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Institutional Design of Intergovernmental Organizations: Cooperation, Vitality, and Evolution

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INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS:

COOPERATION, VITALITY,

AND EVOLUTION

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Abstract

Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) are critical institutions in the international system through which states cooperate and compete. Much scholarship has examined the role and operation of IGOs, but many questions about how they facilitate cooperation, their vitality, and their evolution remain. The functions of IGOs are impacted by their institutional design, which then affects operation and vitality. IGO's perform their roles through multiple mechanisms that facilitate state interaction. IGOs enable states to overcome credibility issues and cooperate. The institutional design of IGOs, their membership, their resources, and their institutionalization, all impact the functioning of the IGO. I examine empirically how joint membership in more institutionalized IGOs impacts general cooperation between member states. I then test how institutionalization affects the survival of IGOs comprised of non-democratic members. Finally, I examine IGO succession using a novel sample of 44 IGO pairs and show that institutional design evolves through successor institutions. These analyses provide evidence demonstrating the importance of institutional design on the functioning, vitality, and evolution of IGOs and contributes to our understanding of the important role that IGOs play in the international system.

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Chapter 1
Introduction

Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) are critical institutions in the international system, coordinating collective action and providing venues for both cooperation and competition between states. Yet, IGOs are incredibly diverse. Specifically, their design varies significantly from one IGO to the next. The institutional design of IGOs is important for their operation, impacting how they affect interactions between their members. Within the body of research on the IGO institutional design important questions remain about how design affects general dyadic cooperation, the vitality of IGOs, and IGO succession. In this dissertation each chapter will contribute to one of these three questions. In chapter two, I explore how increased institutionalization of IGOs impacts state-to-state cooperation. Next, in chapter three, I examine how institutional design affects IGO survival. Finally, in chapter four, I examine IGO evolution through an analysis of how the institutional design of successor IGOs differs from their predecessors. Overall, this dissertation contributes to our understanding of IGO design affects fostering state to state cooperation, vitality, and evolution of IGOs.

Intergovernmental organizations arose out of a need for coordination between states and a desire to avoid costly conflict. Frequently powerful states use IGOs to pursue their own interests and enhance their power. IGOs often develop into arenas for competition between great powers. Economic motivations frequently caused the need for coordination, especially early in the history of IGOs. Early examples of proto-IGOs are the congress system in Europe to preserve peace after the Napoleonic Wars and the Central Commission for Navigation of the Rhine to

govern economic travel along the river.[1] The World Wars and global Great Depression helped sharpen a desire for economic stability and lessened conflict. The League of Nations following WWI in a failed attempt to prevent another world war provides an early example of a desire for larger scale organizations to foster cooperation between states beyond just regionally. The post WWII system saw a marked increase in the number of IGOs, and larger IGOs, with the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade all formed in the mid to late 1940s. By the 1950s a majority of states in the system shared at least one IGO membership with a majority of other states.[2]

IGOs are created to coordinate cooperation among many different states on key issue areas such as regional development, trade, or climate change. This can be a small group of a few states on a very narrow issue, such as economic traversal of a specific river, or a global institution on a wide range of issue areas. As their number and legitimacy increase IGOs became an accepted and common way for states to cooperate on a wide variety of issue areas, especially when dealing with collective actions problems. IGOs now play a pivotal role in the international system and understanding variation in their design and operation is important to understanding that system today.

IGOs have multiple mechanisms that facilitate cooperation between member states on specific issues. Previous research has explored the role of intergovernmental organizations in various areas such as conflict, trade, foreign investment, human rights, environmental policy, and norm diffusion. Yet the effect of IGOs on these areas is not uniform, not all IGOs are equal. Nor are they all viewed as successful by their member states. Many scholars presume IGOs have a

[1] Russett, Bruce, Oneal, John. Triangulating Peace : Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations. New York (State): Norton, 2001.

[2] Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace 2001.

positive effect on overall cooperation. IGOs are also theorized to foster cooperation outside of their issue areas. However, most research has focused on specific issue areas and the impact on cooperation outside of the IGO has had little empirical examination. IGOs also fail more often than initially expected. While a majority of IGOs do persist, approximately one third are dissolved or neglected until defunct by their members.[3] Evidence suggests that states are often more likely to create a new replacement IGO rather than attempt to reform a failing IGO.[4] Successor IGOs often have high degree of continuity from previous institutions.[5] In short, we observe variation in the effect of IGOs, in their survival, and how they are replaced.

Before proceeding several terms and concepts require definition or conceptualization for their use in this dissertation. I follow the Correlates of War definition of an intergovernmental organization, which requires it have three state members, hold plenary sessions at least once every ten years, and have a permanent secretariat and headquarters.[6] I define IGO failure as the end of meaningful operation of the IGO. Meaningful operation requires active participation by a majority of members and active operation by the IGO in attempting to fulfill its mandate. This definition of failure is broader than formal dissolution, including IGOs who may exist officially on paper but are not active, informally defunct. Institutional design is a broad concept studied in many contexts for IGOs.

For this dissertation, I focus on the institutional design of the operating body of the IGO throughout its life. This conceptualization centers on the internal organization and function of the

[3] Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Mette. "Death of international organizations. The organizational ecology of intergovernmental organizations, 1815–2015." The Review of International Organizations 15, no. 2 (2020): 339-370.
[4] Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, "Death of IOs" 2018.
[5] Dijkstra, Hylke, Maria J. Debre, and Tim Heinkelmann-Wild. "Governance abhors a vacuum: The afterlives of major international organisations." The British Journal of Politics and International Relations (2023.
[6] Pevehouse, Jon C.W., Timothy Nordstrom, Roseanne W McManus, Anne Spencer Jamison, "Tracking Organizations in the World: The Correlates of War IGO Version 3.0 datasets", Journal of Peace Research. (2019).

IGO, not specifically the design process at its founding. It also excludes membership size as a design feature, treating it as a relevant but separate attribute of an IGO. The primary operationalization of this concept of institutional design is IGO institutionalization as defined by Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom 2004. IGO institutionalization captures the structure, responsibilities, procedures, and size of the IGO's bureaucracy as well as authority granted to the IGO for providing information, benefits, mediation, adjudication, and enforcement.[7] IGO institutionalization ranges from organizations with a "nominal organizational structure" only to administer periodic meetings of heads of state or their principles to highly segmented and structured institutions with set rules governing how states participate, made decisions, and comply with agreements.[8] IGO institutionalization has three categories, low, medium, and high. IGOs with low institutionalization function as forums for meetings by principal agents of the states, lacking formal power for their bureaucratic, executive, or judicial bodies.[9] IGOs with medium institutionalization possess formal power for these bodies to some degree, requiring some surrender of sovereignty by member states, some codified procedures, a formal decision making process, dedicated staff and a bureaucracy to carry out specified operations.[10] IGOs with high institutionalization also contain the elements from the previous category but with an even more formalized structure, larger staff, and greater authority through adding dedicated bodies for mediation and adjudication, usually through a defined judicial organ, and in some cases these IGOs have the authority to impose direct costs on member states for defection.[11] Through IGO institutionalization I am focused on the internal institutional design of IGOs, on their operating

[7] Boehmer, Charles, Erik Gartzke, and Timothy Nordstrom. "Do intergovernmental organizations promote peace?." World Politics 57, no. 1 (2004): 1-38.
[8] Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom, "Do IOs Promote Peace?" 2004.
[9] Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom, "Do IOs Promote Peace?" 2004.
[10] Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom, "Do IOs Promote Peace?" 2004.
[11] Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom, "Do IOs Promote Peace?" 2004.

bodies and how they function. This concept of IGO institutional design and operationalization of IGO institutionalization will be applied throughout the dissertation.

Scholars have begun theorizing and testing aspects of IGO institutional design, yet many questions remain. Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal establish a theoretical framework for understanding IGO design as a result of multiple rational self-interested states recognizing a need for resilient institutions to coordinate decentralized cooperation.[12] Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom demonstrate stronger pacifying effect of IGOs who have more internal institutionalization and bureaucracy.[13] Karreth and Tir build on Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom but for intrastate conflict, finding similar pacifying effects associate with greater institutionalization.[14] These works examine different levels of IGO institutionalization, but only in the context of conflict. Barnett and Finnemore demonstrate that internal bureaucracy in IGOs matters and can be dysfunctional due to these internal factors.[15] There are conditions where IGOs may even have negative results, especially when hierarchies are created or when security alliances provoke conflict. Cao examines a relationship between IGOs and converging domestic policies considering institutionalization levels, finding that joint membership even in multiple minimally institutionalized IGOs still has an effect.[16] Lall examines when international institutions become independent actors on a subset of IGOs, finding non-state connections and mandates that are highly technical lead to de facto policy autonomy.[17] Gray finds evidence

[12] Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal. "The rational design of international institutions." International organization 55, no. 4 (2001): 761-799.
[13] Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom, “Do IOs Promote Peace?” 2004.
[14] Karreth, Johannes, and Jaroslav Tir. "International institutions and civil war prevention." The Journal of Politics 75, no. 1 (2013): 96-109.
[15] Barnett, Michael N., and Martha Finnemore. "The politics, power, and pathologies of international organizations." International organization 53, no. 4 (1999): 699-732.
[16] Cao, Xun. "Networks of intergovernmental organizations and convergence in domestic economic policies." International Studies Quarterly 53, no. 4 (2009): 1095-1130.
[17] Lall, Ranjit. "Beyond institutional design: Explaining the performance of international organizations." International Organization 71, no. 2 (2017): 245-280.

suggesting bureaucratic autonomy has a positive effect on IGO vitality.[18] Debre and Dijkstra examine multiple factors of institutional design on IGO vitality, creating a composite measure for multiple aspects of flexibility in the IGO, yet do not find a significant effect.[19] For IGOs that do fail and are replaced, we know little about what happens next.[20] These works demonstrate the importance of studying institutional design to understanding the operation and vitality of IGOs, but that many questions remain. How does institutionalization in IGOs matter for cooperation, not just reducing conflict? How does institutional design affect IGO vitality? What does IGO succession look like? I contribute to answering these questions through the next three chapters of the dissertation.

In chapter two I examine how joint membership in more institutionalized IGOs increases dyadic cooperation, including a 'spill over' effect outside of the IGO. I argue more institutionalized IGOs are more effective at building cooperative relationships between member states by providing information necessary for cooperation and reducing transaction costs of establishing and following agreements. States with shared memberships in more highly institutionalized IGOs will be more likely to cooperate dyadically. This interaction builds cooperative relationships that apply outside of shared IGOs as well. I evaluate the impact of institutional variation in IGOs on general dyadic cooperation using OLS regression and time series analysis of IGO institutionalization on a yearly average intensity of cooperation. To measure cooperation broadly with a standard measure that applies across I use CAMEO coding from the ICEWS events database, specifically the "intensity" score of how strong an interaction

[18] Gray, Julia. "Life, death, or zombie? The vitality of international organizations." International Studies Quarterly 62, no. 1 (2018): 1-13.
[19] Debre, Maria Josepha, and Hylke Dijkstra. "Institutional design for a post-liberal order: why some international organizations live longer than others." European Journal of International Relations 27, no. 1 (2021): 311-339.
[20] Dijkstra, Debre and Heinklemann-Wild "Governance Abhors a Vacuum" 2023

is. This makes cooperative events in different issue areas comparable on the same scale and allows for looking a cooperation broadly, capturing interactions at multiple levels of government. I focus on non-conflict state-to-state cooperation but also test for general cooperation for all events. I find support that a greater share of joint IGO memberships with medium and high institutionalization increases state-to-state cooperation. Additionally, low institutionalization appears to have a negative effect. In additional robustness models the positive effect of a greater share of joint membership in medium or high institutionalized IGOs holds. This contributes to our understanding of how IGOs foster general cooperation, including spill over cooperation, and also provides an empirical contribution.

In chapter three I explore how institutional design impacts IGO vitality. Scholars theorize the institutional design of an IGO affects how it operates and therefore if it will survive, however past studies of design and IGO vitality have struggled to find significance. I argue that the effect of institutional design on IGO vitality relates directly to the conditions of cooperation between member states. IGOs survive or fail dependent on their member states finding value in continued participation and support of the IGO. I examine IGOs with a majority of authoritarian members, whose goals for working through an IGO focus on material gains, especially regime survival. Achieving those goals requires addressing the problem of credible commitments for non-democracies. When key mechanisms of an IGO are important for providing critical benefits to members, such as credible commitments for authoritarian states, then design will affect vitality. In summary, institutional design matters for IGO vitality when it causes member states to stop participating or supporting the IGO by lessening the benefits those member states gain. Authoritarian states have fewer domestic sources of audience costs to credibly signal their

commitment.[21] International institutions can fulfill this role and matter specifically for non-democracies' credible signaling.[22] I argue that greater institutionalization increases an IGOs capacity to enable authoritarian members to overcome credibility issues and gain material benefits. IGOs with a majority of authoritarian members will then be more likely to fail when they are less institutionalized and unable to provide these benefits. Using a Cox Hazard model with a split sample design on 114 regional IGOs I find that low institutionalized IGOs with mostly non-democratic members are more likely to fail than are democratic ones. My findings support the importance of institutional design and conditional effects to understanding the vitality of international organizations.

In chapter four I explore the relatively unstudied phenomena of IGO succession. To understand IGO succession we must study the design of successor IGOs relative to their predecessors. This requires examining pairs of IGOs, predecessors and successors. New IGOs are not created in a vacuum, but often incorporate institutional knowledge or tangible resources from past IGOs. I make three conjectures about IGO succession. The majority of successions will occur with minimal time gap between organizations, most successor IGOs will not have expanded issue area responsibilities but will on average increase in institutional size from their predecessors. I explore these questions through a sample of 44 IGO pairs, coded for their transition type, successor fate, change in scope, time gap between IGOs, and change in institutional size. I identify trends of minimal gaps and high survival rates in successors. I find that issue area responsibility is rarely increased, but institutional size is, especially when there is

[21] Fearon, James D. "Signaling foreign policy interests: Tying hands versus sinking costs." Journal of conflict resolution 41, no. 1 (1997): 68-90; Simmons, Beth A., and Allison Danner. "Credible commitments and the international criminal court." International Organization 64, no. 2 (2010): 225-256.
[22] Fang, Songying, and Erica Owen. "International institutions and credible commitment of non-democracies." The Review of International Organizations 6 (2011): 141-162.

an increase in responsibility. I also explore increases in IGO autonomy through three cases, the replacement of the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) with the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the replacement of the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) with the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI), and the replacement of the Central African Customs Economic Union (UDEAC) with the Central African and Monetary Community (CEMAC). In all three cases the successor IGO was granted higher autonomy. These trends contribute to our understanding of the evolution of international institutions and identify areas for further research into the institutional design of successor IGOs.

Through these chapters I contribute to our understanding of how institutional design impacts IGOs ability to foster cooperation, IGO failure, and IGO succession. The share of joint IGO memberships in more institutionalized IGOs can increase cooperative interactions between state, including outside of the IGO. I have provided empirical evidence of how institutional design can impact the vitality of an IGO, but this impact is distinct to IGOs with a majority of non-democratic members. I contribute to the emerging research on IGO succession, identifying trends that meet some expectations, states seek to minimize interruption of benefits, and others that may be surprising, states are often willing to increase the institutional capacity of successors even when they do not increase their issue areas. These findings may be relevant for policymakers, with institutionalization warranting more attention for understanding interactions between states, the nature of authoritarian states and IGOs, and the design of successor IGOs In summary, as IGOs have become ubiquitous throughout the international system and virtually all states have become members of multiple IGOs of varying designs, the concept that not all IGOs are equal is more important than ever, as is our understanding of how variation in the design of IGOs impacts their ability to foster cooperation and their vitality.

Chapter 2
Institutionalized Cooperation

Introduction

Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) are theorized to foster cooperation between states on specific collective action issues. They help states gather information, identify mutual interests, reduce transaction costs, and monitor compliance. Empirical analysis supports this view, with studies showing that IGOs have helped foster cooperation on specific issue areas such as trade, navigation, and standards coordination. Moreover, research suggests that IGOs may help prevent conflict. However, previous research has not evaluated whether IGOs foster broad dyadic cooperation outside of specific issues and the IGO itself. There is wide variation in the forms and intensity of cooperation between states, which IGOs contribute to. IGOs also vary in both design and function, with institutional variation impacting the effect of IGOs generating agreement between member states. Not all IGOs are going to facilitate cooperation to the same degree. Much IGO scholarship has focused on pacifying effects of IGOs, but the absence of conflict is not all there is to cooperation. There has been less empirical study of how IGOs facilitate general non-conflict related cooperation. This leaves questions about the strength of the effect of IGOs on cooperation and the specific nature of that effect. I test the effect of IGO design on general cooperation using intensity scores of dyadic events to measure cooperation across a range of issues and methods.

How does the design of an intergovernmental organization affect cooperation between its member states? The effect of shared IGO membership is not uniform, "not all IGOs are created equal" due to variation in design.[23] Currently, we have limited knowledge about how variation in

[23] Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom, "Do IOs Promote Peace?" 2004.

IGO design impacts cooperation between states. There has also been less study of the extent that IGOs increase cooperation outside of their narrow issue areas, their 'spill over' effect. More understanding of how the design of IGOs fosters member-state cooperation is important for interstate relations and IGO institutional design. As noted above, much previous research has studied the pacifying effects of IGO membership, yet security and political IGOs make up a smaller portion than other less studied issue areas.[24] Interstate cooperation ranges widely from vague public statements to formal declarations to binding agreements requiring material commitments. Factors that reduce conflict, inherently costly for states, may not be the same factors that foster cooperation, or have the same impact. These factors may be related, but factors of cooperation are distinct enough to warrant their own empirical examination. More study is needed to understand how IGOs foster cooperation and how variation in IGOs themselves affects this.

In this chapter I empirically examine whether joint IGO membership increases dyadic cooperation. Specifically, I evaluate how the institutional design of IGOs can explain variation in cooperative interactions between state dyads. Building on previous theories that IGOs have a general positive effect on cooperation, I argue and empirically test that the more a dyad shares membership in institutionalized IGOs the more cooperative they will be. I focus on three key mechanisms of IGOs for facilitating cooperation, information services, identifying mutual interest, and reducing transaction costs. The shared IGO memberships between two states shapes their interactions with each other and their overall relationship. This relationship will then apply to cooperation between the two states outside of their shared organizations. This helps us

[24] Debre and Dijkstra, "Institutional design for a post liberal order" 2021.

understand variation in IGOs and how they facilitate interstate cooperation based on their institutional design.

I expect that more institutionalized IGOs will be more effective at providing information that reduces uncertainty, helping states identify and develop mutual interests, and reducing transaction costs easing cooperation. The more two states interactions are facilitated and shaped through an IGO with higher institutionalization, the more likely they will be to cooperate. This cooperative relationship which develops then continues outside of the narrow issue area of the IGO. As most states are members of multiple organizations, this effect will vary depending on the share of their joint memberships with different levels of institutionalization. Broadly, the more states share memberships in IGOs with higher categories of institutionalization, the more they will cooperate both within and outside of the IGO.

I test this empirically using joint membership in IGOs with different levels of institutionalization and a novel measure that captures the degree to which states cooperate dyadically. To construct this measure, I use the Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS) events dataset with Conflict and Mediation Event Observations (CAMEO) coding which measures a broad range of dyadic interactions. Using this I create an average annual "cooperation intensity" score that aggregates cooperative events, such as expressing intent to cooperate, granting diplomatic recognition, and signing formal agreements, as well as uncooperative events, such as making demands, denouncement, and rejecting offers from the other state. This enables me to examine interstate cooperation more broadly, rather than focusing on conflict or a specific issue area. For my institutional design data, I use IGO institutionalization levels created by Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom and updated by Karreth

and Tir.[25] I then use multivariate regression to conduct statistical analyses evaluating whether variation in joint IGO membership and variation in the institutional design of joint IGOs, contributes to the level of dyadic cooperation between states.

I find statistical significance that shared membership in more institutionalized IGOs increases cooperation. I also find suggestive evidence that shared membership in less institutionalized IGOs may actually decrease diplomatic forms of cooperation. This contributes to refining our understanding of how IGOs foster cooperation, specifically how variation in institutional design can affect member state relationships to increase cooperation both through the IGO and generally. It provides empirical support that IGOs can increase general dyadic cooperation, but the effect may be dependent on institutional design with variation for specific categories of cooperation, such as diplomatic.

Cooperation through Intergovernmental organizations

While some theories about IGOs emphasize they generate broader cooperation beyond just preserving peace or resolving collective action problems, most IGOs are formed for specific purposes. These can vary widely, from mutual security to technical standards to waterway navigation, for the benefit of their members. The specific need that cannot be resolved bilaterally prompts states to work through a multilateral organization. Analysis suggests that networks of member states of IGOs have become less fragmented in recent decades.[26] States are working through IGOs more frequently than in the past. When states act through IGOs they are simultaneously pursuing their own interests while recognizing the necessity of ceding some

[25] Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom, "Do IOs Promote Peace?" 2004; Karreth and Tir, "International Institutions" 2013.
[26] Greenhill, Brian, and Yonatan Lupu. "Clubs of clubs: Fragmentation in the network of intergovernmental organizations." International Studies Quarterly 61, no. 1 (2017): 181-195.

independence to those IGOs. IGOs are both influenced by powerful member states and possess some independent authority in order to be effective at providing benefits.[27] Variation in state interests, influence, and relative power results in variation in specific obstacles to cooperation. Regardless, the conventional wisdom is that IGOs help create a more cooperative environment and increase cooperation generally in the international system. How does this occur? There is still much to learn about what factors make IGOs able to reconcile the different goals of self-interested states to overcome obstacles to cooperation, not only on specific issue areas of the IGO but also beyond it as well.

Much of the previous empirical research on IGO's and cooperation has focused on the effect of IGOs on specific cooperative actions. One example of this is scholarship on coordination of environment policy and how that can overlap with domestic politics.[28] Another is economic and trade organizations, especially larger institutions such as the World Trade Organization.[29] Other research has focused on how IGOs have shaped cooperation on human rights issues and the spread norms of acceptable state behavior.[30] These studies illustrate the impact IGOs can have on their specific issue areas.

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[27] Abbott, Kenneth W., and Duncan Snidal. "Why states act through formal international organizations." Journal of conflict resolution 42, no. 1 (1998): 3-32.; Hooghe, Lenz, and Marks A Theory of Intergovernmental organization 2019.

[28] See examples in Biermann, Frank, and Steffen Bauer. "Assessing the effectiveness of intergovernmental organisations in international environmental politics." Global Environmental Change 14, no. 2 (2004): 189-193; and Longhofer, Wesley, Evan Schofer, Natasha Miric, and David John Frank. "NGOs, INGOs, and environmental policy reform, 1970–2010." Social Forces 94, no. 4 (2016): 1743-1768.

[29] See Rose, Andrew K. "Do we really know that the WTO increases trade?." American economic review 94, no. 1 (2004): 98-114; Ingram, Paul, Jeffrey Robinson, and Marc L. Busch. "The intergovernmental network of world trade: IGO connectedness, governance, and embeddedness." American journal of sociology 111, no. 3 (2005): 824-858; Mansfield, Edward D., and Jon CW Pevehouse. "The expansion of preferential trading arrangements." International Studies Quarterly 57, no. 3 (2013): 592-604; and Esteve-Pérez, Silviano, Salvador Gil-Pareja, and Rafael Llorca-Vivero. "Does the GATT/WTO promote trade? After all, Rose was right." Review of World Economics 156, no. 2 (2020): 377-405.

[30] See Risse, Thomas, and Kathryn Sikkink. "The socialization of international human rights norms into domestic practices: introduction." Cambridge Studies in International Relations 66 (1999): 1-38; Hawkins, Darren. "Explaining costly international institutions: Persuasion and enforceable human rights norms." International Studies Quarterly 48, no. 4 (2004): 779-804; Greenhill, Brian. "The company you keep: International socialization and the diffusion of human rights norms." International studies quarterly 54, no. 1 (2010): 127-145; and Tallberg, Jonas,

Research by conflict scholars has found empirical support for the notion that IGOs can reduce the risk of conflict specific purpose, especially reducing conflict. These findings have generally found IGOs decrease the risk of conflict, often described as part of the three Kantian aspects of democratic peace theory.[31] There is still variation even in the pacifying effects of IGOs, with Anderson, Mitchell, and Schilling finding that specific time frames and IGO designs can increase dyadic conflict.[32] Further research on design examining institutionalization or meeting regularity have found significant pacifying effects.[33] Many articles treat mitigating conflict and cooperation as equivalent. Crescenzi, Enterline, and Long's article titled "Bring Cooperation Back" uses shared membership or shared joining of an IGO as a measure of cooperation to predict conflict onset.[34] Joint IGO membership is assumed to be a proxy for cooperation and the focus is on lessening conflict. Some of this research theorizes the importance of institutional design, looking at how internal factors of IGOs affect how they mitigate conflict. Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom examine variation in IGO design by categorizing three levels of institutionalization, with the highest level being described as interventionist IGOs. Using these categories, they find interventionist IGOs reduce the risk of militarized disputes.[35] Karreth and Tir build on Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom finding

Magnus Lundgren, Thomas Sommerer, and Theresa Squatrito. "Why international organizations commit to liberal norms." International Studies Quarterly 64, no. 3 (2020): 626-640.

