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Policing Protests: An Exploratory Analysis of Crowd Management Policies

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POLICING PROTESTS: AN EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS

OF CROWD MANAGEMENT POLICIES

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ABSTRACT

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Several policing strategies have been used to manage protest crowds over the past 50 years. Research suggests that escalated force and command and control strategies were utilized until the 1990's (Bourne, 2011; Schweingruber, 2000), while negotiated management has as emerged as a prominent protest management strategy within recent decades (Gillham, 2011; Gillham & Noakes, 2006).While literature describes the general evolution of protest strategies over time, there has been no systematic documentation of police approaches to crowd management.

This study examines police policies governing protest management to identify current U.S. police practices. The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) provides model policies to help police agencies become familiar with best practices and develop their own policies. The IACP's model policy on crowd management and control was used to identify tactics that represent best practice standards for protest management in the United States. Through a content analysis of policies from a sample of U.S. police agencies, this study assesses agency compliance with the IACP model policy on crowd management and control, as well as alignment with existing protest management strategies.

Findings inform our understanding of current police protest management practices and offer policy implications. First, this study shows that there is a great deal of variation among protest management policies used within the sample agencies. Second, sample agency policies tend to adopt best practice escalated force tactics more often than command and control or

negotiated management practices. Finally, three specific themes related to community-oriented policing, strict enforcement and use of force, and regional differences emerge from bivariate and multivariate analyses. These themes offer direction for future theory development and protest management research.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the media has portrayed police negatively, due to a number of controversial use of force incidents (Rickford, 2016**).** These instances have affected the publics' opinion of officers on the street, arguably making it more difficult for police to accomplish day-to-day tasks. Sir Robert Peel, the father of metropolitan policing, suggested in his nine principles of policing that public support is paramount for officers to succeed in their position (Emsley, 2013*).* As such, the negative media portrayals of police affecting community perceptions of officers, may also affect police ability to successfully maintain order.

Legitimacy has emerged as a salient policing concern within recent years. Research suggests that, like Peel's principles of policing, community support is essential for police to maintain order within the community (Tyler, 2003). Police legitimacy has been studied extensively, largely in relation to use of force and militarization. While police use of force is a complex moral dilemma that influences research frequently, there are instances when it is necessary to ensure officer and community safety. Ariel and Farrar (2015) contend that even when force is used appropriately, it can have damaging effects on community relations. Numerous agencies have recently revised use of force policies in response to public scrutiny (Albrecht, 2011).

Police use of force incidents have affected more than just public perceptions of police; social movements have begun protesting against police for perceived discriminatory tactics (Rickford, 2016). This presents a unique challenge for United States police agencies; managing the same protest crowds that are targeting police as a social issue. Police management of protests

aimed at police has been heavily scrutinized, particularly following media coverage of questionable policing tactics that have been employed during protests in the United States.

Recently, there have been several high-profile instances of controversial U.S. police protest responses. In 2011, Occupy Oakland turned violent and police were rebuked for indiscriminate use of impact projectiles (King, 2013). In 2014, the Ferguson unrest persisted for days, while police were criticized for militarized tactics and prohibiting First Amendment rights (Institute for Intergovernmental Research, 2015). Many of the criticisms for police responding to protests stem from what some perceive to be an unwarranted escalation toward increased use of force. However, there are instances when use of force may be appropriate to maintain order and safety. Recently, in Portland, an Antifa protest turned violent when protesters attacked Andy Ngo, a reporter for an online magazine, during the event. Protesters responsible for the attack were accused of throwing milkshakes mixed with quick-dry cement (Templeton, 2019). This is a situation where police use of force to restrain or arrest Ngo's attackers would likely be seen by the public as an acceptable response.

Police protest management strategies have been a media and research focal point since the Civil Rights era. Mid-twentieth-century America saw the use of contentious police tactics, like indiscriminate applications of water cannons, tear gas, and impact rounds (McPhail, Schweingruber, & McCarthy, 1998; Schweingruber, 2000). These techniques often led to escalations of violence among the crowd, causing property destruction and injuries to police and crowd participants. Such disastrous consequences persuaded police to reconsider their approach toward protest crowds. Escalated force, or crowd dispersal, tactics were regularly adopted during the Civil Rights era (Bourne, 2011; McPhail, Schweingruber, & McCarthy, 1998; Schweingruber, 2000). However, research suggests that protest management strategies have

altered significantly since this timeframe (Bourne, 2011; Gillham, 2011; Gillham, Edwards, & Noakes, 2012; Gillham & Noakes, 2007; King, 2013).

Despite the transition in police tactics, the media and public citizens have continued scrutinizing police protest management strategies following controversial use of force incidents and tactics used to quell protest crowds. The increased publicity of these policing issues has promoted numerous changes to policy and practice, including the increased use of militarized tactics. Militarization has become increasingly controversial, with research suggesting that these practices are oppressive (Moule, Fox, & Parry, 2019). Sunshine and Tyler (2003) contend that militarization should be inversely related to police legitimacy, as these tactics are likely to lower favorable public attitudes toward officers. However, Moule and colleagues (2019) state that militarization is a function of legitimacy. If police are acting in a legitimate manner while using militarized tactics, public citizens will not perceive their actions to be overly authoritative. Despite this finding, increases in police militarization is highly contentious among the media and general public. As such, police have begun adopting alternative tactics that are directly associated with higher levels of perceived legitimacy. Most notably, police departments are reportedly engaging in more cooperative techniques when managing First Amendment gatherings. However, no systematic work has been conducted to determine the degree to which current police protest management policies align with best practice tactics or strategies described in the literature, nor have researchers assessed the level of variation across policies governing protest management for U.S. police agencies.

Protest and crowd management policies can affect public perceptions of police. Crowd control strategies were heavily practiced in the 1960s and emphasized coercing crowd compliance (McPhail, Schweingruber, & McCarthy, 1998; Schweingruber, 2000). Through these

tactics, police were instructed to use any means necessary to compel crowd obedience (McPhail, Schweingruber, & McCarthy, 1998; Schweingruber, 2000). Crowd control tactics have generated negative perceptions toward police agencies across the United States (Kenny et al., 2001). In response, police began adopting crowd management, rather than crowd control, approaches for special events. Crowd management refers to the ability to effectively organize and facilitate crowd movements (Abbott & Geddie, 2001), instead of simply responding to crowd violence using coercive measures.

Successful crowd management requires an understanding of crowd-specific factors, such as their intentions and motivations for participation. Specific police tactics facilitate this understanding. For example, dialog with crowd organizers prior to and during a protest event is often used by police to understand protester motivation (Borch, 2013; King & Waddington, 2006; Masterson, 2011). Research suggests that dialog is essential for crowd and officer safety (Abbott & Geddie, 2001; Gorringe & Rosie, 2009; Gorringe, Stott, &Rosie, 2012). This is reinforced by the development and adoption of dialog-based approaches in European countries. Police in other countries initially developed this model to promote order within crowds through legitimate means (Borch, 2013; Gorringe & Rosie, 2011; Holgersson & Knutsson, 2011). Due to the comparative success of this tactic, dialog-based crowd management approaches have recently emerged in the United States.

Some newly developed crowd management strategies have originated from other approaches, like community policing, that emphasize public engagement and rely on residents to assist police. The distinction between crowd management and control is rarely discussed theoretically. In simplistic terms, crowd management is employed in the planning of events to facilitate the First Amendment rights of the crowd, while crowd control is utilized when those

rights should be suspended due to an escalation of violence. While crowd management is a highly praised approach that has gained traction within recent years, we still do not know the degree to which agency policies and, in turn, practices reflect crowd management tactics or traditional crowd control strategies. This study will examine the existing policies that govern police response and the strategies they explicitly promote to manage and control protest crowds in the United States.

The development of protest management strategies is guided by police perceptions and understanding of crowds and crowd behaviors. One of the earliest theories of collective behavior contended that crowds were destructive and had no control over their own behavior. Research has significantly altered this perception throughout the years, with recent theorists arguing that crowd participants have individual motivations and act in accordance with their personal goals. Still, perceptions stemming from early and antiquated crowd theories continue to influence discussions and practices designed to manage crowd behaviors (Hoggett & Stott, 2010).

The purpose of the current study is to explore police policies governing crowd management to identify current protest management practices in the United States. This study assesses the degree to which current policies align with (1) tactics recommended by a national police organization–the International Association of Chiefs of Police, and (2) the basic tenets of three prominent protest management strategies (i.e., negotiated management, command and control, and escalated force). This dissertation also examines the relationship between agency- and jurisdiction-level characteristics and the content of police agency protest policies. The current study provides the first national-level empirical assessment of police protest management tactics used in the United States.

Overview of Study

As mentioned previously, U.S. police departments have significantly altered policy and practice associated with policing protests (Masterson, 2011). The historical shift in protest management strategies has been previously framed by theoretical perspectives concerning crowd behavior. Theories of collective behavior are rarely subjected to empirical assessment. However, some case studies have examined how crowds and police interact with one another and report outcomes of these interactions (Drury, Reicher, & Stott, 2003; Reicher, 1984; Reicher, 1996; Stott & Reicher, 1998). These case studies provide at least partial support for existing crowd psychology and management theories. Police legitimacy (Tyler, 1990; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003), the RDFC Interaction Model (Eck & Madensen, 2017; Sousa & Madensen, 2016), and the Elaborated Social Identity Model (ESIM) (Drury, Reicher, & Stott, 2003; Reicher, 1984; Reicher, 1996; Stott & Reicher, 1998) are three of the most prominent theoretical frameworks used to explain when and why protesters are more likely to accept police intervention during protest events.

Chapter 2 begins with a brief overview of currently accepted theoretical frameworks used to explain police-protester interactions. Specifically, this section will expound upon how police legitimacy, the RDFC Interaction Model, and the ESIM explain crowd compliance and defiance. Following this is a summary of the literature pertaining to sociological and crowd-level factors found to impact protest violence. Specific attention is paid to protest participant motivations and how these motivations affect propensities for violence. Next, there is a historical overview of the evolution of police protest management strategies in the United States. Each of these strategies is reviewed in relation to the theoretical background that influenced their inception—specifically, Gustave Le Bon's contagion theory, Wilson and Kelling's broken windows theory, the RDFC

Interaction Model, and the ESIM. Additionally, emerging protest management strategies in the United States are discussed in relation to their efficacy in other countries. The use of dialog policing is highly praised in Europe, and the United States appears to be shifting toward this approach with current protest management strategies. Finally, there is a brief discussion of how existing police policies can be used to examine current police practices. Previous research has constructively analyzed agency policies to examine how agencies respond to vehicle pursuits, and it is suggested that those research methods can also be employed to examine protest management strategies.

Chapter 3 examines the methods used to conduct the current research. First, the study overview discusses policies to examine police behavior within various contexts. This is accomplished by examining police policies' degree of compliance with the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) model policy on *crowd management and control*, as well as the alignment with existing theoretical protest management frameworks. Following this, the research questions for this study are explicitly stated and then discussed in terms of their relationship to previous literature and their contribution to future research. Third, the data are described in detail, including the specific variables that are examined for this study, as well as each data source. A brief explanation of the study's sample and population of interest is also provided. Fourth, the independent and dependent variables are described and examined based on their relation to previous literature and theory. Finally, the analytical plan utilized for this study is illustrated, with brief descriptions of the univariate, bivariate, and multivariate statistical techniques employed.

Chapter 4 provides the analysis results, as well as brief explanations of the findings in light of the proposed research questions. The first question explores whether existing police

policies comply with best practices proposed by the IACP model policy. Findings emphasize the most and least frequently adopted tactics recommended by the IACP, as well as the degree to which current U.S. police crowd management policies follow best practice recommendations. The second question investigates how current agency policies align with three predominate protest management strategies. Findings highlight the most commonly adopted techniques within each strategy, as well as emphasizing characteristics of those agencies that are most and least closely aligned with each management strategy. Third, and finally, bivariate correlations and linear regression models are presented, thus identifying significant associations between agency- and jurisdiction-level variables and tactics proposed by the IACP model policy, as well as the three major protest management strategies.

Chapter 5 concludes this dissertation with a discussion of the study's contribution to current literature. Specifically, a discussion is provided to describe the findings in light of three notable outcomes concerning the impact of community-oriented policing, jurisdiction-level characteristics, and regional variation in policy content. Next, the general strengths and weaknesses along with the implications of this research are explored. This research offers practical recommendations for police policy and practice, as well as a potential roadmap for future research. Finally, this dissertation concludes with a brief discussion of how this study contributes to and expands upon previous literature and accepted knowledge of police practices.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Early crowd theorists contended that crowds were irrational, destructive forces of nature (Le Bon, 1895; Sighele, 1891; Tarde, 1898). Promoting this perspective was Gustave Le Bon, the theorist credited with establishing crowd psychology as a field. The Le Bonian perspective contends that crowd participants experience irrationality and a sense of de-individuation, or contagion (Le Bon, 1895). Le Bon's contagion theory emphasizes a loss of individualism within the crowd, while contending that participants are only capable of negative emotions. This theory is the basis for the term "mob mentality" in social psychology. While later research provides alternative explanations for crowd violence, some studies suggest that the Le Bonian perspective still drives police protest management practices (Hoggett & Stott, 2010).

The act of protesting has been defined as an expression of views, to the public or government, on social and political issues (Bourne, 2011). John Lofland (1985) defines protest as acting on extreme feelings and dissension against a single entity in a public forum. Bourne's and Lofland's definitions hold that protesting occurs through an expression of values that targets an individual or institution. Additionally, the expressions within this process are typically the result of relative deprivation, or perceived injustices against a group (Isaac, Mutran, & Stryker, 1980; Runciman, 1966; Stoeffer, Suchman, Devinney, Star, & Williams, 1949). W. G. Runciman (1966) contends that relative deprivation occurs when a group's rights do not align with those afforded to other populations. For example, during the Civil Rights era, African-Americans were deprived of basic human rights that other populations in the United States were guaranteed. Some of the most prominent protests stemming from perceptions of relative deprivation in recent years have involved issues of racial inequality.

Recently, Black Lives Matter has engaged in a number of protests focusing on perceived discriminatory tactics by police against minorities (Rickford, 2016; www.blacklivesmatter.com, 2013). One highly publicized event was the 2014 shooting of Michael Brown by a Ferguson, Missouri, police officer, which called into question tactics that were used against members of the minority community. This shooting sparked protests nationwide, with the objective of discontinuing excessive use of force by police (Rickford, 2016). When the officer responsible for the shooting was acquitted of criminal charges, some Ferguson residents engaged in riotous behavior that resulted in numerous injuries and millions of dollars in property damage (Chasmar, 2014). The Ferguson unrest became one of the most notorious and violent events in modern history.

In 2017, the protest in Charlottesville, South Carolina, brought attention to white nationalist movements. This event was catalyzed by the planned removal of a controversial statue of Confederate General Robert E. Lee from Charlottesville's Emancipation Park. White nationalists argued that it was a Confederate monument signifying a period of history crucial to their party's formation. Counterdemonstrators argued that the statue was disrespectful to minority populations, as it symbolized slavery during the Civil War. They contested that the beliefs of the Confederate party were founded on hate and, therefore, should not be memorialized within the park. During the event, white nationalists marched through the local university campus with torches, chanting Nazi-related slogans (Keneally, 2018). The tension between the two parties culminated when one of the attendees accelerated his car through a crowd of counterdemonstrators, injuring dozens and killing one protester.

Also in 2017, a May Day demonstration in Portland, Oregon turned violent. May Day is an international day emphasizing labor rights, that occurs on May 1st annually (Nowak, N.D.).

The event in Portland began peacefully with speakers urging participants to support immigrants'

rights in the workforce. As demonstrators marched toward the waterfront, participants began

throwing rocks, cans, and Molotov cocktails (Ryan, 2017). Police responded to this violence by

engaging in crowd dispersal tactics. The violent behavior during this event led to 25 arrests and

the vandalization of multiple establishments.

In Ferguson, Portland, and Charlottesville, the common theme among participants was

the feeling of inequality. Whether inequality is felt from current practices or previous

transgressions, it has been a major reason for public demonstrations over the last half-century.

While some theories have argued that relative deprivation is the basis for protesting (Stoeffer et

al., 1949), others have expanded upon this idea by arguing that it more specifically explains

protest violence (Isaac et al., 1980).

Preventing violence is the primary goal of police when they act as crowd managers

(Borch, 2013; Madensen & Knutsson, 2011). In the United States, freedom of speech is one of

the fundamental rights afforded to citizens. As crowd managers, police face unique challenges in

protest scenarios, due to the necessity of balancing individual rights with societal safety. This

dissertation examines how police approach crowd management and how, according to previous

literature, police tactics influence protest crowd behaviors.

Compliance or Defiance: A Theoretical Explanation of Defiance Within the Crowd

Tom R. Tyler (1990) introduced the idea of procedural justice in his seminal book, *Why*

People Obey the Law. Prior to this publication, research was specifically interested in

discretionary police behaviors. Many studies examined the types of outcomes that were

associated with police discretion (i.e., arrests) (Pilavian & Briar, 1964). Over time, research

became less interested in the outcomes of police decisions and more focused on the process

associated with their decision-making. Police legitimacy translated the idea of procedural justice from the courts to police, emphasizing the importance of positive police-citizen interactions. According to this theory, citizens are especially concerned with how they are treated by authorities and the transparency of decision-making processes (Blader & Tyler, 2003). Studies have demonstrated that, when people are treated fairly and the decision-making process is transparent, the outcome of the decision is not as detrimental to citizen perceptions of police (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Essentially, when police use fair and just discretionary practices and explain how they came to their decision, they are more likely to be perceived favorably (Mazerrole, Bennett, Davis, Sargeant, & Manning, 2013). When the public perceives the police in a legitimate manner, they are more likely to comply with police directives (Blader & Tyler, 2003). Findings from previous research reinforce the argument that when police are perceived as unjust, the public will feel alienated, thus leading to defiance (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003).

Defiance can be defined as the resistance of police directives or interventions (Sherman, 1993). Crowd research has previously examined defiance toward police, and many explanations emphasize their use of authority as a central reason for crowd noncompliance (Madensen & Knutsson, 2011; Reicher, 1984; Reicher, 1996). According to the theories of procedural justice and police legitimacy, when police over-exert or inconsistently employ their authority, the crowd may view this as justification for defiance (Drury, Reicher, & Stott, 2003; Madensen & Knutsson, 2011; Reicher, 1996; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). The use of illegitimate tactics emits feelings of alienation within the crowd, thus increasing the likelihood of noncompliance (Drury, Reicher, & Stott, 2003; Reicher, 1984; Reicher, 1996; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Crowd defiance can lead to disastrous, even violent, consequences. These theories and related research suggest that police practices play a pivotal role in the outcome of protest violence.

While procedural justice and police legitimacy are two of the most common explanations for defiance, other theories expand on the legitimacy of police behaviors and the impact defiance has on violent outcomes. Two such theories are the RDFC Interaction Model (Eck & Madensen, 2017; Madensen, Heskett, & Lieberman, 2012; Sousa & Madensen, 2016) and the Elaborated Social Identity Model, also known as the ESIM (Drury, Reicher, & Stott, 2003; Reicher, 1984; Reicher, 1996; Stott & Reicher, 1998).

The RDFC Interaction Model emphasizes the types of behaviors that police should exhibit to increase levels of legitimacy. Madensen and colleagues (2012) argue that when police demonstrate *reasonable*, *disarming*, *focused*, and *consistent* behaviors, the public will voluntarily comply with police directives (Eck & Madensen, 2017; Madensen Heskett, & Lieberman, 2012; Sousa & Madensen, 2016). The first dimension, *reasonable*, refers to the extent to which police adhere to discretionary decisions or legalistic approaches when they manage others' behaviors (Eck & Madensen, 2017; Sousa & Madensen, 2016). According to Sousa and Madensen (2016), the public is more likely to comply with police directives that protect citizen rights and are necessary to prevent harm. Many police agencies tasked with crowd management accentuate the importance of protecting citizen rights (Masterson, 2011). When police policies do not follow these guidelines, crowds may be more likely to defy their authority.

When police are *disarming,* they de-escalate volatile situations without physical force (Clouse, 2018; Eck & Madensen, 2017; Sousa & Madensen, 2016). This is especially relevant in today's climate as many agencies are engaging their officers in verbal de-escalation training (Oliva, Morgan, & Compton, 2010). While dialog is important for police to de-escalate situations, image can also influence volatile interactions. Sousa and Madensen (2016) contend that officers in soft uniforms are perceived as less threatening than those in full riot gear. When

police adopt militarized tactics, the likelihood of violence increases (Myers-Montgomery, 2016). Disarming (i.e., non-hostile and non-threatening) tactics are hypothesized to increase the likelihood that crowds will comply with police directives (Sousa & Madensen, 2016).

The *focus* dimension refers to using force only against problematic individuals in a crowd instead of targeting whole groups. This dimension draws largely from the ESIM, which argues that groups in a crowd have differing motivations. According to the Le Bonian perspective, crowd members lose all sense of individuality upon participation in the group (Le Bon, 1895). The ESIM refutes this argument, stating that crowd members still hold their individual beliefs and values during crowd participation (Drury, Reicher, & Stott, 2003; Reicher, 1984; Reicher, 1996). Rather than operate under the crowd's single mindset, participants tend to form groups based on their objectives, and these smaller assemblies make up the larger crowd (Drury & Reicher, 2000; Reicher, 1984; Reicher, 2000; Stott & Reicher, 1998; Reicher & Stott, 2011). As such, identity is dynamic and shifts temporarily toward group-based attributes. Upon participation in the crowd, the individual adopts the predominant identity that aligns with the objectives of their specified group, not the crowd as a whole.

The ESIM expands upon the Le Bonian perspective by explaining crowd behavior from an intergroup lens (i.e., how crowd participants interact with one another) rather than from the traditional intragroup perspectives (i.e., how crowds interact with other entities). This perspective is typically used to explain how the interaction between groups within the crowd can result in defiance against police and overall crowd violence. When, for instance, peaceful protesters and violent anarchists are present within the same crowd, police should focus their intervention efforts on the problematic anarchists while protecting the rights of peaceful protesters to avoid larger crowd violence. By targeting the violent anarchists, police are focusing

only on those engaged in harmful behavior and are more likely to be perceived as legitimate authority figures (Eck & Madensen, 2016; Sousa & Madensen, 2016).

Finally, *consistency* relates to the actions of police across similar contexts and time (Eck & Madensen, 2017; Sousa & Madensen, 2016). This dimension argues that police reactions to protesters should be congruent across similar situations over time. Consistent behavior is predictable, and since the crowd knows what type of police actions to expect, they will not be provoked by unexpected police intervention (Eck & Madensen, 2017). *Consistency* ties the rest of the dimensions together. If police behavior is erratic, public confidence will most likely be reduced, especially if the directive seems to be motivated by bias (Clouse, 2018; Sousa & Madensen, 2016). When police behavior aligns with the RDFC Interaction Model, officers are more likely to be perceived favorably, which also diminishes the possibility of defiance within the crowd. Increasing compliance within the crowd is essential to reducing violence during protests.

