Ruling Divided: Disagreement, Issue Salience, and Portfolio Allocation

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

1-26-2017

Publication Title

Party Politics

Volume

24

Issue

6

First page number:

640

Last page number:

651

Abstract

Issue salience and ideological disagreement often predict coalition government behavior. However, research on portfolio allocation has yet to fully specify the complex relationship between issue salience, disagreement, and coalition negotiations. Scholars treat issue salience and disagreement as distinct and disconnected, despite evidence that they work together and with conditional effects in a range of settings. Following a logic of portfolio trades or “logrolls,” we propose that the relative salience of issues and disagreements at the issue level within the coalition both moderate the effect of issue salience on portfolio allocation. Using data drawn from the Parliamentary Democracy Data Archive, we find compelling evidence for our theory that links party manifestos to portfolio allocation. Consistent with a story on the conditional effect of salience and disagreement, we find evidence that the effect of salience is mitigated by the extent of disagreement between coalition parties.

Keywords

Coalition governance; Issue disagreement; Issue salience; Most salient; Portfolio allocation

Disciplines

American Politics

Language

English

UNLV article access

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