On Moral Ignorance and Mistakes of Fact: a Response to Harman
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
1-10-2020
Publication Title
Philosophia
First page number:
1
Last page number:
8
Abstract
Moral ignorance is always blameworthy, but “failing to realize” that P when you have sufficient evidence for P is sometimes exculpatory, according to Elizabeth Harman (2017). What explains this alleged puzzle? Harman (2017) leaves this an open question. In this article, a solution is offered.
Keywords
Blame; Moral ignorance; Consequentialism
Disciplines
Philosophy
Language
English
Repository Citation
Abbate, C. E.
(2020).
On Moral Ignorance and Mistakes of Fact: a Response to Harman.
Philosophia
1-8.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00163-8