Protest Violence

The right to gather peacefully and express personal and societal views is the cornerstone of a democratic society. However, once these events become violent, that constitutional right becomes limited. In the United States, collective behavior is often stigmatized and directly, if unfairly, associated with violence. As such, regardless of motivations, police responsible for crowd management often view demonstrators as a single entity (Hoggett & Stott, 2010). Contrary to popular belief, only about ten percent (10%) of protests result in violence (Davenport, Soule, & Armstrong, 2011).

Protest crowds typically differ in their motivations and behaviors from other groups (Isaac et al., 1980; Nilson & Nilson, 1980). Aligning with the Le Bonian (1895) perspective,

modern researchers contend that negative emotions are often the motivation for protest participation. Negative emotions—anger, frustration, alienation, anomie—are often the result of perceived injustices against an individual or a group (Isaac et al., 1980; Jasper, 1998; Smelser, 1963; Stoeffer et al, 1949; Runciman, 1966). That complex of feelings may predictably result in violence.

Previous research has examined numerous protest factors associated with violence, but none of those studies included recent events. While much of the protest research is outdated and may not accurately reflect the nature of protests today, a general level of consensus among the earlier findings identified factors commonly associated with violent protest outcomes. The factors discussed in the following section are outlined within two general categories: crowd-level factors and sociological factors. Crowd-level factors are group-level elements that represent the physical nature of the crowd (e.g., demonstrator race and number of protesters). Sociological factors can be defined as social factors that arise from the community or society (e.g., protester motivation, target of protest, and police presence).

Crowd-level factors. While a number of crowd-level variables may be attributed to violence, two specific crowd-level factors are routinely associated with protest violence: demonstrator race and protest size (Davenport et al., 2011; Eisinger, 1973; Isaac et al., 1980).

Black Lives Matter emerged in 2013 with the objective of eliminating perceived discriminatory police practices in the United States (Rickford, 2016; www.blacklivesmatter.com, 2013). This prominent social movement has often been compared with the Civil Rights movement, due to the similarity of their motivation for protesting (Rickford, 2016). During both time periods, African-Americans perceived relative deprivation. While empirical studies have

been conducted on protest violence during the Civil Rights era, protests surrounding the Black Lives Matter movement have only been discussed theoretically.

Previous research suggests that protests with more Black participants experience higher rates of violence (Davenport et al., 2011; Eisinger, 1973; Isaac et al., 1980). Relative deprivation theory attributes this to limited opportunity for the black community to affect social change (Isaac et al., 1980). For instance, during Black Lives Matter protests, Black community members have felt disproportionately targeted by excessive use of force (www.blacklivesmatter.com, 2013). When peaceful protest does not accomplish its intended goal, those perceiving relative deprivation feel that violence is the only viable alternative (Isaac et al., 1980).

Black citizens' feelings of deprivation have been documented since the Civil Rights era and through the Black Lives Matter movement (Eisinger, 1973; Isaac et al., 1980; Rickford, 2016). Civil Rights–era blacks fought to obtain basic human rights that were guaranteed to other populations in the United States. Restrictions placed on these black populations included segregation in schools and perceived discriminatory practices by businesses. Although these prejudiced practices have diminished over time, many studies argue that such racial disparities are still present today (Rickford, 2016). Case in point: Black Lives Matter contends that African-Americans are deprived of the right to safe interactions with police. Research concurs that minorities are targeted disproportionately by police use of lethal force (Engel & Calnon, 2004; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002).

While demonstrator race has been largely associated with violence, protest size is also a factor: larger protests tend to be more violent than smaller ones (Davenport et al., 2011; Eisinger, 1973). As more demonstrators engage, police become less familiar with participants and their

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motivations and, in turn, are more likely to rely on aggression to force compliance than on coordination with protesters (Gillham & Noakes, 2007; Noakes & Gillham, 2007).

Boston Police Chief William Evans stated, "If we go in expecting a fight, that's what we'll get" (Peak & Sousa, 2018). This quote accentuates the importance of cooperation between police and protest organizers. As discussed in the following section, familiarity between police and organizers breeds trust and cooperation. Building lasting relationships between police and protesters promotes positive experiences for all parties involved (King, 2013; Gillham & Noakes, 2007). Recently, these cooperative approaches have become more prevalent for crowd management. Coordination with crowd members assists police in their efforts to discern the shifting identities within the group.

Crowd-level factors are crucial in understanding group behaviors. However, without knowledge of external influences, research is limited in explaining why groups behave in a specific manner. The interaction between crowd-level and sociological factors is essential to identifying the situational contexts of protest violence.

Sociological factors. Sociological factors are societal-level variables that provide environmental context for the occurrence of protest violence. They explain how societal disputes can motivate people to engage in protest and why they have targeted specific entities. Previous research highlights three such factors: protest motivation, protest target, and police presence (Davenport et al., 2011; Eisinger, 1973).

Protest motivation and target are inherently associated with one another. Motivation is defined as the reason that demonstrations occur (Eisinger, 1973). A common motivation within recent years is the perceived use of excessive force by police against minorities (Rickford, 2016). The target of the protest is the entity toward which the event is being directed (Eisinger, 1973).

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Indeed, police have been the target of recent protests due to perceived increases in lethal force against members of the Black community (Rickford, 2016).

This example emphasizes systemic issues that affect specific populations at a disproportionate rate. Black Lives Matter contends that systemic racism inherently occurs within the United States criminal justice system (www.blacklivesmatter.com, 2013). Systemic racism arguably accounts for the media's highlighting of overtly aggressive tactics by Black Lives Matter and the resultant public perception that black protesters have a greater predisposition to violence than protesters in other social movements (Isaac et al., 1980; Rickford, 2016). To the contrary, research suggests that many protesters associated with Black Lives Matter do not incite or condone violence during their events (Hoffman, Granger, Vallejos, & Moats, 2016; Rickford, 2016).

Police responsible for managing crowds during Black Lives Matter events face unique challenges. They experience the unique dynamic of being crowd managers at the same demonstrations that are targeting them for perceived discriminatory tactics. When police are both crowd manager and protest target, it is difficult to rely on cooperative techniques because of the demonstrators' lack of trust. Still, while some sociological factors predict violence, police have a decisive impact on the demonstration's outcome. Their use of overtly authoritarian tactics increases the possibility of crowd rebellions against them (Madensen & Knutsson, 2011; Reicher, 1984; Drury & Reicher, 2000).

Police presence has been routinely correlated with protest violence: when police are present, the likelihood of violence increases substantially (Davenport et al., 2011; Eisinger, 1973). While police play an instrumental role in the protest outcome, no studies have examined the mediating effect that police management strategies may have on violence. Previous studies

have examined only whether police were present at the event, and most do not distinguish whether police were crowd managers for the event or were responding to calls for service due to a threat of violence. Additionally, there have been no large-scale empirical studies of police protest management strategies; that discussion is purely theoretical and typically supported by individual case studies. Tactics representative of each of the strategies have not been examined to ensure they align with existing research or theoretical models–an understanding that is essential to educating police on appropriate responses to protests. Currently, United States police agencies continue to be educated on the Le Bonian perspective (Hoggett & Stott, 2010), which highlights crowds as destructive forces of nature (Le Bon, 1895). However, recent research has emphasized that this theory is limited in its explanation of collective behavior, as it does not explain lawful and peaceful assemblies.

Police Response to Protests: Historical Progression of Crowd Management

Protest policing research dates back to the Civil Rights era (Bourne, 2011; Davenport et al., 2011; Eisinger, 1973). One of the most frequent themes across this research is the adversarial relationship between police and demonstrators. The perceived use of indiscriminate force by police during demonstrations has been sensationalized in the media, leading to lower levels of perceived legitimacy by society (King, 2013; Rickford, 2016). Media coverage of these events has increased the scrutiny of police behavior, with many arguing that they are employing "illegitimate" tactics during protests (King, 2013).

Police have employed four prominent protest management strategies over the last sixty years. Some of these strategies emphasize formal social control and tactics that may be perceived as less appropriate. However, in recent years, there has been shifts in proposed best practices of protest management strategies. Contemporary studies suggest that dialog and cooperation are

important in preventing protest violence (Gillham & Noakes, 2007; Gorringe, Stott, & Rosie, 2012; King, 2013). Each of these four strategies—escalated force, command and control, negotiated management, and strategic incapacitation—will be discussed in detail, including their central tenets and the theoretical perspectives that influenced them.

Escalated force. The earliest, and arguably most scrutinized, form of protest management is escalated force, a reactive type of policing often associated with shows and use of force to coerce compliance (Hoggett & Stott, 2010). Many agencies utilize this strategy when a protest escalates toward violence or becomes a civil disturbance (IACP, 2014). Heavily used during the Civil Rights era, this approach is based on the assumption that crowds are irrational and destructive (Della Porta & Reiter, 2016; Le Bon, 1895; Schweingruber, 2000) and that aggression by demonstrators justifies equal or greater force by police to disperse the crowd (Schweingruber, 2000).

There are five dimensions of police behavior that define escalated force (McPhail, Schweingruber, & McCarthy, 1998). First, police ignore First Amendment rights in the face of escalating violence and disorder (Schweingruber, 2000) because violence necessitates immediate dispersal. Second, police are responsible for dispersing crowds to prevent community disruption. Because crowds are perceived as disruptive to routine activities, police are tasked with their dispersal, so there is no tolerance for their formation. Third, due to this intolerance of collective behavior, police have no prior communication with protest leaders. Some research suggests that escalated force strategies are linked to violence due to police aversion to cooperation and communication (King, 2013; Kingshott, 2014). Fourth, mass arrest is used against those engaging in civil disobedience so that the crowd will disperse, deterring further disorderly behavior. When this proves ineffective, police employ indiscriminate force on the crowd—the

fifth element of escalated force (McPhail, Schweingruber, & McCarthy, 1998; Schweingruber, 2000).

The use of force to disperse crowds is a defining trait of escalated force strategies (Schweingruber, 2000). Use of force is employed during civil disturbances to enforce police directives. When force is employed indiscriminately, the crowd may perceive it to be an illegitimate use of force and resist police directives (Drury & Reicher, 2000; Reicher, 1996; Stott & Reicher, 1998). Force is employed indiscriminately when police target the entire crowd, rather than focusing on those unruly participants (Drury & Reicher, 2000; Reicher, 1996; Stott, Drury, & Reicher, 2016; Stott & Reicher, 1998). The use of indiscriminate force has been controversial, and is often perceived as an illegitimate policing tactic, due to the increased possibility of injuring nonviolent bystanders. Alternatively, previous literature contends that police behaviors perceived as legitimate increase public willingness to comply with police directives (Eck & Madensen, 2017; Sousa & Madensen, 2012)

The Le Bonian perspective of crowds as irrational and disruptive provides the framework for escalated force strategies (Hoggett & Stott, 2010; Le Bon, 1895). Contagion theory argues that the crowd operates under a single mindset (Le Bon, 1895). This perception of crowds justifies the use of indiscriminate force, as this may be necessary when the entire crowd is non-compliant and engaging in violence (Hoggett & Stott, 2010). The threat of large-scale violence or serious property damage requires the police to ensure societal safety, so their primary goal is to disperse the crowd by any means necessary (IACP, 2014; Schweingruber, 2000). Because such force often leads the public to perceive police in an illegitimate manner (Hoggett & Stott, 2010; Murray, 2010), police have altered their approach to lawful assemblies (Bourne, 2011).

Command and control. Command and control emerged as the prominent paradigm of protest crowd management during the 1980s, when there was a heavy emphasis on the impact of community disruption (Vitale, 2005). While this strategy promotes a slightly more accepting view of collective action and more emphasis on First Amendment rights than escalated force strategies does, the act of protest is still seen as a form of community disruption (Bourne, 2011) because crowds interfere with routine activities.

Previous research contends that command and control was derived from the use of strict enforcement tactics (Lough et al., 2010; Vitale, 2005). This approach entails adopting a strict, legalistic approach for enforcing minor offenses (Harcourt, 1998; 2001). These types of tactics have often been equated with the use of zero-tolerance policing, which is controversial due to its perceived discrimination toward minority communities (Harcourt, 2001). The adoption of this approach correlates with command and control due to the low tolerance for community disruption. Command and control strategies involve the restriction of time, place, and manner of protest (Bourne, 2011; Vitale, 2005) to minimize the potential for community disruption. Additionally, those protesters engaging in disruptive tactics would likely be subjected to immediate removal from the crowd, as this aligns with strict enforcement tactics (Harcourt, 1998; 2001). Police agencies aligning with this model may facilitate First Amendment assemblies until crowd members violate the restrictions placed on them by police. While restrictions are an essential component of command and control strategies, there are other crowd management tactics that align with this model.

Vitale (2005) introduced five necessary elements for a strategy to be classified as command and control. First, there must be aversion to community disruption. Police must do everything in their power to prevent demonstrations from interfering with routine community

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activities. This is generally accomplished by placing restrictions on the event and its attendees, through tactics like spatial containment (e.g., barricades). Second, access to the event itself is controlled. Police employ barricades to separate the crowd from the public and limit the entry points into the crowd. Wilson and Kelling (1982) discuss two types of disorder: social and physical. Protest crowds are perceived as social disorder when they disrupt the activities of the general public. Therefore, dispersing crowds to ensure that bystanders do not participate is a pivotal component of this strategy. Third, the police should divide-and-conquer protest participants. Using additional barricades within the crowd to separate protest groups diminishes the effect the groups have on each other and reduces contamination among bystanders. Fourth, there should be a shock-and-awe component to the protest management strategy. Agencies should deploy as many officers as the resources allow to deter unlawful or unpermitted behavior. The sheer mass of officers present is meant to act as a deterrent to the crowd as a whole. The fifth, and final, element of command-and-control strategies is zero-tolerance policing. As noted previously, strict enforcement strategies are often equated with this style of policing (Harcourt, 1998; 2001), thus creating an impact on the development of command and control strategies (Vitale, 2005). Over time, however, the restrictions placed on protest crowds became more controversial, leading to the development of cooperative techniques.

Negotiated management. Negotiated management emerged as a protest management strategy during the 1990s. Negotiated management emphasizes the use of dialog between police and demonstrators throughout the planning and demonstration process (Gillham, 2011; King, 2013). Literature highlights negotiated management as a desirable protest management strategy for police agencies in the United States. Recently, and historically, relationships between police and specific communities have been tumultuous. As such, researchers have promoted the use of a

cooperative protest management strategy between police and protesters to diminish the possibility of violence (Gillham & Noakes, 2007; King, 2013). Research suggests that coordination and dialog between both parties stimulates mutual respect (Murray, 2010) and emphasizes public order, while also promoting legitimate societal perceptions (Gorringe & Rosie, 2009; Murray, 2010). Like the transparency component of police legitimacy and procedural justice, when police are able to explain their decision-making during protest management, they are more likely to be perceived positively (Gorringe & Rosie, 2009; Tyler, 1990; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Previous strategies of protest management operated through extensive social control with little coordination between police and protesters.

Emphasizing dialog and planning through relationship building is essential in both negotiated management and community policing. Research suggests that this shift in protest management is partially oriented toward the popularity of community policing in the 1990s (Della Porta & Fillieule, 2004; Gorringe & Rosie, 2008; Vitale, 2005), a decade preceded by a complicated history of violence between police and minorities. This strategy attempts to restore this complex relationship through community involvement, often accomplished by allocating specific officers to designated neighborhoods, which increases familiarity and trust with police and provides officers with unique insight into the community's problems (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1994). Similarly, negotiated management partners specific officers with protest leaders, increasing trust in police during protests (Gillham & Noakes, 2007; Gorringe & Rosie, 2009) and subsequently decreasing the possibility of violence.

Previous researchers suggest that negotiated management is derived from community-oriented policing, but the adoption of these tactics would not have been possible without Wilson and Kelling's (1982) broken windows theory. Cullen (1997) asserts that broken windows was the

"blueprint of community policing," and many suggest that this approach led to a new era of inclusive policing in the United States (Xu, Fiedler, & Flaming, 2005). While much research emphasizes the link between disorder and crime (Braga et al., 1999; Skogan, 1990), the more central elements of broken windows seem to have been understated. Broken windows related more closely to community policing than sometimes presented in academic literature. Kelling (2019) contends that community policing is often perceived as a soft on crime approach, equated with "hug a thug." However, the community policing approach is driven by community concerns, which can evoke more aggressive crime prevention policing. The seminal aspect of broken windows, much like community-oriented policing, is the necessity of community input and relations to drive police response toward crime (Bratton & Kelling, 2014). This often results in communication between police and the community to highlight the issues facing residents.

While negotiated management is portrayed a highly desirable strategy by researchers, some argue that this approach can be used oppressively. King (2013) offers Occupy Oakland, in late 2011, as an example of how attempts to engage in negotiated management, without full embrace of its police-protester cooperation principles, can fail if police resort to repressive tactics. Police managing this event prohibited food and blankets through the permits issued to protesters. Those who violated the prohibition were told to disperse or be subject to arrest. Criminalizing the use of food and blankets—protester behaviors typically considered lawful— led the crowd to rebel, resulting in a violent altercation between police and protesters (King, 2013).

Occupy Oakland highlights the importance of building and maintaining trust between police and protesters. When a breakdown of trust occurs or unanticipated behaviors occur within the crowd, police are not able to employ cooperative methods. In the absence of cooperative

methods, police may turn to crowd management strategies that emphasize formal social control (Gillham & Noakes, 2007).

Strategic incapacitation. Strategic incapacitation typically begins as a coordination between police and protesters, but when a breakdown of trust occurs, it combines focused aspects of escalated force, spatial containment, and command and control—not against the whole crowd, but against problematic groups within the crowd (Bourne, 2011; Gillham, 2011; Gillham, Edwards, & Noakes, 2012; Gillham & Noakes, 2007; Schweingruber, 2000). The targeting of problematic individuals ensures that police behaviors are focused and are not used indiscriminately against an entire crowd (Sousa & Madensen, 2016).

Strategic incapacitation is theoretically grounded within the ESIM and the focus dimension of the RDFC Interaction Model. Both perspectives contend that police are perceived as more legitimate when they target only harmful behaviors rather than generalize their actions to the entire crowd (Drury & Reicher, 2000; Eck and Madensen, 2017; Reicher, 1984; Reicher, 1996; Sousa & Madensen, 2016; Stott & Reicher, 1998). With strategic incapacitation, police agencies employ the same dialog-based approach used in negotiated management until the transgressive protesters or outside agitators are encountered (Gillham & Noakes, 2007; Gorringe & Rosie, 2013; Noakes & Gillham, 2007). Transgressive protesters typically belong to anarchist or counterdemonstrator groups, are unfamiliar to police (Gillham, 2011; Gillham, Edwards, & Noakes, 2012; Gillham & Noakes, 2007), and engage in unpredictable tactics (Tilly, 2000), usually with the aim to incite violence or aggression. Because their presence creates difficulties when attempting to engage negotiated management strategies, police target individuals within the crowd who pose a legitimate threat to peaceful protest.

The ESIM argues there are multiple social identities present within a crowd, and police should only focus their efforts on the problematic identities that hold higher propensities for violence. According to this perspective, the problematic individuals within the crowd would be transgressive protesters, as their methods are unknown to police prior to the event (Gillham, 2011; Gillham, Edwards, & Noakes, 2012; Gillham & Noakes, 2007). By focusing police efforts on problematic individuals within the crowd, police may be perceived in a less overtly authoritative and more legitimate manner. The focused aspect of this strategy leads to more favorable public perceptions.

Spatial containment against transgressive protesters is executed through the designation of *hard zones, soft zones,* and *free-speech zones. Hard zones* are areas protesters are prohibited from entering to restrict their interactions with protest targets (Gillham, 2011; Gillham, Edwards, & Noakes, 2012). The boundaries are frequently sites of contention due to the separation between protesters and their targets (Noakes, Klocke, & Gillham, 2005). *Soft zones* are typically adjacent to *hard zones* and temporarily suspend First Amendment rights (Gillham, 2011). When protesters enter *soft zones,* they declare to the police that they are transgressive protesters (Gillham, Edwards, & Noakes, 2012), which provides police the rationale to suspend their First Amendment rights and order them to immediately disperse from the event. Disobedience with police directives further substantiates the use of force to compel compliance. Finally, *free-speech zones* are locations police allocate as acceptable for the expression of First Amendment rights (Gillham, 2011). These areas are typically placed adjacent to the *soft zones* and outside the vicinity of *hard zones* so there is no possibility of interaction between protesters and targets (Gillham, Edwards, & Noakes, 2012). Each serving a specific function to diminish protest

violence, these zones are typically utilized when there is an imperative to separate two or more groups that have volatile relationships (Gillham & Noakes, 2007; Noakes & Gillham, 2006).

Spatial containment and the focused use of force have been characterized by some as illegitimate police tactics (Gillham & Noakes, 2007; Gillham, Edwards, & Noakes, 2012; King, 2013; Noakes & Gillham, 2006). While historically controversial, the use of force and less-lethal weapons is sometimes necessary to ensure societal safety, especially when violent agitators are present. Much research contends that focusing on problematic individuals is a legitimate approach to protest violence (Drury & Reicher, 2000; Eck & Madensen, 2017; Reicher, 1984; Reicher, 1996; Sousa & Madensen, 2016; Stott & Reicher, 1998), but it can prove difficult in practice because most transgressive protesters are not initially identifiable. An exception is the Black Bloc; members of this anarchist group dress the same: blue jeans, a black hooded sweatshirt, and a decorative Guy Fawkes mask. They do this to increase their anonymity, but police can more easily identify them as problematic individuals. The United States has recently seen a resurgence of the Black Bloc, in the left-leaning anti-fascist movement, or Antifa. This group poses challenges for U.S. police. However, such anarchists have been around for decades in North America and Europe, where police are highly experienced and have reported success in Black Bloc protest management.

Comparative Policing Practices

Protest management is a complex task, and many U.S. police agencies have struggled to find acceptable methods to accomplish it. Other countries have experienced success in preventing protest violence, much of it born from the use of dialog to build partnerships with protest leaders. Two prevalent practices discussed in conjunction with one another are dialog

policing and public order policing, which originated in Sweden and the United Kingdom (Gorringe, Stott, & Rosie, 2012) and have spread to other countries due to their popularity.