[31] See Russett, Bruce, John Oneal, and David Davis. "The Third Leg of the Kantian Tripod for Peace: International Organizations and Militarized Disputes, 1950-1985." International Organization 52, no. 3 (1998): 441; Oneal, John R., and Bruce Russett. "The Kantian peace: The pacific benefits of democracy, interdependence, and international organizations, 1885–1992." World politics 52, no. 1 (1999): 1-37; and Dorussen, Han, and Hugh Ward. "Intergovernmental organizations and the Kantian peace: A network perspective." Journal of Conflict Resolution 52, no. 2 (2008): 189-212.

[32] Anderson, Christopher C., Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, and Emily U. Schilling. "Kantian dynamics revisited: Time-varying analyses of dyadic IGO-conflict relationships." International Interactions 42, no. 4 (2016): 644-676.

[33] Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom, 2004; Haftel, Yoram Z. "Designing for peace: regional integration arrangements, institutional variation, and militarized interstate disputes." International Organization 61, no. 1 (2007): 217-237.

[34] Crescenzi, Mark J. C., Andrew J. Enterline, and Stephen B. Long. "Bringing Cooperation Back In: A Dynamic Model of Interstate Interaction." Conflict Management and Peace Science 25, no. 3 (2008): 264–80

[35] Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom, "Do IOs Promote Peace?" 2004.

similar pacifying effects for intrastate conflict associated with greater institutionalization.[36] This body of research explores how IGOs bring states together and resolve problems, but specifically for reducing conflict. These works contribute important insights into our understanding of IGOs, but specific to narrow issue areas, mitigating conflict, or focused on individual major institutions. They leave open questions about general cooperation and how IGOs might impact a wider variety of state interactions.

Beyond the static effect that IGOs do (or do not) have on cooperation, recent research has also examined variation in the design of IGOs. Institutional design has already been shown to affect outcomes in the conflict literature above. Institutional design research suggests that the design of IGOs matters not only for the operation of an IGO but also its interactions with member states. Not all IGOs are the same, some are complex institutions with expert staff independent of their member states, sometimes with some power to enact penalties, while others are largely 'on paper' forums for meetings of heads of state. Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal provide theoretical groundwork for studying institutional design in IGOs, emphasizing dimensions of membership, scope, centralization, control, and flexibility.[37] Institutional design attributes in organization, contract terms, expertise and operation of the bureaucracy, are all found to be important factors that condition how IGOs function. Lenz et al finds evidence the internal dynamics of an IGO impact how flexible it can be over time, with the capacity for endogenous change shaped by the organizational structure at founding, with "open-ended" contractual IGOs having a greater capacity for new forms of cooperation, engendering more

[36] Karreth and Tir, "International Institutions" 2013.
[37] Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal, "Rational Design of International Institutions" 2001.

delegated authority from member states.[38] Dur, Baccini, and Elsig code the "depth" of preferential trade agreements, finding it effects how much a PTA will increase trade.[39] Debre and Dijkstra find an IGOs' secretariat size matters for its survival, with larger secretariats reducing their likelihood of failure.[40] Lall finds that IGOs with more technical issue areas have more de facto policy autonomy, making those IGOs more independent actors.[41] Nielson and Tierney find that the level of autonomy states grant an IGO is dynamic, fluctuating over time through interactions between member states and the IGO.[42] While this research provides evidence of the importance of institutional design, it does not explore how design matters for general interstate cooperation. A primary theoretical function of IGOs is fostering cooperation, institutional design is pivotal for IGO operation, yet there is little empirical study of how design matters for this function.

While conventional wisdom and evidence from conflict studies suggest that IGOs should promote cooperation, we do observe variation in levels of cooperation. Not all IGOs are successful, with some having limited effect or failing entirely. Research has found some negative effects of IGOs. Hafner-Burton and Schneider find that member state corruption in IGOs can spread to other member states and undermine anti-corruption mechanisms in the IGO.[43] Barnett and Finnemore demonstrate that bureaucracies in IGOs can be come dysfunction and impede

[38] Lenz, Tobias, Besir Ceka, Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, and Alexandr Burilkov. "Discovering cooperation: Endogenous change in international organizations." The review of international organizations 18, no. 4 (2023): 631-666.
[39] Dür, Andreas, Leonardo Baccini, and Manfred Elsig. "The design of international trade agreements: Introducing a new dataset." The Review of International Organizations 9 (2014): 353-375.
[40] Debre and Dijkstra, "Institutional Design for a Post-Liberal Order." 2021.
[41] Lall, "Beyond Institutional Design" 2017.
[42] Nielson, Daniel L., and Michael J. Tierney. "Delegation to international organizations: Agency theory and World Bank environmental reform." International organization 57, no. 2 (2003): 241-276.
[43] Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., and Christina J. Schneider. "The dark side of cooperation: International organizations and member corruption." International Studies Quarterly 63, no. 4 (2019): 1108-1121.

their operation.[44] This research suggests there is important variation in the effect of IGOs on interstate cooperation that requires further study.

Many scholars have theorized about how self-interested states benefit from cooperating through IGOs and why they would choose to do so.[45] Yet, most research on IGOs has not examined how they foster cooperation or variation in levels of cooperation outside of specific conditions. One early study that did look at variation in general cooperations by McCormick found evidence of more cooperative foreign policy behavior through IGOs than without them.[46] McCormick used an events dataset, the Comparative Research on Events of Nations (CREON) data set of specifically foreign policy events between 35 states. McCormick primarily tested joint IGO membership, but also divided IGOs into "high politics," military and political, and "low politics," economic, technical, or social, regional, and global categories. Within these categories McCormick found that low politics IGOs had higher foreign policy cooperation than high politics IGOs. [47] However little further research has been done on the effect of IGOs on broader interstate cooperation. Current research using updated data and methods is needed.

In sum, the conventional wisdom is that IGOs foster cooperation and many view them as pivotal institutions in the international system. Yet we still lack a complete understanding of how different IGOs impact cooperation, as well as whether they foster cooperation beyond the often narrow issue areas that they operate in. Most empirical studies since McCormick have focused on conflict or limited to specific issue areas. Research on institutional design suggests it matters for how IGOs reconcile competing member interests and facilitate cooperation. My contribution

[44] Barnett and Finnemore, "The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations." 1999.
[45] See Abbot and Snidal, "Why states act" 1998; Koremenos Lipson and Snidal, "Rational Design" 2001; and Gilpin, Robert. Global political economy: Understanding the international economic order. Princeton university press, 2001.
[46] McCormick, James M. "Intergovernmental organizations and cooperation among nations." International Studies Quarterly 24, no. 1 (1980): 75-98.
[47] McCormick, "IGOs and cooperation among nations" 1980.

starts exploring these gaps by building on Boehmer Gartzke and Nordstrom examination of institutionalization and on McCormick with a more recent events dataset on a wider range of cooperation and more states that allows for examining categories of cooperation. I provide empirical evidence that IGOs foster cooperation. I specifically test how different levels of IGO institutionalization impact general and diplomatic dyadic cooperation, providing an examination of how and to what extent fostering of general cooperation is taking place.

Institutionalization Design and Interstate Cooperation

If intergovernmental organizations improve general dyadic cooperation, how do they achieve that and what design attributes lead to more or less cooperation? If IGOs foster broad cooperation we need a better understanding of how they do so and what contributes to variation in cooperation outcomes. Previous theories have broadly identified a range of important functions of IGOs: reducing uncertainty, lowering transaction costs, pooling resources, monitoring compliance, and socializing states into cooperative norms.[48] The actual operation of an IGO is carried out by some form of bureaucracy, which may vary from small and informal to incredibly large and complex with many sub organizations. The institutional design of an IGO shapes how it operates which impacts how it performs key mechanisms that facilitate cooperation. Specific "centralization" functions of disseminating information and reducing transaction costs are important design features to the operation of an IGO and how much authority it has relative to its member states.[49] States' willingness to surrender authority to an

[48] See Keohane, Robert O. After hegemony. Vol. 54. Princeton: Princeton university press, 1984; and Axelrod, Robert, and Robert O. Keohane. "Achieving cooperation under anarchy: Strategies and institutions." World politics 38, no. 1 (1985): 226-254. for earlier theory. Then Bearce, David H., and Stacy Bondanella. "Intergovernmental organizations, socialization, and member-state interest convergence." International Organization 61, no. 4 (2007): 703-733; and Hooghe, Liesbet, Tobias Lenz, and Gary Marks. A theory of international organization. Oxford University Press, 2019. for more recent exploration of these mechanisms.
[49] Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal, "Rational Design of International Institutions" 2001.

international organization implies the high value of membership benefits, which then gives the IGO some power to coerce state behavior by withholding those benefits.[50] IGOs foster cooperation and shape member state behavior through multiple mechanisms that are impacted by the institutional design of the IGO.

For how different levels of institutionalization foster general dyadic cooperation I focus on three areas, providing information, identifying mutual interest, and lowering transaction costs. IGOs that effectively broker information between member states help them reduce uncertainty and make credible commitments. IGOs further build on this by helping states identify mutual interests and socializing them to shared norms. IGOs that reduce transaction costs in agreements make it easier for states to cooperate and enter into successive agreements later on. These combined efforts help states build cooperative relationships that apply outside of the IGO, increasing general dyadic cooperation.

IGOs are designed with varying levels of staff and facilities, codified processes and procedures, rules on member voting, secretariat and sub-organ structure, autonomy of the IGO from its members, presence of adjudicating bodies, and ability to impose costs on member states. Less institutionalized IGOs are largely forums for meetings between heads of states or their principles, without codified procedures, formal structure, or binding votes.[51] Conversely more institutionalized IGOs operate more through their secretariat and staff, with formal structures and sub-organs, some decision making power with the IGO staff, codified rules and procedures, and at the highest levels the ability to enact some form of costs on defecting member states.[52] Variation in the level of institutionalization impacts the effectiveness of the IGO's operation.

[50] Karreth and Tir, "International Institutions" 2013.
[51] Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom, "Do IOs Promote Peace?" 2004.
[52] Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom, "Do IOs Promote Peace?" 2004.

Research suggests that economic and social connections between states are more beneficial when made through IGOs with more institutionalized bureaucracies.[53] A dysfunctional bureaucracy in an IGO may also lower its effectiveness in providing member benefits. [54] The institutional design of an IGO matters, affecting how an IGO will perform in the three key areas for increasing cooperation, providing information, identifying mutual interest, and reducing transaction costs.

First, IGOs provide information that helps reduce uncertainty around the costs and benefits of cooperation. IGOs may have more effective information gathering capacities, provide information about past state behavior, and useful context about state intentions.[55] We have empirical evidence of this pertaining to trade agreements, where IGOs have reduced uncertainty and facilitated credible commitments.[56] As part of information services, IGOs can monitor defection, helping members punish rule breakers and make credible commitments. Dedicated and trained staff can provide consistency and expertise. Standardization provides more accurate information, consistent processes, and oversight. Member states create "check sand balances" through the process and procedures of the IGO.[57] Variation in these internal checks and balances can impact member state trust in the IGO's independence and effectiveness, diminishing or increasing the IGO's ability to foster cooperation. Even without specific enforcement mechanisms, IGOs can incentivize compliance and discourage cheating.[58] These functions require staff, resources, and standardized procedures to be more effective. The more institutionalized an IGO is, the more it can perform these information functions.

[53] Ingram, Robinson, and Busch, "Intergovernmental Network of World Trade" 2005.
[54] Barnett and Finnemore, "Politics, Power, and Pathologies of IOs" 1999.
[55] Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal, "Rational Design of International Institutions" 2001.
[56] Baccini, Leonardo, and Soo Yeon Kim. "Preventing protectionism: International institutions and trade policy." The review of international organizations 7, no. 4 (2012): 369-398.
[57] Nielson and Tierney, "Delegation to IOs" 2003.
[58] Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal, "Rational Design of International Institutions" 2001.

Second, IGO theory proposes IGOs can help states identify areas where they have mutual interests, consider opportunities for long term benefits, and even socialize states into shared norms.[59] McCormick explained differences in foreign policy cooperation in his study as a two-fold socializing process where beneficial contact between officials engenders "positive attitudes" that produces more cooperative behavior between states.[60] Additional evidence suggest IGOs can help states created shared norms and interests.[61] This can spill over beyond just the IGO, with some research suggesting when institutionalization level affects "information-driven" learning there can be domestic policy convergence.[62] Furthermore, these socialization effects can be tied to IGO design, with unstructured IGOs not having the same effect.[63] When states recognize mutual interest in long term cooperation with other states and grow closer in norms of behavior it does not just impact interaction through the IGO, but the full relationship between both states. Socialization through the IGO builds a generally more cooperative relationship between states. Joint membership IGOs that more effectively build this relationship will increase overall dyadic cooperation.

A third way IGO institutionalization can foster cooperation is through reductions in transaction costs. Through IGOs member states can pool resources and share costs of agreements. They can agree to terms for multiple states at the same time, rather than repeated bilateral negotiations. Member states can rely on the IGO for mediation or monitoring. These interactions involve state officials interacting repeatedly, which can lead to identifying other

[59] See Abbot and Snidal, "Why States Act" 1998; and Russet and Oneal, Triangulating Peace 2001.
[60] McCormick, "IGOs and cooperation among nations" 1980.
[61] Chelotti, Nicola, Niheer Dasandi, and Slava Jankin Mikhaylov. "Do intergovernmental organizations have a socialization effect on member state preferences? Evidence from the UN General Debate." International Studies Quarterly 66, no. 1 (2022); Bearce and Bondanella, "IGOs, Socialization, and Member-State Interest Convergence" 2007.
[62] Cao, "Networks of Intergovernmental Organizations" 2009.
[63] Bearce and Bondanella, "IGOs, Socialization, and Member-State Interest Convergence" 2007.

common interests and new areas of cooperation that they then take back to the state. These new areas may even be bilateral, not requiring the IGO's direct involvement. Existing IGOs rules and frameworks stay in effect or can be reused, saving costs of recreating them. These become standards for cooperative agreements and are not limited to working within the IGO. Several studies have found evidence that states frequently re-use terms and language from previous agreements in future agreements, and that language from within an IGO, such as the WTO, is used in bilateral agreements outside of the organization.[64] States negotiate through the WTO, seeing specific terms and language in effect. Officials interact and gain knowledge of each other's preferences. Then when they enter into negotiations bilaterally that existing knowledge reduces the time and resources needed, especially when states adopt language directly from agreements already created. Furthermore, interactions between officials may lead to identifying new areas for cooperation unexpectedly. Early transaction costs of cooperation that are facilitated by an IGO may then be applied to bilateral agreements outside of the IGO, creating the spill over effect on cooperation.

Member states also draw on similar or previous IGOs when designing new ones.[65] States will seek to avoid 'reinventing the wheel' when possible and evidence suggests they will take information and frameworks from multilateral cooperation through IGOs and apply them to bilateral cooperation outside of IGOs. Reducing transaction costs is a key mechanism of IGOs that can vary due to institutional design factors, especially for more complex written agreements.[66] A more institutionalized IGOs with more resources and expertise to craft effective

[64] See Allee, Todd, and Manfred Elsig. "Are the contents of international treaties copied and pasted? Evidence from preferential trade agreements." International Studies Quarterly 63, no. 3 (2019): 603-613; and Allee, Todd, Manfred Elsig, and Andrew Lugg. "The ties between the world trade organization and preferential trade agreements: A textual analysis." Journal of international economic law 20, no. 2 (2017): 333-363.
[65] Reinsberg, Bernhard, and Oliver Westerwinter. "Institutional overlap in global governance and the design of intergovernmental organizations." The Review of International Organizations 18, no. 4 (2023): 693-724.
[66] Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal, "Rational Design" 2001.

language, especially when the issue area is highly technical, is not only going to increase cooperation between member states, but also between states negotiating outside of the IGO. If an IGO's design makes it more effective at reducing transaction costs, states are more likely to cooperate.

Brokering information, identifying mutual interest, and reducing transaction costs all help to create foundations and develop relationships for states to continue their cooperation in the future. As agreements are upheld or not, states establish reputations with each other as cooperative or uncooperative types. That reputational information is updated regardless of whether interactions occur inside or outside of an IGO. State reputations are by no means the only factor in making decisions, but they play a significant role and as IGOs help states build more reliable reputations it helps increase cooperation. Crescenzi, Enterline, and Long conceptualize dyadic state relationships as "continuous phenomena" that strengthens or weakens through cooperative and conflictual shocks.[67] Crescenzi et al further find that states evaluate the reputation of other states when considering forming alliances.[68] Weisger and Yarhi-Milo also find that states change their assessment of reputations over time, with past actions mattering less when more recent actions exhibit different behavior.[69] States are also not cooperating in a vacuum. The dominant liberal international order favors multilateralism and cooperation, and IGOs are seen as pivotal to creating and maintaining that order. To understand some of the variation in cooperation between states we need to understand how IGO institutionalization affects facilitating cooperation.

[67] Crescenzi, Enterline, and Long, "Bringing Cooperation Back In" 2008.
[68] Crescenzi, Mark JC, Jacob D. Kathman, Katja B. Kleinberg, and Reed M. Wood. "Reliability, reputation, and alliance formation." International Studies Quarterly 56, no. 2 (2012): 259-274.
[69] Weisiger, Alex, and Keren Yarhi-Milo. "Revisiting reputation: How past actions matter in international politics." International Organization 69, no. 2 (2015): 473-495.

First, I will examine the relationship between total joint IGO membership and cooperation. Theories of IGOs suggest they increase cooperation between states. I will test this basic assertion as the more IGOs a dyad share, as a simple count, the more they will cooperate generally. If all IGOs provide some level of information services and reduced transaction costs, there should be some positive effect on cooperation. This evaluates the impact of IGOs regardless of institutional design and provides a baseline for comparison.

H_1: More joint IGO memberships will increase dyadic cooperation.

Next, I will evaluate my theory of the effect of IGO institutional design on interstate cooperation. I argue that that a greater level of institutionalization within an IGO will increase cooperation between member states overall. As more of a dyad's interactions occur through institutionalized IGOs, states will have less uncertainty through information provision, recognition of mutual interest, and lower transaction costs. This will lead to more cooperation, including spill over cooperation, than cooperation facilitated through less institutionalized IGOs. This leads to my first hypotheses, as the share of joint membership in institutionalized IGOs increases it will have a positive relationship with generally dyadic cooperation. I evaluate this for three categories of institutionalization.

H_2: Joint membership in more institutionalized IGOs will have increase dyadic cooperation.

Research Design

I test my theoretical expectations through regressions of joint IGO membership on a novel dataset that measures the intensity of cooperative events between countries. My sample comprises 160 states forming 3985 dyads from 1995 to 2002. The timeframe is limited due to the availability of overlapping cooperation and institutionalization data. This provides me with

approximately 12,900 observations. Shared IGO membership for a dyad ranges from 11 to 106 organizations. I create this dataset from the COW IGO dataset with variables from Karreth and Tir 2013, Bearce and Bondanella 2007, and with controls from COW MIDs data and Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten 2017 UN voting data.[70] This provides a global sample, post cold war, of state dyads with variation in joint membership in IGOs with different levels of institutionalization.

To capture interstate cooperation, I use 'intensity' scores of state-to-state interactions from the Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS) data, specifically the Conflict and Mediation Event Observations (CAMEO) coding within the ICEWS data. The ICEWS data uses interactions between socio-political actors as individual events for the unit of observation, with over 900,000 observations .[71] The CAMEO coding provides categories for a broad range of political interaction for over 200,000 events.[72] These events are coded for a variety of attributes, including the actors involved, the nature of the event, and its intensity. Each event is given a CAMEO code for the type of interaction, ranging from making public statements, appeals, or declaration to conducting unconventional assaults, conventional fighting, or unconventional mass violence. Each of these categories has a specific code, with subcategories that refine the nature of the event further. Examples of these subcategories are praise or endorse, grant diplomatic recognition, cooperation economically, and cooperate militarily. Each category and

[70] Karreth and Tir, "International Institutions" 2013; Bearce and Bondanella, "IGOs, Socialization" 2007; Bailey, Michael A., Anton Strezhnev, and Erik Voeten. "Estimating dynamic state preferences from United Nations voting data." Journal of Conflict Resolution 61, no. 2 (2017): 430-456; Pevehouse et al, "COW IGO 3.0" 2019; Palmer, Glenn, Vito D'Orazio, Michael Kenwick and Matthew Lane. 2015. The MID4 Data Set, 2002-2010. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 32(2), pp. 222-242.

[71] Boschee, Elizabeth, Jennifer Lautenschlager, Sean O'Brien, Steve Shellman, James Starz, and Michael Ward. "ICEWS coded event data." Harvard Dataverse 12 (2015): 2.

[72] Gerner, Deborah J., Philip A. Schrodt, Omür Yilmaz, and Rajaa Abu-Jabr. "Conflict and mediation event observations (cameo): A new event data framework for the analysis of foreign policy interactions." International Studies Association, New Orleans (2002).

subcategory is then given an intensity score, ranging from -10 to 10, with negative being uncooperative or hostile actions and positive being positive or cooperative actions. Making a formal statement condemning another state would have an intensity score of -2, rejecting a ceasefire agreement a -4, and conventional military warfare would be a -10. On the cooperative side, hosting a formal visit would be a 2.8, expressing intent to cooperate would be a 4, economic material cooperation would be a 7.4, signing a formal diplomatic agreement would be an 8. These are coded by subcategory, so there may be both negative and positive scores within the same general category, making a pessimistic public statement has an intensity score of -0.4 while making an optimistic public statement would be 0.4. A crisis may generate multiple interaction events that would be coded individually in the dataset with their own CAMEO category and intensity score. For example, State A borders State B, which is having internal conflict over political repression. If state A appeals for humanitarian aid for State B, that would have a positive intensity score of 3.4. But if state A demands a change in leadership, that would be a -5 intensity score, and if state B rejects a demand for change in leadership, that would be a -4. If state A decides to provide humanitarian aid to state B itself, that would be a high intensity score of 7.4. The ICEWS data provides a different way to examine cooperation between actors. It captures a range of cooperative events in a single dataset, distinct from looking solely at formal treaties or trade flows. It could also be used to examine overtime comparisons to see changes in cooperation intensity. It allows for examining specific times of state interactions.

As with any dataset, there are limitations to the ICEWS data with CAMEO coding. Data collection on these events only began in 1995, limiting the past application or comparisons to different system polarities. This data draws upon a multitude of sources, capturing more forms of cooperation than traditional measures, but may not be comprehensive and faces limitations in

data collection especially during instability. Dyads with fewer interactions will have events with high value intensity scores affect the average more than dyads with more interactions. It also faces the ongoing challenge of studying international relations in placing complex events into simple categories with standardized intensity scores. However, these categories, subcategories, and intensity scores still provide an alternative measure of cooperation levels between states that can be refined by specific types of cooperation or conflict behavior. It provides a useful supplement to existing measures and can help fill gaps in empirical study of interstate cooperation, especially below the state level.

To create the data for my exploration of IGO institutional design on cooperation, I take the ICEWS dataset from years 1995 to 2002, the time period that overlaps with the existing institutionalization measure. Due to these data limitations, the data is unbalanced, with not all dyads having values for all years. To focus on actions of tangible interstate cooperation, not simply a lack of conflict, I tailored the dataset to state actors engaging in cooperative or uncooperative behavior that is not conflict. I limited the dataset to a specific list of cameo codes that focus on state-to-state non-conflict related cooperation.[73] This also demonstrates the usefulness of CAMEO codes in the event dataset to focus on specific types of state interactions. I further limited the data to events between governments or government actors. CAMEO codes include categories for communicative or signaling events such as a public declaration of intent and measurable actions such as agreement or commitment of resources. To account for issues of 'cheap talk' that may not result in more substantive cooperation, I also remove the general public statement category, which is distinct from declarations of intent. I do run a model with all event

[73] See Appendix A for the list of events included in State-to-State Cooperation.

codes still included as a robustness check.[74] I then collapse the ICEWS events data by dyad year, creating annual average intensity scores for each set of events, non-conflict state-to-state events and all events.

