Stalemates in Bilateral Bargaining
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
1-1-2017
Publication Title
Mathematical Social Sciences
Abstract
In this paper, we develop bilateral bargaining models in which bargainers have an outside option that provide conditions for a stalemate to occur. We provide game theoretic motivations for bargainer behavior by developing their respective decisions as a result of utility maximization problems. The respective utility maximization problems are impractical for an analysis of the conditions for stalemates to occur. Thus, a system of difference equations is used to describe bargainer counteroffers. The descriptive model provides numerous conditions for stalemates to occur. It also provides a detailed description of the equilibrium in other cases.
Keywords
Stalemates in Bilateral Bargaining
Language
eng
Repository Citation
Muleshkov, A. S.,
Sweat, K. R.
(2017).
Stalemates in Bilateral Bargaining.
Mathematical Social Sciences