You're Out! Explaining Non-Criminal Diplomatic Expulsion

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YOU’RE OUT! EXPLAINING NON-CRIMINAL
DIPLOMATIC EXPULSION

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Abstract

The practice of diplomatic expulsion, as well as expulsion of other foreign personnel by an executive, has received little attention in the field of International Relations or in Political Science more broadly. If expulsion were analyzed under the broader category of diplomatic relations, then studying the variation in expulsions could improve our understanding of international relations. It would be understood as one of the many tools executives use in negotiation between states. Executives, however, appeared to treat expulsion specially. Although no international convention requires executives to notify the public of the expulsion of a diplomat, ambassador or other personnel, it has been observed that executives do make highly publicized announcements in some cases, which suggests that expulsions have domestic value to some executives.

This project examines expulsions in terms of their political value to executives with special attention paid to executives from New Left regimes in Latin America and their relationship with the United States. The dissertation argues that expulsions increase in value to states on the weaker end of a power disparity. The stronger state could prefer to conduct diplomacy with military and/or economic threats, but the weaker state does not enjoy such options. The one option that is not limited by such a power disparity is expulsion. Executives of weaker countries may be quick to expel because reciprocation by the stronger state will do little harm to the weaker state. The radical, populist left executives in the expelling states need such a low cost and low risk move to actionize the anti-United States rhetoric they utilized as they were running for office.
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I dedicate this dissertation to my wife, Holly. Your support has gotten me through difficult times. May this be the catalyst of a better life for the both of us.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

During the Cold War, diplomatic expulsion, much like wars, were proxy moves between the United States and the Soviet Union. Diplomats from the United States could be expelled from any country that was influenced by the Soviet Union. During this period, diplomatic expulsion could be understood through the lens of U.S.-Soviet relations, balancing, and counter-balancing. Even after the Cold War, American diplomats were more likely to be expelled from Soviet ally Cuba than from anywhere else in the world.

Since the 1990s, however, a different pattern has emerged. In particular, expulsions of diplomats from the United States have been concentrated in Latin America. Further examination shows that these expulsions were concentrated in a small number of Latin American states (and in particular years), namely Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Cuba, and Nicaragua. With the lack of a global antagonist to the U.S., the explanation for this pattern must exist within the states themselves. The research question for this dissertation, then, is “What would explain the variation in non-criminal diplomatic expulsions in Latin America since the year 1990?”

The practice of diplomatic expulsion, as well as expulsion of other foreign personnel by an executive, has received little attention in the field of International Relations or in Political Science more broadly. If expulsion were analyzed under the broader category of diplomatic relations, then studying the variation in expulsions could improve our understanding of international relations. It would be understood as one of the many tools executives use in negotiation between states. Executives, however, appeared to treat expulsion specially. Although no international convention requires executives to notify the public of the expulsion of a diplomat, ambassador or other personnel, it has been observed that executives do make highly
publicized announcements in some cases, which suggests that expulsions have domestic value to some executives.

This project examines expulsions in terms of their political value to executives with special attention paid to executives from New Left regimes in Latin America and their relationship with the United States. The dissertation argues that expulsions increase in value to states on the weaker end of a power disparity. The stronger state could prefer to conduct diplomacy with military and/or economic threats, but the weaker state does not enjoy such options. The one option that is not limited by such a power disparity is expulsion. Executives of weaker countries may be quick to expel because reciprocation by the stronger state will do little harm to the weaker state. The radical, populist left executives in the expelling states need such a low cost and low risk move to actionize the anti-United States rhetoric they utilized as they were running for office.

This project examines the history around expulsion to provide context around the norm. First, I will examine international agreements, law, and norms around diplomatic expulsion. The purpose of this discussion will be show that the norms around expulsion, as well as diplomacy, have been accepted by many states. It is important to note that I focus on expulsions that are political in nature. Expulsion of diplomats, ambassadors or personnel for criminal reasons will not be examined. Because states often given reasons for expulsions, it is possible to distinguish cases involving allegations of criminal conduct from other types of expulsions. The second way this project examines the history is diplomatic. This project analyzes the three tiers of diplomacy to examine where expulsion fits. The literature on diplomacy has grown since the early days of the Cold War and is more nuanced than simply states interacting. The third way that the history will be examined is from perspectives of countries that are governed by particular types of
executives that have a power disparity with other powerful states in the international system, including the U.S. States may share norms about expulsion and diplomacy, but that does not imply that countries value the act of expulsion equally. Historically, one would be hard-pressed to find evidence of the president of the United States holding a political rally\(^1\) to announce the expulsion of diplomats from Latin America, but executives from Latin America, namely ones from New Left parties, often broadcast this information and use it to rally their supporters as well as other constituents. This project asks why weaker states appear to act this way.

Examining the variation in diplomatic expulsions in Latin America is important for two reasons. First, the prior research literature in political science has not examined this question in a systematic way. Scholarship in international law and other disciplines has documented expulsions, but most studies appear to accept the official reason of “spying” and do not examine international factors or the role that domestic politics may play in the “expelling” state (e.g., Walsh 1982; “U.S. Expulsion of Iraqi Diplomat” 2002; “Expulsion of Cuban Diplomats for Spying” 2003). This dissertation will fill in a gap in the literature by demonstrating that expulsions might be analyzed as political acts that are implemented for domestic political reasons rather than only for diplomacy. Addressing the research question will aid in identifying these domestic benefits and help explain some of the behavior of executives. The second reason that study has value is that research bridges several different fields. The research literature on expulsions encompasses (directly, or indirectly) the theoretical literature in different subfields, including international relations and comparative politics. The international relations field, for example, points to the potential influence of power disparity among states, state interactions, and international norms. From the comparative politics field, one can examine the connection

\(^1\) President Trump might change this pattern, which is suggestive of the affinities between his style of populist leadership and other left-wing populists in Latin America.
between expulsion behavior and domestic interests. Both approaches have merit, but both only explain part of the answer. The answer to this research question is dependent upon a bridge between the fields as it is unlikely that either field can provide a complete answer on its own.

The dissertation is organized into the following chapters. Chapter Two provides a review of the literature and develops the theoretical framework for the analysis. This involves examining the literature from the social sciences, the field of international law, and international treaties themselves. This chapter is intended to show that there is a significant gap in the social sciences literature when it comes to expulsion. The chapter ends by presenting a theory that can be synthesized from the literature, specifically the literature on executive behavior and the radical, populist left (New Left) and the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. I argue that radical, populist left presidents recognize the low risk and low cost of expulsion and use it as a foreign policy tool to act upon rhetoric against the United States that they used while campaigning. Given the power asymmetry between Latin American states and the U.S., I argue that the strategy of expulsion is also potentially effective, low-cost way to counter the U.S. while maximizing domestic political support.

In Chapter Three, I explain and identify the types of data collected for this project and discuss the qualitative and quantitative methods. Although scholarly sources provide information about countries, regimes, political history, and regional relations, they do not provide systematic information about expulsions. As an alternative, I draw on newspapers, and archived documents from the U.S. Department of State, to find data on expulsions for the data set tested in chapter four as well as the cases containing expulsion in Chapters Five and Six. This chapter also argues that the tests in chapters five and six are examples of a qualitative, “double decisive” method (see Collier 2011) and that the qualitative design conforms to the comparative method of
difference The chapter also contains an explanation of how data of radical populist left executives were identified and collected as well as how data on the control variables were collected for the regression models for count data in chapter four.

Chapter Four details the types of statistical estimation used and provides the results of this method. The discussion summarizes the results of various diagnostic tests on the data, discusses the particular type of negative binomial regression used, and reviews the results for coefficients of the estimations. This provides evidence to answer the research question and provides avenues for future research.

Chapter Five contains the control case studies of Mexico and Colombia, the qualitative control cases for the analysis. The chapter analyzes each country’s internal political environment and history as well as their political relationship with the United States. These countries were selected because of their variation in executive party control and relations with the United States. During the period of investigation, neither Mexico nor Colombia was governed by a radical populist-left president. The results suggest that despite period tensions with the United States, bilateral friction is only a necessary, but not sufficient condition for expulsions. The key variable appears to be the presence of a radical populist-left executive.

Chapter Six offers the experimental case studies of Venezuela and Bolivia. Similar to Chapter Five, Chapter Six analyzes each country’s internal political environment and history as well as their political relationship with the United States. Chapter Six also details the rise to power of radical populist left executives and identifies that they created new parties amid a crumbling party system, which served as electoral vehicles. These same executives also made strong accusations against the United States while they were running for office. Once in office these executives made significant constitutional changes. Expulsions of U.S. ambassadors,
diplomats, and other personnel were observed to increase after radical populist left executives took office.

Chapter Seven concludes the project by talking about the findings of the statistical estimations and case studies and discussing future research in this area. The findings of Chapters Four and Six are presented as answers to the research question that provide statistical significance and depth. As Chapter Two illustrates, the dearth of studies on expulsion in the social sciences, this chapter contains multiple ideas for future research about expulsions. Chapter Seven also contains policy prescriptions as well as practical ways to view expulsion. Expulsions may be useful for certain leaders, but their low risk\(^2\) means that concerns about the incidence of expulsion should be limited. Expulsions do not necessarily signify abnormally high tensions with the U.S. Likewise, expulsions do not appear to lead directly to escalations (such as wars or wider economic conflict).

\(^2\) Detailed in Chapter two.
Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theory

Introduction

The literature on diplomatic expulsions\(^3\) varies by discipline as well as field. The Political Science literature contains arguments for why radical, populist left parties may find value in taking a stand against the United States as well as which international theories may best explain why a state would expel a diplomat, ambassador or other personnel. International Law literature detailed how states have interpreted the Vienna Convention of 1961, and an inference can be made from the literature that countries value and adhere to the Vienna Convention.

In this chapter I will discuss the diplomatic, international law, and social science literature that forms my theory. Expulsion is a subject that is not exclusive to any one field and requires breadth of literature in order to understand it. After the literature has been discussed, this chapter will conclude with a theoretical framework that is crafted from the prior literature consulted. This theory will be tested in Chapters Four, Five, and Six.

International Norms on Diplomacy and Treatment of Diplomats: The Vienna Convention of 1961

The Vienna Convention of 1961 serves to codify what had been international norms for centuries. It is an attempt to convert these observed behaviors and accepted norms into international law. By examining the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, one can understand how states define diplomatic relations as and what exact behavior did states anticipate in terms of treatment shown toward diplomats.

\(^3\) The U.S. Department of State defines expulsion “[t]he formal deportation of a diplomat, often as a form of protest against the diplomat’s home country or as a result of actions by the diplomat, such as espionage” (2016). I employ this definition, but add other factors might motivate governments to expel.
The treaty begins by stating “…that peoples of all nations from ancient times have recognized the status of diplomatic agents” (United Nations 1965, 96). This line was not simply placed there as a perfunctory opening. It is recognized by the 60 signatories, and eventual 190 parties to it, (United Nations 2016) that diplomatic relations are part of international relations. The practice of diplomatic relations has existed since ancient times. This implies that diplomatic relations has been accepted and practiced by all political entities since before human beings could document such events with the written word. Diplomatic relations is established as universal and natural.

Further on in the treaty, it states “…that an international convention on diplomatic intercourse, privileges and immunities would contribute to the development of friendly relations among nations, irrespective of their differing constitutional and social systems” (United Nations 1965, 96). Once again, the states who are party to this treaty accepted the universality of diplomatic relations by noting the expectation that the codifying of these norms would not conflict with any constitutional or social system. While the line in the previous paragraph may have claimed universality of diplomatic relations among racial and ethnic lines, there is now established a political universality to diplomatic relations. It also broadens diplomatic relations to include immunities and privileges shown to diplomats. It is suggested that these immunities and privileges were also universally observed.

Article 14 of the treaty divides heads of mission into three categories. Those categories are:

1) “[T]hat of ambassadors or nuncios accredited to Heads of State, and other heads of mission of equivalent rank” (United Nations 1965, 104);
2) “[T]hat of envoys, ministers and internuncios accredited to Heads of State” (1965, 104);

3) “[T]hat of chargé d'affaires accredited to Ministers for Foreign Affairs” (1965, 104).

These are the recognized heads of mission as observed by all parties to the treaty. The states would have to come into agreement as to which category the present head of mission was to be placed (1965, 104). The functions of the mission are not considered to be underway until the head of mission presented his or her credentials or notified the host country of his or her arrival (1965, 104).

The treaty also identifies which actors qualified for consideration of privileges and immunities in diplomatic relations. The treaty specifically identifies the heads of a mission, the members of a mission, the members of the staff of a mission, members of the diplomatic staff, diplomatic agents, members of the administrative and technical staff, members of the service staff and private servants (United Nations 1965, 96-98). The treaty extends immunities and privileges to others besides the diplomat himself or herself. It appears to be expressed that any association with diplomatic relations, even that of being the diplomat’s servant, earns an individual recognition, immunities and privileges.

The treaty later states “that the purpose of such privileges and immunities is not to benefit individuals but to ensure the efficient performance of the functions of diplomatic missions as representing States” (United Nations 1965, 96). This part of the treaty expresses that states expected some kind of benefit from diplomatic relations, which is expressed here as efficiency. What is also stated was that the diplomatic immunities and privileges do not exist for the diplomats themselves or their staffs, but for their state of origin. It could be inferred that harming
a diplomat would less be considered a wrong against the diplomat and more likely to be considered a wrong against the diplomat’s state of origin.

The treaty notes that “[t]he establishment of diplomatic relations between States, and of permanent diplomatic missions, takes place by mutual consent” (United Nations 1965, 98). While diplomatic relations may be universal and natural to humanity, there still exists an important step where countries must consent to having diplomatic relations with each other. One could also argue that since consent is as critical to the process as the treaty appears to suggest, states see a benefit to diplomatic relations. Diplomatic relations would only appear to be in danger if the state hosting diplomats or ambassadors identified a greater benefit from expelling them.

Five functions of a diplomatic mission are identified by the treaty. Those functions are:

1) “[R]epresenting the sending State in the receiving State” (United Nations 1965, 98);
2) “[P]rotecting in the receiving State the interests of the sending State and of its nationals, within the limits permitted by international law” (1965, 98);
3) “[N]egotiating with the Government of the receiving State” (1965, 98);
4) “[A]scertaining by all lawful means conditions and developments in the receiving State, and reporting thereon to the Government of the sending State” (1965, 98);
5) “[P]romoting friendly relations between the sending State and the receiving State, and developing their economic, cultural and scientific relations” (1965, 98).

The signatory states and all states a party to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations all agree on the functions of diplomatic missions. While diplomats are expected to respect the law of the receiving state, it is understood that the diplomat’s presence is for the benefit of his or her own state.
In Articles 4, 5, 6 and 8 of the treaty, guidelines are set for the accreditation of diplomats. The first is that “[t]he sending State must make certain that the agrément of the receiving State has been given for the person it proposes to accredit as head of the mission to that State” (United Nations 1965, 100). The second is that “The receiving State is not obliged to give reasons to the sending State for a refusal of agrément” (1965, 100). This article expresses the clear rights of the receiving state. The receiving state not only has to consent to international relations, but has to consent to the head of mission selected by the sending state. The treaty also specifies that “[t]wo or more States may accredit the same person as head of mission to another State, unless objection is offered by the receiving State” (1965, 100). In the event that this happens “the sending State accredits a head of mission to one or more other States it may establish a diplomatic mission headed by a chargé d'affaires ad interim in each State where the head of mission has not his permanent seat” (1965, 100). For the sending state to perform this, however, the receiving state has to consent to such an arrangement (1965, 100). The receiving state also has to consent when “…[m]embers of the diplomatic staff of the mission [were] appointed from among persons having the nationality of the receiving State” (1965, 100).

The treaty further specifies the rights of the receiving state when it came to the persona non grata designation in Article 9. The treaty states:

The receiving State may at any time and without having to explain its decision, notify the sending State that the head of the mission or any member of the diplomatic staff of the mission is persona non grata or that any other member of the staff of the mission is not acceptable. In any such case, the sending State shall, as appropriate, either recall the person concerned or terminate his functions with the mission. A person may be declared non grata or not acceptable before arriving in the territory of the receiving State (United Nations 1965, 102)

The receiving state has the right to remove any diplomat or member of his or her staff without the burden of justifying the decision. The host country also do not have to obey any time
component. If the host country consents to a head of mission, then changes its mind before the head of mission arrived, there are expectations that the sending state would accept the decision and not send, or recall, the head of mission. More power of the receiving state is recognized when the treaty stated “[i]f the sending State refuses or fails within a reasonable period to carry out its obligations… the receiving State may refuse to recognize the person concerned as a member of the mission” (1965, 102). The host country possession of the right to accredit and accept diplomatic mission is treated as tantamount to its own sovereignty.

In addition to obtaining the consent of the receiving state and honoring all *persona non grata* declarations, the treaty, in Article 10, specifies that the sending state has to notify the receiving state in four instances:

1) “[T]he appointment of members of the mission, their arrival and their final departure or the termination of their functions with the mission” (United Nations 1965, 102);

2) “[T]he arrival and final departure of a person belonging to the family of a member of the mission and, where appropriate, the fact that a person becomes or ceases to be a member of the family of a member of the mission” (1965, 102);

3) “[T]he arrival and final departure of private servants in the employ of persons… and, where appropriate, the fact that they are leaving the employ of such persons” (1965, 102);

4) “[T]he engagement and discharge of persons resident in the receiving State as members of the mission or private servants entitled to privileges and immunities” (1965, 102).

The receiving state enjoys the power to expel diplomats and/or their staffs at any time for any reason, but they are required to notify the heads of missions or their staffs arrived in and left the
host country. The host country is expected to be notified when there were changes on a head of mission’s staff, even for servants.

In Article 11 the treaty grants more power to the host country. It expresses that “the receiving State may require that the size of a mission be kept within limits considered by it to be reasonable and normal, having regard to circumstances and conditions in the receiving State and to the needs of the particular mission” (United Nations 1965, 102). This article suggests that the establishment of diplomatic relations did not permit either sending state to send an enormous staff without the consent of the receiving state. The receiving state is viewed by all parties of the treaty as possessing the right to determine the proper size of a diplomatic mission proposed by the sending state.

Once the receiving state has consented to the terms of a diplomatic mission, it would have some obligations. Article 21 states that “[t]he receiving State shall either facilitate the acquisition on its territory, in accordance with its laws, by the sending State of premises necessary for its mission or assist the latter in obtaining accommodation in some other way” (United Nations 1965, 106). The host country is also expected to help the receiving state in accommodating members of the mission (1965, 106). Article 22 states that “[t]he premises of the mission shall be inviolable. The agents of the receiving State may not enter them, except with the consent of the head of the mission” (1965, 106). Article 22 also states that “[t]he receiving State is under a special duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity” (1965, 108) and “[t]he premises of the mission, their furnishings and other property thereon and the means of transport of the mission shall be immune from search, requisition, attachment or execution” (1965, 108). Archives and documents are also considered
to be immune to search (1965, 108). These articles note that once consent has been given by the receiving state, in multiple areas, that it accepts responsibilities and will treat the mission with respect. The same respect would also be shown to the diplomat’s packages, bags and person (1965, 110, 116).

Diplomatic agents are to receive immunity from the laws of the receiving state as stated in Article 31 (United Nations 1965, 112). Article 37 also notes that “[t]he members of the family of a diplomatic agent forming part of his household shall, if they are not nationals of the receiving State, enjoy the privileges and immunities specified in Articles 29 to 36” (1965, 116). Similar immunities are extended to the administrative and technical staff, service staff and private servants (1965, 116). The only conditions not covered by this immunity would be when the diplomatic agent acted as a private citizen and not on behalf of the sending state (1965, 112). The sending state also retains power because Article 32 states that “[t]he immunity from jurisdiction of diplomatic agents and of persons enjoying immunity…may be waived by the sending State” (1965, 112). Diplomacy does not exist to legitimize crime or to give diplomats a loophole to avoid punishment. They could face action back home and may expect to face action if the states wish to maintain a healthy relationship.

Article 41 states that “[w]ithout prejudice to their privileges and immunities, it is the duty of all persons enjoying such privileges and immunities to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving State. They also have a duty not to interfere in the internal affairs of that State” (United Nations 1965, 120). The final line has been problematic for states. Even though the sending state is obligated to inform the receiving state of the mission and how it would be conducted, diplomats may take liberties viewed as necessary by the sending state, but viewed as unnecessary by the receiving state. Such a disagreement could lead to an expulsion.
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations codifies what states have accepted since ancient times. Countries accepted that their diplomats were only in another country with the consent of the receiving state’s government. Any violation of the stated mission, unauthorized persons, criminal actions or choice of the receiving state’s government could lead to the expulsion of the sending state’s diplomats.

**Literature on International Law**

Expulsions have been examined by scholars who study international law, but most of this is normative and does not offer clear explanations of expulsions. Behrens (2016), for example, examines diplomatic interference. He identifies the concept of diplomatic interference as “…diplomats who allegedly fund[ed] political parties [and] those who engaged in revisionist accounts on international crimes” (2016, 3), “agents who reportedly encouraged acts of terrorism [and] those who granted asylum on mission premises” (2016, 3), and “diplomats who stipulated ultimata to the receiving State [and] those who actively participated in political campaigns” (2016, 3). Behrens, however, does note that diplomats and hosts face difficulties when trying to explain and understand inference and that most authors seldom elaborate on the concept (2016, 5-6). Many of the examples identified in his research ended in expulsion, but Behrens examines these expulsions in terms of how they were ordered and how they fit into international law framework.

In Behrens’s research one could find historical examples of how states viewed diplomatic interference. One such example occurred in 1949 when United States Congressmen Klein noted that the Spanish diplomatic mission appeared to disseminate propaganda that supported the fascist regime in Spain (2016, 30-31). The Assistant Secretary of State replied and noted the

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4 Behrens is not the only scholar in international law to write about diplomatic interference. For instance, Haacke (2005) and Katsumata (2003) examined how interference was handled by ASEAN states.
general rule that diplomats were expected not to interfere in domestic matters of the receiving state (2016, 31). The Assistant Secretary of State did, however, note the difference between interference and “the function to create a favourable sentiment for their own government” (2016, 31). This example suggests that states are aware of interference, but may not have an interest in classifying any and all domestic comments and actions of a diplomat as “interference”. Behrens examined this statement through legality and the Vienna Convention.

Behrens also examines an observation in Zimbabwe in March 2007 involving the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Simbarashe Mumbengegwi, and diplomats from multiple Western states (2016, 19). There had been political unrest in the country, and Mumbengegwi was unhappy about Western diplomats who had visited courts and police stations to check on members of the political opposition (2016, 19). Such actions made it appear as if the opposition had Western support. Mumbengegwi summoned these diplomats and threatened them with expulsion if they further interfered in the domestic politics of Zimbabwe (2016, 19). Behrens argued that the actions taken by Mumbengegwi were legal due to his position, which allowed him to speak for Zimbabwe, and his ability summon diplomats (2016, 19). Spokespeople from France, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States defended their diplomats and argued that such actions were legal (2016, 19).

Although Behrens’ research is useful, his study, and the international law literature more generally, ignore several questions. For example, what determines a state’s interpretation of ‘interference’? In the case of Zimbabwe, why did Mumbengegwi behave as he did?, And why would countries respond as they did to Mumbengegwi? This is where Political Science could be applied. International Law argues for how expulsions may occur, but Political Science could explain why expulsions occur.
Literature on Diplomacy

The diplomacy literature focuses its attention on the conduct and norms of international diplomacy. The literature examines the agents of diplomacy and, in particular, how track two, three and multitrack diplomacy differ from track one diplomacy. The diplomacy literature examines different tracks because, as multiple authors argued, official diplomacy (track one) has limitations that may be addressed by the other two tracks. This section will identify the tracks then argue where the research of this topic fits.

Track One Diplomacy

Track one diplomacy is what the layperson often thinks about diplomacy. It is the type of diplomacy that has existed since the ancient times and was identified by the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic Relations. Track one receives little attention other than to be compared to other tracks to help distinguish them (Davidson and Montville 1981; Chataway 1998; Murray 2008; Nan, Druckman and El-Horr 2009; and Schiff 2010).

Davidson and Montville notes the differences between tracks one and two (1981, as cited in Nan, Druckman and El-Horr 2009, 65). They argue that “[t]rack one would be traditional—policy statements by the president and secretary of state, for example, official visits and meetings” (Davidson and Montville 1981, 154). In this track, diplomacy is conducted by “foreign service professionals who primarily implement the policies of their governments” (Nan, Druckman and El-Horr 2009, 65). Davidson and Montville identify the practitioners of track one as “[g]overnment officials [who] draft[ed] their statements and position papers with guidance of the full dimensional analyses—including psychological—provided by their staffs” (1981, 154-155). As Davidson and Montville, among others, have suggested, track one diplomacy was distinguished by its traditional approach.
Studying track one diplomacy fits into the traditional school of diplomacy (Murray 2008). Murray identifies the traditional school to studying diplomacy as one “where the state endures as the only diplomatic actor of significance” (2008, 22). He suggests that the traditional school came about after the Treaty of Westphalia and is the only school available until after the Cold War (2008, 36). Murray would describe the associated terms and driving factors of the traditional school as “track one…[n]ational Interest, sovereignty, balance of power, zero-sum competition (among state actors), security, international anarchy” (2008, 36). To summarize, track one is arguably the dominant mode that existed before the Cold War ended.

**Track Two Diplomacy**

The exact origin of track two diplomacy has been disputed. Some argue that its academic origins began in the 1980s with Davidson and Montville (1981 and see Nan, Druckman and El-Horr 2009, 65 and Schiff 2010, 94-95). Murray argues that the roots of track two diplomacy fit in the school which he identifies as Nascent, which began in 1989 (2008, 36). Chataway makes a similar argument to Murray as she noted that track two had experienced enormous growth in the ten years prior to her research (1998, 271). Some argue that term originated in the 1960s and has evolved since that time (Jones 2008, 2014 and Fisher 2002).

Along with the dispute of the exact origin of the term, most scholars also conceptualize track two diplomacy in different ways. Nan, Druckman and El-Horr note that “there has been little agreement on appropriate language to describe the many types of activities that occur within this sphere” (2009, 66). Some divide the category into hard or soft track two diplomacy (Agha, Feldman, Khalidi and Schiff 2003 and Klein 2006).

Davidson and Montville argue that “[t]rack two diplomacy is unofficial, non-structured interaction” (1981, 155). Schiff (2010, 94) and Nan, Druckman and El-Horr (2009, 66) agree
with Davidson and Montville’s (1981) definition, especially the “unofficial” part of it. Jones (2008, 2014, 2015) listed several characteristics of track two diplomacy:

They emphasize small, informal dialogues, referred to in the literature as problem-solving workshops, which are usually facilitated by an impartial third party. Although the dialogues are unofficial, it is expected that participants have access to decision makers in their societies. Within these dialogues, participants attempt to ‘step back’ from official positions to jointly explore the underlying causes of the dispute in the hope of jointly developing new ideas. These dialogues are ongoing processes, rather than ‘one-off” workshops. Most practitioners tend to emphasize the value and importance of addressing the deep-seated, psychological aspects of disputes. While usually not “secret,” the dialogues are conducted quietly and the so-called ‘Chatham House Rule’ is applied to encourage ‘outside-the-box’ thinking. (2014, 349)

Schiff identifies track two diplomacy as unofficial diplomacy, which was a contrast from official, track one diplomacy (2010, 94). Many (Burton 1987; Azar, 1990; Kelman 1992; Fisher 1997a,b, and 1989; Kelman and Fisher 2003) would appear to support track two diplomacy defined “as the intervention of nonstate actors in conjunction with representatives who hold no official office” (Schiff 2010, 97). Nan, Druckman and El-Horr suggests that “[t]rack 2 practitioners, on the other hand, are citizens from a variety of sectors who consult with parties on all sides of a dispute; they are nonstate actors” (2009,65). Murray identifies the driving factors of the nascent school as “World/International society, self-determination, public opinion, democracy, integration, interdependence, [and] international organization” (2008, 36). While there may be disagreement about the specifics of track two diplomacy, some themes are common in the literature. These include the idea that track two diplomacy is unofficial and involves non-traditional approaches to negotiation, and expands the realm of diplomacy to include non-state actors.