Dialog policing is a cooperative approach that encourages discourse and coordination between police and protesters (Gorringe, Stott, & Rosie, 2012). According to David Baker (2014), dialog creates an opportunity to set boundaries, limit challenges, and establish expectations between police and protesters. Sweden has experienced success through the employment of dialog officers because of the amount of training these individuals undergo to become certified. Their training utilizes tactics like interviews with protest organizers to understand their wants and needs (Wahlstrom, 2007). Coordinating with protesters ensures that police practices are transparent, which is essential for police legitimacy (Mazerolle, Bennet, Davis, Sargeant, & Manning, 2013; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 1990). Ultimately, the Swedish Dialog Police have provided an international example of how to manage protest crowds.

In an attempt to emulate this specialized unit, dialog-based approaches have emerged in the United States (Baker, 2014; Lovell, 2009), though it still remains a rare approach to U.S. protest management. Specific components of the strategy, dialog and coordination, have been emphasized in other approaches, such as negotiated management, but those approaches have not experienced the same success as dialog policing has elsewhere, due to the lack of extensive discourse training in the United States (Gillham & Noakes, 2007; Gorringe & Rosie, 2008).

Public order policing (POP) was specifically created to manage crowd events. Like many previous policing strategies, this perspective perceives crowds as disorderly and disruptive to the community, an inherent threat to the social order (Reicher, Stott, Drury, Adang, Cronin, & Livingstone, 2007). Stephen Reicher and colleagues (2007) outline four elements of public order policing: intelligence, facilitation, communication, and differentiation. *Intelligence* refers to

being familiar with the social identities of the crowd: police should be aware of who is in the crowd and the motivations that drive their participation. This element is heavily derived from the ESIM, insinuating that crowds do not experience de-individuation. Rather, police should understand that social identities are fluid within a crowd and members typically adopt an identity aligned with the morals and values they traditionally hold (Drury, Reicher, & Stott, 2003; Reicher, 1984; Reicher, 1996; Stott & Reicher, 1998). *Facilitation* ensures that demonstrator goals are considered during the planning process, which can be achieved only through cooperation between police and protesters to ensure a safe and successful event. *Communication* facilitates police and protester objectives, diminishing the dissatisfaction among the crowd, which, in turn, reduces the likelihood for violent outcomes (Gorringe & Rosie, 2008; Vitale, 2005; Wahlstrom, 2007). Police legitimacy, procedural justice, and the ESIM all hold that increasing transparency in the decision-making process is essential to increasing crowd satisfaction (Drury, Reicher, & Stott, 2000; Reicher, 1984; Reicher, 1996; Tyler, 1990; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Dialog should not only be used prior to the event, but also during the event for any necessary problem-solving (Gorringe & Rosie, 2008; Gorringe, Rosie, & Stott, 2012). *Differentiation*, the final component of POP, accentuates the social context of crowds. While Le Bon (1895) believed that crowds lack social context and their motivations do not impact their behavior, proponents of POP assert that protest crowds hold different motivations than spectator crowds (Holton, 1978) and these motivations play a role in the possibility of violence (Reicher, Stott, Croning, & Adang, 2004; Wahlstrom, 2007). Public order policing is one of the most prevalent approaches to crowd management in the United Kingdom because it emphasizes societal safety and preparedness for the possibility of violent outcomes (Gorringe, Stott, & Rosie, 2012).

Police-community relations are also more progressive in other countries than in the United States, perhaps partially due to fewer use of force incidents in other countries (The Economist, 2014). Several controversial uses of force within the last decade have played a role in straining the relationship between police and minority communities, providing additional motivation for protest events against U.S. police agencies. This dynamic of protests—police tasked with crowd management when they are also targets of the event (Davenport et al., 2011; Eisinger, 1973)—is unique, creating additional challenges for police that may not be present in other countries.

This commentary is not to suggest that dialog and public order policing would be ineffective in the United States. Rather, these approaches may need to be altered to account for the distinctive police-community relations in the United States. There is a constitutional right for lawful assembly in the U.S., but there are also negative connotations associated with crowds (Blumer, 1968; Le Bon, 1895). Altering how crowd managers perceive crowds is the first step in diminishing protest violence, achievable by training them from theoretical perspectives that account for social contexts (Drury, Reicher, & Stott, 2000; Reicher, 1984; Reicher, 1996; Reicher & Stott, 1998). Creating a more positive outlook for lawful assemblies can help eliminate the stigma associated with crowds. Second, assuring that crowd dispersal techniques are focused on problematic groups will reduce the crowd's propensity to rebel against police (Drury, Reicher, & Stott, 2000; Eck & Madensen, 2017; Reicher, 1984; Reicher, 1996; Reicher & Stott, 1998; Sousa & Madensen, 2016). Third, creating trust is essential for any protest management strategy (King, 2013), and this can typically be accomplished only when police employ transparency in their decision-making process (Mazerolle et al., 2013; Sunshine & Tyler,

2003; Tyler, 1990). Through the adoption of these three elements, protest management strategies can work to repair community relations and ensure societal safety.

Policy Research

Examining police behavior, particularly the use of discretion, presents a complex research task. An immense amount of discretion can be employed during police-citizen interactions (Pilavian & Briar, 1964; Sherman & Berk, 1984), as well as a high degree of variation in how individual officers approach specific events. Discretion grants police the autonomy to decide how much of an effort should be made to enforce specific laws (Goldstein, 1963) and whether they should approach unlawful behavior from a legalistic or humanistic perspective. Legalistic approaches emphasize a strict enforcement of laws with little discretion (Wilson, 1978), while a humanistic approach allows for police to utilize discretionary practices based on the situation (Carlan & Byxbe, 2000). Because such subjectivity creates difficulty in measuring police decision-making, researchers have designed unique methods to assess police behavior and discretionary practices.

One of these, content analysis, inspects police policies (e.g., those governing vehicle pursuits) that outline acceptable officer behavior (Alpert, Kenney, Dunham, & Smith, 2000; Bayless & Osborne, 1998; Hicks, 2006; Lum & Fachner, 2008). However, it is important to note that police policies do not always align with evidence-based practices. Typically, police policies are drafted based on practitioner knowledge of acceptable behavior—a knowledge derived from situational experiences rather than data-driven practices. And policies are generally reactive in nature, altered based on incidents highly covered in the media. For example, the IACP model policy on crowd management and control is regarded as best practice. However, the effectiveness of this policy has not yet been directly tested or fully substantiated by research

evidence. Still, much of the policy's content is grounded in existing theoretical frameworks, indirect research evidence on police legitimacy, and experiential-based practice. While, many of the tactics advocated in the policy are based on professional experience, rather than research evidence, practitioner field experience offers an alternative form of evidence that agencies can rely upon in the absence of rigorous academic studies.

CHAPTER 3

METHODS

This study examines a select cross section of United States police agencies to provide a summary of current protest crowd management strategies. This is accomplished by analyzing agency policies that direct crowd management practices. Individual agency policies are reviewed and analyzed to determine the degree to which individual policies align with best practices and current protest management strategies discussed within the literature. An analysis of the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) model policy on crowd management and control was conducted to identify specific tactics advocated as best practice for managing various protest crowds (e.g., lawful assemblies/demonstrations, civil disturbances). This analysis was used to create a coding instrument with items that are used to measure the degree to which individual agency policies align with strategies and tactics considered to represent best practices in the field (i.e., the IACP model policy).

The IACP is the largest global professional organization that attempts to influence police practices by promoting positive change among agencies (www.theiacp.org, 2019). One of the functions of this international organization is the production of *model policies* for agencies to adopt or to refer to when revising their existing policies. The IACP draws upon the professional experience and expertise of influential police executives and leaders, as well as research findings, to produce model policies. As the largest professional police organization in the world, the IACP plays the role of an unofficial governing agency that greatly influences U.S. police organizational policies. Over 30,000 IACP members in more than 150 countries have direct access to a library of model policies that govern a wide array of police activities, including crowd management and control (www.theiacp.org).

Comparisons between individual agency policies and IACP model policies have been conducted in the past, although this method has not yet been employed to examine protest management policies. The overarching analytic framework proposed for this study follows the methods used by Lum and Fachner (2008) to assess United States police vehicle pursuit policies. In their study, a thematic analysis was conducted to identify general themes within the IACP model pursuit policy. Following the identification of common themes within the policy, a series of dichotomous (yes/no) questions was created to assess the degree of agency policy compliance with the IACP model policy themes. This same method was employed to create a coding instrument that identifies the degree to which police agency policies align with the IACP's model policy on crowd management and control.

Alpert and colleagues (1996) contend that efforts should be increased to improve policies in specialized areas, stating that there is a lack of data to drive these guidelines. The IACP's model policies provide necessary frameworks to move toward national standards for police behaviors in specific contexts (Lum & Fachner, 2008). While the IACP's model policies are based on a combination of research, practitioner expertise, and advisory board input, this is not the only organization to produce recommendations for police behavior in specialized contexts. There are other organizations, like the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), that outline acceptable standards for police conduct in a number of contexts. Recently, PERF has produced a best practice guide for police response to mass demonstrations (Police Executive Research Forum, 2018). Still, Lum and Fachner (2008) argue that the creation of IACP's model policies represents an important step toward establishing national policing standards. Building upon this research, the current study uses methods similar to Lum and Fachner's and uses the IACP's model policy on *crowd management and control*, while acknowledging that other best practice

standards are available. The purpose of this study is to provide a better understanding of current protest management strategies and tactics being used by various police agencies across the United States, as well as examine factors that might account for variation in policy content across agencies.

Research Questions

As mentioned previously, police can attempt to facilitate lawful assemblies while assuring societal safety during protests (Vitale, 2005). Achieving both goals can be difficult when individuals participating in lawful assemblies become violent. When protests become violent, participant, community, and officer safety supersedes the facilitation of First Amendment rights. Therefore, specific police tactics may become necessary that were not appropriate to use prior to acts of violence (e.g., arrest, use of force, crowd dispersal techniques). In an attempt to outline the context in which specific police tactics are most appropriate, the IACP developed a model policy on crowd management and control. This study employs three research questions to determine the degree to which current police agencies comply with IACP recommendations, assess alignment with protest management strategies, and account for variation across agency policies.

1. ***To what degree do department policies governing protest management, taken from a sample of U.S. police agencies, comply with practices advocated by the IACP model policy on crowd management and control?***

This research question explores the degree to which current police policies comply with the IACP's recommendations for crowd management and control. For this study, the IACP's model policy was analyzed to identify tactics they advocate as best practice. The IACP policy provides suggestions for how police should approach various circumstances in protest contexts

(e.g., lawful assembly, civil disturbances). A 45-item instrument was created to measure agency policy compliance with practices recommended by the IACP. Higher scores indicate greater compliance with the IACP's recommendations.

2. ***To what degree do agency policies align with theoretically based strategy themes (i.e., escalated force, command and control, and negotiated management) identified within the IACP model policy?***

This research questions explores the degree to which current police policies align with the three general protest management themes identified in the literature review: escalated force, command and control, and negotiated management. Previous studies outline specific practices used by police to manage protest crowds (Bourne, 2011; Gillham, 2011; King, 2013; Schweingruber, 2000; Vitale, 2005). The discourse surrounding these practices notes how police approaches to protest management have changed over the past several decades. These discussions are typically based on case studies involving general observations of police tactics used at specific protests. To date, no empirical study has been conducted to determine the degree to which current police policies are aligned with one or more of the general protest strategies (i.e., escalated force, command and control, or negotiated management). For this study, specific tactics advocated by the IACP model policy on crowd management and control were categorized into three themes, each theme representing one of the three general protest strategies. Fifteen specific items/questions were then created to code the degree of individual agency policy alignment with each of the three themes. Appendix B provides the questions contained in the coding instrument, as well as a reference to the source statements in the IACP model policy and justification for theme categorization (i.e., why a specific item was created to assess alignment with a particular protest management strategy).

The United States operates under a decentralized policing structure. As such, variation among the policies of individual agencies is expected. The analysis answers the following question to attempt to understand existing differences in practices across agencies.

3. ***Are agency- and jurisdiction-level characteristics associated with the overall degree of compliance and reliance on strategy themes within the IACP model policy?***

Past studies on protest violence acknowledge that event-specific factors are often related to the likelihood of protest violence. As such, studies often acknowledge the impact that police can have on aggression within the crowd (Bourne, 2011; Davenport et al., 2011; Gillham, 2011; Eisinger, 1973; King, 2013; Schweingruber, 2000). This study examines the association between agency-level characteristics that might influence police perspective or ability to adhere to current best-practice strategies. Agency-level characteristics that will be examined include measures of agency size, percentage of black officers, percentage of minority officers, officer educational attainment, agency militarization, the adoption of community policing strategies, use of force strategies, and the presence of specialized units.

Like agency-level characteristics, jurisdictional characteristics have not previously been examined in relation to police protest management policies. Yet, previous research suggests that community characteristics could theoretically influence the tactics adopted by specific police agencies (Isaac et al., 1980; Nilson & Nilson, 1980; Walgrave Rucht, & Van Aelst, 2010). As such, differences among crowd management policies could be associated with community characteristics, including violent crime rate, population size, educational attainment, unemployment rate, poverty level, and percentage of black residents. In addition, there may be regional differences in the level of compliance with the IACP model policy and general protest management strategies. Previous research suggests that protest violence varies by region. With

violence occurring more frequently in specific regions, it is hypothesized that there are also regional differences in the content of policies that agencies adopt to respond to civil disturbances.

Data Collection

Data in this study are collected from multiple sources: current police policies governing crowd management for demonstrations/civil disturbances (i.e., policies provided by individual agencies), consolidated information from the 2013 Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) survey, the 2017Uniform Crime Report (UCR), the 2017 American Community Survey (ACS), and the Defense Department's Defense Logistics 1033 program datasets. The specific variables to be collected from each data source on protest management tactics, agency-level characteristics, and jurisdiction-level characteristics are described below.

Protest management policies. Policies and procedures on protest management tactics were collected for a specific cross section of U.S. police agencies. Policies pertaining to protest management include directives on First Amendment gatherings, civil disturbances, canine units, use of force, less-lethal weapons, arrest procedures, and civil disturbance units/mobile field forces. These policies provide detailed information on protest management tactics that officers are directed to engage in for lawful assemblies and violent civil disturbances. These policies describe specific tactics, including planning for demonstrations, provisions for use of force, and spatial containment during protest events. Protest management policies were collected online through department-specific and third-party websites. For policies not readily accessible online, a formal public information request was submitted directly to the police agency. For those, policy requests that were denied, the associative agency was excluded from the sample and a

new agency was selected. More information about the sampling method is provided later in this chapter. Additionally, the IACP's model policy on crowd management and control was obtained through the IACP's website.

Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS). Data on agency-level characteristics were collected through the Bureau of Justice Statistics' 2013 Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) survey. This dataset compiles information on over 3,000 agencies within the United States and includes agencies with over 100 sworn personnel (Hyland, 2018). The 2013 data are the most recently available data provided by the Bureau of Justice Statistics. While these data were released pre-Ferguson (November 2014), and it is entirely possible that agencies updated their practices in response to this event, this dataset still provides the most recent data available. The LEMAS data set is considered the most comprehensive and highest-quality data on police administrative statistics. To ensure that this data would be available for analysis, the sample of police agencies used in this study was drawn from agencies represented in this dataset.[1]

Uniform crime report (UCR). Jurisdictional crime data were obtained from the Federal Bureau of Investigation's 2017 Uniform Crime Report (UCR) for all jurisdictions of agencies included in the current study. These data include crimes reported by agencies to the FBI between January 1, 2017 and December 1, 2017. The Part I crime rate reported per 100,000 populations was collected to assess the relationship between crime levels and adherence to the IACP model policy and strategy themes. The Uniform Crime Report is one of the nation's leading data sources on crime rates in the United States (Berg & Lauritsen, 2016). This dataset measures the

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[1] While the agencies in this dataset represent only about 10% of the overall population of police agencies, a much larger proportion of the agencies of interest (i.e., those serving jurisdictions with 25,000 or more residents; approximately 80%) are included in this dataset.

amount of crime in the United States as reported by police agencies. Approximately 95% of all police agencies in the United States report crime statistics to the UCR (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2017).

American community survey (ACS). The U.S. Census Bureau's 2017 American Community Survey (ACS) was utilized to collect data on jurisdiction-level characteristics. The ACS is conducted annually in the United States to gather demographics for citizens at the county, city, state, and national level. This dataset includes variables like median income, educational attainment, and percentage of Black community residents within a jurisdiction. The ACS is one of the most comprehensive sources of data on community demographics in the United States. The sample included in the 2017 survey represents over two million households and reports a 95% response rate (Torrieri, 2018).

Department of defense: Defense logistics agency 1033 program. The Department of Defense's Defense Logistics Agency 1033 program dataset was utilized to examine militarized costs by U.S. police agencies. This dataset provides descriptions and costs of militarized equipment for specific police agencies in the United States. The 1033 program allows the transference of Department of Defense property that might be destroyed to state and local police agencies. The data included in this dataset range from January 1, 2000 to September 30, 2015.

Sample and Population

As discussed previously, this study examines a select sample of U.S. police agencies to understand current police approaches to protest management. Specifically, this study examines agencies with jurisdictional populations of over 25,000 citizens. According to the BJS' 2013 LEMAS data, there are 867 police agencies that serve populations with 25,000 citizens or more (Hyland, 2018). The list of police agencies responding to the 2013 LEMAS survey, which

provides administrative statistics on U.S. police agencies, was used to draw a sample of agencies for the current study. Selecting agencies from this dataset ensures that those included in the sample also have agency-level characteristics available for analysis. The response rate for the 2013 LEMAS survey was 80% and included 2,780 agencies in the United States (Reaves, 2015).

In order to include a diverse cross section of U.S. police agencies, sample selection is stratified by both jurisdictional population size and region of the United States. Disproportionate stratified sampling is used to examine the variation of agencies across the United States. This sampling strategy is especially useful to provide detailed analyses on small samples (Daniel, 2012). Agencies are first stratified according to jurisdiction population, which created five strata: agencies policing populations of 25,000–49,999, 50,000–99,999, 100,000–199,999, 200,000– 499,999, and 500,000+. Following this, agencies are then stratified by region of the United States. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, there are four regions of the United States: West, Midwest, South, and Northeast. Table 1 illustrates the number of agencies that are selected within each category. Appendix B provides a list of agencies that were selected within each strata.

The sample consists of all agencies that serve populations of more than 500,000, often referred to as *super agencies,* since protests are more likely to take place in large urban areas (Eisinger, 1973; Walgrave, Rucht, & Aelst, 2010). Thirty-nine of the 44 super agencies are included in the current sample. Policies for 5 super agencies were not obtainable due to requests for agency policies being denied. All other agencies were given unique identifiers and randomly selected, through a random number generator, for analysis within each region for each of the four remaining population strata ($n = 5$ for each population/region strata). Note that the stratum for Northeastern agencies serving populations between 200,000 and 499,999 citizens contains only five agencies, so the entire population was selected for analysis. However, two of the agencies in

this stratum denied the public information request based on the policy not existing or not being available for public dissemination.

Table 1: Sample Stratification

Population Size	Region of the United States	Sample Size (n)
500,000	N/A	39[2]
200,000 – 499,999	West	3
	Midwest	5
	South	5
	Northeast	5
100,000 – 199,999	West	5
	Midwest	5
	South	5
	Northeast	5
50,000 – 99,999	West	5
	Midwest	5
	South	5
	Northeast	5
25,000 – 49,999	West	5
	Midwest	5
	South	5
	Northeast	5
Total:		N = 117

If agency policies were not available online, formal Freedom of Information requests were submitted to the agency for the policies of interest. If the request was denied—due to the absence of a policy relating to protest crowds or to the policy's being considered privileged information—the agency was then excluded from the sample and a new agency was randomly selected. However, this sampling with replacement strategy was not possible for the

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[2] The super-agency category consists of 44 agencies. Only 39 were available as public information. The remaining agencies denied public information requests, citing these policies as law-enforcement privileged information.

superagencies and 200,000-499,999 Northeast categories due to the entire population being selected for analysis.

This study lacks sufficient power to generalize the findings to all police agencies in the United States due to the limited number of agencies included in the final sample (n =117). However, this exploratory study will be the first to provide a general picture of police protest management tactics across the United States and begin to assess the degree of variation among agencies' crowd management strategies.

Agencies Not Included in the Sample

Overall, 30 agencies were sampled with replacement after policies could not be obtained from the initially selected agencies. Agencies were not included in the sample for multiple reasons: gave positive indication that their policies would be distributed but never did so (n = 10), did not respond to the request (n = 8), refused for legal reasons (i.e., not a state resident, policies were considered tactical operations plans) (n = 4), or did not have a crowd management policy in place (n = 8). Differences were noted for agencies that are included in the sample and those that could not be included in this study[3]. However, the sampling method used in this study was designed to maximize differences between the agencies examined in the sample. This study does not attempt to generalize findings to all U.S. police agencies.

Variables

Independent variables. The independent variables for this study include agency- and jurisdiction-level characteristics. While previous research has examined policies governing police behavior within specific contexts (e.g. police pursuits), the literature rarely identifies

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[3]Analyses reveal that agencies for which policies could not be obtained were typically larger, had fewer black officers, served jurisdictions with fewer high school graduates, and served jurisdictions with higher unemployment and poverty rates.

factors that lead agencies to adopt specific policies. This study will explore whether particular agency or jurisdiction characteristics are associated with the adoption of tactics emphasized within the IACP's model policy or various protest management strategies.

The first variable employed is size of agency, which is operationalized as the number of full-time sworn personnel within an agency. Cordner (1989) contends that larger agencies tend to allocate more personnel to specialized units, which results in the possibility that these agencies receive more training in these areas. Previous research suggests that larger agencies are more likely to adopt policies pertaining to special areas (Lum & Fachner, 2008). Larger agencies typically have more resources, which can be used for training if new policy directives are adopted. Additionally, larger agencies also have more recourses to create the types of specialized units that are referenced in best practice policies. As such, larger agencies may be more likely to continually revise policies and adopt current best practices for protest management. Agency size is examined to determine the level of association with specific differences in protest management policies.

Measures representing minority and black officers within the agencies are continuous variables indicating the percentage of sworn officers who are members of these communities. This measure is indicative of the extent to which an agency contains diversity in their ranks. Within recent years, agencies have become especially focused on diversifying their organizations to become more representative of the communities they police (Peak & Sousa, 2018). As such, agencies with more diversity may be more likely to adopt tactics that align with more progressive protest management strategies.

Educational attainment is operationalized by examining the percentage of officers with a Bachelor's degree or higher. This measure, available through the 2013 LEMAS dataset, is

operationalized as a continuous variable to examine the education level of sworn officers within each agency. Increasing levels of educational attainment is another recent focus within police agencies to diversify and reduce the amount of force used by officers. As mentioned previously, research shows that officers with higher levels of educational attainment are more likely to use reasoning skills and engage in de-escalation practices before using force (Oliva, Morgan, & Compton, 2010). Additionally, agencies with better educated officers are more likely to have positive community relations (Peak & Sousa, 2018), which leads to greater levels of trust between community residents and police. Given that the IACP model policy promotes the use of de-escalation tactics and negotiated management practices, agencies with better educated officers and community relations may find it easier to align their policies with these recommendations. The use of dialog within protest contexts is promoted as a method to diminish the likelihood of violence (Gorringe, Stott, & Rosie, 2012).

