best. The primary reason for this is that the resources designated for enforcement have been minimal. Without an adequate number of personnel to investigate possible infractions, the probability of deterring over 900 NCAA members from violating NCAA rules has been limited (Chu, 1982).

### Significance of the Study

Because of its lack of investigative and policing resources, the NCAA established a set of principles of governance that placed the responsibility for control on the institution and its chief operating officer. The organization's reasoning was that many of the problems involving violations of regulations would be solved without intervention by the NCAA if a school's administration is in control of athletics (D. Taitt, NCAA Enforcement Office, personal communication, 1995). Many from outside of the NCAA have also called for stronger control over intercollegiate athletic (Andre & James, 1991;

Mallett & Howard, 1992; Thelin, 1989; Sack, 1989). The principles of institutional control as prepared by the NCAA Committee on Infractions (1996) are:

1. The NCAA rules applicable to each operation are readily available to those persons involved in that operation.
2. Appropriate forms are provided to persons involved in specific operations to ensure that they will properly follow NCAA rules.
3. A procedure is established for timely communication among various university offices regarding determinations that affect compliance with NCAA rules.
4. Meaningful compliance education programs are provided for personnel engaged in athletics-related operations.
5. Informational and educational programs are established to inform athletics boosters of the limitations on their activities under NCAA rules and of penalties that can arise against the institutions if the boosters are responsible for rule violations.
6. Informational and educational programs are established for student-athletes regarding the rules that they must follow.
7. An internal monitoring system is in place to ensure compliance with NCAA rules.
8. An external audit of athletics compliance is undertaken at reasonable intervals.
9. The chief executive officer and other senior administrators make clear that they demand compliance with NCAA rules and that they will not

tolerate those who deliberately violate the rules or do so through gross negligence

- 10 The institution and its staff members have a long history of self-detecting, self-reporting, and self-investigating of all potential violations.

The NCAA Enforcement Office started keeping records of violations of the NCAA Rule Book on October 16, 1952. It has recorded 96 cases which have included citations against schools for lack of institutional control. Fifty-five of these have involved Division I institutions and have taken place just since 1980 (NCAA Enforcement Summary, 1995).

Scandals involving athletics have taken place at a number of colleges. These have involved such infractions as altered transcripts, shadow courses requiring no attendance by athletes, slush funds for athletics personnel, secret contracts, and the use of professionals posing as amateurs (Hardy & Berryman, 1982). These cases have raised serious questions about the present status and effectiveness of self-governance and institutional control of collegiate athletics.

#### Statement of Purpose

The purpose of this investigation was to determine the current status of institutional control of athletics programs at NCAA Division I colleges and universities by identifying the levels and the ways in which control was exercised and to determine where problems with control lie. This was done through the use of a survey designed to collect information pertaining to the individual elements and conditions that have been determined to impact on self-governance.

### Conceptual Framework

The NCAA is unable to police athletics by itself because of the limited resources of its enforcement office; therefore, it must rely on each institution to police itself. Accordingly, the NCAA Manual (1996-97) specifically states that it is the responsibility of each member institution to control its intercollegiate athletics program in compliance with the rules and regulations of the association.

The ultimate responsibility for institutional control is placed by the NCAA on the school's chief executive officer. This is reasonable since a primary function of any CEO is that of control (Mintzberg, 1975); the objective of that control is to assure proper performance in accordance with established plans (Flippo & Munsinger, 1978). Thus, the NCAA Manual (1996-97) states that it is a school's chief executive officer who is responsible for the administration of all aspects of the athletics program, including approval of the budget and audit of all expenditures.

The concept of institutional control is of primary importance to the NCAA's ability to regulate college sports due to its inability to police athletics itself. According to Dirk Taitt in the NCAA Enforcement Office, many of the violations of NCAA rules have come from schools that have not been in control of their athletics program. If a school's administration controls athletics, rather than the athletics department controlling the institution, Taitt says, many of the problems will be solved without intervention by the NCAA (personal communication, 1995).

### Elements to be Investigated

The institutional control of athletics is complicated by the often conflicting goals

and philosophies of students, coaches, faculty, administrators, alumni, and the general public (Frey, 1982; Fisher, 1984). Although the ultimate responsibility lies with a single person, the CEO, control is inevitably impacted by other issues and by other parties and entities both within and outside of the university. Primary among these are the institution's governing board, its athletics director, its alumni and athletics boosters, and even the financial and operational policies of the school. With that in mind, the following questions served as a basis for the collection and analysis of data:

1. To what degree and with what strategies was control exercised by the chief executive officer of the institution?
2. In what ways and to what extent was institutional control facilitated or inhibited by the governing board of the institution?
3. In what ways did financial and operational policies of the institution influence and affect control of athletics?
4. In what ways were athletics directors involved in the institution's control of athletics?
5. In what ways were the school's boosters and alumni affecting the institution's control of athletics?

### Methodology

A questionnaire was developed which was comprised of eight sections: the first section requested demographic data while the remaining sections sought in-depth descriptions of institutional control of individual athletics programs. The combination of yes-and-no questions, Likert-scale questions, and open-ended questions relating to

institutional control served as a basis for qualitative measures to analyze the existence of institutional control of athletics programs. The population selected to receive the survey instrument consisted of the chief executive officer and the athletics director at NCAA Division I institutions.

### Delimitations of the Study

This study was limited to the chief executive officer and the athletics director of each of the 275 NCAA Division I colleges and universities listed in the 1996-97 National Directory of College Athletics. Not included in the study were those institutions in NCAA Divisions II and III, junior colleges, and NAIA institutions which set different standards. Faculty Athletics Representatives were not included in the survey. No attempt was made to ensure that the controls claimed by the chief executive officers and the athletics directors actually existed.

### Definition of Terms

Athletics Advisory Board: A board which has either controlling or advisory status of intercollegiate athletics at each member institution. This type of board with its responsibility for advising or establishing athletics policies and making policy decisions is not required by the NCAA.

Athletics Certification-External Peer Review: A program of which the central purpose is to validate the fundamental integrity of the athletics programs of each member institution through a verified and evaluated institutional self-study. The certification program is carefully designed with peer reviewers who are external to the institution under examination and who verify that the self-study process is characterized by

campus-wide participation and that the self-study report reflects accurately the operation of the athletics program.

Authority: The capacity to evoke compliance in others on the basis of formal position and of any psychological inducements, rewards, or sanctions that may accompany formal power (Presthus, 1962, p. 123)

Chief Executive Officer (CEO): The administrator designated to be responsible for all that transpires within the institution. A member institution's chief executive officer has ultimate responsibility and final authority for the conduct of the intercollegiate athletics program and the actions of any board in control of that program.

Faculty Athletics Representative: An individual designated by the institution who must be a member of the institution's faculty or an administrator who holds faculty rank but who does not hold an administrative or coaching position in the athletics department. Duties of the faculty athletics representative are determined by the institution.

Governance: Schenkel (1971) defines governance as the process of decision making, the designation of participants in this process, the structure that relates these individuals to one another, the effort that is or should be made to ensure that decisions are carried out, and the assessment of the results that are achieved as a consequence of those decisions. Corson (1975) adds that governance describes the process of deciding and of seeing to it that the decisions are executed. Fryer and Lovas (1990) state that governance comprises the institution's structures and processes for decision making and the communication related to those structures and processes. The definition of The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching (1982) includes not only the formal



arrangements by which colleges and universities carry on their work, but also the informal procedures by which standards are maintained. They also include in their definition those forces beyond the campus that shape the policies of higher education and to which the academy must ultimately respond.

Governing Board: The entity whose function is to act as the guardian of the charter of an institution and to act as the body in which ultimate authority over the institution is vested (Schenkel, 1971).

Institutional Control: The control and responsibility for the conduct of intercollegiate athletics that is exercised by the institution itself and by the conference, if any, of which it is a member; it is constituted of administrative control or faculty control or a combination of the two (NCAA Manual, 1994-95).

National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA): A private, non-profit association organized in 1905, consisting of approximately 903 active member institutions. Membership is open to four-year institutions which meet specified academic standards. The NCAA operates under a constitution and by-laws adopted by the membership and subject to amendment by the membership at annual conventions. Headquartered in Shawnee Mission, Kansas, it employs a professional staff of about 80 who execute NCAA policy under the supervision of an executive director (Greene, 1984).

NCAA Division I-A: One of three divisions into which NCAA institutions are grouped depending on stadium size, number of sports offered, average attendance, scholarships available, and other specifications. Division I-A includes about 275 larger institutions.

Power. McGrath (1971), in Power and Authority, stated that power refers to the ability of various individuals and groups in the academic community to control the policy-making processes through specifically vested or delegated authority or through influence acquired by mere force of circumstance (p. 187). Fisher (1984) concluded that power is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests" (p. 28). Bierstadt (1966) said that power is the ability to employ force while Kanter (1996) said simply that power is the ability to get things done (1996, p. 20).

### Summary

Relevant literature is reviewed in the next chapter; the third chapter contains information about the methodology used for this study including questionnaire development and methods of data analysis. Survey results are reported in the fourth chapter, and conclusions and recommendations for future research are formulated in the last chapter.

## CHAPTER 2

### HISTORICAL VIEW OF GOVERNANCE & INSTITUTIONAL CONTROL OF COLLEGE ATHLETICS IN THE UNITED STATES

#### Early History

Collegiate athletics appeared in the early nineteenth century as unorganized student activities which were not considered to be a meaningful part of campus life (Hardy & Berryman, 1982; Lewis, 1970a; Lucas & Smith, 1978). These extracurricular activities were born out of the students' need for something to relieve the monotony and dullness of their schoolwork (Chapman 1978; Cutting, 1871; Smith, 1988). Nothing existed in the way of structured control by students, and, although some rough and vigorous activities drew the attention of college authorities, the games were not subject to university leadership (Chu, 1982; Fleisher, 1992; Forum, 1894; Hardy & Berryman, 1982). In addition, no rules or regulations had been created for the games (Falla, 1981; Nelson, 1982). As a result, it was quite common for a football player, for instance, to compete in two or three different games representing different collegiate teams during a single weekend (Falla, 1981; Farrell, 1989; Fleisher, 1992; Lucas & Smith, 1978; Rooney, 1980; Slaughter, 1989).

### Student-Controlled Sports

By the late nineteenth century, sports had become more accepted as an intramural activity connected to the university (Kett, 1977). Student-run organizations and the students themselves took responsibility for the governance of these early college sports (Andre & James, 1991; Baker, 1982; Byers, 1995; Fleisher, 1992; Goff, 1988; Guttman, 1982, 1991; Hardy & Berryman, 1982; Lawrence, 1987; Nelson, 1982; Sage, 1990; Slaughter, 1989). The missions of the student organizations which controlled sports were to sponsor and conduct championship competitions, to establish playing rules, and to determine eligibility criteria (Hardy & Berryman). Student athletic associations also provided financial assistance and moral support for college athletes (Smith, 1988).

Because these student governing bodies were usually sport-specific, regulations differed from sport to sport (Nelson, 1982; Smith, 1988). Also, since these organizations were operated by volunteers, the inherent turnover made them short-lived (Hardy & Berryman, 1982; Nelson). The lack of uniform rules and the inconsistency of leadership due to turnover resulted in a call for more controlled adult supervision by university leadership (Chu, 1982; Nelson).

Eventually the athletic associations encompassed all sports in the school (Smith, 1988). Harvard's athletic association was organized in 1874 and was followed by ones at Princeton, Rutgers, and Michigan in 1876. As the movement spread southward and westward, associations were established at Missouri in 1886, at Duke in 1887, at Stanford in 1891, and at Oregon in 1893 (Smith).

The first intercollegiate contest was a crew race between Harvard and Yale, taking place at Lake Winnepesaukee in New Hampshire, on August 3, 1852 (Andre &

James, 1991; Guttman, 1988; Hardy & Berryman, 1982; Hart-Nibbrig, 1989; Lawrence, 1987; Lewis, 1967; Lucas & Smith, 1978; Noverr, 1983; Rooney, 1980; Sage, 1990; Smith, 1988; Whiton, 1852). The Yale faculty banned contests for the next two years (Lucas & Smith). By the second boat race in 1855, the need for some form of control and governance became an issue for the first time (Lewis, 1967; Lucas & Smith, 1978; Sage, 1990; Savage, 1929; Smith, 1988; Stern, 1979). Yale believed that because the Harvard coxswain had graduated, he should not be eligible to compete in the race. However, because the contest was organized completely by students and had no formulated rules nor eligibility standards, Yale had no one appeal to (Hardy & Berryman, 1982; Lucas & Smith, 1978; Savage, 1929; Stern, 1979).

Because each college had its own rules governing athletics, the first intercollegiate event pointed out, according to Hardy and Berryman (1982), that the reasons for governance are the needs for rules of play, eligibility of players, and recognition of a champion. Beginning with the collegiate event between Harvard and Yale, conflicts arose when the regulations of one college gave it an athletic advantage over another (Smith, 1988).

It was from this impetus that the first intercollegiate governing body emerged at a meeting in New Haven, and the College Union Regatta of Brown, Harvard, Trinity, Columbia, Dartmouth and Yale was formed in 1858 (Guttman, 1988; Hardy & Berryman, 1982; Lucas & Smith, 1978). From this meeting a set of rules governing future races between the institutions was agreed upon (Hardy & Berryman, 1982; Sage, 1990).

Early athletics were often carried out over the objections of faculty who saw sport

as distracting from the real work of the college ( Davenport, 1985, Thelin, 1989).

Indeed, the game of football in the early twentieth century had evolved into a violent game with injury and even death becoming commonplace ( Falla, 1981; Farrell, 1989; Fleisher, 1992; Slaughter, 1989). The first intercollegiate football game was played on November 6th, 1869, between Princeton and Rutgers at Rutgers field in New Brunswick, New Jersey (Falla, 1981; Farrell, 1989; Funk, 1991; Lawrence, 1987; Noverr, 1983; Rooney, 1980; Sage, 1990; Slaughter, 1989; Thelin, 1989).

The intercollegiate sport of football highlighted the difficulty of student governance. In 1873, representatives of teams from Princeton, Rutgers, Yale and Columbia agreed to play the game of football like soccer (Falla, 1981; Fleisher, 1992; Lucas & Smith, 1978; Smith, 1988). Harvard, which had not attended the meeting in which this agreement was reached, decided to play the game in the rugby style of play and became isolated from the other schools ( Falla, 1981; Fleisher, 1992; Lucas & Smith, 1978). However, after Harvard played a rugby style rules game with McGill University of Montreal, Canada on May 14th, 1874, a group of spectating Princeton students encouraged a meeting between Princeton, Harvard, Yale and Columbia recommending the adoption of this new style

The subsequent meeting on November 23, 1876, at the Maced Hotel in Springfield, Massachusetts, resulted in the formation of the Intercollegiate Football Association (Baker, 1982; Falla, 1981; Fleisher, 1992; Guttman, 1978; Hardy & Berryman, 1982; Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1989; Lawrence, 1987; Never, 1983; Rooney, 1980; Smith, 1988). Yale, however, refused to join the student-run Intercollegiate Football Association. It took three years before Yale was brought into the

organization by the persuasions of its football captain, Walter Camp (Falla, 1981).

The organization succeeded in adopting 61 rules, only two of which concerned safety (Horrow, 1982; Lawrence, 1987). Unfortunately, brutality intensified under the new Intercollegiate Football Association (Smith, 1988). As football became more popular, the violence on the field escalated (Falla, 1981). By 1884, football had become so violent that the football team at Harvard was ordered to disband. Army and Navy discontinued their series the same year due to violence on the field (Falla, 1981; Smith, 1988).

Following the season of 1887, the Intercollegiate Football Association passed a radical rule that nearly assured mass plays and increased charges of brutality (Smith, 1988). The association, under the leadership of Walter Camp of Yale, ruled that tackling below the waist to the knees would be allowed for the first time. The University of Pennsylvania and Wesleyan withdrew from the association because they opposed the new mass play and eligibility rules (Lawrence, 1987). Harvard and Columbia withdrew in 1889 over a dispute involving the eligibility of players (Falla, 1981; Lawrence, 1987; Smith, 1988). In 1894, with only Yale and Princeton remaining in the organization, the Intercollegiate Football Association disbanded (Fleisher, 1992; Lawrence, 1987).

In 1894, the University Athletic Club of New York attempted to fill the void and asked Harvard, Yale, Princeton, and Penn to form a new rules committee (Falla, 1981; Fleisher, 1992; Lawrence, 1982; Stagg, 1946). Walter Camp of Yale was made secretary and the organization instituted safer rules eliminating mass momentum plays (Smith, 1988). However, the new rules committee proved helpless in eliminating interschool squabbling and the brutality in football (Falla, 1981; Fleisher, 1992). After a violent

game between Harvard and Yale. Harvard split from Yale again and joined Penn and Cornell to form their own rules-making body (Lawrence, 1987; Smith, 1988). The eastern schools came under fire at this time from Amos Alonzo Stagg, athletics director of the University of Chicago, for not creating one set of rules (Smith, 1988).

In 1895, sensing that Stagg and other Big Ten schools might create another set of rules governing football, the large schools in the east again formed a rules-making body called the Football Rules Committee (Fleisher, 1992). With the Football Rules Committee, an athletic association became alumni controlled for the first time (Smith, 1988). Unfortunately, to pass a rule or to change an existing rule, all participants had to agree (Fleisher, 1992). Because schools which benefitted from violent tactics on the field could use a veto to overturn any rule that would adversely affect their ability to use these techniques, the Football Rules Committee also failed in quelling the level of violence in college sports (Fleisher, 1992; Smith, 1988).

Intercollegiate sports during the late 1800's was developed almost exclusively by student leadership (Lucas & Smith, 1978; Sage, 1990). Despite the importance of the student athletic associations, it was still the task of the individual sport's captain to solve problems and ensure the continuance of the sports (Lucas & Smith, 1978; Smith, 1988). However, student mismanagement, interschool squabbling, and violence and brutality on the field, in conjunction with a growing popularity of campus sports eventually led to the American college taking its students' athletic activities within its formal control and financial structure (Chu, 1982). Against the backdrop of interschool squabbling and violence in sport, organizational initiatives began to emerge (Fleisher, 1992).



### Faculty and Alumni Control

The record of faculty governance, according to Thelin (1994), has been weak. Traditionally advisory rather than regulatory, separately incorporated athletics associations always precluded faculty oversight. Lawrence (1987) felt that faculty purposefully kept aloof from athletic issues and that this lack of faculty influence partially explains the abuses that marred the early period of intercollegiate football.

At the time athletic departments were forming, college presidents were in tune with materialism and took the approach that athletics advertised the university and directly correlated with increased enrollment (Thelin, 1989). They became active marketing agents for athletics, attending games, speaking to victorious teams, and soliciting funds from alumni and boards of trustees, while the institutions began to provide money for teams, absorb their debts, and grant scholarships. In addition, they often sided against the faculty regarding the issue of the development of athletics (Gilley & Hickey, 1986).

During the late 1800's, faculty and alumni sought increased participation in the governance of athletics as student control declined (Hardy & Berryman, 1982; Slaughter, 1989). Administrators, however, felt that a campus-controlled program would pose fewer administrative problems than would a program operated by off-campus groups including alumni and politically oriented interests (Nelson, 1982; Sage, 1990). Eventually the faculty attempted to take the student-run athletic programs and place them under what they believed to be sounder educational control (Lucas & Smith, 1978). As educators began to accept athletics as an integral part of collegiate life, if not actually a

part of the curriculum, they began to feel that they should exert greater control over its negative aspects

The first faculty athletic committees were formed at Princeton University in 1881 and at Harvard in 1882 with the purpose of holding in check the excesses of athletics and to veto those aspects of sports that were deemed harmful (Hardy & Berryman, 1982; Lucas & Smith, 1978; Sargent, 1910; Smith, 1988). The Harvard committee soon stopped competition against professional teams and also forbade the hiring of professional coaches. The first action of the Princeton committee was to propose a list of regulations emphasizing the time and place of contests. The Princeton faculty, keeping a close watch over its athletic committee, continued to add responsibilities to the committee's regulatory functions (Smith, 1988).