**Track Three Diplomacy**

Chigas identifies “track-three activities…as unofficial interventions at the grass-roots level aimed at bringing people together across conflict lines and designed to promote peace in a
state of conflict” (2007, 559-560). Schiff (2010, 95) agrees with the activities identified by Chigas. Lederach (1997) and Saunders (1999) would argue that “such interventions may assume various forms, including psychological interventions” (Schiff 2010, 95). Track three may be available for more individuals than track one or track two as the diplomacy observed does not have to be official nor does it need to involve an unofficial, yet prominent source.

**Multitrack Diplomacy**

As early as the 1990s, academic work began to notice that there were observations that were not exclusively located in any one of the three diplomatic tracks. Much of this work focuses on cases that involved diplomacy between tracks one and two. Some argue that there is track one-and-a-half (Chataway 1998, 273; Schiff 2010; Nan 1999, 2004 and 2005; and Nan, Druckman and El-Horr 2009). This track could also be called multitrack diplomacy (Diamond and McDonald 1991 and Murray 2008, 36).

Nan, Druckman and El-Horr observe that track one-and-a-half bridged the gap between official and unofficial activities (2009, 66). They identify track one-and-a-half “as unofficial intervenors working with official representatives of the conflict parties” (2009, 66). They attribute this identification to Nan (1999). Schiff argues that in track one-and-a-half “official representatives of the conflicting parties are involved in the conflict resolution process” (2010, 95). This differs from track two, which only relied upon influential citizens (2010, 95). Murray classifies this type of diplomacy as part of the innovative school (2008, 36). He lists the driving factors as “Advocacy of normative innovation through construction of new diplomatic ‘images’; tracing assumptions within various theoretical traditions; discovering how and why they colour mental maps of diplomacy” (2008, 36).

**Expulsions and the Literature on Diplomacy**
Research on diplomatic expulsion would appear fit within track one diplomacy. It is codified with an official, international law document, which details the treatment of official state representatives. Diplomats are official representatives of their states. The expulsion of these representatives would be decided by the government of the host country and would be executed by government officials. This would fall within the definition and understanding of track one diplomacy.

The other tracks run into the same problems as it pertains to this research. Track two diplomacy involves influential individuals who are not a part of the government. These individuals have no official power. They foster unofficial diplomacy, which may become necessary given the relationship of two states. This function, however, has little theoretical value in explaining diplomatic expulsion. Even if a state expelled unofficial, but influential, members of the receiving state, it would not be treated the same as the expulsion of a diplomat, ambassador or other official representatives. Also, these influential individuals do not have any specific privileges that the host country would have to honor. Even if these unofficial, influential actors met with the host country’s government, which would be considered as multi-track, these interactions would not make these actors official. The same would be true of grassroots organizations and their leaders, actors in track three diplomacy, if they were granted an official audience.

The available evidence supports this argument on the place of tracks two, three, and multi-track diplomacy on this research. Latin American presidents who expelled representatives of the United States appeared to do so without any pressure from non-state actors or NGOs. There are instances of expulsions of NGOs, such as the New Tribes Mission by Hugo Chávez in 2005 (BBC News 2005a and 2005b). It would be difficult to argue that New Tribes Mission was
engaging in Track Three diplomacy because of the lack of conflict within Venezuela. New Tribes Mission was not there to foster communication or broker peace. There is no evidence that they engaged in any kind of negotiations with indigenous peoples, though Chávez claimed they were proxies for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. As for expulsions of diplomats such as John Correa (BBC News 2006a) or ambassadors such as Patrick Duddy (Romero 2008b), Chávez did not appear to be influenced by any party. There could be some theoretical value to a group putting pressure on an executive to expel a member of another state due to the ease with which the executive can expel, but there does not appear to be any evidence to support this theory. Each president appeared to expel for his own perceived, electoral gains.

Any kind of unofficial actor would not be a part of this research because it could not be observed whether or not the receiving state expelled these individuals to send a political message or not. The expulsion of official representatives who conduct track one diplomacy has a clearer theoretical link. Diplomats, ambassadors and other official representatives are in the host country for the expressed purpose of working with the officials in the receiving state for the benefit of the sending state. Both governments expect to benefit in some form when track one diplomacy is being conducted. This becomes less clear in track two, track three and multitrack diplomacy. The unofficial actors may or may not be acting in the best interest of their state. They would not be acting on the behalf of their state.

**Executives as Politicians**

Thus far, I have discussed the prior scholarly literature on diplomacy. Now I develop the theoretical argument, which views expulsion decisions as reflective of the incentive structure facing executives. Any executive in who is elected in competitive elections may be considered a politician. It may border on redundant to make such a statement, but it is necessary to note this
designation for this research. Politicians have been argued to be constantly seeking office and winning elections or winning re-election (Downs 1957 and Mayhew 1974). If this behavior exists in all politicians, thus in all executives, then this motivation could be observed in the expulsions of ambassadors, diplomats and other personnel.

Downs (1957) argues that political parties existed to win elections and used ideologies as cost-saving measures for prospective voters. Downs also examines voters and found full participation to be irrational. Only prospective voters who could obtain real benefits by the election of a certain party or candidate would be rational in their choice to vote. Despite many voters appearing to act irrationally, a Downsian scholar could argue that political parties have done a good job in lowering the costs to becoming informed and to participate to explain what one would assume to be irrational behavior. If parties are this successful, then it could be rational for more voters to participate.

Although we are interested in the behavior of executives, research on legislators is potentially instructive. In his examination of American legislators, Mayhew (1974) argues that legislators were rational actors whose actions could be explained in a primary motivation to win elections. While legislators are the units of analysis, it would not be difficult to apply this argument to directly-elected executives who would face similar stresses and desires to win elections. This argument could more easily apply to parliamentary systems where the executive is a legislator selected by his or her party or coalition to lead the government.

Mayhew (1974) lists three basic kinds of activities in which legislators engage. These actions serve to aid the legislator in winning re-election. They are advertising (1974, 49), credit-claiming (1974, 52) and position taking (1974, 61). Advertising involves creating a brand name for the legislator among his or her constituents. Credit-claiming involves creating a belief that
the legislator was responsible for a government act that the constituents find desirable. Position taking involves publicly judging something that is of interests to the legislator’s constituents.

Jacobson and Kernell (1983) add another wrinkle to Mayhew’s (1974) argument. Mayhew focuses on incumbent legislators seeking re-election while Jacobson and Kernell focused on potential challengers. They argue that potential challengers are rational actors as well. Potential challengers do not run solely because of an ideological desire. They evaluate their chances of winning and the costs of challenging the incumbent.

In a study of Canadian legislators, Loewen et al. (2013) argue that legislators who had the right to propose literature increased their chances of re-election. This research builds upon Mayhew’s basic activity of position taking. Legislators who have the ability to partake in position taking in Loewen et al. enjoy a higher likelihood of re-election. This research suggests that position taking is a beneficial activity for legislators.

Although many Latin American countries only recently transitioned from authoritarianism and are not full democracies, the literature from the U.S. and Canada is potentially of applicability to some Latin American cases. Elections in Latin America have become more competitive since the Cold War. Leftist parties and policies have been able to gain traction as presidential candidates have been able to focus more on the median voter. As will be noted in Chapter VI, these developments led to the crumbling of the party system in countries such as Venezuela and Bolivia.

While much of this literature examines legislators, I argue that this literature may also be applied to executives. Directly-elected legislators and executives reach office via similar methods. Both publicly campaign and make promises and are expected to keep those promises in

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5 Plus the parties and elites who support them.
office. The evidence in Chapter Six supports this argument as radical populist executives appear to continue to campaign even once elected, which suggests that executives share a concern for re-election with legislators.

**New Left in Latin America**

As we have seen, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides clues on how states interpret diplomatic relations, while the diplomacy literature identifies types of diplomatic actors. When combined with Political Science theory on strategic behavior by executives, the literature on the New Left in Latin America may help understand why diplomatic expulsion is attractive to certain types of elected governments. Among the many characteristics of the new left, a common theme is strong rhetoric against the United States as a neo-imperialist power. The incorporation of such critique of the U.S. suggests that the leaders of these governments have identified strong opinions about the United States among their constituents, and they expect political gains by adopting a strong, anti-U.S. foreign policy position.

The left reemerged in Latin America around the turn of the twenty-first century. Cleary (2006, 35) notes the trend “…in Venezuela (1998), Chile (2000 and 2006), Brazil (2002), Argentina (2003), Uruguay (2005), Bolivia (2006), and Peru (2006).” He notes that such a phenomena did not seem possible given how over the past couple decades the political right “…tilted the electoral playing field to the right, and by the hegemony of neoliberal economics, which constrained the possibilities for redistributive policy making and decimated labor and other mass organizations” (2006, 35). The left’s resurgence reflected “…a gradual tactical shift in the left’s approach to electoral politics, and the constraints imposed by the pacted nature of many Latin American transitions” (2006, 40).
Some scholars argue that economic factors explained the left’s resurgence. Murrillo, Oliveros and Vaishnav (2008) offer a conventional economic interpretation, finding that debt and trade deficits increase the likelihood of a left-wing government. These arguments received support from Fishlow (2006) and Ocampo (2007). By contrast, Blanco and Grier add more nuance, finding that the left’s resurgence was, in part, due to “…commodity booms in agricultural, mining, and oil are positively and significantly related to the probability that a country will have a chief executive from a left-of-center political party” (2013, 68). They also observe that past political crises and discrimination contributed to the election of left-wing executives (2013, 68). Similarly, Weyland (2009) argues that economic cycles in resource-rich states “…stimulate radicalism and voluntarist attacks on the established socioeconomic and political order” (2009, 146). He noted such behavior in Ecuador, Bolivia and Venezuela (2009, 146). While also using rentier theory, he argues that in states with fewer resources that developed strong institutions, or in those that lack rentier economies, “…the left feels compelled to work inside the confines of the new market economy and of representative democracy” (2009, 146). Unlike the radical populist left in Ecuador, Bolivia and Venezuela, then, the left in countries such as Brazil and Chile moderated its domestic and foreign policy positions.

Political factors may have played a role, too. During the Cold War, the regional hegemon, the United States, had an interest in eliminating left-wing governments and had been involved in coups. Cleary (2006) argues that voters feared that electing the left was an inevitable step before a military coup. With the Cold War over, the United States appeared to have more tolerance for a Latin American government’s leftist ideology. A weak party system may have led to electoral volatility, which would have made it easier for left-wing candidates and parties to be elected.
(Roberts and Wibbels 1999; Roberts 2007; and Murrillo, Oliveros and Vaishnav 2008). Cleary (2006), in particular, argues for mass mobilization utilized by the left in elections.

In some countries, such as Bolivia, social factors such as ethnic cleavages and inequality may have also aided leftist candidates and parties in winning office. Some scholars note that the policies of the new left were attractive to indigenous people due to the left’s desire to be more inclusive (Castañeda 1994) and because of the left’s willingness to address past discrimination and wrongdoings by elites (Van Cott 2007). Inequality’s role in rallying voters to support the left has been disputed. Some argue that inequality makes the poor favor redistributive policies (Castañeda 2006) and that inequality makes the poor more supportive of populism (Krieckhaus 2006).

While many left-wing candidates and parties won elections in Latin American in the twenty-first century, scholars were not sure if they could all be categorized as the same. Scholars have made distinctions between and old and new left, and, also, between a pragmatic and radical populist left. Harnecker (2010), for example, identifies the new left in Latin America that emerged with the governments of Hugo Chávez of Venezuela, Evo Morales of Bolivia, and Rafael Correa of Ecuador. Castañeda and Morales (2008) note that this new left movement could be identified as a radical populist left. Ellner argues that many scholars identified variation among leftist parties and leaders, yet governments of Chávez, Morales and Correa were often classified together (2012, 97). They identify characteristics of the populist left as “a radical discourse devoid of ideological substance, disrespect for democratic institutions, pronounced authoritarian tendencies, and vituperation against the United States that is designed to pay political dividends at the expense of their nations’ economic interests” (Ellner 2012, 97).
Castañeda (2006) argues that a characteristic of the Latin America’s rising support for the left was breaking from the typical pattern of agreement with the United States.

The rise of the left in Latin America has also allowed for the formation of a new sub-type of leftist regime: the radical populist left. While this new left supports traditional left-wing domestic policies, it is characterized by personalist leaders who campaign on populist appeals. This distrust of elites is not just domestic. This populism carries over into foreign policy, specifically leveling criticisms toward the regional and global elite (i.e., the United States) and promising to confront U.S. leaders.

**Leadership and Strategy in Radical Populist Left Regimes**

Having noted some of the distinctions among new left governments, we now examine the more detailed aspects of leadership in radical populist left regimes. Weyland observes that the “radical left emerged out of popular rejection of the market model, nationalist skepticism about globalization, fierce repudiation of the established political class, and a questioning of pluralist, representative democracy” (2009, 148). In particular, leaders such as Morales, Correa and Chávez rejected constraints and limitations found in the government as it had currently been constructed (2009, 148). These radical left leaders took advantage of failing party systems to institute popular reforms and new constitutions to tear down the existing political framework and elites (2009, 150). The executives “used a majoritarian, plebiscitarian discourse to dismantle checks and balances and concentrate power in [themselves]” (2009, 150). Madrid identifies these leaders as part of the interventionist left and characterized their approach in office as “more willing to act aggressively to address social inequalities, and more determined to overhaul or work outside of the existing political institutions” (2010, 587).
To maintain support, the radical populist left “...feels the political urge to contest with enemies, especially political adversaries, business sectors, or the U.S. government” (Weyland 2010, 3). This could be identified in its economic policies. Weyland, Madrid, and Hunter note that Correa “[took] a tough line on [Ecuador’s] foreign debt, threatening repeatedly to default on its loans...raised tariffs, established quotas on some imports, and rejected a free trade agreement with the United States” (2010, 169). Weyland, Madrid, and Hunter argue that Chávez created the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA) “in an effort to offset the power of the U.S.-friendly, market-oriented regional organizations such as the Inter-American Development Bank” (2010, 169).

**Views on the United States**

As noted, Ellner (2012, 102) and Corrales (2006) claim that radical populist left governments in Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador are similar in their staunch opposition to neoliberalism and their rejection of U.S. leadership in Latin America and the Caribbean. Echoing Weyland’s (2009) conclusions, Ellner notes that governments in Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador and more confrontational with the United States than governments in Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay (2012, 111-112). As noted, Chávez, in particular, frequently made public and verbal attacks on the United States (Seligson 2007, 85). Chávez preferred a multipolar world over the hegemony of the United States (Ellner 2012, 104), and Ecuador and Bolivia, following Venezuela, were anti-capitalist in nature, confrontational with the United States, and sought good relations with moderate Latin American states (2012, 104). Chávez sought to build a strong regional identity by promoting ties with Latin American states such as Paraguay, Uruguay, Brazil and Argentina (French 2010, 48-51).
Weyland (2004; 2009, 149) and Madrid (2010, 588) suggest that radical populist regimes blamed the United States for its role in promoting neoliberalism directly or indirectly through intergovernmental organizations where it held a disproportionate amount of power, including the World Bank or International Monetary Fund. The focus on the U.S. role reflected the left’s desire of “…being more critical of the United States” (2010, 587). In additional to being more critical of the United States, the radical populist left tried to reshape regional economic relations; this included “spurned free trade agreements with the United States…[and] pursu[ing] new trade relationships with a variety of traditional rivals of the United States, including Iran, Russia, and the People’s Republic of China” (2010, 590). The propensity of Chávez, Correa, and Morales to embrace international rivals of the U.S. was consistent with radical populist left foreign policy. Arguably, this strategy also paid dividends with their electoral base.

**Theoretical Framework**

**Overview**

The framework in this dissertation departs from existing systemic and domestic, society and state-centered theories in International Relations (hereafter, ‘IR’). The argument is that domestic electoral factors influence the ideology, foreign policy stances, and diplomacy of certain Latin American states. It is worth noting that some IR scholars would dispute the claim that domestic political conditions influence the behavior of states in the international system.

Structural realists, and neoliberals, view the state as a unitary actor (Waltz 1979; Keohane 1984 and Keohane and Nye 1989). Scholars who work within these traditions argue that structure and power distribution influence state behavior more than domestic factors. Neoliberals also note the moderating influence of state membership in IOs.
Critical Theories also offer a different perspective on state behavior. Neo-Gramscians (Cox 1983 and Gill 2008) and Neo-Marxists are less state-centric than Structural Realists and Neoliberal Institutionalists, but they offer a different society-centered argument. Neo-Gramscians argue that there is a cultural hegemony created by elites that shapes International Relations. The ideology of the executive would be unlikely to challenge that hegemony, but international crises could provide opportunities to challenge hegemony. The theory of this project could be supplemented by this theory as the U.S. maintained hegemony after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, but created an opportunity for the radical populist left to increase criticism and confrontation with the U.S. due a lack of attention paid to the region as the U.S. was focused on the Middle East. However, the efforts of the radical populist left have no resulted in major, global changes. Neo-Marxists argue that capitalism and transnational class alliances explain the phenomena one would observe among so-called compardor elites in the global periphery. A change in the ideology of an executive would be unlikely to change the construction of the international system. An executive within the Neo-Marxist framework, would be shaped by capitalism, so his or her behavior would be consistent with previous executives.

While my argument departs from some IR theories, it does share similarities with Neoliberal Institutionalism. Neoliberal Institutionalists argue that states cooperate for perceived long-term gains (Keohane 1984 and Keohane and Nye 1989). The valuing of these long-term gains would increase the likelihood that states adhere to the norms created by international institutions and international conventions. The theory used in this project argues that states follow the Vienna Convention and accept the rules for diplomacy contained within it. The acceptance of these rules by state parties to the Vienna Convention creates an environment where power asymmetry is limited as all receiving states possess much control over diplomatic
missions it receives. The argument views expulsions as routinized because the long-term gains of not retaliating to an expulsion with anything other than an expulsion. Tit-for-tat expulsions do not appear to harm the relationship between states nor does it interfere with trade or other mutually beneficial acts.

My argument is also consistent with Liberal Democratic Peace theorists. Kant (1983) and Doyle (2012) engage the domestic level by arguing that certain regime types can influence how a state behaves in the international system. They have observed that mature democracies are more pacific and do not go to war with one another (Mansfield and Snyder 2007). Mansfield and Snyder argue that “democratic power rests especially on the distinctive ability of democratic institutions and ideology to align private interests with collective purposes” (2007, 49). They contrast mature democracies and autocracy when they suggest that “repression plays a far smaller role in strategies of rule in mature democracies than it does in autocracies” (2007, 49). In the liberal tradition, it can be argued that states behave differently and are not dependent upon an international system, economic system, or hegemony to control their behavior.

As regimes that come to power through semi-competitive elections, radical populist governments represent a special case of semi-democracy (or hybrid authoritarianism). Although radical populist government have not engaged in foreign wars, their confrontational stance with some liberal democracies raises important questions about democratic peace theory. Still, inasmuch as domestic factors appear to matter, especially to Democratic Peace scholars, some aspects of their analytical focus are consistent with my theory.

The Argument

The theory behind this research builds upon ideas found in neoliberal institutionalism and rational choice theory. States are competitive and may seek to increase power, but they operate
in an international system with a certain power distribution and where the rules of diplomacy exist. They may obey the rules of diplomacy if they perceive it is in their immediate interest to have everyone obey international norms, or they may adhere to these conventions due to learning and “enlightened” self-interest (i.e., learning, viz. membership, that individual and collective interests may be linked). For the purpose of my argument, it is not important to identify the mechanism as to why states operate within certain treaties and conventions governing diplomacy. I make this assumption – although empirical evidence suggests that states do, in fact, adhere to the Vienna Convention.

This project assumes that state executives⁶ are rational political actors. They seek to bolster their domestic support by following through on their international platforms and/or rhetoric. The relative power of an executive’s state can make such an attempt more difficult, if the state exists in the sphere of influence of a hegemon.

I argue that executives in weaker countries (in the global South) use expulsion for international and domestic political gains. Expulsion is attractive to the executives of weaker states for four reasons: (1) it is cheap; (2) retaliation is not perceived as harmful to national or economic interests; (3) there is no power disparity when it comes to expulsion; and (4) expulsions may pay dividends by giving the appearance (to supporters) that executives are standing up to stronger states. All of these reasons are attractive to weaker countries, but particularly in countries governed by radical populist leaders, where countering the U.S. and ‘anti-imperialism’ are key feature of movement ideology. This may explain the propensity of these governments to expel diplomats, ambassadors or other personnel from the United States.

Cost

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⁶ States are not viewed as unitary actors in this research.
Expulsion may be attractive to executives of weaker states because of its low cost. The process is governed by the Vienna Contention of 1961, which has been signed by 190 parties (United Nations 2016). The convention itself claims to be codifying a practice that had been around since ancient times (United Nations 1965, 96).

The Vienna Convention of 1961 provides for the following criteria for a state to initiate an expulsion:

The receiving State may at any time and without having to explain its decision, notify the sending State that the head of the mission or any member of the diplomatic staff of the mission is *persona non grata* or that any other member of the staff of the mission is not acceptable. In any such case, the sending State shall, as appropriate, either recall the person concerned or terminate his functions with the mission. A person may be declared *non grata* or not acceptable before arriving in the territory of the receiving State (1965, 102).

The process of expulsion requires the receiving state to make the decision to expel, then to notify the sending state. That is the extent of the responsibilities of the expelling state and its executive. The only cost to the receiving state is the cost of informing the sending state. The sending state bears the cost of travel and moving the expelled diplomats, of finding a replacement, and potential knowledge gaps until a replacement can be found. But there are relatively minor costs, and in any case, they are borne by the state that has its personnel expelled.

Another aspect of cost is cost relative to the goal. What does the executive want when he or she expels a diplomat, an ambassador or other personnel from another country? It would appear that the executive wants to signal that his or her administration is displeased with the other country or the representatives from another country. Such a signal could be sent through a tit-for-tat expulsion, economic sanctions or military force, but this is not a realistic option for a weaker state. One could also identify a higher cost of a tit-for-tat expulsion, attempting economic sanctions or using military force. This research assumes that executives are strategic in their
approach to diplomacy as they wish to obtain the highest benefit for the lowest cost. That would explain why executives would not contact the leadership of another state and express displeasure. The cost of this act would be equal to the cost of expulsion, but the benefit would be conditional on the other country’s willingness to act. Expulsion would provide a low cost for guaranteed benefit. In this case the benefit would be identified as public knowledge that the executive finds the conduct of the other state and/or its representatives unacceptable and will not tolerate it. This could improve the receiving state’s image among its allies or the adversaries of the sending state and demonstrate the strength of the executive to the international community as well as to his or her own citizens. Such a result achieved through expulsion would be more efficient than achieving it through economic sanctions, military force or propaganda.

**Harmfulness of Retaliation**

Depending on how one calculates costs and benefits,⁷ the cost of expulsion could grow if it increases the likelihood that the sending state escalates hostilities by preventing the expelling state from sending representation to meetings of international bodies (hosted in the receiving state, or elsewhere), by severing diplomatic relations, invoking economic sanctions or, though unlikely, using military force. Fear of retaliation might explain why executives of weaker states do not rush to escalate. In addition to the large cost of performing either action, the anticipated retaliation would further raise the cost, or erode the desired benefit. If executives are maximizers, then one would expect the likelihood of harmful retaliation to deter them from committing to economic sanctions or military force against stronger states.

The theoretical argument here assumes that expulsion may entail retaliation from the sending state, but that retaliation will be proportionate or less severe than other options, such as

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⁷ This could be argued as a diminishment of the perceived benefit.
economic sanctions. On the spectrum of hostile actions, expelling diplomats, ambassadors or other personnel is on the weaker side. Economic sanctions and use of military force are on the stronger side, but these are unexpected retaliations. They may exist as theoretical retaliations, but are not considered likely or practical forms of retaliation to expulsion. While it would take a case-by-case analysis to determine how the countries would respond to expulsions, one could examine this from a tit-for-tat perspective and make assumptions about how expulsion is the safest move for an executive to make. If an executive chose to place economic sanctions on the sending state, the sending state could invoke sanctions of its own. This could be crippling to the weaker state’s, the receiving state, economy. This could also harm the executive’s ability to win re-election, if he or she were eligible. The benefit of standing up to the stronger country could be negative if levying economic sanctions leads to the stronger country to respond in kind. A similar outcome could be expected if an executive chose to use military force. If the stronger state responded in kind, one would expect the weaker state to lose the conflict. If the weaker state did lose, it could face many negative consequences such as economic sectors being destroyed or even losing its autonomy if the stronger state chose to conquer the weaker state.

While the consequences of economic sanctions or the use of military force would be crippling, they would likely not be anticipated. Executives would be more likely to expect a retaliation that is proportionate, in this case a tit-for-tat expulsion. If the nature of interstate hostility is tit-for-tat, expulsions could be considered an efficient way to publicly project a message. The cost of making such a statement would be considered less than the loss generated from the sending state’s retaliation. If the stronger state chose to retaliate and expel diplomats, ambassadors or personnel from the weaker state, the weaker state and its executive would likely be unharmed by such action. The state would continue to retain its autonomy nor would it expect
a downturn in its economy or a loss of territory. There would appear to be little to fear when an executive would choose to expel a diplomat, ambassador or other personnel.

**Asymmetry in Bilateral Relations and Expulsion**

When it comes to expulsion, the actions of the weaker state may be influenced by power asymmetry. When a state is the weaker member of a dyad, its options to send public messages through the use of hostile actions diminish. The decrease in the number of available actions reflect power asymmetry. Expulsion, however, cannot be eliminated as an option due to power asymmetry given the international conventions and norms that define diplomatic relations. Expulsion exists independent of the power asymmetry between states.

One could argue that a country’s power relative to other countries determines how it will act. If one were to examine the United States and Bolivia, one might expect the two states to act differently. One would also expect the United States to enjoy greater latitude in its potential actions as opposed to Bolivia. One would also not expect the countries to treat the actions of others the same. It could be expected that a declaration of war on the United States by Bolivia would not be met with as much fear and stress as a declaration of war on Bolivia by the United States. The gap in economic and military power between the two countries likely factors into their actions, reactions, and appraisal of available options.

The act of expulsion may be one of a handful of actions that would ignore the power disparity between the two states. Numerous times in the Vienna Convention the rights of the host country were identified and protected (United Nations 1965). States and executives may realize that the protection of the autonomy of other states by respecting their ability to expel diplomats, ambassadors and other personnel would protect their own sovereignty. No executive has the power to expel more or fewer diplomats, ambassadors or other personnel based upon the strength
of his or her state. Expulsion is a right enjoyed equally by all states. One could argue that executives in weaker states would be more likely to exercise power that is equal among states than power that his or her state clearly lacks relative to other states.

**Expulsions and Maintaining Support with Domestic Constituents**

The theory crafted for this project is rooted in the domestic political value of expulsion. Although the power to expel exists equally among states, the potential political value varies across different regimes. The value of expulsion can differ country by country as there is no universal value for expulsion. If expulsion had a single, universal value, then one would expect to observe all states expelling diplomats, ambassadors and other personnel frequently. This may be true with retaliatory expulsion, i.e., expelling foreign diplomats in exchange to an expulsion of your own personnel. However, as noted in the introduction, so-called “first mover” expulsions appear to be highly concentrated in a small number of states that share common political characteristics.

Executives have many identities such as head of state and/or head of his or her party. One identity that all democratic executives share is that of a politician. It has been argued that politicians and political parties are preoccupied with the task of winning elections and seats (Mayhew 1974). With respect to foreign policy in the Latin American context, executives as politicians could win support by standing up to hegemons like the United States who are perceived of by many citizens as international bullies. But we expect this to only occur in regimes governed by parties where the salience of anti-U.S. rhetoric and foreign policy is extremely high.