While the use of dialog has been associated with lower rates of protest violence, police militarization has been associated with increased aggression (Wood, 2014). Police militarization has been a controversial topic for many years, especially after the use of militarized tactics during the Ferguson riots (Kiker, 2014; Rickford, 2016). Kraska (2007) defines police militarization as "the process of arming, organizing, planning, training for, threatening, and sometimes implementing violent conflict" (p. 503). Wood (2014) suggests that police militarization during protests has increased since September 11, 2001. Since the events on this day, police have been especially concerned with protests becoming security threats, and militarized agencies are more concerned with dispersing antagonistic crowds in order to prevent potential threats from escalating (Ullrich, 2017). Agencies that spend more on militarization may be more willing and able to adopt recommended best practices or specific tactics associated with

escalated force. Militarization is measured based on the amount of money agencies spend on militarized equipment, standardized per officer, as available through the DOD's 1033 program. This measure offers a picture of the degree of agency militarization, while also accounting for size and budgetary differences by standardizing the cost per officer.

Agency adoption of community policing strategies is measured through a series of items that examine community policing practices within the agency. Research has long confirmed a link between community characteristics and crime. This link affects how police maintain order and enforce laws in the community. Areas that are more socially disorganized (i.e., higher minority populations, crime rates, unemployment rates, and poverty levels) typically receive more police services. Recent findings suggest that community characteristics may also influence police reaction to protests. For instance, research suggests that Black Americans are perceived by police as more threatening during protests (Davenport et al., 2011). This may influence the types of policies and general strategies adopted by agencies, but no research has yet been conducted to test this assumption. First, whether the organization has a community policing focus in their written mission statement is examined. This variable, available in the 2013 LEMAS dataset, is coded as such: a written mission statement is absent or does not have a focus on community policing (0) or community policing is emphasized in the statement (1). Two other measures of community policing examine if recruits and current officers receive eight hours or more of community-oriented policing training. This variable provides a measure of the proportion of officers who receive this amount of training: (0) less than half or (1) over half. Finally, whether officers are regularly assigned to specific beats is measured dichotomously as yes (1) or no (0). This measure represents the familiarity between officers and the communities they police. Additionally, the percentage of officers routinely engaging in patrol within the same areas is

examined. This continuous measure assesses the proportion of the agency who is routinely

responsible for the same area. Community policing is often linked with specific protest

management strategies, including negotiated management (Lough, Halliday, & Dobrzynski,

2010).

Police use of force and the discretion associated with employing force is often

controversial. The IACP model policy includes multiple directives on the use of force in crowd

contexts (IACP, 2014). As such, agencies that authorize all officers to use various methods of

force may be more willing to adopt IACP model policy directives related to specific use of force

guidelines. Agency use of force strategies are measured through agency responses concerning

whether all sworn officers (1) or only some or no sworn officers (0) are authorized to use each of

the following types of force: less-lethal weapons, impact projectiles, chemical agents, or physical

force. The 2013 LEMAS survey asked specific questions about the use of various types of

physical force, including open hand, closed hand, restraint, and takedown use of force techniques

(Hyland, 2018). Each of these will be examined independently.

Specialized training and units can prove beneficial for police agencies. For example,

agencies with mobile field forces have units trained specifically to respond to civil disturbances

(Carter, 2002). The presence of specialized training will be measured through two 2013 LEMAS

survey items. First, whether the agency does (1) or does not (0) have dedicated personnel trained

to engage in special operations (e.g., SWAT, SRT) is included. Second, the specific number of

specialized units within the agency overall will be examined. Each of these variables help

measure the degree to which officers receive training for specialized contexts.

The violent crime rate of each selected jurisdiction is compiled through the FBI's 2017

Uniform Crime Report. This variable will be operationalized as the number of Part I crimes

reported per 100,000 population. As protest research often examines the occurrence of violence during these events, the jurisdiction's violent crime rate may be indicative of the likelihood of these incidents during protests and may influence police response. This study will examine the relationship between jurisdictional violent crime rates and differences in police protest management strategies.

Research suggests that most protests occur in urban environments and many activists engaging in protest are university students (Walgrave et al., 2010). Further, there are often negative stigmas associated with those who choose to engage in activism, sometimes related to the job status of protest participants. Population size, percentage of high school graduates (e.g., those who may be eligible to attend college), unemployment rate, and percentage of the population that falls below the poverty level is examined using ACS data to determine if these jurisdictional characteristics are associated with differences in police protest management strategies.

As many recent protests are related to Black Lives Matter (Rickford, 2016), this study examines the relationship between differences in police policies and the level of racial diversity in the jurisdiction. Larry Isaac and colleagues (1980) contend that members of the black community are more likely to resort to violence during protests because of the perceived lack of legitimate options to be heard. This, in turn, may promote the adoption of specific policing tactics. To assess the relationship between population diversity and police practice, the percentage of black residents within each jurisdiction is obtained from the 2017 ACS.

Dependent variables. The dependent variables represent the degree of compliance with the IACP model policy, as well as adherence to specific protest policing themes for each specified agency. Dependent variables are measured using a coding instrument that includes the

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questions contained in Appendix B. Each item requires a dichotomous response (i.e., yes or no). The general degree of compliance with the model policy for each agency policy is measured by the total number of items (n = 45) coded as "yes" (1) or "no" (0). Measures of the degree to which each agency's policy adheres to a specific protest management theme—negotiated management, command and control, or escalated force—is assessed using the responses to items contained in each section of the coding instrument (n = 15 for each theme/strategy). The justification column in Appendix B notes when reverse coding is used to reflect adherence to a specific theme. The resulting scale scores, for overall compliance as well as each theme, are used to assess degree of compliance with the IACP model policy (range = 0 – 45), as well as level of alignment with the three existing protest management strategies (range = 0 -15).

Analytical Plan

This study employs both qualitative and quantitative analytical methods to explore the degree of compliance with the IACP model policy and protest policing themes. Initially, the IACP model policy on crowd management and control was subjected to a thematic analysis to identify frequently discussed tactics and themes. This analysis was used to develop questions and produce the coding instrument used in the current study. First, questions were created to represent the IACP's model policy recommendations concerning the use or restriction of specific protest policing tactics. These items were then categorized based on the existing theoretical protest policing approaches to create themes (i.e., negotiated management, escalated force, and command and control). Finally, 15 items that best captured the essence of each theme were selected to create the final 45-item coding instrument.

Descriptive statistics are provided to assess the degree of compliance with the IACP model policy, as well as the level of adherence to each of the three protest management themes.

These analyses help to determine the degree of variation across current crowd management policies adopted by the selected U.S. police agencies. It also begins to describe the degree to which any one particular protest management strategy is currently used over others.

Bivariate correlations and linear regression models assess the relationship between agency- and jurisdiction-level characteristics with degree of compliance with the IACP model policy and reliance on the three protest management strategies. Linear regression models are generally employed to examine the effect of a set of attributes on a continuous dependent variable (Montgomery, Peck, & Vining, 2012). In this study, the dependent variables utilize continuous values that are representative of the degree of compliance with the IACP model policy and the levels of reliance with negotiated management, command and control, and escalated force. Due to the continuous nature of the scales used to measure the dependent variables, linear regression is the most appropriate analysis for this study. Additionally, due to the small sample size (which increases the likelihood of Type II error) and the exploratory nature of this study, there is sufficient reason for statistical significance to be measured at a .10 alpha level (two-tailed) in the current analyses (Labovitz, 1968; Sliva, 2015).

Interrater Reliability

The subjectivity of content analyses is often discussed as a limitation relating to reliability (Patton, 2015). To control for the subjectivity of this study, two researchers separately coded the agency policies. Coding of agency policies occurred simultaneously between the researcher and an outside coder over a month-long period. The researcher provided the outside coder with the purpose of the study, the coding scheme, and content analysis procedures. The outside coder was a first-year doctoral student at the same academic institution as the researcher. The results of the coding analysis showed that the coders agreed on approximately 87% (.866) of

the overall items. Following the coding analysis, a neutral third party re-analyzed discrepancies and made a formal decision on which coding was more accurate. This coding was then used for the policy analysis.

CHAPTER 4

FINDINGS

This dissertation examines three research questions relating to how police manage protest crowds. The current study attempts to answer 1) To what degree do department policies governing protest management, taken from a sample of U.S. police agencies, align with practices advocated by the IACP model policy on *crowd management and control*?, 2) To what degree do these policies align with theoretically-based strategy themes (i.e., negotiated management command and control, and escalated force) identified within the IACP model policy?, and 3) Are agency and jurisdiction-level characteristics associated with overall degree of compliance and compliance with strategy themes within the IACP model policy?

A series of univariate descriptive analyses are used to assess department policies' degree of compliance with the IACP model policy on *crowd management and control*, as well as the level of compliance with theoretically-based strategy themes (i.e. escalated force, command and control, and negotiated management). Bivariate correlations evaluate relationships between agency/jurisdiction-level characteristics and the extent to which agencies comply with the IACP model policy and protest management themes. Finally, regression models employing agency/jurisdiction-level characteristics are used to predict compliance with the IACP model policy and theory-based themes. Presentation of these findings follows.

1. ***To what degree do department policies governing protest management, taken from a sample of U.S. police agencies, comply with practices advocated by the IACP model policy on crowd management and control?***

Degree of compliance with the IACP model policy is assessed through the use of a 45-item instrument that asked dichotomous questions relating to whether the policy authorized

specific tactics to manage protest crowds. The agencies in this sample scored between 0 and 45 on this instrument, with a score of 0 representing a policy containing no tactics that align with the model policy and a score of 45 representing a policy authorizing the use of 45 tactics identified within the IACP model policy. The mean score for the sample's overall compliance with the IACP model policy is 15.4 (median = 14), indicating relatively low alignment among agencies. Figure 1 presents IACP model compliance percentages for each tactic.

While the average department policies align with only about a third (34.2 percent) of the IACP model policy tactics examined, at least two specific tactics advocated by the model policy are present in almost all of the sample's policies. The two requirements found most often in this sample are the implementation of the Incident Command System (ICS)/National Incident Management System (NIMS) protocols and restrictions on the use of chemical agents (i.e., chemical agents are only used when lesser force is ineffective). Both of these tactics are present in 93 of the 117 (79.5%) department policies within the sample. These tactics represent opposing protest management themes. The ICS/NIMS protocols are routinely used to plan for lawful assemblies, which aligns with negotiated management strategies. However, chemical agents are used for crowd dispersal during violent incidents, which aligns with escalated force strategies.

Analysis reveals great variation in degree of compliance across department policies. Only one agency has policies that require all 45 crowd management tactics advocated by the IACP model policy. The department with the second highest compliance score requires 43 of the 45 model policy tactics. Policies from two agencies do not require any of the 45 IACP model policy tactics. Five of the ten IACP model policy tactics most frequently found in the sample policies align with escalated force strategies. These five tactics guide the use of chemical agents (79.49%), Tasers (66.47%), and aerosol sprays (64.1%), while also allowing mass arrests

Figure 1: *Percentage of IACP Compliance by Tactic*

Figure 1: *Percentage of IACP Compliance by Tactic*

(56.41%), and stipulating that disorderly crowds should be dispersed (45.30%). This finding

indicates that, among this sample of U.S. police agencies, department policies commonly offer

guidance concerning appropriate tactics for using force against crowds. Among the ten rarest IACP model policy tactics found within the sample policies, seven align with command and control strategies. The current analyses reveal that command and control strategy tactics (e.g., restricting protest activities, spatial containment) are among the least common practices contained within this sample's policies. Policy alignment with particular protest management strategies is further explored in the following section.

2. ***To what degree do agency policies align with theoretically-based strategy themes (i.e., escalated force, command and control, and negotiated management) identified within the IACP model policy?***

Three sub-scales within the protest instrument are used to evaluate department policy alignment with three general protest management themes. Each sub-scale consists of 15 items, with possible scores ranging from 0 to 15. The mean score for the sample's overall alignment with negotiated management tactics – like planning, the use of dialog, and acceptance of protest activities – is 5.9 (median = 5), with a range of 0 to 15. As mentioned earlier, the most frequent negotiated management tactic found within sample policies is the use of ICS/NIMS protocols (79.5%). The U.S. Department of Homeland Security created these protocols to help agencies prepare for and respond to special events or disasters. The least adopted negotiated management tactic present in policies is the requirement for supervisory approval to enact an arrest. Only 10 of the 117 sample agencies (8.55%) require supervisory approval for arrest. While the average number of negotiated management tactics found in agencies' policies is relatively low (39.3%), six specific tactics are present in about half of the sample. Aside from the most frequent tactic, common policy requirements include the necessity of verbal warnings before using physical dispersal tactics (53.8%), planning for the possibility of needing additional personnel (51.3%),

requiring neutral demeanor for officers (48.7%), specific directives for spontaneous civil

disturbances (48.7%), and requiring a written action plan for all demonstrations (47%). Figure 2

presents the percentage of policies containing each negotiated management tactic.

Figure 2: Percentage of Policies Containing each Negotiated Management Tactic

The mean score for the sample's overall alignment with command and control tactics –

including protest activity restrictions to prevent community disruption and the use of spatial

containment – is 4.2 (median = 4), with a range of 0 to 14. The most common policy requirement

from the command and control theme is the allowance of specialized units (e.g. Mobile Field

Force, Civil Disturbance Unit, SWAT) for crowd dispersal, which is present in 73 of 117

(62.4%) agencies' policies. Other frequently-adopted components from this management

strategy include the use of perimeters for civil disturbances (58.1%), use of temporary detention

areas following mass arrest (43.6%), prohibition of canine use for crowd control activities

(27.4%), and restricting bystanders from entering disturbance areas (23.9%). Figure 3 presents

the percentage of policies containing each command and control tactic.

Figure 3: *Percentage of Policies Containing each Command and Control Tactic*

Finally, the mean score for the sample's overall alignment with escalated force tactics –

including use of force, crowd dispersal, and mass arrest tactics – is 8.1 (median = 8), with a

range of 3 to 13. The sample policies contain more escalated force practices than the other two

crowd management strategy tactics (i.e., negotiated management and command and control

tactics). Five of the most commonly adopted escalated force tactics are present in at least half of

the sample agencies' policies. These tactics include restricting tear gas use when lesser force

would be ineffective (79.5%), prohibiting TASER's to restraint/arrest purposes (66.7%),

restricting aerosol agents to those engaging in unlawful behavior (64.1%), allowing mass arrest

(56.4%), and requiring arrest for unlawful behavior (53.8%). The common theme among all of these tactics is the use of force and arrest to disperse crowds. Only about half of all agencies restrict crowd dispersal tactics to disorderly or violent crowds.

Figure 4: *Percentage of Policies Containing each Escalated Force Tactic*

3. *Are agency and jurisdiction-level characteristics associated with overall degree of compliance and reliance on strategy themes within the IACP model policy?*

As mentioned previously, research has determined that there is a relationship between event characteristics and protest violence, but no studies have assessed the impact of agencies' protest management strategies on violence. Before this can be examined in future research, this study documents variation in the protest tactics that are permitted by agency policies and potential correlates that may help to explain the context that promotes the adoption of particular

crowd management tactics. This study explores relationships between agency and jurisdictional characteristics and the use of particular protest strategies. There is reason to expect that such relationships exist. For instance, previous literature highlights the relationship between agency adoption of community-oriented policing and the use of the negotiated management strategy (Lough et al., 2010), agency use of force experiences and the adoption of the escalated force strategy (McPhail, Schweingruber, & McCarthy, 1998; Schweingruber, 2000), and the availability of specialized units and the use of the command and control strategy (Vitale, 2005). Pearson's *r* correlation values and linear regression models are used to examine these and other possible relationships.

Correlations

  Agency level characteristics. Pearson's *r* correlation reveals significant relationships between six agency-level variables and alignment with the IACP model policy. A weak positive correlation is found for the number of sworn officers ($r = .53$, $p < .10$), implying that as the size of an agency increases, so does degree of compliance with the IACP model policy. Two variables commonly linked with a community policing focus are associated with model policy compliance. The diversity of the agency matters; a weak positive correlation exists between departments with more black officers and degree of compliance ($r = .188$, $P < .05$). Agencies that utilize information from community surveys also have higher compliance scores ($r = .162$, $p < .10$). Further, three specific use of force variables are associated with model policy compliance. Agencies with use of force policies authorizing soft projectiles ($r = .182$, $p < .10$), chemical agents ($r = .180$, $p < .10$), and leg hobbling techniques ($r = .203$, $p < .05$) have higher degrees of IACP model policy compliance. The model policy restricts the use of these types of force to

situations in which alternative tactics would be ineffective. As such, these restrictions would only be adopted by agencies that authorize their officers to use these types of force.

Many of these same variables are correlated with the adoption of specific protest management strategies and related tactics. For instance, agencies that use information from community surveys ($r = .158$, $p < .10$), authorize the use of chemical agents ($r = .210$, $p < .05$), or allow the use of leg hobbling techniques ($r = .191$, $p < .05$) are likely to use more negotiated management tactics. Previous research suggests that agencies with more educated officers may be more likely to adopt negotiated management strategies (Lough et al., 2010). The current study supports this finding. As the percentage of officers in a department with a bachelor's degree increases, so does alignment with negotiated management tactics ($r = .229$, $p < .05$).

Significant relationships exist between five agency-level variables and the adoption of command and control strategies. First, larger agencies are more likely to adopt command and control tactics ($r = .223$, $p < .05$). Like previous models, agency percentage of black officers ($r = .225$, $p < .05$) and percentage of minority officers ($r = .206$; $p < .05$) are moderately correlated with command and control crowd management. Further, there is a moderate relationship between agencies use of community surveys and the adoption of command and control tactics ($r = .205$, $p < .05$). Only one use of force variable is significant; the association with use of chemical agents is weak and positive ($r = .173$, $p < .10$).

While multiple agency-level characteristics are correlated with the adoption of negotiated management and command and control strategies, only one is related to escalated force. When agencies are authorized to use soft projectiles, reliance on escalated force tactics decrease *($r = -.160$, $p < .10$)*. This negative relationship implies that while many agencies have authorized the use of impact projectiles, not all policies place restrictions on the use of these types of weapons.

Table 2 provides Pearson *r* values for correlations between all agency-level variables and

model/strategy compliance.

Table 2: *Agency-Level Characteristic Correlations*

Variable	IACP Compliance	Negotiated Management	Command and Control	Escalated Force
Number of Full-Time Sworn Personnel	.153*	.070	.223**	-.068
Percent Black, by Agency	.141	.079	.225**	.090
Percent Minority, by Agency	.188**	.128	.225**	-.028
Percent Bachelor's Degree, by Agency	.121	.229**	-.003	.135
Militarized Equipment Cost by Officer	-.132	-.144	-.080	-.026
C.O.P. Recruit Training	-.037	-.102	.083	.088
C.O.P. In Service Training	-.065	-.026	-.104	.085
Officers Regularly Assigned to Same Beats/Areas?	.078	.042	.118	.012
Percent of Officers Regularly Assigned to	-.016	-.027	.009	-.134

Same Beats/Areas?			
Agency Utilized Information From Community Survey?	.162*	.158*	.205**	-.024
Authorization for Use of Batons	.039	.013	.031	-.139
Authorization for Use of Impact Weapons	.061	.087	.048	.064
Authorization for Use of Soft Projectiles	.182*	.123	.139	-.160*
Authorization for Use of Chemical Agents	.180*	.210**	.173*	-.071
Authorization for Use of Tasers	.036	.008	.034	-.114
Authorization for Use of Neck Restraint	-.035	-.057	-.001	-.044
Authorization for Use of Open Hand Techniques	.052	.042	.014	-.049
Authorization for Use of Closed Hand Techniques	-.060	-.016	-.148	-.062
Authorization for Use of Leg	.203**	.191**	.141	-.112

Hobble Techniques				
Dedicated Personnel for Special Operations	.046	-.004	.100	.036
Number of Specialized Units Within Agency	.069	.081	.109	.105

*Note: * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$, **** $p < .001$*

Jurisdiction-level characteristics. Table 3 provides Pearson's *r* values for all correlations between jurisdiction-level variables and alignment with the IACP model policy and protest management strategies. At the jurisdiction-level, there is only one variable related to the adoption of tactics advocated by the IACP model policy .and alignment with use of negotiated management tactics. Agencies located in the Northeast are less likely to comply with the IACP's recommended practices ($r = -.163$, $p < .10$) or adopt negotiated management tactics ($r = -.197$, $p < .05$).

Three jurisdiction-level variables are related to command and control strategy adoption. First, there is a weak relationship between jurisdictional violent crime rate (per 100,000 population) and an agency's reliance on command and control practices ($r = .194$, $p < .05$). This finding indicates that as the violent crime rate increases in a jurisdiction, the agency is more likely to adopt command and control tactics. Further, this study finds that when the population increases, the adoption of command and control practices increase as well ($r = .196$, $p < .05$). This finding implies that police serving larger populations may be more restrictive during protests. Reliance on command and control tactics may also be attributed to jurisdictional-level diversity. As the

percentage of black residents increases, so does reliance on command and control practices ($r =$ .221, p < .05).

Finally, Pearson's r correlation reveals a relationship between two jurisdiction-level characteristics and the adoption of escalated force tactics. First, there is a moderate relationship between percentage of black residents and reliance on escalated force practices ($r = .227$, p < .05). This finding indicates that as the percentage of black community residents increases, so does the adoption of escalated force tactics. Additionally, agencies in the Western United States adopt fewer escalated force tactics ($r = .-.161$, p < .10), while agencies in the South utilize more of these practices ($r = .164$, p < .10). This finding supports research that suggests there are regional differences in policing styles (Bourne, 2011; Davenport et al., 2011).

