The Hotel Manager’s Perceived Conflict of Providing for Hospitality and Security: Can the Two Exist in Harmony?

Silvano Cozzini
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/thesesdissertations

Part of the Criminology and Criminal Justice Commons, Hospitality Administration and Management Commons, Psychology Commons, and the Public Relations and Advertising Commons

Repository Citation
https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/thesesdissertations/2041

This Professional Paper is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Scholarship@UNLV. It has been accepted for inclusion in UNLV Theses, Dissertations, Professional Papers, and Capstones by an authorized administrator of Digital Scholarship@UNLV. For more information, please contact digitalscholarship@unlv.edu.
The Hotel Manager’s Perceived Conflict of Providing for Hospitality and Security:

Can the Two Exist in Harmony?

By

Silvano Cozzini

Master of Science

University of Nevada Las Vegas

2013

A professional paper submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the
Master of Science in Hotel Administration

William F. Harrah College of Hotel Administration

Graduate College
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

December 2013

Chairperson: Professor William Werner
PART ONE

Introduction

The hospitality industry relies upon regular and repeat customers for its survival. No traveler or visitor will return to a hotel property where a bad incident occurred. Would a diner go back to any restaurant where they were sickened by their meal? Would a hotel guest return to any property where they were a victim of a crime? Bad experiences make us tell ourselves, “I will never go back there again!”

This same psychology holds true for criminals. At places where they have been deterred by a high security presence, it is unlikely that they would return there, either. A bank with no security guards on duty is certainly a much more enticing and inviting target for a robber, than one with security guards on duty.

In the summer of 2013, there was an incident of violence at a shopping mall in Kenya. Such venues are places of public accommodation, as are those of the hospitality industry. These high profile crisis situations make for poor public relations, not only for the venue and for the property owner, but also for the local and multinational corporations vending there.

Yet, crime and violence need not come in the form of the terrorism that is seen on television, which usually takes place in and around the Middle East and Africa. There is plenty of crime and violence in the United States. These crimes come in the form of assault, battery, rape, murder, burglary, abduction, theft, etc. Many of these crimes transpire on hotel and motel properties. For anyone who follows the news regularly, or travels even to a minor extent, this may be common knowledge. Hotels and motels that have little or no visible security measures make for soft and easy targets for criminals. Travelers, many of whom are so easily distinguished from locals, make for soft and easy prey for criminals.
Purpose

The purpose of this exploratory and qualitative study is to investigate whether highly visible security measures employed in the lodging industry influence guests’ perceptions of those properties, and whether those perceptions can be converted into a positive risk opportunity for the industry.

Justification

A hotel’s security department is not commonly perceived by management as having a revenue generating function. It is commonly perceived to be an expense that has no measurable return on investment for the organization. In light of this notion, an investigation for a more thorough understanding towards any potential for a security department to generate revenue through marketing may benefit the industry. In sum, if a visible and present security force were viewed in a more positive light by management, perhaps it can be exploited to the organization’s competitive advantage.

Constraints

Even for those properties that do have a security department, they are unlikely to advertise any present and visible security procedures. This may be in the interest of security, itself, or in the interest of guest comfort. Such lack of transparency will make for a natural research constraint. Also, the general public tends to conceptualize hotel crime in a foreign context, since the media tends to sensationalize terrorist attacks, which regularly occur overseas. However, some sectors of the hospitality industry have taken initiatives towards transparency. Very recently, The Carnival, Royal Caribbean, and Norwegian Cruise Lines voluntarily began posting to their websites data about allegations of serious crime aboard their ships. These
disclosures were reportedly the result of pressure put upon the industry by travelers for becoming more transparent (Anderson, 2013).

But, there has not been much transparency on the part of the land based hospitality sector. There are few hotel crime statistics available to the public. The hotel industry tends to keep such incidents out of the public domain.
PART TWO

Literature Review

Introduction

It suffices to say that everyone perceives their homes to be their ultimate place of refuge and shelter. Peace, tranquility, and security are not only expected there; they are taken for granted there. Travelers carry these concepts and values along on their journeys. While out of town, a place of lodging becomes a traveler’s “home away from home.” It becomes their new and temporary place for refuge and shelter. No one will sleep well or rest easy anywhere, without having these values protected. So much emphasis today is put upon a hotel guest’s feeling of physical and psychological comfort by the lodging industries. Hotel managers believe that soft pillows, firm mattresses, and warm blankets certainly will provide for the former. They also believe that an absence of visible security will provide for the latter.

The Hotel Managers’ Dilemma

Hotel managers are aware of the potential dangers on their properties. They are also aware of the need to provide for a hospitable environment, and to provide for a secure one. The problem for managers is that the two concepts of safety and security seem to disconnect with the two concepts of hospitality and friendliness. They have long held that these two sets of concepts conflict with one another, and that they cannot exist in harmony. Managers believe that there is an inherent dilemma in attempting to adequately provide for both sets. If there is a strong and ubiquitous security presence, managers worry that this may impinge upon guests’ peace of mind because this may make an impression upon the guest that an attack is imminent, thus producing feelings of anxiety for the guest.
Consequently, if there is not a strong and visible presence, management risks a higher probability of an incident occurring. In today’s violent world, this may give criminals and more importantly hotel guests, the impression that security is lax, or even non-existent. Theoretically, criminals will feel discouraged by a highly visible security presence. Through this deterrence effect upon criminals, hotel guests should actually feel empowered, comforted and relaxed.

A study was done on 70 hotel managers regarding the concept of guest security. The study found that hotel managers face a perceived contradiction of encouraging guests to use the hotel as a second home, and securing it against a wide range of potential criminal activity. The study concluded that hotel managers encounter an unusual challenge. Due to their strong customer focus and to their perceptions of guests having a desire for privacy, managers were forced to use a range of security tactics that are less intrusive (Gill, Moon, Seaman, & Turbin, 2002). The study also illustrated the complexity of this matter by noting that crimes at a hotel can be committed by hotel guests, employees, or any third party, and that these same groups can be victims of it. For hotels that offer a wide range of venues, such as theaters, conference halls, restaurants, nightclubs, and shops, security duties become even more complex (Gill et al., 2002).

Alan Orlob, vice president of loss prevention for Marriott International, did not allow himself to be fooled by the hotel managers’ perceived dilemma. Even before the September 11, 2001 attacks, his firm had a color-coded threat level scheme in place, similar to the one adopted by the U.S. Homeland Security Department, in the wake of them. After a hotel bombing in Bali, Indonesia, Marriott put its Jakarta location on the highest level. This called for metal detectors, baggage scanners, and vehicle checkpoints. A car containing a bomb was stopped 40 yards from the lobby entrance. Because of this precaution, upon detonation only one guest inside the hotel was killed (Webster, 2004). Mr. Orlob prides himself on these additional security measures.
In the wake of another high profile incident, the Boston Marathon bombings, many hotel brands made adjustments to their security measures. A spokesperson for Starwood Resorts said that they increased security measures at their locations in Boston, New York, and Washington, D.C. Hilton Worldwide issued a statement that said that it increased security at its hotels in the Boston area. Marriott and Wyndham also announced that they increased measures and that they were stressing added vigilance on their employees’ part (DeLollis, 2013).

There is a Las Vegas property whose managers are not so concerned with negative perceptions. The Rio, which is an all-suite hotel with over 1,500 guest rooms, has over 400 closed circuit television cameras, not including the 450 cameras in the gaming area alone (Florence, Eckels, & Knapp, 1996). In addition to the widespread surveillance of the entire property, it employs armed security officers and loss prevention specialists.