Faculties everywhere by the end of the century had formed athletic committees in an attempt to prevent football and other sports from encroaching upon academic interests. The faculty committees were specifically concerned with abuses related to athletics including: (a) growing professionalism including the practices of hiring coaches and recruiting athletes, (b) increasing size and management of finances, (c) lack of sportsmanship, (d) glorification of athletics over academics, and (e) derivative evils such as drunkenness and gambling (Hardy & Berryman, 1982; Smith, 1988).

According to Smith (1988), friction developed between the faculty committee and the students at Harvard over the control of athletics when the committee dismissed the successful, paid crew coach, William Bancroft, in 1884. The committee pressured the editorial staff of the student newspaper into not publishing negative letters of former crew captains regarding the incident. This discord between faculty and students spilled

over into football as the faculty committee criticized the sport as being brutal and extremely dangerous. The entire faculty at Harvard concurred with the committee when it suggested to the president that football be prohibited. Faculty complained that the number of athletic contests disturbed serious academic work; they objected to the ungentlemanly behavior and the unhealthy moral influences of big city games. They protested against the brutality and the resulting injuries, against the use financial inducements to attend college, and against the waste and extravagance taking place under student management.

As Harvard's students and alumni became increasingly critical of the faculty committee, President Elliot decided to form a new committee that included both students and alumni as well as faculty (Smith, 1988). The new committee recommended a resumption of the sport of football the following year.

Harvard was not the only school to have problems with student-controlled sports. The president of Northwestern wrote that many students "seemed to think that the university was meddling with matters that did not properly come within its jurisdiction" (Smith, 1988, p. 131). Burt Wilder, a professor at Cornell, felt that Cornell should be the first institution to issue a "declaration of independence from the existing athletocracy" (Northwestern University President's Annual Report, 1895-96, p. 5; Smith, 1988, p. 132). Despite this view, with the growth of athletics, it became increasingly difficult for even an entire faculty to attempt to control athletics (Lucas & Smith, 1978).

The alumni, even before they gained an official voice on many of the college athletic committees as they had at Harvard, had acquired some control over a number of athletics programs; they often assisted coaches and the expense of running a program

often required alumni financial help as well (Lucas & Smith, 1978). Their additional involvement of serving on athletic committees would, they claimed, establish continuity and would compensate for the inexperience of the students (Hardy & Berryman, 1982; Lewis, 1965).

In reality, the financial support brought by alumni often translated into alumni governance (Schenkel, 1971; Smith, 1988). At Dartmouth College in 1892, for example, the Board of Trustees placed an unsuccessful athletics department under the control of an alumni athletic committee. Successful teams followed this move and, despite some attempts, the faculty at Dartmouth were unsuccessful in regaining control.

By the 1900's, both students and faculties had seen their powers diminish (Hardy & Berryman, 1982; Sage, 1990; Smith, 1988). The loss of faculty control and the emergence of alumni control was typical, according to Walter Schenkel (1971), of the American university at the turn of the century. This was due in part to faculty lack of interest and also to the emergence of powerful trustees and alumni. As students had lost their freedom to manage athletic contests without interference from faculty and others, individual colleges increasingly lost control of athletics to outside forces. The movement toward inter-institutional control had begun.

### The Brown Conference

When the student-controlled, interschool associations failed to create a uniform standard of rules and to solve the problem of violence in sport, a meeting was planned to discuss these issues. A group made up of faculty, alumni, and undergraduate representatives from seven schools met in Providence, Rhode Island, on February 18.

1898 (Smith, 1988). At the meeting, referred to as the Brown Conference, the group appointed a standing committee made up of faculty members to continue the work begun at the conference. Over the next few months, this committee created a strongly worded report calling for cooperative action to cure the evils of intercollegiate sports. The report included guidelines for intercollegiate athletics that were not accepted immediately, but which were all eventually affirmed, one by one, over the years. These initial guidelines stated that:

- (1) Each institution should form an athletic committee with faculty representation:
- (2) The athletic committee would approve all coaches, trainers, captains, and team managers:
- (3) No athletic competition would take place without athletic committee approval:
- (4) Any student participation in more than one sport would require athletic committee approval:
- (5) The athletic committee would ensure that all athletes were bona fide members of the institution (Smith, 1988, p. 140).

In ensuring that only bona fide members of an institution competed in intercollegiate athletics, the Brown Conference made an early attempt at establishing eligibility guidelines. Qualifications for eligibility required that:

- (a) Only students in good academic standing would be eligible to participate.
- (b) Special or part-time students could not participate until they had attended college for one year.

- (c) Students deficient in studies in one university department could not participate in athletics if they transferred to another department in the same university.
- (d) No student admitted without passing the university entrance examination or by merely convincing governing authorities that he was capable of doing a full year's work would be eligible for athletics.
- (e) Students should be allowed only four years of eligibility.
- (f) Only freshmen would be allowed to participate on freshman teams.
- (g) No freshman could participate on both the freshman and varsity teams  
(Smith 1988, p. 143).

Smith (1988) also reported that besides establishing general guidelines of play and eligibility, the committee set guidelines for practices, contests, and amateur status. For practice, the committee recommended that teams were not to practice during college vacations except for the ten days prior to the opening of the fall term; all contests were to be held on college grounds; and students of the competing colleges were to be given preference in the allotment of seats at contests. In regard to amateur status, the committee proposed that no student could participate in athletics if he had previously played for money, all contests were to be held on college grounds, and no student would be eligible for athletics if he received board free at special dining facilities for athletes or if he owed money for training table meals.

Essentially, the faculty-controlled committee wanted to keep athletics from interfering with the mental and moral training of the students (Smith, 1988). However, this did not sit well either with students or with some faculty members. Students enjoyed

the growing popularity of intercollegiate sports: at the same time, alumni, college towns and communities, and some faculty members liked watching the events.

The Brown Conference, though well intentioned, was derailed by the reluctance of schools, especially Yale, to commit the direction of athletics programs to the influence of an interschool committee dominated by faculty (Smith, 1988; Thelin, 1994). Yale, Harvard, and Princeton resisted reform: the establishment guarded its territory jealously and avoided integration of academics and athletics (Thelin, 1994). Institutional autonomy was the norm among the college athletics establishment.

In spite of the fact that the guidelines which resulted from the Brown Conference were ridiculed at the time and that they were not accepted by the majority of colleges, many of the regulations still exist in intercollegiate sports. For instance, restrictions on practice, definition of and requirement for amateur status, and many of the eligibility standards in some form still continue in modern day collegiate sports.

#### The Growth of Inter-institutional Associations

The expansion of collegiate athletics was so great after 1880 and the rules involving play were so varied that it soon became apparent that inter-institutional controlling agencies were needed for their regulation and supervision (Sage, 1990). As early as 1883, associations of colleges and universities conducting athletics programs were being formed in order to create consistent rules and regulations of governance among them (Guttman, 1978; Hardy & Berryman, 1982). Indeed, according to Thelin (1994), the conference was the crucial collective unit for instilling standards in college sports.

Conferences of colleges were formed to standardize athletic procedures among schools in one geographic area usually with similar enrollments, academic requirements, and financial standings (Sage, 1990). These conferences ordinarily set standards, made rules and regulations concerning athletic eligibility, and drew up playing schedules.

Smith (1988) listed three early attempts at the inter-institutional control of athletics. The first attempt was in 1882, when President Eliot of Harvard invited the faculty of other schools to “prohibit your baseball nine from playing with professionals and secondly to limit the number of matches” (p. 136). The second attempt was when Harvard in 1883 invited faculty representatives from eight colleges — Yale, Harvard, Princeton, Columbia, Penn. Trinity, Wesleyan, and Williams — to meet in New York City to discuss mutual resolutions to the athletic problem.

Four resolutions were passed by this second group; they were: (a) no professional athlete should be employed as a coach of any college team; (b) no college team should play against a non-college team and games should be contested only on the home grounds of one of the colleges; (c) athletes were to be limited to four years of athletic participation; and (d) each college should set up a faculty athletic committee to approve rules and regulations and the colleges which accepted the resolutions would compete only against others who did the same (Smith, 1988, p. 137).

Despite this attempt at controlling college athletics, the members failed to ratify these resolutions. A concern, primarily held by Yale, was still prevalent about taking complete control of student activities (Hardy & Berryman, 1982). Consequently, individual colleges went back to their own rules regarding eligibility, the participation of



professionals, and the hiring of professional coaches ( Sargent, 1910; Smith, 1988; Young, 1886).

The last of the three early attempts at the inter-institutional control of athletics came in 1886 when President McCosh of Princeton proposed that Harvard again attempt to organize the football-playing schools. Harvard said they would organize the meeting only if Yale attended. Because Yale refused to attend, President McCosh's proposal died (Smith, 1988).

By the 1890's, stronger faculty-run inter-athletic associations became more prominent. The Southern Intercollegiate Athletic Conference was founded in 1894 (Hardy & Berryman, 1982; Thelin, 1994). The following year, the Intercollegiate Conference of Faculty Representatives (The Big-Ten) was formed, introducing faculty control of athletics (Hardy & Berryman, 1982; Lawrence, 1987; Slaughter, 1989; Thelin, 1994). Its rules outlawed participation in a collegiate sport by persons who had taken part in any athletic contest in which money prizes were offered.

On February 18, 1898, faculty, alumni, and student representatives of the present-day Ivy League schools, except for Yale, met in a joint attempt to solve athletic-related issues (Hardy & Berryman, 1982). Over the next few years, associations that eventually formed the Big Ten, Ivy League, Northwest Conference, Big Eight, Rocky Mountain Faculty Athletic Conference, and PAC Ten were established by the faculties of the existing schools (Fisher, 1916; Hardy & Berryman, 1982; Needham, 1905; Powell, 1964; Savage, 1929; Stagg, 1946; Thelin, 1994). These associations or conferences differed from the student groups in that they controlled a number of sports within a

school: they also established guidelines that were ratified by all participants for the first time.

These organizations are judged to be a significant development in the evolution of athletic governance due to their insistence on faculty control and their acceptance of eligibility in terms of educational standards (Hardy & Berryman, 1982; Lawrence, 1987; Powell, 1964; Stagg, 1946; Thelin, 1994). Nevertheless, as Guttman (1978) pointed out, the new conferences and associations were not able to solve the problems of governance. The central reason was that they had no way of making educational goals supersede the goals of victory and prestige for all institutions. Violations of rules and regulations continued.

Between 1890 and 1905, different intercollegiate organizations created a variety of rules committees, causing a great deal of confusion among teams that often had to learn two or more sets of rules to play the game of football (Lawrence, 1987). Nevertheless, according to Thelin (1994), these organizations were the crucial collective unit for instilling standards in college sports: these standards included adopting restrictions on athletic scholarships, standardizing schedules to limit the numbers of games and practices, agreeing on recruiting practices, including faculty representatives in conference discussion and governance, regulating player eligibility, and professionalizing athletic administration. Despite these efforts, the new conferences and associations were not able to solve the problems of governance. However, by the turn of the century, both detractors and supporters of intercollegiate sports had adopted the posture that proper governance and regulation were necessary "to improve, reform, or

salvage the athletic pastimes which, like a weed, could neither be left alone nor completely be eradicated" (Hardy & Berryman, 1982, p. 16).

#### The NCAA (National Collegiate Athletic Association)

The lack of adherence to existing rules and governance nearly caused the death of intercollegiate sports. After a tough and brutal football game with Yale in 1905, Harvard dropped the sport of football because it had evolved into a ruthless contest where players were being crippled or even killed (Guttman, 1978, 1982; Hart-Nibbrig, 1989; Lawrence, 1987). U.S. President Teddy Roosevelt personally intervened to save the game by calling a number of college presidents to the White House on October 9, 1905, and pleading with them not to drop football.

Responding to the urging of President Roosevelt, a number of colleges representing intercollegiate football met in Philadelphia to discuss the issue of keeping or reforming the game, but nothing happened. There was strong resistance to giving up individual institutional autonomy over college sports in favor of greater control and the collective good (Fleisher, 1992; Smith, 1988). Following the inaction which resulted from this attempt to reform football, Henry M. McCracken, chancellor of New York University, called a special meeting of the football-playing colleges in the nation (Falla, 1981; Fleisher, 1992; Guttman, 1988; Lapchick, 1989; Lawrence, 1987; Lucas & Smith, 1978; Never, 1983; Smith, 1988). The delegates of thirteen eastern colleges attended the meeting in New York City on December 9, 1905 at the Murray Hill Hotel. The group eventually decided to reform rather than to eliminate the sport. The group also established the organization that ultimately became the present-day governing body of

intercollegiate sports, the National Collegiate Athletic Association — the NCAA (Denlinger & Shapiro, 1975; Falla, 1981; Never, 1983; Sage, 1986; Slaughter, 1989; Tow, 1982). Eventually, the NCAA, under the direction of Captain Palmer Pierce of West Point, succeeded in combining its rules-making body with the old committee dominated by Walter Camp of Yale (Falla, 1981; Smith, 1988).

The initial constitution of the NCAA stated its chief objective to be “the regulation and supervision of college athletics throughout the United States, in order that the athletic activities in the colleges and universities may be maintained on an ethical plane in keeping with the dignity and high purposes of education” (IAAUS Proceedings, 1906, p. 29). Despite its idealistic purpose, the NCAA was not successful at first in attracting the most prestigious institutions to athletic competitions. Harvard, Yale, Princeton, and a number of other major institutions refused to join the association, according to Smith (1988) and Thelin (1994). These major institutions were hesitant to see another group usurp the power which they had traditionally held. In addition, the concept of the basic autonomy of each institution was still very strong in American higher education.

Thelin (1994) stated that the reform impulse was slow and weak because the young NCAA was a “ruling body lacking power and prestige” (p. 21). According to Smith (1988), the real importance of the NCAA in its beginning was not that it solved problems — except for creating a uniform set of playing rules for various sports — but that it created a forum for discussing them (p. 208).

Originally designed to control the violence of football, the NCAA eventually expanded its role to governance of all elements of intercollegiate sports, from the

standardization of rules of play and eligibility of its athletes to the functions of enforcement and punishment. According to Stern (1979), there were a number of reasons that the NCAA grew from a loose confederation into the primary governing organization for intercollegiate sport. The growing number of institutions committed to intercollegiate sports developed the need for standardizing rules, communication, and coordination. Also, the NCAA-staged championship competitions became more important to schools with big-time athletics programs. Later, the rise of sports on television enabled the NCAA to become a strong bargaining force for individual schools. Finally, the NCAA gained recognition and legitimacy as the official spokesperson for college athletics. In spite of its expanding role, however, the NCAA's ability to enforce its rules was still very often unsuccessful as a result of the unwillingness or inability of presidents and faculty to control alumni and fans who were in search of winning teams (Slaughter, 1989).

#### The Carnegie Foundation

In 1929, the NCAA solicited the Carnegie Foundation for assistance in an attempt to provide an independent evaluation of the status of intercollegiate athletics. For thirteen years, the foundation investigated schools and programs (Andre & James, 1991; Durso, 1975; Lawrence, 1987; Lucas & Smith, 1978; Mallette & Howard, 1992; Slaughter, 1989). The results of this investigation, Howard Savage's American College Athletics, showed the extent to which schools were ignoring the rules of the NCAA. Documenting professionalism, commercialism, and exploitation as well as violations in the recruiting and subsidizing of athletes, the Carnegie Foundation considered the illegal

practices so widespread that they showed blatant disregard for NCAA rules (Byers, 1995; Denlinger & Shapiro, 1975; Guttman, 1982, 1988; Lucas & Smith, 1978). In addition, the study took presidents to task for their failure to defend the integrity of higher education (Kjeldsen, 1982; Knight Foundation, 1993).

Macaroon (1991) felt that the Carnegie report of 1929 did not shrink from directly questioning the intellectual quality and sincerity of American higher education itself. It has also been noted that the report showed several cases where intercollegiate sport was not under faculty control but was unduly influenced by overzealous alumni and coaches (Falla, 1981, p. 129). Hardy and Berryman (1982) pointed out that the report suggested that any foreign visitor to an American campus during football season would immediately ask what relation such an "astonishing athletic display had to the work of an intellectual agency like a university" (p. 16).

Slaughter (1989) considered the primary purpose of the Carnegie Report to be to provide a challenge to college presidents to take control of their athletic programs and to overcome the cumulative effects of years of benign neglect and blind obeisance to the desires of students, alumni, trustees, and the public. It concluded that, "Apparently, the ethical gearing of intercollegiate football contests and their scholastic aspects are of secondary importance to the winning of victories and financial success" (p. 8).

This period was marked by an acknowledgment on the part of the NCAA of problems in intercollegiate sports. Unfortunately, it also denoted a lack of effort on the part of the NCAA to provide solutions to these problems (Slaughter, 1989; Thelin, 1994). The association admitted the problem, but shied away from attempting solutions. Part of the problem was that the enforcement program of the NCAA consisted only of

self-discipline among institutions rather than of any actual enforcement activities by the NCAA (Slaughter, 1989).

### The Rules Enforcement Decision of the NCAA

In 1941, the NCAA finally realized that it was not accomplishing what it had set out to do — control intercollegiate athletics. Therefore, a new constitution was created, calling for the expulsion of members who refused to follow the association rules and guidelines. In 1948, the association adopted a “sanity code” that limited the awarding of scholarships based on athletic ability; within a year, it had targeted seven institutions for awarding scholarships to athletes based on athletic ability; twenty more were estimated to have broken the rule (Fleisher, 1992; Lawrence, 1987; Slaughter, 1989; Stern, 1979; Thelin, 1994). Even though the motion to suspend the seven institutions failed in a vote of the membership, the ability to levy other sanctions was established within the NCAA as a result (Byers, 1995; Fleisher, 1992; Robert & Olson, 1989; Stern, 1979; Thelin, 1994). Eventually the code establishing need as a criterion for scholarship was repealed so that scholarships could be awarded based on athletic ability; nevertheless, the enforcement policy of the NCAA had begun (Byers, 1995; Slaughter, 1989).

In 1952, the “enforcement decision” was reached (Falla, 1981; Tow, 1982). This very important decision gave the NCAA formal control over rule making and the authority to impose sanctions upon violators of recruiting, eligibility, and other rules (Chu, 1982; Denlinger & Shapiro, 1975; Lawrence, 1987; Sperber, 1990; Stern, 1979). Since the NCAA Enforcement Office started keeping records on October 16, 1952, it has documented 442 violations of the NCAA Rule Book. In 96 of these cases, institutions

were cited specifically for lack of institutional control. Since 1980, 55 cases of NCAA violation based on lack of institutional control involving 47 Division I athletic institutions have come to light (NCAA Enforcement Summary, 1995).

### The College Football Association Challenge to the NCAA

In 1981, Steve Horn, president of Long Beach State, as well as other presidents, lobbied for the sharing of revenue between all Division I institutions (Byers, 1995). It was felt that distributing revenues more broadly would reduce incentives to cheat. As things stood then, schools sometimes would earn millions of dollars from the handful of athletes who made the team a winner. Incentives to recruit and keep those money-makers was so high that rule breaking and exploitation were almost inevitable (Andre and James, 1991).

The issue of revenue sharing scared the major football institutions into creating the College Football Association (Byers, 1995). The organization was formed on February 2, 1980, as a special interest group within the NCAA. It was made up of 61 institutions with large-scale football programs (Byers, 1995; Thelin, 1994). With Chuck Nanas as its executive director, it became a lobbying group creating rumors of the possibility of seceding if revenue sharing became a reality.

Until the practice was declared in violation of antitrust laws, the NCAA required that all schools abide by its television rules; this precluded any school from selling the television rights to its own Saturday afternoon games (Noll, 1991). In 1981, two major powers of the CFA, Georgia and Oklahoma, filed suit against the NCAA claiming price



fixing, output restraints, and monopolizing under the Sherman Antitrust Act (Funk, 1991). Oklahoma and Georgia sued the NCAA in order to gain the right of self-determination in the televising of their own football games (Thelin & Wiseman, 1989).