Table 3: *Jurisdiction-Level Correlations*

Variable	IACP Compliance	Negotiated Management	Command and Control	Escalated Force
Violent Crime Rate (per 100,000)	.141	.126	.194**	.129
Unemployment Rate, by Jurisdiction	.139	.056	.155*	-.033
Population Size, by Jurisdiction	.096	.030	.196**	-.008
Percent of High School Graduates, by Jurisdiction	.002	.066	-.084	-.076
Poverty Level, by Jurisdiction	.081	.085	.058	-.055
Percent Black, by Jurisdiction	.089	.036	.221**	.227**
West Region	.097	.084	.032	-.161*
Midwest Region	-.031	-.018	-.102	-.060
South Region	.089	.116	.122	.164*
Northeast Region	-.163*	-.197**	-.083	.008

*Note: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01, **** p < .001*

Linear Regression Models

Following the examination of Pearson's *r* correlations, the data are also examined with

linear regression models. This study is an exploratory study and the first of its kind to examine

current policies and how they align with those recommended by the IACP model policy and

existing protest management strategies. There is little theory, beyond the few research studies

cited, to suggest which agency or jurisdictional-level variables might be associated with model

policy adoption or the use of a particular protest strategy. When linear regression is used to

explore the data, few models in this study are statistically significant. The adjusted R-Squared for

many of the models is negative, which indicates that the proposed models do not explain

dependent variable variance (i.e. IACP model policy compliance, or adoption of negotiated management, command and control, or escalated force tactics). Nonetheless, insignificant findings and lack of explanatory power provides important findings for future analysis and theory building. As such, this dissertation will highlight any statistically significant findings, and present general models that do not yield significant results. To begin, two types of agency-level regression models are presented. The first includes administrative-related agency-level variables (i.e., agency size, diversity, education, and funding spent on militarized equipment). The second includes correlates found in previous research that should, theoretically, be related to the adoption of particular protest management tactics.

Agency-level regression models: Administration focused. The regression model examining the relationship between agency-level variables on IACP model policy compliance is not statistically significant and the Adjusted R-Square is slightly negative, indicating that no variance is explained within the dependent variable. Additionally, there are no significant predictors in the model to explain adoption of IACP's recommended practices. Table 4 provides all the model statistics for agency-level variables predicting compliance with the IACP model policy.

Table 4: Agency-Level Regression Model for IACP Compliance

Variable	Unstandardized b	SE B	Standardized B	Significance Level
Number of Full-Time Sworn Personnel	.000	.000	.178	.177
Percent Black, by Agency	.031	.134	.037	.816
Percent Minority, by Agency	-.021	.087	-.039	.811
Percent Bachelor's Degree, by Agency	.119	.084	.178	.162
Militarized Equipment Cost by Officer	.000	.001	-.082	.516

Adj. R^2=-.006, p = .472, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

The regression model predicting the adoption of negotiated management tactics based on agency-level variables is also not statistically significant. However, the Adjusted R-Squared is positive and explains about four percent of the variance in the dependent variable. This model includes one significant predictor; agencies with higher educational attainment are more likely to adopt negotiated management practices (p < .05). Table 5 provides the model statistics for agency-level variables predicting alignment with the negotiated management strategy.

Table 5: Agency-Level Regression Model for Negotiated Management Compliance

Variable	Unstandardized b	SE B	Standardized B	Significance Level
Number of Full-Time Sworn Personnel	6.724 E-5	.000	.067	.603
Percent Black, by Agency	.013	.060	.033	.830
Percent Minority, by Agency	.007	.039	.027	.865
Percent Bachelor's Degree, by Agency	.095	.038	.311**	.014
Militarized Equipment Cost by Officer	.000	.000	-.086	.485

*Adj. R^2=-.049, p = .605, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01*

The model predicting the adoption of command and control tactics with agency-level characteristics is not statistically significant and the Adjusted R-Square is also negative. Like the previous model, there is one significant predictor of the use of command and control tactics. Larger agencies are more likely to adopt command and control practices during protests ($p <$ .10). Table 6 provides the model statistics for agency-level variables predicting alignment with the command and control strategy.

Table 6: Agency-Level Regression Model for Command and Control Compliance

Variable	Unstandardized b	SE B	Standardized B	Significance Level
Number of Full-Time Sworn Personnel	.000	.000	.230*	.084
Percent Black, by Agency	.013	.045	.046	.775
Percent Minority, by Agency	-.005	.029	-.027	.869
Percent Bachelor's Degree, by Agency	.006	.028	.027	.832
Militarized Equipment Cost by Officer	7.602 E-5	.000	-.038	.765

*Adj. R^2=-.020, p = .596, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01*

Finally, the model using agency-level characteristics to predict the adoption of escalated force tactics is not statistically significant, but the Adjusted R-Squared is slightly positive, accounting for about two percent of the variance in the dependent variable. Unfortunately, there are no statistically significant predictors within this model. Table 7 provides the model statistics for agency-level variables predicting alignment with the escalated force strategy.

Table 7: Agency-Level Regression Model for Escalated Force Compliance

Variable	Unstandardized b	SE B	Standardized B	Significance Level
Number of Full-Time Sworn Personnel	-6.919 E-5	.000	-.143	.271
Percent Black, by Agency	.040	.029	.214	.175
Percent Minority, by Agency	.008	.019	.069	.670
Percent Bachelor's Degree, by Agency	.024	.018	.163	.193
Militarized Equipment Cost by Officer	-4.176 E-6	.000	-.003	.980

Adj. R^2 = .021, p = .283, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

Research-based regression models. The models in this section are driven by previous research findings. Variables included in these agency-level models differ based on the dependent variable. For instance, community-oriented policing variables are used to assess the association with the adoption of negotiated management strategies. To examine the adoption of command and control tactics, variables relating to the use and number of specialized units are included in the model. Finally, use of force variables included in the LEMAS dataset are integrated used to predict adoption of escalated force tactics.

First, the community-oriented policing model used to predict the adoption of negotiated management tactics is not statistically significant and the Adjusted R-Squared is negative, indicating that no variance is explained in the dependent variable. Additionally, there are no significant predictors within this model, which implies that the measures of community-oriented policing may not truly represent this concept, or that negotiated management may not be

theoretically driven by agencies that embrace community-oriented policing, as previously suggested. Table 8 provides the model statistics examining the relationship between community-oriented agency-level variables and the adoption of negotiated management tactics.

Table 8: Community-Oriented Policing Model for Negotiated Management

Variable	Unstandardized b	SE B	Standardized B	Significance Level
Recruit Training on C.O.P.	-1.845	1.438	-.140	.203
Current Officer Training on C.O.P.	.130	.996	.014	.896
Whether Officers Are Responsible For Same Beat	1.846	1.936	.113	.343
Percent of Agency Responsible For Same Beat	-.002	.022	-.009	.938
Information Utilized From Community Survey	1.175	.985	.127	.236

*Adj. R^2=-.013, p = .580, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01*

The next model examines the relationship between specialized units and an agency's adoption of command and control practices. This model is not statistically significant and the Adjusted R-Squared does not explain dependent variable variance. Additionally, there are no significant predictors in the model. This finding implies that agency use of specialized units may not influence the use of command and control strategies. Table 9 provides the model statistics examining the relationship between specialized unit agency-level variables and the adoption of command and control tactics.

Table 9: Specialized Unit Model for Command and Control Reliance

Variable	Unstandardized b	SE B	Standardized B	Significance Level
Whether Agency Has Dedicated Personnel for Special Operations	1.263	1.231	.098	.307
Number of Specialized Units in the Agency	.019	.018	.096	.317

*Adj. R² = .003, p = .310, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01*

The final model is presented in Table 10. The model assesses the correlation between use of force policies and the adoption of escalated force tactics. This model is not significant and the Adjusted R-Squared indicates that no dependent variable variance is explained by the model. There is one predictor that is on the verge of being statistically significant. Agencies who authorize all officers to use impact weapons are more likely to adopt escalated force strategies (p = .109). Although insignificant, the current study's small sample size reduces the power of the current analysis. The influence of officer authorization to use impact weapons on escalated force strategy adoption might prove important in future studies based on larger samples.

Table 10: Use of Force Model for Escalated Force Reliance

Variable	Unstandardized b	SE B	Standardized B	Significance Level
Authorization for Use of Batons	-2.529	1.729	-.149	.147
Authorization for Use of Impact Weapons	.748	.463	.166	.109[4]
Authorization for Use of Soft Projectiles	-.851	.626	-.139	.176
Authorization for Use of Chemical Agents	-.238	.452	-.053	.600
Authorization for Use of Tasers	-.552	.752	-.076	.465
Authorization for Use of Neck Restraints	-.116	.535	-.022	.829
Authorization for Use of Open Hand Techniques	.896	1.460	.074	.541
Authorization for Use of Closed Hand Techniques	-.147	.846	-.020	.862
Authorization for Use of Leg Hobble Techniques	-.351	.502	-.071	.486

*Adj. R^2= -.007, p = .514, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01*

Jurisdiction-level regression models. The data are examined using linear regression to assess the relationship between jurisdiction-level characteristics with IACP model policy

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[4] When rounding, this finding falls just outside the range of rejecting the null hypothesis. As such, I will leave it up to the discretion of the reader as to how to interpret this finding.

compliance and reliance on particular protest management strategies. The first model, regressing IACP compliance on jurisdiction-level characteristics, is not statistically significant and only explains about two percent of the variance in the dependent variable. As presented in Table 11, there is only one significant predictor of overall IACP model policy compliance. Agencies located in the Western region of the United States are more likely to adopt practices recommended by the IACP model policy ($p < .10$). This finding could be due to the fact that many of the agencies in the Western region of the United States contract out their policy construction to private agencies (e.g., Lexipol). Eagly & Schwartz (2018) contend that 95% of police agencies in California rely on policy manuals constructed by Lexipol. These agencies seem to align with the basic principles recommended by the IACP at face value. As such, it is likely that these agencies, hiring private organizations, are less likely to deviate from industry-recommended practices.

Table 11: Jurisdiction-Level Regression Model of IACP Compliance

Variable	Unstandardized b	SE B	Standardized B	Significance Level
Population Size, by Jurisdiction	1.255E-6	.000	.125	.203
Percent of High School Graduates, by Jurisdiction	.231	.156	.155	.141
Unemployment Rate, by Jurisdiction	.421	.477	.100	.380
Poverty Level, by Jurisdiction	.116	.194	.063	.552
Percent Black, by Jurisdiction	.038	.079	.061	.628
Violent Crime Rate (Per 100,000)	.001	.003	.044	.697
West	17.670	9.853	.803*	.076
Midwest	13.722	9.969	.464	.172
South	15.353	9.739	.783	.118
Northeast	11.011	9.840	.448	.266

*Adj. R^2 = .027, p = .231, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01*

Unfortunately, the findings for each of the strategy management models are similar to those of the general IACP compliance model. The negotiated management model is not statistically significant and only explains about two percent of the variance in the dependent variable. Table 12 shows that there is only one significant predictor in this model. Jurisdictions with higher levels of high school graduates are more likely to follow the principles of negotiated management (p < .10).

Table 12: Jurisdiction-Level Regression Model for Negotiated Management Compliance

Variable	Unstandardized b	SE B	Standardized B	Significance Level
Population Size, by Jurisdiction	3.347 E-7	.000	.074	.453
Percent of High School Graduates, by Jurisdiction	.127	.070	.189*	.074
Unemployment Rate, by Jurisdiction	.053	.216	.028	.807
Poverty Level, by Jurisdiction	.081	.088	.097	.357
Percent Black, by Jurisdiction	.001	.036	.002	.987
Violent Crime Rate (Per 100,000)	.001	.001	.077	.500
West	6.639	4.460	.667	.140
Midwest	5.139	4.513	.385	.257
South	5.917	4.409	.668	.183
Northeast	3.511	4.455	.316	.432

*Adj. R^2 = .024, p = .250, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01*

The command and control model is also not significant and only explains about four percent of the dependent variable variance. Table 13 shows that those agencies policing larger jurisdictions are more likely to rely on command and control tactics (p < .10). Like the correlations explained earlier, larger populations signify more people on the streets for routine activities. When protests occur, higher population densities and interactions may increase the chance of community disruption during routine activities. Risks associated with increased interactions in larger jurisdictions may explain why these agencies rely on more restrictive practices.

Table 13: Jurisdiction-Level Regression Model for Command and Control Compliance

Variable	Unstandardized b	SE B	Standardized B	Significance Level
Population Size, by Jurisdiction	5.945 E-7	.000	.185*	.059
Percent of High School Graduates, by Jurisdiction	.032	.049	.067	.523
Unemployment Rate, by Jurisdiction	.095	.152	.071	.531
Poverty Level, by Jurisdiction	.007	.062	.011	.913
Percent Black, by Jurisdiction	.039	.025	.195	.122
Violent Crime Rate (Per 100,000)	.000	.001	.055	.625
West	3.789	3.129	.538	.229
Midwest	2.129	3.166	.225	.503
South	3.172	3.093	.505	.307
Northeast	2.451	3.125	.312	.435

*Adj. R^2 = .043, p = .144, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01*

Finally, the escalated force model reveals no significance and the model explains about two percent of the variance in the dependent variable. Table 14 reveals that there are no significant predictors in this model. As such, this study finds that the jurisdiction-level variables selected for this analysis cannot be used to predict the adoption of escalated force tactics.

Table 14: Jurisdiction-Level Regression Model for Escalated Force Compliance

Variable	Unstandardized b	SE B	Standardized B	Significance Level
Population Size, by Jurisdiction	1.585 E-7	.000	-.068	.488
Percent of High School Graduates, by Jurisdiction	-.035	.036	-.101	.339
Unemployment Rate, by Jurisdiction	-.097	.111	-.101	.381
Poverty Level, by Jurisdiction	-.048	.045	-.111	.296
Percent Black, by Jurisdiction	.027	.018	.189	.139
Violent Crime Rate (Per 100,000)	.001	.001	.100	.384
West	-2.128	2.290	-.418	.355
Midwest	-2.137	2.317	-.313	.359
South	-1.625	2.264	-.359	.474
Northeast	-1.567	2.287	-.276	.495

*Adj. R^2= .016, p = .311, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01*

Summary

This study provides an exploratory and cursory examination of protest management tactics and alignment with a model policy and particular management themes. To help guide future police protest management research and theory, the significant bivariate correlations and linear regression model findings are reiterated and briefly discussed. This summary begins with findings related to overall model policy compliance, followed by findings associated with each of the three protest management strategy themes.

IACP model policy compliance. First, Pearson's *r* correlations reveal significant relationships with multiple agency-level and a single jurisdiction-level characteristic. Larger

agencies tend to rely more on practices advocated by the IACP model policy ($r = .153$, p < .10). These agencies typically have more resources (Carter & Carter, 2009) and are able to use these resources to include community input in their policies (Alpert & Smith, 1994; Eagly & Schwartz, 2018). This input is essential for police to employ legitimate tactics (Sadusky, 2001). Community input is the cornerstone of community policing, which has potential to improve police-community relations (Bazemore & Schiff, 2015). Diversity within police agencies is also advocated by proponents of community policing. This study finds that agencies with more minority officers are more likely to adopt practices recommended by the IACP ($r = .188$, p < .05). This diversity is discussed in research as a way for agencies to be more representative of the populations that they police (Skogan, 2004), thus reducing tensions between officers and community residents. Like other variables representative of community policing, agencies utilizing information from community surveys are more likely to adopt practices recommended by the IACP ($r = .162$, p < .10). Each of these findings suggests that agencies that adhere to community policing principles also demonstrate greater compliance with the IACP model policy.

Although it is preferable for police to avoid conflict with protestors, it is important to have contingencies in place for interactions that necessitate use of force. Agencies who authorize all of their officers to use soft projectiles ($r = .182$, p < .10), chemical agents ($r = .180$, p < .10), and leg hobbling techniques ($r = .203$, p < .05) also tend to adopt practices advocated by the IACP. Restrictions on the use of physical force, as mentioned previously, are likely to follow mass authorization for officers to employ this type of force. Finally, bivariate correlations also reveal that agencies in the Northeastern United States are less likely to adopt IACP recommended tactics ($r = -.163$, p < .10). After examining the data, there are no differences between variables that were found to be statistically significant for all sample agencies and those

within the Northeastern United States. However, it is unlikely that region alone can explain the differences in the adoption of IACP recommended practices and those that align with negotiated management. As such, future research should examine the relationship between additional agency- and jurisdiction-level and the adoption of these tactics. Conversely, the jurisdiction-level regression model predicting IACP compliance signifies that agencies in the Western United States are more likely to utilize tactics the IACP promotes as best practice (B = .803, p < .10). This finding suggests that there is regional variation in the degree of compliance with the IACP's model policy on *crowd management and control.* Table 15 presents all significant factors associated with IACP model policy compliance.

Table 15: Factors Associated with IACP Model Policy Compliance

Bivariate Correlations	
Variable	*r*
Number of Full-Time Sworn Personnel	.153*
Percent Minority, by Agency	.188**
Utilized information from community survey	.162*
Authorization for use of soft projectiles	.182*
Authorization for use of chemical agents	.180*
Authorization for use of leg hobble techniques	.203**
Northeast Region	-.163*
Regression Model Variables	
Variable	*B*
West Region	.803*

* p < .10, ** p < .05

Negotiated management strategy. In addition to assessing the correlation between agency- and jurisdiction-level variables with IACP compliance, the relationship between each of these variables and existing protest management strategies is also examined. Bivariate correlations indicate that agencies with officers who have higher educational attainment are more likely to adopt negotiated management practices (r = .229, p < .05). This finding highlights the

potential benefits of an educated police force. Like the IACP compliance models, this finding suggests that some aspects of community policing may be inherently linked with negotiated management tactics. This is reinforced by the finding that agencies utilizing information from community surveys are also more likely to adopt tactics representative of negotiated management ($r = .158$, $p < .10$). Also similar to the IACP compliance models, use of force variables show significance. Agencies authorizing all of their officers to utilize chemical agents ($r = .210$, $p < .05$) and leg hobbling techniques ($r = .191$, $p < .05$) are more likely to employ negotiated management practices during a protest. Finally, like overall IACP model compliance, agencies in the Northeastern United States are less likely to adopt negotiated management practices ($r = -.197$, $p < .05$). Existing theory and research do not provide insight into explanations for the relationships between use of force policies and negotiated management, or why Northeastern police agencies might be less likely to employ negotiated management strategies.

The regression models for negotiated management tactics reveal two important findings. First, agencies with officers who have higher educational attainment rely more on negotiated management practices ($p < .10$). Second, agencies policing jurisdictions with more high school graduates are also more likely to adopt negotiated management tactics ($p < .10$). In previous research, contacting and building relationships with protest leaders has been discussed as an important police responsibility (King, 2013). However, these relationships can only be built and thrive when both parties are willing to cooperate. This finding seems to indicate that education is an important factor in negotiated management for both police and community members. Table 16 presents all significant factors associated with agency adherence to the negotiated management strategy.

Table 16: Factors Associated with Negotiated Management Strategy

Bivariate Correlations	
Variable	*R*
Percent Bachelor's Degree, by Agency	.229**
Utilized information from community survey	.158*
Authorization for use of chemical agents	.210**
Authorization for use of leg hobble techniques	.191**
Northeast Region	-.197**
Regression Model Variables	
Variable	*B*
Percent Bachelor's Degree, by Agency	.311**
Percent of High School Graduates, by Jurisdiction	.189*

* p < .10, ** p < .05

Command and control strategy. Adoption of command and control tactics is significantly associated with nine variables and predicted by two agency- and jurisdiction-level variables. First, larger agencies are more likely to adopt tactics aligning with command and control ($r = .223$, $p < .05$). As mentioned previously, larger agencies have more resources at their disposal (Carter & Carter, 2009). As such, these resources may be allocated toward the purchase of equipment used for spatial containment (e.g. barricades, shields, etc.). Diversity of the agency also matters, as agencies with more black ($r = .225$, $p < .05$) and minority officers ($r = .225$, $p < .05$) are more likely to align with command and control strategies. Like previous models, agencies employing information from community surveys were more likely to adopt command and control practices ($r = .205$, $p < .05$). These findings indicate that agencies focused on community policing strategies may be more likely to adopt command and control strategies, as well. Additionally, agencies authorizing officers to use chemical agents were more likely to adopt tactics relating to command and control ($r = .173$, $p < .10$). Chemical agents are typically employed in conjunction with the use of command and control strategies (Vitale, 2005). These

tactics are commonly utilized to disperse problematic crowds, that have previously been subjected to spatial containment.

While several of the same agency-level variables were associated with IACP model policy and negotiated management compliance, jurisdiction-level characteristics seem to differ with respect to the adoption of command and control tactics. For instance, agencies policing areas with higher violent crime rates tend to rely more on command and control practices ($r = .194$, $p < .05$). Additionally, those areas with higher unemployment rates utilize these tactics more often ($r = .155$, $p < .10$). According to Harcourt's (1998; 2001) strict enforcement approach, these areas may be targeted by perceived discriminatory tactics, leading to a heavier reliance on restrictive measures. Agencies policing larger jurisdictions also tend to rely more on these practices ($r = .196$, $p < .05$). Finally, jurisdictions with a higher proportion of black residents are more likely to adopt command and control tactics ($r = .221$, $p < .05$). While beyond the scope of this dissertation, future researchers may want to examine the extent to which racial threat theory (Blalock, 1967) could be used to explain these relationships.

The regression model examining the relationship between jurisdictional characteristics and reliance on command and control signifies that larger agencies ($B = .230$, $p < .10$) policing larger jurisdictions ($B = .185$, $p < .10$) are more likely to adopt these practices. A potential explanation was discussed previously; larger populations lead to more interactions within the course of routine activities. As such, police may rely on these practices to minimize community disruption during protests. Table 17 presents all significant factors associated with agency adherence to the command and control strategy.

Table 17: Factors Associated with Command and Control Strategy

Bivariate Correlations	
Variable	*R*
Number of full-time sworn personnel	.223**
Percent black, by Agency	.225**
Percent minority, by Agency	.225**
Utilized information from community survey	.205**
Authorization for use of chemical agents	.173*
Violent crime rate, by Jurisdiction	.194**
Unemployment rate, by Jurisdiction	.155*
Population size, by Jurisdiction	.196**
Percent black, by Jurisdiction	.221**
Regression Model Variables	
Variable	*B*
Number of full-time sworn personnel	.230*
Population size, by Jurisdiction	.185*

* p < .10, ** p < .05

Escalated force strategy. Pearson's *r* correlations reveal four significant bivariate relationships and one predictor approaching significance associated with police adoption of escalated force tactics. Agencies authorizing the use of soft projectiles are less likely to rely on escalated force tactics ($r = -.160$, $p < .10$). This finding indicates that not all agencies within the sample that authorize impact munitions place restrictions on their use. Theoretically, those agencies that do not stipulate that impact weapons should not be fired indiscriminately into the crowd align with the escalated force model (McPhail, Schweingruber, & McCarthy, 1998; Schweingruber, 2000). Additionally, agencies policing jurisdictions with more black community members tend to rely more on the use of escalated force practices ($r = .227$, $p < .05$). Like command and control, racial threat theory (Blalock, 1967) may also be used to explain why escalated force tactics are more likely to be used to manage protests in jurisdictions with larger proportions of black residents. Finally, while agencies in the Western United States are less likely to adopt escalated force tactics ($r = -.161$, $p < .10$), those in the South adopt these practices

more often ($r = .164$, $p < .10$). Once again, findings suggest that there is regional variation in police protest management strategies.

