Preserving the past and planning the future in Pasadena, Riverside and San Bernardino

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PRESERVING THE PAST AND PLANNING THE FUTURE
IN PASADENA, RIVERSIDE, AND SAN BERNARDINO

by

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ABSTRACT

Preserving the Past and Planning the Future in Pasadena, Riverside, and San Bernardino

by

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This study examines how three Southern California cities—Pasadena, Riverside and San Bernardino—used the processes of urban renewal and historic preservation as development strategies for their downtown business districts. The ways in which these processes were employed has both reflected and shaped the cities’ evolving definitions of community. These ideas of community were both inclusive and exclusive, favoring certain ethnicities and cultural practices over others to advance a particular civic image. The case studies are representative of cities in the region that are “other than Los Angeles;” those founded in the nineteenth-century after the Spanish and Mexican periods, but prior to the expansion of suburbs linked to the metropolitan area. The three cities are of similar size, and each was created by specific group of immigrants intent on establishing a settlement of like-minded people, with shared values and viewpoints. Each city subsequently faced similar economic and social challenges imposed by rapid population growth in the decades following World War Two, but developed divergent responses vis-à-vis policies of renewal and preservation.
Was Pasadena’s nationally-recognized success in building civic character through historic preservation aided by a greater level of homogeneity within the community than was in evidence in San Bernardino and Riverside? Guided by this initial question, the study highlights the scholarly debates concerning the use of history as an element of community identity, and presents an overview of the origins and practice of urban renewal and historic preservation at the national level. Shifting to the specific histories of the three cities, the narrative illustrates how residents sought to develop and define their civic identities through promotion, agriculture, and architecture that evoked what has been termed the “Spanish Fantasy Past.” At the same time, residents attempted to exclude or minimize the presence of ethnic minorities or others who did not fit into the preferred community image.

After World War Two, government and business leaders attempted to use the federally-funded urban renewal process to reverse the economic fortunes of their aging central business districts. Renewal emphasized large scale rebuilding of the cityscape for maximum efficiency, and to better accommodate automotive traffic, but often at the cost of the older buildings that were key to the cities’ distinctive identities. Such loss of local history through renewal became a national concern, and contributed to the passage of federal historic preservation legislation in 1966.

Preservation’s new legal standing gave added weight to the efforts of local history advocates, but also provided an impetus to developers who recognized that historic buildings could serve as the basis for attractive and economical commercial properties. From the mid-1970s onward, historic preservation became increasingly institutionalized as a planning and development strategy in Pasadena and Riverside. As a
result, the Spanish Fantasy Past received new life as a preferred means of revitalizing the cities’ commercial fortunes through promotion to residents and visitors. However, preservationists worried that the drive to make history profitable compromised its integrity, while developers and members of minority groups contended that regulations put in place to protect historic properties hampered economic growth, or guided it in ways designed to maintain the existing racial status quo. By contrast, interest in historic preservation in San Bernardino remained minimal until Latinos gained a significant voice within the city government in the late 1990s. From that point on, city policy began to emphasize the preservation and development of the few historic properties remaining in the downtown area, in hopes of emulating the success apparent in Pasadena’s efforts.

The experiences of all three cities suggest that the success of historic preservation as a planning strategy does indeed reflect the level of homogeneity within a community, but with important distinctions. The community need not be synonymous with the entire population of a city, but may instead refer to a group within the city with access to political and economic influence. Further, the group’s homogeneity need only be one of shared values, and a shared vision for the city as a whole. It is fair to conclude that preservation on a citywide scale thus depends on the presence of people similar to the early founders and boosters of towns. As with the initial efforts in the nineteenth century, however, success can come at the price of marginalizing residents with differing viewpoints and excluding alternate representations of history that do not support commercial development.

Technical Note: Images included in the study are in .jpeg format.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The title and abstract pages have the words, “by Charles Conway Palmer,” but in fact this dissertation is a collaborative project involving a number of people, spread throughout the West. First and foremost are the members of my examination committee: David Wrobel (chair), Greg Hise, Andy Kirk, and David Baird. Their collective guidance, pointed questions and depth of experience are largely responsible for turning a rather vague research topic into a complete academic study. Professors Hise and Baird are due special thanks for agreeing to join a project so late in the game. Lynette Webber in the UNLV History Department office also deserves recognition for shepherding me through all the necessary paperwork, and responding with unfailing good humor to the many times I nearly forgot to register for dissertation units. And, a special thank you to my M.A. advisor at Sonoma State University, Daniel Markwyn. When I was looking at Ph.D. programs for the history of the American West, Dr. Markwyn asked the critical question, “Have you considered UNLV?”

Writing a dissertation means becoming a regular fixture at libraries and archives. My thanks go out to the staffs of the Lied Library at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas; the Feldheym Library’s California Room in San Bernardino; the Pfau Library at California State University, San Bernardino; the Pasadena Central Library; the Rivera Library at the University of California, Riverside; the Riverside Public Library, Downtown Branch; the University of California, Los Angeles’s Arts Library; Sonoma State University’s Jean and Charles Schulz Information Center; the Doe, Moffitt, Ethnic Studies, Intergovernmental Studies, and Environmental Design libraries at the University
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I wrote this dissertation primarily while employed by the National Park Service, first at Yosemite National Park, and subsequently at the Pacific West Regional Office. Balancing work and academia was made much easier by the supportive environment created by my colleagues in both places. At Yosemite, these include Niki Nicholas, division chief of Resources Management and Science, Archeology and Anthropology branch chief Laura Kirn, History, Architecture and Landscapes branch chiefs Paul Chattey and Dave Humphrey, and fellow HAL team members Sueann Brown and Marti Gerdes. Sueann and Marti, together with Carol Knipper, were a part of the Midpines to El Portal carpool that endured me going on about the latest research and writing, or asked “So how’s that dissertation coming?” when I hadn’t talked about it for a while. At the PWRO, History Program lead David Louter created accommodating work arrangements, and provided the kind of advice about writing and perspective that I missed by not being on campus. Historians Timothy Babalis and Elaine Jackson-Retondo in Oakland, and Steve Mark at Crater Lake NP, extended this sense of a historian’s community within the region.

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historic preservation: friends, pastors, assorted dates, supermarket checkers, the guys at the repair shop, random people in elevators and airplanes, and all the rest. I promise that I’ll find other things to talk about.

Inevitably, there are some very important people who went to their reward before this dissertation was complete, but who never had any doubts that it would be completed. With this in mind, “Preserving the Past and Planning the Future in Pasadena, Riverside, and San Bernardino” is dedicated to the memory of my parents, Charles G. and Jean C. Palmer, and my professors Hal K. Rothman and Willard H. Rollings.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................. iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................... vi

LIST OF TABLES .......................................................................................................... xi

LIST OF FIGURES ......................................................................................................... xiii

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 1
  I. Preservation and Urban Renewal—An Introduction ........................................ 8

CHAPTER 2 UNDERSTANDING URBAN RENEWAL .............................................. 18
  I. To the Future and Back Again ........................................................................... 19
  II. New Patterns for Historic Preservation .......................................................... 44

CHAPTER 3 OWNING THE PAST ............................................................................ 47
  I. Memory, Authenticity, and Preservation ............................................................. 48
  II. Natural Beauty and the Townscape ................................................................. 64

CHAPTER 4 FOUNDATIONS ...................................................................................... 72
  I. Water and the Mediterranean Dream ................................................................. 72
  II. Building the Foundations ................................................................................ 91
  III. San Bernardino ............................................................................................... 93
  IV. Riverside ......................................................................................................... 104
  V. Pasadena .......................................................................................................... 108
  VI. From Physical Foundations to Mythical Foundations .................................. 111

CHAPTER 5 MYTHOLOGY AND MARGINALIZATION ............................................ 113
  I. Building the Spanish Fantasy Past .................................................................... 114
  II. Architecture of the Idealized Past and Present .............................................. 121
  III. The Mission Revival and the City Beautiful .................................................. 128
  IV. Displaced from the New History—Minority Residents and Migrants .......... 147

CHAPTER 6 PLANNING THE POSTWAR CITY ...................................................... 167
  I. Postwar Planning and Development in Southern California ....................... 168
  II. Redevelopment and Division ....................................................................... 181
  III. “Riverside has an inheritance to lose” ......................................................... 191
  IV. Redevelopment and Reconsideration in Pasadena ..................................... 194

CHAPTER 7 PRESERVATION AND PROMOTION .................................................. 211
  I. Riverside: Rediscovering Frank Miller ............................................................. 212
  II. Pasadena: Institutionalizing Preservation, and Making it Pay .................... 223
  III. San Bernardino: Demolition and a Tentative Embrace of History ............ 236
  IV. Conclusions—The Next Century of Preservation and Planning ................ 248
V. Epilogue .......................................................................................................................... 262

APPENDIX 1 FINDINGS AND DECLARATIONS OF THE NATIONAL HISTORIC PRESERVATION ACT OF 1966 ................................................................. 268

APPENDIX 2 PASADENA—NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES LISTED PROPERTIES ........................................................................................................... 269

APPENDIX 3 RIVERSIDE—NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES LISTED PROPERTIES ........................................................................................................... 273

APPENDIX 4 SAN BERNARDINO—NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES LISTED PROPERTIES ....................................................................................... 274

BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................. 276

ENDNOTES .......................................................................................................................... 302

VITA ................................................................................................................................... 326
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1  Area and Population, 1940 ................................................................. 154
Table 2  Area and Population, 1950 ................................................................. 170
Table 3  Area and Population, 1960 ................................................................. 187
Table 4  Area and Population, 1970 ................................................................. 199
Table 5  Area and Population, 1980 ................................................................. 215
Table 6  Area and Population, 1990 ................................................................. 220
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1  Route 66 Rendezvous Event Map ................................................................. 2
Figure 2  Southern California as seen from San Bernardino ........................................ 5
Figure 3  Southern California and the three case study cities .................................... 9
Figure 4  Southern California as seen from Pasadena ................................................. 10
Figure 5  Southern California as seen from Riverside .............................................. 14
Figure 6  Modern view of the Santa Fe depot in San Bernardino ............................ 129
Figure 7  Modern View of the Pasadena City Hall .................................................... 133
Figure 8  Colorado Street Bridge over the Arroyo Seco, Pasadena ......................... 134
Figure 9  Riverside’s Carnegie Library (1903-1964) .............................................. 138
Figure 10 Main entrance to the Mission Inn ................................................................ 139
Figure 11 Victoria Avenue Bridge over Tequesquite Arroyo, Riverside .................... 143
Figure 12 Pergola and raincross streetlight on Mission Inn Avenue, Riverside ....... 145
Figure 13 Advertisement showing the extent of the Southern California aircraft industry in 1939 ................................................................. 157
Figure 14 Overview of Pasadena .............................................................................. 161
Figure 15 Pasadena Central Business District .......................................................... 162
Figure 16 Overview of Riverside .............................................................................. 163
Figure 17 Riverside Central Business District .......................................................... 164
Figure 18 Overview of San Bernardino .................................................................. 165
Figure 19 San Bernardino Central Business District and railroad yards .................... 166
Figure 20 Riverside Civic Center plan, 1954 .......................................................... 176
Figure 21 Demolition of Riverside’s Carnegie Library, 1964 .................................... 177
Figure 22 Mission Inn themed freeway retaining wall in Riverside, 2010 ................. 252
Figure 23 Riverside historical districts .................................................................... 254
Figure 24 Pasadena National Register of Historic Places and Pasadena Landmark districts ........................................................................................................ 258
Figure 25 New development in the Santa Fe Depot District, San Bernardino, 2010 .... 260
Figure 26 Street scenes, Victoria Gardens in Rancho Cucamonga, and Colorado Boulevard in Pasadena, 2010 ................................................................. 265
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The Twentieth Annual Stater Bros. Route 66 Rendezvous—a four day celebration of nostalgia, classic cars and “mass transit, cruisin’ style”—drew upwards of 500,000 people to downtown San Bernardino, California, in September, 2009. 1 Organized by the city’s Convention and Visitors Bureau as an economic development project, and sponsored by a local supermarket chain, the event offered spectators activities such as a Burnout Contest, Open Header Cruise and Contest, Grill-to-Grill Culinary Cook-off, firefighter competition, and live 1960s-style music. 2 The showpiece of the event was the official “Cruise Route” that took participants on a 2 1/3 mile loop through the downtown, giving them ample opportunities to see and be seen. 3 As the drivers turned south from 5th Street onto E Street, they passed a parking lot on the northwest corner of the intersection. Those with a personal connection to the city may have recalled that, between 1926 and 1985, this had been the site of San Bernardino’s premier hotel, the California. The hotel had closed due to a loss in business caused by changes in the local economy and social patterns caused, in part, by the car culture at the center of the Route 66 Rendezvous. The conviction held by San Bernardino’s governmental and business leaders that a sweeping rebuilding of the central business district was the only way to overcome these changes sealed the hotel’s fate.

The California Hotel was conceived by developer Roy Durbin in 1926 in the belief that, despite being located at the intersection of important road and rail corridors, San Bernardino lacked a “first class traveler’s hotel.” Architect Frank Solt designed the hotel in a fashionable “Spanish Renaissance” style, and equipped it with an innovative
Figure 1. Route 66 Rendezvous Event Map. The former location of the California Hotel, now a parking lot, was at the upper left corner of the map. The location of the Rendezvous activities generally avoided the downtown Carousel Mall (formerly the Central City Mall), which by 2009 lacked any large “anchor stores,” and was partially used for local government offices. (http://www.route-66.org/pdf/Media_2009/new/Event-Map.pdf).

“rocking foundation” designed to absorb the shock of earthquakes. The city had a number of older hotels, but the size and ambience of the hotel made it the focal point for social events and the more prominent downtown service clubs. Size and location were what prompted Maj. Gen. George S. Patton to commandeer the building on the afternoon
of December 7, 1941, to serve as a temporary headquarters for the Southern Sector of the U.S. Army’s Western Defense Command. The hotel subsequently served as housing for officers assigned to the nearby Army air depot.

With the end of World War Two, business at the hotel began to return to its familiar pattern, but did so in the midst of a changing social and economic environment. San Bernardino, in common with much of metropolitan Southern California, had experienced a sharp increase in population due to the expansion of the wartime industrial base. Where the 1930 census had recorded 37,481 residents, by 1950 the number had grown to 62,694. By 1960, the population reached 91,922. In a pattern duplicated throughout the region, the bulk of this growth took place in new, low density residential areas located some miles from the existing central business district. The residential developments were accompanied by new retail centers that explicitly catered to shoppers who preferred to drive their own cars whenever possible. Large parking lots and slogans such as “Easy In-Easy Out” emphasized the convenience of the “modern” centers over the older businesses of the downtown.

As the attractiveness of the new residential areas reduced the perceived value of older neighborhoods nearer the downtown, homeowners in these areas began to join the more recent arrivals. Due to lingering racial prejudice within the housing market aimed at restricting the movements of minority groups within residential areas, those who were able to relocate were likely to be white, while African Americans, Latinos, and members of other ethnic minority groups could typically move only within the older neighborhoods. Popularly termed “white flight,” this dynamic reinforced the notion that the downtown area was increasingly undesirable for both homes and business. Because
perceptions of decline ultimately bred actual decline, local business and government leaders seized on new federal programs aimed at helping cities like San Bernardino to eliminate “blighted” areas and, in their place, build modern, efficient developments capable of drawing consumer dollars back to the downtown.\textsuperscript{9}

San Bernardino’s enthusiasm for urban renewal was such that by the early 1970s, designated redevelopment areas occupied some 2.5 square miles in and near the downtown. In the midst of this area stood the California Hotel. By the time the doors closed in July, 1972, the building, gradually abandoned by its target clientele, had become a low-income residence hotel. A proposal to convert the building to senior citizens’ housing failed due to concerns about adequate parking, and fire damage caused by homeless people prompted the city building commission to declare the hotel a public nuisance in December, 1980.\textsuperscript{10} Expressions of concern occasionally appeared in the pages of the San Bernardino Sun, such as an editorial for December 1, 1980, which commented that “There are few structures in the city that are as valuable as the hotel in terms of historic symbolism. If it slips through the fingers of preservationists, there will be little practical hope that the remaining physical reminders of San Bernardino history can be saved from disintegration.”\textsuperscript{11}

The California Hotel’s defenders were few, and they lacked financial backing for the extensive restoration effort demanded by the city government to bring the hotel up to the standards of the 1979 Uniform Building Code. Mayor W.R. “Bob” Holcomb, the city’s most vocal advocate of urban redevelopment, was aware in 1982 that code requirements for similar buildings in Los Angeles had been relaxed due to “a tremendous lobbying effort by owners of older residential buildings.”\textsuperscript{12} “Fortunately,” he added, “we
don’t have that situation here in San Bernardino.” In the end, Holcomb had his way, and the California Hotel was demolished in March, 1985, to make way for a “better, more profitable development.” Exactly what this development was meant to be was never quite clear, as for the past twenty-four years the site has only been used, as noted above, for parking.

Figure 2. Southern California as seen from San Bernardino. This view of San Bernardino as central to all of Southern California’s important business and tourist centers, such as Los Angeles, the mountains (Big Bear), and the deserts (Palm Springs, etc.), was central to the city’s self-image throughout the twentieth century, and remains a potent influence in the twenty-first century. In effect, San Bernardino’s civic identity tends to be defined in relation to other places, rather than through any innate qualities of the city itself. (Adapted from City of San Bernardino, San Bernardino General Plan, Adopted November 1, 2005 (San Bernardino, 2005), Figure I-1).
It is, inevitably, tempting to speculate what could have resulted if there had been enough support by residents and the municipal government to preserve the California Hotel, and make it a centerpiece of efforts to revive the fortunes of San Bernardino’s downtown. This is actually a question that could be asked of a number of cities, throughout the West, that faced the dilemma of once-preeminent downtown hotels that had fallen on hard times due to economic woes and changing patterns of visitation.

The Mapes Hotel in Reno, Nevada, was one such example. Built in 1947 by the Mapes family, the hotel established a new pattern for the state’s gambling industry by combining lodging, a casino, and regularly scheduled entertainment under one roof. This made it the centerpiece of Reno’s downtown, and a preferred destination for visitors and entertainers. However, the Mapes closed its doors in 1982, as the family was unable to compete with newer hotel/casinos and the lingering effects of a national recession. This touched off a nearly twenty-year battle between preservationists, who hoped to restore the hotel as a symbol of modernizing Nevada, and those who saw the old building as a blighting influence on downtown Reno. The issue gained national prominence in 1998, when the National Trust for Historic Preservation listed the Mapes as one of the Eleven Most Endangered historic properties in the United States. Despite this extra attention, money to preserve the hotel was not forthcoming, and the Reno Redevelopment Authority ultimately demolished the building in January, 2000.15

In like manner, a lack of preservation funding condemned Albuquerque, New Mexico’s, Alvarado Hotel, built in 1902 by the Fred Harvey Company on behalf of the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad. As with the Mapes and California hotels, the Alvarado had long been the centerpiece of Albuquerque’s downtown and its civic life.
By the late 1960s, however, air travel had largely eclipsed commercial rail travel, and the railroad sought to divest itself of its non-freight business, including its hotels. The railroad was willing to sell the entire property to the city, but insisted that Albuquerque would have to pay the current market rate for the real estate under the hotel. This was beyond the city’s means, even though the its planning department hoped to use the hotel as a key feature in a new downtown tourist development. Despite expressions of support by local residents for preserving the hotel, private donors had pledged only a few thousand dollars towards the purchase. Thus, even as the Albuquerque Journal explained how the Alvarado could be used for downtown revitalization—“If that building were integrated with other nearby historical landmarks, the area could become a real tourist attraction, comparable to Old Town”—the railroad began demolition in February, 1970.16

A similar debate, with different results, played out in Victoria, British Columbia in the early 1960s. Since 1908, the Empress Hotel, standing adjacent to the provincial parliament buildings by the city’s Inner Harbour, had presented an iconic image of the British Empire on the Pacific coast. But by 1965, the hotel, though still in business, came to be seen by many in Victoria as a shabby, outdated relic occupying a prime location that would be better served by a modern building. Unlike the situations in San Bernardino and Reno, the Empress’s owners were swayed by those in the city and elsewhere in the province who argued that the Empress—with its accumulated social history—was the “heart and soul” of Victoria’s civic identity. A multi-million dollar restoration project rejuvenated the hotel and ensured that it would remain a vital feature of the Inner Harbour district into the twenty-first century.17 In the city of Riverside—San Bernardino’s neighbor and longtime civic rival—the Mission Inn faced many of the same
kinds of problems. As will be seen, there were enough committed citizens, policy-makers, and access to money in Riverside to make it possible to retain the hotel as the focal point of a gradual revitalization of the surrounding downtown area, and of the city’s identity as a whole.

I. Preservation and Urban Renewal—An Introduction

These hotels are discrete examples of the much larger national issues surrounding the related concepts of urban renewal and historic preservation. Stated very simplistically, urban renewal sought to correct economic decline in the central business districts of cities by removing wide sections of the built environment deemed by planning theories to be inefficient and unhealthy. In their place would be carefully planned cityscapes that were meant, by their very design, to uplift those who lived in them while promoting new interest and economic vitality. In reaction to the loss of familiar places and patterns of life, due to the inevitable disruptions of wholesale demolition and rebuilding, advocates of historic preservation hoped to find strategies that would reuse much of the existing civic structure while enhancing the established ways of life. With either strategy the intent was, to a certain extent, to bypass what might be considered the natural patterns of a city’s growth in favor of a drastic change. Both sought to boost the prosperity of communities by making them more attractive to new residents, business people, and tourists. Federal funds that promoted urban renewal were primarily intended to improve the conditions of inner-city housing, but in smaller cities that lacked such housing on the large scale, urban renewal was almost entirely synonymous with business renewal.
Residents of Pasadena residents used urban renewal primarily to spur economic growth, rather than to correct any specific problems with substandard housing. The Pasadena Redevelopment Agency had in fact initially planned to make use of the legal aspects of the 1949 Housing Act without seeking funding, in the belief that federal involvement would prove more trouble than it was worth. Pasadena's attentions were focused on a 340-acre zone centered on Colorado Boulevard, the city's original business district that had faded economically in the post war years due to competition with new developments in Pasadena and surrounding cities. The planners dreamed of a boomtown filled with international business headquarters in high-rise office blocks together with a bustling downtown mall to attract shoppers. A rationalized circulation plan for the central business district was considered essential to success—a contention that was at the heart
of projects nationwide that sought to draw shoppers in private cars back to the downtown.\textsuperscript{18}

The results of urban renewal, such as the Tijeras Urban Renewal Project in downtown Albuquerque, New Mexico, or Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania’s Golden Triangle projects, transformed the appearance of the downtown business districts, but for those who had to live with them on a daily basis the new cityscapes frequently left much to be desired. Whatever their benefits in theory, the developments in many cases lacked the intangible qualities of human scale, and references to the shared local culture and history

\textbf{Figure 4}. Southern California as seen from Pasadena. An important distinction between this map and Figure 2 is that, in the original text, the distances illustrated show how far other potential visitors would travel to come to the city—Pasadena’s orientation is towards itself, rather than towards other places. (Adapted from City of Pasadena, \textit{Comprehensive General Plan—Central District Specific Plan} (Pasadena: City of Pasadena, 2004), Figure 2: Regional Map).
that were a part of the residents’ identity. Rather than correcting economic and social ills, critics claimed that urban renewal often exacerbated these conditions by disrupting long-established patterns of society and replacing them with a “numbing artificiality” that disregarded the needs of the individual person. Advocates of renewal maintained that it was an opportunity to correct the urban environment’s lingering ills. In the words of the Pasadena City Planning Commission in 1962, “The urban renewal procedure offers the city a ‘second chance.’ Errors of the past can be rectified and the knowledge gained from new techniques can be applied on a broad front.”

Jane Jacobs, one of the earliest and harshest critics of renewal, countered that planners were blinded by their adherence to theory and statistical analysis. In her landmark work, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (1961), she cited the example of a Boston planner who enjoyed visiting the city’s old North End for “that wonderful, cheerful street life,” but who simultaneously believed that “of course we have to rebuild it eventually. We’ve got to get those people off the streets.” In Jacobs’s analysis, the planner put more faith in surveys of housing density and acres of park per person than his own perceptions.

Jacobs’s central argument was that “Large swatches of construction built at one time are inherently inefficient for sheltering wide ranges of cultural, population, and business diversity. They are even inefficient for sheltering much range of mere commercial diversity.” Because old buildings could support impromptu uses at a relatively low cost, in contrast with expensive, purpose-built structures, they encouraged risk-taking and innovation: “Minglings of old buildings, with consequent minglings in living costs and tastes, are essential to get diversity and stability in residential populations, as well as diversity in enterprises.” As these opinions by Jacobs and her
fellow critics of urban renewal gained traction in the public awareness, they encouraged a reexamination of older buildings and neighborhoods that had once been seen as obstacles to progress.

The process was a gradual one, as city planners, local government officials and business leaders came to realize that the physical character of older business districts, if carefully rehabilitated, could be developed as a way to create a unique, marketable identity that would set their communities apart from their neighbors. “Old Town” historic districts could be the focal point for tourism and upscale retail ventures that consciously avoided the homogeneity of shopping malls by selling a lifestyle image along with their products. This marketing and image building, however, raised its own questions among historians and preservationists. Did it, in fact, represent a rejection of the truth of the local past in favor of an idealized version that would appeal to outsiders? And what did it mean for the residents who found themselves living in the middle of a designated historic district turned marketing device?

Historians Chris Wilson and Hal Rothman separately examined these questions in relation to Santa Fe, New Mexico. They found a city that had been physically reshaped to better suit preconceived ideas of what an old Spanish colonial town should look like, and historically reshaped to impose an appearance of continuity and harmony that belied the violence inherent in the Spanish and American conquests of the area. Together, these inhibited an understanding of the city’s contemporary conditions by its own native residents, and reduced their relevance. More immediately, the gentrification resulting from tourists who decided to become residents themselves meant that some natives could no longer afford to live in their own city, even as they worked to support the lifestyles of
newcomers who took their places. Because the United States was built by the layered effects of colonization, conquest and immigration, it is inevitable that nearly every locale, like Santa Fe, carries with it multiple histories claiming to represent the true nature of the place. This is especially true in California, where the situation has been amplified by rapid population growth and the region’s characteristic drive for self-reinvention.

In this study I examine how the processes of urban renewal and historic preservation played out in the cities of Pasadena, Riverside and San Bernardino as the residents of each attempted to define the nature and identity of the community in each place. While the term “community” derives from “common,” the definition depends entirely on what residents of a city believe that they, in fact, share in common. This may be a geographic location, a language, a cultural background, a religion, or a set of moral or ideological values, to name but a few. The evolving attempts to define and give physical form to the sense of community in these three cities form the larger backdrop of the study. As a result, an important factor in is the role played by ethnic minority groups in shaping this evolution, and the resulting attitudes towards urban renewal and historic preservation. These roles are both direct, by members of the minority groups, and indirect, in the form of reactions to these groups by members of the majority population.

I have chosen Pasadena, Riverside and San Bernardino as case studies because they are often treated academically as extensions of the larger Los Angeles metropolitan area. While this indeed true for the purpose of a population census, or planning on the regional scale, it would be incorrect to think of these cities as suburbs of Los Angeles in the traditional sense. They are not the result of an urban population spreading outward, but rather were founded independently in the nineteenth century, and grew alongside
each other and their larger neighbor. In each of the three smaller cities, the founders expressed a desire to be close enough to take advantage of Los Angeles’s commercial and transportation resources, but at the same time far enough away to escape what they saw as its corrupting social influences. This is because each city represented the fulfillment of specific plans by groups of idealists intent on establishing a community of like-minded individuals. In all three cities, the residents’ sense of what their community was, or should be, took physical form through changes in the landscape rendered by irrigation and town planning.

Figure 5. Southern California as seen from Riverside. Designed to accompany documentation of resources related to Riverside’s early citrus ranching, this illustration depicts the city as the center of the citrus industry in California. (Adapted from Historic American Engineering Record, California Citrus Heritage Recording Project, HAER No. CA-118 (Washington, D.C.: Historic American Engineering Record, National Park Service, Department of the Interior, 1993)).
This study contributes to the larger body of knowledge on Southern California in several ways. It brings greater attention to places such as Pasadena, Riverside and San Bernardino that are “other than Los Angeles,” with their own distinctive histories, but that are commonly overlooked in analyses that see Southern California in terms of the dominant metropolitan areas. This study also examines historic preservation in settings that are simultaneously atypical, and typical. Atypical, because existing examinations of historic preservation in the West have logically concentrated on places such as Santa Fe, Santa Barbara, and San Diego where there is a dense layering of historic resources built up through centuries of migration and settlement. The resources within the cities in this study are, by contrast, of more recent vintage, but were often designed to give the appearance of much greater age and historical depth. In this, Pasadena, Riverside and San Bernardino are typical examples of the majority of cities and towns throughout Southern California, and as such can carry greater relevance for residents of such places.

Beginning the study proper, Chapter 2, “Understanding Urban Renewal,” presents a general history objectives of the urban renewal process, and its conceptual origins in the housing reform movement of the 1920s and 1930s. This includes an indication of the criticism directed against renewal, by those who argued that urban planners lacked an understanding of how cities functioned, and by those who argued that renewal actually meant the removal of minority residents from their long-established neighborhoods.

Chapter 3, “Owning the Past,” is an overview of the recent scholarly treatments of memory, authenticity, and historic preservation. These works emphasize the ways that the presentation of local history in places such as Santa Fe, New Mexico, and Los Angeles and Monterey in California has been far from a constant. Instead, history has
been treated as a plastic medium, to be shaped and reshaped in the service of commerce and social agendas. Architecture, and the restoration of older buildings has, in this context, been a potent means for giving a tangible shape to a specific interpretation of the past.

Chapter 4, “Foundations,” begins by showing the role that irrigation played in transforming the landscape of Southern California to suit the Mediterranean fantasies of the region’s American settlers. At the same time, irrigation politics guided the course of development, and established the power relationships that remain a factor in California to the present day. Moving from the large scale to the specific, the chapter continues with accounts of the early days of each city, emphasizing the attempts by the founders to define a distinctive community. As will be seen, this was a matter of both including individuals of like mind and culture, while excluding those—primarily Chinese immigrants and the native Californio and American Indian populations—who did not fit the preferred image.

Chapter 5, “Mythology and Marginalization,” continues the theme of defining community, through an examination of the Mission Revival and City Beautiful architectural movements. As with irrigation, architecture was a way to transform the physical environment of Southern California, and impose on it a new version of history that agreed with Americans’ views of themselves and their place in the world. This is contrasted with the continuing efforts in each city to minimize the presence of ethnic groups that did not fit within the new, romanticized self-images.

Chapter 6, “Planning the Postwar City,” takes up the narrative in the period after World War Two, and the introduction of urban renewal. The chapter highlights each
city’s response to economic decline in their respective central business districts, and accentuates the differences in how the leadership groups in each attempted to cope with the problem. In doing so, the narrative sets the stage for the introduction of historic preservation as an alternative urban renewal strategy. This is linked with the resurgence of expressions of ethnic identity by the minority groups that had been excluded from earlier visions.

Chapter 7, “Preservation and Promotion,” presents the growing maturity of preservation efforts in Riverside and Pasadena, and examines the meanings and impacts of the resulting civic identities. By contrast, San Bernardino presents a picture of a city where continued divisions between ethnic groups may have played a significant role in limiting local advocacy for historic preservation. The chapter concludes with a brief epilogue commenting on the present condition of each city’s central business district after more than a half-century of planning and preservation efforts. These are compared with the phenomenon of the Victoria Gardens “regional lifestyle center”—an outdoor shopping mall in western San Bernardino County that invokes the feel of a historic retail district through entirely new construction.
CHAPTER 2

UNDERSTANDING URBAN RENEWAL

Urban Renewal, as it was practiced in the United States in the decades following World War Two, was a federally-subsidized effort to respond to the economic and physical decline in the central business districts (or downtowns) of cities throughout the nation. Though subject to considerable debate, the decline seemed linked to the cities’ rapid growth, in the form of low-density residential and light industrial areas on the urban periphery that drew commerce away from the downtown. Many observers specifically associated decline with the growing influence of private automobiles that enabled people to live considerable distances from the places where they worked or shopped. Both of these points seemed particularly significant in Southern California and the Southwest. In response to these problems, civic planners increasingly advanced the notion that broad areas of the central business districts should be rebuilt; replacing old, inefficient buildings and infrastructure with a cityscape better suited to automotive access and other aspects of the modern world.

The concept was an outgrowth of the housing reform movement that flourished during the 1920s and 1930s. Here, too, reformers identified older urban structures as a cause of social decay, and called for extensive rebuilding to provide urban residents with modern, rational homes. Advocates for these programs, both before and after World War Two, drew inspiration from the work of influential urban planners such as Le Corbusier, who proposed the reworking of entire cities in the name of maximum efficiency and the collective good. Critics of these ideas charged that the reformers lacked a fundamental understanding of how cities actually worked. They charged that through their devotion to
statistical theories and architectural models, planners were doing more harm than good by destroying established neighborhoods and eliminating older buildings that were actually essential for a city’s character and vitality. Critics further maintained that urban renewal had a disproportionately severe impact on ethnic minority groups who lived within the areas targeted for rebuilding. The perception among many in these groups that renewal was synonymous with their removal cast doubt on reformers’ motives and the entire focus of the urban renewal agenda.

I. To the Future and Back Again

World War Two, and its immediate byproduct the Cold War, exerted profound influences on the real and figurative landscapes of Southern California. Industry created to serve the needs of the nation's military prompted urban growth beyond the wildest dreams of the early real estate boosters. As Carl Abbott notes in *The Metropolitan Frontier*, nearly all of the 8.3 million people added to the population of the Western United States during the 1940s were city dwellers.¹ Of the three cities examined in this study, Pasadena experienced a comparatively modest 27.7 percent increase between 1940 and 1950, while Riverside grew by 34.8 percent and San Bernardino 44.5 percent. These numbers were easily exceeded in cities such as Burbank or Lynwood that housed major manufacturing operations; in these places the population increase was over 100 percent.² At first living wherever they could find a place to sleep, most of these new Californians soon settled in the great expanses of mass-produced residential neighborhoods that supplanted farmland at the edges of established cities. Greg Hise points out in “Homebuilding and Industrial Decentralization in Los Angeles: The Roots of the Post-
World War II Urban Region,” that these new residential areas were not suburbs as the term is usually understood, because they were not meant as bedroom communities for the older urban centers. They were instead carefully planned as complete communities in their own right, and by design appealed to a more heterogeneous population.³

Gerald Nash explains in *The American West Transformed* that this period of nearly unchecked expansion served as a prelude to the problems that would arise throughout the West in succeeding decades. In many cities the level of population increase, either permanent or transient, outpaced anything municipal planners had foreseen in the pre-war years. Decades of anticipated growth took place in only a few years. Civic governments struggled to absorb the financial burden of providing health care, schools, water and sewer systems to their new residents.⁴

The difficulties were not limited to infrastructure and city services. As Nash indicates, rapid growth brought with it a number of social problems, or rather, exposed a number of issues that had been suppressed with varying degrees of success in the years before the war. A key factor was the differing cultural experiences the new Californians brought with them. While some of the migrants represented the same areas of the United States that had produced the early settlers of the nineteenth century, particularly the Midwest and Northeast, many others, particularly African Americans, hailed from the South, and brought with them forms of culture little seen in the state prior to that time.⁵ At times this put them at odds with the populations within which they settled. In cities such as Pasadena and Oakland, for instance, the established African American residents were taken aback by the confrontational attitudes that Southern blacks maintained towards whites, feeling that it damaged their reputations and hampered their relations
with the city at large. An Oakland resident quoted by Gretchen Lemke-Santangelo in *Abiding Courage* (1996) maintained that prior to World War Two, “there wasn’t that feeling that white people were your enemy.” In her opinion, the Southern migrants “had an ingrown dislike of white people. . . . It seemed like overnight people on the street would be fighting. You would go into the store downtown and the people wouldn’t want to wait on you. That bothered me because I wasn’t used to that.” A study of the situation in Pasadena in 1948 asserted that the more recent arrivals were responsible for physically attacking whites simply as a matter of principle, upsetting the sense of order carefully built by pioneering African American families in the name of peaceful coexistence.

The development of military facilities and their associated industrial base also brought a fundamental change to the idea of what it meant to live in Southern California. Towns developed in the nineteenth century played on the image of California as the nation's Mediterranean paradise. Promoters depicted the area as a green, sunny land free from the rigors of life in the East, where cultivated citizens of the highest moral standards lived lives of ease amid ever-productive citrus ranches. The remains of the Spanish Colonial period added an air of romantic mystery—at least in the vivid imagination of the local boosters. This iconic vision lingered in the postwar years, but it was joined by a new image of Southern California derived from its leading role in the entertainment and aerospace industries. This saw the region as home to an exciting, fast-paced life on the leading edge of the nation's cultural and technological future. While some of this had no more substance than the Utopian tales driving the early real estate boom, it was true enough that the war years caused many in Southern California to visualize their
communities in far different ways than citizens of prior decades. Winter havens for the wealthy redefined themselves as centers for research and development, finding prestige in the application of intellectual capital rather than simple refinement.

These developments brought with them new residents trained in the scientific approaches to solving problems. For many in this group, pre-war cityscapes and pre-war city governments symbolized inefficient ways of life that would hinder the nation's ability to achieve its full potential as they envisioned it. Many turned their attention to status-quo administrations dominated by old families, hoping to replace a business-as-usual approach to municipal governance with one based on actual business practices. Abbott asserts that many Western cities were “fertile ground for the professionalization of local government in the 1940s and 1950s . . . . Younger civic activists [often newcomers] wrote new charters, organized reform campaigns, and defined a new consensus about the role of local government. To use the phrase of political scientist Amy Bridges, residents of many Western cities 'refounded' their political communities in a generation of business-led reform.”

Spencer Olin illustrates just such a refounding in the Orange County, California, city of Santa Ana, where by 1951 business activists had gained a majority on the city council with a platform focused on “A sound business-like administration of city affairs.” The new council created the position of city administrator, who was to be the “undisputed boss of city business” and would “crack the whip over all municipal departments.” In fact, all the communities incorporated in Orange County through the 1960s were to adopt the council-manager system of government. This same drive for efficiency inspired nationwide efforts to reshape the physical form of cities, and by extension the lives of those who lived in them.
Urban renewal became an almost magical formula for those hoping to modernize the nation’s cities. In their most optimistic visions, renewal seemed to promise a way to sweep away all evidence of poverty and past failures with a modern, rational cityscape. Efficiency and modernity were essential features of progress, and during the 1950s progress was one of the foremost weapons of the Cold War. The United States and the Soviet Union strove to demonstrate the triumphs of their respective political and economic systems in improving the lives of the common man. Because housing is such a fundamental need, both sides realized that the continued existence of old, apparently substandard accommodations in high-visibility urban settings could be seized on by their rivals as evidence of failure.\(^\text{12}\)

Ironically, both the U.S.A and the U.S.S.R.—and many of their allies—approached the problem in similar ways. The large scale development of standardized housing blocks seemed to promise an equitable means of raising the standard of living for urban populations, particularly when set in the midst of dramatically reimagined cityscapes. The concept, of course, was not new to the post-war era, as Dana Cuff demonstrates in *The Provisional City: Los Angeles Stories of Architecture and Urbanism* (2000). In the United States, large-scale public housing programs represented, in Cuff’s estimation, “the most progressive and radical part of the New Deal.” As guiding principles, “Rationality, efficiency, and planning—fundamental modernist principles—would be sought in International Style Modern housing.”\(^\text{13}\) Post-war urban planners working in the devastated cities of Europe often had a clear motivation for symbolically looking forward with new ideas. In the United States urban renewal was driven more by a quest for economic advantage, and perhaps embarrassment over the visual appearance
of older inner-city neighborhoods. For planners, government officials and many urban residents, the prospect of modern housing units surrounded by lawns and plazas for common space, rather than crowded streets, presented an appealing vision of a clean, efficient city that had overcome the mistakes of the past.

Though a phenomenon most commonly associated with the mid-twentieth century, the basic principles of urban renewal have existed, by whatever name, almost as long as there have been cities. For example, Caesar Augustus boasted that during his reign Rome had been transformed from a city of brick to a city of marble, while the great fire during the tenure of Nero has been interpreted as a particularly aggressive slum clearance measure. Closer to our own time, Dublin was the subject of repeated attempts to improve circulation, including those by the Wide Streets Commissioners between 1757 and 1851, while almost ninety acres in central Glasgow were systematically cleared and rebuilt from 1866. Paris would be unrecognizable without the bulldozer-like attentions of Baron Haussmann.\(^{14}\) Alexander von Hoffman explains in “A Study in Contradictions: The Origins and Legacy of the Housing Act of 1949” (2000) that the campaign for housing reform that gave rise to urban renewal began in the 1840s, when religious and moral reformers, together with advocates of public health, seized upon the notion that the growing slums of eastern cities were a physical and spiritual danger to their residents.\(^{15}\) These were the same motivations that inspired the city parks movement in the United States, beginning with New York’s Central Park in 1851.\(^{16}\) The Progressive Era at the turn of the century moved many of these concerns into the government realm, with formal building and health regulations, together with model housing projects. In the
spirit of the era, housing reformers believed that careful, scientific management of the housing problem would improve the characters of residences and residents alike.

Reformers seemed to find vindication in the public housing projects created in Great Britain and Europe during the 1910s and 1920s. Catherine Bauer, one of the foremost advocates of housing reform, undertook an extended study of these European projects in her seminal work, *Modern Housing* (1934). She was emphatic that the housing problem could not be solved simply by replacing old buildings with new. Rather, Bauer called for the restructuring of American culture as a whole, stating that “There is no getting around the fact that ‘modern housing’ and much of the framework of contemporary western society are mutually antipathetic.” Capitalism, nationalism, private property and other “old interests” were obstacles that had to be overcome if public housing—or social housing, as it was then known—was to be “successful and forward-pointing.” Although Bauer averred that she had not personally visited the Soviet Union, she held it up as the model, noting that in that nation, “all signs point toward great future achievements in modern planning and modern architecture.”

John F Bauman’s study, *Public Housing, Race, and Renewal: Urban Planning in Philadelphia, 1920-1974* (1987), further illustrates this mindset, explaining that for Bauer and her counterparts, “Modern housing was to liberate the family from the cluttered, overstuffed, emotionally stifling Victorian residential environment; it was to provide housing for the ‘machine age.’”

As the Great Depression made the housing situation in the United States more acute, reformers such as Bauer called on the federal government to begin this transformation in housing by enacting sweeping rental programs to benefit not just the
poorest in the nation, but also the working and middle classes who were in danger of joining the poor as the economy worsened. The first step in this direction was the Housing Act of 1934, which established the Federal Housing Administration. The agency was charged with providing insurance for private residential mortgages, and as a result encouraged national mortgage associations to create a secondary market for these mortgages.\(^{19}\)

This first step proved a disappointment for housing reformers, because it supported the real estate agencies and building firms they blamed for creating slums in the first place. The United States Housing Act of 1937—also known as the Wagner-Steagall Act—would have been somewhat more to their liking, though it aimed only to relieve the poorest of the poor. Rather than establishing “decent housing” as a right, the legislation only called for minimum levels of shelter for low-income families unable to afford anything in the private market.\(^{20}\) To make this possible, the Act established a new federal housing authority empowered to make loans and grants directly to local housing authorities for the purpose of developing and operating new housing projects. The goal of slum clearance was furthered by a requirement that each public housing unit built under this act had to be matched by the demolition of an existing slum unit.\(^{21}\)

While high-minded reformers focused on new housing as a vehicle for social reconstruction, it was the elimination of slums that occupied the minds of many civic officials, business owners and downtown landlords. The growth of suburbs along expanded municipal rail lines accelerated during the 1920s, taking with them an increasing number of affluent residents who had traditionally lived close to the downtown, as seen in the South Orange Grove Boulevard neighborhood of Pasadena,
adjacent to the Colorado Boulevard business district. Civic leaders described the trend and its associated economic decline as “urban blight.” They worried that if it was allowed to continue, this blight could lead to a loss of tax revenues that could cripple the economic vitality of the nation's cities. They called for a campaign of urban redevelopment that would clear slums and outdated housing while improving the municipal infrastructure and promoting new development. For her part, Catherine Bauer opposed putting low income housing in former slum areas, but instead wanted the federal government to force cities to build on vacant sites, as she was convinced in the 1930s that urban decentralization was inevitable.

In contrast, the National Association of Real Estate Boards (NAREB), an organization representing urban real estate brokers, landlords, and others with a financial stake in preserving the health of the downtown, became the leading proponent of urban redevelopment. The association opposed public housing projects, reasoning that they competed with private business but did not produce tax revenue, decreased the independence and initiative of the American citizen, and risked the loss of the best urban redevelopment sites to low-income residential units. In that light, public housing could be depicted as promoting further urban blight, rather than correcting it.

The Association’s research arm, the Urban Land Institute (ULI), identified the growing influence of automobiles as a chief cause or urban decay. Through studies conducted in a number of cities in 1940-1941, including St. Louis, Baltimore, Cleveland, and Boston, the Institute concluded that city centers would have to be adapted or rebuilt to accommodate automobiles, with expanded parking facilities, re-planned street systems, and expressways designed to funnel shoppers into downtown while routing
other traffic around it. The Institute asserted that this process would provide more open space and a cleaner life for inner city residents. Because automobiles were linked to the larger process of suburbanization, what these early urban renewal studies proposed was to recreate the main attractions of suburbs within the inner cities. This was meant to appeal to middle-class consumers who had increasingly abandoned the downtown, and to deliver those who remained from the evils of the urban wilderness.  

The Real Estate Boards’ preferred approach to achieving this goal initially focused on private initiative and private enterprise. The problem, as members of the Association soon discovered, was cost. While inner-city properties were often unattractive to the preferred class of residents, landlords typically still found them profitable. In the 1930s there was a market for downtown commercial sites close to established infrastructure, and for low-cost residential units, even though the latter were of the kind that housing reformers hoped to eliminate. This meant that few private developers possessed the financial resources to assemble all the plots of land necessary for a meaningful redevelopment project, much less manage the demolition and rebuilding. The result was that in 1941 the Association put forward the proposal that metropolitan land commissions should acquire slum properties through eminent domain, and make use of subsidized loans from both local and federal sources to support selling land to private developers at below market prices through write-downs. Advocates of public housing, unsurprisingly, thought it hypocritical that the Association would take this approach while still opposing similar subsidies for public housing projects.  

Despite this inconsistency, in 1941 two federal government economists, Alvin Hansen and Scott Greer, proposed a redevelopment plan very similar to that put forward
by the National Association of Real Estate Boards. They suggested that the subsidy
loans should be replaced with funding that, for all intents, functioned as an outright
grant, and that the redevelopment process should be overseen by a national planning
agency. Even though the concept was still hypothetical, the endorsement by Hansen and
Greer was sufficient to encourage legislatures in twenty-five states to pass urban
redevelopment acts between 1941 and 1948, although only two took the next step to
provide subsidies for actual sum clearance. 29 California's Redevelopment Act of 1945,
for example, authorized city and county governments to form Regional Development
Agencies, with the power to acquire blighted properties through eminent domain for
demolition and rebuilding. It was left to the regional agencies themselves to match this
legal authority with the financial capital needed to see the process through. 30

By 1948 the issue of housing reform had achieved sufficient national prominence
for President Truman to use it as a key element in his reelection campaign. Truman had
hoped to continue Franklin Roosevelt's domestic policies, especially the Economic Bill
of Rights, but the Republican-majority Congress was not inclined to cooperate.
Truman’s decision to call the Congress into a special session in 1948, specifically to deal
with the twin problems of inflation and the nationwide housing shortage, was likely the
deciding factor in his unexpected victory over Thomas Dewey in the general election,
even though the Housing Act of 1948 only resulted in modest changes in policy. 31

The election also returned a Democratic majority in Congress—one that was
more sympathetic to Truman's goals. In his State of the Union Speech for 1949, Truman
declared: “The housing shortage continues to be acute. As an immediate step, the
Congress should enact the provisions for low-rent public housing, slum clearance, farm
housing, and housing research which I have repeatedly recommended. The number of low-rent public housing units provided for in the legislation should be increased to 1 million units in the next 7 years. Even this number of units will not begin to meet our need for new housing.”

The provisions that Congress did enact made up the landmark Housing Act of 1949, which promised “a decent home and suitable living environment for every American family.” Title I of the Act marked the formal genesis of urban redevelopment as a federal program through the Housing and Home Finance Agency's Division of Slum Clearance (later the Urban Renewal Administration). Title I provided up to $1 billion in federal loans to assist municipal governments in acquiring properties designated as experiencing blight to begin the process of either public or private redevelopment. A key principle was that these projects could not be done piecemeal—in order to attract developers, redevelopment zones would have to be big; assembled from a number of privately held parcels. The projects also needed to be big in order to have the desired effect on the surrounding cityscape. They were meant to be the frontier outposts of the new urban America, with a ripple effect that would ultimately transform the city as a whole.

The Act also designated $100 million to be spent every five years on grants to cover two-thirds of the write-down costs for these properties, with local governments covering the remaining third. Despite these apparently concrete spending plans, Jon C. Teaford explains in “Urban Renewal and Its Aftermath” that Title I was “better suited to stir hopes” than it was to seeing projects through to completion. Business owners saw its provisions as way of restoring the value of property in city centers; municipal
governments focused on ways to increase local tax revenues; social reformers believed the purpose of Title I was to clear slums; and backers of low-income housing hoped that the law would stimulate the building of affordable, quality urban residences. According to Catherine Bauer, urban redevelopment won congressional approval “because different groups of people, like the blind men feeling the elephant, made entirely different assumptions as to the essential nature and purpose of this legislation.” The problem was that the legislation was not entirely clear on what the essential purpose of Title I was. The assumption was that the Act was meant to improve housing, but Congress had not actually spelled out how this was to be defined, or that the work had to be limited to residential projects.