In September of 1982, Judge Juan Burciaga in New Mexico ruled that the NCAA was a cartel and a monopoly and that its television control constituted an unlawful constraint of trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act and an unlawful monopolization of the pertinent market, violating Section 2 (Thelin, 1989). The Supreme Court upheld the decision on June 27, 1984 (Byers, 1995; Fleisher, 1992; Guttman, 1988; Hart-Nibbrig, 1989; Sperber, 1990; Thelin, 1989). The NCAA could no longer act as the sole distributor of college football games to national television networks. In effect, this decision made each college or university a seller in a newly deregulated sports television market and instigated a helter-skelter scramble to gain access to the largest prime-time sports audiences (Hart-Nibbrig, 1989).

### The Difficulty of Institutional Control

Frey (1985) has suggested three reasons for the problems of institutional control of athletics. First, the nature of American colleges and universities has been that of a public service entity. Universities have pushed athletic departments into external partnerships when institutional budgets for athletics were not increased, while athletics costs have doubled in as little as ten years. Athletic departments have had to seek revenue from external groups, who, in turn, desire control (Atwell, 1980).

Because there was no reliable source of support, such as the State, the financing

of higher education was often precarious. University presidents have found themselves directing their energies more to fund raising than to educational development. They have had to adopt an entrepreneurial spirit relating more to the business and government communities than to the academic. The nature of the modern university requires that the president work at the boundary of the institution focusing on obtaining resources from the external environment (Frey, 1994).

Colleges and universities have also been put into competition with each other for resources (Frey, 1985). The most popular solution athletics departments have used to close the gap between flat revenues of ticket sales and rising expenses is the soliciting of donations. Because of this, presidents and athletics departments have relied on communities for financial support.

According to Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), once an organization subunit is defined as vulnerable or in critical need of resources, demands and dependencies expand. Organizations are not self-sufficient: they are subject to uncertainties and may be vulnerable to exploitation or external control by the outsiders who control resources the organization needs. The controlling coalitions may have goals that are inconsistent with those of the larger organization. If the larger organization cannot develop an alternative base of resources, then it will not be able to counter the power of the external constituencies over the subunit (Frey, 1994).

Athletics also broadened the appeal of the institution to the community (Chu, 1982) and assisted in fund-raising and student recruitment (Frey, 1985). The result of this was that governance responded more to external constituencies of the local community than to internal preferences of the institution or of a national governing body such as the

NCAA (Frey, 1985; Simon, 1985). As a consequence, it was difficult to control athletic departments because these units have very powerful network constituents in the community (Frey, 1994). However, these linkages were not just the result of university efforts; the community saw the value of athletics and cultivated profitable linkages.

Riley and Baldrige (1977) also felt that it was difficult to control departments because the community has very powerful network constituents. They went on to say that it was natural that community business and political elites would be attracted to athletics; sports provided a vicarious reinforcement of their ideals. More important, however, was the view that a successful college athletics program could reflect positively on the community or region. The area could obtain national recognition or visibility should the college team be successful. In addition, any time a sporting event was conducted, the business community reaped benefits.

The athletics department's ability to forge strong links to external constituencies has promoted stronger independence compared to other institution subunits (Frey, 1985; Riley and Baldrige, 1977; Sperber, 1990). These strong links to external constituencies have turned into what Frey (1982, 1986) called a booster coalition made up of booster clubs, non-profit foundations, and independent athletic departments. The coalition is composed of alumni and community representatives who exchange resources in the form of money, materials, and political influence for the right to associate with coaches and athletes, for the status or prestige this association brings, and for the access to other persons like themselves who may possess political and economic resources that coalition members need or want (Frey, 1994).

Frey (1985) pointed out that as any department on campus retains autonomy,

athletics have acquired independence, but the latter's autonomy exceeds what is possible for the other subunits. This is largely due to the ability of athletic departments to build connections with significant external constituencies to an extent beyond what other university subunits have been able to do. The established distribution of power by means of this alliance is an accepted way of doing business; it has cultural support; and it has some legitimation within the larger organizational context because university administrations prefer to rely on this alliance rather than make the changes necessary to redirect their resource-acquisition strategies (Frey, 1994).

Frey (1982) has asserted that presidents, faculty, and students will always lose the control battle because they do not have the resources to compete with those available to the booster coalition. Thelin (1989) has also pointed out that a partnership of powerful external boosters and the athletics department is a formidable opponent for a president. This partnership makes entrepreneurial athletics directors especially strong; at some universities, the athletics directors may have a better chance than the president to prevail in a major confrontation (Davis, 1979; Miller, 1982).

Finally, Frey and other authors have pointed out that it is the nature of the university to be composed of loosely related segments and to have many goals, numerous and varied constituencies, and fragmented decision-making (Aldrich, 1979; Frey, 1985, 1986, 1994; Riley & Baldrige, 1977). The American college or university, as Cohen (1974) has stated, is a prototype of organized anarchy. Its goals are either vague or in dispute; its technology is familiar but not understood; its major participants wander in and out of the organization. These factors do not necessarily make it a bad organization or a disorganized one, said Cohen, but they do make it a problem to describe, understand,

and lead. It can also create a situation where weakly-connected departments act independently of each other and of the institution (Riley and Baldrige, 1977).

Frey (1994), Lapchick (1987), and Thelin (1989) have maintained that a number of the problems in college athletics can be traced to the fact that many programs have operated separately from their institutions, with little or no accountability to the president or chancellor. Riley and Baldrige (1977) have said that decision making is often shared and participatory and appears disorderly at times, but it reflects the autonomy of departments and professionals. It is a system with little central coordination and is almost an organized anarchy in which each individual in the university is seen making autonomous decisions. The decision making reflects the variety of goals, the multiplicity of specialized interests of faculty and departments, and the autonomy of athletics.

Davies (1979) and Thelin (1989) have contended that although the confusion disturbs the president, it also serves him. An ambiguity of power, as Cohen and March (1974) point out, leads to a parallel ambiguity of responsibility. Nowhere is this ambiguity more striking for presidential authority than in intercollegiate athletics. If no one is in charge, no one is to blame. Presidents, as well as athletics directors, may hide behind the NCAA umbrella when things turn bad (Thelin, 1989).

Combining with the service orientation and the loosely coupled nature of the higher education institution is the independent nature of athletics and the long tradition of local autonomy. Stern (1979) contended that the local autonomy of the institution was affected by three factors related to the NCAA. First was the fact that the original 38 schools insisted that their own programs be controlled by their own school faculty. Second, the NCAA 1906 constitution established local autonomy and faculty control of

programs as fundamental principles. In addition, the NCAA 1909 constitution permitted schools to file written objections to any legislation enacted by the delegates; such a filing made the legislation non-binding on the institution. Third, the right of self-governance for constitution members was continually referred to in the rhetoric of association meetings, particularly when the issue of enforcement of NCAA rules of eligibility and conduct was debated. Thelin (1994), too, has pointed out that higher education has traditionally been a markedly decentralized arrangement characterized by institutional autonomy, voluntary association, and relatively little government regulation. This principle of local autonomy established a pattern of loose coupling within the NCAA (Flath, 1964; Stern, 1979).

In an effective organization, as Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) have stated, each subunit develops characteristics that enable it to deal with a particular sector of the environment. However, at the same time, these subunits must be integrated for the purpose of control — the essence of organizational control is the restriction of subunit autonomy (Frey, 1994).

Restricting the autonomy of the athletics department has been difficult. “Doing something” about athletics carries great personal risk for a president (Frey 1982; Thelin 1989). It’s risky business as Hanford (1976) has said, and academic lore is full of unpleasant stories about university presidents who have been forced out by athletic imbroglios. Paul Hardin of SMU, for example, was fired in 1974 after he exposed significant violations of NCAA rules on his own campus (Andre & James, 1991; Oberlander, 1988c; Thelin, 1989). In 1988, first-year Indiana University President

Thomas Ehrlich committed a cardinal Hoosier sin when he openly criticized popular, successful basketball coach Bobby Knight (Thelin, 1989).

Unfortunately, for presidents, intercollegiate athletics often is a no-win proposition. No matter what happens, someone is visibly and vocally upset; this can lead to the syndrome of 'presidential inattention' (Hanford 1976; Thelin, 1989). According to Thelin, a president may legitimately wonder if it is prudent to risk one's office on something as educationally peripheral as athletics; even the most courageous college presidents may feel that accepting the local status quo is the best strategy.

There are still other problems noted in the literature concerning the institutional control of athletics. Smith (1989) pointed out the fact that while chief executive officers head individual institutions, the control of athletics necessitates inter-institutional agreements. A truism in college sports is that one president or institution which makes a dramatic move will do so alone (Thelin, 1989); not even a courageous president dares to embrace the notion of "unilateral disarmament." The harsh news, as Thelin has pointed out, is that abuses in intercollegiate athletics will be solved only when presidents and institutions act together.

Another difficulty lies in the fact that college presidents are hired and fired by governing boards; therefore, it is rare for a president to take a stance on athletics that differs from that of the board (Smith, 1989). Indeed, Thelin (1989) believes that, "The more intense, the more visible, and the more costly the athletic program, the less influence the CEO has over it" (p. 75).

It is clear that, from the beginning of intercollegiate sport, presidential involvement and leadership have never been consistent. Yet, leading a university is a

much more complex and demanding task today than it was thirty or forty years ago (Slaughter, 1989). This opens the way for highly paid athletic directors, large athletic department staffs, booster clubs, and even independent corporations with their own boards of directors to run all or a portion of the athletic program (Slaughter, 1989, p. 186).

Walter Schenkel (1971) considers "governance of the contemporary university to be a complex system of checks and balances in which it is virtually impossible for a single person to dominate the governance process" (p. 12). The NCAA has, however, assigned responsibility for control of athletics specifically to the university president. Caught between the demands of the NCAA and the pressures to creating winning programs, chief executive officers can find their job of controlling athletics very complicated.

### Commercialism and Winning at All Cost

Presidents have learned of their communities' lust for winning: most believe that a winning program attracts students, financial contributions, and favorable legislative appropriations (Frey, 1986). According to Guttman (1982), the lust for winning extends to alumni and state legislators: "It is common knowledge that alumni and state legislators are invariably more generous to their alma mater or state university when the football team has done well" (p. 73).

Most CEO's choose not to be in the direct firing line should athletic problems erupt (Miller, 1982). So who is in the direct firing line? Some might say it's the athletics director. According to Miller, however, it is the head coach who faces the greatest



pressures to win. As early as the late 1800's, coaches had to win to keep their jobs (Camp, 1894; Lucas & Smith, 1978). Bringing in the professional coach in the latter 1800's did not change the emphasis on winning; instead it intensified it. The emphasis on winning continued on into the 1900's. Hardy and Berryman (1982) quoted Amherst's president, Alexander Meiklejohn, as saying in 1922 that "victories indicated better than anything else the quality of the undergraduate life" (p. 24).

Enormous financial rewards for winning expanded during the 1960's and multiplied in the 1970's and 1980's. NCAA enforcement never kept pace and the effectiveness of conference commissioners as regulators and enforcers became virtually non-existent (Byers, 1995). Indeed, according to Andre and James (1991), winning is so lucrative that schools face great pressure to circumvent or violate whatever standards exist.

By 1980, according to Lapchick (1996), the number one, and perhaps only, rule that mattered was winning; it sold tickets and increased chances for TV coverage. Coaches who followed this rule kept their jobs; no one pointed a finger at the coaches unless they lost. Richard Davies (1995) has declared that, "If you lose your games, you're certain to be fired. If you break the rules, you have to be caught to be fired" (p. 27). As Rooney (1980) observed, a little cheating buys time in what can be described as, at best, an insecure profession (1980). It can hardly be surprising that when confronted by the stark contrast between success and failure, many, if not most, coaches are tempted to do whatever needs to be done to win.

In addition, successful head coaches today are rewarded with salaries in the hundreds of thousands of dollars, with fast food franchises, stocks, bonds, homes,

automobiles, country club memberships, income-producing television and radio shows, highly lucrative product endorsements, lecture and sports clinic opportunities, and other special amenities (Edwards, 1986). Over time, as the rewards for winning have multiplied, so have cheating and the breaking of rules (Byers, 1995). As Funk (1991) said, "Coaches are under intense pressure from administrators and alumni to produce victories. These pressures, combined with the tremendous monetary and material rewards available to successful Division I coaches, motivate some in the business to use any means necessary to secure the skilled athlete" (p. 89).

The 1980's was a period when many of the unfortunate effects of the pressures surfaced. Irregularities and illegalities at universities as diverse as Maryland, Georgia, Minnesota, SMU, Tulane, and USC were widely publicized (Wheeler, 1996, p. 132). According to Simon (1991), a particularly sad account of abuse of the rules, which unfortunately may not be atypical, is provided by former Clemson University basketball coach Tate Locke. As Locke described the situation at Clemson, said Simon, "There was a tremendous pressure on him to win. While he did not let himself know about many of the recruiting violations involving under-the-table payments to players which were perpetrated by alumni and boosters, he may have condoned deceptions designed to lure recruits to Clemson" (Simon, p. 127).

One of the few attempts to correct the attitude that coaches need to win was offered by Leonard Koppett according to Sperber (1990). Koppett's feeling was that coaches should have the same status as professors and be hired according to the same standards of integrity and at comparable salaries. This, he said, would free them of the win-at-all-costs demands.

A recurrent criticism of college sports and a contributing cause of the win-at-all-costs attitude is that college sports have become a big business characterized by commercialism and professionalism (Frey, 1982; Koch, 1971; Rooney, 1985; Scott 1956; Thelin, 1989). Lucas and Smith (1978) explained that the commercial aspects of intercollegiate athletics began early as a means of survival when students had to raise money to support and finance college athletics. "If administrators in the beginning had controlled athletics and financed them through proper channels, then students may not have commercialized them for reason of survival" (p. 225). Also, as Riley and Baldrige (1977) and Raiborn (1982) have pointed out, universities have pushed their athletic departments into external partnerships by not increasing their athletic budgets while athletic costs have increased significantly. Athletic departments have had to seek revenue from external groups, who, in turn, desire control (Atwell, 1980). The results have made it difficult to control athletic departments because they have very developed powerful network constituents.

In the early 1900's the commercial and professional aspects of athletics began to intensify. Players wanted to win because of institutional and individual prestige; alumni wanted to win for it was the most visible symbol of a virile institution; college presidents felt that success in football meant greater institutional as well as personal recognition, for the coach — his job depended on it (Lucas & Smith, 1978).

The desire for popular support led college presidents to advertise their institutions in any way they could. No other advertising medium had a greater hold upon the populace than did athletics (Lucas & Smith, 1978). The use of athletics as an advertising tool was started in the 1870's and was a national phenomenon by 1900.

University of Chicago's president Harper attempted to promote his institution with winning teams by hiring Amos Alonzo Stagg. According to Lucas and Smith, he told Stagg to develop teams which "we can send around the country and knock out all the colleges. We will give them a palace, a car, and a vacation, too" (p. 219). President McCosh of Princeton recruited students by mentioning victories over Harvard and Yale. CAL sent its track team on a tour of the east in 1895 to pursue their goals in part by taking advantage of the publicity successful athletic programs could generate (Ferrier, 1930; Schmidt, 1957). When Indiana first won the state football championship, they reportedly felt that everything that was connected with their university became suddenly interesting to the people of the state (Lucas & Smith, 1978; Woodburn, 1940). President Slocum of Colorado College felt his institution would never gain the recognition that it deserved until it had a winning football team (Lewis, 1964).

Not all college presidents favored advertising their institutions through athletics though they generally did not speak out loudly for fear of losing enrollment, public support, or alumni backing (Lucas & Smith, 1978). For example, President Charles Eliot of Harvard spoke out against the promotion of athletics. Although he originally rowed for Harvard crew, he later became disillusioned with athletics. He denied that athletic wins and losses affected prestige and enrollment.

Although commercialized collegiate athletics was a growing industry before midcentury, financial domination of big-time collegiate football and basketball is a post World War II phenomenon. The factors identified by Sage (1990) that contributed to this were the growth of mass media and television revenues, the development of rapid and convenient air transportation making possible interregional rivalries, an increase in

leisure time and discretionary income, and the advent of Sports Information Directors and their widely successful advertising efforts (p. 174).

Athletics has always been a business to a certain extent, but according to Funk (1991) today's athletic endeavors have definitely become a big business: the profit motive has increased the necessity and importance of winning, and the winning-is-everything attitude has opened the door to the moral decay afflicting college athletics (p. 93). The effect on colleges has been to sharpen the financial importance of winning to a team and league. The obvious result is to increase the incentives to violate NCAA rules in order to recruit the kinds of athletes who improve the athletic program (Noll, 1990).

Simon (1991) also has agreed with the contention that sports has become big business. Television revenues and the visibility and support which come with winning basketball and football teams seem to many to undermine the educational ideal of sports, according to Simon and to Wheeler (1996). Byers (1995) maintained that television is commercializing all of America's values. The need to compete with professional teams for the entertainment dollar became, ex post facto, a legitimate economic argument of the football coaches (p. 136).

According to Hart-Nibbrig (1991), universities and the NCAA have failed by and large to contain the commercial aspects of sports. A part of the problem is that schools have perpetuated an vicious cycle of the need to win. In intercollegiate athletics, huge coaching and recruiting staffs are necessary to compete with other schools. Winning teams are necessary to justify the staffs. The staffs are necessary to produce the wins. The wins are necessary to sell the tickets and rate TV exposure. The income is necessary to justify the expense of producing the wins. Some authors have felt that the sharing of

television and bowl revenues within a conference would make winning less important and so lessen the schools' incentive to cheat (Andre & James, 1991; Byers, 1995). Either way, one person who can make a difference in solving the problem is the college president.

### Presidential Efforts to Control Athletics

Mallette and Howard (1992) wrote that "the college presidency is a complex job with multiple responsibilities, many competing values and priorities, and an abundance of distractions. But whether the campus is large or small, Division I or III, 'big time' or 'small time,' the president still is accountable for ensuring the integrity of the intercollegiate athletics program" (p. 31). Observers agree, according to Thelin (1994), that the key figure in reform is the college or university president. However, making decisive changes in athletics policy is not easy for a president who must contend with external pressures, problems of a single campus working in isolation, and the visibility of college sports. Presidents who take a stand as national leaders and spokesman on containing the costs and abuses of college sports show a high burnout rate (Thelin, 1989). From the early days, they have encountered difficulties from a number of different sources. For example, presidents, hired and fired by boards of trustees, have usually not taken stands in opposition to those who pay their salaries. As boards of trustees were supportive of intercollegiate athletics in the latter 1800's, it was natural for presidents not to create controversies by calling for drastic actions when intercollegiate athletics crises occurred (Smith, 1988).

However, university presidents, not governing boards, have usually been singled

out for having the opportunity to reform athletics. They have also been criticized for seldom doing so. Presidents, who throughout the nineteenth century had a great deal of power in controlling the destinies of higher education, rarely took initiatives in reforming athletics (Smith, 1988). Yet some chief executive officers have spoken out against the excesses of intercollegiate athletics and some have taken strong action. President Andrew White of Cornell said in 1883 that, "I will not permit 30 men to travel 400 miles merely to agitate a bag of wind" (Isaacs, 1978, p. 169). President Eliot of Harvard condemned football with its increasing violence saying, "The game of football grows worse and worse as regards foul and violent play, and the number and gravity of injuries which the players suffer. It has become perfectly clear that the game as now played is unfit for college use" (Report of the President of Harvard College, 1893-1894, p. 16). Benjamin Ide Wheeler of Cal and David Starr Jordan of Stanford led early efforts to declare freshman ineligible for track and football during the 1910-1915 era (Schultz, 1989). President Woodrow Wilson of Princeton commented that higher education was forced to worry that the "sideshows" had started to swallow up the "circus," leaving the performers in the "main tent" to "whistle for their audiences, discouraged and humiliated" (Hardy & Berryman, 1982 p. 21). Harold Stoke, former president of New Hampshire and LSU stated that the duties of higher education have been transformed into a responsibility of the educational system to supply the public with entertainment (Noverr, 1983).