My first dependent variable is *total JIGO* which is a count of the total number of IGOs both states share memberships in that year. This accounts for the basic effect of having more joint membership in IGOs regardless of institutional design. For my primary dependent variables, I use the annual averaged intensity scores as my dependent variables, *state-to-state cooperation* and *general cooperation*. The annual average intensity score of a dyad for non-conflict state-to-state events is used for *state-to-state cooperation*. This focuses on more diplomatic interaction between states that is not directly associated with militarized conflict. The annual average intensity score of a dyad for all events between government actors is used for *general cooperation* as a robustness check. *State-to-state cooperation* provides a single yearly score of how cooperative or uncooperative two states have been. I chose to average these scores to create a general measure that captured both positive and negative events and give more weight to cooperation that required more commitment and resources, based on the cameo intensity score. A simple count of events would treat all interactions equally. An average captures states cooperating on some issues while being uncooperative on others, with more meaningful cooperation such as signing an agreement raising the average more than a less meaningful act such as a public demand without resulting action. If the States A and B example above were the only interactions between those states that year, then *cooperation* for that dyad year would have a value of 0.45. This accounts for the cooperative events around aid to State B, in particular State

[74] Surrendering in a military conflict, coded as a 10 for cooperation intensity, was also removed as it did not fit the context of cooperation for this paper.

A expending resources to provide humanitarian aid, but also an uncooperative stance between the states in the rejected demands over change in leadership.

State-to-state cooperation has a mean of 6.09 with a range of -8 to 8 and a standard deviation of 1.97. The lower quartile is 5.2 and the upper quartile is 7, putting half the observations in roughly a two point range in intensity. The mean *general cooperation* score is 2.69 with a range of -9.2 to 9 and a standard deviation of 2.03. The lower quartile is 1.14 and the upper quartile is 3.73. Eighty percent of values range between 1 and 5, making a one point change roughly equivalent to a twenty percent change in cooperation levels. As a real-world example, the United States and Iraq generally have *general cooperation* scores lower than -2 for while U.S. relations with friendly neighbors like Canada are higher than +2. Their *state-to-state cooperation* scores also follow this pattern, with more low or negative scores with Iraq and higher scores, all positive, with Canada. Scores may also change over time, with the United States and Cuba having a *general cooperation* value of -2.17 in 1996 after civilian planes carrying Cuban Americans were shot down and a value of 1.02 in 1999 after the U.S. eased travel restrictions to improve relations. *State-to-state cooperation* values also follow this variation over time, with an even lower negative score in 1996 and a higher positive score in 1999. *Cooperation* has an approximately normal distribution, with most dyads being somewhat cooperative, matching previous research and expectations considering basic diplomatic and economic interactions between states post cold war. These dependent variables allow me to measure interactions between states at multiple levels and include events often not measured in other studies. This could help address questions about how IGOs build cooperative or uncooperative relationships between member states. Using variables from this events data also

captures all interactions, not just those that occur through an IGO, enabling me to capture those 'spill over' effects of joint IGO membership.

To capture the influence of joint membership in IGOs with different levels of institutionalization I build upon the three categories created by Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom and expanded by Karreth and Tir.[75] IGOs with low institutionalization serve largely as forums for meetings between heads of state or their principals, with minimal staff or bureaucracy, codified procedures, or binding agreements. IGOs with medium institutionalization have a secretariat with dedicated staff and resources, written procedures, and internal divisions. IGOs with high institutionalization have even larger bureaucracies and greater internal organization, but also include stated mediation mechanisms and adjudication bodies, creating some form of enforcement of agreements. The higher the category, the more an IGO has the facilities and resources to provide information and reduce transaction costs to increase cooperation between its member states.

As states build their relationships with other states, the more their interactions are through IGOs with higher institutionalization, the more those two states build a cooperative relationship. Cooperation through an IGO is not entirely independent from cooperation through other IGOs. Rather interaction between two states compromises of a 'portfolio' of IGOs, resulting from their interactions in multiple organizations, not just one. The effect of institutionalization from a shared IGO is a relative one, part of a group. The effect of joint membership in highly institutionalized IGOs is different if it is from three out of nine shared IGOs or from three out of thirty shared IGOs, especially if a majority of the rest of the thirty are low institution IGOs. If one third of two states' interactions on issues they cannot resolve bilaterally is being facilitated

[75] Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom, "Do IOs Promote Peace?" 2004; Karreth and Tir, "International Institutions" 2013.

by highly institutionalized IGOs they will have a different effect than if that proportion is only one tenth.

To explore my theory on the impact of IGO institutionalization I measure the proportion of a dyad's shared IGOs for each institutionalization category. This captures how much of each dyad's IGO affected relationship is shaped by different levels of institutionalization. I use three variables, *low institutionalization, medium institutionalization,* and *high institutionalization* as my explanatory variables. Low is created by the number of joint memberships in IGOs with low institutionalization over the total joint memberships in the dyad, medium is created by taking medium plus high over the total joint memberships, and high is the number of shared high memberships over joint total memberships. Focusing on active cooperation and not reducing conflict, I exclude security focused IGOs.[76] The mitigating effect of security IGOs on conflict is well researched and conflict negotiation takes place under different conditions. I test each of these categories for their impact on dyadic cooperation.[77] I also use a count of all joint memberships in a dyad year for *total JIGOs.* This captures the basic effect of shared IGO membership alone. Table one displays summary statistics for these variables for my sample.

Table 1. Categories of Joint IGO Membership
Categories as percent of total joint IGOs for a dyad year

	Mean	**Lower Quartile**	**Upper Quartile**
Joint IGOs	41.7	32	49
Low Inst.	23.3%	17.2%	29%
Medium Inst.	58.3%	53.2%	63.4%
High Inst.	16.9%	14.5%	19%

[76] See Appendix for robustness check model with security IGOs included.
[77] This approach follows models from previous research by Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom 2004 and Karreth and Tir 2013.

These provide a measure for each level of institutionalization's influence over the whole relationship between the two states.

I account for existing *interest similarity* using the ideal point measure developed by Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten.[78] I reverse the sign so a positive coefficient indicates similar state interests. This controls for existing shared preferences between two states that would naturally drive cooperation. Previous research demonstrates regime type also impacts cooperation, with democracies more likely to cooperate with one another. I follow past literature by controlling for this using *polity difference*, created from the absolute difference of polity scores between the two states.[79] I include a binary variable, *allies*, for the existence of a formal alliance between the states in the dyad.[80] The relative economic and military power in a dyad may also impact cooperation between the two states. I use *capabilities* which takes the log of the higher state capacity over the lesser state capacity.[81] While I argue we need to consider cooperation as more than the absence of conflict, certainly ongoing conflict will impact cooperation levels in a dyad. I use a binary control, *conflict,* for if a dyad engaged in a militarized interstate dispute that year.[82] Finally I control for states with a shared border. The variable *contiguous* captures if there is a shared border or a water border less than 25 miles.[83] States with shared borders are both more likely to have opportunities for conflict that may impede cooperation but also have more issues which require cooperation between them.

We must be mindful of the limitations of this data and model. The data covers a limited time frame and not all dyads have observations. Examining broad dyadic cooperation inherently

[78] Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten, "Estimating Dynamic State Preferences" 2017.
[79] Bearce and Bondanella, "IGOs, Socialization, and Member-State Interest Convergence" 2007.
[80] Bearce and Bondanella, "IGOs, Socialization, and Member-State Interest Convergence" 2007.
[81] Bearce and Bondanella, "IGOs, Socialization, and Member-State Interest Convergence" 2007.
[82] Palmer et al, "The MID4 Dataset" 2010.
[83] Bearce and Bondanella, "IGOs, Socialization, and Member-State Interest Convergence" 2007.

hinders establishing clear causality. State dyad years are not independent observations, interactions carry over from year to year. For IGO institutionalization in particular, it is difficult to establish that greater institutionalization is a direct cause of dyadic cooperative. An alternative explanation could be these cooperative interactions lead states to design or join more institutionalized IGOs. In order to address these concerns, I perform additional models included in the appendix to attempt to address these limitations.

I test the effect of IGO institutionalization on average cooperation through a standard Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. This serves as my primary empirical test due to the limited time frame and unbalanced nature of the sample. I also conduct an additional time series regression to account for the temporal dimension of the data. I regress measures of joint membership in different levels of institutionalized IGOs on average interstate cooperation while including standard controls from past research. I run four OLS regressions with robust standard errors testing the effect of *total JIGO, low*, *medium,* and *high institutionalization* on state-to-state *cooperation,* with robust standard errors. While my primary model is an OLS regression due to the limited time period and unbalanced data, I also duplicate these four tests with time series regressions. I employ a random effects model with robust standard errors as I am comparing dyads to other dyads.[84] I then provide further robustness checks running OLS regressions using *general cooperation*, and then again using *general cooperation* for all interaction events between government actors. To account for the alternative explanation that increased cooperation prompts joint membership in more institutionalized IGOs I also perform both OLS and time series regressions with multiple versions of lagged dependent and independent variables, which are

[84] Hausman tests returned mixed results, but using a test parameter on indexed years rejected a fixed effects model. A Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test indicated a random effects model was appropriate.

included in the appendix.[85] These models provide an initial exploration of the relationship between joint membership in more institutionalized IGOs and greater interstate cooperation. They test the relationships in multiple ways and on different measures of cooperation.

Results

The results suggest a relationship between institutionalization and cooperation and provide some support for hypothesis one. Table two displays the regression results of joint IGO membership on *state-to-state cooperation*. A regression of *total JIGOs* testing a count of all joint memberships on *state-to-state cooperation* produces a statistically significant but negative result. This is a surprising result and contrary to conventional wisdom on IGO membership. Testing my institutional design explanatory variables, *low institutionalization* is also negative and significant at the .05 level. All else held equal, a one percent increase in the share of joint low institutionalized IGO memberships is associated with a 0.769 decrease in average intensity of dyadic cooperation. *Medium institutionalization* is statistically significant and positive at the .01 level.[86] A one percent increase in the share of joint medium and high institutionalized IGO memberships increases the average intensity score of dyadic cooperation by 1.461, all else equal. *High institutionalization* is also significant and positive, with a one percent increase in share of only joint high institutionalized IGO memberships associated with a 1.997 increase in average intensity score. The negative results for both the total count of joint memberships and low institutionalized memberships are interesting. They suggest there may not be a straightforward relationship between IGO membership and general cooperation. These results provide evidence counter to hypothesis one. The significant positive results for *medium* and *high*

[85] See Chapter 2 Appendix C.
[86] Testing medium institutionalization as medium alone produces the same significance and positive sign.

institutionalization provide support for hypothesis two. A greater share of joint membership in either category is associated with an increase in average intensity of *state-to-state cooperation*.[87]

Table 2. The Effect of Joint IGO Membership on State-to-State Cooperation

	All Joint IGOs	Low Inst IGOs	Med+Hi Inst IGOs	Hi Inst IGOs
Total JIGOs	**-0.010*** **			
	(0.002)			
Low Inst		**-0.769** **		
		(0.342)		
Med+Hi Inst			**1.461*** **	
			(0.404)	
High Inst				**1.997*** **
				(0.693)
Interest Similarity	0.164***	0.148***	0.148***	0.151***
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Polity Diff	0.003	0.008*	0.007	0.011**
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Allies	0.018	-0.063	-0.021	-0.043
	(0.078)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.075)
Capabilities	-0.048***	-0.038**	-0.046***	-0.035**
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Conflict	-0.300*	-0.270*	-0.265*	-0.266*
	(0.155)	(0.155)	(0.154)	(0.156)
Contiguous	0.018	0.001	0.025	0.018
	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.071)	(0.071)
N	6160	6160	6160	6160

*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 OLS Linear Regression of dyadic cooperation on dyad year data.

Hypothesis two is further supported by contrasting these results with the previous negative results for *low institutionalization* and *total JIGOs*, demonstrating a distinct effect for higher levels of institutionalization. Furthermore, *high institutionalization* has a greater coefficient,

[87] OLS regressions with lagged variables, shown in Chapter 2 Appendix C, returned similar results.

1.997, than *medium institutionalization*, 1.461, demonstrating a distinct, greater effect for highly institutionalized IGOs. In all regressions *interest similarity* was positive and significant at the .01 level, meeting expectations that states with similar interest will be more likely to cooperate. *Polity difference* displays some significance, at the .1 level for the *low institutionalization* regression and .05 for the *high institutionalization* regression, with positive coefficients. The ratio of *capabilities* was negative and significant at the .05 level in all models. A larger gap in capabilities makes a dyad less likely to cooperate with each other. *Conflict* was negative but surprisingly only significant if a .1 threshold is applied. This may be due to the focus on non-conflict interactions.

Table 3. The Effect of Joint IGO Membership on State-to-State Cooperation

	All Joint IGOs	**Low Inst IGOs**	**Med+Hi Inst IGOs**	**Hi Inst IGOs**
Total JIGOs	**-0.010***** (0.003)			
Low Inst		-0.609 (0.403)		
Med+Hi Inst			**1.078**** (0.454)	
High Inst				1.437* (0.779)
Interest Similarity	0.143*** (0.040)	0.127*** (0.040)	0.129*** (0.040)	0.129*** (0.040)
Polity Diff	0.001 (0.005)	0.006 (0.005)	0.005 (0.005)	0.008 (0.005)
Allies	0.095 (0.089)	0.040 (0.086)	0.061 (0.087)	0.050 (0.087)
Capabilities	-0.044** (0.019)	-0.035* (0.019)	-0.040** (0.019)	-0.032* (0.018)
Conflict	-0.251 (0.162)	-0.226 (0.161)	-0.225 (0.161)	-0.225 (0.161)
Contiguous	-0.017 (0.091)	-0.045 (0.092)	-0.022 (0.092)	-0.031 (0.092)
N	6160	6160	6160	6160

*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 Time Series regression of dyadic cooperation on dyad year data.

I next conduct a time series regression with random effects and robust standard errors for robustness, with some similar results. These results are displayed in table three. Testing the count of total joint memberships, *total JIGOs* is again negative and significant. *Low institutionalization* remains negative, however is no longer statistically significant, suggesting they have no impact on *state-to-state cooperation. Medium institutionalization* holds its linear regression results with a positive sign and significant at the .05 level. This supports the evidence from table two for hypothesis two. However, *high institutionalization* is no longer significant at the .05 level, only if a .1 standard is applied.[88] For control variables *interest similarity* is again positive and significant in all models at the .05 level. *Capabilities* shows some significance at the .05 level in the total count of joint IGOs and medium institutionalization models. All other control variables, including conflict, are not statistically significant.

The marginal effects of the primary model regressions are displayed in figure 1, visualizing the impact of joint membership in more IGOs for reach institutionalization category. They demonstrate a clear increasing effect for *medium* and *high* institutionalization. In the context of a standard deviation of 1.97 and half of the observations within a two point range, coefficients of .769, 1.461, and 1.997 are substantively significant. The contrast of a negative result for *low institutionalization* and positive for *medium* and *high institutionalization* supports my theory that IGO institutionalization helps explain variation in dyadic cooperation.

[88] Lagged variable models using the previous year's cooperation and institutionalization also find significance for med+hi institutionalization, and then also high institutionalization, at the .05 level. See Chapter 2 appendix C.

Figure 1.
Institutionalization and State-to-State Cooperation



To further test my theory about IGO institutionalization and demonstrate the usefulness of cooperation intensity scores, I repeat the four regressions on the *general cooperation* average intensity scores. This tests a wider range of cooperation scores between governments or government officials for my sample of specific non-conflict related events. This also serves as an additional robustness check for my findings. These results are displayed in table four. These results match the negative effect of *total JIGOs* and *medium institutionalization.* Total joint memberships is again negative and significant at the .01 level. *Medium institutionalization* is

positive and statistically significant at the .01 level. *Low institutionalization* and *high institutionalization* are both not statistically significant and also both have a negative sign.

Table 4. The Effect of Joint IGO Membership on General Cooperation

	All Joint IGOs	**Low Inst IGOs**	**Med+Hi Inst IGOs**	**Hi Inst IGOs**
Total JIGOs	**-0.001*****			
	(0.001)			
Low Inst		-0.313		
		(0.250)		
Med+Hi Inst			**0.958*****	
			(0.298)	
High Inst				-0.814
				(0.567)
Interest Similarity	0.070***	0.058***	0.058***	0.063***
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.021)
Polity Diff	-0.006	0.001	-0.001	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Allies	0.126**	0.032	0.073	-0.004
	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.058)
Capabilities	-0.018	-0.006	-0.013	-0.001
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Conflict	-0.926***	-0.894***	-0.892***	-0.897***
	(0.145)	(0.144)	(0.144)	(0.144)
Contiguous	0.065	0.037	0.059	0.070
	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.074)
N	11633	11633	11633	11633

*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 OLS Linear Regression of dyadic cooperation on dyad year data.

Interest similarity is positive and significant in all four regressions, matching the first table and prior expectations. *Allies* is significant and positive only in the *total JIGOs* regression. Here *conflict* matches expectations and is negative and statistically significant in all four regressions at the .01 threshold. As these regressions include conflict related interactions it follows that we see a significance for *conflict.* All other controls were not statistically significant. These results

continue to counter hypothesis one while providing some support for hypothesis two. They are also similar to the time series regression results and the significance of the effect of *medium institutionalization*.

Finally, for an additional robustness check I use a larger sample from the dataset without limiting the events to non-conflict interactions or excluding 'cheap talk' events and using the *general cooperation* dependent variable. This provides the broadest possible sample and measure of cooperation as a contrast with the more refined primary model displayed in table two. These results are displayed below in table five. These results hold with the findings of the time series

Table 5. The Effect of Joint IGO Membership on General Cooperation for All Events

	All Joint IGOs	**Low Inst IGOs**	**Med+Hi Inst IGOs**	**Hi Inst IGOs**
Total JIGOs	**-0.009*****			
	(0.002)			
Low Inst		-0.010		
		(0.254)		
Med+Hi Inst			**0.754****	
			(0.303)	
High Inst				-0.898
				(0.563)
Interest Similarity	0.086***	0.078***	0.076***	0.081***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Polity Diff	-0.004	0.003	0.001	0.003
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Allies	0.114**	0.017	0.058	-0.003
	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.057)
Capabilities	-0.013	0.001	-0.007	0.004
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Conflict	-1.189***	-1.158***	-1.157***	-1.160***
	(0.158)	(0.157)	(0.158)	(0.156)
Contiguous	-0.099*	-0.127**	-0.107*	0.139**
	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.058)
N	12248	12248	12248	12248

*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 OLS Linear Regression of dyadic cooperation on dyad year data.

regression and previous *general cooperation* models. *Total JIGOs* is again statistically significant and negative. *Medium institutionalization* is positive and statistically significant at the .05 level. Like the previous *general cooperation* regressions *low* and *high institutionalization* are not significant. These results provide further evidence of a surprising negative effect of a count of joint IGO membership, present across all models. They also continue to find a positive effect for shared membership in IGOs with *medium institutionalization.* The consistency of these results through multiple robustness models shows a clear lack of support for hypothesis one but some consistent support for hypothesis two.

Given the nature of examining broad cooperation between two states with multiple joint IGO memberships over periods of time and the iterative nature of dyadic interactions determining empirically the independent effect of IGO institutionalization on cooperation is difficult. Research does suggest IGOs shape member state behavior and preferences, and theoretically we would expect this.[89] States may be uncertain about the commitment or benefits of additional cooperation with another state, lessening cooperation bilaterally. But through more institutionalized IGOs states gain information and increased interactions, which will reduce that uncertainty. This allows states to update the reputation of potential partner states, leading to additional cooperation. States may also be unaware of possible opportunities for cooperation that are then revealed through direct interaction of diplomats and state bureaucrats through IGOs, developing networks that increase awareness of these opportunities. Most of all, states turn to IGOs largely for solutions they cannot develop themselves. These obstacles that cause states to turn to IGOs in the first place also prevent cooperation between states. Through even as simple a

[89] Chelotti, Dasandi, and Mikhaylov, "Do IGOs Have a Socialization Effect" 2022; Bearce and Bondanella, "IGOs, Socialization, and Member-State Interest Convergence" 2007.

mechanism as reducing transaction costs with standardized terms and existing language that states do not have to develop, institutionalized IGOs foster future cooperation that could not take place without joint membership. We can expect that joint membership in more institutionalized IGOs can have an independent effect on dyadic cooperation.

To account for this question empirically I perform several robustness checks which are included in appendix C in chapter 2. I replicate my main models on *state-to-state cooperation* with different lagged variables to attempt to capture an effect of joint membership in prior years on the current year's cooperation. I take the OLS models of joint IGO membership on state-to-state cooperation for the three categories of IGO institutionalization and repeat them with lagged independent variables. I do this twice, first with a one year lag and then with a three year lag. These produce similar results, continuing to find a greater share of joint IGO membership in more institutionalized IGOs is statistically significant and positive. Low *institutionalization* loses significance while high *institutionalization* is now significant at the .01 level. I next replicate the time series regression twice, first with a one year lagged dependent variable and then with both dependent and independent variables lagged one year, controlling for the effect of past cooperation with the lagged dependent variable. These models continue to find a positive significant effect for both greater institutionalization categories. These models provide some support for an independent effect of IGO institutionalization on dyadic cooperation.

Discussion

The empirical analyses in this chapter present evidence that the institutional design of IGOs can help explain variation in dyadic cooperation. It also supports the theory that this cooperation spills over into areas outside of the IGO. In all models the more two states interact through IGOs with medium or high institutionalization the more they cooperated with each other.

The negative or not significant findings for low institutionalization further demonstrates the variation in the effect of IGO design on cooperation. Different results for *state-to-state cooperation* emphasizing diplomatic avenues from the broader *general cooperation* variable also suggests that different types of cooperation will be affected differently not only by the institutional design of shared IGOs but other independent variables as well. The model for *state-to-state cooperation* suggests that non-conflict diplomacy and state interactions are more specifically affected. States who have their dyadic relationships shaped by larger shares of more institutionalized IGOs, which provide key information services, developing mutual interests, and reducing transaction costs, are more likely to cooperate. Interestingly, when these relationships are shaped more by less institutionalized IGOs, it can actually decrease this type of cooperation suggesting joint membership in these IGOs may actually hurt dyadic diplomatic relationships. Combined with the negative finding for total count of joint memberships we must consider that not all IGOs have a consistent cooperative effect.

The variation in these findings suggest areas for further study. Joint membership in specifically highly institutionalized IGOs was only significant in the linear regression on *state-to-state cooperation*. What might explain this? The effect of institutionalization's specific mechanisms for facilitating cooperation may not have the same effect on general cooperation past a certain level of institutionalization. Greater institutionalization may also become counterproductive when considering a broad range of interactions. More highly institutionalized IGOs have more sub-organizations to provide more effective services through division of labor. However, perhaps at higher levels these become too complicated and sometimes serve as a barrier to information provision or even create transaction costs. Highly institutionalized IGOs also generally have adjudication bodies that can impose costs on member states. Perhaps this

increased authority reduces some avenues of cooperation. and specifically adjudicating bodies that are able to impose some costs on member states. Another possible explanation is the presence of large pivotal IGOs in this category, such as the United Nations and World Trade Organization, that have most states as members as part of a liberal international regime regardless of actual intent to cooperate on specific issues.

These findings only contribute to our understanding of interstate cooperation and should not be considered as strong evidence to disprove past theories on IGOs and interstate cooperation. Using the intensity scores of dyadic interactions between states allows us to capture many events not previously tested but should not be seen as replacing emphasis on important forms of cooperation such as trade agreements or human rights conventions. Specifically, we should consider the negative finding of total joint membership in context. It may decrease overall cooperation when considering a wide range of interactions. This should not be taken as countering previous studies that found IGOs do foster meaningful cooperation on specific areas or that IGOs do not contribute to cooperation in the international system. Further study is also needed to explore the lack of significant of highly institutionalized IGOs. The full nature of this association is not yet clear.

While using CAMEO intensity scores provides an additional measure of cooperation that can be refined by specific categories of cooperation, there are limitations to these scores, especially when aggregating them annually. While ICEWS includes non-state actors, I have only looked at events coded between state actors. The role of non-state actors, especially in internal crises that still involve neighboring states, may affect the precision of intensity scores between states. CAMEO codes also face the challenge of distinguishing between conventional and

unconventional conflict and the use of proxy paramilitary forces.[90] Data collection is a common challenge, and in particular at the events level there are likely many events not being captured. This creates an additional limitation when collapsing and averaging intensity scores annually. Dyads with a small number of events in a given year will have fewer datapoints going into the average, making it harder to capture the effects of different variables on cooperation in that dyad. Averaging standardized scores creates a measure that can be generalized to state dyads over time but can also obscure exceptional circumstances that may not be accurately reflected in their intensity scores. Specific crises events may impact the average score for a specific dyad year. Even with these limitations, intensity scores provide a useful scale of cooperation, especially for observing the impact of variation in other factors over time. Future research should build on the initial exploration presented here to examine how institutional design might facilitate specific types of cooperation but not others.

