When Do Scientific Explanations Compete? Steps Toward A Heuristic Checklist

Authors

Todd E. Jones, University of Nevada, Las VegasFollow
Michael G. Pravica, University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

1-6-2016

Publication Title

Metaphilosophy

Volume

48

Issue

1-2

First page number:

96

Last page number:

122

Abstract

It's not uncommon for scientists to give different explanations of the same phenomenon, but we currently lack clear guidelines for deciding whether to treat such accounts as competitors. This article discusses how science studies can help create tools and guidelines for thinking about whether explanations compete. It also specifies how one family of discourse rules enables there to be differing accounts that appear to compete but don't. One hopes that being more aware of the linguistic mechanisms making compatible accounts appear to compete will prevent people from wasting resources trying to show which account is right.

Repository Citation

Jones, T. E., Pravica, M. G. (2016). When Do Scientific Explanations Compete? Steps Toward A Heuristic Checklist. Metaphilosophy, 48(1-2), 96-122.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/meta.12226