President James B. Angell of the University of Michigan talked his fellow Big Ten presidents into adopting rules to keep football within reasonable bounds. On March 9th, 1906, they limited the season to five games, restricted eligibility to three years with

graduate students banned. students must have a year of residence before competing in athletics. they must have proper grades. training tables were abolished and capped student ticket prices at 50 cents. The coach had to be a full time faculty member. On top of this the Big Ten insisted on absolute faculty control. Unfortunately, president Angell's own football coach went to his board of regents and the board pulled Michigan out of the big ten. Michigan did not rejoin until 1917 (Byers, 1995; Nelson, 1982; Wilson & Brondfield, 1967).

In 1931, Dr. James Angell of Yale stated, "I believe that any system which by its very nature encourages proselytizing among boy athletes in the secondary schools is pernicious. I do not believe there is any obligation on the part of the college to furnish the general public nor even the alumni with substitutes for the circus, the prize fight, and the gladiatorial combat" (Noverr, 1983, p. 114). At about the same time, Dr. Charles Kennedy of Princeton declared, "I earnestly hope that the colleges of our country will deflate intercollegiate football and restore it to its natural place in the life of the undergraduates" (Noverr, 1983, p. 114).

Also in the 1930's, Abraham Flexner, a veteran of the Carnegie Foundation studies, criticized the commercialism of the University of Chicago football program (Thelin, 1994). Apparently, President Robert Hutchins of the University of Chicago agreed. He became one of the first presidents to eliminate a major collegiate sport by dropping his school's football program (Nelson, 1982; Rooney, 1980). In dropping out of the Big Ten Conference in 1946, Hutchins stated that, "Education is primarily concerned with the training of the mind, and athletics and social life, though they may contribute to it, are not the heart of it and cannot be permitted to interfere with it . . ."



(Byers, 1995, p. 41). Everett Case of Colgate speaking in 1947 asked, "Where is the glory in a Colgate victory won by men not picked and developed from the regular student body but offered special financial inducements to 'represent' you? What would you think of your college if we used funds entrusted to us for educational purposes to go out and hire a football team?" (Rooney, 1980, p. 21)

In 1982, Father Lo Schiavo, the president of the University of San Francisco, after renegade boosters were responsible for causing back-to-back probations, decided to eliminate the basketball program. In dropping basketball, Father Lo Schiavo commented that the university could no longer control its powerful booster organization; he said, "There was no way to measure the damage done to the university's most priceless assets, its integrity and reputation" (Chronicle of Higher Education, 1983, p. 26). Lo Schiavo reportedly also declared that there are those who "are determined to break the rules presumably because they are convinced that the university cannot stay within the rules and maintain an effective competition program" (Simon, 1991, p. 43).

Father Lo Schiavo met with criticism from his school's booster club. A member of the Don Century Club stated that "Lo Schiavo aspires to mediocrity and could never form a selection committee that would bring us the type of coach we need. I hope for the good of the university, Father Lo Schivo goes" (Boston Globe, 1983, p. 29; Simon, 1991, p. 65). However, Father Lo Schiavo prevailed and amateur norms are being restored at the University of San Francisco. Basketball players are recruited locally; the mission in this case is to demonstrate that a basketball program can stay clean and still win. Alumni help raise funds, but are no longer involved in recruiting (Hart-Nibbrig, 1991).

Eamon Kelly of Tulane University suspended its basketball program after a point

shaving scandal was uncovered: the key player at Tulane admitted having received \$10,000 from an assistant coach on signing to attend the university in 1981 (Lapchick, 1986).

On the other hand, there have also been presidents who have commented favorably on intercollegiate athletics. President Ethelburt D. Garfield of Miami of Ohio all but required his faculty to join the football team and became the only president to ever incur an injury while competing for his college team (Rudolph, 1962; Schultz, 1989). President William Rainey Harper of the University of Chicago hired former Yale All-American Amos Alonzo Stagg to coach his team "to develop teams which we can send around the country and knock out all the colleges. We will give them a palace car and a vacation too" (Lucas & Smith, 1978, p. 219).

John R. Hubbard of USC called college sports the glue that holds the university together (Kirshenbaum, 1980; Nelson, 1982). John Hannah, president of Michigan State in 1941, promoted athletics by saying, "I believe that somehow athletics are tied up with that fiercely burning spirit of competition which has been the trademark of America since the day it was discovered" (Byers, 1995, p. 42). Unfortunately, Hannah's big time athletics also, in the view of Walter Byers (1995), fueled a new era of cheating, which soon brought the colleges to a crisis comparable to the one that drove Teddy Roosevelt to act.

### Governing Boards

Governing boards, many of which were made up of alumni, became a natural method of controlling athletics. Even though Smith (1989) considered governing boards

a real power behind big-time athletics, he suggested that they have also been a source of athletic abuse. Governing boards in the late nineteenth century, like presidents, spoke for America when they endorsed football and other sports on the college campus. Boards more and more were drawn from the business elite to set policy in American colleges and universities. They soon began to set athletic policy as well. Smith (1988) wrote that governing boards, condoning the business aspects of athletics, increasingly agreed to the hiring of professional coaches and the erection of large stadiums which could seat far more than the number of student and staff. "The brutal nature of mass plays in football probably mirrored the businessmen's world, as did the commercial aspect of football" (Smith, p. 98).

One telling example of abuse of athletic governance power occurred in Texas. While the head of the board of governors, the newly-elected governor of Texas, Bill Clements, was involved in paying a football player to attend Southern Methodist University (Andre & James, 1991; Trager, 1990). Neither was SMU's nearby neighbor, TCU, immune to the negative results of the governing board behavior. It was found that a payment-to-players scheme was coordinated by a member of the TCU Board of Trustees (Lapchick, 1986; Rooney, 1980). This exemplifies how the mixed interest of controlling athletics while still promoting winning programs is worsened by the fact that governing boards generally do not have contact with the NCAA, main enforcement organization of college sports (Smith, 1989).

Thelin pointed out that the University of Miami President, Edward T. Foote, was caught in a bind with his governing board. When Miami came under fire for athletics abuses, at least one influential member of the university's governing board said that

nothing would interfere with the Hurricanes's drive to be nationally competitive in football (Sullivan, 1987; Thelin, 1989).

Since it is the president of a college, not its governing board, who sends a representative to the NCAA, it is the duty of the president, not the governing board, to control athletics. The president is caught between these responsibilities, the demands of faculty, and the demands of the governing board. But presidents are hired and fired by boards, and it has been a rare president who has taken a stance on athletics which differs from the board's (Smith, 1989). One who did was the president of Clemson, William Lee Atchley, who resigned when he realized that he could not control his athletics department (Lapchick, 1986). There was a power struggle between him and Bill McLellan, the athletics director and the trustees would not give Atchley a vote of confidence (Lapchick, 1986). Similarly, when President John A. DiBaggio of Michigan State tried to prevent his football coach from becoming the athletics director, he was overruled by the trustees (Byers, 1995).

The Knight Foundation report has suggested that it is time for governing boards to support their presidents. A number of writers have asserted that with the support of the governing board, a conscientious president may make a difference in the institutional control of athletics (Mallette.& Howard, 1992; Schultz, 1989; Thelin, 1989).

#### The Faculty Athletics Representative

At the 1991 annual conference of the American Association of University Professors, Creed Black, chair of the Knight Foundation Commission on the Future of College Sports said, "Of all the people testifying before the Knight Commission, the

most disappointing, the least impressive, were the faculty athletic representatives. They seemed to have no idea what their role was. Their role is obviously to represent academic interests, but they seemed to have been co-opted by the athletic departments” (Thelin, 1994, p. 150).

At most institutions, faculty athletics representative are responsible for relationships with the NCAA and with the conference of which the institution is a member. They are also responsible for intra-institutional relationships among the faculty, administration, and department of athletics. Finally, they should have a concern for the academic and athletic performance and well-being of the institutions student athletes (Mallette & Howard, 1992).

In many instances, the faculty athletic representative is the key person within conferences. The most distinctive characteristic of the Pacific Coast Conference, according to Thelin (1994), was that its power was vested in its faculty athletic representatives. The faculty athletic representative was usually appointed by the president, often upon recommendation from the campus faculty senate. Despite alleged autonomy, the representative was still subject to pressure from the athletics director, the coaches, and the president. Thelin contends that, in sum, it was unreasonable to expect the faculty athletic representative either to represent faculty or to be influential in the NCAA forum.

### Conference Efforts in Governance

On the conference level, the one major effort made to control athletics came in 1951 when the Ivy League Conference de-emphasized athletics by dropping scholarships

based on athletic ability (Byers, 1995; Guttman, 1988, 1991). At present, they offer only needs-based and academic scholarships. According to Simon (1985), many would argue that the only reputable intercollegiate athletic programs are those which resemble the Division III or Ivy League levels, where scholarships are given only for need, athletes are treated as students, and competition is regional rather than national in scope.

Unfortunately, there have been examples where conferences have not been effective in controlling athletics. Byers (1995) points out the plight of the conference commissioner as having the rather unenviable position of sitting as judge of those who employ him. Vic Schmidt, the commissioner of the Pac Ten, after punishing UCLA and USC for transgressions, saw his problems multiply (Byers, 1995). He eventually was asked to resign in June, 1958.

As commissioner of the Southwest Conference, Howard Grubbs faced pressure because of a 1956 investigation into violations by Bear Bryant's Texas A&M football program. The message was clear. Investigate a power conference team and you jeopardize your job (Byers, 1995). Following the retirement of Grubbs in 1973, SWC enforcement became far less effective (Byers, 1995).

In 1971, Wayne Duke became the Big Ten Commissioner. After he had problems with Michigan, its president, Robben Fleming, pushed through a change in Duke's contract, amending it from a multi-year to a year-to-year contract. After retiring in 1988, Duke was asked for parting advice for the presidents. Byers reports that he responded, "I said that a year-to-year contract is a mistake when you made it, and I say it again today. One thing the Big Ten needs to do is give my successor a contract and, after that, give him your support" (Byers, 1995, p. 191).

As the years passed, fewer and fewer conference commissioners were willing to place their careers at risk. Most conference commissioners have decided to let the NCAA do it (Byers, 1995). Present-day conference commissioners emphasize compliance programs and rules seminars; they leave tough enforcement matters to the NCAA (Byers, 1995).

### The American Council on Education

Founded in 1918, the American Council on Education (ACE) represents over 1,600 colleges and universities. Its purpose is:

. . . to advance education . . . through comprehensive, voluntary, and cooperative action on the part of American educational associations, organizations, and institutions . . . and to serve education in such undertakings as may be required and approved from year to year, from generation to generation for the common welfare (Funk, 1991, p. 107).

Because of the link of athletics with higher education, the ACE felt it was within its mission to investigate, study, and comment upon intercollegiate sports (Funk, 1991).

In 1952, repeated instances of scandals related to intercollegiate sports occurred. Because of these scandals, ACE funded an investigation (Hardy & Berryman, 1982; Thelin, 1994). In the results of the study, the weak regulatory performance of the NCAA was criticized and the de-emphasis of sports in college was recommended. In order to offset the negative publicity generated by the criticism, the NCAA created the Enforcement Decision of 1952; this gave the organization control over rule making and over enforcement of sanctions against violators of rules (Chu, 1982).

Despite the NCAA's new sanction powers, the ACE continued to be critical of intercollegiate sports. As a result of a comprehensive study, the ACE called for major reforms in college athletics. Derek Bok, head of Harvard University and chair of ACE, appointed a committee of 26 presidents from schools across the country to create a plan to implement its recommendations. Their first action was to form a Presidents' Board to attempt to take charge of the NCAA (Sperber, 1990; Byers, 1995). A favorable legacy of the ACE Special Committee's report was that it showed presidential and institutional concern (Thelin, 1994). On the negative side, Scott (1982) viewed the report as a failed attempt to curb abuses.

In 1974, George Hanford created a report for the American Council of Education, the purpose of which was to get college presidents to confront the future of intercollegiate athletics (Hardy & Berryman, 1982; Thelin, 1994; Durso, 1975; Rooney, 1980). In the report, Hanford listed the violations that were taking place in intercollegiate athletics; they were:

- ▶ Alterations of high school transcripts
- ▶ Threats to bomb the home of a high school principal who refused to alter a transcript
- ▶ Changes made in admissions test scores
- ▶ Substitutes, including assistant coaches, taking admissions tests
- ▶ Offering jobs to parents or other relatives of a prospect
- ▶ Promising one package of financial aid and delivering another
- ▶ Firing from a state job the father of a prospect who enrolled at a university other than the state team's



- ▶ Tipping or otherwise paying athletes who perform particularly well on a given occasion
- ▶ Providing a community college basketball star with a private apartment and car
- ▶ Getting grades for athletes in courses they never attended
- ▶ Enrolling university athletes in junior colleges out of season and getting them grades there for courses they never attended
- ▶ Using federal work-study funds to pay athletes for questionable or nonexistent jobs
- ▶ Getting a portion of work-study funds paid to athletes kicked back into the athletic department kitt (Denlinger & Shapiro, 1975, p 249)

Thelin (1994) reported that Hanford claimed that faculty were relatively uninvolved in intercollegiate athletics governance. Hanford also felt that regional accreditation associations had abdicated responsibility and should be more active in supporting institutional control of athletics: he recommended that a self-study of athletics be required as a requisite to regional accreditation.

Hanford's report, according to Thelin, highlighted the lack of debate among presidents as well as the scholarly inattention to policy issues surrounding college sports. Frey felt at the time that inattention from college presidents and faculties might become a thing of the past. In fact, the inattention of presidents to athletics is a characteristic of the past. The ACE Committee on Division I Athletics pressured the NCAA to include in its governance structure a board of presidents with the power to veto or modify NCAA rules (Bok, 1983). In January, 1984, this proposal was defeated at the NCAA convention; in its place, the NCAA created a Presidents' Commission with limited

authority. It was vested with the power to review NCAA policy and practice, to place items on the convention agenda, to conduct studies, and to demand a roll-call vote on any council or convention issue. In June, 1985, nearly 200 presidents attended the convention and every one of the Presidents' Commission proposals passed. In previous years, it had been rare to see as many as a dozen presidents at NCAA conventions (Frey, 1986). The widespread presidential inattention to athletics had come to an end.

### Presidents' Commission

The Presidents' Board, now called the Presidents' Commission, was an attempt at presidential, inter-institutional control of athletics. A group of concerned presidents from within the American Council on Education met in the early 1980's to discuss ways to work within the NCAA to promote increased presidential power in athletics (President's Commission Handbook, 1996-97; Bok, 1985; Thelin & Wiseman, 1989; Thelin, 1994; Sperber, 1990; Macmillan, 1992). Their rationale was that individual presidents are too busy to effect change within athletics alone. Therefore, they recommended forming a presidential board selected by their peers to control the NCAA's agenda (Sperber, 1990).

At the NCAA convention in 1984, the Presidents' Commission was formed as a compromise between the ACE presidents and the NCAA (President's Commission Handbook, 1996-97; Thelin & Wiseman, 1989; Sperber, 1990). As a result, it has less power than the presidents had sought, but more than the NCAA staff had desired (Thelin & Wiseman, 1989; Thelin, 1994). The commission consists of presidents from all divisions, but it is weighted with more Division I members. This reflects the attitude that

problems in athletics belong primarily to big-time programs (Thelin & Wiseman, 1989).

The Presidents' Commission is empowered to:

- (a) Review any activity of the association,
- (b) Place any matter of concern on the agenda for any meeting of the council for any NCAA convention.
- (c) Request studies of intercollegiate athletics and urge certain courses of action,
- (d) Propose legislation directly to the convention,
- (e) Establish the final sequence of legislative proposals in any convention agenda within the provisions of Section 2-(e) of the Special Rules of Order.
- (f) Call for a special meeting of the association under provisions of Article 5.7 of the constitution,
- (g) Designate before printing notice of any convention specific proposals for which a roll-call vote of eligible voters will be mandatory, and
- (h) Approve appointment of an executive director of the association

(President's Commission Handbook, 1996-97; Thelin & Wiseman, 1989).

The commission has made its presence felt through its efforts in a number of areas. In 1984, it successfully pressed for legislation establishing minimum academic qualifications for participation in intercollegiate sports. Other proposals made by the commission and adopted at a special convention in 1984 were: the institutional self-study requirement, the differentiation between major and secondary violations of NCAA

legislation and the so called death penalty for repeat offenders, and the annual financial audit requirement (President's Commission Handbook, 1996-97).

In 1987, a special convention was held at the request of a delegation from ACE regarding the issues of playing-season limitations and cost-containment. While several of the commission's recommendations regarding spring football practice and reductions in grants-in-aid in the various sports were not successful, the membership did approve establishment of an 18-month National Forum on the proper role of intercollegiate athletics in higher education, as well as a series of research studies in that regard. It also adopted the proposals calling for studies of financial aid limitations, numbers of individuals involved on noninstitutional athletics staffs, limits on recruiting periods, and the effects of varsity participation on the academic performance and collegiate experience of freshman student-athletes (President's Commission Handbook, 1996-97).

National Forums were held in Nashville in January, 1988 (featuring economic considerations in athletics); in Orlando in June, 1988 (emphasizing the NCAA membership structure, NCAA legislative and governance procedures, and financial aid); and in San Francisco in January, 1989, at the annual convention (highlighting the effects of intercollegiate athletics participation on the student-athlete) (President's Commission Handbook, 1996-97).

As a result of these sessions, the Presidents' Commission sponsored four successful legislative proposals at the 1990 NCAA Convention dealing with the disclosure of graduation rates; the reduction of time demands on student-athletes; the reinstating of the partial qualifier in Division I and permitting such individuals to received need-based, non-athletically related financial aid; and permitting incoming

student-athletes to received non-athletically related financial aid to attend summer school prior to their full-time enrollment (President's Commission Handbook, 1996-97).

The Commission met with success again the following year when it developed a group of proposals that became known as the "reform agenda." Eight of the ten proposals were adopted at the 1991 convention (President's Commission Handbook, 1996-97).

In 1992, the emphasis of the Presidents' Commission shifted to matters of presidential authority and institutional control. The Commission sponsored nine proposals at the 1993 Convention — highlighted by the establishment of an athletics certification program in Division I — and all were adopted except for a portion of one amendment. In addition, the Presidential Agenda Day was implemented at that Convention, grouping in one specified day all legislation identified as being of particular interest to CEO's (President's Commission Handbook, 1996-97).

In 1996, the primary focus of legislation supported by the Presidents' Commission was the restructuring the association. A central goal was to affirm presidential control of and responsibility for the NCAA. In 1997, the Commission was replaced by a new Executive Committee composed exclusively of CEO'S and division-specific presidential bodies in each of the three divisions (President's Commission Handbook, 1996-97).

Presidents have difficulty making headway on their own campuses unless they can act within a common framework of collective rules that will maintain adequate minimum academic standards (Bok, 1983). It appears by the results of the Presidents' Commission at the NCAA conferences that presidents are well on the way to making the maintenance of adequate minimum academic standards a reality.

### The Knight Commission

In 1989, after a decade of highly visible athletic scandals, the Knight Commission was formed with a \$2 million grant from the Knight Foundation to propose a reform agenda for college sports (Mallette & Howard, 1992). The report which resulted from this study on intercollegiate athletics was called "Keeping Faith with the Student-Athlete" (Thelin, 1994). The trustees of the John S. and James L. Knight Foundation were concerned that "... athletic abuses threatened the very integrity of higher education" (Knight Foundation, 1993, p. 10).

The Knight Commission Report described athletic abuses in the 1980's that led to the NCAA's censuring, sanctioning, or placing on probation 109 colleges and universities (Fleisher, 1992). This group included more than half the universities playing at the NCAA's top competitive level--57 (54%) of 106 institutions. Evidence from nearly one-third of present and former professional football players who responded to a survey near the end of the decade indicated that they had accepted illicit payments while in college. In addition, more than half said they saw nothing wrong with the practice. Another survey showed that among 100 big-time schools, 35 had graduation rates of less than 20% for their basketball players; 14 had the same low rate for their football players.