Managers there decided that their security officers would carry weapons, in order to provide for the strongest deterrent against crime and violence. They believe that they have achieved a solid deterrence level, since none of its guards has ever needed to draw their firearm. They emphasize that the duties of their officers are overt, and that guards are available for guest escorts to and from the parking lot, and to and from their rooms. They also claim that the presence of firearms helps its employees, especially those who are in charge of handling money in the casino, to feel safe doing so (Florence et al., 1996).

At another Las Vegas property, Robert Baldwin, president of Mirage Resorts is not worried about perceptions either. He said, “Las Vegas hotels are different than hotels in other cities because guests spend 80 percent or more of their time inside the facility. It used to be that cameras were primarily used to watch the money moving. Now, some of our 8,000 closed circuit television cameras are directed at other areas” (Higley, 2002, p. 8).
In the wake of a string of casino robbery incidents in Las Vegas between 1993 and 1994, Tom Triccoli, security director at the Las Vegas Hilton said, “It was a wake-up call. I am a firm believer in the visibility of a security officer, and the only way you get that is by uniforming the guards, instead of using under-cover guards in suits. Our security officers are taught that 99% of their job is in public relations” (Rusting Publications, 1997, p.5).

Before the string of robberies, burglar bars at casino cages were removed in an attempt by management all over town to become more customer-friendly and hospitable. After the incidents, however, the burglar bars went back up, and have since come down once again. As in Las Vegas, some casinos in Atlantic City were not so concerned with image and atmosphere. Bob Bauers, vice president of security for the Trump Plaza Hotel and Casino, said, “While robbery has occurred against individuals, Atlantic City has never experienced any of the organized gang-related attacks that Las Vegas has. Foreseeability is the name of the game in security. We watch and observe what goes on around us” (Rusting Publications, 1997, p. 6).

Security and Risk Assessment in Theory

Michael Hymanson, a certified protection professional (CPP), wrote that all hotels face security risks. He says that if nothing is done to prevent risk, there is an increased likelihood that harm can occur at a hotel property and to its guests. A hotel’s reputation and success is largely based upon the comfort and safety it provides to its guests, he insists. Failure to provide for a safe and secure environment will damage the hotel’s reputation, and this may result in serious financial loss and damages, according to Hymanson (Hymanson, 2013).

Another security expert argues that because the hospitality industry has always adhered to a policy of having an open and welcoming atmosphere, its properties have become soft targets. He draws a parallel of the difficulty of protecting a heavily guarded nuclear power plant, to the
difficulty of protecting a lightly guarded and open facility, such as a hotel property. Hotels fail to succeed in this safety endeavor because they do not employ the most fundamental step of security, which is performing a risk assessment. He acknowledges that this is a complex responsibility, and suggests that hotels hire a professional for this task. He defines risk assessment as a calculation of severity and probability. This includes not only an evaluation of the potential loss of intrinsic assets, but also, the potential harm to guests and other invitees (Clifton, 2012).

This function can be performed by the hotel internally and doing so has some benefit, he says. He offers a very practical example of this by illustrating that each time a security officer approaches someone in the hotel, a mental assessment is being done. He notes that a petite, elderly, or intoxicated woman trying to get her room key to work does not pose the same threat as a tall, muscular, or younger-aged man does. He claims that a simple risk assessment can be performed here, on the spot, by a guard weighing the possibility of an observed person attacking him (being a threat), and the potential harm that person might cause (severity of it). He instructs managers to expand upon this calculation for its various potential threats, and then formalize this for the purpose of creating a documented security plan, which he describes next (Clifton, 2012).

First, the property needs to be divided and categorized. Each segment or venue needs to have its own assessment done, such as the casino, front desk, nightclub, guest rooms, etc. Second, the potential threats of each area should be listed. Third, the severity of those possible threats must be considered through a subjective analysis. Fourth, the probability of those threats needs to be determined through an objective and external research process. The external research will consist of gathering and compiling local crime data, along with any available market incident data. The latter will be achieved through benchmarking their closest competitors. Once
this data is collected, management can determine the likelihood of such a threat actually occurring. He suggests using a Likert Scale from 1-10 for assigning degrees of severity and probability, and then multiplying severity by probability for determining risk. Those threats whose products are highest represent the greatest risks for that property (Clifton, 2012).

Two authors propose that by creating a tourism security theory, several questions can be answered for the industry that can have practical implications. Some questions are: Why do crime, terrorism, war, riot, and civil unrest occur at tourist destinations? What are the perpetrators’ motives? What are the impacts of these incidents on the industry, on the guest, and on the community? How does the general public react to them? How should the private sector and the public sector react? What methods can be used to prevent future security lapses?

A successful theory can provide for explanations and predictions for this tourism security phenomenon, they argue. They define theory as an attempt to explain a particular phenomenon that must predict and explain such a phenomenon, and that it be ultimately testable (Mansfeld & Pizam, 2006).

They elaborate that the ultimate objective of the tourism security theory is to establish a causal relationship between two phenomena. These two phenomena are the elements of hotel incidents, which can consist of crime, riots, and terrorism, and any correlating aspects. These can consist of tourism demand, criminal motives, and victim behavior. They offer an example that says an increased crime rate makes for a decrease in tourists’ visits (Mansfeld & Pizam, 2006).

They say a negative relationship is one where higher crime rates make for fewer tourist visits, and a positive relationship is one where an increased visible presence of uniformed police and security officers makes for an increased feeling of personal security upon guests (Mansfeld & Pizam, 2006).
It is important to note that correlation is not equal to causation. These authors have simply attempted to raise awareness of the possibility of such effects of one phenomenon upon another, in the absence of a quantitative and empirical research study.

Peter Tarlow, president of Tourism & More, spoke at the Tenth Annual Las Vegas Tourism Security and Safety Conference of 2001. In summarizing the event, he suggested that delegates need to employ creative thinking that goes beyond any petty or bureaucratic points, in order to assure travelers of their safety and security. He emphasized that good security is good business, and as the world becomes more intertwined, the roles of security professional and goodwill ambassador will merge (Tarlow, 2002).

Chris McGoey, another certified protection professional (CPP), warns the general public that a hotel or motel room invasion robbery is much like the residential form of an automobile car-jacking, and that it is on the rise. He says that neither police agencies, nor the FBI, track hotel room invasions as a separate crime, and that they will simply categorize these as residential burglaries or robberies. He concludes that because of this, little information is available to the travelling public, in regards to the frequency or location of hotel room crime invasions (McGoey, 2013).

He also warns the industry that hotel security is a growing concern among travelers, worldwide. He points to the negative impact on hotel bookings in the wake of a highly publicized attack on a traveler, in order to illustrate the importance of the security perceptions travelers have. He says that frequent travelers seek a property that has superior security measures and that after visiting a property it is the security features of that property that will determine continued guest loyalty for it (McGoey, 2013).
A pair of experts argues that a security department’s objective is to have a proactive program in place for the prevention of hazards which can hurt, injure, or destroy lives, or property. It is for this purpose alone that laws are passed and security measures are taken, they say. A security department that can brag about the number of arrests and convictions it has made is one that is actually not doing its job properly, they argue (Buzby & Paine, 1976).

Another set of authors agrees that a security program should stress the prevention of security problems, and that it is far more desirable to keep security incidents from happening, than it is to catch a criminal after a crime has been committed (Ellis & Stipanuk, 1996).