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8 This is dependent upon how the executive achieves his or her position.
9 This may not be the case for all Latin American states such as Costa Rica.
Given the power disparity between the United States and Latin American countries, it might difficult for Latin American leaders to increase electoral support by countering the U.S in a way that is not costly to the national interest. One way would be through the expulsion of American diplomats, ambassadors and other personnel. As we have seen, particularly in regimes governed by radical populist parties on the left, a key element of party ideology is limiting the influence the U.S. in domestic, regional and international politics. The act of expulsion is therefore potentially attractive because it is cheap and may build political capital with the core constituency of the ruling party; any tit-for-tat retaliation would not be harmful to the executive or the state, and it is a sovereign right that the international community acknowledges among states who have ratified the Vienna Convention. Given the nature of executives as politicians as well as the efficiency of expulsion, one would expect Latin American executives – and particularly those associated with radical populist parties -- to expel American diplomats, ambassadors and other personnel and to make these expulsions public knowledge.

Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed the literature on international law and diplomacy, IR theory, and the emergence of radical populist left governments in Latin America. After reviewing the literature, I developed an argument about why radical populist left executives in Latin America use expulsion as a foreign policy tool. To summarize, I view expulsion is an attractive foreign policy tool because it is low cost and low risk. International law, and reciprocity, determines and limits the cost, which can be anticipated by executives who are vested with the authority to make these diplomatic decisions. The cost can either be a phone call or a note delivered to an embassy. The risk is also low because the norms surrounding expulsion do not treat it equally to other foreign policies. An expulsion of one’s own diplomats is likely to be met with a tit-for-tat
expulsion. Relations still exist between the countries, and the embassies still function, albeit with less staff.

Radical populist left executives in Latin America find the low cost and low risk nature of expulsion attractive because they have campaigned on rhetoric that painted the United States as a bullying hegemon. Their supporters expect some action to be taken against the U.S. Expulsions of U.S. diplomats, ambassadors, and other personnel signal to the radical populist left executive’s constituents that they were sincere in their rhetoric and are faithfully acting in a manner their supporters would expect.
Chapter 3: Data and Methods

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss data used in this project as well as the methods to which the data was used. This chapter will be broken into two main sections. In the first section, I will identify the data collected for the statistical analysis. After identifying what data was needed, I will explain how I collected and from what sources I collected it. I will conclude the section by talking about the specific models used. In the second section, I will identify the data collected for the case studies. After identifying what data I needed for the case studies, I will explain how and from where I collected that data. I will conclude this section by discussing the design of the case studies as well as the how I analyzed the data.

Data and Methods for the Statistical Analysis

Finding data and information for the statistical analysis – and particularly for expulsions – was challenging. There is no comprehensive list of expulsions of U.S. diplomats in the archives or in the secondary literature, and nor is there a dataset. The fragmentation of information on expulsions makes it difficult to know if all expulsions during the time period have been identified. This challenge was addressed by searching through multiple sources, triangulating records of observed expulsions, and utilizing more than one coder of the data sources. Likewise, the coding of radical, populist left executives was also a potential issue, although the prior literature and datasets have identified executives based on the ideological orientation of their party.\(^{10}\)

Dependent Variable. The dependent variable for this research is expulsions of United States diplomats, ambassadors and other personnel from all Latin American countries, and when

\(^{10}\) Descriptive statistics for all the variables are in Table 3.1 at the end of this section.
the Latin American country is the first mover (i.e. it expels first). The time frame for this study controls for polarity in the international system as it will only examine expulsions after the Cold War. This is necessary because expulsions during the Cold War may solely be the result of the Soviet Union pressuring a Latin American state to make the expulsions. There would be an expectation that the rivalry between the superpowers could explain expulsion better than the party of the executive in power. This data set focuses on the period 1991 to 2016 to avoid such a problem. Data was collected for 20 Latin American countries, which comprised the panels for the statistical analysis. This resulted in 540 observations. These 20 countries included all the sovereign states in Mexico, Central and South America.

Given that there is no dataset for the dependent variable, the data for expulsions were collected from several sources, including the U.S. Department of State records in U.S. National Archive\textsuperscript{11} and a search of the LexisNexis database and Google News for newspaper articles. Official State Department documentation and comments along with news reports compiled from LexisNexis and Google News were consulted. An attempt was made to verify the accuracy of observations by confirming that an expulsion in a country and year was reported in more than one source. Expulsions were collected the same way they were in the case studies, but for twenty countries instead of four. In addition, I coded the data along with my dissertation adviser, Professor John Tuman. Using the same sources (U.S. Department of State, LexisNexis, Google News, and Google Books), and the same criteria, and working independently, we identified the same instances of expulsion with a >96% agreement (the lack of agreement was not due to a difference in coding, but rather where one coder identified a small number of cases that was

\textsuperscript{11} See https://www.archives.gov/research/foreign-policy/state-dept. The U.S. National Archives serve as the repository for all U.S. Department of State records. Separate publications from the U.S. Department of State were also examined (e.g., U.S. Department of State “Dispatch”).
missed by the other’s search). This strengthens the assertion that this project has observed all expulsions between Latin American and the United States from 1990 to 2016\textsuperscript{12}.

I operationalize the expulsion variable in by counting the number of expulsions in a county/year. Expulsions can be examined with a continuous measure. This involves data on the number of executive diplomats, ambassadors, or other personnel who are expelled in a country/year.

To control for the possibility that expulsions are simply tit-for-tat reactions, I included a separate coding for both the count measures where the expelling state in Latin America is the first-mover (that is, the country that expels first). Expulsions where a Latin American country is retaliating for an expulsion by the United States\textsuperscript{13} are not what my theory is attempting to explain. Retaliations are more likely to be a diplomatic consequence than an independent move influenced by the ideology of the executive.

**Covariates.** The main independent variable is the presence (or absence) of a New Left executive for the country/year. This is coded as a binary variable coded “1” representing the presence of a New Left executive in any country/year, and “0” representing for all other executives and years. I made use of standard data sets on party ideology in the region to code parties and executives, including the data set from Huber, Stephens, Mustillo, and Pribble (2008; and updated by the author using the same coding criteria). The data from Huber, Stephens, Mustillo, and Pribble (2008) did not have a category for radical, populist left. The types of party identification available were left, center-left, center, center-right, and right as well as a Christian

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{12}Data from 1990 was collected due to the fact that multiple variables were lagged.

\textsuperscript{13}I also included a lagged variable for U.S. retaliatory expulsions and used it as a control for so-called “tit-for-tat” patterns that might exhibit an influence on first-mover expulsions in a country/year. Lagging the U.S. retaliatory response by one year help to avoid endogeneity between the dependent variable (first-mover expulsions) and U.S. retaliatory responses.
\end{flushleft}
or secular denotation with each of the five listed ideologies. In addition to these ideologies, they also included “Unknown”, “Other”, and “Personalist”.

Radical, populist left executives\textsuperscript{14} were identified by using examining regimes that came to power amid a crumbling party system, ran on left-wing populist rhetoric, were often in a mode of permanent campaigning (after winning elections), implemented left-wing or statist policies, strongly opposed the role of the U.S. in Latin America and the global system, and made major structural changes to government after winning office. These structural changes could be implementing a new constitution or adding constitutional amendments that allow more terms or consolidate their power. This definition was supplemented by criteria found in Weyland (2004; 2009), Madrid (2010), Ellner (2012), Castañeda and Morales (2008), and Corrales (2006). These sources were also used, along with data from the Georgetown Political Database of the Americas, for data on the presence of radical populist left executives.

The radical, populist left is differentiated from other left-wing ideologies by its messaging in its campaigns and its actions in office. The New Left ran for office using messages that the neo-liberal policies of the present and past governments were harming the poorest members of their countries as well as the indigenous populations. They would also argue that the present administration serves the United States more than its own constituents. They would also run on the platform that they will create a new constitution to help remove the influence from Washington and to remove the constraints of term limits.

\textbf{Control Variables.} The data includes several control variables. One control variable is the number of dyadic expulsions by the U.S. To control for any possible endogeneity between this control variable and the dependent variable, I included expulsions (any, coded as a binary

\textsuperscript{14} Christian Democrat and centrist executives are also included in the model as control. A null result is expected due to the typically healthy relationship between centrist executives and the U.S.
variable; and the count) by the U.S. lagged by one year. In addition, as mentioned, since the dependent variable is expulsions where the Latin American state is the first mover, lagging the U.S. retaliatory response will tend to reduce the possibility that the pattern observed is simply a reaction to expulsion from the U.S. in the same year.

A second control variable is the level of bilateral trade between each Latin American country and the United States, normalized by each country’s GDP\textsuperscript{15} (or log transformed) in constant 2010 dollars. The variable is lagged by one year to avoid endogeneity (that is, that trade declines in the year due to an expulsion). The logic behind this variable is that dependency on trade with the United States could make an executive less likely to expel personnel from the United States out of fear of any potential economic punishment. Higher levels of bilateral trade might also suggest a higher level of alignment between the U.S. and the Latin American state and reduce the probability of an expulsion. The trade data is drawn from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (various years), while inflation and GDP data (in the recipient, for conversion to constant dollars and normalization) is drawn from the World Bank Development Indicators database (various years).

A third control variable I included a covariate for the level of U.S. official development assistance (ODA) to each recipient, also in constant dollars, scaled to recipient GDP (or log transformed) and lagged by one year. Again, we would expect that higher levels of ODA give the U.S. leverage over an executive, while also signaling stronger alignment, all things being equal. The data on U.S. ODA is drawn from the OECD Development Assistance Committee database on aid (various years), while inflation and GDP data (in the recipient, for normalization) is drawn from the World Bank Development Indicators database (various years).

\textsuperscript{15} For much of the same reasons as the other economic variables, GDP is used as a control in one model.
The final control variable collected was dyadic voting similarity index\textsuperscript{16} between the U.S. and the Latin American country in the General Assembly of the U.N. (Voeten, Strezhnev, and Bailey 2009). The logic behind the inclusion of this variable is that states who agree on international policies may not experience expulsion as this agreement may create a condition where neither side would want to expel the other. U.N. voting similarity, along with trade and ODA, can have high levels of association, so it may not be possible to include them in a full model.

\textsuperscript{16} “agree2un” in Voeten, Strezhnev, and Bailey (2009).
Table 3.1. Descriptive Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expulsion Events</td>
<td>.024</td>
<td>.176</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical Populist Left Executive</td>
<td>.141</td>
<td>.348</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Center-Left Executive</td>
<td>.013</td>
<td>.113</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retaliatory Expulsions by the U.S.</td>
<td>.013</td>
<td>.113</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Voting Similarity</td>
<td>.244</td>
<td>.107</td>
<td>.016</td>
<td>.649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Dependency</td>
<td>8.721</td>
<td>3.170</td>
<td>-3.000</td>
<td>21.148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>11.275</td>
<td>1.856</td>
<td>8.721</td>
<td>24.669</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Estimation Method. Expulsion will be analyzed as a count variable. It will be measured as the number of expulsion events per year per country. An expulsion event is understood as an instance when an executive declares an individual or individuals *persona non grata*. The count represents the number of expulsions in a country and year, not the number of individuals expelled in that country and year. For instance, if an executive expelled an ambassador in April and two diplomats in June, that would qualify as two expulsion events for the year despite the fact that three individuals were expelled for the year.
Table 3.2 summarizes the number expulsion events identified and the main explanatory variables. Over the 540 observations there were 76 country/years where an executive’s party was classified as radical, populist left. There were 11 country/years in which a Latin American country expelled an ambassador, diplomat, or other personnel from the United States. In those 11 country/years, there were 13 total expulsion events where 39 individuals were expelled. The maximum number of expulsion events in a country/year was two, which occurred twice. The maximum number of individuals expelled in a country/year was 20.

Given that expulsion events is a count variable, some preliminary diagnostic analyses were required. Table 3.3 reports the variance and mean of the expulsion data. As one can see, the variance is greater than the mean, which suggests overdispersion of the data. This finding indicates that negative binominal regression is the best approach for modeling the count data for expulsions (see Cameron and Trivedi (1998, 77). The Poisson regression in the presence of overdispersion produces biased standard errors.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Observations (out of 540 country/years)</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Radical, Populist Left Executives</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expulsion Events Occurring in a Country/Year</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.3. Variance and Mean of Expulsion Events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Variance</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expulsion Events in a Country/Year</td>
<td>.0309593</td>
<td>.0240741</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Case Studies

For the case studies, I selected four countries that varied on the independent variable of executive ideology. During the period of investigation, Venezuela and Bolivia experienced periods of rule by radical populist left executives that were preceded by executives that had different ideologies. The control cases of Mexico and Colombia exhibited variation in executive ideology and party identification, but did not have the presence of radical populist left presidents. Both countries also experienced tension\(^{22}\) with the United States, which would theoretically make an expulsion more likely. The experimental cases of Venezuela and Bolivia were selected for the presence of a radical populist left executive. These two countries, like the control cases, experienced tension with the United States but differ by having periods of continuous radical populist left executives.

I examined the same sources (as used for the statistical analysis) for the qualitative analysis of expulsions.\(^{23}\) However, I also looked for more information to contextualize expulsions. The U.S. Department of State had information about expulsions of U.S. diplomats, although it was often either one or two sentences long. When one would consult Latin American official sources, it was observed that Presidents often announced expulsions in a public speech or

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\(^{21}\) Latin American countries expelled first.

\(^{22}\) Tension can be understood as the relationship of (all or a combination of) three binary variables: attitude (positive/negative), capabilities (weak/strong), and/or behavior (active/passive) (Holsti 1963, 613).

\(^{23}\) Expulsions exclusively occurred in the cases of Venezuela and Bolivia.
in a highly visible press briefing. Often times, the speech included allegations of conspiracies hatched by the U.S. government. A majority of information regarding the behavior of the Latin American executive as well as the circumstances surrounding the expulsion was acquired from news reports. Multiple sources were used in the collection of expulsion data of individuals from the United States being expelled from Venezuela or Bolivia. These sources were also used to determine if the U.S. responded with a tit-for-tat expulsion or only expressed disapproval and disappointment. The secondary academic research on each case was also consulted.

Academic sources were used to analyze the administrations in Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, and Bolivia, and the tenor each country’s bilateral relations with the U.S. These analyses examined the political state in each country briefly before the start of the data set used during the time series for the study. Each administration was observed in Mexico and Colombia with special attention being paid to the Fox and Samper administrations due to the high levels of tension with the United States. Academic journals, books, and databases were sufficient to acquire the information needed to analyze Mexico and Colombia for the whole time period and to examine Venezuela and Bolivia until the Chávez and Morales administrations were in power.

**Design and Analysis.** The design of the case studies shares characteristics with historical sociological studies and is based on the comparative method of difference. The comparative method of difference can trace its roots back to Mill (1843). Mill argued that, in cases where one observation contains a phenomenon and another does not, a researcher could find the explanatory variable by identifying the sole instance where the two observations differ (1843, 455). Building on Mill, Skocpol (1984b) suggests that the method of difference works well when the research compares cases that are substantially similar but where the presence, or absence, of a key
explanatory variable is associated with a variation on the outcome. The cases selected for comparison conform to this method.

The most important way in which this design is similar to historical sociological studies is that this design “address(es) processes over time, and take(s) temporal sequences seriously in accounting for outcomes” (Skocpol 1984b, 1). Processes can be identified as party systems, the electoral process, constitutional structures, and diplomacy. Over time it can be observed that the rise of radical populist left executives affect all of these processes, but this research focuses more on diplomacy than the former three.

The data will be analyzed using process tracing. Collier defined process tracing “as the systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analyzed in light of research questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator” (2011, 823). Collier argued that process tracing “can add inferential leverage that is lacking in quantitative analysis” (2011, 823). Mahoney (2010) and Collier (2011) argued that process tracing is performed by closely examining the dependent, independent, and intervening variables.

Collier (2011, 825, Table 1) constructed a test for process tracing with criteria he found in Bennett (2010, 210) and Van Evera (1997, 31-32). The purpose of test is to determine is the process tracing applied to one’s research was necessary and sufficient for affirming causal inference. If one research yielded a test that provided a “necessary and sufficient standard for establishing causation” (Collier 2011, 827), Collier argued that it would pass the “Doubly Decisive” test (2011, 827-828). One’s hypothesis, tested with a doubly decisive test, has to

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24 Party systems, electoral processes, and constitutional structures will still be analyzed.
25 One could also use straw-in-the-wind, hoop, and smoking-gun tests to strengthen a hypothesis, but until a doubly decisive test is passed, the causal interference provided by these three tests would not be necessary and sufficient. Bennett (2010, 211) argued that passing multiple and diverse tests could be considered a doubly decisive tests as these tests can be used to eliminate hypotheses.
meet two conditions. The first condition is that the test confirms the hypothesis. The second condition is that the passing of the test by the hypothesis would successfully eliminate all other hypotheses, not just weaken them. Bennett (2010, 211) argued that a single test is unlikely to create the necessary and sufficient standard, but that multiple tests may be combined to produce such a standard. Also, this analysis provides a comparison of four cases.

This research employs a “doubly decisive“ test. This test is created by the examination of two hypotheses to explain diplomatic expulsion. The first hypothesis is: As tension increases between countries, the likelihood of a non-criminal diplomatic expulsion increases, controlling for economic interdependence and other shared interests. This hypothesis emerges from logic one would apply when examining relations between states and the act of expulsion. States closer to having a harmonious relationship would be expected not to expel members of the other state for non-criminal reasons. Political differences could be handled through communication. If tension is observed between states, however, then one would expect the chances of a diplomatic expulsion to be higher. A low cost, low risk move like expulsion might be attractive to an executive as he or she wants to express displeasure to another executive. This hypothesis could pass the straw-in-the-wind test as it makes sense at face value. It could also pass the hoop test as tension is observed when a non-criminal expulsion is ordered. It would fail the smoking-gun test, though. Countries can have tension, but an expulsion may not occur. Tension may be necessary for a non-criminal diplomatic expulsion, but it is not sufficient in and of itself.

The second hypothesis is that as the presence of a radical populist left executive is observed, the likelihood of a non-criminal diplomatic expulsion increases. Previous tests such as straw-in-the-wind, hoop, and smoking-gun tests find tension to be necessary, but not sufficient. That causes the first hypothesis to fail. This second hypothesis can pass the straw-in-the-wind
test given that radical populist left leaders can increase tension between states, and tension was a necessary, but insufficient standard. It can also pass a smoking-gun test as radical populist left leaders do expel. This helps establish a sufficient standard for the hypothesis.

**Conclusion.**

This chapter accomplished two main goals. The first goal was identifying what data needed to be collected and where it was found. The second goal was identifying and explaining how the data would be used to advance the argument that radical populist left leaders are more likely to order non-criminal diplomatic expulsion than an executive of any other ideology. This argument is advanced using statistical analysis and doubly decisive tests. Statistical analysis is used to establish a relationship between radical populist left executives and expulsion. The doubly decisive tests in the case studies are used to support the statistical analysis and to eliminate the hypothesis that tension alone can explain the occurrence of a non-criminal diplomatic expulsion.
Chapter 4: Statistical Analysis

Introduction

This chapter will examine competing explanations of expulsions in addition to the presence of a radical, populist left executive. The cases of Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, and Bolivia were researched to demonstrate that tension between a president and the United States was not enough to cause an expulsion event. They also suggested that the presence of a radical, populist left executive made expulsion events more likely when combined with tension between countries. In the case studies, all expulsion events were examined regardless of whether they were of individuals or organizations or official representatives of the United States or civilians.

Competing explanatory variables were not explored in the case studies, but they will be explored in this chapter. Trade, official development aid, and UN voting similarity might have an influence along with radical, populist left executives. The expulsion events examined here will be of individuals who were official representatives of the United States. That means that expulsions of missionaries or organizations, even official organizations, will not be counted. The research in this chapter is intended to provide an explanation for why so-called “first mover” expulsions of U.S. diplomats or personnel occur.

This chapter will begin by elaborating more on why the measurement of the dependent variable focuses on expulsion of individual U.S. diplomats or government personnel. Although there are observations of U.S.-affiliated groups and U.S. government agencies being expelled in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Bolivia, these group and agency expulsions were not included in the data in order to keep measurement of the dependent variable standardized. The next section will explain this decision and also provide a theoretical rationale.

In addition to suggesting that expulsions are more likely, the cases suggested that expulsions by a radical, populist left execution would be made publicly and in front of a crowd.
The following sections will present the models. In the proceeding section, I discuss the results further and offer an explanation for the statistical significance of trade dependency in both models.

**Why Individuals?**

The cases of expulsion analyzed earlier included individuals, official U.S. organizations, and non-governmental organizations (some of whom worked under contract with the U.S. government)\(^{27}\) that originated in the U.S. The data collected for this research was of expelled individuals who were official representatives of the U.S. government at the time of their expulsions. This was done for theoretical and methodological reasons.

Based on theory outlined in this research, one would expect official U.S. organizations to not be expelled as often as individuals because that might decrease future opportunities for expulsions. The sizes of diplomatic missions can be altered as quickly as an executive can expel, but it can also be done quietly. It would make sense that a radical, populist left executive would expel one or multiple diplomats only to permit the mission to regain its former size in the future. Expulsion is only useful if there is someone -- or something -- to expel. Expelling organizations is not practical if executives are behaving the way this research theorizes.\(^{28}\) Only three expulsions of U.S. organizations were observed in the cases. Two of organizations expelled were in Bolivia and have had a rocky relationship with Morales that existed before he was elected president\(^{29}\). The third was a Christian mission from the United States, with no official

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\(^{27}\) New Tribes Mission, which will be examined in Chapter Six.

\(^{28}\) While the cases of Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Cuba were not examined in detail, there is little evidence to suggest that they expelled U.S. organizations, though Rafael Correa did expel a World Bank envoy.

\(^{29}\) He definitely had problems with the DEA. It has been argued by scholars (provide a citation) that USAID specifically operated in ways to undermine his administration and strengthen his oppositions.
governmental relationship, that was expelled by President Chávez\textsuperscript{30} in Venezuela. Given the concentration of expulsions in these two countries, the inclusion of these cases would not have changed the statistical results. Still, for theoretical reasons, it makes sense to exclude these observations from the data set.\textsuperscript{31}

**Regression Diagnostics**

As noted in the prior chapter, I employed pooled negative binomial regression due to the overdispersion of the data.\textsuperscript{32} Beyond overdispersion, it is important to review some of the additional findings of other diagnostic tests. Specification tests suggested that the pooled estimator was preferable to a random or fixed effects estimator for this data. In addition, similar to other types of regression estimators, negative binomial regression assumes that there is no multicollinearity in the predictors. To assess the degree of collinearity in the predictors in the data, a model was first estimated in ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. Next, a variance inflation factor (VIF) test was performed on the linear predictors of the OLS equation to determine whether or not there was multicollinearity in the data (which is a suitable technique even when one is assessing collinearity in count models estimated with negative binomial regression).\textsuperscript{33} The VIF for the equation was 1.13, while the highest VIF (presence of a radical populist left executive) was 1.31. These VIF scores suggest that the degree of collinearity was within tolerance and that the regression results are not distorted by excessively highly levels of collinearity.

\textsuperscript{30} Chávez argued to the contrary (i.e., that the mission was not linked to the U.S. government), but his evidence was incomplete, at best.

\textsuperscript{31} Expulsions of U.S. organizations may be included in future data sets as this current research will suggest that the presence of a radical populist left executives performed strongly without the inclusion of U.S. organizations.

\textsuperscript{32} This is also explained in Chapter Three.

\textsuperscript{33} Although negative binomial log-transforms the predictors, the VIF (through OLS) is acceptable as it diagnoses the degree of linearity in the predictors. Prior studies note that the VIF (as a post-OLS diagnostic) may be generalized to regression equations for count data, including negative binomial regression (see Vatcheva et al. 2016).
Negative binomial regression also assumes that each expulsion in the count is independent (Hilbe 2011, 141, 169). The nature of this data suggests there is within-panel dependence of events, and that this assumption of independence is not valid.\footnote{This is examined in Chapter Six.} I addressed this issue by employing robust standard errors with negative binomial regression (as suggested by Hilbe 2011, 169).

Finally, in separate analyses, I modeled the lag of expulsion events (log-transformed) as an independent variable to examine the possibility that there is serial correlation in the data (see Cameron and Trivedi 2013). In these trials, the coefficient for the lagged dependent variable was not statistically significant, while the results for all other covariates (in terms of significance levels) were completely consistent with results in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. These findings suggest that the data was not compromised by serial correlation.

**Statistical Results**

Table 4.1 provides results for the basic model. The model is highly significant and appears to be a reasonably good fit to the data. The result for the main covariate of interest is consistent with expectations and appears to support the theoretical framework. The coefficient for radical populist left executives is positive and significant (at the 0.001 level), which indicates that counts of expulsions were higher when a radical populist president was in power. The coefficient for many of the control variables, including U.S. retaliation expulsions (lagged), Christian center left executive, U.N. voting similarity (lagged), and the log of U.S. ODA (lagged) failed to achieve statistical significance. The log of real (inflation-adjusted) bilateral trade with the U.S. displays an unexpected positive sign and achieves statistical significance. In the next section, I offer a tentative explanation for the finding with regard to bilateral trade.
Table 4.2 presents the basic model but adds a covariate for the log-transformed gross domestic product (GDP) for each Latin American country. This is important as levels of economic development might influence the relations with the U.S. and have an impact on expulsions. The results of this model are consistent with prior results. As one can see, the coefficient for a radical populist left executive remains positive and statistically significant (at the 0.001 level), while the coefficients for U.S. retaliatory expulsions, Christian Democratic executives, U.S. ODA, and U.N. voting similarity fail to achieve significance. The coefficient for bilateral trade is also positive and statistically significant as well, suggesting that this is a robust – although unanticipated – pattern.

Table 4.1. Model 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient (Robust Standard Error)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Retaliatory Expulsion ( t-1 )</td>
<td>.444 ( (.787) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical Populist Left Executive</td>
<td>19.452*** ( (.905) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Center Left Executive</td>
<td>-.464 ( (.600) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real U.S. Official Development Aid (log) ( t-1 )</td>
<td>2.750 ( (4.22) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Voting Similarity ( t-1 )</td>
<td>-1.872 ( (4.66) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Bilateral Trade (log) ( t-1 )</td>
<td>.237*** ( (.049) )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Log pseudolikelihood = -27.77  
Chi-square (6) = -27.782***  
Pseudo \( R^2 = .442 \)  
***p <.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05  
\( N = 469 \)
Table 4.2. Model 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient (Robust Standard Error)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Retaliatory Expulsion t-1</td>
<td>.427 (.784)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical Populist Left Executive</td>
<td>19.755** (1.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Center Left Executive</td>
<td>-.406 (1.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real U.S. Official Development Aid (log) t-1</td>
<td>3.397 (5.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Voting Similarity t-1</td>
<td>-1.785 (4.65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Bilateral Trade (log) t-1</td>
<td>.223*** (.052)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real GDP (log) t-1</td>
<td>.054 (.200)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Log pseudolikelihood = -27.77
Chi-square (7) = 3812.12***
Pseudo $R^2$ = .443

***p <.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05
N = 469

Discussion of Results

The results of both models provide evidence in support of the main theoretical argument advanced in this dissertation. As noted, the coefficient for radical, populist left executives suggests that in comparison to executive governments from other parties, when a radical, populist left executive is in office, the number of expulsion events is higher. The presence of a radical populist left executive increases the average number of expulsions by 17 percent over all over executive party types in the first model.\textsuperscript{35} This relationship is what the theory behind this

\textsuperscript{35} It increases the average number of expulsions by approximately 17.1 percent in both models.
research suggested. The calculated probability of the null hypothesis being true is less than 0.001 percent, which is a strong finding.