Overall, these results contribute empirically to our understanding of IGOs and general dyadic cooperation. They provide some quantitative evidence of variation in dyadic cooperation through IGOs. The negative and insignificant findings reinforce that not all IGOs are equal. They present a novel way to examine more general forms of interstate cooperation through CAMEO coding of events in the ICEWS dataset. Specifically, using intensity scores can be useful for generalizing cooperation across different issue areas and take a more holistic approach to state interactions. Further research is needed to confirm these results over a broader timeframe. Finally, these results support my theory that the institutional design of IGOs is important for understanding interstate cooperation, not only through those organizations but also beyond them. I contribute new empirical research on non-conflict cooperation, explore a possible relationship

[90] Gerner, Schrodt, and Abu-Jabr, "Conflict and mediation event observations (cameo)" 2002.

between IGO institutional design and average cooperation, and demonstrate how interstate events data can be useful for general measures of cooperation.

Chapter 3
Death, Design, and Authoritarianism

Introduction

Intergovernmental Organization (IGOs) play an integral role in interstate relations, yet only recently has research begun to dig deeper into the design and life cycles of IGOs. Intergovernmental Organization play a key role in the international system, with many prominent examples persisting over time. It is difficult to imagine the modern world without long-lived institutions like the World Trade Organization or European Union. Yet over a third of all IGOs have died, with the majority of those deaths occurring in the first few decades and resulting from member states actively deciding to stop cooperating through the IGO.[91] Many IGOs officially remain but no longer operate, or they vacillate between stagnant and operational, termed 'zombie' IGOs that do not fit an alive or dead label.[92] At the same time, the institutional design of IGOs varies greatly, with some IGOs mostly 'on paper' without a formal a secretariat, whereas others are highly structured IGOs with dedicated representatives and independent judicial bodies.[93] How do these factors of institutional design affect the vitality of IGOs?

States design and use IGOs to further their own interests and achieve their own goals.[94] Institutional design affects the operation of an IGO while membership composition affects goals and conditions for cooperation. If states perceive they cannot achieve their goals through an IGO, they will stop participating in that IGO. We can then expect institutional design to have an important impact on the life and death of an international organization, based on the interests and goals of its member states. Yet previous research has struggled to find a strong link between

[91] Eilstrup Sangiovanni, "Death of IOs" 2018.
[92] Eilstrup Sangiovanni, "Death of IOs" 2018; Gray, "Life, Death, or Zombie?" 2018.
[93] Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom, "Do IOs Promote Peace?" 2004.
[94] Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal, "Rational Design of International institutions" 2001.

prominent design features of IGOs and their vitality. Debre and Dijkstra (2020) provide one of the most direct examinations of IGO design and vitality, testing multiple design elements, such as voting rules, withdrawal clauses and contract precision, yet find little significance for IGO survival.[95] Debre and Dijkstra also control for the level of democracy in the IGO without significance.[96] Theories of institutional design and IGO vitality suggest there should be a relationship between the two.[97] Yet the lack of more significant findings about the nature of that relationship is puzzling.

My contribution provides one approach by suggesting the impact of institutional design on IGO vitality is conditional on the composition of the membership. One important trend in recent decades is an increase in IGOs dominated by authoritarian influence, particularly regional IGOs.[98] Authoritarian participation in IGOs has begun receiving more attention, exploring autocratic goals for IGOs and domestic regime benefits from membership, but many questions remain.[99] My central contention is that cooperation between authoritarian states operates in a different environment than cooperation between democratic states, one where credibility is often harder to gain. Democracies have multiple factors facilitating their cooperation, including the ability to make more credible commitments.[100] Democratic institutions can increase credibility

[95] Debre and Dijkstra, "Institutional design for a post liberal order" 2021.
[96] Debre and Dijkstra, "Institutional design for a post liberal order" 2021.
[97] Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2021 includes endogenous institutional factors and the utility of IOs to member states as elements of how IOs may be resilient to exogenous shocks, increasing their vitality. Gray 2018 theorizes about the importance of bureaucracies to IOs achieving their mandates and IO survival.
[98] See Cottiero, Christina, and Stephan Haggard. "The Rise of Authoritarian Regional International Organizations." University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation Working Paper. Retrieved June 7 (2021): 2022; and Cottiero, Christina, and Stephan Haggard. "Stabilizing authoritarian rule: The role of international organizations." International Studies Quarterly 67, no. 2 (2023).
[99] See Debre, Maria J. "Clubs of autocrats: Regional organizations and authoritarian survival." The Review of International Organizations 17, no. 3 (2022): 485-511; Debre, Maria J. "The dark side of regionalism: how regional organizations help authoritarian regimes to boost survival." Democratization 28, no. 2 (2021): 394-413; and Cottiero, Christina. "Protection for Hire: Cooperation through Regional Organizations." International Studies Quarterly 67, no. 4 (2023).
[100] See Maoz, Zeev, and Bruce Russett. "Normative and structural causes of democratic peace, 1946–1986." American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (1993): 624-638; Maoz, Zeev. "Realist and cultural critiques of the

through mechanisms such as higher audience costs.[101] Democratic goals for IGOs include promoting good governance and increasing human rights.[102] On the other hand, authoritarian states have different goals for IGOs, focusing on strengthening their own regimes and using the IGO to redistribute resources to their supporters.[103] Most authoritarian leaders still need allies and resources to maintain stable regimes and ensure their survival.[104] These can come from outside the state as well as within. Regional IGOs can support repression by authoritarian member states under the justification of maintaining order and the status quo, as well as increase the survival of authoritarian regimes.[105] Additionally autocracies may use IGOs as external mechanisms to make credible commitments to each other.[106] The specific purpose and goals of IGO membership for non-democracies are impacted by the institutional design of that IGO. The institutional design of an IGO impacts its ability to provide the specific goals and benefits non-democracies seek. If an IGO is unable to provide meaningful benefits to its members, that IGO is at greater risk of failure. I argue this is the case for majority authoritarian IGOs. For authoritarian states, more institutionalized IGOs allow them to credibly commit to cooperation, helping them create lasting "clubs of autocrats". In contrast, less institutionalized IGOs with a majority of non-democratic members will be more likely to fail.

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democratic peace: A theoretical and empirical re-assessment." International Interactions 24, no. 1 (1998): 3-89; Henderson, Errol Anthony. "The democratic peace through the lens of culture, 1820–1989." International Studies Quarterly 42, no. 3 (1998): 461-484; Oneal and Russet, "The Kantian Peace" 1999; Russet and Oneal, Triangulating Peace 2001.

[101] See Fearon, James D. "Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes." American political science review 88, no. 3 (1994): 577-592; Bueno De Mesquita, Bruce, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith. "An institutional explanation of the democratic peace." American Political Science Review 93, no. 4 (1999): 791-807; and Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff. "Why democracies cooperate more: Electoral control and international trade agreements." In Global Trade, pp. 215-252. Routledge, 2017.

[102] Debre, "Clubs of Autocrats" 2021.

[103] Debre, "Clubs of Autocrats" 2021.

[104] Svolik, Milan W. The politics of authoritarian rule. Cambridge University Press, 2012.

[105] Cottiero, "Protection for Hire" 2023 and Debre "Clubs of Autocrats" 2021.

[106] Fang and Owen, "International Institutions and Credible Commitment" 2011.

I find evidence of this relationship using a Cox Hazard model of 114 regional Intergovernmental organization over the period 1816 to 2014. Building on Debre and Dijkstra (2020), I test the impact of different degrees of institutionalization on an IGO's risk of failure, including both death and zombification. I use a split model with a sample of 86 majority non-democratic IGOs and 28 majority democratic IGOs to compare the effect based on membership composition of the IGO.[107] This captures the different cooperation environment between IGO members when they are mostly democratic or non-democratic.

My contribution helps refine our understanding of when and how institutional design affects IGO vitality. IGO's facilitate cooperation among member states to help them solve collection action problems. The importance of institutional design on IGO survival is determined by conditions that make institutional design particularly salient for achieving gains, securing continued member support. This helps explain the difficulty in finding significance for institutional design features while also providing evidence for a specific condition, authoritarian cooperation. This supports past theories that institutional design features matter, authoritarian cooperation has distinct elements, and further research into IGO vitality and authoritarian cooperation should consider conditional effects. In testing my theory, I find evidence that greater institutionalization reduces risk of failure for mostly non-democratic IGOs.

The Life, Death, and Undeath of Intergovernmental Organization

[107] This proportion of authoritarian IOs is similar, but slightly higher, to the proportion in the full population of international organizations. Future plans include expanding the sample to match the population proportion.

Intergovernmental organizations are ubiquitous in the international system and vital to maintaining international order.[108] IGOs arose out of a self-interested need by states to solve specific collective action problems they cannot on their own, such as coordinating economic travel along riverways, prompting them to delegate some authority and independence to IGOs to enforce collective commitments.[109] Nearly all states are members of at least one IGO, with most IGOs being regional organizations without a major power member.[110] IGOs build credibility and foster cooperation through mechanisms of relationship building, information brokering, lowering transaction costs, and creating transparency.[111] The critical role of IGOs and their utility to member states is well established.

Yet the effectiveness and lifespan of IGOs varies, with states frequently choosing to dissolve or stop participating in an IGO. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni's findings suggest IGOs 'die' more often than was commonly understood.[112] She also argues that states are often more willing to replace an IGO than reform it despite the additional costs that creates.[113] Gray demonstrates that over a third of IGOs are 'zombies' that, while still technically existing on the books, receive minimal resources and have ceased function in any meaningful sense.[114] Eilstrup-Sangiovanni argues multiple factors combine to cause IGOs to die and examines how both exogenous shocks

[108] See Keohane, After Hegemony 1984; Russet, Oneal, and Davis, "The Third Leg of the Kantian tripod for Peace" 1998; Russt and Oneal, Triangulating Peace 2001; and Gilpin, Global Political Economy 2001.
[109] Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace 2001; Abbot and Snidal "Why States Act" 1998.
[110] Blake, Daniel J., and Autumn Lockwood Payton. "Balancing design objectives: Analyzing new data on voting rules in intergovernmental organizations." The Review of International Organizations 10 (2015): 377-402.
[111] Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace 2001; Abbot and Snidal, "Why States Act" 1998; Pevehouse, Jon C. "Democracy from the outside-in? International organizations and democratization." International organization 56, no. 3 (2002): 515-549; and Hooghe Lenz and Marks, A Theory of International Relations 2019.
[112] Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, "Death of IOs" 2020.
[113] "…my analysis shows that states have repeatedly chosen to dismantle existing institutions and to start over from scratch – negotiation new rules of cooperation and creating new organizations to oversee their implementation" Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, "Death of IOs" 2018 p366.
[114] Gray, "Life, Death, or Zombie" 2018.

and endogenous institutional factors impact the survival of IGOs.[115] She finds that smaller membership size without more centralization increases risk of IGO death.[116] Despite their importance in the system, IGOs fail more often than previously thought through both IGO death and also neglect leading to 'zombie' IGOs. Much is still unclear about what causes these unexpectedly higher rates of IGO failure.

Extant research has explored how the design of IGOs affects their operation. Abbott and Snidal theorize how degrees of centralization and independence in an IGO serve the best interests of member states, empowering the IGO to act as a community manager even to the point of enforcement.[117] Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal explain how self-interested states make intentional design choices to reduce uncertainty, solve distribution problems, and provide enforcement mechanisms.[118] Examining IGO design and operation, Nielson and Tierney discuss how changes in the expertise of IGO staff and their involvement in specific parts of the bureaucratic process impact IGO behavior and outcomes.[119] IGO bureaucracies can have unintended negative effects when they develop inefficient pathologies that create internal competition, insulation, and rigidity.[120] Reinsberg and Westerwinter find that many new IGOs are designed similarly to pre-existing organizations that have similar governance tasks, even with little to no shared membership between previous and new IGOs.[121] Institutional design, through both intentional choices and unintentional effects, impacts IGO operation and how it provides benefits to its members.

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[115] Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Mette. "What kills international organisations? When and why international organisations terminate." European Journal of International Relations 27, no. 1 (2021): 281-310.
[116] Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, "What Kills IOs" 2021.
[117] Abbot and Snidal, "Why States Act" 1998.
[118] Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal, "Rational Design of International institutions" 2001.
[119] Nielson & Tierney, "Delegation to IOs" 2023.
[120] Barnett and Finnemore, "The politics, power, and pathologies of IOs" 1999.
[121] Reinsberg and Westerwinter, "Institutional Overlap in Global Governance 2023.

Several studies have sought to understand how the design features of IGOs are likely to affect their vitality. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni suggests design factors can make IGOs more resilient, but only finds evidence to support membership size and membership restrictions, theorizing these IGOs are also more likely to have larger staff and organizational resources.[122]Providing some of the strongest support for the importance of design, Gray finds evidence that increased bureaucratic autonomy reduces risk of death among a select sample of economic regional IGOs.[123] Debre and Dijkstra perform a comprehensive analysis of multiple institutional design factors, especially different forms of flexibility, on IGO vitality. However, they only find a positive effect for majority voting rules and a dichotomous measure of staff size.[124] A composite flexibility measure and a dichotomous institutionalization measure were not statistically significant.[125]

In sum, the literature suggests that there is likely to be a relationship between institutional design and IGO vitality but current research leaves unresolved many questions about the exact nature of that relationship. Several authors have called for further research to refine our understanding of IGO design and vitality.[126] Multiple design features impact cooperation between states and the benefits of IGO membership. Fundamentally, to continue supporting and participating in an IGO, states must believe they are better off than not.[127] If design affects the perceived benefits of membership by states, then it follows it must also affect the vitality of IGO

[122] Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, "Death of IOs" 2020.
[123] Gray, "Life, Death, or Zombie" 2018. Bureaucratic autonomy was significant at the .05 level for IO death, but at the .1 level for zombification.
[124] Debre and Dijkstra, "Institutional design for a post liberal order" 2021. Staff was measured dichotomously as greater or less than 50 people.
[125] Debre and Dijkstra, "Institutional design for a post liberal order" 2021.
[126] See Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, "Death of IOs" 2020; Gray "Life, Death, and Zombie" 2018; Debre and Dijkstra "Institutional Design for a Post-Liberal Order" 2021.
[127] Keohane, After Hegemony 1984.

as without those benefits driving continued participation, IGOs will fail. Yet empirical evidence of this effect has mostly been elusive in these early studies.

Institutionalization and Credibility under Authoritarian Conditions

My novel argument is that institutional design affects the vitality of IGOs conditionally based on the nature of the cooperating member states. The effect of an IGOs institutionalization depends on how it impacts providing the benefits members seek to keep participating through that IGO. When the design of an IGO makes it less able to provide value to its members, it is more likely to fail. Specifically, IGOs with low institutionalization will be less likely to address credible commitment problems between non-democratic states and provide them with the benefits they seek. Therefore, IGOs with a majority of authoritarian members and low institutionalization are more likely to fail.

Authoritarian states have different goals and interests for cooperation and working through IGOs than democratic states. Non-democratic states have self-interested reasons, specifically regime survival, to participate in IGOs that support authoritarianism. Non-democracies face greater obstacles to cooperation on average, as they have more difficulty sending credible signals of their commitment to long-term cooperation. If an IGO is not able to address this credibility issue, enabling non-democratic members to gain benefits from cooperation, then that IGO is less likely to survive as autocratic members stop participating or supporting the IGO. In summary, the nature of authoritarian cooperation and their goals for IGO membership make the institutionalization of an IGO important for that IGO's survival. I develop the logic of my argument first by discussing the conditions of authoritarian cooperation, then the obstacles to credible commitments for authoritarian states, and finally how more institutionalized IGOs address these obstacles, which can help autocracies reap the benefits of cooperation.

Autocracies face collective action problems and seek benefits from membership in IGOs just as democracies do. They do benefit from IGOs, but the benefits they seek are different than democratic states. Democracies often set collective goals for cooperation through IGOs, such as common goods, increasing human rights, or promoting good governance. Autocratic goals focus more on direct benefits, such as strengthening the regime, increasing their capacity for repression, and redistributing resources.[128] Authoritarian leaders often need resources to either coopt elite support or maintain enough power to prevent replacement.[129] IGOs can be a source of these resources. Less capacity for repression or less ability to distribute materials to co-op key actors make authoritarian regimes more likely to fail.[130] Autocratic leaders facing a high risk of removal from coups d'etat are more likely to cooperate through regional IGOs to help secure their position.[131] Backsliding states will resist resolutions that expose specific states for illiberal behavior.[132] Autocracies do recognize the benefits from working through IGOs and will cooperate with other regimes to achieve them. They use IGOs to pool material and military resources towards regime survival.[133] Evidence shows regional IGOs with mostly non-democratic members are more likely to support illiberal norms and leaders, even to the degree of direct military intervention on their behalf in some cases.[134] Authoritarian cooperation is often

[128] Debre, "Clubs of Autocrats" 2021.
[129] Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule 2012.
[130] Gerschewski, Johannes. "The Three Pillars of Stability: Legitimation, Repression, and Co-Optation in Autocratic Regimes." Democratization 20, no. 1 (2013): 13–38.
[131] Cottiero, "Protection for Hire" 2023. Cottiero's regional IGOs studied here are majority authoritarian.
[132] Meyerrose, Anna M., and Irfan Nooruddin. "Trojan horses in liberal international organizations? How democratic backsliders undermine the UNHRC: Contribution to the Special Issue "Autocratic Regimes, Democratic Backsliding, and International Organizations"." The Review of International Organizations (2023): 1-32.
[133] See Ambrosio, Thomas. "Constructing a framework of authoritarian diffusion: Concepts, dynamics, and future research." International studies perspectives 11, no. 4 (2010): 375-392; Erdmann, Gero, André Bank, Bert Hoffmann, and Thomas Richter. International cooperation of authoritarian regimes: Toward a conceptual framework. No. 229. GIGA Working Papers, 2013; Hall, Stephen GF, and Thomas Ambrosio. "Authoritarian learning: A conceptual overview." East European Politics 33, no. 2 (2017): 143-161; and Cottiero and Haggard, "Stabilizing Authoritarian Rule" 2023.
[134] Cottiero and Haggard, "Stabilizing Authoritarian Rule" 2023.

successful, providing real benefits to strengthening authoritarian regimes. Membership in IGOs with mostly non-democratic members can increase authoritarian regime survival by as much as six times.[135] Authoritarian cooperation is distinct, seeking tangible benefits that are often tied to regime survival. Authoritarian states recognize these benefits of cooperating through IGOs to solve collective action problems, but for different reasons than democratic states. These benefits are directly tied to survival, raising the stakes and making authoritarian states more likely to abandon IGOs that do not contribute to their survival. This creates specific conditions and goals for authoritarian cooperation, with non-democracies evaluating the benefits of IGO membership differently than democracies. In short, non-democracies seek and gain different benefits from IGO membership than democracies, and often these benefits are tied to their survival.

However, cooperation does not come easily to autocracies, they have a credibility problem. Other states often do not trust non-democracies and are skeptical of their commitments. Authoritarian leaders are perceived as being less accountable and authoritarian regimes are perceived to be less likely to honor international commitments.[136] Authoritarian states face a credibility dilemma, one that is tied to costly signaling. Autocrats prefer consolidated power that buffers accountability to others, but that lack of accountability also weakens their credibility, they cannot engage in costly signaling the same way as democratic leaders. States can send 'costly' signals through a variety of means to demonstrate credibility, such as up front "sunk costs" or committing to actions after the fact with "tied hands" due to audience costs.[137] Democracies have domestic sources of audience costs that enable costly signaling and increase

[135] See Ambrosio "Constructing a Framework" 2010; and Debre, "The Dark Side of Regionalism" 2021.
[136] Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule 2012; Debre, "Clubs of Autocrats" 2021.
[137] Fearon, "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests" 1997.

the credibility of their commitments and more easily cooperate.[138] Additionally, greater transparency about foreign policy decisions also matters for how much a regime focuses on "quid pro quo" material benefits in cooperation.[139] Non-democracies have fewer sources of audience costs and less transparency. Evidence also supports that increased transparency in international agreements impacts autocracies more than democracies.[140] Autocracies also lack democratic domestic institutions that can enhance sunk costs. Lacking these democratic institutions that generate audience costs or increase sunk costs non-democracies are less credible. They are not as easily able to send costly signals and make credible commitments. This does not mean authoritarian leaders do not face any audience costs at all, they do, but with greater variation than in democracies, with less stable autocratic regimes and personalist leaders especially having less credibility.[141] Autocrats need to see other autocrats somehow put 'skin in the game' to know they will be held to their commitments, either through upfront costs or penalties faced for defection.

Intergovernmental organizations provide a way for non-democracies to have audience costs to tie hands or generate up front sunk costs to send costly signals and make more credible commitments. By addressing these credibility issues, authoritarian states are able to cooperate and gain benefits that improve the survival of their regime. We have evidence that authoritarian states turn to international institutions to address credibility issues.[142] The level of institutionalization of an IGO matters, with less institutionalized IGOs less able to facilitate sunk

[138] See Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences" 1994; Fearon, "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests" 1997; Tomz, Michael. "Domestic audience costs in international relations: An experimental approach." International Organization 61, no. 4 (2007): 821-840; and Mansfield et al, "Why Democracies Cooperate More" 2017.
[139] Cottiero, "Protection for Hire" 2023.
[140] Mazumder, S. (2017). Autocracies and the international sources of cooperation. Journal of Peace Research, 54(3), 412-426.
[141] Weeks, Jessica L. "Autocratic audience costs: Regime type and signaling resolve." International Organization 62, no. 1 (2008): 35-64.
[142] Fang and Owen, "International Institutions and Credible Commitment" 2011.

costs or tie the hands of members. Scholars have found more institutionalized institutions such as the International Criminal Court or the International Monetary Fund have been used to replace domestic sources of audience costs for authoritarian states.[143] International institutions provide a "central commitment device" to address weaker domestic sources of audience costs in non-democracies.[144] But their effectiveness as this centralized 'commitment broker' depends on their institutional design. More institutionalized IGOs have greater capacity for coordinating collective action or creating binding agreements about pooling resources, facilitating up front sunk costs. Examples of this could be contributing to the creation or maintaining of the IGO, or alternatively contributing money, supplies, and even personnel for security interventions. More institutionalized IGOs can monitor for defection, ensuring a state failing its commitments will be made public to the other members. The higher levels of institutionalization have adjudication bodies and some enforcement power, giving those IGOs the ability to impose future costs by coordinating punishments for defectors. The increased transparency of more institutionalized IGOs can reduce uncertainty about intentions and create confidence in assessing the strength of the costly signal.[145] These provide alternate sources of audience costs to demonstrate tied hands for autocratic leaders. Autocrats who put 'skin in the game' are viewed as making more credible commitments, enabling them to gain benefits from IGO membership. These benefits will usually improve the survival of that non-democratic regime. We see examples of this in regimes with greater past security contributions being more likely to receive future security support from regional IGO members.[146] Working through an institutionalized IGO autocracies are willing to

[143] See Simmons and Danner, "Credible Commitments and the ICC" 2010; and Fang and Owen, "International Institutions and Credible Commitment" 2011.
[144] Fang and Owen, "International Institutions and Credible Commitment" 2011.
[145] Morrow, James D. "The strategic setting of choices: Signaling, commitment, and negotiation in international politics." Strategic choice and international relations 86 (1999): 86-91.
[146] Cottiero, "Protection for Hire" 2023. Cottiero's regional IGOs studied here are majority authoritarian IGOs.

contribute resources, sending a costly signal to other autocracies, making them more likely to receive future help in maintaining the security and stability of their regime. IGOs with higher institutionalization are much more equipped to create ex post costs for states, facilitating credible commitments. Put simply, institutionalized IGOs are more likely to provide the specific tangible benefits authoritarian states seek because they address the authoritarian credibility dilemma. This in turn makes the IGO less likely to be dissolved or abandoned by its members. Institutionalized IGOs enable non-democratic member states to create and sustain a "club of autocrats" that provides benefits for regime survival.

Less institutionalized IGOs have informal bureaucracies, little to no binding rules and procedures, do not compel action by members, and generally leave enforcement of agreements as optional.[147] They are less able to help non-democratic members overcome their credibility problem and provide the specific material and survival benefits autocracies seek from IGO membership. In short, they are ineffective at helping autocrats put skin in the game. Since the benefits autocracies seek are tied to their own regime survival, ineffectiveness in providing those benefits increases the likelihood these member states will dissolve or neglect the IGO. I argue when an IGO's membership is mostly non-democratic, low institutionalization hinders its ability to provide benefits to members and therefore increases its risk of failure. This leads to my primary expectation:

> **H_1:** Majority authoritarian IGOs with a lower level of institutionalization will be more likely to fail than those with higher levels of institutionalization.