One certified protection professional expands on the term of security by introducing the term of protection. She defines protection as shielding someone or something from harm, injury, or destruction. This is achieved only if those who have been assigned this duty become proactive. If one is indeed shielded from harm, then no such harm will be allowed to reach that person or thing being protected. A line of defense, or a protective shield, that decreases the possibility and probability of any danger or harm from reaching that protected one, is necessary, she insists (Newland, 1997).

She qualifies the definition by noting that this does not require attacking a potential perpetrator of harm, just simply surrounding the intended target. There is also no intent of preventing crime, just deterring a criminal from performing it. This deterrence will be achieved by having protective measures in place before a threat actually occurs (Newland, 1997).

She also makes a distinction between protection and enforcement. The former is proactive, in theory; the latter is reactive, in theory. The latter is typically the duty of the municipal police and the public defense, whose mottos and mission statements are “to serve and protect.” But, she argues that this mission is not achieved when there is a response coming after
the fact. No protection has been afforded to someone who has to report a crime. She stresses that the private sector, and the hotel industry, in particular, should approach a situation before it happens. It needs to be proactive, she says (Newland, 1997).

She also offers a hotel protection management model similar to the risk assessment model discussed earlier. The model calls for management to identify assets to be protected, identify threats to those assets, employ countermeasures, develop a protection profile system, and apply management accepted techniques for it. She insists that this can be achieved and instituted without ruining the hospitality image of a hotel (Newland, 1997).

In all fairness, given the fact that police agencies have such a widespread and diverse area to patrol, one must realize the burden in their duty to protect. This is illustrated when they say that the police cannot be everywhere. But, the duties of a private sector security force are much smaller in size and in scope and much more limited, than those of the police. In light of this polarization of duties, it would seem that a private security force has a better chance of accomplishing its missions of protection and of proactivity, than a public force might have.

**Security Design and Practice**

One security expert offers some insight on the corporate organizational structure of hotel security. He says that the corporate security directors of today report directly to senior corporate executives, not to some building engineer, while still acting as liaisons for individual property security managers. This person’s duties include creating policies that act as guidelines; serving as counselor to senior management and to security managers for the efficacy of security; serving as a data center for all divisions in the corporation, and providing for the special security needs of top executives (Beaudry, 1996).
Considering a particular property, this author says that there are no established standards for the various-sized hotels. He does offer some suggestions for the industry. He points out that security departments typically consist of a manager, assistant manager, a shift supervisor, and officers. For a hotel with 300 rooms or less, he recommends 2 to 5 security staff members, and one manager; for hotels with 301-500 rooms, 5 to 10 members, and one manager; for hotels with 501-800 rooms, 10 to 20 staff members, and one manager, one assistant, and some supervisors; for a hotel with 801-1200 rooms, 20 to 30 members, and one manager, one assistant, and one investigator; for hotels with 1201-4000 rooms, 30 or more members, and one manager, one assistant, and one investigator, and for hotels that have over 4,000 rooms, the staff numbers will depend upon the various amenities offered at the property, such as a casino, theater, theme park, nightclub, etc. (Beaudry, 1996).

He also notes that the primary objective of corporate security directors is to learn how to manage opportunities for increasing profit. This is difficult to do because labor, raw material, and overhead cannot be reduced. This task is necessary because until the entire security department achieves this, the department’s own existence will not be perceived by corporate executives as being necessary or legitimate (Beaudry, 1996).

Moving down the corporate ladder, he argues that the most basic function of a security department in any hotel is to perform regular patrols inside and outside. In a random routine patrol, as he refers to it, officers are to serve as a crime deterrent, and are to inspect for any suspicious activity or irregularities that may arise. He emphasizes that this should be done in a randomized fashion, not in a scheduled or structured one. If it is performed via the latter, wise criminals will estimate the next time an officer will pass through, and they will take advantage of this (Beaudry, 1996).
He insists that officers have a second duty of patrol in the lobby area, which should not be randomized, but constant and extended. He claims that its benefits and purposes are to observe suspicious persons, assist guests, and act as a crime deterrent. This will only be achieved through a highly visible presence on the part of officers (Beaudry, 1996). He further illustrates a third patrolling duty officers need to perform, one of fire watch, which will not be discussed for the purpose of this research.

He concludes that the image and reputation of security will be determined primarily through the nature of its contact with hotel guests. If a guest becomes a crime victim, the guest will not only blame security or management, the guest will look to them for empathy, compassion, and answers. He stresses that officers need to have not only policing skills, but also, listening skills because they may serve as a temporary psychologist and friend for a hotel crime victim (Beaudry, 1996).

He also notes that a hotel security department’s reputation and image have external perceptions coming from other hotels, police, courts, the public, travelers, and criminals, themselves. He offers an example of prostitutes knowing which hotels are easy to work in, and which are not (Beaudry, 1996).

In a more concrete example, at a hotel in Miami, the property’s 16 full-time officers were previously dressed in plain clothing with no badges. Crime against the hotel and its guests was on the rise. Thus, the security director there ordered the soft dress code to be changed out for a more high profile one. In just the first 90 days after uniforming the guards, the crime rate there plummeted (Marshall, 1998).
Legal Principles, Obligations, and Consequences

A lack of adequate security can have drastic implications for the innkeeper. Civil negligence jury awards can be extreme. In a high profile case that took place in Las Vegas, a jury awarded $6.7 million to the victim of the U.S. Navy Tailhook sexual harassment scandal. The jury’s reasoning for this was not out of sympathy for the victim, but out of punishment for the defendant, the Las Vegas Hilton. The jury simply stated that 3 security guards were not enough to patrol 5,000 drunken party-goers (Holden, 1994).

Legal experts define negligence as a breach of a legal duty to act reasonably that which results in the direct, or proximate, cause of injury to another party. They put it into laymen’s terms by simply saying that negligence is any carelessness that causes harm, and that businesses need to act reasonably to prevent harms because not doing so qualifies them as being liable (Morris, Cournoyer, & Marshall, 2008).

Duty is commonly defined as an obligation. Acting reasonably is defined as the manner in which a person of average prudence or ordinary sense would act, by using ordinary skill or care. Proximate cause is defined as the direct and immediate cause of any harm (Morris, et al., 2008).

If an injured party proves that this duty existed on the part of the innkeeper towards the injured party, if there was a breach in that duty, and if that breach was the proximate cause for that actual injury, then that party has fulfilled the requirements of starting litigation for a civil negligence lawsuit (Morris et al., 2008).

The greatest duty of care is owed to an “invitee” of the property. All hotel guests are invitees. An invitee is anyone who comes onto the property with a direct or indirect purpose of conducting business there (Morris et al., 2008).
The plaintiff must also show that the harm or injury should have been foreseen by the defendant. If the property is in a high crime area, or if any of its guests or employees were crime victims while on the property, then foreseeability of it exists. However, even in the absence of any on-site criminal incidents, so long as the property is located in a high crime neighborhood, then the principle of foreseeability still qualifies (Morris et al., 2008).

Two authors cite what they call a “landmark and watershed” legal case for the hotel industry. They call it so, not because of the legal precedent set by it, nor for the substantial damage award given by it, but because of the attention produced by it, through the media. The case is titled *Gazilli v Howard Johnson Motor Lodges*, which is commonly known as the “Connie Francis Case” (Ellis & Stipanuk, 1999).