The model testing the correlations with agency-level characteristics and reliance on escalated force tactics indicates that those agencies authorizing the use of impact weapons were more likely to align with escalated force practices ($B = .109$, $p = .109$). Although just short of reaching significance at the $p = .10$ level, this finding deserves further researcher attention. Impact weapons are often used for crowd dispersal. Since escalated force strategies focus on means of crowd dispersal, it follows that there is a relationship between these two variables. Table 18 presents all significant factors associated with agency adherence to the escalated force strategy.

Table 18: Factors Associated with Escalated Force Strategy

Bivariate Correlations	
Variable	*r*
Authorization for use of soft projectiles	-.160*
Percent black, by Jurisdiction	.227**
West Region	-.161*
South Region	.164*
Regression Model Variables	
Variable	*B*
Authorization for use of impact weapons	.109^t

*$p = .109$ ^{t}, * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$*

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

This dissertation examines three specific research questions governing the use of police protest management tactics in the United States. The research questions examined in this study assess the degree of policy compliance by police agencies with recommended IACP practices, the use of tactics aligning with the three existing protest management tactics, as well as the relationship between agency-/jurisdiction-level characteristics and the use of these tactics. This chapter begins with a brief discussion of the overall findings from this study. This discussion interprets and emphasizes how previous research relates to this dissertation's findings. The discussion concludes by considering how the associations between agency-/jurisdiction-level characteristics and the use of strategy tactics align with three major topics: community-oriented policing, strict enforcement and use of force, and regional variation.

This section also describes the strengths and limitations, as well as the implications of the current study. The implications into two sections. First, policy implications are offered to explain how this study may impact the field of policing. Second, directions for research are considered, and special attention is given to how the assumptions made in this study point to future avenues for research on protest violence. Finally, this dissertation concludes with final thoughts on the significance of the current work and how this study expands upon existing knowledge.

Discussion

This study attempts to identify current protest management practices and strategies used by police agencies across the United States. It is the first study that seeks to determine the degree to which these policies differ from each other, as well as from policies considered to represent best practices within the policing field. Police influence on protest outcomes, including violence,

has been established by research since the 1970's (Davenport et al., 2011; Eisinger, 1973). Research has also deeply explored various theoretical frameworks of protest management strategies (Bourne, 2011; Gillham & Noakes, 2007; King, 2013; Schweingruber, 2000; Vitale, 2005). To date, these strategies have been presented as fitting neatly across a historical timeline, with one strategy replacing another as new strategies emerge. This study questions the accuracy of this sequential presentation of strategy adoption and replacement. It is the first systematic documentation of current U.S. police protest management policies that demonstrates the degree to which agencies rely on a variety of management tactics. This dissertation reports the degree to which a sample of agencies adhere to best practice standards, and reveals that these agencies use tactics that stem from three different management strategies.

Protest management has historically been a controversial aspect of policing. Many police crowd management tactics have been questioned by scholars and the public. The complexities of demonstration management contribute to on-going dialog about the need to improve policing practices with regard to crowd management and control. Managing protest crowds requires that attention be given to several potentially competing priorities, including preserving constitutional rights, preventing crowd violence, and ensuring officer and societal safety. Police face the unique challenge of balancing each of these goals without sacrificing one to achieve another.

The methods employed within this study emulate those used by Lum & Fachner (2008) to study agency policies governing police pursuits. Like Lum & Fachner, this study uses an IACP model policy as a focal point from which to compare existing agency policies. The IACP model policy on *crowd management and control* was subjected to a content analysis. This analysis was then used to identify tactics promoted by the IACP as best practice, and a 45-item coding instrument was created. Dichotomous items were used to assess agency policy adherence to the

IACP's recommendations concerning the use of specific tactics. The data are described and analyzed using descriptive statistics, bivariate correlations, and linear regression models in an attempt to answer three specific research questions. The findings of this study will be discussed in relation to each of these research questions.

1. ***To what degree do department policies governing protest management, taken from a sample of U.S. police agencies, align with practices advocated by the IACP model policy on crowd management and control?***

While the data were examined using a variety of statistical analyses, (univariate, bivariate, and multivariate), arguably, the most impactful findings stem from basic descriptive statistics that reveal the degree to which existing police policies adhere to tactics recommended by the IACP and to three different protest management strategies. These findings identify differences among the specific tactics used by a sample of U.S. police agencies to manage protests.

Overall, U.S. police agency policies show relatively low compliance with the tactics IACP promotes as best practice. The average agency policy adheres to about one-third of 45 tactics identified within the IACP model policy (31.1%). The most frequently adopted practices within this sample align with the escalated force model of protest management (53.3%). As such, many of the sample agencies provide guidance on the use of force during civil disturbances. While policy statements governing the use of escalated force tactics are the most common within this sample, command and control tactics are only implemented half as often (26.7%). Command and control tactics relate to the use of spatial containment and constraining the time, place, and manner of protests (Vitale, 2005). On average, agencies adopt about one-third (33.3%) of negotiated management tactics examined in this study. Negotiated management advocates the

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use of planning and dialog to facilitate First Amendment rights for participants while maintaining public safety (Gillham & Noakes, 2007; King, 2013). Overall, police agencies appear most concerned with providing guidance on use of force during protests, should force become necessary. Following this, policies promote tactics to facilitate peaceful and lawful assemblies. Finally, and least frequently, policies emphasize the restriction of protest activities to minimize community disruption.

Another research question in this study is designed to assess differences between agencies with high and low model policy compliance. However, given the relatively small sample used in this study, it may be useful to provide context around those agencies with the highest and those with the lowest compliance scores. Only one of the 117 sample agencies complies with all 45 IACP model policy recommendations. Interestingly, this agency has a history of protest violence and other violent crowd events (e.g. sporting event riots). These past events might have served as the impetus for the police agency to adopt best practice protest management techniques promoted by the IACP. This agency faced the challenge of shifting community perceptions of the agency, and media reports indicate that the agency aimed to reduce police use of force while managing crowds. The Chief of this department, as cited in a 2015 news article, stated that the agency's use of new protest management tactics resulted from the agency's adoption of constitutional policing.

Constitutional policing is derived from Law Enforcement Misconduct Statute § 14141, which states that police shall behave in a lawful manner without infringing upon individual constitutional rights (United States Department of Justice, 2017). Fyfe (2004) contends that this statute holds officers accountable for their decisions and ensures that officers behave in an appropriate manner. This strategy is heavily linked with constitutional issues relating to search

and seizures (Fyfe, 2004; Rushin & Edwards, 2017). However, the focus of this strategy extends beyond this issue into other policing activities, including the management of crowds and protests.

As stated previously, in policing, there has been a recent emphasis on preserving constitutional rights during protests. The adoption of constitutional policing has emerged in many agencies for protest management, including the agency that has the greatest level of compliance with IACP recommendations. Protecting individual rights during violent protests can prove quite difficult. The challenge becomes safeguarding law-abiding participant rights, while ensuring the safety of officers and society as a whole. While some see police use of force during protests as an inherent violation of constitutional rights, there are times that force is necessary to ensure the protection of both the public and police.

The high-profile nature of controversial use of force incidents has led many agencies to adopt constitutional policing as part of their overall mission. One primary impetus, the shooting of Michael Brown by a Ferguson police officer in August 2014, triggered an investigation into Ferguson Police Department's practices (Dukanovic, 2016). The Department of Justice (DOJ) released a report of their findings in a document commonly referred to as *The Ferguson Report.* This report highlighted the need for police agencies to embrace fair and impartial practices. Findings suggested a history of police conduct that disproportionately targeted black community residents (United States Department of Justice, 2015). According to this report, black residents accounted for 67% of Ferguson's population, but they were subject to 93% of arrests from 2012 to 2014. The DOJ suggested that this outcome was at least partially the result of police prioritizing revenue generation through citations, instead of public safety.

Many researchers have also examined perceived discriminatory practices when assessing protest management and outcomes. Police are not solely blamed for perceived discriminatory practices during protests. For example, research suggests that the media inaccurately portrays black demonstrators as being more violent than others (Rickford, 2016). This research, along with others highlighted in the current study, including the *Ferguson Report*, seems to have served as catalysts in the adoption of constitutional policing nationwide.

The agency with the second highest model policy compliance score adopted 43 of the 45 practices recommended by the IACP. The two tactics that were not adopted by this agency were the provisions to use batons and barricades/police lines for spatial containment. Interestingly, both of these tactics align with command and control strategies. There were multiple similarities between the agency with a perfect IACP model policy compliance score and this agency. For instance, both agencies were above the median for the percentage of officers with bachelor's degrees. Additionally, these agencies served poorer jurisdictions, housing more residents below the poverty line. Finally, both agencies authorized all of their officers to employ leg-hobbling techniques. This last finding deserves further examination. It may be that agencies who are likely to face numerous violent protests are more likely to adopt best practices, which explains the high degree of compliance, as well as providing officers a wide-range of options for dealing with violent offenders, including permitting various forms of restraint.

In contrast to those with the highest compliance scores, two agency policies do not adhere to any of the practices advocated by the IACP model policy. These low-scoring agencies also share interesting similarities. Both of these agencies employ fewer officers with bachelor's degrees and typically serve populations housing residents above the poverty line. Additionally, neither of these agencies authorize officers to use leg-hobbling techniques. Interestingly, these

agency characteristics are completely divergent from the characteristics of the two agencies with the highest level of model policy compliance. This may indicate that each of these variables (officer education, jurisdictional poverty level, and use of specific restraints) have important implications for adoption of best practices in protest management. This represents a potential avenue for future research.

One agency with a protest management policy that does not adhere to any of the IACP model policy recommendations presents an especially unique case. Of interest is this agency's geographic proximity to a location that experienced a significant incident of civil unrest. Given the high-profile protests that occurred in this area, the lack of compliance with the IACP model policy is noteworthy. One distinctive difference between agencies with higher compliance scores and this agency is the adoption of body-worn cameras (BWC's). Both of the agencies with the highest compliance scores have utilized BWC's for a number of years. The agency that experienced significant civil unrest and does not comply with any of IACP recommended tactics measured in this study, has not adopted this technology. According to recent news articles, the jurisdiction's council recently voted to require BWCs for all officers in mid-2019. Media reports suggest that the delay in implementing this technology was due to the vast data storage costs associated with BWCs.

BWCs have become increasingly popular within recent years due to calls for increased transparency and accountability of police practices (Smykla, Crow, Crichlow, & Snyder, 2016; Taylor, 2016). While adoption of BWCs has increased, researchers and others continue to call attention to privacy and surveillance concerns (Simmons, 2014; Sousa, Miethe, & Sakiyama, 2017). Still, some research shows that use of force incidents decrease significantly when officers are required to wear BWCs (e.g., Ariel, Farrar, & Sutherland, 2015). To date, the impact of BWC

adoption on police policy changes has not been studied. As such, the adoption (or failure to adopt) BWC technology may help us to understand why and when shifts in protest policies occur. This also represents a future avenue for policy- and protest-related research.

2. ***To what degree do agency policies align with theoretically-based strategy themes (i.e., negotiated management, command and control, and escalated force) identified within the IACP model policy?***

In addition to measuring agency policy degree of compliance with the IACP model policy on *crowd management and control,* this study also examines the degree of alignment with three specific protest management strategies. The sample agency policies vary greatly, and current findings indicate that agencies typically adopt practices stemming from each of the protest management strategies, rather than aligning with one specific strategy. The following sections discuss agency alignment with each of these strategies in detail.

Alignment with Negotiated Management

On average, agencies align with about one-third (33.3%) of the tactics representing the use of negotiated management. This strategy promotes tactics focused on planning for lawful assemblies and the use of police-protestor dialog to problem solve during demonstrations. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the most commonly adopted negotiated management tactics include using the ICS/NIMS protocol for planning (79.5%), requiring verbal warnings before resorting to physical dispersal tactics (53.9%), providing contingencies for additional personnel (51.3%), requiring a neutral demeanor for officers (48.7%), and providing directives for spontaneous civil disturbances (48.7%). Agencies within this sample with high levels of negotiated management alignment place importance on planning for lawful assemblies and promoting dialog in order to effectively manage protests and avoid use of force incidents.

According to the negotiated management approach, the ultimate goal is avoidance of use of force (King, 2013). However, training in this approach requires police to know how to appropriately identify the contexts in which dialog will be effective and when use of force is necessary (Gorringe, Stott, & Rosie, 2012).

There are three agency crowd management policies that align with all 15 items used to measure compliance with the negotiated management strategy. Since these items were drawn from the same instrument that measured compliance with the IACP model policy, it is unsurprising that two of these agencies are also the agencies with the highest degree of model policy compliance. The three agencies with perfect negotiated management compliance all employ officers with higher educational attainment and authorize all of their sworn personnel to employ chemical agents. The agency with perfect negotiated management compliance but not one of the top two with regard to IACP model compliance (i.e., scoring 33 out of 45) is also unique in its own way. This agency serves a well-educated jurisdiction and has a well-educated police force, with 98% of residents graduating high school and about one-quarter of officers holding higher education degrees. However, neither the jurisdiction nor the agency is very diverse, reporting populations of 1.8% non-white residents and 1.8% non-white officers. While there is little diversity within the police department, it can be said that the agency is truly representative of its population.

Conversely, there are 12 agencies with policies that do not contain any of the measured negotiated management tactics. Half of these agencies employ officers with lower educational attainment and do not authorize officers to utilize chemical agents. These findings indicate that education and permission to use chemical agents may be important in understanding negotiated management strategy adoption among agencies. Nine of the 12 agencies that do not require

negotiated management tactics to manage protests employ fewer minority officers than are constituted within the community, thus leading to a sense of underrepresentation within these agencies. This finding may imply that agencies that better reflect the populations they serve may also be more likely to adopt negotiated management practices.

Alignment with Command and Control

In general, agency policy alignment is lower for command and control tactics than negotiated management. On average, agencies align with about one-quarter (26.7%) of the 15 measured command and control tactics. These tactics focus on the restriction of time, place, and manner of protest activities. As discussed in the previous chapter, the more frequently adopted command and control tactics are implementing specialized units for crowd dispersal (62.4%), required perimeters for civil disturbances (58.1%), temporary detention areas following mass arrest (43.6%), prohibiting canines for crowd control (27.4%), and restricting bystanders from entering disturbance areas (23.9%). Most command and control tactics relate to the use of spatial containment to prevent additional participants from entering disturbance areas and removing problematic individuals to stop further crowd incitement. The central aim of this strategy is to prevent protests from disrupting routine activities in the community (Vitale, 2005).

There are two agencies with policies that aligned with 14 of 15 possible command and control tactics. Both agencies had more specialized units than the average agency (median = 7 specialized units). Having more specialized units aligns with the command and control model, as this strategy advocates for specialized training to manage protest crowds (Vitale, 2005). Additionally, both of these agencies authorize all of their officers to use chemical agents, soft projectiles, and impact weapons. These types of police use of force options also support the basic tenets of command and control. These weapons are often used in conjunction with spatial

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containment techniques (Schweingruber, 2000; Vitale, 2005). Finally, both of these agencies utilize information from community surveys and provide in-depth training for new recruits on community-oriented policing. One agency policy does not contain any tactics that align with the command and control strategy. Unlike the two agencies with the highest command and control alignment, this agency has fewer specialized units than the median; officers are not authorized to use chemical agents, soft projectiles, or impact weapons; the agency does not use community surveys for input; and community-oriented policing training is not provided for new recruits.

Alignment with Escalated Force

Agency policies are most aligned with the escalated force strategy. On average, agencies within this sample aligned with about half (53.3%) of the 15 measured escalated force tactics. Escalated force strategies rely on the use of force to disperse disorderly crowds (McPhail, Schweingruber, & McCarthy, 1998; Schweingruber, 2000). The most commonly adopted escalated force tactics within the sample agencies are restricting tear gas to appropriate situations (79.5%), prohibiting Tasers for restraint purposes (66.7%), using aerosol spray only against those engaging in unlawful behaviors (64.1%), allowing mass arrest during civil disturbances (56.4%), and requiring arrest for those engaging in unlawful behavior (53.9%). Escalated force strategies typically promote the use of less-lethal weapons and arrest to ensure crowd compliance (McPhail, Schweingruber, & McCarthy, 1998; Schweingruber, 2000).

Two agencies have policies that align with 13 of 15 escalated force tactics. These two agencies are both below the median for number of sworn personnel (median = 376). Both agencies also have fewer specialized units than the average agency and provide extensive community-oriented policing training to recruits in the academy. Additionally, both agencies have percentages of minority (median = 16.86) and black officers (median = 7.76) that are above

the median. Finally, the two agencies with the greatest degree of escalated force alignment also authorize all officers to use soft projectiles and impact weapons. Conversely, the single agency with the lowest level of escalated force alignment (i.e., 3 of 15 tactics) is above the median for number of sworn officers and number of specialized units, but below the median for percentage of minority and black officers. Additionally, this agency does not authorize all officers to use soft projectiles, impact weapons, or provide community-oriented policing training to new recruits. These findings suggest that differences in agency-level characteristics may be helpful in explaining why escalated force tactics are (or are not) adopted.

3. ***Are agency- and jurisdiction-level characteristics associated with overall degree of compliance and reliance on strategy themes within the IACP model policy?***

While examining differences between agencies with the highest and lowest compliance/alignment scores provides cursory insight into why agencies might adopt different practices, the data in this study are also subjected to linear regression models to assess the relationship between agency- and jurisdiction-level characteristics with the adoption of model policy and strategy-specific tactics. The findings from the bivariate correlations and regression models are presented in the findings section, but are now discussed in terms of three themes: community-oriented policing, strict enforcement and use of force, and regional differences in practices.

Community-Oriented Policing

This study examines the correlation between various community-oriented policing variables and the degree of compliance with the IACP model policy, as well as the level of alignment with the three existing protest management strategies. Variables in these models include the educational attainment and level of diversity within an agency, as well as the extent

to which agencies adopt and train recruits/officers in the use of community-oriented practices. The findings from this study indicate that there is a relationship between community-oriented policing and multiple protest management strategies employed in the United States. Agencies employing more black ($r = .225$, p < .05) and minority ($r = .225$, p < .05) officers are more likely to adopt command and control tactics. Those agencies with more minority officers ($r = .188$, p < .05) are also more likely to employ tactics advocated by the IACP. Additionally, agencies with higher educational attainment ($r = .229$, p < .05) are more likely to align with negotiated management tactics. Finally, agencies that utilize information from community surveys are more likely to comply with the IACP model policy ($r = .162$, p < .10), as well as align with negotiated management practices ($r = .158$, p < .10) and command and control tactics ($r = .205$, p < .05). Regression models indicate that agencies with more educated officers ($B = .311$, p < .05), serving populations with higher educational attainment ($B = .189$, p < .10) are more likely to adopt negotiated management tactics. The model testing the community-oriented policing training and practice on the adoption of negotiated management tactics is not significant and does not reveal any significant correlations.

While previous research attributes community-oriented policing to the development of negotiated management tactics, this study finds mixed results. The variables used to represent training of new recruits and current officers in community-oriented policing were not related to the use of negotiated management tactics. This result was the same for variables representing the adoption of community-oriented practices. However, these are not the only measures of community policing in this study. Diversity, community involvement, and education seem to be related to the use of negotiated management. Additionally, diversity and community involvement are also related to the command and control strategy.

Since the 1990's, community-oriented policing has been one of the most widely adopted U.S. policing strategies. Advocates of this approach contend that there are specific factors that necessitate the success of community policing. For example, employing a diverse population is advantageous to those agencies adopting community-oriented policing, as officers are able to better represent the populations that they serve (Cordner & Scarborough, 1997). Recent studies provide inconclusive results on the impact of agency diversity on both use of force (Alpert, Dunham, & Mcdonald, 2004; Shjarback. Decker, Rojek, & Brunson, 2017; Todak, Huff & James, 2018) and perceived police legitimacy (Ozkan, Worrall, & Piquero, 2016; Todak, Huff, & James, 2018). However, diversifying agencies is advocated by many proponents of community policing as a way to identify with and facilitate change in the community (Peak & Sousa, 2018). This study indicates that agencies with more diversity are more likely to adopt practices recommended by the IACP, which as mentioned previously, is largely related to providing guidance on the use of force during protests. Additionally, the more diverse an agency, the more likely they are to align with command and control strategies. This finding indicates that the level of diversity within an agency may be more correlated with the adoption of restrictive practices, than was previously realized.

One of the most commonly emphasized aspects of community policing is the necessity for the community to participate in order maintenance. The father of metropolitan policing, Sir Robert Peel, stated that police could not effectively manage their jurisdictions without the support of the public (Emsley, 2013). Trajanowicz and Bucqueroux (1990) reinforced this point, when introducing community-oriented policing, asserting that the community must play a role in policy-making decisions with the police. This argument is partially supported by findings in this dissertation, which designate that agencies utilizing community input are more likely to comply

with the IACP model policy ($r = .162$, p < .10), while also adopting negotiated management ($r = .158$, p < .10) tactics. However, agencies utilizing community input are also more likely to adopt command and control practices ($r = .205$, p < .05).

Along with diversifying and employing community input, advocates find the role of higher education to be advantageous for agencies to promote community-oriented policing (Peak & Sousa, 2018). College educated officers have been praised for being more understanding of human behavior and more aware of community issues (Carlan & Byxbe, 2000). Additionally, those officers with higher educational attainment have been found to rely on force less often (Oliva, Morgan, & Compton, 2010). Previous research accentuates the necessity for education within policing. However, while research suggests that educating police, at least partially, improves community relations (Carlan & Byxbe, 2000), the education of the public is rarely discussed.

Negotiated management thrives when there are successful relationships built between police and protest organizers (King, 2013). This study finds that agencies that have more highly educated officers ($B = .311$, p < .05) and serve more educated populations ($B = .189$, p < .10) are more likely to adopt negotiated management tactics. This finding implies that the adoption of negotiated management tactics may be correlated with the education of both police and community residents. Future research should further examine this relationship.

Finally, while the use of community-oriented policing has been associated with the use of negotiated management tactics, this dissertation finds that there is also a relationship between community-oriented policing and command and control practices. Kelling (2019) contends that community-oriented policing is sometimes portrayed as a soft approach to crime. However, community-policing strategies are tailored to community concerns and can involve aggressive

crime control tactics. This argument aligns with the findings produced within this dissertation. Agency use of community-oriented policing tactics is correlated with use of command and control tactics, which are defined by the use of restrictive measures for protest management. As such, this dissertation expands upon previous research by revealing an association between community-oriented policing and multiple protest management strategies, beyond negotiated management.