Research Design

I evaluate my theory using a Cox Hazard model with a split sample design. My dataset has 114 regional IGOs from 1816 to 2014, with approximately 86 IGOs in a non-democratic

[147] Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom, "Do IOs promote peace" 2004.

sample and 28 in a democratic sample.[148] The unit of analysis is IGO year, providing sample sizes of 1404 and 910 respectively. A majority of these IGOs are focused on economic, technological, or social cooperation, but also include regional cooperation or cooperation on narrow specific issues. Cox hazard models are a "partial likelihood" method commonly used for survival data to determine the risk factors for an observation to fail.[149] They are better able to model the 'hazard' of IGO failure at a given time point than a logit model.[150] I use clustered robust standard errors to account for correlation within each IGO from year to year.[151] The split samples are divided by a majority of democratic or non-democratic members. This is determined through the averaged polity score of all IGO members, coded as non-democratic if the average polity score is less than five.[152] A split model is used instead of an interaction term to account for how the different cooperation conditions for autocracies would affect the operation of the IGO overall, impacting multiple variables in the model, not just institutionalization.[153] This data is sourced from Debre and Dijkstra 2018 and Borzyskowski and Vabulas 2019.[154] I coded the fate of an additional 30 IGOs that was not present in the existing datasets.[155]

My dependent variable is IGO ***failure***. I define this as the end of meaningful operation of an international organization. This includes all forms of ceasing operation; being dissolved,

[148] Some IGOs do change from non-authoritarian to authoritarian on average over time which is reflected in the IGO year values in the dataset
[149] Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M., and Bradford S. Jones. Event history modeling: A guide for social scientists. Cambridge University Press, 2004.
[150] A logit model of these variables is included in the appendix.
[151] Cleves, Mario. An introduction to survival analysis using Stata. Stata press, 2008.
[152] Additional models using stricter polity thresholds for authoritarian subset were also tested, using less than 2 and less than 0, which returned similar results and significance for institutionalization.
[153] A model with an interaction term does produce a statistically significant result for the interaction of institutionalization and polity.
[154] Debre and Dijkstra, "Institutional design for a post liberal order" 2021; Von Borzyskowski, Inken, and Felicity Vabulas. "Hello, goodbye: When do states withdraw from international organizations?." The Review of International Organizations 14 (2019): 335-366.
[155] IGO vitality was coded for variable failure, a 0 for 'living' as of 2014 and 1 if they had ceased function as of 2014.

absorbed by another IGO without keeping their own identity or falling into disuse. I consider all other IGO vitality states as survival. This directly captures when IGOs cease meaningful function, either through the end of that organization or lack of use of the organization even though it continues to exist officially. Using IGO years also allows for IGOs that may revitalize from their zombie state and become operational again, *failure* is not a permanent state. This also supports moving beyond a "binary live/dead" categorization that scholars have suggested may overlook these transitions back and forth between states.[156] These states are sourced from the Debre and Dijkstra 2018 data using the NestIOr project.[157]

My explanatory variable for IGO institutional design is ***institutionalization***. This measurement was first created by Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom (2004) and has been expanded by Karreth and Tir (2013) and Debre and Dijkstra (2021).[158] I draw upon Debre and Dijkstra (2021) and Borzyskowski and Vabulas 2019 for these values.[159] I employ the original three-category version of institutionalization, low, medium, and high. Low institutionalization indicates a lack of an organized bureaucracy with dedicated staff, fewer divisions, little to no autonomy, and little to no surrendered sovereignty. [160] Medium institutionalization has a formal bureaucracy with codified procedures to make and implement decisions, sometimes without relying on member states, and some surrendered sovereignty.[161] High institutionalization indicates more organizational structures, extensive codification of procedures, have greater

[156] Eilstrup Sangiovanni, "Death of IOs" 2018.
[157] Debre and Dijkstra, "Institutional design for a post liberal order" 2021; Borzyskowki & Vabulus, "Hello, Goodbye" 2019.
[158] Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom, "Do IOs promote peace" 2004; Karreth and Tir, "IOs and civil war prevention" 2013; Debre and Dijkstra, "Institutional design for a post liberal order" 2021.
[159] Debre and Dijkstra, "Institutional design for a post liberal order" 2021; Borzyskowki & Vabulus, "Hello, goodbye" 2019.
[160] Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom, "Do IOs Promote Peace?" 2004.
[161] Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom, "Do IOs Promote Peace?" 2004.

influence over their member states' behavior, and contain a dispute adjudication body.[162] Table six provides a distribution breakdown and examples of each category.

Table 6. Institutionalization in IGOs

Institutionalization Levels	Approx Count	Example
Low	86	*Central African Common Market*
Medium	20	*Central European Initiative*
High	8	*European Union*

Institutionalization captures the complexity of internal organization, the presence of dedicated staff and facilities, codified procedures, voting rules, decision making power, dispute adjudication mechanisms, and enforcement bodies that can manipulate costs to influence state behavior.[163] Each of these factors can contribute to credibility building among autocrats through pooled resources, sunk costs, and tied hands. *Institutionalization* provides a comprehensive measure of institutional design.

Past research has also used a ***staff*** variable to capture the size of an IGO's permanent staff. Specifically, Debre and Dijkstra (2021) include both *institutionalization* and *staff* together in several models on IGO death and replacement. Using Debre and Dijkstra's criteria, *staff* is a dichotomous variable coded as small if IGOs have less than 50 permanent staff and large if they have more than 50 permanent staff.[164] In studying regional IGOs I believe there is more meaningful variation than a dichotomous staff variable can provide. *Institutionalization* already

[162] Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom, "Do IOs Promote Peace?" 2004.
[163] Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom, "Do IOs Promote Peace?" 2004.
[164] Debre and Dijkstra, "Institutional design for a post liberal order" 2021.

captures staff size to some extent. In the data *institutionalization* and *staff* has a correlation of .36, one of the highest values between model variables.[165] I include additional models with *staff* to speak to previous research where *staff* was found to be significant and distinguish between the effect of *staff* versus *institutionalization*.

For my control variables I follow established theoretical variables from previous research.[166] I use ***shared preferences*** to capture how closely IGO member states' interests align. This is measured through UN General Assembly voting.[167] I account for ***competition*** from similar IGOs that might contribute to the failure of an IGO using Debre and Dijkstra (2021) measure of the logged number of regional IGOs in a policy domain.[168] Flexibility is an important institutional design feature and impacts member state participation in the IGO. I use Debre and Dijkstra's combined ***flexibility*** measure that aggregates several flexibility measures into a single dichotomous variable.[169] The average polity score across IGO members is used for a ***polity*** variable, using below five for non-democratic.[170] Differing state capacity in the IGO is controlled for using Debre and Dijkstra's power distribution ***capabilities*** variable based on logged CINC scores of member states.[171] Controlling for IGO size is important as more states means simultaneously more obstacles to cooperation and more states to provide resources for the IGO. This is captured with the variable ***membership size***, the logged total membership for each IGO year as used in previous research.[172] Other studies have identified that conflict can have an

[165] See Appendix for the correlation table.
[166] See Eilstrup-Sangiovanni "Death of IOs" 2020; Borzyskowki & Vabulus, "Hello, Goodbye" 2019; and Debre and Dijsktra, "Institutional design for a post liberal order"" 2021.
[167] Bailey et al, "Estimating Dynamic State Preferences" 2017.
[168] Debre and Dijkstra, "Institutional design for a post liberal order" 2021.
[169] Debre and Dijkstra, "Institutional design for a post liberal order" 2021.
[170] Borzyskowki & Vabulus, "Hello, Goodbye" 2019; and Debre and Dijsktra "Institutional design for a post liberal order" 2021.
[171] Debre and Dijkstra, "Institutional design for a post liberal order" 2021.
[172] Debre and Dijkstra, "Institutional design for a post liberal order" 2021.

impact on IGO survival, so I use the dichotomous variable ***conflict*** based on the presence of militarized interstate disputes.[173] I consider security IGOs to have fundamentally different benefits and credibility conditions than other regional IGOs due to external threats and a focus on survival. I would expect under an external threat that authoritarian states would be more likely to cooperate, and defense agreements may require less negotiation if there are fewer terms relative to economic agreements. I employ a dichotomous variable ***security*** based on the IGO's mandate category.[174]

I test the relationship between *institutionalization* and IGO *failure* through four models. I begin with model one by building on prior research from Debre and Dijkstra testing institutionalization on the full 114 IGO dataset, including *staff* as an independent variable.[175] I control for important design and vitality variables in *flexibility* and *shared preferences.* My primary models are split sample models that subset the data for non-democratic and democratic memberships. Model two is IGOs with a majority of democratic members and model three is IGOs with a majority of non-democratic members. These models test *institutionalization* on IGO *failure* without *staff* or *polity* variables. Model four replicates the non-democratic model, but with *staff* included to demonstrate the significant effect of *institutionalization* is not due to the absence of *staff* in the model.

[173] Maoz, Zeev, Paul L. Johnson, Jasper Kaplan, Fiona Ogunkoya, and Aaron P. Shreve. "The dyadic militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) dataset version 3.0: Logic, characteristics, and comparisons to alternative datasets." Journal of Conflict Resolution 63, no. 3 (2019): 811-835.
[174] Borzyskowki & Vabulus, "Hello, Goodbye" 2019; and Debre and Dijsktra, "Institutional design for a post liberal order" 2021.
[175] Debre and Dijkstra, "Institutional design for a post liberal order" 2021.

Results

These models evaluate the relationship between *institutionalization* and IGO *failure* comparing IGOs with a majority of democratic members and IGOs with a majority of non-democratic members. The difference between the two samples is visualized below in figure two. Especially in earlier years which previous research has shown are the most perilous for IGOs, failure rates by *institutionalization* are mixed for majority democratic IGOs, with low and

Figure 2. Risk of IGO Failure



high crossing. Majority authoritarian IGOs, however, have distinct failure rates by degree of *institutionalization* suggesting a relationship that is unique to those IGOs. Models two and three test this relationship and the difference between the two samples, while model one builds on past research testing the full dataset to create a combined baseline and model four performs a robustness check by including the previously significant variable *staff*. These results are displayed in table seven.

Model one confirms the results of previous research that employed a dichotomous institutionalization variable, *institutionalization* is not significant at the .05 level, but *staff* is significant. The *staff* variable has a negative coefficient, meaning having more staff decreases the risk of failure, but institutionalization has no effect. No other variables were significant, including theoretical variables *shared preferences, flexibility, competition,* and membership composition in *polity.* These results also establish that regime type, captured through *polity,* is

Table 7. The Effect of Institutional Design on IGO Failure Rates

	All IGOs (Model 1)	**Authoritarian IGOs** (Model 2)	**Democratic IGOs** (Model 3)	**All IGOs model with *staff* variable** (Model 4)
institutionalization	.060 (0.575)	.572 (0.439)	**-2.85*** (0.974)	**-2.45*** (1.088)
staff	**-1.306*** (0.603)			-1.308 (0.753)
shared preferences	.498 (0.652)	.009 (1.104)	.936 (1.079)	.867 (1.029)
flexibility	-0.065 (0.527)	-.099 (0.860)	-.047 (0.628)	.059 (0.666)
competition	.259 (0.197)	.024 (0.267)	**.770*** (0.348)	**.789*** (0.355)
capabilities	.031 (0.183)	-.196 (0.339)	.174 (0.175)	.117 (0.183)
membership size	.331 (0.331)	-.675 (0.566)	**.997*** (0.291)	**.797*** (0.317)
conflict	-.229 (0.461)	.584 (0.604)	-.400 (0.520)	-.426 (0.512)
security	.920 (0.563)	.154 (0.956)	**2.56*** (0.814)	**2.646*** (1.743)
polity	.010 (0.047)			
N	2284	910	1404	1379

*p < 0.05 Cox Hazard Model of IGO failure on IGO Year data

not a significant predictor of IGO failure.[176] While authoritarian states may have different goals for IGO membership and different conditions for credible commitments, IGOs with mostly authoritarian states are not more likely to fail. These findings match those of similar models from past research that fail to find significance for multiple theoretical variables expected to impact IGO vitality.

Model two is subset for IGOs with a majority of democrat members, providing the comparative sample for the split model. Here *institutionalization* is not significant. Additionally, control variables *competition, membership size,* and *security* were all not significant. This demonstrates there is no effect of institutionalization on the vitality of IGOs with mostly democratic members.

Model three directly tests my hypothesis, subset for IGOs with a majority of non-democratic members. The three-category *institutionalization* variable is significant at the .05 level with a negative coefficient of 2.85, reducing the risk of failure, supporting hypothesis one. Variables *shared preferences* and *flexibility* were insignificant, against theoretical expectations they should affect IGO survival but in line with previous findings. Unlike in the democratic sample, several control variables were statistically significant. The presence of other similar IGOs was significant in *competition* with a positive coefficient, increasing the risk of failure and matching theoretical expectations. *Membership size* was significant but positive, increasing the risk of failure and contrary to research on vitality of all IGOs. Additionally, *security* was significant and positive, making IGOs with security mandates more likely to fail. Contrasted with the democratic sample, model three demonstrates a unique significant negative effect of institutionalization on the risk of IGO failure.

[176] Model 1 replications with a dichotomous regime type variable, tested with multiple cut points, were also not significant.

The final model tests if the significance of *institutionalization* in model three was only due to omitting the *staff* variable that had been significant in previous research and the full model. In model four *institutionalization* is still significant with a negative coefficient, matching the results of the authoritarian model. *Competition, membership size,* and *security* are also still significant with the same sign as in model three. A model not included in the results with *staff* included for the majority democratic membership IGOs also does not change any significance for variables in that model.

Discussion

These results provide evidence for both hypotheses. A significant negative coefficient means low *institutionalization* increases the risk of IGO failure for IGOs with a majority of authoritarian members. This effect remains even when *staff* is included in model four, and is not statistically significant, demonstrating the effect is not driven by greater staff, but multiple factors in addition to staff captured by *institutionalization*. Testing IGO vitality using a sample conditional on member composition also provides other significant variables for IGO vitality, such as competing IGOs and size of IGO membership, providing a stronger model of IGO vitality than the full sample or democratic membership sample. This evidence demonstrates an authoritarian IGO with lower *institutionalization* is less likely to maintain support and participation of its members, making it more likely to be dissolved or fall into disuse. In the context of other research on authoritarian goals for IGO membership, this supports the idea that higher *institutionalization* provides greater material benefits and contributes to authoritarian regime survival. I theorize this occurs through credibility building, which is also supported by these findings, however perception of credibility is not being directly measured in this model.

Considering the significance of *institutionalization* but not another design variable, *flexibility*, may support a theoretical focus on credibility. Greater *flexibility* could impact vitality by providing more utility to states by giving them more ability to protect their own interests, an option to legally cheat in specific cases. Especially among authoritarian states we might expect an increased preference for flexibility measures to protect sovereignty and material interests to be important for evaluating benefits of IGO membership. This is distinct from building credibility, as greater flexibility means states do not know when other states may exercise cheat clauses and defect on agreements, even though that defection is allowed, which could increase uncertainty and undermine credibility. *Institutionalization*, in contrast, is going to help build credibility through pooled resources, shared costs among members, detection of cheating, and enforcement mechanisms. The significance of *institutionalization* but not *flexibility* would then support a theory focused on facilitating credible commitments.

These results also suggest that authoritarian states perceive value in cooperation through IGOs differently than democratic states. The effect of *institutionalization* was unique to the non-democratic sample in the split model. These results in a split model account for how different credibility conditions among authoritarian states affect all of the variables, not only *institutionalization*. The appeal of a competing IGO, how more members might impede cooperation through increasing the coordination problem or facilitate cooperation by increasing costs of defection, are all factors that would also be affected by different conditions for cooperation and different goals from IGO membership. Comparing the two samples demonstrates how multiple factors contributing to IGO failure are significant among IGOs with a majority of authoritarian members versus a majority of democratic members.

This further suggests that understanding IGO vitality may require more consideration of the conditions under which an IGO provides value to its members, such as membership composition changing the nature of cooperation and credibility building. The value of continued support and participation in an IGO may be affected by many different factors, not only the institutional design of the IGO. What factors will matter for providing value, and ultimately IGO failure or success, will certainly vary with specific conditions of the IGO. The importance of the issue area, the technical expertise required, the presence of major powers willing to provide a larger share of resources, and of course exogenous factors in the system could all be significant factors depending on different conditions.

An interesting finding was the positive coefficients of *security.* Security mandated IGOs being more at risk of failure suggests that authoritarian states are more likely to dissolve or discontinue use of regional security IGOs despite often facing threats. This is also interesting considering the benefit to autocratic regime survival from pooling intelligence and security resources. It may reflect a focus on short term utility for authoritarian states or that security threats from fellow members of the IGO create greater credibility obstacles. This finding does match some past research where a security mandate increased the risk of specifically expiration, dissolution, or desuetude fates of IGOs.[177]

There are limitations to these findings. *Institutionalization* is a comprehensive but imperfect measure of IGO design features. Future measures that can more adequately separate factors such as organization structure and bureaucratic culture in addition to existing measures on voting rules and design flexibility will help determine what specific mechanisms improve IGO vitality as result of institutional design. While the proportion in the population of IGOs favor

[177] Eilstrup Sangiovanni, "Death of IOs" 2018.

both non-democratic majorities and low institutionalization, increasing the size of this dataset to include more higher institutionalized and majority democratic IGOs will strengthen these findings. These models also do not directly measure credibility. Future research employing approaches used in previous audience cost literature may help more directly capture perception of credibility among IGO members. These findings demonstrate a relationship between institutional design and IGO vitality but require further research to confirm and help define the nature of that relationship.

Disuse, Death, and Rebirth

To demonstrate the role of internal organization in IGO vitality, I employ two illustrative cases, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the replacement of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) with the African Union(AU). These are illustrative cases of how design plays a role in the vitality of IGOs. They provide examples of how regional IGOs with authoritarian member states often fail to facilitate meaningful cooperation, potentially falling into disuse or needing to be replaced. The CIS demonstrates a less structured regional cooperation IGO where most member states cease participation, rejecting the influence of the major power, Russia, in the IGO. The Organization of African Unity demonstrates the death of a less organized regional IGO which is followed by a more organized successor. These are organizations with primarily authoritarian member states, illustrating the theoretical impact of IGO institutionalization for cooperation among non-democracies. The CIS is considered by many scholars to be a failure, and objectively has produced very little in the form of agreements or tangible cooperation between its members. Similarly, the OAU was also seen as unable to address the needs of its members and create collective action and was disbanded in favor of

forming a new organization, the African Union. These three cases illustrate different examples of how institutional design plays a role in the success or failure of an IGO.

The Commonwealth of Independent States was first formed in 1991 after the dissolution of the Soviet Union to coordinate collective action between post-soviet states. First founded by Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, the three core soviet states, another eight post-soviet states would almost immediately join.[178] At its height it would have twelve members, but as dissatisfaction grew several states, including Ukraine, would leave the CIS reducing its membership to nine. At the millennium criticism of the CIS was high, failing to meaningfully integrate its member states, considered a failure by most measures, and predicting its collapse.[179] In that first decade the CIS was a "loose and unstructured regime" that served as an "engine for bilateral relations" mainly between Russia and the other states rather than between themselves.[180] It did not have a well-organized internal structure, the independence of the CIS was limited, in particular from Russia, and member states delegated very little authority or sovereignty to the CIS. Member states frequently violated or ignored CIS statutes regarding sovereignty, adopting a single currency, or movement of people across borders. As the CIS did begin to organize, eventually creating over 60 institutions for subject area cooperation, many member states refused to participate in these institutions or sign on to new agreements.[181] Member states often simply negotiate their own bilateral or even multilateral agreements between themselves without working through the

[178] Brzezinski, Zbigniew K. Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States: documents, data, and analysis. Routledge, 2016.
[179] Brzezinski, Russia and the CIS 2016; Sakwa, Richard, and Mark Webber. "The commonwealth of independent states, 1991-1998: Stagnation and survival." Europe-Asia Studies 51, no. 3 (1999): 379-415; and Kubicek, Paul. "End of the Line for the Commonwealth of Independent States." Problems of Post-Communism 46, no. 2 (1999): 15-24.
[180] Dragneva and Kort "The Legal Regime for Free Trade in the CIS" Dragneva, Rilka, and Joop De Kort. "The legal regime for free trade in the Commonwealth of independent States." International & Comparative Law Quarterly 56, no. 2 (2007): 233-266.
[181] Kubicek, "The End of the Line for the CIS" 2009.

CIS.[182] Post 2000 develops in the CIS that show some positive cooperation on energy and security have been driven primarily by Russia and Belarus, with less involvement or even exclusion of the Central Asian members.[183] As Central Asian states have grown more distant from Russia geopolitically, this speaks to Russian influence and its strong ties with Belarus, not the ability of the CIS to foster cooperation.

To date the primary significant example of regional cooperation from the CIS is a customs union that has had some success in organizing trade and tariffs. However, as more member states joined the World Trade Organization the importance of the customs union has lessened, and some analysts have concluded the overall impact of the CIS on economic integration is negative.[184] The CIS does continue operation, although several members have left or are currently in the process of leaving the organization, but it is functionally a discussion forum for "low politics" that demands "virtually nothing" from its members.[185] Multiple other organizations have been created, either on specific issue areas to facilitate cooperation where the CIS failed, or IGOs sponsored by European states as an alternative to the Russian dominated CIS. The CIS represents a failure in creating cooperation by a regional IGO that has less institutionalization.

The specific nature of this failure could be attributed to several possibilities, such as distrust of Russia. The CIS was unable to facilitate credible commitments between its member states. In particular former soviet states in the CIS were likely distrustful of Russia, which is only increased as Russia exerts influence over the IGO. This illustrates how an IGO with low

[182] Sakwa and Webber, "The Commonwealth of Independent States" 1999.
[183] Kubicek, "The End of the Line for the CIS" 2009.
[184] Kubicek, "The End of the Line for the CIS" 2009.
[185] Kubicek, "The End of the Line for the CIS" 2009.

institutionalization fails to foster cooperation between its members, leading it to fall into disuse as a zombie IGO.

The Organization of African Unity, established in 1963, attempted to provide a unified organization to facilitate cooperation among most of the African states and three different ideological blocs.[186] The OAU had four original organs, with most of its policy to be determined by the heads of state of its members and executed by ministers from those member states.[187] The OAU was designed with a "minimalist" approach that emphasized member state sovereignty.[188] The OAU lacked a strong independent organization or enforcement mechanisms on its members. Member states "jealous guarding" of their sovereignty limited the OAU's effectiveness.[189] The OAU was commonly described as a "bull dog that could only bark, but could not bite."[190] Struggling with frequent coups that changed the heads of state and their preferences, the OAU was especially seen as a failure at resolving civil conflict on the continent.[191] The OAU did experience some success and is considered important in establishing many sub organizations that have fostered cooperation.[192] By 1999 OAU member states agreed it was a failure and should be dissolved in favor of a new institution. This came to pass in 2002 when the OAU was disbanded after the creation of the African Union (AU) to take its place. The AU was designed with a

[186] Edo, Victor Osaro, and Michael Abiodun Olanrewaju. "An Assessmnent of the Transformation Of The Organization of African Unity (OAU) To The African Union (AU), 1963-2007." Journal of the historical society of Nigeria (2012): 41-69.
[187] Mathews, Kuruvilla. "The Organization of African Unity." India Quarterly 33, no. 3 (1977): 308-324.
[188] Stapel, Sören, and Sören Stapel. "The Organization of African Unity and African Union: Following the Design of Reference Models." Regional Organizations and Democracy, Human Rights, and the Rule of Law: The African Union, Organization of American States, and the Diffusion of Institutions (2022): 237-275.
[189] Legum, Colin. "The Organisation of African Unity-success or failure?." International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 51, no. 2 (1975): 208-219.
[190] Edo and Olanrewaju, "An Assessment of the Transformation of the OAU to the AU" 2012.
[191] Edo and Olanrewaju, "An Assessment of the Transformation of the OAU to the AU" 2012.
[192] Legum, "The OAU – Success or Failure?" 1975.

"maximalist" position that wanted deeper integration of member states and did not emphasize their sovereignty.[193]

The African Union established multiple sub-organs for cooperation on multiple issue areas, from economic to conflict prevention, and set immediate priorities to create independent sub-organizations in the African Central Bank, the African Monetary Union, and the African Court of Justice.[194] This implies the lack of a larger organizational structure was possibly part of what the OAU lacked. These institutions may provide more capacity for information provision. The AU also has the legal right to intervene in member states under "grave circumstances."[195] Combined with the Court of Justice this gives the AU more power to impost costs relative to the OAU. The African Union was designed with greater institutionalization from its predecessor with the goal of overcoming the limitations of the OAU and facilitating greater consensus and cooperation in the region.

The OAU persisted for three decades, facilitating discussion and some cooperation between its states, but eventually its member states viewed it as a failure. They chose full dissolution and replacement rather than attempting reform. The African Union, whose membership was slightly different from that of the OAU, was designed with the intent to integrate its member states. The AU held more independence of operation, more internal organization, and strong sub-bodies that would enable it to help members make more credible commitments and foster cooperation. It has more capacity to impose costs and settle disputes.