John A. Jakle and David Wilson find in this ambiguity a key element in the continuing problem of urban decay during the post-war years. In Derelict Landscapes: The Wasting of America’s Built Environment (1992), the authors charge that in response to conservatives calling for a return to the “normalcy” of the 1920s, and liberals advocating the resumption and extension of the New Deal, policy-makers and the federal government chose to mollify both camps by focusing energy on economic growth. The working class could be promised jobs, and the corporate sector could expand without restriction. Jakle and Wilson identify urban renewal as one element of the public subsidy required to sustain growth, along with spending for defense, transportation infrastructures, and the space program. Renewal had its social element, but in their view its primary role was to make the inner city safe for the investment of maintenance dollars. The problem was that in practice, the designation of an urban renewal zone reduced the short-term maintenance incentive, for obvious reasons, replacing it with the
motivation to maximize profits before condemnation. Jakle and Wilson contend that urban renewal “became not so much a cure for urban ills as a self-fulfilling prophecy of decline.” Planners contributed to dereliction by an “arrogant” rejection of past generations and their values as expressed in the existing form of the cities they had constructed through organic growth. They advocated instead an aggressively modern vision of the city, defined in terms of architectural “space” rather than as the location of the homes of individual people.  

In the absence of a clear way forward, by 1953 only 60 municipalities nationwide had made use of Title I to begin the process of land acquisition, and only a tenth of those had gone so far as to begin rebuilding. The following year, a new Housing Act modified the terms of Title I, with mixed results. On the positive side, the act added provisions for the rehabilitation and preservation of existing buildings, instead of simply calling for clearance and rebuilding. It also addressed a common complaint of the redevelopment process by mandating involvement by local residents in the planning process. This was intended to bring greater clarity, as was the requirement that federal funds would be contingent on local agencies preparing comprehensive civic development plans. Large-scale civic planning was not new to the United States, as the City Beautiful movement of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries demonstrates. The difference was that the initiative for earlier efforts was found in the enthusiasm of local business leaders and chambers of commerce, but federal dollars in the 1950s and beyond helped to transform urban planning into a lucrative industry, and its leading figures became national celebrities.
Many of these planners were inspired, to a large degree, by the work of Modernist architects such as Le Corbusier, Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, Walter Gropius, and I.M. Pei. Le Corbusier—born Charles-Edouard Jeanneret-Gris—was perhaps the most influential due to the breadth of his aspirations. He did not confine his interests to simply creating buildings, but rather sought to create entire cities that would direct the lives of those who lived within them. In his “Radiant City” plan of 1933, he declared that he sought a design that would “fill every moment of [the resident's] daily life” so nothing would be left to chance. Much of what he sought to avoid could be found in the individualism of the United States. This antipathy is neatly summed up in a caption he affixed to an aerial photograph of Manhattan in the 1930s: “Tout est paradoxe, désordre; la liberté de chacun anéantit la liberté de tous”—“Everything here is paradox, disorder; individual liberty destroying collective liberty.”

The theories of Le Corbusier and his fellow urban designers dazzled, but the stubborn persistence of individuality ultimately doomed them to failure. The designers believed they could literally remake cities from the ground up, without any particular consideration for the unique factors behind their original form and function. In common with many socialist economic planners, they often failed to appreciate the complexity of human society, and instead regarded it as a sort of statistical problem that could be solved scientifically. New York activist and writer Jane Jacobs famously illustrated this dilemma in *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (1961). She asserted that “This conception of the city as a collection of separate file drawers, in effect, was suited very well by the Radiant City vision of Le Corbusier . . . . Although Le Corbusier himself made no more than a gesture toward statistical analysis, his scheme assumed the
statistical reordering of a system of disorganized complexity, solvable mathematically; his towers in the park were a celebration, in art, of the potency of statistics and the triumph of the mathematical average.”

From this viewpoint, the architects who shared Le Corbusier’s vision regarded “the people” in an abstract sense, and attempted to fit them into their design schemes as one more uniform architectural element. The result was that while renewal worked to a degree in some cities, in many others it only made the situation worse. In cities such as Pittsburgh, Boston and San Francisco, residents were uprooted, still vital ethnic neighborhoods were dispersed, and local landmarks were lost forever. Jacobs considered Radiant City to be little more than a “wonderful mechanical toy” with perhaps as much actual life to it. However, as Jacobs ruefully reported, the concept proved irresistible to planners, developers, lenders, and civic officials because of the seeming clarity and simplicity of its massive geometric forms. And because of this simplicity, it seemed easy for other planners to produce their own version of the Radiant City for renewal projects around the country.

I.M. Pei sought to translate the Radiant City to Cleveland, beginning in 1959, with a commercial and residential project dubbed "Erieview." Characteristic of modern planning philosophy, Erieview rejected the existing patterns of streets and multiple land uses as inefficient. Instead, Pei favored the use of the super-block—a design that combined a number of smaller blocks by eliminating the often narrow side streets running between major thoroughfares. This made it possible to consolidate smaller real estate parcels, and provided open space between buildings. Planners favoring super-blocks argued that it represented a more efficient use of land, while Jacobs and other
critics asserted that such developments lacked human scale, and abandoned the circulation patterns they deemed essential for urban vitality.46

Jacobs charged that Radiant City, Erieview, and similar projects were based on conceptions of the way urban dwellers should live, rather than on an observation of how they actually lived. Erieview featured only offices and apartments set amid wide plazas and sweeps of lawn. Pei made no accommodation for the other accretions of human life, such as churches, schools, restaurants, or entertainment, which marked the existing cityscape. Jacobs contended that while slums might have been crowded and untidy, they still possessed working social structures fashioned by their residents. Urban renewal projects that overlooked or rejected this point were likely to create a lifeless environment that would only promote, rather than correct, urban decline. Urban dwellers on the receiving end of these projects might have found a parallel in the treatment of Native American groups during the process of westward expansion. Both were regarded as either features of the landscape that could be changed along with it, or as sorry holdovers from an earlier age that needed an outside agency to provide them with a new way of life for the modern world.47

Another significant problem with these "modern world" projects was that they tended to restrict or disrupt the natural circulation of a city's residents. Louis Lopilato, author of Main Street: Some Lessons in Revitalization (2003), and other critics of the process, have noted that by imposing such structures on established cityscapes, planners created internal borders or stagnant dead-ends that in most instances eventually promoted further decay, rather than a ripple effect of renewal. This is an important point, because "circulation" was one of the most commonly stated concerns in many urban renewal
projects, including those proposed for the city of Pasadena. Advocates of renewal echoed the Urban Land Institute's findings on the automobile, and pointed to traffic congestion and the allied problem of insufficient parking as one of the major causes of blight and decay.\textsuperscript{48}

Richard Moe and Carter Wilkie also find common ground with Jacobs’s assessment of urban renewal: well-intentioned in theory, but too-often “monstrous” in practice.\textsuperscript{49} In \textit{Changing Places: Rebuilding Community in the Age of Sprawl} (1997), they compare urban renewal to the Radical Reconstruction following the American Civil War, noting that both were federal programs unable to accomplish their goals, and both alienated many of those they were intended to help, while increasing the level of social division. The organic processes by which cities grew were swept aside in an attempt to remake the most important features as quickly as possible in accordance with the latest planning theories.\textsuperscript{50} The progressive arguments of clearance and renewal were that new was better than old, and that society must necessarily benefit from the intervention of trained professionals. Moe and Wilkie demonstrate that putting these theories into action cost American cities many of their most distinctive features, and replaced them with facilities that often made no reference to their contexts. Many of the cities that experienced renewal lost historically significant districts wholesale, and often, as in the case of Pittsburgh, many residents at the time were glad to see them go. Stefan Lorant wrote in 1964 that “The city welcomes tomorrow, because yesterday was hard and unlovely. . . .”\textsuperscript{51} It is easy to overlook these sentiments, but the fact remains that from the passing of the Housing Act of 1949 urban renewal was widely accepted as a viable way to combat social ills, and as a demonstration of America’s economic prowess. The
full impact of renewal was typically realized only after irreplaceable landmarks were lost, or replaced by bland modern structures.\textsuperscript{52}

The ire of Moe and Wilkie is focused, again, on Le Corbusier, whom they cast in a distinctly malevolent light. They describe him as an elitist who considered urban planning too important to be left in the care of ordinary citizens. Louis XIV, “a great town planner” in Le Corbusier’s words, provided the model for his autocratic ambitions. The authors interpret his famous declaration that “A house is a machine to live in” to mean that the city and its residents were meant to serve the advance of technology as expressed in his exalted creations.\textsuperscript{53} Moe and Wilkie advance the now-familiar proposition that the Modernist school abandoned traditional respect for locale, replacing it with projects designed for self-gratification and self-aggrandizement. Vincent Scully declared that Modernists were bent on committing as many architectural crimes as possible against the traditional city. Scully condemned Le Corbusier’s “cataclysmic vision” as the most far-reaching, and the force which reduced the centers of American cities to wastelands. British planner Peter Hall reached an even harsher conclusion, writing “The evil that Corbusier did lives after him.”\textsuperscript{54}

Jonathan Barnett has a somewhat more charitable view of post-war renewal, contending in \textit{The Fractured Metropolis: Improving the New City, Restoring the Old City, Reshaping the Region} (1995) that it worked to a better degree in some cities than others, citing positive examples in San Francisco, Pittsburgh, Baltimore, and Hartford, Connecticut.\textsuperscript{55} At the same time, he acknowledges that the prevailing Modernist school of design, adequate for individual buildings, was less than ideal for the task of rebuilding entire sections of an American city. Barnett also points out again the political aims which
informed urban planners, who “decided that they had been freed from pretentious and elitist notions that had no current social relevance.” As a result, their projects tended to be detached from the surrounding cityscape, and lacking in human scale as designers pushed for maximum efficiency of land use.

Large-scale civic planning was not new to the United States, as the City Beautiful movement of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries demonstrates. The difference was that the initiative for earlier efforts was found in the enthusiasm of local business leaders and chambers of commerce, while planning in the 1950s came to be driven by federal statutes and federal dollars. This change helped transform urban planning into a lucrative industry, and its leading figures were, in their day, national celebrities. One of the most prominent of the celebrity planners during this period, particularly in Southern California, was Victor Gruen. His career, in which he advocated for revitalized city centers on the European model even as he designed suburban shopping malls that drew business away from these centers, is emblematic of the uncertainties faced by downtown business owners and city government leaders in the immediate post-war decades.

Gruen, whose design firm would play an influential role in the redevelopment programs for both Pasadena and San Bernardino, had immigrated to the United States from his native Austria in 1938. Specifically, he was Viennese, with a socialist’s faith in the transformative power of the state. In his biography of Gruen, M. Jeffrey Hardwick relates that the members of the city’s Socialist party saw large-scale planning and redevelopment as a form of human engineering, and central to their dream of an egalitarian society. Gruen carried this belief that the environment played a guiding role
in determining the character of its inhabitants with him to America, where it became
central to his architectural career. This belief caused Gruen to be repelled by the
chaotic “avenues of horror” that he found in the nation's suburbs and smaller cities. In a
speech to a gathering of architects in 1956, he proclaimed suburbs “the greatest
collection of vulgarity—billboards, motels, gas stations, shanties, car lots, miscellaneous
industrial equipment, hot dog stands, wayside stores—ever collected by mankind.”
Elsewhere, he derided the sort of low-density commercial district found in many Western
communities as a “subcityscape” that “drags all other urban elements down to its lowest
level . . . .”

Where residents would listen, Gruen dreamed of sweeping away this random
accretion and replacing it with an uplifting urban landscape inspired by the ideals of his
beloved Vienna. And leaders did listen. Journalist Malcolm Gladwell argues in The
New Yorker that “Postwar America was an intellectually insecure place,” and many were
drawn to Gruen's buoyant confidence and sophistication. Gruen “was a European
intellectual, an émigré, and, in the popular mind, the European émigré represented
vision, the gift of seeing something grand in the banality of postwar American life.
When the European visionary confronted a drab and congested urban landscape, he didn't
tinker and equivocate; he leveled warehouses and buried roadways and came up with a
thrilling plan for making things right.”

The problem created by this situation was one of understanding and continuity.
While civic planning agencies might have earlier made use of consultants to advise
certain aspects of their development projects, on the whole these projects were small
enough—several blocks of a business district, for example—that the local authorities
could still shape their course according to strictly local needs. By virtue of being members of their community, they had at least some appreciation for its distinctive character, even if they interpreted “community” to mean their contemporaries in the business and governmental class. In other words, they understood the basic dynamics of the downtown—how it had developed, how local consumers had related to this particular section of the city, and how these patterns of use had changed.

By contrast, professional urban planners with national reputations, as exemplified by Victor Gruen, carried with them grand ideas, often based on political theories, and saw their creations as engines of social change. Just as an architect with the stature of Frank Lloyd Wright would have expected the owners of a new home he had designed to conform their lives to his aesthetic vision, so too a prominent urban planner would expect local planning officials to yield to his judgment. Some study of the local conditions would obviously have been made, but in the end a cityscape of superblocks and Bauhaus-inspired socialist minimalism would tend to sweep local history aside in favor of a clean start in a transformed world. Local authorities in Southern California could themselves formulate ambitious Space-Age plans for their cities. The crucial difference, though, was that these plans still represented local ambitions, and were ultimately consistent with the ambitions for success and reputation that drove the earliest settlers in the nineteenth century. They grew out of the city’s history, to a certain extent, and reflected its character, rather than reflecting an external vision of an internationalist utopia. The failure of redevelopment projects in the aesthetic and thus emotional sense was, in part, due to the simple problem that residents could no longer recognize their own cities and thus felt no attachment to them.
Clearly there was more to the success or failure of redevelopment efforts than the question of local versus international vision. A more prosaic factor, which produced the same sense of detachment, was the simple fact that redevelopment took a long time to come to fruition. The transfer of millions of dollars out of the federal treasury required a ponderous bureaucracy that was matched at the local level. Alexander von Hoffman notes that “According to the National Commission on Urban Problems, almost a third of urban renewal projects took 6 to 9 years to complete; more than a third took from 9 to 15 years. Local frustration grew in proportion to the time community residents had to stare at vacant lots with no signs of development.” In St. Louis, residents dubbed the Mill Creek Valley project “Hiroshima Flats,” while Detroit had a project that came to be known as “Ragweed Acres.” Even with federal support, redevelopment agencies found it increasingly difficult to attract private developers as the pattern became clear.

Even as Congress passed amendments to Title I in 1959 and 1961 to increase the levels of funding, there was increasing suspicion among critics of the process that urban redevelopment was being reshaped to benefit commercial or institutional projects at the expense of those the Housing Act of 1949 was meant to help. In a number of cities, still-viable residential tracts were designated as slums, cleared and rebuilt with luxury housing or developments with no housing at all. In Los Angeles the Latino neighborhood of Chavez Ravine, once designated for public housing, instead became the site of Dodger Stadium and the Police Academy. Don Parson explains that the housing project itself had received considerable opposition in the city, as the neighborhood was undoubtedly substandard and even reminiscent of the Third World in its lack of city services and improvised construction; it was not a slum in the commonly understood
sense. Sympathetic whites in the city described it—with perhaps a hint of romanticism—as an idyllic social environment, despite the evident poverty. This suggests that the Chavez Ravine project was not meant to help the residents of the neighborhood, so much as it was to bring them into greater cultural conformity with residents in the surrounding areas of the city. The project would have also removed a negative influence on the value of adjoining real estate.

Similar motives may help explain why the African American neighborhood of the Fillmore District/Western Addition in San Francisco was subjected to extensive redevelopment activities beginning in 1948. The San Francisco Redevelopment Agency cited substandard housing as a prime indicator of blight in the neighborhood, but measured its success by increased land valuation and tax revenues. In the process, thousands of residents were displaced and the character of the district permanently changed.

California's local redevelopment agencies had gained an incentive to steer projects away from simple housing improvements through a 1952 amendment to the state's redevelopment act that provided for tax increment financing. This meant that redevelopment agencies could receive and make use of increases in local property tax revenue that resulted from higher land values generated by the redevelopment process itself. The provision was meant to create a new source of funding for projects, but also had the effect of promoting an emphasis on retail development, with its inherently greater tax valuation, than on low-income residential units.

In Los Angeles and San Francisco, and in many other cities around the nation, redevelopment seemed to hit hardest at minority neighborhoods. When redevelopment
was aimed at revitalizing a downtown business district, rather than building housing, the mechanics of “white flight” and the growth of suburbs made this almost inevitable. Success, where white retailers and government officials were in the majority, was defined as the return of prosperous white consumers. While at least some of the more limited pre-war public housing projects were welcomed by their new residents, as Lawrence J. Vale has demonstrated in his study of housing in Boston, the more extensive post-war schemes that removed entire neighborhoods had a generally negative effect on long-established communities and their identities.\(^{67}\) Peter Hall suggests that the failure of the later projects was due to the fact that they had been designed, as had the pre-war projects, for what were termed the “deserving poor”—low income families headed by employed males. By the mid-1960s, however, the projects housed primarily single parent families dependent on welfare. Hall asserts that these residents harbored “a deep fatalism about the power to influence their environment,” and simply could not cope with the modernist urban designs that had been imposed on them.\(^{68}\)

It is not surprising that African American activists began referring to urban redevelopment, rightly or wrongly, as “Negro removal.”\(^{69}\) After the first round of demolition in the Fillmore District from 1956, residents formed organizations such as Tenants and Owners in Opposition to Redevelopment in an attempt to halt or at least modify a new plan in 1964 that called for demolition amounting to half of a square mile in the heart of San Francisco. Opponents won an injunction preventing any further displacement of residents until a plan for adequate replacement housing could be developed, but in the end they could not seriously change the city's plans for their neighborhood.\(^{70}\)
Von Hoffman explains that, partly in response to this growing level of opposition to the stated goals of redevelopment, by the mid-1960s many local officials began to place a greater emphasis on preserving and reusing existing buildings and neighborhoods. They were both aided and prodded by legislation in 1964 that made it possible to use redevelopment funds for the enforcement of building codes, but also required that any proposed demolition be certified by a federal housing official as the only way a city's objectives could be achieved. This change in preference, from replacement of older buildings to reuse, with replacement as a last resort, was characteristic of the new approaches to urban redevelopment under Lyndon Johnson's administration.

II. New Patterns for Historic Preservation.

Johnson’s new legislation giving preservation and reuse of older buildings a place in the urban renewal process marked a significant shift in the practice of historic preservation in the United States. Prior to World War Two, preservation had been primarily a local activity undertaken by private individuals or historic societies. Those involved were typically affluent, with the personal means or social connections needed to acquire sites or properties of interest. Their motivations were often patriotic, and sometimes highly personal. William Murtagh, the first Keeper of the National Register of Historic Places, explains that in the nineteenth century, preservationists concentrated their attentions on buildings associated with historic personages, creating shrines to memory, rather than emphasizing any innate qualities of the physical structure.71 The
movement towards institutionalizing preservation at the federal level began during 1933, through the make-work projects of the New Deal.

National Park Service director Horace M. Albright had engineered an executive order, issued by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in June, 1933, transferring to the Department of the Interior all of the historic battlefields, parks, monuments and cemeteries administered by the War Department. The labor force needed to maintain and rehabilitate these facilities initially came from the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), created several months earlier. With a legislative mandate differing from that of the War Department, the Park Service used CCC workers to establish educational and interpretive programs at the historic sites, to conduct archeological surveys, and to restore or reconstruct associated buildings. The CCC was aided by the Historic American Buildings Survey (HABS)—a program designed to employ out-of-work architects and draftsmen. HABS survey teams only documented historic structures, rather than restoring them, but by design they addressed a range of public and industrial buildings that were commonly neglected by local historical societies. The extent of the work carried out by the CCC and HABS in preserving significant structures, combined with Roosevelt’s personal interest, motivated passage of the Historic Sites Act of 1935. The Act established, for the first time, a “national policy to preserve for public use historic sites, buildings, and objects of national significance for the inspiration and benefit of the people of the United States.”

The deteriorating international situation of the late 1930s diverted federal funds away from preservation in favor of defense spending, but these programs provided an environment in which local preservationists and historical societies could communicate
with their colleagues and compare their approaches to similar problems. This communication included an increasing desire for a national preservation organization to coordinate efforts and foster consistent approaches to preservation. In 1946, when the country could again focus on preservation, Ronald F. Lee, a future National Park Service regional director spoke to the American Association for State and Local History about “the changing nature of postwar technological America and warned that the preservation movement must emerge as a unified national private and public constituency with a clear program of action.” In doing so, Lee helped set the stage for the establishment of the Congressionally-chartered National Trust for Historic Preservation in the United States in 1949. The National Trust’s early activities, including building a paid membership and acquiring historic properties, paralleled the expansion of urban renewal and likely benefitted from popular reactions against renewal’s perceived excesses. Beyond that, the Trust’s legal status—similar to that of the Smithsonian Institution—put the organization in a position to help guide the development of new legislation that would give historic preservation a fully-institutionalized basis within the federal government.
CHAPTER 3
OWNING THE PAST

A significant byproduct of the institutionalization of historic preservation within the federal government is the sense, expressed by some critics, that “the people” have been alienated from their own heritage by requirements that key decisions in the preservation process must be made by recognized professionals in the field. The Secretary of the Interior’s Historic Preservation Professional Qualification Standards, introduced in 1996, set minimum levels of education and experience for those who are allowed to determine questions of historical significance. Non-professionals, including those who are perhaps most intimately connected with specific historic resources, can provide input and evidence for the preservation professionals’ consideration, but according to the bureaucratic process they are not qualified to make final decisions regarding the importance of their own history. Because the Qualification Standards require graduate degrees and/or “full-time experience in research, writing, teaching, interpretation, or other demonstrable professional activity with an academic institution, historic organization or agency, museum, or other professional institution,” this can be taken as evidence that preservation has become an activity of the academic class, imposing its will on the unqualified.¹

However, historic preservation has had a class-based element well before the advent of preservation professionals. As noted in Chapter 2, preservation in the United States was long a hobby of the wealthy, who often acted through a sense of patriotism, personal interest, and/or noblesse oblige. Historic properties were often a medium through which preservationists advanced personal interpretations of history to reinforce
their places in society, and for the purpose of inculcating their preferred values in those of the “lower classes” (especially immigrants). Thus, the role of “elites,” either professional or economic, in preservation means that historic buildings can be visible symbols of a much more far-reaching debate that encompasses fundamental issues about how the past should be interpreted. Within individual cities, such as the three in this study, the debate presents important questions about the identity and definition of the community, who was to be included or excluded as a result of this definition, and how the community would ultimately develop. Rather than speaking of the past as forming the foundation for the present and future, it is more correct to first ask which interpretation of past forms the foundation, and has it always been the same interpretation. Because each group and institution maintains its own version of history, which reflects its own particular experiences, concerns, and prejudices, they also have their own interpretations of the way things are now, and how they are likely to develop.

I. Memory, Authenticity, and Preservation

The physical structure of the cities and other places where people live tends to reinforce or minimize the legitimacy of these competing interpretations, because of the way many people equate tangible evidence, i.e., “solid facts,” with historical truth. Versions of the past that are readily visible, in the form of historic buildings or districts, can in this way be perceived as more “real” than those that are associated with less (literally) concrete reminders. The question of who chooses which structures to preserve, and which to demolish in the name of progress, can be a direct function of whose viewpoint has gained the ascendancy.
John Walton examines just such a conflict of memory that took place in Monterey, California, in 1998. In *Storied Land* (2001), Walton illustrates a proposal by real estate developers to build a 3.5-acre shopping mall and condominium complex on the city’s waterfront and dubbed, almost inevitably, Cannery Row Marketplace, in homage to the John Steinbeck novel that has come to dominate the city’s image. The developers promised to respect the area’s historical integrity with cannery-style architecture and a history center in a converted warehouse. To promote the project, they took the further step of enlisting the support of the author’s son Thom Steinbeck, who declared for press releases that the Marketplace was just the sort of development his father would have favored. Despite these efforts, the local preservation groups Cannery Row Foundation and Save Our Waterfront would have none of it. They insisted that the mall and condominiums represented nothing less than a defilement of Cannery Row and its history, and they had a Steinbeck of their own to prove it. Nancy Steinbeck, the widow of Steinbeck’s younger son, John Steinbeck IV, publicly opposed her brother-in-law, asserting that such commercialization ran counter to family tradition.\(^2\)

The guiding principle on both sides of the battle was that *Cannery Row* represented a faithful picture of Monterey’s people and history. The problem with this, as John Walton explains, was that *Cannery Row* was a work of fiction that, while set in Monterey, had little to do with the actual town or its sardine-canning industry. Yet, Steinbeck’s Monterey has supplanted the “real” Monterey, to the point that the history which the preservation groups staunchly defended may not be that much more authentic than the vision of the Cannery Row Marketplace developers.\(^3\)
This raises the question of how and why Steinbeck became the standard for preservation and reconstruction efforts in Monterey. One inescapable answer is that Steinbeck’s history is the history that many residents as well as non-residents know or think they know the best. It serves as shorthand to define and promote the city’s identity, made all the more real when it is expressed through specific places. This point illustrates the fundamental principle of historic preservation: tangible links with the past provide a sense of identity and stability in the present. But the example of Monterey raises the question of just how authentic this tangible history actually is. The situation is complicated by the popular mindset that tends to equate the tangible with the authentic. Any artifact that can be experienced first-hand--such as an old building--is taken to be an honest encounter with "real" history, unmediated by the opinions of historians in ivory towers. As the Smithsonian Institution’s now-infamous exhibits of the Enola Gay and "The West as America" demonstrate, for a good number of Americans real history is history that confirms what they already know, with no contradictions. Because of this, historic preservation and reconstruction can be used to give added legitimacy to a specific interpretation of history, as can be seen in such places as Santa Fe, New Mexico.4

Chris Wilson describes this process in The Myth of Santa Fe (1997). Local white business leaders had been inspired by the proximity of a railroad line to attempt a rebuilding of the city in an appropriately modern American style, unaware of the appeal historic buildings held for visitors. One such visitor from Indiana warned in 1892 that “Tourists who wish to visit the town should not delay, for the ruthless hand of progress will soon destroy the haloed glow of romance that broods with its benign wings over the antique walls of this ancient city.”5 When the railroad failed to deliver immediate
prosperity, however, civic promoters in the early 1900s gradually turned to a trade which capitalized on Santa Fe's antique charm.

Jeffery Thomas demonstrates that city leaders made use of a vision of the Southwest, promoted especially by the Fred Harvey Company and the Santa Fe Railroad, which held up the region as an antidote to modern urban, industrial life. At the urging of Edgar Hewett, director of both the School of American Archaeology and the Museum of New Mexico, the city adopted a plan in 1912—“The City Different”—centered on the preservation and restoration of historic structures, as well as construction of new buildings in a distinctive style based on Indian pueblos. Wilson asserts that this mythic Santa Fe not only drew tourists as its backers had hoped, but also imposed a “historic amnesia” on its own residents. The preservation ethic imposed an appearance of continuity and harmony on the city which belied the actual history of Santa Fe. In this artificial Santa Fe, the Spanish and American conquests were accomplished without violence, repression, or appropriation of resources. The myth also downplayed the reality of ethnic intermixing, preferring instead to depict Indian, Hispanic, and--especially for Eastern visitors--white peoples and their cultures as existing safely side-by-side, with no crossover beyond the merely picturesque. Finally, the myth denied the actual process of history and attempted to freeze Santa Fe in the late nineteenth century. Taken together, Wilson explains, these manifestations of historical amnesia inhibited an understanding of the city’s contemporary conditions by its own residents, and reduced their relevance.

Wilson maintains that the question of authenticity and artificiality are central to the development of Santa Fe’s civic identity. In practice, the "City Different" plan, with its emphasis on a specific “look,” yielded such designs as the prototypical 1916 Museum
of Fine Arts, which employed modern materials to create a pastiche of Southwestern designs, combined for maximum appeal. Wilson claims that the application of the City Different plan to preservation yielded buildings every bit as artificial as the new constructions. The plan identified 1846, the year in which General Stephen Watts Kearny occupied Santa Fe, as the historical baseline. In practice, this typically meant removing any elements of existing buildings suggestive of the American period, an approach dubbed “Scrape” restoration by British designer William Morris. Wilson explains that this reflected a “distaste for the messy complexity of history” and a desire to return to an imagined pure, enduring culture when life was presumably simpler. In many cases, buildings surviving more or less intact from the preferred historic period were also subject to extensive renovation, in order to bring them in line with American notions of what they should have looked like.

Like New Mexico, California has made extensive use of its Spanish and Mexican history for promotion and development. The twenty-one Roman Catholic mission churches built between San Diego to Sonoma have been the most fertile source of romanticized history, especially within the towns and cities that grew up around many of the mission settlements. Author, editor, and booster extraordinaire Charles Fletcher Lummis declared to readers of the *Santa Barbara Morning Press* in 1923 that their city was an equal of Santa Fe, and together they were the only cities left in the United States “rich in historic Romance, Atmosphere, Character” that could make them world famous. “It is a safe bet Santa Fe will never turn back on her resolve to be Herself,” Lummis continued, and likewise Santa Barbara must become “SANTA BARBARA THE ONE AND ONLY.” His solution: “Santa Barbara should have an architecture of its own, as
Santa Fe is getting. Obviously, for historic, climatic and artistic reasons, it should be based on the Spanish.”

William Deverell and Phoebe Kropp have written extensively in recent years on the development of the “Spanish Fantasy Past” in Southern California. They build on the foundation laid by Carey McWilliams in his landmark *Southern California Country* (1946). It was McWilliams who asserted the distinctiveness of the culture in California south of Tehachapi Pass and who, as Deverell explains, “reminds us that regional identity in southern California . . . has everything to do with ethnic relations and ethnic history. Flowing from the script laid out in countless journalistic, booster, and historical narratives in the years following the Mexican War, the Spanish Fantasy Past took the form of a societywide history lesson. Its purpose was to explain the nineteenth century to the nineteenth century.” Deverell and Kropp continue this analysis, arguing that white Americans constructed an institutionalized public memory that they used to celebrate racial and national conquest, and to set their own regional agendas. By emphasizing a romanticized version of the Spanish colonial era, whites were able to marginalize both the state’s more recent Mexican history, and its Mexican residents. The Spanish era was combined with that of the American to produce a history of the continuous and inevitable advancement of Western civilization to the Pacific coast. For both authors, the visual aesthetic created by California’s early Mexican population has been appropriated and converted into a means of removing this population from the area’s cultural identity in favor of clichés and idealized stereotypes.

This process of editing local history is in many respects only the most visible and deliberate aspect of the ongoing, and often unconscious, production of local public
memory. In *Remaking America* (1992), John Bodnar has defined public memory as the interaction of official and vernacular forms of cultural expression—“an argument about the interpretation of reality.” In this analysis, official culture is a top-down process, promoting “social unity, the continuity of existing institutions, and loyalty to the status quo.” It works to promote consensus through interpretations of both the past and present that tend to minimize competing interpretations, based on appeals to timeless or sacred values. Bodnar contrasts this with vernacular culture, formed by a broad range of specialized or even conflicting interests within the larger culture as a whole. Bodnar insists that because vernacular culture is that of ordinary people, its memory of the past transmits what the world actually felt like to them, and is thus more honest than official culture's emphasis on what the past should have been. Because of this, he asserts that vernacular culture represents an innate threat to official culture and its claims of timelessness and sacredness.

The problem with this approach is that the distinction between official and vernacular culture may not be as clearly defined as Bodnar perceives it. Both serve to define the identity and character of those who formed them by explaining who these people are, and what they believe. Both types of culture also explicitly define who the people are not, because the existence of an “us” almost requires the existence of a "them" to serve as a negative example. As Susan Davis has noted in *Parades and Power* (1986), culture depends as much on what has been omitted as on what has been included. Comedian Groucho Marx made much the same point, without the academic baggage, when he insisted that he did not wish to belong to any club that would accept someone like him as a member. Bodnar contends that ordinary Americans are “less interested
than cultural leaders in exerting influence or control over others, and are preoccupied, instead, with defending the interests and rights of their respective social segments.”

But how do they go about this? It seems clear that specific social segments retain their identity by the same process of promoting unity, continuity, and loyalty that Bodnar assigns exclusively to official culture. All social groups remember their own versions of reality, emphasizing some points and minimizing others to promote their own particular agendas. It is true, as Bodnar explains, that these vernacular groups can be recast from time to time, but this can also be said of official culture, though the process happens much more slowly. The official culture of the United States in the first decade of the twenty-first century is surely far different from that which was in place at the turn of the previous century. This shows that official and vernacular culture can have far more in common than Bodnar allows.

An example can be seen in the way that an official cultural expression of a specific religious community in San Bernardino, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, became a fundamental element in the city’s vernacular culture, but stripped of its official meaning. The first Mormon settlers laid out the town on the principle of the “farm village” promulgated by church president Brigham Young—a square half-mile, divided into blocks of one acre each, with lots large enough for a house and a garden capable of supporting the needs of each family. A writer for a church newspaper in Great Britain explained that “Under this system the advantages of town life are blended to a very considerable degree with the charms of rural existence.” At a deeper level, the farm village plan was derived from the idealized “plat for the City of Zion” that church founder Joseph Smith had developed in 1833. Thus, the shape of San Bernardino was
meant as a reflection of an earthly city of God, and a daily lesson in theology. For all practical purposes this lesson was lost after Brigham Young dis-established San Bernardino as a church settlement, but the form remained as an influence on life in the city to the present day.

The way that groups such as San Bernardino’s Mormon settlers shape their culture and identity forms the subject of Michael Kammen’s seminal 1991 study Mystic Chords of Memory. In it, Kammen observes that the creation of collective memory can serve as a key element binding together a nation increasingly marked by social and cultural diversity. He repeats the assertion that the educator and future politician Edward Everett made in 1824 that “Divisions may spring up, ill blood may burn, parties be formed, and interests may seem to clash; but the great bonds of the nation are linked to what is past.” At the same time, however, Kammen notes that “traditions are commonly relied upon by those who possess the power to achieve an illusion of social consensus.” What is agreed upon, by both points of view, is that the past is a vital force, and the memory constructed of it speaks equally to the present. An essential point in Kammen's analysis is that there is more than one memory or history in the United States, and its constituent communities. There are, rather, a multitude of histories reflecting different groups or social agendas, which at times can intersect, overlap, merge to produce new histories, or move in different directions according to the purposes which first brought them into being.

Hand-in-hand with the question of what to remember is that of the authenticity of the memory. Kammen notes that Americans exhibit a particular obsession with taking their history in the most authentic form possible, and yet the definition of authentic is as
changeable as the range of historic narratives. He writes that, particularly in the first half of the twentieth century, Americans wanted memories that were happy and reinforced their collective self-image, but were also absolutely the unvarnished truth.\(^\text{22}\)

Authenticity, in many circumstances, seems to be synonymous with the past we want to have happened, rather than what actually happened. It may be that authenticity is as much a social construction as history, and as such can change in the much the same way. If we take this comparison to be true, does it then nullify the assumption that the past is, by definition, more authentic than the present? Or in the case of local history in the West, are earlier or indigenous peoples more authentic than those who came later, with the intent of conquest?

James Walton’s examination of the production of collective memory and history in the specific western setting of Monterey could support interpretations based on both cultural hegemony and social memory. The former claims the imposition of culture and invented history by the ruling order, while the latter argues that collective memory is formed by social groups based on their own distinctive experiences.\(^\text{23}\) However, he asserts, both interpretations fail to explain how people actually behave in the real world. He proposes instead a theory of social memory based on the collective purposes of a given group. He argues that history is not simply a record of past events, but also a pragmatic justification for them. Public history, including such activities as historic preservation, is created through collective action “not, in the main, for the purposes of posterity or objectivity, but for the aims of present action.”\(^\text{24}\) It is a point of contention between competing social groups seeking to advance their own power or agenda through control of the collective memory. This allows the dominant group to proclaim “not
primarily what happened in the past, but who we are now as a result of how we understand the past and what we propose to be in the future.” Walton asserts that public history represents a convergence and interplay of historical events and historical narratives with pragmatic origins, produced to further specific group agendas. Walton’s analysis of Monterey shows that the dominant historical narratives at each point in time made a set of claims for specific groups, though ostensibly on behalf of the entire city “about what ‘our’ history signifies.”

While urban histories have often been constructed in the West to confer legitimacy on the American conquests of existing communities, the dominant narratives in Eastern cities are often those made by descendants of the original founders. In these communities, the narratives and their accompanying preservation efforts tended to emphasize the continuing central role of these families in the face of modern developments or periods of rapid growth. In Charleston, South Carolina, for example, Robert Weyeneth writes in *Historic Preservation for a Living City* (2000) that “preservation of local heritage was frequently inseparable from preservation of family history.” These efforts were spurred on by changes to the fabric of the city imposed by the automobile in the 1920s, and by wealthy out-of-towners who bought and dismantled historic structures for their architectural details. The main actors in the movement were typically members of the National Society of Colonial Dames or the Daughters of the American Revolution.

The debate around authenticity in Charleston focused on the effects of catering to tourism, and on the question of who was intended to benefit from preservation. In the late 1970s, a proposal to construct a hotel and convention center complex in the downtown
area ignited fears that Charleston’s historic district would be transformed from a residential neighborhood into a “commercialized tourist mecca like the French Quarter in New Orleans.” Weyeneth quotes a member of the Save Historic Charleston Fund who continued the theme, commenting that it would be best to not attract too many people, lest the city become another Walt Disney World. To a large degree, the residents of Charleston wanted to save the city’s historic appearance for themselves—specifically, those with family ties to specific structures, and who knew how to interpret the narratives they contained. The specific message through much of the twentieth century is revealed by the city’s original historic preservation ordinance, which set 1860 as the beginning of the modern era in terms of architectural significance.

Michael Kammen writes that Americans, as seen in Charleston, began changing their attitudes towards physical reminders of the past in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in response to anxieties about the future. He believes that the rise of the corporate state, combined with new immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe, sapped the earlier sense of confidence about the nation’s destiny. The aftermath of the Great War had instilled a sense of disillusionment with European civilization, and promoted an isolationist mood. Kammen argues that during such periods of cultural anxiety or transition, there is an increased sense of longing for the past, and its presumably simpler life and sure values. Previously neglected historic structures, or recreations of them, provide a tangible link with the past, and with carefully directed interpretation, can be used to teach specific points of view. This principle was one of the motivating factors that inspired the Reverend Dr. W.A.R. Goodwin, his financial backer John D. Rockefeller, Jr., and industrialist Henry Ford to create idealized American towns
in the 1920s. Goodwin and Rockefeller carved Colonial Williamsburg out of the existing town of Williamsburg, Virginia, in 1927, while Ford constructed Greenfield Village in 1929 by moving historic buildings from elsewhere in the country to a new site in Dearborn, Michigan. The men intended to enshrine their personal visions of the heritage that “made America great,” and that every American should know for the future.

Lewis Fisher notes this motive in *Saving San Antonio* (1996). Some of the earliest developments in the historic preservation movement in the Northeast part of the country, such as the campaign centered on George Washington’s residence at Mount Vernon, were motivated by recollections of America’s origins in the Revolutionary War, particularly as sectional rivalries increased in the 1850s. Nostalgia for a presumably more heroic era would have similar effects in the West. Fisher explains “In Texas, bitter memories of the defeated Confederacy were transcended by remembering an earlier war, one with a glorious ending.” The supreme symbol of this war, the Texas Revolution, was the Alamo, a building “ingrained in the Texas psyche since its defenders died in 1836.”

Holly Beachley Brear explains in *Inherit the Alamo* (1995) that the siege of the former mission is, metaphorically, the cradle in which Texas was violently born, and the altar where the heroes of the Revolution offered their lives. Designating settler Ben Milam as the first casualty of the Revolution, three months before the siege of the Alamo, is crucial to this narrative, because his death was seen as "paying for" the soil from which liberty would spring. In this way the Texans could see themselves as the rightful owners of the land, and defenders against an aggressive Mexican invasion. Preservation of the Alamo, first formally advocated by the Alamo Monument Association in 1879,
institutionalized Texas's own unique expression of manifest destiny, and served as a reminder of the "correct" interpretation of the city's history. In addition, the Alamo prompted a reassessment of other historic structures, which had embarrassed some city leaders as painfully antique after the arrival of the modern world by railroad in 1877.  

As Fisher has demonstrated, one of the motivations for historic preservation in San Antonio was its attractiveness to paying visitors. The city had promoted itself to Eastern tourists primarily through its pleasant winter weather, but during a period of rapid growth in the 1920s, local officials came to realize that there was more to its appeal. City commissioner Frank Bushick, author of a book titled Glamorous San Antonio, claimed “San Antonio is one of only six or seven cities in the United States which really have individual atmosphere, and that atmosphere is one of the things—and not climate alone—that brings us our annual thousands of tourists. Kill that atmosphere by abolishing the old landmarks and names, and so far as individuality goes we might as well be Kansas City, Dallas, Houston or any other bustling western city.” Preservation was intended to capitalize on the city's “odd and antiquated foreignness” that had been described by landscape architect Frederick Law Olmsted in 1856. While the St. Anthony Hotel converted its roof garden into a “typical village of Old Spain,” local preservationists concentrated their efforts on the Governor's Palace, the only Spanish secular building left in the city. Of particular concern was that the Palace be restored in a way that would please tourists, and that it would not look too much like the Palace of the Governors in Santa Fe.  

Fisher emphasizes that women's groups formed the early core of the preservation movement in San Antonio. Composed, at first, of well-traveled artists, these groups were
motivated by visions of San Antonio as the quaint city of quaint "foreignness" that had attracted Olmsted's attention. Fisher demonstrates that the preservationists also understood the powerful attraction this foreignness would exert on travelers and paying guests. He claims such awareness provoked a concern for preserving what would later be termed the cultural landscape of the city, rather than individual buildings in a piecemeal manner. This is in contrast to attitudes in the late nineteenth century, when some city leaders were embarrassed by San Antonio’s Old World appearance, and hoped to sweep it away in favor of new construction more in keeping with the urban transformations characteristic of America’s Gilded Age. When the Spanish Revival style became a popular theme in Southwestern architecture in the 1920s, for instance, the Conservation Society (formed in 1924) emphasized the “authenticity” of San Antonio’s colonial landmarks as an obvious means to draw tourist dollars. The post-World War Two Six Flags Over Texas campaign, and the Night in Old San Antonio street fair—inagurated in 1948—similarly attempted to promote an image of blended Spanish, Mexican, Texan, and Confederate influences as an authentic ambiance unique to the city. Char Miller has pointed out in his essay “City Lights” (2001) that the white leadership of San Antonio maintained a segregationist mindset, which used the Spanish and Mexican heritage of the city, without acknowledging that Mexican-American residents were truly a part of its social community. He concludes that historic preservation in San Antonio was apparently less reflective of a city-wide consensus on its importance, and more of its role in reinforcing the romantic—and profitable—vision centered on the Alamo.43

These early exercises in preservation and restoration were the work of private individuals, historical societies, or local governments and business groups with motives
and objectives that were highly localized and, in the case of individuals, often distinctly personal and idiosyncratic. In the decades following World War Two, increasing doubts about the pace and goals of urban development, especially in light of the many apparent failings of urban redevelopment in cities across the country, elevated preservation to a national concern. Familiar landmarks and cityscapes had been sacrificed in the cause of functionality, and in many cities the result was the disturbing loss of a distinctive sense of place. This loss was very likely accentuated by uncertainties over the course of the nation in the larger sense in the early 1960s. As in the 1920s, the visual backdrop of buildings recalling an idealized, and presumably more stable, past became a source of reassurance.

To a certain degree, these trends in the 1960s revived the substance of earlier planning debates explored by Maureen A. Flanagan in her essay “The City Profitable, The City Livable” (1996). During the second decade of the twentieth century, professional planners emphasizing efficiency and commercial profitability gained the ascendency over local citizens, who often promoted the more intangible human factors epitomized in the City Beautiful movement. Such drive for efficiency foreshadows similar motivations in the later urban renewal movement. However, as the results of “The City Profitable,” as Flanagan terms it, were increasingly found wanting in the 1910s as well as the 1960s, attention turned again to “The City Livable”—a built environment seen more as a home than as a business.44
II. Natural Beauty and the Townscape

The rekindled desire for a more “livable” human environment, both natural and constructed, in the 1960s suggested to President Lyndon Johnson the political advisability of appointing a Task Force on the Preservation of Natural Beauty to examine this issue as a part of his sweeping Great Society program. The group’s report, presented on November 18, 1964, included a number of recommendations for urban design and historic preservation to further the larger goal. The authors called on the National Park Service to begin the task by undertaking a comprehensive inventory of Nation’s historic sites and areas, to be completed in five years. They suggested that “Federal loans and matching grants should be used by State and local governments for the historic preservation task,” and that “The FHA [Federal Housing Administration] should revise its regulations so that private efforts for preservation will be encouraged.” To further encourage the reuse of notable older buildings, “Machinery should be set up so that Federally financed building projects do not conflict with historic preservation,” and “In city areas of particular significance, HHFA [Housing and Home Finance Agency] demonstration grants should be used for conservation studies. Special loans should be available to people who own historically or architecturally significant properties.”

As federal studies often do, the report called for additional studies, and especially recommended a high-level meeting on “America the Beautiful.” Johnson acted quickly, announcing in a message to Congress on 8 February 1965 that “I intend to call a White House Conference on Natural Beauty to meet in mid-May of this year . . . . It will look for ways to help and encourage State and local governments, institutions, and private citizens in their own efforts.” Further, “In almost every part of the country citizens are
rallying to save landmarks of beauty and history. The government must also do its share to assist these local efforts which have an important national purpose.” In order to do so, Johnson expressed his intention to sponsor legislation authorizing supplementary grants that would enable local authorities to acquire private property for development as historic landmarks. He also praised the national Historic Landmarks program— together with its low cost—and “the new wave of interest it has evoked in historical preservation.”

The Conference on Natural Beauty was duly convened on 24 May 1965, to examine all aspects of the nation’s cultural landscapes. Reporting on the protection of historic properties under the purview of “The Townscape,” Gordon Gray, the chairman of the National Trust for Historic Preservation, put forward a number of proposals to encourage the reuse of older buildings. Some were incentives to private owners of historic structures, in the form of direct financial aid or a reduction in taxes on property, income and inheritance. Others would impose greater governmental control—stronger zoning ordinances, “restraining covenants” and the ability for preservation agencies to prevent federal expenditures being used to demolish historic landmarks. Gray also favored the use of eminent domain as a tool to protect significant properties by bringing them into public ownership, and called for direct federal and state aid to local governments to make such transfers possible. The “Townscape” panel incorporated these ideas into “action proposals for historic preservation,” and included a recommendation for “The creation of historic districts, wherever appropriate, including the whole of some historic towns.”

The concept of an entire town functioning as a historic district was not entirely new, as the example of Santa Fe demonstrates. Open-air folk museums in Europe, such
as Skansen, founded in Stockholm, Sweden in 1891, pioneered the “living history” approach, where visitors would encounter historical artifacts in settings meant to recreate their original contexts. These likely models for similar museums in the United States, most notably Ford's Greenfield Village, Old Sturbridge Village in Massachusetts (1946), and above all, Colonial Williamsburg. Where Greenfield Village and Old Sturbridge followed the earlier European approach of creating the “historic village” from the ground up, Goodwin and Rockefeller conceived of Colonial Williamsburg as a restoration of the existing town to what they presumed to be its appearance during the mid-eighteenth century.

In actual practice this restoration came to resemble urban renewal, in that the majority of the existing buildings in the designated historic district were demolished on the grounds of incompatibility with Goodwin and Rockefeller's master plan. The two men set 1790 as the cut-off date for their period of interest, meaning that 720 buildings, out of a total of 808 in the project area, had to be eliminated. They were replaced with some 400 new structures designed to fit Goodwin and Rockefeller's notions of what the colonial town should have looked like. The resulting development would be “inhabited” by costumed re-enactors who would interact with paying visitors, providing both entertainment and education.

Architectural critic Ada Louise Huxtable bemoaned what Williamsburg had become during the very period when the Conference on Natural Beauty was formulating the principles of modern historic preservation. Writing in the New York Times in May, 1965, Huxtable insisted that “Williamsburg is an extraordinary, conscientious and expensive exercise in historical playacting in which real and imitation treasures and
modern copies are carelessly confused in everyone's mind.” Further, “Partly because it is so well done, the end effect has been to devalue authenticity and denigrate the genuine heritage of less picturesque periods to which an era and a people gave life.”48 Here again is the conflict between history as it was, and history as it ought to have been that forms the basis of recent works by Deverell, Kropp and others. Williamsburg put forward history as it ought to have been because its backers were hoping that it would be popular and profitable. This very same desire was what gave the preservation movement viability when it reached cities such as Pasadena and Riverside. For the civic leaders that had seen their downtown business districts decline, profit was exactly what they had in mind. A truly authentic preservation of a complex and nuanced local history would have been an admirable goal, but it was likely beyond their means until they had restored their municipal fortunes with local history repackaged as consumer goods.

History as a commodity was likely not what the Conference on Natural Beauty had in mind when it proposed the creation of large-scale historic districts, nor were they intended to freeze towns at a particular moment in time as Colonial Williamsburg had done. The idealism that surrounded historic preservation in the mid-1960s certainly would not have favored consciously denigrating genuine history. Rather, preservationists were making what they saw as honest and even enlightened attempts to encourage the preservation and appreciation of architectural heritage as it existed in the present day. By the same token, by advocating for the preservation of an entire cultural landscape, in other words, notable buildings together with as much of their physical and functional context as possible, the historic district did in fact lay the foundation for local history as a salable commodity, very much like the “commercial” historic towns. The
main differences were that this process would be supported by federal, rather than private money, and that residents, rather than re-enactors, would be expected to live their regular lives while maintaining the character of a place that was being transformed into a product.

And why, by the middle of the 1960s, had the past become such a viable product? America had changed since the early years of urban renewal. Renewal had been driven by the optimistic belief in American exceptionalism, and faith in a technological future that would cure all of society's ills. With a difficult war in Southeast Asia, increasing domestic instability, and evidence that “futuristic” solutions were causing as many problems as they were meant to eliminate, this optimism seemed increasingly misplaced. As Kammen, T. J. Jackson Lears, Roderick Nash and others have explored at length, anxiety in the present, particularly about the future, can lead to a nostalgic retreat into the past, where life (in hindsight) appeared simpler and the values more stable. Just as Henry Ford’s Greenfield Village was inspired by his uneasiness about the pace and increasingly diverse nature of American society that he had helped create, so too there can be little doubt that the comforts of tradition and heritage played a key role in the push for historic preservation. As Huxtable notes, “In today's fractured and deeply troubled society, the need is for something that comforts, reassures, and entertains—a world where harsh truths can be suspended or forgotten for a benign and soothing, preferably distracting substitute.”