Ms. Francis, who was a successful singer during the 1950’s and 1960’s, was initially awarded $2.5 million in compensation damages for a raping and assault that occurred in her guest room, in which she was the victim. At trial, she proved that management was aware that the locks to the exterior sliding glass door were faulty, and that the hotel experienced four previous crimes, in which access was gained through the same manner that her assailant gained access (Ellis & Stipanuk, 1999). This case may serve as a classic example of the principle of foreseeability, and how management failed in that regard.

This principle does offer some protection for innkeepers, however. It stipulates that innkeepers are not absolute guarantors of well-being for their invitees. So long as management exercises adequate and reasonable security precautions, it has fulfilled its duty towards its invitees. Thus, even if an incident should occur, innkeepers can be released of liability if they can demonstrate that they took all and any reasonable precautions (Morris et al, 2008).
Just as the police cannot guarantee for the absolute safety and protection of the general public from a third party, hoteliers cannot do so for their invitees.

Managers need to know that in a court’s examination of negligent security evidence, it will typically consider the property’s security director, its patrol personnel, its pedestrian access, its lighting, its closed circuit television system, its key controls, or lack of any, or all these (Maggiano, 2013).

Managers also need to consider certain factors for adequate implementation of their security program. These include evidence of prior crimes, frequency of them, crimes of a certain nature, the community’s crime rate, the statistical likelihood of its occurrence in that zone, the property’s design, any reports of suspicious activity, guests’ conduct that may invite crime, guests’ special needs or vulnerabilities, exactly where alcohol is served on the property, the number of non-invitees, and special events hosted on the property (US Legal, 2001).

When tangible loss is suffered by hotel guests, and by the hotel itself, through litigation and compensation, this is normally covered by an insurance policy. But, intangible loss suffered by the hotel brand is not covered by insurance. This loss is difficult to repair and replace. These intangibles come in the form of negative perceptions upon the hotel, not only from crime victims, but from the general public. Thus, the property will suffer a loss in repeater business from that victim, and a loss in any potential new business from many other informed travelers.

There is also the negative impact on human resources to consider. In the event of a crime taking place, especially one where the victim was a hotel worker, it is not unreasonable to assume that the property will experience a dramatic increase in employee turnover, or at minimum, a dramatic decrease in employee morale. Any incident, major or minor, will have a lasting impact. The hospitality industry already suffers from a high turnover rate under normal
conditions. Customers are the primary focus of external marketing management. Employees need to be the primary focus of internal marketing management. The hospitality industry is only as good as the human resources that drive it. Without its human resources, there is no industry.

**Diverse and Intellectual Clientele**

The various hotel brands typically target a particular market sector. Business travelers, whose demographic make-up seems to be more commonly female today, account for a great number of repeat and loyal guests. James Ahearn, director of safety and security at the Sheraton Hotel in St. Louis, says, “We have uniformed officers who patrol the parking lot and who offer to escort lone females to and from the hotel. If they decline, I instruct my officers to follow them anyway, at a discreet distance. We also have a uniformed guard posted at the door, who advises women about the dangers of wandering around town. We pay special attention to the health club and pool because females may be alone or scantily clad there, in order to deter rape. We instruct the house officer to watch for men who enter the elevator after an unescorted female does. The guard will follow her up to make sure that she is okay. We frequently receive compliments from our female guests, who tell us that they feel safe. They even thank us for it” (Rusting Publications, 1996, p. 8).

Michael Loftus, general manager of the Palmer House Hilton of Chicago, said, “Our philosophy about security is simple, we want to be addressing issues before they become issues. For this reason, we prefer to hire security officers with experience in the hotel industry that also have good social skills. Guests, especially business travelers, are becoming more sophisticated and better educated. Their levels of expectation are higher now, and we intend to meet and exceed those” (Rusting Publications, 1996, p.13).
Dick Hudak, corporate director of security for ITT Sheraton, said, “Our philosophy is that security needs to be taken seriously, in order to protect our guests, many of whom are higher educated business travelers, and to protect our employees, as well. Female travelers are a lot more sensitive to hotel security issues, and the courts have raised the level of care for, and the manner in which, a hotel is required to give due diligence regarding security” (Rusting Publications, 1996, p. 14).

ITT Sheraton uses a “Ten Commandments” scheme for security, which was written by Hudak, and is still in use today. The corporation established a worldwide security council comprised of its most experienced security directors. The council awards employees and managers who save a life, who prevent a crime, or who enhance the reputation of ITT Sheraton (Rusting Publications, 1996,).

A security tactic employed by some in the industry years ago included a restriction for women only guest floors. But, Harriett Peterson, senior marketing director for Radisson Hotel Corporation said that this marketing tactic failed. “The female traveler does not want to be isolated. She wants to be treated equally. She just wants security. We offer concierge floors with a high presence that can serve as an open space for women to report suspicious activity,” said Peterson (Rusting Publications, 1996, p.3).

Susan Stoga, corporate public relations manager at Hyatt concurred, “I think men and women are equally concerned about security.” But, Alicia Angone, PR assistant for Hyatt’s Chicago locations, said, “Anything that can offer women a feeling of greater security is always appreciated by our guests. There is enough on their minds when they are on a business trip, without the added stress of worrying about their security” (Rusting Publications, 1996, p.6).
Guests’ Perceptions and Demands

A survey done by *Business Travel News*, in conjunction with Carlson Wagonlit Travel, found that 45% of corporate travel managers plan to write more security specifications into their requests for proposals, 34% plan to conduct more on-site inspections, and 66% said that they would simply walk out of a hotel that did not appear to protect access to its guest rooms (Rustering Publications, 1996).

A survey done by two professors at Virginia Polytechnic Institute found that security and safety measures were amongst 8 of the top 20 most important factors used by managers, consultants, salespeople, and other business travelers, regarding hotel selection. Pamela Weaver, one of those professors said, “Security is something hotels can use in their promotional material, but it is just not being used right now” (Rustering Publications, 1996, p.12).

In a more recent survey done by two UNLV faculty members, security was ranked as the number one factor in meeting efficacy, by meeting planners and attendees. It found that meeting planners strongly agreed that security was a factor in their site selection, site inspection, and final decision making processes. The only time it did not play a major role was in the initial request for proposal stage. It also found that meeting planners strongly agreed when asked if they would be more likely to choose a hotel that had security and safety certifications. They even said that they would be willing to pay more for one that is certified (Hilliard & Baloglu, 2008).

In another study, 900 hotel guests were asked about their security desires and expectations. It found that, on average, the guests were willing to pay 10% above the regular room rate for a hotel that meets their security demands (Feickert, Verma, Plaschka, & Dev, 2006).
It also found that there has been a dramatic rise in the number of female business travelers, and that their primary concern is for good security. It further found that guests under the age of forty were actually more receptive to overt security measures, such as metal detectors and armed guards, than guests over the age of forty (Feickert et al., 2006).

These researchers considered the managers’ dilemma of balancing security and hospitality in their study. They concluded that managers are unnecessarily stressing over this because the results of the survey showed that the presence of armed guards does not produce negative perceptions from guests towards a hotel property (Feickert et al., 2006).

One researcher surveyed nearly 500 passengers at an airport about their perceptions of overt security measures at hotels. The report defined overt as obtrusive physical safety devices, such as metal detectors, baggage checks, and the presence of uniformed guards. It found that only 15% of the respondents would find this to be worrisome, almost 50% found it to be reassuring, 33% found it frightening, and just 13% found it to be discouraging (Rittichainuwat, 2013).