While many factors contributed to the failure of the OAU, the immediate expansion of sub organizations, greater internal organization, and limited right to intervene AU suggest that on

[193] Stapel, "The OAU and AU" 2022.
[194] Edo and Olanrewaju, "An Assessment of the Transformation of the OAU to the AU" 2012.
[195] Chekol, Yayew Genet. "African Union institutional reform: Rationales, challenges and prospects." Insight on Africa 12, no. 1 (2020): 29-44.

some level member states felt a more institutionalized organization was needed. This has frequently served the needs of the AU's authoritarian members. The AU has facilitated pooling military resources, validated elections "rife" with fraud, and legitimized the rule of its authoritarian members.[196] The AU's increased institutionalization has enabled it to foster cooperation between its member states more effectively than its predecessor in the OAU. Its continuation, despite criticism and struggles, is due at least in part to the benefits it provides its authoritarian member states in supporting their regimes. The succession of the Organization of African Unity by the African Union illustrates both how low institutionalization might increase risk of failure and how greater institutionalization might mitigate that risk.

Conclusion

Institutional design matters for IGO vitality, but under specific conditions that will vary. This chapter has demonstrated the significance of design features under specific conditions to IGO vitality, depending on which IGO mechanism provides utility to members. Together these findings support the importance of institutional design and conditional effects in understanding the vitality of IGOs. They demonstrate how low institutionalization can increase risk of failure by authoritarian IGOs. They provide support for my theory that when credible commitments are necessary to achieve the cooperative goals of IGO members states, institutional design will impact that IGO's vitality. The factors impacting IGO vitality are multidimensional and complex, these findings also demonstrate the need for further research into institutional design of IGOs, conditions under which different design factors matter, and more refined theories of IGO vitality.

[196] Cottiero and Haggard, "Stabilizing Authoritarian Rule" 2023.

A better understanding of IGO vitality may require narrowed scope conditions and more specific measures.

The narrow conditions of the authoritarian models yielding more additional significant variables also may present a puzzle for generalizable theories on IGO vitality. A better understanding of IGO survival may require also understanding the composition of the IGOs membership. These findings support other research suggesting a different evaluation of membership benefits and conditions for cooperation by authoritarian states. Autocracies may have different benefit evaluations, but they do still need to solve collective action problems, they need IGOs to work. As key institutions in the international system, a better understanding of how regional IGOs with a major of authoritarian IGOs operate and persist is important to understanding current global cooperation and conflict. A more refined understanding of IGO vitality and also authoritarian cooperation are valuable contributions to understanding the international system.

These findings are only a small step towards understanding how institutional design impacts IGO vitality or the unique conditions of cooperation between authoritarian regimes. Institutionalization is only one factor of IGO design and is not a direct measure of many important design factors. Future research should seek more refined measures to capture multiple dimensions of design, especially different factors of bureaucratic efficiency and autonomy. Greater insight may also be gained with a closer examination of the processes and procedures of IGO bureaucracies and the expertise of their staff. This could also be valuable in examining variation in IGO failure, looking specifically at death, zombification, or replacement.

Chapter 4
Institutional Evolution

Introduction

Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) are key institutions in the international order, making their success and failure an important subject for study. IGOs coordinate decentralized cooperation in an anarchic system.[197] Nearly every state is a member of multiple IGOs, making them critical to interstate cooperation and global governance. Research has shown these IGOs fail more often than previously thought, with succession being the most common form of IGO "death," either directly or indirectly. Yet we do not yet fully understand what IGOs succession looks like. How do states design successor IGOs differently from their predecessors? Are they more cautious with the successor and scale it down or do they scale up in scope, size, and autonomy? Recent scholarship poses further questions about how "states pick up the pieces" to continue cooperating through new institutions.[198] Specific changes in the operation and organization of a new IGO is naturally expected, but there has been little study to establish these changes do occur, examine the nature of these changes, or identify trends in changes in successor IGO design. I contribute to answering these questions by examining a sample of pairs of IGOs, predecessors and successors, to identify trends in institutional design changes and begin to understand what succession looks like broadly in the international system.

As we learn more about the life and death of IGOs, recent scholarship has begun studying how the functions and roles of IGOs evolve after their death, including successor organizations. Succession, defined broadly, is the transfer of functions and responsibilities from one

[197] Jupille, Joseph Henri, Walter Mattli, and Duncan Snidal. Institutional choice and global commerce. Cambridge University Press, 2013.
[198] Dijkstra, Debre, and Heinkelmann-Wild, "Governance abhors a vacuum" 2023.

organization to another.[199] Replacing an IGO with a successor rather than reforming is an interesting question, as replacement requires additional resources and different mechanisms of change than reform.[200] From a rationalist perspective, states seek the least costly options to pursue their interests. We would expect them to prefer reforming IGOs to minimize costs whenever possible.

Yet research has shown states are often more willing to create new institutions than reform them.[201] We need a better understanding of what factors would make a seemingly more costly option be preferred, what changes the decision making calculation for states. Scholars have framed IGO succession in the context of "supply" and "demand" for cooperation.[202] States have a demand for cooperation on collective action issues they cannot resolve themselves. They then turn to IGOs to produce the supply. Replacing an IGO with a successor implies first there is agreement among the influential member states that a need for an IGO to facilitate cooperation still exists. Second it implies that, for multiple possible reasons, the existing IGO cannot be reformed to address the needs for cooperation. As mentioned above, some factor prevents a lower cost option of reform. The current institution cannot supply enough cooperation to meet the demand, so a change is needed on the supply side. Member states go through a decision-making process to determine this, where they must reject using or changing the current institution, then reject selecting a different already existing institution, before they will choose to create a new organization.[203] In these cases of creation some set of factors must decrease the benefits of reform while another set of factors decreases the costs of creating a new institution. It

[199] Wessel, Ramses A. "Dissolution and succession: The transmigration of the soul of international organizations." In Research handbook on the law of international organizations. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011.
[200] Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Mette, and Daniel Verdier. "To reform or to replace? Succession as a mechanism of institutional change in intergovernmental organisations." The Review of International Organizations (2024): 1-29.
[201] Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, "Death of IOs" 2020.
[202] Dijkstra, Debre, and Heinkelmann-Wild, "Governance abhors a vacuum" 2023,
[203] Jupille, Mattli, and Snidal, Institutional choice and global commerce. 2013.

must be ‘cheaper’ to replace the IGO than reform it for those member states with influence over the fate of the IGO. In some cases, this could be made easier due to an already existing similar IGO that states can turn to for the same function. But more often than not predecessors are dissolved only upon the creation of a new successor IGO, even when that IGO may not be a direct legal replacement.

Succession is one of the most common fates of IGOs and dissolution without any continuation of duties in some form is very rare.[204] The successor is then taking over the cooperative activities of the predecessor, and often also inherits additional elements such as organs and even staff. In some cases, this includes existing legal provisions.[205] This can be conceptualized as the replacement inheriting some of the ‘body’ in these tangible aspects or inheriting some of the ‘soul’ in intangible duties and procedures from the predecessor.[206] Succession is fuzzy, with many ways for an IGO to be a partial successor. To understand the full range of IGO succession and how institutions evolve we need a broad concept that includes indirect replacements by other organizations.

IGO succession is a complicated process that will vary widely depending on the current conditions for those member states and the issue area. Succession is also not just influenced by member states, but also the international bureaucrats working in these organizations. A majority of IGOs, roughly two-thirds, are created with significant design involvement of bureaucrats from pre-existing IGOs.[207] IGO succession encompasses the operation and effectiveness of the IGO, the need for cooperation of member states, member state politics, and experience of international bureaucrats. From a global governance perspective, the creation of new organizations may be

[204] Wessel, "Dissolution and succession" 2011; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, “Death of IOs” 2020.
[205] Dijkstra, Debre, and Heinkelmann-Wild, "Governance abhors a vacuum” 2023.
[206] Wessel, "Dissolution and succession" 2011.
[207] Johnson and Urpelainen, “International Bureaucrats” 2014.

closer to institutional *change* rather than something entirely new.[208] Succession is not an independent event, relating to the broader conditions in the system but especially to how the successor organization relates to its predecessor, to a pair of organizations.

To gain a better understanding of the complicated picture of institutional succession I use a sample of 44 IGO pairs, 44 predecessors with 42 successor organizations, spanning from 1905 to 2015.[209] I code additional variables for their transition and institutional design changes from predecessor to successor organization. My initial findings with this small sample support recent scholarship that the need for cooperation persists and member states prefer not to dissolve replaced IGOs until their successors are created. Member states appear to seek to minimize any time gaps between predecessor and successor. I examine changes in issue area responsibility, finding increases only in just over a quarter of the sample. Through logistical regression I find evidence of a relationship between shared membership in other IGOs and this increase in responsibility. This could suggest that experiences by states cooperating through other institutions make them more willing to work through IGOs, leading to the new IGOs they form having more issue areas. Additionally, they may have developed more cooperative relationships and are willing to expand that cooperation to new issue areas. Furthermore, I identify trends suggesting successor IGOs are frequently increased in institutional size. This occurs even when the issue area responsibilities of the successor remain similar. Finally, I explore three examples that all demonstrate an increase in autonomy for the successor organization. Identifying and understanding general trends in the population of successor organizations is important to understanding the vitality of not just individual organizations, but the evolution of IGOs and global governance.

[208] Jupille, Mattli, and Snidal, Institutional choice and global commerce. 2013.
[209] From Eilstrup-Sangiovanni's 2020 dataset on IO death.

Literature Review

Research into IGO vitality has greatly improved our understanding of the life cycle of individual IGOs. IGOs experience more change and 'death' than previously thought. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni finds that IGO death occurs more frequently in younger institutions, and that membership size and resiliency to exogenous shocks may make IGOs more likely to live longer.[210] Gray finds that many IGOs that are technically still 'alive' on paper are often not active, describing these as "zombie" organizations that may dynamically change in and out of active status.[211] Gray further finds that less autonomy may be significant for IGO death.[212] Reinsberg examines how overlapping governance tasks and issue areas can actually increase survival rather than increase risk due to competition.[213] Eilstrup-Sangiovanni also finds that succession is the most frequent form of IGO death.[214] Debre and Dijkstra examine multiple flexibility measures and design features for IGO vitality, but only found majority voting and a dichotomous staff size measure significant.[215] IGO death and succession are frequent and warrant further study to understand how these institutions affect the international system.

Yet scholars have only begun to explore what happens after these IGOs die. Meyers establishes a framework to categorize successions, creating a "typology of succession" listing transition types as replacement, absorption, merger, separation, and transfer of specific functions.[216] The final two, separation where a larger IGO separates a part of itself to make it an independent smaller IGO, and transfer of specific functions where both IGOs continue, are

[210] Eilstrup-Sangiovanni "Death of IOs" 2020, Eilstrup-Sangiovanni "What Kills IOs" 2021.
[211] Gray, "Life, Death, or Zombie" 2018.
[212] Gray, "Life, Death, or Zombie" 2018.
[213] Reinsberg, "Institutional overlap and the survival of IGOs" 2024.
[214] Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, "Death of IOs" 2020.
[215] Debre and Dijkstra, "Institutional design for a post liberal order" 2021.
[216] Myers, Patrick R. Succession between international organizations. Routledge, 2013.

virtually unobserved in the international system. Jupille, Mattlie and Snidal present a theory of how states choose to Use, Select, Change, or Create (USCC) institutions using bounded rationality based on both the nature of desired cooperation and existing institutions.[217] They identify *issue characteristics*, *preferences*, *uncertainty*, and *institutional costs* as important factors in state's decision making about institutions.[218] They argue, with examples, how states will favor existing institutions even if not they are not optimal for their specific needs.[219] This research provides a theoretical foundation for how to categorize successions and model state choices. It establishes an expectation that states will favor avoiding the greater institutional costs associated with new institution creation.

Yet empirical studies cited above demonstrate how frequently states do incur the costs of replacing IGOs. This may be explained by considering additional obstacles to reform and how successor IGOs often use information and resources from their predecessors. There are several factors that can make a predecessor too 'rigid' to reform. Existing terms and conditions of an IGO may be enshrined by the legal language and are not able to be changed without an entirely new agreement. Specific states may be powerful veto players unwilling to make concessions or there may be a larger number of veto players making agreement to reform difficult. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni theorizes successions may be used to escape "joint decision traps" that prevent desired reforms.[220] Lugg provides some support for this demonstrating how states use "linked IGOs" to circumvent these types of obstacles to reform.[221] Changes in the international system, such as advancements in technology, shifts in norms, or even climate change, could also

[217] Jupille, Mattli, and Snidal. Institutional choice and global commerce. 2013.
[218] Jupille, Mattli, and Snidal. Institutional choice and global commerce. 2013.
[219] Jupille, Mattli, and Snidal. Institutional choice and global commerce. 2013.
[220] Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, "Death of IOs" 2020.
[221] Lugg, Andrew. "Re-contracting intergovernmental organizations: Membership change and the creation of linked intergovernmental organizations." The Review of International Organizations (2024): 1-33.

necessitate large scale changes to an IGOs operation or issue areas that necessitate replacement over reform. Rivalries or shifts in relative power between states in the IGO may also make negotiations over reform challenging. Successor IGOs have formed due to decolonized states seeking to form an organization independent of their former colonizer or creating a new institution to exclude or circumvent a single hostile member state. State decision-making about reform versus replacement is broader than just weighing resource costs. States have adopted various strategies to deal with obstacles to reform organizations, one of which is succession.

Dijkstra, Debre, and Heinklemann-Wild provide a recent empirical study into the "afterlives" of IGOs that examines transfer of various elements to successor IGOs. They apply a two dimensional measure of continuity, legal-institutional and assets, and examine how each may carry on in some form even if indirectly.[222] Through this they find that 21 out of a sample of 26 dissolved IGOs had some form of continuity in other IGOs.[223] This sample is focused solely on "major" organizations to study potential large gaps left in international governance.[224] These studies help explain why states might prefer replacement over reform and gives an empirical glimpse into how the body and soul of major IGOs can live on. Yet there is still more to understand about when and how states choose to replace these organizations and what succession looks like for the larger population of IGOs.

Institutional design does not happen independently for each organization. Reinsberg and Westerwinter find that new IGOs are often designed using previous or currently existing IGOs as templates, especially when they have similar roles.[225] Grigorescu finds evidence of diffusion of

[222] Dijkstra, Debre, and Heinklemann-Wild, "Governance Abhors a Vacuum" 2023.
[223] Dijkstra, Debre, and Heinklemann-Wild, "Governance Abhors a Vacuum" 2023.
[224] Dijkstra, Debre, and Heinklemann-Wild, "Governance Abhors a Vacuum" 2023.
[225] Reinsberg and Westerwinter, "Institutional Overlap in Global Governance" 2023.

bureaucratic oversight mechanisms across IGOs.[226] Johnson and Urpelainen argue that international bureaucrats may be given "substantial discretion" in designing new IGOs even when there is disagreement between the principle states and the bureaucrats.[227] They also discuss how valued expertise for an issue area spread across bureaucrats in multiple organizations may prompt new institutions to bring those experts together in a single organization.[228] Institutional design features of IGOs matter for their operation, and could potentially carry on into new organizations. States will look at successful organizations when designing new institutions. Staff will carry their past experiences and knowledge from previous organizations with them. These factors of institutional knowledge may not only impact vitality but could carry on into a successor organization either as parts of an inherited 'body' or a knowledge based 'soul' from a predecessor organization.

I contribute to this research by exploring a wider sample of successor IGOs of all sizes and mandates, not just major organizations. I treat succession as a dyad, coding the predecessor and successor together to see how various factors change from one institution to the next. Successor IGOs vary along several dimensions from their predecessors, such as issue area responsibility, institutional size, and autonomy. Changes in issue area responsibility are differences in what issues the IGO is responsible for coordinating, what duties and services it has for those issues. If a successor IGO duties are expanded to new issue areas, it demonstrates a choice by founding states to grant it more responsibility. This can occur without a change in mandate or even scope category from the predecessor. The West African Economic Community (CEAO), responsible for economic integration and increasing trade, was replaced by the West

[226] Grigorescu, Alexandru. "The spread of bureaucratic oversight mechanisms across intergovernmental organizations." International Studies Quarterly 54, no. 3 (2010): 871-886.
[227] Johnson and Urpelainen, "International Bureaucrats" 2014.
[228] Johnson and Urpelainen, "International Bureaucrats" 2014.

African Monetary Union(UEMOA) which had greater responsibilities in establishing a full economic common market. UEMOA had the same economic mandate and scope category, medium, as CEAO. Yet UEMOA had increased responsibilities, taking on the duties of both CEAO and another organization to manage a formal common market. This shows an increase in issue area responsibility relative to its predecessor that does not appear in coding its mandate and scope category independently.

Institutional size refers to changes in the structure and resources of the operating body of the IGO. These are specific to institutional factors of the IGO itself, not its membership, mandate, or duties. These may change the complexity and 'depth' of the IGO. For example, when the Southern African Development Coordination Conference(SADDC) was replaced by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) it added additional committees, subcommittees, and a parliamentary forum. This demonstrates a deeper institutional design and more formalized division of labor in the successor IGO.

Autonomy refers to the amount of independence the IGO's bureaucracy is granted from its member states. This captures the ability of an IGO to act without direct member approval, measuring what tasks the IGO's bureaucracy is empowered to perform in practice. This "implemented autonomy" is taken from Gray 2018 and measures if an IGO can independently gather information, amend proposals, or possesses veto power.[229] I examine this for three pairs of IGOs where we have autonomy scores for both predecessor and successor.

Through these dimensions I explore how new institutions may increase in scale demonstrating a commitment by states to create more supply of cooperation and willingness to incur those costs. I highlight interesting areas for continued research, provide support for initial

[229] Gray, "Life, Death, or Zombie" 2018.

findings of past research, and examine changes in issue area responsibility, institutional size, and examples of greater autonomy in successors.

Expectations

Scholars acknowledge the "messy" nature of IGO termination and succession.[230] This makes it difficult to generalize when every succession possesses some unique factors. Yet by examining degrees of institutional change between predecessor and successor we can still explore general trends in IGO replacement. Dimensions of an IGO's institutional design matter for its ability to supply the cooperation states seek.[231] Exact changes in these factors may differ from situation to situation, an increase or decrease in scope or institutional size can be captured. These institutional features are important for how IGOs perform those key functions of reducing uncertainty and transaction costs to foster cooperation.[232] IGOs have largely preformed these roles under an existing international order with an "institutionalized status quo" shaping solutions to cooperation problems.[233]

While specific legal conditions and procedures for dissolution exist in most IGOs operating documents, the dissolution of institutions occurs on the basis of the rules and principles perceived by member states more than the strict text of their treaties.[234] IGO termination is not dictated by law, but by the practices and perceptions of the member states. These practices and perceptions change over time and are influenced by member states' experiences in other IGOs. Understanding IGO succession requires more than examining the specific legal language in

[230] Jupille, Mattli, and Snidal, Institutional choice and global commerce. 2013
[231] I specifically explore changes in responsibilities, institutional size, and autonomy but these could also include staff size, staff technical expertise, secretariat size, and others.
[232] Keohane, After hegemony 1984; Jupille, Mattli, and Snidal, Institutional choice and global commerce. 2013.
[233] Jupille, Mattli, and Snidal, Institutional choice and global commerce. 2013,
[234] Wessel, "Dissolution and succession" 2011.

founding documents. General trends in IGO succession should be understood in the context of the international system and shared population of IGOs between members. As we examine these pairs of organizations, we should be mindful that these successions are not truly independent of each other or conditions of the international system.

The succession of IGOs is an interconnected phenomenon occurring in an environment with overlapping memberships, functions and goals. Successors are shaped by this environment and previous IGOs. Recent research suggests the need for cooperation may change and evolve, but in most cases, it persists even when an organization is dissolved.[235] Similar goals continue from organization to organization. Several cases of replacement are a chain of multiple successions as the demand for cooperation expanded. Many IGOs are created as "linked" organizations to other IGOs, often as a result of changing dynamics among current members.[236] Rarely is a new IGO created from scratch. Existing knowledge, successful agreement terms, and even resources and staff continue on past termination, impacting the institutional cost to create new organizations.

Recent scholarship has focused on how successor IGOs address issues with the supply of cooperation. An insufficient supply of cooperation, which can just as easily be different in type rather than quantity, is not the same as decreasing demand.[237] I assert that succession is often attempting to remedy an insufficient or ineffective supply of cooperation. If the change was largely in demand, member states would be more likely to simply terminate or neglect the organization, rather than go through the costs of replacing it. But there is uncertainty in creating a successor IGO to address the limitations of its predecessor, especially if different member

[235] Dijkstra, Debre, and Heinklemann-Wild, "Governance Abhors a Vacuum" 2023.
[236] Lugg, "Re-contracting IGOs" 2024.
[237] Dijkstra, Debre, and Heinklemann-Wild, "Governance Abhors a Vacuum" 2023.

states disagree on the problem. Our rational design approach to how states structure IGOs suggests they are optimized for states interests. But frequent IGO termination and succession suggests this is not the case. States turn to IGOs because collective action is too challenging to accomplish on their own, IGOs by nature are tackling difficult cooperation issues. It is not surprising they are not always successful in their first try, necessitating a replacement. Member states' relative power and preferences change over time, changing how an IGO may be constrained and affecting latent demand for cooperation. Nor do they have perfect information for the creation of a successor IGO, with multiple strategies open to them.

They could adopt a strategy of more direct member state control, decrease the size of the successor organization, narrow its scope, and allow it less autonomy. Conversely, they could increase its size, expand its scope, or grant it more autonomy. Likely they might employ a mixed strategy, some combination of changes in some of these dimensions but not others. Which strategy provides member states with the benefits they seek will depend on specific conditions. However, the conditions of replacement require reforming the existing IGO to be too costly or not possible, so is continuing the IGO, necessitating a complete change. Under these conditions there may be identifiable general trends towards increasing the size of the organization and its autonomy.

We must be mindful of the many factors that may go into the cost benefit considerations by member states, some may not even be directly related to the IGO's operation. There may be "handicaps" limiting an existing IGO unrelated to its staff.[238] Membership may create barriers to reform or prompt a need for greater change. Often an IGO's membership is not unanimous in agreement about dissolving an organization or creating a successor. These negotiations create

[238] Johnson and Urpelainen, "International Bureaucrats" 2014.

"winners and losers" among member states.[239] If a state that is functionally a 'veto player' member refused to allow reform, that may force dissolution and succession. The risk of this increases the more veto players there are. Alternatively, potential new members may prompt a need for greater changes than reform can provide. Potential new member states may prefer a "fresh start" in a new IGO to soothe concerns about taking on costs and obligations they had no voice in negotiating.[240] These examples demonstrate the utility being considered by states in their decision making is not just one of resources, but political issues beyond the IGO. This may shift costs in favor of succession rather than reform.

Previous research suggests that in most cases, especially cases of succession, the need for cooperation persists and pure dissolution is rare. Even when member states may be dissatisfied with an existing IGO to the extent they dissolve it, their need for an IGO in that issue area will remain. States turn to IGOs to solve problems they cannot bilaterally, achieving gains they cannot otherwise. States will not be quick to turn their back on those possible gains but will often be sensitive to how these gains are distributed. Who else benefits can make designing IGOs for cooperation difficult. States may be dissatisfied with their first attempt but will commit to a second to not lose out on those potential gains. Additionally, having already put resources into an existing IGO, they will seek to mitigate costs of replacement, possibly by incorporating organization, resources, or staff from an existing institution. Past research has indicated that technical IGOs are more likely to be merged or replaced than other forms of 'death' which may indicate they are still needed or even have been successful, but the nature of cooperation or that particular issue may require reorganization and replacement.[241] Successor IGOs will be created

[239] Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Verdier, "To reform or to replace?" 2024.
[240] Wessel, "Dissolution and succession" 2011.
[241] Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, "Death of IOs" 2020.

within a short period of time of their predecessors being dissolved, as states will not want extended periods without an organization managing cooperation, especially on economic matters. This would increase the risk of losing gains or the ability to use resources from the previous IGO in creating its replacement.

Succession's messy nature is inherently woven with its bureaucracy which impacts facilitating agreements, evaluating effective practices, and developing institutional memory to carry on into future institutions. Bureaucracies can affect making credible commitments. Bureaucracies matter for providing accurate information used to persuade potential partners of an actor's commitment to an agreement.[242] Experienced, quality bureaucrats increase political communication that removes barriers to cooperation and encourages state governments to uphold their agreements.[243] Member states value bureaucratic expertise in forming new institutions and often grant them significant input on IGO design, even when they may have different views of the role of the IGO.[244] In the modern system IGOs are competing for qualified international bureaucrats, especially for technical issue areas. When IGOs provide poor working conditions and fail to attract quality staff it can limit the success of the IGO.[245] Differences in the bureaucracy of a successor IGO matters on multiple dimensions but is difficult to observe and measure.