It was this renewed appreciation—or perhaps idealized longing—for the past that informed the Townscape portion of the White House Conference on Natural Beauty, and which led the U.S. Conference of Mayors to form a Special Committee on Historic
Preservation during the fall of 1965. The Committee received a grant from the Ford Foundation, as well as a substantial anonymous donation “for the purpose of assembling a body of fact on historic preservation and preparing guidelines for action,” and to enable it to visit a number of European nations to study preservation techniques and laws. The Committee also received the assistance of a National Park Service Task Force in drafting a staff paper on “a new program of historic preservation.” The Committee recommended legal recognition of Registered National Historic Landmarks and Registered National Historic Districts, including grants and loans to encourage the preservation of buildings in continued use. More radically, the Committee also put forward the idea of considering short-term protection measures that could be applied without the consent of the property owner.

In February 1966, the Special Committee published the results of its work, a report titled *With Heritage So Rich.* At the same time, Senator Edmund Muskie, one of the members of the Committee, inserted the final recommendations into the *Congressional Record.* These included a host of new legislative measures to, among other things, consolidate existing federal historic preservation programs, create a national register of historic places, establish a national advisory council on preservation, clarify the status of historic properties with respect to tax codes, create new loan programs to aid acquisition and preservation efforts by individuals or private groups, and to enact scholarship and training programs devoted to the skills needed for the restoration of historic properties. The most noteworthy recommendations for communities in the midst of urban renewal efforts focused on making historic preservation an integral part of that process.
Under the provisions of federally-funded urban renewal programs then in place, local agencies receiving grants were required to match every two dollars of federal aid with one dollar from local sources. Rather than outright monetary payments, the communities had the option of creating some other contribution of benefit to the public within a project area, such as a school or improvements to the municipal infrastructure. The Special Committee proposed that public expenditures made for the purchase of historic properties be recognized as eligible non-monetary contributions to match federal renewal grants. These properties would not necessarily have to be within the project area, and could even be those acquired with a separate federal grant.55

In modified form, a portion of these recommendations achieved the status of law on 15 October 1966, when President Johnson signed the National Historic Preservation Act together with six additional bills concerned with protecting various aspects of the natural and cultural environment. After speaking on several of the other bills, Johnson noted: “I am also signing today the Endangered Species Preservation Act and the National Historic Preservation Act. Both of these will help us to preserve for our children the heritage of this great land we call America that our forefathers first saw.”56

The National Historic Preservation Act spelled out the philosophical basis for the federal government taking a direct role in encouraging and supporting the preservation and reuse of historic properties. In seven findings and declarations (See Appendix 1) the Act established that “the spirit and direction of the Nation are founded upon and reflected in its historic heritage,” and that the physical aspects of this heritage were being lost with increasing frequency due to urban expansion, commercial developments and highway construction among other reasons. As with the earlier Housing Act of 1949, the
Historic Preservation Act instituted a new layer of federal bureaucracy and a cascade of associated policies, but its effect at the level of individual communities was not exactly what had been intended. As argued above, and as will be seen, when preservation could be linked with profitability the outcome could produce a depiction of local history that earlier residents might not have recognized as the time and place they inhabited.
CHAPTER 4
FOUNDATIONS

The theory and practice of urban renewal seemed to hold the answers to how Southern California would cope with population growth beyond the wildest dreams of the state’s early real estate promoters. And yet, when renewal in Pasadena, Riverside and San Bernardino began to produce downtown cityscapes that seemed unconnected to any particular sense of place or history, groups of concerned residents in the first two cities returned to the civic identities forged in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In the process, the physical environments that earlier generations of residents had built through fictionalized interpretations of the past became the authentic subjects of the cities’ historic preservation efforts in the late twentieth century.

These fictionalized interpretations—the “Spanish Fantasy Past” described by Carey McWilliams—depended heavily on the ability to transform a fundamentally arid region into a lush, Mediterranean landscape populated (presumably) by gentleman farmers of impeccable morals. As the early settlers in Pasadena, Riverside and San Bernardino discovered almost immediately, the control of water was the key to realizing the communities they had already created in their minds. Through irrigation they could attempt to shape the landscape into a physical expression of the values and character they hoped would give their cities a prominent place in the growing California.

I. Water and the Mediterranean Dream

In California, control of the state’s water supplies would determine who would control the course of economic development. The contest pitted two opposing doctrines
of water use: riparian rights and prior appropriation. Riparian rights were inherent in the system of English common law that the state legislature adopted in 1850. Simply put, this gave all the owners of land adjacent to a particular watercourse the right to make reasonable use of it—”reasonable” being defined to mean use that did not prevent others from taking their own fair share of the water. Importantly, this right of use could not be transferred to consumers away from the watercourse, though in a well-watered land such as England, this was hardly a problem. In the Mediterranean climate of California, it was another matter. Because of this, miners working in the Sierra Nevada developed their own water doctrine of prior appropriation, based on the principle of first in time, first in right. This meant that the first person to make use of any water source gained exclusive control of it. At their discretion they could divert the entire flow regardless of any downstream uses that might have developed at a later time. And, where water rights were tied to a specific location under the riparian system, prior appropriation allowed the right of use to be sold to a distant consumer. The landmark case of Lux v. Haggin, decided by the California Supreme court in 1886, established the somewhat confusing “California Doctrine” in which both systems were acknowledged. Riparian rights continued to be attached to all private lands adjacent to watercourses, including those tracts acquired from public ownership. At the same time, prior appropriation was deemed the superior right if the appropriation predated any riparian claims. The decision was deeply unpopular, as Californians saw riparianism as favoring large landholders against the interest of small farmers. But, the decision led directly to the Wright Irrigation Act of 1887. This established the concept of irrigation districts, local
government bodies invested with the authority to override riparian rights for the common good.¹

Pasadena encountered its problems with water rights in 1879. The situation developed because the city founders’ Orange Grove Association had purchased a parcel of land belonging to the former Rancho San Pascual, and its attendant riparian rights, that amounted to thirty percent of the flow from springs feeding into a watercourse descending from the San Gabriel mountains, known as the Arroyo Seco. The owner of a neighboring parcel, Benjamin Wilson, also drew water from the Arroyo Seco, and in 1876 he had sold this to the new Lake Vineyard Land and Water Company. For the first few years growth in the area was slow enough that the two developments could share the water between them, with each settlement drawing from the springs for three days in an alternating schedule. In 1879 the agreement broke down when the Lake Vineyard Company filed suit against the larger Orange Grove Association to prevent it taking water from springs not attached to their original land purchase. The suit was successful, with the decision being sustained by the state supreme court the following year. Faced with this severe limitation, the Orange Grove Association had little choice but to purchase the Lake Vineyard Company's water rights and absorb the smaller settlement into a larger Pasadena.²

In Riverside the water rights debate led directly to the town's formal incorporation. The Riverside Land and Irrigating Company, formed by real estate promoter Samuel Evans in 1875 to consolidate his New England Colony at Riverside with the original Southern California Colony Association, provided water by canals to residents through a private subscription system. However, residents charged that Evans
and his partners were letting the canals deteriorate. Property owners dependent on irrigation formed the Citizens Water Company in 1882 as a first step towards municipal control of Riverside's most important utility. Their next step was to push for incorporation the following year over the objections of early settlers such as K. D. Shugart, who thought such a move was unwarranted in a thinly populated agricultural town. If water had not been the primary motivator more residents might have agreed with him, but as it was they approved incorporation on September 25, 1883, by a sixty-percent majority.³

Evans wasted little time in responding to the threat of government regulation by firing off a heavy-caliber lawsuit in October against the San Bernardino County Board of Supervisors, the new City of Riverside, and the Citizens Water Company. He contended that the city had no rights to set water rates, and proposed that a reasonable solution would be for the county to establish rates sufficient to cover the Riverside Canal Company's operating expenses, plus a guaranteed eight-percent return for the Company's stockholders. Evans's motive for suggesting what would have amounted to a government subsidy of his Company was the threat posed by the new irrigation colony of Etiwanda, a dozen or so miles to the northeast.⁴

Etiwanda was the brainchild of Canadian brothers George and William Chaffey, who would subsequently gain international notice for their irrigation projects in Australia's Murray River Valley and the Imperial Valley of California. They had originally settled in Riverside in 1880, following the example of their father. After observing the potential of the Land and Irrigating Company they determined to do it one better by offering plots of land with rights to water provided by a mutually-owned non-
profit corporation. This proved more attractive to potential residents than Evans's monopoly, bringing his sales almost to a standstill. Further inconsequential legal maneuvering finally prompted Luther M. Holt, editor of the *Riverside Press and Horticulturalist* and an authority on water politics, to propose an acceptable compromise plan in the fall of 1884 forming a new Riverside Water Company to oversee the city's irrigation system. The plan also created the Riverside Land Company, jointly owned by the Water Company and the Land and Irrigating Company, to manage land sales in accordance with existing supplies, as at Etiwanda.

It is difficult to overstate the importance of all these legal proceeding to the development of Southern California. The residents of San Bernardino, Pasadena, and Riverside were not simply concerned with securing reliable household supplies of water. Rather, the irrigation systems were essential to the development of what was becoming the region's iconic industry: citrus cultivation. Earl Pomeroy explains that citrus, the orange above all, was suggestive of a lush tropical paradise and a life of relative ease. The ideal presumed that growers could live as “country squires” surrounded by fragrant blossoms, as opposed to the wheat framers and cattle ranchers of the windswept plains.

The essence of this appeal is found in a little remembered novel by Harold Bell Wright; *The Eyes of the World*. Wright lived seasonally in both Riverside and the San Bernardino mountains, and was an unabashed booster for both. The tale of brave men, stout-hearted women and faithful dogs was published in 1914, giving readers a fully developed image of Southern California as a Mediterranean garden. Departing from a grim winter scene in his native New York, the book’s hero found California in full bloom even in January:

> With a long, triumphant shriek, the flying overland train—from the lands of ice and snow—from barren deserts and lonely mountains . . . swept out into
the beautiful San Bernardino Valley where the travelers were greeted by
wide, green miles of orange and lemon and walnut and olive groves—by
many acres of gardens and vineyards and orchards. Amid these groves and
gardens, the towns and cities are set; their streets and buildings half hidden in
wildernesses of eucalyptus and peppers and palms. . . .

The particular orange at the heart of this idyllic landscape, the seedless variety
dubbed the Washington navel, entered California through the efforts of a decidedly
eccentric Riverside housewife. Eliza Tibbets was an amateur spiritualist, who dressed to
accentuate her supposed resemblance to Queen Victoria. At some point in her life she
had made the acquaintance of William Saunders, the Superintendent of the Gardens and
Grounds of the United States Department of Agriculture in Washington, D.C. Through
means that are no longer entirely clear, Tibbets convinced Saunders to send her three
examples of grafted orange tree cuttings recently imported from Bahia, Brazil. He had
previously sent the bulk of the cuttings to growers in Florida, but the results proved
disappointing. Given that the late nineteenth century was the heyday of the amateur
scientist and experimenter, it should not be entirely surprising that Saunders would
gamble a few of the new trees on Tibbets and the Mediterranean climate of Riverside.
Tibbets instructed her husband to plant the cuttings in the garden next to their house and,
according to local stories, tended them with her used dishwater. Exactly when this
happened is also open to debate. Various sources make definitive claims for most of the
1870s, but the one date that matters is 1879, when the mature fruit made its prize-winning
debut in the local citrus fair.

The size and quality of the new oranges created a sensation. The first trees had to
be fenced to prevent over-eager growers from helping themselves to cuttings. Areas near
the foothills, protected from the Santa Ana winds blowing out of Southern California's
mountain passes, and with a soil of alluvial sandy loam proved particularly suitable for navel cultivation. As it happens this exactly describes the situation of San Bernardino, Riverside, and Pasadena. At the height of their production, the growing area around the first two cities contained well over a third of the state's total navel orange acreage. Growers in the Southern California, together with those throughout the state, soon discovered that the key to their specialty agriculture was not just production, but distribution. The official report of a statewide grower's convention in 1884 concluded “We must have an outlet for our fruit. In ten years from now this State will raise fifty times more fruit than is needed for home consumption and the Eastern market must be opened for us.” San Bernardino County’s growers—including, at this time, those in Riverside—were confident enough of their success that in 1886 they joined forces with their counterparts in Los Angeles County to organize a citrus fair in Chicago. The intent of the fair was to develop new markets in the East, and a new way for easterners to think about citrus fruits.

The specific environmental requirements for growing citrus, and the difficulty of transporting fresh fruit in good condition meant that oranges, lemons and the like had long been considered regional specialties. For most Americans, they were luxury items. The fruit might occasionally appear in shops in the Midwest or Northeast, but for the most part a person had to go to the fruit, rather than having the fruit brought to them. When expanded rail service made it possible to rush fresh produce across the country in ice-cooled cars, growers realized that the future depended on transforming citrus from an occasional treat into a daily necessity. Oranges, in particular, would have to become as normal a part of the American diet as the ubiquitous apple. One approach was to appeal
to growing concerns in the late nineteenth century about physical health and fortitude. The presence of a glass of orange juice “as part of a complete breakfast” in American homes a century later testifies to the success of this tactic. The other important method for increasing the sale of citrus was to link it to a more attractive lifestyle. Rather than shipping the fruit to market in plain wooden crates, growers hit upon the idea of adorning the boxes with evocative, romantic scenes of idealized California life. The box labels suggested to consumers that to eat an orange was to make this life, in a way, their own. This strategy proved to have such lasting popularity that even in the first decade of the twenty-first century the city of Riverside made use of citrus labels' design and symbolism for its official civic iconography.

Another Canadian immigrant, Matthew Gage, ensured Riverside’s preeminence in citrus with a new irrigation project he had launched in 1882. A jeweler by trade, Gage filed a patent under the Desert Land Act of 1877 for a new tract east of the existing water systems. The terms of the patent required that Gage irrigate the plot to make it agriculturally productive. As the more obvious sources of water along the Santa Ana River close to Riverside had already been tapped by earlier developments, Gage proposed a gravity-fed canal running twenty miles from artesian wells in the San Bernardino Valley. The financial burden of building the canal and developing the land proved more than Gage could manage on his own, he went in search of investors to keep the project moving. In fact, he went as far as London, where contacts at the Bank of England set up an investment syndicate as the Riverside Trust Company. The company’s owners assumed ownership of what became the Arlington Heights development, with Gage serving as the on-site supervisor. Arlington Heights soon became one of the most
important orange growing districts in the state, while at the same time taking on a
distinctively British character. The company sent out its own managers from Great
Britain, who in the best colonial tradition were often remittance men—younger sons of
wealthy families who were paid to stay out of trouble, and as far away from home as
possible. They lived in Victoria, a separate neighborhood with street names recalling
Prince Albert, English counties, and Dickensian characters.15

While Riverside growers took part in the 1886 citrus fair, the event added to a
growing sense of annoyance that the city and its products had to be linked to San
Bernardino County. Residents contended that the county’s advertising efforts, and the
subsequent financial benefits, focused on the city of San Bernardino even as Riverside
gained such a positive name that it was used to sell oranges grown in neighboring
counties. Local boosters insisted in 1893 that “Riverside has always taken the lead in
horticultural development in Southern California. Here the Washington Navel had its
birth and it is the reputation of the Riverside orange in Eastern markets that first brought
Southern California into prominence as a favored section for horticulture.” They
continued by asserting that Riverside’s achievements were responsible for the area’s
speculation and immigration boom from 1885 to 1887, and for making Los Angeles a
“metropolis of empire” destined to be the wealthiest in nation. Residents were also
plagued by the nagging suspicion that they were simply too good to be associated with
San Bernardino, as the presence of its English residents seemed to suggest. The county
seat had taken on the character of a brawling frontier town in the post-Mormon era, with
an abundance of saloons, a flourishing red-light district and dubious politics. By contrast,
Riverside’s citizens regarded themselves as morally upright, yet progressive, intellectuals who maintained the original ideals of founders John North and James Greves.\textsuperscript{16}

The matter went beyond simple civic pride. The real estate boom that Riverside's boosters immodestly claimed as their own was in the process of bringing tens of thousands of new residents to Southern California. Each city in the region vied to attract as many as possible, and so increase their fortunes and status. While Riverside's success with oranges undoubtedly had some part in drawing attention to California, the real reason, as with the earlier boom of the 1870's, was the completion of another transcontinental rail line and the ensuing rate war. In October, 1880, a group of San Diego real estate developers, together with the directors of the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad and investors from Boston formed the California and Southern Railroad Company, for the purpose of constructing a line to connect San Diego, by way of San Bernardino and the Cajon Pass, to the Santa Fe's new line from the east at Barstow in the Mojave Desert. Anticipating this, the Southern Pacific Railroad had been purchasing land in the pass at key points along what its surveyors identified as the only feasible route. The Santa Fe, which purchased the California and Southern outright in 1884, secured the services of local pioneer surveyor Fred Perris, who determined that a line could be constructed that would avoid the Southern Pacific's holdings.\textsuperscript{17} Working through most of 1885, Mexican and Chinese laborers completed the line through Cajon Pass into San Bernardino on the 15th of November. It was this line that made it possible to ship fresh oranges to the Chicago citrus festival in 1886, even as eager migrants began to stream west.
The new settlers were lured by rail fares so low, and promises so grand, that for many it must have seemed foolishness not to try their luck in the Golden State. When the Southern Pacific enjoyed a monopoly on transcontinental travel, passenger rates from the central plains remained fairly constant at about $125.00, a considerable amount during a period when the average laborer made between $1.00 and $2.00 per day. The advent of the Santa Fe line provoked a rate war that saw fares drop to as low as $1.00 by early March, 1887. At the same time, state boosters and real estate promoters indulged in increasingly florid advertising that, at times, would make Harold Bell Wright's later description of the San Bernardino Valley read like a modest understatement. Historian David Wrobel draws attention to one especially notable outburst—a description of Riverside made in c.1885 by Frank Pixley, the editor of the *San Francisco Argonaut*. Pixley, however, credited the description to God, for the description is nothing less than the Almighty thinking about His intention to “illustrate the crowning glory of My labors with the production of a perfect spot.” That spot was Riverside, where “in all the perfection of its soil and the salubrity of its climate, shall be found the highest social condition of which the creation of My image is capable.”

Carey McWilliams notes that even the most unlikely plots of land became the ideals of beauty and productivity through the efforts of real estate boosters. Desert towns became health resorts, and settlements laid out in the midst of coastal swamps became busy harbors. Developers in the town of Mentone, in the foothills just east of San Bernardino, were typical examples, describing a boulder and sagebrush-strewn stretch of the Santa Ana River wash as a fashionable beach, and provoking local ridicule that was still current one hundred years later. San Bernardino itself was touted as a health resort;
“the garden of Southern California,” with a climate that was good for those suffering from rheumatism. The combination proved irresistible for tens of thousands of ordinary Americans, who cast aside their settled ways for one last chance to strike out West and fulfill their dreams.

J. W. Wood, author of an early history of Pasadena, described the boom as “a strange overturning” that “drove hitherto placid-minded, contented citizens to acts of frenzy and drew to the village of Pasadena thousands of boomers and speculators . . . .” He suspected that the larger boom may have had something to do with a highly publicized subdivision of Coronado Island near San Diego in addition to the railroad fare war. Pasadena's own subdivision craze began in 1885 in the form of eighty lots measuring 150 by 50 feet, each guaranteed to fulfill the California ideal: “Pure mountain water piped to each and every lot . . . . The orange and lemon trees are heavy with abundance of golden fruit.” Further impetus came the following year with a subdivision of five acres owned by Pasadena's school trustees in the business district at the intersection of Colorado Boulevard and Fair Oaks.

It was in the midst of this dramatic transformation of Southern California that matters between Riverside and San Bernardino finally came to a head. In 1887 the County Board of Supervisors proposed a bond issue to replace the existing courthouse in downtown San Bernardino. Questions arose in Riverside and elsewhere in the county about why the new building, and thus the county government, should remain in what many saw as a clearly unsuitable location. As a result the bond issue failed. Undaunted, the supervisors drafted an ordinance to raise the necessary funds by simply imposing a direct tax. This prompted a petition drive in November 1889 to force an election on the
matter of the county seat, but the Board declared the petitions invalid. With the possibility of relocation blocked, Riverside’s leaders began to focus their attention in early 1891 on the more drastic step of forming a new county. Initial attempts to introduce legislation in the state senate were fruitless, but the supervisors’ fixation on a new courthouse ultimately saved the day. After two more failed bond elections in 1891, the Board took out its frustration by lowering the tax assessment in San Bernardino while raising it by fifty-percent in areas such as Riverside where voters continued to oppose the project. This was enough to ensure the passage of the next bill to form Riverside County, in February 1893.24 Having gained its independence from San Bernardino, Riverside was free to develop in the manner to which it hoped to become accustomed.

During much of Riverside’s history, Pasadena served as a yardstick or sister-city in development. While nearly every city had (and has) boosters to praise it in the most expansive terms, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries both Riverside and Pasadena could make legitimate claims to exceptional levels of affluence and municipal improvements. Both found early favor with wealthy Easterners looking for winter homes or hobby ranches. Riverside's residents often looked to Pasadena as a model for civic growth, just as those living in Pasadena sometimes hoped to emulate the most attractive features of Riverside. There was one key difference between the two cities that was already becoming apparent by the 1880s. Riverside was surrounded by open country, which would permit decades of low-density expansion along the Santa Ana River. Pasadena's proximity to Los Angeles meant that it was soon joined in the San Gabriel Valley by a number of other communities eager to grow into the available space. This gave the city a more compact character reminiscent of the eastern United States,
rather than the wide-open pattern characteristic of the West. Pasadena's boosters played up this resemblance, while at the same time maintaining the theme of California as a Mediterranean paradise. In practical terms, this seeming contradiction was meant to reassure potential settlers that, in Pasadena, they could have the best of both worlds.

Unfortunately, these reassurances did not apply to every settler in Pasadena. As in other cities in California, including San Bernardino and Riverside, the 1870s and 1880s were a time of ethnic violence in Pasadena. The city had attracted a number of Chinese residents, who primarily operated laundries, grew and sold vegetables, and generally took on many other jobs that white Americans found unpleasant or distasteful. Hiram Reid, a temperance advocate and early observer of Pasadena's history, noted that despite not wanting to fill such jobs themselves, local American residents resented Chinese immigrants doing so. “A good deal of rough talk was indulged in against Chinamen,” which came to a head in 1885, when a mob attacked a laundry on November 6. The situation rapidly escalated with demands that all Chinese be driven from Pasadena or hanged that very night. Reid explained that “cooler-headed citizens succeeded in quieting the crowd,” but only to the point that they agreed to give Chinese workers twenty-four hours to leave. On the morning of November 7, a group of citizens met to adopt resolutions stating “It is the sentiment of this community that no Chinese quarters be allowed within the following limits of Pasadena: Orange Grove and Lake Avenues, California Street and Mountain Avenue.” Further, the group congratulated themselves on stopping the mob violence, as “the good name of our community depends upon its law-abiding character.”

25
San Bernardino and Riverside also had small but significant numbers of Chinese residents from the late 1860s onward and, as in Pasadena, the immigrants found themselves the focus of considerable hostility. Sixteen young Chinese men arrived in San Bernardino in August, 1867, to set up a laundry in the town's business district.\textsuperscript{26} Again, this was a job that most in the city would not want to do themselves, but by the 1870s the local newspaper warned that Chinese would ruin California by “rooting out White labor.” The \textit{San Bernardino Guardian} further warned its readers in April, 1875, of the “danger of saturation from the filthy diseases of these odious celestials.”\textsuperscript{27} By that time the following year, residents formed an Anti-Chinese Association, declaring that the small number living in San Bernardino were a greater threat than a hypothetical army of 20,000 French or German soldiers encamped nearby.\textsuperscript{28} On June 10, 1876, the city government responded to the growing pressure and enacted Ordinance No. 35 expelling all laundries from within town limits. The laundry owners attempted a legal challenge at first, but in 1878 they were able to fulfill the letter of the law without losing their business by relocating to an area then known as Squaw Flat—now Meadowbrook Park—with a creek to supply the wash tubs and still within walking distance of the downtown businesses.\textsuperscript{29}

Riverside's Chinese quarter began to develop during this same period, initially on a commercial block close to other businesses. Farmers also developed large vegetable gardens on the west side of the Santa Ana River to raise produce for the local markets. In common with Pasadena, ethnic tensions reached a flash point in the fall of 1885. In both cases the agitation echoed the earlier anti-Chinese incidents throughout the state in the 1870s, though these later episodes took place during a period of economic growth, and on
the cusp of the decade's great boom in real estate and settlement. It may be that a highly visible Chinese presence within the business district was perceived as a blighting influence that could check a town's potential for development. In Riverside, one of the main voices calling for the removal of the Chinese quarter belonged to Luther Holt, the journalist, water expert, and dedicated promoter of Southern California's glories.³⁰

Holt insisted that the crowded Chinese neighborhood and the runoff from its laundries constituted a health hazard that could not be tolerated so close to Riverside's main businesses. His calls gained popular support, leading the city's governing Board of Trustees to pass nine separate ordinances aimed at forcing the Chinese businesses out of the downtown, and presumably away from the eyes of prospective settlers and investors. The ill will was further compounded by an arson fire in October, 1885, that could have destroyed a major commercial block had it not been quickly discovered and contained. White residents assumed that the fire had been set in retaliation for the city's legal actions. As it was, the Chinese businessmen moved from the downtown early in 1886 and reestablished themselves a short distance away in Tequesquite Arroyo. With more room available to them the men built a miniature village reminiscent of their homeland, applying the geomantic principles of feng-shui to ensure the most auspicious layout. Internally, the community was dominated by two political factions, both led by men from Ganbian village, Taishan District, Guangdong Province.³¹

The obvious foreignness of Chinese immigrants made them easy targets for Americans worried about competition for jobs or in promoting refined reputations for their cities. The presence of Asian populations within their cities suggested to early residents just how far they were from the centers of traditional American life and culture.
The Mexican population of the state gave an even more pointed reminder that California's American identity was recent, and thinly spread. In order to feel secure in their new possession, settlers had to minimize the Indian, Spanish, and Mexican history of the region and overlay it with a distinctively American identity. Chris Wilson demonstrates in *The Myth of Santa Fe* how a similar process played out in New Mexico during the same period. Where California had at least rapidly gained statehood, immigrants to the New Mexico Territory faced a long campaign to convince the federal government that they were ready to become full members of the republic. Wilson particularly focuses on the architecture of Santa Fe, explaining that residents constructed new buildings—and remodeled existing ones—in styles suggestive of New England or the Midwest. They intended for the city to look like a solid, respectable product of British colonial efforts, rather than that of Spain and Mexico. It was only when their American identity was secure that white New Mexicans felt safe to examine local history, but on their own terms.  

Those terms were, to a large degree, financial. Santa Fe's business community discovered that the vestiges of Spanish colonialism possessed a tremendous appeal for tourists seeking adventures away from the American mainstream. A cultural landscape that had once seemed shabby was reinvented as exotic and mysterious. But beyond simply appealing to visitors, this new past and its manufactured traditions gave recently arrived residents a sense of permanence in an unfamiliar land. They did so at the expense of the Indian and Latino population of the city, establishing themselves as the central figures of the region's history.
Carey McWilliams condemned this recreated culture as being divorced from its living representatives. Speaking of the “frustrated businessmen” and their ilk who took part in Santa Barbara's *Rancheros Visitadores* pageant, McWilliams wrote “In their thinking, the Mexicans who live in Santa Barbara have no connection with this past. They just happen to be living in Santa Barbara.”

William Deverell and Phoebe Schroeder Kropp have made this the focus for their recent studies of Southern California's artificial past. In *Whitewashed Adobe: The Rise of Los Angeles and the Remaking of its Mexican Past* (2004), Deverell argues that the city of Los Angeles “came of age amidst (and in part because of) specific responses to Mexican ethnicity and Mexican spaces.” As McWilliams had demonstrated, these sometimes took the form of elaborate productions such as *La Fiesta de Los Angeles* or John McGroarty's *Mission Play* that cast Americans as the inevitable fulfillment of the region's history, while picturing Mexicans as a people whose time had passed, save for the sense of the exotic they imparted to the state.

In similar fashion, Phoebe Kropp's *California Vieja: Culture and Memory in a Modern American Place* (2006) examines the ways in which Americans made use of Mission-themed architecture to further advance claims that they were the natural heirs of Spanish culture on the Pacific Coast.

McGroarty’s *California: Its History and Romance* (1911) provides its own illustrations of these points. Summing up his chapter on the Mexican era, McGroarty comments that the end of “Latin power and authority” did not mean a complete loss of traditions: “Spanish and Mexican speech and thought were destined long to linger as, indeed, they linger still. It is to be hoped that at least the poetry, the romance and much else that was sweet and alluring in the life of a people who were so great in so many ways
will not entirely disappear.” Drawing his book to a close in the final chapter, McGroarty announces that, “in considering the present and future greatness of California, the imagination constantly reverts to the first attempts that were made at civilization and commercial progress. . . . And thus Junipero Serra stands forth the first and greatest character of which California yet can boast—her first missionary, her first merchant, the first of her empire builders.\textsuperscript{36}

By most accounts, Helen Hunt Jackson's 1884 novel \textit{Ramona, A Story} was the catalyst for this rediscovery of the native and Spanish-speaking past. Initially decried as “a damnable libel on Southern California,” \textit{Ramona} was soon adopted as the ideal fuel for the economic speculation of the 1880s.\textsuperscript{37} Jackson had previously written \textit{A Century of Dishonor; A Sketch of the United States Government's Dealing with Some of the Indian Tribes} (1881) as an indictment of the federal government’s dealings with American Indians, drawn from her experiences as an agent of the United States Commissioner of Indian Affairs.\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Ramona} was meant to tell the same story, but couched in a historical romance to better appeal to the average reader. Most readers completely missed the point. Appearing as it did on the eve of the great real estate boom, promoters seized on the book as the perfect narrative for the reinvention of California. Rather than inspiring readers to examine the record of mistreatment experienced by Indians in California and elsewhere, \textit{Ramona} instead triggered a movement to create new histories for the state's communities as they ought to have been.

In Pasadena, San Bernardino, and Riverside these new versions of the past supplemented or even replaced elements of the communities' own historical experiences to the degree that it proved materially useful. The shared history of citrus development
fed into the *Ramona* craze by supplementing the image of Southern California as a sun-drenched land of romantic ease. Pasadena undoubtedly benefited from its proximity to the restored San Gabriel Mission and McGroarty's *Mission Play*, but the Revival Movement was but one part of a sophisticated blending of architecture, Mediterranean climate, and intellectual culture that formed the city's urbane yet intimate identity in the early twentieth century. San Bernardino, as William Deverell notes, was home in the 1890s to a Mexican fiesta far more authentic than La Fiesta de Los Angeles. Rather than developing this as a legitimate expression of regional history, the city's leaders chose to craft a general but undefined image around sunshine and citrus. San Bernardino's main selling point was as a transportation hub—a place from which residents and visitors could easily get to more obviously appealing destinations. Of the three cities in this study, Riverside most enthusiastically embraced *Ramona* mania. Business leaders collaborated with the local government to build a downtown cityscape that came to be as closely identified with the mission era as that of any cities or towns that were actually founded during the Spanish colonial period.

II. Building the Foundations

The actual early histories of San Bernardino, Riverside, and Pasadena were rather more prosaic than the romance of Helen Hunt Jackson’s novel, but each city began as an expression of ideals held by their founders that presupposed a California that was part physical reality, and part mythic reality. Both realities would guide development in the following decades. The geographic, infrastructural, economic, political, and cultural foundations of each city were unique, and yet yielded important parallels as well as
divergences among the three as they continued to grow. Examining these processes in
detail will help to explain the varied responses to local history that characterized the
redevelopment plans for these cities.

To a certain degree, history was a flexible concept for the cities’ founders. Each
group saw in California the opportunity to make at least a limited break with the past, and
to make a new beginning through a community of like-minded individuals. The Latter
Day Saints had originally hoped to create in San Bernardino an extension and outlet for
their new Zion, while the Midwestern free-thinkers and abolitionists who crafted
Riverside and Pasadena aimed to live as gentlemen farmers in the refined company of
their social and intellectual equals. Yet within a few decades, the growing towns were
drawn in varying degrees to new identities based on a Mediterranean climate and the
idealized history of a conquered people. Why would residents who had earlier acted with
such self-confidence claim to find their true selves in the physical trappings of a foreign
culture? This question is crucial for an understanding of how the three cities in this study,
as well as similar cities throughout Southern California, approached the civic challenges
of the post-World War Two world.

A significant part of the answer can be found in the nationwide trend in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries towards regionalism as a counter to growing
urbanization and industrialization. Then, as now, an intensively localized cultural
experience is seen as more real and authentic than one available to a wide audience. The
drive to create national parks was a part of this movement. These places contained
unique landscapes that were held to embody the essential American spirit that would
protect the nation's citizens against urban enervation. In Southern California, regionalism
found expression in what Carey McWilliams termed the Spanish Fantasy Past—a semi-fictional version of history designed to give the state's newest residents a place in a grand, romantic story. Beyond this broad movement are the unique local factors that produced Pasadena's image of the roses-in-wintertime City Beautiful, Riverside's devotion to the Mission Revival style, and San Bernardino's general ambivalence towards its own history in nearly any form.

III. San Bernardino

San Bernardino had its origins in the vision of Brigham Young, president of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints. Young, who attained the presidency of the church in 1844, had envisioned a home for the Latter Day Saints in a region previously unsettled by Americans, far from unsympathetic neighbors, where they would constitute the dominant majority. This new home would occupy as much land as possible, to provide ample room for incoming converts, and to put the maximum distance between themselves and the hostile, corrupting influence of the outside world. This earthly Kingdom of God was dubbed Deseret, after the Book of Mormon's industrious honeybee. It was to include not only present-day Utah, but most of the Great Basin and Colorado Plateau, and stretched as far west as Southern California. The California extension was particularly important, as Young had determined the need for a Mormon seaport, giving Deseret its own access to international commerce, and providing an entry point for year-round migration through Mormon controlled country, rather than the more hazardous overland route from the eastern states.
This was vital, as the extent of the proposed Deseret was such that the number of original migrants was too small to maintain an effective majority over the entire area. Even considering the rate of population growth afforded by plural marriages, the Mormons would have to rely on a rapid influx of converts to people their state. Amasa Lyman, a member of the Council of Fifty which advised Brigham Young, was instructed in the autumn of 1849 to begin the process of investigating possible sites for a string of settlements extending from Salt Lake City to the coast, in the company of fellow Council member Charles Rich. Because rapid progress on California's own proposed statehood made it increasingly clear that Deseret itself would not reach the Pacific, the need for a Mormon controlled migration and supply route became all the more pressing. The very existence of a Mormon state was called into question in 1849, during California's constitutional convention in Monterey. Delegates William Gwin and Henry Halleck promoted a state boundary that would extend east to the Rocky Mountains, and incorporate the Mormon colonies including Salt Lake City. This extended border was defeated, in part, by arguments that it was a fundamental violation of republican liberty, as the Mormons were not represented at the convention or even consulted on the matter.

While the California constitutional delegates argued their state into being, Amasa Lyman and Charles Rich attempted to find the best route through it from the Pacific to the Great Basin. The two explorers soon discounted a northern California route, as the area around San Francisco Bay was already becoming too crowded for their purposes, and the Sierra passes would not remain open all year. Instead, they headed to the southern part of the state, and an area already well known to the so-called Mormon Battalion, which had marched from Council Bluffs, Iowa, to Southern California in 1846 in support
of the Mexican War.⁴⁵ Henry Standage, a private of the battalion's “E” Company, commented on their passage through the San Bernardino Valley, noting in his journal that they “encamped at the ruins of an old town now deserted, formerly inhabited by Spaniards, called it Bernardo. This is a pleasant valley, good water grass, and a sufficiency of fuel found here.”⁴⁶

Though they were too late to take part in any fighting, some members of the battalion erected a fort at the mouth of the Cajon Pass, to guard against raids by opportunistic native tribes from the Mojave Desert. Others, notably Captain Jefferson Hunt, made the acquaintance of Col. Isaac Williams, the owner of a large rancho at the town of Chino, and worked for him during their furloughs to get provisions for their return trip.⁴⁷ Lyman and Rich were impressed by their own examination of the Chino Rancho site in 1850, and recommended the southern route to California, which also had the advantage of terminating in a more sparsely populated part of the state.⁴⁸ Williams’s offer to sell his rancho was sufficient to convince President Young, and before the end of the year he initiated the process of recruiting families for the new colony, under the leadership of the constantly mobile Lyman and Rich. In addition to providing an entry point for migration, Young instructed that the colony should attempt to grow olives and grapes, while experimenting with tea, sugar cane, and cotton.⁴⁹

The expedition immediately encountered problems. The four hundred and thirty-seven settlers who made their way to California in June of 1851 were almost twice the number authorized by Brigham Young. Many, it seemed, were only too willing to exchange the Spartan environment of Utah, and Young's authoritative government, for the agreeably distant climes of Southern California.⁵⁰ The situation in California was
also not what was expected. When Amasa Lyman and Charles Rich called upon Williams to complete the sale of his rancho, he informed them that he had made other plans, and the deal was off. Faced with the need to get a crop planted before the winter rains, the settlers decided after a three month search to purchase the San Bernardino Rancho, where they were temporarily camped, from Williams’ former in-laws, the Lugo family. This was despite Brigham Young’s explicit directions to settle on land without any prior ownership. A quick survey revealed that San Bernardino was, in fact, superior to Chino, with a better water supply and abundant timber nearby.  

The colonists laid out their initial stockaded settlement on an alluvial plain, formed by the actions of Cajon and Lytle Creeks flowing out of the Cajon Pass, and the Santa Ana River from the East. Although the site was semi-arid, the adjacent San Bernardino mountain range had a decidedly humid climate on its southern face, with annual precipitation ranging as high as sixty inches. The steep slope of the mountains produced rapid runoff to the plain below, with the result that the Mormon colonists found numerous springs, some heated by geothermal action, as well as tule swamps and standing ponds. Early visitors to the town were informed that in the winter, streams from thirty-two springs converged on the plain.  

The abundant water meant that the area had long motivated people to make their homes there. Some fifteen hundred Serrano Indians occupied a number of small, clan-based settlements in the foothills, along the Santa Ana River, and near the Cajon Pass creeks. Some occupied abandoned buildings from the original San Bernardino Rancho, granted to the San Gabriel mission in 1819 for the expansion of its grazing lands. The Mormons intended that their primary crop would be dry-farmed wheat, both for their own
use and to supply the expected wagon trains of immigrants heading out across the Mojave Desert for Salt Lake City. Subsidiary summer fruit crops, primarily grapes, which required irrigation were concentrated near the old rancho buildings some distance south of the town site, in order to make use of the rancho's zanja. The water channel, extending twelve miles to the east, had been excavated by Serrano neophytes under Franciscan supervision in 1819. In subsequent years additional irrigation efforts would focus on diverting water from Lytle Creek, running to the west, to supply vegetable gardens close to the residences.56

Despite Brigham Young’s displeasure that the Settlers in San Bernardino had gone against his edicts, the major newspapers in California pronounced themselves quite happy with the new settlement. The Los Angeles Star speculated that the Mormons’ proven industriousness would enhance the value of land close to San Bernardino, while the San Francisco Alta California announced: “We predict that important results will follow the acquirement of a position on our coast by these people.”57 In fact, only a year after its founding, the celebrated Benjamin D. Wilson cited San Bernardino as a model of productivity which could be emulated by the communal settlements he proposed for California's native tribes.58 Unfortunately, in the eyes of the church leadership, the town was also prospering in terms of its population. Intended as a small way-station for migrants to Utah, it had become instead a popular destination for migrants from Utah who hoped to find some relief from Young’s theocratic government, as well as from elsewhere in the southwest. By 1856 the population was in excess of 3,000.59

These developments, coupled with the activities of land promoters close to San Bernardino, who were drawing numbers of outsiders to the area, caused Brigham Young
to worry that his Saints would either come into conflict with their new neighbors or, perhaps more dangerously, “imbibe the spirit of the world” and learn new ideas beyond the church’s purview.\textsuperscript{60} This all played into Young's growing conviction that a withdrawal to the mountain fastness of Utah would best preserve his Kingdom of God. Writing to Charles Rich in December, 1855, Young informed him that the church could not “afford to spare good men enough to sustain such a place” as San Bernardino was becoming, as it was not “of sufficient importance to justify the expense.”\textsuperscript{61} Though he did not act on his worries immediately, it is likely that Young would have ordered the abandonment of San Bernardino even without the impetus of the Federal march on Utah in 1857. As with settlements in Carson Valley and Las Vegas, Nevada, San Bernardino had proven to be too far from the Mormon center, and too close to the influences of the outside world.\textsuperscript{62} Contraction, rather than expansion, was to be the new pattern of Mormon settlement. The approach of the U. S. Army did, however, give the evacuation of San Bernardino an urgency and purpose a simple abandonment would not have, and in December of 1857 approximately half of the population sold out for whatever they could get, and began the hurried trip back to Utah.\textsuperscript{63}

Those members of the church who remained in defiance of Young's authority likely thought themselves rewarded by the discovery of gold in the San Bernardino mountains, in 1860, by prospector William F. "Uncle Billy" Holcomb.\textsuperscript{64} The local climate on the northern side of the San Bernardino range, where the strikes were located, forced the resulting rush to assume a seasonal character. In winter the area was covered by a heavy snow pack, and in the summer there was insufficient surface water flow to support placer mining techniques.\textsuperscript{65} Though short lived, the mining brought a rapid
increase in the local population, such that in 1861 a vote was held on the (ultimately defeated) proposal to move the county seat from San Bernardino to the mountain boomtown of Belleville. Many of those drawn by the lure of gold were described by Major Edwin A. Sherman, publisher of the San Bernardino unionist newspaper *The Patriot*, as "Southern frontier people," who were also drawn to support California's Confederate Volunteers. Sherman claimed that his stand was so unpopular among the "renegade Mormons, secession sympathizers and openly avowed armed rebels," that he felt it prudent to remove himself and his press over the mountains to a new location. In short order, the town that had been founded as a colony of Saints had been transformed into a haven for a much more diverse population. Despite repeated attempts to polish the city's image over the years, San Bernardino would always retain the rough edges formed at the end of its first decade.

Despite the excitement of the gold rush, a discovery of more long term significance was made in 1869 on the property of the coincidentally named J. B. Waters. As his land was too far up the slope of the alluvial fan to permit gravity irrigation from the existing springs or streams, Waters had been digging a well when, at a depth of fifty-six feet he was startled to find "that there came flowing copiously a pure soft stream, as cold as mountain water . . . . It has been a much argued and disputed question by many, as to whether artesian water could be 'struck' in our valley. Here is evidence that it can be had . . . ." Waters was correct in his assessment. Before the year was out, five more artesian wells had been completed in the area. With an assured year-round water supply, the amount of irrigated land in San Bernardino would rapidly increase, while the
crops shifted from dry farmed grain to the iconic citrus fruits of the California boomtowns. It took more than water to create the California boomtowns. In fact, it was the absence of water that helped to set the stage for the massive influx of new settlers who would transform the state during the 1870s and 1880s. A severe drought took hold in 1862, and dragged on until 1864. Cattle died on a vast scale, frequently taking with them the fortunes and livelihoods of Californio ranchers. Unable to pay the property taxes imposed after the American conquest, many ranch owners were forced to sell their land for whatever they could get, more often than not to a new arrival with ready cash. In many cases the drought compounded a problem that began with the Land Act of 1851. Large numbers of Californio ranchers found it necessary to sell portions of their land simply to meet the expense of proving their legal title to the rest of it. As ownership was often based on little more than a verbal description of boundaries and key features, the court proceedings drove many ranchers to bankruptcy. Inevitably, the land found eager buyers in Americans, and in new kinds of Americans who began making their way to California in ever-increasing numbers by way of the transcontinental railroad.

When work crews from the Central Pacific and Union Pacific railroads met at Promontory, Utah on May 10, 1869—the same year that J. B. Waters discovered his artesian well—they opened the way to California for a different breed of pioneer. In prior years, even after the American conquest a trip to California might as well have been a trip to another country. Potential settlers and fortune-seekers had their choice of how they wanted to make the voyage, but all were daunting and offered many opportunities for disaster. They could try the overland route across plains, deserts, and mountains,
while passing through the territories of indigenous people who might not be at all happy to see them. If their finances were up to it, they might attempt a passage by ship around Cape Horn, with the real possibilities of wrecking in a storm or of spending the better part of a year at sea if the winds were unfavorable. Or, they might try to combine the two approaches by crossing the Isthmus of Panama, with the added risk of contracting malaria along the way. All this changed with the reality of direct rail service to California. Setting out for the Golden State was still an adventure, but it was an adventure that could be faced from a Pullman car.

This was, perhaps, a more prudent sort of adventure, and it began to attract a more prudent sort of settler. Rather than subsistence farmers looking for a fresh start, or prospectors hoping to strike it rich in the diggings, many of this new sort were already well off, but looking for investment opportunities to help them do better. These were quality of life migrants, who fancied themselves gentlemen (and gentlewomen) farmers, living with people very much like themselves, far from the harsh winters of the East. In a sense, of course, all those who struck out for the West hoped to improve their life, or otherwise they would have stayed where they were. This is true of all migrants, regardless of when or where they might be, but the attractiveness of the West had a mythic quality unlike almost any other place. As Henry Nash Smith had noted, those drawn to the region believed it to be a “virgin land” where they could not only improve their lives, but reinvent them if need be. The West was—supposedly—a place where no one cared about your past, but only about what you could make of yourself in the present and future. Whether any of this was actually true was less important than the perception
that it was. It did not matter if the West was, in an objective sense, really an exceptional place unlike any other—the myth made it so.\footnote{72}

The myth also emphasized that the West was a land of big skies and wide open spaces. Even in more recent times, commentators not known for their romantic bent have still suggested that this is perhaps a crucial feature of the region’s identity. In response to Walter Nugent's 1992 survey “Where Is the American West,” urban historian Carl Abbott explained that “space or elbow room” was an unsatisfying and imprecise way to define the region. “Nevertheless,” he grudgingly allowed, “I don't see other single factor that will come as close.” Writer Tom Bryant was less reserved answering the survey. “Sheer space is the main characteristic of the West. The expanse of unpopulated areas . . . . The open plains, the shining mountains and the clear streams—the Big Sky.”\footnote{73}

Advertisements for a wide range of places and products certainly seized upon the image, with a persistence that suggests that it has lost none of its appeal since the mid-nineteenth century. Despite this, the West is actually (among) the most urbanized places in America, with the majority of its residents living in or on the outskirts of major cities. Carl Abbott, Michael Findlay, and Greg Hise all argue that the distinctive low-density growth of these metropolitan areas is a direct result of the western drive for independence. The authors claim that because settlers hoped to escape the established hierarchies and centralized power characteristic of the East, they built their own cities as diffuse as possible, with as little of a downtown as they could manage. Rather than trying to recreate large cities on a small scale, westerners preferred to scale up a small village with its single Main Street.
As with every model that attempts to explain things on the broad scale, this conception of the decentralized city has its exceptions. San Bernardino eventually became an almost stereotypical example of the wide-open western town, but thanks to the guiding ethics of the Latter-Day Saints it began with as strong a social hierarchy as any in the nation. In fact, the Mormon civic plan emphasized an idiosyncratic blend of institutionalized independence that in many ways foreshadowed the ideals of the urban planning movement in the twentieth century. Each family was to occupy a plot of land large enough for extensive gardens and domestic animals to help them provide for themselves, while at the same time providing for the town’s common supply. The physical layout of the blocks and streets was the same rigid grid applied to all Mormon settlements, which reflected the idealized order of the church’s theocratic community. Riverside and Pasadena represent a different kind of problem for the model of the decentralized city, even though Pasadena’s founders apparently intended at first to get by without any business district at all. Far from being a way for settlers to escape Eastern hierarchies, the towns were specifically intended to appeal to those sorts of people who prospered in a traditional, Eastern setting, with the added bonus of better weather.

The two communities were launched as investment colonies, in which interested parties could buy shares that would entitle them to plots of land within the new settlement. Unlike towns that developed “on the spot” throughout the West from individual homesteading activities, Pasadena and Riverside existed first as ideas. The investors carefully planned out the social structure of their communities in advance, and only after accumulating sufficient capital did the search begin for a suitable location in California. In this respect the cities resembled San Bernardino, which also began as a
concept looking for the right plot of ground. In all three cases, the founders had originally imagined the cities as exclusive havens for the right sort of people—an idea soon abandoned in San Bernardino, but one that would have a pervasive influence in the histories of Riverside and Pasadena.

IV. Riverside

Riverside was the older of these two towns, if only by a few years. It began as the brainchild of John W. North, a peripatetic native of Sand Lake, New York, who had planned for a life in the Methodist ministry before breaking with the church over its position on slavery. He instead became a lawyer and abolitionist lecturer. Abraham Lincoln rewarded North's abolitionist credentials and political support during the Civil War with a presidential appointment as the surveyor-general of the Nevada Territory. He was soon promoted to the post of federal judge, where he inadvertently advanced the career of Virginia City journalist Samuel Clemens by expelling him from the territory for violating strict dueling ordinances. While in Nevada, North made the acquaintance of Dr. James P. Greves, who had headed west from Michigan for his health. With the end of the war, the two men began to formulate a plan to establish a town populated by people much like themselves, in what was hoped to be the New South. They soon found that neither they nor their intentions for the South would be gladly received. Fortuitously, the newly completed transcontinental railroad inspired them to turn their attentions to Southern California.77
In March, 1870, the two men each issued advertising flyers trumpeting the prospective town. North’s *A Colony for California* laid out the basic plan for the new settlement, while Greves’s *Ho! For California!!* invited potential investors on a scouting trip to select a suitable town site. They appealed to “good families” able to invest $1,000 each to form “a colony of intelligent, industrious, and enterprising people, so that each one’s industry will help to promote his neighbor’s interests, as well as his own.” Shortly afterward North, Greves, and temperance advocate Ebenezer Brown traveled to California to begin the search. One likely parcel of land was a section of Rancho San Pascual, at the northwestern end of the San Gabriel valley, that would later be sold to the founders of Pasadena. Brown, however, was troubled by the proximity to Los Angeles. Though little more than a village, Brown worried that its vices and temptations would undermine the character of their as-yet unnamed city. The group accordingly headed southeast, towards an available plot owned by the defunct California Silk Center Association.