It cited previous research that found travelers having attitudes towards the presence of closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras as unimportant, once an incident occurred, and ineffective in preventing future occurrences (Rittichainuwat & Chakraborty, 2011).

It also cited a study that found CCTV and electronic door locks were regarded as insufficient by guests, in terms of their personal security, in the absence of trained security guards (Enz, 2009).

In regards to the efficacy of CCTV cameras versus the efficacy of visible security guards, one must consider the psychology of criminals. CCTV cameras will not absolutely deter, since criminals can simply wear a baseball cap and sunglasses to disguise themselves. A disguise not
only eliminates any deterrence potential, but also, any enforcement and capturing effects. Someone wearing a disguise, especially upon entering a bank, will certainly be stopped by a security guard, assuming there is one present. If there is not one present, a camera is useless. An on-duty guard will have a much greater deterrence effect on disguised persons than a CCTV camera will, in any venue.

According to the Market Metrix Hotel Index, which gauges customer satisfaction, its study found that while feeling secure is important to all hotel guests, it is especially so amongst those who stay at upper upscale, upscale, and midscale hotels. The presence of hotel security staff and their availability made guests feel more secure. Seeing staff members manning the front door and patrolling the parking lot gave guests a better perception of that property (Barsky & Nash, 2002).

A study exploring the determinant attributes of hotels, and how they differentiate themselves from competitors’ offerings towards traveler purchase intentions was also done. Hotel attributes, which are services and facilities (amenities) offered by a hotel, are commonly perceived to be how travelers choose one property over another. Safety and security were found to be the second most important attribute for travelers in their site selection processes (Atkinson, 1998).

Another study found that security was the most important criteria for hotel selection. It concluded that a security system differentiates one property from its competitors, giving it competitive advantage over them through gaining the trust and confidence of clients (Clow, Garretson, & Kurtz, 1994).
Another study showed that leisure travelers were highly concerned with a hotel’s safety and security in their selection processes, since they normally travel with their entire family, including their children (Knutson, 1998).

It is important to note here that it is not only business and female travelers that have an interest in hotel security. It is also important to realize that these studies were conducted prior to September 11, 2001. This gives rise to the notion that hotel guests are not just concerned with terrorism threats. They are concerned with ordinary crime threats that are typical of a hotel property, such as rape, robbery, burglary, battery, fighting, assault, murder, etc.

A study was also done to explore the gap between hotel security managers’ perceptions towards the importance of security, and guests’ perceptions towards the importance of it. It found that managers are underestimating the importance of this. Out of 32 hotel and safety attributes, only 2, fire prevention and an emergency evacuation plan, were equally matched in importance by both managers and guests. Twenty-four hour uniformed guards were amongst the top five most important attributes selected by hotel guests. The importance of guards was much under perceived by managers (Chan & Lam, 2013).

Industry Psychology and Politics

Everyone likes to feel good about them self. This attitude can derive from religious faith, positive thinking, or anti-cynicism. These feelings of goodwill do not necessarily rise to the level of arrogance. Notions of, “That will never happen to me” may be ones of simple optimism, and not so much of narcissism. In the wake of a crime, in which a hotel guest was the victim, managers may ponder, “Did this incident happen to me or just to someone else?” Certainly, when front desks and casino cages get robbed the answer is yes, directly for managers. But,
when hotel guests are assaulted, battered, raped, robbed, or murdered, the answer is also yes, indirectly for managers.

Any litigation notwithstanding, it is important for managers to understand the implications of an incident. Problems will only get solved by exploring the root cause of them. It is necessary for managers to consider the motivations of criminals and terrorists. While their directly intended target and victim may be the hotel guest, the indirectly intended target and victim is the hotel. Managers need to realize that crimes that are not directly happening to “me” are directly happening to the guest (someone else).

Any such mentality that says “That has never happened to me and never will” may be naïve and dangerous. What is happening to a hotel guest while on the property is indeed happening to hotel managers. Persons on the property produce a vicarious experience for managers. Perhaps, three new authors can better shed some light on this phenomenon.

The attack at the Bali, Indonesia Marriott Hotel was not an attack on the Marriott Corporation, according to two authors. It was an attack on a location where a large number of Western travelers, business persons, and foreign tourists congregated. There was no evidence to indicate that the terrorists intended to damage the corporation. They intended to inflict harm on Westerners visiting a predominately Muslim country. Marriott was an indirect target, not a direct one they say. Yet, because of the damage done, it was still a victim (Halibozek, Jones, & Kovacich, 2008).

The authors provide a more down-home and visceral example. They argue that it does not appear that the airline industry was the intended target of the terrorists who carried out the attacks of September 11, 2001, even though airline assets (airplanes) were used as tools (means) to commit this act. For a victim, this distinction is a petty one, they say. But, for a security
director trying to protect company assets, it is an important one. This can aid in developing and understanding the probability that an incident will occur against the company (Halibozek et al., 2008).

Thus, a direct threat (physical harm) to someone else (hotel guests), is indeed happening to the corporation. These authors argue that it is also important for managers to know whether a threat is direct or indirect because levels of risk may differ between the two, and knowing this will assist security in developing and instituting preventive measures (Halibozek et al., 2008).

Perhaps, this misunderstanding of who is the victim and who is the target contributes to the cognitive dissonance (dilemma) that managers experience in weighing the importance of having a secure environment and the importance of having a welcoming atmosphere.

Another group of researchers raises the issue of invulnerability. They argue that some managers see themselves as incapable of failing, which makes them blind to danger and its symptoms. Their work acknowledges the difficulty in anticipating the unexpected, in light of the infinite number of signals, and the capability of capturing those signals (Rousaki & Alcott, 2006).

They suggest that these barriers of uncertainty can be reduced by increasing the skills and knowledge involved for dealing with crisis situations, and by scanning the environment for possible threats. They recommend thinking through the potential consequences of possible threats, in order to make confident decisions for facing risk. They also realize any potential bureaucracy that may exist in offices at large corporations. It is quite possible that organizations acknowledge potential threats, but just never act upon them. They also note that while certain managers at the corporation may know of a high probability of their firm becoming a target,
others at the organization (higher-ups) may not, or they just simply downplay that probability (Rousaki & Alcott, 2006).

Another pair of researchers highlights the common attitude of industry management towards a security department in general. In their interviews with security managers at high-end hotels in the London area, they found that security is still looked upon by management in the old-fashioned manner as an expense, since it does not bring in revenue. The notion is that since there is no crime on the property, there is no need for a security department. One security manager, however, argues that there may not be any crime on the property because of the presence of the security department (Groenenboom & Jones, 2003).

This manager’s argument may not be invalid. Perhaps, that manager could attempt to prove his point by suggesting to management that it should eliminate the security department, and then test to see if any crime occurs in the wake of its removal. The researchers also found management perceiving overt security measures as a dare or an enticing challenge for potential criminals, thereby inviting them in, and being counter intuitive (Groeneboom & Jones, 2003).

In regards to this perception, it is important to remember that criminals pick on hotels because they are soft, easy, open, and normally unprotected targets. If criminals want to be of the “Lex Luther” mastermind type, then they would go pick on hard, difficult, closed, and normally protected sites, such as Fort Knox.

In order to deter criminal behavior, hotel managers must consider the psychology and motivations of potential criminals. In order to invite legitimate guests, hotel managers must consider the fundamental needs of safety for their guests, along with their desires of hospitality.
PART THREE

Introduction

According to a recent strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) analysis, done for the Ritz-Carlton hotel chain, its most notable weakness may have been a security concern for a suicide bombing that occurred on July 17, 2009. The bullet point acknowledges that this incident lingers on the minds of its customers (“Free Swot Analysis,” 2010).