To understand more about the nature of IGO succession we should seek to understand how states alter institutional design to generate the desired cooperation. Often this may not be best viewed not as deaths and births, but as indirect evolution with new organizations shaped by and taking on the roles and resources of their predecessors. Successor IGOs are shaped by both

[242] Keohane, After hegemony 1984.
[243] Gray, "Life, Death, or Zombie" 2018.
[244] Johnson and Urpelainen, "International Bureaucrats" 2014.
[245] Gray, "Life, Death, or Zombie" 2018.

the successes and failures of their predecessors. There is a "heritage" of terminated IGOs that inspires the design of their replacements and shapes future cooperation. One prominent example of this is how founding states evaluated lessons learned from the League of Nations when creating the United Nations. But this heritage is not always one of overcoming failures, it may also be expanding successes. An area for further study is distinguishing when IGO terminations are truly failures or success prompting expansion that requires succession. We can identify trends in design choices for successor IGOs that help us understand the nature of replacement and evolution of IGOs looks like.

I make three conjectures about institutional changes in successor IGOs from their predecessors. I expect member states to minimize interruption in the supply of cooperation, only terminating the previous IGO when the successor is in place. States will not want to risk losing potential gains, even from failing IGOs, by terminating without possible successors. This may also allow for reducing replacement costs when some resources, either assets or legal frameworks, may be readily transferred to the successor. Conjecture one expects successor IGOs will be implemented with minimal time gap.

Conjecture 1: There will be little to no time gap between predecessor and successor IGOs.

Next, I expect member states to largely keep the responsibilities and issue areas of successors similar to their predecessors. If successions frequently occur as strategies to circumvent obstacles to reform, then the successor IGOs should be similar in issue area and duties to their predecessor. Assuming more IGOs are replaced for insufficient supply of cooperation rather than growing demand after success, states may be cautious in designing successors. With a lack of proven success, states would be less likely to add additional issue

areas without knowing if their design changes will be successful. Thus, we may see more cautious behavior after failure as expected, not in the choice to replace but in the design of the replacement. Conjecture two is that successor IGOs with have similar or fewer issue area responsibilities in relation to their predecessors.

Conjecture 2: Most successor IGOs will not have expanded issue area responsibilities.

Succession requires significant changes to an IGO beyond just the name. I expect that member state choices about the institutional design of successors will be distinct from aspects of their predecessors. Successors will be designed differently in some significant way from predecessors. On average these changes will require increasing some aspect of the institutional size of the successor IGO. States will seek to empower bureaucracies to overcome limitations of previous organizations. These changes may improve division of labor in the successor, increasing the ability of the IGO to provide information to mitigate uncertainty, reduce transaction costs, or even have more power to mediate disagreements and monitor defections. Increasing the size and power of the bureaucracy of the IGO may also help address membership issues that prevented reform. States may be willing to surrender more control if other states are doing so as well. This could reduce the number of states with influence or veto power that prevented reform in the predecessor. Additionally, more power to monitor and impose costs may give the successor teeth to enforce agreements on more reluctant member states that stalled cooperation in a predecessor. Conjecture three is that, on average, member states will increase the institutional size of the successor organization.

Conjecture 3: Successor IGOs will be more institutionalized than their predecessors, on average.

In this chapter I code a variable for each of these conjectures and explore them by analyzing trends in the data and performing a preliminary regression on changes in issue area responsibility. I find the vast majority of the sample experienced no time gap in between organizations, increases in responsibilities is rare and associated with membership overlap in other organizations, and increases in institutional size is slightly more frequent than not. I then further explore greater autonomy granted to successor institutions through three cases. This identifies important trends for further study and provides preliminary results of a possible relationship between shared memberships and expanded issue area responsibilities. It also demonstrates the utility of studying IGO succession as pairs of institutions relative to each other.

Sample of Replaced Organizations

I explore the replacement of IGOs through a sample of 44 organizations and 42 successor organizations from Eilstrup-Sangiovanni's 2018 dataset.[246] The IGOs in the sample are mostly Economic or Social and primarily from Africa, Europe, and the Americas.[247] The time frame spans from 1905 to 2015. Table eight below displays summary statistics for the sample.

Table 8. Replaced IGOs Sample

Type	Count
Economic	22
General	4
Security	2
Social	12
Technical	4

Region	Count
Africa	12
Americas	7
Asia	1
Europe	8
Global	3
Inter Regional	13

Scope Category	Approx Count	Example
Narrow	31	*African and Malagasy Industrial Property Office*
Medium	7	*Latin American Free Trade Association*
Broad	6	*Organization of African Unity*

[246] Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, "Death of IOs" 2020.
[247] See Appendix A for List of IGOs and their Successors.

The average life span of these IGOs is 20 years, with the oldest being 56. This is similar to an average life span of 23 years found in studies with a larger sample size.[248] The lower lifespan quartile is eight years while the upper quartile is 30 years. I draw on Reinsberg 2024 for membership variables and additional controls.[249]

I code five variables, nature of *transition*, *time gap* between predecessor and successor, increase in issue area *responsibility*, increase in *institutional size, and* if the successor IGO is still *alive* as of 2015. I code these variables using official organization pages, the Yearbook of International Organizations, and published articles or organization documents. [250] Each of these variables except *alive* is coded relative to the predecessor, focusing on change in design between the two organizations. Combining these variables with others from previous datasets I can make comparisons, identify trends, and perform preliminary regressions to evaluate my conjectures about IGO succession. This contributes new data in these variables and a new approach in analyzing succession as a dyad of organizations.

For *transition* I created five categories, Restructured, Superseded, Dissolved and Later Replaced, Dissolved for Existing IGO, and Dissolved for Broader IGO. Restructured was applied when existing agreements and internal bodies were modified and reorganized along with a name change, but much of the original IGO was retained and continued in the new organization. Similar in practice to reform but still with the creation of a new successor IGO. An example of

[248] Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, “Death of IOs” 2020.
[249] Reinsberg, "Institutional overlap and the survival of IGOs" 2024.
[250] Yearbook of International Organizations. Brussels: Union of International Associations, 2000.

this is the replacement of the European Collaboration on Measurement Standards (EUROMET) with the European Association of National Metrology Institutes (EURAMET) or the replacement of the Preferential Trade Area for Southern and Eastern Africa (PTASEA) with the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). These are displayed in table nine.

Table 9. Transition Categories and Examples

Transition Type	Count	
Resturctured	12	European Monetary Institute replaced by the European Central Bank
Superseded	23	International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries replaced by the North American Fisheries Organization
Dissolved and Later Replaced	2	Organization of Central American States replaced by the Central American Integration System
Dissolved for Existing IGO	2	Agence de La Francophonie replaced by the Organization Internationale de la Francophonie
Dissolved for Broader IGO	5	Inter-American Coffee Board replaced by the Organization of American States

Superseded applies when a predecessor IGO ceases operation upon creation of a new IGO that takes over its function and activities. This new IGO may be created independently or may be formed directly from the parts of its predecessor. The replaced IGO must end official function with the start of full operation of the successor IGO.[251] This frequently occurs with fresh negotiations or other new meetings of relevant member states to intentionally create a successor IGO to replace the existing IGO. Over half of IGO transitions in the sample fall into this category. An example of this is the North Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) replacing the

[251] This does not include when specific projects or sub-organs of the replaced IGO are continued by the successor.

International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNWAF) after a new round of negotiations occurred to accommodate new member states.

Dissolved and Later Replaced refers to specifically IGOs that were dissolved without a successor already in place, leaving a time gap between a new IGO taking on the activities of the previous IGO. This time gap makes this category distinct from superseded. Only two transitions fall into this category. An example is the Organization of Central American States (ODECA), which ceased most of its activities in 1973 due to regional conflict and was not officially replaced by the Central American Integration System (SICA) until 1993.

Dissolved for Existing IGO is used when an IGO is dissolved in favor of an existing IGO that is already doing similar activities, especially with an overlap in member states. In this category member states are selecting a competing IGO rather than creating a new institution to be the successor. An example of this category is the absorption of the Agence de Cooperation Culturelle et Technique (ACCT) into the Organization Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF).

Finally, Dissolved for Broader IGO applies when the IGO is replaced in favor of an IGO with a wider scope and mandate, either existing or newly created, such as a regional or global IGO that takes on multiple issue areas. An example of this category is the Inter-American Coffee Board (IACB), an IGO with a narrow issue area, having its function taken over by the Organization of American States (OAS), a regional IGO with a broad mandate to foster cooperation on multiple issue areas.

For *time gap* I use a dichotomous variable, 0 if there is no gap between organizations and 1 if there was. This allows for transition periods of one year where there may be some interruption in services as an IGO is dissolved or merged into a new IGO with an existing treaty but still in the functional creation process. A dichotomous scheme is also used due to the rarity of

time gaps in the sample. If the previous IGO is officially dissolved or largely non-functional for over a year before the successor IGO comes into effect, then it is coded as a 0 with a time gap between organizations. There are only two replacements coded as a 0, corresponding with the two Dissolved and Later Replaced transitions mentioned above. In addition to SICA's replacement of ODECA after more than a decade, the replacement of the Central American Coffee Board (CACB), which dissolved in 1978, by the Productores de Cafes Asociados (PANCAFE) in 1980. In total forty-two successions had no time gap, while two did.

For changes in issue area *responsibility,* I use a dichotomous variable with 0 if responsibilities remained similar, and 1 if there is an increase in issue area responsibilities. This variable captures changes in duties and responsibilities specifically relative to the preceding IGO. If a successor IGO with a technical mandate is still governing largely the same industry standards as its predecessor, then its responsibilities have remained similar. If an IGO governing trade terms in a region is replaced by one that coordinates both trade and currency exchange rates, then this is an increase in responsibilities. The successor IGO has a new issue to facilitate, even though that issue may be within the same broad mandate. This also does not require a change in scope category. A narrow IGO's successor may still be deemed narrow in overall scope, but still have more responsibilities and would be coded as an increase. This relative coding captures variation from predecessor to successor that independent categorization may miss.

An example of similar issue area *responsibility* is the West African Health Organization (WAHO), which was created from the merger two other regional health institutions, the West African Health Community (WAHC) and the Coordination and Cooperation Organization for the Control of the Major Endemic Diseases (OCCGE). Despite replacing two organizations and

having a larger geographic scope, WAHO's issue area and responsibilities were similar to both predecessor organizations.[252] WAHO is coded as a 0, similar *responsibility*. An example of an increase in *responsibility* is the replacement of the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) with the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). CARIFTA responsibilities were primarily administering a free trade agreement, while CARICOM administered a full common economic market, giving it significant additional responsibilities beyond a free trade agreement. While the overall mandate of both IGOs is economic, the issue areas of CARIFTA were narrowly tied to specific free trade issues while CARICOM broadly fosters all economic activity in the region and external trade. Issue area *responsibility* captures an increase in what duties member states want the successor organizations to perform relative to their predecessors. This is important as it captures when the institutional role evolves from organization to the next. It also provides information that is missed by considering each organization independently, as there may be no change in mandate or scope category.

For increase in *institutional size* I also code as either 0 or 1, with 1 representing the bureaucratic institutions of the replacement IGO being expanded from its predecessor. This is a very broad measure. Increases in *institutional size* could be enlarging the secretariate or increasing the number of sub-organs, such as committees, councils, courts, etc. This expansion of the bureaucracy should represent a change in capacity through an increase in the division of labor, important technical expertise, or greater authority in the form of monitoring or adjudicating bodies. This can be difficult to precisely measure due to limited information for many of the IGOs, especially the dissolved predecessors. I apply a 1 cautiously, erring on the side of no increase. For example, the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA/ALADI)

[252] The WAHC had primarily English speaking west African states as members, while the OCCGE had primarily French speaking west African states as members. WAHO merged these into one but continued the same function.

has four primary institutions while its predecessor, the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) only has three. However, the additional institution is an "Evaluation and Convergence Conference" that does not appear to significantly increase ALADI's bureaucracy, nor does other literature on the succession indicate other significant changes. ALADI is coded as 0, no increase in *institutional size* from LAFTA. In contrast, the North Pacific Anadromous Fish Commission (NPAFC), replacing the International North pacific Fisheries Commission (INPFC), had a larger secretariate, multiple committees, and regular working groups that its predecessor lacked. Due to these changes NPAFC is coded as a 1 for *institutional size.* Measuring relative changes in *institutional size* captures if member states choose to scale up the institutional design of successor IGOs, giving them more capacity to perform functions, not less. Table ten displays both theoretical variables of change in issue area *responsibility* and increase in *institutional size.*

Table 10. Issue Area Responsibility and Institutional Size

Issue Area Responsibility	**Count**
Similar Responsibilities	31
Increase Responsibilities	12
Increase in Institutional Size	**Count**
No	20
Yes	21

Lastly, *alive* is also a dichotomous variable, coded 1 if the successor IGO is still operating and 0 if it was dissolved or replaced. An overwhelming majority of successor IGOs are *alive*, with only nine IGOs being coded as 0. Out of eight successor IGOs that are not still operating, two were themselves directly succeeded by another IGO, another five were dissolved in favor of different or multiple other organizations, leaving only one that simply ceased operation. This sample provides a glimpse of replaced IGOs with some variation in most

dimensions, except notably *time gap* and *alive.* Examining this small sample, we can identify trends in how IGOs are replaced and identify areas for further data collection and study.

Additional existing variables are used in the sample to help identify trends, provide controls, and perform a preliminary regression. *Membership overlap* captures the average shared memberships in other IGOs by member states.[253] This displays some significance in when states do choose to give successor organizations more *responsibility.* The variable *autonomy* captures how much agency an IGO's bureaucracy is granted, coding for if they can perform independent information gathering, the ability change proposals, or if they have veto powers.[254] From this I also create an *autonomy difference* variable by subtracting the value of the predecessor from the value for the successor IGO. This captures the change in autonomy for that succession. The variable *lifespan* measures the age of the predecessor IGO at dissolution, from which I also employ a categorical variable segmented by ten year increments.[255] *Membership* is the logged number of member states and *region* controls for geographic region of the IGO.[256] *Scope* categorizes IGOs into narrow, medium, or broad scope categories based on how specific their issue areas are.[257] *Governance overlap* is used to control for the degree of similar governance tasks shared with other IGOs.[258] Lastly, *major powers* controls for the presence of great power states who may have greater influence or global interests distinct from the other members. Not all successor pairs have data for each of these additional variables.

Evolution of Failed Organizations

[253] Reinsberg, "Institutional overlap and the survival of IGOs" 2024.
[254] Gray, "Life, Death, Zombie" 2018.
[255] Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, "Death of IOs" 2020.
[256] Reinsberg, "Institutional overlap and the survival of IGOs" 2024.
[257] Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, "Death of IOs" 2020.
[258] Reinsberg, "Institutional overlap and the survival of IGOs" 2024.

I explore IGO evolution through examining trends in these variables, specific case examples, and a logistic regression on increase of issue area responsibility for a smaller sub sample due to data availability. I evaluate each conjecture, identifying trends that show some support for them. Time gaps are very rare in the sample. Issue areas only increased roughly one quarter of the time. Institutional size is increased just over 50% of the time. Together these suggest member states more frequently scale up in terms of institutional organization and bureaucracy while more frequently keeping similar scale for issue areas.

For conjecture one, a majority of successions will be created without any time lag, I found this to be overwhelmingly the case in this sample. Only two out of forty-four successions contained a time gap. Some cases did involve a transitional period, where the successor may not have been fully functional upon dissolution of the predecessor. Even in cases where the new organization is not a direct successor, the replaced IGO is often not dissolved until the new IGO is active. From this sample it appears very rare that states dissolve an IGO without some plan for the future provision of that IGOs services. In some cases, specific sub organs of a predecessor have even continued operation for a short period after the dissolution of the IGO. This suggests when the responsibilities being performed are highly valued by member states, they take additional steps to ensure those services continue.

A similar trend is revealed in the sample is a high survival rate of these successor IGOs. Out of forty-two successor organizations in the sample, only nine have ceased operation.[259] This trend fits with expectations that states are reluctant to incur costs of frequently dissolving and recreating IGOs, preferring to reform and work through existing institutions if possible. Their current situation may necessitate expending resources to create a new successor, but the member

[259] One of these nine is a unique case as the IGO ITSO largely ceased public operation but does continue as a privatized company, INTELSAT.

states are perhaps more willing to commit to the successor to avoid incurring these costs a second time. It is also possible that after experiencing obstacles to reforming the original organization, design choices in the new IGO successfully mitigate those obstacles in the replacement. Additionally, some cases of successor death are due to a broader regional or global cooperation organization performing similar duties. In the cases states selected a larger organization for the same services to avoid duplication of efforts, which may not indicate any dissatisfaction with the dissolved successor IGO.

A closer examination of the nine no longer operating successors helps illustrate these possibilities. One organization not coded as a currently operational IGO is the unique case of the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (ITSO) which was privatized to a multinational firm Intelsat, which does still provide services similar to ITSO as an intergovernmental organization. The function of ITSO does still live on in a direct successor, simply in a form outside of the population of IGOs. Three other dissolved successors do have their functions carried out by a current IGO or multiple IGOs. The International Refugee Organization (IRO) was dissolved in 1952 by the United Nations, with multiple other agencies picking up specific responsibilities of the IRO, including the current UN Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees. The Western European Armaments Group (WEAG), set up by the Western European Union (WEU), was dissolved in 2004 when the WEU was superseded by the European Union which has defensive sub-organs such as the European Defense Agency that have similar stated goals of strengthening European defensive capabilities. The European Monetary Agreement (EMA) was dissolved in 1972 by the OECD, which administered the EMA, due to competing functionality within the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These organizations may have ‘died’ but were not necessarily failed IGOs. Their dissolution was not prompted by their

function, but by changes in regional or global institutions that provided preferable alternatives for influential member states. The East African Community (EAC), successor to EACSO, shows as dissolved when it ceased functioning in 1977. However, it was replaced in 1993 with the East African Cooperation agreement which then resurrected its predecessor in 2000, and the new incarnation is still functioning today. The initial collapse of the EAC is attributed to hostility between key member states of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, described as a "bitter" "three-dimensional verbal guerilla war."[260] It is notable that the need for the EAC was strong enough to result in its resurrection, and it is no longer a dead successor. Of the nine no longer operating successor organizations only the InterAmerican Committee for Crop Protection (CIPA), which succeeded the Permanent InterAmerican Anti-Locus Committee (PIAALC), appears to have no modern successor. CIPA also had a very narrow issue area which simply may no longer require a specific organization to coordinate state cooperation.

Five of the nine no longer operating successors do represent straight forward cases of death due to failure. Returning to the supply and demand framework, it may be that they supplied sufficient supply of cooperation and their dissolution (or privatization) was due to exogenous reasons. One was not replaced, possibly due to a lessened demand for cooperation in that narrow issue area. This would leave only three cases of successors failing to perform the responsibilities desired by member states and member states choosing replacement again. This high survival rate in this sample of successor IGOs may be that design choices successively addressed limitations of the predecessor. However, it could also mean that after expending resources in creating a new organization once already, states are more committed the second time to continuing or reforming the successor organization. This survival rate does not inherently mean successor IGOs are more

[260] Mugomba, Agrippah T. "Regional organisations and African underdevelopment: The collapse of the East African Community." The Journal of Modern African Studies 16, no. 2 (1978): 261-272.

effective at providing the desired supply of cooperation. This an area requiring further study into the decision-making process of member states through multiple IGO iterations.

For conjecture two, most successors will have similar issue area responsibilities, I find support through comparison of the data and a preliminary logistic regression. States cooperate through IGOs out of self-interest when they are unable to cooperate bilaterally, that need is rarely going to fade when an IGO ceases operation, prompting succession. As shown above, succession frequently occurs without disruption and the successors mostly persist. If we expect states to be cautious about the costs and risks of creation of a replacement, rather than reform or selecting an alternative, perhaps this bears out in issue area responsibility. If the previous IGO failed to sufficiently supply cooperation, member states will not want to increase the tasks they give the successor. The previous design choices suffered from some form of limitation, and the design choices in the successor will be unproven. Examining change in *responsibility* in the sample, conjecture two is borne out with only twelve successors having increased issue area responsibility. For additional context I compare this with the original scope category of the predecessor, displayed in Table eleven.[261] Examining this by the scope category of the

Table 11. Predecessor Scope and Successor Issue Area Responsibility

	Responsibility Change			
Predecessor Scope	**Similar**	**Increased**		**Global/Regional Successors**
Narrow	23	7		4
Medium	3	4		0
Broad	5	1		0

[261] Scope measure of predecessor IGO taken from Eilstrup-Sangiovanni "Death of IOs" 2020.

predecessor, IGOs with a broad scope are least likely to increase.[262] Narrow scope predecessors also more frequently keep a similar scope and are the most numerous category overall. We might expect IGOs with already very narrow issue areas can more easily have responsibilities added without greater costs and risks for member states relative to higher scope categories. However, IGOs with a medium scope are roughly equally likely to have a scope expansion as not, twice the proportion of increases for narrow scope predecessor. Proportionally medium scope predecessors are replaced with successors given greater issue area *responsibility* more frequently than narrow scope predecessors. This becomes more interesting when we examine *responsibility* increases due to the successor being a global or regional cooperation organization, such as the European Union or the United Nations. All successor IGOs that were global/regional organizations, or a subordinate of a global/regional organization, replaced IGOs with a narrow scope. There were four such successions, comprising over half of responsibility changes for predecessors in that category. Considering these replacements by larger, broader cooperative organizations the distinction between narrow and medium increases in *responsibility* becomes questionable. An existing narrow in scope IGO would seem to be the easiest to increase scope without significant cost, yet this rarely occurs, instead favoring replacement by a regional or global organization. IGOs with a medium scope seem to most frequently have member states dissatisfied with the current scope and seek to expand the issue areas covered. The small sample limits any strong conclusions from these numbers, especially given most IGOs are both narrow in original scope and do not experience a change in scope, but the prevalence of expanded scope for successors of medium scope IGOs invites further study.

[262] Only one organization with the "Broad" scope category saw an increase, the succession of UDEAC by CEMAC which replaced both UDEAC and UMAC, giving it additional issue areas and responsibilities beyond its individual predecessors.

To further explore what might prompt states to increase successor IGO *responsibility* I conduct a preliminary logistic regression. I test possible theoretical variables of overlapping memberships in other IGOs, presence of major powers, and governance task overlap with other IGOs. I included controls for predecessor membership size, predecessor scope, predecessor lifespan, and geographic region. Results are displayed in table twelve. Shared membership for member states in other IGOs was positive and statistically significant at the .05 level. The presence of major powers was also significant, but negative. Overlap of governance tasks was not significant. These preliminary results pose interesting questions about when states do choose to give successors more responsibility. Member states with more shared memberships in other organizations may have more knowledge and experience in how different institutional designs

Table 12. Logistic Regression of Responsibility Increase

Membership Overlap	**104.56****
	(45.88)
Major Powers	**-6.408****
	(2.340)
Governance Overlap	-7.367
	(9.904)
Membership	-1.763
	(1.082)
Scope	1.145
	(0.804)
Lifespan Category	0.178
	(0.638)
Region	-0.372
	(0.375)
N	33

*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01

can be effective. They may have stronger relationships with fellow member states, making them more willing to commit to a new IGO with expanded responsibilities. An alternate explanation could be they seek to test how this new organization can handle issue areas they already have another IGO coordinating, to provide themselves with more selection options for which organization is most effective at supplying cooperation. The negative finding for major powers is also interesting, especially considering the four global/regional successor IGOs in the increase *responsibility* observations. The role of overlapping membership and presence of great powers in succession both warrant further exploration.

Turning to changes in *institutional size*, we see this occur far more frequently than *responsibility* change, just over half the sample. Table thirteen breaks this down both by transition type and scope of the predecessor IGO. Organizations that go through a simple restructuring have the lowest proportion of a size increase. There are fewer observations, but all cases of dissolved for an existing or broader IGO are for IGOs that also have a greater institutional size than the predecessor IGO. Superseded successions are the most numerous, and here we see a nearly fifty-fifty split. When successors are changed to a greater degree than simple restructuring, member states will increase institutional size over half the time.

Table 13. Transition Type and Increase in Institutional Size

Transition Type	**Increase**	
	No	**Yes**
Restructured	9	2
Superseded	10	11
Dissolved and Later Replaced	1	1
Dissolved for Existing IGO	0	2
Dissolved for Broader IGO	0	5

Predecessor Scope	**Increase**	
	No	**Yes**
Narrow	16	12
Medium	2	5
Broad	2	4

We saw above that most successors to IGOs with a narrow scope do not have increased issue area *responsibility*, yet here a large number of those replacements do come with an increase in institutional size. This is interesting, and further comparison, displayed in table fourteen, indicated that increases in issue area *responsibility* included an increase in *institutional size* in all successions but one. Additionally, even when *responsibility* was kept similar, member states still

Table 14. Responsibility and Institutional Size

	Increased Inst Size	
Issue Area Responsibility	**No**	**Yes**
Similar	19	10
Increased	1	11

increase *institutional size* in roughly one third of succession. This suggests that member states often feel the new IGO needs greater institutional capacity, through additional division of labor or increased expertise and resources, to be more effective than its predecessor. This appears to especially be the case when increasing issue areas for the successor. It may be in many cases that member states view greater institutionalization as more effective for fostering cooperation. A related trend in the data is that none of the successors who had an increase in *institutional size* later died or were replaced. As explored above, these deaths were rare and many for exogenous reasons, but it is notable that successors with increased institutional size did not experience death. These comparisons also suggest that increasing institutional size is prevalent regardless of scope or mandate. In making institutional design choices about successor IGOs, member states will more frequently increase institutional size, possibly to empower the bureaucracy of the IGO to overcome limitations of the predecessor obstacles to reforming the predecessor. This occurs in

almost all cases of increased responsibility, and in many cases even without this increase. This suggests the importance of institutionalization in succession.