In spite of these indicators of embarrassing scandals, the Knight Commission did not approach college sports with a hostile attitude. Chairman James Knight said:

We have a lot of sports fans on our board, and we recognize that intercollegiate athletics have a legitimate and proper role to play in college and university life. Our interest is not to abolish that role but to preserve it by putting it back in perspective. We hope this Commission

can strengthen the hands of those who want to curb the abuses which are shaking public confidence in the integrity of not just big-time collegiate athletics but the whole institution of higher education. (Knight Foundation, 1993, p. 10)

The Knight Commission was attempting to do the same as President Roosevelt had in 1905—to reform instead of abolish intercollegiate sports. Yet as Creed Black, the president of the Knight Foundation, stated, “Public faith in higher education cannot be sustained if college sports are permitted to become a circus, with the institution itself little more than a supporting sideshow” (Thelin, 1994, p. 147)

The central concept proffered by the Knight Commission is that intercollegiate athletics should reflect the values of the university; therefore, the regulatory process should be grounded in the primacy of academic values (Thelin, 1994). Those taking part in athletics should be student-athletes. To accomplish reform in this area, the commission created a “one-plus-three” model. The “one” is presidential control directed toward the “three” principles of academic integrity, financial integrity, and accountability through certification (Fleisher, 1992; Thelin, 1994; Macmillan, 1992).

The Knight Commission made a number of recommendations for advancing presidential control. The first recommendation was that governing boards “. . . explicitly endorse and reaffirm presidential authority in all matters of athletics governance” (Knight Foundation, 1993, p.12) . All financial matters in the athletics program were to be delegated specifically to the president. It urged that the governing board assist the president in establishing common principles for hiring, evaluating, and terminating all athletic administrators, and it also affirmed the president's central authority in this role.

A governing board's expectations of the president regarding athletics should be clear and the board should take responsibility for reviewing the program annually. Finally, the governing board should help the president to define the faculty's role in terms of academic issues in athletics (Knight Foundation, 1993).

The second recommendation of the Knight Commission was that presidents should act on their obligation to control NCAA conferences (Knight Foundation, 1993, p. 13). The Commission felt strongly that presidents should formally retain the authority to define agendas; offer motions; cast votes or provide voting instructions; and to review and, if necessary, reshape conference decisions. In so doing, the president influences shaping the academic goals of the conference (1993).

The third recommendation for enhancing presidential control was that presidents should maintain control the NCAA (Knight Foundation, 1993, p. 12) This includes making informed use of their votes on the NCAA convention floor, following up on the success of the Presidents' Commission with additional reform measures, and continuing to fight for athletic reform.

Presidential control must be directed to academic integrity; academic integrity includes the fundamental premise that athletes must be students. It is comprised of the areas of admission, academic progress, and graduation rates. To promote academic integrity, the Knight Commission recommended that the NCAA strengthen initial eligibility requirements, link athletic eligibility to progress towards a degree, and use graduation rates as a criterion for NCAA certification (Knight Foundation, 1993, p. 18).

The commission further recommended that presidential control should also be directed toward financial integrity. Financial integrity consists of reducing the costs of



athletics and recommending that grants-in-aid cover the full costs of attendance for the very needy. It includes the curbing of independence of athletics foundations and booster clubs, the reviewing and approving by each university of all athletics-related coaches' income, offering long-term contracts to coaches, and financially supporting intercollegiate athletics by each institution (Knight Foundation, 1993).

Finally, presidential control should be directed to the independent authentication by an outside body of the integrity of each institution's athletics program. The commission recommended that the NCAA extend the certification process to all institutions granting athletics aid. They further recommended that each university should undertake comprehensive, annual policy audits of their athletics program. In addition, this certification program should include the major themes put forth in the Knight Commission's report (Knight Foundation, 1993).

A primary contribution of the Knight Commission's report has been to bring together college presidents to face serious issues involving intercollegiate athletics (Thelin, 1994). Thelin pointed out that the 1929 Carnegie Report, the ACE Reports of 1952 and 1974, and the Knight Commission Report all emphasized that college presidents must be centrally involved. All warned against commercialization and portrayed excesses of recruitment, athletic scholarships, and special privileges as corruptions of student athlete ideals. However, all reports suggested that intercollegiate athletics be balanced not abolished.

### Summary

Intercollegiate sports competition made its first appearance in 1852 with a

student-organized crew race between Yale and Harvard; a second race followed in 1855. Conflicts and disagreements arose almost immediately and the issue of governance of intercollegiate sports was born. In this chapter, the literature related to the history of intercollegiate sports since that first race was reviewed. The literature traced the governance of athletics from students, faculty, alumni, NCAA to eventual institutional control by the CEO. The research of the literature has shown repeated unsuccessful attempts in controlling intercollegiate athletics.

The complex governance structure of the institution and the traditional independence of institutional units including that of athletics has been shown to contribute to the difficulty of controlling intercollegiate athletics. Another factor that has been discussed as a contributing element is the ability of athletics to forge strong ties to external forces such as boosters. Despite these problems and difficulties, the NCAA as well as other organizations and many authors have called for strong presidential leadership in the institutional control of athletics. It is this issue of institutional control of athletics that led to this study.

## CHAPTER 3

### RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

In this chapter, the research methods used to determine the existence of institutional control of collegiate athletic programs are described. Based on this research, recommendations in areas of improvement in institutional control over NCAA Division I athletics for the future can be made.

#### Selection of Population and Subjects

The total population of 275 NCAA Division I colleges and universities listed in the 1996-97 National Directory of College Athletics were selected for use in determining and comparing the existence of control because a large proportion of Division I schools have been cited for lack of institutional control. The chief executive officer, usually the president or chancellor, and the athletics director of each institution were surveyed regarding the issue of institutional control of athletics.

#### Survey Questionnaires

Two separate questionnaires were designed, one for the chief executive officers and one for the athletics directors. The questionnaires consisted of both specific and open-ended questions the subjects of which included the principles of institutional

control suggested by the Knight Commission and the NCAA Committee on Infractions as well as other literature on the subject.

The queries were designed to allow subjects to express their feelings about the extent and origins of control of athletics at their institutions. The survey was in booklet form, laid out so that it was easily read; the number of questions was limited so that the survey could be completed in thirty minutes or less. The questions were divided into groups, mixing easily-answered questions with the more time-consuming questions so that the survey would not be monotonous or boring to complete.

The survey was sent by first-class mail with a cover letter from the researcher indicating the purpose of the study. A second mailing took place approximately thirty days after the first in order to increase the rate of return. A total of 149 surveys were returned from athletics directors and 107 from chief executive officers. The final return rates were 54% and 39% respectively resulting in a combined return rate of 47% (256 surveys).

#### Reliability of the Survey Instrument

A large population size was used to correct for random error. This consisted of the chief executive officers and athletics directors from the entire list of NCAA Division I institution. In addition, the reliability of the questionnaires was tested by employing a panel of experts from the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, the site of the research. The panel consisted of Dr. Carol Harter, President of UNLV; Dr. Anthony Saville, professor in the College of Education; Dr. Brad Rothermel, former athletics director of UNLV; Charlie Cavagnaro, current UNLV Athletics Director; Dave Chambers, UNLV

Compliance Officer, and Dr. James Frey, UNLV sociologist. Test-retest with alternate-forms was employed with the panel.

#### Face Validity of the Survey Instrument

Face validity was established in a preliminary test before assessing content validity. A number of athletics personnel at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, such as the assistant athletic directors and the compliance officers, were given the survey instrument to confirm that the questions were reasonable and appropriate. These personnel were considered to be semi-expert on the subject matter.

#### Content Validity of the Survey Instrument

The panel of experts from UNLV focused on testing for content validity of the questionnaire. The panel members were asked to review each question to confirm that its answer would be relevant in assessing the status of the institutional control of athletics.

#### The Pilot Study

A pilot study was conducted to identify errors and weaknesses in the survey's form and presentation such as typographical mistakes, overlapping response sets, ambiguous instructions, and overly long or tedious format. A panel of experts consisting of chief executive officers and athletics directors of Division I institutions was used in the pilot study. The panel consisted of Dr. Carol Harter, President of UNLV; Dr. Pat Goodall, former President of UNLV; Dr. Don Baepler, former President of UNLV; Dr. Robert Maxson, President of Long Beach State; Charlie Cavagnaro, current UNLV Athletics Director; Dr. Brad Rothermel, former Athletics Director of UNLV; Steve

Holton. Athletics Director, Northern Arizona University; John Kasser. Athletics Director, University of California; and Bill Shumard. Athletics Director, Long Beach State.

The panel employed the following checklist to analyze the survey instrument:

- \* Are there any typographical errors?
- \* Are there any misspelled words?
- \* Do the items measure the existence of institutional control?
- \* Are there any other relevant measures for institutional control that should be added?
- \* Do the item numbers make sense?
- \* Is the type size big enough to be easily read?
- \* Is the vocabulary appropriate for the respondents?
- \* Is the survey too long?
- \* Is the style of the items too monotonous?
- \* Are there easy questions in with the difficult questions?
- \* Does the survey format flow well?
- \* Are the items appropriate for the respondents?

#### Data Collection

The surveys were mailed on September 30th, 1997. A self-addressed, stamped envelope was included for returning the questionnaire to the researcher. The respondent was asked to return the questionnaire within four weeks. The return rate from this mailing was 32%. On November 16, 1997, those who had not responded were sent a

follow-up letter and another copy of the questionnaire. This resulted in the return of an additional 15% for a total response rate of 47%.

### Data Analysis

Nominal and ordinal data were collected through percentage, yes-and-no, ratings of agreement, and scales. The open-ended questions were coded for patterns and themes according to accepted methodologies.

The yes-and-no questions were used to determine if a specific strategy or element of institutional control existed at the institutions. A mean score, median, and mode for each element of institutional control was calculated from the completed surveys.

The ratings-of-agreement scale employed was a Likert-type using the categories of "Strongly Agree," "Agree," "Undecided," "Disagree" and "Strongly Disagree." The scale was used to determine the extent to which the elements of institutional control existed or were utilized.

The percentage scale was blocked from 0 to 100% in 10% intervals. These scales were used to determine the degree of selected issues of institutional control. For example, regarding the issue of the amount of money awarded from the state to fund the athletics program, 0% would indicate that all revenue would have to be generated from donations from private sources while 100% would indicate that there was no need to generate revenue from private sources. The conclusion would be that more control over athletics would exist by an institution that did not need to generate private donations. A mean score, median score, and mode for each percentage scale was calculated from the completed surveys. The open-ended questions were utilized primarily in order to identify

strategies for, or elements of, institutional control of athletics that might not have shown up in the research of the literature. A list of strategies and elements was then assembled based on identified data. This list was used to create guidelines for institutions and the NCAA who may wish to test for or to implement increased institutional control of athletics.



## CHAPTER 4

### DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS

#### Introduction

In this chapter, the information collected from responses to the research questionnaires is presented and discussed. The questionnaires were completed and returned by the chief executive officers and the athletics directors at the 275 NCAA Division I colleges and universities listed in the 1996/97 National Directory of College Athletics.

The purpose of this investigation was to determine the current status of institutional control of athletics programs at the Division I schools by identifying the sources and levels of control and the methods by which control was exercised and to determine where problems with control exist. The questionnaire used to obtain this information was designed with the following questions in mind:

1. To what degree and with what strategies was control exercised by the chief executive officer of the institution?
2. In what ways and to what extent was institutional control facilitated or inhibited by the governing board of the institution?

3. In what ways did financial and operational policies of the institution influence and affect control of athletics?
4. In what ways were athletics directors involved in the institution's control of athletics?
5. In what ways were the school's boosters and alumni affecting the institution's control of athletics?

### The Governing Board

Control of athletics at a college or university begins with its governing board. However, as Slaughter (1989) points out, it is important that the governing board resist the temptation to micromanage the daily life on campus. When a board involves itself in micro-managing, says Slaughter, it undermines the authority of its chief executive officer. Rather than attempting to directly manage athletics themselves, boards need to delegate the full authority for control of the athletics programs to their CEO's and to support them in exercising that authority. This need arises from the fact that it is the chief executive officer, not the governing board, who has traditionally been identified as the one bearing the responsibility for control of the athletics program (Smith, 1988; Thelin, 1989).

The governing board's delegation of authority to its president should be clearly articulated in its mission statement. In addition, a governing board should assist its CEO by drafting a mission statement in which it defines the role of athletics at the institution; this provides guidelines and standards within which the CEO can assert control. As Table 1 shows, questionnaire responses indicated that a majority of governing boards

have written mission statements in which they define the role of athletics. However, a number of respondents (6% of athletics directors and 21% of presidents) indicated that their institution has no such mission statement.

Table 1: Mission Statement Concerning Role of Athletics

Question: "Does the governing board have a mission statement concerning the role of athletics at your university?"

Response		Yes	No	Totals
Athletics Director	Frequency	131	8	139
	Percent	94%	6%	100%
Chief Executive Officer	Frequency	84	22	106
	Percent	79%	21%	100%

A larger majority of boards, according to respondents, have addressed the issue of delegation of authority to the CEO. Fewer than 2% of AD's and 5% of CEO's either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement, "The governing board of your institution has a clearly articulated mission statement concerning the authority of the chief executive officer."

Another issue involving the governing board concerns the degree to which the board is supportive of presidential authority at their institution. As Table 2 shows: the majority of both chief executive officers and athletics directors (78% in both cases) strongly agreed that their governing board is supportive of presidential authority at their institution. Of the remainders, almost all agreed that their CEO receives the support of the board. Less than 1% of respondents indicated either neutrality or disagreement with this statement.

Table 2: Governing Board Support of Presidential Authority

Statement: "The governing board is supportive of chief executive officer authority at your institution."

	Response	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Totals
Athletics Director	Frequency	110	30	1	0	0	141
	Percent	78%	21%	1%	0%	0%	100%
Chief Executive Officer	Frequency	82	22	1	0	0	105
	Percent	78%	21%	1%	0%	0%	100%

On the other hand, although they felt that the boards are supportive of the president's authority in managing the athletics program, a majority — 65% of the presidents and 70% of the athletics directors — also either strongly agreed or agreed that their governing boards expect winning programs.

Table 3: Governing Board Expectations Regarding Wins

Statement: "The governing board of your institution expects the athletics department to have winning programs."

	Response	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Totals
Athletics Director	Frequency	15	84	25	16	1	141
	Percent	11%	60%	18%	11%	1%	100%
Chief Executive Officer	Frequency	12	56	15	16	6	105
	Percent	11%	53%	14%	15%	6%	100%

The board's expectations of a winning program does not in itself constitute a problem. However, it could translate into pressure from the governing board on the chief executive and the athletics director and, in turn, on the coaches. This could constitute a problem because pressure to win can translate into a win-at-all-costs attitude (Rooney, 1980). It can become so intense that coaches and athletes, as well as the university administration, sometimes put athletic success ahead of educational achievement (Simon, 1985). When governing boards expect coaches to win, a situation can be created

whereby the coaches believe that it is more likely that they will be fired for not winning than that they will be fired for violating NCAA rules ( Davies, 1995; Frey, 1994).

The extent of the financial support which the governing board provides for the operation of the athletics department can result in yet another pressure on the coaches. If the financial support provided by the board is not enough for the athletics department to be self-sufficient, the institution will of necessity search externally for revenue to fund the program (Riley & Baldrige, 1977). This external revenue will come either from boosters seeking control or from the gate receipts from winning programs (Atwell, Grimes, & Lopiano, 1980; Riley & Baldrige, 1977).

The questionnaire results shown in Table 4 make it evident that many chief executive officers believe that the governing board of their institutions does not provide enough financial support for the athletics department to be self-sufficient.

Table 4: Extent of Financial Support

Statement: "The governing board provides enough financial support to your institution for the athletics department to be self-sufficient."

Response	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Totals
Frequency	8	34	13	30	13	98
Percent	8%	35%	13%	31%	13%	100%

This question was asked of the CEO's alone. Those chief executive officers who responded either "Strongly Agree" or "Agree" total 43%. The total for those who disagreed or strongly disagreed was 44%. According to this, almost half of the institutions underfund their athletics departments. It is probable that these institutions are searching externally for revenue to fund their athletics programs.

## The Athletics Director

The athletics directors are critical elements in the institutional control of athletics. Many problems in college athletics can be traced to the fact that athletics directors, coaches, and athletics departments have operated separately from institutions, with little or no accountability to the president or chancellor (Lapchick 1987; Thelin, 1989). Chief executive officers have learned of their communities' lust for winning, and most choose not to be in the direct firing line should athletic problems erupt; they are thereby abetting this independence of AD's (Miller, 1982). Some athletics directors, hung out on a limb, have been chewed up like confetti, as have head coaches and assistant coaches in such high pressure sports as football and basketball (Miller, 1982). However, chief executive officers can no longer ignore the problems of athletics. They have been mandated to take control and bring athletics back into the fold of the institution (Knight Commission 1991; Miller, 1982; Scott, 1982; Slaughter, 1989).

A key aspect of institutional control involves the role of the athletics director at the institution. Potential problems exist when the duties of the athletics director include coaching responsibilities. As Thelin (1989) pointed out, "The dual role of head coach and athletics director is a dangerous concentration of roles and powers, is increasingly rare, and often signals an institution more concerned with emphasizing one or two sports at the expense of a balanced, equitable intercollegiate sports program" (p. 92). The survey results showed that 97% of institutions have separated the athletics directors from coaching responsibilities.

The athletics director of an institution is critical to the institutional control of athletics. If the athletics director is not supportive of presidential authority, then control

of athletics is more difficult to attain. The responses to the survey were almost unanimous in either agreeing or strongly agreeing that athletics directors are supportive of presidential authority.

Table 5: Support for Presidential Authority by Athletics Director

Statement: "The athletics director at your institution is supportive of presidential authority."

Response		Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Totals
Athletics Director	Frequency	128	15	0	143
	Percent	90%	10%	0%	100%
Chief Executive Officer	Frequency	89	16	1	106
	Percent	84%	15%	1%	100%

Similarly, all CEO's indicated that the athletics director at their institution is committed to NCAA rules education compliance.

A major issue for the institutional control of athletics is the relationship between the athletics department and the success of its programs. The chief executive officers are, in many cases, faced with the same pressures as the athletics directors and the coaches. They can be fired for the same reason as the football coach is fired (Scott, 1982, p. 35). Everyone agrees that losing games can get you fired (Denlinger & Shapiro, 1975; Fleisher, 1992; Frey, 1988, 1994; Funk, 1991; Guttman, 1982, 1988; Isaacs, 1978; Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1989; Simon, 1985; Smith, 198; Rooney, 1980). On the other hand, if coaches feel they must win at all costs, or break NCAA rules in order to win, then athletics scandals can occur. Blackburn and Nykos (1974) commented, "If the team falters, if scandal clouds the campus, if the university is embarrassed, the president almost always takes substantial blame" (p. 65).

One situation that can lead to this is when athletics directors expect coaches to

have winning programs as the highest priority. The data in Table 6 shows that many athletics directors do expect coaches to have winning programs: 39% of them said that they agreed or strongly agreed that this is true.

Table 6: Athletics Director's Expectations of Coaches

Statement: "The athletics director at your institution expects coaches to have winning programs."

Response	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Totals
Frequency	7	49	11	61	15	143
Percent	5%	34%	8%	43%	10%	100%

When the same question was asked of CEO's, their responses showed that many more of them feel that AD's expect their coaches to have winning teams. Ninety-three percent of respondents either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement.

Table 7: Athletics Director's Expectations of Coaches (According to CEO's)

Statement: "The athletics director at your institution expects coaches to have winning programs."

Response	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Totals
Frequency	24	74	4	3	1	106
Percent	23%	70%	4%	3%	1%	100%

This expectation by athletics directors that their coaches have winning programs does not necessarily mean that the coaches will cheat. However, it does reflect a pressure that would add to the temptation for a coach to cheat in order to win.