Perhaps, it most notable threat was a bullet point that identified a security threat due to terrorism. In its opportunities section, perhaps the most interesting bullet point was to improve and promote the security arrangements of its hotels (“Free Swot Analysis”, 2010).

According to an article published in USA Today, hotels in India will be in danger of losing their star rating if they do not institute security measures mandated by the Indian government implemented on the second anniversary of the terrorist attacks at the Oberoi and Taj Mahal Palace Hotels (DeLollis, 2010).

The Indian Ministry of Tourism required hotels with three or more stars to install specific equipment for securing their properties, and the executive director with that office said that the safety of guests needs to figure into the priority list of hotels that wish to retain their star classification, since security is of prime importance (DeLollis, 2010).

Methodology

It is necessary to note that many of the opinions that were presented in this article were those of stakeholders in the security industry. Certainly, those stakeholders in the security business have something to sell or promote. However, this perceived conflict of interest does not necessarily disqualify them for any objective and expert analysis on the current state of the hotel industry, or to any perceived threats towards it.
An investigation of 12 major multinational hotel/resort firms was conducted of their corporate websites, in order to determine if these companies post a security mission statement to the public. Those twelve firms were Marriott International, Hilton, Hyatt, Best Western, Intercontinental, Starwood, Choice, Wyndham, MGM International, Caesars Entertainment, Wynn Resorts, and Las Vegas Sands.

Results

Only 3 of the 12 multinationals had posted a security mission statement, or policy, for hotel guests on their websites. This is not to be construed as any the other nine not having some form of empirical security measures in place, but simply as failing to market this concept. It should also not be construed that the three firms who had something posted necessarily promote, advertise, or market their security programs with an intention of gaining a competitive advantage. The three firms that posted something were Marriott, Wyndham, and Hyatt.

Marriott’s statement said that it understands and appreciates that today’s travelers are more concerned than ever about their safety and security, and that security has always been one of its top priorities (Marriott News, 2012).

It goes on to say that security measures and risk assessments are reviewed often, and that staff has been trained to assess and respond appropriately to threatening situations. It also states that the corporation works with the U.S. Department of State for establishing security protocol, and that each of its hotels works closely with local, state, federal, and international authorities (Marriott News, 2012).

Marriott also published lists titled, “Guest safety tips” and “Safety tips for traveling with children,” courtesy of The American Hotel & Lodging Association. It was the only one of the three to do so. The ten guest safety tips were as follows: Do not answer your door without
identifying who it is, and if it is someone claiming to be a hotel employee, call the front desk to confirm it; notify the front desk if you have lost your key; while inside your room use all the door locks; make sure all connecting and sliding glass doors are locked; do not invite strangers to your room; do not display cash or jewelry in public; use the in-room safe; during late hours stay in well-lighted areas, and use the main entrance only; be aware of all emergency exits; report any suspicious activity (American Hotel & Lodging Association, 2003).

The ten safety tips for travelling with children were as follows: Be aware of their location at all times, and ensure that they are properly supervised during your absence; help them recognize persons to ask for help; have them check-in with you regularly; instruct them to refuse anything that makes them feel uncomfortable; teach them to use the hotel house phones and to avoid strangers; make sure they know in case of emergency (ICE) information; show them emergency exit routes, and tell them to remain calm; instruct them not to open the guestroom door for anyone at all, including hotel staff; if the phone rings while they are in the room all alone, teach them to say that you are in the bathroom; in case of an emergency request help from a staff member (AH & LA, 2005).

Hyatt’s statement said that its hotels consider guest comfort and security to be a priority, and that it is committed to creating an environment of well-being and security. It goes on to list proactive security measures in place at each hotel. They include: Trained hotel staff with duties of security and well-being for guests, advanced technology systems of surveillance and locks, rigorous security and safety assessments, dedicated fire/life/safety systems monitoring, and comprehensive emergency response plans, in which staff is regularly trained for (Hyatt Corporation, 2013).
Wyndham’s statement was simply one that detailed an optional safe warranty program for anyone using the in-room safe. The program, which is called “Safemark,” provides for recourse of up to $5,000 in case the safe is broken into. The fee for the program is automatically billed to the guest, and for those who do not use the safe the fee is deducted upon checkout. In case of a burglary incident, a police report and documentation of all the stolen valuables, including proof of ownership, is necessary (Wyndham Hotels, 2013). No other information about security or any mission statement was apparent on its website.

While Marriott’s posting appeared to have been the most comprehensive, from the perspective of a hotel guest, its marketing and promotion of it was not so evident, from the perspective of a random user. In order to retrieve this information, one must click-on the news media selection and the actually type in the term “security statement,” or something of that nature, in the upper right hand corner search bar, which is not so visible to the user.

A likewise procedure needed to be done on Wyndham’s website. On Hyatt’s website, there was an independent click-on selection titled “security and safety.” However, it was inconspicuously placed at the very bottom of its webpage. These oversights and omissions invite a detailed discussion of the concept of strategic marketing.

**Case Questions**

In light of the due diligence performed by the hotel industry towards efforts of marketing its products and services (amenities), which the industry perceives as producing tangible and intangible benefit for itself, why has it not generally performed that diligence on visible security, and exploit it as a potential marketing amenity? Does the industry seem to think that security does not qualify as an amenity for its customers? Is security still perceived by the industry to be a just a necessary expense? Do certain hotel firms not have any visible security measures in place?
Case Discussion

Some in the marketing industry wish to distinguish between strategic marketing and marketing management. They define strategy as the creation of a unique and valuable position in choosing activities that are different from competitors, whereas, if there were only one ideal position for the industry, then there would be no need for it (Lewis & Chambers, 2000).

This work emphasizes that competitive strategy is about being different, and that strategic competition is a process for perceiving new positions that bring new customers into the market. They note that new positions open or close, through environmental changes, or through omissions and avoidances by the competition. They elaborate on how strategy is a function of the differences on the supply side and the demand side of each, although strategic positioning often accommodates any differences on the demand side (Lewis & Chambers, 2000).

These authors illustrate how Southwest Airlines uses competitive strategy to its advantage. The airline not only performs differently, but it performs different things. The airline does well, from a business perspective, because it creates a “fit” for itself. Fits make for uniqueness, and those fits lock out the competition, by creating a chain that is as strong as its weakest link. They say that this airline performs well in regards to customer attraction and retention because it sticks what it does best, and it keeps its promises to its customers. Most of all, it offers a unique amenity, which is its “bags fly for free” program. This is what sets it apart from its competition, giving it an advantage (Lewis & Chambers, 2000).

Certainly, just as airlines cannot promise that their planes will not crash, or that passenger baggage will not be lost, hotels cannot promise that their properties will not be targeted by terrorists, or that their guests will not be victimized by criminals. Security is not a new concept
for the hotel industry, but its failure in promoting it can present an opportunity for its marketing departments. This invites a discussion for reactive versus proactive marketing.

Reactive strategy is defined simply as a response to a competitor’s action; proactive strategy is defined as a preemptive effort to gain a competitive advantage (Bojanic & Reid, 2006). Proactive strategy for the manufacturing sector consists of research and development, and for the service sector, it can also. Determining the needs and wants of customers, and then designing products and services to meet those, is how the Ritz-Carlton chain brand received the Malcolm Baldridge National Quality Award for its attempts at meeting customer needs (Bojanic & Reid, 2006).