The addition of the control for Christian-Democratic Center Left executives strengthens the findings with regard to radical populist left executives. Despite some tensions with U.S. administrations, Christian Democratic executives have tended to have stable relations with the U.S., including reformist governments, such as the one led by former Chilean president Eduardo Frei, whom the U.S. supported (see U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, 2016). Although some Christian Democratic executives embraced mildly reformist projects, they did not endorse the anti-U.S. initiatives characteristic of radical populist left parties. As expected, Christian Democratic executives were not more likely to expel U.S. diplomats or personnel.36

The coefficient for bilateral trade suggests that trade with the U.S. has a significant, positive relationship with expulsions. At first glance, this result is inconsistent with the theory behind this project because it suggests that higher levels of trade with the U.S. would make a Latin American country more likely to expel U.S. diplomats and governmental personnel, all things being equal. However, there may be other factors influencing this coefficient. In particular, observations from Venezuela and Ecuador may be exhibiting a strong effect on the direction, and magnitude of the regression coefficient. For example, Venezuela37 was one of five countries that expelled U.S. representatives (with the highest count), followed closely by Ecuador and Bolivia. From 1991 to 2016, crude petroleum made up $429 billion out of $534 billion (80 percent) of U.S. imports from Venezuela (Observatory of Economic Complexity

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36 Equally important, the results of the analysis are robust to the inclusion of conservative, or right-wing populists in the model, including years when Presidents Fujimori (Peru), Menem (Argentina), and Collor (Brazil) were in power (see Weyland 2003). In these trials, the coefficient for radical left populists remained positive and significant, while the coefficient for right-wing populists was negative but insignificant (while results for all other covariates were consistent). Similar to left-wing populists, right-wing populists by-passed parties and other institutions, but they sought strong economic relations with the U.S. and were therefore unlikely to pursue expulsions.

37 They are joined by Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Cuba.
During the same time period, crude petroleum made up $78.2 billion out of $123 billion (63%) of U.S. imports from Ecuador (2017). Bolivian imports were more diversified, including some energy products, and totaled $13.1 billion from 1991 to 2016 (2017). The relatively large share of oil in exports to the U.S. from Venezuela and Ecuador probably accounts for the average effect of bilateral trade in the model. The finding suggests that despite bilateral tensions, the U.S. separated economic interests from other concerns and continued the oil trade even as bilateral problems were leading to more expulsions. For their part, governments in Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia pursued oil exports to the U.S. as a short- to medium-term expediency while they sought to diversify export markets in countries more aligned with their domestic and foreign policies, including China (see Wang and Li, 2016; Tuman and Shirali, 2017). To probe systematically the inference that fuel exports might be driving the result for trade, I substituted lagged fuel exports as percentage of merchandise exports for the U.S. bilateral trade covariate. In this trial, the coefficient for fuel exports were positive and statistically significant, while the results for all other covariates in the model remained completely consistent.

After adjusting for the effects of radical populist left executives and trade, the results for the other controls did not have any significant influence of expulsions. The coefficients for U.N. voting similarity and U.S. ODA were statistically insignificant. The coefficients for U.N. voting similarity and U.S. ODA displayed unexpected signs, but the effects were not significant, which suggests that the direction of the coefficient is not statistically meaningful.

An argument could be made that radical populist left executives may have been emboldened to expel due increased bilateral trade from China and/or ODA from China as part of substitution effect (i.e., that trade or aid with China would substitute for the loss of economic

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38 They combine data from Feenstra et al. (2005) and United Nations (2017) to get the data.
39 Data obtained from the World Bank (2017).
resources from the U.S.). This hypothesis is consistent with the observation that China has attempted to create a multilateral order (Ikenberry, Feng, Jisi 2015). Perhaps, this could have limited the role of the United States in Latin America to the point where bilateral trade with the U.S. and U.S. ODA would not be expected to have much explanatory power. Separate trials were run to estimate the effect of China by substituting the log-transformed and lagged Chinese bilateral trade\textsuperscript{40} for U.S. bilateral trade, as well as substituting log-transformed and lagged Chinese ODA\textsuperscript{41} for U.S. ODA in the model from Table 4.1. In both trials, the coefficients for Chinese bilateral trade and ODA\textsuperscript{42} were both statistically insignificant, while the results for all other coefficients – including radical populist left executives – was completely consistent. This suggests that the pattern of expulsions observed in the data is not explained by a trade and aid substitution effect with China.

**Conclusion**

After estimating negative binomial regression models, I found that the presence of a radical populist left executive produced a strong, positive effect on the total number of expulsions during the study period. This supports the hypothesis that the presence of a radical populist left executive increases the likelihood of expulsion event, and suggests that there may be a domestic-level influence on pattern of diplomacy pursued by these countries.

The findings for bilateral trade also point to the need for IR theorists to consider how economic interests may be “compartmentalized” and separated from other broader bilateral conflicts. As discussed, the result for trade is most likely explained by oil trade between the

\textsuperscript{40} From IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (2017).
\textsuperscript{41} From Dreher et al. (2017).
\textsuperscript{42} With only 88 observations, Chinese ODA to Latin America may not have been reliable. When greater data is available, it can be estimated again.
United States and Venezuela and Ecuador.43 Despite diplomatic tensions and expulsions, the U.S. did not impose trade sanctions on continued importing high levels of petroleum from Venezuela and, to a lesser degree, Ecuador. For their part, Chávez and Correa pursued oil exports as a temporary expedient, particularly given the high contribution of oil export earnings to total government revenues. If they had reduced oil exports to the U.S., their entire economic project of increased social spending for the poor would have been difficult – as recent events in Venezuela have demonstrated since the collapse of oil prices44 during the past five years (see Cannon and Brown, 2017: 614). There was no support in the case studies that suggested that increased trade provided a mechanism directly to expulsions. Thus, we have good reason to suppose dependency on oil exports is the most likely reason for the statistical finding.

43 Also, Ecuador, to a lesser extent.
44 Between 2014 and 2016, the price of oil (per barrel, Brent) decreased from an average of US$97.98 to U.S.$48.66 a change of -56 percent (data calculated from U.S. Energy Information Office, 2017). Foreign exchange earned from oil exports comprises about 90 percent of government revenues in Venezuela. The collapse of crude oil prices has created a severe budgetary crisis and constrained the government’s ability to import food, medicine, spare parts, and other necessities.
Chapter 5: Control Cases: Mexico and Colombia

Introduction

The purpose of these next two chapters is to examine foreign policy of four Latin American states toward the United States during the timeline of the dataset (1991-2016). This examination was undertaken to better understand the foreign policy toward the United States of the executives and to better understand the expulsions themselves. With regard to the latter, it was important to examine the circumstances around the expulsions and to be able to juxtapose how other executives in that country handled similar situations.

Mexico and Colombia were selected as the control cases for two reasons. The first reason is that the explanatory variable of this project, radical, populist left executives, was absent from these cases. The second reason is that there was bilateral tension between the U.S. and each country during the time frame of the study. The main theoretical argument advanced in Chapter 2, however, is that tension is a necessary but not sufficient condition for expulsions. Therefore, we would not expect to find expulsions (or a high level of expulsions) in these two cases.

Mexico

Mexico’s bilateral relations with the United States are, in some ways, unique when contrasted with Colombia, Venezuela, and Bolivia. Mexico shares a long border with the U.S., while the other three countries are in South America. As a member of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the U.S. and Canada, Mexico is also highly integrated with the U.S. economy (Tuman 2000; Villareal and Fergusson 2015). Mexican foreign policy can be understood partly as a reflection of the president’s approach to NAFTA as well as Mexican migration to the U.S.
This bilateral relationship began within the context of economic stagnation in Mexico beginning with the Hidalgo revolt in 1810 and lasting until Porfirio Díaz assumed the presidency in 1876 (Hansen 1971, 11). During that time of stagnation, Mexico went to war with the United States, as well as Spain and France (1971, 11-12). Mexico was just as chaotic domestically as many groups attempted coups or rebellions (1971, 12). The lack of stability in Mexico kept foreign investment low. Foreign investment, notably from the U.S., eventually grew once the presidency of Díaz brought stability to Mexico. By the end of Díaz’s presidency in 1911, U.S. investments accounted for 38 percent of all foreign investment in Mexico (1971, 17). Hansen argued that from 1860 to 1932 the Mexican government was “businessman’s government” just like the numerous Republican administrations in the U.S. during the same time (1971, 87).

Tension between Mexico and the United States would increase again during the social revolution of the 1910-1917 (Morris 1995, 17) and during the presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas from 1934 to 1940. Hansen noted that from 1915 to 1920, Mexico acted abrasively and belligerently toward the United States during multiple incidents (1971, 170). Cárdenas caused tension between Mexico and the U.S. by expropriating U.S. oil properties in 1938 (1971, 169). Half of Mexico’s arable land was taken from foreign owners, and Mexican aristocrats, and redistributed by Cárdenas to mestizo campesinos (1971, 157). This was a departure from the Díaz administration, which welcomed U.S. investment and created a pro-business atmosphere. The administration of Cárdenas, however, appeared to be an outlier as Hansen noted “that most…of Mexico’s post-1940 development policies have met with the approval of both the United States government and U.S. business interests in Mexico” (1971, 169). With the dominance of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), Hansen described the period as “the Peace of the PRI” (1971, 171). As noted below, however, the outbreak of Mexico’s 1982 debt
crisis led to important changes in Mexico’s economic model, political regime, and its political party system.

Mexico had five different executives from 1991 to 2016. Three presidents were from the PRI, while two were from the National Action Party (PAN). However, neither party exhibits the ideology of radical populist-left parties. Moreover, although there are differences between the PRI and the PAN, Mexico’s foreign policy with the United States was fairly consistent in this period. This will be supplemented with a chronological examination of the five executives who held office during the 27-year span.

There was also variation observed in terms of tension with the United States. While President Salinas was eager to work with the U.S., President Fox experienced disappointment with American domestic and foreign policy during his sexenio. Despite his displeasure with American policy, President Fox did not expel any U.S. ambassadors, diplomats, or other personnel. President Fox’s ideology was identified by Huber, et al. (2008) as being center-right, which conforms to the theory that radical, populist left executives are more likely to expel. The PAN was a stable party that had existed for decades and did not emerge as a vehicle for Fox’s ideological and political ambitions.

*Mexico’s Liberalizing Party System: The PRI vs. PAN*

In terms of ideology, it can be challenging to differentiate political parties, especially after the decade of the 1980s. Seelke (2012) identified the PRI as centrist and the PAN as conservative. In the dataset from Huber et al. (2008), the PRI was identified as secular center-right while the PAN was identified as Christian center-right. The administrations of Ernesto Zedillo, Vicente Fox, and Felipe Calderón were identified as secular center-right. Zedillo was a part of the PRI, while Fox and Calderón were a part of the PAN. While Huber et al. did not code
the Carlos Salinas and Enrique Peña Nieto administrations, there does not appear to be much of a reason to assume drastic variation in the PRI’s ideology from 1991 to 1994 and from 2012 to 2016 when one considers that Salinas embraced neo-liberal reforms and none of his successors have significantly altered those policies. Indeed, after 1982, the PRI and the PAN increasingly converged around a common set of economic principles that have been described as “neoliberal.” This included support free trade and regional integration, privatization of state-owned industries, openness to foreign direct investment, economic deregulation, and a reduction in social spending. Based on the criteria employed by Huber et al., who borrow from Coppedge (1997, 2007), the main cleavage between the PRI and the PAN after 1982 was primarily on social issues, although Fox and Calderón (who were PANista presidents) broke from the PAN and were more similar to the PRI in that regard as both were considered to be secularists in their administrations.

The convergence between the PRI and PAN on economic issues was partly related to the emergence of the 1982 debt crisis in Mexico. Following the crisis, the “…PRI embraced neo-liberal (market-friendly) economic policies” (Selke 2012, 3) in the 1980s. Camp agrees and suggests that the PRI had coopted the PAN’s economic strategy into its own economic philosophy in order to compete for more moderate voters (1995, 78). Such support was critical as the regime started to implement reforms that gradually made elections – and the party system – more competitive. The PRI’s support for neoliberalism was also important to implement structural adjustment policies demanded by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), who helped to resolve Mexico’s debt crisis. The PRI’s commitment to neoliberalism has been enduring. In its 2015 platform section about foreign policy, the PRI promised to “[d]evelop policies for economic, political and social cooperation with The United States for the management of natural
resources in the border region” (Partido Revolucionario Institucional 2015). These idealistic shifts contrast with the origins of the PRI through the 1970s where the party’s ideals could have been characterized as “revolutionary nationalism” (Selee and Peschard 2010, 4-5). After President López Portillo proposed nationalizing the banks in 1982, the PRI began to shift its economic politics to the middle to attempt to counteract growing PAN support in the north (Frieden 1991, 220).

The PAN can be characterized as a pro-business party that succeeded in business-friendly northern states (CRS 2012, 4 and Rodriguez and Ward 1995, 5-6). Rodriguez and Ward characterized the PAN as a party that was “right-wing, eschewed social and revolutionary rhetoric, had strong clerical roots and relations with the Catholic church, and tended to attract support from small- and middle-sized businesses and from the more conservative urban middle classes” (1995, 5). Selee and Peschard classified the PAN as center-right that was created by middle-class activists (2010, 5).

This pro-business ideology of both parties45 would lead one to expect that any Mexican executive from either party would be inclined to cooperate with the United States. The implementation and maintenance of NAFTA would support such an argument. No presidential candidate from either party had suggested any significant structural changes to NAFTA since its implementation.

While the PRI and the PAN disagree on domestic social issues, such as gender issues, their embracing of neo-liberal policies would lead one to argue that their respective executives would seldom conflict with the United States. On top of NAFTA, Mexico and the U.S. work together on security issues and counter-narcotics operations (Congressional Research Service

45 A more recent development for the PRI.
2000; 2006; and Seelke 2012). While some members of Congress were worried about the
election of Peña Nieto (Seelke 2012), the Obama administration expected “strong counter-
narcotics cooperation with the new president” (U.S. Department of State 2012). CRS reports on
the transitions of Zedillo to Fox and Fox to Calderón expressed a similar amount of optimism to
the Clinton and Bush administrations (2000 and 2006). With regard to the PRI’s Peña Nieto,
“few analysts are predicting that the transition from PAN to PRI rule will result in any seismic
shifts in bilateral relations [between the U.S. and Mexico]” (Seelke 2012, 13).

Due to the foreign policy similarities of both parties, one would expect their executives to
behave in a similar manner when it comes to expulsions. This expectation appears to be true as
there was no expulsion of a U.S. ambassador, diplomat, or other personnel from Mexico from
Salinas through Peña Nieto despite the presidency flipping between the PRI and the PAN. The
variation in the party of the executive, however, may not matter much given the ideological
similarities of the executives (Huber et al. 2008).

In what follows, I briefly review the foreign policy tendencies of the past five presidents
in Mexico, with a focus on bilateral relations with the U.S. and any crises that might have been
associated with diplomatic expulsions.

The Salinas Presidency

Carlos Salinas was the president of Mexico from 1988 to 1994. Before his term, and
particularly before 1982, Mexican interests often diverged from U.S. interests (Purcell 1997,
137). In the 1970s, Mexican President Luis Echeverría Alvarez made efforts to lead the Third
World voting bloc in the United Nations (Purcell 1997, 138). This resulted in an increase in anti-
Americanism in Mexico as Mexicans claimed to be the victims of “the Colossus of the North”
(1997, 138). With a history of U.S. intervention, the U.S. was viewed “as imperialistic,

The U.S. reacted mildly most of this anti-Americanism from Mexico until the Sandinistas claimed victory in Nicaragua in 1979 (Purcell, 1997, 139). The U.S. considered the Sandinista victory to be a security issue and disagreed with Mexican foreign policy toward Nicaragua. Bilateral conflict between the U.S. and Mexico increased greatly over this time period (1997, 139).

Mexican and American interests began to converge after the debt crisis of 1982 (Purcell 1997, 139). The debt crisis threatened Mexican economic and political systems. Preserving Mexican stability became a mutual goal of Mexico and the United States. The two governments announced that there would be “a moratorium on the amortization of Mexico’s debt to commercial banks, and an international package of emergency loans” (Smith 2000, 252). President López Portillo announced that Mexico would nationalize their banks less than a month after Mexico and the United States made their previous announcement to the chagrin of business communities in the U.S. and Mexico (2000, 252). President Miguel de la Madrid (1982-88) assumed office in a few months after López Portillo’s announcement and reversed course on such radical policies for traditional measures (Frieden 1991, 219).

The United States wanted to preserve Mexican stability due to revolutionary leanings of many countries in Central America (Purcell 1997, 139). President Ronald Reagan ordered his administration to “[provide] lines of credit, swap lines, and other forms of assistance” (1997, 139). The U.S. gave Mexico an advance payment of $1 billion for purchases on its strategic oil.
reserves (Smith 2000, 252). The U.S. also provided a $1.85 billion loan from sources such as the Federal Reserve (2000, 252).

President Miguel de la Madrid was forced to de-emphasize regional involvement and devote much of his administration’s efforts to securing Mexican stability, which decreased foreign policy conflicts with the United States46 (Purcell 1997, 139). President de la Madrid opened the Mexican economy up to imports and foreign investment and brought Mexico into the General Agreement for Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1986 (Frieden 1991, 220), which began Mexican convergence with American interests (Purcell 1997, 139-140). This marked a reversal in Mexican politics as domestic businesses had defeated an attempted launched by international firms to attempt to bring Mexico into the GATT in 1979-1980 (Frieden 1991, 217).

The convergence of Mexican and American interests intensified with the fall of the Soviet Union in 198947 and new administrations in Mexico and the United States (Purcell 1997, 140). As President of the United States, George H.W. Bush changed American foreign policy toward Central America. The most notable change was ending aid to the contras in Nicaragua, which removed an obstacle to bilateral cooperation (1997, 140). Mexico treated the Bush administration’s policy toward Nicaragua to be vindication of Mexican foreign policy of previous administrations (1997, 140). This was a significant foreign policy change by the U.S. as the Reagan administration had managed to stall the “Contadora Act for Peace and Cooperation in Central America” attempted by Mexico, Colombia, Panama, and Venezuela (Smith 2000, 213-215).

46 This is not an argument that the de la Madrid administration agreed with American foreign policy, but was simply unable to enact their preferred foreign policy due to the debt crisis.
47 Purcell’s assertion is that the fall of the Soviet Union was in 1989. This paper asserts that the fall was in 1991.
President Carlos Salinas was part of the new generation of Mexican political elites and “recruited to his administration young, internationally-oriented economists who strongly supported deepening Mexico’s integration into the global economy” (1997, 140). A characteristic of this new elite was to “[seek] closer integration, and rather than highlight the political or even cultural differences with its northern neighbor, it spoke of convergence and unity” (Morris and Passé-Smith 2001, 126). Salinas originally planned to achieve this integration by working with Europe and Asia; however, Europe was focused on the Single European Market while Japan was more interested in other Asian markets (Purcell 1997, 141). These developments led Salinas to reverse his earlier rejection of constructing a free trade agreement with the United States (1997, 141 and Smith 2000, 328)). Salinas was forced to challenge “a long tradition of state control and anti-Americanism” (Pastor 1990, 1). He continued the neoliberal policies initiated by de la Madrid and lowered tariffs; adopted an anti-inflation policy; liberalized trade and pursued deregulation in the automobile industry (Tuman 2003, 31); and pursued faster privatization of state corporations (Purcell 1997, 141). Salinas was the first executive to use the Brady Plan, created by U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, Nicholas Brady, to negotiate debt relief (Pastor 1990, 4). The Bush administration was pursuing a similar free trade agreement with Mexico strengthen its role in the Western Hemisphere (Purcell 1997, 141).

As Salinas’s sexenio was coming to an end, the relationship between Mexico and the United States appeared to be strong in an economic sense. Russell and Tokatlian argued that Salinas had engaged in a “coupling” strategy with the U.S., which involved “bandwagoning with U.S. strategic interests, at both a global and regional level” (2011, 52). The North American Free

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48 In terms of the drug war, the relationship was strained as Salinas was forced into a two-front fight of resisting the cartels’ attempt to gain the power of the state and the U.S. ambitions that threatened potential U.S. creating a surrogate justice system in Mexico (Smith 2000, 292).
Trade Agreement was negotiated by Mexico, the United States, and Canada and took effect January 1, 1994. Mexico had opened, stabilized, and restructured its economy, and trade between Mexico and the United States doubled (Purcell 1997, 142). Salinas had carried on the policies of neo-liberal reformation from de la Madrid and developed a relationship with the United States.

Ernesto Zedillo

President Ernesto Zedillo was elected to govern Mexico for a sexenio from 1994 to 2000. Like Salinas he was from the PRI and favored neo-liberal policies and a good relationship with the United States. Russell and Tokatlian argued that Zedillo, like Fox and Calderón after him, took a policy of accommodation toward the United States (2011, 131). They characterized it as “selectively accompanying the United States under certain circumstances…[and] promot[ing] an active role in the configuration of international regimes, preferably in harmony with Washington” (2011, 131-132).

President Zedillo came to office during an economic crisis that saw the Mexican GDP shrink 6.9% (Morris and Passé-Smith 2001, 134). He responded to the economic crisis by committing further to neo-liberal policies and maintaining healthy relations with the United States. Despite elites being split over NAFTA, Zedillo supported it during the crisis (2001, 135). Zedillo continued with privatization and “even stricter fiscal and monetary policies” (2001, 135) such as devaluing the peso (Purcell 1997, 143). When it came to the United States directly, Zedillo reversed the Mexican government’s stance on policies such as extradition⁴⁹, the cease of opposition to discussions of Mexico’s human rights record, allowing the U.S. to airlift immigrants in the interior, and permitted Mexican soldiers to be trained at American bases.

⁴⁹ There was a possibility that President Clinton would have recommended that Congress “decertify” Mexico due to doubts that Mexico was cooperating when it came to anti-narcotics programs (Purcell 1997, 146-147). Action such as this might have persuaded Clinton to choose against decertification.
Zedillo also accepted IMF funds, arranged in part by the Clinton administration, on the condition that he let the IMF have oversight on his budget and cut spending (2001, 136).

Zedillo did not break from the economic policies of the previous two presidents. He supported economic policies that the United States endorsed. He did appear to take a step further in building a relationship with the United States by cooperating with U.S. extradition requests and increasingly making an effort to help U.S. anti-narcotics programs. Like Salinas, however, Zedillo did have some tension with the United States outside of international economics. The Zedillo administration was upset when the U.S. led a sting on Mexican bankers after luring them into the country (Smith 2000, 290). The Zedillo administration was only informed at the last minute, which led to the foreign minister proclaiming “We Mexicans are very jealous of our national sovereignty” (2000, 290). Smith noted that the Clinton administration was frustrated with Zedillo for not stomping out corruption in his own administration (2000, 290).

**Vicente Fox**

President Vicente Fox served a sexenio from 2000 to 2006. He was a member of the PAN. His election broke decades of PRI control of the presidency and brought about the country’s first democratic transfer of power (Samuels and Shugart 2010, 207). A unique characteristic about his presidency was his lack of reliance on and obedience to his political party. While the PRI had internal battles that resulted in the formation in the leftist Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD) in the 1980s and stress between old and new generations, the PAN elites made an effort to uniform ideology of their party. Fox’s campaign and subsequent presidency ran counter to the goals of the PAN elites. During his presidency Fox experienced
growing tensions with the United States over American immigration policy. These tensions, however, did not lead to Fox expelling American officials.

In his time as party leader from 1996 to 1999 (Samuels and Shugart 2010, 211), future president Felipe Calderón applied strict rules of membership for the PAN (2010, 207). The result of these new rules was a decrease in party membership (Shirk 2005, 117). The PAN also refused public campaign funds for the 1997 midterm elections and centralized each congressional candidate’s campaign (Samuels and Shugart 2010, 207). Shirk argued that the both actions were designed to keep PAN candidates “on message” (2005, 119). He suggested that the PAN opted for policy-seeking strategy over a vote-seeking strategy (2005, 118 and Samuels and Shugart 2010, 209). The result of these actions were that the PAN dropped from having the second most members in the Chamber of Deputies before the election to third most after the election (2005, 119).

Vicente Fox, after winning the gubernatorial election in Guanajuato in 1995, was positioning himself to secure the PAN nomination for president for the 2000 election. Fox realized he would have to secure the nomination without support from the PAN’s central organization (Shirk 2005, 123). Fox came to this conclusion once his campaign was met with by resistance from the party. Had he run a traditional campaign, he would have had little chance of winning the nomination (Mizrahi 2003, 100). Fox decided to circumvent the party organization and remove their influence from his campaign by declaring his candidacy after the 1997 congressional elections. Ard argued that this gave Fox a head start and allowed him to intimidate other candidates (2003, 180). Fox chose to embrace the opposite policy of Calderón and to build a broad coalition instead of appealing to the PAN’s “narrow conservative base” (Shirk 2005, 125).
Fox created a political action committee called Amigos de Fox, which would become “larger” (Mizrahi 2003, 101) and “more formidable” (Ard 2003, 181) than the PAN. Samuels and Shugart argued that Fox’s success with Amigos de Fox discouraged other candidates from seeking the nomination, which led to Fox being the only candidate at the nomination convention (2010, 208). The PAN was forced to decide between nominating a candidate who did not fully embrace the party platform or not running a candidate, which could have had disastrous results for the party (2010, 208). The PAN had little latitude as many predictions pointed to this being a presidential election the PRI would finally lose (Shirk 2005, 125). Fox won the nomination and, later, the presidency without support from PAN elites, PAN organizational structure or even the PAN membership base (2005, 176).

Fox did not appear to govern as faithful member of the PAN. He nominated fewer PAN members to his cabinet than their legislative representation predicted (Samuels and Shugart 2010, 209). He nominated three members of the PAN to a cabinet with 23 posts (2010, 209-210). Fox made his governing style vis-à-vis the PAN clear when he said, “The PAN must respect the president’s authority to choose his own cabinet. At the end of the day, the one who governs is Fox, not the PAN” (Romero 2005, note 2). Fox’s lack of preference for the PAN angered party legislators and leaders (Shirk 2005, 189) and increased tension between the PAN organization and Fox’s administration (Romero 2005, 17).

During a trip to the United States in August 2000, Fox “called for working toward a more open border in the long term and for support for Mexico from the other NAFTA partners, similar to the support given in the European Union, to reduce wage and economic differences between the countries” (United States Congressional Research Service 2000, 6).
Although Fox hoped to improve relations with the U.S., there were a number of challenges during his sexenio. Pastor and Wise argued that the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, strained the Mexican economy and “cast a general pall over U.S.-Mexican relations” (2005, 136). Despite a U.S. recession that contributed to Mexican GDP shrinking until 2004 (2005, 145), Fox did not appear to attempt to strain relations with the United States by trying to renegotiate NAFTA.

Despite breaking the PRI’s hold on the presidency, Vicente Fox was not the proto-typical PAN politician. He did not embrace the PAN party organization nor reward the party with a significant number of posts within his cabinet. Fox, however, did not appear to stray from PRI or PAN foreign policy preferences. Mexico’s economy was harmed by the U.S. recession that began in 2001 due to its reliance on the American market due to NAFTA, but Fox did not dissolve relations between Mexico and the United States.

While Fox did not choose to take action that may have been harmful to Mexico’s bilateral relations with the U.S., he was nonetheless frustrated with the Bush administration. Presidents Fox and Bush took office within a month of each other and “made cooperation regarding Mexican migration to the United States a priority on their agenda” (Falk 2002, 62). Both sides were close to an agreement before the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, changed how the Bush administration viewed immigration (2002, 62). Despite the negotiations being derailed, President Fox’s administrative was supportive of American international initiatives as evidenced by American support for a Mexico’s successful attempt to gain a seat on the United Nations Security Council (2002, 63). Gutiérrez argued that the Bush administration revisited immigration during the 2004 as part of Bush’s efforts to add Latinos into a winning coalition (2007, 72). After Bush secured reelection, Secretary of State Colin Powell “admitted that the administration had
done little to advance the reform of American immigration laws” (2007, 72). The Bush administration also supported legislation to place 6,000 members of the National Guard on the border. Congress also appropriated $1.2 billion to construct a 700 mile fence along the U.S.-Mexican border (2007, 73) as part of the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act for 2007 signed by Bush (United States Congressional Research Service 2006, 5). The Mexican government asked President Bush to veto the Secure Fence Act of 2006 to no avail (2006, 5).