The Association was the creation of one Louis Prevost, who had purchased 4,000 acres of land formerly belonging to the Rancho of Louis Rubidoux with financial assistance from the state government. The scheme failed with Prevost’s death in 1869, coupled with the cancellation of state aid. Later promotional literature would play up the hardships facing the city’s founders, describing the land as a barren plain inhabited by jackrabbits, burrowing owls, and billions of ants. At the time, however, North considered the site the best he had seen, as it was close to potential trade routes and the water rights were not in question, as had been the case at Rancho San Pascual. This is not to say that the land was entirely free and clear. Nearby were the towns of La Placita
and Agua Mansa, whose residents were in the habit of using the area as common grazing land. They had resettled there from New Mexico in 1844 at the invitation of Californio rancher Juan Bandini, but like many other Mexican residents of the state, could not prove their titles to the satisfaction of the new American government. Local promoters recast them in 1889 as “nude and semi-barbarous” Indians who experienced rapid improvement thanks to the “influence and control of the people of Riverside.”

But before the people could bless the land with their presence, they had to buy it. North and company accomplished this in September 1870 with the financial backing of San Francisco investor Charles Felton. On the 12th of that month, North, Greves, and Felton, together with new investors K. D. Shugart, Sanford Eastman, and one Capt. Broadhurst formally incorporated the Southern California Colony Association. With water the key to prosperity in Southern California, the partners quickly hired the Los Angeles civil engineering firm of Goldworthy and Higbie to lay out both the town and its irrigation system, with construction starting on the latter only a week after incorporation. The town plan—much in line with the heady confidence of western promotional rhetoric in the period—featured an ambitious mile-square grid of hypothetical streets and lots, presided over by the Association’s sales office.

The first families began to arrive in the winter of 1870, before the irrigation system had been completed. Because the new settlement was located on a mesa above the Santa Ana River, it was necessary to divert a portion of the flow well upstream into an elaborate flume and canal system, which further distributed the water by means of ditches running alongside major streets. This was very similar to the method of irrigation developed for Salt Lake City, and modified for use in San Bernardino. Despite this, one
city booster would later claim that the residents of San Bernardino ridiculed the irrigation scheme rather than offering “encouragement and cordial support.” Another, reflecting the growing rivalry between the two towns, later dismissed San Bernardino as “an insignificant Mormon settlement” and implied that this was another of the hardships the city’s founders had to overcome.\(^8\)

Having had the benefit of twenty years in Southern California, those in San Bernardino may have been ridiculing the optimism of Riverside’s gentlemen farmers. K. D. Shugart apparently planted orange trees soon after settling in during the spring of 1871, even though the water system would not be available until July. Whether or not this was the most prudent move, it did show what the course of future development would be for both Riverside and Southern California. Rather than the subsistence agriculture practiced by more traditional western homesteaders, those who came to California by rail expected to raise exotic Mediterranean cash crops. On the whole, these expectations were well founded, as the climate and geography was perfectly suited to not only citrus fruits, but olives and grapes as well. Only an early attempt at farming opium poppies in Riverside seriously missed the mark, and then because the labor costs were deemed uneconomical. Given the high-minded ideals of the early founders, the opium would—presumably—have been sold for medicinal purposes only.\(^8\)

Even with the irrigation in place, land sold slowly for several years. In part, this was due to the ready availability of government land immediately to the south of the mile-square town site which, though lacking in the colony’s self-proclaimed prestige, was certainly cheaper. A visitor to the area in 1872 described Riverside as a “desolate prospect,” with few buildings and only barely defined streets. The colony association
even offered land free to any taker—especially to any church—that would build immediately, in an attempt to give the town a physical substance worthy of its aspirations. The economic Panic of 1873 further hampered early growth, and almost brought an end—even before it had started—to an attempt by investors from Indiana to establish a similar colony not too far away.  

V. Pasadena

In May of that year, the group organized itself in Indianapolis as the California Colony of Indiana, seeking, as had Riverside’s founders, to establish a community of discerning, upright ladies and gentlemen. Following the same pattern, the corporation dispatched D.M. Berry, Jonathan H. Baker and Nathan Kimball westward as its agents to select the land in advance. The three men eventually determined that the site at the west end of the San Gabriel Valley, rejected by North, Greves and Brown three years earlier, would best suit their needs. Before the agents could negotiate a purchase, the deteriorating national economy caused many of the original investors to reassess their priorities, and the colony association came near to collapse. In order to salvage something from the enterprise, some of the more committed members of the group decided to make a pitch to transplanted easterners already living in the area. Berry held a number of informal meetings at the office he had set up in Los Angeles, culminating in the formation of the San Gabriel Orange Grove Association on November 13, 1873.  

After ensuring that the land would be equally divided among its members, the directors authorized the purchase on December twentieth for the sum of $25,000. As at Riverside, the first order of business was to bring water to the new town site. In January 1874, even as the first twenty-seven settlers began arriving for the formal selection of
town lots on the 27th, workers began building a reservoir and aqueduct system at the
head of the Arroyo Seco, at a spot known as the Devil's Gate.\textsuperscript{88} Perhaps somewhat
predictably, given the name of the main watercourse—“Dry Stream”—the reliability of
Pasadena's water supply during the summer proved to be a constant source of anxiety in
the early years.\textsuperscript{89}

Water indirectly played the key role in ending the first brief phase of Riverside's
everal history. The same year that the group that had originally organized in
Indianapolis launched the beginnings of what would become Pasadena, a banker from
Fort Wayne, Indiana, named Samuel Evans had his eye on a plot of land southwest of
Riverside's sparsely populated square mile. The Hartshorn Tract, as it was called, was at
that point in the hands of one William Sayward, a San Francisco-based investor who
preferred to be addressed as “Captain Sayward” even though it was his brother who had
the nautical career. He had both the land and financial muscle Evans needed and that,
despite his dubious character, qualified Sayward to be an equal partner in what Evans
called the “New England Colony.” The difference between this and the earlier Southern
California Colony Association was that Evans and Sayward were interested in selling a
commodity, rather than trying to build an idealistic community. Future residents would
purchase land directly from the two men instead of entering into a joint stock
agreement.\textsuperscript{90} The change was significant because it was representative of what would
become the standard model for development in California through the twentieth century,
as opposed to the approach followed by the founders of Riverside and Pasadena.

The owners of the nearby Rancho Sobrante San Jacinto sought to cash in on the
growing interest in the Riverside area by forming the Santa Ana Colony during this same
time and, with water the key to life in Southern California, suggested a joint irrigation scheme with the New England Colony. Evans and Sayward hired civil engineer Christopher Columbus Miller, father of the future Mission Inn operator Frank Augustus Miller, to design the canal system which. Like the original Riverside canal, the new watercourse had to draw from the Santa Ana River well to the north if it was to flow into the town site. This immediately posed a problem, as the line would cross the Southern California Colony Association Land, and John North opposed granting the rival development a right of way. Without the canal the New England Colony would have been untenable, but at that point North's financial backer Charles Felton provided the solution. He had grown tired of the lack of return on his investment, and sold out to Evans and Sayward, giving them a controlling interest in the Southern California Colony Association. The two men wasted little time in amalgamating the original settlement with their own, and in partnership with the Santa Ana Colony formed the Riverside Land and Irrigating Company on April 14, 1875. Given his disappointment with the earlier venture, Charles Felton remained faithful to Riverside as one of the directors of the new company.

The new partners, led by “Captain” Sayward, soon began causing problems for the area’s residents by trying to expand the new company's influence through the expedient of claiming that property lines, derived from early rancho boundaries, were based on misidentified landscape features. This was the same tactic used to deprive Californios of their holdings in the 1860s and, as before, the legal proceedings dragged on for several years. The disputes were finally settled in 1879, with John North personally arguing the case for Riverside's individual property owners as his final service
to the town. That same year, he pulled up stakes once again and headed for the San Joaquin Valley to start a new colony near Fresno. Even as the boundary cases played out in 1875, Sayward announced a new policy developed by Evans aimed at achieving the same results. From that point on, the Riverside Land and Irrigating Company would not continue supplying water, as it had done previously, to any property that had been not acquired through the company or its predecessors, unless the owners either paid the princely sum of twenty dollars per acre, or signed over half of their land to the company.  

Riverside's residents rightly feared that the Land and Irrigating Company would both establish a monopoly on the area's water supply, and overtax it with continued subdivisions. Their concerns prompted state senator John Sattaerwaite to introduce a bill in 1876 that forbade water companies from engaging in preferential pricing towards established customers. The following year, Riverside resident William Price successfully sued under the terms of what had become known as the Satterwaite Act. California's Supreme Court turned down an appeal of the judgment in 1880, with the result that Price v. Riverside Land & Irrigating Company, together with the Satterwaite Act, were key to establishing the principle of “appurtenancy to the land” maintaining the right of access to a water supply tied to a specific piece of property. In other words, the owner of a plot of land with an established source of water could not be deprived of it, even if that water source was owned and developed by another party.

VI. From Physical Foundations to Mythical Foundations
Once the cities of Pasadena, Riverside and San Bernardino had achieved a degree of physical permanence by sorting out the basic issues of governance and access to resources, they were in a position to give more attention to the Mediterranean dream that had drawn many of their residents to California. Helen Hunt Jackson’s *Ramona*, as noted earlier, gave Southern Californians an exciting new way to experience their surroundings and its history—provided that the actual message of the book was carefully disregarded. The tale gave small towns, full of transplanted Midwesterners who distrusted anyone too different from themselves, a sense of the exotic. Towns that were little more than expanses of scrub-brush only a few years before gained a sense of history that went back centuries. Beyond history, the residents even gained a sense of destiny, by seeing themselves as completing the work of Spanish missionaries who had endeavored to “bring civilization” to the Pacific coast. However, *Ramona* might have been only a passing curiosity if it had not been accompanied by an architectural movement—the Mission Revival—that gave these romantic ideas a presence durable enough to assume their own historic significance.
CHAPTER 5

MYTHOLOGY AND MARGINALIZATION

The enthusiasm towards *Ramona* was, in part, an expression of a larger national process of redefinition and re-identification in reaction to immigration, economic growth and colonial expansion. As the nation absorbed an increasingly diverse population, it faced dwindling opportunities for the sorts of frontier experiences that had been seen as a source of distinctive American character and vitality. These factors combined to produce a sense of Darwinian anxiety concerning the “survival of the fittest” on a national scale. *Ramona* and the associated architectural movement of the Mission Revival helped to assuage this anxiety by giving white Southern Californians a way to see themselves as fulfilling a great cultural destiny, while (somewhat paradoxically) creating cultural distance between themselves and the descendents of the people who had created and lived in the historical mission system.

This distance was an important way in which the dominant communities in Pasadena, Riverside and San Bernardino defined their group identities and maintained their positions. Each city maintained both formal and informal means of segregating minority residents who might otherwise present a challenge to the preferred identity and civic culture. Maintaining this status quo became increasingly difficult as inevitable local growth and changes to the economy moved the cities further away from the intentions of their original founders, and from the appeals of the Mission Revival movement.
I. Building the Spanish Fantasy Past

*Ramona* appeared during a period when American public life was marked both by confidence in some areas, and uncertainty in others. By 1884, less than ten years after George Armstrong Custer's defeat at the Battle of the Little Bighorn, the United States was taking a growing interest in international affairs and seeking to establish its place in the world. One early step in this direction was the Naval Act of 1883, authorizing the first ships of a modern fleet that would soon make the United States a colonial power in both the Western and Eastern Hemispheres. ¹ Though still far from being considered a Great Power in the nineteenth-century sense, the nation was beginning to entertain the idea that its Manifest Destiny might extend beyond the natural borders of North America. Industrial expansion would be the engine driving national growth, but it also threatened to change the character of the nation in the process. This reflected Americans' tendency, then as now, to embrace change only when it promised to bring a bigger and better version of the status quo. Colonial forays into Asia and Latin America in the 1890s were meant to project the United States outwards, not draw the wider world inwards. Selected elements of foreign culture could be incorporated into American life to add aesthetic variety or a dash of romance, but the foreign culture itself stayed outside the mainstream. The same held true for people. Immigrants from northern and western Europe, who could assimilate with relative ease into the national culture were welcome, but those who could not escape an association with personal foreignness, such as the Chinese migrants to California, were marginalized as a matter of course.

This situation helps to explain how Californians could seize so eagerly upon the world of *Ramona*. They were not looking back to the reality of a Mexican and Indian
past. Rather, they were focused on how the built environment of this earlier California could be used to create a more attractive and fulfilling American future. The Mexican and Indian people could be accepted in this spirit as a part of the decor, or as a source of implied romance. As the living representatives of distinct, non-American cultures they were no more welcome than the Chinese, for the same reason. They embodied a break with the status quo, and a change in the fundamental American character. This was, in part, because the native culture of the United States was based primarily on a set of shared beliefs, instead of shared geography or shared ethnic heritage. As G. K. Chesterton once observed, “America is the only nation in the world that is founded on a creed.”

2 This creed—the Declaration of Independence, together with the Constitution, the precedents of English Common Law and the writings of the Founding Fathers—assured freedom of expression and individuality, provided that it grew out of a common set of assumptions and expectations. In other words, foreign cultural elements were welcome as long as they were first broken down and homogenized in the great American Melting Pot. “Diversity,” as the term is used today, would likely have been seen then as a prescription for disaster.

One of the underlying motivations for this mindset was the growing awareness and acceptance of Charles Darwin's theories on evolution and natural selection. Or, rather, the acceptance of theories that employed Darwinian language to give greater legitimacy to preconceived cultural and national goals. Gail Bederman's *Manliness and Civilization* (1995) explores the concerns that began during this period suggesting the “American race” was in danger of losing its evolutionary fitness due to a surfeit of civilization. Though the “Closing of the Frontier,” as articulated by Frederick Jackson
Turner still lay several years in the future, the creation of Yellowstone National Park in 1872 underscores a growing awareness that the frontier experience might not always be a factor in American life. Many Americans believed that the nation had gained its essential vitality by fighting its way across the continent. With that opportunity lost it, was feared that the nation's manhood might slide towards the decadence of Europe. The awareness of this situation was so acute that, as Bederman recounts, when Theodore Roosevelt visited Riverside in 1903, his comment on the large number of children in the city was “No race suicide here.” The remark was warmly received by residents as complementing their patriotic civic character.³ If the United States was contending for position in an international evolutionary contest, then accepting foreign cultures unaltered was simply counterproductive and illogical. Furthermore, some observers, as early as the 1880s, were arguing that the closing frontier would make it increasingly difficult to assimilate new immigrants.⁴

Then why the attraction of Ramona? After all, many American readers with a long history in California recognized the critique for what it was, and initially sought to downplay the book's significance. An answer lies in understanding that California was a far more settled place when most Americans arrived than other parts of the West. In places such as Kansas or the Dakotas, pioneer homesteaders played out the frontier myth by wresting control of the “Virgin Land” away from “less-advanced peoples” as popular understanding of Darwin dictated they must. By contrast, Americans who made their way to California found a region with towns and privately owned ranches that would have reminded many of them of the places they had only recently left. Conquest of free land was one thing. Taking possession of land that had already been “civilized,” in the
contemporary understanding of the term, was a relatively new experience for the United States, and one that did not entirely square with the nation’s historic self-image. *Ramona* provided a way to mentally resolve this poor fit by giving Americans who arrived in the decades after the Mexican War a glimpse of an earlier, frontier California more in keeping with the national experience elsewhere. These later readers did not see themselves in the book's rough-hewn, antagonistic American characters. Rather, their hearts went out to Jackson's detailed, yet romantic, description of the land and its people, full of exotic names and paradisiacal beauty. Sympathetic figures such as the kindly Father Salvierderra assumed the role of promoting civilization in the West. By this process, the civil and religious institutions established by the Spanish Empire paradoxically came to be seen as precursors of the American Republic on the Pacific Coast. Helen Hunt Jackson's world of the Missions was drawn into the history of the United States, and enthusiastically developed by Californians as a distinctive backdrop for their new towns and cities.

As has been emphasized, this was a very selective development that allowed Californians to build the society that they saw fit. The state's own past served as the raw material residents could use to craft an idealized self-image that belied the often rough character of the American conquest and its aftermath. Through this process, the appropriation of land from native Californios—“the degradation, the ruin, and the oppression,” in the words of Josiah Royce—could be recast as a natural progression of ownership from the Spanish monarchy to the American citizen. And, by making the history their own, Americans could establish a comfortable distance between themselves and those who did not fit into the new narrative. In this way, Californians acted in much
the same manner as the late nineteenth-century residents of New England, who crafted the now-familiar image of the region as the essence of “true America” as a defense against social change—especially that brought about by industrialization and its immigrant workers. In Southern California, this process was turned on its head. It was the immigrants who were creating the regional image as a defense against its native population.

William Deverell and Phoebe Kropp both examine the ways in which this process of recasting Southern California's history for new ends tended to be fixed on the explicitly Spanish past, so that white newcomers could create a sense of cultural and personal distance between themselves and the area’s ethnically Mexican residents. The intent, as Deverell explains, was not to make Mexicans disappear, but rather to make them visible within a carefully prescribed role forever linked to the region’s history—to “fix them in space and around a particular set of characteristics or traits.” To a certain extent, these traits depicted “the Mexican” as a perpetual child who was fundamentally simple, emotional, and either lazy or hard-working, as the stereotype required. Deverell demonstrates that through such invented traditions as La Fiesta de Los Angeles in the 1890s, and The Mission Play in the early twentieth century, Americans could cast themselves as the natural heirs of a process of civilization-building on the Pacific coast. Mexicans had literally had their time on stage, but the present and the future were to be yielded to new actors.

Phoebe Kropp examines this same process in the work of local writers and boosters such as Charles Fletcher Lummis to create a state highway connecting the twenty-one missions in a single tour route suitable for a modern “Gasoline Pilgrimage.”
To drive the road and stop at the missions was to insert oneself into an imagined version of their history that, like The Mission Play or La Fiesta de Los Angeles, had a specific niche for the modern Mexican. The backers of El Camino Real depicted the Franciscan missionaries as patriots who anticipated that their work would be taken up by the Americans who were bringing their own nation into being on the East Coast, and who, by Manifest Destiny, would ultimately reach the West. For those who worked to bring the highway to fruition, this history was entirely authentic. In commenting on the project in its early phases, Lummis commented “No person now alive now knows [where El Camino Real was]. We must know. The people of Southern California will not stand for a faked Camino Real.”

One of the most florid examples of this desire to depict Americans as the true inheritors of California, the Panama-California Exposition of 1915-1916 in San Diego, made use of elaborate Spanish-inspired architectural styles to illustrate the rich future that regional boosters expected with the completion of the Panama Canal. Kropp comments that it mattered little that California had never seen anything like the exposition’s architecture during the Spanish colonial period. As with El Camino Real, the organizers of the exposition created their own Spanish history of California, for which the architecture was perfectly suited as an expression of regional identity. This is reflected in Leland Stanford’s suggestion as early as 1887 that his university should be built in a style blending the mission-style with a more sophisticated design tradition to produce “for the first time an architecture distinctively Californian in character.”

Like Leland Stanford, Charles Lummis had travelled to California as an adult in search of a fresh start. A journalist, sometime Indian rights activist, and inveterate
promoter of the charms of the American Southwest, he quickly became one of the greatest proponents of the idea that the missions and their associated culture should be put to use in creating a distinctive California identity. Historian Martin Padget comments that Lummis’s fascination with the ethnically diverse Southwest was ironic, as he had originally headed to the region in “a self-conscious departure away from the perceived threat of immigration to Anglo-Saxon racial and cultural purity in the East.”¹⁵ Lummis was already a prodigious travel writer by the time he accepted the position of editor for Land of Sunshine magazine—later renamed Out West—in 1894. Through this venue, he became a leading figure in the formation of Southern California’s new urban culture. In Padget’s interpretation, the romanticized colonial past was meant, in part, to soften local booster impulse through a sense of purpose and gentility. Lummis further hoped that the area’s new residents, now freed from what he saw as the enervating effects of the eastern climate, would create a “hybridized future” by building on the best aspects of the colonial culture that had gone before them.¹⁶

A polymath in the grand tradition of the Victorian age, Lummis teamed with Mission Inn architect Arthur Benton to form the Association for the Preservation of the Missions in 1888 (renamed the Landmarks Club in 1895). The organization was dedicated to restoring the missions of San Fernando and San Gabriel as a way to give physical expression to the founders’ interpretations California history.¹⁷ Writing later in life, Lummis declared, “Romance is the Greatest Asset of California . . . for 300 years the very word has been a Fairy Story, a name to conjure, a Lure, a Spell. Its magic grew taller still with the heroic era of the Missions, then the glorious Patriarchal pastoral period—the happiest, the most generous, the most hospitable, the most lovable life ever
lived on this continent.” And for those who still might not be clear on the point, “The Romance of California is Spanish Romance.” The clear implication was that by maintaining the appearance and feeling of the mission era, modern California could again become the happiest and most lovable place in North America.

II. Architecture of the Idealized Past and Present

The emphasis on the romantic in Mission Revival architecture made it an offshoot of the larger American Arts and Crafts Movement. Inspired by the original British movement, based on the philosophies of artist William Morris and writer John Ruskin, Arts and Crafts rejected the regimentation of industrialized work, together with the scattershot aesthetics of the Victorian era. Devotees emphasized the idiosyncratic qualities of traditional craftsmanship, believing that everyday creativity was essential for a healthy society. In Southern California, one of the centers of the movement was Pasadena, in a loose association of artists known as the Arroyo group, after the Arroyo Seco that runs through the western side of the city. Undoubtedly influenced by the nearby San Gabriel Mission, its designers and architects were attracted by what they perceived as the simplicity and honesty of mission life. By choice they strove after the rudimentary, unadorned styles that they associated with mission buildings and their furnishings, though these were, originally, a matter of expediency and practicality on the part of the missions' builders.

The missions were largely functional complexes combining the roles of religion, political administration, and industry. The earliest buildings were the work of soldiers assigned to protect the religious expeditions, using whatever materials were readily
available. Fr. Francisco Palóu described the first chapel at Mission San Francisco de Asís in 1776 as being made of wood, with tule reed thatching for the roof. 21 Upon assuming the administration of California’s missions in 1785, Fr. Fermín Francisco de Lasuén set about creating more impressive and permanent buildings in stone or adobe. 22 Even by 1792, the British naval officer George Vancouver could be impressed by the new mission church at San Francisco, recording that “for its magnitude, architecture and internal decorations, [it] did great credit to the constructors of it, and presented a striking contrast between the exertions of genius and such as bare necessity is capable of suggesting.” 23

Each mission complex was unique, and typically laid out in response to the local landscape. The specific design of the buildings depended on the skills of the missionaries, the Indian converts who provided the labor force, and the availability—if any—of technical experts from Mexico. Some missions remained simple, with adobe walls and pitched roofs. By contrast San Juan Capistrano was rebuilt largely in stone, including a church with vaulted ceiling designed by Mexican stonemason Isidro Aguilar. 24 In general, the main features of the mission were the church itself and a collection of residence and service buildings known as the convento. In a fully executed plan the narrow convento buildings formed the sides of a large courtyard serving as a work area for Indian converts. A distinctive feature of many conventos were wide, sheltered walkways called corredors, running along the sides of the buildings and supported on the outer edge by colonnades or arched arcades. 25 Also intended as work areas, the corredors became one of the iconic elements of Mission Revival design. Other important features were the campanario, a free-standing wall holding bells as an alternative to a bell tower, and a decorative curvilinear gable seen primarily on the front
of churches. This gable was interpreted differently at each location, but the basic concept was defined architecturally as the “Mission Order gable” in the 1960s. The red tiled roof, the white plastered wall, and the rounded arch completed the stereotypical picture of Mission architecture as it was later reinterpreted for American use in California.

Of course California was not the only part of the United States with a rich collection of Spanish and Mexican colonial buildings. Roman Catholic religious orders established an extensive network of missions throughout Arizona, New Mexico and Texas from the late 1500s to spread the Christian Gospel and extend the temporal power of the Spanish Empire. The builders drew from the same background of Spanish architecture as those in California, but in each case adapted the basic concepts to the location, skill of available labor, and their own inclinations. San Esteban del Rey de Acoma in New Mexico, for example, is a Spartan adobe building matching the nearby Indian pueblo, while Mission San Xavier del Bac near Tucson, Arizona, is an elaborate stone structure blending a range of Spanish architectural styles. In all of the states that experienced Spanish missionary activity, this built environment ultimately provided inspiration for the local identity, but only after being recast to fulfill American expectations.

This was the case, as Chris Wilson demonstrates, in New Mexico, where Americans adapted and extrapolated Spanish architecture to fit their self-image and enhance their quality of life. There as in California, the early settlers who arrived after the Mexican War set out to assert the fundamental American-ness of their new home. They sought to disguise the primitive-looking adobe structures they found in places like Santa Fe with façades worthy of the most typical small towns in the republic, to
demonstrate to themselves and visitors that they truly belonged. Subsequent groups of residents, secure in the knowledge that Santa Fe was indisputably American, sought to reverse these building trends in a bid to create a distinctive and profitable local identity. Wilson relates that Santa Fe’s civic promoters sought to build new structures, and rehabilitate older ones, with an appearance that could not be confused with any other region also experiencing a Mission Revival movement. This is seen in the guidelines for a 1913 competition to design a “New-Old Santa Fe” house, which advised contestants to avoid the California Mission style. “Nothing,” the guidelines warned, “can retard the development of Santa Fe style more than to confuse it with the California Mission Style.”

As the Santa Fe style spread, the church of San Esteban del Rey de Acoma itself was subjected to a similar approach. The Society for the Restoration and Preservation of New Mexico Missions set to work on the building in 1924 over the occasional protests of the pueblo’s residents, who had assumed the church would be repaired and brought up to date. The church was repaired, but in a manner that augmented the Society’s romantic vision. Wilson explains that this included towers based on Santa Fe’s La Fonda Hotel, which were based in turn on what the Society’s architect thought San Esteban’s towers should have looked like. History was not so much an absolute to be preserved inviolate, but a resource, like the building itself or the land around it, that Americans could employ in their quest for an attractive and distinctive aesthetic world.

As the mission style developed, it became attractive to American architects in part because of this connection to European history. The burgeoning American Arts and Crafts Movement, like its counterpart in Europe, sought a return to the values of the
rustic and the homemade as a means of countering an increasingly industrialized world. The hand-built quality of the missions held great appeal in this regard, as did the connection to the older, presumably slower paced Mediterranean world. Architectural historian Elizabeth McMillian notes that many of the early proponents of Mission Revival drew directly from the architectural vocabulary of the California vernacular style, although Americans had often distorted this vocabulary in the course of archeological reconstruction. By contrast, architects who made use of the more sophisticated Spanish Colonial Revival style often had little interest in the theories of Arts and Crafts or the actual details of early California culture. Instead, they were interested in a range of academically-defined period styles, of which Spanish Colonial was simply one variant. In the “Melting Pot” culture of the United States, it was the skillful execution of a period style in a contemporary manner that garnered praise, not its historical grounding. However, “The justification of California’s Spanish heritage was a nice addition for those who either wanted to perpetuate the mythic heritage or realized the appropriateness of the design elements for the California climate and heritage.”

McMillian argues that the Spanish Colonial Revival looked explicitly to Europe, and drew on a range of Spanish building traditions from the Islamic period to the nineteenth century: Moorish, Gothic, Renaissance (Plateresco), Classical (Desornamentado), Baroque (Churrigueresco), and Andalusian Vernacular. These new styles further reinforced Californians’ image of their state as a place possessing not just a Mediterranean climate, but a Mediterranean culture. With growing self confidence at the turn of the century came a desire to go beyond the emulation of simple adobe walls to a fuller expression of a prosperous, established society.
William Randolph Hearst took this next step in commissioning San Francisco architect Julia Morgan to design a new home for his Los Angeles *Examiner* newspaper. The result, completed in 1914, was not the sort of simple, “handmade” structure advocated by Charles Lummis and the Arroyo group. It was nothing less than a *Plateresco* palace of journalism, with lavish detail inside and out, though the California setting was still acknowledged with a curved Mission Order gable over the main entrance. In terms of design the building served as a forerunner for Hearst's estate at San Simeon, for which Julia Morgan was also responsible.\(^{32}\)

The *Examiner* building predated by one year the great celebration of California-as-Mediterranean-paradise at the Panama-California Exposition in San Diego, marking the completion of the Panama Canal. The Exposition’s organizers chose Bertram Grosvenor Goodhue of New York as the supervisory architect, assisted by local architect Irving Gill. The architectural theme was meant to be Mission Revival, along with southwestern Pueblo styles, but Goodhue’s fame and experience with the more ornate Spanish Colonial designs prevailed for the main buildings. This may have precipitated Gill’s resignation, as he favored a more subdued style of architecture. However, as Matthew Bokovoy explains in his recent study of the Exposition, Goodhue believed that the Spanish Colonial style, “forged between Indians and Spaniards on the frontier of New Spain,” was fundamentally North American and thus ideally suited to the Exposition’s intent.\(^{33}\) In this combination of Indian and Spanish architecture, Goodhue and his design assistants saw “the sense of moral purpose and artistic inspiration lacking in a nation mesmerized by secular thinking, business values, an uncertain Protestantism, and a cult of spiritless personality.”\(^{34}\) Whether expressed consciously or not, this view reflected
Charles Lummis’s thinking that the colonial past could serve as the basis for a new and more enlightened American future.

Goodhue, Stein, and assistant designer Carleton Winslow gave this belief physical form in what San Diego historian Richard Amero describes as “a fairy-tale city in Balboa Park of cloud-capped towers, gorgeous palaces and solemn temples.” The Exposition’s guide booklet informed visitors “It is hard to pull oneself back to the twentieth century for it is wondrous sweet to dwell in the romance of the old days, to peer down the cloister and try to see the shadowy shapes of the conquistadores creeping up the dell from their caravel at anchor in the Harbor of the Sun.” The centerpiece California Building assembled design elements drawn from throughout the Spanish-speaking world, including the Cathedral of Santa Prisca in Taxco, Mexico. To these were added figures of kings, missionaries and explorers ranging from Phillip III to George Vancouver—a clear assertion that California was an established society with its own rich history, and not simply an outpost of East Coast culture. Riverside hotelier Frank Miller, a friend of Charles Lummis, was so taken with Goodhue’s work that he predicted it would have an influence “for generations to come in every town and village in California.” Though Miller, like Lummis, was always given to some degree of hyperbole, the Mission Revival movement and its subsequent evolution, the Spanish Colonial Revival, did produce a number of new buildings throughout San Bernardino, Pasadena, and Riverside during the period.
III. The Mission Revival and the City Beautiful in Pasadena, Riverside and San Bernardino

The way these movements were expressed in each case reflects the character of the individual city, and foreshadows the roles the buildings would play in the decades following World War Two. Pasadena, befitting its status as the focal point for the Arroyo group, attempted a major program of civic design in the period inspired by the City Beautiful Movement. At the same time its local architects produced a range of landmark eclectic designs drawing on the larger ideals of the Arts and Crafts tradition that informed the Spanish Colonial aesthetic. Largely through the efforts of Frank Miller, Riverside's downtown became a showpiece of Spanish Colonial architecture, centering on Miller's own Mission Inn. The strength of the image is such that Riverside not only retains Miller's imprint in the twenty-first century, but is attempting to build on it as a key element of the city’s identity.

By contrast, San Bernardino grew without any particular effort at the sort of central planning found in the other two cities, though it was not without its charms. Rhode Island businessman Samuel Frank Dexter stopped in the city with his wife while on an extended tour of Southern California in 1901. Writing to his children back home, he recounted that “We at last landed in S.B. and we were more than pleased for we had been lead [sic] to believe that this place had no attractions and in stepping off the car we saw the town settled in a beautiful valley surrounded on all sides by mts of remarkable beauty and many parts of which were covered with snow.” In his letter of the following day, Dexter noted that “There are several fine buildings in San B. The Court House and Record building would be suitable anywhere.”
“Suitable anywhere” was an apt description of San Bernardino’s cityscape through much of the twentieth century. It tended to be solidly Middle American, without any particular reference to local or regional history. Mission and Colonial design found its way piecemeal into civic and private buildings around the city, but without coalescing into a greater architectural whole. San Bernardino’s distinctiveness and sense of place was instead based on the natural setting described by Dexter, and its role as a transportation hub. Because of this, the city’s most architecturally significant building was located away from the downtown, at the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad depot (see Figure 5). The relative paucity of distinctive structures in the central business
district probably made large scale redevelopment there more acceptable. The result of this is that in the present day, efforts to promote physical history on the model of Pasadena and Riverside must necessarily look outside the downtown to the largely Latino neighborhoods surrounding the depot.

City leaders had asked the railroad company to design a building that would be appropriate for the city's chosen image as “The Gateway City” of Southern California. Undoubtedly based on Santa Fe's experience with the Panama-California Exposition, and its own identification with popular conceptions of the Southwest, the company assigned staff architect W. A. Mohr to create a sprawling station in a “Moorish Revival” style, featuring domed towers and a 330-foot corredor facing the tracks to welcome new arrivals (See Figure 6). Completed in 1918, the depot housed baggage facilities, railway offices with the latest communications equipment and, from 1921, a Fred Harvey restaurant with living quarters for its staff of “Harvey Girls.”

Several small hotels were located near the depot, which was itself some distance from San Bernardino's downtown business district. There were a few older hotels in the downtown, such as “The Antlers,” but none on the same level as Riverside's Mission Inn or the resort hotels of Pasadena. California developer Roy Durbin initiated a project to change this situation in 1926, while also hoping to capitalize on the city's position at the intersection of several major highway and rail routes. Architect Frank Solt designed the California Hotel with elements of the Spanish Colonial style, such as Mission Order gables at strategic points, sections of tiled roofs, and a modest tower with arched windows. The storefronts of shops in the hotel's ground floor were also shaped to resemble an oversized corredor, but unlike at the depot, these features were added on to
an otherwise modern building, rather than being a guiding design principle. Perhaps because of this, the hotel never came to represent San Bernardino to the larger world in the way that Riverside's or Pasadena's hotels did for their cities, though it did function as an important cultural center for local residents.\textsuperscript{42}

Pasadena's businesses and civic organizations made a special point of publishing lavish photo books demonstrating to potential visitors the superior character of the city's buildings and, presumably, of the people to be found within. Some explicitly made the connection with California's missions, while others, such as the author of a promotional booklet produced for the Hotel Green in 1896, spoke in more general Mediterranean terms. Potential guests to the Green were informed that “The building is Moorish in design” and that “Situated in the Athens of this highly-favored region it is the chosen abode of the most cultivated and refined tourists and families who visit the Switzerland-Italy of America.” In common with the Mission Revival, however, was the evocation of a grand history suggestive of an established culture on the Pacific coast: “In this charming retreat it is easy to imagine one’s self transported to some far away foreign shore, in the shadow of an ancient building erected by a long-forgotten people, and yet kept from any symptom of decay by some mysterious power.”\textsuperscript{43}

By contrast, in the early decades of the twentieth century the Hotel Maryland would boast that while “Containing every appointment and every convenience of the most modern of American hotels, the Hotel Maryland yet reminds one of old Spanish days in the style of its architecture and the rich stucco color of its walls, which serve as a beautiful background for views and flowers and reflect every passing light and color.” Guest could enjoy a “Mission style” banquet room, while a photo of a pretty young
woman in a hammock served to remind them again that “The Spanish architecture of the Maryland bungalow is most attractive.”

The hotels Green and Maryland both featured in Beautiful Pasadena California, published around 1920, together with photographs of the San Gabriel Mission. The Mission was not physically in Pasadena, but the image suggests that it was within the mental image of the city. By this point the strictly Mission-style design was giving way in Pasadena to the more sophisticated and cosmopolitan late Spanish Colonial approach inspired in part by the Panama-California Exposition (See Figures 7 and 8). It was also driven by the City Beautiful movement, a physical manifestation of the larger trend of Progressivism. Fundamentally, City Beautiful sought to transform both the appearance of American cities, and the lives of those dwelling within them. Supporters of the movement believed in environmentalism—the notion that an individual's surroundings had a direct bearing on their thoughts and behaviors. They argued that by employing professional urban planners to create harmonious city layouts, municipalities could provide their citizens with a higher standard of living and enjoy what urban historian William Wilson describes as an “idealized, transcendental bond” with one another.

The essence of the City Beautiful idea was the Civic Center. This was to be a rational, efficient, and attractive place for the city to conduct its business, and which would impress on visitors the worthiness of those who created it. George Damon, the dean of Throop College of Technology (later known as the California Institute of Technology) made this point in 1915 in an address to the Woman’s Civic League of Pasadena. He asked “Wouldn’t it be a grand idea for our bigger and better city if our visitors could step out of a fitting gateway upon a view of an orderly municipal square, backed up with an
open plaza for our automobiles, while in the near distance could be seen an auditorium, a library, and the homes of numerous social organizations, all placed in a setting of lawns, flowers, and trees?” Damon also called for a city park at an area called Monk's Hill, which, he said, “should be to Pasadena what Rubidoux is to Riverside.” Astronomer George Ellery Hale described Pasadena as the “Athens of the West” and likewise called on residents to build a civic center of suitably international stature.

As a result of these and similarly positive pronouncements, Pasadena voters approved a $3.5 million bond measure in 1923 to build a Civic Center featuring a city hall “of imposing beauty, massive yet graceful, and suited to a land of flowers and sunshine.” The general plan was developed by the Chicago architectural firm of

Figure 7. Modern view of the Pasadena City Hall, western façade from East Holly St. The design of the building has more in common with the “White City” of the 1893 World’s Columbian Exposition in Chicago than anything created during California’s Spanish of Mexican periods. (Photo by the author, January 2010)
Bennet, Parsons and Frost and also included a new public library, civic auditorium, police department, municipal courthouse, YMCA and YWCA buildings, Southern California Gas Company office, and a post office. The San Francisco firm of Bakewell and Brown designed the city hall in an exuberant Palladian style (see Figure 7) that “seemed to get a Spanish reputation purely by association with the Southern California setting . . . .” 50

Figure 8. The Colorado Street Bridge over the Arroyo Seco, built during 1912-1913 in a Beaux Arts style characteristic of the City Beautiful movement in Pasadena. The bridge originally served as a dramatic entryway to the city’s downtown business district, but is now visually and functionally somewhat obscured by the adjacent State Highway 134 (Ventura Freeway). Nevertheless, the bridge remains one of Pasadena’s most recognizable features, and influenced the design of a number of other bridges around Southern California (See Figure 11). (Photograph by Brian Grogan for the Historic American Engineering Record, No. CA-58, December 1988).
The first building to be completed in the Civic Center, in 1927, was the library, designed by the firm of Myron Hunt and H. C. Chambers. Hunt had recently completed work on the rustic Yosemite National Park Museum, and had earlier designed the *Churrigueresco* First Congregational Church in Riverside and the Spanish Wing at Miller's Glenwood Mission Inn.51

This trend away from the “pure” Mission Style in Pasadena reflects the city's image of itself as an eclectic community—a view supported by the broad range of innovative architecture that developed out of the local Arts and Crafts tradition. The most notable are the bungalows created by brothers Charles and Henry Greene. Unlike the dramatic Spanish Colonial style or the more broadly Mediterranean designs found in Pasadena's large public buildings, the architecture of Greene and Greene was more suited to individual residences. They tended to bring to mind the appearance of the Midwestern towns that had previously been home to many Pasadena residents, combined with more subtle references to the Southwest or Asia. Together with other architects in the bungalow movement, they produced a style that proved to be an ideal expression of the character that Pasadena's residents wanted to project to the world. Because bungalow architecture was also intended to blend the design of the house with its surroundings, Greene and Greene made use of boulders from the Arroyo Seco, and native oaks, lending the finished buildings a sense of permanence. By extension, this was another way to assert the permanence of the city in which the house existed.52

These innovative architectural trends did not extend to all corners of the city. The Civic Center was built where it was because of growing problems with traffic congestion in the old business district surrounding western Colorado Boulevard. This area had
grown without any particular planning, and in its way also resembled Midwestern towns in its random collection of small commercial buildings on narrow streets. An attempt was made, following the completion of the Civic Center, to update the area by widening Colorado Boulevard to allow for U-turns—the assumption being that vehicle access was the key issue in the success of a modern business area. Some business owners also remodeled their storefronts, often in Spanish Colonial styles to echo the newer developments, but Art Deco design also had its adherents. Despite attempts at reshaping Colorado Boulevard, the grand plans of the City Beautiful never fully made its way into the area. As a result, it retained a small-scale character that would ultimately prove a major asset in post-World War Two Pasadena.

While Pasadena featured elements of the Spanish Colonial trend among a host of different architectural styles, it was the citizens of Riverside who made one of the most comprehensive attempts to refashion their city in an image that would recall the nineteenth century romance of Ramona. A promotional book published in 1889, titled Riverside Illustrated, A City Among the Orange Groves included photographs of the city's most prominent public buildings, all demonstrating some variation on the Victorian Gothic theme. By the early teens, California Mission Architecture Among the Orange Groves of Riverside showed that while citrus maintained its hold on the public imagination, the essence of the city was now expressed through stuccoed walls and tiled roofs. The Carnegie Library, the Federal Building, and an assortment of solidly respectable churches were all masterpieces of the Mission Revival and Spanish Colonial genres. The centerpiece of the book, and indeed of Riverside in the decades preceding the Second World War, was the Mission Inn—the lifelong obsession of Frank Miller. A
hotel owner, art collector, friend to the rich and powerful, amateur diplomat and local éminence grise, Miller imposed a personal vision on Riverside that continues to shape the city's image and course of development in the twenty-first century.

Frank Augustus Miller arrived in Riverside from his hometown of Tomah, Wisconsin, when his father Christopher Columbus Miller was hired to survey the irrigation canal of the early New England and Santa Ana colonies. The elder Miller was paid in land—a full block in the middle of the New England colony where he and his son hired local Indians to build them an adobe house in 1876. Striving, as were their fellow residents, for a sense of permanence and respectability, the Millers finished their house as a typical New England residence.  

Because there was no hotel for visitors and prospective residents to the new town, Christopher Miller began accepting paying guests in 1878. He formally sold the operation in 1880 to his son Frank, who apparently had a flair for business and promoting development. The little inn was named the “Glenwood Tavern,” suggestive of the grand hotel in Glenwood Springs, Colorado, and by extension, the scale of Miller's plans. By 1887, he was in the position to play a key part in developing and managing the Riverside and Arlington Street Railway streetcar system that would give the city a sense of modernity while encouraging a suburban pattern of low-density expansion.  

Though small, Riverside's streetcars attracted the attention of Henry E. Huntington as he looked to assemble local rail lines into his Pacific Electric System. Huntington acquired the Riverside operation, and in the process became acquainted with the energetic Miller. Perhaps recognizing a kindred spirit, Huntington was the primary backer of the Glenwood Inn Company, incorporated in May, 1902. Huntington's
financial clout enabled Miller to hire Arthur Benton to design an extensive new building surrounding the original adobe. Benton had first come to Miller's attention for his work on Riverside's First Church of Christ, Scientist, building during 1901-1902. Also during 1902, Benton prepared the design for the city's new Carnegie Library—a structure described as “Moorish,” but which, in fact, was a classic expression of the Mission Revival style. His original drawings for the Glenwood Inn showed no suggestion of

![Figure 9. Riverside's Carnegie Library (1903-1964), designed by Arthur Benton, exemplified the architectural motifs characteristic of the Mission Revival style. The design is fundamentally ecclesiastical, presumably to suggest that the library was a temple of learning. This metaphor was one that Andrew Carnegie specifically encouraged in libraries he funded. The steps leading to the entrance (visible on the left) symbolized personal elevation, and the lamps alongside the steps represented enlightenment. (Riverside Public Library, Photo LIB RIV CEN CAR V 22 CLD2-98)](image-url)
missions, but Miller soon became enamored of the style and called for its addition during construction.\textsuperscript{59}

\textit{Figure 10.} Main entrance to the Mission Inn, in the form of a \textit{campanario}, from Mission Inn Avenue. Beyond the archway, to the left, are plaques commemorating the Hotel’s designation as a National Historic Landmark, and a visit by African American educator Booker T. Washington. This is the first of a number of courtyards and terraces encountered by guests, which serve to surround them with Frank Miller’s version of history, while excluding the surrounding city. (Photo by the author, January 2010).
Miller issued a promotional booklet for his new hotel in 1902, playing heavily on the mission theme and the surrounding landscape. “Nowhere,” it claimed, “do stately crags pierce bluer skies or silver streams thread through finer groves than in California’s Eden, Riverside, where halcyon days ever wait those weary of the icy breath of winter or summer’s torrid blast. This Southland is a land of romance and mystery, where the gray walls of ancient missions awaken memories of mellow chimes, sounding from some distant monastery, and visions of fathers of the faith moving past with solemn tread in their chosen home of peace.” The hotel itself, a “long, low, cloistered building, in style like the old Missions, encloses a spacious court, wherein is the old Adobe, or Casino, which adjoins the stately Campanile with its sweet chime of old Mission bells.” The “old Adobe” was in fact the original Miller home, stripped of its New England-style exterior trim and gabled roof. All the better to serve Miller's romantic vision:

“Within, as without, the mission style of architecture has been followed and emphasized in the decoration and quaint monastic furnishings. The colonnaded parlors, rotunda, and dining-room; the mezzanine floors and the social halls, all add to the charm of this luxurious resort. Heavy open timbered ceilings lend that sense of strength that is typical of the old Missions . . . .”

Arthur Benton clearly shared Miller's enthusiasm for this grand redesign, and even went beyond it. Where Miller initially made only passing references to Spanish missionaries to set the scene for the Glenwood, Benton produced a remarkable book in the form of an illuminated manuscript, “religious in style,” praising his both own work and Miller's inspiration. He declared in *The Mission Inn* (1908) that beyond its hospitality and architecture, the hotel was known as the center of the “betterment of
Riverside, whether of social or civic life.” And, at the center of the hotel was Frank Miller, who—Benton assured the reader—had made it his life’s work to improve Riverside through his advocacy for better highways, public buildings, schools and parks. The Mission Inn was the grandest expression of this impulse, and through Miller’s “love for old California ways,” one that the author believed put the state in his debt. Benton explained that “The Mission Inn is making history; therefore I have thought it not unfitting to link it in story with the old time mission days which have been its inspiration.”

What makes the book so significant is that Benton created a fictional history casting the hotel as the direct inheritor of the mission legacy. In sometimes perilous verse he related the tale of a kindly “Father Gorgonio” at San Juan Capistrano, who in a rash moment cursed a burro belonging to the mission’s cook, an Indian convert named “Antonio.” Antonio and his burro fled in fear, to Gorgonio’s great regret. Later, weak with hunger after becoming lost during a night-time storm in the San Bernardino Valley, Gorgonio wished that he could taste Antonio’s cooking one last time. Of course, who should then rescue him but the same Antonio. While at Antonio’s welcoming hut, the missionary fell into a dream, and saw a vision of a beautiful building something like his own mission, where scores of guests could experience the same kind hospitality that he enjoyed. “Here glad birds sing and children play/ Here youth and age keep holiday/ Here none ahungered go unfed/ Here none aweary lack for bed/ Here love keep warm and hate turn cold/ Here kindness count for more than gold/ here works well worth the while be wrot/ Here men be loved, nor God forgot.” And if that were not enough, Benton had Gorgonio dedicate the site to St. Francis, foreshadowing the Frank who was to come. He
depicted his creation as mission in its own right, where guests were pilgrims and doves chanted “songs of Holy Church.”

This explicit connection between the missions and what was now called the Mission Inn was reinforced in subsequent years by Miller's own promotional materials. The 1915 *Handbook of the Mission Inn*, by Francis Borton, points out that there was never a mission or old church in Riverside, but nonetheless documented “the importance, historic and sentimental, of the old mission buildings, those earliest monuments of Christian civilization on the Pacific Coast.” Guests were informed that the hotel embodied the “spirit of those old mission days, the spirit of courtesy and kindliness and true, frank hospitality.” Physically, the building incorporated the side wall and *campanario* of the San Gabriel mission, the front of Santa Barbara, the dome of Carmel, and the colonnades of San Fernando and San Juan Capistrano. Those who stayed at the Inn were invited to feel the influence of saints, and to regard themselves as pilgrims. They could gain further enlightenment from Miller's collection of artwork illustrating the “growth of worship through the ages” while appreciating his collection of bells, including one saved from the “hellish unbelief” of the Moors. By 1940, after Miller's death, much of the religious emphasis was toned down, though the hotel still contained a number of ecclesiastical artifacts. These included a baptismal font brought from Taos, New Mexico, the private altar from the mansion of the Marquis de Rayas in Guanajuato, Mexico, and the International Shrine for Aviators located in the St. Francis Chapel. According to the 1940 *Handbook*, Miller had determined that St. Francis was a lover of both “birds and birdmen.”
Miller was not content to confine his attentions to the Mission Inn, and as an increasingly influential behind-the-scenes presence he had a major voice in the building of Riverside as a whole. He worked closely with the Sunkist Growers citrus cooperative and the Santa Fe Railroad to sell Riverside’s reputation as a Mediterranean-style resort destination and to develop it as a proper setting for his hotel. Miller had envisioned Seventh Street as an avenue of distinguished government and community buildings.

Figure 11. The Victoria Avenue Bridge over Tequesquite Arroyo in Riverside, built in 1928. The bridge design incorporates the same general design elements as the earlier Colorado Street Bridge, though simplified and on a smaller scale. The bridge connects the city’s downtown with the Arlington Heights neighborhood, and was meant to compliment Victoria Avenue’s scenic drive through the citrus growing district. (Photograph by Brian Grogan for the Historic American Engineering Record, CA-122, 1993).
guests. By the 1920s, the street had become a showplace for the Mission Revival style, between his hotel and the city’s railroad stations, in order to further impress arriving including buildings that had been designed by architects who also worked on the Mission Inn. According to Zona Gale, a friend of Miller and the author of his hagiographical 1938 biography, his guiding principle and advice to all comers was “Dramatize your resources . . . . That's nothing but common sense.” Miller said “I used to lie awake at night, planning what Riverside must have to bring out its best . . . . Its development was a game.”