It solicited input not only from customers, but also, from employees and vendors on how to deliver high quality service to its customers. This innovative research method was considered to be trend-setting, since employees can be an excellent source of input, especially when it comes to security. The Ritz-Carlton brand is Marriott’s luxury line. Clever and ambitious criminals most likely will prey on a hotel property where wealthy guests stay. Almost all of the multinationals researched here operate a luxury brand name.

Hotel employees everywhere are often cross-trained for security duties. They are sometimes even victims of crime themselves, while on the job. Yet, cross-training hotel employees into security responsibilities may not be very strategic. Not only will an incident take them away from their prescribed duties, it will take them out of that friendly, inviting, and welcoming context that hospitality associates need to remain in. This puts hotel management back at its perceived dilemma of security versus hospitality. These security duties must be delegated to a distinct job position, or should be simply outsourced.
From a practical perspective, a uniformed security guard will certainly have much greater success in diffusing a potentially violent situation, than some bellboy or housemaid will. The uniform and visible weapons that guards carry can make for a much more intimidating and discouraging factor for those persons having sinister intentions.

Moreover, putting a general hotel employee in a dangerous situation may not only result in potential physical harm for them, but psychological harm, as well. This may have a detrimental effect upon employee retention, should they be harmed in any way. Should they decide to stay on, their morale may be affected. As noted earlier, bad publicity can exist internally. This invites a discussion for public relations.

Publicity has been referred to as a tool of public relations, and public relations as a tool of marketing. The marketing gimmick used by the tourism industry of Las Vegas has been “What happens here stays here.” It is world renowned. But, when crime happens here, it does not stay here. Unfortunately, it usually makes national headlines. During 2013, there was a fiery crash at the corner of Las Vegas Boulevard and Flamingo Road, which left casualties. There was a shooting just outside Drai’s Nightclub, which left one casualty. There was an allegation by the U.S. Justice Department against Caesars Entertainment for money laundering. Caesars was also forced to pull out of a new development because of alleged criminal mafia ties towards its partner. All of these events made national news. Publicity can be good or bad, although it usually seems to be sensationalized in the latter instance.

A practical and updated definition of public relations concerns the marketing of it. This has been described as the process of planning, executing, and evaluating programs that encourage purchase and consumer satisfaction, through credible communication of information
and impressions that identify companies and their products with the needs, wants, concerns, and interests of consumers (Kudrle & Sandler, 1995).

In light of the two legal setbacks for Caesars, and the fact that the homicide took place at Bally’s, which is one of its properties, it is no wonder that its stock price took a fall in the wake of all this. It is not unreasonable to suggest that its public relations were negatively impacted by these incidents. Although Bally’s does have uniformed security guards, through observation it was learned that they are not armed. As noted earlier, security is not advertised by the Caesars Corporation on its website.

According to the SWOT analysis theory, what is deemed to be an internal weakness of an organization can be perceived to be an opportunity for a competitor, or any other external party. The lack of armed guards at Bally’s may have provided encouragement for the murder assailant. SWOT implications do not just exist solely within an industry; they can exist outside of it, in society.

Because hotels are places of public accommodation, it is difficult for them to hide their internal weaknesses. Most of all, it is difficult for them to conceal incidents of adversity. What happens inside a hotel will become public knowledge. Thus, what happens in Las Vegas does not stay here. Perhaps, it is time for the Las Vegas Convention and Visitors Authority to rethink its own marketing gimmick.

Yet, this unfortunate incident at the Bally’s property can present an opportunity for its competitors, without them becoming unethical. The competition does not need to sensationalize this incident. It can simply advertise itself as a property “with visible and present security measures.” As noted in the literature review, the Rio Suites Resort management prides itself on having armed security guards, which are highly visible and available for customer escorts.
Managers there also pride themselves on their guards never having to draw their weapons. It is not unreasonable to assume that the presence of armed guards is making for a positive and significant effect upon criminal deterrence. Yet, the general public is not so privy to The Rio’s security philosophy. Travelers to Las Vegas never seem to say, “The Rio is the safest hotel in town to stay at.”

Pride derives from one’s reputation. Rio’s reputation for being a safe place may not exist. This is not because it is not a safe place empirically or statistically. This is because it is not commonly perceived to be as one. Management there seems to have failed in marketing and exploiting the good news of its guards never having to draw their weapons. This internal pride ought to be exploited externally.

It does not require an incident, weakness, or a mistake at, or by the competition, for an organization to gain a competitive advantage. This can be achieved, in part, by cleverly transposing negative risk assessments into positive ones. A proactive approach to public relations would apply here. This method requires using the public relations tools of news events, publications, community relations, and corporate social responsibility (LaTour, 2008).

Proactive public relations are not a single technique, but a process. Waiting for an incident to occur, and then attempting to save face, is an example of reactive public relations. The public only seems to hear from an organization’s public relations department in the wake of a crisis situation. This is where business and marketing management can falter. This invites another topic for discussion, which is crisis management.

It has been argued that crisis prevention is the best method of crisis management. It is what fire prevention is to firefighting. It is defined as the examination of organizational operations under threat based scenarios in order to find and fix operational and communications
weaknesses (Bernstein, 2011). This differs from risk assessment in that the underlying purpose here is external, via marketing and communications. In a risk assessment the underlying purpose is internal, via loss prevention and asset control.

A definition of crisis is also necessary. It is a fluid and dynamic state of affairs containing equal parts of danger and opportunity; a turning point for better or worse (Fink, 2013). The term opportunity is noteworthy here.

A definition for crisis management is also in order. It is the managing of a precarious incident that is rapidly unfolding by making swift and vigilant decisions, gathering resources, and marshaling troops while under great stress and enormous time constraints to resolve a pressing problem, with the hope of gaining the upper hand over an event that could possibly cause great harm to a company, its various publics, its employees, its stakeholders, and its bottom line. It is the reality of what is happening, the management of drama, the attempt to prevent the situation from escalating, and the steps taken by management to determine the ultimate outcome of a crisis (Fink, 2013). The most noteworthy terms here are publics, employees, and stakeholders.

A definition for crisis communications is also warranted. It is the managing of the perceptions of this same reality by telling the public what is happening, shaping public opinion, or just telling the public what you want them to know. Crisis communications is what the public remembers, and that when it comes down to a battle between perception and reality, perception will always win (Fink, 2013). Note the author’s emphasis for the aspect of perception. This invites a discussion for organizational perception management (OPM).
OPM is defined as actions that are designed and carried out by organizational spokespersons to influence audiences’ perceptions of an organization as an entity, or as a whole (Elsbach, 2006).

Existing research on OPM traditionally categorized it into its three components of image, reputation, and identity, and described all three as interchangeable. But, new research draws distinctions for these three.

Regarding image, OPM suggests that this is the current and temporary perception of an organization, held by internal or external audiences, in terms of the fit that an organization has with concepts of legitimacy, consistency, trustworthiness, and correctness (Elsbach, 2006).

Regarding reputation, OPM says that this is the enduring status classification for the quality of an organization, as it is perceived by external audiences and stakeholders. This differs from image by its nature and endurance, and by its focus upon status, as perceived by outsiders. Reputation is also more general than image, which is normally specific (Elsbach, 2006).

Regarding identity, OPM says that it is also enduring, but, it is mutable. Identity can be both specific and general, and it can involve both status and distinctiveness. It is best conceived through the question posed by the internal audience that asks who exactly they are (Elsbach, 2006).