Disagreement about the border caused diplomatic relations to sour (Richmond 2011, 4) and led to tension between Fox and Bush (2011, 7). Fox opposed the mobilization of the National Guard and fought against any kind of militarization of the border (2011, 8). Fox argued that enforcement would not address immigration problems (2011, 8). Despite years of pressuring Bush to help Mexican migrants, the Fox administration had little to show for their efforts (2011, 9).

Immigration drove a wedge between the two administrations who took office with a shared goal of immigration reform. The nativist branch of the Republican Party ensured that Bush would not achieve any of his immigration goals (Gutiérrez 2007). The immigration policy of the United States moved further away from the preferences of the Fox administration as his sexenio neared its end. Despite these issues around the border, Fox worked within the traditional framework of affecting policy. He reached out to state legislatures (Richmond 2011) as well as the United States Congress and President Bush to attempt to change their minds. Tensions increased between the two countries, but Fox did not use expulsions to announce his displeasure with American policies.

Further, Mexico refused to back the Bush administration’s efforts at the U.N. to secure a resolution authorizing the invasion of Iraq (Domínguez and Fernández de Castro 2016, 43). Fox
gave formal notice that Mexico would pull out of the Rio Treaty, a mutual security treaty that the Bush administration hoped to use to gain Mexican assistance for the war effort immediately after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks (2016, 43). Fox’s actions were a stark contrast from Brazil, which chose to invoke the Rio Treaty and stand with the U.S. (2016, 43). Fox chose to pursue security through Operation Sentinel, which decided its efforts to strengthening Mexico’s borders as well as securing oil platforms, airports, and other installations (2016, 43).

*Felipe Calderón*

Felipe Calderón became the second candidate from the PAN to be elected president when he won the 2006 presidential election. Calderón was the consummate PAN insider as he succeeded Vincenze Fox, who frequently clashed with the PAN during his presidency (Samuels and Shugart 2010, 211). Where Fox could barely be used as an example of PAN executive behavior, Calderón could be considered the party base’s (panistas) ideal candidate who would govern as the party elites and base would prefer.

While no one in the PAN ran opposed to Fox in 2000, Calderón faced an uphill battle against Santiago Creel and Alberto Cárdenas. Calderón used his party connections build as party leader to rally the panistas during the PAN primary. Fox supported Creel over Calderón in the primary, which Shirk argued aided Calderón because many panistas were angry with Fox’s relationship with the party (2006, 10). Panistas wanted a candidate who would uphold party ideals (Samuels and Shugart 2010, 212). Calderón cemented his loyalty by signing a “unity agreement” with PAN officials after winning the nomination (Pensamiento 2005).

The United States Congressional Research Service suggested that Calderón would not be detrimental to relations between the U.S. and Mexico. It noted that Calderón supported the “extradition of drug kingpins to the United States” (2006, 5). It also noted that Calderón would
address a Mexican concern that NAFTA would further open agricultural trade in 2008 by working within NAFTA’s framework (2006, 5). The CRS noted that Calderón’s approach differed from PRD candidate Andrés López Obrador’s approach which “call[ed] to re-open NAFTA negotiations” (2006, 5).

Beyond the CRS predictions, the implementation of the Merida Initiative would suggest that Calderón had a good relationship with the United States. The U.S. Department of State identified the Merida Initiative as “an unprecedented partnership between the United States and Mexico to fight organized crime and associated violence while furthering respect for human rights and the rule of law. Based on principles of common and shared responsibility…the two countries’ efforts have built confidence that is transforming the bilateral relationship” (2017b). The Merida Initiative was crafted by Calderón and Bush in March 2007 (Olson and Wilson 2010, 3). The first phase of funding was aimed at equipment, though, after succeeding Bush, Obama focused on institutions in a strategy dubbed “Beyond Merida” (2010, 3).

Delgado-Ramos, Romano, and Breña characterized the Merida Initiative as defending the U.S. in Mexican territory along with guaranteed investments (2011, 98). The investment from the U.S. government has totaled $2.5 billion since 2008 (U.S. Department of State 2017b). Delgado-Ramos, Romano, and Breña argued that the U.S. used the Merida Initiative to increase its ability to intervene on Mexican soil (2011, 97). Military personnel at local and state levels in Mexico increased after the implementation of the Merida Initiative. Delgado-Ramos, Romano, and Breña argued that the division and arrangement in power in Mexico stemming directly from the Merida Initiative may not be legal (2011, 98). They later argued that the U.S. intervention in the security matters as well as training paramilitary groups resemble what is currently observed in Colombia (2011, 99).
Despite being the second PAN president, Calderón represented the first president with PAN party ideals and preferences as Vicente Fox could not be considered to be a president who truly represented the PAN. In terms of foreign policy with the United States, Calderón did not behave differently from past presidents regardless of whether or not they were in the PAN or PRI. He promised to work with the U.S. and not to renegotiate NAFTA as well as to aid in the extradition of accused criminals to the U.S. The implementation of the Merida Initiative and the increased presence of U.S. influence in Mexican security would suggest that Calderón had healthy relationships with both the Bush and Obama administrations. The presidency of Calderón aided that argument that neither PRI nor PAN executives would have a tense relationship with the U.S.

Enrique Peña Nieto

Enrique Peña Nieto won the 2012 presidential election a returned the PRI to control of the executive branch. Seelke notes that Peña Nieto was a candidate for the PRI and Green Ecological Party (PVEM) as the parties were allies for the 2012 election (2012, 1, 4). The alliance was identified as the “Committed to Mexico” coalition (2012, 6).

In Peña Nieto’s approach to the United States, Mexico would seek to “…hav[e] an intense, close relationship of effective [security] collaboration measured by results” (Booth and Miroff 2012). Seelke also noted that Peña Nieto would try to reassure U.S. policy makers that his administration would aid in combating organized crime and would work to increase bilateral economic cooperation” (2012, 14). Peña Nieto also promised more trilateral economic cooperation with the U.S. and Canada (2012, 14). That would lead one to believe he intends to preserve NAFTA in its present form.
Peña Nieto moved away Calderón’s public messages of security opting to speak about economic reforms (Domínguez and Fernández de Castro 2016, 46). He approached security through attempts to improve coordination among Mexican agencies (2016, 46). The Obama administration appeared to support the security initiatives of Peña Nieto. This may be because of a homicide rate that dropped from 23.5 per 100,000 in 2011 to 16.6 per 100,000 in 2014 (Guerrero 2015 and Domínguez and Fernández de Castro 2016, 46).

Through the end of the time frame of this project, Peña Nieto has not appeared to deviate from the foreign policy approaches, to the United States, of past presidents. His actions appear to support the promises he made during the 2012 campaign, which were documented by Seelke (2012). His approach to the U.S. appear to be congruent with the approaches of recent Mexican presidents.

Future relations between Mexico and the United States may not be smooth due to the election of President Trump. In his first week in office, Trump issued an executive order for a 2,000-mile border wall to be built on the U.S.-Mexican border (BBC News 2017a). He also maintained a campaign promise by proposing that Mexico would pay for the construction of the wall. All Mexicans, from Peña Nieto to political opponents of the PRI to Mexican citizens have been fervent about the wall and have insisted that Mexico will not pay for it (2017a). Peña Nieto cancelled a trip to the United States over the wall controversy (2017b). Peña Nieto faced harsh criticism for meeting with Trump in September 2016. When that was combined with his low approval numbers, few were surprised to see Peña Nieto take a harder line against Trump (2017b). The Peña Nieto administration also expressed disdain at Trump’s suggestion that a 20 percent tax on Mexican goods could be levied to pay for the wall and reiterated that Mexico would not engage in any negotiations for the construction of the wall (2017c). Given the
Mexican public’s distaste for Trump, it can be theorized that Peña Nieto and Trump may clash even more in the final years of Peña Nieto’s sexenio.

Conclusion

Whether one chooses to classify the PAN and the PRI as center-right parties or classify the PAN as conservative and the PRI as centrist, the Mexican case suggests that such ideologies did not appear to include a confrontational foreign policy approach with the United States. Despite periodic tensions with the U.S., both parties appeared to work with the U.S. and adopt neo-liberal policies after the PRI re-aligned in the 1980s. Also, the act of a new party taking the presidency, did not appear to alter Mexican-U.S. relations. Incoming presidents pledged to work with the U.S. instead of opposing invasive U.S. security initiatives (such as extradition) and to preserve NAFTA.

It does not appear that the Mexican electorate punished either the PRI or the PAN for possessing pro-U.S. policies in 2000. Vicente Fox did not appear to campaign on a foreign policy that would have been a stark contrast from Ernesto Zedillo, and he did not govern differently with respect to the U.S. Enrique Peña Nieto did not run on a platform of confronting the United States nor did he appear to repudiate PAN cooperation with the U.S. Neither the PRI nor the PAN appeared to find such confrontational rhetoric as beneficial to their electoral chances.

Expulsions did not occur despite times of diplomatic tension. President Fox had expectations of a different immigration policy from the United States that stemmed from then Governor George W. Bush’s approach to Texan-Mexican relations in the 1990s. President Bush, along with Congress, was not as cooperative as Governor Bush. While President Fox was unhappy and vocal about the American policy, he did not choose to expel the United States
ambassador nor any American diplomats or other personnel. He also did not weaken Mexican approval of U.S.-favored policies such as NAFTA.

Colombia

Colombian foreign policy with the United States centers on narcotics policing. The Colombian president’s view of the U.S. can be understood through their cooperation with the U.S. on anti-narcotics policies. Other issues that shaped foreign policy are the insurgency of left-wing revolutionaries, such as the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) \(^{50}\) and Colombia’s human rights record concerning citizens displaced in the war with the FARC.

According to Huber et al. (2008), there was little ideological variation among Colombian presidents from 1991 to 2016. César Gaviria and Ernesto Samper were considered to have governed from the secular center while Andrés Pastrana, Álvaro Uribe, and Juan Santos were considered to be secular center-right. There was also little party variation despite new party names emerging. Gaviria and Samper were members of the Partido Liberal Colombiano (Liberal Party) while Uribe and Santos were members of coalitions that had strong Liberal Party influences. Pastrana was a member of the Partido Conservador Colombiano (Conservative Party).

This section will examine important, Colombian issues then take a chronological look at Colombian presidents from 1991 to 2016. The section begins with an examination of the large issues in Colombia that would affect foreign policy: narcotics, insurgency of the FARC, and human rights. These three issues are not completely independent of one another, but each issue requires some discussion to better understand the environment in which the Colombian president

\(^{50}\) The United States also recognized similar guerrilla groups such as the Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN) and Ejercito Popular de Liberacion (EPL). While the ELN still opposes the government, the EPL signed a peace agreement with the government in January 1991. This research focuses primarily on the FARC due to it being the largest guerrilla group (de la Asuncion 2000, 448).
governed. Then the section will examine the administration of President César Gaviria vis-à-vis its foreign policy toward the United States and relationship with the United States. Gaviria was the first of five Colombian presidents over this time frame. He was followed by Ernesto Samper, Andrés Pastrana, Álvaro Uribe, and Juan Santos. Each subsequent administration was examined similarly to the Gaviria administration.

*Colombia’s Semi-Democratic Party System: The Conservative Party vs. Liberal Party*

The Conservative Party and Liberal Party maintained control of the presidency in Colombia until 2000, minus some brief interruptions. Presidents Uribe and Santos broke away from the Liberal Party and were elected by movements that acted outside of the traditional two-party framework. Despite losing control over the presidency, both parties remain influential in Colombian politics.

The current two-party system of the Conservatives and the Liberals began in 1958 (Martz 1999, 650), though both parties have been influential in Colombian politics since the mid-1800s (Boudon 2000, 35). The previous party system had collapsed in 1953 and was replaced by military rule under General Rojas Pinilla (Rezazadeh and McKenzie 1978, 4). Democracy would return in 1958 as the Conservatives and Liberals created Frente Nacional after ousting Rojas (Rezazadeh and McKenzie 1978, 4 and Martz 1999, 650). As a form of “pacted democracy” (Karl 1991), the Frente Nacional stipulated that the presidency would alternate between the parties for the next 12 years, then was amended to last for 16 years (Martz 1999, 650). Actual competition for the presidency between the two parties would not resume until 1974 (1999, 651).

The Conservative Party has been supported by voters in rural zones (campesinos) (Rezazadeh and McKenzie 1978, 1 and, Dix 1987, 96). Conservatives are made of old families of high social status (Dix 1987, 97). Conservatives tend to be Roman Catholics who profess
views and beliefs that align with the church, such as being against any government action that would support family planning (1987, 95). Conservatives have resisted state involvement in economics (1987, 95).

The Liberal Party has been supported by laborers in urban centers (Rezazadeh and McKenzie 1978, 1, and Dix 1987, 96). The Liberal Party has attracted upwardly mobile individuals (Dix 1987, 97). Liberals tend to be secular when compared to Conservatives (1987, 95). Liberals have supported making the state more active in the realms of economic planning and development (1987, 95). They have also taken the lead in agrarian and urban reform (1987, 95).

Party loyalty has been more generational and regional than ideological in Colombia. Party affiliation was given not unlike a family name (Rezazadeh and McKenzie 1978, 1 and Dix 1987, 92). This was partly the result of communities which faced abuses when one party was in control of a territory (Rezazadeh and McKenzie 1978, 1). Enduring such abuses bonded a community against one party more than embracing the other (1978, 1). Loyalty, for or against a party, was passed down to children as was hatred of the other party. Dix characterized this as “hereditary hatred” (1987, 92). This hatred persisted despite ideological the convergence of the parties (1987, 96, and Boudon 2000, 35-36). This convergence made Frente Nacional a possibility after the military seized control of the government (Dix 1987, 96). The differences between the parties can be identified as cultural (1987, 97).

Constitutional reform in 1957 codified the two-party system with the Conservatives and Liberals being the recognized parties (Rezazadeh and McKenzie 1978, 6). While the party system faced threats from the Popular National Alliance (ANAPO) in the 1970s and from the M-19 Democratic Alliance in the 1990s (1978, 7 and Boudon 2000, 37), it survived. Boudon argued
that a large blow to the two-party system occurred with the new constitution that took effect in 1991 (2000, 38). Parties could now receive legal recognition by winning one seat in either legislative chamber or have a candidate receive 50,000 votes (Taylor 1995). Though it was more of a problem in the Conservative Party, both parties had been able to fight factionalism (Boudon 2000) since 1974 until the new constitution. Having provided a brief overview of Colombia’s post-1958 party system, I will now examine Colombian presidents who served from 1990 through 2016. As in the Mexican case study, the analysis focuses on foreign relations with the U.S. in each presidential administration.

*César Gaviria*

President César Gaviria governed from 1990 to 1994. He was from the Liberal Party, and his administration represented the “new right” of Colombian politics (Avilés 2006, 388). Avilés characterized the new right as those “who identified with the defence of the individual and market economy” (2006, 388). They were also identified as being anti-statist, anti-populist, and anti-communist (2006, 388).

One of the first challenges Gaviria and his administration faced was a new constitution. Colombia’s new constitution took effect in 1991 and reduced advantages enjoyed by the two major parties, gave greater judicial protections for human rights, and made more offices subject to direct democracy (Boudon 2001). There were also numerous reforms in civilian-military relations (Avilés 2006, 389). Gaviria embraced these reforms by selecting the first civilian head of the Ministry of Defense in 40 years (2006, 389).

Despite some claiming that Gaviria placed more civilians in positions of authority with the military due to pressures from the FARC (Avilés 2006, 389), the U.S. policymakers also “emphasized the importance of civilian control” (2006, 389). As a condition of further U.S.
military and financial aid, the U.S. Congress also demanded that the International Military
Education and Training (IMET) programs expand to aid new democracies (2006, 390). One
million U.S. dollars was earmarked for the training “foreign civilian and military officials in
respect for civilian control over military affairs, and promoting awareness and understanding of

In regional issues the Gaviria administration sided or was supported by Washington. With the approval of the United States, Gaviria, along with administrations in Spain, Mexico, and Venezuela, formed the El Salvador Support Group in 1992 (Tokatlian 2000, 343). Colombia also joined with the United States, and other countries, to participate in the Guatemalan peace process in the early 1990s (2000, 343). The Colombian government was backed by the United States despite many questioning its human rights record (2000, 344).

Crandall argues that “…many in Washington saw as the archetype of a reliable antidrug
ally” (2001, 96). Stokes concurs that the Bush Administration’s Andean Initiative of 1989 was
given to Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia to fight the war on drugs, but it was conditioned based on
each country implementing neoliberal reforms (2005, 85). Such reforms were compounded with
the Gaviria administration’s efforts to undermine popular and labor movements through new
provisions in the new constitution (Avilés 2006, 391). The Gaviria administration appeared to
prioritize fighting the war on drugs over the president’s promises of fighting paramilitarism
(2006, 393-394). The foreign policy of the Gaviria administration became “narcotized” after the
escape of Pablo Escobar from Colombian prison (Tokatlian 2000, 343).

By the end of his term, however, “Gaviria’s antidrug credentials became increasingly
suspect in Washington” (Crandall 2001, 102). The U.S. government believed that Gaviria had
weakened on his position by not following the U.S. government’s requests when it came to
addressing the Cali cartel (2001, 102). The United States did not appear to lose confidence in the Gaviria administration, but did come to a realization that Gaviria may not have been the ally they wanted him to be (2001, 102).

Despite not being as cooperative as he once was with the United States, Gaviria worked with the U.S. to aid in their narcotics policy and implemented neoliberal reforms. There were no major diplomatic rifts between the two countries, and, certainly, no expulsions of Americans by Gaviria. The United States still believed, even despite some loosening up by the administration in Bogotá, that Gaviria was committed to the policy goals in Washington.

**Ernesto Samper**

President Ernesto Samper succeeded fellow Liberal Party politician Gaviria and served from 1994 to 1998. The Samper administration had a tense relationship with the Clinton administration. This was due to the fact that the government did not consider Samper to be an ally in the war on drugs (Crandall 2001, 95). Despite the fact that the U.S. government routinely circumvented President Samper and considered his administration to be corrupt, Samper did not expel any American officials.

The relationship between the Samper and Clinton administrations was described as “acerbic and [deeply] strained” (Crandall 2001, 95). The foreign policy approach of the U.S. became highly interventionist in nature during the Samper administration (2001, 95). This had domestic ramifications as the state was weakened during a time when clashes between guerrillas and paramilitaries in the countryside were increasing (2001, 96). The United States had previously focused on kingpins and cartels, but dedicated its counternarcotics efforts “to bring[ing] down the scandal-ridden but democratically elected president of Colombia” (2001,
96). This strategy was taken to a diplomatically extreme, and rare, level by the revoking of Samper’s visa in 1996 (2001, 96).

Crandall argued that the U.S. approach to Colombia may not have been completely due to accusations of Samper’s connection to drug cartels (2001, 102). He argued that the U.S. had begun to lose faith in Gaviria as an ally in the war on drugs, which impacted the amount of tolerance they would have for Samper (2001, 102). When Gaviria’s perceived softening on the war on drugs was compounded with evidence that Samper had some kind of relationship with drug kingpins, the Clinton administration was concerned about maintaining counternarcotic operations in Colombia. After Samper was elected, the Clinton administration made it clear that he would have to agree to their demands. One demand was to replace General Octavio Vargas Silva with General Rosso José Serrano as commander of the National Police (2001, 103). With a commander who the U.S. felt would cooperate in place, the groundwork was laid to circumvent President Samper. The Clinton administration adopted a policy of working with officials in the Colombian government they felt they could trust while attacking those they felt they could not trust (2001, 103).

The approach of the Clinton administration led to the Samper administration launching counternarcotic actions either before or after important decisions by the Clinton administration vis-à-vis Colombia (Crandall 2001, 104). Given Samper’s concerns about how the U.S. viewed his administration, his administration “govern[ed] Colombia with one eye focused on Washington” (2001, 104). This led to Samper being tougher on drugs than Washington expected, yet the U.S. continued to demand a greater effort to combat drugs given their perception of Samper (2001, 104). An example of this was when the Samper administration successfully dismantled the Cali cartel, yet the United States chose to decertify Colombia regardless (2001,
Crandall argued that the Clinton administration exploited Samper’s credibility in fighting the war on drugs to force his administration to conduct greater counternarcotic actions than what occurred under President Gaviria (2001, 105-106).

The negative view of Samper held by the United States would also affect how they viewed other branches of the Colombian government. When the Colombian Congress refused to pursue corruption charges against Samper, officials in Washington asserted that the Liberal-dominated Colombian Congress was corrupt, as well (Crandall 2001 108). The U.S. responded to the vote by revoking Samper’s visa in hopes that Colombians would undermine their legislative branch and demand Samper be removed (2001, 108). Crandall argues that this backfired on the U.S. as Crandall was now seen as a victim of American bullying (2001, 108). Indeed, Samper responded to these U.S. actions by launching Operation Condor as well as to attempt to amend the 1991 constitution to permit the extradition of certain Cali cartel leaders to the United States (2001, 108-109). The U.S. responded by fully decertifying Colombia in 1997, which was the second straight year in which Colombia had been decertified (2001, 109).

President Samper faced a great amount of tension with the Clinton administration. He chose to deal with this tension by amplifying Colombia’s participation in the war on drugs. Samper not choose to work within the existing framework of bilateral relations, and did not contemplate expulsion to express his displeasure or to garner domestic political support. To the contrary Samper intensified efforts at cooperation with the U.S.-backed war on drugs whenever the U.S. questioned his regime’s integrity. Samper responded to the tension by attempting to win the approval of the Clinton administration instead of combating it at any level.

Andrés Pastrana
The election of Conservative Andrés Pastrana in 1998 signaled an end to the tension between the U.S. and Colombian governments. Pastrana was the preferred candidate of the U.S. as it suspected Liberal Horacio Serpa had ties to drug cartels just like Liberal President Samper (Crandall 2001, 112). The State Department offered high praise to the Pastrana administration and invited President Pastrana to Washington soon after he took office (2001, 113).

Members of the U.S. Congress were concerned about Pastrana’s desire to initiate peace negotiations with the FARC, but the U.S. government still gave Pastrana greater latitude in this issue area than they gave Samper (Crandall 2001, 113). Counternarcotics funding rose as Pastrana took office (2001, 114). Even when Colombia was deemed to be in “crisis” by the U.S., the policy coordination between the Pastrana and Clinton administrations “fueled a stronger bilateral relationship” (2001, 114). It could be argued that U.S. foreign policy toward Colombia during the Pastrana administration had been “denarcotized” (2001, 114).

Plan Colombia was initiated during the Pastrana administration in a joint effort with the Clinton administration. The Clinton administration committed $1.3 billion to help fight the war on drugs in Colombia (Crandall 2002 160). Colombia pledged $4 billion to aid in the project (2002, 163). Pastrana promoted it as a plan to aid in reviving the Colombian economy (2002, 163). Plan Colombia made Colombia the third largest recipient of military aid from the United States (Stokes 2001, 59). Crandall argued that the U.S. was compelled to intervene after the deaths of American activists in Colombia combined with an increase in coca production, increased attacks by guerrilla groups, and increased kidnappings by guerrillas (2002, 162).

Plan Colombia was an international effort (Crandall 2002, 163), but it did serve U.S. interests. The U.S. had three goals with Plan Colombia. The first goal was Colombian economic development (Stokes 2001, 60). The second goal involved the promotion of human rights (2001,
The third goal was the destruction of Colombian cocaine plantations (2001, 60). Stokes argued that the third goal was the most important to the Clinton administration (2001, 60).

Plan Colombia survived past the Clinton administration. Both the Bush (Stokes 2001) and Obama administrations continued it (Shifter 2012, 36). The Obama administration allocated $300 million under the program in 2012 (2012, 36). As of 2012 the U.S. had contributed $8 billion (2001, 36). Rochlin observed that 75 per cent of the funding for Plan Colombia went to police and military assistance (2010, 716).

President Pastrana observed slight tension in his relationship with the Clinton administration, but the implementation of Plan Colombia appeared to ease much of that tension. The improved relationship with the United States did not appear to change when the Bush administration came to power in January 2001. Bush praised Pastrana for his role in combating terrorism (Rochlin 2010, 733). Pastrana was seen as an ally in the war on drugs. He was also not suspected of corruption unlike Samper. Pastrana enjoyed a large amount of support from the United States even as domestic issues became a threat to U.S. national security (Crandall 2001, 113). Because of this support, Pastrana never had to consider expulsion as an option.

Álvaro Uribe

Álvaro Uribe served as president of Colombia from 2002 to 2010. He broke from the Liberal Party to run for the presidency (Dugas 2003). Uribe ran under the Movimiento Primero Colombia (Colombia First Movement) (Dugas 2003, 1129). Uribe built a coalition that spanned parties and tried to pull in rival Conservative voters as well as independents. Dugas notes that President Pastrana ran his campaign in 1998 similarly as he reached out to Liberals and independents (2003, 1129).
One could argue that Uribe was a populist, but Dugas (2003) disagrees with such a characterization. Dugas notes that while Uribe did not run as a Liberal, he “never eschew[ed] his own Liberal identity” (2003, 1129). He also argued that Uribe “was not a rhetorical master who established a mystical bond with his followers” (2003, 1129). Specifically, Uribe did not specifically target the lower classes, or the “people,” of society (2003, 1129). Uribe ran using “traditional forms of mobilization and in the clear appeal of a hard-line candidate in a time of increasing public anxiety over the inroads made by leftist guerrillas” (2003, 1130). Uribe also had orthodox economic policies that were neoliberal (2003, 1117).

President Uribe’s hard-line approach synced up with the “redefinition of counterinsurgency efforts [by the United States] as part of the ‘global war on terror’” (Nieto 2007, 117). The policies of the Uribe and Bush administrations were “…more focused on the defense of the state than on defense of the individual” (Nieto 2007, 117). The Uribe administration supported the Bush administration’s assertion that the fight against terrorism is global and will require multilateral agreements to combat (2007, 118). Uribe’s support for the United States placed Colombia in a lonely position given most of Latin America’s position toward the United States during his terms in office with some declaring that the Monroe Doctrine was dead (Wallerstein 2005). Nieto argued that Uribe’s approach to security “can be seen as a U.S. response to these new developments [in Latin America]” (2007, 118).

Uribe’s closeness with the Bush administration caused stress in the region between Colombia and other Latin American states. After Colombian forced crossed into Ecuador to fight the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) in March 2008 to capture a FARC leader, evidence acquired suggested that that Venezuela might have been a safe haven for the FARC (Wrobel 2010, 26). U.S. intelligence suggested that drugs out of Colombia traveled
through Venezuela (2010, 26). The Uribe administrations accusations caused stress between them and the Chávez administration in Venezuela. Due to Venezuela being one of the biggest markets for Colombian goods, bilateral trade was affected by the disagreements between presidents (2010, 26). Imports from Colombia to Venezuela decreased from 15.6 percent of all Colombian exports to 3.6 percent (Weisbrot and Johnston 2010).

Uribe was also close with the Obama administration as the two countries came to a defense agreement in July 2009 (Weisbrot 2011, 65). The agreement increased the U.S. presence at multiple bases in Colombia (2011, 65). Numerous South American leaders disagreed with the pact (2011, 65). The Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (UNASUR), with Colombia signing on, would reaffirm its stance that foreign militaries cannot conduct forward operations out of South American bases (2011, 66).

Like President Pastrana before him, President Uribe had a relationship with the United States with little tension, certainly far less than what President Samper felt. Uribe did not expel any representative of the United States nor was he expected to expel given a relatively low amount of tension and agreement with the Bush administration over how to combat terrorism. While Uribe was not a member of either the Liberal or Conservative parties, he did not completely disavow the Liberal Party. He worked within traditional structures to achieve office, and the Colombian party system had not collapsed.

Juan Santos

Juan Santos served as president of Colombia from 2010 to the end of the timeline for this research. He served as minister of defense under President Uribe. He helped found the Social Party of National Unity and ran as its candidate in the 2010 election (please find a more
scholarly source). Other founders of the Social Party of National Unity were supporters of Uribe and former members of the Liberal Party.