Frank Miller was aided in his quest by the California State Planning Act of 1927, which gave communities the authority to adopt master plans to guide both public and private growth and development. The city had formed a planning commission in 1916—the third in the state after Berkeley and San Rafael—but the new statute gave its recommendations the authority to make substantial changes. Riverside officials quickly moved to hire Charles Cheney—one of first professional urban planners—to draft a comprehensive vision for the city's future. The Cheney Plan built on existing efforts and expanded projects already underway. Significantly, it formalized the Seventh Street civic center concept that Miller had been advocating. The Plan focused considerable attention to accommodating cars by widening major streets and extending or creating others. To that end it also pushed for wider, shallower house lots without alleys behind, to accommodate garages instead of carriage houses and stables. Though not a part of the Cheney Plan, the city endorsed efforts by Frank Miller's Spanish Art Association to build pergolas along the sidewalks out of reinforced concrete, disguised to look like logs—“such a mission lane as one might imagine in a town of unimagined southern beauty,” as
Gale effusively described the results (see Figure 12). Henry Coil, the president of the planning commission from 1927 into the late 1940s, said of Miller’s discreet influence: “You would see his hand, but you didn’t see him.”

In addition to his bells, Frank Miller also maintained a large collection of crosses, chief among them one with two horizontal arms that Miller maintained was a “raincross” symbol used by Southwestern Indians. Placed atop a trapezoidal frame containing a bell, the raincross became the symbol of the Mission Inn, and eventually of the entire city of Riverside. Miller actually donated the symbol to Riverside, which adapted it for use on streetlights installed throughout the city from 1910 onward (see Figure 12). Local journalist and historian Tom Patterson wrote that “For many a tourist, the view of these decorative street lights, interspersed with trees, became in memory a symbol of

*Figure 12* (Left) A surviving, though overgrown, pergola section along Mission Inn Avenue, outside of the former railroad freight depot—now an Italian restaurant. This portion of the Avenue is separated from the downtown by Interstate 215/Highway 91 and its access ramps, discouraging pedestrian traffic from downtown proper to the west of the freeway. (Right) A raincross streetlight on Mission Inn Avenue. Both photos by the author, January 2010.
Riverside. The identities of the city and the Mission [Inn] became so enter-twined for so many years that it was one of the more interminable tasks to explain that the Inn was a hotel and only incidentally a museum. It was also necessary to explain, again and again, that no part of the Inn or its site had ever been a mission or a church and that no Franciscan mission had ever been situated in or adjacent to Riverside.” 70

Zona Gale asserted that Miller “tried in many ways to discharge a little of the unpayable American debt to the Indians.” 71 Though well intentioned, some of these ways suggest the tendency, as Phoebe Kropp has noted, to regard Indians as living museum exhibits, rather than residents of the modern world. Gale relates that Miller hoped to acquire the Indian village produced for San Francisco’s Panama-Pacific Exposition of 1915, including its residents, to be set up in one of the city’s parks: “We can give some of those people work, and the rest of them will just be Indians for the tourists.” 72 Presumably, to “just be Indians” meant to behave in the picturesque way that tourists expected.

To be fair to Miller, he did seem to place special emphasis on a nascent form of multiculturalism. When Booker T. Washington was a guest at the Mission Inn, Miller insisted that the educator dine with him at his private table—a visit still memorialized at the hotel by a bronze plaque. Miller’s wide-ranging artistic interests took him to Japan, and inspired in him an enthusiasm for promoting improved relations between that nation and the United States. He was proud that his efforts had been recognized by the Japanese government with the award of the “Fourth Degree of Merit of Meiji” and the “Small Order of the Rising Sun.” 73
IV. Displaced from the New History—Minority Residents and Migrants

However, Miller’s fondness for Asian culture was not generally shared outside of the world of art and architecture. The Chinese population of California had been subject to increasingly severe restrictions, both legal and extra-legal, since the 1850s. As the Panic of 1873 sent the national economy into a depression for the remainder of the decade, members of groups such as the Workingmen’s Party of California turned their wrath on Chinese immigrants and their effects in the labor market. Their agitation helped to create a sentiment at the national level leading to the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Treaty of 1880, followed by the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and subsequent legislation to block new Chinese residents. However, during this same decade, the first Japanese immigrants began arriving in Southern California. Walter Nugent pointedly comments in Into the West (1999) that they “provided West Coast xenophobes with a new supply of Asian targets just as the Chinese were fading.” By 1920, the Japanese population of Los Angeles County had risen to 20,000 and this, combined with their growing economic success, made them the principal target of even more restrictions on the rights of Asian immigrants.

The Chinese residents of Riverside, as seen earlier, were highly visible due to their living together in a distinct neighborhood. To a degree this made them easy targets for the antipathy of the larger population because of their readily apparent “otherness.” On the other hand, attempting to fit in with the white population was no guarantee of success either. Japanese native Jukichi Harada, who operated a restaurant and boarding house, discovered this fact after buying a home in 1915 within a few blocks of the Mission Inn and its resident advocate of Asian culture. California’s Alien Land Law of
1913 would have made Harada’s ownership of the house illegal as he was not a citizen, and forbidden to “possess, acquire, transfer, or enjoy any real property in the state.” Harada claimed that the property was owned by his three children Mine, Sumi, and Yoshizo, who had been born in the United States and were thus unaffected by the law. In the year following the purchase Harada expanded the house with a second floor, while declining profitable buy-out offers from neighbors who were worried that he would bring down their land values. In October of the same year the neighbors filed charges against Harada with the attorney general of California, charging that he was violating the intent, if not the letter, of the Alien Land Law. Judge Hugh Crain of the Riverside County Superior Court issued his ruling on *The People of the State of California v. Jukichi Harada, et al.* on September 17, 1918 in favor of Harada, agreeing that native-born children of immigrants enjoyed the full rights of American citizenship, regardless of their parents’ status. However, Harada’s legal victory did not hasten a new era of respect of Japanese and Japanese-American rights among white residents of Riverside.

If anything, the Harada case might have contributed to a hardening of opinion against minorities in general by the city’s white population in the late-teens and early-twenties. During this period, restrictive covenants and other expressions of racial hostility gradually pushed Riverside’s African American residents towards the east side of the city, across the railroad tracks from the downtown area. Originally there had been no “Black neighborhood.” From the time the first migrants from the deep South arrived in 1875, they had lived throughout the city, enjoying the freedom of what they hoped would be an “American Canaan.” Like many people who made the trip west, these migrants had hoped to put the past behind them. But, as segregation took hold, separate
business districts, such as Casa Blanca, originally the home of an English tennis club, developed to cater specifically to East Side residents.80

While they might have been able to take care of basic commerce close to home, Riverside's civic and recreational amenities were still concentrated on the West side. These included the municipal pool at Fairmount Park, which operated on the "understanding" that African Americans would only swim on Thursday. This arrangement was challenged in August 1920 by an African American high school student who attempted to use the pool on a different day, and was denied entry. The student's father, Frank Johnson, sought the help of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People's Los Angeles office in bringing a lawsuit against the city to force a change in policies. City Attorney Miguel Estudillo filed demurrers against the lawsuit, centering on the questions of whether the city's park board was acting in a governmental or a proprietary capacity when it set its admission policies. A local auto dealers' newspaper, The Citizen, left little question where its sentiments lay, urging Riverside's leadership in 1921 to "enforce the park board ruling to the letter and if these agitators start anything a little 'action' will soon clear the atmosphere'.” The NAACP proposed to withdraw the suit in April 1921 if the city council would adopt a resolution stating all residents had the right to use pool, which the council was agreeable to, provided "the colored people would do as they have for the first nine years and abstain from the use of the plunge excepting at the particular times agreed upon for them as their period."81 Ultimately the case was settled out of court, and in 1925 the city built Lincoln Park—with a pool—on the East Side of the city in a primarily African American neighborhood.
With it came an “understanding” that the Fairmount Park pool was once again meant only for whites.\textsuperscript{82}

This was just one local incident reflecting the nationwide growth of segregationist sentiments. Ten years after this particular episode, John Gabbert admitted in his “mug book” style history of Riverside County that the Ku Klux Klan was “strong in Riverside,” and managed to have one of its members—grocer Edward Dighton—elected mayor in 1927 after a “bitter” campaign.\textsuperscript{83} Dighton's tenure was short, as he immediately antagonized the city council by demanding that it do more to enforce prohibition locally. His position was backed by an anonymous “One Hundred Percent American League,” which issued a circular blaming alcohol for most of society's ills. Dighton filed suit against the Riverside \textit{Press} because of its claims that he and the Klan were behind the circulars, and went on to charge the city government with “irregularities and a heavy shortage of funds.” Both Dighton and the city council hired auditors to investigate the matter, and for good measure the council brought its own charge of criminal libel against the mayor. Although Dighton was acquitted, he was still removed from office through a special recall election in February 1929.\textsuperscript{84}

Riverside's stance on the use of city facilities by members of ethnic minorities was not unique in Southern California during the first half of the twentieth century. Adele Barnes, an early resident of Pasadena, recalled that during this same period African Americans were only allowed to use the city's Brookside pool one day a week, before its scheduled cleaning.\textsuperscript{85} Benjamin McAdoo, the son of the first African American restaurateurs and grocers in Pasadena, explained that unofficial segregation in that city followed the same general pattern as has been seen in Riverside: “When I came
here, most of the blacks lived on South Vernon Avenue. That was the ghetto. Vernon Avenue is known as St. John Ave. now since Ambassador College is there. The restrictive laws came into being about the early twenties. There were blacks living around in spots all over town because they had moved in when it was just vacant territory. Segregation at that time was so well known that nobody challenged it.”

Much of the segregation was of the covert variety, including zoning ordinances that worked against African Americans, or restrictive covenants to keep them from moving into “traditionally” white neighborhoods. A study completed in 1941 reported that a campaign by white business leaders had, to that point, secured agreements making sixty-percent of the city's residential housing unavailable to African Americans. Other discrimination was more overt. Benjamin McAdoo noted that as the African American population grew and expanded outwards, the pastor of the First Methodist Church preached a sermon on its residents “getting into neighborhoods where they weren’t wanted.” Beyond that, McAdoo remembered an attempt to burn down the African Methodist Episcopal church that had been built on North Vernon Avenue, beyond what he identified as the South Vernon ghetto.

As Pasadena grew, its connection with Southern California's citrus culture became increasingly abstract. As part of its image, the city’s promoters built on the “gentleman farmer” model, where groves were more of a garden feature associated with a particular lifestyle, rather than large scale production. In Riverside and San Bernardino citrus was an industry depending heavily on immigrant farm workers—in the nineteen-twenties, primarily from Mexico. The long harvesting season characteristic of citrus fruits meant that the grove and packing house workers were often able to establish a more settled life
than those who followed the crops in California's San Joaquin Valley. Many still had to contend with poor living conditions in squatters' camps, such as one in the Santa Ana River wash between San Bernardino and Riverside. Other families were able to achieve a permanent residency, buying or renting plots of land on the edges of towns.⁸⁹

This permanence proved to be an illusion with the coming of the Great Depression. To appease those calling for “American jobs for American workers,” U.S. Secretary of Labor William Doak instituted a plan in 1931 to round up and deport all illegal aliens living and working in the United States. This resulted in only a fraction of the expected four hundred thousand deportations, but officials in Los Angeles, San Bernardino, Riverside and Orange counties seized on the idea. Historian Camille Guerin-Gonzales demonstrates that the officials used the implied threat of mass deportations to induce Mexicans and Mexican Americans living in California legally to be voluntarily repatriated to Mexico. In some cases these included families whose children were native-born U.S. citizens.⁹⁰ Popular sentiment in San Bernardino guaranteed that such plans would receive a favorable response. The editor of the San Bernardino Sun threw the newspaper's support behind a proposal by Los Angeles County supervisor John Quinn, explaining it provided that “aliens illegally in the country be prevented by law from holding jobs, entering business or taking any part in the commercial life of the country. More power to Mr. Quinn and his plan!”⁹¹

Mexican consuls, such as Armando Alatorre in San Bernardino, readily cooperated with local officials on the deportations. The Mexican government had its own concerns with large-scale emigration to the United States. The loss of workers not only hampered Mexico's prospects for industrial growth, at the time it was seen as
an embarrassment to the ideals of the nation's revolution. Largely through Consul Alatorre's efforts, trains carrying from 150 to 400 repatriates from San Bernardino and Riverside counties left San Bernardino on an average of one per month from April 1931 to February 1933. Of the 3,492 individuals sent to Mexico as a result of this operation, only five had been formally deported. The irony was entirely unintentional, but these returnees boarded their trains at the Santa Fe depot designed to evoke the spirit of the Spanish colonial era.

Even as local officials supported the effort to create more jobs for American workers, they found themselves facing the dilemma of the jobs being filled by what they often saw as the wrong kind of Americans. This was apparent as early as 1931, when the Catholic Altar League in the town of Colton, between San Bernardino and Riverside, decided to close its busy soup kitchen after noticing that “hard up” local working men had largely given way in the serving line to “professional traveling types.” The stream of out-of-state job seekers and “traveling types” entering Southern California would prove to be one of the primary concerns in the area during the Depression, particularly during and after 1935. The number of jobs that could have been created through the Mexican repatriation was more than matched by the ever-increasing number of migrants from the Dust Bowl states willing to work for virtually any wage, no matter how low. Walter Stein explains that the Dusts Bowl migration kept pay rates so low “that local residents actually lost money if they went off relief in order to pick crops. Had there been no Okie influx, wages in California agriculture likely would have risen.” This influx was the most important factor in the 20 percent increase in the population of San Bernardino County between 1935 and
1940, and proved a significant burden for the county under the provisions of the New Deal. The county supervisors were, as a result, apparently quite happy to play host to officers from the Los Angeles Police Department attempting to turn back persons of “no definite purpose” and no means of support—an episode known as the “Bum Blockade”—at the far eastern edge of the county at the Colorado River.  

Table 1. Area and Population, 1940

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Area (sq. mi.)</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Non-white</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Pasadena</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>81,864</td>
<td>76,707 (93.7%)</td>
<td>5,157 (6.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riverside</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>34,696</td>
<td>32,822 (94.6%)</td>
<td>1,874 (5.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Bernardino</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>43,646</td>
<td>42,686 (97.8%)</td>
<td>960 (2.2%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The county and the Los Angeles Police soon discovered that the effects of the Depression could not be addressed so easily. Despite the earlier repatriations, Mexican workers still presented convenient targets as relief programs drained the local economy. San Bernardino’s local daily newspaper—the *Sun*—declared that many citizens would “wonder why the relief budget could not be balanced with existing revenues by the simple process of refusing to extend aid to aliens who refuse, neglect, or are not eligible to become citizens of the United States.”  

And as seen in the early 1930s, migration by those who were citizens presented its own problems. Throughout 1940 newspaper readers were told that if the state and federal governments did not formulate a plan to permanently settle and employ the ever-growing numbers of people arriving in California from the South and Midwest, the state's living standards would be seriously disrupted.
Concern that the classic Southern California image—healthy and prosperous living amid endless sun and citrus—was in danger of being lost seems to have been the primary fear during the early 1930s. Newspaper accounts of police raids on local stills and gin joints far outnumbered pieces on the state of the economy. A local minister, one Golder Lawrence, took the city leadership to task in a speech before the San Bernardino Kiwanis Club in September 1932. He excoriated the city's law enforcement for a lax attitude toward “commercialized vice and speakeasies.” “Something must be done,” Lawrence warned, “if we are to have a society in San Bernardino that can hold up its head in common decency.” Lawrence built on the speech by announcing the formation of the City Betterment League “to combat the flourishing vice conditions which are giving San Bernardino a reputation as the wide open city of the Southland.” In response the city's mayor, I. N. Gilbert, and police chief, W. H. Baldwin, blamed the police court for letting offenders off too easily, while police court judge Donald Van Luven insisted that it was the police department's fault for not enforcing the law in the first place.

Whatever the cause, and despite the efforts of the City Betterment League, by 1940 the city of San Bernardino still had some forty houses of ill-repute. The *Sun* echoed the dire warnings of 1932, insisting that “This community can continue to plug cotton in its ears and refuse to listen to what others are saying about its reputation as to morals or it can organize a militant movement to clean up.” By this point, local citizens realized that it was not simply an image at stake. The United States Army's Air Service Command was considering San Bernardino as the site for an aircraft repair depot, but threatened instead to declare the city off limits to personnel stationed at
Riverside's March Field unless the city could bring prostitution under control. The “cleanup agenda” ordered by incoming mayor Will Seccombe in February 1941 put enough of a crimp in the red light district's business that the War Department felt safe to go ahead with its plans, but the city was still notorious among members of the armed forces right through World War Two.\textsuperscript{101}

March Field, the motivation for both the Army's interest in, and concern over, San Bernardino had its beginnings in 1917 during the United States' mobilization for the First World War. The Alessandro Aviation Field, as it was first designated, was laid out some ten miles from downtown Riverside on an abandoned town site named for the male protagonist in \textit{Ramona}. It has been suggested in local histories that Frank Miller may have played a role in the Army's decision, despite a lack of direct evidence. Given Miller's level of influence in the city, residents may have come to assume that he was involved in any major development that occurred during his lifetime. The field initially served as a training base, and the student pilots soon managed to offend the sensibilities of many in the nearby city. Their “impositions upon the hospitality” of Riverside's citizens led the city council to pass an ordinance banning public kissing, in hopes of protecting the virtuous women of Riverside.\textsuperscript{102} The sharp reduction in military forces and the need for aviation training following the end of the war caused the Army to deactivate what had become March Field between 1923 and 1927. A caretaker staff looked after the facility until increased budgets allowed the new Army Air Corps to reopen the field and resume training operations. As Col. William Gardenhire began directing the refurbishment of the field's temporary structures he received word that the base would be rebuilt in the Mission Revival style, including
the control tower. Assistance with the designs was provided by the city of Riverside's Park Board, and major construction was completed by 1934. 103

Both March Field and the San Bernardino Air Depot, ultimately renamed for local war hero Glen Norton, became the primary engines driving growth in Riverside

Figure 13. Advertisement for the California Flyers School of Aviation in Inglewood, 1939. The ad was intended to show the graduates of the aviation school the many employment opportunities that awaited them. Seen in retrospect, it suggests the extent of the aircraft industry that was to transform Southern California in the coming decade. The manufacturers featured in the ad are Douglas (Santa Monica), Douglas (El Segundo), Lockheed, Vultee, North American Aviation, Menasco, Interstate Engineering, Security Aircraft, and Consolidated. The airline companies are Western Air Express, Trans World Airlines, Continental, Pan-American, American Airlines, and Wilmington-Catalina Airways. (Advertisement in the author’s collection).
and San Bernardino during the World War Two and the remainder of the 1940s. At its height March supported some 75,000 troops for aircrew training, with a further 85,000 troops at the adjacent Camp Hahn anti-aircraft artillery school. Added to this was the civilian workforce supplying clerical and other administrative needs. At Norton the civilian workforce was predominant, reaching 22,618 by December 1943, with 4,603 military personnel. The magnitude of the changes imposed on the area becomes apparent when considering that the total population of San Bernardino in 1940 was 43,646. Civic leaders throughout California had hoped local military spending would fuel continued economic growth, but the impact of the war caught them unaware.

A significant problem was that the wartime buildup was too successful in producing more jobs. Military service and military-related jobs pulled skilled workers away from established industries, and created a demand beyond what the local labor market could supply. Many businesses and manufacturing operations turned to women to fill their vacancies, but the situation was particularly acute in the agricultural sector, which could not offer competitive wages and benefits. Ultimately it required the intervention of the federal government, and a familiar source of cheap labor. The United States negotiated an agreement with Mexico in 1942 to bring Mexican nationals to fill the same jobs that had been so jealously reserved for Americans only a decade earlier. According to the terms of the agreement, known as the “Bracero” program, the Mexican workers would not be used to displace Americans or lower wage rates. They were theoretically guaranteed a minimum of 75 percent of the prevailing wage for their particular job and locale, together with minimum
standards for working and housing conditions. American employers, however, were often tempted to cut the definition of minimum as finely as possible. In the case of the Braceros arriving for work in the San Bernardino area by train, most doubtlessly passed through the same Spanish Revival depot as Mexicans who had been repatriated in the early thirties.106

By contrast with the large-scale military presence in San Bernardino and Riverside, Pasadena was host to various headquarters operations and an Army convalescent hospital. These were primarily located in hotels that had suffered serious losses of business during the Depression. Some had been converted into apartment buildings, while others, such as the Hotel Maryland—demolished in August 1937 to make way for a Broadway department store—disappeared altogether. The founding of the California Institute of Technology’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory in 1944 likely suggested to some within the city that the prewar economic focus on seasonal tourism could be replaced after the war by research facilities and precision manufacturing for the aeronautical industry. This idea would play a major role in the planning and development process in Pasadena from the 1950s onward, and in the resulting redefinition of the city’s identity.107

New directions for city planning were also driven by the need to accommodate the population growth brought about by the war. Pasadena’s increase of 27.7% between 1940 and 1950 was comparatively modest compared to other communities in Southern California. Riverside and San Bernardino, with more adjacent open land to accommodate new residential development, experienced increases of 34.8% and 44.5%, respectively.108 Such growth taxed the ability of the municipal governments
to extend the necessary service infrastructure, while encouraging the migration of retail and entertainment businesses away from the central business districts.\textsuperscript{109} Compared to Riverside and San Bernardino, the physical growth of Pasadena was constrained by the population density of the San Gabriel Valley, but the city still experienced the effects of suburbanization as a regional process.

The development of freeways like the Arroyo Seco Parkway brought Pasadena more directly into the metropolitan sphere, and changed an essential aspect of the city’s character. Early promotional material for the Raymond Hotel assured visitors that “Los Angeles itself is shut out by its own surrounding hills, so that the visitor has not even the distraction of the busy town to attract him from the more rural aspect” of the immediate scenery.\textsuperscript{110} In the postwar period this rural flavor would increasingly become a nostalgic memory, and Pasadena, like San Bernardino and Riverside, would face the challenges inherent in a much larger urban area. Each had its own approach to accommodating growth, and what to do with the older sections of the town that no longer seemed to fit into the modern order.
Figure 14. Overview of Pasadena showing the location of “Old Pasadena” (Historic Resources Group and Pasadena Heritage, Cultural Resources of the Recent Past: Historic Context Report (Pasadena: City of Pasadena, 2007), 12).
Figure 15. Pasadena Central Business District incorporating West Colorado Boulevard and the Civic Center (City of Pasadena, “District-wide Map 1: Specific Plan Boundaries,” Central District Specific Plan (Pasadena: City of Pasadena Planning and Development Department, 2004), 3).
Figure 16. Overview of Riverside highlighting the original central business district (Adapted from City of Riverside, “Figure LU-10, Land Use Policy Map,” General Plan 2025, Land Use/Urban Design Element (Riverside: City of Riverside, 2007), LU-54).
Figure 17. Riverside Central Business District and associated residential areas (Adapted from The Arroyo Group, “Figure 1A, Specific Plan Area, Downtown Specific Plan,” Downtown Specific Plan (Riverside: City of Riverside, 2002), 1-4).
Figure 18. Overview of San Bernardino highlighting the Santa Fe railroad yards (left) and the E Street commercial corridor (right) (Adapted from City of San Bernardino, “Figure I-2, City Boundaries and Sphere of Influence,” San Bernardino General Plan (San Bernardino: City of San Bernardino, 2005), 1-7).
Figure 19. Detail of the Santa Fe railroad yards (left) and the E Street commercial corridor (right) (Adapted from San Bernardino South Quadrangle, California, 7.5-Minute Series (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of the Interior, United States Geological Survey, 2009)).
CHAPTER 6

PLANNING THE POSTWAR CITY

World War Two transformed the landscape of Southern California physically, culturally and economically in a span of only four years. Cities large and small struggled to accommodate the sudden population growth while devising strategies to retain the benefits that accompanied the influx of new defense-related industries. At the same time, they sought ways to address the problems, exacerbated by these changes, of their aging downtown business districts. In common with cities throughout the region and nation, Pasadena, Riverside and San Bernardino launched large-scale civic planning and urban renewal projects with the guidance and support of the federal government.

Perceptions within ethnic minority groups that they were being bypassed by renewal, or even actively victimized by it, sharpened resentments brought about by the apparent return to the inequalities of the pre-war years. In all three cities, minority residents challenged these inequalities, and demanded a place within a larger definition of the community. During the same period, advocates for local history and architecture—primarily in Pasadena and Riverside—were increasingly concerned by renewal’s emphasis on rebuilding the older downtown sections that they believed were the source much of the cities’ distinctive character and appeal. By the mid- to late-1960s, these views began receiving tentative support from at least some within the urban planning field.
I. Postwar Planning and Development in Southern California

Post-war San Bernardino still resembled the typical Western city at the beginning of the decade, in which economic and political power was largely personal, residing with established families and downtown business cliques.\footnote{1} At the county level the situation was much the same. The total population had increased by some 22 percent between 1940 and 1944, from 161,108 to 197,000 due to wartime industrial and military buildup—a condition the county government described as its “war winnings.” As far as both city and county governments were concerned, their primary task was to direct planning efforts to retain these winnings.\footnote{2} San Bernardino was thus among those communities in Southern California that sought to preserve the status quo, rather than risk political reforms that could threaten this new prosperity.

The status quo meant, among other things, maintaining a city government that operated under the terms of the 1905 charter, which provided for a strong mayor/weak council system that gave the mayor the power of a city manager, but without the concomitant accountability to the city council. The mayor did not have a vote on the council, but exercised the right of veto over all council orders, resolutions, and ordinances.\footnote{3} Additionally, the mayor had the freedom to act by executive order, including entering into contracts on behalf of the city.\footnote{4} In practice, this meant that the mayors were inordinately responsible for guiding the city’s economic development efforts.\footnote{5} Al C. Ballard, a former firefighter and weed-abatement contractor who occupied the office from 1965 to 1971, exemplifies this situation. He was so pleased by the extent of redevelopment during his term that he urged the city’s Chamber of Commerce to change its motto from “The Friendly City” to “City on the Move.” He was equally
proud of his ability to extract funding from the federal government, claiming that “all he had to do was be there first with the best program and he could bring some home with him. . . . he told about ‘wining and dining’ the people in Washington by night and proving to them he needed federal aid to keep his city on the move by day.”

Clearly, with such a system the direction of the city government depended on the ability and personality of the individual occupying the mayor’s office—an individual not required to be a professional administrator, as in the case of a city manager. It is also clear that any mayor with enough allies on the city council could act with almost complete impunity. Such a mayor would have been aided by San Bernardino’s system of at-large voting, in which the entire electorate selected all the council members. This was a sore point with the city’s African American residents, because the system almost guaranteed that no candidate could be elected on a platform of representing minority interests. By contrast, the city of Riverside abandoned at-large representation in its charter of 1907 specifically to avoid concentrating too much power in the hands of a single individual. The city adopted the council-manager form of government with a new city charter in 1952, while Pasadena was an early convert in 1921. This suited the preferred image of Pasadena’s residents, who from the first had seen—and promoted—theirselves as a progressive, intellectual community.

While San Bernardino’s government remained static in its structure, the city itself did not. Between 1940 and 1950, the population grew by almost 45 percent to 63,058. The result was that San Bernardino entered the post-war decades as a fast growing industrial city with a leadership structure perhaps more suited to a small agricultural
Table 2. Area and Population, 1950

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Area (sq. mi.)</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Non-white</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pasadena</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>104,577</td>
<td>94,747 (90.6%)</td>
<td>9,830 (9.4%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Riverside</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>46,764</td>
<td>44,473 (95.1%)</td>
<td>2,291 (4.9%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>San Bernardino</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>63,058</td>
<td>60,914 (96.6%)</td>
<td>2,144 (3.4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


town. The city leaders did not ignore the changes taking place, but the ways they responded to the new conditions showed that they may not have grasped the complexity of the modern urban world. The evidence of this is found in the series of urban renewal plans the city adopted after formed a redevelopment agency in 1952. Each focused, to a large extent, on the same problem as the one before it—the decline of San Bernardino's central business district. Each was characterized by the desire to solve all of San Bernardino's problems with a single grand, comprehensive building project that swept away more and more of the city's past. Ironically enough, this meant that despite their outdated approach to government, San Bernardino's leadership were among the most enthusiastic supporters of the radical redevelopment programs that changed the face of urban America after World War Two.

The decline of the downtown was a problem confronting cities throughout the United States. Because immigrants to the West had largely built their new cities on the model of those they had left behind, they had duplicated the densely-developed central business district served by public transit. Following the war, rapidly growing cities were
hard-pressed by the continuing need to extend basic municipal utilities into their new residential areas. Where prewar growth had often followed the building of trolley lines, as in the example of Los Angeles, the new pattern moved to fill in the spaces between the rails with residential neighborhoods better suited to the personal transit exemplified by the automobile.\textsuperscript{10} Robert Fishman points to this motivation in “The American Planning Tradition” (2000), explaining that urban planning and renewal theory emphasized making use of the most modern technology and design practices, rather than attempting to prolong the usefulness of “horse-and-buggy” infrastructure.\textsuperscript{11} Savvy developers capitalized on the comparatively low land prices available in these areas to attract national retail chains, giving them the opportunity to create modern stores specifically-tailored to the newly affluent middle class who didn’t mind or even preferred to drive wherever they went. The impact of this trend went beyond lost revenue to threaten local leadership structures built on the prosperity of downtown businesses.

The earliest attempts to correct this situation focused on making the downtown more accommodating to automobile traffic. The fundamental idea had been proposed in Pasadena as early as 1900, when residents presented city leaders with a petition calling for western Colorado Boulevard to be widened by fifteen feet through the original business district in anticipation of future auto traffic. The plan was not immediately taken up, but by 1912 the idea was sufficiently developed for business owners on the south side of the boulevard to begin remodeling their buildings with abbreviated façades. Actual widening of the street began in 1929 east of Fair Oaks, but in later years some local observers would blame the delay for the decline of the Colorado Boulevard
business district, as seen in the retail vacancies observed by 1940.\textsuperscript{12} The decline was symbolized in 1947 by the opening of a new Bullock's department store on South Lake Avenue, marking the beginning of the surrounding neighborhood's status as the city's prestige retail area. From that point on, large stores on South Lake designed specifically to accommodate shoppers arriving singly in their own cars would draw interest away from the smaller, less convenient establishments on Colorado.

1947 also represented a significant year in the history of the other cities. Riverside’s leaders and downtown merchants made their initial attempt at creating more parking spaces to draw in residents from new residential areas to the southwest, while the citizens of San Bernardino received news that the Army intended to deactivate what had become the San Bernardino Air Material Area as a part of the post-war demobilization. In a display of civic activism that would be increasingly rare over the succeeding decades, the soon to be unemployed workers formed a seven member delegation to personally lobby lawmakers in Washington concerning the decision. The delegation stayed in Washington, D.C. from late March until June, the original deactivation date, with financial support from the San Bernardino Chamber of Commerce and private citizens. The determining factor in keeping the base open, however, was the creation of the Air Force as a separate service in September 1947. With extra funds released by Congress for its consolidation, the Air Force suspended the deactivation procedure in May 1948, although by then the civilian workforce had dropped to less than four thousand.\textsuperscript{13}

During this same period, a pair of brothers operating a small restaurant in San Bernardino launched what would become one of the nation's most distinctive popular
culture institutions—the McDonald's fast-food chain. Richard and Maurice McDonald had opened San Bernardino's first drive-in restaurant in May 1940 to capitalize on the newest fad sweeping increasingly car-obsessed Southern California. The menu featured an extensive selection of barbecue dishes and side orders, delivered to customers by uniformed roller-skating carhops. In 1948, however, the brothers took the novel approach of applying mass production techniques to the restaurant business. Such was the success of the experiment that by 1953 the brothers were able to announce the sale of their nine millionth hamburger in a full page newspaper advertisement, which also boasted that McDonald's had become “The Most Imitated Operation in America.”¹⁴ That same year the brothers established franchises in Phoenix, Arizona, and Los Angeles County, in buildings as standardized as the menu. These included a pair of yellow neon arches added to the roof by Richard McDonald over the objections of his architect.¹⁵

The success of the McDonald brothers represents something of a paradox when compared to the larger process of urban renewal. They had directly responded to the perceived desire of their customers for speed and convenience by jettisoning their institutional history in favor of an entirely new model. They persevered with it in the face of early resistance by customers who sat waiting in their vehicles for carhops who would never come; the McDonalds were confident that their model would soon catch on. Success vindicated the experiment, and demonstrated that to a certain extent, Americans would accept regimentation and standardization in their lives as a reassuring symbol of quality. What they would not accept, however, was the transference of the McDonald's approach to every aspect of their lives.
City leaders throughout the United States discovered this fact—in many cases—only after committing to urban renewal schemes featuring the “one size fits all” design ethic inherent in much of the post-war style of architecture. The difference, stated simplistically, was that standardization of a discrete consumer product did not fundamentally limit the broad range of choices Americans had come to see as their right in the postwar world. They could visit McDonald’s for convenience and speed, or they could continue to patronize restaurants that stayed with the “tried and true.” Urban renewal removed that aspect of choice, by imposing a single vision, and a single way of living, on a cityscape that for all its faults had once teemed with variety. In *Moment of Grace: The American City in the 1950s*, Michael Johns reflects that “Central business districts that once afforded all manner of commerce, services, and entertainment have become finance centers catering to the daytime needs of office workers. Most downtown sidewalks are empty on Friday nights and Saturday afternoons. Decorated buildings of brick, stone and terra cotta, so pleasing to the pedestrian, are fewer in number and are overshadowed by office towers that look their best when seen at night from a speeding car.”  

16 This was the essential failure of urban renewal, and it would prove to be a greater source of decline in central business districts than the natural growth that took consumers further away from their traditional retail destinations.

Of course, this is the advantage of hindsight. For the merchants who saw their livelihoods, and their cities' fortunes, apparently slipping away to outlying markets, the problem was immediate and had to be addressed while there was still something left to save. In San Bernardino, a Chamber of Commerce “unity luncheon” held in early 1950 to discuss civic goals for the coming year inadvertently highlighted this process. The
sponsoring organizations were the Uptown Exchange Club, the Uptown Lions Club, and the Uptown 20-30 Club—all representing new commercial areas in the northern part of the city, and clearly meant to be distinguished from the fading downtown. A further indication of this decline was the news item in the column next to the San Bernardino Sun's report of the luncheon: “Slum Clearance Project Nearer.” In the preceding month the city's housing agent had been sent to Washington, D.C. To solicit redevelopment funds for “blighted” areas. The federal money would be used to secure loans enabling the city to raze “deteriorating fringes of business districts or dilapidated property along the highway entrances of the city.”

Along these same lines, Pasadena's city manager announced “Operation Junkyard” in 1951—a program to issue notices of violation against the owners of residential properties identified as contributing to blight. The city Building and Fire departments targeted blighted commercial properties with “Operation Safeguard” in 1954, focusing on substandard health and safety conditions. In Riverside, new city manager Oren L. King instituted a civic improvement program called “The Riverside Plan,” involving fifty local organizations and several hundred private citizens in its formulation. The plan produced several bond issues to expand the fire department and school system, created several new parks and, critically, put forward a ballot measure to form the Western Municipal Water District. Approved by voters in January 1954, the intent of the district was annexation to the larger Metropolitan Water District as a means of gaining access to water from the Colorado River. This gave the city the ability to grow beyond the capacity of its longstanding local sources, particularly wells operating within the city of San Bernardino.
The centerpiece of The Riverside Plan was the “Civic Center Recommended Program” to redevelop the heart of the city adjacent to the Mission Inn. The program called for two of the four historic churches clustered near the intersection of Lemon and Seventh streets to be acquired and demolished—one to make room for new Police and possibly Fire Department headquarters, the other to allow for construction of a new central library. The existing library, designed by Arthur Benton in the Mission Revival style had been deemed both obsolete and unsuited for expansion. It had less than 15,000 square feet of floor space, and the Riverside Plan called for a building of more than three times the size. As King explained, “Modern library plants are primarily functional and secondarily ornamental. It is not practical to fit the ornamental architecture of the existing building into any expansion plan which would carry out or continue the original
Figure 21. Demolition of Riverside’s Carnegie Library in 1964, with the new library (and current Downtown Library branch) in the background. (Riverside Public Library, LIB RIV CEN CAR XIII 61 CLD2-212).

architecture. For the same reason, it would not be economically sound to consider conversion of the building presently occupied by the Police Station and Museum.”

The outcome of the library proposal would prove to be a turning point for Riverside's downtown, but not ultimately in the way that the Planning Commission had anticipated. Rather than serving as a landmark for modernization, the ultimate demolition of Benton’s library would be the catalyst for a rediscovery of the city’s architectural past (see Figure 21).

During this same period in San Bernardino, the city government established the legal basis for a Community Redevelopment Authority in 1950, but the actual formation did not take place until 1952. In the meantime, members of San Bernardino area
chambers of commerce—rather than members of municipal governments—had met in February 1950 with Stuart Walsh of San Francisco's Industrial Survey Associates. They proposed the formation of a county economic council comprising labor, industry, agriculture, service groups and recreational organizations in order to conduct a survey of the area's industrial potential. Arthur Walker of the county Chamber of Commerce believed the future was in “industries allied to the iron and steel industries because of the Kaiser steel mills and industries in which the west coast consumes large amounts of the products but produces very little.”

The report the San Bernardino County group received in 1951 generally reinforced the views Arthur Walker expressed at the initial planning meeting in 1950: the county's recent growth was due to heavy industry and the military, and the most promising field of development was in “steel use and other raw material centered industries.” However, the report warned that the chambers of commerce would have to educate residents as to the benefits of industrialization, as the survey found a belief that industry brought labor strife, pollution, congestion, and a scarcity of water. The bulk of the report examined the difficulties facing the county in general, and the city of San Bernardino in particular. “The problems created by rapid growth,” the authors advised, “are numerous and pressing.” The most notable were blight in the city center, the need to extend city services to the expanding northern and eastern edges of the city while increasing the tax revenue to pay for such services, and the lack of coordination between city and county planners.

Subsequent to the 1951 industrial survey, San Bernardino officials hired planning consultants Harold F. Wise and Simon Eisner to begin preparation of a master plan to
guide the redevelopment effort. The subsequent report, subtitled “Facts and Proposals,” was delivered to the Planning Commission on 1 December 1952. Simon Eisner's introductory letter, addressed to both the government and people of San Bernardino, explained the rationale of the plan: “All of the decisions on land use were based on the criteria that they must be in the interests of the majority and that in every case the individual interest be measured against the common good over a long period of time.”

The report accurately projected that San Bernardino's population would triple by 2000 and approach the 200,000 mark. Because of this, the authors returned time and again to their point that future prosperity and quality of life in the city hinged on a long term, regional approach to development. Short term thinking, they insisted, focused only on current needs would produce long term headaches for San Bernardino.

Wise and Eisner commented that “new and vigorous” shopping centers had developed along both Baseline and Highland avenues, and warned that the trend away from the downtown would continue if businesses did not provide “more convenience and comforts for their patrons.” Adopting the urban planning fashion of the time, the consultants linked improved retail conditions with the elimination of older buildings in favor of custom-designed shopping centers “similar to those in Seattle, . . . Sacramento and Long Beach,” accompanied by extensive new parking facilities. Wise and Eisner compared the downtown to the newer sections of the city, noting that in the older areas “there is little orderliness, and not much can be done to bring about better conditions short of large scale redevelopment, a process which could hardly be given serious consideration in reference to an area of this size. Many of the conditions which are plaguing older cities are to be found here. Vacant lots are scattered through the area but
there is considerable doubt as to whether they can be favorably viewed as potential building sites due to the unstable surroundings.”

Part of this instability may have resulted from uncertainty over a proposed new freeway—U.S. 395—which was to cut across San Bernardino Valley from north to south, linking the Cajon Pass with the city of Riverside. One proposed route, known as the Rancho Line, ran along the thinly populated western edge of San Bernardino, while the alternative I Street Line followed an existing railroad right-of-way into the heart of the city adjacent to the downtown business district. Harold Wise and Simon Eisner suggested that the Rancho Line would best serve the city's future needs, while admitting that the I Street route would take people where they already wanted to go, and had the potential to serve as a “practical means of eliminating blight.” While the city's planners were not directly involved in the project, the business owners had a representative on the California State Highway Commission. James A. Guthrie was the owner, publisher, and de facto editor of the San Bernardino Sun, as well as being closely allied with the city's municipal leadership. As a result, it is reasonable to believe that the final route accurately reflected the desires of San Bernardino's business and political leadership.

The Highway Commission announced its decision in favor of the I Street line in June 1953—a choice heartily endorsed by James Guthrie's newspaper the following month. An editorial declared that because of the freeways built in Orange County, "property values have soared many hundreds of millions of dollars during the past two or three years. Vast acreages of open land have been turned into subdivisions on a huge scale. Apparently the reason for the transition is that it is now easier and safer to ride the
freeway back and forth between home and job.”  

After hearing a presentation by district highway engineer Clyde Kane in August, the directors of the Chamber of Commerce gave their unanimous approval to the project as having “a healthy impact on business throughout San Bernardino.” Kane assured the Chamber that “the theory that freeways should by-pass all cities has been exploded.” Kane further assured those at the public hearing several days later that “the I Street route of the freeway will not be barrier to east-west travel within San Bernardino, but rather will expedite the flow of traffic to and from both sections.”

Many residents were not convinced—at the meeting and in the days afterward some insisted the freeway was a scheme by downtown merchants to steal business from other parts of the city, or that it was simply shortsighted and would prove to be a nuisance. Despite this opposition, the route through the middle of San Bernardino was almost certainly a foregone conclusion from the time the project was first announced. It seemed an ideal fit in the city's redevelopment plans by providing an easy means of clearing “blight” and by bringing increased traffic volume as close as possible to the traditional downtown business district. Rather than being something the state had simply imposed on the city, the freeway was actively sought out as an agent of growth by a partnership of state and local interests.

II. Redevelopment and Division

The San Bernardino Redevelopment Agency's primary effort, titled the Meadowbrook Project, completed a methodical survey of designated blight zones in early 1955, but the agency discouraged thoughts of an immediate transformation of the
city. Under the terms of its formation the agency could only buy and clear land. It was up to other public entities or private enterprise to make use of it. Agency director Earl Fraser estimated that actual land purchases should begin by late 1956, barring complications. The most difficult part of the process would be attracting new buyers as the land became available.®

Despite the years of planning already devoted to redevelopment in San Bernardino, the county housing authority commissioned a new study in 1956 titled “Urban Redevelopment: What's it All About?” The information in the report had a generic quality, speaking primarily to broad concerns, and drew its language from federal government publications on the subject. The basics were quickly summed up in three points: “First—Prevention of the spread of blight into good areas of the community through strict enforcement of housing and neighborhood standards and strict occupancy standards. Second—Rehabilitation of salvageable areas. Third—Clearance and redevelopment of non-salvageable areas.”® The uncredited author(s) warned that “opponents of the program and those with vested interest in blighted property suddenly become the champions of the poor and speak platitudes about democracy.” Housing questions would be sharpened to a “razor's edge” by existing racial conflicts, as redevelopment projects often targeted older neighborhoods occupied by a city's minority groups.® These complications would have to be endured, the report concluded, because “a family in a decent sanitary home is less susceptible to disease, is less prone to anti-social behavior, and less likely to become a charge on the community in any of a dozen ways.”® The authors insisted that it was particularly important for the citizens of San Bernardino County to have better living conditions than were available in the Soviet
Union, because “until we show improvement, the slums of our cities are one of the best talking points for propaganda machines of countries attempting to disparage us in our way of life.”\textsuperscript{39}

By 1958 the San Bernardino Redevelopment Agency was ready to begin its initial land purchases for the Meadowbrook Project. This would ultimately involve clearing over forty-six acres of land in a patchwork spread across a dozen city blocks adjacent to the central business district.\textsuperscript{40} For the most part, these were areas occupied by members of various minority communities, including the descendents of the original inhabitants of the nineteenth century Chinatown. Regardless of the promises put forward by the state highway engineer that US 395 would not become a barrier between eastern and western San Bernardino, it came to symbolize the belief among Latino and Black residents on the west side of the city, away from the commercial heart, that they were being intentionally left out of the city’s redevelopment efforts.

Suggestions of segregationist policies surfaced in 1950, due to the lack of a west side junior high school, as noted in a newspaper editorial: “What is needed, so it is strongly argued, is a junior high school which would serve children of Anglo-Saxon as well as Mexican extraction. The debate over this problem has continued for so many years that it is obvious there cannot be harmonious community relations unless there is a demonstration that the school system does not practice racial segregation.”\textsuperscript{41}

Indeed, the issue of de facto segregation in local schools would trouble all three cities during the postwar decades. The growth of the national civil rights movement gave the problem a stature that, by the early to mid-1960s, could no longer be ignored. In Pasadena, the case of \textit{Jackson v. Board of Education} would prove a landmark that
strongly influenced opinion in Southern California. The case had its origin in a petition to the Pasadena Board of Education on behalf of an African American junior high school student, Jay Jackson, Jr., asking that he be allowed to transfer from the mostly Black Washington Junior High to a more mixed, and presumably superior, school. When the Board denied the petition, attorneys representing Jackson filed suit in the Pasadena Superior Court, alleging that the Board had aggravated existing de facto segregation by arranging attendance zones to concentrate African American students in particular schools. Specifically, the suit contended that students from the all-white Linda Vista Elementary School were being directed away from the closest junior high—Washington—to McKinley Junior High, more than twice the distance away, but with a mostly white student body.\(^2\)

The court disagreed, as did the Fourth District Court of Appeals, finding that the Board of Education was not responsible for the racial makeup of Pasadena's neighborhoods and schools. Such was the interest in the case, though, that the California State Attorney General, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) all supported a second appeal to the California Supreme Court. A. L. Wirin, representing the ACLU, further threatened to take the issue to the United States Supreme Court if this last hearing at the state level went against his client.\(^3\) The ACLU did not have to take this step, as the California Supreme Court issued its unanimous decision on 27 June 1963 overturning the rulings of the two lower courts. The justices believed that the Board of Education had indulged in racial gerrymandering when it had drawn the attendance zones, as the
plaintiff argued. However even if had acted in a “color blind” manner, the court declared, this was not enough:44

Residential segregation is, in itself, an evil which tends to frustrate the youths in the area and to cause anti-social attitudes and behavior. Where such segregation exists it is not enough for a school board to refrain from affirmative discriminatory conduct. The harmful influence on the children will be reflected and intensified in the school room if school attendance is determined on a geographic basis without corrective measures. The right to an equal opportunity for education and the harmful consequences of segregation require that school boards take steps, insofar as reasonably feasible, to alleviate racial imbalance in schools regardless of its cause . . . .45

This decision clearly took the Board of Education by surprise, as just a week beforehand they had been advised by the Los Angeles County Counsel that they were required to act in a color blind manner when setting high school attendance zones. Robert E. Jenkins, the superintendent of Pasadena City Schools could only say that “We do not feel there is anything gerrymandered here. We'll study the decision with the county counsel and determine where we go from here.”46

Where the school administrators went was towards a highly visible effort at promoting racial equality in the schools. In August 1964, a little over a year after the decision in Jackson v. Board of Education, the Board hired Raymond J. Pitts as its “Director of Intergroup Education.” Pitts was charged with making “recommendations on anything that has to do with promoting racial understanding, easing racial tensions in the schools, and installing programs designed to help lift the horizons of students whose home environments give them little background of incentive to stimulate a desire to achieve in the classroom.”47 According to Elmer Wells, the education editor for the Pasadena Independent, this made Pasadena's school district one of only four in the nation, along with Los Angeles, New York, and Washington, D.C., to institute such a
program. Wells also noted a report released in the same week by the city’s Human Relations Committee that explored the problems—particularly related to still segregated housing—of Pasadena's growing African American population:

The pattern of de facto housing segregation constitutes a problem because it tends to add to racial misunderstandings and tensions and because it renders more difficult the solution of such other problems as public education, the renewal of our older areas—residential, commercial, and industrial—and the enforcement of our laws, codes and ordinances in a uniform manner . . . . It is obvious, for example, that our school board would not have been obliged to wrestle so fearsomely with the problem of school redistricting if de facto housing integration had already been achieved.48

The example of Pasadena was not lost on the Black residents of Riverside and San Bernardino. In the latter city, a citizens’ advocacy group called the Community League of Mothers retained the services of the ACLU's A.L. Wirin in December 1965, to bring a lawsuit against the San Bernardino Board of Education over the topic of school segregation. In an echo of Wirin's earlier case, he explained that the suit resulted from a “very serious difference of opinion” over the Board's responsibility for addressing the population patterns in San Bernardino. Specifically citing the decision in Jackson v. Board of Education, Wirin contrasted San Bernardino's stance with that of Riverside's Board of Education, which had instituted a busing program in response to its own de facto segregation problem. In what might almost have been seen as a veiled threat, Wirin stated “I believe the difference [between San Bernardino and Riverside] is this: In early September one of the schools [in Riverside] was burned down. I'm hoping it's not necessary to burn down the building to roast the pig.” He added, “I'm being facetious. The board in Riverside wanted to do something about de facto segregation.”49
For its part, San Bernardino's Board responded by contending that the suit only served to delay and complicate desegregation efforts already underway. In the fall of 1966 school superintendent F. Eugene Mueller made a point of reading letters from African American residents criticizing the Community League into the minutes of the Board's meetings. One such letter aired on 27 October 1966 prompted "furious gavel-rapping and near-hysteria," according to the San Bernardino Sun, along with predictions by the Community League's president that the Board members were destined for a fiery hereafter. Prompted, perhaps, by the school board's unsympathetic stance, the city's voters approved a charter amendment in 1966 to replace at-large representation on the city council with a ward system. As a result, African American residents gained their first voice in city government, in the person of council member Norris Gregory, Jr.,

Table 3. Area and Population, 1960.

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Area (sq. mi.)</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>African American</th>
<th>“Foreign stock” of Mexican origin</th>
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<td>22</td>
<td>116,407</td>
<td>98,480 (84.6%)</td>
<td>14,551 (12.5%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Riverside</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>84,332</td>
<td>79,862 (94.7%)</td>
<td>3,964 (4.7%)</td>
<td>4,301 (5.1%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>San Bernardino</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>91,922</td>
<td>83,373 (90.7%)</td>
<td>8,089 (8.8%)</td>
<td>8,181 (8.9%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 1960 Census abstract did not directly list a percentage of Hispanic residents, but rather reported on the "Leading country of origin as percent of foreign stock." In the case of Pasadena, this was the 3.85% of the total population with origins in the United Kingdom. United States Bureau of the Census, *County and City Data Book 1967* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967).