Some researchers insist that an organization cannot change its identity overnight, even if it conducts a clever advertising campaign. Because identities are culture based within the organization, it will be difficult to convince employees to deliver on new promises that management proposes, even if it is possible to change the expectations of customers with such great speed and success (Hatch & Schultz, 2008).
Other researchers argue that OPM is necessary to create a stream of information to the greatest degree possible, in order to raise public awareness for an organization, and that an organization’s image is the direct reflection of the public’s perception of it. These perceptions arise from exactly what the public knows about an organization (Marconi, 1996).

It is necessary to realize and understand that these stakeholders are not only comprised of investors, customers, employees, but also of criminals. The purpose and intent of marketing and advertising is to target a particular audience. This is most commonly conceived as targeting those persons that an organization wants on their premises (customers). Advertising and marketing need to also target those persons that an organization does not want on their premises (criminals).

Omissions in advertising do not work to an organization’s advantage, even in those in a negative context. Criminals are a vibrant and enduring market segment that should not be avoided. Marketing needs to play offense and defense. No sports team (organization) will ultimately succeed by solely concentrating on offense. An omission by the defense (hotel) will provide for opportunities and ideas for the offense (criminal).

Just because an organization markets or advertises its high security, this does not mean that it must reveal the actual methods or logistics of it. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) advertises that it deploys air marshals on board flights. For national and organizational security reasons, it cannot and should not, disclose how many agents it employs, or which flights they will be on. Since the creation of the TSA, security has become highly visible at airport terminals, and airline passenger traffic has actually increased. The airlines are busier now that they were on September 10, 2001.

Imagine if the U.S. government had taken a proactive approach towards security, and the marketing of it, prior to September 11, 2001. Maybe some 3,000 lives would not have been lost.
on that terrible day in history. In all fairness, it is too easy to criticize in retrospect, and all of the blame for this tragedy certainly does not fall upon the U.S. government.

It is fair and important for hotel managers to realize that the airline industry is also a major player in the hospitality field. It can be legitimately regarded as the feeder for the lodging industry. Almost all airline passengers become hotel guests at some point in their journey, and before doing so they are subject to obtrusive security measures. They are delayed and highly inconvenienced at the airport security checkpoint. They are forced to remove their shoes, belts, coats, cellphones, and jewelry. They are patted-down, x-rayed, and questioned. Their purses and totes are sometimes searched, or even dumped out for the entire viewing public to see all of their personal items.

These very obtrusive and highly visible security procedures force the passengers to “steel” themselves. They cannot be concerned with their self-image, identity, or reputation. All perceptions of themselves, and of the airport security procedures, have no realistic application there, whatsoever. If a passenger fails to heed to all of these invasive procedures, then they will simply not be allowed on board the airplane. They realize this and they accept it.

It is quite evident, then, that one of the biggest players in the hospitality industry (airlines) has customers that are subject to highly visible and obtrusive security measures. In light of this, one would think that airline managers would also perceive a dilemma of hospitality versus security. Evidently, the airline managers are not. Even if they are, such a perceived dilemma is having no empirical effect upon passenger volume.

Since the majority of hotel guests are airline passengers, hotel managers’ worries for their guests having feelings of anxiety produced by a highly visible security force may be unfounded.
These guests have already steeled themselves at the airport. It is not unfair to assume that they will be immune to any perceived anxieties produced by a visible hotel security force.

While not all hotel guests arrive by air travel, for those who do not, it is highly unlikely that they have never flown at least once in the wake of September 11, 2001. Airport security notwithstanding, for anyone who was old enough to cognize the events of that day, it is seems inconceivable that they have not steeled themselves somehow since then.

A study was done regarding the importance of passport or photo identification check-in at airports and at hotels. It found that these two measures were perfectly on par with one another from the perspective of travelers (Rittichainuwat & Chakraborty, 2012).

These findings may buttress the point that travelers carry along their perceived and practiced security protocols from the airport to the hotel. The study even suggested that travelers expect to be screened at a hotel. Travelers understand that a photo identification requirement at the hotel’s front desk protects them from fraudulent claims of lost keys or lock-outs by a criminal. Given the fact that the first night’s hotel stay has been already charged to the guests’ credit card, it may not be unfair to assume that guests would want to be protected by a request for identification upon arrival, just as they wish to be protected by it at the airport, since their seat has been already paid for.

Conclusion

It seems as though that security protocols are not only a perceived expectation on the part of travelers, but are routine for them. If there is no dilemma of security versus hospitality in the airline industry, one may wonder how or why a dilemma should exist in the hotel industry. If travelers wish to be safe in their means of travel, they certainly would wish to be safe in their
ends of it. A hotel room is a traveler’s home away from home, and everyone has a reasonable expectation and desire to feel and to be safe, in their homes.

It is also necessary to note that some hotels use plainclothes and undercover officers. In the absence of a uniform, identification, or badge, a hotel guest may be in doubt of that person’s authenticity when approached by them. This can produce a dilemma, per se, not just for the accosted hotel guest, but for hotel management. It also presents a situation of being reactive instead of proactive. It defeats the theory of deterrence and its purpose of protection. Managers may then revert back to the psychology of acting after the fact, which is counterintuitive for this.

According to the SWOT analysis theory, crisis management theory, and the public relations theory, threats, adversities, and omissions can all be construed and transposed into opportunities. Those in the marketing management fields who are wise enough to understand this will be clever enough to exploit this.

It is a dangerous world. But, danger need not come in the form of some terrorist attack. It can come in the form of an ordinary fist fight. All human induced violence is subject to the deterrence theory and method. Deterrence is not only a proactive form of security; it is a proactive form of marketing. The entire intent of marketing is to achieve a competitive advantage. The concept of marketing emphasizes customer values. Surely, travelers do value their own personal safety and security, and that of their familial travel companions.

**Recommendations for Future Research**

This has been an exploratory exercise in purely qualitative research. No empirical studies were performed here, nor any statistical analyses done. Perhaps, quantitative experiments can be conducted which employ at least two hotels with like crime data in proximity of one another. If they both have on-site visible security, then one can have its force eliminated to serve as a
stimulus, with the intent of determining the effects of deterrence. Or, if neither have on-site and visible security, then a force can be introduced at one property to serve as the experiment’s stimulus, with the other property serving as the control group, in either instance.

Perhaps, another study can be performed of two like competitors in proximity of one another, who do not currently advertise their security as an amenity, but do have an on-site force and similar crime data. An entry can be made to one of the firm’s websites that noticeably advertises its security. After a period of time, the resulting crime data can be compared to see if there was any impact. More importantly, hotel occupancy rates can be compared to determine if there was an effect upon customer selection in the wake of this website posting.

A focus group of regular hotel guests, business travelers, and of meeting planners can be assembled to gain their inputs and perceptions on hotels with visible security versus those without. They can also be asked whether they deem security to be a necessary amenity, and whether it factors into their property selection processes.

A pretest-posttest can also be performed on hotel managers with this article serving as a stimulus. This can help to determine whether this research had any psychological or empirical effect upon themselves, upon their organization, upon their management philosophy, upon their perceptions, upon their properties, upon their visitor statistics, or upon their marketing approaches.
References

http://www.ahla.com/uploadedFiles/AHLA/information_center/travelers_tips_1.pdf

Retrieved from 


Hotel & Restaurant Administration Quarterly 29(2), 12-14.

Hotel & Motel management 217(16), 20.

Hotel & Restaurant Administration Quarterly 29(2), 12-14.