The domestic stances of President Santos did not differ greatly from President Uribe. Chambers argued that, in terms of addressing human rights, Santos represented a “significant change in style, tone, and discourse [but his] strategic and ideological deployment of human rights language remain[ed] the same” (2013, Note 8). Given that Santos and Uribe shared a similar coalition, this was not a surprise.

The international stances of President Santos did separate from President Uribe. Crandall argued that Santos “believe[d] his government can assume the mantle of regional leadership by adopting a more balanced foreign policy, one less dependent on Washington” (2011, 90). Santos appeared to usher in a new strategy that gave less weight to the policy preferences of the Obama administration (2011, 83). Weisbrot argued that Santos was faced with a choice of integrating into South America or stay loyal to the U.S. and chose to become part of South America (2011, 66).

This foreign policy independence was not, however, indicative of Santos’s feelings toward the United States. Crandall noted that Santos did not want to lose the closeness Colombia shared with the U.S. (2011, 90). That did not mean, however, that the Obama administration was not miffed by Santos’s agenda. The American government was unsettled by Santos’s preferences for a multilateral agenda over the patron-client relationship the two countries had shared (2011, 94).

On November 30, 2016, a peace agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC was approved by the Colombian Congress (Naucke 2017, 145). The peace capped a four-year process in Havana between both sides (2017, 145 and Angelo 2017, 135). Both sides had
been fighting for over 50 years (Naucke 2017, 145). Santos was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his part in the peace process (2017, 163 and Angelo 2017, 135). The peace process was supported by the Obama administration (Angelo 2017, 143).

Despite an increase in tension between Colombia and the United States as Colombia transitioned from Uribe to Santos, Santos wanted to maintain a strong relationship with the U.S. The United States was displeased with the gravitation of Santos toward other administrations in South America, one that were not close with the U.S., but Santos did not interpret the displeasure of the Obama administration as hostile. Despite Santos’s departure from the U.S. in regional matters, Obama still supported Santos in the peace process with the FARC. An increase in tension between the two countries did not lead to any expulsions.

**Conclusion**

Colombia had more variation in parties controlling the presidency as Mexico did over this timeline, but that is misleading. Gaviria and Samper were members of the Liberal Party while Uribe and Santos were members of movements led by former Liberals. Pastrana was the only president without some relationship with the Liberal Party, though he attempted to court Liberals. In terms of ideology, there was not much variation among the five presidents. The codings from Huber et al. (2008) suggest that Pastrana was slightly right of Gaviria and Samper51, but that Uribe and Santos shared the same ideological score as Pastrana.

The greatest variation was the amount of tension between Colombia and the United States. Gaviria52, Pastrana, and Uribe experienced little tension with the U.S. while Samper and Santos experienced more tension. Santos experienced a modest amount of tension while Samper experienced a great amount of tension with the United States. Despite this variation in tension,

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51 A shift from secular center to secular center-right.
52 Though the U.S. was doubting of Gaviria’s commitment to the war on drugs near the end of his term.
no expulsions of American ambassadors, diplomats, or other personnel was observed from 1991 to 2016. As observed in the Mexican case with President Fox, this suggests that tension alone may not be enough to explain a variation in expulsions.

**Conclusion**

The purpose of this chapter was to examine Latin American cases where the executive could not be characterized as radical, populist left, yet had tension with the United States. As in the presidencies of Vicente Fox and Ernesto Samper\textsuperscript{53}, their respective countries had a tense relationship with the United States during their administrations. This tension alone was not sufficient for one to observe non-criminal diplomatic expulsions. In the case of Samper, the tension appeared to drive his policies closer to the preferences of the United States. These cases support the argument that presence of a radical, populist left executive increases the likelihood of a non-criminal diplomatic expulsion. It also supports the argument that tension alone is not sufficient to cause non-criminal diplomatic expulsions. This is supported in Table 5.1 (below).

**Table 5.1. Expulsion Events and Executive Ideology in Control Cases from 1991-2016**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Number of Expulsion Events</th>
<th>Executive Ideology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991-1998</td>
<td>0 in Mexico</td>
<td>Center-right in Mexico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 in Colombia</td>
<td>Center in Colombia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2005</td>
<td>0 in Mexico</td>
<td>Center-right in Mexico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 in Colombia</td>
<td>Center-right in Colombia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-2016</td>
<td>0 in Mexico</td>
<td>Center-right in Mexico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 in Colombia</td>
<td>Center-right in Colombia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{53} Other presidents experienced tension with the United States, but it could be argued that Fox and Samper experienced the highest amount of tension between the United States and their respective countries.
Even outside of the major instances of tension such as immigration policy with Fox and the drug policies of Samper, there were other moments of tension that did not result in any expulsions. Colombia suffered consequences of staying loyal to the United States especially during the Uribe administration as Colombia agreed with U.S. allegations of Venezuelan support for the FARC and circumvention of Colombian drug policy as exports to Venezuela fell sharply. The harsh rhetoric and policy goals of Donald Trump has increased tension between Mexico and the United States, yet no expulsions have been observed.

Even with brief instances of tension, the United States achieved major policy in each country. The implementation of the Merida Initiative in Mexico and Plan Colombia in Colombia are instances were major U.S. security and drug policies were implemented on foreign soil. Neither policy would have been possible without the consent of the Mexican and Colombian governments respectively. Tension did not lead to expulsions nor did it impede U.S. policy goals for Mexico and Colombian.
Chapter 6: Radical Populist Left Cases: Venezuela and Colombia

Introduction

As noted in Chapter 2, Venezuela and Bolivia were selected as “crucial” cases because both experienced the presence of a radical, populist left executive during the time frame of the study. Both countries have also exhibited variation in types of expulsions as their executives have expelled American diplomats, ambassadors, military personnel, missionaries, corporations, and U.S. government agencies. There were obvious tensions between Venezuela and Bolivia and the United States. When party systems in each cases collapsed, social movements emerged that eventually elected radical populist-left executives. The result was presidents who used the parties as vehicles to build personal support for their leadership positions. After the election of radical populist-left presidents, there was also a growing pattern of conflict with the U.S., and increased expulsion activities in both cases. These cases support the argument that non-criminal diplomatic expulsions in Latin America can be explained by the presence of a radical, populist left executive.

Venezuela

The election of Hugo Chávez in 1999 coincided with the collapse of a stable Punto Fijo party system in Venezuela. This collapse permitted Chávez, and later Maduro, to create a vehicle for his political ambitions and to ascend to the presidency. The populism that swept Chávez into office was combined with left-wing rhetoric that morphed into a foreign policy against the region’s capitalistic hegemon. Unlike most administrations in South America that worked to secure the blessing of the United States, Presidents Chávez and Maduro actively spoke out against the U.S. Their harsh words were eventually combined with action as both administrations...
expelled Americans\textsuperscript{54} from Venezuela. These expulsions were enacted neither privately nor discreetly. Quite to the contrary, these presidents let their supporters know of their strong diplomatic actions.

This section begins with an examination of Hugo Chávez’s rise to the presidency. Chávez was embraced by neither major party. His goal of becoming the executive of Venezuela was realized by the formation of a new political party organized as a vehicle to elect him. After Chávez died in 2013, his hand-picked successor, Nicolás Maduro, assumed the presidency. Maduro demonstrated that he would have a similar approach to the United States as his diplomatic actions and public notifications of expulsions mirrored the acts of Chávez. Chávez embraced the left and populism as he campaigned for president. His election marked an abrupt left turn for Venezuela. His new left-wing approach\textsuperscript{55} appealed to the poor, who could see benefits in structurally changing the Venezuelan government and implementing socialist policies.

The next subsections examine Chávez in office. He followed through on his leftist, populist, radical, and Bolivarian rhetoric and did not use it as a campaign slogans. He led Venezuelan to draft and approve a new constitution in his first year in office. This kind of follow-through was appreciated by his constituents as he was re-elected in 2000. Chávez also attempted to increase the efficiency of the Movimiento Quinta República (MVR) by converting it into the Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV). The international views of the Chávez administration are examined, as well. One could argue that Chávez’s international views are the manifestation of his domestic, Bolivarian rhetoric. Venezuela’s change to embracing and

\textsuperscript{54} Not all of those expelled were official representatives of the U.S. government.

\textsuperscript{55} Contrasted from the old left who sought to remain in the old party system.
attempting to export socialism quickly caught the attention of the Bush administration. Tension between Venezuela and the United States followed.

This section continues by detailing six expulsion events under the Chávez and Maduro administrations. Five of the six events involved the expulsion of official representatives of the United States. The expulsion of New Tribes Mission differed in that the mission did not officially represent the United States or the Bush administration, but Chávez’s rationale for the expulsion would be compatible to his later explanations of future expulsions. These expulsions were non-criminal. The Chávez and Maduro administrations accused the diplomats of acting outside of their missions, and Chávez accused New Tribes Mission of acting outside the purview of a Christian mission. If these accusations were true, the expelled individuals would not have committed criminal activity and were not punished by the United States open their return. This distinction is important because these expulsions demonstrate that the Presidents Chávez and Maduro acted more like politicians seeking support from their constituents in expelling these individuals rather than government officials seeking justice for broken laws. The public forum, as well as passion displayed and rhetoric used, in which each president announced the expulsions supports the argument that these expulsions had some political motive to them.

*Chávez’s Rise to the Presidency*

Before Chávez won the presidency of Venezuela in 1998, Venezuela had a highly institutionalized party system (Roberts 2003, 35; and Morgan 2007, 78) that was entrenched in one of the oldest democracies in Latin America (Canache 2002, 69). The two major parties in Venezuela prior to the election of Chávez were Acción Democrática (AD) and the Christian Democratic Party (COPEI). This was the result of Punto Fijo, which ended military rule in

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56 The accuracy of these accusations are irrelevant to this research and will not be investigated.
Venezuela in favor of democracy in what Karl conceptualized as a “pact” in 1958 (1990). The overthrow of General Marcos Pérez Jiménez and the signing of the Pact pf Punto Fijo by the AD and the COPEI began four decades of exclusive political rule between the two parties (Ellner 2000, 30). Eventually the parties began to converge to the point where little differentiation existed between them (2000, 30). The established dominance of the AD and the COPEI would result in the marginalization of the left (Sanoja 2009, 398).

Punto Fijo was characterized by the relative ease with which its agreements were made. Prior to Punto Fijo, Venezuela was in a unique position as landowners willingly sold their land to oil interests as the price of agriculture was depressed due to the ability to import cheap foodstuffs (Karl 1990, 7). This mostly voluntary liquidation of the agricultural sector would ultimately result in a lack of an anti-democratic rural population, which made Punto Fijo easier to craft (1990, 7). This voluntary liquidation also removed any incentive for urban elites to attempt to seize the land and oppress the rural population (1990, 7). The military accepted its removal from power once the AD and COPEI agreed to amnesty for the military for its actions during its authoritarian rule (1990, 11). Both parties agreed to have mixed economy that had social protections (Ellner 2000, 30). The pact also protected the political order from destabilizing radical reform (2000, 30).

While the election of Chávez represented the end of the prior party system, the party system had begun to unravel in the 1980s (Morgan 2007, 80). President Carlos Pérez, of the AD, was reelected in 1988 and took policy positions that moved the AD from center-left to right (2007, 82). These largely neoliberal positions and policies led many citizens to protest. Pérez’s
shift to supporting neoliberalism\textsuperscript{57} led to the \textit{Caracazo}\textsuperscript{58}, a large, popular revolt in February and March of 1989 that would serve as the catalyst for 8,355 protests in Venezuela from October 1989 to September 2000 (López-Maya 2002, 202). The violent protests ended only after Pérez called in the military (Morgan 2007, 82; and Canache 2002, 73). The number of deaths in the \textit{Caracazo} ranged from 277 to 310 depending on the source (Maya 2003, 129).

By 1991 40\% of Venezuelans did not identify with either major party (Morgan 2007, 83). The Venezuelan government became consumed by party politics as early as 1991 as it faced challenges from The Notables, a group led by Arturo Uslar Pietri, which would create the necessary vulnerability for a coup (Corrales 2002, 155-156). Pérez backed off his attempted reforms and agreed to the demands of AD party leadership (2002, 158). Neither the old left nor COPEI could take advantage of the unpopularity of the AD. Rafael Caldera left the COPEI to run as an independent as part of the coalition, Convergencia, when he won the 1993 election for president\textsuperscript{59} (Morgan 2007, 82, and Corrales 2002, 158). For the 1998 election, both AD and the COPEI threw their support behind Proyecto Venezuela candidate Henrique Salas Romer as both parties’ run as being major forces in Venezuelan politics had essentially come to an end (Morgan 2007, 83).

While the party system was crumbling in Venezuela, Chávez was making his second attempt to create change in the executive office with the support of his newly-created party, the Movimiento V República (Fifth Republic Movement, MVR), in 1998 (Canache 2002, 74). Chávez’s first attempt to create such a change was unsuccessful. As a military officer in 1992, Chávez led one of two unsuccessful coups against Pérez (2002, 69). Chávez was imprisoned for

\textsuperscript{57} This shift came through a 100 per cent increase in the price of petroleum and a 30 per cent increase in public transport fares (Maya 2003, 120-121).
\textsuperscript{58} Also referred to as the \textit{Sacudón}.
\textsuperscript{59} Pérez was already out of office due to impeachment.
his part in the coup. He was released in 1994 under the condition that he resign from the military (2002, 73).

After his release from prison combined with the notoriety that came from his surrender speech on February 4, 1992 (Canache 2002, 73), Chávez turned his attention to regime change initiative by the civilian sector. He became aware of a strong preference for him, should he chose to run (2002, 74). He organized the MVR in 1998 for the purposes of winning the upcoming presidential election (2002, 74). Chávez embraced the left and populism (Roberts 2003, 35) and attracted “members of the marginalized class of the informal economy and poorer non-unionized workers of the formal economy” (Ellner 2005, 162-163). Chávez, especially once becoming president, prioritized cultural and social goals over economic goals (Bowman and Stone 2006, 22; and Piñeiro Harnecker 2009, 333-337). Once he became political, Chávez’s left-wing preferences were hardly surprising given the historical alliances between the far-left political groups and the military in Venezuela (Blanco Muñoz 1998 and Garrido 1999).

Like a true populist, Chávez ran as the consummate outsider. He was “a master of ‘the politics of antipolitics’” (Roberts 2003, 36). He accused Venezuelan politicians of wasting the oil money and destroying democracy (2003, 36). This may have been an accurate observation by Chávez as Karl argued that oil revenues led to an inefficient state, unstable economic performance, and a party system built upon patronage that could no longer provide public services or distribute benefits (1997). The effect of this rhetoric was to cause Venezuelans to distrust established institutions (Roberts 2003, 36). Roberts argued that Chávez relied on his personality to garner support over organizational bonds (2003, 36).

Chávez as President
Chávez won in a landslide election in 1998 (Roberts 2003, 35). As president, he supported “diverse social programs that provide[d] education and employment opportunities to large numbers of the underprivileged, in accordance with the government policy of prioritizing quantity over quality” (Ellner 2005, 82). Chávez supported populist policies that would redistribute wealth and land (Sylvia and Danopoulous 2003, 63). He had also fought to reverse the privatization of the health care sector (Mahmood et al. 2012, 818). Chávez supported drafting a new “Bolivarian” constitution, which would aid in health reform and lead to *Barrio Adentro* (BA) in 2003 (2012, 815, 818). BA was the largest reform to health care to the point and opened up access to health care and created participation by communities (2012, 815). Chávez also appointed loyalists to run Petróleos de Venezuela, Sociedad Anónima (PVSDA), the state-run oil company (Parenti 2006, 9). Chávez attempted to clean out the company in order to exercise further control over it\(^{60}\) (2006, 9). Such initiatives appeared to be preferable to his constituents as Venezuelans supported the Chávez and the MVR in the 2000 mega-elections, which contained elections for president, legislators for the National Assembly, governors, state legislatures, and mayors (Molina V. and Pérez B. 2004, 106).

Chávez campaigned on overturning the status quo by drafting a new constitution, making major changes to the judicial system, and halting the economic reforms of his predecessors (Canache 2002, 74). He was faithful to these campaign promises and a referendum was held in April 1999 to call for a constitutional assembly. By July there were elections held to select delegates to the constitutional assembly (2002, 85). The new constitution was approved in December\(^{61}\). The new constitution stopped previous neo-liberal reforms “by embracing the

\(^{60}\) An oil strike in 2002 would finally give Chávez the leverage he needed to exert further control over PVSDA (Parenti 2006).

\(^{61}\) The mega-elections mentioned in the previous paragraph were held in accord with the newly approved constitution.
model of state intervention in the economy and affirming the state’s responsibility for the welfare of the non-privileged sectors of the population” (Ellner 2005, 167).

The Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (United Socialist Party of Venezuela, PSUV) succeeded the MVR in 2007. Ellner argued that PSUV was designed to overcome flaws in the MVR such as lack of communication and bureaucracy (2005, 81). 75 percent of the Chavistas who supported Chávez in the 2006 election joined the party after its creation in early 2007 (2005, 81). PSUV was the party of Chávez, and after his death in 2013, became the party of Maduro.

Relationship with the United States

It could be argued that this was Chávez converting his domestic rhetoric into international policies. The populism he utilized to rally Venezuelans against political elites was focused at the regional and global elite: the United States. Chávez embraced a revolutionary icon, Simón Bolívar, and it showed in his foreign policies and rhetoric. Chávez ran on a strong anti-colonialist sentiments (Sylvia and Danopoulos 2003, 67). Foreign debt and creditors had harmed many states in Latin America, so Chávez “paint[ed] foreign bankers with the Bolivarian brush of anti-colonialism to appeal to the masses of Venezuela” (2003, 67). He promised to toss out foreign, neo-liberal capitalists along with their unfair aid packages and asymmetrical trading propositions (2003, 67).

Despite multiple electoral successes for Chávez, Venezuela was not harmonious during his terms as president. In April 2002 Venezuela’s military and business leaders removed Chávez from power and held him hostage (Cole 2007, 498). The new government, with Pedro Carmona at the head, abolished the new constitution and amended laws it considered to be harmful to business interests (2007, 498). Carmona also canceled Venezuela oil shipments to Cuba (Azicri
Chávez was re-installed as president a few days later as thousands took the streets to protest the new government, and the military refused to work with Carmona (Cole 2007, 498). The role of the Bush administration in the coup was unclear. There were signs, however, that President Bush did support the coup regardless of whether the U.S. was involved or not (Cole 2007, 498). U.S. officials, before the coup, met with members of the Venezuelan military who wanted Chávez out of power (Sharma, Tracy, and Kumar 2004). This evidence led Shifter to argue that “the Bush administration endorsed the military coup against Chávez in April 2002” (2006, 56). Clement argued that “[t]he White House…praised the coup and justified it on the grounds that Chávez had allegedly instigated his supporters to attack demonstrators and later resigned” (2005, 70). Almost every Latin American state in the Organization of American States (OAS) considered the coup a violation of the OAS Democratic Charter (Pevehouse 2005, 216). Pevehouse noted that the Bush administration would even initially deny that a coup had taken place (2005, 216). The OAS called a meeting and officially condemned the coup. Once Chávez was freed and returned to the power, the U.S. had no choice but to support the OAS’s condemnation of the coup (2005, 216). Sharma, Tracy, and Kumar (2004) argued that Chávez upset the Bush administration by providing communist Cuba with cheap oil and by undermining U.S. regional authority by lobbying for Latin American governments to reject the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and to pursue socialist policies. The diplomatic and international tension did not appear, however, to cause any trade issues between the countries. As late as 2015, the Observatory of Economic Complexity (2017) observed that the U.S. was Venezuela’s largest
exporter. The U.S. received 43 per cent of Venezuelan exports totaling $14.6 billion. 85 per cent of those exports were crude oil, which accounted for $12.3 billion.

Expulsion of New Tribes Mission

The relationship between Venezuela and the United States was already weak by October 2005. The Chávez and Bush administrations had embraced international policies and taken international positions that the respective administration disliked. Chávez had also begun a process of refusing to renew the work permits of DEA agents in Venezuela, which would cut the number of agents from 10 in 2005 to 2 in 2009 (Kraul 2009). The Chávez administration also had domestic policies that ran contrary to the interests of the Bush administration. Despite the tension between the two states, the expulsion of the New Tribes Mission was unexpected. Such behavior had not been evidenced in the region to this point.

While at a ceremony to present farming equipment and land titles to indigenous peoples, Chávez announced that he was going to expel New Tribes Mission from Venezuela (BBC News 2005a). Chávez noted that he had yet to sign the order because he was giving New Tribes time to collect their belongings (2005a). That did not mean that Chávez was uncertain about his decision. He is quoted as saying, “This is an irreversible decision that I have made. We don’t want the New Tribes here. Enough colonialism!” (2005a). The following month it was reported that New Tribes Mission was given 90 days to leave Venezuela (BBC News 2005b).

Chávez accused New Tribes of flying in and out of Venezuela without permission from the government (BBC News 2005a). He also accused New Tribes of building luxurious accommodations for themselves amid the poverty suffered by the indigenous people of

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62 In 2002, the U.S. exported $15.1 billion in goods from Venezuela and 75 per cent of the exports were crude oil, worth $11.3 billion (Observatory of Economic Complexity 2017).
63 While relative percentage of exports to the U.S. vis-à-vis the rest of the world experienced variation since 2002, there was no year where any country consumed a larger share of Venezuela exports than the U.S.
Venezuela (2005a). Chávez claimed that New Tribes was providing the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with sensitive information (BBC News 2005b). New Tribes denied the allegation (2005b). BBC News noted their reporter’s\textsuperscript{64} story that “Caracas has suggested that American evangelicals are part of a broader conspiracy in Washington to topple a president whose regional influence is growing thanks to massive oil revenues” (2005a). BBC News noted that this is among many accusations Chávez has made against the U.S. with other allegations being that the United States was planning to assassinate him and that U.S. drug enforcement agents spied on the Venezuelan government (2005b).

New Tribes Mission was, and still is, a mission that spreads Christianity to indigenous peoples (BBC News 2005a). Their goal is to reach out to 2,500 of the 6,500 peoples of the world who do not have churches nor are working to have churches (New Tribes Mission 2017). It was one of the largest missionary groups in Latin America at the time of the expulsion. It also had 3,200 workers who were spread across 17 countries including West Africa and Southeast Asia (BBC News 2005a). Prior to the expulsion, New Tribes had worked with the indigenous peoples of Venezuela for decades (BBC News 2005b).

Regardless of whether the accusations were true or not, Chávez sent a clear message that no American mission, whether official U.S. representatives or not or even diplomatic or not, were going to operate in Venezuela without the government being fully aware of all their actions. Any lack of transparency would be interpreted as a clandestine action meant to undermine the Chávez administration. The ambiguity with which New Tribes was accused of action was a threat to Venezuela as Chávez said, “These violations of our national sovereignty have to stop” (BBC News 2005a).

\textsuperscript{64} Identified as Simon Watts in BBC News (2005a).
Despite no international convention requiring such action, Chávez announced the expulsion publicly. During the announcement he invoked Bolivarian rhetoric and accused the U.S. of violating Venezuelan sovereignty. Such a speech would seem to fit better in a campaign stop than in a presentation of land and farming equipment. This is the first piece of evidence that would suggest Chávez behaved differently than non-radical, populist, left, Latin American executives, not only in the decision to expel Americans for non-criminal actions but in how he chose to inform the expelled parties and the United States.

*Expulsion of John Correa*

A little less than three months after the official declaration of the expulsion of New Tribes Mission, Chávez took additional action. This time he expelled the U.S. naval attaché to Venezuela, Commander John Correa, on February 2, 2006 (United States Department of State 2006). This expulsion was different from New Tribes in that Chávez chose to expel an individual who was an official representative of the United States.

Chávez accused Correa of spying and demanded that Correa leave as soon as possible (BBC News 2006a). Chávez announced this decision in a speech that was commemorating his seventh year in power (2006a). The United States considered the espionage allegations against Correa to be baseless (BBC News 2006a; 2006b; and 2006c). Chávez claimed that Venezuelan agents had unearthed a spy ring in the U.S. embassy three days before the expulsion of Correa (2006a). Chávez had threatened to arrest any U.S. official involved in espionage (2006a). The spy ring was alleged to include Venezuelan officials who the Chávez administration accused of giving state secrets to the U.S. (2006a). If the alleged spying did not stop, Chávez threatened that “[t]he next step would be to withdraw the whole so-called military mission of the United States”

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65 Of the many accusations made by Chávez, spying and maybe unauthorized air travel were crimes. There was little evidence of New Tribes committing these crimes, but there is no burden of proof when it comes to expulsion.
BBN News noted that, before the expulsion, the Bush administration questioned the strength of democracy in Venezuela and Venezuela’s effect on regional stability (2006a). The Bush administration even attempted to block Venezuelan purchases of military equipment that contained American technology (2006a and 2006b). Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld compared the legal of Chávez and his consolidation of power to the rise of Adolf Hitler in Germany (2006a and 2006b). Venezuelan Vice-President José Vicente Rangel retaliated by calling Bush “North American Hitler” (2006b)66.

The response from the Bush administration was swift as it expelled Venezuelan Minster Counselor Jeny Figueredo Frias the very next day (United States Department of State 2006). In the official statement, it was made clear that this was a tit-for-tat expulsion as the United States said that this decision was made because of the expulsion of Correa (2006). Frias was given 72 hours to leave the country (BBC News 2006b). State Department spokesman, Sean McCormack, said that the U.S. did not want to play “tit-for-tat games”, but chose to do so because of the expulsion of Correa (2006b). Chávez responded by promoting Frias to deputy foreign minister to Europe (BBC News 2006c).

If Chávez did have evidence that would suggest Correa’s involvement in any spy ring, he did not chose to make it public. The Bush administration denied any wrongdoing by Correa. As with New Tribes Mission, the United States did not charge Correa with any crimes upon his return.

By this point, a pattern was beginning to emerge in Venezuelan expulsions of U.S. officials. The expulsions of New Tribes Mission and of John Correa were highlighted in the public speeches and rallies by Chavez. One can juxtapose this expulsion with the response from

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66 Neither Rumsfeld nor Rangel were addressing the expulsions of Correa or Frias when they made their statements.
the Bush administration. Where Chávez made this public and, perhaps, grandstanded, Bush never directly commented on the expulsion. The decision was made and was disseminated to the press during a typical press conference\textsuperscript{67}. It was not an addition to any public speech from Bush.

Chávez clearly alleged that the United States was acting illegally and clearly stated that he would take harsher action should spying continue. It could be argued that Chávez made a diplomatic matter into a political matter and addressed it as a politician rather than a head of state.

\textit{Expulsion of Patrick Duddy}

When Chávez expelled U.S. ambassador Patrick Duddy on September 11, 2008, it was a unique case. Chávez did not chose to expel for reasons only pertaining to Venezuela. He chose to expel Duddy as a show of solidarity after Bolivian president Evo Morales expelling U.S. ambassador Philip Goldberg\textsuperscript{68} one day earlier (Forero 2008; Romero 2008b; BBC News 2008a; Pretel 2009; and James 2011). Chávez chose to recall his ambassador from the United States, as well (Romero 2008b). In addition to the expulsion, Chávez also announced that it would reduce the number of flights arriving in Venezuela from the United States (Romero 2008b and Forero 2008).

There was other tension in the region besides the diplomatic tension between Bolivia and the United States. Both the United States and Colombia asserted that cocaine was being funneled through Venezuela at an increasing rate (Forero 2008). Chávez also hosted to Russian bombers while they flew training missions over the Caribbean (2008). The Russian training was in result to the U.S. sending warships to assist Georgia in its war with Russia (2008).

In addition to standing with Morales, Chávez alleged that the United States was supporting coup against him (Romero 2008b). Chávez also alleged that the result of the coup

\textsuperscript{67} The statement itself was two sentences long.