A related issue concerns whether or not the athletics director at an institution believes the stability of his or her position depends on having winning programs. The data in Table 8 shows that a substantial number of respondents (40% of AD's and 46% of CEO's) felt that athletics directors believed the stability of their position depends on



having winning programs. Again, this does not necessarily mean that pressure would be put on coaches to win, but it is certainly an element that could contribute to the temptation to cheat.

Table 8: Stability of Athletics Director Position

Statement: "The athletics director at your institution believes the stability of his or her position depends on having winning athletics programs."

	Response	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Totals
Athletics Director	Frequency	2	56	15	64	6	143
	Percent	1%	39%	10%	45%	4%	100%
Chief Executive Officer	Frequency	7	41	16	36	6	106
	Percent	7%	39%	15%	34%	6%	100%

A parallel issue concerns coaches and whether or not they believe the stability of their positions depends on having a winning program. Coaches can be under intense pressure to produce victories; if they believe the stability of their position depends on having winning programs, there is a chance they will cheat to win. In addition, these pressures, combined with the tremendous monetary and material rewards available to successful Division I coaches, motivate some in the business to use any means necessary to secure the skilled athlete (Funk, 1991).

Table 9: Stability of Football and Basketball Coaches Positions

Statement: "Football and basketball coaches at your institution believe the stability of their positions depends on having a winning program."

	Response	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Totals
Athletics Director	Frequency	20	90	9	21	3	143
	Percent	14%	63%	6%	15%	2%	100%
Chief Executive Officer	Frequency	17	71	5	12	1	106
	Percent	16%	67%	5%	11%	1%	100%

The data in Table 9 shows that 83% of chief executive officers and 77% of athletics directors strongly agreed or agreed that football and basketball coaches at their institutions believe the stability of their positions depends on having a winning program. The same question was asked of both chief executive officers and athletics directors in regard to coaches of Olympics sports (track, tennis, golf, etc.); the results were similar — 51% of CEO's and 50% of AD's either agreed or strongly agreed that these coaches believe their positions are reliant on winning; this is shown in Table 10.

Table 10: Stability of Position of Olympic Sport Coaches

Statement: "Olympic sports coaches (tennis, soccer, golf, etc.) at your institution believe the stability of their positions depend on having a winning program."

Response		Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Totals
Athletics Director	Frequency	4	68	17	50	4	143
	Percent	3%	47%	12%	35%	3%	100%
Chief Executive Officer	Frequency	5	48	20	27	4	104
	Percent	5%	46%	19%	26%	4%	100%

Another potential problem for the institutional control of athletics exists when the contracts of coaches contain athletics performance clauses that could cause the contracts to be non-renewed. Coaches are extremely competitive anyway, as Sperber (1990) pointed out: they can be so obsessed with winning that they will bend or break the rules to obtain the winning edge. Performance clauses that could cause non-renewal increase the chances that coaches will feel the pressure to break NCAA rules. Dennis Wagner (1997) of the Arizona Republic said that "College coaches get caught between the NCAA rule book and the knowledge that their careers depend on winning" (p. 203). Frey (1994) said it more plainly: "If you lose your games, you are certain to be fired. If you break the rules, you have to be caught to be fired" (p. 6). The data collected in the survey showed

that many coaches in Division I athletics did indeed have performance clauses that could cause their contracts to be non-renewed. The question was asked of the athletics directors: the results are shown in Table 11.

Table 11: Performance Clauses for Football and Basketball Coaches

Question: "Do the contracts of football and basketball coaches contain athletics performance clauses that could cause the contracts to be non-renewed?"

Response	Yes	No	Totals
Frequency	35	107	142
Percent	25%	75%	100%

According to respondents, a majority of coaches (75%) do not have performance clauses in their contracts: 25% constitutes a significant number, however, that do have clauses that can result in their losing their jobs if their teams do not win. This is enough to pose majors problems for institutional control.

The same question was asked of AD's concerning performance clauses in the contracts of Olympic sports coaches. The data in Table 12 indicates that some Olympics sports coaches did have performance clauses in their contracts.

Table 12: Performance clauses for Olympic Sports Coaches

Question: "Do the contracts of Olympic sports coaches (tennis, soccer, golf, etc. ) contain athletics performance clauses that could cause the contracts to be non-renewed?"

Response	Yes	No	Totals
Frequency	24	118	142
Percent	17%	83%	100%

The survey responses indicated that fewer Olympic sports coaches have contracts containing performance clauses that can result in non-renewal. However, 17% still

represents a significant number of coaches who face losing their jobs if they fail to have a winning team.

Another area that is important to institutional control of athletics concerns whether or not the athletics director makes it clear that he or she demands compliance with NCAA regulations. The data collected showed that this is not a problem. Almost all of chief executive officers (99%) and athletics directors (98%) indicated that the AD at their institution does make it clear that he or she demands compliance with NCAA rules and that they will not tolerate those who deliberately violate the rules or do so through gross negligence.

Also important to the matter of institutional control of athletics is the attitude of a school's athletics director about its educational goals. Kjeldsen (1992) stated that presidents must actively participate in athletic governance by holding athletics directors accountable for contributing to the educational goals and principles of the university. Here too the responses were almost unanimous: 99% of CEO's indicated that they believe that the athletics director at their institution agrees with the educational goals of the school. In the same way, the attitude of the coaches toward their schools' educational goals is important. Again, the data showed no problem at all in this area.

Questions designed to determine if coaches have a clear understanding of their role within the university, if they understand and adhere to NCAA rules, and if they are committed to NCAA rules compliance were asked in the questionnaire. The responses indicated that there were no problems felt to exist in these areas.

Table 13 shows the responses by athletics directors asked to name the greatest threat to institutional control at their schools. The most frequently identified threat was

boosters: it was listed 37 times as the greatest threat to the institutional control of athletics. Better education and educational brochures and guides for boosters, coaches, and students were mentioned as the best methods to lessen the impact of this threat. Better monitoring and enforcement procedures were mentioned five times frequently as other suggested methods.

Table 13: Threats to the Control of Athletics

Question (to AD's): "What is the greatest threat to institutional control of athletics at your institution?"

Response	Frequency	Percent
Boosters	37	28%
Agents	17	13%
External Force	14	11%
Money, Funding, Resources	12	9%
Coaches	10	8%
Alumni	8	6%
NCAA & Regulations	5	4%
Staff	5	4%
Winning at All Costs	4	3%
Athletes	4	3%
Lack of Compliance Staff	3	2%
Regents	3	2%
Lack of Understanding	3	2%
Gambling	2	2%
Media	2	2%
The President	1	1%
Faculty	1	1%
Totals	131	100%

Professional agents were the second most frequently identified threat to the institutional control of athletics. Better education, educational brochures and guides for coaches and students was mentioned by everyone as a method to lessen the impact of this threat on institutional control. A few athletics directors mentioned working closely with the NCAA and their respective state governments on registration of agents programs.

Better compliance, monitoring, and enforcement policies were also mentioned as good methods.

Another open-ended question designed to gather comments from AD's asked them to identify strategies that they have used to establish or reestablish the institutional control of athletics? The responses are tabulated in Table 14.

Table 14: Strategies to Establish Control

Question (to AD's): "Name three strategies that you have used to establish or reestablish institutional control of athletics."

Response	Frequency	Percent
Education	53	22%
Compliance	47	19%
Athletic Department	25	10%
Policy, Procedures, Goals	24	10%
Audits, Reviews, etc.	23	9%
Hiring & Firing	12	5%
Athletics Council	10	4%
President	9	4%
Athletics Director	8	3%
Financial	8	3%
Communication	6	2%
Conference & NCAA	5	2%
Coaches	3	1%
Board of Regents	3	1%
Administration	3	1%
Faculty Athletics Rep	2	1%
Contracts	2	1%
Total	243	100%

The most commonly named strategy, listed 53 times, was education. Specific educational activities named included: reviewing rules and regulations with staff and coaches; reinforcing the need for compliance; stressing rules and regulations with student athletes; educating about and stressing the goals, missions, and rules expectations; educating the faculty athletics representative; educating the boosters and alumni; using

educational pamphlets, programs and mandatory seminars; holding regular meetings with the faculty athletics board; arranging professional improvement seminars; and writing reminders of "Can Do" and "Cannot Do" to boosters and alumni.

The second most frequently listed strategy used by athletics directors to establish or reestablish institutional control was the compliance office which was listed 47 times. Specific activities named in this area were varied; they included: developing a strong compliance office emphasizing institutional control; scrutinizing applicable rules more closely; committing support to the compliance officer; conducting compliance audits; maintaining compliance records detailing recruiting, fund raising, playing seasons, and practice sessions activities; employing a full time compliance officer directing functions and education of coaches, staff, alumni, and boosters; implementing compliance policies and procedures; detailing a checks and balance system; emphasizing importance of the office; improving the monitoring program; making everyone a part of the compliance team; and using technology to monitor management and rules compliance.

### The Chief Executive Officer

At the heart of institutional control of athletics is the chief executive officer. It is the CEO whom the NCAA has identified as the person ultimately responsible for control. The Knight Commission (1991) stated that presidents have a responsibility to act (p. 181) while Kjeldsen (1982) declared that it is the presidents on whom improvement in intercollegiate athletics depends. Many others have also called for presidents to take action to assert control of athletics (ACE, 1979; Hartford, 1976; Lapchick, 1987; Smith, 1988; Thelin, 1989, 1994).

First and foremost, the CEO must make it clear that he or she demands compliance with NCAA rules and regulations and will not tolerate those who violate those rules either deliberately or through gross negligence. Almost all survey respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that they do so. However, the survey also showed that in many cases, it is not the chief executive officer who directly supervises the school's athletics directors: 39% of AD's and 45% of CEO's identified someone other than the school's CEO as the direct supervisor of the athletics director. In those cases, it is possible that the strength of the CEO's demands regarding strict rules compliance is diluted to some degree by the fact of an intermediate supervisor.

Like the AD's, the chief executive officers were asked to identify the greatest threat to institutional control of athletics at their institution. Their responses are shown in Table 15:

Table 15: Threats to Control of Athletics

Question (to CEO): "What is the greatest threat to institutional control of athletics at your institution?"

Response	Frequency	Percent
Boosters	22	27%
Money, Funding, Resources	16	20%
Coaches	9	11%
Agents	9	11%
External Force	4	5%
Staff	3	4%
NCAA & Regulations	3	4%
Athletes	2	2%
Winning at All Costs	2	2%
Television	2	2%
Alumni	2	2%
Regents	2	2%
Lack of Understanding	2	2%
Faculty	1	1%



Athletics Director	1	1%
Compliance	1	1%
Lack of Compliance Staff	1	1%
Media	1	1%
Athletics Department	1	1%
Totals	82	100%

The CEO's, like the athletics directors, identified boosters as the greatest threat to the institutional control of athletics. Specifically identified were those boosters who are overzealous with no personal risk at stake, who are uneducated and uninformed about NCAA rules and regulations, who interfere, who want to win at all costs, who are renegade supporters, who involve themselves in improper relations with students and coaches, and who are out of control.

Better education and educational brochures and guides for boosters, coaches, and students were named as the best methods to lessen the impact of this threat. Other suggestions included consolidating all boosters groups and placing them under the control of the institution, requiring that all booster funds be deposited under the budgetary control of the institution, conducting periodic audits of expenditures, strengthening procedures for monitoring and enforcement, and stating policies more clearly. Also, two chief executive officers stressed the need for a strong athletics director with a high level of integrity as key to controlling the threat that boosters can pose.

The CEO's, again like the AD's, identified money-related issues as the second greatest threat to institutional control. Specific circumstances named were lack of adequate financial resources, loss of fiscal integrity, increases in dependence on external financial support from boosters, budget difficulties, cost increases, the need to produce income, lack of institutional funding, and the greed of a small number of Division I A

institutions. The actions recommended by the CEO's to lessen the impact on control were tightening of fiscal controls; establishing a balance between self-generated revenue and institutional funds; better promoting of events; generating more revenue; gaining support from alumni, corporations and boosters; earmarking all income for athletic grants-in-aid; and improving fund raising.

CEO's were asked what percentage of control they had over the athletics program at their institution. The mode was 100% having been selected by 74% of the respondents revealing that a sizable majority of CEO's felt that they have complete control over their athletics program. An additional 21% selected either 95% or 90% level of control.

Table 16 shows that the most common strategy named by chief executive officers to establish or reestablish institutional control, listed 43 times, related to the athletics director, most commonly to the appointment of the AD (mentioned 18 times). Comments in this regard ranged from noting the importance of hiring a strong athletics director, to hiring one who supports the overall mission of the institution, who is competent, who is in clear agreement with the CEO on goals and standards, who understands athletics must be managed as a business, who has integrity, who is a leader, or who shares the CEO's values. The reporting line of the athletics director was mentioned eleven times; the comment of all eleven CEO's who specified this was that the athletics director should report directly to the CEO.

Table 16: Strategies to Establish Control

Question (to CEO's): "Name three strategies that you have used to establish control of athletics."

Response	Frequency	Percent
Athletics Director	43	21%
Compliance	19	9%
Policy, Procedures, Goals	19	9%
Financial	16	8%
Athletics Council	15	7%
President	12	6%
Audits, Reviews, etc.	12	6%
Education	10	5%
Communication	10	5%
Faculty Athletics Rep	9	4%
Hiring & Firing	9	4%
Boosters	7	3%
Conferences and NCAA	5	2%
Contracts	5	2%
Board of Regents	4	2%
Coaches	3	1%
Athletics Department	3	1%
Totals	201	100%

The data in Table 16 shows that the second most common strategy used by chief executive officers to establish or reestablish institutional control was compliance related. Compliance-related strategies were listed 19 times; specific actions listed included adding a full time compliance officer, making sure the executive council fully supports institutional control, and taking swift action when needed. Other comments related to developing a strong compliance office emphasizing institutional control, constant reinforcing of policy, encouraging broad-based participation, implementing strong monitoring policies, and establishing accountability.

## Financial & Operational Policies

Various financial and operational policies have been identified as potential influences on the institutional control of athletics. According to a study conducted by Mitchell Raiborn (1974), the budgetary process was considered valuable to the planning and control of athletic operations by 84% of all respondents in his study.

An operational policy that includes self-study and evaluation of the intercollegiate athletics programs is considered a necessity by the NCAA which mandates such an undertaking for member institutions at least once every five years (NCAA Manual 1997-98). The results of this study indicate that the majority of institutions conduct comprehensive self-studies and do so at least once every five years. However, 8% of CEO's and 6% of AD's reported that their schools did not conduct such a self-study and evaluation.

An external peer review of the athletics program has been identified by the NCAA as a method to gauge the level of institutional control over the athletics department. The NCAA states:

The involvement in the certification program of peer reviewers who are external to the institution is designed to verify and evaluate the methodology and results of the institutional self-study. Peer reviewers shall verify that the self-study process was characterized by campus-wide participation and that the self-study report reflects accurately the operation of the athletics program. Peer reviewers also shall evaluate the institution's athletic program in relation to a set of fundamental operating principles" (NCAA Manual, 1997-98, p. 47).

In response to the survey, 19% of AD's and 13% of CEO's said that their schools have not conducted external peer reviews of the athletics program.

Another policy element of institutional control is based on an institution having an articulated set of goals concerning the athletics program. According to Thelin (1989), presidents face a serious confusion of roles in matters of athletics policy and administration. To solve this problem, he said, "Each institution should clearly define its purpose and should incorporate this definition into a statement as a pronouncement of its role in the educational world" (p. 96). The results of the study showed that the majority of institutions have a set of goals concerning the athletics program; however, 11% of AD's and 7% of CEO's reported that their institutions do not.

Admissions and academic policies are another area of concern. Michener (1976) reported that "the temptation to recruit young men skilled at games but totally unfitted for academic work is overpowering" (p. 189). A former CEO of Harvard University, Derek Bok (1983), expressed the opinion that some universities were admitting more and more athletes whose educational backgrounds and aptitudes were so low that they have little chance of academic success. Athletes, said Simon (1985), should also be students who are academically qualified to be in the university, who make satisfactory academic progress, and who graduate with meaningful academic skills. The NCAA has mandated that "intercollegiate athletics programs shall be maintained as a vital component of the educational program, and student-athletes shall be an integral part of the student body. The admission, academic standing, and academic progress of student-athletes shall be consistent with the policies and standards adopted by the institution for the student body in general" (NCAA Manual 1997-98, p. 4). However, as indicated by the figures in

Table 17. a significant number of institutions may not be complying with this directive since 20% of AD's and 13% of CEO's reported that athletes at their schools are not expected to meet the same admissions requirements as the general student body.

Table 17: Admission Requirements for Athletes

Question: "Are all athletes expected to meet the same admission requirements as the general student body?"

	Response	Yes	No	Totals
Athletics Director	Frequency	115	29	144
	Percent	80%	20%	100%
Chief Executive Officer	Frequency	87	13	100
	Percent	87%	13%	100%

According to Hardy and Berryman (1982), colleges and athletics have frequently lacked clearly defined goals regarding athletics; Scott (1982) also observed that institutions need to clarify their philosophy and objectives concerning athletics. Most respondents to the survey confirmed that their schools have clearly articulated mission statements pertaining to the role of athletics; 3% of AD's and 8% of CEO's replied that their schools do not have mission statements concerning the role of athletics.

Another element which can influence institutional control relates to the establishment of an athletics board. The function of a faculty athletics board or committee according to Sack (1982), is to give priority to the educational needs of student athletes; athletic competition, he maintained, should be limited to schools that are equally committed to the educational model of sport. Most respondents (91% of CEO's and 94% of AD's) confirmed that an athletics board has been established at their schools.

However, the role of the board is limited to an advisory one according to the

majority of respondents — 83% of CEO's and 81% of AD's. Frey (1982) criticized institutions that have advisory-only committees as did Thelin (1989) who summed up the objection by saying that a board without authority to make decisions was like playing basketball without keeping score.

Table 18: Role of the Board

Question: Is the role of the board advisory only?

	Response	Yes	No	Totals
Chief Executive Officer	Frequency	114	26	140
	Percent	81%	19%	100%
Athletics Director	Frequency	85	17	102
	Percent	83%	17%	100%

Another element that impacts institutional control is the level of financial support provided to the athletics department to be considered self sufficient. Riley and Baldrige (1977) and Nyquist (1979) have charged that universities have pushed athletic departments into external partnerships because institutional budgets for athletics have not kept pace with costs which have steadily increased and have even doubled in as little as ten years. Athletic departments have had to seek revenue from external groups, who, in turn, desire control (Atwell, Grimes & Lopiano, 1980). According to Frey (1994), "External coalitions provide the resources necessary to maintain the department's operational livelihood and to keep it from being a resource drain on the larger organization" (p. 6).

The figures in Table 19 indicate that almost half of the institutions did not provide enough financial support to the athletics department for it to be considered self sufficient. This implies that the other half of the institutions find it necessary to turn to other sources including those outside of the university in order to obtain the funds that

are necessary to support their athletics programs. Table 20 presents the data concerning the percentage of the annual athletics budget that was reported to have come from institutional or state funds and the percentage that came from other funding.

**Table 19: Financial Support to the Athletics Department**

**Statement:** "Your institution provides enough financial support to the athletics department for it to be considered self-sufficient."

Response		Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Totals
Athletics Director	Frequency	20	44	11	46	17	138
	Percent	14%	32%	8%	33%	12%	100%
Chief Executive Officer	Frequency	9	35	8	36	14	102
	Percent	9%	34%	8%	35%	14%	100%

**Table 20: Percentage of Athletics Budget from Institutional or State Funds**

**Question (asked of CEO's):** "What percentage of the athletic budget comes from institutional and/or state funds?"

Percentage of Budget	Frequency	Percent
0	14	14%
90%	14	14%
80%	13	13%
30%	11	11%
40%	9	9%
20%	8	8%
70%	8	8%
60%	7	7%
10%	5	5%
50%	4	4%
100%	4	4%
5%	1	1%
25%	1	1%
45%	1	1%
<b>Totals</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100%</b>

The chief executive officers reported that an average of 49% of their annual athletics budget comes from institutional and/or state funds. The conclusion follows that the remaining 51% of the athletics budget, on average, comes from other sources of



funding — either successful athletic programs or successful donation drives.