In contrast to their relationship with African American residents, San Bernardino's leadership, both governmental and cultural, occasionally made a greater
show of including Mexican American residents in the life of the city—especially when it served some additional purpose. This can be seen in a proposal made during a 1947 mayoral campaign to develop a section of western San Bernardino as “a niche of Old Mexico,” and in the “Fiesta Mexicana” theme adopted for the 1960 edition of the city's annual fair, the National Orange Show. The first did not last much beyond the election, but the second, occurring not long after the overthrow of the Batista regime in Cuba, became the subject of a film made by the U.S. State Department for audiences throughout Mexico. The Eisenhower administration was eager to promote the image of continued good relations with the rest of Latin America, and seized on the success of “Fiesta Mexicana” as evidence of a warm, cross-border friendship.\(^{51}\)

William Deverell has noted that San Bernardino had a more authentic expression of Mexican culture in its late-nineteenth century fiesta than the pageants promoted in other cities such as Los Angeles, which turned to mission themed romance. San Bernardino’s civic leaders did not make use of this rich heritage as a promotional device at the time, nor did they change their strategy in the 1960s, when Riverside and Pasadena began to return to idealized visions of Mexican and Mediterranean romance through the use of new historic preservation laws. Paradoxically, it may have been that San Bernardino’s own expression of Mexican American culture was too authentic to be readily commodified.

In 1966, while the city’s African American leaders, such as Frances Grice, battled the school board over charges of racism and segregation, the editors of the San Bernardino Sun approved an article titled “Mexican Heritage Lends Color, Vitality to S.B.,” concentrating on the backyard patio or residents’ fondness for tacos.\(^{52}\) A series of
articles published in the same pages two years later revealed a rather less romantic reality, and one that had much in common with the African American experience. Author Marjie Shoemaker described life in San Bernardino's west side barrios, and particularly the attraction that criminal gangs held for Mexican American youth. Yolanda Ariaza, a student at the University of California at Los Angeles, blamed the attitudes in her hometown that preferred to see Latinos as a source of “color,” instead of integral parts of the community. “These gangs,” she insisted, “reject a society that has rejected them.” Residents with whom Shoemaker spoke reported a sense that they were viewed with suspicion when they ventured into stores outside of their neighborhoods, and many were concerned by a perceived cultural gap within the school system. In response to this last concern, Latino leaders called for increased hiring of Spanish-speaking teachers and counselors who would presumably have greater empathy with Latino students.

While these concerns would not have been unique to San Bernardino, the city's Mexican American population was larger than that in either Riverside or Pasadena, and as a result seems to have maintained a stronger sense of cultural identity (see Tables 3 and 4). This identity became more sharply defined with the growth of the Chicano heritage movement in the mid-1960s, at the same time as the renewed national interest in historic preservation. It is likely that leaders within San Bernardino's Mexican American population, inspired by this new spirit of cultural and political activism, would have been unwilling to support large-scale preservation/development schemes that emphasized nostalgia for a stereotyped “Old California” of whitewashed walls and red tile roofs. In
this idealized fantasy past, the histories of the Indian, Spanish and Mexican populations were pressed into service as disjointed elements of a new American regional identity.\textsuperscript{55}

While San Bernardino's urban planners were probably not aware of the motives that would later be ascribed to them and others in their profession, it is probable that they would have wanted to avoid promotion of the "real" Chicano culture of the 1960s. For one thing, the center of this culture was inconveniently located away from the city's downtown business district—construction of the interstate freeway had seen to that. More to the point, backers of historically-themed redevelopment were not particularly concerned with authenticity, or asking the hard questions favored by academics. Rather, their focus was on giving consumers something that seemed exotic and flattered their own self-image, without losing a sense of the safe and familiar. The problem for San Bernardino, seen in this light, was that the city had never undertaken the extensive urban image-building that distinguished Riverside and Pasadena. Instead, local boosters had promoted the city on the basis of its proximity to other places in Southern California.\textsuperscript{56} San Bernardino was not so much a destination to be visited in its own right as it was a nice place to leave. The City Beautiful movement that shaped Pasadena, or the Mission Revival fantasies promoted by Frank Miller in Riverside, appeared in only isolated examples in San Bernardino. As a result the city lacked the basic architectural resources that could later be used to create a historical business district with nostalgic appeal for consumers. Old buildings remained merely old buildings, and reminders of the loss of economic vitality.
III. “Riverside has an inheritance to lose”

The contrast between San Bernardino and Riverside is readily apparent in a report developed by the planning firm Livingston and Blayney, with the title *Riverside: 1966—The View Ahead*. Presented to Riverside’s City Council, the report presented the guiding themes proposed for a new general plan. The authors began by explaining that “City planning is riding a crest of popularity because Americans are dissatisfied with their cities and there is a general realization that we have both the wealth and the taste to do better.” After posing the question of what was missing to cause this dissatisfaction, the authors answered:

“In most of the nation's burgeoning metropolitan areas the historic image, where there was any, is being quickly covered by an unrolling urban carpet, each square mile of which is the same as any other. Unlike many communities, Riverside has an inheritance to lose, and there is a clear and present danger of losing it. The image of the quality city, with its distinctive character and well-known landmarks, is threatened—not by identifiable villains but simply by growth.”

The report pragmatically accepted that the downtown would no longer be the center of the city’s retail activity, reasoning that Riverside did not have a large enough population to support a large-scale department store of the modern type “until the shopping center era was well-advanced.” While there had been smaller Sears and J.C. Penney stores in the downtown, the lack of readily available space for expansion had prompted Sears to relocate away from the city center in the early 1960s in order to compete with a new Harris Co. department store that opened in 1957. The authors expected that J.C. Penney would soon follow for the same reason, but insisted that “downtown need not continue to decline.”
Livingston and Blayney presented the argument that Riverside should seek to revitalize the downtown as a focus for cultural activity and specialty retail, by capitalizing on the unique character of the older buildings: “Seventh Street east of Main Street has a good start towards this with the Mission Inn, City Hall, Library, Museum, Congregational Church, Auditorium, and [Julia Morgan designed] Y.W.C.A. This group of buildings, and even those of less distinguished architecture, substantiate much of downtown's claim as the center of a quality city.” By contrast, the planners found the new Magnolia Center retail development to be visually chaotic, and poor design meant that the new University of California campus failed to physically integrate with the surrounding neighborhoods. In addition, the authors judged that there was “much mediocre and some gimmicky architecture,” a trait shared with recent construction at many other campuses in the University of California system.59

The authors believed that Riverside’s location, between the Santa Ana River and Mt. Rubidoux on the north and west, and Box Springs Mountain to the east, gave the city “a sense of geographical security,” with Mt. Rubidoux serving in the role of a castle, cathedral, or cluster of skyscrapers to “proclaim the location” of the city. They noted the differences between this situation and those of the cities of Orange County, the San Gabriel and Santa Clara Valleys and much of western San Bernardino County where, due to common and often illogical boundaries, “residents seem permanently condemned” to an “unclear community identity.”60 The report warned that rapid development would make it increasingly difficult to maintain the established standards of architecture and design. As a result, both restoration and new planning measures would be needed “if
Riverside is not to slip gradually into the morass of mediocrity characteristic of much post-war urban development across the nation.”

Livingston and Blayney expressed their hope that the Mission Inn, especially, would play a role in any new plans for the original central business district, “Because it is an important functional part of downtown as well as because of its architectural distinction and historic significance . . .” In a sharp reversal from earlier attitudes that seemed to dominate the drive for urban renewal, the planners concluded that “A real city needs both old and new, both plain and fancy neighborhoods. The terms ‘old’ and ‘plain’ should not be taken to mean slums.”

Livingston and Blayney presented a second section of Riverside: 1966—The View Ahead in 1967, and used it as an opportunity to further discuss their preference for careful rehabilitation, rather than large-scale renewal. They explained that while clearance of substandard buildings might have been appropriate in certain small areas of the downtown or in residential areas near the freeway, it did not suit Riverside’s needs on the large scale. Rather, they argued for the “less spectacular” approach of patiently upgrading target areas through code enforcement and rehabilitation. In this way the city could avoid the disruption of residents’ lives and their social institutions as was so often seen in urban renewal.

The authors put community identity at the center of their recommendations for Riverside’s future planning efforts. When compared to the strategies being developed in neighboring cities, such as San Bernardino, this reflected considerable foresight:

Too often planners seem to consider the general plan complete after translating a standard of living decision into a functional design for the city. This is not a sufficient basis for a good city plan or for a good design for a chair, an automobile, or a building. Development of a distinct
identity or personality is an essential and difficult part of the job. Just as
loss of personal identity causes mental illness, failure of an urban area to
establish an identity leads to a kind of malaise that stifles community pride
at the least, and may even lead to physical blight and social chaos.
Identity is a state of mind established both by institutional and physical
organization. . . . In an attempt to create identity in 'planned' communities,
planners often have imposed a kind of hierarchical order that snuffs out
individual character and creates monotony. Planned 'variety' often
becomes monotony at a larger scale.64

The authors cautioned, as they had in the report of the previous year that
community identity was not synonymous with beauty. However, it did depend to a
certain extent on distinctive and unique characteristics of the built environment that
helped form a mental landscape for its residents. These points would also become
increasingly appreciated in Pasadena, from the mid-1960s onward, as apprehensions grew
that development plans posed a threat to the distinctiveness that the city possessed in
abundance.

IV. Redevelopment and Reconsideration in Pasadena

As had been the case in San Bernardino and Riverside, accommodating the
increasingly ubiquitous automobile was seen in the immediate postwar years as a key to
addressing the decreasing attractiveness of Pasadena's downtown in the minds of local
shoppers. In 1956 the merchants of the Pasadena Central Improvement Association
prompted the creation of a parking district with two large lots for the Fair Oaks area
south of Colorado Boulevard, financed by a city bond issue.65 Through this process, the
city began to join Riverside and San Bernardino in the use of public funds and special
administrative districts, a strategy that began in earnest in the early 1960s after the
creation of a Community Redevelopment Agency. Three years later, the City Planning
Commission published its *General Plan*, presenting a vision of Pasadena as it could exist in 1980. The most striking aspect of the plan was in its general reversal of the city's long-held image that it was a place of relaxed intellect, rather than industry. The plan noted that in 1940, the city’s economic base included approximately 1,000 factory jobs. The California Institute of Technology's role in World War Two had brought the realization that industry could maintain an element of prestige and intellectual achievement through such fields as aeronautical engineering, electronics and pharmaceuticals. By 1960, the city had some 18,000 jobs in these and similar areas. As outlined in the *General Plan*, Pasadena's Chamber of Commerce proposed to make the city a center of research and development, together with industry “that conforms to the character of the community.”

The *General Plan* identified a redesigned downtown as essential to this new vision, and moved sharply away from the earlier efforts that simply hoped to bring shoppers back to the original city center. Talk of more parking or wider streets had been replaced by a “Highway 66 Terminal” that would combine all available means of transportation—helicopter, bus, rail and automobile—in a single convenient location. The *General Plan* emphasized the use of super-blocks, similar to the land use plan that I. M. Pei had employed for his Erieview project in Cleveland. The authors of the *General Plan* explained that “The concept of the super-block is used throughout this proposed plan. This would eliminate short dead-end streets and unnecessary cross-streets and would facilitate parking and traffic problems in addition to providing a more beautiful downtown area.” Those who had reservations about the scale of the proposed undertaking were reassured that “Urban renewal is the newest and most effective method
for implementing planning. The urban renewal procedure offers the city a 'second chance.' Errors of the past can be rectified and the knowledge gained from new techniques can be applied on a broad front.” The authors reminded readers that this would not be the first time that Pasadena had reinvented itself, recalling the words of George Damon’s presentation on city planning to the Women's Civic League in 1915: “The furniture of our large city is being delivered, and we don't know where to put it.”

Following on the General Plan, the Community Redevelopment Agency began developing more specific plans in the next few years. The area around West Colorado Boulevard, identified as Redevelopment Area II, was seen as a special problem combining what one newspaper account described as “curious mixture of the best and worst that Pasadena has offered throughout its long and colorful history.” In 1964 the Redevelopment Agency deemed more than half of the buildings in Area II—60.6%—to be “substandard,” meaning it considered demolition to be more economical than repair. The Redevelopment Agency preferred to look forward rather than back, emphasizing that the California Institute of Technology's Jet Propulsion Lab gave Pasadena a recognizable status in the field of space exploration that could be capitalized on to create an “urban think center.” However, the Agency did not entirely discount the role of historic buildings in defining the city's future. The deteriorating, yet iconic Hotel Green represented a “very special problem”—its influence on the surrounding area was too great to simply allow it to decay further. The Agency suggested the hotel should either be restored to a “position of dignity in the community,” or it should be completely eliminated to make way for something better.
During the mid-1960s, putting aside the past to make way for the future was clearly the preferred alternative. Pasadena's urban renewal consultants—the nationally-renowned firm of Victor Gruen Associates, the same firm advising San Bernardino's efforts—described the West Colorado Boulevard district as harking back to the “horse and buggy days.” Gruen Associates again urged development based on superblocks that would make the area a “bustling center of activity,” with freeways and rail lines running under buildings to create the pedestrian malls beloved of the era's urban planners. The Redevelopment Agency hoped to replace the old retail spaces between Pasadena Avenue and Fair Oaks Avenue with a fifty-eight acre research and development complex hosting manufacturing, laboratories, and offices in a mixture of high- and low-rise buildings. Modern apartment blocks and hotels would complete the re-imagined space—according to the “General Development Plan,” the only older buildings to be retained were those on a single block at the corner of Colorado and Fair Oaks.

Pasadena's government and business leaders were committed to the idea of a transformed and sophisticated downtown, and initially reacted with alarm at the prospect of a major, though conventional, new retail outlet within the redevelopment area. In 1966 the Montgomery Ward department store chain proposed to spend $21 million to construct a shopping center complex at the corner of Walnut and Fair Oaks. Given the city's previous concerns about the decline of business in this area, the development would, at first glance, have seemed a natural and desirable fit. But Pasadena's citizens had visions of greater things—at a hearing on the matter, one resident declared “Many cities have shopping centers but how many have a nationally known research and development center?” Scientific work was expected to attract high-income
professionals, while the Montgomery Ward plan was dismissed as “a suburban design in an urban area.” An attorney representing the retailer defended the value of the shopping center, and called into question Pasadena's claims that the designated redevelopment zone was suffering from blight as it was normally defined: “It would seem odd that you could say blight exists when a private developer proposes to acquire and improve the sector. If any of you have priced land in this particular area, you would wonder where the blight exists, at least in the minds of the property owners.”

The city leadership had its own plan in mind for retail business in the renewal zone in 1967, but rather than the more traditional plan proposed by Montgomery Ward, they looked to the “exciting” prospect of the enclosed shopping mall. Referring to one such development in Hartford, Connecticut, the Redevelopment Agency believed that Pasadena could be home to “a truly metropolitan business complex of nationwide appeal.” As with other grand proposals for the downtown area, the mall hinged on the availability of a federal grant to support the necessary land acquisitions. The city requested $35 million to cover the entire redevelopment area, but came up empty in May 1967 when the federal government determined the amount to be out of line with available funds. This rejection prompted a new round of studies, and ultimately the formation of a new business/government partnership to successfully promote a more limited scheme of redevelopment.

The new group debuted in 1970 under the name “Pasadena Now!” and appealed directly to downtown business owners to join in a grassroots-style program to push for civic improvements. A self-published brochure described the organization as “a committee of Pasadena business and professional men who are joining forces with the
Pasadena City Government to raise funds for a critically-needed program to set up a blueprint for action for downtown redevelopment.” In place of the Space Age visions of the mid-1960s, Pasadena Now initially returned to the more basic issues of more parking and improved traffic flow. Speaking directly to local business owners, the brochure promised “If parking improvements can be made, traffic patterns bettered, the central city rejuvenated, it will directly affect the value of you location and business.” Readers were warned that a new freeway through the city—subsequently Interstate 210—would be completed shortly, and the opportunity to benefit from it would be fleeting. “Turn this sheet over,” the pamphlet advised, “and look at the freeway plan. This will all be built by 1974! There is no more time to consider what might be. The freeways are here! The challenge to us is whether these cars will come to or through Pasadena. . . It's up to us to make Pasadena a regional business center rather than a city at the dead end of a second-rate freeway.”

Table 4: Area and Population, 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Area (sq. mi.)</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>African American</th>
<th>Hispanic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pasadena</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>112,951</td>
<td>90,700 (80.3%)</td>
<td>18,298 (16.2%)</td>
<td>12,989 (11.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riverside</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>140,089</td>
<td>130,703 (93.3%)</td>
<td>7,285 (5.2%)</td>
<td>17,791 (12.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Bernardino</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>109,203</td>
<td>92,713 (84.9%)</td>
<td>14,633 (13.4%)</td>
<td>23,479 (21.5%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In a reflection of the financial resources available to Pasadena Now!, the organization retained the services of the urban planning firm Livingston & Blayney to analyze growth potential, develop traffic and transportation plans, determine the feasibility of renewal projects downtown, and prepare design criteria for a “distinctive and attractive downtown.” Pasadena Now!’s brochure explained that “...we'd rather plan with the city than have them plan for us,” and asked in a final burst of promotional vigor “ARE YOU WILLING TO JOIN WITH THE OTHER PROGRESSIVE BUSINESSMEN AND PROPERTY OWNERS IN BECOMING A MEMBER OF PASADENA NOW!???”

Pasadena Now! did indeed plan with the city. Despite the initial appearance of a grassroots organization of business owners, subsequent efforts made it clear that the group operated as a direct partner in the city government's redevelopment efforts. In September 1972 Pasadena Now! appointed a subcommittee to place an urban landscape architect under contract with the city, in order to develop specific plans for Colorado Boulevard between Orange Grove Boulevard and Catalina Avenue. This was, as has been seen, the oldest section of Pasadena's central business district, and long the object of some disdain by the city Redevelopment Agency for its property owners' reluctance to join the campaign for modernization. This new approach sought to reverse this stance by recruiting owners as “block captains” to provide their neighbors with information and promote enthusiasm for beautification.

Beauty could exist for its own sake, but in the political world of redevelopment it was better appreciated if it could also turn a profit. Pasadena's assistant city manager Donald Pollard confessed as much when reporting in 1973 on the potential value of
projects then being considered. He explained that “Generation of property and sales taxes . . . was among the main premises on which we based our whole redevelopment program.”\textsuperscript{80} Obviously, maintaining these taxes at a healthy level had always been a concern for the business district of Pasadena, or indeed any city. But as will become apparent, during the early 1970s there was a growing perception among some residents that too many of the downtown's distinctive but intangible qualities were being sacrificed in the pursuit of revenue.

Part of the concern came from the continued interest by the city leadership in creating a new identity for Pasadena based on new development and construction. Harriman L. Cronk, a member of the governing Board of Directors, noted in 1974 that he favored remaking Pasadena as “the epitome of the headquarters city” with a downtown devoted to major office buildings and their supporting infrastructure, rather than the smaller-scale retail operations that had characterized the area to that point. And, continuing the common theme of the past several decades, he held that “Personally, from a philosophical standpoint, I think the western part of Colorado Boulevard must be redeveloped.”\textsuperscript{81} A report issued by Pasadena Now (no longer operating with its emphatic punctuation) in May of that year examined the experience of other California cities that had converted downtown streets into that icon of the redevelopment era, the pedestrian mall. Particular attention was paid to the Fulton Street Mall in Fresno, completed ten years earlier through the design collaboration of urban planner Victor Gruen and landscape architect Garrett Eckbo. The mall had received nationwide attention and was acclaimed as an aesthetic masterpiece, but achieving commercial
success had been rather more difficult. Pasadena Now blamed this on a lack of proper promotion, rather than any inherent flaws with the pedestrian mall concept.

In September, 1974, the consulting partnership of Kennard, Delahousie and Gault and Keyser Marston Associates released the “Final Environmental Impact Report” for Pasadena’s Downtown Redevelopment Project. In keeping with the ideals of urban renewal, the plan included the closing of smaller streets and alleys in order to make way for block-sized developments. And continuing with the principles equating new with better, the report classified 55 percent of the buildings in the redevelopment area as being in poor condition, meaning in practice that their age had rendered them “obsolete.” Further, because of these aged structures, the central business district “fail[ed] to project a united or exciting visual image.” By contrast, the consultants determined the area’s newer buildings to be of high quality, but too dispersed throughout the downtown for a consistent image. The solution, according to the report, was more new buildings for “infilling” to create a “harmonious impression” better reflecting the desired concept of a headquarters city. In order to create room for the proposed infilling, seventy “obsolete” buildings would have to go. Perhaps hoping to capitalize on this report, architect and planner Ronald T. Aday shortly afterward submitted a new design concept for western Colorado Boulevard to Pasadena Now. He called for realigning the street in a meandering pattern to create additional pedestrian areas while breaking up what he termed the “monotony” of the “straight tunnel vista” created by rows of store fronts. Aday also maintained that this plan would increase safety by eliminating the “hypnotic and dangerous boredom” of driving on the straight street, while simultaneously increasing the visibility of store fronts.
While western Colorado Boulevard faced the possibility of artful meandering—never to actually be taken up—eastern Colorado Boulevard was set for a much more dramatic transformation, more in keeping with the ideals of Pasadena Now and the city's redevelopment agency. In late 1974 and early 1975, the Pasadena Redevelopment Agency revealed plans for an entirely new, enclosed shopping mall to be located immediately south of the city's Beaux-Arts civic center. The new Foothill Freeway—Highway 210—was scheduled to be completed in 1975, and Pasadena Now stoked concerns that it could prove to be a conduit routing retail and other business dollars away from the city if Pasadena did not respond with a suitable development strategy. The Colorado Boulevard Beautification subcommittee's report for March 1975 explained, “Completion of the freeway in 1975 will add a new dimension to Pasadena. To take advantage of this opportunity, the city must be inviting to freeway travelers or they will drive right by us for shopping, dining, and entertainment.” Further, “We are now at the cross roads. It is essential to revitalize Colorado Boulevard or it will continue to decline and there will be no central city future in Pasadena . . . . If we expect to gain commercial non-retail development, offices, financial, institutional, hotel and restaurant facilities, we must improve Colorado Boulevard.”

Pasadena's Comprehensive General Plan of 1977 gave a clear indication of how far official viewpoints had changed concerning the place of older buildings in the city's future. Structures once deemed obsolete, and barriers to progress, were recharacterized as symbols of the city's cultural heritage. Sketching out the basic objectives of urban design in Pasadena, the plan specified that “the Downtown Retail Center/Civic Center complex [is] to demonstrate the human scale and visual interest which can result from
sensitive integration of old and new development.” Further, new development was to reflect an “expansion upon the quality of design inherent in some of the original buildings and urban design relationships in the downtown area.” This was meant to lead to “Urban Design Strategy 200.0: Improvement of Pasadena’s image as a city identified with civic beauty.” The policy was explained in greater length in a section of the plan devoted specifically to Historic and Cultural Resources:

Historic and cultural preservation represents a responsibility of the present generation to maintain unique and significant structures and areas established in the past for the use, edification and enjoyment of future generations. Pasadena, because of its rich history and legacy of architecturally significant buildings, has a particularly handsome endowment to protect and retain. The Historic and Cultural Preservation Element seeks to identify and protect areas, sites and structures having architectural, historical or cultural significance and to reaffirm their continuing value as a resource contributing to the vitality and diversity of the present.

The General Plan examined the combinations of economic and political factors that had discouraged the preservation of historic and cultural resources to that point, admitting that there had often been a “lack of effective response to [the] impending loss of landmarks.” Partly this was the result of “disincentives built into existing codes and policies that discourage[d] continued use of older buildings” in favor of new development that could produce greater levels of tax revenue and modernistic visual prestige. Rather than making allowances for the structural or design quirks inherent in many older structures, Pasadena’s building codes had insisted that they be brought up to full compliance with modern standards if they were to be of continued use. The plan noted that there had been a “failure to develop programs to take advantage of funding sources” to support rehabilitation, prompted by the more basic “failure of government to
recognize historic and cultural assets, and the assumption that age alone is a factor in the determination of blight.”

It is apparent from the earlier actions of the Redevelopment Agency and Pasadena Now that these failures described in the General Plan were not so much oversights as they were the results of a calculated strategy to restore the economic fortunes of the central business district. From the late 1940s through the early 1960s, these efforts in Pasadena reflected the optimistic faith in technological progress that characterized the larger national mood. Grand redevelopment schemes were the local equivalent of the Interstate Highway System, or the National Park Service's MISSION 66 program of facility modernization, both launched in 1956. All had the common goals of accommodating an automotive public through efficient, modern design principles and, by extension, giving Americans the future they believed they had earned in years of sacrifice during the Great Depression and the Second World War. Many residents of Southern California, the center of the national aerospace industry, would have grown accustomed to predictions in the popular media that personal helicopters, atomic-powered cars and climate-controlled cities were just around the corner. As a result, they could have had a greater inclination to regard the built environment of an earlier era as perhaps quaint, and aside from a few high-profile landmarks, not worth the price of impeding progress.

The change from attitudes such as these towards historic buildings and other properties in Pasadena mirrored the broader trends that produced the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966. A reexamination and revaluation of the past perhaps gave some measure of reassurance to a society that had discovered the future was not what it
had expected. The more far-reaching predictions remained in the world of science fiction, while the most persistent problems continued to assert themselves. However, this looking to the past would have remained simple nostalgia if it had not been accompanied by legislation that made history profitable enough to serve as the means of finally achieving the long hoped for revitalization in the downtown business district.

The keys to bringing this about were committed residents and enough raw materials—in the form of older buildings—to create a new urban landscape that would give nostalgia concrete form. Pasadena Now, among other organizations, demonstrated the former, while the city's early twentieth century image building, together with ambitious futuristic redevelopment schemes left unpursued, provided the latter.

By contrast, the unique power of San Bernardino’s strong mayor form of government meant it had been able to carry out demolish-and-rebuild urban renewal projects in its downtown on a scale that developers in Pasadena and Riverside could have only dreamt about. Following the pattern of the earliest projects, however, redevelopment focused on the downtown, while conditions beyond the freeway to the west continued to decline. By 1970 crime in that part of the city prompted calls for a police substation, which Police Chief Louis Fortuna rejected on the basis of cost and his belief that “a substation, lightly manned, would be a perfect target for . . . terrorist attacks. I have to think of the safety of my men.”93 Facing these attitudes from the city government, African American civic leaders and activists formed the San Bernardino Black Community Coalition in order to present a united front in demanding changes. The Coalition's most pointed grievance was a contention that the federal funds being used in downtown redevelopment plans had been granted to the city specifically because
of the economic conditions on the west side. Coalition member Harry Davidson asserted that because of the subsequent neglect by redevelopment officials, “We feel that the ‘City on the Move’ [San Bernardino's motto] has been moving away from the Black community.” A fellow member, local activist Frances Grice, warned that “Unless we Black people can deal with that problem, the freeway will become a Berlin Wall in San Bernardino.”

These conditions had previously contributed to racial tensions in San Bernardino’s schools in 1969, particularly two violent riots that occurred at the new San Bernardino North High School in October and November. Both incidents required the use of tear gas and mass arrests, while leaving “dozens of officers and students injured.” An editorial in the San Bernardino Sun reflected on a meeting between school board members and a crisis intervention expert, explaining that the problem was deep-seated, “for it is intertwined with community attitudes . . . . The great expectation was that after integration a generation of children would come along free of the prejudices of its elders. Instead, in San Bernardino, school students have created some hostilities by themselves.” The California Department of Education's Bureau of Intergroup Relations concluded that attitudes within the city as a whole bore primary responsibility for racial tensions within the school system. The researchers found residents to be surprised and bewildered by the campus riots, and concluded that the city as whole was naïve about the extent of its racial problems. Looking specifically at minority residents, the researchers cited widespread “hopelessness and paranoia” that caused many to look for hidden motives in every action by the city government, no matter how well intentioned.
Part of this suspicion might have been fostered by the freewheeling style of Mayor Al Ballard, who had gained national notoriety in 1968 by equipping the city's fire trucks with shotguns, after firefighters in Detroit had been fatally ambushed by rioters. In 1969 he weathered a vote of censure by the City Council for his comment that San Bernardino's own rioters deserved to be shot.99 After declining to run for a fourth term in 1971, Ballard was replaced by W. R. “Bob” Holcomb, who quickly faced the resentment of the city's minority population. Four members of his newly-formed Mexican-American Committee immediately resigned because, according to the (former) vice chairman Paul Perea, “It seems that every politician forms some kind of committee to solve the problems of the Mexican community. It always ends representing everything but the community. The committee is usually picked as payment for political debts. This time, we want something more.”100 This sentiment was echoed by African American residents. Future city council member Valerie Pope, speaking on behalf of the Welfare Rights Organization, told Holcomb that they were “through being dictated to by a white boy from City Hall . . . . Either you produce or get over on the other side [of the freeway] and stop fooling with us.”101

Holcomb's administration would ultimately break new ground in its dealing with the Latino and African American communities in San Bernardino, but maintained more continuity with what had become the local tradition of commissioning studies and launching grand redevelopment schemes. In 1973, the city's Community Planning and Management Program used a grant from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development to produce a new quality of life study. The State of the City of San Bernardino, 1973 analyzed census and business data to identify specific problem areas
within the city, and their relationship to ethnicity and housing patterns. A significant aspect of this report was its examination of the aftereffects of federally-subsidized urban redevelopment and rehabilitation projects. The authors concluded that the city's past efforts had been misdirected, with a focus on improving the image of downtown businesses while neglecting substandard housing conditions. The report further contended that in some cases—particularly on the west side—rehabilitation projects actually accelerated the decay they were meant to correct.  

A comparison with the city of Riverside makes it clear how far San Bernardino had come from the bright potential its boosters had once claimed for it. Both cities were of similar size in the 1970s, and both were home to institutions of higher education: California State College, San Bernardino, and the University of California, Riverside. San Bernardino hosted Norton Air Force Base, while Riverside had long been associated with March Air Force Base. The differences between the two cities appear in the quantifiable measurements of resident's quality of life, and in their characteristics. In 1960, 50 percent of San Bernardino's residents 25 years of age or older had completed high school, compared with 62 percent for Riverside. Ten years later, these figures had changed to 53 percent in San Bernardino, and 68 percent for Riverside. The gap between median family income had also increased during the 1960s. Where the median San Bernardino family earned approximately 90 percent of the income of a comparable Riverside family, by 1970 their income of $8,656 represented only 81 percent of their neighbor's earnings. Poverty was present in both cities, but again the census figures suggest the situation was more sharply felt in San Bernardino. Just over 8 percent of Riverside's families in general, and 18 percent of African American families in
particular, lived below the poverty level in 1969. In San Bernardino almost 13 percent of the all families lived in this condition, increasing to 28 percent for African American families.103

Describing San Bernardino in the late 1960s, author Joan Didion writes: “The future always looks good in the golden land, because no one remembers the past. Here is where the hot wind blows and the old ways do not seem relevant . . . .”104 The future for the city in the 1970s, as it was in the 1950s and 1960s, was a comprehensive redevelopment program focusing on what had been dubbed the “Central City” business district. Despite the findings of The State of the City of San Bernardino, 1973, remediation of substandard housing was again deferred in favor of new projects to draw shoppers downtown. Meanwhile, in Riverside and Pasadena, developers and residents did remember the past, but selectively, coming full circle to create new visions of local history that hearkened back to the made-to-order histories of the earliest civic boosters.
CHAPTER 7
PRESERVATION AND PROMOTION

From the mid-1970s onward, historic preservation became increasingly institutionalized as a planning and development strategy in Pasadena and Riverside. As a result, the early twentieth-century Mission Revival and City Beautiful visions of boosters such as Frank Miller received new life as the preferred means of revitalizing the cities’ commercial fortunes through promotion to residents and visitors. This approach brought critics from two fronts. Preservationists worried that the drive to make history profitable compromised its integrity, especially when the reuse of an older property meant that something legitimately old was replaced with something that merely appeared old. Developers and members of still-disadvantaged minority groups contended that regulations put in place to protect historic properties hampered economic growth, or guided it in ways designed to maintain the existing structure of the community.

San Bernardino’s municipal and business leaders largely maintained their commitment to traditional redevelopment projects, until Latinos gained a significant voice within the city government in the late 1990s. From that point on, city policy began to emphasize the preservation and development of the few historic properties remaining in the downtown area, in hopes of emulating the success apparent in Pasadena’s efforts. However, new retail developments near the city that present the feel of a complete historic business district, without the issues that accompany actual preservation, have added a new level of complexity to the city’s plans, and to the larger topic of planning and preservation.
I. Riverside: Rediscovering Frank Miller

It would be a stretch to suggest that civic leaders in Riverside had taken to heart the recommendations made by planners Livingston and Blayney in their report *Riverside: 1966—The View Ahead*. However, the assertion that the “downtown's claim as the center of a quality city” rested in large part on the visual appeal of its older buildings—coming as it did after the long-planned demolition of the Mission Revival-style main library branch—clearly pointed to the advisability of greater oversight in the management of the city’s architectural patrimony. ¹ With this in mind, the city government began to investigate the need for a Cultural Heritage Board in early 1968, together with local landmark ordinance that would allow it to formally recognize historic resources for their significance. ² The Board was duly formed and the landmark ordinance adopted in 1969, with the Mission Inn designated as City Landmark No. 1. The city assigned the administration of the program to the Riverside Municipal Museum. ³ This suggests that while historic preservation had gained greater visibility, it was not yet an integral part of the city planning process.

This was an important distinction, because simply designating a historic landmark did little to ensure its protection, much less to give it a role in the city’s future. By the early 1970s the Mission Inn had passed through a series of owners, foreclosures and forced sales, each one bringing the structure closer to the possibility of demolition. No longer an active hotel, one wing had been converted into apartments, while other sections were used as dormitory space for the UC Riverside. The city Redevelopment Agency ultimately bought the Inn in 1976 using federal funds acquired through the Community Block Grant program. In his study of Riverside’s downtown, historian Andy McCue
observes that “The inn quickly became an embarrassment to the city's budget, but it was an embarrassment city leaders thought had to be borne.”¹ This point was emphasized in the Riverside Downtown Plan; the culmination of a four-year study completed in the previous year. The plan, based on both professional study and the input of a specially-commissioned citizens’ committee, informed the city’s leadership that “The time has passed to attempt any controlled architectural style for the City of Riverside, and the Mission Inn should be allowed to stand as the dominant symbol of past eclecticism—it gives living proof of the value of diversity and confusion in stimulating and eliciting reverence—future physical development should be true to this thesis.”⁵

The description of “confusion” as a positive quality presents a sharp contrast to the rationalistic ideals found in the early urban renewal movement. It could also be seen as a way to clearly set the downtown apart from modern residential areas. As Greg Hise has demonstrated in his studies of Los Angeles during and after World War Two, many of Southern California’s suburban housing developments were, in their own way, as carefully planned as any of the great city center projects proposed during the same era. The Riverside Downtown Plan recognized this, and insisted that, “In order to become truly viable, the central city must become a place where an urban lifestyle is possible and where the needs of those who seek diversion from suburbia can be satisfied. Downtown must, in other words, offer that which is not available in the suburbs and the surrounding rural areas.”⁶ One of the most important things the downtown could offer was a sense of place and history that was missing in mass-produced subdivisions: “Preservation of the major historic buildings and objects as identified by the Cultural Heritage Board is most
important to illustrate to the citizenry the variety in Riverside's past. This plan supports the Cultural Heritage Board's determinations heartily."\textsuperscript{7}

Separately during 1976, the Mission Inn served as the location for California’s annual State Historic Preservation Conference. This was the result of civic leaders lobbying the Western Regional Office of the National Trust for Historic Preservation, and the State Office of Historic Preservation, in order to bring greater attention to Riverside’s downtown in general, and the hotel in particular. The most immediate result was that the Mission Inn was listed as a National Historic Landmark in May, 1977, for its place within the Mission Revival movement. Beyond the simple prestige value, this recognition helped to build momentum for treating historic properties on the citywide level, rather than through a building by building approach. This is seen in Riverside’s agreement with the State Office of Historic Preservation during the same year to conduct a comprehensive survey of the city’s historic resources. This, in turn, inspired local preservation advocates to form Downtown Renaissance in 1978, and the Old Riverside Foundation in 1979. Both organizations took leading roles in identifying local historic sites and preparing nominations to the National Register of Historic Places.\textsuperscript{8}

Downtown Renaissance and the Old Riverside Foundation also provided input on the city’s planning efforts, beginning with the \textit{Downtown Community Plan} in 1981. As was becoming common, the plan emphasized the value of historic buildings in providing a “people-oriented environment,” in which the scale and spatial arrangement of the structures provided a sense of comfort for those around them. The Mission Inn was an obvious example of this environment, but the report also highlighted a number of other structures, including the 1929 YWCA building designed by Julia Morgan; the 1929
Municipal Auditorium; the First Congregational Church, designed by Myron Hunt and completed in 1913; the 1891 Universalist-Unitarian Church; the former Post Office, built in 1912; the Old City Hall of 1923; and the 1908 Bonnett Building and 1928 Security Title Insurance Building, both distinguished by their arcaded ground floors. All were located within three blocks of the Mission Inn, and formed an eclectic mixture of period styles that the *Downtown Community Plan* recommended as model for future development. The plan also promoted the concept of designating historic districts “a means of preserving and integrating historical charm within the modern Downtown” through careful planning and the use of architectural design guidelines. Civic leaders were advised that such an approach had already been adopted by San Diego, San Francisco, Sacramento, Brea, San Buenaventura and Pasadena as “an inexpensive, manageable way of revitalizing older sections in many cities, offering new vigor and an increased property tax base while retaining an historical context.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Area (sq. mi.)</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>African American</th>
<th>Hispanic</th>
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<td></td>
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<td>(66.0%)</td>
<td>(20.7%)</td>
<td>(18.4%)</td>
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<td>Riverside</td>
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<td>11,790</td>
<td>27,511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(81.4%)</td>
<td>(6.9%)</td>
<td>(16.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Bernardino</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>117,490</td>
<td>79,893</td>
<td>17,506</td>
<td>29,843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(68.0%)</td>
<td>(14.9%)</td>
<td>(25.4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Because of the growing number of recognized historic resources in Riverside, and the “exposure to maturing historic preservation methodology” through such means as the National Conference of State Historic Preservation Officers held at the Mission Inn in 1980, city leaders accepted that a more coordinated approach to preservation and planning would be needed. As a result, the city commissioned the architectural firm Donald A. Cotton and Associates in 1981 to make a study of the downtown area and evaluate the potential for specific historic districts. The Downtown Historic Preservation Study: Historic Districts Report, completed in March, 1982, identified six districts with either local or national significance: Mt. Rubidoux, Mile Square West, Mile Square East, City Center, Twogood Orange Grove Tract, and the Citrus Industrial Thematic District.

In 1983 the firm was asked to develop a two-part preservation plan for the downtown: Restoration Riverside: A Plan for Downtown Historic Districts and Downtown Rehabilitation and Design Guidelines. In the following year, the Cultural Resources Ordinance was amended to bring the city plan into line with other municipal preservation programs in the state.

Neither action represented a moratorium on the demolition of historic buildings in Riverside. Various resources around the city were still sacrificed to the pressures of growth, new planning philosophies or “changes in vision,” but not without an understanding that preservation was assuming a legitimate role in the city’s development strategies. In recognition of this, during 1989 the City Council established two Historic Preservation Project Manager positions in the Development Department to concentrate on the rehabilitation of historic commercial, institutional, and residential historic properties in the downtown. This may have also been motivated by ongoing difficulties
with the Mission Inn. In 1985 the Redevelopment Agency had contracted with Carley Capital Group, an urban development firm based in Madison, Wisconsin, to renovate and operate the hotel, backed by a $2.2 million grant from the Department of Housing and Urban Development, a $1 million loan from the city and a $15.5 million loan from Chemical Bank. The developer discovered that the hotel’s structural problems were more serious, and costly, than first anticipated. The financial situation was compounded by an adverse real estate investment climate in the wake of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, and finally compelled Carley to halt renovation in 1988, and file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy the following year.¹³

This was over ten years since the city had originally purchased the hotel. In Andy McCue’s analysis, this drawn out process of renovation at the hotel was symptomatic of an uncoordinated approach to development by Riverside’s city government. As has been seen, the city adopted a number of plans during the 1970s and 1980s, but lacked a comprehensive strategy that could effectively tie the recommendations and proposals together. City officials did not have a consistent vision for the city’s future that would have enabled them to direct the renewal process on the large scale. Instead, they tended to operate reactively as individual developers put forward their own ideas. McCue asserts that as a result, developers hoping to undertake a project in the city first had to build local political support for their proposal. This would give them the advantage they needed to negotiate effectively with “Riverside's deal maker,” assistant city manager and Redevelopment Agency chief Robert Wales. The problem, McCue contends, was that this approach depended on gaining the favor of the politically powerful within the city, and maintaining their willingness to work on
behalf of the developer’s project. This necessarily meant that whether the project involved historic preservation or new construction, it had to appeal to the civic image that Riverside’s elites hoped to promote. A project such as the rehabilitation of the Mission Inn, which still embodied hotelier Frank Miller’s romantic vision of Southern California, ultimately had access to the resources needed to carry it through to completion. On the other hand, a proposal that could not win the backing of the city’s big names often had little chance of success.  

Further developments would make it clear that the romantic vision was the preferred way forward. In 1990 Riverside’s Department of Development initiated a study on the potential of tourism as a significant source of business in the coming decades. The study included the suggestions of a “citizen’s task force,” which had concluded that any formal tourism program for the city should be “heritage based.” Based on this, the Curator of History for Riverside’s Municipal Museum, Vincent Moses, developed the historic contexts that would be used to define exactly what this heritage would be, from the viewpoint of the marketplace. Moses referred to the concept of the “California Dream,” as described by historians Carey McWilliams and Kevin Starr, and from this basis focused on the role that Riverside’s citrus industry had played in creating and promoting Southern California as a Mediterranean paradise.

McWilliams considered Riverside to be the true birthplace of the industry in California, and depicted the orange tree as “the living symbol of richness, luxury, and elegance,” which “contributed as much, perhaps, as any single factor to the physical charm of the region.” He also noted that the cultivation of oranges had a particular appeal for people of means from the East Coast or Midwest, a characteristic that gave “a
homogeneous character and a unique social quality to the citrus-belt communities.” Though these communities had many of the institutions of small cities, McWilliams saw them as quiet and complacent suburban shopping districts. However, McWilliams also saw sharply defined social divisions between “the do-nothings who own the groves” and the vast army of Hispanic labor on whom the industry depended. The social and economic segregation in the citrus towns was inevitably accompanied by physical segregation. Political power was a commodity distributed by the California Fruit Growers Exchange and its allied commercial farmers’ associations, operating under the brand name of “Sunkist.”

These divisions likely shaped the political and cultural climate in Riverside for decades, but were not the sort of civic images that could form the basis for a local tourism industry. Instead, the city emphasized the more salutary aspects of this historic context when it created the Citrus Heritage Task Force, which set, as its first priority, the need to identify the remaining citrus heritage-related resources around the city. Through the efforts of Historic Preservation Manager Marion Mitchell-Wilson, the city reached an agreement with the National Park Service’s Historic American Engineering Record to begin the California Citrus Heritage Recording Project in the summer of 1991. Additional funding came from the California State Department of Parks and Recreation, together with local corporations and families that owned many of the resources previously identified as significant. The project did not directly address any historic properties in Riverside’s downtown, but generations of promoters had already established the conceptual and visual link between citrus farming and the Mission-style architecture associated with many the city’s most visible buildings.
Table 6: Area and Population, 1990.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Area (sq. mi.)</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>African American</th>
<th>Hispanic</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Pasadena</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Bernardino</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>172,451</td>
<td>99,550 (57.7%)</td>
<td>26,281 (15.4%)</td>
<td>56,755 (32.9%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The role of promoters in creating Riverside’s civic image was acknowledged in *Looking Toward the Future: Riverside, California Strategic Plan: The Year 2000*—a planning document also produced during 1991. “Understanding that a great city needs myths and symbols as well as wealth to establish its identity,” the unnamed authors explained, “[Frank] Miller strove for the first 30 years of the twentieth century to generate distinctive myths and symbols for Riverside.” Miller’s preeminent accomplishment during this period was, clearly, his place of business. “Designed and built as a shrine to California’s Spanish past, the Mission Inn was to become what author Kevin Starr has called a ‘Spanish Revival Oz.’ It made Riverside the center for the emerging mission style that came to be identified with southern California and proved to be a promoter's dream.”^{22}

In order to preserve the distinctive cityscape that Miller and his contemporaries created, *Looking Toward the Future* included the goal of downtown revitalization “based on a philosophy of integrating the following features: open spaces and landscaping;
historic buildings; and new buildings.” Recommendations intended to make the goal a reality proposed focusing the rehabilitation of historic buildings towards mixed-use retail, office and residential space; developing design guidelines and land use plans for specific areas within the downtown to ensure the preservation of existing buildings and the compatibility of new construction; protecting “architecturally significant focal points” and vistas from visually intrusive building elements; directing new construction towards vacant areas or lots occupied by buildings deemed historically or architecturally insignificant; and maintaining sensitivity towards the city’s diverse yet harmonious architectural heritage—“its style should be emphasized and respected.” The modernism of the 1950s and 1960s, however, was not considered a part of this style. *Looking Toward the Future* noted “The facade of the Central Library is not appropriate to an historic district. If the library were to be expanded on that site, a new facade in keeping with the historic district should be considered.”

These efforts to “recapture the sense of style and place that is [Riverside’s] heritage” received a critical boost with the long-awaited reopening of the Mission Inn in late December, 1992. Local entrepreneur Duane R. Roberts, who had fond memories of the hotel from his boyhood, purchased the hotel from the city earlier in the same month with a combination of his own money and loans from other local sources. The building had been sitting vacant since Carley Capital Group had been forced to halt work in 1988, but the fact that Roberts could open for business in less than one month indicates how close the project had come to completion. This can be seen as adding weight to McCue’s contention that Riverside’s leaders were accustomed to waiting for developers to come forward with specific ideas, rather than launching their own
initiatives. At the same time, it shows that redevelopment emphasizing historic character was far from a risk-free concept, even with cities such as Pasadena and San Diego as examples of what might be accomplished.

While waiting for the right developer to complete the task of putting the Mission Inn back in business, Riverside’s leadership came to the conclusion that the city’s general plan had, in fact, become scattered and uncoordinated through piecemeal updates in response to evolving state requirements. In late 1989, the city initiated a five-year program to develop a new, comprehensive plan that was adopted by the City Council in September, 1994. In addition to sections required by state law, such as Land Use, Transportation and Housing, the city also chose to include a “Community Enhancement Element.” This was intended to address “those aspects of the Riverside community that make it a unique and desirable place in which to live, work, play and do business. Thoughtful attention to community character is essential to achieve the goals of the ‘Quality City.’”

To a large extent, the plan’s goals and policies focused on a combination of quality of life issues and what is known in the business world as “branding”: creating a distinctive and consistent identity for Riverside that would readily convey the preferred “Citywide image.” Historic preservation was incorporated into the plan as a means of achieving both objectives: “Riverside’s cultural heritage includes both historical and archeological resources. Historic sites, structures and natural features throughout the community can enhance the charm of the City, offer opportunities to enrich the City’s character and form the cornerstones of successful revitalization efforts. The City has an abundance of historic sites and structures that, if preserved, can help the City attract the
people and businesses required to maintain a vibrant Quality City.”

The authors of the plan also emphasized that historic natural resources could add to the distinctive “flavor of Riverside.” These were primarily what were termed “heritage trees” that were linked to developments in the city’s history, such as the Parent Navel Orange Tree, or those, including the Chicago White Sox Redwood Tree, that reflected the backgrounds and interests of the city’s early residents.

Beyond this sort of image building, one of the most important policies that the General Plan suggested in the quest for the “Quality City” was that of encouraging high-density residential areas close to the downtown. Instead of simply trying to find a new way to attract retail traffic from other parts of the city or region, people living and working directly in the downtown would attract retail activity. As Andy McCue notes, “The new theory stood the old one on its head,” except it was not, of course a new theory. Instead, it represented a return to the downtown’s original pattern of intensive mixed use, which had been responsible for the vitality that planners had long hoped to reproduce by other means.

