Defending Representation Realism

Document Type

Book Section

Publication Date

10-12-2021

Publication Title

What are Mental Representations?

Publisher

Oxford University Press

Edition

1

First page number:

54

Last page number:

78

Abstract

The representations that are invoked by theorists and researchers in cognitive science allow for a variety of different ontological interpretations. Along with both straightforward realist and eliminativist positions, there are various forms of deflationism. Deflationist accounts deny that the explanatory value or even accuracy of representational theories depends upon the existence of objectively real structures or states that play a representational role in the brain. Alternatively, many deny the existence of any sort of representational content that is objectively real and independent of our explanatory goals or interpretative activities. This chapter argues that this sort of representational deflationism doesn’t really work. After spelling out what a robust sort of realism does or does not entail, the chapter offers some general reasons for thinking realism is preferable to deflationism. Then it looks at three versions of deflationism and argues that all three either fail to capture our scientific practice, or collapse into a more straightforward sort of realism or eliminativism.

Keywords

Content; Deflationism; Eliminativism; Fictionalism; Instrumentalism; Intentional gloss; Mechanism; Realism; Representation

Disciplines

Psychology | Social and Behavioral Sciences | Theory and Philosophy

Language

English

UNLV article access

Search your library

Share

COinS