Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
First Committee Member
Jonathan R. Strand
Second Committee Member
Third Committee Member
Fourth Committee Member
Number of Pages
As global environmental problems have received more attention in the international arena, questions of global environmental governance have become more salient. The increase of international and multilateral environmental agreements has raised questions about participation, compliance, and ultimately, effectiveness of these institutions. Consequently, this dissertation seeks to understand what factors affect participation in and compliance with international environmental agreements. Specifically, I find that treaty design plays a critical role in levels of participation. Using both qualitative and quantitative analysis, I also examine the case of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) as a case study, and find that contextual domestic and international factors largely affect compliance, but that state capacity seems to be a driving force in compliance and participation. Finally, I develop a theory of institutional dissonance to explain the inconsistencies that sometimes occur in the perceptions of states and actors both within and between international institutions, but also between theory and practice.
CITES; environmental agreements; institutional dissonance; international environmental governance; international organization; treaty design
Environmental Health and Protection | Environmental Law | International Relations
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Masaki, Erika Komura, "Institutional Dissonance and Reserved Cooperation: Theory and Evidence from International Environmental Agreements" (2018). UNLV Theses, Dissertations, Professional Papers, and Capstones. 3287.
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