\textsuperscript{68} This expulsion will be examined in the Bolivian case.
would have been his assassination (Romero 2008b and Forero 2008). Local media in Caracas counted 26 occasions where Chávez claimed there was a plot to assassinate him (Romero 2008b). State television “played what it described as intercepts of phone discussions between active-duty and retired military officers that referred to a plot to take Miraflores, the presidential palace” (2008b). It was not clear, nor was it implied, that Duddy was a part of those conversations.

Chávez announced the expulsion in a fiery speech to thousands in Puerto Cabello (Forero 2008). Over the course of the expletive-laden speech, Chávez said, “Go to hell, Yankees” (Forero 2008) and “Go to hell 100 times” (BBC News 2008a). Singling out the Bush administration, Chávez claimed that “when there is a new government in the United States, we will send an ambassador, a government that respects the people of Latin America, the America of Simón Bolívar” (Forero 2008).

The case of Patrick Duddy has an unusual epilogue. Duddy returned to Venezuela in 2009 to finish his assignment (Pretel 2009 and James 2011). With Barack Obama succeeding George W. Bush, U.S. relations with many states started to thaw (James 2011). Chávez honored his previous statement and restored diplomatic relations with the United States. This was short lived, however, as Chávez refused to take Obama’s nominated ambassador, Larry Palmer (2011). Relations soured as Chávez continued to criticize the U.S., and the Obama administrations expressed concerns over the state of democracy in Venezuela (2011). Palmer did not help endear himself to Chávez when he responded to a question in the Senate hearings by suggesting that morale was low in the Venezuela armed forces and asserted that Colombian rebels may have found refuge in Venezuela (2011). Chávez also replied to some comments made by Obama in March 2009 by calling the U.S. president an “ignoramus” (2011).
Chávez again appeared to supplant diplomacy for politics. The speech in which Chávez announced the expulsion of Duddy was a campaign speech in Puerto Cabello. With local and gubernatorial elections in November, Chávez was stumping for PSUV. While this may explain the passion of the speech, it was Chávez’s choice to include the announcement of the expulsion in that speech. Chávez also chose to bind his brand of diplomacy with his domestic rhetoric by invoking the name of Simón Bolívar. As he had done before, Chávez only gave his word that Duddy was guilty. No evidence was presented.

This expulsion provides a degree of variation in U.S. administrations. Duddy was an ambassador under George W. Bush and Barack Obama. While he was not expelled during the Obama administration, he was not going to be retained by Obama, who nominated Larry Palmer. Had Obama tried to send Palmer to Venezuela, it would have been likely that Chávez would have expelled him. Chávez remained hostile toward the United States regardless of who was president.

*Expulsion of David Delmonico and Devlin Kostal.*

The fact that there was an expulsion of a U.S. Air Force Attaché to Venezuela, Colonel David Delmonico, and an Assistant Air Force Attaché, Devlin Kostal, from Venezuela provides further evidence for the impact of Venezuela’s party politics on expulsions. The circumstances around the case make it difficult to pinpoint whether the dying Hugo Chávez or Vice-President Nicolás Maduro ordered the expulsion. It was even difficult to find the correct spellings of the names of the expelled. This examination will examine expulsion as best can be determined. Regardless of spelling or whether it was Chávez or Maduro, this case would still support the central argument.

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69 All references for this expulsion feature variations in spelling “Delmonico” and “Kostal” within the reports. After multiple searches, “Delmonico” and “Kostal” appear to be the most frequent spellings, so they were chosen.
On March 5, 2013, David Delmonico and Devlin Kostal were expelled from Venezuela. Later that day Hugo Chávez died after a two-year battle with cancer (BBC News 2013b). An ill Chávez could have ordered the expulsion as it was in his nature to expel Americans. It also could have been Maduro. Maduro became acting president on the same day. He was sworn in two days later (2013b). The constitution of Venezuela called for presidential elections to be held within 30 days of the death of the sitting president, despite the fact that Chávez had been re-elected on October 7, 2012, and had named Maduro as his preferred successor and his vice-president (CBS News 2013; CNN 2013; and BBC News 2013b). It is plausible that Maduro ordered the expulsion to show his strength before the election.

Maduro announced the expulsion of Delmonico and alleged that the United States had been plotting against the Chávez administration and attempting to destabilize the country (CBS News 2013 and BBC News 2013a; 2013b). Delmonico was accused of spying on the Venezuelan military (BBC News 2013a). Maduro accused “enemies of the fatherland”, names the U.S., of attempting to undermine democracy within Venezuela (2013a). Maduro claimed that Chávez’s cancer was the result of an enemy attack (CBS News 2013). The expulsion of Kostal was announced later by the foreign minister (CBS News 2013 and BBC News 2013a). On March 11, 2013, State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland confirmed that the U.S. expelled Orlando José Montañez Olivares and Victor Camacaro Mata and stated that “[w]hen you have an incident you consider unjust…you need to take reciprocal action and make your point clear” (Bureau of International Information Protocol 2013).

Whether it was a final insult from Chávez or an opportunistic attempt by Maduro, the expulsion of Delmonico and Kostal was similar to previous expulsions by Chávez. Maduro spoke in an antagonistic manner that was similar to Chávez. He also presented no evidence that
Delmonico or Kostal were actively plotting against the government. The U.S. rejected the accusation and did not punish either attaché. The announcement was made on state-run television, so it was no less public than any announcement of Chávez (CBS News 2013). Like Chávez, Maduro was a member of PSUV. In declaring his candidacy for president, Maduro said, “I am not Chávez, but I am his son and all of us together, the people, are Chávez” (BBC 2013b). Maduro was not Chávez, but he saw the value in Chávez’s tactics and approach toward the United States. The effect of politicizing this expulsion was dampened by the fact that Chávez died hours after the announcement, but, regardless, Maduro approached it in a near identical manner.

**Expulsion of Kelly Keiderling, Elizabeth Hoffman, and David Moo**

Less than six months after being elected president, Maduro adopted the techniques used by his predecessor, expelling Kelly Keiderling, Elizabeth Hoffman, and David Moo on September 30, 2013 in well publicized events (Neuman 2013). Keiderling was the Chargé d’affaires of the U.S. embassy, who ran the embassy in the absence of an ambassador (2013). Neither Chávez nor Maduro accepted a new ambassador after Patrick Duddy’s assignment ended. Hoffman was an official in the political section of the embassy while Moo was the vice consul (2013).

Maduro announced the expulsion of the three officials a military event to commemorate the bicentennial battle of the Venezuelan war for independence (Neuman 2013). Maduro shouted, “Get out of Venezuela! Yankee go home!” to punctuate the announcement (2013). The speech was also broadcast on TV as Maduro accused the three officials of meeting with right-wing groups to finance them, to aid them in sabotaging elections, and to destroy the economy
Maduro blamed right-wing groups for the blackouts and food shortages, but provided no evidence (Associated Press 2013).

This built upon previous claims by Maduro that the Obama administration was plotting against him (Neuman 2013). Maduro issued a Chávez-esque claim that Venezuela would not have cordial relations with the U.S., if American diplomats continue to attempt to destabilize Venezuela and did not respect Venezuela’s sovereignty (Associated Press 2013). State-run television displayed pictures and videos of the three officials in Bolivar who met with Sumate, an election monitoring group (2013). The foreign minister reminded Venezuelans about Sumate helping to organize a failed recall vote against Chávez in 2004 (2013). A board member of Sumate denied meeting the diplomats (2013).

The U.S. embassy rejected Maduro’s accusation (Neuman 2013). The State Department spokeswoman, Jen Psaki, clarified the allegations and identified that Maduro was referring to travel by embassy workers to Bolivar (Associated Press 2013). It was called a “normal diplomatic engagement” (2013). Keiderling admitted to meeting with Venezuelans before saying that meeting with Venezuelans was part of her job and identifying types of non-political actors she had met (2013).

On October 1, 2013, the U.S. retaliated by expelling Venezuelan Chargé d’affaires, Calixto Ortego Rios, Second Secretary Monica Alejandra Sanchez, and Consul Marisol Gutierrez (Associated Press 2013). The Obama administration had hinted that such a retaliation was possible (2013). Like Keiderling, Ortega was the highest ranking diplomat in his mission as there was no Venezuelan ambassador to the United States. The United States continued to advocate its stance that it had done nothing wrong.
Unlike other accusations that led to expulsions, Maduro’s administration attempted to provide evidence of wrongdoing by U.S. diplomats. This evidence, however, was unclear and did not appear to be particularly strong. There was also no admission of guilt from any of the three diplomats, and there was no punishment of the diplomats by the United States. Maduro added the announcement into a speech and used antagonist rhetoric against the U.S., just as Chávez had. Maduro followed the Chávez approach of taking a political approach to a diplomatic matter.

Expulsion of Breann McCusker, Jeffrey Elsen, and Kristofer Clark.

On February 17, 2014, while in office for less than a year, Maduro expelled Breann McCusker, Jeffrey Elsen, and Kristofer Clark\textsuperscript{70}. All three were second secretaries [of what?] (Associated Press 2014). The foreign minister of Venezuela claimed that two of them were vice consuls (2014). The foreign minister claimed to have e-mails from all three officials, in which they attempted to gain funding from the U.S. to back anti-Maduro student groups (2014). Further evidence was not replaced as the minister claimed the investigation was not complete, yet (2014). The Obama administration denied all allegations against the three officials (2014; BBC News 2014; and Wroughton 2014).

What stands out about this case were the circumstances surrounding the expulsion. Maduro was less public than in previous expulsions. The Foreign Minister, Elias Jaua, made the announcement of the expulsion instead of Maduro. Jaua, however, did advance prior claims of Maduro that the United States supported the leader of the opposition, Leopoldo López (Associated Press 2014). The day before the expulsion, Sunday, Maduro went on television to rally supporters to march on Tuesday. In same speech Maduro accused the U.S. of creating discord and unrest in Venezuela (2014).

\textsuperscript{70} There were some inconsistencies in the spelling of “Kristofer”, but more sources than not used “Kristofer” over “Kristopher”.

As the Maduro administration was deciding to expel, there were protests in Caracas both from those against Maduro and those who supported his administration. The protesting led to three deaths during anti-government protests the week before the expulsion, which caused the Obama administration to express concern over whether the Maduro administration would permit free expression and peaceful protests (Associated Press 2014). Evidence emerged that the deaths resulted from gunfire from a pro-government militia (2014). Maduro called on López to turn himself in as the Venezuelan courts brought up multiple charges against López, including homicide (2014).

The Obama administration responded to the expulsion by expelling First Secretary Ignacio Luis Cajal Avalos, First Secretary Victor Manuel Pisani Azpurua, and Second Secretary Marcos Jose Garcia Figueredo (BBC News 2014, and Wroughton 2014). Obama was questioned by the press and responded by saying that Maduro’s claims were baseless and recommended that Maduro should concentrate on the “legitimate grievances of the Venezuelan people” (BBC News 2014). Maduro named a new ambassador to the United States the same day the Obama administration announced the expulsion (2014). The Obama administration did not accept the nominated ambassador, and there was no ambassador from Venezuela through the end of 2016 (United States Department of State 2016b).

As with the expulsion of Keiderling, Hoffman, and Moo, the Maduro administration offered evidence that was inconclusive. They claimed to have stronger evidence, but have not shared it with the public. As with all previous expulsions of U.S. diplomats, the U.S. defended their officials and did not punish any of them upon their return home. While Maduro did not personally announce the expulsion, he was on television the day before to rally his supporters for a protest that would take place the day after the expulsion. It is plausible that the expulsion was
already planned. Maduro’s antagonistic words for the U.S. remained unchanged as he was blaming the United States for the anti-government protests in Venezuela.

Conclusion

Although the circumstances surrounding each expulsion varied somewhat, a strong similarity across all cases is that the election of radical populist-left governments in Venezuela was associated with a large increase in expulsions. Chávez came to power through the MVR, which evolved into the PSUV. Maduro became the leader of the PSUV after Chávez’s death. Three expulsions were ordered by Chávez while two were ordered by Maduro. The expulsion of David Delmonico and Devlin Kostal was less clear, but it would likely belong to Maduro as he announced the expulsion and because Chávez died hours later from cancer. Chávez was still president, but Maduro likely was responsible for this expulsion. The presidency of the United States changed from George W. Bush to Barack Obama while Chávez and Maduro were in power. Despite being from different parties and Obama enjoying a better international image than Bush, each president experienced three expulsion events from Venezuela over his two terms in office.

There were also consistent elements that appeared in each expulsion. These six expulsion events were all announced publicly. Every expulsion event, except for the expulsion of McCusker, Elsen, and Clark, was announced by the Venezuelan president in front of an audience. Each announcement was accompanied by accusations of wrongdoing by the United States. There was an effort by Chávez, then Maduro, to make an argument that the United States was actively attempting to disrupt the administration. Neither president argued that the

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71 A sudden death would make this more unclear. The fact that Chávez had been ill for years makes an accusation that he ordered the expulsion suspect.
diplomats/individuals expelled acted independently. The implication of each expulsion was that the Chávez or Maduro administration caught the U.S. up to its typical, imperialistic tricks.

Another constant was the lack of any evidence to suggest the expelled diplomats/individuals were guilty of any crime. This research would assert that these expulsions were non-criminal. Chávez and Maduro argued to the contrary. Spying on another country and attempting to overthrow an administration would likely be criminal acts. If the expelled diplomats/individuals were guilty, then these expulsions could be considered criminal. Chávez and Maduro, however, gave the public little evidence outside of their administrations’ accusations. The United States never confirmed these accusations nor did they punish any of the expelled diplomats/individuals upon their return home. If one were to compound this lack of evidence with the fact that Chávez and Maduro announced these expulsions with passion in front of crowds at celebrations of Venezuela, at campaign stops, or during times of unrest, one would be likely to doubt that these expulsions were criminal.

Bilateral tension between Venezuela and the United States was constant once Chávez took office. There was much tension between the Chávez and Bush administrations, and later, the Chávez/Maduro administration and the Obama administration. In addition to this tension, Venezuela’s party system decayed, and Chávez was able to form the MVR, later the PSUV, to propel him to the presidency. The MVR was characterized by its relationship with populism and leftist policy positions. Chávez made large, structural changes to the Venezuelan government as evidenced by a new constitution. Such characteristics were absent in the cases of Vicente Fox and Ernesto Samper. Both presidents were members of established political parties and were not leftists or populists. Neither made large, structural changes to their respective governments, either. The case of Venezuela suggests that a radical, populist, left president who came to power
in a party created as a vehicle to elect him president in addition to tension between states may be a necessary condition for non-criminal diplomatic expulsion.

**Bolivia**

The Bolivian case shares much in common with the Venezuelan case. Bolivia elected a radical, populist left executive, Evo Morales, who harshly criticized the United States. Morales came to power as the party system in Bolivia was falling apart as new blocs were forming. Morales, once president, spear-headed a successful effort to write a new constitution for his country. While in office he expelled a U.S. ambassador and a diplomat. Morales differed from Chávez and Maduro by also expelling U.S. agencies as he expelled the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) during his presidency.

This section begins by examining Morales’s rise to the presidency as a candidate of the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), a radical left populist party. The section continues by examining how Morales acted as president and paying particular attention to his successful effort to enact a new Bolivian constitution. Morales’s strained relationship with the United States will be discussed next. The purpose of those subsections is to demonstrate that Morales followed through on his rhetoric and made radical changes to the Bolivian government and that he possessed an antagonistic attitude toward the U.S. similar to Chávez and Maduro.

From the day Morales took office through the end of 2016, there were four expulsion events where Bolivia expelled a U.S. ambassador, diplomat, or agency. Those four expulsion events are examined in four subsections. Ambassador Philip Goldberg and the DEA were expelled by Morales in 2008. In 2009 Morales expelled American diplomat Francisco Martinez. In 2013 Morales expelled USAID. These expulsions came with inflammatory accusations about
the United States’ role in Bolivia and its respect for Bolivian sovereignty. Finally, the Bolivian case is concluded with analysis of the expulsion events.

Morales’s Rise to the Presidency

Before the election of its first indigenous president, Evo Morales (Canessa 2007 and Webber 2010), in December 2005, Bolivia had a long-standing neo-liberal ruling tradition (Webber 2010, 51). Three parties ruled Bolivia and alternated power after the 1952 Revolution (Canessa 2007, 151). They were the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR), the Acción Democrática Nacionalista (AND), and the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario (MIR). All three ruled at some point while “workers’ rights were eroded; state assets were sold off to foreign investors; [and] trade deals were struck allowing competitive imports to undermine Bolivian producers” (2007, 151). The elites were characterized by their wealth and whiteness (2007, 151).

Evo Morales began his career in politics by being a leader of Quechua-speaking coca growers (Canessa 2007, 151). Coca growers disapproved of the eradication policies of President Hugo Bánzer, who was elected in 1997 after being Bolivia’s former dictator (2007, 152). Morales, at this point in his career, was more known as a leader of the coca growers opposed to being known as a leader of indigenous people (2007, 152). With the support of coca growers, Morales founded the Instrumento Político por la Soberanía de los Pueblos (IPSP). With the MAS nearly defunct, the IPSP fused with the MAS to become the MAS-IPSP (Anria 2013, 27 and Madrid 2012, 49). Leaders of the party considered the MAS72 to be the political arm of social movements more than a traditional political party (2013, 27). The MAS was considered by many to be populist (Burron 2012, 116).

72 “MAS” is short for “MAS-IPSP”.
Morales did not enjoy early success. When he and his followers were in Izquierda Unida\textsuperscript{73} (IU), they won three per cent of the national vote in 1995 and 3.7 per cent in the national vote in 1997 (Madrid 2012, 49). The party barely won over one percent of the vote outside of the department of Cochabamba (2012, 49-50). After joining the MAS, Morales and his followers could not improve their electoral results as they only won 3.3 per cent of the national vote in 1999 (2012, 49).

While the MAS fared little better than indigenous parties in the beginning, the infusion of Morales and his supporters changed the identity of the party. Morales transformed the MAS into a party that could be characterized as “ethnopopulist” (Madrid 2008). Where ethnic parties may have placed a ceiling on their electoral success, ethnopopulist parties were inclusive, not exclusive like ethnic parties (2008, 480-481). By fusing populist rhetoric with ethnic appeals, ethnopopulist parties could appeal to indigenous peoples, but maintain the ability to attract mestizos and individuals who did not identify as indigenous (2008, 480-482).

As the 21\textsuperscript{st} century began, however, left-indigenous insurrections began to shake that order and toppled the regimes of President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada and President Carlos Mesa during water and gas wars from 2000 to 2005 (Webber 2010, 51). During the Mesa administration, Bolivia experience political polarization down racial, regional, and class lines (2010, 52). Webber argued that this led to the formation of two blocs: a left-indigenous bloc and an eastern-bourgeois bloc (2010, 52). President Mesa came to office supporting reforms of the leftist-indigenous bloc, but was harmed by the fact that he “was clearly not of the left-indigenous social bloc” (2010, 53). This was evidence that he was Sánchez de Lozada’s vice president and had advocated for neo-liberal restructuring (Webber 2010, 53). He was not part of the eastern-

\textsuperscript{73} Also known as “Asamblea de la Soberanía de los Pueblos (ASP)” (Madrid 2012, 49).
bourgeois bloc, either, due to his lack of party affiliation with the parties of that bloc. His betrayal of Sánchez de Lozada, well-liked in the eastern-bourgeois bloc, during the end of the October 2003 gas war sealed his fate with the bloc (2010, 54). His inability to make in-roads with rural Bolivia left him with little policy power in Bolivia politics (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 179). It was quickly evident that Mesa lacked the expertise to handle the problems that forced Lozada from office (2006, 4).

While Mesa was in power, Morales74 attempted to work with him. It was a part of the MAS’s strategy of embracing moderation in order to expand its electoral base (Webber 2010, 57). The results of these modernization efforts were mixed as the MAS won 18 percent of the popular vote in the 2004 municipal elections (Madrid 2012, 51). The MAS had the most popular votes of any running party, but the collapses of the traditional neo-liberal parties led to the fragmentation of their supporters (Webber 2010, 57). Despite the mixed electoral success that accompanied this modernization approach, Morales continued to attempt to work with Mesa in hopes of softening Mesa’s proposed neo-liberal reforms (2010, 54). Morales even went back on statements he made as a union leader, criticized members of the left-indigenous bloc who wanted to fully nationalize the hydrocarbons industry (2010, 56), and backed off demands to renationalize (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 183). He pressured Mesa to renegotiate contracts with foreign exporters (Madrid 2012, 67). Morales and the MAS made a proposal in March 2005 to charge a 50 percent royalty upon the profits of petroleum companies (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 183). Such reforms led to opposition from the U.S. embassy, transnational petroleum companies, and the IMF (Webber 2010, 60).

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74 Morales finished 2nd in the 2002 presidential election by only two percentage points after a final week surge (Madrid 2012, 49).
Relations between Mesa and Morales soured over the hydrocarbon taxation. After the March 2005 proposal from Morales, the MAS began to mobilize its social bases in hopes of gaining support for the proposed tax (Webber 2010, 60). This was the first time the MAS had mobilized during the Mesa administration (2010, 60). Mesa responded by attacking Morales in speeches and realigning himself with the eastern-bourgeois bloc (2010, 60). Kohl and Farthing argued that the U.S., IMF, and other international bodies left Mesa with no alternative but to resist Morales (2006, 180-184). As Mesa courted the same urban middle class the MAS tried to win over in 2004, Morales and the MAS began to embrace the left-indigenous bloc as well as the bloc’s more radical sectors (Webber 2010, 60-61). The mobilization coupled with Mesa’s refusal to accept the proposed tax left Mesa in an untenable position: he could not stop the MAS’s mobilization by accepting the proposal and he could not crack down on protestors as he based his legitimacy on not embracing Sánchez de Lozada’s choice to use violence against civilians (2010, 61). In a practical sense, Mesa was likely aware that the use of force would not achieve his desired results (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 187).

With Morales and the MAS threatening to expand their protest beyond blockades and mobilization on March 7, 2005, Mesa gave a resignation speech on March 6 (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 183). Mesa formally ended any cooperation between his administration and the MAS by attacking Morales in manner described as “personalized, patronizing, and racist” (Webber 2010, 62). Mesa also reiterated his opposition to the hydrocarbon tax because of the strain it would place on international relations between Bolivia and the rest of the world (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 183). Mesa’s signal that he would embrace the right drove Morales further to the

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75 During “Black October” in 2003, the army killed 60 unarmed protesters (Canessa 2007, 153).
76 Morales was named 27 times in the 45 minute speech (Webber 2010, 62-63).
77 Oil companies did announce that they would go to international trade courts after the passing of the hydrocarbons law in May (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 184).
left (Webber 2010, 62). Morales was given a more prominent role in the opposition by Mesa in the speech as he claimed that Morales was driving the demands as opposed to the left-indigenous bloc pushing these demands for the past five years (2010, 63).

Less than a day after Mesa presented his resignation to the legislature, Mesa and various political actors began to negotiate the terms under which Mesa would continue to serve as president (Webber 2010, 64). The United States also threw its support behind Mesa (2010, 65). An agreement to keep Mesa in power was forged by March 8 among the right-wing parties in the legislature (2010, 65). While the MAS had been integral in allowing Mesa to become president and keeping left-indigenous bloc from mobilizing, they had been completely shut out of the negotiations. The result of this was the MAS signing a pact with multiple parties of the left-indigenous bloc to become a united front against Mesa (2010, 66). Government was forced to conduct operations in Sucre, instead of La Paz, due to the protestors’ success in shutting over the seat of government (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 11). The opposition’s success was not limited to La Paz as they had constructed 119 roadblocks throughout the country (2006, 184). The radical element new front continued to protest and march, which led to the gas war of May and June 2005, which culminated with the official resignation of Mesa on June 6 (Webber 2010, 67). Eduardo Rodríguez filled in as interim president (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 11). Rodríguez had 180 days with which to call new elections (2006, 180).

Morales won the presidential election on December 18, 2005, with a 53.7 percent of the popular vote (Oviedo 2010, 96, and Madrid 2012, 51). It was the largest vote share in a presidential election since democracy had returned to Bolivia (Madrid 2012, 51). It signaled the collapse of the party system in Bolivia (Oviedo 2010, 99). Morales’s success was not an outlier was he won re-election in December 2009 with 64 percent of the popular vote (2010, 91). The
MAS succeeded in the July 2006 election of the Constituent Assembly by winning 54 percent of the seats (2010, 99-100).

*Morales as President*

Once in office Morales “[renationalized] hydrocarbon industry, halted the mandatory eradication of coca, and hosted three visits by Hugo Chávez in six months” (Dunkerley 2007, 134). His first port of call was Fidel Castro (Canessa 2007, 145). Morales also proclaimed agrarian reform and promoted anticorruption laws (Anria 2013, 36). Morales called for “a reduction of the proportion of the acutely poor…within five years” (2007, 134). He also expanded the education of indigenous languages (Madrid 2008, 476). His leftist reforms were opposed the right-wing of the former party system, but they could not gain enough support to stop the president. Morales even accepted a recall referendum in 2008 and legitimized himself by winning 67 percent of the popular vote (Oviedo 2010, 101).

Emboldened by his electoral gains, Morales set forth to create a new Bolivian constitution. The MAS had promised such action leading up to the election of Morales (Oviedo 2010, 100; Anria 2013, 36 and Note 22; and Hammond 2011). One of President Morales’s first acts was to request that Congress call for the election of a Constituent Assembly (Hammond 2011, 652). Despite the MAS not having a large enough majority to approve a draft of a new constitution (Oviedo 2010, 100), the constitution was still debated in a Constituent Assembly. The indigenous movement that swept Morales into office had some of their demands added to the final draft such as recognition of the practice of indigenous community justice alongside state justice (Hammond 2011, 650). On the heels of Morales’s recall election success, the referendum for a new constitution was set for January 25, 2009 (BBC News 2008b). Once the draft of the constitution passed Congress and was prepared to become a referendum, Morales remarked that
“neo-liberalism will never return to Bolivia” (2008b). The new constitution was easily expected to pass (2008b) and did (Oviedo 2010, 100).

In addition to passing a new constitution, more structural changes occurred in Bolivia when the constitutional court permitted Morales to run for president again in 2014 despite being elected to terms in 2005 and 2009 (BBC News 2013c). The constitution passed in 2009 allowed Morales to run in the December elections in the same year, but stipulated that he would be termed out and could not run in 2014 (BBC News 2008b). The court ruled that since Morales’s first term came before the new constitution, it would not count toward the two-term limits set in place by the 2009 constitution (2013c). Morales also pursued a constitutional amendment that would have allowed him to run for a fourth term in 2019 (Ramos and Machicao 2016 and United States Department of State 2017a). With a vote of 51.3 percent to 48.7 percent, the referendum was defeated at the polls in February 2016 (Ramos and Machicao 2016). Morales accepted the defeat and said he would respect the will of the people (2016).

Relationship with the United States.

Morales’s relationship with the United States was rocky long before Morales ever took office. U.S. Ambassador Manuel Rocha labeled Morales a “narcoterrorist” heading into the 2002 presidential election (Oviedo 2010, 92; and Canessa 2007, 146, 153). The statement appeared to be counterproductive as Bolivians rallied behind Morales to propel him to second place. Morales would later refer to Rocha as the “MAS’s campaign manager” (Oviedo 2010, 93). Upon being elected, Morales called himself “Washington’s worst nightmare” (Dunkerley 2007, 134). He also routine called the United States “the empire” (Reuters 2009). The MAS also reminded Bolivians how the coca eradication programs increased heavily in the 1990s due to pressure from the U.S. government (Madrid 2012, 67).
Burron (2012) argued that the United States switched from soft tactics to hard tactics with the election of Morales. During the regimes of Sánchez de Lozada and Mesa, the United States used its foreign aid to attempt to stabilize Bolivia to preserve the neo-liberal policies of the government (2012). Soft tactics were identified as “programs supporting moderate civil society organizations and party-strengthening programs” (2012, 117). Once Morales and the MAS came to power, the U.S. employed hard tactics to undermine Morales (2012). Hard tactics were identified as tactics that “mobilize elite social forces and build their capacity to conduct a war of position” (2012, 118).