II. Pasadena: Institutionalizing Preservation, and Making it Pay

The threat posed to Pasadena’s long-treasured civic image of the “City Beautiful” or the “Athens of the West” by such “other means” as the past emphasis on revitalizing the downtown on the corporate headquarters model aroused considerable concern and antipathy in tradition-minded residents by the mid-1970s. The Pasadena Redevelopment Agency, the city’s preeminent advocate of traditional redevelopment by demolition, as well as the Plaza Pasadena downtown mall that drew attention away from
street-level retailers, was the obvious focal point for those fearing irreversible change. In October, 1977, this fear escalated to outright violence in the form of an arson fire at the Agency’s office. Agency chairman Cornelius Pings judged the fire to be “surely the act of a sick mind . . . which I am sure is rejected by all the citizens of our community.” Pings acknowledged that the Agency faced considerable criticism within Pasadena, but insisted that it was welcome, as long as it was constructive.\(^{34}\)

Seeking an alternative to a skyline dominated by modern office blocks, and backed by funding from local advocacy group Pasadena Heritage, the Pasadena Central Improvement Association, and the National Endowment for the Arts, the city’s Board of Directors turned to Pasadena’s local architects. The Board commissioned the recently formed Arroyo Group, a design firm that modeled itself on Pasadena’s late nineteenth/early twentieth century Arroyo Guild of architects, planners and craftsmen, to develop a plan for the West Colorado business district and its historic resources.\(^{35}\)

*A Plan for Old Pasadena*, completed in January, 1978, combined a conceptual strategy for reinvigorating the area by exploiting its historic resources, with specific design guidelines for both reused buildings and new construction. “The design plan,” as the authors explained, “attempts to preserve the special physical qualities of the area—the small scale buildings and the beautiful Colorado Boulevard facades—and add the missing ingredients which will facilitate the area's revitalization. Among the recommendations are increased numbers of off-street parking spaces, a pedestrian walkway system, both along the major streets and along the former alleyways, suggestions for several special pedestrian plaza areas, and specific recommended treatments for the area's streets.”\(^{36}\) The plan compared West Colorado Boulevard to the
city of Sacramento’s Old Sacramento District as a place where “irregular skyline and random building widths combine to create an area of intimate visual scale.” Within this environment, the aim—perhaps familiar now through its use in numerous locales—was to a “destination specialty retail area” characterized by stores carrying antiques, crafts, “unusual clothes,” specialty books, music, art and quality furniture, as well as eating and entertainment suitable for daytime and nighttime business.\(^{37}\)

The authors of *A Plan for Old Pasadena* cautioned that “The revitalization will happen only with the strong continuous commitment of both the local owners and the public sector.” They advocated for the creation of an Urban Conservation Area which would “establish procedures to prohibit demolition of buildings except through a rigorous appeal procedure,” and also could “unlock provisions of state enabling legislation allowing building codes to be interpreted flexibly on a building by building basis, thereby serving to reduce rehabilitation costs.”\(^{38}\) In their analysis of the Old Pasadena area, Allan D. Kotin and Kim K. Szalay repeatedly assert that the ultimate success of the city’s efforts was indeed due to “a continuity of commitment to the community on the part of the political leadership and many of the affected property owners, leading to a strong valuing of historic preservation.” Further, “it is not accidental that Pasadenans have strong roots in community and see themselves as members of a clearly defined, albeit economically and ethnically diverse, community.”\(^{39}\)

It may be more correct to say that, in the late 1970s at least, these were the qualities shared by those who were in a position to influence the course of development within the city. Despite many outward appearances, Pasadena was marked by its own share of internal divisions based on race and ethnicity, and not merely architectural
philosophies. In these cases as well, the Redevelopment Agency’s policies were a particular source of friction as it sought to extend its reach into residential areas, such as the primarily low-income Hispanic neighborhood of Villa-Parke. The residents had the misfortune to occupy a site north of the civic center, on the opposite side of the Foothill Freeway, which the Agency had identified as an ideal location for condominiums and multiple-unit townhouses. Facing condemnation through eminent domain, some homeowners sought help in 1978 from El Centro de Accion Social, a non-profit service organization founded in the late 1960s. El Centro, in turn, called upon the Western Center on Law and Poverty to help bring pressure on the Redevelopment Agency. The Western Center argued that such an enclave of affluence would have an adverse effect by changing the ethnic and economic dynamics of the neighborhood. Homeowners such as the Acosta family, who were profiled in the Altadenan/Pasadenan Chronicle, generally understood the Redevelopment Agency’s goals. However, they wanted “to live in a nice neighborhood too, but they don’t understand why people like themselves, who have kept up the property so nicely, now have to move . . . .”

The Pasadena Redevelopment Agency faced a number of allegations during this period that it was unresponsive to the concerns of the Spanish-speaking residents. During 1979, El Centro de Accion Social charged that the Agency was refusing to meet with Hispanic residents of Villa-Parke or to provide them with information on its plans. The Pasadena Ecumenical Council and Interdenominational Ministerial Alliance had similar objections to the Agency, questioning why an African American member of the Agency’s board who had intended to meet with Villa-Parke residents had been prevented from doing so.
Actions such as these helped to fuel the perception that the Redevelopment Agency was increasingly disconnected from the interests of Pasadena residents, and was instead focused on its own agenda. Preservation advocates accused the Agency’s board members of being “megaphiliacs” who were obsessed with oversized office towers. Preservationist Rick Cole insisted in 1980 that “We are more and more finding ourselves strangers in the city we grew up in—a more West Los Angeles kind of city where the human scale is gone.” Critics further decried proposals for a series of high-rise buildings along Los Robles Avenue as “Pings’s Canyon,” after the Agency’s chairman Cornelius Pings, but Pings countered that they were being shortsighted. He maintained that low “monotonous” buildings with little setback, as were found on West Colorado Boulevard, could create as much of a canyon effect as tall buildings.

Part of the difference in opinion likely came from the points of view. Pings’s description corresponds to that of a motorist who only perceives the general shape of buildings in passing, as their eyes are primarily directed well down the street. By contrast, the opinions of Cole and other preservationists reflected the viewpoint of the pedestrian. An individual strolling along Colorado Boulevard could appreciate the small architectural features of the older retail buildings but, as has been explained elsewhere, would probably find the large, Spartan buildings of a Pings’s Canyon uninviting due to their lack of human scale.

These were among the issues that led the city’s Board of Directors to dissolve the Pasadena Redevelopment Agency in April, 1981. The city replaced the Agency with a new Economic Development Committee less explicitly devoted to the traditional approach towards redevelopment. However, members of the Hispanic population were
mindful of what they considered to be a history of unresponsiveness towards Pasadena’s Spanish-speaking residents—particularly with regard to how they would be affected by development projects. Activists demanded that the board add a Hispanic member who could theoretically represent their voices in the planning process.\(^46\)

Further evidence of the changing attitudes towards preservation and development in Pasadena came in 1983. Preservationist Rick Cole defeated a pro-development candidate for a seat on the city Board of Directors, giving an institutional presence to those in the city favoring the retention and reuse of the city’s historic resources.\(^47\) These included the members of Pasadena Heritage, a preservation advocacy organization founded in 1977. In large part through the efforts of the organization to identify historic properties under threat from development or neglect, the Old Pasadena Historic District—centered on the intersection of Colorado Boulevard and Fair Oaks Avenue—was listed on the National Register of Historic Places on September 15, 1983. The district is considered significant in local history as the original commercial center of Pasadena, and because it represents within its fabric the evolution of architectural design in Southern California.\(^48\) During July of the same year, the Pasadena Planning Commission approved a revised version of the Arroyo Group’s *Plan for Old Pasadena*. Shortly afterwards, the Board of Directors initiated the Plan for Old Pasadena Redevelopment Project, which established the legal framework for using public funds to construct three parking structures within the downtown district.\(^49\)

Kotin and Szalay identify the parking structures as key factors in the rehabilitation of the downtown, because “The central issue in the preservation of older buildings for modern retailing is the lack of parking.” City owned parking garages at
three to five block intervals gave retailers the infrastructure needed to make redevelopment economically and practically feasible by fostering pedestrian movement past the downtown shops, creating the foot traffic necessary to support viable businesses. This presented a certain risk at the time, as there was no assurance that new retail activity could be successfully developed. However, the authors believe that this risk taking encouraged a similar sense of initiative on the part of developers and entrepreneurs. This represents a notable difference in comparison with Riverside where, according to historian Andy McCue, developers advanced their own proposals during the 1980s in an atmosphere that lacked a sense of vision and shared risk between the city and business.\(^{50}\)

This should not be taken to mean that redevelopment in Pasadena had reached a stage of trouble-free harmony by the mid-1980s. The One Colorado Project, presented as a case study in Dana Cuff et al., *Form in Contention: Design in Development Disputes* (1994) demonstrates that difficulties could still arise for preservationists when developers were committed to the concept of adaptive reuse. The project incorporated seventeen late-nineteenth/early twentieth century buildings at the intersection of Colorado Boulevard and Fair Oaks Avenue; almost an entire block of the Old Pasadena historic district. It had been conceived in 1983 as “Pasadena Marketplace” by a team of developers who had been successful in creating the Main Street corridor in Santa Monica. They planned a similar development for Pasadena “based upon a ‘Victoriana’ design theme. This was a vision of urbanism anchored by restaurants and shops to be frequented by prosperous, and usually young, clientele within Victorian-styled buildings.”\(^{51}\)
Primary developer John Wilson was influenced by the Baltimore Harbor Front project, and the rehabilitation of Boston’s Quincy Market and Faneuil Hall. He wanted the project block to be developed as a “festival marketplace,” a concept which also reflected the general aims of city authorities. Wilson’s initial design featured an interior shopping arcade with atriums and upper level bridges to connect buildings. Street façades would be maintained, but the interior walls and floors would be replaced, together with the roofs, in order to provide modern retail spaces. Pasadena’s Design Review Board approved this strategy, and considered it to be consistent with the Old Pasadena Redevelopment Plan. On the other hand, Pasadena Heritage was adamantly opposed to the plan. The group believed that removing interior structures sacrificed too much of the historic fabric, and feared that this loss of integrity could lead to these buildings being removed from the National Register of Historic Places. Pasadena Heritage also did not feel the festival marketplace concept was consistent with the history and atmosphere of Old Pasadena, and argued that the project was out of scale and inconsistent with the surrounding businesses in the area. They contended that the project seemed “introverted,” and lacked the street orientation that they deemed essential for a historically-accurate revitalization of the downtown.\(^5^2\)

Opposition to Wilson’s approach led to the spectacle of dueling consulting firms conducting studies and market analyses on the viability of the project during the mid-1980s. Linda S. Congleton and Associates argued on behalf of Pasadena Marketplace Associates that developing the project area on a building-by-building basis would not create enough usable retail space to make the project financially feasible. Keyser Marston Associates, hired by the city government, suggested a different mix of uses with
more historic integrity. Pasadena’s Board of Directors ultimately sided with the festival marketplace concept, and formally approved the project in May, 1988. By this time, however, the property owners had absorbed serious financial losses, and Wilson had yet to obtain funding to move the project forward. The owners dissolved the partnership, and in December of the same year, sold the property to a new developer, The Stitzel Company.\textsuperscript{53}

Stitzel considered the festival marketplace approach to be a “bastardization” of historic buildings, but subsequently proposed a revised concept that still aroused the ire of Pasadena Heritage. The new design emphasized a street orientation to the point of creating split-level store fronts for maximum exposure to pedestrian traffic. Pasadena Heritage and other preservationists opposed this design, because it would have meant the alteration or removal of many envelope walls. The idea was successfully blocked in the more historically important buildings, but when Pasadena Heritage threatened a lawsuit to stop the project over concerns about interior modifications, Stitzel threatened to return to the festival marketplace plan that had already been approved.\textsuperscript{54}

The One Colorado Project that was finally completed in 1992 primarily reflected the Stitzel company’s vision, rather than that of Pasadena Heritage. The fact that it proved to be a key element in making Old Pasadena once again a popular shopping and entertainment district was only small comfort for preservationists. In July, 1991, Pasadena Heritage had argued “When the project is finished, the casual observer may not realize how much is honestly old and how much is new and just made to look old.”\textsuperscript{55} They believed that “honestly old” was essential in a historic district, but even more important were the small retailers and artists who were displaced in the course of
reconfiguring the building interiors. Preservationists contended that both were needed to maintain the social community and sense of place that made Old Pasadena unique. The developers successfully countered that rehabilitating the historic buildings while maintaining the “mom and pop” retail environment beloved of Pasadena Heritage made little economic sense, and could not have justified the expense of making the buildings seismically-safe for continued use.\textsuperscript{56}

As in other localities throughout the United States, once the principle of historic preservation had been accepted as a viable alternative to traditional redevelopment, the debate moved on to the nature of the history being preserved, and its link to the city’s contemporary community. It is important to understand, as Cuff et al. demonstrate, that even though Pasadena had existed for little more than one hundred years, the commitment that the members of Pasadena Heritage displayed “to integrity and authenticity in the restoration of the [One Colorado] buildings was almost sectarian in intensity.”\textsuperscript{57} In earlier decades, the residents of Pasadena had assiduously borrowed the cultural trappings of other people and places to enhance their own civic gravitas. By the 1980s and 1990s, these were perceived by many as genuine elements of the city’s unique cultural heritage and sense of place. For the residents, such intangible qualities were as real as anything that might be found in a city with a longer history, such as Santa Barbara or Santa Fe. The history and the sense of place were real and authentic, precisely because of what they meant to those who were willing to defend them.

This impulse continued to find increasing expression in formal city ordinances and planning guidelines. In 1989, during the tenure of then Mayor Rick Cole, Pasadena voters approved a Growth Management Initiative that set strict annual limits on the
number of development projects that could be approved for both residential and non-residential areas of the city. Rather than operating on a first-come, first-served basis, projects would be assigned a development evaluation based on competitive evaluations. The Initiative established exemptions for certain categories, such as affordable housing, non-residential development to provide jobs in the heavily African American and Latino northwest section of the city, and projects that were a part of the pre-existing Civic Center Master Plan.\textsuperscript{58}

Organizations such as the Building Industry Association of Southern California, the Pasadena Chamber of Commerce, and the Urban League, together with individuals opposed to limits on development, filed suit to block the Initiative, arguing that it confirmed the city’s reputation as “anti-business.”\textsuperscript{59} Isaac Richard, an African American member of the city’s Board of Directors, alleged that the underlying message promoted by the Initiative was “'We don’t want jobs coming here that might attract minorities.'”\textsuperscript{60} In testimony before the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights in 1993, Richard went on to insist that “during the late 1970s and early 1980s, there were many attempts for business community to develop economically in the downtown area. Both attempts were fought tooth and nail by a group that we call the preservationists. They said ‘This building is a landmark. This building is historical.’ And they used that as a ruse to prevent economic development.”\textsuperscript{61} Richard contended that in order to attract and retain business, the attitude of Pasadena’s leadership should have been “'Come in and tear this thing down. Put up anything you like, sir’” rather than “'No, you can’t tear this building down because it’s sacred.'”\textsuperscript{62}
Through an out-of-court settlement in 1991, the Growth Management Initiative was again placed on the ballot in November 1992, where it was ultimately repealed. Anticipating this possible result, the city government began a program in 1991 to formally revise the Land Use and Circulation elements of its existing General Plan. In contrast to perceptions that might have identified the Growth Management Initiative as the product of special interest groups, the revision program made extensive use of public outreach to inform citizens of planning issues and solicit their participation. The city held nearly sixty workshops, forums and speakers events over the course of seven months to identify the issues and preferences that would inform Pasadena’s 1994 General Plan. The findings made it clear that the residents who chose to participate favored controlled development linked to “preserving Pasadena’s character and feel,” together with “the preservation of historic buildings through housing renovation and adaptive reuse of commercial structures.” The findings also noted a preference for new development to harmonize with their surroundings through the use of appropriate scale, architectural style and materials.63

The policies formulated as a result of the outreach program were incorporated into the 1994 General Plan, and effectively replaced and extended the principles of the Growth Management Initiative. They were summarized as the Historical/Cultural Element Goal: “Preservation and enhancement of the City’s cultural and historic buildings, streets and districts, not merely as gentle reminders of a pleasant past but also as relevant and unique alternatives for the present and future – a source of community identity, social, ecological and economic vitality.”64
Isaac Richard’s testimony during the previous year serves as a clear reminder that not every segment of Pasadena’s population regarded historic properties with so positively. If Richard could be considered a reliable representative of his constituents’ views (his reputation for eccentricity not withstanding), this suggests that some within the African American and Latino communities could have regarded the city’s older buildings with ambivalence, rather than affection. During the early 1990s, these two populations together accounted for 45.9% of Pasadena’s total population, but neither appeared to be significantly represented within the local preservation movement’s membership or objectives. From the perspective of those who had experienced the inequalities evident in Pasadena’s history, the near-religious fervor of the preservationists for maintaining both the appearance of certain old buildings and the resulting status of National Register of Historic Places listings could have been seen as an attempt to deny the inevitably changing social character of the city. The “gentle reminders” would in this instance serve as symbols of the status quo, unless they could be put to use in new economic developments capable of bringing economic benefits to the entire city.

The question of historic preservation and economic benefit was the centerpiece of Cuff et al.’s analysis of the One Pasadena project. This suggests that if historic properties are to be a significant element in urban revitalization plans, there is a need to balance the historian’s desire for authenticity with the realities of the marketplace. Pasadena’s General Plan addressed this issue by identifying the potential contributions that historic resources could make towards the city’s economic vitality, particularly with regard to the growing travel and tourism industry. But at the same time, the plan raised one of the most important questions to be considered in urban redevelopment: “How
much economic development can Pasadena absorb without losing the qualities which attract businesses and residents to it or at what point will Pasadena cease to be Pasadena and become just another faceless urban center.”

III. San Bernardino: Demolition, and a Tentative Embrace of History

Pasadena’s urban planners could have had the increasingly anonymous San Bernardino in mind as a model for the “faceless urban center” they hoped to avoid. During the 1970s the fondness of the city’s leaders for demolish and rebuild redevelopment continued unabated. Often the latest projects were intended to correct the problems introduced by earlier projects. The Central City Mall, the crown jewel of the preceding decade’s cure for what ailed San Bernardino, is an example of this cause-and-effect. The issue was not that the mall was not successful. Rather, after it opened its doors in October 1972, it was too successful, to the detriment of nearby businesses. According to local historian Martha Gaines Stoebe, “many of the stores along [the downtown’s main thoroughfare] ‘E’ Street found they couldn’t compete so they either moved to the Mall or sold out, leaving empty buildings . . . .” In the official view of the city’s Redevelopment Agency—summarized in the 1975 proposal for the next downtown project—the mall had “triggered development of surrounding parcels by attracting visitors to Central City by the tens of thousands a day.” This development all took place in new construction to the south and west of the mall, away from the older retail blocks. Several pages later in its summary the Agency allowed that in these areas the vacancy rate ran as high as 90 percent.
A fundamental problem with the Central City Mall was that it did not emphasize pedestrian traffic to or from the established parts of the downtown. It occupied a roughly square plot of land measuring a quarter of a mile along each side, with its main entrances facing south and west towards the new developments across broad parking lots. The design effectively turned its back on the older business district, placing a three-level parking garage catering exclusively to the mall at the important corner of 4th and E Streets. The only street-level entrance specifically for foot traffic was through the existing Harris Co. department store on E Street, or a plaza nearby. Anyone approaching on foot from a different direction had to traverse the full width of a parking lot while trying their luck dodging the traffic. As a result, most of the “tens of thousands” of visitors to Central City drove directly to the mall in their cars, shopped inside, and drove directly home without ever venturing out to other parts of the downtown. If they wished to visit the new retail developments nearby, it was far more convenient to drive across the street from one parking lot to another. As was characteristic of much of Southern California, urban walking had typically become a means of transportation reserved for those who had no other option.71

In spite of these obvious problems, the Redevelopment Agency congratulated itself as a “practical, vigorous, yet visionary” organization that had “in the short span of seven years, redeemed a failing city.”72 The agency conceded that the redemption was not quite complete, as in 1975 it proposed a new “bold and ambitious Plan of Development,” again devised by Victor Gruen and Associates. This promised to be the most far-reaching effort yet, targeting more than three miles from north to south, and at some points nearly two miles wide. It incorporated all of the downtown not already
absorbed by the Central City project, the rival Gruen Associates-designed Inland Center Mall, and an expanse of sand and tumbleweeds in the Santa Ana River wash.\textsuperscript{73}

The plan included a long wish-list of demolition and new construction, including a modern downtown hotel, a modern central library, a new performing arts theater, a general-purpose commerce building, a specialty shopping block dubbed Pioneer Plaza, and a downtown transit center. A “Metropolitan Sports Center and Mercado” that was described as “appropriate to the heritage of the large Spanish-speaking population of Central City West” was to be another magnet for retail patrons. While the plan explicitly invoked the heritage of the Latino neighborhoods of western San Bernardino for this complex, it was to be located on the east side of the development area, between the existing shopping malls.\textsuperscript{74} The plan proposed to refurbish several existing structures, but for economic interests, rather than to preserve any inherent historical value. The old California Hotel, once the center of downtown social life, would be converted to a senior citizen's residence, while department stores abandoned in favor of shopping malls would serve as government offices.\textsuperscript{75}

This apparent lack of interest in local history provoked concern among preservationists in the state government. After reviewing the city's redevelopment proposal in 1976, Knox Mellon, Historic Preservation Coordinator for the Department of Parks and Recreation's Public Resources Agency pointed out the problem to James P. Tryner, chief of the department's Resource Management and Protection Division. Mellon had reviewed the city's environmental impact reports and found them lacking. The treatment and consideration of cultural resources was incomplete and vague, he wrote, and the reports failed to identify registered historical properties. “In the aesthetic
section of both reports, demolition is presented as the solution to 'poorly maintained', 'obsolete', or 'outmoded' structures. What are the standards for these qualitative words? What specific structures are involved? In the text and table illustrating proposed land uses no planned rehabilitation of existing structures is presented as an alternative action."  

Recall again what Joan Didion wrote about the future always looking good in San Bernardino, because no one remembered the past. A striking example of this continuing fixation on futurism among the city's leaders can be found in the Redevelopment Agency's "far reaching concept" to link the city's two malls through the use of an Aerobus—a type of cable-suspended monorail. In subsequent years suggestions would be put forward that such a system, or an even more advanced magnetic levitation train, could link the downtown directly with the resort areas of the San Bernardino Mountains. As with the redevelopment projects that went before, this was all based on the assumption of readily-available federal funds.

Shortly after the 1974 Plan of Development was put forward, when it still seemed as though all the elements of the proposal might be accomplished, the city's government and business leaders made a bid to boost San Bernardino's image through the National Civic League's All-America City award program. The award, created in 1949, was made annually to ten cities in recognition of "exemplary grass roots community problem solving and is given to communities that cooperatively tackle challenges and achieve results." In practice, it gives the winning cities the right to use the "All-America City" title and logo on promotional materials, letterer heads, billboards, and the like as a
nationally recognized “stamp of approval” to attract the attention of developers and others in the business world.\textsuperscript{79}

San Bernardino won the All-America City designation in 1977, but not on the strength of its downtown redevelopment projects. Rather, it was a result of the city's role as host to Little League Baseball's Western Regional Headquarters, city sponsored senior citizens' programs, and the work of Operation Second Chance, an organization founded in 1967 by members of the African American and Latino communities to compensate for the city government's preoccupation with downtown redevelopment.\textsuperscript{80} The award, while it lasted, was a source of pride for many residents and civic leaders, but it could not reverse a poor civic image that had been years in the making. Residents of other Southern California communities were often bemused, rather than impressed, and regarded the designation as something of a fluke—an opinion shared by some in San Bernardino as well.\textsuperscript{81} This attitude was driven by the fact that, All-America City or no, the actual quality of life was not improving by any quantifiable degree, particularly when compared to Riverside, the city's traditional rival.

Crime represented a special point of concern in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Crime rates throughout Southern California rose during this period, driven in part by drug trafficking and gang activities, but the effect in San Bernardino was especially startling. By 1985 the city's residents were much more likely to be the victim of a violent crime than those living in Riverside. Between 1975 and 1985 the rate of violent crime in Riverside had increased by 16 percent. During these same ten years San Bernardino's violent crime rate had risen 53 percent.\textsuperscript{82} Worse still, as far as San Bernardino's merchants and elected officials were concerned, this crime problem extended to the
crown jewel of the downtown redevelopment projects, the Central City Mall. A gang-related murder during the 1977-78 holiday season brought calls for increased security to deal with individuals suspected of being gang members.\textsuperscript{83} The problem was that the mall was technically a public thoroughfare—a pedestrian walkway built along what had been a downtown street. Gruen Associates promoted this approach as a way to get around a federal regulation prohibiting the use of redevelopment grants to build shopping centers. What this meant was that the mall’s managers had to guarantee the same rights of access as the streets outside, even as this also meant that the mall took on much more of the real character of central San Bernardino.\textsuperscript{84}

During the late 1970s this character was increasingly dubious thanks, in part, to the city landmarks that stood vacant. The California Hotel, mentioned in Chapter 1, had become a magnet for transients and vandals, and in 1979 the nearby Municipal Auditorium in Pioneer Park was closed to the public. Built in 1923, the Auditorium was a companion piece to the hotel as the scene for much of San Bernardino’s cultural life in the mid-twentieth century. The development of larger concert venues in the area brought a decline in the building’s use, coupled with a gradual physical deterioration resulting from leaders’ preoccupation with ever-larger redevelopment schemes. The city briefly entertained a proposal in 1970 to convert the building to a museum, but in the end took the auditorium out of service on the grounds that it had become unsafe due to roof leaks, bad wiring, bad plumbing, and faulty heating. Initially, the city government planned to clear the site for either a tennis court, or to accommodate more cars downtown, leading a local citizen to comment “It is hard to believe this would happen. I know we need parking, but there is a certain amount of nostalgia connected with the old building.”\textsuperscript{85}
Nostalgia would not prove to be enough. A measure to establish an assessment district to raise $1.2 million to rehabilitate the Auditorium was placed on the ballot for the 1979 off-year election, but residents who voted narrowly defeated the proposal by 6,434 to 6,408.\textsuperscript{86} Without funds dedicated to preserving the building, the city leadership was able to explore other uses for the site. Bypassing the earlier suggestions for tennis courts or parking, by 1980 the most attractive option was to build a new central library. The City Council reinforced the idea by commissioning the Santa Ana architectural firm of Ralph Allen and Partners to conduct a site analysis for the library that also assessed the condition of the Auditorium.

Not surprisingly, the authors found that “The building under study is in need of extensive structural rehabilitation if it is to be occupied by the public.”\textsuperscript{87} They identified numerous areas where the fifty-eight year old building did not comply with the latest State codes, and estimated that 70\% of the Auditorium would have to be removed and reconstructed before it could be declared fit for use. The authors stated their opinion that while the building represented style of public architecture fashionable during its period, it possessed “no unique architectural elements of historic significance.”\textsuperscript{88} The report discouraged the idea of adaptive reuse as a library with the somewhat contradictory statement that this “would compromise any historical or architecturally [sic] significance remaining,” and by asserting that the cost of such reuse would be “41\% higher than all new construction.”\textsuperscript{89}

Based on these findings, the San Bernardino Library Board of Trustees advised the mayor and City Council in September, 1981, that it recommended demolition of the Auditorium so that construction of a new building could begin.\textsuperscript{90} Four years later, and
five months after the demolition of the California Hotel, the Norman F. Feldheym Central Library opened to the public. It had been financed by a $1 million Library Services and Construction Act grant from the California State Library, and by $4.9 million in bonds issued by the San Bernardino Redevelopment Agency—a distinctly different process than the tax assessment proposed for the Municipal Auditorium. Unlike the new library, however, the Auditorium was not compatible with the Redevelopment Agency’s 1974 Plan of Development for remaking the downtown. And while the Feldheym Library was completed in a timely fashion, other proposed projects fell by the wayside.

The Plan was impressive on paper, but it was far more than the city could actually manage. Economic difficulties, reluctant landowners and the mundane reality of daily government all served to direct attention and energy away from the plan's lofty goals. A 1991 editorial in the San Bernardino Sun reviewed what had actually been accomplished in the seventeen years since the plan was originally put forward. Under the category of “Done” the article listed the new central library, new downtown hotel, and one refurbished office building. Under “Not Done” appeared every other major element of the plan.

Concern for San Bernardino's self-image brought on, in part, because of the apparent lack of progress in reversing the decline of the central business district, prompted the local Life Savings Bank in 1988 to commission a survey of residents' attitudes toward their city. The Quality of Life In San Bernardino: “As We See Ourselves” contained comments regarding the friendliness or warmth of the respondent's fellow residents indicating that a sense of community “worked” in San Bernardino at the
immediate, neighborhood level, even in the often distressing conditions of the African American and Latino west side. Juanita Scott, the city's affirmative action training officer, declared “I live in the Black area, Westside, out of choice. People help each other in the community in a neighborly way.” The comments also suggest that the sense of community began to dissipate at the city-wide level. Former city council member Robert Henley, liked the “good, hard-working friendly people,” but continued that he was disappointed by the “fragmentation of the community. Blacks pushing for Blacks, Hispanics for Hispanics, and so on. We all share the community, we should push for the entire community, not just the segment we happen to belong to.” A third respondent, Denny Shorette, repeated this worry and placed much of the blame squarely on the city government. “San Bernardino has a 'what can you do for me' political system,” he said, “there's too much segmentation. We need leadership that is concerned for the entire community, not just some fraction. We need leaders, not power brokers.”

A large part of the problem with San Bernardino’s sense of community was that, compared to Riverside and Pasadena, it lacked a defining sense of place. The city’s location at the juncture of major travel corridors had long inspired civic boosters to employ themes of motion and transportation, such as “The Gate City” or “The City on the Move.” A number of respondents to the Quality of Life survey echoed the views of a local highway contractor, who explained “We're very well located. You can get to almost anything in Southern California in an hour or so.” Even after decades of effort to rebuild the city center as a focal point for (hopefully) free-spending visitors and residents, a local business owner could still point to the fundamental perception that “San Bernardino is a bypass city, not a stopping place.” This perception was noted as early
as 1952 by urban planners Harold Wise and Simon Eisner, who described the city as having a reputation as “the most go-throughable place in Southern California.” In *City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles* (1990), author Mike Davis dismissed the entire area as “the geological and social detritus that has accumulated at the foot of the Cajon Pass,” a region “traversed at warp speed with the windows rolled up against the smog and dust” by residents of Los Angeles on their way to someplace more pleasant.

Motivated, in part, by a desire to counter such perceptions, San Bernardino’s city government had commissioned a new general plan, which the City Council adopted on June 2, 1989. The plan, produced by the Los Angeles consulting firm Enviocom Corporation, noted a “pervasive concern” about the need for, and means to achieve, a higher quality of life. The authors explained that “many cite the City’s perceived lack of a strong, positive image in the southern California region as a manifestation of these problems.”

The contributing factors included “the absence of a strong sense of ‘community’ or ‘special place’; lack of a vital and definable downtown, which can be distinctly identified in the region;” a profusion of bland, automobile-oriented commercial strips; areas of deteriorating or poorly designed housing; and “loss of historic residential neighborhoods and culturally significant buildings and sites . . .”

The plan placed a particular emphasis on correcting the “low intensity, low-activity uses which physically and functionally fail to convey the ‘sense’ of a primary regional downtown.” The proposed strategy focused on “Intensification” of the area through additional hotels, offices, cultural facilities with associated retail and restaurant activity, and the return of high density housing. An important factor was to be
“Establishment of an Historic Preservation District(s) to help reinforce cultural resources and opportunities in the community,” along with an urban design philosophy based on typical late-nineteenth/early-twentieth century storefronts. The authors pointed to the economic success of commercial historic districts in Pasadena and San Diego as examples of what could be achieved through preservation and adaptive reuse. With respect to less tangible benefits, the authors observed that “Through the preservation, use and reuse of culturally significant buildings, sites, and districts, built by earlier generations, and from a diverse ethnic background, area residents will be able to participate in the perpetuation and enrichment of the City’s cultural heritage and will develop a greater appreciation for the diversity of culture that typifies present-day San Bernardino.”

In order to bring this goal about, the General Plan stated that it would be the goal of the city to develop a comprehensive Historic Preservation Plan, including a cultural resources survey, a Preservation Ordinance, establishment of a Historical Resources Commission, adoption of the Secretary of the Interior Standards for Historic Rehabilitation, and application to the State Historic Preservation Officer for Certified Local Government Status. This last step would allow the city to compete for grants from the National Park Service’s Historic Preservation Fund, while providing it with technical assistance and assuring that the local preservation plan was fully consistent with federal and state standards. The city government subsequently completed a Historic Resources Reconnaissance Survey in 1991, and adopted a Historic Building Demolition Ordinance, Main Street Overlay District plan, and a Concept Improvement Plan for the Santa Fe Railroad passenger depot and adjacent neighborhood. The majority
of the other elements in the 1989 General Plan were not undertaken during the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{108}

The provisions of the 1989 General Plan had again proven too ambitious, but during the following decade an interesting development took place. In 1997 Judith Valles was elected as San Bernardino’s first Latina mayor. Valles took a particular interest in the 1918 Mission Revival-style Santa Fe depot, and in 1998 began a campaign to secure state and federal funds for its renovation. Valles described her connection to the depot as a personal one, as her parents had often used the building on trips to visit their families in Mexico. She commented “It's part of our history and that's why it's really important to re-establish and remodel the depot.”\textsuperscript{109} City Council members Esther Estrada and Rita Arias, who represented the districts adjoining the depot, both saw its restoration as an opportunity to infuse the nearby Mount Vernon Avenue district with new business and a sense of “Latino pride.”\textsuperscript{110}

What is especially intriguing about these proposals is that the depot represents a classic example of the architecture used by railroad companies and local boosters to project the idealized, romantic image of Southern California at the heart of the Mission Revival movement. As seen in the preceding chapters, this imagery has been interpreted in recent scholarship as a means by which white Americans appropriated the Latino identity of the region and transformed it into an innocuous backdrop for a new California lifestyle. However, San Bernardino’s most politically prominent Latinas saw links to personal and community history in the depot, and enthusiastically supported its rehabilitation. This suggests that the city’s Latino residents, who accounted for a third of the total population in the 1990s, were in a sense re-appropriating their own history, and
making use of the boosters’ promotional history to do so. Council members Estrada and Arias hoped that the depot would be the catalyst for economic development in the surrounding neighborhoods, but Valles insisted that preservation work had first priority, ahead of formulating any specific plans for its use.

IV. Conclusions—The Next Century of Preservation and Planning

Mayor Valles’s emphasis on history for its own sake is similar to the philosophy taken by such local preservation groups as Pasadena Heritage or The Old Riverside Foundation. The potential of historic sites or districts for generating economic activity, particularly through specialty retail or dining, is often presented as an incentive for preservation, but it is rarely the prime factor. Instead, preservationists are chiefly motivated by aesthetic considerations and issues relating to personal and community identity. They might act because they find certain older buildings in their towns or cities to be more attractive, more carefully crafted, or in some other way more compelling to the senses than structures created in the present day. They might act because the older properties are connected to important people or events in history, and can serve as a link to the important lessons of the past. Or, they might act because carefully restored historic properties reflect the lifestyle and values that preservationists wish to maintain in their city.

This last point, especially, is reminiscent of historian Hal K. Rothman’s concept of “full-belly environmentalism.” Rothman coined this term to highlight the tendency of those in a prosperous, developed society to be fascinated by the primitive and undeveloped. Having fully satisfied their material needs, they looked to “unspoiled”
nature for their spiritual and aesthetic needs. As a result, groups such as the Sierra Club or the Save the Redwoods League advocated for the preservation of natural resources not in order to husband them for future use, but rather so that they and like-minded individuals would always have a place of refuge from their modern life. By this analysis, trees, rivers and other natural features were valued mainly because they were a means of maintaining and enhancing a particular lifestyle, not because they were sources of wood, irrigation, and the like.

In a similar sense, many groups dedicated to local historic preservation approach the problem with an eye towards also maintaining the culture that has long been associated with them. An example of this are the eclectic retail and art activities that Pasadena Heritage hoped to see continued at One Colorado. These were the associations that the members of the group enjoyed, and the ones they believed gave the properties their authentic meaning. When both the use and physical structures of the properties were altered for the sake of economic viability, members of the group felt “somewhat betrayed” that their vision of preservation had not been maintained absolutely. In other words, the project no longer fully reflected their lifestyle and self-image. It did, however, reflect the image that Pasadena would require if it was to revitalize the commercial fortunes of the West Colorado Boulevard business district.

This demonstrates an important distinction between preservation for the sake of historical accuracy, and preservation for the sake of economic development. Entirely accurate preservation tends to be a precursor to a historic site—a generally non-profit tourist destination staffed by volunteers or government employees. Such sites do not, in themselves, typically act as a catalyst for major economic development unless they can
absorb a significant amount of tourist traffic at the level of a state or national park. In fact, nearby development is often discouraged as a threat to the site’s sense of place.\textsuperscript{114} If preservation is to be of real use in generating business activity, there must necessarily be compromises to accommodate the needs of retailers, restaurateurs and the like. The irony, perhaps, is that such compromise is what dedicated preservationists typically hope to avoid, and yet without their dedication and determination to see historic properties given new life, preservation would likely have not had a place in the processes of planning and redevelopment at all.

Dedication and determination are among the essential factors that have made city-wide preservation projects “work” in an economic sense, combined with organization, unified vision, and at least some degree of access to money and power. Note, however, that city-wide preservation does not have to be the result of a city-wide impulse. In both Pasadena and Riverside, historic preservation became institutionalized as a development strategy primarily through the actions of particular segments of the larger community, who in a way shared the vision and promotional instincts of their cities’ early residents.

The history of both cities had been characterized by the careful nurturing of an idyllic image of Southern California, and the roles played in it by their presumably enlightened citizens. By contrast, the sense of direction and identity in San Bernardino was, to a significant degree, withdrawn with its founders in 1857 when Brigham Young called his faithful back to Utah.\textsuperscript{115} City promoters in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries would play up the delights of Southern California just as surely as those in Riverside and Pasadena, but with a different subtext. Building on the city’s role as a transportation hub, San Bernardino was not portrayed as a locus of the idealized life,
but instead, as a place that was convenient to all of the area’s attractions. The city’s image, which persisted throughout the twentieth century, was thus derived from other places. This ultimately deprived the city of a coherent identity as compared to Pasadena or Riverside. This may help explain both the enthusiasm for redevelopment, and the slow acceptance of preservation until it had become established as a viable strategy elsewhere.

In the cities where preservation has become a major planning influence, advocates act as modern manifestations of the early boosters, crafting an image of the community and its lifestyle through the built environment, the prestige of National Register listings, and the cultural resource reports that replace the florid advertising of earlier days. The strength of the civic image enabled these advocates to act on behalf of their cities even, as noted above, when the city as a whole does not necessarily share their objectives. During the years when preservation became an established movement, San Bernardino, Riverside and Pasadena all had significant ethnic minority populations—during 1990, Pasadena had the greatest diversity of the three. All experienced tensions between ethnicities stemming from a legacy of de facto segregation and discrimination. Again, Pasadena was notable because one expression of this tension was an overt distrust of preservationists as opponents of progress by African Americans and Latinos. In Riverside also, preservation initially proceeded with little reference to the city’s ethnic minorities. What made preservation an institution in its own right was the presence of historic properties and ideas created by early boosters, and the presence of people committed to advancing them as the centerpiece of their chosen lifestyle. In
other words, people committed to following Frank Miller’s maxim: “Dramatize your resources.”

This is readily apparent when one considers that the current seal and logo of the city of Riverside still draws upon the romanticized imagery created by Frank A. Miller, through the use of the “Mission Inn raincross” symbol that he had designed for the hotel. Since that time the raincross has become nearly ubiquitous throughout the public spaces of the city, appearing on the city flag, adorning bridge railings in both concrete and wrought iron, and being molded into bus shelters and even the concrete retaining walls of freeways passing through the city (see Figure 22). The continued use of the original

![Mission Inn-themed retaining wall at the intersection of Interstate-215/State Highway 91 and Mission Inn Avenue in downtown Riverside. (Photo by the author, January 2010).](image)
raincross streetlights was an entirely appropriate gesture in that Miller was, for all intents and purposes, once again the guiding light of Riverside’s image building process decades beyond his death in 1935.\textsuperscript{116}

In 2000, the city of Riverside expanded its historic preservation efforts into a survey of the historically African American and Latino Eastside and Casa Blanca neighborhoods. Conducted by the Santa Monica based environmental consulting firm PCR Services Corporation through a Community Development Block Grant, the surveys included both property evaluations and oral histories with residents of the area. The surveys documented approximately 1,400 properties, and identified a number of additional resources eligible for local designation, as well as one potential historic district and one neighborhood conservation area in the Eastside.\textsuperscript{117} This would add to 108 City Landmarks, over 1,000 Structures of Merit, nine Historic Districts, three Neighborhood Conservation Areas, and twenty properties listed on the National Register of Historic Places.\textsuperscript{118}

The Mediterranean-fantasy downtown, however, retains its prominence at the heart of Riverside’s public image and is the focal point of the city’s preservation efforts. The history that is promoted through these efforts is clearly not the genuine history of the city, but it is absolutely faithful to the history of the idea of the city. What the modern visitor will see on Mission Inn Avenue is largely the same Riverside that Miller and his fellow community leaders wanted visitors to see in the early twentieth century. Authenticity in downtown Riverside describes a paradoxical blending of verisimilitude and genuineness: the faithful preservation of a nostalgic vision.
Figure 23. Riverside Historic Districts in the downtown area (The Arroyo Group, “Figure 2A, Historic Districts, Downtown Specific Plan,” Downtown Specific Plan (Riverside: City of Riverside, 2002)).
Away from downtown, where even a Farmer Boys burger shop sports a Mission Revival façade, Riverside places a major emphasis on its history as a center of the citrus industry. Signs based on citrus packing-crate labels that incorporate various combinations of oranges, orange blossoms, palm trees, green hills, and elements of Mission-Revival architecture identify historic districts, points of interest, and award-winning “Neighborhoods that work.” By the first decade of the twenty-first century, citrus trees that still have not given way to housing developments serve primarily as attractive landscape features, rather than the raw material for a viable industry. Along Victoria Avenue, described in the city's local history web page as "One of California's great historic avenues . . . bordered by orange groves," the trees really are little more than borders, separating the road from the soundwalls of mass-produced subdivisions.  

Nonetheless, local historian and librarian William M. A. Swafford noted in 2003 that, in Riverside, “the latest thing is citrus heritage tourism,” which is enshrined at the California Citrus State Historic Park. The park is intended, in the words of its promotional web page, "to tell the colorful and far-reaching story of the citrus industry, and to preserve a vanishing cultural landscape" through the use of buildings constructed in the Bungalow Style of the early 1900s. While the park is operated by the California State Parks system, there can be little doubt that it is specifically intended to connect Riverside with "the lush groves of oranges, lemons and grapefruit [that gave California] its lingering image as the Golden State - the land of sunshine and opportunity."  

Where Riverside continues to embrace Frank Miller’s conception of Southern California as a Mediterranean agricultural paradise, Pasadena’s claim to the Golden State image is now based more on the promotion of the city as a place that blends this idyllic
landscape with more cosmopolitan sensibilities. Even more so than in Riverside, however, a key to the revitalization of the downtown has been the return of mixed use development. Combined with light-rail transit from downtown Los Angeles, this has promoted a balance of day and evening use that avoids the nighttime depopulation effect characterizing city centers dominated by office space.\textsuperscript{121}

The drawbacks brought about by the success of this “New Urbanism” almost inevitably include gentrification brought on by increased housing prices, though a city zoning ordinance requires maintaining a specific level of affordable housing within the area. Such levels of intensive use also have the potential to increase automobile traffic, air and noise pollution, and the sense of crowding that can annoy residents in the surrounding single-family neighborhoods. Kotin and Szalay observe that the popularity of Old Pasadena with the “boisterous younger crowd” who congregate in and around equally boisterous restaurants and clubs have discouraged some older professionals and prosperous seniors from visiting this section of the city. As a result, businesses catering to older customers who prefer a more sedate experience have, in some cases, relocated to less-busy neighborhoods.\textsuperscript{122}

Here, too, the city has been making a push to identify and document historic resources. Pasadena now has over 3,500 designated historic properties, including architectural masterpieces such as the Gamble House, scientific landmarks like the Jet Propulsion Laboratory’s Space Flight Operations Facility, and a collection of pre-World War Two bungalow court apartments. The city also has nine nationally-recognized historic districts representing a similar range of properties: Old Pasadena, Orange Heights—Barnhart, Pasadena Civic Center, Civic Center Financial District, Pasadena
Playhouse, Prospect, South Marengo, Lower Arroyo Seco, and Park Place/Arroyo Terrace. All help to protect and project Pasadena’s preferred cultural identity. As with the early efforts of Henry Ford at Greenfield Village or John D. Rockefeller at Colonial Williamsburg, the city has given its history a concrete permanence, and has found ways to sell that history to others.

In the last few years, the city and local preservation advocates have turned their attention to cultural resources that might not appear to be as obviously historic as a Greene and Greene bungalow, or the Colorado Street Bridge over the Arroyo Seco. In 2007 the Historic Resources Group teamed with Pasadena Heritage to produce a historic context report titled Cultural Resources of the Recent Past. This covered the general period from 1935-1965, and placed a particular focus on post-World War Two single family residential development. It also addresses the best examples of the sort of modernistic commercial design that earlier preservationists might have decried, including the Saga Motel on Colorado Boulevard, and the Stuart Pharmaceutical Company on Foothill Boulevard.

Along these same lines, the East Colorado Boulevard Specific Plan, completed in 2003, instructs developers to produce “designs for new construction, additions, and substantial exterior alterations that reinterpret some of the traditions of the Route 66 era.” Although backers of preservation often connect the car and car culture to the evils of urban sprawl and decay, automobiles remain a key element of the evolving California image. The drive through a sunny, Mediterranean landscape in an open-topped car and all that goes with it has been a stereotypical feature of how Southern Californians prefer to see themselves and to be seen by others. This has remained so,
Figure 24. National Register of Historic Places and Pasadena Landmark Districts (Pasadena Permit Center, “Historic Preservation,” Brochure (Pasadena: Pasadena Planning and Development Department, 2006)).
even as the reality has continued to diverge from the ideal. The Pasadena Freeway—originally the Arroyo Seco Parkway—for instance, built between 1938 and 1940, still manages to radiate the charm of “motoring,” even as increasing speeds and traffic density have made the most routine trip along it a white-knuckle ride. Pasadena taps into this aspect of California life by embracing the history of Route 66, together with properties gathered under the multiple listing of “Early Automobile-Related Properties in Pasadena” on the National Register of Historic Places. This gives another dimension to the city’s cultural identity, and from the point of view of economic development, and almost certainly helps to broaden its appeal to business and consumers.

San Bernardino’s own efforts with the “traditions of the Route 66 era” have been more in the line of events and commemorations, instead of addressing the preservation related properties. This is primarily a result of institutionalized preservation being a more recent concern in the city, and focusing on the most prominent public buildings. As of 2009, the city’s three nationally-designated historic properties are the main downtown Post Office, the San Bernardino County Court House, and the previously mentioned Santa Fe Railroad depot. As Judith Valles had hoped, a full-scale restoration project began in 2002 though a partnership between the city and the San Bernardino Associated Governments, a regional transportation planning agency. The project was supported by $11.6 million in federal grants, $1.96 million from the city, and $1.53 million from the Associated Governments. Upon completion of the project in 2004, the Associated Governments occupied new office on the second floor, while other areas were set aside for the Metrolink commuter rail system and other potential tenants.
According to the Associated Governments, San Bernardino is working towards a “‘Mercado Santa Fe Depot District’ with shops, restaurants, landscaping and other features that follow the Mission Revival architectural theme.” With this concept as a catalyst, as City Council members Estrada and Arias had suggested in 1998, the city is also proposing a number of other projects in the immediate area, including light industrial development to provide local jobs, and a “Neighborhood Spirit Property Improvement Program” that would support the rehabilitation of existing housing together with new development based on pre-approved house plans.130

The city government may be able to devote more time and attention to these projects now that a lack of funding forced it to abandon, in February 2009, the last and

Figure 25. New retail development in the Santa Fe Depot District. The development replaced an older supermarket/swap meet complex and several residences in what is now a Hispanic and African American neighborhood. The stores’ northern entrances, seen here, are presumably intended to accommodate commuters using the Southern California Metrolink trains at the depot across the street, while the main entrances on the south side are oriented towards neighborhood consumers. Note the stylized Mission architecture and use of the typical “Southwestern” color palette of earth tones. (Photo by the author, January 2010).
most ambitious of all its redevelopment concepts, the Lakes and Streams Project. This would have entailed constructing a 44.5 artificial lake immediately to the north of the downtown, connected by a stream to a smaller 5 acre lake or wetland area south of the downtown. Planners envisioned something like San Antonio’s River Walk, or perhaps a lakeside Old Pasadena with all-new buildings. The project had been conceived of as a way to manage the dangerously high water table under the center of the city, while also addressing the ever-present problem of blight. While undoubtedly a dramatic use of resources in the service of image building, this might have been more than even Frank Miller would have attempted.

The experiences of Pasadena, Riverside and San Bernardino three ultimately suggests that the success of historic preservation as a planning strategy serves as a commentary on the level of homogeneity within a community, but with important distinctions. The community need not be synonymous with the entire population of a city, but may instead refer to a group within the city with access to political and economic influence. Further, the group’s homogeneity need only be one of shared values, and a shared vision for the city as a whole. It is fair to conclude that preservation on a citywide scale thus depends on the presence of people similar to the early founders and boosters of towns. As with the initial efforts in the nineteenth century, however, success can come at the price of marginalizing residents with differing viewpoints and excluding alternate representations of history that do not support commercial development.
V. Epilogue

A casual visitor strolling through the downtowns of Pasadena, Riverside, and San Bernardino in 2010 would find it readily apparent why Pasadena has become a beau ideal for communities seeking to revitalize their own central business districts. Even on a Sunday morning, there is abundant pedestrian and vehicle traffic along western Colorado Boulevard, and indeed for blocks on either side, throughout “Old Pasadena.” The Civic Center, with its concentration of government buildings, is quieter, but by no means depopulated, thanks to residents of nearby apartment buildings who are out and about. Occasional commercial real estate signs suggest that Old Pasadena is not immune from the effects of economic recession, but the general air is still one of prosperity and activity.

The fact that this can be observed on a weekend indicates how successful Pasadena has been at reversing the fortunes of the once-declining commercial district. Many of the works on urban renewal mentioned in the preceding chapters make pointed distinctions between downtowns that remain busy during weekends and evenings, and those that are all but deserted outside of the regular 9:00 to 5:00 business hours. Businesses in the latter areas draw, in large measure, from a “captive audience” of office and retail workers who retreat to their homes in outlying residential areas when they are not required to be downtown. By contrast, truly successful business districts can pull people in from outlying areas at nearly any hour. Even more importantly, as Andy McCue has noted, they have their own populations, who are willing to take ownership of the downtowns and give them life in more than just an abstract sense. This hearkens back to Jane Jacobs’s advocacy for the natural mixture of residential and retail activity,
while countering the strict separation of uses pursued by urban planners in the mid-
twentieth century.

The area around Colorado Boulevard contains this kind of mixed use; a situation
resembling the traditional European townscape that Victor Gruen, somewhat ironically,
always maintained that he was trying to bring to America. In comparison, the casual
visitor to Riverside would observe that, while the collection of historic buildings along
Mission Inn Boulevard gives the downtown a sense of place that is perhaps even more
powerful than in Pasadena, the city has yet to achieve the same level of consistent use.
For the most part, weekend activity is limited to areas within direct sight of the Mission
Inn, primarily along the Main Street pedestrian mall adjacent to the hotel. Here there are
shops and sidewalk cafes of the sort one would find in Pasadena, but one block away the
traffic is almost entirely vehicular. Older housing within the immediate downtown is
primarily lower-income, though developments such as the single-family “townhomes” in
Mission Village, north of the hotel, could produce a Pasadena-like residential
environment if continued.\textsuperscript{132}

The possibility that San Bernardino could also follow suit seems—again, to the
casual visitor—to be less probable. On a weekend nearly a full year away from the next
Route 66 Rendezvous, the atmosphere of the city’s downtown is almost foreboding.
Aside from small groups of people nervously eyeing a lone passerby while waiting for
buses or their turn at bank ATM machines, the streets are nearly empty of pedestrians,
and vehicle traffic is little heavier. The Carousel Mall—formerly Central City Mall, the
linchpin of the city’s redevelopment hopes—is in a similar condition. Without its three
anchor department stores, the complex is effectively an enclosed suburban strip mall,
partially given over to local government offices and surrounded by acres of largely unused parking. Across the street from the mall, a sign posted by the city’s Economic Development Agency in front of a decade-old, but now vacant, 20-screen theater complex promises a complete renovation including Imax, restaurants, shops, and a public square.