Another element of institutional control is whether the institution conducts an independent financial audit of the athletics department at least once a year. The NCAA has mandated that:

All expenditures for or in behalf of a Division I member institution's intercollegiate athletics program, including those by any outside organization, agency or group of individuals, shall be subject to an annual financial audit conducted for the institution by a qualified auditor who is not a staff member of the institution and who is selected either by the institution's chief executive officer or by an institutional administrator from outside the athletics department designated by the chief executive officer (NCAA 1997-98 Division I Manual, p. 48).

The responses to the questionnaire indicated that almost all of the institutions conduct an independent financial audit of the athletics department at least once a year: only 1% of AD's and 2% of CEO's reported that this was not done.

Another circumstance that affects institutional control exists when a foundation whose control is external to the institution provides monetary support to the athletics program. A popular solution to financial problems is to solicit donations from outside sources (Frey, 1982; Thelin, 1989). Thelin reported that these foundations, associations, and fund-raising groups exist with limited accountability to the host institution. Sperber (1990) also has reported that booster clubs have "an amazing degree of autonomy from the university" (p. 74). In addition, according to Frey, booster clubs have tended to move athletics increasingly away from academic and educational concerns. The results of this

study showed that those athletics programs which were provided with monetary support by foundations whose control is external to the institution were a minority. Nevertheless, there were enough of them to pose a potential problem. Table 21 presents the data concerning external foundations.

Table 21: Monetary Support from External Foundations

Question: "Do external foundations provide monetary support?"

Response		Yes	No	Totals
Athletics Director	Frequency	42	101	143
	Percent	29%	71%	100%
Chief Executive Officer	Frequency	38	67	105
	Percent	36%	64%	100%

Another element of institutional control concerns the establishment of informational and educational programs for student-athletes regarding the rules that they must follow. These programs are needed, according to Sack (1979), because "athletes are expected to handle the same course loads and to maintain the same academic standards as regular college students. It is not surprising, given the strains inherent in the scholar- athlete role, that athletes have been found to be more likely than regular students to cheat, to take easy courses, and to seek out other academic short cuts" (p. 60). Table 22 presents the data on whether informational and educational programs for student-athletes regarding rules that they must follow have been established.

Table 22: Educational Programs for Student-Athletes

Question: "Are informational and educational programs regarding the rules established for student-athletes?"

Response	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Totals
Frequency	94	48	2	143
Percent	90%	10%	0%	100%

The data in Table 22 indicates that the majority (90%) of institutions have established informational and educational programs for student-athletes regarding the rules that they must follow. Ten percent, unfortunately, have not done so.

The NCAA requires that institutions have in place procedures for self-reporting NCAA violations (NCAA Guide to Rules Compliance 1997-98). Almost all AD's reported that their institutions identify and report to the NCAA instances in which compliance has not been achieved.

The NCAA has recommended that an internal monitoring system be instituted in order to ensure compliance with NCAA rules (Principles of Institutional Control as Prepared by the NCAA Committee on Infractions, 1996). Again, responses showed that almost all institutions had a comprehensive monitoring program to ensure rules compliance.

Institutions are required by the NCAA to have a meaningful compliance education program provided for personnel engaged in athletics-related operations (Principles of Institutional Control as Prepared by the NCAA Committee on Infractions, 1996). Survey results indicated that almost all institutions had a comprehensive NCAA-rules-and- regulations education program for the athletics department

Although the NCAA has not mandated that Division I institutions have a full time

compliance officer, it places the burden of proof on institutions “to demonstrate control of their athletics programs and the effectiveness of compliance systems with concrete examples of implementation and effectively functioning compliance systems” (Principles of Institutional Control: NCAA Guide to Rules Compliance, p. 6). The Principles of Institutional Control, as prepared by the NCAA Committee on Infractions, lists examples of lack of institutional control related to personnel responsible for compliance. These examples are as follows:

1. A person with compliance responsibilities fails to establish a proper system for compliance or fails to monitor the operations of a compliance system appropriately.
2. A person with compliance responsibilities does not take steps to alter the system of compliance when there are indications the system is not working.
3. A supervisor with overall responsibility for compliance, in assigning duties to subordinates, so divides responsibilities that, as a practical matter, no one is, or appears to be, directly in charge.
4. Compliance duties are assigned to a subordinate who lacks sufficient authority to have the confidence or respect of others.

These examples indicate that the responsibility for compliance should belong to one person who does not share coaching responsibilities. This study indicates that this is the

case at the majority of institutions: however, 16% of AD's and 18% of CEO's responded that their schools did not have a full-time compliance officer.

### Boosters & Alumni

A difficult element of controlling the intercollegiate athletics program concerns the involvement of alumni and boosters. Sperber (1990) indicated that the booster problem is worse than ever: "It's become especially acute because institutions must attempt to obtain financial support from booster organizations and then worry about turning over control of their programs to these same people" (p. 79). Hart-Nibbrig and Cottingham (1989) have also said that the influence of boosters is difficult to control. This is easy to understand because, according to Frey (1982), a unit which does not have the support of the booster element does not usually survive politically or economically; if a booster organization can provide the money, then it can also command some power in athletic decision making. In fact, according to Sperber (1990), any effort to control the booster groups has been largely superficial since the need for the resources these groups provide is so great: "Boosters are usually can-do business types and the distinction between ethical conduct and succeeding by any means is often unclear to them. When this syndrome is combined with their sense of ownership of a college sports team and their desire to see that team win at any cost, they ignore NCAA and all other rules" (p. 79).

Despite the difficulty in controlling external groups or individuals, such as boosters and alumni, the NCAA has mandated that the institutions are responsible for these groups. The 1997-98 NCAA Manual states that "an institution's "responsibility"

for the conduct of its intercollegiate athletics program shall include responsibility for the acts of an independent agency or organization when a member of the institution's executive or athletics administration, or an athletics department staff member, has knowledge that such agency or organization is promoting the institution's intercollegiate athletics program" (NCAA Manual, 1997-98, p. 49).

A place to start when considering booster involvement in athletics is to determine if the boosters and alumni of an institution are supportive of presidential authority. This support cannot be assumed considering the need for money at many institutions and the control that could be ceded to receive that money (Frey, 1982).

Table 23: Boosters and Alumni Support of Presidential Authority

	Response	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Totals
Athletics Director	Frequency	70	60	13	1	0	144
	Percent	49%	42%	9%	1%	0%	100%
Chief Executive Officer	Frequency	48	48	8	2	1	107
	Percent	45%	45%	7%	2%	1%	100%

The figures in Table 23 show that a majority of both chief executive officers and athletics directors agreed that boosters and alumni of their institution are supportive of presidential authority: 90% of presidents and 91% of athletics directors either strongly agreed or agreed that boosters and alumni of their institution are supportive of presidential authority.

Even if boosters and alumni are supportive of presidential authority, are they necessarily committed to NCAA rules education and compliance? Hart-Nibbrig and Cottingham (1989) reported many violations of NCAA rules initiated by boosters; these included giving money to players according to their performance on the field, paying the

college costs of the sisters of a potential recruit, supplying the use of an apartment to a recruit at a reduced rent, providing free room and board for recruits: providing transportation for recruits, and offering money in exchange for a letter of intent to attend a university. Sperber (1990) has stated that the stories of boosters giving recruits and college athletes illegal gifts are legion. He reported that in the history of the NCAA's policing of intercollegiate athletics, almost half of the approximately two thousand penalties have involved boosters abetting coaches in various violations (p. 79). The results of this study showed that a majority of chief executive officers and athletics directors either strongly agreed (45% and 37% respectively) or agreed (45% and 54%) that boosters and alumni of their institution are committed to NCAA rules education and compliance. Although almost no one disagreed with the statement concerning booster and alumni commitment, a relatively large group of both CEO's (8%) and AD's (15%) were undecided about the issue. This may be interpreted as indicating a degree of concern about the actual level of booster and alumni commitment to rules education and compliance.

Another question relating to boosters and alumni concerns the establishment of informational and educational programs in order to inform athletics boosters of the limitations on their activities under NCAA rules and of the penalties that can arise if they are responsible for rule violations. The NCAA has recommended that such informational and educational programs be established (Principles of Institutional Control as Prepared by the NCAA Committee on Infractions, 1996). Response to this question was definitive: 96% of respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that such programs had been established at their schools.

On a related issue, the NCAA has mandated that an institution is responsible for the acts of an independent agency or organization promoting the institution's intercollegiate athletics program (NCAA Manual, 1997-98). If the institution is responsible for the actions of external foundations or booster groups, then it is relevant for the institution to determine if these organizations exist: 29% of AD's and 36% of CEO's replied that these external organizations exist at their schools. Thelin (1994) reported that these foundations, associations, and fund-raising groups exist with limited accountability to the host institution. Unfortunately, these organizations, with their limited accountability, have gotten their institutions in trouble for various NCAA rules violations (Simon, 1985, p. 127).

Since the schools are responsible for the actions of these external foundations, an attempt should be made to bring these organizations under the control of the institution. At a minimum, attempts at education for these external booster groups should be made in order to relate the potential problems facing the school if NCAA rules are violated.

Hart-Nibbrig and Cottingham (1989) have stated that to the extent that universities must appeal to the public for funds, they can hardly resolve the systematic pressures associated with intercollegiate athletics. Frey (1982) stated that "the truth of the matter is that presidents, faculty, and students will always lose the control battle because they do not have the resources to compete with those available to the booster coalition" (p. 225). External funds are necessary for athletics programs because legislative appropriations, university budgets, and gate receipts do not provide sufficient funds for a high-level program (Atwell, 1980; Frey, 1982). The results of this study showed that the majority of institutions rely on funds generated from boosters and



alumni. This is shown in Tables 24 and 25:

Table 24: Monetary Support from External Athletics Foundations

Question: "Do external foundations provide monetary support to the athletic program?"

Response		Yes	No	Totals
Athletics Director	Frequency	31	111	142
	Percent	22%	78%	100%
Chief Executive Officer	Frequency	32	74	106
	Percent	30%	70%	100%

Table 25: Funds Generated from Boosters and Alumni

Statement: "The athletic department relies on funds generated from boosters and alumni."

Response		Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Totals
Athletics Director	Frequency	29	52	10	44	9	144
	Percent	20%	36%	7%	31%	6%	100%
Chief Executive Officer	Frequency	17	36	5	37	12	107
	Percent	16%	34%	5%	35%	11%	100%

Do boosters and alumni of institutions expect the athletics department to have winning programs? Funk (1991) stated that coaches are under intense pressure from alumni to produce victories (p. 89). This pressure could cause some coaches to use any means to secure victories. Table 26 presents the related data.

Table 26: Expectations of Boosters and Alumni

Statement: "Boosters and alumni expect to have winning programs."

Response		Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Totals
Athletics Director	Frequency	40	93	7	3	1	144
	Percent	28%	65%	5%	2%	1%	100%
Chief Executive Officer	Frequency	29	69	2	1	1	102
	Percent	28%	68%	2%	1%	1%	100%

Guttman (1988) contended that alumni, who are not always concerned with

excellence in the classroom. have been known to give generously to purchase athletic greatness: it is common knowledge. he said, that alumni and state legislators are more generous to their alma mater when the football team has done well (p. 73). Survey respondents were split on the issue of whether or not boosters and alumni would contribute to a losing program. Although over half felt that boosters would contribute regardless of the programs success, 21% of AD's and 22% of CEO's felt that the contributions relied on a winning program. A substantial number (20% and 22%) neither agreed or disagreed indicating again an uncertainty or ambivalence about boosters.

Table 27: Booster & Alumni Contributions

Statement: "Boosters and alumni will not contribute unless the athletic programs win."

Response		Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Totals
Athletics Director	Frequency	3	28	29	77	7	144
	Percent	2%	19%	20%	53%	5%	100%
Chief Executive Officer	Frequency	2	21	23	52	8	106
	Percent	2%	20%	22%	49%	8%	100%

Funk (1991) reported that coaches are under intense pressure from alumni to produce victories. Lapchick (1996) declared that the number one rule that mattered was winning: the coaches who followed this rule, he said, stayed at their schools for long periods of time — no one pointed a finger at the coaches unless they lost. Hart-Nibbrig and Cottingham (1989) pointed out that even at the Ivy League universities, coaches can be fired for sustaining a losing tradition. Primary sources of this widespread pressure to win are boosters and alumni. This is reflected in the study results which showed that only 30% of CEO's and 32% AD's disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement that boosters and alumni of an institution expect coaches with losing records to be fired.

Once again, a sizable number of respondents (29% and 33%) indicated uncertainty or indecision by choosing to remain "neutral."

**Table 28: Boosters Expectations Regarding Coaches**

**Statement:** "Boosters and alumni of your institution expect coaches with losing records to be fired."

	Response	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Totals
Athletics Director	Frequency	4	45	48	41	6	144
	Percent	3%	31%	33%	28%	4%	100%
Chief Executive Officer	Frequency	5	38	31	29	3	106
	Percent	5%	36%	29%	27%	3%	100%

### Summary

The results of this study indicated that governing boards, chief executive officers, and athletics directors were taking steps to support institutional control of Division I athletics. Most governing boards had written mission statements in which they have defined the role of athletics at their school; they had also articulated the authority of the chief executive officer in a mission statement and are supportive of that authority as were the athletics directors.

CEO's and AD's have been making it clear that they demand compliance with NCAA rules. The institutions have been conducting independent financial audits of the athletics department, establishing faculty athletics boards, creating clearly articulated mission statements concerning the role of athletics, creating articulated sets of goals concerning the athletic program, conducting peer reviews of the athletics department, and conducting comprehensive self-study and evaluation of the athletics program. The CEO's have also separated the Athletics Directors from coaching responsibilities for the

majority of institutions.

Comprehensive NCAA rules-education programs have been established as have informational and educational programs for boosters and student-athletes. Monitoring programs have been set up to ensure that rules compliance has been established and institutions have identified and reported to the NCAA instances in which compliance has not been achieved.

Despite these successes in the institutional control of athletics, there were areas of concern that were identified by this study.

Pressures to Win: There were a number of pressures placed on coaches to have winning and successful programs. The data in Table 3 showed that governing boards expect athletics departments to have winning programs. Data in Table 6 and Table 7 reflected the fact that athletics directors expected coaches to have winning programs as their highest priority and Table 31 showed that boosters and alumni also expect the athletics department to have winning programs.

The fact that governing boards, athletics directors, and boosters expected coaches to have winning programs does not necessarily mean that coaches will cheat. However, it did reflect pressure on a coach to win. Combined with other influences, it could add to the temptation for a coach to cheat to win.

The results of the study also indicated that the athletics directors and coaches felt that the stability their position depends on having winning programs. The data in Table 8 showed that a large number of athletics directors believed the stability of their position depends on having winning programs. Tables 9 and 10 indicated that Olympic sports coaches as well as football and basketball coaches believe the stability of their positions

depends on having a winning program. That belief is easy to understand — the data in Table 26 indicated that boosters and alumni of an institution expect coaches with losing records to be fired. On top of that, as the information in Tables 11 and 12 showed, the contracts of some coaches contain athletics-performance clauses that could cause the contracts to be non-renewed. Such clauses increase the risk that coaches might feel enough pressure to do anything to win.

On the one hand, CEO's and AD's educate and expect coaches to follow NCAA rules. On the other hand there is substantial pressure on coaches to have winning programs. Will the coach be fired for breaking NCAA rules — or for losing? This is a dilemma that not only causes problems for coaches but for the concept of institutional control of athletics as well.

Reliance on External Funds: Another issue raised by the data in this study was the reliance on external monies to help fund the activities of the athletics departments. The data in Table 25 indicated that athletics departments rely to a great extent on funds generated from boosters and alumni. Also, as the information in Table 19 showed, half of the respondents indicated that their institution did not provide enough financial support to the athletics department for it to be considered self sufficient. More specifically, the data in Tables 20 and 21 showed that CEO's and AD's agreed that only half of the athletics department budget came from the institution. This implies that the other half came from external funding.

Athletics finance was a concern for the chief executive officer. The data in Table 15 showed that CEO's rate money, funding, resources, and financing as the second greatest threat to institutional control. Inadequate financial resources, dependence on

financial support from boosters, budget difficulties, cost increases, the need to produce income, and the lack of institutional funding were all identified as threats to institutional control.

The methods recommended by CEO's to reduce the impact of finance-related concerns on athletic control included establishing a balance between self-generated revenue and institutional funds; improving of events promotion; generating more revenue; gaining support from alumni, corporations, and boosters; and improving fund raising. However, the suggested solutions create a paradox — the solution to one problem creates another. The NCAA has mandated that an institution is responsible for the acts of an independent agency or organization promoting the school's intercollegiate athletics program (NCAA Manual, 1997-98). Nevertheless, the data in Tables 21, 24, and 25 showed that some external athletic foundations or booster organizations not under the direct control of their institution do exist in order to support and provide money to the institution. The paradox consists of how to satisfy the need for financial help from boosters and alumni on one hand while also keeping external forces from either controlling or causing the institution trouble by breaking NCAA rules.

Faculty Athletics Board: Survey results showed that the majority of institutions have either a board that is in control of athletics or an athletics advisory board. However, the data in Tables 18 and 19 also showed that the role of the board is advisory only. Institutions cannot expect their faculty to help with the control of athletics if they do not allow the faculty board to have authority beyond the merely advisory role.

Admitting Student-Athletes Under Different Criteria: The NCAA has mandated that "intercollegiate athletics programs shall be maintained as a vital component of the

educational program, and student-athletes shall be an integral part of the student body. The admission, academic standing, and academic progress of student-athletes shall be consistent with the policies and standards adopted by the institution for the student body in general” (NCAA Manual 1997-98, p. 4). However, the data in Table 17 showed 13% of the chief executive officers and 24% of the athletics directors said their institutions did admit athletes under different requirements as the general student body. This policy could signal that the institution treats athletes on a different standard than regular students.

While the status of a number of the areas looked at in the study proved to be satisfactory, other areas were shown to need improving if institutional control of athletics is to become a reality at all NCAA Division I schools.

## CHAPTER 5

### SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

#### Introduction

The purpose of this investigation was to determine the current status of institutional control of athletics at NCAA Division I colleges and universities and to determine where problems with control lie. This was done through the use of a survey designed to collect information pertaining to the individual elements and conditions that have been determined to impact on self-governance. These include the actions and policies of the chief executive officer who is the person ultimately responsible for control of the institution intercollegiate athletics. They also include certain actions and beliefs by the institution's governing board, its athletics director, and its boosters and alumni. In addition, financial and operational policies of the institution can affect the control of athletics.

A questionnaire was mailed to the CEO's and AD's of the 275 NCAA Division I schools listed in the 1996-97 National Directory of College Athletics. The results from the returned surveys were presented and analyzed in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 summarizes the findings derived from the results of this study and the implications for institutional



control of athletics. It also suggests further studies in the area of institutional control of athletics.

### Implications

The findings of this study pointed out a number of implications concerning the institutional control of athletics as it relates to the NCAA which instituted the concept in an effort to attain its ultimate goal of compliance with its rules and regulations. The survey results indicated that there are weaknesses in the exercise of institutional control that can be addressed in order to strengthen control at a number of institutions.

The governing board and its actions affect the exercise of institutional control in several important areas. The boards at some schools still need to take action to support institutional control by writing mission statements clearly defining the role of athletics and endorsing the authority of the CEO concerning athletics. Governing boards must also take action to define their expectations concerning the athletics program and to decide what amount of money is needed to meet those expectations.

CEO's should encourage their boards to take these steps if they have not already done so. In addition, before taking a new position as CEO, the candidate should ensure that a mission statement addressing these concerns exists and that it is clearly worded and realistic. Care should be taken not only that expectations are defined and are realistic but that sufficient funds are budgeted so that goals and expectations can reasonably be accomplished. If this is not the case, the implication for the CEO's is that they may be in a position in which the control of athletics and NCAA rules compliance for which they are responsible is difficult or impossible.