I explore this further by examining increase in bureaucratic autonomy in successor IGOs. Past research has examined the degree of autonomy an IGO is granted by its member states. There is limited available of this measure for this sample, so I examine three specific cases with autonomy scores for both predecessor and successor organizations. The average bureaucratic autonomy score from Gray 2018 is 0.349 in a larger sample with a standard deviation of 0.252.[263] Among a small sub sample of seven successor IGOs from this dataset the average score is 0.525, nearly one standard deviation higher than a larger sample of IGOs.

The Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) lasted less than 10 years, was dissolved for the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) which had a broader mandate and had an increase in institutional size. While many member states recognized the benefits of greater cooperation, political crisis bogged down CARIFTA's efforts and it had a minimalist structure lacking meaningful legal basis for enforcement.[264] CARIFTA's institutions were also shaped by member states experience in the West Indies Federation (WIF), which CARIFTA can be seen as a partial spiritual successor to. CARIFTA's autonomy score was 0, the lowest level of autonomy, while CARICOM has an autonomy score of .611, an increase of two standard deviations in comparison with the larger sample. This coincided with multiple expansions of areas of cooperation from CARIFTA to CARICOM, notably creating a new standing committee to coordinate collective foreign policy and a Committee of Finance Ministers that successfully harmonized exchange rate practices.[265] CARICOM also later added the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) providing a

[263] Gray, "Life, Death, or Zombie" 2018.
[264] Payne, Anthony. The political history of CARICOM. Ian Randle Publishers, 2008; O'Brien, Derek. "CARICOM: Regional Integration in a post-colonial world." European Law Journal 17, no. 5 (2011): 630-648.
[265] Payne, The political history of CARICOM. 2008.

stronger adjudicating body than CARIFTA, even if still generally weak overall.[266] The Secretariat of CARICOM also surpassed in practice the "limited role accorded to it on paper."[267] These provide examples of new institutions created in CARICOM, increased ability to hold member states accountable, and greater influence for the secretariat that indicated the greater autonomy of CARICOM *relative* to CARIFTA.

The Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), which lasted 19 years, was superseded by the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA or ALADI), which did have an increased scope but not a significant change in institutional size. LAIA's structure is described as "streamlined" from LAFTA's and as having a "very similar legal nature."[268] LAFTA struggled to succeed as member states negotiated on a product-by-product basis and progress was expected to happen through bilateral negotiations, not necessarily through LAFTA itself.[269] LAFTA also had the lowest autonomy score of 0, while LAIA has an autonomy score of .210. LAILA is stated to have a "solid institutional system of an intergovernmental nature" in contrast to LAFTA, with greater technical controls to enact a broader scope of actions towards economic integration.[270] Furthermore the LAILA secretariat is empowered to assess the economic integration process and "on its own initiative" monitor agreement compliance.[271]

The Central African Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC) lasted 30 years, was dissolved in favor of the broader Central African and Monetary Community (CEMAC), which was also had a larger institutional size. CEMAC replaced UDEAC to create a more "stable configuration"

[266] O'Brien, "CARICOM: Regional Integration in a post-colonial world" 2011.
[267] Payne, The political history of CARICOM. 2008
[268] López-Jacoiste Díaz, Eugenia. "The Latin American Integration Association." Latin American and Caribbean International Institutional Law (2015): 23-42.
[269] López-Jacoiste Díaz, "The Latin American Integration Association." 2015.
[270] López-Jacoiste Díaz, "The Latin American Integration Association." 2015.
[271] López-Jacoiste Díaz, "The Latin American Integration Association." 2015.

to deal with regional and global changes.[272] UDEAC had an autonomy score of .03 while CEMAC has a score of .25. CEMAC's greater institutional capacity led to its management of the Economic Partnership Agreement with the EU, which included non-CEMAC members.[273] CEMAC lacks as much recognition of member state sovereignty as past IGOs and is designed to "reduce juridico-political and socio-economic sovereignties" of its member states.[274] These provide examples of CEMACS increased institutionalization and autonomy to act from its member states.

Each of these cases, all in different lifespan categories, one without an increase in institutional size, saw an increase in autonomy granted the successor organization. These successor organizations had many key member states overlapping with their predecessors and were designed specifically to address areas where those predecessors struggled. In some cases, like CARIFTA to CARICOM, you had direct institutional succession of the body of the organization, while perhaps it is the soul that expanded. LAIA as a contrast is a case where the successor was made to be more focused than its predecessor, but still with greater autonomy. In all of these cases multiple aspects of the predecessor IGOs limited their ability to achieve their goals and to resolve those limitations through reform. In all of these cases, part of the solution was to make institutional changes and grant greater autonomy.

[272] Mattheis, Frank. "Towards bifurcated regionalism: The production of regional overlaps in Central Africa." In The New Politics of Regionalism, pp. 57-71. Routledge, 2016.
[273] Mattheis, "Towards bifurcated regionalism." In The New Politics of Regionalism 2016.
[274] Godwin Bongyu, Moye. "The Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) and the Decline of Sovereignty." Journal of Asian and African Studies 44, no. 4 (2009): 389-406.

Discussion

This small sample exploration of successor organizations supports expectations for several trends, but also indicates some possible interesting relationships. I found support for three conjectures, that member states avoid gaps in IGOs, largely do not increase issue area responsibility, but do frequently increase institutional size. I identified notable trends from these conjectures. Most successor IGOs survive, and many cases of successor death may not be due to endogenous factors. Almost all cases of increase issue area responsibility is accompanied by increases in institutional size. Increases in responsibility may also be associated with membership overlap in other IGOs. I also explored three cases of increases in bureaucratic autonomy, which may be associated with increased institutional size.

These trends suggest member states are committed to continuing to work through IGOs even when they feel they have not met expectations and need to be replaced. They overwhelmingly avoid a time gaps in IGO function, even when the IGO is not a direct successor. We further see that successor IGOs in the sample infrequently fail or are replaced. When successor IGOs are themselves replaced, it is often as part of a chain of succession to a larger regional or global IGO, further limiting the number of truly failed successor IGOs. Is this because institutional design changes satisfied the needs of the member states or states aversion to incurring the costs of replacement a second time? Specific case studies show how member states may want to grant successor organizations increased autonomy, even if they are not increasing the institutional size.

Future research should examine in more detail why successor IGOs are rarely dissolved, evaluating IGO effectiveness and member state risk aversion as potential explanations. The evolution of issue areas an IGO is responsible for is also of interest. We should better understand

when member states choose to increase the scale of an organization's duties. Preliminary results in this chapter suggest there is an association with overlapping memberships. This could have implications for how more interconnected member states choose creation over selection and the design choices they make with successor states. Further exploration of increases in institutional size and autonomy is needed. Are these factors independent or related? What additional conditions make these increases more likely in successor IGOs? Finally, data on more specific changes in institutional design features should be collected. An increase in institutional size may give a successor more resources or even centralization, but does that inherently mean less flexibility for member states? Voting rules, flexibility contract terms, and withdrawal clauses are all areas for deeper consideration.

Understanding IGO succession requires not looking at successor IGOs independently, or succession itself as unaffected by the population of IGOs. The evolution of international institutions is not a direct or individual one, but one of collective organisms that learn and change as portions of a whole. Our approach to studying successor IGOs should incorporate this understanding.

Chapter 5
Conclusion

This dissertation contributes to our understanding of IGO institutional design and how it affects IGOs fulfilling their roles in the international system. All IGOs do not have the same impact, different designs matter. IGOs are important for increasing general cooperation, but not all IGOs will have this effect, and some may even hinder it. The benefits that matter to member states of IGOs are also not uniform, and to understand both IGO design and vitality we must consider what benefits member states seek as well as how design impacts those benefits. The succession of IGOs demonstrates a commitment by states to continue to work through multilateral organizations and possibly a trend to increase their size and autonomy. IGO failure does not make states more cautious. These chapters also identify areas for further research to continue delving into the importance of IGO design. With IGOs ubiquitous in the system and increasing variation in mandate, membership, and scope, it is important to understand how variation in IGO design impacts the functioning and vitality of IGOs.

My first study examined how the institutionalization of an IGO affects its ability to foster general cooperation between its members both within and outside of the IGO. I found a consistent significant effect for medium and high institutionalized IGOs. I also found that joint membership in low institutionalized IGOs may negatively impact non-conflict state-to-state cooperation. I demonstrated how events data with a standardized score of the intensity of an interaction provides a useful tool to examine cooperation broadly or in general categories.

Next, I connected institutionalization with IGO vitality when the IGO has a majority of non-democratic members due to the importance of facilitating credible signaling to those

members. I presented evidence that institutionalization matters for the survival of IGOs with a majority of authoritarian members. The less an IGO is able to help autocracies commit and cooperate, the more likely they are to dissolve or neglect the IGO. This also helps demonstrate important variation in IGOs beyond mandate. IGOs with the same issue area may be vastly different institutions based on the goals of specific members, which then determines how institutional design will matter. As more IGOs are created by different groups of states understanding these kinds of variations will only increase in importance.

Finally, I examined IGO succession, identifying important trends for further study of how member states replace IGOs. I identify trends to evaluate three conjectures about what IGO succession looks like. In my sample of 44 IGO pairs, member states prefer to minimize disruption of an IGOs services, rarely dissolving a failed IGO without having the successor already in place. Successors have a high survival rate, possibly either due to addressing limitations of the predecessor or states avoiding incurring the costs of replacement a second time. States infrequently give successors new responsibilities, but when they do it may be associated with more shared IGO memberships. It does appear states frequently increase the institutional size of successors, even when issue area remains similar. When there is an increase in responsibilities there is most frequently an increase in institutional size. Member states may also design successors with increased bureaucratic autonomy. Further study is needed to confirm and fully explore these changes in institutional design in successor IGOs. While failure is an important cause of succession, we should not assume all dissolved IGOs are failures. Understanding succession requires not just examining the new organization, but how it differs from its predecessor and relates to other IGOs in the international system. These trends should be

considered in the framework that institutional evolution is wider than only material transfer to direct successors.

Future research continues to face the challenge of measurement and data collection. These chapters provide important steps forward, but we need more refined variables about different internal design features of IGOs. Gathering this information for the full population of IGO has been an obstacle that slows study of IGO institutional design. More attention should be paid to aspects of IGO bureaucracies in examining design and operation. Text analysis methods may also provide new tools to compare language similarity to further capture how successors carry over or learn from their predecessors. Diffusion of IGO structural design or creation of specific sub-organs, such as adjudication bodies, may further help identify how IGOs and member states are learning from the population of IGOs. Finally, network analysis allows us to account for the integrated nature of the international system and not treat each IGO as independent from the others, or its member states as independent. These methods could build on this work to further help examine how institutional design affects cooperation, IGO vitality, and future IGOs.

These analyses contribute to our understanding of important implications for variation in the design of IGOs. Joint membership in more institutionalized IGOs does increase cooperative interactions in some cases, and this effect applies to interactions outside of the IGO. IGO design is important for understanding variation in outcomes and member state cooperation. The proportion of joint IGOs between two states matters for their interaction and warrants more consideration. This could be relevant for policymakers, encouraging membership in more institutionalized organizations could help increase cooperation where it is lacking. I provide evidence of a link between institutional design and IGO vitality, demonstrating that the

relationship may be conditional on the membership of the IGO. IGO design can matter for an IGO's survival when it affects providing benefits due to the conditions of cooperation and goals of its members. Institutionalization matters for the survival of IGOs with mostly non-democratic members. This is important for the design of future IGOs but also contributes to our understanding of authoritarian participation in IGOs. Policymakers should consider this risk factor when examining existing regional authoritarian IGOs or when new IGOs of this type are being created. My exploratory analysis of IGO succession adds further definition to what these replacements look like, confirming some expectations but also identifying potential interesting trends. Institutional design of IGOs is only becoming more critical to understanding the modern population of IGOs as these organizations are increasingly formed without major powers, or with major powers having less influence ongoing operation, and with authoritarian states participating in more IGOs. Deeper analysis into different aspects of IGO institutional design is necessary to our understanding of the evolution of the international system and the role IGOs play in that system.

Appendices

Chapter 2 Appendices

Appendix A
State-to-State Cooperation CAMEO Codes

- 50 Engage in diplomatic cooperation, not specified
- 51 Praise or endorse
- 52 Defend verbally
- 53 Rally support on behalf of
- 54 Grant diplomatic recognition
- 55 Apologize
- 56 Forgive
- 57 Sign formal agreement
- 25 Appeal to yield, not specified
- 213 Appeal for judicial cooperation
- 251 Appeal for easing of administrative sanctions
- 254 Appeal for easing of economic sanctions, boycott, or embargo
- 255 Appeal to allow non-mediation international involvement
- 26 Appeal to negotiate
- 28 Appeal to engage/accept mediation
- 45 Mediate
- 46 Engage in negotiation
- 85 Ease economic sanctions, boycott, or embargo
- 102 Demand diplomatic cooperation
- 1013 Demand judicial cooperation
- 1051 Demand easing of administrative sanctions
- 1054 Demand easing of economic sanctions, boycott, or embargo
- 1055 Demand non-mediation international involvement
- 106 Demand meeting or negotiation
- 107 Demand settling of dispute
- 108 Demand mediation
- 1241 Refused easing administrative sanctions
- 1244 Refuse easing economic sanctions, boycott, or embargo
- 1245 Refuse to allow non-mediation international involvement
- 125 Reject proposal to meet, discuss, or negotiate
- 126 Reject mediation
- 127 Reject plan, agreement to settle dispute
- 129 Veto
- 161 Reduce or break diplomatic relations
- 163 Impose embargo, boycott, or sanctions
- 164 Halt negotiations
- 165 Halt mediation

Appendix B

The Effect of Joint IGO Membership on Cooperation with Additional Controls

Linear Regression Results

	All Joint IGOs	Low Inst IGOs	Med+Hi Inst IGOs	Hi Inst IGOs
Total JIGOs	**-0.011*****			
	(0.002)			
Low Inst		-0.505		
		(0.349)		
Med+Hi Inst			**1.089*****	
			(0.395)	
High Inst				-0.863
				(0.751)
Interest Similarity	0.075**	0.072**	0.072**	0.083***
	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.029)
Polity Diff	-0.002	0.003	0.002	0.004
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Allies	0.146**	0.036	0.089	0.007
	(0.065)	(0.062)	(0.065)	(0.063)
Capabilities	0.080**	0.081**	0.075**	0.071*
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Conflict	-1.031***	-1.009***	-1.004***	-1.071***
	(0.181)	(0.181)	(0.181)	(0.180)
Contiguous	0.084	0.094	0.113	0.091
	(0.075)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.074)
Relative Econ Size	-0.114***	-0.106***	-0.107***	-0.089**
	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Relative Dev Size	0.067*	0.084**	0.087**	0.088**
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Trade Dependency	0.087	-3.582	-3.561	-4.769
	(4.212)	(4.152)	(4.071)	(4.147)
N	7429	7429	7429	7429

*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01

Appendix C

Lagged Variable OLS and Time Series Models[275]

OLS of *institutionalization* at t-1 on *state-to-state cooperation* at t

Low Inst$_{t-1}$	-0.516
	(0.332)
Med+Hi Inst$_{t-1}$	0.910**
	(0.407)
High Inst$_{t-1}$	1.912***
	(0.684)
N	6159

*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01

OLS of *institutionalization* at t-3 on *state-to-state cooperation* at t

Low Inst$_{t-3}$	-0.467
	(0.308)
Med+Hi Inst$_{t-3}$	0.856**
	(0.371)
High Inst$_{t-3}$	2.154***
	(0.685)
N	6157

*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01

Time series model accounting for previous year's *state-to-state cooperation* ($y_t=y_{t-1}+x...$)

State-to-state Coop$_{t-1}$	0.027	0.025	0.026
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Low Inst	-0.914*		
	(0.474)		
Med+Hi Inst		1.765***	
		(0.627)	
High Inst			2.409***
			(1.086)
N	2778	2778	2778

*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01

Time series model with previous year's *institutionalization* and *state-to-state cooperation* ($y_t=y_{t-1}+x_{t-1}...$)

State-to-state Coop$_{t-1}$	0.027	0.025	0.026
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Low Inst$_{t-1}$	-0.893*		
	(0.458)		
Med+Hi Inst$_{t-1}$		1.997***	
		(0.607)	
High Inst$_{t-1}$			2.605***
			(1.062)
N	2778	2778	2778

*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01

[275] Models included all control variables from state-to-state cooperation models but only coefficients for institutionalization categories are displayed here.

Appendix D
Correlation Table

	Total JIGOs	*Interest Similarity*	*Polity Diff*	*Allies*	*Capab.*	*Conflict*	*Contig.*	*Rel. Econ. Size*	*Rel. Dev. Size*	*Trade Dep.*
Total JIGOs	1									
Interest Similarity	.26	1								
Polity Diff	-.42	-.41	1							
Allies	.45	.20	-.27	1						
Capabilities	-.26	-.23	.11	-.10	1					
Conflict	.01	.04	-.02	.03	-.06	1				
Contiguous	.16	.22	-.12	.23	-.09	.23	1			
Relative Econ Size	-.34	-.32	.19	-.13	.90	-.07	-.11	1		
Relative Dev Size	-.35	-.45	.28	-.21	.15	-.06	-.21	.34	1	
Trade Dependency	.33	.10	-.11	.15	-.16	-.001	.25	-.16	-.14	1

Chapter 3 Appendices

A. IO Descriptive Stats[276]

Type	Approx Count
Economic	27
Social-Environmental	19
Research & Technology	18
General Purpose	13
Security	6
Other	31

Institutionalization	Approx Count
Low	86
Medium	20
High	8

B. Logit Regression Model on IO Failure

Institutionalization	**-2.838***** (1.094)
Shared Preferences	0.144 (0.909)
Flexibility	-0.280 (0.559)
Competing IGOs	0.919*** (0.343)
Capabilities	0.225 (0.182)
Membership	1.099*** (0.389)
Conflict	-0.570 (0.626)
Security	2.867*** (1.008)
N	1404

*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01

[276] Where categories change over time, such as shift authoritarian membership, the category of interest is used for the count.

C. **Reduced Cox Hazard Model**

Cox Hazard Model of Authoritarian IGOs with only statistically significant controls.

	Model
institutionalization	**-2.187*** (1.02)
staff	**-1.707*** (0.736)
competition	**.**584 (0.337)
membership size	**.**635 (0.396)
security	**1.595*** (0.570)
N	1688

* $p < 0.05$

D. **Variable Correlation**

Correlation table of Model Variables

	Institutionalization	Staff	Shared Preferences	Flexibility	Competition	Capability	Membership Size	Polity
Institutionalization	1							
Staff	**.36**	1						
Shared Preferences	.01	-.23	1					
Flexibility	.16	.17	-.23	1				
Competition	-.10	-.20	.23	-.27	1			
Capability	.03	-.25	**.47**	-.07	.08	1		
Membership Size	.10	.003	-.04	**.30**	-.18	.21	1	
Polity	.19	-.18	**.41**	-.05	.03	**.40**	-.05	1

Chapter 4 Appendices

Appendix A

Successor Pairs

Predecessor	Successor	Predecessor	Successor
ABEPSEAC	ACPEEC	ICNWAF	NAFO
AMIPO	AIPO	INPFC	NPAFC
CAMRSD	AMCEN	IACB	OAS
OAU	AU	OEEC	OECD
CTCAf	AU STRC	ACCT	OIF
ComAB	CABI	OSLO	OSPAR
CARIFTA	CARICOM	PC	OSPAR
AACarib	CComm	AALAE	PAALAE
UDEAC	CEMAC	CACB	PANCAFE
PIAALC	CIPA	SARTC	RETOSA
PTASEA	COMESA	SADCC	SADC
CAPTAC	COPTAC	OCAS/ODECA	SICA
EACSO	EAC	UMOA	UEMOA
EAEC	EAEU	CEAO	UEMOA
NACC	EAPC	ECITO	UNECE
EMI	ECB	WAHC	WAHO
ECCA	ECCB	IEPG	WEAG
EPU	EMA	GATT	WTO
EUROMET	EURAMET		
IIA	FAO		
ITSO	INTELSAT		
IRLCS	IRLCOCSA		
IGCR	IRO		
ISuC	ISO		
LAFTA	LAIA		
ICCILMB	MRC		

Appendix B

IGO List

- AACarib Anglo-American Caribbean Commission
- AALAE African Association for Literacy and Adult Education
- ABEPSEAC Association between the European Economic Community and the Partner
- ACCT Agence de La Francophonie
- ACPEEC ACP-EEC Convention Lome
- AIPO African Intellectual Property Organization
- AMCEN African Ministerial Conference on the Environment
- AMIPO African and Malagasy Industrial Property Office
- AU STRC African Union Scientific Technical Research Commission
- AU African Union
- CABI Commonwealth Agricultural Bureau International
- CACB Central American Coffee Board
- CAMRSD Conference of African Ministers Responsible for Sustainable
- CAPTAC Conference of Post and Telecommunication Administration of Central Africa
- CARICOM Caribbean Community
- CARIFTA Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA)
- CComm Caribbean Commission
- CEAO West African Economic Community (CEAO)
- CEMAC Central African and Monetary Community
- CIPA InterAmerican Committee for Crop Protection
- ComAB Commonwealth Agricultural Bureau
- COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
- COPTAC Conference of Post and Telecommunications of Central Africa
- CTCAf Commission for Technical Cooperation in Africa South of the Sahara
- EAC East African Community
- EACSO East African Common Services Organization
- EAEC Eurasian Economic Community/Central Asian Cooperation Org
- EAEU Eurasian Economic Union
- EAPC Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
- ECB European Central Bank
- ECCA East Caribbean Currency Authority
- ECCB Eastern Caribbean Central Bank
- ECITO European Central Inland Transport Organization
- EMA European Monetary Agreement
- EMI European Monetary Institute (EMI)
- EPU European Payments Union
- EURAMET European Association of National Metrology Institutes
- EUROMET European Collaboration on Measurement Standards
- FAO Food and Agriculture Organizaiton of the UN
- GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
- IACB Inter-American Coffee Board
- ICCILMB Interim Committee for Coordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin (
- ICNWAF International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
- IEPG Independent European Programme Group
- IGCR Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees
- IIA International Institute of Agriculture
- INPFC International North Pacific Fisheries Commission
- INTELSAT Intelsat
- IRLCOCSA International Red Locust Control Organization for Central and Southern Africa
- IRLCS International Red Locust Control Service
- IRO International Refugee Organization
- ISO International Sugar Organizaiton

- ISuC International Sugar Council
- ITSO International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT)
- LAFTA Latin American Free Trade Association
- LAIA Latin American Integration Association
- MRC Mekong River Commission
- NACC North Atlantic Cooperation Council
- NAFO North Atlantic Fisheries Organization
- NPAFC North Pacific Anadromous Fish Commission
- OAS Organization of American States
- OAU Organization for African Unity
- OCAS/ODECA Organization of Central American States
- OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
- OEEC Organization for European Economic Cooperation (Organization for Economic Cooper
- OIF Organization internationale de la Francophonie
- OSLO Oslo Commission
- OSPAR OSPAR Commission
- OSPAR OSPAR Convention
- PAALAE Pan African Association for Literacy and Adult Education
- PANCAFE Productores de Cafes Ascodiados
- PC Paris Commission (PARCOM)
- PIAALC Permanent Inter-American Anti-Locust Committee
- PTASEA Preferential Trade Agreement for Southern & Eastern Africa
- RETOSA Regional Tourism Organisation of Southern Africa
- SADC Southern African Development Community
- SADCC Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)
- SARTC Southern Africa Regional Tourism Council (SARTOC)
- SICA Central American Integration System
- UDEAC Central African Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC)
- UEMOA West Africa Economic and Monetary Union
- UEMOA West African Economic and Monetary Union
- UMOA West African Monetary Union/UMOA
- UNECE UN Economic Commission for Europe
- WAHC West African Health Community (WAHC)
- WAHO West African Health Organization
- WEAG Western European Armaments Group
- WTO World Trade Organization

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Research

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