Morales, like Chávez, fostered friendships with leaders who opposed the United States. He frequently met with Hugo Chávez (Dunkerley 2007) and made a point to meet with Fidel Castro early in his presidency (Canessa 2007, 145). The Morales administration favored the same kind of “multipolar world” as the Chávez administration (Ellner 2012, 104). Such a world would involve the support of anti-imperialism and opposition to U.S. hegemony (2012, 104). Dunkerley noted how the United States, early on in the Morales administration, “expressed little more than tight-lipped irritation” (2007, 134). Kohl argued that “the United States proceeded with uncharacteristic caution” (2010, 117).

**Expulsion of Philip Goldberg**

Morales may have enjoyed a less tense relationship with the United States than Chávez in the beginning of his administration, but that would come to an end with the expulsion of U.S. Ambassador Philip Goldberg on September 10, 2008. Tension had been steadily increasing between Bolivia and U.S. before the expulsion. The states disagreed over the U.S. granting asylum to Bolivian officials who fled the country and over U.S. antinarcotics policies (Romero 2008a).

The United States responded to the expulsion of Ambassador Goldberg by expelling the Bolivian ambassador, Gustavo Guzman. (BBC News 2008a). The Bush administration also decertified Bolivia’s anti-drug effort after the expulsion (Kraul 2009). The presidential spokesman for the Bush Administration, Sean McCormack, characterized the expulsion by Morales, as well as the expulsion by Chávez almost immediately after, as weak and desperate (United States Department of State 2008). He also argued that the expulsion was meant to be a distraction from the internal problems Bolivia was facing (2008). McCormack also referred to Morales as Chávez’s protégé (2008). McCormack stated that the two countries would maintain diplomatic relations (2008).

The expulsion was announced a month after Morales scored resounding win in the recall election (Romero 2008a and Oviedo 2010, 101). Even after such a win, there was rebellious activity in Bolivia. Anti-Morales protests were spreading in the eastern part of the county (Romero 2008a). The same protesters were occupying buildings and blocking roads in the east (BBC News 2008a). The goal of many of these protesters was greater autonomy in addition to control over natural gas revenues (2008a). They opposed the land redistribution plans of the Morales administration (2008a and Romero 2008a). The day of expulsion the protesters were accused of causing an explosion in natural gas pipeline (BBC News 2008a and Romero 2008a).
The result of the expulsion caused the Morales administration to announce a 10 percent cut in natural gas exports to Brazil (BBC News 2008a). The day after the expulsion groups supporting and against Morales clashed in northern Bolivia leaving eight dead and 20 injured (2008a).

This expulsion shares some similarities with the expulsions made in Venezuela by Chávez and Maduro. Despite a healthy amount of support in the recall election, Morales faced domestic protests and turmoil, which were similar to circumstances faced by Maduro. Morales also made the expulsion public, albeit with less passion than that of Chávez. The U.S. State Department spokesman even noted that Chávez and Morales shared the same playbook (United States Department of State 2008). The Bush administration was convinced that the Morales and Chávez administrations were expelling for the same reasons and were fabricating the reason for the expulsions. Morales, like Chávez and Maduro, offered little evidence to support his accusations.

*Expulsion of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)*

Less than two months after expelling Ambassador Goldberg, Morales expelled the DEA on November 1, 2008. A trademark of Morales was his willingness to confront the U.S. on drug enforcement (Brienen 2015, 115). Morales spent the early part of his career speaking out against human rights abuses in the Chapare committed by the DEA and its Bolivian allies (2015, 113). The cost in livelihood as well as lives led Morales to publicly argue that the actions of the DEA were nothing more than armed foreign intervention in Bolivia (2015, 113-114).

This expulsion event contributed to bilateral tensions as the Bush administration had floated the idea of halting special trade deals with Bolivia until the Morales administration did a better job of policing narcotics (CNN 2008;). In implementing the expulsion order, Morales repeated the allegation that the Bush administration and its ambassador of supporting a rightist,
rebel group in the eastern part of the country (CNN 2008; Quiroga 2008). While agents were not
initially expelled, all DEA operations were suspended (Quiroga 2008). The Bolivian government
took over the antinarcotic efforts (CNN 2008). By the end of January 2009, the last DEA agents
had left Bolivia, and there was confirmation that three dozen agents had been expelled in total
(Kraul 2009; see also Brienen 2015, 115).

Morales announced the expulsion in a remote area of Bolivia, but the speech was
broadcast on national television as well as radio stations (CNN 2008). Morales said, “There were
DEA…agents that were doing political espionage…financing criminal groups so that they could
act against authorities, even the president” (as cited in Quiroga 2008 [PAGE# needed]). He
accused the DEA of having ties with anti-government organizations and considered the DEA’s
actions to be part of a conspiracy (2008). Preceding the expulsion Morales criticized the Bush
administration to the United Nations General Assembly (CNN 2008). As it had with the
expulsion of Ambassador Goldberg, the United States again denied Morales’s allegations (CNN
2008 and Quiroga 2008).

This expulsion demonstrates a difference between the Bolivian case and the Venezuelan
case. Chávez and Maduro did not expel whole U.S. organizations from Venezuela, though
Chávez did shrink the DEA presence (Kraul 2009). Given his background as a coca farmer and
leader of coca farmers, Morales had a desire to handle the counternarcotic operation his own
way. The announcement was, again, public and broadcast. The timing was interesting, as well, as
it came two months before Bolivia was to vote on ratifying the constitution via referendum. The
civil unrest in Bolivia experienced little variation from the time Goldberg was expelled to the
time the DEA was expelled. It could be argued the time was right for another expulsion, if one
accepts the Chávez playbook, but, Morales may have faced more pressure and had more incentive/political need to create a bigger expulsion event with the DEA.

Expulsion of Francisco Martinez

For the third time in a six month period, Morales expelled another U.S. diplomat (Francisco Martinez) on March 9, 2009 (Reuters 2009 and BBC News 2009). Martinez was a second secretary in the U.S. embassy (Reuters 2009 and BBC News 2009). The expulsion came two weeks after Morales claimed that the CIA was conspiring against the state-run energy company (Reuters 2009 and BBC News 2009).

In a press conference in La Paz, Morales stated, “Today, I’ve decided to declare Francisco Martinez…persona non grata” (Reuters 2009 and BBC News 2009). Morales based his decisions upon “deep investigations” that Martinez was “in permanent contact with opposition groups” (BBC News 2009). As he had done in the previous two expulsions, Morales directly spoke of a U.S. conspiracy against his administration. The Obama administration denied any wrongdoing by Martinez (2009 and Reuters 2009).

The main variation with this expulsion was in U.S. presidents as Obama succeeded Bush. The change in U.S. executive did not appear to affect Morales. There was another variation in terms of elections. There was a referendum on the new Bolivian constitution two months prior to this expulsion, but there was no immediate election78 in Bolivia forthcoming. Despite Morales administration’s comments that they wanted to work with the incoming president, there was an expulsion event with Obama’s first two months in office (Kraul 2009). As with the Goldberg expulsion, Morales announced the expulsion of Martinez at a press conference. There was also

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78 The new constitution did call for a presidential election in December.
no evidence provided by Morales, which conforms to almost every expulsion made by Chávez and Maduro.

*Expulsion of U.S. Agency for International Development (US AID)*

On May 1, 2013, a day after the constitutional court allowed him to run for election in 2014 (BBC News 2013c), Morales expelled USAID. USAID had been operating in Bolivia since 1964 (United States Department of State 2013). USAID in Bolivia had a budget of $52.1 million in 2010 (BBC News 2013d). In an April 17 testimony, Secretary of State John Kerry referred to Latin America as “the backyard of the United States” (BBC News 2013d and Valdez and Bajak 2013).

At an International Workers’ Day rally, Morales announced the expulsion. He accused USAID of conspiring against his administration (BBC News 2013d). Morales promised the crowd that he “would only nationalize the dignity of the Bolivian people” (2013d). Morales also addressed Kerry’s remarks saying he lamented and condemned Kerry’s testimony (Valdez and Bajak 2013). Bolivia’s state news agency reported that the agency was “accused of alleged political interference in peasant unions and other social organizations” (2013). After announcing the expulsion, Morales turned to his foreign minister and asked him to inform the U.S. embassy of this decision (2013d). Morales had been critical of USAID in the past and threatened to expel it before 2013 (2013d and Valdez and Bajak 2013). In the past he accused USAID of having political goals rather than social goals and that it manipulated and used union leaders in Bolivia (BBC News 2013d).

The United States denied the allegations (United States Department of State 2013; BBC News 2013d; and Valdez and Bajak 2013). Department of State spokesman, Patrick Ventrell, defended USAID by saying “[a]ll USAID programs have been supportive of the Bolivian
government’s national development plan and have been fully coordinated with appropriate
government agencies” (United States Department of State 2013). He claimed that the expulsion
of USAID would hurt the Bolivian citizens the most (2013). He also stated that the Obama
administration was working to “establish a relationship based on mutual respect, dialogue, and
cooperation with the Bolivian government” (2013). He argued that the expulsion demonstrated
that the Morales administration was not interested in such a relationship (2013).

The consistent element with this expulsion, vis-à-vis previous expulsions by Morales,
was the talk of a U.S. conspiracy. This was present in every expulsion. There was variation with
respect to U.S. executive, Bush to Obama, and expulsion of an agency. In cases with both Bush
and Obama, Morales expelled an individual and an agency. There was also variation in the where
the expulsion was announced. Previous expulsions were announced at press conferences or,
once, at a remote area. This expulsion was announced at a rally. Given the fact that Morales had
threatened this for years and it was over two weeks after Secretary Kerry’s testimony, one could
argue that Morales chose this rally as the setting for the announcement. It is also worth noting
that this rally occurred weeks after Maduro won a contested election in Venezuela.

Conclusion

The tension between Morales and the United States began years before he was elected
president. As with the cases of Chávez and Maduro, the tension between Morales and the United
States led to expulsions by Morales. The similarities between Morales and the radical, populist
left executives of Venezuela extend beyond expulsions of Americans. Morales was also a left-
wing populist who organized a party to propel him to the presidency as the old party system was
crumbling in his country. Once president he led an effort to ratify a new constitution, which led
to large structural changes to the government.
In terms of the modality of expulsion, Morales was a little closer to Maduro than Chávez. Chávez never announced an expulsion at a press conference while Morales and Maduro announced at least one expulsion at a press conference. Three of Morales’s four expulsions happened six months before or after an important election amid turmoil. The fourth expulsion happened a day after the constitutional court allowed Morales to run in the next presidential election. All of Maduro’s three expulsions occurred within a year of the 2013 election he won with one a month before the election and the remaining two happened within a ten month window after the election. Only one of Chávez’s three expulsions happened within a year of a presidential election.

Morales did vary in who he chose to expel. Morales did expel individuals such as Ambassador Goldberg and Second Secretary Martinez, but he also expelled the agencies of the DEA and USAID. This might suggest that while Morales had political goals such as Chávez and Maduro, he may have also had goals for practical changes to the U.S. role in Bolivia. Venezuelan expulsions might have challenged U.S. operations, but they did not halt those operations. The Bolivian expulsions did. Morales, however, did not possess variation in terms of why he expelled. In every expulsion he would claim the expelled parties were partaking in a U.S. conspiracy. This could suggest that Morales may not have been as interested in the justification of expelling as Chávez and Maduro, but may have been more interested in the political or practical result of that expulsion.

**Conclusion**

The case studies provided in this chapter support the main argument of this dissertation. Venezuela and Bolivia had tension with the United States, but so did Mexico and Colombia.
Thus, the presence of bilateral friction with the U.S. appears to be a necessary, but not sufficient condition for the increase in expulsions of U.S. officials. After the election of a radical, populist left executive, however, expulsions increased in a context of growing tension with the U.S. Chávez, Maduro, and Morales all expelled numerous official U.S. representatives. Table 6.1 provides data which describes this pattern. Although there were no expulsions with previous presidents characterized as center-left, center-right, and right, expulsions were observed once radical populist left presidents came to power in Venezuela and Bolivia. The election of radical populist left presidents appeared to result in the increase of expulsion events.

Radical populist left presidents shared multiple things in common. Chávez and Morales created political parties as vehicles for their presidential aspirations and rose to the presidency amid collapsing party system. The traditionally strong parties in Venezuela and Bolivia were reduced to non-factors in the presidential elections. The citizens of each country lost confidence in the traditional parties, which resulted in a degree of electoral chaos. Chávez and Morales also brought about new constitutions in their respective countries, which resulted in structural changes. Chávez had his first term cut short as the new constitution called for elections just two years into his term. The new constitution in Bolivia also changed the timing of elections, but also created enough leeway for Morales to claim that his previous term did not count in terms of the total term limits which he was permitted. The Bolivian constitutional court agreed with Morales.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Number of Expulsion Events</th>
<th>Executive Ideology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991-1998</td>
<td>0 in Venezuela</td>
<td>Center-right in Venezuela</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 in Bolivia</td>
<td>Center-left to Right in Bolivia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2005</td>
<td>1 in Venezuela</td>
<td>Radical populist left in Venezuela</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 in Bolivia</td>
<td>Center-right to Right in Bolivia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-2016</td>
<td>5 in Venezuela</td>
<td>Radical populist left in Venezuela</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 in Bolivia</td>
<td>Radical populist left in Bolivia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to expelling more than other presidents, radical populist left leaders were more likely to expell U.S. ambassadors, diplomats, and others officials in a very public way. Most of the time, Chávez and Maduro, announced expulsions in fiery speeches at rallies, filled with supporters, that had much in common with campaign speeches. These speeches were often broadcast through the media. Morales was less of a showman, but his announcements were made publicly. If Morales did not announce the expulsion at a rally, he did call the press to personally announce the expulsion. All three accused the U.S. of sinister goals and a lack of respect for their country’s sovereignty.

Another similarity was that these expulsions were evenly distributed between different U.S. administrations. The hostilities between radical populist left presidents and George W. Bush were obvious, which could have led on to theorize that more expulsions would have occurred during a time of obvious tension. This, however, did not appear to be the case. Despite Chávez and Morales claiming that a change from George W. Bush to Barack Obama would improve relations, the number of expulsion events were perfectly split between the Bush and Obama
administrations. This suggests that the American president’s ideology may matter less than the executive of the Latin American president. Radical populist left presidents may not value identities such as “Republican” or “Democrat” over “American”.

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Chapter 7: Conclusion

Introduction

The research question for this project was “What would explain the variation in non-criminal diplomatic expulsions in Latin America since the 1990s?” The theory behind this project argued that the radical populist executives use expulsion as a low cost and low risk foreign policy tool to signal to their bases that they are following through with their campaign promises vis-à-vis foreign policy. I argued that given the power asymmetry between Latin American states and the U.S., expulsions as a foreign policy tool represented an effective way for less powerful executives to attempt to limit U.S. influence within their own countries and the region more generally. However, I also hypothesized that the choice of expulsions would be appealing to executives from only certain types of parties. Specifically, the presence of a radical populist left executive would increase the likelihood and number of non-criminal diplomatic expulsions.

The evidence presented by the case studies as well as the statistical analysis support the hypothesis and the theory. The case studies demonstrated that the presence of bilateral friction and tension with the U.S. alone is a necessary, but sufficient condition for the occurrence a non-criminal diplomatic expulsion. If tension were a key explanatory variable, then expulsions from Mexico and Colombia would have occurred as both countries had tension with the United States. Although one might assert that the diplomatic problems between Colombia and the U.S., or Mexico and the U.S., did not rise to the level seen in Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia, the evidence suggests that tensions in the former cases were nonetheless significant and encompassed U.S concerns about Colombia’s handing of the war on drugs, to Mexico’s concern about immigration or the imposition of the death penalty for Mexican citizens in the U.S. (see for
example Shifter, 2012). Mexican and Colombian presidents of different parties chose to resolve their bilateral challenges in way that departed significantly from the pattern seen in the radical populist left countries. The case studies also demonstrated that radical populist left executive behave differently than United States presidents when it comes to the publicizing of expulsions. Radical populist left executives publicly announced the expulsions in front of crowds and on television. The United States, by contrast, either announced the tit-for-tat expulsion in a daily briefing or did not announce it at all. This behavior suggests that radical populist left executives find value not just in expulsions, but in making sure their constituents are aware that the radical populist left executives made the decision to expel and stand up to the United States.

The results of the statistical models discussed in Chapter Four provided further evidence in support of the theoretical framework. As discussed, in the negative binomial regression models, the coefficient for radical populist left executives was positive and highly significant. By examining 20 countries for the period of 1990-2016, the statistical analysis yields additional evidence that in the countries and years that radical populist presidents were in power, the count of expulsions was higher. This buttresses the findings of the four states examined in the case studies.

The evidence presented by this project adds to multiple sub-fields and literatures in both social science and international law. The finding that radical populist left executives behave differently than presidents from different types of parties suggests that states may not be unitary actors when it comes to foreign policy behavior. Presidents may make calculated decisions about expulsions, but the logic of those decisions do not appear to be separated from domestic political context, which varies by partisan identities in Latin America. Further, radical populists appear to use non-traditional tools to enhance their popularity and signal a commitment to campaign
rhetoric and promises. This project thus also adds to the literature on the New Left in Latin America as the foreign policy examined by the literature did not examine expulsion. This research supplements the international law literature, which describes how expulsions occur, but has only attempted to non-criminal diplomatic expulsion as a punishment for diplomats who act outside of their mission.

**Contribution to Radical Populist Left Literature**

This research adds to the radical populist left literature because prior research on these executives and regimes neglected the distinctive features of the expulsion behavior. Previous research on the foreign policies of radical populists either examined attempts to counter the regional domination of the U.S. through the formation of ALBA (Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América) (e.g., Muhr, 2012), or focused at attempts of radical populist left executives to pivot toward states such as China, Russia, or the BRICS bloc of countries (Wang and Li, 2016). These policies indirectly challenged the United States. Expulsion, however, challenged the U.S. directly as Americans were forced to leave countries run by radical populist left executives.

The literature on radical populist left executives suggested that the U.S. was viewed as an antagonist, but did not explain how radical populist left executives deal with the U.S. once they are in office. This research fills in that gap. The evidence of this dissertation suggests that radical populist left executives act against the U.S. by expelling American diplomats and/or other representatives.

**Contribution to International Relations Literature**

The findings of this dissertation also make a number of possible contributions to the literature on International Relations. As noted the dissertation highlights that states are not
unitary actors (influenced exclusively by systemic factors). Rather, domestic political considerations appear to be important, and particularly when executives come from one type of party, a radical populist party. Likewise, the findings potentially refine the literature on power asymmetry in terms of hegemony. Prior theoretical literature calls attention to the power of strong and hegemonic states to constrain the behavior of weaker states in the international system. This research did not observe this phenomenon. Radical populist left executives implemented expulsions, and often with no coordinated efforts with other radical populist left executives. Expulsions appear to be used as a foreign policy tool by weaker states, although one could debate how much this represents more than a symbolic challenge to hegemony.

It has also been argued in International Relations literature that interdependence (and international regimes) would lead to a stronger alignment of foreign policy goals among states (for a classic statement, see Keohane 1984: 122-124). The research in this dissertation does not fully support that argument. Each radical populist left executive presided over an economy with extensive exports and trade with the U.S., but each still expelled many U.S. diplomats and governmental personnel. Further, each state had many other bilateral disputes and problems with the U.S. There are multiple explanations that could explain why this was the case. The most straightforward explanation would be that Latin American states and the U.S. treat trade as something distinct and insulate it from other foreign policy disputes. A similar and consistent explanation would be that the oil trade, specifically between Venezuela and Ecuador and the U.S., drove the results for the bilateral trade variable. If this is the case, this still challenges the literature because the oil trade remained robust despite multiple expulsions. Further, the trade

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81 Venezuela did expel their U.S. ambassador shortly after Bolivia expelled their U.S. ambassador in 2008, but evidence suggests this was done in a show of solidarity instead of a premeditated effort by both states.
occurred despite multiple differences other issues (including arguments in the U.N.) between the U.S. and radical populist governments in Latin America.

**Competing Explanations**

The central argument of this dissertation is that expulsions are likely to increase as radical populist left executives take office. The evidence suggests that this argument is stronger than competing explanations for the rise of diplomatic expulsions. One such competing explanation argues that expulsions are a response to perceived U.S. interference within the politics of Latin American countries. While this appears to have face value in countries such as Bolivia, for instance, there is not enough qualitative evidence to suggest that the U.S. presence in Bolivia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua has been any greater than in the other Latin American countries. The heavy presence (and, in some years, unilateral action) by the U.S. in Colombia and Mexico for counternarcotic operations would challenge such an explanation. Indeed, despite perceived “middling” or heavy-handed action by the U.S. in certain years (see Shifter, 2012), neither Colombia nor Mexico expelled any U.S. diplomats or representatives during the study period. This competing explanation is also weakened when one observes the finding that the coefficient for U.S. aid, a blunt measure of U.S. influence, was not statistically significant.

Another competing explanation is that tension between the expelling country and the U.S. could explain the increase in expulsions. Tension does appear to be high between Latin American states that expelled U.S. diplomats and representatives, which would support this interpretation. A flaw with this counterargument, however, is that tension was high between the U.S. and other Latin American states\(^{82}\) that did not expel U.S. diplomats. Indeed, the case studies suggested that tension alone is insufficient to expect an increase in diplomatic expulsions. This

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\(^{82}\) Such as Mexico and Colombia.
suggests that one needs to move beyond bilateral tensions alone to explain when, and why expulsions are likely to occur.

**Limitations of This Research**

There were three main limitations of this research. The first limitation was generalizability. The unit of analysis was country/years in Latin American. While there were robust observations in the region, data needs to be collected from other parts of the world to better understand the relationship between regime type and diplomatic expulsion. It is possible that this is a phenomenon only in Latin America, but this research alone is not sufficient to assess the generalizability of the findings.

The second limitation was the time period for this research. This is related to the first limitation because the rise of radical populist left executives has been limited to the past two decades. To some extent, beginning the time series in 1990 – at the end of the Cold War, but prior to the election of Hugo Chávez in 1998 – allowed for some over-time variation in executive party control. Still, observations from additional years would be helpful. If future research can support the argument of this dissertation, then this limitation can also be addressed due to the fact observations with radical populist left executives only begin in the late 1990s. However, if other factors are influencing diplomatic expulsion, data from before 1990 could be required (although this would complicate the research design by introducing the element of Cold War politics).

The third limitation is that this dissertation has not offered a systematic investigation of other types of populism in Latin America. As noted in Chapter Four, when adding right-wing populist executives to the model, the coefficient for right-wing populism is insignificant, while left-wing radical populists remained positive and significant, and all other covariates were completely consistent. This suggests that the anti-U.S. ideology of the radical, populist left has a significant role in the pathway to higher expulsions of U.S. diplomats and personnel.
post-1990 was of the radical populist left variety. However, it could be argued that expulsion is a low cost, low risk foreign policy tool for any populist, making expulsions an attractive option for populists presidents to build his or her support with “the people.” This is a plausible hypothesis, but one needs to consider whether conservative or right-wing populists have a different foreign policy position with regard to the U.S. For example, if one accepts that Fujimori was an economically (and even socially) conservative neopopulist (see Weyland 2003: 196-7), then it is clear that his commitment to neoliberal economics required his government to pursue close economic and diplomatic relations with the U.S. In other words, Fujimori’s economic agenda – which was built around trade liberalization, privatization, and deregulation – mediated the diplomatic approach of his government with the U.S. This suggests a clear difference with radical left populists, who have created an agenda around rejecting neoliberal economic reform on the grounds that it represents U.S. neo-imperialism in Latin America. For this reason, one has good reason to suspect that conservative populists behave differently when it comes to first-mover expulsions – and, indeed, Peru did not expel any U.S. diplomats while Fujimori was president. Likewise, in separate trials, the inclusion of right-wing populists in the statistical models had no statistically significant influence on the number of expulsions.

**Future Research**

Future research in this area might focus on improved methodology and measurements. The statistical analysis tested expulsion measured as number of expulsion events per country/year. Expulsion could also be measure as a binary variable or as number of individuals expelled in a country/year. If these variables could perform as well as expulsion events, then it

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84 Peru is classified as conservative-personalist in the data.
would strengthen the argument that radical populist left executives have an impact on non-criminal diplomatic expulsion.

In addition, attribution theory (Heider 1958; Sobel 2001; and Baum and Potter 2008) could be added to this theory in future research. While attribution theory does not originate in Political Science, it has applications in this research. It can be argued that radical populist left executives externally attribute the blame for many domestic and international failures to the United States as well as domestic political elites. The inclusion of attribution theory might provide greater contextual richness to understanding how, and why political leaders tend to view the U.S. in a negative light, with attendant consequences for expulsions and diplomatic behavior more generally.
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Instructor, University of Nevada, Las Vegas
- Introduction to American Politics and Nevada Constitution (PSC 101)
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Graduate Assistant – College of Education, University of Nevada, Las Vegas
- Worked in Office of Research and Sponsored Projects
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- Introduction to American Government and Nevada Constitution (with online components)
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- Survey of Political Theory
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Conference Panel Chair
- Chaired the New Directions in International Relations Panel at the International Studies Association – West Conference on September 23, 2017.
- Chaired the Foreign Policy panel at the 70th Western Political Science Association annual meeting on April 15, 2017.

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- Discussant on Foreign Policy panel in the International Relations section at the 70th Western Political Science Association annual meeting on April 15, 2017.

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- Participated in the Norms and Norms Diffusion in Regional Politics roundtable at the International Studies Association - International Conference in Hong Kong on June 17, 2017.
- Presented "Examination of Non-Criminal Diplomatic Expulsion” in the Foreign Policy panel in the International Relations section at the 70th Western Political Science Association annual meeting on April 15, 2017.
- Presented "When Is Diplomatic Expulsion Used for Political Purposes" in the International Relations and Domestic Audiences panel at the 88th Southern Political Science Association conference on January 12, 2017.
- Presented "Polarity and War" at the Emerging Scholars Panel at the 2014 International Studies Association-West's Annual Conference on September 26, 2014.

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- Awarded a Graduate and Professional Students Association conference grant ($445.62) – Spring 2017
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  * Attended a UNLV Graduate College on “Interpersonal Communication” on October 16, 2017.
  * Attended a UNLV Library workshop on “Identifying External Funding” on October 10, 2017.
  * Attended a UNLV Library workshop on “Strategies for Research in Archives and Special Collections” on October 3, 2017.
  * Attended a UNLV Graduate College workshop on “General Ethical Responsibilities in Mentoring” on September 26, 2017.
  * Attended a UNLV Graduate College workshop on “Pedagogy” on September 21, 2017.
  * Attended a UNLV Graduate College workshop on “Mentor/Trainee Responsibilities” on September 20, 2017.
  * Attended a UNLV Institutional Development and Research workshop on “Effective Discussion Teaching” on September 15, 2017.
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• **Memberships and Affiliations**
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  * Midwest Political Science Association – Member
  * Western Political Science Association – Member
  * Southern Political Science Association – Member
  * National Society of Leadership and Success (Sigma Alpha Pi) – Member
  * Team Leader, Success Networking Team for National Society of Leadership and Success in Spring 2015
  * Golden Key International Honour Society
  * Phi Theta Kappa – Member
  * Spanish National Honor Society – Member
Volunteer Work

- Volunteered at Spread the Word Nevada during the fall semester of the 2014-2015 school year

Other Accomplishments and Information

- Participated in Student Success Status Reporting Program in the Fall 2017 semester.
- Appointed to UNLV Political Science Graduate Student Advisory Committee for the 2017-2018 school year
- Assisted on a CNN focus group production team for the 3rd Presidential Debate of the 2016 election cycle in Las Vegas, NV. Live and taped segments played on CNN October 19 to October 23, 2016.
- Certified Floodplain Manager by the Association of Certified Floodplain Managers from 2008 to 2009.
- Former licensed insurance producer in the State of Mississippi
- Trained as a professional wrestler at Rod Price’s wrestling school from 2001-2002