Strict Enforcement and Use of Force

The current dissertation highlights the effect of jurisdiction-level characteristics on the adoption of command and control tactics. While this study examines the relationship between both agency- and jurisdiction-level variables and multiple crowd management strategies, jurisdictional characteristics are found to be related to only the command and control model. Command and control tactics are primarily employed to minimize community disruption (Vitale, 2005). As such, when an agency serves larger populations that may be seen as threatening to the greater society, they may be more likely to adopt restrictive tactics for protest crowds. The current study finds that those agencies serving larger populations ($r = .196$, p $< .05$) are more likely to adopt command and control tactics. Additionally, agencies serving larger black populations ($r = .221$, p $< .05$) are also more likely to align with command and control tactics. Those agencies policing areas with higher violent crime ($r = .194$, p $< .05$) and unemployment rates (.155, p $< .10$) tend to adopt command and control tactics more often, as well. Regression models reveal that larger agencies ($B = .230$, p $< .10$) serving larger populations ($B = .185$, p $< .10$) typically align with command and control strategies.

LeGrande (1967) historically stated that the most widely accepted police strategy in the United States is a strict enforcement policy, where all parties are treated equally under the law.

However, Harcourt (1998; 2001) suggests that this is not the case and strict enforcement strategies lead to perceived discriminatory practices that unfairly affect minorities and the lower class. These populations are often equated with disruptive behavior (Harcourt, 1998; 2001). The current study's findings reveal that areas with greater levels of disorganization and more minorities– higher violent crime rate, higher unemployment rate, larger population, and larger Black populations – tend to align with the use of restrictive protest management strategies. Communities with larger Black populations tend to have more negative perceptions of police (Peck, 2015), thus creating more tension during interactions. However, while the social disorganization literature stresses the influence of poverty, findings from this analysis indicate that poverty levels are not associated with more restrictive policing tactics. While poverty levels are often included in social disorganization studies, some research suggests that income inequality may be a better representation of this concept (Kawachi et al., 1999). Income inequality leads to feelings of perceived deprivation (Runcimann, 1966), which in turn can result in disorderly behavior, or in extreme cases, violence (Piven & Cloward, 2012). As such, it is possible that the adoption of command and control tactics is correlated with income inequality, rather than general poverty levels. Overall, as police struggle to manage these types of social issues – violent crime, unemployment, larger populations, and negative community relations – their approach to crowd management may be to adopt more restrictive measures.

While areas with more disorganization and larger Black populations are more likely to use command and control tactics, areas with more black community residents are also more likely to experience the use of escalated tactics. Previous research suggests that racially motivated protests are more likely to be violent and that black demonstrators hold higher propensities for violence, due to the lack of legitimate opportunity to affect social change

(Davenport et al., 2011; Eisinger, 1973; Isaac et al., 1980; Nilson & Nilson, 1980). Rickford (2016) asserts that Black Lives Matter protests may not be as violent as the media portrays. However, the media's portrayal of this movement as violent may lead police to adopt more restrictive practices and employ guidance on use of force tactics as a contingency for these types of demonstrations. While this study finds that areas with larger black populations align with escalated force strategies, it does not necessarily mean that police are using more force against protestors in these areas. From the current findings, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that agencies in these areas are more likely to include plans for use of force, should force prove necessary.

Regional Differences

Previous research finds regional differences in protests, namely that some regions are more likely to experience violent protest outcomes than others (Davenport et al., 2011; Eisinger, 1973). As such, one might expect police policies governing protests to also vary by region. This study finds regional variation in the policies implemented for protest management. Northeastern agencies are less likely to align with the IACP model policy and negotiated management strategies. Western agencies are more likely to adopt practices recommended by the IACP and less likely to adopt escalated force tactics. Western police agencies may be more likely to adopt best practices due to the methods used to construct their policies. For example, approximately 95% of police agencies in California rely on private corporations (i.e., Lexipol) to create their policies (Eagly & Schwartz, 2018). According to Reaves (2011), there are over 500 agencies in California alone, which accounts for a large portion of agencies in the Western United States. Agency policies in the West reveal greater alignment with the IACP model policy – adoption of planning and dialog, limited use of restriction, and guidance on use of force. The higher

compliance scores on the IACP scale for Western U.S. agencies may be due to the use of

privatized corporations for policy construction in this region of the United States,

 Finally, Southern agencies are more likely to adopt escalated force tactics.

The Southern United States has a history of racial hostility, that has repeatedly resulted in

violence (Blee, 2005). As such, some may suggest that racism can explain the finding that

Southern agencies are more likely to adopt escalated force tactics. However, this study does not

include measures of police bias or racism. Conclusions concerning the association between the

use of escalated force and police bias cannot be drawn from the current analyses and further

research is warranted. As previously mentioned, this study finds that escalated force tactics are

most prominent in areas with larger black populations. The 2010 U.S. Census revealed that the

highest concentration of black Americans was in the Southern United States (Rastogi, Johnson,

Hoeffel, & Drewery, 2011). As such, the finding that the Southern United States is also more

likely to adopt these tactics is not surprising. Isaac and colleagues (1980) suggest members of the

black community may have higher propensities for violence during protests. Previous research

contends that this population relies on violence to enact social change due to a lack of legitimate

opportunity to voice their opinion in alternate arenas (e.g., criminal justice system, political

system, etc.) (Isaac et al., 1980; Piven & Cloward, 2012). This finding coupled with the fact that

police may perceive Black groups to be more threatening (Davenport et al., 2011) can help to

explain why escalated force crowd management strategies are more likely to be adopted by

Southern police agencies.

While it appears that place matters, region alone cannot explain all, or even most, of the

observed agency policy differences. Future research might examine interaction effects between

region and other agency/jurisdiction-level variables to further explore why some agencies are

more likely to adopt best practices. Further, examining these interactions might provide additional insight into why particular agencies embrace particular types of crowd management strategies.

Current Study: Strengths and Limitations

The primary contribution of the present study is that this research represents the first attempt to examine current U.S. police agency protest management policies. Historically, police protest management strategies have only been discussed theoretically. Previous research has identified the basic elements of specific strategies (Bourne, 2011; King, 2013; McPhail, Schweingruber, & McCarthy, 1998; Schweingruber, 2000) and provided case studies about the use of specific strategy tactics for single events (Gillham & Noakes, 2007; King, 2013; Vitale, 2005). To date, there have been no empirical examinations of police practices in the United States to manage protest crowds. This study provides the first empirical assessment of U.S. police protest management strategies. It offers insight into variation among agency policies, the degree to which they align with best practice standards, and agency adoption of particular protest management strategies.

Previous literature highlights the correlation between protest violence and police presence (Davenport et al., 2011; Earl et al., 2003; Eisinger, 1973). However, no empirical studies have examined the mediating effect of protest management strategies on protest violence. This dissertation provides evidence that police policies differ dramatically across agencies. The differences documented in the current analysis can be used to guide future observational studies and empirical research on police protest management and protest crowd behavior.

While the first of its kind, there are several limitations to this exploratory study. First, the sample of police agencies included in this study is relatively small. Power calculations indicate

that a random sample of 267 agencies is needed to generate appropriate power levels to identify true agency differences and appropriately generalize findings to all U.S. police agencies. As such, the sample within this study (n = 117), while stratified to obtain a comprehensive cross section of different sized agencies across various regions of the country, did not produce findings generalizable to all police agencies in the United States. However, these initial findings still demonstrate the vast differences among U.S. police protest management policies and hold potential to guide future protest management studies in the United States.

Second, this study offers a content analysis of police policies. Qualitative methods, especially content analyses, are often criticized for the subjectivity associated with their interpretation (Patton, 2015). The policy content examined in this study is documented using dichotomous measures, which constrains interpretation by limiting potential responses. Still, some subjectivity is introduced with any coding procedure. This study attempts to control for this limitation by using independent coders to measure the degree of interrater reliability. Two coders examined police policies and indicated whether or not particular crowd management tactics were present in each agency's policies. Initial analysis revealed an interrater reliability score of .866. McHugh (2012) contends that .800 is the minimum acceptable standard to ensure coding reliability. For policies where coder discrepancies existed, a neutral-third party was asked to recode the answers based on their interpretation of the policy. This coding was then included as the final value for the data.

Third, many of the variables in this study (i.e., use of force, community policing) are measured dichotomously, restricting variation within the data. These variables represent complex concepts and interactions that may not be appropriately captured using binary attributes. Research employing more robust measures may produce different findings.

Fourth, this study only includes police agencies serving populations of over 25,000. Those agencies serving smaller populations are not represented within this sample, thus no conclusions can be drawn concerning agency policies in smaller jurisdictions. Future research may include agencies of all sizes. Since protests generally occur in urban areas, smaller agencies may not have policies governing these activities. Still, further evaluation is needed to explore whether this hypothesis is accurate and determine, if policies exist, the degree to which these policies differ from those of larger agencies.

Fifth, recent studies have introduced an additional protest management strategy, strategic incapacitation, discussed within the literature as an alternative to negotiated management (Gillham, 2011; Gillham, Edwards, & Noakes, 2013; Gillham & Noakes, 2007). However, this strategy integrates specific tenets that define other strategies (e.g., use of force, spatial containment). The measures used in this study were not developed to directly measure agency adoption of strategic incapacitation tactics. As such, this dissertation does not provide insight into the degree to which policies reflect this integrated strategy.

Sixth, the items created to code specific protest management strategies within the model policy are presented in a manner that suggests that each item aligns with only one management strategy (i.e., negotiated management, command and control, or escalated force). However, single items may be interpreted as representative of multiple strategies. For instance, the reverse-coded item, "*Does the policy require officers to maintain a courteous demeanor during the event,*" was created to measure alignment with escalated force. However, this item, if not reverse coded is symbolic of negotiated management. The items created are this author's subjective interpretations of tactics that represent existing protest strategies. This is the first attempt to identify specific tactics, outlined in policy, that represent each strategy. Future research may

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employ a different coding scheme or identify different tactics that align with each strategy and, thus, produce different findings.

Seventh, agency compliance and alignment scores could be biased for specific items. For example, those questions pertaining to canine or other specialized units may have generated misleading results. For example, agencies that do not provide restrictions for canine units are coded as not aligning with IACP recommended practices. However, this study does not control for whether agencies currently employ canine units. Additionally, to adopt use of force policies governing various force methods (i.e., impact weapons, impact projectiles, Tasers, chemical agents, aerosol restraint spray), officers would first need authorization to employ the various methods of force outlined in the IACP model policy. As such, it is important to note that the current findings may be biased against smaller agencies that do not have the type of structure assumed by the IACP model policy.

Finally, while all policies collected for this study contain dates that suggest the policies were written or revised after August 2014 (i.e., following the events of Ferguson), this study did not control for when the policy was initially constructed. Many agencies require that their policies be regularly inspected or revised (e.g., every six months or every year). However, the revision dates may or may not reflect significant changes made to the policy, as there is no document assessing the differences between original and revised policies. Therefore, it is not possible to examine if or how policies have changed over time or following significant events, like the unrest in Ferguson.

Implications

Policy implications. This research highlights the frequency in which various tactics, including guidance on the use of force, are included in police protest management policies.

Recent emphasis on the appropriate use of police force, including escalated force tactics, stems from a number of controversial use of force incidents within recent years. The media has widely covered contentious and violent police-protestor interactions (Rickford, 2016), affecting public perceptions of police (Donovan & Klahm, 2015; Lawrence, 2000). This study's findings document the use of specific tactics within U.S. police policies that promote or restrict particular police behaviors. It highlights the diversity of policy content and the degree to which current policies reflect, or fail to reflect, best practice standards promoted by one of the largest national police organizations – specifically the International Association of Chiefs of Police. The relatively low degree of overall organization-level compliance with the IACP model policy offers important insight for those looking to improve police practices. This finding also leads to two important questions. First, what factors encourage (or allow) police agencies to align their policies with national-level standards? Although the current study begins to explore this question, much more work is needed to identify the contexts in which agencies are most likely to adopt national standards. Second, does adopting best practice standards improve protest outcomes? Again, this question cannot be answered without further investigation.

This study finds that only about one-third of 15 examined negotiated management tactics are present in the average U.S. police agency protest management policy. Yet, international research suggests that negotiated management techniques help police to reduce protest violence. For example, dialog policing is hailed as one of the most popular and successful protest management strategies used to prevent protest violence in other countries (Gorringe, Stott, & Rosie, 2012). This strategy has been adopted in several countries, including Sweden, Canada, and the United Kingdom. The popularity of dialog policing in Western countries has led to an emergence of dialog-based approaches in the United States, including the use of related

negotiated management tactics. There is some evidence to suggest that negotiated management, and other communication-focused strategies, can be effective at preventing protest violence (Baker, 2008; Gillham & Noakes, 2007). This study suggests that there is room to increase and improve our use of negotiated management tactics through policy revisions. The adoption of this strategy encourages police to engage in impactful negotiation with protest organizers throughout the demonstration process and could potentially reduce violent protest incidents that occur due to preventable negative police-protestor interactions.

Finally, this study offers insight for professional organizations that construct and distribute model policies. The analyses reveal that most agencies policies have a low level of alignment with the tactics promoted by the best practice model policy used in this study. Professional organizations, in this case IACP, may want to attempt to determine why agencies are not aligning their policies with the proposed model. However, it may be the case that these model policies prove most helpful for agencies in turmoil. One interesting finding from this study is the agency that aligns perfectly with practices advocated by the IACP has a history of crowd violence at protests. As such, the model policies provided by professional organizations may influence agencies who are pressured alter their protest management practices in times of crisis, but do not greatly affect agencies that are not facing professional or public scrutiny.

Directions for future research. This study's findings and limitations offer considerable guidance for future research. First, future research may examine the impact of additional agency- and jurisdiction-level characteristics on the adoption of particular police policies. As mentioned previously, the variables in this study are largely dichotomous, so future studies with more robust measures may provide greater insight into the factors that impact the adoption of best practices or certain protest management strategies. While the overall statistical models within this study do

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not reach significance levels, future research may identify other characteristics that help to explain policy content. Other variables that would likely influence policy, like numbers of jurisdictional protests or the level of crowd management training provided to officers, are beyond the scope of the current study.

Both quantitative and qualitative assessments of the impact of agency policy on police officer behavior would greatly benefit both theory and practice. This study assumes that agency policy drives officer behavior, but this cannot be confirmed without further investigation. Differences between policy and practice, if any exist, have important implications for protest management. This type of investigation can also highlight critical areas in which police administrators can improve officer training to better affect protest outcomes.

Finally, future research might examine the timing of the tactics adopted for protest management. The "Ferguson Effect" hypothesized that negative perceptions of police in the United States, following the events in Ferguson, caused violent crime rates to increase. Some research suggests that this effect is purely anecdotal and is not supported by data (Pyrooz, Decker, Wolfe, & Shjarback, 2016). However, Wolfe & Nix (2016) state that other areas of policing may be experiencing a Ferguson Effect. This begs the question, "Did the events of Ferguson lead agencies to alter their protest management practices?" If possible, future research should examine the timing of policy changes within U.S. police agencies to determine whether such changes have occurred, or are more likely to occur following high-profile incidents.

Final Thoughts

This study represents a first attempt at documenting the diversity and types of strategies used by U.S. police agencies to manage protest crowds and activities. While the impact of police presence on protests was explored several decades ago (Eisinger, 1973), little additional

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empirical research has been conducted. Most extant literature provides theoretical contexts for classifying and understanding the impact that specific policing strategies have had on protests in Western democracies (e.g., see Della Porta & Reiter, 1998). Protest scholars note that escalated force strategies were developed and used during the 1960's and 1970's (McPhail, Schweingruber, & McCarthy, 1998; Schweingruber, 2000), command and control during the 1980's (Bourne, 2011; Vitale, 2005), and negotiated management from the 1990's to present (Gillham & Noakes, 2007; King, 2013; Vitale, 2005).

This study examined police policies pertaining to protest management to assess the degree of compliance with the IACP's model policy on *crowd management and control*, as well as alignment with existing protest management strategies. Additionally, agency- and jurisdiction-level characteristics were examined to determine if specific factors are associated with agency adoption of best practices or specific types of crowd management strategies. Both qualitative and quantitative methods were used to identify specific tactics within the IACP model policy and build an instrument to measure agency compliance with this policy, as well as alignment with specific management strategies. The findings of this study indicate that there is a large degree of variation in the types of tactics found within U.S. police protest management policies. Although the three major strategies examined in this study are typically discussed as fitting neatly into historical eras, U.S. police agencies currently permit and require the use of tactics that align with all three of these strategies. As such, this study suggests that agencies have not replaced one specific strategy with another, rather, police manage protests using a variety of tactics developed over time to address the complexities of modern-day protest management. While negotiated management tactics help police to engage with protest organizers and plan for events, command and control tactics are useful for addressing disorderly crowds and escalated force tactics may be

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needed to address protestors who engage in violence or management protests that evolve into civil disturbances.

This study provides insight into the types of tactics employed by police in the United States to manage protest crowds. While previous literature provides theoretical frameworks that explain the development and purpose of various strategies, this is the first study to empirically assess the degree to which these tactics are incorporated into police policies. As such, this dissertation provides a preliminary framework to further evaluate protest management policies and the impact of police strategies on the occurrence of protest violence.

The impact of police policy and practice on protest outcomes remains a worthy and mostly unexplored research topic. While protest violence is a rare occurrence (Davenport et al., 2011), the consequences associated with it can prove quite disastrous for participants and the surrounding community. As such, it is essential that future research continue to explore the impact of specific agency policies on police practice and protest outcomes.

Protest Strategy Information Table

Table 19: Protest Strategy Information Table

Protest Management Strategy	Time Frame (According to Literature)	Theoretical Basis	Central Tenets
Escalated Force	1960's and 1970's	Le Bon's Contagion Theory	1. Ignore First Amendment Rights 2. No tolerance for community disruption 3. No communication with protesters 4. Mass Arrest 5. Indiscriminate use of force
Command and Control	1980's	Strict Enforcement	1. Minimal community disruption 2. Controlled access 3. Divide and conquer protesters 4. "Shock and awe" distribution of officers 5. Zero tolerance policing
Negotiated Management	1990's to present	Community-Oriented Policing	1. Trust between police and protesters 2. Transparency in discretionary process 3. Dialog between police and protesters
Strategic Incapacitation	2000's to Present	Elaborated Social Identity Model	1. Focused component of use of force 2. Focused component of arrest 3. Perceived legitimacy of police action

Protest Strategy Instrument Items and Justifications

Negotiated Management Coding Items

Protest Instrument Item	IACP Reference	Rationale for Inclusion
1. Does the policy prioritize the protection of First Amendment rights?	II. Policy	Negotiated management strategies perceive protest crowds as exercising First Amendment rights, whereas other strategies view them as disorderly and destructive. This item examines whether agencies prioritize the facilitation of constitutional rights, as well as safety and security.
2. Does the policy utilize the Incident Command System or National Incident Management System protocol for crowd management?	A3	Negotiated management strategies emphasize the use of planning and organization for demonstrations. By utilizing the ICS or NIMS protocol, agencies emphasize the importance of organization during these types of events.
3. Does the policy require that protests be photographed and/or video recorded?	A7	As negotiated management strategies are built upon trust and coordination between police and demonstrators, utilizing video and photographs accentuates the transparency of the tactics police employ. Transparency is essential for trust and cooperation.
4. Does the policy require supervisory approval before an officer can make an arrest?	B1	Negotiated management strategies call for arrest to be used as a last resort. By stipulating that arrests must be approved by supervisors, agencies are ensuring that they are truly justified in using this tactic.
5. Does the policy require a supervisor to submit a written action plan for demonstrations?	D1	Negotiated management strategies emphasize pre-planning for demonstrations. Requiring a written action plan by a supervisor promotes advance consideration of potential risks and police response to those risks.
6. Does the policy require an effort to contact protest organizers before the event?	D2	Negotiated management strategies promote trust and coordination between police and demonstrators by requiring attempts to establish pre-event contact and relationship building. Pre-event contact allows police and protest leaders to express their objectives and outline agreed upon acceptable behavior prior to the event.

7. Does the policy require an attempt to gather information on the event before it begins?	D2	Negotiated management strategies promote gathering intelligence to plan for demonstrations. By gathering intelligence, police learn more about potential risk factors to increase the effectiveness of crowd management strategies.
8. Does the policy require police to determine if necessary permits have been issued prior to the event?	D2i	A large component of negotiated management strategies is the use of permits to outline acceptable crowd behavior. By reviewing whether there is a need for permit applications and whether applications have been submitted, police can promote lawful compliance by event organizers.
9. Does the policy stipulate that police should determine whether additional personnel should be available when planning for the event?	D2l	Negotiated management strategies emphasize planning contingencies. Outlining whether additional personnel are necessary ensures that police are prepared for potential contingencies.
10. Does the policy require officers to maintain a neutral demeanor during the event?	D7	Negotiated management strategies stipulate that police should work with protesters to promote peaceful demonstrations. Impartial police behavior can facilitate higher levels of positive interaction between police and potentially adversarial groups.
11. Does the policy require continued police contact with protest organizers to gather intelligence throughout the demonstration?	D9	A central component of negotiated management strategies is police use of dialog during protests. Maintaining communication with protest organizers is essential to understand shifting dynamics of the event.
12. Does the policy include directives for officers responding to a spontaneous civil disturbance?	E	As negotiated management strategies stress the importance of a planning approach, police should have contingencies for numerous outcomes. This includes a response plan for unplanned events that turn violent. By providing contingencies for unplanned occurrences, police can diminish the possibility of violence or other negative outcomes.
13. Does the policy stipulate that traffic should be rerouted during spontaneous civil disturbances?	E3a	Negotiated management strategies emphasize police planning prior to events. This includes outlining contingencies to address foreseeable risks (e.g., traffic accidents) likely to occur during a spontaneous event.
14. Does the policy require the use of dialog between police and crowd members as a solution to problems arising during the event	F1	Negotiated management strategies acknowledge that police dialog with protesters helps to deter violence and advocates the use of dialog as a first response to issues arising throughout the event.

prior to the use of other tactics (e.g., dispersal)?		
15. Does the policy require the police to issue verbal warnings to disperse before engaging in forced crowd dispersal tactics?	F3	Negotiated management strategies state that physical crowd dispersal tactics should be a last resort, when dialog is not possible or not effective. As such, by utilizing verbal commands first, police can reduce the potential for police use of force.

