Award Date

1-1-1992

Degree Type

Thesis

Degree Name

Master of Arts (MA)

Department

Economics

First Committee Member

Thomas M. Carroll

Number of Pages

39

Abstract

This thesis presents the development of a demand equation for symphony orchestras and a three equation, simultaneous model examining factors which influence nonprofit executive compensation. Results from the demand equation demonstrate that nonprofit orchestras operate in the inelastic portion of the demand curve. Thus, ticket sales generate negative marginal revenues and attendance is increased at the expense of profit. If total revenue is less than total cost, the orchestra must be subsidized by contributions from private and public sectors. The compensation model indicates that salary is positively correlated with the ability to increase contributions and improve organizational quality. Therefore, administrators seeking to enhance income and marketability would do well to focus their energies on these two critical areas. Additionally, private contributions and quality respond positively to executive pay. Organizations seeking to enhance their reputation by increasing their level of service will bid up the salary of superior managers.

Keywords

Compensation; Determinants; Executive; Nonprofit; Orchestras; Organizations; Salary; Study; Symphony

Controlled Subject

Economics; Economics; Management

File Format

pdf

File Size

1290.24 KB

Degree Grantor

University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Language

English

Permissions

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Identifier

https://doi.org/10.25669/063q-ugox


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