The study results indicated that governing boards expected institutions to have

winning programs: at the same time, most programs were shown to be underfunded. In addition, it was indicated that approximately 50% of annual budgets for athletics came from external funding, a situation that leaves the institution in the position of being compromised by external organizations including boosters and alumni who may seek to exercise a degree of control of the athletic programs to which they contribute. CEO's in the study identified funding-related issues as a primary threat to their institutional control. The CEO would be well advised to avoid or to take actions to alleviate those situations where there are conflicts between expectations and funding of athletics programs.

The study revealed the good news that coaches are expected to follow the rules dictated by the NCAA, and their education in this regard was the most common strategy used in efforts to establish institutional control of athletics. Unfortunately, the study indicated that these same coaches are frequently under a great deal of pressure to win. Athletics directors commonly felt that the stability of their jobs and of the coaches' jobs depended on having winning programs. Boosters and alumni expect losing coaches to be fired. On top of that, one quarter of the institutions that responded indicated that athletics performance clauses that could cause the contracts to be non-renewed were included in the contracts of their coaches. An unavoidable question arises: Will a coach lose his job faster for cheating or for losing? This situation must be corrected if institutional control of athletics is to be successful.

The existence of a strong board in control of athletics could possibly help in solving these paradoxes and the problems that face intercollegiate athletics leadership today. Unfortunately, study responses indicated that the role of this board in a majority

of institutions was not to establish policies or to make policy decisions; it was advisory only. Changing this could be an effective starting place for institutions looking for ways to improve their control of athletics. Other recommendations follow.

### Recommendations

The results of this study suggest a number of possible changes in policies, procedures, and attitudes in order to improve the degree of institutional control of athletics at NCAA Division I intercollegiate athletic institutions. These recommended changes include:

1. Governing boards of all institutions should create a mission statement concerning the role of athletics and use it as a guideline for consistency.
2. Governing boards, chief executive officers, and athletics directors should reconsider their expectations and policies towards winning athletics departments or programs. The study showed an alarming attitude on the part of boards, CEO's, and AD's that contributes to the pressure placed on coaches to have winning programs. They should do their best to help eliminate the belief by athletics directors and coaches that the stability of their positions depends on having a winning program.
3. Athletics performance clauses that could cause contracts to be non-renewed should be eliminated; the attitude that a coach will be fired quicker by having a losing program than by breaking NCAA rules is one that should be eliminated.

4. The governing board and chief executive officer should consider the financial commitment given to the athletics program: the athletics department should not have to rely on funds generated from boosters and alumni. The level of expectation for success should be determined by the institution and funded accordingly.
5. All institutions should eliminate special admission policies and standards designed only for student athletes.
6. The role of the board in control of athletics or of the athletics advisory board should be expanded to include policy decisions and the reviewing of all athletic administrative and coaching hires.
7. External athletics support foundations be brought under the direct control of the institution.

#### Recommendations for Further Study

1. It is recommended that a study be conducted to determine why the majority of athletics directors are directly supervised by the chief executive officer.
2. It is recommended that a follow-up study be done concerning mission statements defining the role of intercollegiate athletics in order to determine what these mission statements consist of. Also the number of institutions that do not have mission statements should be updated.

3. It is recommended that a study be conducted to obtain more detailed information about the expectations of having winning athletics programs and the effects of these expectations on athletics.
4. It is recommended that a study be conducted on the reliance on external funding to finance the operation of athletics departments in order to identify ways that financial support can be generated without giving up control and ways to generate loyalty based on the institution instead of on the success of the athletics department.
5. It is recommended that a study be done on the admission policies of institutions for student-athletes.
6. It is recommended that a study be conducted to determine the reasons why institutions have athletics performance clauses that could cause the contracts of coaches to be non-renewed; to determine exactly what these clauses consist of; and to determine whether or not they promote a win-at-all-costs attitude.

# APPENDIX I

## SURVEY FOR CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICERS

**INSTRUCTIONS:** Following are statements regarding elements of institutional control of athletics that may or may not exist at your institution. Please complete each question as instructed. YOUR RESPONSES WILL BE KEPT STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

### I. Demographic Information

1. Name of Institution: \_\_\_\_\_
2. How many years have you been chief executive officer of this institution?  
\_\_\_\_\_
3. Who is the direct supervisor of the athletics director and what position does he or she hold?  
\_\_\_\_\_
4. Has your institution ever been cited by the NCAA for a violation of institutional control of athletics during your term in office?  
Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_
5. What percentage of time do you devote for interacting with athletics department personnel concerning issues of institutional control?  
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%  
\_\_\_\_ \_

### II. The Governing Board

6. Does the governing board have a clear mission statement concerning the role of athletics at your university. Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_
7. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements by checking the box under the heading that best describes your feelings.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Un- decided	Strongly Disagree	Disagree
The governing board of your institution has a clearly articulated mission statement concerning the authority of the president.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
The governing board is supportive of presidential authority at your university.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

The governing board of your institution \_\_\_\_\_  
 expects the athletics department to have  
 winning programs.

The governing board provides enough \_\_\_\_\_  
 financial support to your institution for  
 the athletics department to be self-sufficient.

### III. Athletics Director

8. Do the duties of the athletics director include coaching responsibilities?  
 Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

9. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with  
 the following statements by checking the box under the heading that  
 best describes your feelings.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Un- decided	Strongly Disagree	Disagree
The athletics director at your institution _____ is supportive of presidential authority.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
The athletics director at your institution _____ is committed to NCAA rules education and compliance.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
The athletics director at your institution _____ expects coaches to have winning programs.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
The athletics director at your institution _____ believes the stability of his or her position depends on having winning programs.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
The athletics director at your institution _____ agrees with the educational goals of the school.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
The athletics director at your institution _____ makes clear that he or she demands compliance with NCAA rules and that they will not tolerate those who deliberately violate the rules or do so through gross negligence.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

### IV. Athletics Department

10. Does the athletics department at your institution have a full time compliance officer?  
 Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_
11. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following  
 statements by checking the box under the heading that best describes your feelings.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Un- decided	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Coaches at your institution are committed to NCAA rules compliance.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Football and Basketball coaches at your institution believe the stability of their positions depend on having a winning program.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Olympic coaches (Tennis, soccer, golf, etc.) at your institution believe the stability of their positions depend on having a winning program.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Coaches at your institution agree with the educational goals of the school.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Coaches at you institution understand and adhere to NCAA rules and regulations.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Coaches have a clear understanding of their role within your university.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

#### V. Alumni and Boosters

12. Do external athletic foundations or booster organizations not under the direct control of your institution exist to support your institution's athletic endeavors?  
Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

13. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements by checking the box under the heading that best describes your feelings.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Un- decided	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Your athletics department relies a great deal on funds generated from boosters and alumni.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Boosters and alumni of your institution are supportive of presidential authority.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Boosters and alumni of your institution are committed to NCAA rules education and compliance.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Boosters and alumni of your institution expect the athletics department to have winning programs.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____



	Strongly Agree	Agree	Un- decided	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Boosters and alumni will not contribute to your university unless you have winning athletics programs.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Boosters and alumni of your institution expect losing coaches to be fired.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

## VI. Financial Information

14. Does the athletic operating budget of your institution match the revenue generated?  
Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

15. What percentage of the annual athletics budget comes from institutional and/or state funds?  
0%    10%    20%    30%    40%    50%    60%    70%    80%    90%    100%  
\_\_\_\_\_

16. Do foundations, whose control is external to the institution, provide monetary support to the athletics program at your institution?  
Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

17. Does your institution conduct an independent financial audit of the athletics department at least once a year? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

18. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements by checking the box under the heading that best describes your feelings.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Un- decided	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Your institution provides enough financial support to the athletics department to be considered self sufficient.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Your athletics department relies a great deal on funds generated from boosters and alumni.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

## VII. The Institution

19. Does your institution have a faculty athletics board?  
Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_
20. Is the role of the board in control of athletics or the athletics advisory board at your institution to establish athletics policies and to make policy decisions? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_
21. Is the role of the board in control of athletics or the athletics advisory board of your school advisory only? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

22. Are the coaching hires at your school reviewed by the Athletics Advisory Board? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_
23. Does your institution have a clearly articulated mission statement concerning the role of athletics? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_
24. Are all athletes expected to meet the same admission requirements as the general student body? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_  
If no, how do the standards differ?  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
25. What percentage of athletes are admitted to your institution under different requirements as the general student body?  
0%    10%    20%    30%    40%    50%    60%    70%    80%    90%    100%  
\_\_\_\_    \_\_\_\_    \_\_\_\_    \_\_\_\_    \_\_\_\_    \_\_\_\_    \_\_\_\_    \_\_\_\_    \_\_\_\_    \_\_\_\_    \_\_\_\_
26. Does your institution have an articulated set of goals concerning the athletics program? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_
27. Has your institution conducted an external peer review of the athletics program? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_
28. Does your institution conduct a comprehensive self-study and evaluation of the intercollegiate athletics programs at least once every five years? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

#### VIII. Institutional Control

29. What is the greatest threat to institutional control of athletics at your institution?  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
30. What methods have been used to lessen the impact of this threat on institutional control?  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
31. What percentage of institutional control over the athletics program do you have at your institution?  
0%    10%    20%    30%    40%    50%    60%    70%    80%    90%    100%  
\_\_\_\_    \_\_\_\_    \_\_\_\_    \_\_\_\_    \_\_\_\_    \_\_\_\_    \_\_\_\_    \_\_\_\_    \_\_\_\_    \_\_\_\_    \_\_\_\_

32. Please name three strategies that you have used to establish or reestablish institutional control of athletics?

1. \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

2. \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

3. \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

33. Please rank in order from a 1 for potentially the greatest threat to an 9 for the least threat to institutional control of athletics at your institution.

- a. Governing Board \_\_\_\_\_
- b. Alumni \_\_\_\_\_
- c. Boosters \_\_\_\_\_
- d. Coaches \_\_\_\_\_
- e. AD of school \_\_\_\_\_
- f. Professional agents \_\_\_\_\_
- g. NCAA \_\_\_\_\_
- h. Student Athletes \_\_\_\_\_
- i. Other \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

34. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements by checking the box under the heading that best describes your feelings.

Strongly Agree	Agree	Un- decided	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
-------------------	-------	----------------	----------	----------------------

The chief executive officer at your institution makes clear that he or she demands compliance with NCAA rules and that they will not tolerate those who deliberately violate the rules or do so through gross negligence.

_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
-------	-------	-------	-------	-------

35. Is there any aspect regarding institutional control that you wish to add?

Comments \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

## APPENDIX II

### SURVEY FOR ATHLETICS DIRECTORS

**INSTRUCTIONS:** Following are statements regarding elements of institutional control of athletics that may or may not exist at your institution. Please complete each question as instructed. **YOUR RESPONSES WILL BE KEPT STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.**

#### I. Demographic Information

1. Name of Institution:

\_\_\_\_\_

2. How many years have you been athletics director of this institution?

\_\_\_\_\_

3. Who is the direct supervisor of the athletics director and what position does he or she hold?

\_\_\_\_\_

4. Has your institution been cited by the NCAA for a violation of institutional control of athletics during your term in office? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

5. What percentage of time do you devote with the chief executive officer of your institution for issues of institutional control?

0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	%100
___	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	___

#### II. The Governing Board

6. Does the governing board have a mission statement concerning the role of athletics at your university? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

7. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements by checking the box under the heading that best describes your feelings.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Un- decided	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
The governing board of your institution has a clearly articulated mission statement concerning the authority of the president.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
The governing board is supportive of presidential authority at your institution.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
The governing board of your institution expects the athletics department to have winning programs.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

### III. Athletics Director

8. Do the duties of the athletics director include coaching responsibilities?  
Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

9. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements by checking the box under the heading that best describes your feelings.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Un- decided	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
The athletics director at your institution is supportive of presidential authority.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
The athletics director at your institution expects coaches to have winning programs as the highest priority.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
The athletics director at your institution believes the stability of his or her position depends on having winning athletics programs.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
The athletics director at your institution makes clear that he or she demands compliance with NCAA rules and that they will not tolerate those who deliberately violate the rules or do so through gross negligence.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

### IV. Athletics Department

10. Does the athletics department at your institution have a full time NCAA compliance officer? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_
11. Do the contracts of Football and Basketball coaches contain athletics performance clauses that could cause the contracts to be non-renewed.

12. Do the contracts of Olympic sports coaches (Tennis, soccer, golf, etc.) contain athletics performance clauses that could cause the contracts to be non-renewed.

13. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements by checking the box under the heading that best describes your feelings.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Un- decided	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Coaches at your institution are committed to NCAA rules compliance.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Your institution has a comprehensive NCAA rules and regulations education program for your athletics department.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Your institution has a comprehensive monitoring program to ensure rules compliance.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Your institution identifies and reports to the NCAA instances in which compliance has not been achieved.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Football and Basketball coaches at your institution believe the stability of their positions depend on having a winning program.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Olympic sports coaches (Tennis, soccer, golf, etc.) at your institution believe the stability of their positions depend on having a winning program.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Coaches at your institution agree with the educational goals of the school.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Coaches at your institution understand and adhere to NCAA rules and regulations.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Informational and educational programs have been established at your institution to inform athletics boosters of the limitations on their activities under NCAA rules.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Informational and educational programs are established at your institution for student-athletes regarding the rules that they must follow.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

#### V. Alumni and Boosters

14. Do external athletic foundations or booster organizations not under the direct control of your institution exist to support your institution's athletic endeavors? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

15. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements by checking the box under the heading that best describes your feelings.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Un- decided	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Your athletics department relies a great deal on funds generated from boosters and alumni.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Boosters and alumni of your institution are supportive of presidential authority.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Boosters and alumni of your institution are committed to NCAA rules education and compliance.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Boosters and alumni of your institution expect the athletics department to have winning programs.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Boosters and alumni will not contribute to your university unless you have winning athletics programs.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Boosters and alumni of your institution expect coaches with losing records to be fired.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

#### VI. Financial Information

16. Does the athletic operating budget of your institution match the revenue generated? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

17. What percentage of the annual athletics budget comes from institutional and/or state funds?

0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

18. Do foundations, whose control is external to the institution, provide monetary support to the athletics program at your institution?

Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

19. Does your institution conduct an independent financial audit of the athletics department at least once a year?

Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

20. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements by checking the box under the heading that best describes your feelings.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Un- decided	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Your institution provides enough financial support to the athletics department to be considered self sufficient.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Your athletics department relies a great deal on funds generated from boosters and alumni.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

## VII. The Institution

21. Does your institution have a board in control of athletics or an athletics advisory board? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_
22. Is the role of the board in control of athletics or the athletics advisory board at your institution to establish athletics policies and to make policy decisions? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_
23. Is the role of the board in control of athletics or the athletics advisory board of your school advisory only? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_
24. Are the coaching hires at your school reviewed by the board in control of athletics or the athletics advisory board? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_
25. Does your institution have a clearly articulated mission statement concerning the role of athletics? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_
26. Are athletes expected to meet the same admission requirements as the general student body? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_  
If no, how do the standards differ?  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
27. What percentage of athletes are admitted to your institution under different requirements as the general student body?
- |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| 0%    | 10%   | 20%   | 30%   | 40%   | 50%   | 60%   | 70%   | 80%   | 90%   | 100%  |
| _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ |
28. Does your institution have an articulated set of goals concerning the athletics program? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_
29. Has your institution conducted an external peer review of the athletics program? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_



30. Does your institution conduct a comprehensive self-study and evaluation of the intercollegiate athletics programs at least once every five years? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

### VIII. Institutional Control

31. What is the greatest threat to institutional control of athletics at your institution?

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32. What methods have been used to lessen the impact of this threat on institutional control?

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33. What percentage of institutional control over the athletics program do you have at your institution?

0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

34. Please name three strategies that you have used to establish or reestablish institutional control of athletics?

1. \_\_\_\_\_

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2. \_\_\_\_\_

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3. \_\_\_\_\_

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35. Please rank in order from a 1 for potentially the greatest threat to an 9 for the least threat to institutional control of athletics at your institution.

- a. Governing Board \_\_\_\_\_
- b. Alumni \_\_\_\_\_
- c. Boosters \_\_\_\_\_
- d. Coaches \_\_\_\_\_
- e. CEO of school \_\_\_\_\_
- f. Professional agents \_\_\_\_\_
- g. NCAA \_\_\_\_\_
- h. Student Athletes \_\_\_\_\_
- i. Other \_\_\_\_\_

Explain other: \_\_\_\_\_

36. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements by checking the box under the heading that best describes your feelings.

Strongly Agree	Agree	Un- decided	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
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The chief executive officer at your institution makes clear that he or she demands compliance with NCAA rules and that they will not tolerate those who deliberately violate the rules or do so through gross negligence.

_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
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37. Is there any aspect regarding institutional control that you wish to add?

Comments \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

APPENDIX III  
COVER LETTER TO CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICERS

Dear Sir or Madam:

As the chief executive officer of an NCAA Division I institution, you are being asked to participate in a survey involving the institutional control of athletics. This research will be used in my doctoral dissertation in Educational Leadership at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. The topic is "Institutional Control of Division I Collegiate Athletics."

At present, the NCAA has developed specific guidelines for the proper institutional control of college athletics. However, the NCAA and division I institutions do not necessarily know the extent to which these guidelines of institutional control exist in Division I athletics today. Because of the emphasis placed on institutional control of athletics by the NCAA, it is important to gauge its existence. Since the NCAA has identified the chief executive officer as the responsible individual for institutional control, the existence of institutional control is important to you.

**ALL RESPONSES WILL BE KEPT STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL!**

After completing the questionnaire, please return it in the enclosed self-addressed, stamped envelope as soon as possible.

Thank you for your time in taking part in this study. Results will be available upon completion of the research. I will be happy to send you a summary of the findings upon your request.

Sincerely,

Larry Easley  
185 Webster Way  
Henderson, NV 89014

APPENDIX IV  
COVER LETTER TO ATHLETICS DIRECTORS

Dear Sir or Madam:

As the athletics director of an NCAA Division I institution, you are being asked to participate in a survey involving the institutional control of athletics. This research will be used in my doctoral dissertation in Educational Leadership at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. The topic is "Institutional Control of Division I Collegiate Athletics."

At present, the NCAA has developed specific guidelines for the proper institutional control of college athletics. However, the NCAA and division I institutions do not necessarily know the extent to which these guidelines of institutional control exist in Division I athletics today. Because of the emphasis placed on institutional control of athletics by the NCAA, it is important to gauge its existence. Since the NCAA has identified the chief executive officer as the responsible individual for institutional control, the existence of institutional control is important to your institution.

**ALL RESPONSES WILL BE KEPT STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL!**

After completing the questionnaire, please return it in the enclosed self-addressed, stamped envelope as soon as possible.

Thank you for your time in taking part in this study. Results will be available upon completion of the research. I will be happy to send you a summary of the findings upon your request.

Sincerely,

Larry Easley  
185 Webster Way  
Henderson, NV 89014

**APPENDIX V**  
**FOLLOW-UP LETTER**

Dear Sir or Madam:

I need your help!

Recently you received a questionnaire from me regarding "The Institutional Control of Division I Athletics." The questionnaire is for my doctoral dissertation research.

According to my records, I have not yet received your response. Since a larger number of replies adds to the significance of the study, I would like to get back as many as possible.

**ALL RESPONSES WILL BE KEPT STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL!**

If you have returned your questionnaire, please disregard this letter and accept my thanks and appreciation for taking time to participate. If you have misplaced it or it simply slipped your mind, please complete it now and return it as soon as possible. Another questionnaire and self-addressed, stamped envelope are included for you.

Thank you for your assistance!

Sincerely,

Larry Easley  
185 Webster Way  
Henderson, NV 89014

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




Dissertation Title: The Institutional Control of NCAA Division One Collegiate Athletics

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# IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (QA-3)



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