Command and Control Coding Items

Protest Instrument Item	IACP Reference	Rationale for Inclusion
1. Does the policy restrict time of protest to prevent community disruption?	A1	Command and control strategies involve restricting the time, place, and manner of protest to ensure minimal community disruption. Through this perspective, agencies placing restrictions on how, when, and where protesters can demonstrate align with command and control strategies.
2. Does the policy restrict place of protest to prevent community disruption?	A1	Command and control strategies involve restricting the time, place, and manner of protest to ensure minimal community disruption. Through this perspective, agencies placing restrictions on how, when, and where protesters can demonstrate align with command and control strategies.
3. Does the policy restrict manner of protest to prevent community disruption?	A1	Command and control strategies involve restricting the time, place, and manner of protest to ensure minimal community disruption. Through this perspective, agencies placing restrictions on how, when, and where protesters can demonstrate align with command and control strategies.
4. Does the policy prohibit canine units from being used for crowd control (i.e., spatial containment or dispersal)?	B3a	The IACP model policy prohibits canine units being used for crowd control purposes. Spatial containment is a defining tenet of command and control so ensuring that canine units cannot be used for spatial containment opposes the idea of command and control. This item will be reverse coded.
5. Does the policy permit motor vehicles to be used for spatial containment?	B3c	As mentioned previously, spatial containment is a central component of command and control strategies. Utilizing motor vehicles as barricades would align with these same strategies.
6. Does the policy require an avenue of escape for crowds after chemical agents are deployed?	B3g	Kettling is a controversial tactic used by police responsible for crowd control. This involves corralling crowds into a contained area. Utilizing chemical agents without an avenue of escape would align with command and control strategies. This item will be reverse coded.
7. Does the policy allow batons to be used for spatial containment?	B3h	Spatial containment is a central component of command and control strategies. Utilizing batons to assist in spatial containment aligns with command and control strategies.
8. Does the policy restrict bystanders from entering disturbance areas (e.g., only	D8	Spatial containment is used to minimize community disruption. According to command and control strategies, protest crowds are acceptable as long as they do not disrupt legitimate community activity. Restricting bystanders from entering

permitting those who reside, are employed, or have emergency business in the area)?		the area aligns with this strategy because it diminishes the opportunity to expand the crowd size.
9. Does the policy require that a perimeter be established during a civil disturbance?	E2b	Spatial containment can be used to prevent community disruption in the event of a civil disturbance. Establishing perimeters to contain disorderly or violent crowds aligns with command and control strategies.
10. Does the policy allow for the use of barricades or police lines to contain crowd members in order to prevent community disruption?	F1	Utilizing barricades and police lines to contain crowds aligns with command and control strategies. This strategy promotes restricting the time, manner, and location of protest, which is often accomplished through the use of barricades.
11. Does the policy permit police to engage in shows of force to control crowd behavior?	F3b1	Shows of force are often employed through tactics like police lines and formation, which "shock and awe" the crowd into compliance. The "shock and awe" component of crowd control, rather than crowd management tactics align with command and control strategies.
12. Does the policy allow police lines to be formed to disperse unruly crowds that fail to vacate the location following verbal directives?	F3b1	Police lines are often used to shock and awe crowds into dispersing. The use of these tactics aligns with command and control.
13. Does the policy allow the use of mobile field forces, or other specialized units (e.g., mounted, motorcycle), to disperse unruly crowds that fail to disperse following verbal directives?	F3b1	Command and control strategies often promote the use of specialized units to disperse crowds. These units, like mobile field forces, specialize in civil disturbances responses that include crowd dispersal to prevent further violence.
14. Does the policy permit crowd encirclement tactics to disperse unruly crowds that fail to disperse following verbal directives?	F3b2	Kettling is a controversial tactic used by police responsible for crowd control. This is a form of corralling crowds into an area. Utilizing these containment tactics aligns with command and control tactics.

15. Does the policy require police to establish a secure detention area for prisoners awaiting transportation following a mass arrest?	G2	While mass arrest is a tactic employed under escalated force strategies, utilizing secure areas aligns with command and control tactics. Secure detention areas restrict access to and protect detainees.

Escalated Force Coding Items

Protest Instrument Item	IACP Reference	Rationale for Inclusion
1. Does the policy stipulate that disorderly or threatening crowds be dispersed to eliminate immediate risk or violence escalation?	A4b	Escalated force strategies embrace dispersal tactics as a legitimate crowd management strategy. Therefore, this item will measure whether advisement for dispersal tactics are included in the policy.
2. Does the policy stipulate that demonstrators engaging in unlawful behavior will be arrested?	A4c, F1c	While negotiated management strategies employ arrest symbolically or as a last resort, escalated force strategies employ arrest as an initial response to unlawful behavior. Agencies adopting this approach typically employ legalistic approaches to unlawful behavior.
3. Does the policy allow for mass arrests during civil disturbances?	A6, F2, F3b3, G	Escalated force strategies typically employ mass arrest during civil disturbances. Mass arrest tactics are employed to disperse crowds in an attempt to prevent further violence.
4. Does the policy prohibit firing impact projectiles into the crowd indiscriminately?	B3d	Escalated force strategies promote indiscriminate use of force. As such, rather than focusing only on problematic individuals, agencies adopting the escalated force approach disperse crowds through the use of indiscriminate force. This item will be reverse coded.
5. Does the agency prohibit the firing of non-direct skip fire rounds indiscriminately into crowds unless life is in immediate danger?	B3d1	Escalated force strategies promote indiscriminate use of force. As such, rather than focusing only on problematic individuals, agencies adopting the escalated force approach disperse crowds through the use of indiscriminate force. This item will be reverse coded.
6. Does the policy advise that direct fire rounds should be used only against those who pose a threat of death to others or significant property damage?	B3d2	Escalated force strategies promote indiscriminate use of force. The IACP policy advocates targeting only individuals engaged in harmful behavior, rather than the entire crowd. As such, this policy item directly opposes the indiscriminate application of force promoted by escalated force strategies. This item will be reverse coded.

7. Does the policy prohibit the use of Electronic Control Weapons (ECW's) for the purpose of restraint or arrest when less forceful measures of control are available?	B3e	Escalated force strategies emphasize the use of force to uphold the law and disperse crowds. This is typically accomplished through use of force and arrest, rather than less forceful or intrusive measures. This item will be reverse coded.
8. Does the policy prohibit the firing of Electronic Control Weapons (ECW's) into the crowd indiscriminately?	B3e	Escalated force strategies promote indiscriminate use of force. As such, the escalated force approach does not require differential treatment of individual crowd members. This item will be reverse coded.
9. Does the policy prohibit aerosol restraint sprays from being fired into the crowd where bystanders would be unreasonably affected?	B3f	Escalated force strategies employ force in a manner that will disperse the crowd by any means necessary. The use of indiscriminate force is a central component of these strategies. Therefore, escalated force would employ these tactics without accounting for bystanders. This item will be reverse coded.
10. Does the policy restrict the application of aerosol restraint sprays to only individuals engaging in unlawful behavior, resisting arrest, or those who pose a threat to officer safety (i.e., in self-defense)?	B3f	Escalated force strategies employ force in a manner that will disperse the crowd by any means necessary. The use of indiscriminate force is a central component of these strategies. Escalated force would argue that crowds should be targeted as a whole, rather than focusing solely on problematic individuals. As such, this item opposes the central tenets of escalated force strategies and will be reverse coded.
11. Does the policy restrict the use of CS chemical agents to instances when lesser force options are unavailable or would be ineffective?	B3g	Escalated force strategies prioritize arrest and use of force as being the most appropriate responses to aggression. Utilizing chemical agents when lesser force options would still be effective to disperse the crowd would align with escalated force strategies. Therefore, this item opposes the central tenets of the escalated force model and will be reverse coded.
12. Does the policy allow batons to be used for crowd dispersal?	B3h	Escalated force strategies promote police use of force as a means of crowd dispersal. As such, utilizing weapons for this purpose would align with escalated force strategies.
13. Does the policy require officers to maintain a courteous demeanor during the event?	D7	Courteous behavior promotes positive interaction between police and participants. However, this type of behavior is antithetical to escalated force strategies. This item will be reverse coded.

14. Does the policy restrict crowd control tactics (e.g., use of force, containment, dispersal, or mass arrests) to civil disturbances?	III. Definitions	The indiscriminate application of crowd control tactics including show of force, use of force, and the use of less-lethal weapons to gain crowd compliance aligns with escalated force strategies. This item assesses whether policies restrict crowd control tactics to civil disturbances, and is therefore antithetical to escalated force strategies. As such, this item will be reverse coded.
15. Does the policy allow police to carry resistant demonstrators when they refuse to walk?	G4	Escalated force strategies promote the use of force when there is non-compliance among individuals within the crowd. By allowing police to physically remove noncompliant protesters, agencies promote officer behavior aligned with escalated force strategies.

Sample Agencies, By Strata

Population Size	Region of the United States	Agency Name	City	State
500,000+	N/A	Tucson Police Department	Tucson	AZ
		Fresno Police Department	Fresno	CA
		San Francisco Police Department	San Francisco	CA
		San Jose Police Department	San Jose	CA
		San Diego Police Department	San Diego	CA
		Los Angeles Police Department	Los Angeles	CA
		Denver Police Department	Denver	CO
		Washington Metro Police Department	--	DC
		Miami-Dade County Police Department	Miami	FL
		Cobb County Police Department	Marietta	GA
		Dekalb County Police Department	Tucker	GA
		Gwinnett County Police Department	Lawrenceville	GA
		Chicago Police Department	Chicago	IL

		Indianapolis Metro Police	Indianapolis	IN
		Louisville Metro Police Department	Louisville	KY
		Baltimore Police Department	Baltimore	MD
		Prince George's County Police Department	Palmer Park	MD
		Baltimore County Police Department	Towson	MD
		Montgomery County Police Department	Rockville	MD
		Detroit Police Department	Detroit	MI
		Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department	Charlotte	NC
		Albuquerque Police Department	Albuquerque	NM
		Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department	Las Vegas	NV
		Nassau County Police Department	Mineola	NY
		Suffolk County Police Department	Yaphank	NY
		New York City Police Department	New York	NY
		Columbus Police Department	Columbus	OH
		Oklahoma City Police Department	Oklahoma City	OK
		Portland Police Bureau	Portland	OR

		Philadelphia Police Department	Philadelphia	PA
		Nashville Metro Police Department	Nashville	TN
		El Paso Police Department	El Paso	TX
		Fort Worth Police Department	Fort Worth	TX
		Austin Police Department	Austin	TX
		Dallas Police Department	Dallas	TX
		San Antonio Police Department	San Antonio	TX
		Fairfax County Police Department	Fairfax	VA
		Seattle Police Department	Seattle	WA
		Milwaukee Police Department	Milwaukee	WI
200,000 – 499,999	West	North Las Vegas Police Department	North Las Vegas	NV
		Riverside Police Department	Riverside	CA
		Oakland Police Department	Oakland	CA
		Long Beach Police Department	Long Beach	CA
		Boise Police Department	Boise	ID
	Midwest	Minneapolis Police Department	Minneapolis	MN

		Wichita Police Department	Wichita	KS
		St. Louis County Police Department	St. Louis	MO
		Omaha Police Department	Omaha	NE
		Cincinnati Police Department	Cincinnati	OH
	South	Lexington Police Department	Lexington	KY
		Orlando Police Department	Orlando	FL
		Fayetteville Police Department	Fayetteville	NC
		Durham Police Department	Durham	NC
		Raleigh Police Department	Raleigh	NC
	Northeast	Rochester Police Department	Rochester	NY
		Newark Police Department	Newark	NJ
		Pittsburgh Bureau of Police	Pittsburgh	PA
100,000-199,999	West	El Cajon Police Department	El Cajon	CA
		Fullerton Police Department	Fullerton	CA
		Boulder Police Department	Boulder	CO
		Peoria Police Department	Peoria	AZ

		Lakewood Police Department	Lakewood	CO
	Midwest	Elgin Police Department	Elgin	IL
		Aurora Police Department	Aurora	IL
		Grand Rapids Police Department	Grand Rapids	MI
		Springfield Police Department	Springfield	MO
		Columbia Police Department	Columbia	MO
	South	Alexandria Police Department	Alexandria	VA
		Henry County Police Department	McDonough	GA
		Knoxville Police Department	Knoxville	TN
		Charleston Police Department	Charleston	SC
		Columbia Police Department	Columbia	SC
	Northeast	New Haven Police Department	New Haven	CT
		Cambridge Police Department	Cambridge	MA
		Woodbridge Township Police Department	Woodbridge	NJ
		Amherst Police Department	Amherst	NY
		Providence Police Department	Providence	RI

50,000-99,999	West	Kirkland Police Department	Kirkland	WA
		Davis Police Department	Davis	CA
		Newport Beach Police Department	Newport Beach	CA
		Loveland Police Department	Loveland	CO
		Rio Rancho Department of Public Safety	Rio Rancho	NM
	Midwest	Iowa City Police Department	Iowa City	IA
		Waterloo Police Department	Waterloo	IA
		Evanston Police Department	Evanston	IL
		Duluth Police Department	Duluth	MN
		Bellevue Police Department	Bellevue	NE
	South	Lakeland Police Department	Lakeland	FL
		Bowie Police Department	Bowie	MD
		Chapel Hill Police Department	Chapel Hill	NC
		Asheville Police Department	Asheville	NC
		Fayetteville Police Department	Fayeteville	AR
	Northeast	Framingham Police Department	Framingham	MA

		Brookline Police Department	Brookline	MA
		Somerville Police Department	Somerville	MA
		Albany Police Department	Albany	NY
		Lower Merion Township Police Department	Ardmore	PA
25,000-49,999	West	Tigard Police Department	Tigard	OR
		Oro Valley Police Department	Oro Valley	AZ
		Bell Police Department	Bell	CA
		Beverly Hills Police Department	Beverly Hills	CA
		Culver City Police Department	Culver City	CA
	Midwest	Burbank Police Department	Burbank	IL
		Urbana Police Department	Urbana	IL
		Roseville Police Department	Roseville	MN
		Gladstone Police Department	Gladstone	MO
		Greenfield Police Department	Greenfield	WI
	South	Gainesville Police Department	Gainesville	GA
		Myrtle Beach Police Department	Myrtle Beach	SC

		Greenville Police Department	Greenville	TX
		Texarkana Police Department	Texarkana	TX
		Lancaster Police Department	Lancaster	TX
	Northeast	Watertown Police Department	Watertown	MA
		Amherst Police Department	Amherst	MA
		Concord Police Department	Concord	NH
		Yorktown Police Department	Yorktown Heights	NY
		Chester Police Department	Chester	PA

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PUBLICATIONS

Madensen, T., **Kennedy, L.,** Birds, J., & Morgan, D. (2015). "DTAC – Project Daybreak Resident Survey Summary."

Madensen, T., **Kennedy, L.,** Belalcazar, L., Haroan, F., Quintanilla, E., Santamaria, A., Serrano, D., & Tesar, J. (2014). "Managing Pedestrian Flow Around Escalators Technical Report."

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MANUSCRIPTS IN PROGRESS

Clouse, S., West, M., **Kennedy, L. P**., & Herold, T. D. (Forthcoming). Police Behaviors and Citizen Acceptance: An Exploratory Analysis of the RDFC Interaction Model.

PRESENTATIONS

Kennedy, L. P. (Forthcoming). Policing Demonstrations: Examining Procedural Guidelines for Crowd Management of Protests. American Society of Criminology, San Francisco, CA.

Kennedy, L. P. (2019). The Emergence of Hybrid Learning: Challenges Associated With Teaching Hybrid Courses. American Society of Criminology, San Francisco, CA.

Kennedy, L. P. & Herold, T.D. (formerly Madensen) (2019**).** Managing a Tense Relationship: An Examination of Policing Protest Crowds. Western Society of Criminology, Honolulu, HI.

Kennedy, L. P. (2019**).** "Murky Waters: A Comparative Analysis of Data Sources on Homicide by Law Enforcement." Panel Presentation, Graduate Professional Student Association Research Forum, Las Vegas, NV.

Radmall, R. L., **Kennedy, L. P.,** & Madensen-Herold, T. D. (2018). "Fans Gone Wild: An Interdisciplinary Review of Spectator Violence." Poster Presentation, Graduate Professional Student Association, Las Vegas, NV.

Kennedy, L. P. (2018). "Murky Waters: A Comparative Analysis of Data Sources on Homicide by Law Enforcement." Panel Presentation, American Society of Criminology, Atlanta GA. Chair for Presentation.

Radmall, R. L., **Kennedy, L. P.,** & Madensen-Herold, T. D. (2018). "Fans Gone Wild: An Interdisciplinary Review of Spectator Violence." Poster Presentation, American Society of Criminology, Atlanta, GA.

Kennedy, L. (2018) "When Protests Become Violent: A Conjunctive Analysis of Contextual Factors Violent and Non-Violent Activities." Panel Presentation, Graduate Professional Student Association Research Forum, Las Vegas, NV.

Clouse, S.L., **Kennedy, L.**, & Madensen, T.D. (2017). "From Verbal Judo to Physical Restraint: A Multidisciplinary Content Analysis of De-escalation Techniques." Poster Presentation, American Society of Criminology, Philadelphia, PA.

Kennedy, L. (2017) "When Protests Become Violent: A Conjunctive Analysis of Contextual Factors Violent and Non-Violent Activities." Panel Presentation, American Society of Criminology Annual Conference, Philadelphia, PA.

Madensen, T., **Kennedy, L.,** & Schmidt, K. (2016) "Crime Prevention in Apartment Complexes: What Works?" Panel Presentation, Graduate Professional Student Association Research Forum, Las Vegas, NV.

Kennedy, L. & Lu, H. (2017). "Black Lives Matter: An Application of Critical Race Theory to Protests." Poster Presentation, Western Society of Criminology Annual Conference, Las Vegas, NV.

Madensen, T., **Kennedy, L.,** & Schmidt, K. (2016) "Crime Prevention in Apartment Complexes: What Works?" Panel Presentation, American Society of Criminology Annual Conference, New Orleans, LA.

Kennedy, L. & Madensen, T. (2016). "Black Lives Matter: A State-Level Analysis of Police Shootings and Protests." Poster Presentation, Greenspun College of Urban Affairs Research Forum, University of Nevada – Las Vegas, Las Vegas, NV.

Kennedy, L. & Madensen, T. (2016) "Black Lives Matter: A State-Level Analysis of Police Shootings and Protests." Panel Presentation, Graduate & Professional Student Association Research Forum, University of Nevada – Las Vegas, Las Vegas, NV.

Kennedy, L. & Madensen, T. (2015) "Black Lives Matter: A State-Level Analysis of Police Shootings and Protests." Poster Presentation, The American Society of Criminology, Washington D.C.

Kennedy, L. (2015). "Policing Political Protests: Risks and Challenges." Poster Presentation, Greenspun College of Urban Affairs Research Forum, University of Nevada – Las Vegas, Las Vegas, NV.

Kennedy, L. (2015). "Policing Political Protests: Risks and Challenges." Poster Presentation, Graduate & Professional Student Association Research Forum, University of Nevada - Las Vegas, Las Vegas, NV.

Kennedy, L. (2015). "Policing Political Protests: Risks and Challenges." Poster Presentation, The American Society of Criminology, San Francisco, CA.

HONORS & AWARDS

2019   **Outstanding Graduate Award**
Department of Criminal Justice, University of Nevada – Las Vegas

2018   **Graduate Professional Student Association Student Travel Fund Award - $650**
University of Nevada – Las Vegas

2018   **Summer Doctoral Research Fellowship - $7000**
University of Nevada – Las Vegas

2018   **Graduate Professional Student Association Research Forum, 1st Place - $200**
University of Nevada – Las Vegas

2017   **Criminal Justice Department Travel Fund Award - $250**
Department of Criminal Justice, University of Nevada – Las Vegas

2017   **Graduate & Professional Student Association Student Travel Fund Award - $800**
University of Nevada – Las Vegas

2017   **UNLV Access Grant - $2,000**
University of Nevada – Las Vegas

2016   **Criminal Justice Department Travel Fund Award - $200**
Department of Criminal Justice, University of Nevada – Las Vegas

2016   **Graduate & Professional Student Association Student Travel Fund Award - $500**
University of Nevada - Las Vegas

2016   **UNLV Access Grant - $2,000**
University of Nevada – Las Vegas

2015   **Criminal Justice Department Travel Fund Award - $150**

Department of Criminal Justice, University of Nevada - Las Vegas

2015   **Graduate & Professional Student Association Student Travel Fund Award - $400**
            University of Nevada - Las Vegas

2015   **UNLV Access Grant - $2,000**
            University of Nevada – Las Vegas

2015   **Criminal Justice Department Outstanding Graduate Award**
            Department of Criminal Justice, University of Nevada - Las Vegas

2014   **Criminal Justice Department Travel Fund Award - $100**
            Department of Criminal Justice, University of Nevada - Las Vegas

2014   **Graduate & Professional Student Association Student Travel Fund Award - $450**
            University of Nevada - Las Vegas

2014   **Alpha Phi Sigma Target Scholarship Course**
            University of Nevada – Las Vegas

2014-present   **Alpha Phi Sigma National Criminal Justice Honor Society Member**
            University of Nevada – Las Vegas

2012   **Alpha Phi Sigma Target Scholarship Course**
            University of Nevada – Las Vegas

2012   **Dean's List**
            College of Urban Affairs, University of Nevada – Las Vegas

RESEARCH PROJECTS

2018   **Focused Deterrence Call-In Session**
            IACP/UC Center for Police Research and Policy, Las Vegas, NV

2017-2018   **National Science Foundation Police Legitimacy Study**
            Department of Criminal Justice, University of Nevada – Las Vegas, Las Vegas, NV

2015 – 2016   **Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Body Worn Camera Study**
            Department of Criminal Justice, University of Nevada – Las Vegas, Las Vegas, NV

2015   **Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Project Daybreak Survey**
            Department of Criminal Justice, University of Nevada – Las Vegas, Las Vegas, NV

UNIVERSITY/COMMUNITY SERVICE

2015   **Alpha Phi Sigma Career Fair Setup Committee (Leader)**
            University of Nevada – Las Vegas

2014-2015   **President, Alpha Phi Sigma**
            University of Nevada – Las Vegas

MEMBERSHIP

2014 – Present   **Alpha Phi Sigma**
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

2014 – Present   **American Society of Criminology**

2016 – Present   **Western Society of Criminology**

WORKSHOPS

2017   **Kennedy, L.** Guest Lecturer for "CRJ 733 Doctoral Teaching Practicum Class"
Dept. of Criminal Justice, University of Nevada – Las Vegas

2017   **Kennedy, L.,** Guest Lecturer for "CRJ 701 Masters Theory Class" – Feminist
Criminology
Dept. of Criminal Justice, University of Nevada – Las Vegas

2015   Madensen, T. & **Kennedy, L.**, Guest Speaker for "Culminating Experience Faculty
Institute" on Teaching Undergraduate Research
University of Nevada – Las Vegas, Lied Library, Las Vegas, NV.

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

2019   **CRJ 104 – Introduction to Administration of Justice: In Person Section**
Nevada State College

2019   **CRJ 413 – Dilemmas in Law Enforcement: In Person Section**
Nevada State College

2019   **CRJ 444 – Advanced Criminology: In Person Section**
Nevada State College

2018   **CRJ 211 – Policing in America: Hybrid Section**
University of Nevada – Las Vegas

2018   **CRJ 211 – Policing in America: Online Section**
University of Nevada – Las Vegas

2013- Present   **Lab Director – Crowd Management Research Council**
University of Nevada – Las Vegas

2013-Present   **Graduate Mentor – Crowd Management Research Council**
University of Nevada – Las Vegas