Despite this optimism, the commercial center of gravity in this part of San Bernardino County has shifted west to the city of Rancho Cucamonga, formed in 1977 from the unincorporated communities of Cucamonga, Alta Loma and Etiwanda. Most of the city has been built since incorporation, and often in architectural styles that would be very familiar to students of Carey McWilliams’s Spanish Fantasy Past. Since 2004, the focal point has been Victoria Gardens, a 160 acre, pedestrian-oriented complex described by its private developer as a “regional lifestyle center.” The development serves, for all intents and purposes, as a ready-made equivalent of a historic downtown, combining retail and office space with residential areas and city-owned cultural facilities, including a library and performing arts center. Rather than simply functioning as an open-air mall surrounded by parking, Victoria Gardens is laid out amid narrow, functional streets with curbside parking, which enhances the impression of being in an older business district. This appearance is further amplified by the use of varying architectural styles that evoke the sense of growth over time. Some buildings even sport faded, fictional advertising painted on the exterior walls, in some cases carefully placed under a store’s actual sign, to suggest the adaptive reuse of an older structure.

The cumulative effect of Victoria Gardens is to give Rancho Cucamonga many of the benefits of Old Pasadena, without any of the contentious politics. Unless one is a
student of architecture and design, the overall effect is remarkably similar. But, the
history here is the product of designers and marketing experts, who are concerned only
with creating a nostalgic atmosphere that patrons will find appealing. What is interesting
is that, when looking at the buildings in Victoria Gardens, it becomes apparent that this
nostalgia has moved on from the Spanish Fantasy Past. The designers have focused on
the mid-twentieth century, rather than seeking to evoke the world of Ramona that so
entranced figures such as Frank Miller. Mission Revival architecture appears only
through simplified design elements, such as arches or domes, alongside references to the
range of other styles that might be encountered in a commercial district that had escaped
the effects of urban renewal. And, where the creators of Olvera Street in Los Angeles
might have deployed strolling guitar players to enhance the sense of history, shoppers at
Victoria Gardens are serenaded through hidden speakers by the likes of Frank Sinatra
and Bobby Darin.

Victoria Gardens draws on an idealized image of California’s “mid-century cool”
in much the same way that the promoters of El Camino Real or the Panama-California
Exposition crafted their visions of a noble Mediterranean paradise. The real, inconveniently complex history of the region was trimmed of its negative aspects, and distilled down to a simple, attractive concept that flatters the sensibilities of those who buy into it. Just as the Mission Revival movement whitewashed—as Deverell cannily puts it—the history of conquest in the nineteenth century as a natural, preordained succession, so Victoria Gardens and the Route 66 Rendezvous downplay the abundant problems of the twentieth century for a California where everyone can be a member of Sinatra’s Rat Pack, and the freeways are always wide open.

In a sense this development fills the same role as a modern-day Mission Inn, by replacing the actual history of the place—agricultural fields and scrub land—with the look and feel of history as it should have been. The question is what will happen to Victoria Gardens as Rancho Cucamonga ages. If the regional lifestyle center remains viable long enough, perhaps one day it could be preserved, like the hotel, as an actual historic property. Or, it could be replaced by an entirely different sort of development, in a new process of suburban renewal.

In the broader sense, as Southern California moves into what is now (Spring 2010) an economically uncertain future marked by budgetary anxiety at every level of state and municipal government, it should be asked whether images and civic landscapes that evoke a seemingly more optimistic time will still serve as a foundation for building local prosperity and identity. As we have seen, concerns in earlier eras about the nation’s direction inspired nostalgia for a past that seemed unchangeable, and helped drive the creation of the modern preservation movement. It remains to be seen whether this pattern holds true in the future, when changing demographics mean that an increasing
number of those resident in Southern California have no personal or cultural connection
to the history of the region, or even to the nation as a whole. And if they do look to the
past to plan and re-plan the shapes and identities of the cities in which they live, which
past will it be? Could it be some version of the history of the region where they have
made their homes, or could it be the history of the homes that they have left behind in
some other country, and which might be the focus of their own sense of nostalgia? It
may be that Southern California has an entirely new fantasy past in its future.
APPENDIX I

FINDINGS AND DECLARATIONS OF THE NATIONAL HISTORIC
PRESERVATION ACT OF 1966
(Public Law 89-665; 16 U.S.C. 470 et seq.)

(1) The spirit and direction of the Nation are founded upon and reflected in its historic heritage;

(2) the historical and cultural foundations of the Nation should be preserved as a living part of our community life and development in order to give a sense of orientation to the American people;

(3) historic properties significant to the Nation’s heritage are being lost or substantially altered, often inadvertently, with increasing frequency;

(4) the preservation of this irreplaceable heritage is in the public interest so that its vital legacy of cultural, educational, aesthetic, inspirational, economic, and energy benefits will be maintained and enriched for future generations of Americans;

(5) in the face of ever-increasing extensions of urban centers, highways, and residential, commercial, and industrial developments, the present governmental and nongovernmental historic preservation programs and activities are inadequate to insure future generations a genuine opportunity to appreciate and enjoy the rich heritage of our Nation;

(6) the increased knowledge of our historic resources, the establishment of better means of identifying and administering them, and the encouragement of their preservation will improve the planning and execution of Federal and federally assisted projects and will assist economic growth and development; and

(7) although the major burdens of historic preservation have been borne and major efforts initiated by private agencies and individuals, and both should continue to play a vital role, it is nevertheless necessary and appropriate for the Federal Government to accelerate its historic preservation programs and activities, to give maximum encouragement to agencies and individuals undertaking preservation by private means, and to assist State and local governments and the National Trust for Historic Preservation in the United States to expand and accelerate their historic preservation programs and activities.
APPENDIX 2

PASADENA—NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES LISTED PROPERTIES
(National Register of Historic Places Database, http://nrhp.focus.nps.gov)

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<td>Bekins Storage Co. Roof Sign</td>
<td>511 S. Fair Oaks Ave.</td>
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<td>Louise C. Bentz House</td>
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<td>Robert R. Blacker House</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>Evanston Inn</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>Fenyes Estate</td>
<td>470 W. Walnut St. &amp; 160 N. Orange Grove Blvd.</td>
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30 First Trust Building and Garage  587-611 E. Colorado Blvd. and 30-44 N. Madison Ave.
30-44 N. Madison Ave.

31 Foothill Boulevard Milestone (Mile 11)  S side of E. Colorado Blvd., W of jct. with Holliston Ave.

32 Richard and Mary Alice Frank House  919 La Loma Road
33 Friendship Baptist Church  80 W. Dayton St.
34 Gamble House  4 Westmoreland Pl.
35 Gartz Court  270 N. Madison
36 Hale Solar Laboratory  740 Holladay Rd.
37 Harnetiaux Court  48 N. Catalina Ave.
38 Haskett Court  824-834 E. California Blvd.
39 Hermitage  2121 Monte Vista St.
40 Holly Street Livery Stable  110 E. Holly St
41 Home Laundry  432 S. Arroyo Pkwy.
42 Hotel Green  99 S. Raymond Ave.
43 House at 1011 S. Madison Ave.  1011 S. Madison Ave.
44 House at 1015 Prospect Boulevard  1015 Prospect Blvd.
45 House at 1050 S. Madison Ave.  1050 S. Madison Ave.
46 House at 1141 N. Chester Ave.  1141 N. Chester Ave.
47 House at 1233 Wentworth Ave.  1233 Wentworth Ave.
48 House at 1240 North Los Robles  1240 N. Los Robles Ave.
49 House at 1487 Loma Vista Street  1487 Loma Vista St.
50 House at 380 W. Del Mar Blvd.  380 W. Del Mar Blvd.
51 House at 530 S. Marengo Avenue  530 S. Marengo Ave.
52 House at 574 Bellefontaine St.  574 Bellefontaine St.
53 House at 674 Elliot Drive  674 Elliot Dr.
54 Howard Motor Company Building  1285 E. Colorado Blvd.
55 Kindel Building  1095 E. Colorado Blvd.
56 Kosy Knook Court  830 Brooks Ave.
57 La Loma Bridge  Crossing the Arroyo Seco at La Loma Broad
58 Las Casitas Court  656 N. Summit Ave.
59 Longfellow-Hastings House  85 S. Allen Ave.
60 Lower Arroyo Seco Historic District  Roughly Arroyo Blvd., W. California Blvd., La Loma Blvd.
61 Theodore Parker Lukens House  267 N. El Molino Ave.
62 Marengo Gardens  982, 986, 990 S. Marengo Ave. and 221-241 Ohio St.
| 63 | Marguerita Lane Historic District   | Marguerita Lane off South Marengo Avenue |
| 64 | Mary Louise Court                  | 583-599 N. Mentor Ave.                  |
| 65 | Clarence and Mary Mello House      | 541 Fremont Dr.                         |
| 66 | Mentor Court                       | 937 E. California Blvd.                 |
| 67 | Samuel Merrill House               | 1285 N. Summit Ave.                    |
| 68 | Millard House                      | 645 Prospect Crescent                   |
| 69 | Miss Orton's Classical School for Girls (Dormitory) | 154 S. Euclid Ave. |
| 70 | Mission Court                      | 567 N. Oakland Ave.                    |
| 71 | Newcomb House                      | 675-677 N. El Molino Ave.              |
| 73 | John Norton House                  | 820 Burleigh Dr.                       |
| 74 | Odd Fellows Temple                 | 175 N. Los Robles Ave.                 |
| 76 | Orange Grove Court                 | 745 E. Orange Grove Blvd.              |
| 77 | Orange Heights-Barnhart Tracts Historic District | Roughly bounded by N. Los Robles Ave. W, N. El Molino Ave. E., Jackson St. N., and E. Mountain St. S. |
| 78 | Palmetto Court                     | 100 Palmetto Dr.                       |
| 79 | Park Place-Arroyo Terrace Historic District | 368-440 Arroyo Terrace, 200-240 N. Grand Ave., 201-239 N. Orange Grove Blvd. |
| 80 | Pasadena Arroyo Parks and Recreation District | Roughly bounded by the Foothill Freeway on the north, the city limits on the south, Arroyo Blvd on east, San Rafael Ave on the west. |
81 Pasadena Civic Center District
Roughly bounded by Walnut and Green Sts., Raymond and Euclid Aves.
82 Pasadena Playhouse
39 S. El Molino Ave.
83 Pasadena Playhouse Historic District
464-611 E. Colorado Blvd.,
84 Robert and Barbara Pike House
512 Glen Ct.
85 Prospect Historic District
Prospect Blvd., Square,
Crescent, and Terrace,
Rosemont Ave., Armada and Fremont Drs., and La Mesa Pl.
86 Rose Bowl (stadium)
991 Rosemont Ave., Brookside Park
87 Rose Court
449-457 S. Hudson Ave.
88 Royal Laundry Complex
443 S. Raymond Ave.
89 Sara-Thel Court
618-630 S. Marengo Ave.
90 Singer Building
16 S. Oakland Ave. and 520 E. Colorado Blvd.
91 Ernest W. Smith House
272 S. Los Robles Ave.
92 South Marengo Historic District
S. Marengo Ave.
93 Space Flight Operations Facility
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
270 Arlington Dr.
94 Storrier-Stearns Japanese Garden
255 S. Marengo Ave.
95 Stoutenburgh House
3360 E. Foothill Blvd.
96 Stuart Company Plant and Office Building
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
800 S. San Rafael
97 Twenty-Five-Foot Space Simulator
125 S. Grand Ave.
98 Villa Verde
460 Bellefontaine St.
99 Vista del Arroyo Hotel and Bungalows
475 E. Washington Blvd.
100 Henry A. Ware House
101 Washington Court
### APPENDIX 3

**RIVERSIDE—NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES LISTED PROPERTIES**  
(National Register of Historic Places Database, http://nrhp.focus.nps.gov)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Location</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Administration Building, Sherman Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>All Souls Universalist Church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Arlington Branch Library and Fire Hall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>William Childs House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Chinatown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Federal Post Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>First Church of Christ, Scientist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>First Congregational Church of Riverside</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Harada House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Heritage House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>March Field Historic District</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Masonic Temple</td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Mission Court Bungalows</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Mission Inn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Old YWCA Building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Riverside Municipal Auditorium and Soldier's Memorial Building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Riverside-Arlington Heights Fruit Exchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>San Pedro, Los Angeles, &amp; Salt Lake RR Depot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>M. H. Simon's Undertaking Chapel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Sutherland Fruit Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>University Heights Junior High School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Victoria Avenue</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Address</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>9010 Magnolia Ave.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3657 Lemon St.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>9556 Magnolia Ave.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1151 Monte Vista Dr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Brockton and Tequesquite Aves.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>3720 Orange St.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>3606 Lemon St.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>3504 Mission Inn Ave.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>3356 Lemon St.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>8193 Magnolia Ave.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Eschscholtzia Ave., March Air Force Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>3650 11th St.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>3355-3373 Second St. and 3354-3362 First St.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>3649 7th St.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>3425 Mission Inn Avenue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>3485 7th St.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>3391 7th St.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>3751 Vine St.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>3610 11th St.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>3191 Seventh St.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>2060 University Ave.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Victoria Ave., from Arlington Ave. to Boundary Ln.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 4

SAN BERNARDINO— NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES LISTED PROPERTIES
(National Register of Historic Places Database, http://nrhp.focus.nps.gov)

1 Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Passenger and Freight Depot  1170 W. 3rd St.
2 The California Theatre  562 W. 4th St.
3 Crowder Canyon Archeological District  Address Restricted
4 San Bernardino County Court House  351 N. Arrowhead Ave.
5 US Post Office-Downtown Station  390 W. 5th St.
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_________. “Cleaner City' to Be Goal of Organization,” San Bernardino Sun, 30 September 1932.

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_________. “Council Paves Way for City to get $1,000,000 in Aid,” San Bernardino Sun, 20 January 1950, 17.

_________. “Economy of Freeways,” San Bernardino Sun, 15 July 1953, 34

________. “Here's text of PRA takeover resolution to city board” Pasadena Star-News, 29 January, 1981

________. “Heritage board for Riverside being studied,” Riverside Press, 18 January 1968


________. “Migrants Become Nation's Problem,” San Bernardino Sun, 12 February 1940.

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Chapter 1. Introduction


2 San Bernardino Convention and Visitors Bureau, “Route 66 Rendezvous-History-Where the Cars are the Stars,” Available at http://www.route-66.org/about_us.htm

3 Nostalgia buffs who were particular about details would have noticed that the Cruise Route did not include the actual route of Route 66. This was a full mile away, on the opposite side of Interstate 215. The Convention and Visitors Bureau apparently preferred to highlight the downtown, rather than the lower income Mt. Vernon Avenue district.

4 Robert A. Schaefer, “The Historic Research of the California Hotel, Downtown San Bernardino, California,” Unpublished manuscript, California Room, Feldheym Central Library, San Bernardino, California, 1. The earthquake measures in the hotel’s design predated any legal requirements, which were first instituted in California by the Riley Act of 1933.


6 No Author, California Blue Book, or State Roster (Sacramento: California State Printing Office, 1932), 687; No Author, California Blue Book (Sacramento: California State Printing Office, 1950), 956.


8 Richard Longstreth attributes this automobile-oriented mindset in Southern California to the values and tastes of immigrants from rural areas of the Midwest, where distance and the lack of public transit had led to ready acceptance of cars as the preferred form of transportation. See City Center to Regional Mall: Architecture, the Automobile, and Retailing in Los Angeles, 1920-1950 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), 9-11. There is no particular reference for “Easy In-Easy Out,” but the author has abundant memories of this phrase on signs and advertising throughout Southern California.

9 No Author, “Council Paves Way for City to get $1,000,000 in Aid,” San Bernardino Sun, 20 January 1950, 17; No Author, “Slum Clearance Project Nearer,” San Bernardino Sun, 4 February 1950, 11. It is important to note that declaring a section of community to be “blighted” was a technical requirement for municipalities seeking aid from the federal Housing and Home Finance Agency. The definition of blight was generally left up to the municipal government making the request, and standards varied wildly, or even wildly.


12 The author makes this assertion based on reading several decades-worth of urban redevelopment articles in the San Bernardino Sun.


15 No author, “Reno’s Historic Mapes Hotel is Dynamited,” Los Angeles Times, 31 January 2000. As a direct result of this loss, advocates for the state’s historic properties formed an organization called Preserve Nevada—based at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas—to foster greater awareness of the state’s cultural legacy.


17 Donald Luxton, Building the West: The Early Architecture of British Columbia (Vancouver, British Columbia: Talonbooks, 2003), 515.


 Ibid., 191, 194. Because Jacobs was a journalist, rather than an academic, she expressed her views with a passion and freedom that undoubtedly energized her readers, even if she neglected to prove her assertions with a careful presentation of evidence:

But look what we have built with the first several billions [of federal urban renewal dollars]: Low-income projects that become worse centers of delinquency, vandalism and general social hopelessness than the slums they were supposed to replace. Middle-income housing projects which are truly marvels of dullness and regimentation, sealed against any buoyancy or vitality of city life. Luxury housing projects that mitigate their inanity, or try to, with a vapid vulgarity. Cultural centers that are unable to support a good bookstore. Civic centers that are avoided by everyone but bums, who have fewer choices of loitering places than others. Commercial centers that are lackluster imitations of standardized suburban chain-store shopping. Promenades that go from no place to nowhere and have no promenaders. Expressways that eviscerate great cities. This is not the rebuilding of cities. This is the sacking of cities. (Ibid., 4)


Chapter 2. Understanding Urban Renewal


2 United States Bureau of the Census, *County and City Data Book* (1956)

3 Greg Hise “Homebuilding and Industrial Decentralization in Los Angeles: The Roots of the Post-World War II Urban Region” in Mary Corbin Sies and Christopher Silver, eds., *Planning the Twentieth-Century American City* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 251-256


12 Urban Redevelopment: What’s it All About?” Report to the Housing Authority of the County of San Bernardino, 23 May 1956, 1.


19 Von Hoffman, “A Study in Contradictions.”

20 Bauman, *Public Housing*, 44.

21 Von Hoffman, “A Study in Contradictions.”


23 Von Hoffman, “A Study in Contradictions.”


25 Teaford, 26-34; Monkkonen, 159; Rockefeller Brothers Fund, *Prospect for America: The Rockefeller Panel Reports* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1961), 300-301.

26 Bauman, *Public Housing*, 82.

27 Meaning, to formally declare that the land had been over-valued at the time of acquisition, and so absorb the difference between the purchase and subsequent resale price.

28 Von Hoffman, “A Study in Contradictions.”

29 Ibid.


31 Von Hoffman, “A Study in Contradictions.”


34 Von Hoffman, “A Study in Contradictions.”


37 Jakle and Wilson, *Derelict Landscapes*, 134 (both quotes).

38 Von Hoffman, “A Study in Contradictions.”


British playwright and Internet pundit David Szondy condemns Le Corbusier and his planners as:

> ...the sort of Modernist dreamers that did away with all that bourgeois ornamentation and obsolete classical nonsense in favour of good, clean lines suitable for the enlightenment of the proletariat who didn't know what was good for them. They loved to plop down great slabs of brick that were cities unto themselves in vast plains of concrete dotted with trees that gave no shade, marble benches that no human being could sit comfortably on, steps that were so wide and low that they made you walk like a duck, and nothing to give any pedestrian any protection from the elements. In the summer you roasted under the sun and in the winter you froze in the raw northern winds. But it gave the paperboard models a wonderful sense of perspective.

> It's all horrible, so why do it? Because it was all so anti-bourgeois and it was the sort of place where, in the words of [comedian] Alexi Sayle, 'They expected working class people to wander around discussing Chekov.'"  


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42 Jacobs, *Death and Life*, 23.


44 Jacobs, *Death and Life*, 258, 8; Kolson, *Big Plans*, 83-84.


47 Ibid., 67-68.

48 Ibid., (both quotes).

49 Ibid., 44.

50 Barnett, *Fractured Metropolis*, 121.

51 Ibid., 184.


54 Ibid., quoted in Hardwick, *Mall Maker*, 160.


58 Teaford, “Urban Renewal and Its Aftermath”


62 Doherty and Block, “The Revitalization of the Fillmore.”

63 Hall, *Cities of Tomorrow*, 258-260.
Chapter 3. Owning the Past


5 Wilson, *Myth of Santa Fe*, 79.


8 Wilson, *Myth of Santa Fe*, 311-313.


12 Deverell, “Privileging the Mission,” 236.


16 Bodnar, *Remaking America*, 16.

17 Author credited as “B,” “‘Merited Praise of the Saints,’” in *The Latter-Day Saints’ Millennial Star* 57, (July 18, 1895), 456-458.


20 Kammen, *Mystic Chords*, 4-5.

21 Ibid., 38.
Of course, these are still not necessarily the first residents in a given area. As in the West, the native peoples are pushed to the background of all but the most recent and informed historical interpretations. 


Lambe, “Legislative History,” 2.


Huxtable, quoted in Rifkind, “Faking It.”

Lambe, “Legislative History,” 8.

Ibid., 9.

Ibid., 11-15.

Ibid.


Chapter 4. Foundations

1 Norris Hundley, Jr., *The Great Thirst: Californians and Water, 1770s-1990s* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 92-98; Earp 11-17-2005. While *Lux v. Haggin* was seen at the time as a battle
between “the people” and wealthy landowners, in truth Charles Lux, his partner Henry Miller, and their opponent James Ben Ali Haggin were all corporate farmers of the first magnitude.


3 Patterson, A Colony for California, 93-94.

4 Ibid., 95-96.


7 Patterson, A Colony for California, 97; William Hammond Hall, Irrigation in Southern California (1888), 232, available at online holdings of the Water Resource Institute, California State University, San Bernardino http://wri.csusb.edu/web-pages/archives/wri-holdings/etextbooks/hammond_hall.pdf


14 Schuiling, 70.

15 Patterson, Beginnings of Riverside, 8-9; A Colony for California, 317-323; W. W. Robinson, Southern California Local History: A Gathering of the Writings of W. W. Robinson, Doyce B. Nunis, Jr., ed. (Los Angeles: Historical Society of Southern California, 1993), 344-345.

16 Patterson, A Colony for California, 164, 206; Riverside Daily Press, Home of the Orange, 5.


19 David M. Wrobel, Promised Lands: Promotion, Memory, and the Creation of the American West (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 38. Pixley’s complete description is a marvel of Victorian-era prose:

This is the happy Canaan—the holy land; that God, when He made the world, and had gathered the experience of all His efforts, said to himself: “I will now illustrate the crowning glory of My labors with the production of a perfect spot. I will give it wealth of soil and wealth of precious metals; I will enrich it with nature’s grandest productions; I will give it splendid mountains, rich and gorgeous valleys, grand and stately forests; I will thread it with magnificent rivers and beautiful brooks; its grasses shall be nutritious; its soil shall produce in generous quantities the best of fruits. I will smile down through cloudless skies upon its beautiful fields; I will fan it with breezes from my broadest sea; I will waft to it the odors of spices and the perfumes of tropic lands; and in the ripeness of time its people shall be great-hearted and generous, liberal and just; and there, in all the perfection of its soil and the salubrity of its climate, shall be found the highest social condition of which the creation of My image is capable.”

20 McWilliams, Southern California, 120-121.
Carey McWilliams, Deverell, McWillia

P

William Deverell, Chris Wilson, "Into the American Melting Pot, 1846

Ibid., 46

Harry W. Lawton, "Riverside's First Chinatown and the Boom of the Eighties" in

Thompson, "San Bernardino's Chinatown"; Harry W. Lawton, "A Selected Chronological History of

The 1880 US Census recorded 123 Chinese residents in San Bernardino County as a whole. U.S. Census

of Population and Housing, 1880, Volume 1, Table V. "Population, By Race and By Counties: 1880,

1870, 1860"

Thompson, "San Bernardino's Chinatown"; Harry W. Lawton, "A Selected Chronological History of

Chinese Pioneers in Riverside and the Southern California Citrus Belt" in Wong Ho Leun: An American


Harry W. Lawton, "Riverside's First Chinatown and the Boom of the Eighties" in Wong Ho Leun, 4, 46.

Ibid., 46-50; Esther Klotz, Riverside and the Day the Bank Broke: A Chronicle of the City 1890-1907

(Riverside: Rubidoux Press, 1972), 9, 42.


McWilliams, Southern California, 82.


Phoebe Schroeder Kropp, California Vieja: Culture and Memory in a Modern American Place (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006).


McWilliams, Southern California, 73.


Deverell, Whitewashed Adobe, 61.


Klaus J. Hansen, Quest for Empire: The Political Kingdom of God and the Council of Fifty (Michigan State University Press, 1967), 133. A concise biography of Brigham Young, emphasizing his role in the settlement of the West, can be found in Newell G. Bringham, Brigham Young and the Expanding American Frontier, ed. Oscar Handlin (Boston: Little, Brown, 1986). See also Ernest H. Taves This is the Place: Brigham Young and the New Zion (Buffalo, New York: Prometheus, 1991).

orba, a member of one of the region’s leading families, brought Wilson both land and a certain amount of financial matters is followed by sinking and wasting money.” As quoted in ibid., 58.


54 William B. McBride, as quoted in Lyman, San Bernardino, 52-53.

55 Martha Gaines Stoebe, The City of San Bernardino, California, 1854-1985 (San Bernardino: City of San Bernardino Historical and Pioneer Society, 1986), 1; George William Beattie, “San Bernardino Before the Americans Came,” California Historical Society Quarterly 12.2 (1933): 111-124. In the twentieth century the few descendants of these tribes occupied the small San Manuel Reservation in the scrub-covered foothills northeast of the city. There they essentially disappeared from local consciousness, while managing to raise apricots and rabbits on the few suitable sections of their land with access to water. In the 1990s, with gambling legalized on reservations, the San Manuel band replaced their apricot orchards with a wildly profitable high-stakes bingo parlor. The hillsides of the reservation are now studded with the band’s luxury houses. They command a fine view of gamblers arriving from throughout the Los Angeles metropolitan area who would otherwise have little reason to visit San Bernardino.

56 Lyman, San Bernardino, 66. In order to construct a town of greater permanence, and also to provide a source of income for the community, Amasa Lyman launched an effort in the spring of 1852 to build a sawmilling road north into the mountains, through what would be later named Waterman Canyon. Using the unpaid labor of one hundred men, the road was completed in only ten days. The first mountain sawmill began operation in the spring of that year, and was powered by a steam engine laboriously hauled in from the abandoned Salt Springs mine in the Mojave Desert. Despite difficulties caused by fires, washouts and occasional raids by Mojave tribes, by the time Brigham Young issued his recall notices to San Bernardino in 1857, two steam-powered and four water-powered mills were operating in the mountains. Such was the demand for finished lumber in Southern California that the output actually increased following the Mormon's departure, growing from four hundred and fifty thousand board feet in 1859, to three million feet in 1868. The biggest single market was Los Angeles, with a tremendous appetite for building materials to accommodate its growing population (Raup, “Pass-Site City,” 23-24).

57 Los Angeles Star, 4 October 1851; San Francisco Alta California, 15 July 1851; As quoted in Lyman, San Bernardino, 49.

58 Benjamin D. Wilson, The Indians of Southern California in 1852 ed. John Walton Caughey (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), 54-55. Wilson was a native of Tennessee by way of New Mexico, who assimilated into Californio society after arriving in 1841. His marriage to Doña Ramona Yorba, a member of one of the region’s leading families, brought Wilson both land and a certain amount of
respectability, and he would add to both in subsequent years with his skills as a negotiator and businessman. During the period of Mormon settlement he was serving as an Indian agent for the Federal government.

59 Creer, *Founding of an Empire*, 366; Lyman, *San Bernardino*, 110; Brigham Young, Heber C. Kimball, and Willard Richards, “General Epistle to all Latter-day Saints,” 19 February 1853, as quoted in Lyman, *San Bernardino*, 89. The problem was that they had relocated without consulting with church authorities at either their old homes or in San Bernardino. This threw into question a basic assumption of Mormon life: that the leadership at all levels had been ordained by God, and made its decisions according to divine revelation. This included not only determining where members would live, but also who would represent them in civil government. In a Mormon community, the electoral process consisted of the residents ratifying a list of candidates presented to them by their local church leaders. Thus, if the unauthorized settlers felt free to discount their leaders' wisdom on where to reside, they might also feel free to do so when it came to the matter of choosing their civic authorities. So it was that in a widely reported incident of April, 1855, three men in San Bernardino faced expulsion, or "disfellowship", from the Mormon Church for the transgression of standing in an election against Amasa Lyman's nominations for the new County Board of Supervisors (Lyman, *San Bernardino*, 155-56; Walter C. Schuiling, *San Bernardino County: Land of Contrasts* (Woodland Hills, Calif.: Windsor Publications, 1984), 49-50; P. A. M. Taylor, *Expectations Westward: The Mormons and the Emigration of their British Converts in the Nineteenth Century* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1966), 66-67.)

60 Brigham Young, as quoted in Lyman, *San Bernardino*, 185. One particularly interesting development was that San Bernardino proved attractive to another group of people who also identified themselves as God's Chosen. Marcus Katz arrived with a backpack full of sundries and notions soon after the settlers built their stockade, and found the environment so agreeable that he stayed to build a permanent store. In doing so, he became the first of the Jewish merchants who would play a leading role in the town's commercial development over the next century. These included Lewis Jacobs, a native of Prussia, and Louis Glaser who in 1854 began operating one of the sawmills that brought early recognition to the city, and which set Jacobs on a career that would eventually lead to the presidency of the Bank of San Bernardino. Although later members of the Jewish community characterized these pioneers as indifferent and apathetic in their religious practices, their presence must have been a thought-provoking influence on the Mormon community (San Bernardino Diamond Jubilee Committee: Commemorating Jewish Activities, *The Pinkos (Jewish chronicle) published under the supervision of the Diamond Jubilee Committee: commemorating seventy-five years of Jewish activities in San Bernardino and Riverside Counties, 1860-1935* (San Bernardino: Sun Printing and Publishing House, 1935), 14, 17-18, 35).

61 Ibid., 186.


63 Most of the original Mormon structures were as short lived as the settlement. Many were washed out by flooding in 1862. Three houses survived as late as 1975, when one was bulldozed as part of a redevelopment project. A second collapsed in 1986 during a heavy-handed restoration effort. See Gregg Patton, “One adobe remains standing,” *San Bernardino Sun*, 28 January 2001, B-1+.


65 Schuiling, *San Bernardino County*, 57.

66 Knight, Haenszel, and Smith, "Historic Chronology," 9. Little remains to be seen of Belleville today.


68 As quoted in Raup, “Pass-Site City,” 30.


70 Ibid., 31.

71 McWilliams, *Southern California*, 62; Rawls and Bean, California, 171

Chapter 5. Mythology and Marginalization

74 A resident of Salt Lake City or Provo would feel right at home in San Bernardino. Typically, the town plan was applied without regard for the local topography. San Bernardino’s north-south streets were, and in some places still are, transformed into fast-flowing steams during heavy rains.
77 James T. Brown, Harvest of the Sun: An Illustrated History of Riverside County (Northridge: Windsor Publications, 1985), 48; Patterson, The Beginnings of Riverside, 3; A Colony for California, 24-25.
78 John W. North, A Colony for California, 17 March 1870, Folder 1, Series III, Founding Documents of Riverside, Riverside Local History Resource Center; James P. Greves, Ho! For California!!, 25 March 1870, Folder 2, Series III, Founding Documents of Riverside, Riverside Local History Resource Center.
79 Brown, Harvest of the Sun, 50; Patterson, A Colony for California, 21-28, 33-35.
81 Brown, Harvest of the Sun, 51-52; Patterson, A Colony for California, 41, 117.
82 H. J. Rudisill, compiler, Riverside Illustrated, A City Among the Orange Groves: Its History, Resources and Advantages as a place of residence and of profitable Investment (San Francisco: H. S. Crocker and Co., 1889), 9.
83 Patterson, A Colony for California, 37-38; Riverside Daily Press, Home of the Orange, 3, 5; Southern California Colony Association, “Certificate of Incorporation,” 12 September 1870, Folder 2, Series II, Founding Documents of Riverside, Riverside Local History Resource Center.
84 Rudisill, Riverside Illustrated, 7; Riverside Daily Press, Home of the Orange, 5. Although the town was located near the river, rather than strictly on it, the residents chose the solidly American identity of “Riverside” early in 1871, abandoning the original name of Jurupa—Patterson, Beginnings of Riverside, 4.
85 Patterson, A Colony for California, 49-50
86 ibid., 54-55; Beginnings of Riverside, 4.
87 Henry G. Bennet et al., The Following Facts Relating to the Early History of Pasadena are Given in Response to Many Inquiries (Pasadena: No publisher, 1915), 1; Joyce Pinney A Pasadena Chronology 1769-1977 Remembering When-Where (Pasadena: City of Pasadena—Pasadena Public Library, 1978), 2. The name is sometimes remembered as the San Gabriel Orange Growers’ Association, depending on the source. The Rancho San Pascual was an extensive tract of former mission lands owned by Jonathan Griffin and Benjamin Wilson. Since the formal dissolution of the San Gabriel Mission the rancho had passed through the hands of Eulalia Perez de Guillen, the Perez and Sepulveda families jointly, and finally Manuel Garfias before he in turn sold it to the two Americans in 1860 (Pinney, Pasadena Chronology, 1-2).
89 Arnold, Gay Nineties, 126, 193.
90 Patterson, A Colony for California, 63; Riverside Land and Irrigating Company, Southern California (San Francisco: Bacon and Co., 1879), 6.
91 Riverside Land and Irrigating Company, Southern California (San Francisco: Bacon and Co., 1879), 6
92 Patterson, A Colony for California, 78-85; Beginnings of Riverside, 4; Suzie Earp, Archival Assistant, Water Resource Institute, California State University, San Bernardino, email to author, November 17, 2005 (hereafter referred to as “Earp 11-17-2005”).
93 Patterson, A Colony for California, 88; Earp 11-17-2005.


5Josiah Royce, quoted in Robert V. Hine, “Josiah Royce: The West as Community” in Richard W. Etulain, ed., *Writing Western History: Essays on Major Western Historians* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1991; Reno: University of Nevada Press, 2002), 22. As an example of this imagined natural progression, the now-defunct Harris Co. department store in San Bernardino prominently displayed an elaborate chronology demonstrating how the legal title for the store’s real estate had passed in an apparently unbroken line from the king of Spain to the Harris family. Ironically, the family ultimately sold the business to the Madrid-based retailer El Corte Inglés in 1981.


8Ibid., 42.

9See especially Chapter 2, “History on Parade,” and Chapter 6, “The Drama of Los Angeles History.”


11Ibid., 89.

12Editor [Charles F. Lummis], “The Camino Real,” *Out West* 20, no. 1 (January 1904), 79-83.

13Ibid., 119-127.


16Ibid., 135.


24McMillian, *California Colonial*, 13

25Ibid., 10-12

26Ibid.


28Wilson, *The Myth of Santa Fe*, 237-244.


30McMillian, *California Colonial*, 32.

31Ibid., 3, 31.

32Ibid., 31, 49.


34Ibid., 82.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Kropp, California Vieja, 121.
42 Robert A. Schaefer (Schaefer Construction Co.) “The Historic Research of the California Hotel, Downtown San Bernardino, California” manuscript and correspondence collection California Room, Feldheym Central Library, San Bernardino, California, 1-6.
48 No author, Greeting from Pasadena, California (Pasadena: City of Pasadena Cultural Heritage Commission, 1987), 20.
50 McMillian, California Colonial, 46.
52 McClelland, Building the National Parks, 104-108, 114-120; Tyler, Historic Preservation, 130-131.
55 Julius J. Hecht, California Mission Architecture Among the Orange Groves of Riverside (Los Angeles: Julius Hecht, 191?). Huntington Library, San Marino California.
58 Klotz, Day the Bank Broke, 91-93; Patterson, A Colony for California, 240.
59 Klotz, Day the Bank Broke, 86, 93.
61 Patterson, A Colony for California, 241.
62 The Glenwood (1902).
Arthur Burnett Benton, *The Mission Inn* (Los Angeles: Segnogram, 1908), Foreword. Henry Huntington was presented with a copy of the book, signed by Frank Miller and inscribed “To H. E. Huntington, the man who made the Glenwood Mission Inn possible with love and gratitude” Huntington Library, San Marino California.


Ibid., 11, 22, 28; DeWitt V. Hutchings, *Handbook of the Mission Inn* (Riverside: Cloister Print Shop, 1940), 56, 47, 42. The actual Roman Catholic patron saints of aviators are St. Joseph of Cupertino (because he was said to levitate on occasion), Our Lady of Loreto (because house Mary was born in was said to have been transported through the air by angels to Loreto, Italy), and St. Thérèse de Lisieux (perhaps due to her general popularity).


Gale, *Frank Miller*, 88, 84.

Patterson, *Colony for California*, 293-294, 297; Gale, *Frank Miller*, 91.

Ibid., 242.

Gale, *Frank Miller*, 86

Ibid., 89.

Ibid., 101, 103.


Ibid., 166.


Patterson, *Colony for California*, 384.

Based on the author’s experience, the term “plunge” was commonly used in Southern California during this period as a synonym for a municipal swimming pool.

Patterson, *Colony for California*, 299-300.

A type of promotional history work, so called from the pictures and laudatory biographies of local figures found in the back of the book.


Ibid., 12-13.

James E. Crim, “The Social Status of the Negro in Pasadena, California” (M.A. thesis, University of Southern California, 1941), 123

Talking about Pasadena, 29.
Chapter 6. Planning the Postwar City

1 Abbott, *Metropolitan Frontier*, 33.
San Bernardino City Charter (1905), art. III, sec. 31.

San Bernardino Municipal Code (1998), art. III, sec. 39. This power was completely independent of city council oversight until 1992, when a charter revision introduced the possibility of revision or withdrawal of the order on a two-thirds majority vote.


Monkkonen, America Becomes Urban, 163.


Snedecker, 31-32.

Advertisement, San Bernardino Sun, 28 July 1953, 6.


Civic Goals for 1950 Listed at Unity Luncheon,” San Bernardino Sun, 4 February 1950, 11.

Council Paves Way for City to Get $1,000,000 in Aid,” San Bernardino Sun, 20 January 1950, 17; “Slum Clearance Project Nearer,” San Bernardino Sun, 4 February 1950, 11. It is important to note that declaring a section of a community to be “blighted” was a technical requirement of municipalities seeking aid from what was then the federal Housing and Home Finance Agency. The definition of blight was generally left up to the municipal government making the request, and standards varied wildly, or even wildly.

Pasadena City Planning Commission, General Plan, City of Pasadena, California (1962), 103


Move to Bring Industry Into Valley Begins,” San Bernardino Sun, 18 February 1950, 11.


Ibid., 53.

Ibid., 34.

Wise and Eisner, A Master Plan, 23.

Ibid., 87.

Economy of Freeways,” San Bernardino Sun, 15 July 1953, 34.

31a Chamber Board Endorses Proposed Freeway Route,” San Bernardino Sun, 8 August 1953, City Page. Owen D. Gutreid’s Twentieth-Century Sprawl: Highways and the Reshaping of the American Landscape (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004) suggests that from their earliest conception in the 1930s, federal interstate highways were planned to directly link urban centers. Beyond the simple fact that the majority of the nation’s vehicular traffic involved either an urban origin or an urban destination, this concept built broad political support for the Bureau of Public Roads and its long-term objectives, while drawing attention away from a competing proposal for a small number of federally-operated rural toll roads (pp. 39-40). See also Michael Light Chernoff, The Social Impacts of Urban Sections of the Interstate Highway System (Ph.D. Diss., University of Massachusetts, 1976); Tom Lewis, Divided Highways: Building the Interstate Highways (New York: Viking, 1997); Gary Schwartz, “Urban Freeways and the Interstate System,” Southern California Law Review 49, no. 406 (March 1976).

32 “Residents of S.B., Colton Present Views on Freeway,” San Bernardino Sun, 12 August 1953, 15+. Ibid.


34a Redevelopers Set Sights on Two Blighted Areas,” San Bernardino Sun, 24 March 1955, 32.

35a Urban Redevelopment: What’s it All About?” Report to the Housing Authority of the County of San Bernardino, 23 May 1956, 1. Ibid., 4-5.


37a Warner Hodgdon et al., San Bernardino 1851-1980: A Supplement to the Overall Central City Plan of Development (San Bernardino: Redevelopment Agency of San Bernardino, 1975), 22, fig. 23.


39a No Author, “High Court Ponders Bias Suit,” Pasadena Independent, 5 June 1963, 13. Linda Vista Elementary School was located in an isolated neighborhood at the northwest corner of the city, adjacent to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. Washington Junior High, less than two miles away, was in the area that would later be described as the core of Pasadena’s Black ghetto. By contrast, McKinley Junior High was south of Colorado Boulevard, some four and one half-miles from Linda Vista, but in a well-to-do neighborhood less than a half-mile from the campus of the California Institute of Technology.

40a Ibid.


Ibid.


Ibid.

No Author, “S.B. Education Board Faces Segregation Suit,” San Bernardino Sun, 9 December 1965, B-3


Phoebe Kropp has explored this process at some length, arguing that the “Spanish Fantasy Past represented a method of affirming a white future in Southern California.” Phoebe Schroeder Kropp, “‘All Our Yesterdays’: The Spanish Fantasy Past and the Politics of Public Memory in Southern California, 1884-1939.” PhD. diss., University of California, San Diego (1999), 11.

During the 1920s, San Bernardino's Chamber of Commerce adopted the motto of “The Gate City” to emphasize the role of a transportation hub and entry point for the surrounding area. See for instance the Map of the City of San Bernardino, California and the “Rim of the World Drive” in the San Bernardino Mountains (San Bernardino: Sun Printing and Publishing House, 1929) in the collection of the California Room, Feldheym Central Library, San Bernardino.

Livingston and Blayney, City and Regional Planners, Riverside: 1966—The View Ahead: Part I. A Report Preliminary to the Riverside General Plan (Riverside: Riverside City Planning Department, 1966), 1.

Ibid., 17.

Ibid., 17, 26.

Ibid., 13, 38.

Ibid., 40.

Ibid., 41, 43.

Livingston and Blayney, City and Regional Planners, Riverside: 1966—The View Ahead: Part II (Riverside: Riverside City Planning Department, 1967), 6-7.


Pasadena City Planning Commission, General Plan, City of Pasadena, California (1962)

Ibid., 36, 103, 4.


77 No author, “Pasadena Now! Questions and Answers” (Pasadena: Pasadena Now!, c. 1970). All emphases original. The “second-rate” freeway referred to here is presumably the original Pasadena Freeway—Highway 110—that becomes a surface street in downtown Pasadena.
78 Ibid.
79 No author, Pasadena Now report from Colorado Boulevard Beautification subcommittee, presented to Pasadena Board of Directors, March 6 1975.
86 Pasadena Now, Report of Colorado Boulevard Beautification Subcommittee presented to Board of Directors, City of Pasadena, 6 March 1975, Section I.
87 No author. The City of Pasadena Comprehensive General Plan (Pasadena: City of Pasadena, 1977), 39.
88 Ibid., 41.
89 Ibid., 42.
90 Ibid., 43.
91 Ibid.
92 See for instance the work of Arthur C. Radebaugh, a prolific commercial illustrator who, between 1958 and 1963, produced a syndicated newspaper comic strip titled “Closer Than We Think.” Every Sunday, readers were presented with technological marvels such as these, typically with the assurance that they were already under development by major corporations, and could reasonably be expected within the reader’s lifetime. An Internet exhibit of Radebaugh’s work, “Radebaugh: The Future We Were Promised” is available at http://www.palaceofculture.org/radebaugh.html. Accessed 26 March 2008. The Tomorrowland section of Walt Disney’s Disneyland theme park, opened in 1955, was similarly intended as a realistic, though entertaining, foretaste of the world Americans would soon enjoy through the continued march of progress and private industry. However, see Michael Steiner’s “Frontierland as Tomorrowland: Walt Disney and the Architectural Packaging of the Mythic West,” Montana: The Magazine of Western History 48, no. 1 (Spring 1998), 2-17. Steiner convincingly demonstrates that visions of the future exemplified by Radebaugh’s comics, or the Monsanto “House of the Future” at Disney’s Tomorrowland, faded quickly into an uneasy nostalgia, while the idealized virtues of the American West, as seen in Frontierland, are now more commonly embraced as models for a simpler way of life.
95 Ibid.
96 David Otis, “Nation’s Largest County Had a Big Year,” San Bernardino Sun-Telegram, 1 January 1970, B-1+. San Bernardino North was a temporary name given to the then new Cajon High School, in the city’s previously rural northwest corner, while it hosted students displaced by a reconstruction project at the older, centrally located, San Bernardino High School. The riots were characterized primarily as “turf battles” between African American and Hispanic students attempting to establish social dominance in the new setting.
Chapter 7. Preservation and Promotion

1 Livingston and Blayney, Riverside: 1966—The View Ahead: Part 1, 1.
3 Architectural Planning Services, Historic Preservation Element of the City of Riverside General Plan (Riverside: Planning Department, City of Riverside, 2003), 6.
5 The Riverside Plan Group (Clinton Marr & Associates; Bruce & Hansen Architects; Brown+Rawdon Architects; Eckbo, Dean, Austin & Williams) Riverside Downtown Plan (Riverside: The Riverside Plan Group, 1975), 13.
6 Ibid., 10.
7 Ibid., 14.
8 Architectural Preservation Planning Services, Historic Preservation Element of the City of Riverside General Plan (Riverside: Planning Department, City of Riverside, 2003), 7.
9 No credited author, Downtown Community Plan (City of Riverside, 1981), 31-32, 36; Planning Department, Landmarks of the City of Riverside (City of Riverside, 2002), 1-4.
11 Architectural Preservation Planning Services, Historic Preservation Element of the City of Riverside General Plan (Riverside: Planning Department, City of Riverside, 2003), 11-12.
12 Architectural Planning Services, Historic Preservation Element, 7.
14 McCue, “Riverside, California,” 112.
15 Architectural Planning Services, Historic Preservation Element, 8.
17 Ibid., 214, 217.
18 Ibid., 218.
19 Ibid., 212, 221.
20 Architectural Planning Services, Historic Preservation Element, 8.
24 Ibid., 22.
25 Architectural Planning Services, Historic Preservation Element, 7; McCue, “Riverside, California,” 111.
26 City of Riverside, City of Riverside, California General Plan 2010, Adopted September 13, 1994 (Planning Department, City of Riverside, 1994), iv-v.
Ibid., VI-2.
31 Ibid., “Key Community Character Issues,” VI-7.
32 McCue, “Riverside, California,” 114.
37 Ibid., 15, 37.
38 Ibid., 59, 63.
47 Pasadena: Roses, Redevelopment and Rejected Reform (Los Angeles: California Commission on Campaign Financing, no date), 10.
49 Dana Cuff et al., Form in Contention: Design in Development Disputes (Los Angeles: University of Southern California, 1994), 41.
51 Dana Cuff et al., Form in Contention: Design in Development Disputes (Los Angeles: University of Southern California, 1994), 44.
52 Ibid., 45.
53 Ibid., 41-45.
54 Ibid., 46-48.
55 Ibid., 48.
56 Ibid., 48-49.
57 Ibid., 49.
58 City of Pasadena, Comprehensive General Plan—Land Use Element (Pasadena: City of Pasadena, 2004), 1.
61 Ibid., 447-448.
62 Ibid., 448.
64 General Plan Historical/Cultural Element (1994)
69 Warner Hodgdon et al., *San Bernardino 1851-1980: A Supplement to the Overall Central City Plan of Development* (San Bernardino: Redevelopment Agency of the City of San Bernardino, 1975), 26, Fig. 36.
70 Ibid., 37-38, Figs. 69-72.
71 These observations and assertions are based on the author’s personal experience in San Bernardino.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid., 58, Fig. 122.
75 Ibid., 52-53.
77 Hodgdon, 62, Figs. 129-130.
79 Ibid.
80 Stoebe, *City of San Bernardino*, 21-22.
81 This assertion is based on the author’s personal experience in San Bernardino.
82 Bureau of the Census, *County and City Data Book 1977*, 630; *County and City Data Book 1988*, 619.
86 C. Glen Wilson to Jack Reilly, Chairman, Mayor’s Task Force on Library Relocation, May 14, 1981 File no. 6.257.
88 Ibid., 13, 8-9.
89 Ibid., 55, 14.
90 Larry Harvey, President, Library Board of Trustees to Mayor and Common Council, September 24, 1981, “Pioneer Park Site Analysis.”
91 No Author, “About the Library,” (San Bernardino Public Library, 2009). Available at: http://www.sbpl.org/about_library.html
The hotel was a saga in its own right, passing through the hands of multiple owners and several questionable financial deals. In one case, the city provided generous tax incentives to the Japan-based Maruko Group, only to discover later that it was backed by the commercial giant Mitsubishi.


Juanita Scott, quoted in Marc Ober et al., The Quality of Life in San Bernardino: “As We See Ourselves” (Pasadena: Quality of Life Research Institute, 1988), 35.

Robert Henley, quoted ibid., 28.

Denny Shoret, quoted in ibid., 30.

Martin Matchich, quoted in ibid., 23.

James Hinojosa, quoted in ibid., 32.


Mike Davis, City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles (London: Verso, 1990), 375.

Enivcom Corporation, City of San Bernardino General Plan, Adopted June 2, 1989 (San Bernardino: City of San Bernardino, 1989), 12.

Ibid.

Ibid., 1-18.

Ibid., 1-23, 1-70, 1-73.

Ibid., 3-1.

Ibid., 3-31 - 3-32.


Lyman, San Bernardino, 390-393.


Architectural Preservation Planning Services, Historic Preservation Element, 12.


Ibid., 81.


Ibid.


Ibid.


McCue, “Riverside, California,” 114.

http://www.forestcity.net/properties/shop/regional_lifestyle_centers/Pages/victoria_gardens.aspx
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